tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca-fr/topics/the-gambia-32990/articlesThe Gambia – La Conversation2024-01-19T09:44:01Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2211532024-01-19T09:44:01Z2024-01-19T09:44:01ZWhat is genocide? Six western countries want a broader application of the law – experts unpack why it matters<p>In November 2023, six western states filed a <a href="https://icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/178/178-20231115-wri-01-00-en.pdf">joint application</a> before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) arguing for an ample and expansive understanding of genocide. This intervention, as it is legally termed, was made by Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK in relation to the genocide case The Gambia filed against Myanmar in 2019. The still on-going case revolves around the <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmar-charged-with-genocide-of-rohingya-muslims-5-essential-reads-128742">violent expulsion of Rohingya</a> people from Myanmar into Bangladesh.</p>
<p>Our research focus is on international law and transitional justice. Our view is that the intervention is interesting and significant, both because of how it interprets past genocide cases, and in terms of what this could mean for the ICJ’s future determinations regarding states’ commission of genocide. </p>
<h2>Consolidating genocide law</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-what-the-term-genocide-means-under-international-law-podcast-218844">Genocide</a> concerns the destruction of a people. It is called <a href="https://legal.un.org/avl///pdf/ls/Schabas_outline.pdf">“the crime of crimes”</a> because of its collective significance; it diminishes our humanity. The Genocide Convention, which grew out of the horrors of the <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/the-holocaust">Holocaust</a>, was introduced in 1948 and has since been <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide-convention.shtml">joined by 153 states</a>. Its <a href="https://theconversation.com/both-israel-and-palestinian-supporters-accuse-the-other-side-of-genocide-heres-what-the-term-actually-means-217150">definition of genocide</a> requires the demonstration of an intent to destroy a group in whole or in part. The Genocide Convention addresses states, which can either carry out or refrain from genocidal policies. It was <a href="https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2024-01-12/icj-israel-south-africa-genocide-case-gaza-civilians">designed to prevent genocide</a> and should be forward-looking. </p>
<p>The ICJ, which hears claims between states, has only decided two genocide cases to date, and has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/11/icj-case-against-israel-could-finally-empower-the-genocide-convention">never held a state responsible</a> for genocide. This has contributed to discussions of the Genocide Convention as a “<a href="https://theconversation.com/genocide-70-years-on-three-reasons-why-the-un-convention-is-still-failing-108706">failure</a>”. </p>
<p>While the ICJ’s record is sparse, there are many genocide findings produced by international criminal courts in cases against individuals. For example, the <a href="https://ijrcenter.org/international-criminal-law/ictr/case-summaries/akayesu/">Akayesu case</a> before the International Tribunal for Rwanda found a Rwandan major guilty of genocide in relation to sexual violence. And the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia found several individuals guilty of genocide in relation to the 1995 massacre of 8,000 Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica. </p>
<p>This law is developed not under the Genocide Convention but rather through international criminal law. International criminal courts have produced far-reaching and inclusive definitions of the kinds of violent crime that can constitute genocide. This is the jurisprudence that the joint intervention consolidates to argue for a more expansive construction of genocide than the ICJ has so far employed.</p>
<p>The joint intervention makes three key interpretive points. First, genocide concerns “destruction”, which need not be death. Indeed, the Genocide Convention itself recognises that killing is not a necessary aspect of genocide and that other forms of violence may also be genocidal. </p>
<p>Second, the joint intervention examines how sexual and gender-based crime can contribute to a finding of genocide. It connects these crimes both to the intent standard in the crime of genocide, as well as to the group destruction standard.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/genocide-70-years-on-three-reasons-why-the-un-convention-is-still-failing-108706">Genocide: 70 years on, three reasons why the UN Convention is still failing</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Finally, the joint intervention argues that the threshold for how genocide is constituted should be lowered when considering crimes against children. These crimes affect an individual for the rest of their life, defining entire generations. It also matters that children are more vulnerable than adults, and therefore easier to harm or to kill. The joint intervention reasons: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Given the significance of children to the survival of all groups, evidence of harm to children may contribute to an inference that the perpetrators intended to destroy a substantial part of the protected group.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In legal terms, the joint intervention is progressive because it draws from existing case law to show patterns in how genocide can be established. These legal conversations are part of how jurisprudence develops and can be integral to judicial decision making. In political terms, the joint intervention is enterprising because it may lock the six states into a more ample understanding of genocide. This is because one of the characteristics that distinguish law from politics is its relative stability of meaning.</p>
<p>Therefore the joint intervention suggests ways the ICJ can apply genocide jurisprudence to better realise the Genocide Convention’s forward-looking mandate. </p>
<h2>Significance beyond The Gambia v Myanmar</h2>
<p>The Genocide Convention makes all states that are parties to it responsible for the prevention of genocide anywhere in the world. Before The Gambia’s 2019 case against Myanmar, however, this “erga omnes” jurisdictional mandate had never been realised. The Gambia’s case against Myanmar <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-gambias-plea-for-the-rohingya-matters-for-international-justice-129365">is the first time</a> that the Genocide Convention has been raised not by states in conflict with each other, but rather between two unrelated states. The alleged genocide does not target The Gambia or its citizens. </p>
<p>The collective responsibility signalled by erga omnes jurisdiction is why the six states were allowed to intervene in The Gambia v Myanmar. This is also why South Africa, in its recent case against Israel alleging genocide in Gaza, characterised its actions as <a href="https://icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240111-ora-01-00-bi.pdf">“seeking interim measures against itself as well as against Israel</a>”. </p>
<p>So far, the six states who submitted the joint intervention in The Gambia case <a href="https://theconversation.com/canada-is-being-hypocritical-by-failing-to-support-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-220531">have not expressed</a> support for South Africa in its case against Israel. Regardless of what they do or don’t say regarding South Africa’s case, however, their November 2023 intervention in The Gambia v Myanmar speaks for them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221153/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Genocide is called ‘the crime of crimes’ because of its collective significance.Kerstin Bree Carlson, Associate Professor International Law, Roskilde UniversityLine Engbo Gissel, Associate Professor, Global Political Sociology, Roskilde UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2211142024-01-16T00:55:36Z2024-01-16T00:55:36ZNew Zealand can learn from South Africa, The Gambia and others when it comes to international accountability<p>In 2023 the world witnessed a sustained attack on the very foundations of the international legal order. </p>
<p>Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9847/">continued its illegal invasion in Ukraine</a>. Israel’s response to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/07/israel-strikes-back-after-massive-palestinian-attack">October terrorist attack by Hamas</a> exceeded its legitimate right to self-defence. And <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-venezuela-is-threatening-to-annex-guyanas-oil-rich-province-of-essequibo-219352">Venezuela threatened force against Guyana</a> over an oil-rich area of disputed territory. </p>
<p>But is it all bad news for the international legal order? </p>
<p>There are six ongoing international court cases initiated by states or organisations seeking to clarify the law and hold other states to account on behalf of the international community. </p>
<p>These cases offer smaller countries, such as New Zealand, an opportunity to have a significant role in strengthening the international legal order and ensuring a pathway towards peace.</p>
<h2>A departure from the legal norm?</h2>
<p>Normally, <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/cases">cases are brought</a> to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) when a state’s direct interests are impacted by the actions of another state.</p>
<p>However, six recent court cases reflect a significant departure from this tradition and mark an important development for international justice. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-made-its-genocide-case-against-israel-in-court-heres-what-both-sides-said-and-what-happens-next-221017">South Africa has made its genocide case against Israel in court. Here's what both sides said and what happens next</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>These cases argue the international community has a collective interest in certain issues. The focus of the cases range from Israel’s actions in Gaza (brought by South Africa) through to the responsibility of states to ensure the protection of the climate system (brought by the United Nations General Assembly).</p>
<h2>Holding states accountable for genocide</h2>
<p>Three of the six cases seek to hold states accountable for genocide using Article IX of the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%2520on%2520the%2520Prevention%2520and%2520Punishment%2520of%2520the%2520Crime%2520of%2520Genocide.pdf">1948 Genocide Convention</a>. Put simply, Article IX says disputes between countries can be referred to the ICJ. </p>
<p>In late December, South Africa <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20231229-pre-01-00-en.pdf">asked the court</a> to introduce <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-is-taking-israel-to-court-for-genocide-in-palestine-what-does-it-mean-for-the-war-in-gaza-220660">provisional measures</a> – a form of international injunction – against Israel for genocidal acts in Gaza. </p>
<p>These proceedings build on the precedent set by a 2019 case brought by <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/178/178-20220722-jud-01-00-en.pdf">The Gambia against Myanmar</a> for its treatment of the Rohingya people. </p>
<p>In 2022, the ICJ concluded it had jurisdiction to hear The Gambia’s case on the basis that all parties to the Genocide Convention have an interest in ensuring the prevention, suppression and punishment of genocide. </p>
<p>According to the ICJ, The Gambia did not need to demonstrate any special interest or injury to bring the proceedings and, in effect, was entitled to hold Myanmar to account for its treatment of the Rohingya people on behalf of the international community as a whole. </p>
<p>South Africa has <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20231228-app-01-00-en.pdf">made the same argument</a> against Israel. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1745260487267307788"}"></div></p>
<p>In the third case, Ukraine was successful in obtaining <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/182/182-20220316-ord-01-00-en.pdf">provisional measures</a> calling on Russia to suspend military operations in Ukraine (a call which has been reiterated in several <a href="https://www.un.org/en/ga/sessions/emergency11th.shtml?_gl=1*1i8bd0e*_ga*MTc2NzMyNjk4MC4xNjkxOTc0NjUx*_ga_S5EKZKSB78*MTcwNDY3Mjk1MC4xLjAuMTcwNDY3Mjk1NC41Ni4wLjA.*_ga_TK9BQL5X7Z*MTcwNDY3Mjk1MC4zLjAuMTcwNDY3Mjk1MC4wLjAuMA..">United Nations General Assembly resolutions</a>). </p>
<p>While Ukraine is directly impacted by Russia’s actions, 32 states, including <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/182/182-20220728-WRI-01-00-EN.pdf">New Zealand</a>, have also intervened. These countries have argued there is an international interest in the resolution of the conflict. </p>
<p>In November 2023, following the example of intervention in Ukraine v. Russia, seven countries – Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (jointly) and the Maldives – <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/178/intervention">filed declarations of intervention</a> in The Gambia v. Myanmar, in support of The Gambia and the international community. </p>
<p>States can apply for permission to intervene in proceedings where they have an interest of a legal nature that may be affected by the decision in the case (in the case of the ICJ, under <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/statute">Article 62 of the ICJ Statute</a>). That said, intervening in judicial proceedings in support of the legal order or international community more generally was relatively rare until 2023. </p>
<h2>Climate change obligations under international law</h2>
<p>But it is not just acts of genocide that have attracted wider international legal involvement. </p>
<p>In 2023, three proceedings seeking advisory opinions on the legal obligations of states in respect of climate change under international law have been introduced before the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/187/187-20230412-app-01-00-en.pdf">ICJ</a>, the <a href="https://www.itlos.org/en/main/cases/list-of-cases/request-for-an-advisory-opinion-submitted-by-the-commission-of-small-island-states-on-climate-change-and-international-law-request-for-advisory-opinion-submitted-to-the-tribunal/">International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea</a> and the <a href="https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/soc_1_2023_en.pdf">Inter-American Court of Human Rights</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmar-charged-with-genocide-of-rohingya-muslims-5-essential-reads-128742">Myanmar charged with genocide of Rohingya Muslims: 5 essential reads</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>These cases can be similarly characterised as having been brought on behalf of the international community for the international community. <a href="https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/31/written_statements/1/C31-WS-1-3-New_Zealand.pdf">New Zealand</a> has intervened in the Law of the Sea case.</p>
<p>Collectively, these six cases comprise actions taken on behalf of the international community with the overarching purpose of strengthening the international legal order. </p>
<p>They demonstrate faith in and support for that legal order in the face of internal and external challenges, and constitute an important counter-narrative to the prevailing view that the international legal order is <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/project-2100-is-the-international-legal-order-fit-for-purpose/">no longer robust</a>. </p>
<p>Instituting proceedings does not guarantee a positive outcome. But it’s worth noting that less than three years after the ICJ issued an <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/169">advisory opinion</a> condemning the United Kingdom’s continued occupation of the Chagos Archipelago, the UK is quietly negotiating with Mauritius for the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/03/uk-agrees-to-negotiate-with-mauritius-over-handover-of-chagos-islands">return of the islands</a>.</p>
<h2>New Zealand’s support for the global legal order in 2024</h2>
<p>The international legal order underpins New Zealand’s security and prosperity. New Zealand has a strong and internationally recognised track record of positive intervention in judicial proceedings in support of that order. </p>
<p>In 2012 <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/148/17256.pdf">New Zealand intervened</a> in the case brought by <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/148">Australia against Japan</a> for whaling in the Antarctic. Following our contributions to cases before the ICJ and ITLOS in 2023, we are well placed to continue that intervention in future judicial proceedings. </p>
<p>Calls have already been made for New Zealand to intervene in <a href="https://www.thepost.co.nz/nz-news/350142118/government-urged-join-genocide-case-against-israel">South Africa v. Israel</a>. Contributing to this case and to The Gambia v. Myanmar proceeding provides an important opportunity for New Zealand to make a proactive and substantive contribution to strengthening the international legal order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221114/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karen Scott does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Six cases are testing international accountability mechanisms and showing how small countries like New Zealand can impact global justice.Karen Scott, Professor in Law, University of CanterburyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2162872023-11-09T14:10:40Z2023-11-09T14:10:40ZKora: in search of the origins of west Africa’s famed stringed musical instrument<p>“How come we’ve never heard of this beautiful instrument until now?” This was posted by a first-year college student to my world music course discussion board recently. He voiced what many of his peers probably felt after watching the extraordinary documentary <a href="https://www.womex.com/virtual/piranha_arts_1/event/ballake_sissoko_kora">Ballaké Sissoko, Kora Tales</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://vimeo.com/805181419/7fd122d3aa">film</a> follows <a href="https://www.ballakesissoko.com/en/">Sissoko</a>, a world class musical artist, from his home in Bamako, Mali to a sacred well and baobab tree in The Gambia on the Atlantic coast. In the film, the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTzlFlG86qA">award-winning</a> Sissoko revisits his childhood homeland and traces the origins of the instrument that became his destiny. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/BKBiW_maFUs?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Sissoko is a jeli (called a griot by outsiders) – a hereditary oral historian and musician attached to the ruling class. Like generations before him, he plays the <a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/501115">kora</a>, a unique kind of harp that’s indigenous to the western African savannah. It has 21 strings and is played with four fingers. And it can create dazzling, dense musical textures as well as thin shimmering veneers that accompany the delivery of deep oral history. It is one of the most sophisticated handmade musical instruments in the world, both in its musical capabilities and the depth of its tradition.</p>
<p>Ballaké Sissoko: Kora Tales is a beautifully made film that should be seen by everyone interested in African culture and history.</p>
<h2>Kora’s global spread</h2>
<p>If you haven’t heard of the kora, it’s not for lack of exposure. Dozens and dozens of kora albums have been released since Gambian <a href="https://www.allmusic.com/artist/jali-nyama-suso-mn0000782773#biography">Jali Nyama Suso</a>’s debut solo album in 1972. The kora has won more Grammy Awards in the World/Global Music category than the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/art/sitar">sitar</a>. An <a href="https://seckoukeita.bandcamp.com/album/african-rhapsodies">album</a> featuring the kora with the BBC Symphonic Orchestra was released in 2023. The reach of the kora beyond western Africa is <a href="https://open.spotify.com/playlist/3hfZqOzSQplKqClwf0gMRn?si=bdcd4e9447e746f3">expansive</a>. It can be heard on recordings by musicians across the world. </p>
<p>I first heard the kora on a 1973 album by Gambian <a href="https://www.allmusic.com/artist/alhaji-bai-konte-mn0000003544">Alhaji Bai Konte</a>. It was an early formative experience that put me on the path towards becoming an <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=Eric+Charry&btnG=">ethnomusicologist</a>. In the 1980s, Senegalese-American kora player <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1984/04/09/djimo-kouyate/d73afa76-13bc-4cce-82a4-2accdde56373/">Djimo Kouyate</a> inspired me to study regional differences in kora playing in four neighbouring countries. I wound up in Bamako, living three doors down from Ballaké Sissoko, studying with <a href="https://www.discogs.com/artist/991801-Sidiki-Diabat%C3%A9">Sidiki Diabaté</a> (father of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/music/2014/may/22/toumani-diabate-sidiki-kora-music-industry-family">Toumani</a>), who lived two doors down. That became the basis of my first book in 2000, <a href="https://echarry.faculty.wesleyan.edu/mande-music/">Mande Music</a>.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>Constructed from a large half calabash, cowhide, thick wooden neck and leather tuning loops and strings (now nylon), the kora is several centuries old. Precursors go back much further.</p>
<p>It is intimately intertwined with the history of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Mande">Mande</a> homeland along the Niger River, slicing through modern-day Mali and Guinea. This chiefdom rose to power in the 1200s when the legendary Sunjata conquered an oppressive king, Soumaoro Kante, with the help of neighbouring allies. Kante owned the primordial bala (also called <a href="https://www.arts.gov/honors/heritage/balla-kouyate">balafon</a>), a magical xylophone, which was passed on to the jeli (griot) of Sunjata. His name was Balla Faséké Kouyaté and his direct descendants guard that very instrument in a hut in northeastern Guinea. </p>
<p>In 2008 Unesco declared the instrument a site of intangible cultural heritage and today a museum is being constructed on the <a href="https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/cultural-space-of-sosso-bala-00009">site</a>. At its height, the Mande empire extended across much of western Africa and its mines supplied most of the gold circulating in Europe. A visit to Mecca by Mande king <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Musa-I-of-Mali">Mansa Musa</a> in the 1300s secured his reputation as one of the <a href="https://money.com/the-10-richest-people-of-all-time-2/">wealthiest people</a> in the history of the world. Migrations westward to the Senegambia region led to the development of a related language and culture, Mandinka.</p>
<p>Just as the bala (Mande xylophone) has origins in Mali in the 1200s, the kora has origins in the Kaabu federation of the Senegambian Mandinka in the 1700s. Traditionally, jelis have the exclusive right to play both of these instruments. Many origin stories of musical instruments in Africa refer to a jinn (genie) first bringing it out. So it is with the kora. </p>
<h2>What the film is about</h2>
<p>One of my favourite lines in the documentary comes from Sissoko’s aunt Kadiatou Diabaté, herself a jeli: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>This person before you, he was born with the kora. The seventh generation of his lineage. Even if you just touch him, out comes the sound of one of the strings. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Travelling by car, Sissoko leaves his capital city Bamako for a voyage of over 1,000km west to the birthplace of the kora on the Gambian coastline. All of this was part of the Mande empire at its height, as far as the northern reaches of the Niger River at Timbuktu. Sissoko stops at Sibi, where Sunjata is said to have united his armies, made pacts and created the governing constitution of what would become the largest empire in Africa.</p>
<p>The cinematography of the countryside, much of it from aerial drones, is magnificent. Passing through southern Senegal, they cross the Casamance River by boat for a visit with kora master Malan Diébaté. This is kora country and a half dozen kora players appear, singing the praises of Sissoko and his lineage. </p>
<p>They are accompanied by the women in their extended family tapping out a diasporic source of the signature Cuban <a href="https://www.masterclass.com/articles/learn-about-music-clave-rhythm-definition-and-examples">clave pattern</a>. </p>
<p>Diébaté recounts the supernatural origins of the kora, and Sissoko takes off for that very spot, Sanementereng in The Gambia. In one sense all musical instruments are magical, given the impact they may have on our lives. Widespread oral traditions attribute the origins of the kora to this specific place on the Gambian coast. When Sissoko arrives here towards the end of the documentary, at a sacred well and a baobab tree that marks the spot, it is a moving experience.</p>
<h2>Inspiring work</h2>
<p>The writers and directors of the film, Lucy Durán and Laurent Benhamou, have done inspiring work in conveying the beauty of the landscape, the depth and humanity of the tradition, and the artistic persona of Sissoko. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.soas.ac.uk/about/lucy-duran">Professor</a> of music and former <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/profiles/4TSBr0qL391y8lDnM4NZHVM/lucy-duran">radio presenter</a> Durán has an awesome track record in this part of the world over many decades, from producing early albums by Toumani Diabaté and other Malian artists to <a href="https://www.growingintomusic.co.uk/">Growing Into Music</a>, a pioneering documentary <a href="https://www.growingintomusic.co.uk/mali-and-guinea-music-of/films-of-growing-into-music.html">film series</a> laying bare the process of children learning the musical arts of jelis in Mali and Guinea. </p>
<p>Narrated by French-Malian rap star <a href="https://www.allmusic.com/artist/oxmo-puccino-mn0000502254#biography">Oxmo Puccino</a>, the documentary takes you deep into one of Africa’s great classical traditions through the eyes of one of its great artists. For the eyes, ears and collective cultural memory, this film is a treasure.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216287/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Charry does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The extraordinary documentary Ballaké Sissoko: Kora Tales takes a journey from Mali to The Gambia.Eric Charry, Professor of Music, Wesleyan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2061312023-05-29T13:09:51Z2023-05-29T13:09:51ZAfrican migration to Europe: forced returns run into resistance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528810/original/file-20230529-19-g9c03p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Forced return of irregular African migrants from Europe is affecting political relationships in the two regions. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/29162/concern-at-eus-growing-push-to-return-rejected-asylum-seekers">forced return</a> of migrants from the European Union (EU) to their countries of origin continues to be a source of major tension in African countries as well as EU member states. The result has been that the EU – and individual member states – have been scrambling to come up with ways to improve cooperation on migration. </p>
<p>What EU countries want is for countries of origin to take back migrants that are not able to live legally in Europe. But return rates from the EU to Africa are the lowest compared to other world regions and have <a href="https://afripoli.org/germanys-new-migration-policy-what-the-paradigm-shift-means-for-african-partner-countries">even decreased</a> in the last decade. For example, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21622671.2023.2198579?scroll=top&needAccess=true&role=tab&aria-labelledby=full-article">only 9% of Senegalese</a> with an order to return from the EU did so between 2015 and 2019. In other words, of the 30,650 Senegalese migrants who received an order to leave from a European country between 2015 and 2019, only 2,805 did. Forced return necessitates the cooperation of countries of origin through for example issuing travel documents or allowing flights to land. </p>
<p>Based on my recent <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21622671.2023.2198579?scroll=top&needAccess=true&role=tab&aria-labelledby=full-article">work</a> and broader <a href="https://www.arnold-bergstraesser.de/en/projects/the-political-economy-of-west-african-migration-governance-wamig-0">research project</a>, I argue that returns are so low in part because European policy makers ignore the competing issues and interests African stakeholders face. </p>
<p>I also show how West African states resist cooperating on returns. Their strategies range from reluctant compliance with deportations of their citizens to proactive noncompliance. </p>
<p>My findings help explain why current migration partnerships continue to have little effect on returns. </p>
<h2>Migration partnerships coming up empty</h2>
<p>Apart from Rwanda, which has signed a <a href="https://theconversation.com/europe-outsourcing-asylum-to-african-countries-is-a-terrible-idea-there-are-alternatives-203246">deal with the UK</a> to take in asylum seekers, not yet implemented, returns from European countries are hugely unpopular in most African countries. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/factsheet_ec_format_migration_partnership_framework_update_2.pdf">EU’s Partnership Framework</a> was established in June 2016. It sought to mobilise the instruments, resources and influence of both the EU and member states to establish cooperation with partner countries in order to “manage” migration flows. It stated that <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2016/0385/COM_COM(2016)0385_EN.pdf">the priority was to achieve fast returns</a>. It named five priority countries for this approach: Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal, seeking to establish tailored migration compacts with them. </p>
