tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca-fr/topics/us-taliban-peace-talks-70748/articlesUS Taliban peace talks – La Conversation2023-11-29T17:20:00Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2184612023-11-29T17:20:00Z2023-11-29T17:20:00ZGaza war: how Qatar used its business connections to become a leading mediator in the Middle East<p>During the temporary ceasefire negotiated between Israel and Hamas with the mediation of the Qatar government, 81 hostages <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67477240">have been released</a> in return for the freeing of 180 Palestinians held in Israeli custody. Hundreds of lorry loads of aid have been allowed into the war zone and, just as the deadline for the end of the ceasefire was due to expire, it was announced that it has been extended for two days.</p>
<p>This represents a major success for Qatari mediators, with tangible and very visible results. Israeli and Palestinian families have been reunited and the desperate plight of Palestinians trapped in Gaza has been eased by the arrival of supplies of fuel, food and medicines – at least for now. The hope is that this situation can continue.</p>
<p>Qatar’s role in conflict mediation goes back many years. As a third-party mediator, Qatar has been exercising such diplomatic abilities since the 1990s and it has become an important aspect of its foreign policy. </p>
<p>Qatar emerged as a centre for conflict resolution in the late 2000s and a succession of deals have been brokered there since. It hosted the talks between the US and the Taliban, which resulted in the US withdrawing from Afghanistan in 2021. But before that, the signing of peace deals in Lebanon (2008), Yemen (2010), Darfur (2011) and Gaza (2012) contributed significantly to Qatar’s rising reputation as a peace broker. </p>
<p>The last deal on this list, in which Qatar’s emir, Hamad bin Khalifah Al Thani, played an important role as the only head of state to have visited Gaza since Hamas took over in 2007, established the small but important Gulf kingdom as a possibly key player in peace talks in the current conflict. </p>
<p>In 2022, al-Thani <a href="https://www.gulf-times.com/story/724670/trustworthy-mediator-and-reliable-partner">declared</a> at the 77th UN general assembly that “mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes” was at the centre of Qatar’s foreign policy to “solidify a reputation as an internationally reliable partner”. </p>
<p>Qatar is not a completely neutral party in the latest conflict. Hamas has a <a href="https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-hamas-war-gaza-strip-2023-11-04/card/qatar-says-hamas-political-office-in-doha-to-stay-open-uhBAJyCK8zgsHBk0cXKt">political office in the Qatari capital</a>, Doha – which it has said will remain open, despite the October 7 attacks. And the Qatari government has given <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-cash-to-crypto-global-finance-maze-israels-sights-2023-10-16/#:%7E:text=Gas%2Drich%20Qatar%20too%20has,in%20the%20Hamas%2Drun%20government.">billions of dollars in aid</a> to Hamas in Gaza over the past decade. </p>
<p>So what is it about Qatar that makes it such an <a href="https://gulfif.org/qatars-growing-role-as-a-humanitarian-and-diplomatic-hub">effective broker of peace deals</a>? </p>
<h2>All-round integration</h2>
<p>First, it has no history as a colonial power, so it comes with none of the baggage that inevitably accompanies peacemaking efforts by, say, Britain, France or the US. And, as a small Gulf state that doesn’t publicly align itself intimately with Washington, Moscow or Beijing, its mediation efforts are less likely to draw “great power” suspicion or criticism.</p>
<p>But – perhaps more importantly – Qatar’s position as regional mediator is a byproduct of its wealth management, investment capacity and its extensive and complex business connections, including personal connections in the Middle East, North Africa and particularly to the US. </p>
<p>The US is Qatar’s largest foreign direct investor. US <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/middle-east/north-africa/qatar#:%7E:text=U.S.%20goods%20exports%20to%20Qatar,up%20184%20percent%20from%202012.">exports to Qatar</a> increased by more than 42% between 2021 and 2022, totalling US$3.7 billion (£2.9 billion) in 2019.</p>
<p>Neoliberal globalisation advocated for open markets, global distribution of production and deregulated financial markets. Qatar has <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/qatar-world-cup-middle-east-neoliberalism-revolution">wholeheartedly embraced</a> this in its transition to a multi-faceted economy, no longer wholly dependent on revenue from hydrocarbon production. </p>