<p>This framework has so far largely failed to achieve better migration cooperation. The same applies to the <a href="https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/negotiating-with-third-countries-under-the-new-pact-carrots-and-sticks/">New Pact on Migration and Asylum</a> from 2020, and a revised visa code which allows <a href="https://ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Policy-Note-36-Playing-the-Visa-Card-June-2021.pdf">visa restrictions for</a> countries not adequately cooperating on returns. </p>
<p>Forced returns, especially back to west Africa, remain low as noted above.</p>
<p>There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, deportations are often <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07256868.2022.2086224">violent and traumatic events</a> for those being returned and involve serious human rights violations. For example, a Senegalese migrant rights group recently <a href="https://bozafii.org/index.php/2023/05/07/rapport-deportation-3-mai-2023-allemagne-senegal/">documented</a> a case of a person who was deported from a closed psychiatric institution in Germany without medication, medical records or telephone and other personal belongings and was left to fend for himself on arrival. Governments wanting to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/09670106221119598?journalCode=sdib">take care of their citizens</a> will want to avoid this. </p>
<p>Secondly, returns can come at the cost of important remittances (often higher than development aid). For <a href="https://www.medam-migration.eu/publications/policy-papers/policy-briefs/challenges-in-eu-african-migration-cooperation-west-african-perspectives-on-forced-return-14152/">example</a>, Nigeria is the largest net remittance-recipient country in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2017, the country received US$22 billion in official remittances, representing 5.9% of Nigeria’s GDP. In comparison, official development assistance came to US$3.36 billion, only 0.89% of GDP. Thus, countries calculate that returns could reduce remittances. And reintegrating deportees comes with <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/imig.12578">social</a> and <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40878-019-0141-7">economic</a> costs. </p>
<p>Thirdly, countries feel that they are badly treated by their European counterparts. Legal migration pathways are <a href="https://www.medam-migration.eu/publications/policy-papers/policy-briefs/challenges-in-eu-african-migration-cooperation-west-african-perspectives-on-forced-return-14152/">limited</a> and the EU approach has become increasingly punitive. There are stricter visa conditions for countries not seen to be adequately cooperating on returns, like <a href="https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/eu-to-introduce-visa-restrictions-for-senegal-the-gambia-as-a-leverage-for-readmission-of-illegal-migrants/">The Gambia or Senegal</a>.</p>
<p>Governments respond in various ways to return pressures from the EU.</p>
<h2>A range of responses</h2>
<p>The research considered the interests of governments in Nigeria, Senegal and The Gambia. It built on 129 interviews with policymakers, politicians, civil society activists and academic experts in these countries and in the EU. </p>
<p>Countries’ responses range from reluctant compliance to reactive and proactive noncompliance. They are likely to use all these strategies at different times, sometimes simultaneously. Responses are influenced by the often conflicting pressures governments face domestically and externally. </p>
<p><strong>Reluctant compliance</strong> is when countries comply with deportations, but only reluctantly. For example <a href="https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Policy-Study28.pdf">informal return agreements</a> signal compliance to international partners but attract less scrutiny from parliamentary oversight bodies or the general public. This strategy can, however, backfire and cause distrust and outrage from citizens. </p>
<p><strong>Reactive noncompliance</strong> includes calling out technical issues and causing delays in return operations. States may fail to identify whether migrants are their citizens, or fail to <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/PB_Returns_at_what_cost.pdf">issue travel documents</a> of migrants awaiting deportation. This can be a less costly strategy than outright refusing deportations, while increasing domestic approval. </p>
<p><strong>Proactive noncompliance</strong> is the most extreme response. This is when states are more direct in their refusal to cooperate with returns. It includes, for example, stalling on negotiations for a formal return agreement. <a href="https://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/434">Senegal</a> and <a href="https://migration-control.info/en/wiki/nigeria/">Nigeria</a> have taken this route. The Gambia even implemented a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-return-from-europe-is-causing-problems-for-the-gambia-124036">moratorium</a> on all (chartered) deportation flights for a few months. </p>
<p>Proactive noncompliance holds the most potential for governments to improve their domestic legitimacy – especially during elections. But it can come at the cost of international support. In the case of The Gambia, for example, the EU has imposed <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/08/the-gambia-council-increases-the-visa-fee-due-to-lack-of-cooperation-on-readmission/">visa sanctions</a>. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>EU stakeholders could do more to consider the interests that African countries have when it comes to accepting returnees. </p>
<p>Ratcheting up the pressure will produce more resistance. Rather, the EU should focus on repairing relationships. One way would be to offer migration pathways that are <a href="https://www.medam-migration.eu/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/MEDAM-Webseite/Publications/Assessment_Reports/2020_MEDAM_Assessment_Report/MEDAM_Assessment_Report_2020_Political_economy.pdf">accessible, visible and credible</a>. Tying this to return pressures is <a href="https://afripoli.org/germanys-new-migration-policy-what-the-paradigm-shift-means-for-african-partner-countries">not likely to work</a>, and will not improve relationships in the long run.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206131/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This article was written based on a research project in the Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration, funded by the Mercator Stiftung.</span></em></p>The forced return of migrants by European states has ignored pressures and interests of African countries of origin.Franzisca Zanker, Senior research fellow, Arnold Bergstraesser InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1997952023-02-27T13:31:11Z2023-02-27T13:31:11ZCough syrup can harm children: experts warn of contamination risks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511675/original/file-20230222-20-qw2pr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The recent deaths of over <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/24/who-urges-action-after-cough-syrups-linked-to-more-than-300-child-deaths">300 children</a> in Africa and Asia have prompted the World Health Organization (WHO) to <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/23-01-2023-who-urges-action-to-protect-children-from-contaminated-medicines">warn</a> about the use of “substandard and falsified” medical products. The organisation called for more efforts to protect children from contaminated medicine. Toxicologists Winston Morgan and Shazma Bashir unpack the story.</em></p>
<hr>
<h2>What caused the WHO to issue these warnings?</h2>
<p>Over the last five months the WHO has issued three alerts warning people not to use specific over-the-counter medicine for children. The warnings came after the deaths of at least <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/24/who-urges-action-after-cough-syrups-linked-to-more-than-300-child-deaths">300 children</a> in various countries including The Gambia, Indonesia and Uzbekistan. </p>
<p>Medical product alerts were released in <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/05-10-2022-medical-product-alert-n-6-2022-substandard-(contaminated)-paediatric-medicines">October 2022</a> for Africa, <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/02-11-2022-medical-product-alert-n-7-2022-substandard-(contaminated)-paediatric-liquid-dosage-medicines">November 2022</a> for south-east Asia and for the European region in <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/11-01-2023-medical-product-alert-n-1-2023-substandard-(contaminated)-liquid-dosage-medicines">January 2023</a>. </p>
<p>The WHO issues these warnings only when independent laboratory analysis has confirmed that the product is substandard or falsified and that it poses a significant threat to public health. The threat must also extend beyond one country. </p>
<p>The children died after consuming cough syrup contaminated with ethylene glycol and diethylene glycol, leading to the WHO medical product alerts. Some of the children were as young as five. Cases were reported in at least seven countries. </p>
<h2>What are ethylene glycol and diethylene glycol?</h2>
<p>Ethylene glycol and diethylene glycol are toxic alcohols with a slightly sweet taste. They are widely used in windscreen wiper fluids and engine coolants. </p>
<p>These compounds are sometimes also found at very low levels as contaminants in many food ingredients and medical solvents (including propylene glycol, polyethylene glycol, sorbitol and glycerin/glycerol). This happens when there are poor standards of manufacturing and testing. </p>
<p>Medical solvents are widely used to dissolve the ingredients of a medicine. Ethylene glycol and diethylene glycol contamination poisonings over the years have mainly been associated with solutions containing paracetamol.</p>
<p>Paracetamol in cough syrups is good and safe for children with infections. It is a pain killer which is good at reducing fever, without causing gastric irritation like aspirin or ibruprofen may do. </p>
<h2>Are they dangerous?</h2>
<p>Both ethylene glycol and diethylene glycol are seen as toxic. A <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/7613408/">fatal oral dose</a> is about 1,000-1,500 milligrams per kilogram. For a small child weighing 20kg a fatal single dose would be about 28 millilitres or about 6 teaspoons of pure ethylene glycol. However it is also possible to cause toxicity by consuming much lower doses over several days and weeks. That is why the WHO safe level for these chemicals is only 0.5 milligrams per kilogram per day. That’s the equivalent of 1/15th of a teaspoon per day. </p>
<p>What makes these glycols <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9555756/">potentially so dangerous</a> is that toxicity comes from the consumption of relatively large amounts before symptoms of contamination appear. </p>
<p>The additional danger from <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11242827/">cough syrups</a> is that symptoms of ethylene glycol and diethylene glycol <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20010509/">contamination</a>, such as drowsiness, are sometimes observed in children who have not taken contaminated medicine, and can be misinterpreted as normal in a child with a cough or fever. Guardians and medical professionals may not notice what’s wrong until it’s too late.</p>
<h2>What’s the role of paracetamol?</h2>
<p>To understand the potential role of paracetamol in these poisonings, we need to understand what happens to ethylene glycol and diethylene glycol in the body. </p>
<p>To be toxic, these glycols must be converted to a compound called glycoaldehyde, and then to glyoxylic acid. Glyoxylic acid can concentrate in and damage the kidneys – leading to death from renal failure. </p>
<p>The conversion is triggered by a certain concentration of a coenzyme called nicotinamide adenine dinucleotide (NAD+). NAD+ is regulated by mitochondria – small structures in human cells which regulate many chemical reactions in the body.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36379307/">recent study</a>, we demonstrated that at the normal dose required to treat fever, paracetamol inhibits mitochondria. Thus it affects the level of NAD+ and, in turn, the conversion of glycols to toxins. Children taking paracetamol preparations contaminated with the glycols could potentially be in danger. </p>
<p>We believe that the combination of medicines containing paracetamol and glycols, even when the contamination is relatively low but above the WHO acceptable limit of 0.5 mg/kg of body weight per day, could be lethal. </p>
<p>Unlike other medications or food products which do not disrupt mitochondrial function, preparations containing standard levels of paracetamol are more likely to lead to adverse outcomes for children, because of the increased metabolism of ethylene glycol and diethylene glycol. </p>
<p>Other medicines and foods contaminated with low levels of ethylene glycol and diethylene glycol probably go unnoticed because they don’t contain paracetamol.</p>
<h2>What must be done to prevent future deaths?</h2>
<p>If spotted early enough, ethylene glycol and diethylene glycol poisoning can be treated. The two most widely used antidotes for overdose are fomepizole and ethanol. Both reduce the amount of toxic ethylene glycol and diethylene glycol metabolite produced in the body.</p>
<p>Incidents of mass poisonings highlight the need for greater vigilance in monitoring preparations containing paracetamol. </p>
<p>Medications containing paracetamol are normally very safe for children. But to avoid deaths related to cough syrup in future, both parents and medical professionals should consider glycol poisoning as a possibility if children start to display symptoms of intoxication and drowsiness after taking the medicine. </p>
<p>These incidents generally happen in countries categorised as the global south. Manufacturers and regulatory authorities in these countries also have a responsibility to protect children.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199795/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Winston Morgan receives funding from University of East London and UKRI</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shazma Bashir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The danger from contaminated cough syrups is that early symptoms of poisoning, such as drowsiness, are sometimes observed in children without contamination.Winston Morgan, Professor of Toxicology, Equity and Inclusive Practice, Director of Impact and Innovation, University of East LondonShazma Bashir, Postdoctoral fellow, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2002892023-02-23T07:11:06Z2023-02-23T07:11:06ZElection observers are important for democracy – but few voters know what they do<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511364/original/file-20230221-14-2b9goz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of a European Union election observation team speak to voters in Zimbabwe. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Marco Longari/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Election observers keep watch over polls throughout the world. Their job is to support efforts to improve electoral quality and to provide transparency. In African countries, both local citizen and international observers have been deployed regularly since the 1990s. </p>
<p>During several recent elections across the continent, however, questions have arisen about the competence and impartiality of observation missions. This has led to concerns about the future of observation, both in Africa and elsewhere.</p>
<p>In 2023, <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2023/02/africa-elections-all-upcoming-votes/">more than 20 African countries</a> are scheduled to go to the polls. It will be a busy year for observers who’ll <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/uhuru-to-head-au-polls-mission-in-nigeria-4124542">be present</a> at the majority of these elections. </p>
<p>When done well, election observation <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414008325571">detects</a> ballot-box stuffing, voter suppression and political violence. Observers’ presence at polling stations <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/electoral-fraud-or-violence-the-effect-of-observers-on-party-manipulation-strategies/C1EC14B4C4BBB2156A9A17A24F6A90DF">deters election-day fraud</a>.</p>
<p>Observers also provide public statements about election quality and offer recommendations on how electoral processes could be improved. </p>
<p>Yet some observers have been criticised for a reluctance to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-studies-in-society-and-history/article/abs/valid-electoral-exercise-ugandas-1980-elections-and-the-observers-dilemma/300FE5D9472423B0C1F19813688EA87D">point out flawed processes</a>, for holding <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/election-observers-and-their-biases/">biases</a> and for weaknesses in their methodologies. </p>
<p>The perception that observation missions’ verdicts were “proved wrong” by court judgements in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2019.1657277">Kenya (2017)</a> and <a href="https://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/news/malawi-courts-landmark-ruling-puts-spotlight-on-foreign-observers/">Malawi (2019)</a> has been particularly damaging. In both cases, many commentators (mis)interpreted international observers’ statements as endorsements of electoral processes that the courts later annulled.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-kenyas-judiciary-can-break-the-cycle-of-electoral-violence-182710">How Kenya's judiciary can break the cycle of electoral violence</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>It’s not clear how widely held these critical views are. The perspectives of the broader public in countries holding elections are often missing from discussions on observation. So we set out to get a sense of what voters in three African countries thought.</p>
<p>We found that people wanted to know more about election observers, but couldn’t easily get the information. Both the media and observers need to do more to provide it. Knowledge of observers’ goals and statements is essential if they are to play the role of public arbiters of election quality. </p>
<h2>What citizens think</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/lmeo">research</a> into citizen perceptions and media representations of election observation took place in Zambia, The Gambia and Kenya. These three countries have had varying experiences of election observation. </p>
<p>We interviewed 520 citizens about topics relating to their perceptions of election observation. In each country, we conducted in-depth interviews in both urban and rural areas, and in constituencies that supported the opposition and the incumbent. </p>
<p>Ordinary citizens in our case study countries rarely offered criticisms of election observation. </p>
<p>For example, we asked 120 Kenyans to evaluate the past performance of election observers during the run-up to the country’s 2022 election. Only one person referred to <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/article/future-election-observation-after-kenyas-supreme-court-judgement">the controversy</a> surrounding observation in 2017 and the supreme court’s annulment of the presidential election.</p>
<p>Instead, we found <a href="https://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/sites/default/files/assets/pdf/Local%20Perceptions%20of%20Election%20Observation__Jan23.pdf#page=2">strong support</a> for election observation among citizens. This was the case in all three of our case study countries, which cover east, southern and west Africa. </p>
<p>Our respondents tended to have concerns about the electoral process in their own country. They spoke favourably about the potential of observation to improve overall electoral quality and transparency. They also felt that observers contributed to reducing the potentially destabilising effects of elections, such as violence. </p>
<p>In both Zambia and Kenya, support for the presence of international observers was higher than support for citizen observers. Respondents in The Gambia, however, tended to prefer citizen observers.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-rest-of-africa-can-learn-from-the-gambias-transition-to-democracy-71822">What the rest of Africa can learn from The Gambia's transition to democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The explanations from those who chose international observers highlighted a perception that they were more impartial than citizen observers, who were often viewed as being biased or corruptible. </p>
<p>Perceptions in Zambia and Kenya may be <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2023.2173177">influenced</a> by:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>political polarisation</p></li>
<li><p>a perception that political corruption is high</p></li>
<li><p>the prominence of ethnicity in politics. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>These factors appear to reduce confidence in citizen observers. </p>
<p>Despite the popularity of election observers in our case study countries, we found that citizens knew little about their roles. Few could name any specific observation missions. Citizens often confused observers with other electoral actors like polling station staff, the electoral management body and party agents. </p>
<p>It’s common for citizens to believe observers can and should intervene in the electoral process. Yet, non-interference should be a key principle for both <a href="https://gndem.org/declaration-of-global-principles/">citizen</a> and <a href="https://www.ndi.org/DoP">international election observers</a>. </p>
<h2>The information gap</h2>
<p>Our interviews made it clear that citizens – especially those in rural areas – found it difficult to get information about the activities and statements of election observers. Few of the respondents heard this information when missions issued their preliminary statements.</p>
<p>The media can bridge this information gap by providing more coverage of election observation. </p>
<p>The quality of this coverage could also be improved, as observers’ preliminary statements are <a href="https://www.research.ed.ac.uk/en/publications/re-evaluating-international-observation-of-kenyas-2017-elections">often mischaracterised</a>. </p>
<p>Observers’ statements tend to be complex and nuanced because they are commenting on numerous aspects of an ongoing process. In media coverage, these statements are often reduced to simple either/or judgements (such as “free and fair”). </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Our project has drawn upon interviews with African journalists and editors to create a short <a href="https://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/sites/default/files/assets/doc/Tips%20for%20Journalists%20and%20Editors%20who%20Cover%20Election%20Observation_.pdf">list of tips</a> on covering election observation. These are designed to improve the circulation of accurate information. The tips include getting a range of perspectives from observer missions and reaching out to them early.</p>
<p>Observer missions could also be more active in raising the profile of their work. We created a <a href="https://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/sites/default/files/assets/doc/Media%20Representations%20of%20Election%20Observation_Jan23.pdf#page=6">list of suggestions</a> from the media in our three case study countries to help them do this. One of the tips is to interact with the media in local languages.</p>
<p>Citizens are more likely to criticise observers for the poor flow of information than for anything else. This doesn’t invalidate other criticisms of observers. In fact, if citizens begin to get more information, these criticisms may become more common. Our research suggests the media and observers need to provide it anyway.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200289/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Molony receives funding from the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), for the ‘Local Perceptions and Media Representations of Election Observation in Africa’ research project, under grant reference ES/T015624/1.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Macdonald receives funding from the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), for the ‘Local Perceptions and Media Representations of Election Observation in Africa’ research project, under grant reference ES/T015624/1.</span></em></p>Voters speak favourably about the potential of observation to improve overall electoral quality and transparency.Thomas Molony, Senior Lecturer in African Studies, The University of EdinburghRobert Macdonald, Research Fellow in African Studies, The University of EdinburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1956642022-12-22T06:14:50Z2022-12-22T06:14:50ZWest Africa has experienced a wave of coups - superficial democracy is to blame<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501303/original/file-20221215-19-ea9qw6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A small group of protesters holds Russia and Burkina flags as they protest against the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Issouf Sanogo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>West Africa has seen <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">coups</a> and military takeovers in three countries in 2022. Like those of the past, they came with promises of a quick return to civilian regimes once socio-economic and political challenges had been met. The challenges are usually listed as inept governance, corruption, rising insecurity and popular revolts amid economic hardship.</p>
<p>One <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-49348-6_1">view</a> of governance on the African continent is that liberal democracy has spread since the 2000s, bringing an end to dictatorships. Most African countries, it’s argued, have multiparty democracies with elected governments.</p>
<p>My own <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-49348-6_2">view</a> is that a mere introduction of electoral democracy is not sufficient. A strong democracy needs strong institutions to build resilience against fragility. Poverty and insecurity are an indication of fragility. They show that institutions are not efficiently distributing wealth. Civil rule is under threat as long as institutions remain fragile.</p>
<p>In my opinion, based on <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-49348-6_2">my research</a>, is that the failure of civilian governments to improve living conditions, provide leadership and protect citizens is a major threat to democracy in the west African sub-region.</p>
<h2>The military never left</h2>
<p>The military continues to wield huge influence in governance in the region. Citizens don’t seem willing or able to challenge this.<br>
In Nigeria, for example, since the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/abacha-abiola-and-nigerias-1999-transition-civilian-rule">return to civil rule in 1999</a>, former military generals have largely led the country. By the end of the current regime in May 2023, former military rulers will have been civilian presidents too for 16 out of 24 years of civil rule. </p>
<p>Similarly, in Sierra Leone, former military head of state <a href="https://embassyofsierraleone.net/about-embassy/brig-rtd-julius-maada-wonie-bio-president-republic-sierra-leone">Brigadier Maada Bio</a> returned as elected civilian president in 2018.</p>
<p>Election periods in these countries see frequent trips by candidates to the homes of previous military or autocratic leaders, seeking their endorsement. </p>
<p>An example is the move by the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Adama-Barrow">Gambian president Adama Barrow</a> to form an alliance with the hitherto sit-tight dictator <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58924630">Yahya Jammeh</a>. Jammeh ruled the country for 22 years, starting with a 1994 coup, and sustained himself in office through incessant <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/24/gambia-commission-uncovered-ex-presidents-alleged-crimes">human rights violations</a>. </p>
<p>Barrow gave Jammeh a soft landing before going on to renege on his agreement to resign and transfer power. He is now relying on support from the old order to stay in power, knowing that his popularity with the people has diminished. </p>
<h2>A toothless regional bloc</h2>
<p>The return of civil rule to Nigeria in 1999 ushered in a sense that military coups and autocratic regimes in the region would end. </p>
<p>The presidency of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Olusegun-Obasanjo">Olusegun Obasanjo</a> and the <a href="https://ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States</a> (ECOWAS) were diplomatically active against military coups. But more recently it appears that the regional bloc is <a href="https://dailytrust.com/of-coup-detat-and-political-fragility-in-west-africa/">relatively weak and individual countries are challenged by economic, social, political and security issues</a>. </p>
<p>Citizens are dissatisfied with multilateral institutions – such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2018.1417899?journalCode=rsaj20">ECOWAS</a> and the <a href="https://au.int/">African Union</a>. These bodies may be quick to condemn military takeovers, but they are slow to express concern about poor governance, such as altering of constitutions for regime survival. </p>
<p>Governments have failed to deliver on the promises that got them elected. This failure has led to growing dissatisfaction and a quest for alternatives. In some cases, citizens welcome the military, as witnessed in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-crowd-celebrates-west-africas-latest-coup-2022-01-25/">Burkina Faso</a>.</p>
<p>Common to most of the military takeovers in the sub-region is the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/07/contagious-coups-what-is-fuelling-military-takeovers-across-west-africa">failure of the civilian regimes to deliver</a>. Rising insecurity and worsening living conditions remain the fate of the people. These factors have acted as incubators for the return of the military. </p>
<p>In the last 24 months, governments in <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/08/five-things-know-about-malis-coup">Mali</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58461971">Guinea</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/5/coup-in-burkina-faso-what-you-need-to-know">Burkina Faso</a> were toppled in quick succession. </p>
<p>In Mali, outrage over the erstwhile <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60015898">president Ibrahim Keita’s</a> ineffective leadership in the face of rising insecurity and corruption led to his ousting. </p>
<p>In Guinea, the attempt to stay in power by altering the constitution, even in the face of rising inequality, corruption, gross under-performance and human rights violations, led to the ousting of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alpha-Conde">President Alpha Conde</a>. </p>
<p>In Burkina Faso, civilian <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Roch-Marc-Christian-Kabore">president Roch Marc Christian Kabore</a> was removed because of rising internal displacement, widespread poverty, inequality and insecurity. Security forces were also <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60112043">discontented</a> over his failure to adequately support them against militants linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.</p>
<h2>Democracy is not necessarily good governance</h2>
<p>Although the region has made some headway with efforts to propagate democracy, it remains superficial. Its dividends, in the form of good governance, remain elusive. </p>
<p>Periodic elections are held, which legitimises civilians in power. But the critical fundamentals that foster democracy are missing: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>informed and active participation</p></li>
<li><p>separation of powers</p></li>
<li><p>respect for the rule of law</p></li>
<li><p>fundamental human rights</p></li>
<li><p>accountability. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>As insecurity rises and living conditions worsen, will the region experience more military takeovers? </p>
<p>Democracy appears to have come to stay in parts of the region, such as Nigeria, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. Others still have work to do in getting the military back to the barracks permanently. </p>
<p>Even governments in the rather more stable nations cannot afford to be complacent. They will have to intensify efforts to deliver the dividends of democracy, if they are to avoid civil unrest or military incursion. </p>
<h2>What will shape the future of democracy in the region</h2>
<p>Nigeria still exhibits fault lines of religion and ethnicity, as well as abuse of privilege by the elites over the rest of the citizens. </p>
<p>Failure to protect the lives, property and rights of citizens fuelled the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2021/02/nigeria-end-impunity-for-police-violence-by-sars-endsars/">“EndSARS” protest</a>, which is fast crystallising into a social movement with potential to make a strong political statement in the <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/514001-updated-inec-changes-dates-for-2023-general-elections.html">February 2023</a> elections. </p>
<p>In Ghana, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/police-disperse-protest-over-economic-hardship-ghana-2022-06-28/">local lobby groups have staged street protests</a> amid growing anxiety over <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/business-news/560180-ghanaian-cedi-world-worst-performing-currency-as-naira-also-struggles.html">economic conditions</a> in the country and rising allegations of corruption and government lethargy.</p>
<p>The future of democracy in the region will depend on the level of development in democratic institutions, level of military sophistication and professionalism, level of literacy, and presence of a broad based elite class that is not self-serving. </p>
<p>Elected civilians need to respect their social contracts with citizens. Citizens need to feel better off with civilians in power. </p>
<p>Nepotism, graft, outright theft of public funds and constitutional manipulations create grounds for military coups.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195664/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Temitope J. Laniran does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Although West Africa has made some headway with efforts to propagate democracy, its dividends, in the form of good governance, remain elusive.Temitope J. Laniran, Research Associate, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1756612022-01-27T15:09:47Z2022-01-27T15:09:47ZWhy The Gambia should fast-track gender quotas for women<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442685/original/file-20220126-19-gyuv41.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of incumbent president Adama Barrow’s National Peoples Party (NPP) during a campaign rally in Banjul in November 2021.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Guy Peterson/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Women have <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/gambia/gambia-s-women-demand-seat-political-table">historically</a> been poorly represented in positions of power and decision-making in The Gambia. Out of 58 National Assembly members, only six are women lawmakers and only three of these are elected. Women make up more than half of the Gambian population, yet they account for <a href="http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm">only 10% of parliamentarians</a>, including the speaker.</p>
<p>This poor representation is just as evident in <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202108090284.html">the political parties</a>. None of the 18 <a href="https://iec.gm/political-parties/registered-parties/">registered political parties</a> is led by a woman. A few have women serving as deputy party leaders. But for the most part, women are assigned token positions that lack the necessary power and authority. They are deployed as mobilisers, campaigners and cheerleaders. </p>
<p>Little wonder then that during the December 4, 2021 elections, only one woman, Marie Sock, filed her nomination for the presidency. Even then her application was <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202111100022.html">rejected</a> by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) as she failed to declare her assets. She also did not have the <a href="https://www.lawhubgambia.com/electoral-laws">legally required number</a> of registered voters to support her nomination.</p>
<p>This left the field open to a contest between six male candidates in which Adama Barrow <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/6/the-gambias-barrow-wins-second-term-opposition-reject-results">secured his second term</a>. </p>
<p>Adama Barrow was voted into office in December 2016, <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/new-gambia-and-remaking-constitution">ending 22 years of autocratic rule</a> under Yahya Jammeh. In the democratic transition that followed, Barrow pledged a <a href="https://crc220.org/">reformed constitution</a> and transitional justice for victims of Jammeh’s brutal dictatorship. </p>
<p>But the <a href="https://www.lawhubgambia.com/latest-news/publication-constitutional-developments-in-2020-gambia">constitution-making process is stalled</a>. The proposed Constitution Promulgation Bill of 2020 was <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202009230283.html">rejected</a> by the National Assembly owing to <a href="https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2020-posts/2020/9/29/attempts-at-constitutional-reform-in-the-gambia-whither-the-draft-constitution">political party disagreements</a>. </p>
<p>The draft constitution outlined several provisions to accelerate substantive equality between men and women. Among its transformative provisions was a section that explicitly forbids discriminatory treatment based on gender. </p>
<p>Section 55 further provided equal treatment between men and women. This included equal political, economic and social opportunities. Section 74 set out general principles for the electoral system. This included fair representation of all genders in elective public bodies. The draft constitution also provided a quota system that reserves 14 seats in parliament for women.</p>
<p>The failure to pass the bill represents a loss in the momentum for gender reforms. </p>
<p>But, in my view, there is still an opportunity to address the issue of women’s representation in politics. This is in the form of a <a href="https://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/headlines/women-seek-16-parliament-reservation-seats">private member bill</a> which seeks to increase women’s representation in the National Assembly.</p>
<p>The bill presents a timely opportunity to rectify imbalances in political representation by guaranteeing a number of seats for women. Arguments against it might be that it’s only a temporary measure. But, I would argue, temporary measures such as legislative gender quotas can increase women’s access to political participation. </p>
<p>It’s true that over the past few decades the principle of equality between women and men has become increasingly <a href="https://constitutions.unwomen.org/en">constitutionalised</a>. These include gender-specific constitutional provisions on women’s rights, the right to reproductive healthcare, access to education, protection from violence.</p>
<p>But a number of <a href="https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/General%20recommendation%2025%20(English).pdf">temporary special measures</a> have also been put in place. One is the quota system. </p>
<h2>Support for quotas</h2>
<p>Gambians are ready for change.</p>
<p>A nationwide <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331260768_'Women's_Political_Participation_and_Representation_in_The_Gambia_One_step_forward_or_two_back">study</a> on women’s political participation and representation showed that 89% of all respondents supported the introduction of the quota system.</p>
<p>In 2018, a <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/D%C3%A9p%C3%AAches/ab_r7_dispatchno338_gambias_draft_constitution_reflects_citizen_preferences.pdf">survey</a> by Afrobarometer – the pan-African research network – showed overwhelming support (85%) in the country for constitutional change that would mandate a quota system for women’s representation in the National Assembly.</p>
<p>But this support has not yet been translated into the statute books.</p>
<p>Gender rights in The Gambia are governed by the <a href="https://www.lawhubgambia.com/1997-constitution">1997 constitution</a> and other relevant laws. These laws include the <a href="https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/MONOGRAPH/90619/115464/F-1335047347/GMB90619.pdf">Women’s Act 2010</a> which has general provisions to support women’s political participation and representation. </p>
<p>The Gambia is also one of few countries in Africa that has <a href="https://www.hhrjournal.org/2019/12/the-gambias-political-transition-to-democracy-is-abortion-reform-possible/">enacted</a> specific legislation to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331260847_The_impact_of_the_African_Charter_and_the_Maputo_Protocol_in_The_Gambia">domesticate</a> African and international norms and standards that recognise the human rights of women and girls. </p>
<p>But the legal framework in its present form is not comprehensive in securing a substantive right for women in the political realm. Take section 15 of the Women’s Act. It provides a general obligation to adopt temporary special measures. But it does not make a definitive prescription such as electoral gender quotas.</p>
<p>In addition, existing laws are grossly inadequate given the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331260768_'Women's_Political_Participation_and_Representation_in_The_Gambia_One_step_forward_or_two_back'?_sg=WRVtUl1YUavXBZSSNsLQEjiyRFEUtNBOxlLPqKAqiTQKdOhGY-h2p_s0n-zQKA265YaXx99x8J8B9PivTjbP17OHETYsPlsPy-CU54Cm.6wvKJV6BgmNiDlJocFXUEfaJvYbcl6MujA4VelILKp3f9NzI5ObDTfnj7n_KB6zvxsRZ7IKzA2cOTHsC4IBCYw">socio-cultural barriers</a> that are well entrenched in society against women. </p>
<h2>An alternative route</h2>
<p>The private member bill before parliament presents an opportunity to embrace reform. The bill proposes increasing the total number of seats in The Gambia’s National Assembly from 58 to 71, reserving 16 seats for women assembly members. Fourteen would be elected from each region; people with disabilities will elect one woman from among them, and the president would appoint one. </p>
<p>In my view the private member bill effort would be beneficial for advancing women’s rights. </p>
<p>However, a key question has arisen as to what will be the modalities for electing the women parliamentarians. It would be helpful to draw from other countries with a quota system to address this. For example, the <a href="https://ulii.org/akn/ug/act/statute/1995/constitution/eng%402018-01-05">revised 1995 Constitution of Uganda</a> institutionalised the quota system by providing for a number of reserved seats in the national parliament equal to the number of districts in the country. Each district elects a female parliamentary representative. </p>
<p>In this case, reserved seats are organised as <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/recruitment-mechanisms-for-reserved-seats-for-women-in-parliament-and-switches-to-nonquota-seats-a-comparative-study-of-tanzania-and-uganda/4ADE9AFC34E95A7F163588EF62629F88">single-member “women’s districts” constituencies</a>, designed as first-past-the-post districts. In essence, a one-woman representative is elected by universal suffrage in each district – which may consist of multiple counties (constituencies) – indirectly contested “female candidate only” elections.</p>
<p>Equally, in the case of The Gambia, it is proposed that parliamentarians for the female-reserved seats be elected and not appointed to enhance the legitimacy of these parliamentary seats. Some have <a href="https://academic.oup.com/sp/article-abstract/15/3/345/1616342">argued</a> that this may promote a static view of “women” as a group and push for a parallel process that affects equal voting rights. But in this case this is necessary as a time-limited positive measure that is intended to provide opportunities for a historically and systematically disadvantaged group.</p>
<p><em>A longer version of this article was <a href="https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/spotlight-on-africa/2022/1/25/womens-political-participation-in-the-gambia-gender-quotas-as-fast-track-to-equality">published</a> by International Association of Constitutional Law.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175661/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Satang Nabaneh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Temporary measures such as legislative gender quotas can increase women’s access to political participation.Satang Nabaneh, Director of Programs, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1734372021-12-09T15:05:32Z2021-12-09T15:05:32ZWhat Barrow’s re-election means for The Gambia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436638/original/file-20211209-21-8m3mr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gambia's president Adama Barrow waves to supporters shortly after he arrived the country in 2017.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Carl De Souza/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Gambia’s President Adama Barrow, of the National People’s Party, comfortably <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-59542813">won re-election</a> on 4 December with about 53% of the vote. </p>
<p>The runner-up, Ousainou Darboe of the United Democratic Party, won about <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-12-05/gambia-president-barrow-wins-re-election-in-post-jammeh-vote">28%</a> of the vote. In third place was Mama Kandeh of the Gambia Democratic Congress with about 12%. </p>
<p>Three other candidates — Halifa Sallah of the People’s Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism, Abdoulie Jammeh of the National Unity Party, and Essa Faal (independent) – each got under 5% of the national vote. </p>
<p>The outcome was not a surprise. Public <a href="https://ceprass.gm/research/second-pre-election-opinion-poll-survey-findings/">opinion polling</a> conducted before the election had shown the National People’s Party with a commanding lead. </p>
<p>Darboe and Kandeh have <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/499258-gambiadecides-darboe-two-others-reject-election-result.html">rejected</a> the result of the election, citing unspecified irregularities. (Faal initially did too, but has since conceded.)</p>
<p>United Democratic Party supporters <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gambia-one-three-rebel-presidential-candidates-accepts-barrows-victory-2021-12-06/">clashed</a> with police a day after the election results were announced but it is unlikely that the result will change. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-gambias-55-year-old-marbles-voting-system-is-simple-but-difficult-to-cheat-173263">The Gambia's 55-year-old marbles voting system is simple but difficult to cheat</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>A coalition of <a href="https://twitter.com/WANEP_Gambia/status/1467565714269777921?s=20">civil society organisations</a> and the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R2mNjhFCi2s">Commonwealth</a> have both described the election as credible and transparent.</p>
<p>Barrow’s decisive win will reverberate through the Gambian political landscape. It signals the diminishing importance of his predecessor, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-59531167">Yahya Jammeh</a>, who tried to influence the election from his exile in Equatorial Guinea. </p>
<p>And it calls into question the fate of The Gambia’s transitional programme, adopted by Barrow and his coalition partners after they won the 2016 election. </p>
<p>The programme included a new constitution, security sector reform, a Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission, and the lifting of repressive laws, many of colonial origin, used by Jammeh. </p>
<p>The effort to create a new constitution is currently dormant. It’s not clear if it will be revived. </p>
<p>Equally unclear is whether the recommendations in the final report of the <a href="https://www.trrc.gm/">Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission</a>, submitted to the Barrow administration just days before the election, will be heeded. </p>
<p>The report is yet to be made public. But it is believed to include recommendations for prosecuting certain political figures in the Jammeh administration who may now be in a political alliance with Barrow. </p>
<p>Barrow’s win leaves the opposition with an uncertain path forward, faced with weak results and in several cases ageing leadership.</p>
<p>Finally, it is clear that Barrow pulled off what Jammeh failed to do before the 2016 election: consolidate an anti-United Democratic Party alliance out of several smaller parties. </p>
<p>As my <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/anticipatory-tribalism-accusatory-politics-in-the-new-gambia/F6F89D60BD65F47C26A9D504BB363E65">research</a> has shown, there is a long history of a kind of shadow politics of ethnicity in The Gambia. But Barrow won across the country and even a majority of the constituencies that make up Foni, the heartland of Jammeh’s Jola ethnic group.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-in-store-for-gambians-as-they-gear-up-for-hotly-contested-poll-172807">What's in store for Gambians as they gear up for hotly contested poll</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Implications of Barrow’s victory</h2>
<p>Jammeh sought to influence the election from afar and his messages were recorded and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-59531167">broadcast</a> at rallies for his supporters. But his former party, the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction, had split into two factions. </p>
<p>One of Barrow’s more controversial moves prior to the election was to form an alliance with the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction and several other smaller parties. The inclusion of the party in the alliance was decried as a <a href="https://gainako.com/victims-center-npp-aprc-alliance-is-a-treacherous-betrayal/">betrayal</a> of the victims of Jammeh and the making of an <a href="https://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/opinion/the-hypocrisy-in-defending-the-evil-alliance-of-betrayal-between-npp-and-aprc">“evil alliance”</a>.</p>
<p>Initial reporting on the alliance suggested that it would pave the way for <a href="https://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/headlines/aprc-npp-agree-on-jammehs-return-as-duo-form-alliance-ahead-of-dec-polls">Jammeh’s return</a> to the country. But Jammeh himself <a href="https://www.gambia.com/ex-president-yahya-jammeh-denounces-aprcs-alliance-with-npp/">denounced</a> the alliance and called for his old party’s members to support Kandeh’s Gambia Democratic Congress.</p>
<p>If Jammeh had ambitions to serve as a kingmaker, these ambitions have been dashed. Kandeh generally did worse in 2021 than he did in the 2016 election. </p>
<p>At the same time, there is clearly no love lost between Barrow and Jammeh. It does not seem likely that Barrow would welcome Jammeh’s return to the country.</p>
<p>Second, it is very uncertain what will happen with the draft constitution. Although Barrow was officially supportive of the work of the Constitutional Review Commission, it was legislators loyal to Barrow that, in September 2020, torpedoed the effort because of the issue of term limits. </p>
<p>The Gambian political scientist <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/09/the-gambia-why-mps-just-shot-down-the-popular-new-draft-constitution/">Sait Matty Jaw wrote</a> at the time that their key concern was “allowing Barrow to stay in office”.</p>
<p>However, in his first press conference after his victory, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-07/gambia-s-reelected-leader-vows-to-push-for-term-limits-justice">Barrow pledged</a> a new constitution that would include term limits.</p>
<p>It is also unclear what Barrow’s victory means for the recommendations of the Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission. The commission has given Gambians a window into the extensive and systematic <a href="https://www.hrw.org/tag/yahya-jammeh">human rights abuses</a> of the Jammeh era. </p>
<p>Jammeh loyalists, including some now in the alliance with Barrow, have criticised the commission’s hearings as a “witch hunt”. They called for its recommendations to be “trashed”, raising the worry that the report and its recommendations will be ignored with Barrow’s victory. </p>
<p>Unlike other candidates, Barrow did not make the implementation of the recommendations a major theme in his campaign. Even after winning re-election, if Barrow concludes that he is reliant on Jammeh loyalists to push his agenda, the recommendations might only be enacted in part. </p>
<p>The final report of the Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission was originally scheduled to be presented to the government in July 2021. It was finally <a href="https://jfjustice.net/trrc-in-last-ditch-efforts-to-make-its-final-report-public/">submitted</a> to the government on 25 November. Critics raised <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0b6f45z">questions</a> about the timing. There was not sufficient time for it to be released to Gambians before the election. </p>
<p>The entry of the lead prosecutor of the commission, Essa Faal, into the political fray as an independent candidate added fuel to the criticism. Some Gambians <a href="https://www.thegambiatimes.com/essa-faal-for-president-a-classic-betrayal-and-disservice-to-the-nation/#:%7E:text=On%20Friday%2C%20August%2027th%2C%202021%2C%20Essa%20Mbye%20Faal%2C,independent%20candidate%20in%20the%20December%202021%20Presidential%20election">criticised</a> Faal as an ambitious opportunist. </p>
<p>His candidacy was arguably not helped by the commission not being as popular as one might expect. According to <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/countries/gambia-1">Afrobarometer polling</a>, less than half of all Gambians trust the Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission at least somewhat.</p>
<p>Faal’s abysmal showing (around 2% of the national vote) may well show Barrow that he has the political headroom to ignore or soften the commission’s recommendations. </p>
<p>In the post-election press conference, Barrow <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-07/gambia-s-reelected-leader-vows-to-push-for-term-limits-justice">said</a> “there will be justice” and “there will be reconciliation and there will be reparations.” But what justice will look like, given his successful electoral alliance, remains unclear.</p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>Darboe, the leader of the United Democratic Party, is 73 years old and it seems unlikely he will contest the 2026 presidential election. He doesn’t have a clear successor.</p>
<p>Kandeh is 56 and will likely have another go at the presidency in five years, but his showing in this election does not suggest a successful run.</p>
<p>Sallah is 68 and has already <a href="https://www.voicegambia.com/2021/12/08/halifa-sallah-announces-retirement-from-political-representation/">announced</a> that he is done running for office. </p>
<p>Abdoulie Jammeh and Faal are both in their 50s, but their results call their future candidacies into question unless there is a political re-alignment of some sort in The Gambia. </p>
<p>It is thus difficult to see a serious electoral challenge against Barrow and the National People’s Party in the near future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173437/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Niklas Hultin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Adama Barrow’s re-election in The Gambia was not unexpected. It, however, leaves the opposition with an uncertain path forward and signals the shrinking status of his predecessor, Yahya Jammeh.Niklas Hultin, Assistant Professor, Global Affairs Program , George Mason UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1732632021-12-07T15:22:07Z2021-12-07T15:22:07ZThe Gambia’s 55-year-old marbles voting system is simple but difficult to cheat<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/441165/original/file-20220117-15-13semxp.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C5%2C3598%2C2391&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> </figcaption></figure><p>The Gambia’s President Adama Barrow has been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-59542813">declared</a> winner of the election held on 4 December. Barrow received around 53% of the vote cast while his closest rival at the polls, Oussainou Darboe, got 28%.</p>
<p>The election – the first since Barrow <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38183906">defeated</a> Yahya Jammeh in 2016 – is largely seen as a test for democracy in The Gambia. Jammeh was forced into exile following refusal to accept his loss at the poll. His 22-year rule had been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/tag/yahya-jammeh">marred</a> by human rights violations and repression of opposition voices. </p>
<p>The ousting of Jammeh opened the political space in the country, allowing mass participation. Citizens had the freedom to affiliate with any political party of their choice without fear of being arrested, detained, and tortured.</p>
<p>As results of the 2021 election came in, representatives from all opposition parties signed off on nearly all the tally sheets read to the independent electoral commission.</p>
<p>However, Darboe and two other candidates, Mama Kandeh and Essa Mbye Faal, said they would <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/499258-gambiadecides-darboe-two-others-reject-election-result.html">not accept</a> the results because counting took longer than expected and because of unspecified problems at some polling stations. </p>
<p>Members of the electoral commission later confirmed that delay in the announcement of the results was made out of precautionary measures to ensure that the votes are fully vetted before being announced.</p>
<p>Barrow’s victory was resounding mainly due to his messages of reconciliation and promoting unity across ethnic and tribal affiliations in the country. </p>
<p>For Darboe, Kandeh and Faal, challenging the results may be a political tactic to energise their supporters. There are no expectations that any error could emerge substantial enough to produce a different outcome. </p>
<p>The Gambia’s democracy has so far endured. </p>
<p>The country has a unique system of voting that does not involve the use of paper ballots in casting votes. Instead, it uses <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-38164870">marbles</a>. </p>
<p>The opposition candidates who rejected the results have not indicated any problem with the voting process, especially as it relates to the use of marbles.</p>
<p>This form of voting has proven to be simple and difficult to cheat.</p>
<h2>Votes cast in marbles</h2>
<p>Voting with marbles was introduced in The Gambia by the <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=gvz-Qy0vrS0C&pg=RA16-PA11&lpg=RA16-PA11&dq=Voting+with+marbles+was+introduced+in+The+Gambia+by+the+British+in+1965&source=bl&ots=KUeurNc-UY&sig=ACfU3U2vHPSpCyP2b_7KCGfRoJgxmwX23Q&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjk7ICmhtH0AhUUV8AKHYT4AH0Q6AF6BAgJEAM#v=onepage&q=Voting%20with%20marbles%20was%20introduced%20in%20The%20Gambia%20by%20the%20British%20in%201965&f=false">British in 1965</a> when the country first obtained its independence because of the low literacy levels in the population at the time. The system has continued to be in use.</p>
<p>In the place of ballot boxes, there is a metal cylinder with a hole in the top. The containers are arranged on a table inside a voting booth and painted with the party colours of candidates as well as their photos for ease of identification. Each voter drops a marble into the container representing the chosen candidate.</p>
<p>The final tool used in this unique form of voting is the counting box. Marbles are emptied into a square tray that is dotted with holes. At the end of the voting, counting is done on the spot. </p>
<p>The holes in the trays get evenly filled with marbles. The total is then tallied and recorded on the spot for representatives of candidates and voters.</p>
<p>Counting on the spot ensures fairness and builds public confidence in the electoral process. </p>
<p>The candidates who have questioned the results have pointed to procedural issues in the delayed counting by the independent electoral commission. No evidence of fraud has been presented to prove that the results were rigged in favour of the incumbent.</p>
<h2>Gambia voting zones</h2>
<p>As a standard rule of election and for ease of identification, the country is divided into zones referred to as constituencies and in each constituency, there are several polling stations where voting takes place. Every polling station is headed by a presiding officer representing the Independent Electoral Commission. </p>