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<img alt="Map of Qatar showing Bahrain and land border with Saudi Arabia." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562150/original/file-20231128-19-1x3jr1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562150/original/file-20231128-19-1x3jr1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=772&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562150/original/file-20231128-19-1x3jr1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=772&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562150/original/file-20231128-19-1x3jr1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=772&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562150/original/file-20231128-19-1x3jr1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=970&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562150/original/file-20231128-19-1x3jr1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=970&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562150/original/file-20231128-19-1x3jr1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=970&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Qatar shares its only land border with Saudi Arabia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>It has been a success story. In per capita income, Qatar is now one of the <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-country/">top ten richest countries</a> in the world and the wealthiest in the Arab world, with a per capita GDP of US$88,046 compared to the US at US$75,269 and the UK at US$45,485. </p>
<p>Significantly, given the conflict in Ukraine which has highlighted the need for European countries to diversify their energy supplies, Qatar is the second largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the world, with some 85% of its export earnings coming from hydrocarbons. Investing the resulting trade surplus in America government debt has led to <a href="https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2023/04/09/welcome-to-a-new-era-of-petrodollar-power">mutual interdependency</a> between its economy and that of the US.</p>
<p>The more the Qatari economy is intertwined with global supply chains, the more alert its diplomacy has become in providing solutions to thorny – especially regional – conflicts. </p>
<p>It should be noted that Qatar’s regional relations have hit road blocks along the way. Between 2017 and 2021, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt – among other countries in the region – <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-40155829">cut off diplomatic relations with Qatar</a>, accusing the country of supporting “Iranian-backed” terrorist groups, something vociferously denied by Doha. Things have since thawed considerably, though, thanks to the mediation of Kuwait, and ties have been <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/qatar-blockade-saudi-arabia-lift-cause-end">cautiously re-established</a>.</p>
<p>It serves Qatar’s regional and global economic interests to seek peace and cooperation, rather than conflict and war. This, apart from making Qatar stand out among many other regional powers, generates a powerful dynamic whose full potential has been on full display in the ongoing Hamas-Israel conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218461/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vassilis K. Fouskas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Qatar has built goodwill – and business connections – around the world in recent decades.Vassilis K. Fouskas, Professor of International Politics & Economics, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2110522023-08-11T16:17:55Z2023-08-11T16:17:55ZTwo years after Taliban takeover: why Afghanistan still poses a threat to the region and beyond<p>The dramatic and rapid Taliban offensive in the spring of 2021 <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/south-central-asia_talibans-afghanistan-takeover-timeline/6209678.html">culminated</a> in its takeover of Kabul on August 15. The chaos of the western withdrawal that surrounded the return of the Taliban represented a sad endpoint of two decades of failed US-led attempts to impose a liberal democratic system on a country that had hosted al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden and facilitated his masterminding of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. </p>
<p>For Afghanistan, the return of the Taliban marked the beginning of a deeply illiberal regime that is particularly <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-talibans-war-on-women-in-afghanistan-must-be-formally-recognized-as-gender-apartheid-210688">hostile to women</a> and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-shiite-persecution-discrimination/32507042.html">minorities</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/16/swift-taliban-takeover-proves-us-and-uk-analysis-badly-wrong">swiftness</a> of the Taliban takeover <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/16/swift-taliban-takeover-proves-us-and-uk-analysis-badly-wrong">confounded</a> more optimistic US and UK predictions about the survival of the Afghan government. But most of its consequences were entirely predictable, and indeed predicted – from the worsening <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/13/afghanistan-taliban-takeover-worsens-rights-crisis">human rights</a> situation to an <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-58328246">economic crisis</a>. </p>