<p>Voters are only allowed to cast their ballots at locations where they have registered to vote. On the election day, the presiding officers have a list to crosscheck the identities of the voters at that location. Voters’ fingers are marked with liquid ink before they get a marble. These measures are taken to prevent individuals from voting twice. </p>
<h2>A two horse race</h2>
<p>The 4 December presidential election was more of a competition between Barrow, the incumbent and candidate of the National People’s Party, and his former vice-president Darboe of the United Democratic Party.</p>
<p>The electoral system in The Gambia is based on first past the post. There is no runoff and any party that manages to record the highest number of total votes cast, however small the margin, is declared winner.</p>
<p>Barrow and Darboe’s political “bromance” came to a grinding halt when Darboe began to express a presidential ambition. Darboe, who is one of the founding members of the United Democratic Party, has repeatedly run for office in the past and lost to Jammeh. </p>
<p>Beyond these two individuals, a number of issues were of significance to voters on 4 December.</p>
<p>They <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/sep/23/gambia-joy-gives-way-to-sinking-distrust-adama-barrow-clings-to-power">include</a> the economy, security, corruption and falling standards of healthcare delivery.</p>
<p>While some of these issues were an assessment of the incumbents’ four years of leadership, there is also a concerning increase in ethnic and tribal politics never seen before in the country.</p>
<h2>Election as a statement</h2>
<p>Although the use of marbles in elections may be considered an obsolete form of voting, it is a process that has so far been transparent and discouraged rigging. </p>
<p>Despite its simplicity, this form of voting has successfully ended a dictatorship in The Gambia. That is clear evidence that the voting system is working. Jammeh may have ruled with fear and intimidation but also respected the voting process which ultimately led to his ouster. </p>
<p>There is talk of introducing paper ballots in conformity with modern standards of voting. But why change to something much more complex when what is already in place is producing the desired outcome of a free and fair election?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173263/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alieu Sanneh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Gambia has a unique system of voting that does not involve the use of paper ballots in casting votes – instead it uses marbles.Alieu Sanneh, Political scientist, University of Missouri-St. LouisLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1728072021-11-30T14:36:01Z2021-11-30T14:36:01ZWhat’s in store for Gambians as they gear up for hotly contested poll<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434456/original/file-20211129-58471-f3p3yx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Gambia's president, Adama Barrow, sing and dance during a campaign rally in Banjul on November 27, 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guy Peterson/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Gambians will <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/10/the-gambia-elections-meet-the-men-running-for-president">shortly go to the polls</a> to elect a new president in the country’s ninth direct presidential election, of which only one has seen an opposition candidate defeat the incumbent. That was in December 2016 when Adama Barrow <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38183906">defeated</a> Yahya Jammeh to end the latter’s 22 years of brutal rule. </p>
<p>Before that, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2008.00513.x">Dawda Jawara</a> had won three successive elections between 1982 and 1992 and <a href="https://qz.com/africa/905081/the-legacy-of-gambias-yahya-jammeh-captured-in-photos-and-words/">Jammeh</a> five between 1996 and 2011. </p>
<p>Even after being defeated at the polls Jammeh tried to cling to power by initially <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gambia-election-idUSKBN13Y2QO">rejecting</a> the outcome. But Barrow was eventually <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/1/19/adama-barrow-sworn-in-as-gambias-president-in-senegal">sworn in </a> as president in January 2017. </p>
<p>The 2021 election is expected to be peaceful and, unlike 2016, losing candidates are likely to accept the outcome.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://ceprass.gm/research/second-pre-election-opinion-poll-survey-findings/">recent poll</a> showed that 89% of Gambians expect there is more than a 50% chance that the 2021 election will be peaceful. </p>
<p>Barrow contested the 2016 election as an independent representing a seven-party coalition. This time he is the candidate of the <a href="https://www.npp.gm/">National People’s Party</a> which he established in December 2019. </p>
<p>The National People’s Party is one of 18 political parties that the <a href="https://iec.gm/">Independent Electoral Commission</a> has registered. Many are very small and have no representation in the National Assembly. In the most recent National Assembly election in <a href="https://iec.gm/download/national-assembly-final-results-6th-april-2017/">April 2017</a>, the <a href="https://udpthegambia.com/">United Democratic Party</a> won 31 out of 53 seats. Three parties, the <a href="https://www.gdc.gm/">Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction</a>, the <a href="https://www.gdc.gm/">Gambia Democratic Congress</a> and the <a href="https://iec.gm/political-party/national-reconciliation-party-nrp/">National Reconciliation Party</a>, each won five. The <a href="https://pdois.org/">People’s Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism</a> won four seats and the <a href="https://iec.gm/political-party/peoples-progressive-party-ppp/">People’s Progressive Party</a>, two. One independent candidate was elected.</p>
<p>Barrow’s surprising victory in 2016 was widely welcomed both in The Gambia and externally for restoring democracy and human rights. Jammeh’s repeated <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/17/gambia-two-decades-fear-and-repression">human rights violations </a> included extra-judicial executions, ‘disappearances’, detentions without trial and extensive media harassment. </p>
<p>Human rights has improved enormously under Barrow, but he has nevertheless faced strong criticism for:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>going back on his 2016 promise to serve for only three years rather than for a full five year term; </p></li>
<li><p>retaining the Economic Community of West African States Military contingent, which has been responsible for Gambian security since 2017. A recent <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/press/gambians-feel-less-safe-want-ecomig-leave-afrobarometer-survey-shows">poll</a> showed that Gambians overwhelmingly want the regional troops out;</p></li>
<li><p>effectively <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-gambias-quest-for-a-new-constitution-came-unstuck-and-what-next-147118">preventing</a> the 2020 draft Constitution being passed by the National Assembly;</p></li>
<li><p>signing an <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/barrow-puts-political-power-ahead-of-justice-in-the-gambia">electoral pact</a> recently between the National People’s Party and the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction, the party formed by Yahya Jammeh in 1996 and which he led throughout his presidency. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Many Gambians feared the pact might make an eventual Jammeh return more likely. It might also undermine the work of the <a href="https://www.trrc.gm/">Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission</a> that was established in 2018 to investigate human rights violations, consider reparations for the victims of abuses and promote reconciliation.</p>
<p>In spite of these issues, Barrow remains the favourite to win the poll. He may, however, not achieve an absolute majority of the votes cast. </p>
<h2>The main contenders</h2>
<p>Although 21 presidential candidates were nominated, only <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/six-stand-president-gambias-first-election-after-jammeh-2021-11-06/">six</a> were given the all clear by the Independent Electoral Commission. </p>
<p>Three contenders, all of whom have previously contested presidential elections, stand out.</p>
<p>They are <a href="https://www.gambia.com/anm-ousainou-darboe-receives-thousands-of-supporters-at-his-residence-in-pipeline/">Ousainou Darboe</a>, <a href="https://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/headlines/mama-kandeh-says-mou-does-not-include-jammeh-amnesty">Mamma Kandeh</a> and <a href="https://www.ourcampaigns.com/CandidateDetail.html?CandidateID=128049">Halifa Sallah</a>. </p>
<p>Darboe, the United Democratic Party leader since 1996, finished second behind Jammeh in each election between 1996 and 2011. He could not stand in 2016 having recently been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2016/07/gambia-prison-sentences-for-opposition-leaders-continues-downward-spiral-for-human-rights/">imprisoned</a> for participating in an illegal demonstration. </p>
<p>He was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in February 2017 and served as Barrow’s vice-president between June 2018 and March 2019, before being sacked.</p>
<p>The United Democratic Party remains the largest party in the National Assembly, even though eight of its 31 MPs <a href="https://nationaltelegraph.net/gambias-udp-expels-8-lawmakers-from-parliament-suspected-of-supporting-president-barrow/">were expelled</a> in November 2019 and now sit as independents. </p>
<p>Darboe’s courageous opposition to Jammeh over two decades counts in his favour. However, at 73, he is the oldest candidate. The <a href="https://iec.gm/download/group-by-region-2021/">youthful profile</a> of the Gambian electorate (58% are aged between 18 and 35) may cost him votes. </p>
<p>Darboe’s best electoral performance was in 1996. He may well achieve a higher share than his 17% in 2011, but he is unlikely to defeat Barrow. </p>
<p>The leader of the Gambia Democratic Congress, Kandeh is a former Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction National Assembly member, who finished third behind Barrow and Jammeh in 2016. He had previously refused to join the opposition coalition. </p>
<p>This time he will stand in alliance with a breakaway faction of the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction. Jammeh supports the alliance with Kandeh, seeing this as a way to engineer his return to The Gambia, and has recently spoken by telephone at his campaign rallies. </p>
<p>Kandeh’s links with Jammeh will bring him votes in the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction heartland of the Fonis. But it may well cost him support in other areas where voters fear his victory would lead to Jammeh’s return. His chances of victory remain slim.</p>
<p>Sallah was a founding member of the People’s Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism in 1986. He is currently National Assembly member for Serrekunda and was the party’s presidential candidate in 2006. </p>
<p>The party is seen as radical and often criticised by both Jawara and Jammeh. </p>
<p>Sallah commands respect because of his long political career. However, the party he leads has never enjoyed much support outside the urban areas and he is unlikely to achieve more than the 6% of the vote he gained in 2006.</p>
<p>The two remaining candidates – apart from Barrow – are contesting their first presidential election. <a href="https://www.internationalairportreview.com/speaker_profile/70405/abdouliejammeh/">Abdoulie E. Jammeh</a>, a former director general of the Gambia Civil Aviation Authority, heads the <a href="https://www.nupgambia.com/">National Unity Party</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.gammatters.com/essa-faal">Essa M. Faal</a>, the only independent candidate, is an international lawyer who until recently was the chief prosecutor of the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission. </p>
<p>Neither is expected to win many votes.</p>
<p>Thanks to the electoral commission’s vigorous promotion of voter registration the size of the electorate has <a href="https://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/article/about-900000-electors-expected-to-vote-in-dec-polls-1">increased </a> from 886,578 in 2016 to 962,157 in 2021. Women account for <a href="https://iec.gm/download/group-by-region-2021/">57%</a> of registered voters.</p>
<p>Only Gambians registered in the country are eligible to vote. </p>
<h2>What to expect</h2>
<p>A recent <a href="https://ceprass.gm/research/second-pre-election-opinion-poll-survey-findings/">opinion poll</a> showed that 41% of those surveyed in November intended to vote for Barrow, compared with 22% for Darboe, 6% for Kandeh and 5% for Sallah. </p>
<p>Importantly, however, 23% remained undecided or declined to state their voting intention. Doubtless some in this group will not vote. But if a substantial proportion support Darboe, he could yet upset the odds and at last become president. </p>
<p>If, as anticipated, Barrow wins again, he will probably continue to lead the country in a similar manner and direction. He will doubtless change his cabinet, but may retain the leaders of some other parties, including Hamat Bah of the National Reconciliation Party. </p>
<p>One immediate challenge for a new Barrow government would be how to respond to the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/11/gambia-truth-and-reconciliation-report-must-lead-to-justice-and-reparations-for-victims/">final report</a> of the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission, which was submitted to him on 25 November. </p>
<p>Barrow will certainly face pressure to prosecute some of the major violators of human rights under Jammeh.</p>
<p>Fears that a Barrow victory would lead to the former president returning to The Gambia have receded following Jammeh’s denunciation of the pact between his party and the ruling party.</p>
<p>If Darboe loses once again, his hopes of ever becoming president will surely be over. If he should win against the odds, there may be relatively few changes in government policy, although all talks of Jammeh ever returning to The Gambia will surely be over.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172807/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Perfect does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The 2021 presidential election in The Gambia is expected to be peaceful and losing candidates are likely to accept the outcome.David Perfect, Visiting professor, University of ChesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1621372021-06-15T14:25:20Z2021-06-15T14:25:20ZAreas in Africa with more Chinese-backed projects were more likely to experience protests<p>Chinese investment in Africa has helped spark economic growth and improve social outcomes across the continent. Yet Chinese projects often seem to go hand in hand with civil protests. We wanted to find out whether these were isolated incidents or signalled broader discontent among the population.</p>
<p>In new <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0014292121000945">research</a>, we show that regions hosting Chinese-led projects are more likely to experience protests. </p>
<p>China’s financial involvement on the continent has grown dramatically since the launch of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 and the China-Africa Development Fund in 2006. Today, China is Africa’s <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1844049/trade-between-china-and-africa-dropped-14-percent-in-the-first-quarter/">largest trading partner</a>. China also spent an estimated <a href="http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/WPS46_Aid_China_and_Growth.pdf">US$350 billion</a> (£250 million) on development programmes on the continent between 2000 and 2014 (the most recent data), on a par with what the US spent in the same period. </p>
<p>The social, economic and political implications of this vast investment are subject to much controversy. Western countries are critical of China’s attempt to gain “soft power” (gaining economic and cultural power without coercion) on the continent, saying it might <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2014.898893">undermine good governance</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/90001834.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A4e069aee8c090c80762752e7b0a57abc">human rights</a>. But what do Africans citizens think about China’s impact on their lives? </p>
<p>It is easy to find evidence of protests against Chinese projects and investments. In the Kenyan archipelago of Lamu, for instance, residents and local businesses recently managed to <a href="https://chinadialogue.net/en/energy/lamu-kenyan-coal-project-chinese-investors-take-environmental-risks-seriously/">block</a> a proposed Chinese coal power plant, which they said would hurt the local tourist industry. People in the Gambia have <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-in-the-gambia-highlight-tensions-over-chinese-investment-in-africa-119221">protested against Chinese fish factories</a>, which have drained waste into nearby wildlife reserves, hurting the local fish industry and the environment. Or in 2012, Zambian workers protested against low pay and hazardous working conditions in Chinese-run mines and even <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19135435">killed a Chinese manager</a>. </p>
<p>Of course, these are just a few examples from across a huge continent – we wanted to explore whether there is a systematic link between Chinese projects and civil protests. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-in-the-gambia-highlight-tensions-over-chinese-investment-in-africa-119221">Protests in the Gambia highlight tensions over Chinese investment in Africa</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>To do this, we used a global database on local protests that located around 125,000 protests across Africa and combined it with data on the location of Chinese projects across the continent. We did find a link: areas with more Chinese projects were more likely to experience protests. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405973/original/file-20210611-27-1srcebl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Africa with green and red dots" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405973/original/file-20210611-27-1srcebl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405973/original/file-20210611-27-1srcebl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405973/original/file-20210611-27-1srcebl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405973/original/file-20210611-27-1srcebl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405973/original/file-20210611-27-1srcebl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405973/original/file-20210611-27-1srcebl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405973/original/file-20210611-27-1srcebl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map of Chinese projects and protests in Africa between 2000 and 2014. (Chinese projects in green; protests in red)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Iacoella, Martorano, Metzger, Sanfilippo (2021)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We also found that the type of project and its location matter. For instance, energy projects, often hydropower, are generally far away from towns and cities. By contrast, big infrastructure projects could be more likely to promote public demonstrations because they have visible effects on local and regional activities. </p>
<h2>Perceptions influence and trust in governments</h2>
<p>There are a couple of potential explanations for this link between projects and protests. First, we know from previous research that, compared with World Bank aid, Chinese finance is prone to being <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S030438781831099X">used by local elites</a> to pursue their own interests and obtain <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272718300021">many of the benefits</a>, perhaps because of a <a href="https://www.aiddata.org/publications/how-china-lends">lack of transparency</a> in loan conditions, or because of China’s principle of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S030438781831099X">not interfering in domestic affairs</a> when granting loans, which gives local political leaders more power to allocate resources to projects. All this can lower citizens’ trust in their government institutions. When people lose trust in institutions, they may prefer protesting to voting. Our analysis confirms that areas with a larger number of Chinese projects do see lowered trust in local government. </p>
<p>Second, using data from the <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/data">Afrobarometer</a>, which surveys Africans on their view on democracy, governance and other issues, we observe a growing sense of China’s rising domestic economic influence among citizens who are more strongly exposed to Chinese projects. This perception can stir protests when citizens feel that the economic changes are serving Chinese rather than domestic interests. </p>
<p>But under what circumstances will citizens’ grievances and distrust effectively result in protests? Almost unsurprisingly, and reminiscent of the Arab spring, we find that improved mobile connectivity may have played an important role in helping citizens to coordinate. </p>
<p>Protests are an interesting way to explore how African citizens are responding to Chinese investment. A direct and legitimate form of political participation, protests can draw attention to grievances and to demand accountability from governments. Our study shows a systematic link between Chinese projects and the occurrence of protests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162137/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>We looked at 125,000 protests across Africa and mapped them against Chinese investments.Bruno Martorano, Assistant Professor, Maastricht University and Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (UNU-MERIT), United Nations UniversityFrancesco Iacoella, Researcher, Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (UNU-MERIT), United Nations UniversityLaura Metzger, Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for International Development, Harvard Kennedy SchoolMarco Sanfilippo, Associate Professor of Economics, Università di TorinoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1607162021-06-06T09:00:03Z2021-06-06T09:00:03ZHow The Gambia beat trachoma, an infection that causes blindness<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402320/original/file-20210524-21-1tzhvoe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A health worker examines a child for signs of trachoma </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-african-ministry-of-health-worker-with-opthamology-news-photo/72546415?adppopup=true">Joe McNally/Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The government of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/The-Gambia">The Gambia</a> recently <a href="https://www.iapb.org/news/the-gambia-eliminates-trachoma-as-a-public-health-problem/">announced</a> that the country had eliminated trachoma, a highly contagious eye disease, after years of hard work by health workers, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and communities. </p>
<p>In The Gambia, the disease <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1041660/">accounted</a> for 17% of the reported blindness in a national survey in 1986. The prevalence of trachoma has dropped from <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9828780/">0.1% to 0.02%</a> in the last 10 years. Current <a href="https://www.iapb.org/news/the-gambia-eliminates-trachoma-as-a-public-health-problem/">estimates</a> show a prevalence of less than 0.2% in adults aged over 15 years. This is about one case per 1,000 people.</p>
<p>Trachoma has been <a href="https://academic.oup.com/bmb/article/84/1/99/382442">described</a> as the most infectious cause of blindness in the world, <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/trachoma">responsible for 1.4%</a> of blindness. It is <a href="https://idpjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40249-020-0630-9">one</a> of the 20 neglected tropical diseases that plague over a billion of the world’s poorest people. </p>
<p>As at <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/trachoma">September 2020</a>, 13 countries had reported that they had eliminated it as a disease of public health concern. Others in Africa were Ghana and Morocco. Togo is <a href="https://endinafrica.org/news/its-time-to-take-togo-off-the-who-trachoma-list/">pending</a> validation from the World Health Organisation. The organisation has <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/trachoma">validated</a> the claims of 10 of the 13 countries. </p>
<p>The WHO lists <a href="https://www.who.int/trachoma/resources/who_htm_ntd_2016.8/en/#:%7E:text=In%202012%2C%20Oman%20became%20the,as%20a%20%E2%80%9Cverification%E2%80%9D%20exercise.&text=The%20process%20for%20diseases%20targeted,been%20defined%20as%20%E2%80%9Cvalidation%E2%80%9D">strict guidelines</a> to determine whether trachoma has in fact been eliminated from endemic countries. One is that there must be a system in place to identify and, where necessary, manage any new cases in line with protocols. This means that once a country is confirmed as having eliminated trachoma, a resurgence is not expected. </p>
<p>As we are involved in the ongoing <a href="https://espen.afro.who.int/system/files/content/resources/NIGERIA_NTD_Master_Plan_2015_2020.pdf">Nigerian effort</a> to curb trachoma, my colleagues and I are studying countries like The Gambia closely for guidance.</p>
<p>Sario Kanyi, the coordinator of The Gambia’s trachoma elimination initiative, <a href="https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/doi/10.1289/EHP2699">said</a> its success started in the community. He added that once people knew what trachoma was, they took charge and helped in communicating what had to be done.</p>
<h2>What is trachoma?</h2>
<p>Trachoma is an infection caused by the bacteria <em>Chlamydia trachomatis</em>. It can be spread through physical contact with the eyes, nose or throat of those infected. It can also be picked up from the items used by infected individuals, such as face towels.</p>
<p>Crowded conditions and poor sanitation have been identified as possible enabling factors. </p>
<p>The signs and symptoms of trachoma include: mild itching and irritation of the eyes and eyelids, a discharge of mucus and pus, eyelid swelling and sensitivity to light. </p>
<p>Others are ocular pain, redness of the eye and vision loss. Young children are the <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0009067">most susceptible</a> to trachoma infection. It usually progresses slowly, presenting with more painful symptoms at adulthood.</p>
<p>Repeated episodes of active trachoma can cause the eyelid to be scarred. In some individuals this leads to trachomatous trichiasis, in which the eyelashes turn inward and touch the eye, causing extreme pain. If left untreated it can lead to blindness. </p>
<p>Treating trachoma requires a strategy that integrates four steps known as <a href="https://www.trachomacoalition.org/prevention-and-treatment-strategy">“SAFE”</a>. The letters stand for surgery (to alleviate eye pain or prevent further complications), antibiotics, facial cleanliness and environmental sanitation.</p>
<h2>The Gambian success story</h2>
<p>The Gambia <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1041660/">established</a> an eye care programme in 1986. It also initiated policies that helped in combating the condition. </p>
<p>The country mobilised resources through partnerships with local and international specialists, such as the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.</p>
<p>A trachoma task force was created under the Gambian National Eye Programme. This was helped by the small size of the country’s population, <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/gambia-population/#:%7E:text=Gambia%202020%20population%20is%20estimated,(and%20dependencies)%20by%20population">2.4 million</a>, which allowed intervention to easily reach most citizens.</p>
<p>Clinical staff were trained and retrained to deliver surgical procedures to manage the disease. Lid surgeries were then carried out to correct turning in of scarred eyelids and damage to the cornea.</p>
<p>The Gambia undertook campaigns to educate the public on the risks posed by the disease, and about preventive measures like hygiene. Open defecation and proper face and hand hygiene were addressed by building latrines and boreholes for communities.</p>
<p>It also created a network of eye care units across the country with the sole aim of diagnosing and treating people with trachoma. High potency antibiotics were also mass administered to reduce the average bacterial load in the endemic areas of The Gambia.</p>
<p>Thousands of community health volunteers were trained to go from house to house to find people with the disease. The government had support from several NGOs. The Gambia also adhered to the World Health Organisation’s <a href="https://www.trachomacoalition.org/prevention-and-treatment-strategy">SAFE strategy</a> for eliminating trachoma. </p>
<p>A major component of the SAFE strategy is the mass distribution and administration of Azithromycin. This antibiotic was donated by Pfizer to national programmes that are implementing the trachoma strategy in The Gambia. This led to monitoring of the bacteria load in a community before and after treatment. </p>
<p>Recent <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-017-15056-7#Sec6">studies</a> have been done in The Gambia on measuring the rate of reinfection after mass treatment programmes. The <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0004906">experts do not</a> foresee a reemergence of trachoma in the country even with the risk of infected individuals coming from Senegal to Gambia, where disease is endemic.</p>
<p>The Gambia’s success in eliminating trachoma prevents the occurrence of about <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9828780/">100,000</a> new cases, saving people pain and possible blindness. It also means that resources previously allocated to combating the disease can now be reallocated to other public health conditions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160716/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Gambia’s success in eliminating trachoma means that resources previously allocated to combating the disease can now be reallocated to other public health conditionsMusa Mutali, Lecturer of Optometry, University of BeninLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1471182020-10-06T14:43:43Z2020-10-06T14:43:43ZWhy The Gambia’s quest for a new constitution came unstuck – and what next<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/361121/original/file-20201001-22-19pux1w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gambians celebrate the departure of former strongman Yahya Jammeh in front of an armoured vehicle manned by West African troops in early 2017.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Carl de Souza/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The constitution-drafting process aimed at ushering in The Gambia’s third republic has reached an unfortunate dead-end. More than two years after the process began, and after a highly acrimonious and polarised parliamentary debate, the proposed Constitution Promulgation Bill, 2020 was recently <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202009230283.html">rejected</a> in the national assembly. </p>
<p>This bill would have brought in a new constitution to replace the 1997 one. But with 23 lawmakers voting against, the backing of 31 fell short of the three-quarters required to put it to a referendum.</p>
<p>The failure to adopt the new constitution is a hurdle in efforts to put the country firmly on the road to democracy. This began when former president <a href="https://www.hrw.org/tag/yahya-jammeh">President Yahya Jammeh</a> was voted out of office in December 2016, ending his 22 years of dictatorship. His efforts to cling to power failed after the Economic Community of West African States intervened militarily, forcing him to make way for the winner, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/1/26/profile-adama-barrow-the-gambias-new-president">Adama Barrow</a>.</p>
<p>A new vision for The Gambia included a new constitution and accountability for past human rights violations. A <a href="http://www.trrc.gm/">Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission</a> was established to probe human rights violations committed between July 1994 to January 2017.</p>
<p>While this has been a costly exercise, it was worth it. Gambians have grappled with some important constitutional ideas, and reached insights that will be helpful in the long run. Given its great quest for change and the broad consensus that there cannot be any meaningful break with the political past without true and complete reform, I am confident that The Gambia will eventually give itself a new constitution.</p>
<h2>Draft constitution</h2>
<p>Constitutional change and a rebuilding of the foundations for good governance and democracy were a campaign promise of the ruling coalition. The <a href="https://crc220.org/">formal process</a> of reviewing the 1997 constitution and drafting a new one started in June 2018 with the appointment of an 11-member commission.</p>
<p>The commission had a two-fold mandate. The first was to review the 1997 constitution and draft a new one. The second was to prepare a report on the draft constitution. The commission solicited the views and opinions of Gambians about issues they wished to see addressed in their new constitution.</p>
<p>The commission began the review by preparing a list of 369 questions and issues on which public opinion was sought. It toured the country, had further consultations and conducted additional household and online surveys.</p>
<p>It held dialogues with various actors, including political parties, central and local government institutions and civil society organisations. In addition, it consulted with Gambians in the diaspora.</p>
<p>Following these consultations as well as some in-depth research, the commission produced a draft constitution, published on 15 November 2019. It then toured the country again to make people aware of the draft and to solicit feedback. </p>
<p>On 30 March 2020, the commission <a href="https://www.voicegambia.com/2020/03/31/president-barrow-receives-final-draft-of-new-constitution/">submitted</a> the “Final Draft Constitution and Report” to the President Barrow. In line with requirements in the 1997 constitution, the bill was twice published in the Government Gazette, then introduced in the national assembly on 14 September 2020.</p>
<p>The draft constitution introduced several measures aimed at enhancing and strengthening democracy. They included a presidential term limit, limits on executive power and greater political inclusion of marginalised groups (including women, youth and people with disabilities). The Bill of Rights chapter complied with international and regional human rights standards. </p>
<p>The public had high hopes for significant constitutional change. The personalised politics of the recent past, the undemocratic provisions in the frequently amended 1997 constitution and a complete disregard of the rule of law by the former president left Gambians with a desire for change. </p>
<p>Sadly, these hopes were dashed when the bill did not receive the requisite majority vote in parliament.</p>
<h2>The options</h2>
<p>One way of trying to determine why it did not pass is to look at who voted against it. From this it is possible to speculate what their main concerns were. </p>
<p>A review of the parliamentary debates suggests that the major concerns were those of the governing party. It took issue with the limitations to the scope of executive power. It also <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/gambias-draft-law-restricts-presidential-terms/a-53825425">did not like</a> the fact that the presidential term limit would operate retroactively. This provision would ensure the current term of President Barrow would be counted towards his term limit.</p>
<p>The rejection of the bill on its merits means that Gambians will not get to see this version of the 2020 draft constitution in a future referendum. So, what now? The executive has not yet shared any plans, so we are left to speculate. </p>
<p>I foresee two possibilities here. One option is to amend the 1997 constitution to include some of the more progressive provisions in the 2020 draft. The problem with amendment is that it would have to follow the same process as for the promulgation of a new constitution. </p>
<p>In other words, it would require approval of three-quarters of all the members of the national assembly on the second and third readings and would also have to be passed in a national referendum. This further requires a minimum 50% voter turnout with 75% approving.</p>
<p>A second option is to go back to the drawing board. Under this scenario, the Constitutional Review Commission Act would be amended. The commission could either restart the drafting process afresh, or amend the draft to resolve obstacles to a consensus. But this too would be challenging.</p>
<p>The majority of parliamentarians who did support the bill would view a new process with suspicion. On the other hand, given the assertive citizenry and engaged and revitalised civil society seen in recent times, the public is also not likely to buy into any process that produces a watered-down version.</p>
<p>Even if going back to the drawing board was feasible, success is clearly not guaranteed.</p>
<p><em>An earlier version of this article was <a href="https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2020-posts/2020/9/29/attempts-at-constitutional-reform-in-the-gambia-whither-the-draft-constitution">published</a> by International Association of Constitutional Law.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147118/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Satang Nabaneh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The rejection of the bill on its merits means that Gambians will not get to see this version of the 2020 draft constitution in a future referendum.Satang Nabaneh, Post-Doctoral Researcher, Centre for Human Rights, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1470382020-10-01T14:38:03Z2020-10-01T14:38:03ZDigital democracy is still a long way off in Africa: it takes more than technology<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360247/original/file-20200928-16-1iimkex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">African leaders blunt the transformative power of smartphones through censorship and internet shutdowns.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/John Hrusha</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>From the mid-2000s onwards, the digital revolution raised hopes of democratic transformation and strengthening in Africa. But it hasn’t quite turned out like that. Now, almost a decade after the <a href="https://blog.transparency.org/2011/08/02/digital-technologies-and-the-arab-spring/">“Arab Spring”</a>, techno-optimism has given way <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/social-media-disruption-nigerias-whatsapp-politics/">to techno-pessimism</a>. </p>
<p>African leaders have proved able to blunt the transformative potential of smart phones through censorship and internet shutdowns. When the internet is on, social media attracts more attention for spreading fake news than preventing election rigging.</p>
<p>What was once thought of as <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/385959">“liberation technology”</a> has turned out to be remarkably compatible with the maintenance of the status quo. Or has it? Does this more pessimistic reading overlook genuine progress?</p>
<p>A new publication I co-edited with Lisa Garbe – <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/decoding-digitaldemocracy-in-africa/"><em>Decoding #DigitalDemocracy in Africa</em></a> – draws together the latest research on the extent to which digital technology has changed Africa … and the ways in which Africa is changing digital technology.</p>
<p>The articles show that we should not miss the wood for the trees: despite disappointment, digital technology has had profound impacts on African politics and society. But, they also highlight how much more needs to be known about digital technology on the continent.</p>
<h2>Digital access and inclusion</h2>
<p>A lot of recent analysis has focused on the <a href="https://www.africaportal.org/features/covid-19-implications-of-the-pandemic-for-the-digital-divide-in-africa/#:%7E:text=COVID%2D19%20has%20emphasised%20the,pronounced%20on%20the%20African%20continent">digital divide in Africa</a>, and the many people excluded from online access by poverty and lack of coverage. </p>
<p>Yet researchers have also found that closing this divide <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0736585306000359?casa_token=5YvB4vBqfcYAAAAA:B1iKNTpvSANE2Qwf_gw9FxLh-_DOTDEM-Q-HYjW7YcEgjvx-mvdwFLTY5nWEjd6jpg33RTPzBw">cannot be achieved by cheaper technology alone</a>. Using digital technology to access information and resources is only possible when a set of political, legal, and economic conditions are in place.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360248/original/file-20200928-24-10qqfw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360248/original/file-20200928-24-10qqfw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360248/original/file-20200928-24-10qqfw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360248/original/file-20200928-24-10qqfw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360248/original/file-20200928-24-10qqfw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360248/original/file-20200928-24-10qqfw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360248/original/file-20200928-24-10qqfw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Facebook and other tech giants are more concerned with growing user numbers than addressing social ills caused by their technology.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Ali Haider</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For example, the content that citizens can access increasingly depends on giant tech companies, especially for poorer citizens. In his contribution on <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/facebooks-ongoing-scramble-for-africa/">Facebook’s Free Basics</a> - a service that provides basic online services without data charges - Toussaint Nothias explains that tech corporations’ dominant position enables them to shape how individuals use the internet under the pretence of making it more affordable.</p>
<p>This raises tough questions about whether multinational companies engage ethically in Africa. As Julie Owono’s contribution points out, Facebook has been accused of “dumping” products such as Free Basics, stymieing the production of local alternatives. This has raised concerns of a fresh “scramble for Africa”, with multinational companies expending more energy and resources in securing new users than tackling hate speech and misinformation.</p>
<h2>Social media, democracy and accountability</h2>
<p>From the recent <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2020-06-26-audacious-zambian-protesters-outsmart-the-police/">“virtual protest”</a> in Zambia to <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2020-09-11-campaigning-together-but-on-their-own/">#ZimbabweanLivesMatter</a>, the potential of social media to empower dissenting voices is clear. </p>
<p>Idayat Hassan and Jamie Hitchen’s analysis of WhatsApp and Facebook use ahead of <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/how-hashtag-activism-moves-offline-in-the-gambia/">elections in The Gambia</a> shows that even in rural areas with limited connectivity, social media content contributes to offline political mobilisation.</p>
<p>It is important not to lose sight of this more positive impact amid the growing focus on fake news and hate speech.</p>
<p>Sadly, though, further problems are on the horizon. Azeb Madebo reveals how the Ethiopian diaspora has <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/social-media-the-diaspora-and-the-politics-of-ethnicity-in-ethiopia/">fuelled the polarisation</a> between the Oromo community on the one hand, and the Ethiopian government and Ethiopian nationalists on the other. </p>
<p>Not all fake news is believed of course, but when stories play into widely held <a href="https://www.cddwestafrica.org/whatsapp-nigeria-2019-elections/">fears, prejudices and assumptions</a>, they can exacerbate distrust and encourage a cycle of violence.</p>
<p>It is, therefore, significant that there is relatively little regulation of content moderation. Julie Owono shows that in part this can be attributed to the limited local capacity of content providers such as Facebook or Twitter. Neither has invested heavily in African experts capable of identifying fake news and hate speech circulated on their platforms. </p>
<p>In part, it is also rooted in the limited funding available for civil society groups, considerable linguistic diversity, and the volume of information being shared. As a result, organisations such as <a href="https://africacheck.org/">Africa Check</a> highlight instances of fake news but cannot hope to cover all harmful content.</p>
<p>There are no easy answers to these problems though, because when governments do try and combat free speech, Ashwanee Budoo finds that misinformation is often abused as an excuse to clamp down on <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/how-fighting-fake-news-hurts-free-spech/">freedom of expression</a>.</p>
<h2>Free speech, censorship and Internet shutdowns</h2>
<p>While growing internet coverage has enabled citizens to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2014.885505?casa_token=UaJPiCWtiLkAAAAA%3A4LCwyxQQGcDpQehzEYCU3skFgOQR3mXCdue7sy-4uIS8I8yZcgSdT_3EvgNdfRRVZ2Qe4yeXZtMv">challenge authoritarian rule</a>, non-democratic leaders have also manipulated or disrupted online access. According to Lisa Garbe, internet shutdowns have become the <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/what-we-do-not-know-about-internet-shutdowns-in-africa/">“new normal”</a> in some authoritarian states. This is especially so during politically contested periods such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/internet-shutdowns-in-africa-threaten-democracy-and-development-142868">elections or major protests</a>. </p>
<p>Moreover, while internet shutdowns are important, they are the thin end of the wedge. A number of steps have been taken to prevent citizens from being able to express themselves online. There is a growing use of <a href="https://citizenlab.ca/2018/09/hide-and-seek-tracking-nso-groups-pegasus-spyware-to-operations-in-45-countries">spyware across the continent</a> to snoop on government critics.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360316/original/file-20200928-20-1xqtcfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360316/original/file-20200928-20-1xqtcfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360316/original/file-20200928-20-1xqtcfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360316/original/file-20200928-20-1xqtcfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360316/original/file-20200928-20-1xqtcfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360316/original/file-20200928-20-1xqtcfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360316/original/file-20200928-20-1xqtcfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">High data costs fuel digital exclusion in Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Tanzania, restrictive laws about what can be said online go hand in hand with government pressure. A prominent lawyer <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/africa/article/2001387599/no-room-for-opposition-tanzania-lawyer-loses-job-at-top-firm-and-position-at-the-roll-of-advocates">was recently fired</a> because of her “activism”. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/feb/27/millions-of-ugandans-quit-internet-after-introduction-of-social-media-tax-free-speech">Uganda</a>, <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1377582/benin-is-taxing-use-of-social-media-apps-like-facebook-whatsapp/">Benin</a> and several other states have imposed a social media tax that has excluded many users. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, those who can afford internet access still face restrictions on governments information. Thus, Lisa-Marie Selvik argues that digital technology has done little to give many African citizens the right to <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/decoding-digitaldemocracy-in-africa/">basic government information</a>.</p>
<h2>What we know and what we don’t know</h2>
<p>Some sixteen years on since the creation of Twitter, it is becoming clear what we do and don’t know about digital democracy in Africa. We know that digital technology is acting as a disruptive force that simultaneously has <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/authors/nic-cheeseman/">“liberating” and destructive</a> potential. </p>
<p>The continent has yet to develop an effective way to stop the flow of fake news. And the full benefits of digital democracy are being thwarted by digital exclusion that is driven by the <a href="http://www.connectingafrica.com/author.asp?section_id=761&doc_id=756372#:%7E:text=The%20quarterly%20comparison%20by%20Research,1GB%20in%20Zimbabwe%20cost%20%2420.">high cost of data</a>, the strategies of authoritarian governments, and in some cases the approach of major tech companies themselves.<br>
But, what we don’t know is just as important. We urgently need more research in a number of areas.</p>
<p>To what extent has social media exacerbated ethno-regional tensions? How much online content is actually produced by governments and the trolls that work for them? Who should be responsible for content moderation and how can ethno-linguistic diversity be accounted for? What are the political and socio-economy consequences of restricting internet access, and how can this be resisted? Does the finding that how an individual behaves online <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/j.1681-4835.2015.tb00479.x">does not dramatically change</a> their offline political activity in Uganda hold more broadly? And is social media reinforcing existing gender norms rather than challenging them?</p>
<p>These questions should inspire the research agendas of the future.</p>
<p><em>Idayat Hassan, Director of CDD-West Africa, contributed to the publication and is a co-author of this article</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147038/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The full benefits of digital democracy are being thwarted by digital exclusion that is driven by the high cost of data.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLisa Garbe, Doctoral Researcher, University of St.GallenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1429332020-07-20T15:18:29Z2020-07-20T15:18:29ZIvorian president might be sorely tempted to seek a third term. Why he mustn’t<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/348420/original/file-20200720-37-19cl3xu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Alassane Ouattara of Ivory Coast.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Horacio Villalobos/Corbis via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The death of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/ivory-coast-prime-minister-amadou-gon-coulibaly-dies-200708183836945.html">Ivorian Prime Minister Gon Coulibaly</a> and subsequent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-politics/ivory-coast-vice-president-quits-days-after-pms-death-idUSKCN24E1D9">resignation</a> of Vice President Daniel Kablan Duncan, reportedly on personal grounds, have added heat to the contestations over the presidential elections planned for October this year. </p>
<p>Coulibaly was the chosen successor of the current president, Alassane Ouattara. The events have reignited concerns over a possible third presidential bid by Ouattara which commenators believe could lead to political instability.</p>
<p>The country was expected to have its first ever peaceful democratic change of power, following Ouattara’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-politics/ivory-coasts-ouattara-says-he-wont-run-for-re-election-idUSKBN20S1IZ">announcement</a> in March that he would step down at the end of his current term. </p>
<p>The death of Coulibaly has reopened a Pandora’s box. </p>
<p>Quattara’s governing coalition, Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace, has asked him to seek a third term, following the death of his preferred succcessor. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/07/20/world/africa/20reuters-ivorycoast-politics.html?searchResultPosition=8">According</a> to the party’s executive director, Adama Bictogo </p>
<blockquote>
<p>A majority of our supporters have turned to President Alassane Ouattara. He is our solution…</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Importantly, Quattara (78) has been blowing hot and cold on whether he’ll be seeking a third term. He may be tempted to reconsider his promised departure to give himself time to groom a new successor. </p>
<p>In my view he should not. Quattara has done well economically. The economy <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cotedivoire/overview">grew above 8% between 2011 and 2018</a>, becoming one of the fastest growing economies in Africa. Staying in power could mean continuing this trend. But, that’ll have dire implications for the country’s democratic trajectory. The potential political and security instability that his return could spark would only serve to undo what he has achieved.</p>
<h2>Constitutional ambiguity</h2>
<p>When Ouattara came to power in 2010, the Ivorian constitution contained a two-term limit on presidential candidacy. During his 2015 presidential election campaign, he promised to lead the adoption of a new constitution. This was primarily to abolish the principle of <a href="http://constitutionnet.org/news/third-cote-divoire-republic-towards-inclusive-constitutional-reform-process">“Ivoirité”</a>, which was used to exclude individuals from the Muslim north from high office. </p>
<p>They were excluded ostensibly because of their perceived links with neighbouring countries. It was infamously used to exclude Ouattara, himself from the Muslim North, from running for the presidency <a href="http://constitutionnet.org/news/third-cote-divoire-republic-towards-inclusive-constitutional-reform-process">in the 1990s</a>. </p>
<p>A new constitution approved in a referendum in October 2016 <a href="http://constitutionnet.org/news/third-cote-divoire-republic-towards-inclusive-constitutional-reform-process">resolved</a> the ‘Ivoirité’ problem. Under the new constitution, a presidential candidate need only show that he or she is exclusively Ivoirian, born of a father or of a mother Ivorian by birth.</p>
<p>Under the old constitution, both parents needed to be Ivorian by birth. The new constitution also introduced a new senate and a position of a vice president. </p>
<p>Perhaps the most significant thing about the new constitution is what it didn’t say. It retains the two-term limit on presidential aspirants, but says nothing regarding terms served prior to its adoption. </p>
<p>Exploiting this ambiguity, Ouattara <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-politics-ouattara/ivory-coasts-ouattara-says-hes-free-to-run-again-in-2020-jeune-afrique-idUSKCN1IZ0S3">declared</a> in June that he could run for two more terms.</p>
<p>He subsequently <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/11648/a-third-term-for-ouattara-my-decision-is-almost-made/">quipped</a> that he would step down at the end of his term in October 2020 – but on condition that other members of the old guard also abandoned their presidential aspirations. He was referring to former president and current rival Henri Konan Bédié. Bédié (86), a historical adversary of Ouattara’s, hatched and pursued the “Ivoirité” drive in his first stint as president <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/47c565a0c.html">in the early 1990s</a>. </p>
<p>In the run-up to this decision, Ouattara <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-politics-soro/ivory-coast-presidential-candidate-soro-sentenced-to-20-years-in-prison-idUSKCN22A2E0">pursued criminal charges</a> against Guillaume Soro, a former ally-turned-rival and presidential aspirant.</p>
<p>Following a declaration of his intent to run for the presidency, Soro was hastily charged and convicted of embezzlement for events <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-politics-soro/ivory-coast-presidential-candidate-soro-sentenced-to-20-years-in-prison-idUSKCN22A2E0">dating back to 2007</a>.</p>
<p>Many saw the prosecution and its timing as politically motivated. With Soro effectively out of the way, Coulibaly was set to secure victory for the ruling <a href="https://www.ourcampaigns.com/PartyDetail.html?PartyID=5102">Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace</a> coalition and stay the course Ouattara charted. </p>
<h2>Case against a third term</h2>
<p>With the vice president resigning, Ouattara faced the uneasy lot of backing a less known face. This could ignite succession battles and potential divisions within his ruling coalition, and a potential electoral loss. The party’s view that he should seek a third term would seem to put paid to that. </p>
<p>But, seeking a third term would deny him the chance to leave a good legacy of an improved democratic dispensation, peaceful alternation of power and economic recovery.</p>
<p>Crucially, a new presidential bid would raise legal complexities and could worsen instability and insecurity at a time of when <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-security/suspected-jihadist-militant-head-arrested-in-ivory-coast-idUSKBN23T1U7">terrorism</a> is expanding in the Sahel region.</p>
<p>A third Ouattara presidential bid will almost certainly provoke legal challenges because of the constitutional two-terms limit.</p>
<p>Because all Constitutional Court judges were appointed during Ouattara’s reign, such a case would provide a test of their independence. There is a precedent for this. </p>
<p>Courts in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/30/senegal-president-run-third-term">neighbouring Senegal</a> held in 2012 that a new constitution resets the term count, allowing then President Abdullahi Wade to run again, drawing serious criticism from the opposition, alleging judicial complacency.</p>
<p>To avoid a similar prospect, <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Gambia_2019D.pdf?lang=en">Gambia’s draft constitution</a> includes a specific provision counting terms served prior to the new constitution. If adopted, the Gambia would be the first in Africa to set this trend.</p>
<p>Regardless of the outcome, the spirit of the two-term limit in the Ivorian constitution and the general understanding at the time of its writing was against having presidents for life.</p>
<p>More seriously, a third term for Quattara could worsen risks of political instability. Already, the practical exclusion of Soro and a potential return of former president Laurent Gbagbo, who was recently acquitted of crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court, plus Quattara’s historical rivalry with Bédié, have created a <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/c%C3%B4te-divoire/cote-divoire-defusing-electoral-tensions-amid-polarised-politics">potentially combustible political atmosphere</a>. </p>
<p>With the departure of Bédié and other key partners, the ruling Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace coalition is effectively composed of Ouattara’s former <a href="https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/ivory-coast/conflict-profile/key-people/">Rally of the Republicans</a>, with a support base concentrated in the north of the country. Accordingly, the presidential election could heighten inter-regional contestation and rivalry.</p>
<h2>Role for the African Union and ECOWAS</h2>
<p>Considering their mandate to promote stability and democracy, the <a href="https://au.int/en/psc#:%7E:text=The%20powers%20of%20the%20PSC,conflicts%20where%20they%20have%20occurred">African Union </a> and Economic Community of West African States (<a href="https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/ecowas-peace-security-stability-and-governance">ECOWAS</a>) should closely monitor the developments in Cote d’Ivoire. In view of the risks, it would be advisable for them to pursue a proactive rather than reactive approach.</p>