<p>Five million Afghans fled the country and over three million were internally displaced, according to the <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/102160">UN refugee agency’s update</a> in July 2023. The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is now at an unprecedented critical level: more than 18 million people – just under half the Afghan population – face acute <a href="https://www.wfp.org/countries/afghanistan">food-insecurity</a>. </p>
<h2>Least peaceful country</h2>
<p>After an initial upsurge, violence <a href="https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard/0B428DC54C4FF4146CBB3EAE58256BCF">has significantly declined</a> in Afghanistan under the Taliban. Yet, Afghanistan remains “the least peaceful country in the world in 2023”, according to the <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GPI-2023-Web.pdf">Global Peace Index</a>. </p>
<p>This reflects, in part, the ongoing rivalry between the Taliban and the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) group. This branch of the Islamic State remains the most potent domestic challenger to the Taliban. It <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/125/36/PDF/N2312536.pdf?OpenElement">comprises</a> somewhere between 4,000 and 6,000 fighters, including former regime officials and members of ethnic minorities opposed to the Taliban regime. IS-K has been <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2023/06/afghanistan-impact-improvised-explosive-devices-civilians">responsible</a> for the majority of civilian casualties in terrorist attacks inside Afghanistan and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/32460999.html">has established itself</a> firmly in the northern and northeastern provinces of Afghanistan.</p>
<p>From a regional perspective, IS-K poses an equally important security threat to Afghanistan’s <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-khorasan-taliban-central-asia-attacks/31844898.html">northern neighbours in central Asia</a>. At the end of July 2023 it <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-bajaur-rally-blast/32526408.html">claimed</a> a suicide attack in northwest Pakistan that killed more than 50 people.</p>
<p>IS-K, however, is not the most significant security threat to Pakistan. Rather, the Taliban’s longstanding ally has been afflicted by an upsurge in violent attacks committed by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a terrorist group allegedly <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/ap-afghanistan-islamabad-peshawar-shehbaz-sharif-b2385883.html">enjoying safe havens in Afghanistan</a>. According to a recent <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/189/74/PDF/N2318974.pdf?OpenElement">UN report</a>, the TTP has reabsorbed several splinter groups and seeks to regain a measure of territorial control along the Afghan-Pakistan border. </p>
<p>Since the Taliban takeover, other, more regionally oriented terrorist groups, such as the <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-movement-uzbekistan">Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan</a> and the <a href="https://www.hstoday.us/featured/understanding-the-turkistan-islamic-party-from-global-jihad-to-local-anti-chinese-resistance/">Turkestan Islamic Party</a> (formerly known as the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement), have also benefited from a more permissive environment in which to operate. These and numerous other groups are smaller in size – numbering in their tens and hundreds, rather than thousands. But they tend to <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/038/91/PDF/N2303891.pdf?OpenElement">coordinate and cooperate</a> with each other and increasingly also with IS-K. </p>
<p>This is of particular concern to China. Beijing <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-china-taliban-uyghurs-security/32444038.html">is worried</a> that the Uyghur extremist Turkestan Islamic Party will eventually use Afghanistan as a base for attacks against China and Chinese interests in the wider region. </p>
<h2>Water wars</h2>
<p>Beyond terrorism, competition over scarce water resources is the other major source of conflict. The Taliban’s plan to build the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-canal-water-central-asia/32350996.html">Qosh Tepa Irrigation Canal</a> will <a href="https://www.intellinews.com/taliban-threaten-water-resources-of-uzbekistan-turkmenistan-and-tajikistan-273219/">decrease</a> water available to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan from the transboundary Amu Darya River by as much as 15%. This will have <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/what-afghanistans-qosh-tepa-canal-means-for-central-asia/">major</a> social, economic and public health consequences for both countries. </p>