<p>The African Union and ECOWAS would do well to actively nudge Ouattara to leave a good legacy, not just for his country but also the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/142933/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adem K Abebe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Alassane Ouattara (78) has been blowing hot and cold on whether he’ll be seeking a third term.Adem K Abebe, Extraordinary Lecturer and editor of ConstitutionNet, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1395672020-06-30T14:06:00Z2020-06-30T14:06:00ZWhy the African Union has failed to ‘silence the guns’. And some solutions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343988/original/file-20200625-33524-1mjaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A soldier from Niger patrols near the border with Nigeria. Porous borders with Nigeria and Mali are hotbeds for Jihadists and marauding local militias.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Giles Clark/GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Seven years ago African leaders committed themselves to working towards an end to armed conflict. As they marked the 50th anniversary of the founding of the African Union they swore to ensure lasting peace on the continent. They <a href="https://dppa.un.org/en/un-support-to-au-initiative-silencing-guns-africa">pledged</a> not to bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans.</p>
<p>The pledge was followed by the <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/au-retreat-to-elaborate-a-roadmap-on-practical-steps-to-silence-the-guns-in-africa-by-2020-concludes-in-lusaka-zambia">adoption</a> in 2016 of the <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/au-retreat-to-elaborate-a-roadmap-on-practical-steps-to-silence-the-guns-in-africa-by-2020-concludes-in-lusaka-zambia">Lusaka Road Map</a> to end conflict by 2020. The document outlined <a href="http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/N-Instruments/2018-AU-Silencing-the-Guns-Roadmap-ENG.pdf">54 practical steps</a> that needed to be taken. They focused on political, economic, social, environmental and legal issues. They ranged from adequately funding the <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/page/82-african-standby-force-asf-amani-africa-1">African Standby Force</a> for deployment, to stopping rebels or insurgents and their backers from accessing weapons. Other steps included fighting human trafficking, corruption and illicit financial flows.</p>
<p>At the time of the declaration, Africa had disproportionately high levels of conflict. State and non-state actors in Africa waged about 630 armed conflicts between <a href="https://ucdp.uu.se/">1990 and 2015</a>. Conflicts orchestrated by non-state actors accounted for over 75% of conflicts globally. </p>
<p>The efforts to ‘silence the guns’ has been singularly ineffective. Since the pledge was signed conflict in Africa has <a href="https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=1888&type=publicationfile">increased</a>.</p>
<p>One reason for the failure is that the 2020 goal was too ambitious given the number of conflicts on the continent. The second reason is that many are internal, arising from the grievances citizens have with their governments. This internal dynamic appears to have been ignored from the outset. </p>
<p>To make some headway the African Union needs to recognise this, and design solutions to conflicts that are informed by the need to protect human rights. The continental body should be empowered to act against any party that violates core values centred on human dignity.</p>
<h2>Theatre of conflict</h2>
<p>Prominent conflicts by non-state actors include the <a href="https://www.ctc.usma.edu/the-local-face-of-jihadism-in-northern-mali/">Tuareg separatist</a> and jihadist insurgencies in Mali, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/topics/organisations/boko-haram.html">Boko Haram</a> in Northern Nigeria, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/burkina-fasos-alarming-escalation-jihadist-violence">jihadist and militia</a> insurgencies in Burkina Faso, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/topics/organisations/al-shabab.html">al-Shabaab</a> in Somalia, and the <a href="https://institute.global/policy/ethno-religious-violence-central-african-republic">ethnic war</a> in the Central African Republic. </p>
<p>The most notable civil wars are those in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/18/war-in-libya-how-did-it-start-what-happens-next">Libya</a>, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan">South Sudan</a> and the one waged by Anglophone Ambazonia <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2020/02/06/Cameroon-elections-anglophone-separatist-insurgency-Ambazonia">separatists</a> in Cameroon.</p>
<p>Most conflicts are generally centred on these areas: </p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://www.nrc.no/shorthand/fr/sahel---the-worlds-most-neglected-and-conflict-ridden-region/index.html">Sahel region</a>, including Mali, Burkina Faso, Northern Nigeria, Chad, Sudan and Eritrea</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://plan-international.org/emergencies/lake-chad-crisis">Lake Chad area</a>, including Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://items.ssrc.org/category/crisis-in-the-horn-of-africa/">Horn of Africa</a>, including Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Kenya, and </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/conflict-great-lakes-region/">Great Lakes region</a>, notably Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Though domestic, most of these conflicts tend to be <a href="https://www.routledge.com/African-Borders-Conflict-Regional-and-Continental-Integration-1st-Edition/Moyo-Changwe-Nshimbi/p/book/9780367174835">cross-border in form</a>. They threaten interstate and regional stability. For example, al-Shabaab in Somalia exploits <a href="https://www.foreignbrief.com/security-terrorism/al-shabaab-in-kenya-cross-border-attacks-and-recruitment/">porous borders</a> to carry out deadly attacks in Kenya.</p>
<p>Most of Africa’s conflicts are also increasingly characterised by violent extremism. The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52532741">emerging conflict</a> in the Cabo Delgado Province in Mozambique falls into this category. </p>
<h2>Perennial conflict, elusive peace</h2>
<p>The African Union has put a great deal of emphasis on <a href="https://au.int/en/psc">promoting peace, security, and stability in Africa</a>, including in its <a href="https://au.int/Agenda2063/popular_version">Agenda 2063</a> adopted in 2015. </p>
<p>But peace and security continue to elude the continent. Some conflicts have been raging for decades. These include fighting in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-western-sahara-remains-one-of-africas-most-divisive-political-issues-114373">Western Sahara</a>, conflict in the Maghreb region involving the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2016.1208280">Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</a>, the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/book/fighting-for-peace-somalia-history-and-analysis-the-african-union-mission-amisom-2007-2017">Somali civil war</a>, and the <a href="http://congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Inside-the-ADF-Rebellion-14Nov18.pdf">Allied Democratic Forces</a> and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S027795361730429X">Lord’s Resistance Army</a> insurgencies in Uganda and the DRC. </p>
<p>Eighteen years ago the African Union changed its <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">Constitutive Act</a>, allowing it to intervene in the internal affairs of member states. Nevertheless, it’s been reluctant to do so. For example, it is conspicuously absent while bloody conflict escalated in <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon">Cameroon</a> and <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya">Libya</a>.</p>
<p>There has been one notable exception: the organisation’s refusal to countenance the coup in Sudan, and <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-854th-meeting-of-the-peace-and-security-council-on-the-situation-in-the-sudan">suspending</a> the country’s membership in June 2019. This should be the norm. </p>
<p>But this highlighted the AU’s double standards. It tacitly countenanced the coups in Egypt in 2013 and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/african-union-wrong-zimbabwe-171204125847859.html">Zimbabwe</a> in 2017.</p>
<p>Although it did <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-protests-africa/african-union-suspends-egypt-idUSBRE9640EP20130705">suspend</a> Egypt after the coup led by Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, it subsequently restored its membership in 2014, and went on to make President El-Sisi its <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/egypt-sisi-takes-head-african-union-190210140131428.html">rotational chairman</a> in 2019. This went against its own <a href="https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/1143/Assembly%20AU%20Dec%20269%20%28XIV%29%20_E.PDF?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">rule</a> that bans coup leaders from occupying political office. </p>
<p>The organisation never suspended Zimbabwe over the coup that ended Robert Mugabe’s despotic presidency. Neither did it speak out against <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42053753">General Constantino Chiwenga</a>, the coup leader, becoming the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/zimbabwe-coup-general-appointed-vice-president/a-41918031">vice-president</a>.</p>
<p>Another example of failure has been in Libya, where the AU has been seen to be wringing its hands while deadly conflict escalates and external actors make it their war theatre. These include <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-libya/turkey-signs-maritime-boundaries-deal-with-libya-amid-exploration-row-idUSKBN1Y213I">Turkey</a>, Egypt, Russia and United Arab Emirates. </p>
<p>The presence of foreign military forces on the continent is of concern beyond the Libyan conflict. The increasing number has been <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-601th-meeting-of-the-au-peace-and-security-council-on-early-warning-and-horizon-scanning">recognised</a> by the the African Union Peace and Security Council as a problem.</p>
<p>The numbers are going up via bilateral agreements between African states and foreign governments. </p>
<p>African countries gain economically from hosting foreign military bases. Djibouti, for example, earns about <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/25/world/africa/us-djibouti-chinese-naval-base.html">$63 million annually</a> from the US and <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-parting-the-red-sea-why-the-chinese-and-us-armies-are-fortifying/">$20 million annually</a> from China by leasing parts of its territory for their military bases. It also <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/000203971605100107">hosts</a> British, French, German, Italian, Japanese and Spanish military bases. </p>
<p>The foreign actors establish themselves in Africa to protect their <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79S01091A000300050001-3.pdf">economic interests</a> and for <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/90018134?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">strategic reasons</a>. Djibouti, for instance, is strategically close to the Middle East and the Red Sea.</p>
<h2>Credible solutions</h2>
<p>The African Union should revisit its Constitutive Act to address principles that limit its ability to intervene in conflicts in member states’ territories. This will set the stage for crafting robust legislation, policies, institutions and mechanisms for long-term stability in such countries.</p>
<p>Following that, the organisation should work through regional economic communities and people at grassroots to end conflict. Its eight <a href="https://au.int/en/organs/recs">recognised regions</a> should emulate the successes of the <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/member-states/">Economic Community of West African States</a>.</p>
<p>The regional bloc occasionally gives early warnings of brewing conflicts in member states. It has also provided military support and helped reform the security sector in <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137280794">Sierra Leone</a>, The Gambia and <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/civil-war-and-democracy-in-west-africa-9780857720740/">Liberia</a>. It has also helped with post-conflict reconstruction in these countries.</p>
<p>Notably, its military intervention in The Gambia <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-west-africa-built-the-muscle-to-rout-dictators-and-keep-the-peace-71688">forced the despotic Yahya Jammeh to vacate office</a> in early 2017, after losing the presidential elections. </p>
<p>Ordinary people can also provide vital information to early warning systems. It’s thus imperative to set up long-term, people-centred, innovative and inclusive measures to promote peace. Such bottom-up solutions, based on intimate knowledge of local areas, are key to success.</p>
<p>Finally, the issue of foreign military forces on the continent. Here the African Union has no control over their growing presence because they come through bilateral agreements between member states and foreign powers. Nevertheless, the African Union should work through its regional organisations to play a role in these decisions. </p>
<p>There’s a precedent: the Southern African Development Community under the chairmanship of late Zambian President <a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-49.pdf">Levy Mwanawasa</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-usa-africom/u-s-africa-command-aid-crusader-or-meddling-giant-idUSL3030068820070930">opposed</a> the establishment of an American base in the region. Southern Africa went on to establish its own regional military <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/zambia-mwanawasa-launch-of-the-sadc-brigade-17082007-2007-08-17">brigade</a> instead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/139567/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Changwe Nshimbi receives funding from the European Commission (Erasmus+), Department of Science and Technology/National Research Foundation (DST/NRF, South Africa), The Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES). </span></em></p>Leaders’ efforts to end conflict have been ineffective. Working through regional economic communities might be part of a better approach.Chris Changwe Nshimbi, Director & Research Fellow, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1405082020-06-15T08:21:05Z2020-06-15T08:21:05ZAfrican tourism has been put on ice by coronavirus – here’s how some countries are reviving it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/341248/original/file-20200611-80789-z28iul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">On Bijilo Beach in the Gambia, there are no fruit sellers in sight. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/giselaglb/22548711458/in/photolist-235LJrW-2fpy2WQ-EjTUkY-78uj3D-93BE6-EvvCSt-2hHG3sA-Amy3kd-KdFx9Z-4wTgKd-7yB2VR-7yTAHA-7yDCvs-6nMMf4-58u2Tc-a3Dq48-58u9ha-4jZ3N1-CeRERK-9j8KPd-6t6reB-7gUema-6tazpo-6tazkW-6tazuJ-s4PL2">gisela gerson lohman-braun</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the Gambia, teams of young tourism guides in their first holiday season are doing something very different from what they learned in training. They have been <a href="http://www.intracen.org/news/Youth-tour-guides-in-the-Gambia-emerge-as-first-responders-to-COVID19-awareness-and-prevention/">redeployed to act</a> as coronavirus guides for their local communities, raising awareness and explaining to their fellow Gambians how to prevent the spread of infection. </p>
<p>On the beaches, the normally busy fruit seller huts are empty and everything is quiet. Such is the situation in many African tourist resorts in 2020, with tourism reduced to almost nothing.</p>
<p>Globally, tourism could lose around 120 million jobs as a result of the coronavirus pandemic, <a href="https://ftnnews.com/other-news/39646-wttc-more-than-197m-travel-tourism-jobs-at-risk">according to</a> the World Travel & Tourism Council. The number of holidaymakers travelling abroad is forecast to halve in 2020 as more than US$3 trillion (£2.4 trillion) gets wiped off global tourism GDP. </p>
<p>This will be keenly felt by the many countries whose people depend on tourism. Two examples on opposite coasts of Africa are the Gambia and Kenya. Tourism accounts for 9% of Kenya’s GDP and 20% in the Gambia. It provides a living to <a href="https://investingroup.org/snapshot/289/kenyas-tourism-industry-kenya/#:%7E:text=Tourism%20sector's%20total%20contribution%20to,%2C%20according%20to%20the%20WTTC.">around 10%</a> of Kenyans and nearly a fifth of Gambians, while acting as an important source of foreign exchange. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/341257/original/file-20200611-80770-1ntg7xu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/341257/original/file-20200611-80770-1ntg7xu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/341257/original/file-20200611-80770-1ntg7xu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341257/original/file-20200611-80770-1ntg7xu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341257/original/file-20200611-80770-1ntg7xu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341257/original/file-20200611-80770-1ntg7xu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341257/original/file-20200611-80770-1ntg7xu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341257/original/file-20200611-80770-1ntg7xu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Downtime in Tanji, the Gambia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/110089254@N02/32634831654/in/photolist-RHQ3th-MZXyk9-EA3oLk-otkz4E-amwFnQ-SWcKN3-oiNu4u-a4RuvF-TuUzZo-7w7GMG-dsnRmF-23hoZAJ-Ers1a1-s6zs34-CzqPu-KZUr4J-r5o4BM-avbBfZ-awAj1a-FXGdBp-NXpJ7z-aGNd1n-GSk4Ly-D96rw9-e5k6zo-BBcBvP-aRjrzp-5bQ7eN-j52jgA-oHZaTN-8YcRUA-KZ5nKJ-dCEnQw-JkG4sD-oHZ9TG-5PvG9j-otwm8g-8Y9Mgx-m7oXAp-dQwYs7-PBErgQ-8YcMr3-oKZdaf-oHZaYh-hYhku8-Bfjz2-oL24ir-8Y9Jv4-LLWzow-8Y9KRP">Rachel Whitelock</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In both countries, the pandemic is damaging hotels and tour operators, putting people out of work, reducing GDP, and affecting thousands of small businesses in the tourism supply chain, such as providers of food, transport and souvenirs. </p>
<p>There are also wider consequences that may be less obvious. Poverty alleviation initiatives tied to tourism through youth and women’s empowerment programmes are being set back. </p>
<p>Tourism can also support conservation. In Kenya, the <a href="https://www.olpejetaconservancy.org/">Ol’Pejeta Conservancy</a> to the north of Nairobi is home to the world’s last two northern white rhinos. In 2018, Ol’Pejeta <a href="https://issuu.com/olpejetaconservancy/docs/2018_-_ol_pejeta_annual_report_-_fi?fr=xIAEoAT3_SkocQklDQEBAbgYWzP5qAsR1vBttGhxTbio6wSY7FgbhCsHPAgMKwSY7FgbhCsH_BDIwMTnB_wIwNsH_Ck9QX0xPR09fV0_ICqmYbjtU">spent US$2.6 million</a> on wildlife conservation and community development, much of it protecting endangered species from poaching.</p>
<h2>How they are responding</h2>
<p>Kenya’s 51 million population is more than 20 times bigger than that of the Gambia. Tourism is usually the number-one source of income after agriculture for those in rural areas, especially on the coast and in places rich with wildlife. But for a country that specialises in high-end safari and beach holidays for rich westerners, the crisis has hit hard. </p>
<p>Early in the crisis, tourism associations advised their members on keeping clients and staff safe, as well as holiday cancellation policies. They negotiated with the government, tax authority and banks on how to protect businesses. Tourist businesses have now cut back to skeleton staff and business partners have been giving one another 12 months’ grace on debts. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/341254/original/file-20200611-80742-19uh2bk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/341254/original/file-20200611-80742-19uh2bk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/341254/original/file-20200611-80742-19uh2bk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341254/original/file-20200611-80742-19uh2bk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341254/original/file-20200611-80742-19uh2bk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341254/original/file-20200611-80742-19uh2bk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341254/original/file-20200611-80742-19uh2bk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341254/original/file-20200611-80742-19uh2bk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ain’t complaining: elephants in Amboseli national park.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/30107812@N05/3439101952/in/photolist-6eUicf-7i4K9L-6mtb5b-aPJzU6-GrL3m6-8Ygfr-79nNnh-FJAz8-24jE4sT-2bku3JN-28jDMf2-2bqLaLt-bvG5kL-zqdW23-ix779-68a9QA-mBcUsD-8Ygvq-mBd7uH-cRs35s-bbbpVv-zEvHX3-a97Vc5-a97VmJ-zqczwu-qA6McN-qZrtQ1-S8aK4X-rDSZDj-9SrJVU-a957QZ-qRLbcL-c2gQgL-aAgTQm-28BNzM-vCWrA-c2gRZs-qwdUey-c2h171-RUZ5kQ-5k73tu-GpmSd9-9SrK2s-9QSXdE-RWrV66-28sx4nD-28BNv6-vCY5B-vCW6J-cQM2wG">Jimmy Edmonds</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The government is providing some financial support to industry workers through an <a href="https://www.president.go.ke/2020/05/23/the-seventh-presidential-address-on-the-coronavirus-pandemic-the-8-point-economic-stimulus-programme-saturday-23rd-may-2020/">economic stimulus programme</a>. It has also mobilised tourism-association leaders into a taskforce to oversee reopenings.</p>
<p>In the Gambia, tourism had <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/years-gambians-protesting-191216134431488.html">already suffered</a> in recent years from <a href="https://skift.com/2017/01/18/unrest-in-the-gambia-prompts-tourist-evacuation/">political unrest</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-30495101">Ebola</a> and the collapse of <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1719477/thomas-cooks-collapse-will-devastate-gambias-tourist-industry/">Thomas Cook</a>. It is also over-dependent on a few tour operators selling winter-sun holidays, and charter flights that find it more profitable to fly to the Mediterranean during the European summer. This imposes a “season” that limits the potential to bring in tourists all year round. </p>
<p>As well as deploying the youth tourism guides to help fight coronavirus, the Gambia Tourism Board <a href="http://www.visitthegambia.gm/news/covid-19-preparedness-and-measures-for-hotels-guesthouses-restaurants-and-ground-tour-operators-amongst-others">has worked with</a> the ministry of health to develop safety measures for hotels. The government is working with the UN to kickstart recovery efforts to safeguard livelihoods. Meanwhile, those in the industry have called on the government to provide tax breaks, moratoriums on loans and support packages for wages and economic stimulus. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/341203/original/file-20200611-80784-etcr4u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/341203/original/file-20200611-80784-etcr4u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/341203/original/file-20200611-80784-etcr4u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341203/original/file-20200611-80784-etcr4u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341203/original/file-20200611-80784-etcr4u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341203/original/file-20200611-80784-etcr4u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341203/original/file-20200611-80784-etcr4u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341203/original/file-20200611-80784-etcr4u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Normally packed with tourists, the Gambia’s most popular tourist beach at Kololi Beach is empty.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Adama Bah</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In both countries, the emphasis during the crisis has been on collaboration. But this needs to happen internationally, too, since neither has the “fiscal space” for the economic stimulus seen in advanced economies. A Mandinka proverb says that “rice fields with the same borders share the same waters”. We’re all in this together, in other words. </p>
<p>In March 2020, the World Economic Forum <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/03/flattening-the-covid-19-curve-in-developing-countries/?fbclid=IwAR1ogzm8n1laybGyX4A8RvCsLJ42puSuzweZOCbdoOucqUAnbGoRl5FnGSw">called on</a> the US Federal Reserve and other central banks propping up their economies with quantitative easing (QE) – creating new money to buy their government’s debt – to help developing countries by also buying their debt. There is no sign of this happening. </p>
<p>Some bigger developing countries such as South Africa <a href="https://think.ing.com/articles/qe-in-em-unconventional-risks/">have launched</a> their own QE programmes, but for many others dependent on tourism, the lack of international support is making the crisis worse. </p>
<h2>Sustainable tourism</h2>
<p>The crisis is also <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-end-of-global-travel-as-we-know-it-an-opportunity-for-sustainable-tourism-133783">an opportunity</a> to develop more sustainable tourism. The Gambia has already shown a way forward by developing an alternative to “sun, sand and sea” packages known as
<a href="http://cscuk.dfid.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/3483-Common-Knowledge-Issue-7.pdf">The Ninki Nanka Trail</a>. The trail enables visitors to discover the Gambia’s rich natural and culture heritage while experiencing the important oral legend of the mythical Ninki Nanka dragon said to reside in the creeks of the River Gambia.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.voicegambia.com/2020/02/18/ninki-nanka-trail-launched/">Launched in</a> February 2020 and set up with the help of an <a href="https://yep.gm/">EU-funded Youth Empowerment Project</a>, the trail <a href="https://unevoc.unesco.org/e-forum/The%20Gambia%20Summary%20Report%20November%202006.pdf">aims to</a> do two things: help the Gambia to reduce poverty in rural areas by diversifying into community-based tourism, while extending the season into the “green/tropical” months of July/August. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/341250/original/file-20200611-80746-1too0e9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/341250/original/file-20200611-80746-1too0e9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341250/original/file-20200611-80746-1too0e9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341250/original/file-20200611-80746-1too0e9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341250/original/file-20200611-80746-1too0e9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341250/original/file-20200611-80746-1too0e9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341250/original/file-20200611-80746-1too0e9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">All aboard …</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://all4counselling.uk/ninki/about/trail">ASSET (2013) NNT feasibility study. Design by Art Hotel; Illustration by Nigel Kirton</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Ninki Nanka Trail shows how tourism can be used to celebrate culture and facilitate meaningful engagement with communities, but there is much more that could be done in Kenya and the Gambia to target tourists that bring environmental and social benefits as well as economic ones. With stronger international support and a good vision for the future, it is a good moment to build something better than what was there before.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140508/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors would like to acknowledge and thank Job Odhiambo from the Sustainable Travel and Tourism Agenda in Kenya who provided much of the content and background research for the section on Kenya. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adama Bah does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Developing countries that depend heavily on tourists need international support, and more sustainable offerings for the future.Davina Stanford, Course Director, Responsible Tourism Management MSc, Leeds Beckett UniversityAdama Bah, Honorary Doctor of Responsible Tourism, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1330972020-03-08T07:46:23Z2020-03-08T07:46:23ZThe way we measure iron deficiency in children needs to change. Here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318882/original/file-20200305-106579-sx76bw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A deficiency of iron for normal body function is the <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)32279-7/fulltext">most common nutritional disorder in the world</a>. Iron deficiency is the <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24297872">main cause of anaemia</a> and is associated with poor brain development and long-term impairment of behavioural and cognitive performance in children. </p>
<p>Common symptoms of iron deficiency include pallor of the skin, eye and beds of nails, weakness, difficulty breathing, dizziness, headache, hair loss, dry or rough skin and cravings for non-food items such as ice, paper, dirt, or clay.</p>
<p>Iron deficiency is commonly diagnosed using laboratory blood tests that mainly measure levels of <a href="https://www.healthline.com/health/ferritin#ferritin">ferritin</a>, a protein that stores iron. In Africa, the tests can be misleading because ferritin levels go up in a person’s body during inflammation or infections such as malaria. This means that a person who is iron deficient may appear iron replete if they’re carrying an infection. </p>
<p>It is therefore challenging to estimate the burden of iron deficiency in settings such as sub-Saharan African where infections are common.</p>
<p>But accurate estimates of the burden of iron deficiency are important for designing public health interventions dealing with nutritional iron levels. Giving iron supplements based on poor data can lead to the wrong children being targeted. This could include children who should be getting supplements but aren’t, and those who don’t need them being given supplements with possible adverse effects.</p>
<p>To help overcome this problem <a href="https://bmcmedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12916-020-1502-7">we set out to calculate</a> more reliable estimates of the burden of iron deficiency in African children. </p>
<p><a href="https://bmcmedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12916-020-1502-7">Our study</a> highlighted that a huge burden of iron deficiency may be missed out given the current tools used to measure it. This is important for governments to properly plan, monitor, and target effective interventions to deal with iron deficiency on the continent.</p>
<p>We analysed data for 4,853 children from communities in Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, Burkina Faso and The Gambia. We used statistical modelling to correct for the effects of malaria and inflammation on iron biomarkers. We found that over half (52%) of the African children were iron deficient. </p>
<p>We also found that <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/medicine-and-dentistry/transferrin-saturation">transferrin saturation</a>, an indicator of transferrin-bound iron in the bloodstream, may more accurately estimate the burden of iron deficiency in African children. This is because transferrin saturation was the iron biomarker least influenced by infections. We found that transferrin saturation below 11% may indicate iron deficiency in African children. Transferrin saturation is easy to measure in routine laboratory tests.</p>
<h2>The implications</h2>
<p>We found that ferritin levels may be elevated even before children are defined as having inflammation. We also found that malaria infection influenced ferritin levels independently of inflammation.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318883/original/file-20200305-106589-7ccg6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318883/original/file-20200305-106589-7ccg6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318883/original/file-20200305-106589-7ccg6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318883/original/file-20200305-106589-7ccg6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318883/original/file-20200305-106589-7ccg6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318883/original/file-20200305-106589-7ccg6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318883/original/file-20200305-106589-7ccg6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Source: Author.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The influence of malaria infection on ferritin levels is not accounted for in the World Health Organisation’s <a href="https://www.who.int/vmnis/indicators/serum_ferritin.pdf">definition of iron deficiency</a>. In addition, its <a href="https://www.who.int/vmnis/indicators/serum_ferritin.pdf">definition of iron deficiency</a> accounts for the effect of inflammation by applying an arbitrary higher cut-off of ferritin levels in individuals with inflammation.</p>
<p>Using the World Health Organisation definition, the overall prevalence of iron deficiency was 34%. But this is an underestimate of the burden of iron deficiency (52%) that we found. </p>
<p>In some communities, where the prevalence of infections was high, over a quarter of the children were misclassified as iron replete whereas they were iron deficient.</p>
<p>This has huge implications for the rollout of nutritional iron programmes. The World Health Organisation uses the prevalence of anaemia as a proxy of iron deficiency or need in a population. The organisation recommends that <a href="https://www.who.int/nutrition/publications/micronutrients/guidelines/daily_iron_supp_childrens/en/">daily iron supplementation</a> should be provided to all children if the prevalence of anaemia is more than 40%. In places where malaria is prevalent, the iron supplementation should be provided in conjunction with effective malaria controls and treatment measures since giving iron may increase the risk of malaria infection. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://bmcmedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12916-020-1502-7">our study populations</a>, the prevalence of anaemia was more than 40%. Therefore, based on the <a href="https://www.who.int/nutrition/publications/micronutrients/guidelines/daily_iron_supp_childrens/en/">World Health Organisation recommendations</a>, all children would receive iron supplementation although we found that approximately half of the children were iron deficient. Half of the children would needlessly take iron supplements. This suggests that the prevalence of anaemia is a poor indicator of iron need.</p>
<p>Giving iron supplements to children who are not iron deficient may predispose them to infections, including malaria. A <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16413877">large study</a> in Pemba, Tanzania, showed that iron supplemented children were more likely to die or be admitted to hospital. In <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16413877">that study</a>, iron supplementation increased the risk of malaria-related events by 16%. However, in iron deficient children, iron supplementation was not harmful. </p>
<h2>How to manage iron deficiency</h2>
<p>There are multiple causes of iron deficiency in children. These can include eating diets low in iron, impaired absorption of iron, excessive loss of iron through injury, increased iron need for growth, or genetic factors. </p>
<p>Iron in foods such as meat, fish and poultry is easily absorbed while iron found in plant foods, such as vegetables, cereals, beans and lentils, is poorly absorbed. Eating fruits rich in vitamin C enhances iron absorption. Grains and tea contain substances that inhibit iron absorption.</p>
<p>The need for iron varies. For example, iron requirements increase during the first year of a child’s growth. This means that weaning children should be supplemented with foods rich in iron.</p>
<p>In sub-Saharan Africa, chronic infections such as <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)32279-7/fulltext">malaria, HIV, and TB are common</a>. These diseases may be an underlying cause of iron deficiency. This is because they can cause a blockade of dietary iron absorption. Thus, even iron supplements may not be effectively absorbed in the presence of infections. The <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ajcn/article/92/6/1406/4597520">fortification of foods has also been associated with gut disorders</a> since unabsorbed iron favours the growth of bad bacteria.</p>
<p>What this shows is that managing iron deficiency is complex and an integrated approach is required. <a href="https://bmcmedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12916-020-1502-7">Our study</a> suggests that improved control of malaria and other infections would also improve assessment of iron status in African children. </p>
<p>Improved control of infections may also improve absorption of iron although future research should quantify the benefits of such an approach in addressing iron deficiency.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/133097/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr John Muthii Muriuki does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In some communities, over a quarter of the children were misclassified as iron replete whereas they were iron deficient.Dr John Muthii Muriuki, PhD Fellow, Open University (UK), Kenya Medical Research InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1293652020-01-14T14:10:00Z2020-01-14T14:10:00ZWhy the Gambia’s plea for the Rohingya matters for international justice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309072/original/file-20200108-107231-1az78ni.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A protester supports the Rohingya outside the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands, on 10 December 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Sem van der Wal</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In early December, the International Court of Justice <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/178">heard arguments</a> filed by <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20191111-APP-01-00-EN.pdf">the Gambia against Myanmar</a> for violations of the Genocide Convention. This included a request for “provisional measures”, asking that the UN court immediately order Myanmar to cease <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/myanmarffm/pages/index.aspx">genocidal activities</a> and to report to it within four months. </p>
<p>Under the 1948 Genocide Convention any member state can bring a claim against any other and be heard by the International Court of Justice. This is in keeping with the principle that the act of genocide harms all of humanity, not just those directly involved in it. Yet the case against Myanmar is only the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-aung-san-suu-kyi-is-in-the-hague-defending-myanmar-against-allegations-of-genocide-125102">third invocation of the Genocide Convention</a> before the UN court. It is the first case ever to consider acts and actors of non-contiguous, non-warring countries.</p>
<p>But even a successful judgement on provisional measures may still not bring relief to the minority Rohingya community in Myanmar or Bangladesh. Provisional measures against genocidal acts have an unfortunate history. The International Court of Justice issued them in 1993 against Serbia, for example, and this did not prevent the 1995 Srebrenica massacre. </p>
<p>Moreover, even though legally binding, enforcement of provisional measures will prove difficult. In the meantime the Rohingya are still being persecuted and killed in Myanmar. They are also <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/bangladesh-may-force-100000-rohingya-to-resettle-on-uninhabited-island/a-50256755">increasingly unwelcome in Bangladesh</a>.</p>
<p>Yet the Gambia’s invocation of the Genocide Convention remains politically and legally significant, not least for the potential it signals about the application of international law by actors in the global south.</p>
<h2>Why the Gambia?</h2>
<p>The Gambia emerged from 22 years of dictatorship in 2016. President Adama Barrow came to power on a human rights and anti-corruption platform. He has embraced the case, which has been vigorously pursued by his justice minister, Abubacarr Tambadou. </p>
<p>In 2018 Barrow told <a href="https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/73/gm_en.pdf">the UN General Assembly</a> that his government would “champion an accountability mechanism” for crimes against the Rohingya.</p>
<p>Tambadou worked for 13 years in the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. In 2017, he travelled to Bangladesh for the annual meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. This is an international organisation open to countries with a Muslim majority and which the Gambia currently chairs. </p>
<p>Meeting refugees in the settlement of Cox’s Bazaar in Bangladesh convinced Tambadou of the need for his country to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-world-court-gambia/with-memories-of-rwanda-the-gambian-minister-taking-on-suu-kyi-idUSKBN1Y91HA">“use our voice”</a> to assist the Rohingya. </p>
<h2>The arguments</h2>
<p>Two central points emerged from the December hearing on provisional measures. First, the hearing reiterated how Myanmar, in the person of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11685977">once-celebrated</a> human rights advocate Aung San Suu Kyi, categorically denies the atrocities for which there is overwhelming evidence. </p>
<p>The Gambia, led by Tambadou, relied almost exclusively on evidence collected by UN fact-finding missions, which are officially constituted and rigorously vetted. Yet Aung San Suu Kyi rejected these findings in favour of Myanmar’s internal investigations, and <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20191211-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf">concluded</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It would not be helpful for the international legal order if the impression takes hold that only resource-rich countries can conduct adequate domestic investigations and prosecutions, and that the domestic justice of countries still striving to cope with the burden of unhappy legacies and present challenges cannot be made good enough. The Gambia will also understand this challenge with which they too are confronted.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In this way, Aung San Suu Kyi borrowed from both neocolonialism and “fake news” populism in constructing her argument. </p>
<p>Second, the hearing emphasised how narrowly the International Court of Justice has previously drawn the definition of genocide. In the two previous cases invoking the Genocide Convention, the court declined to find state-sponsored genocide, due to its interpretation of the Convention’s “intent” element. As the court stated in its 2007 judgment <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/91/091-20070226-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf">Bosnia-Herzegovina v Serbia</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is not enough that the members of the group are targeted because they belong to that group, that is because the perpetrator has a discriminatory intent. Something more is required. The acts listed must be done with intent to destroy the group as such in whole or in part.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Aung San Suu Kyi specifically invoked this judicial history throughout her address to the court.</p>
<p>The prominent international law scholar appearing on behalf of Myanmar, William Schabas, <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20191211-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf">pushed this definition even further</a>. He argued that the International Court of Justice’s jurisprudence suggested that the correct understanding for genocidal intent was necessarily the absence of any other explanation for a state’s conduct.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Myanmar submits that the information in the application and in the materials invoked in its support … provide ample evidence to indicate alternative inferences…. Should the Court agree that there is ample support for an alternative explanation, then it cannot but conclude that the application has no reasonable chance of success on the merits. Not a 50 per cent chance. Not a 25 per cent chance. No chance.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Schabas went on to cite the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20191211-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf">International Criminal Court’s investigation</a> into deportation of the Rohingya as a demonstration of the kinds of “alternate inferences” that would disallow the court to find the requisite genocidal intent.</p>
<p>Schabas developed this definition through an analogy of how domestic criminal law categorises crime. This interpretation would destroy the possibility of finding states responsible for genocide, however. This is because it is impossible to intentionally destroy a group in whole or in part, which is the core of the legal definition of genocide, without committing other international crimes along the way. </p>
<p>This distortion of the Genocide Convention perverts both its purpose as well as the International Court of Justice’s past jurisprudence, and seems unlikely to be adopted by the court.</p>
<h2>Promising new direction?</h2>
<p>The Gambia and Myanmar are a world away from one another. Nevertheless, in bringing a case against Myanmar, the Gambia represents “humanity” rather than Africa or world Islam. </p>
<p>The curiosity and surprise that have met the Gambia’s bold step remind us that this universal mantle is rarely worn by African countries. The Gambia’s initiative signals a promising new direction.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129365/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Rohingya case before the International Court of Justice is politically and legally significant.Kerstin Bree Carlson, Associate Professor International Law, University of Southern DenmarkLine Engbo Gissel, Associate Professor, Global Political Sociology, Roskilde UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1251022019-12-10T11:34:12Z2019-12-10T11:34:12ZWhy Aung San Suu Kyi is in The Hague defending Myanmar against allegations of genocide<p>In what is likely to be a remarkable moment for international justice, Aung San Suu Kyi, the political leader of Myanmar and a Nobel peace prize winner, will <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/20/aung-san-suu-kyi-to-defend-myanmar-against-genocide-charge-at-the-hague">be in The Hague</a> this week to lead her country’s defence against allegations of genocide. </p>
<p>On November 11, the Gambia launched <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20191111-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf">proceedings</a> against Myanmar before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for alleged violations of the <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf">Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide</a>. I have looked into the question of atrocity crimes, including genocide, as part of my <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jcsl/article-abstract/23/2/173/5086414">recent research</a> on the principle of the responsibility to protect in international law. </p>
<p>The case focuses on the clearance operations carried out from around October 2016 by Myanmar’s military and security forces against the Rohingya Muslims, a distinct ethnic and religious group that resides primarily in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. </p>
<p>The Gambia <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20191111-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf">claims</a> that those operations amounted to a genocidal campaign of violence that included mass murder, forcible displacement, rape, and other forms of sexual violence. The UN says that <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/rohingya-emergency.html">742,000 Rohingya</a> have fled Myanmar for neighbouring Bangladesh since 2017 and many are still living in dire conditions <a href="https://theconversation.com/citizens-of-nowhere-one-million-rohingya-still-without-rights-status-or-justice-122135">in refugee camps</a>. </p>
<p>During the public hearings that the ICJ will <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20191118-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf">hold</a> between December 10 and 12, the Gambia will essentially ask the court to order Myanmar to prevent ongoing atrocities against the Rohingya so as to protect them from further, irreparable harm – something known as “provisional measures”.</p>
<p>This is the third time that the world’s court has been called to establish whether a state is responsible under international law for breaches of the genocide convention. In 2015, the ICJ <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/118/118-20150203-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf">ruled</a> that neither Croatia nor Serbia had committed genocide during the hostilities that took place in Croatia between 1991 and 1995. In a 2007 case brought by Bosnia-Herzegovina, the court also <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/91/091-20070226-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf">cleared</a> Serbia of direct responsibility for genocide and complicity in genocide in relation to the 1995 massacre of Srebrenica. </p>
<p>This means that the ICJ has never held a state responsible for committing genocide. In this respect, the 2007 and 2015 verdicts reveal some of the obstacles that the Gambia will face in persuading the court that Myanmar committed genocide against members of the Rohingya group. </p>
<h2>Proving ‘intent’</h2>
<p>The genocide <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">convention</a> lists a number of acts, including killing or causing serious bodily or mental harm, that may constitute genocide provided that they are committed with the “intent to destroy”, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. </p>
<p>It is precisely the existence of this special intent that distinguishes genocide from other heinous crimes. This is of special importance given the difficulty of proving genocidal intent in a courtroom. In the absence of direct conclusive evidence, the ICJ will infer genocidal intent from particular circumstances – such as a pattern of acts committed against members of the targeted group – only if the circumstances point unequivocally to the existence of that intent. </p>
<p>Adopting this strict approach in both the 2007 and 2015 judgements, the court determined – with the only exception of Srebrenica – that the atrocities committed during the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia lacked the requisite intent to destroy the targeted groups, and so could not be qualified as genocide. In the case of Srebrenica, the court <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/91/091-20070226-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf">ruled</a> that the acts “were committed with the specific intent to destroy in part the group of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina” and were therefore genocide. </p>
<p>Still, it found that Serbia itself was not directly responsible for the massacre, which was committed by Bosnian Serbs. Serbia was nevertheless found responsible for failing to prevent genocide given that it was in a position of influence over those who devised and implemented it.</p>
<p>The rationale for setting such a high standard of proof is, in the ICJ’s <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/91/091-20070226-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf">words,</a> that: “Claims against a state involving charges of exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is fully conclusive.” </p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, this stringent approach has been the object of much criticism. One of the current judges sitting at the ICJ, Cançado Trindade, noted in 2015 that imposing such a high threshold for proof of genocide <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/118/118-20150203-JUD-01-05-EN.pdf">runs the risk</a> of reducing the genocide convention to a dead letter.</p>
<h2>UN fact-finding mission</h2>
<p>To demonstrate the genocidal nature of the violence against the Rohingya, the Gambia – which is backed by the 57 members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation – will rely extensively on UN sources. In March 2017 the UN Human Rights Council created an <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/myanmarffm/pages/index.aspx">Independent International Fact-finding Mission on Myanmar</a> and tasked it with establishing the facts and circumstances of the human rights violations committed by Myanmar’s military and security forces against the Rohingya. </p>
<p>The implications of the mission’s investigative activities could be profound. In the 2007 genocide case, the ICJ relied heavily on the judgements of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to conclude that genocide was committed at Srebrenica. The authoritativeness of the UN’s factfinding mission to Myanmar cannot be equated to that of a tribunal such as the ICTY. Yet, the ICJ is likely to give serious consideration to the mission’s reports in light of the care taken in preparing them, their comprehensiveness, and the independence of those responsible for their preparation.</p>
<p>Crucially, the <a href="https://undocs.org/A/HRC/39/CRP.2">2018</a> and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/20190916/A_HRC_42_CRP.5.pdf">2019</a> reports infer genocidal intent behind the attacks against the Rohingya from a number of factors and circumstances linked to, among other others, the brutality and the scale of destruction of the military operations as well as the widespread use of rape and sexual assault during those operations. </p>
<p>The ICJ judges will need to be satisfied with the solidity of this inference of genocidal intent by the UN mission. However, the very fact that they will have to engage with and determine the weight of those findings as evidence will be of paramount importance.</p>
<p>After ruling on the question of provisional measures – and assuming that no <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-gambias-gamble-and-how-jurisdictional-limits-may-keep-the-icj-from-ruling-on-myanmars-alleged-genocide-against-rohingya/">jurisdictional obstacles</a> will be identified – the court will fix time limits for the filing of the parties’ written pleadings in the case. After the written and then oral proceedings, the court will begin its deliberation and so it will be <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/en/contentious-cases">some years</a> before a final decision on this important case is made.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125102/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mauro Barelli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A case brought by the Gambia claims that Myanmar’s military committed genocide against its Rohingya Muslim minority.Mauro Barelli, Senior Lecturer in Law, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1246932019-10-16T01:33:33Z2019-10-16T01:33:33ZMyanmar might finally be held accountable for genocide, but the court case must recognise sexual violence<p>It has been more than two years since “clearance operations” by Myanmar’s security forces, the Tatmadaw, forced more than 700,000 Rohingya across the border to neighbouring Bangladesh.</p>
<p>During this time, the UN Security Council has remained silent on the plight of Rohingya, with China and Russia working to keep it off the council’s agenda.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-the-un-has-found-myanmars-military-committed-genocide-against-the-rohingya-102251">Explainer: why the UN has found Myanmar’s military committed genocide against the Rohingya</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><a href="http://webtv.un.org/watch/gambia-vice-president-addresses-general-debate-74th-session/6089855367001/">But at the UN General Assembly last month</a>, The Gambia announced it would take the Myanmar government to the International Court of Justice for the genocide of the Rohingya. </p>
<p>Vice-President Isatou Touray said The Gambia is: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>a small country with a big voice on matters of human rights on the continent and beyond. […] The Gambia is ready to lead the concerted efforts for taking the Rohingya issue to the International Court of Justice on behalf of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and we are calling on all stakeholders to support this process.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Myanmar might finally be held accountable, but defending the Rohingya from genocide shouldn’t just be left to the global Islamic community. They need to be joined by countries with an interest in reducing the sexual and gender based violence at the core of <a href="http://www.globaljusticecenter.net/blog/1157-that-s-illegal-episode-11-justice-and-the-genocide-of-the-rohingya">the Tatmadaw’s genocidal campaign</a>. </p>
<p>Otherwise, these important issues may not be sufficiently included in the case due to regional religious politics. </p>
<h2>Sexual and gender violence</h2>
<p>Last year, a Human Rights Council Fact-Finding Mission <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/20190916/A_HRC_42_CRP.5.docx">report</a> detailed serious breaches of international humanitarian and human rights law by members of the Tatmadaw, including killing, rape, torture, arson and forced displacement. </p>
<p>The report also detailed how the Myanmar government, as a whole, was responsible for perpetrating these crimes, and should be held to account. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/vQn1u-Z6LVU?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">‘An OIC film on the Rohingya issue, a continuing tragedy of human rights violations and unimaginable humanitarian suffering’</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In an <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/sexualviolence/A_HRC_CRP_4.pdf">additional report</a> released in August this year, the fact-finding mission found sexual and gender based violence was: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>part of a deliberate, well-planned strategy to intimidate, terrorise
and punish a civilian population.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2017.1402291">The sheer volume</a> of pregnant women in the refugee camps was one early indicator of the extent to which sexual violence was used against women and girls. But the mission <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24907&LangID=E">also found</a> it was used against men, boys and trans people. </p>
<p>In their view, acts of sexual and gender based violence were <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/sexualviolence/A_HRC_CRP_4.pdf">committed as genocide</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/they-shot-my-two-daughters-in-front-of-me-rohingya-tell-heartbreaking-stories-of-loss-and-forced-migration-86153">'They shot my two daughters in front of me': Rohingya tell heartbreaking stories of loss and forced migration</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In general, the UN Security Council has recognised the use of sexual violence as genocide, but they haven’t tied it to the crisis in Myanmar. </p>
<p>The council has passed nine resolutions on <a href="https://unwomen.org.au/our-work/focus-areas/women-peace-and-security/">women, peace and security</a>. Among other things, these resolutions call for the protection of women and girls, <a href="https://undocs.org/S/RES/2467(2019)">men and boys</a> from conflict-related sexual violence, and urge countries to end to impunity for these crimes. </p>
<p>So, it is of the utmost importance that the sexual- and gender-based violence used in the genocide is accounted for in any International Court of Justice (ICJ) case. </p>
<h2>How can the ICJ help?</h2>
<p>The ICJ adjudicates between states, not individuals. Although individuals commit genocidal acts, under the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide-convention.shtml">Genocide Convention of 1948</a>, states also have responsibility for preventing and punishing the crime of genocide. </p>
<p>Myanmar signed the UN’s <a href="https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&clang=_en">Genocide Convention in 1957</a>, which contains an article giving the ICJ jurisdiction if another state thinks they’ve breached their obligations. </p>
<p>This means once the case comes before the court, it can make rulings within a matter of days that would be binding on the government of Myanmar, the Security Council, or both. What’s more, it can begin almost immediately and can have immediate effect inside Myanmar. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/citizens-of-nowhere-one-million-rohingya-still-without-rights-status-or-justice-122135">Citizens of nowhere: one million Rohingya still without rights, status or justice</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This could make a big difference for Rohingya still inside Myanmar who are <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/09/1046442">experiencing the ongoing genocide</a>. </p>
<p>An ICJ case could also serve as a way to recognise and remedy the <a href="https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/WP1651-Report-1-1.pdf">collective harm</a> of the sexual- and gender-based violence, not just the harm experienced by individuals. </p>