<p>A similar crisis is <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/a-compulsive-embrace-beneath-the-afghanistan-iran-water-conflict/">brewing between Tehran and Kabul</a>. The Taliban is reportedly <a href="https://time.com/6302192/taliban-suicide-bombers-water-dispute-iran/">preparing toops, including suicide bombers</a> for what looks certain to be a conflict with Iran over water shortages caused by the Taliban allegedly <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-taliban-water-dispute-/32435442.html">reneging</a> on a 1973 water treaty. </p>
<h2>Fear and intimidation at home and abroad</h2>
<p>After two years of Taliban rule, Afghanistan, is a different – but not a lesser – problem. The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-51689443">deal signed</a> between the Taliban and the US on February 29 2020, after two years of talks pushed by the then US president, Donald Trump, precipitated the withdrawal of western troops but did not bring about intra-Afghan reconciliation. </p>
<p>On the contrary, since the takeover in August 2021 the Taliban has <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/08/afghanistan-one-year-of-the-talibans-broken-promises-draconian-restrictions-and-violence/">ruled with fear and intimidation</a>. And it has failed in its commitment to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. </p>
<p>This has not, however, stopped international efforts to engage with the Taliban regime. Central Asian states have been at the forefront of efforts <a href="https://thegeopolitics.com/afghanistan-should-be-reintegrated-into-regional-trade-and-security-structures/">to integrate Afghanistan</a> into regional trade and security structures and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-trans-afghan-railway-line-back-on-track/">pushed the idea</a> of a trans-Afghan railway line. In early August, 2023, Kazakhstan hosted a Taliban delegation for a business forum. The two countries signed US$200 million (£157 million) worth of <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-signs-200-million-in-contracts-with-afghanistan">deals</a>, primarily to supply grain and flour to Afghanistan. </p>
<p>Afghanistan has vast <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/11/afghanistan-taliban-mining-resources-rich-minerals/">mineral deposits</a>, including critical <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/science/science-news/rare-earth-afghanistan-sits-1-trillion-minerals-n196861">rare earth</a> minerals. These have <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinese-investment-in-afghanistans-lithium-sector-a-long-shot-in-the-short-term/">attracted Chinese investment</a> in Afghanistan’s lithium sector. Beijing and Kabul also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/afghanistans-taliban-administration-oil-extraction-deal-with-chinese-company-2023-01-05/">agreed a deal</a> in January 2023, enabling a Chinese company to drill for oil in the Amu Darya basin.</p>
<p>While these efforts do not imply recognition of the Taliban regime – even by its closest neighbours – they suggest a slow but inevitable trend in that direction. This all the more likely now that even Washington has begun to re-engage with the Taliban. This has included <a href="https://www.state.gov/meeting-of-u-s-officials-with-taliban-representatives/">signalling</a>, at recent high-level talks in Doha, Qatar, an “openness to a technical dialogue regarding economic stabilisation issues”.</p>
<p>Washington is still <a href="https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-1-2023/#post-466596-AFGHANISTAN">ruling out</a> recognition “right now for a number of reasons, including the treatment of their own people, including their many flagrant human rights violations”. But this represents a significant shift in US policy. </p>
<p>Two years of Taliban rule have seen the regime in Kabul double down on its repressive domestic policies and do little to assuage its near and far neighbours’ concerns over new and old security <a href="https://osce-network.net/file-OSCE-Network/Publications/OSCE-CA-2023.pdf">risks</a>. So this apparent willingness to re-engage with the Taliban will send all the wrong signals and is unlikely to bring about more security and stability for Afghans and their neighbours. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>When originally published, this article mistakenly carried a photograph of a Palestinian funeral procession instead of an image of girls being turned away from their school. This has now been rectified.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211052/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>Two years on from taking control of Afghanistan the Taliban continues to rule through fear and threatens the stability of the whole region.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1881332022-08-03T15:44:55Z2022-08-03T15:44:55ZAfghanistan: assassination of al-Qaida chief reveals tensions at the top of the Taliban<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-was-ayman-al-zawahri-where-does-his-death-leave-al-qaida-and-what-does-it-say-about-us-counterterrorism-188056">killing of the al-Qaida leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri,</a> in Kabul by a US drone strike on July 31 raises some crucial questions. It appears the ruling Taliban were aware of, and gave their blessing to, al-Zawahiri staying in one of the residential areas in Kabul. But did someone in their hierarchy turn him in to the US – and if so, who and why? </p>