<h2>International efforts</h2>
<p>The Gambia has called on other countries to join it in taking a case against Myanmar to the ICJ. <a href="https://www.newmandala.org/canada-myanmar-icj/">Canadian civil society</a> and parliamentarians have been working to convince their government to bring such a case for more than a year. Importantly, a case from Canada against Myanmar would include sexual- and gender-based violence. </p>
<p>And there are a range of reasons why Canada would step forward in support of The Gambia’s case. Taking such action would align with Canada’s foreign policy objectives, such as those on human rights and women, peace and security. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/world-must-act-to-end-the-violence-against-rohingya-in-myanmar-83645">World must act to end the violence against Rohingya in Myanmar</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Canada is also campaigning for a seat on the UN Security Council, but they have stiff competition from Ireland and Norway. </p>
<p>Taking Myanmar to the ICJ would show Canada is a strong international actor, able to work for the good of global peace and security, navigating the full set of challenges posed by the permanent members of the Security Council. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1172608821526769664"}"></div></p>
<p>But other countries can – and should – support The Gambia’s case and ensure the <a href="http://www.globaljusticecenter.net/blog/1167-read-akila-radhakrishnan-s-speech-at-the-feminist-majority-foundation-s-2018-national-young-feminist-leadership-conference-2">inclusion of sexual and gender-based violence</a> in a range of ways. </p>
<p>ICJ cases are usually long and costly. Interested countries could offer financial assistance for The Gambia’s case. They can also join the case as co-applicants in support of The Gambia’s leadership. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rohingya-killings-should-remind-all-nations-of-their-responsibility-to-protect-victims-of-mass-atrocity-crimes-112246">Rohingya: killings should remind all nations of their responsibility to protect victims of mass atrocity crimes</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Lastly, once the case is lodged, the court allows other countries to intervene. Countries unwilling to come forward as co-applicants could ensure gendered and sexual violence issues are included by making just such an intervention.</p>
<p>At the Security Council later this month, UN Member States will have the opportunity to participate in the annual open debate on women, peace and security. </p>
<p>By then, someone must surely be able to stand up and say: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>we stand with The Gambia, we will take the government of Myanmar to the International Court of Justice, to hold them to account for the sexual and gender based violence they perpetrated as genocide against the Rohingya.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124693/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan Hutchinson is the architect of the 'prosecute; don't perpetrate' campaign to end impunity for conflict related sexual violence. She is also a member of the Australian Civil Society Coalition for Women, Peace and Security. </span></em></p>The sheer volume of pregnant women in the refugee camps was an early indicator of the extent sexual violence was used against Rohingya women and girls.Susan Hutchinson, PhD Candidate, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1229902019-09-23T13:21:24Z2019-09-23T13:21:24ZA stomach bacteria threatens Nairobi’s residents. What can be done to stop it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291940/original/file-20190911-190035-1sp6afr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">3D illustration of Helicobacter Pylori in the stomach.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tatiana Shepeleva/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The spread of Helicobacter Pylori (H.pylori) has <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/lifestyle/fitness/Public-health-drives-can-boost-sanitation/4258372-5216692-lpuxgsz/index.html">been flagged</a> as a public health concern in Nairobi due to <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/lifestyle/fitness/Urgent-policies-needed-to-curb-rising-city-pollution/4258372-5144822-11npls0z/index.html">poor</a> urban sanitation and access to clean water. It’s a concern because it’s contagious, is present in the city’s water systems and is hard to treat. If left untreated, it can cause inflammation and even lead to cancer. Kimang'a Nyerere explains what H.pylori is and what needs to be done to better manage infection rates.</em></p>
<p><strong>What is <em>H.pylori</em> and what are the dangers of having it? What does it do in one’s stomach?</strong></p>
<p><em>H.pylori</em> is a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0889855305701357">type of bacteria</a> that interferes with the process controlling how much acid is in the stomach.</p>
<p>It <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21044126">can cause</a> a heavy acid load which leads to many issues including inflammation of the stomach lining (gastritis) and ulcers in the duodenum (the first part of the small intestine). It can even damage the stomach’s protective mucus layer, allowing <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4723543/">certain cancers</a> to develop. </p>
<p>In general, patients infected with <em>H.pylori</em> don’t have any obvious symptoms. Signs may include an ache or burning pain in the abdomen – particularly when your stomach’s empty – nausea, loss of appetite, frequent burping, bloating and unintentional weight loss.</p>
<p><strong>How do people catch it and how prevalent is it in Kenya? How does this compare to other countries in the region?</strong></p>
<p>People usually catch it from another person (through saliva) or if they eat food or drink water that’s contaminated with faeces. </p>
<p>In 2016 my colleagues and I <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4915402/">investigated</a> the presence of <em>H.pylori</em> in the water of the Nairobi River basin, which <a href="https://na.unep.net/atlas/kenya/downloads/chapters/Kenya_Screen_Chapter5-End.pdf">has three major rivers</a> – Ngong, Nairobi and Mathare. Currently <a href="https://kenyariversandwaterresources.wordpress.com/2016/11/08/master-plan-for-nairobi-river-basin/">about</a> 56% of the city’s residents live in highly congested informal and middle class settlements along the Nairobi River banks. The river is very polluted by garbage, human waste, industrial waste (including agrochemicals, petrochemicals and metals) and overflowing sewers.</p>
<p>This was evident in our tests. There was a high presence of faecal bacteria in the water samples and <em>H.pylori</em> was detected in two of the nine domestic wells sampled and one out of four rivers sampled. This finding is significant considering <em>H.pylori</em> is a serious pathogen that’s categorised as <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4678392/">a “definite”</a> carcinogen by the World Health Organisation.</p>
<p>The presence of <em>H.pylori</em> can be attributed to a lack of sanitation. We found that <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4915402/">90%</a> of the people who lived in the areas where <em>H.pylori</em> was detected didn’t have toilets connected to the main sewerage system. They mostly used long-drops or defecated openly. </p>
<p>This is worrying because as Nairobi’s population continues to grow, if sanitation issues aren’t resolved, the risk of spread will increase. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Association-of-Helicobacter-Pylori-VacA-Gene-and-in-M%E2%80%99itonga-Kimang%E2%80%99a/202b5e08f90e6c87b976c89035d60d229ee07b20">Studies</a> in Kenya have put the prevalence of <em>H.pylori</em> at about 67.5% in all age groups. Though this might seem high, some African countries have shown higher infection rates: 91.7% in <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3770500/">Egypt</a>, 97% in <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21507253">The Gambia</a> and 75.4% in <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4577627/">Ghana</a>. This is almost twice as high as the average rates in developed countries <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29430669">of 34.7%</a>.</p>
<p><strong>What can be done to treat it and reduce the risk of infection?</strong></p>
<p>Those infected can be treated with antibiotics. Treatment is quite intensive and usually involves more than one antibiotic and <a href="https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/antacids/">antacids</a> over a period of up to 10 days. Because it’s contagious, treating it properly is key to preventing the bacteria’s spread. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, treatment failures <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5847180/">are frequently</a> reported. That’s usually because people haven’t taken the medication properly, though there are also cases where the bacteria has become resistant to some of the drugs. </p>
<p>The treatment regime – which drugs are selected, the number and doses of medications used in a combination, dosing frequency, and treatment duration – is crucial in <em>H.pylori</em> eradication. </p>
<p>My colleagues and I <a href="http://www.samj.org.za/index.php/samj/article/view/7012">recently investigated</a> the effectiveness of a 10-day sequential therapy compared with the standard 10-day triple therapy for treatment of <em>H. pylori</em> infection in children.</p>
<p>Sequential treatment consists of four different medications given over a 10-day treatment in which a proton pump inhibitor (a drug that helps reduce stomach acid production), and amoxicillin (an antibiotic) is given for five days. This is followed by an inhibitor and a combination of two other antibiotics for another five days. Triple therapy consists of two antibiotics and a proton pump inhibitor running over a course of 10 days.</p>
<p>We saw a significant difference in <em>H.pylori</em> eradication between the two regimens. Patients on the 10-day sequential therapy had a much higher <em>H.pylori</em> eradication rate than patients who received conventional treatment: 84.6% versus 48.8%, respectively. This is in line with other studies <a href="https://bmcgastroenterol.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12876-015-0401-4">that show</a> the same.</p>
<p>Kenya should also consider using a test-and-treat strategy. In this approach groups of people who are thought to be at high risk are tested and those who test positive are given treatment. In other countries this strategy has had <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-011-3927-4_51">tremendous success</a> in reducing infection rates. </p>
<p>A test-treat strategy won’t need much to roll out as it only needs a stool sample and a rapid five-minute test. It can be done in any health centre. </p>
<p>Aside from this, because <em>H.pylori</em> is primarily spread through contaminated food and water, it’s important that people have good hygiene practices and access to safe water drinking water. Most of Nairobi’s residents <a href="https://www.wsup.com/where-we-work/kenya/nairobi/">aren’t connected</a> to the city’s sewage system or piped water. They are supplied water – that hasn’t been treated – from groundwater aquifers through private <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a3660e82.pdf">water vendors or private wells</a>. This likely plays a big role in the spread of <em>H.pylori</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kimang'a Nyerere does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Because Helicobacter Pylori is contagious, treating it properly is key to preventing its spread.Kimang'a Nyerere, Microbiology Lecturer, Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1206012019-07-23T07:03:37Z2019-07-23T07:03:37ZDemocracy in Africa: success stories that have defied the odds<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284781/original/file-20190718-116590-cw2viv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Senegalese women cast their ballots in the presidential elections in February. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When I first said that I was going to write a book about the <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Democracy-Africa-Successes-Political-Approaches/dp/0521138426/ref=sr_1_5?keywords=democracy+africa&qid=1563291882&s=gateway&sr=8-5">history of democracy in Africa</a>, quite a few people responded with a joke. That will be one of the world’s shortest books, up there with the compendium of great English cooking, they would say. </p>
<p>But, it turned out that there was a lot to talk about: Africa’s past reveals more fragments of democracy than you would think. And, its present has a number of important things to teach the world about the conditions under which democracy can be built.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/publications/pp35-election-quality-public-trust-are-central-issues-africas-upcoming-contests">poor quality of elections</a> in many sub-Saharan African countries, combined with a tendency for the media to focus on controversy, means that Africa is often depicted as a bastion of authoritarianism. But, it actually has some of the most remarkable and important stories of democratic struggle.</p>
<p>Countries such as Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Namibia, Mauritius, Senegal and South Africa have not only become beacons of political rights and civil liberties, they have done so <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/democracy-in-africa/introduction-democratization-against-the-odds/69FC0205A06760562CFF822FD1F16CB4">against the greatest of obstacles</a>. These experiences teach us important lessons about where democracy can work, and why.</p>
<h2>Pre-conditions for strong democracy</h2>
<p>Political scientists like to talk about the conditions necessary for countries to build a strong and stable democracy. These lists are fiercely fought over, but there are a number of factors that most researchers would agree are probably important.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ZeaWzPZb54AC&oi=fnd&pg=PA261&dq=robert+dahl+national+identity&ots=f5p5GzOMZV&sig=3xmTowrnoS7kbmYAwWYoGIkr9IU">cohesive national identity</a> is likely to make it easier to maintain national unity, while <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/16730/summary">wealth</a> and economic success have been found to promote political stability. A strong national infrastructure, underpinned by respect for the <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/218813/summary">rule of law</a>, means that the government is likely to be effective without being abusive. And, a vibrant <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/jid.3057">middle class</a> and powerful civil society are usually seen as important to promote accountability and responsive government.</p>
<p>What is remarkable about the democratisation of African states is that most did not enjoy a single one of these “pre-conditions”.</p>
<p>With the exception of South Africa, all of Africa’s democracies entered multiparty politics with low GDP per capita and high levels of unemployment. This was compounded by <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2698386">weak and underdeveloped states</a> that had been designed – both in the colonial era and during the authoritarian rule of the 1980s – to exploit resources rather than empower citizens. In states like Ghana, this was compounded by a history of military rule, which heightened the risk of further coups.</p>
<p>Almost all of these states also featured civil societies that were fragile and fragmented, despite the strength of religious organisations. At the same time, in the early 1990s, the middle class was small. More often than not, it was also economically dependent on the government. It was thus poorly placed to fight against corruption or democratic backsliding.</p>
<h2>Challenges</h2>
<p>These were not the only challenges that African states faced. With the exception of Botswana, they are all diverse multi-ethnic societies in which the question of national identity has been problematic. In <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2149995?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">Ghana</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/cd36800a-cb1b-11e8-8d0b-a6539b949662">Mauritius</a> for instance, ethnic identities have historically played a role in structuring political networks. This increased the tension around elections. </p>
<p>Worse still, under colonial rule and <a href="https://theconversation.com/world-politics-explainer-the-end-of-apartheid-101602">during apartheid</a>, white regimes sought to entrench <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=3MqNER4J6zEC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=apartheid+south+africa+race&ots=ov1DHZtITC&sig=Q8AoHCIHjIXcnB7zEbTWf_j8rg0">racial divisions and hostilities</a> in Namibia and South Africa, creating a particularly difficult environment.</p>
<p>Against this backdrop, all of these states might have been expected to collapse into some form of authoritarian regime by now. Given this context, their success should be celebrated and studied for what it tells us about how democracy can be built even in the most challenging of contexts.</p>
<h2>Bucking the trend</h2>
<p>It is striking that, with the exception of <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2019/04/28/benin-vote-in-an-election-with-no-opposition/">Benin</a> and possibly <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/senegalese-govt-accused-of-misusing-courts-to-skew-vote-20180710">Senegal</a>, these democracies have grown stronger during a period in which the world is supposed to be <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/facing-up-to-the-democratic-recession/">backsliding on democracy</a>. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/V4KXUKCm9eo?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>While Europe is convulsed by <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-wisdom-of-crowds-proves-effective-predictor-of-britains-chaotic-eu-departure-119906">Brexit</a> and the <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/2018/05/right-wing-populism-rising-progressive-politics-fails-it-too-late-save-democracy">rise of right-wing populists</a>, and Donald Trump is doing his best to undermine America’s reputation for political checks and balances, Africa’s most democratic states have proved to be remarkably resilient.</p>
<p>Ghana has experienced numerous transfers of power and, in 2016, the first ever defeat of a sitting president. Namibia has consolidated its position as a “free” political system with robust respect for civil liberties, according to <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/namibia">Freedom House</a>. </p>
<p>South Africa suffered politically and economically during the <a href="https://www.news24.com/Analysis/analysis-stepping-out-of-the-nuclear-shadow-of-the-zuma-years-20190627">presidency of Jacob Zuma</a>, but now has the chance to bounce back after the governing African National Congress (ANC) voted to pursue reform under <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/whats-next-ramaphosa-south-africa-heads-polls/">President Cyril Ramaphosa</a>.</p>
<p>For their part, Botswana and Mauritius – the continent’s oldest democracies – continue to combine respect for political rights with prudent economic policies.</p>
<p>Praising Africa’s democratic success stories does not, of course, mean that we should overlook its failures. A number of countries have taken steps backwards in recent years, including <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzanias-latest-clampdown-takes-decades-of-repression-to-new-lows-96959">Tanzania</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-museveni-has-twisted-ugandas-constitution-to-cling-to-power-118933">Uganda</a>. Authoritarian leaders also remain entrenched in <a href="https://theconversation.com/biya-needs-to-devise-a-monumental-shift-if-cameroon-is-to-turn-the-corner-106254">Cameroon</a>, <a href="https://time.com/5559491/chad-social-media-internet-ban-censorship/">Chad</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/eritrea">Eritrea </a>, and many more. But it is important to recognise that there is much more to Africa than authoritarianism.</p>
<h2>Explaining success</h2>
<p>In the absence of the conventional building blocks of democracy, we need to look elsewhere to explain these success stories. Some might be tempted to think that the role of the global community has been critical in keeping governments on the straight and narrow. But in reality, democracy is built from within, as the fact that aid-dependent countries such as Uganda and Rwanda have remained firmly authoritarian shows only too well.</p>
<p>We should, therefore, give greater credit to the politicians and people of Africa’s democratic states. African presidents are often lambasted for being corrupt and self-serving. But, in a number of countries, they have shown considerable restraint, establishing institutions capable of checking their power.</p>
<p>In Ghana, cohesive relationships among the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/114/457/529/2195167">political elite</a> have underpinned a growing consensus on the value of democracy. In South Africa, inclusive leadership played a critical role in overcoming racial divisions and building trust in the new post-apartheid political system since 1994. In Namibia, successive presidents have refused to use the electoral dominance of the governing party to remove the opposition.</p>
<p>The role played by African citizens also deserves greater recognition. It was their willingness to take to the streets that forced democratic openings in the late 1980s. The same has been true in recent years, with mass action challenging authoritarian regimes in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/31/burkina-faso-president-blaise-compaore-ousted-says-army">Burkina Faso</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-sudans-protesters-upped-the-ante-and-forced-al-bashir-from-power-115306">Sudan</a>. </p>
<p>Despite economic challenges and democratic difficulties, high levels of <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/press/africans-want-high-quality-elections-especially-if-they-bring-change-afrobarometer-surveys">public support for democracy</a> in Africa mean that leaders understand the costs of backsliding.</p>
<p>At a time when people are questioning the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/04/shock-system-liberal-democracy-populism">value of democracy</a> in many Western states, many African populations who have lived under one-party, one-man, or military rule are prepared to fight to prevent their return. This should serve both as an important lesson and a source of inspiration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120601/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Africa’s democracies have grown stronger during a period in which the world is backsliding on democracy.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1197652019-07-08T15:09:11Z2019-07-08T15:09:11ZAmid mounting abuse claims, Jammeh is unlikely to face justice soon. Here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282270/original/file-20190702-126376-yh8adk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Then President of The Gambia Yahya Jammeh and First Lady Zeinab arrive at the White House in Washington DC for the US Africa Leaders Summit in 2014. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Michael Reynolds</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two weeks ago, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48757981">new allegations</a> were added to a litany of human rights abuses that have been levied against the former president of The Gambia, Yahya Jammeh. The exiled former leader, who once infamously claimed that he could cure AIDS with his own <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jun/01/survivors-yahya-jammehs-bogus-aids-cure-sue-former-gambian-leader">secret herbal mixture and spiritual healing techniques</a> has been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/26/gambia-women-accuse-ex-president-sexual-violence">accused of sexually abusing</a> at least three women at the height of his power.</p>
<p>Jammeh ruled The Gambia with a totalitarian grip for 22 years after seizing power in an army coup in 1994. After he suffered a shock defeat in the 2016 presidential election, he refused to relinquish power. It was only after regional troops <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38682184">mobilised troops</a> on The Gambian border that he fled to Equatorial Guinea. He’s still there. </p>
<p>Since then, allegations of torture, enforced disappearances, freedom of speech violations, and suspicious deaths in government custody have <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/12/gambia-truth-commission-uncover-jammeh-abuses">emerged</a>. To get to the bottom of the allegations hearings are being carried out by a <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a7c2ca18a02c7a46149331c/t/5a8451b4e4966bfad91329e9/1518621128178/truth%2C+reconcilation+and+reparations+commission+act%2C+2017.pdf?fbclid=IwAR34Rm3AtU6WJhL_h6nSuckVavr_8rbCMMMNRFLb0W7jG5YNNK8zMIsiuxo">Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission</a> set up by the new government. </p>
<p>Under the slogan, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48525284">“never again”</a>, the Commission has the job of creating an impartial historical record of violations of human rights that took place under Jammeh’s regime. It is hoped that process achieves a number of objectives. These include promoting healing and reconciliation, addressing the impunity of previous members of government, establishing the fate of disappeared victims, allowing victims to tell their account of violations, and to grant reparations where appropriate.</p>
<p>So far, the public has heard from current and former members of armed forces over an alleged counter-coup plot against Jammeh early in his rule. The testimony of those soldiers has been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-48525284">horrific</a>. But even if more victims come forward and speak out, and more human rights violations are revealed during future testimony from both victims and abusers, pursuing legal consequences against Jammeh is likely to prove very difficult, if not impossible.</p>
<p>The problem is one that those pursuing justice against former dictators and human rights abusers have encountered <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/22/it-finally-happened-the-long-fight-to-expel-americas-last-known-nazi">before</a>. After Jammeh lost power, he fled to Equitorial Guinea with the equivalent of more than <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/27/gambias-ex-president-stole-almost-1bn-before-fleeing-country">$1 billion from public funds</a>. Equitorial Guinea is not a signatory to the Rome Statute and has no obligation to return him to The Gambia to face justice. This has left Jammeh’s fate in the hands of the country’s President Teodoro Obiang, a close friend and ally. </p>
<h2>The evidence</h2>
<p>In one <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-48525284">incident</a> an alleged member of the counter-coup was arrested, beaten, stripped naked, shot and stabbed with bayonets. It was then discovered that his body was too tall for the grave that had been dug, so one of the executioners chopped off his legs with an axe. </p>
<p>Three women so far have levied accusations of sexual violence against Jammeh. Two have remained anonymous while one – Fatou “Toufah” Jallow – has agreed to come forward publicly. She is expected to give testimony to the Commission later in the year. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/26/gambias-women-break-their-silence">graphic detail</a>, Toufah explained to Human Rights Watch how she became a target of the president’s unwanted attentions when, at the age of 18, she won a state-sponsored beauty pageant. As part of her duties as a beauty queen, she was called to a meeting with Jammeh, who began to shower her with presents and money. After a sexual attack in the presidential residence, and fears for her future safety, she disguised herself in a burka and fled across the border to Senegal.</p>
<p>Two other women have also made allegations to Human Rights Watch, but they have chosen to remain anonymous. Marion Volkmann-Brandau, the researcher who exposed these allegations, believes that there were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/26/gambias-women-break-their-silence">many more victims</a>.</p>
<p>Toufah has said that she hopes her revelations encourage other victims to come forward and share their stories. Her plea has been echoed by the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/world/africa/gambia-president-rape-accusation.html">Attorney General </a> who has praised her actions and asked others to speak out. </p>
<p>The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has not yet examined any allegations of sexual violence. These hearings are due to take place later in the year. </p>
<h2>Justice might be elusive</h2>
<p>Pursuing legal consequences against Jammeh is likely to prove very difficult, if not impossible. One reason for this is that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission does not have the power to prosecute Jammeh, or any other individual for human rights abuses. Its powers are limited to recommending that the Attorney General acts on cases that can be taken before the courts. </p>
<p>Even if cases are brought, the Gambian government would have to extradite Jammeh from Equatorial Guinea to face trial. Initially, there were hopes that Obiang, who himself has been accused of numerous <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/02/human-rights-defenders-and-activists-in-equatorial-guinea/">human rights atrocities</a>, might feel political pressure to return Jammeh to The Gambia to face his accusers. But a recent <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e-6nzNzX87E">video</a> of the two celebrating New Year together extinguished those hopes.</p>
<p>At least in the short term, it looks unlikely that Jammeh will face either his victims or consequences for human rights abuses.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119765/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sophie Gallop does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>At least in the short term, it looks unlikely that Jammeh will face either his victims or consequences for human rights abusesSophie Gallop, Lecturer, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.