<p>It’s worth thinking about what this means for the relationship between the two groups: one an ailing global terror network, the other an insurgent group trying to gain international legitimacy for its takeover in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>A little recent history is enlightening. In February 2020, a <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-us-and-taliban-sign-accord-afghanistan-must-prepare-for-peace-132303">peace deal signed in Doha, Qatar</a> between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the Taliban) and the US paved the way for Washington to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan after 20 years. The Americans were promised a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan which pledged not to “allow any of its members, other individuals or groups, including al-Qaida, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies”. </p>
<p>The US hoped to use the Taliban to counter ISIS-K’s growing threat in the region. Desperate for cash and international recognition, this sealed the deal on the Afghan part.</p>
<p>But even if they were publicly praised, the Doha accords were <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/311-taking-stock-talibans-perspectives-peace">not accepted and honoured by all</a>. The pledge to sever ties with al-Qaida created friction inside the Taliban. This was largely a generational divide. On one side was a younger, more technologically savvy and English-speaking leadership group which saw the opportunity to rebuild the group’s image and attract vital funds to rebuild civil society. On the other side were older Taliban fighters.</p>
<p>A faction of these older fighters are loyal to <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2021/08/18/who-is-mullah-abdul-ghani-baradar-the-talibans-de-facto-leader">Abdul Ghani Baradar</a>, who was appointed deputy leader after the Taliban takeover. The Mullah Brothers group mostly hail from the Taliban heartland around Kandahar in the south of Afghanistan, and represent a hardline jihadist viewpoint. Also opposed to the Doha accords is the militant <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/haqqani_network.html">Haqqani network</a>, which is thought to have been instrumental in installing al-Zawahiri in Kabul in a house owned by Sirajuddin Haqqani, now the interior minister in the Taliban government in Kabul. </p>
<p>The Mullah Brothers and the Haqqani network represent a more militant wing of the Taliban that feel that the Doha agreement not to aid or support al-Qaida sets them against a group which is ideologically close to them, in breach of the <a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2006/12/19/honour-among-them">Pashtun code</a> which forbids betrayal.</p>
<p>This instability within the Taliban surfaced even as the last US airplane left the country in August 2021, and the various factions began to jockey for primacy in the new administration. aqqani’s appointment as interior minister is thought to have been a sop to his faction but this has not eased the tension, according to a high-ranking official of the disbanded Afghan Army, who told me: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Sirajuddin Haqqani has never obeyed the Quetta Council of the Taliban, for he considers himself the conqueror of Kabul. So there is little doubt that created a safe haven for Ayman al-Zawahiri – keep in mind, that was a Haqqani guesthouse.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another Afghan intelligence officer told me: “The truth is, in spite of their promise, the Taliban – and the Haqqani network in particular – have never really cut ties with al-Qaida, going against what was agreed with the US.”</p>
<h2>Did the US have local help?</h2>
<p>It is still too early to know what happened – and the whole truth might never emerge. The drone strike had reportedly been planned for months. It may well have been planned and executed without any local assistance, and might just have been down to first-rate intelligence work. But the kind of surgical operation carried by a US drone in a heavily guarded area suggests at least some help in tracking al-Zawahiri’s precise location. </p>
<p>And, in an area of the world torn by poverty, food insecurity and rampant corruption, the <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/ayman-al-zawahiri">US$25 million (£20.5 million) reward</a> to uncover al-Zawahiri’s safe house would have been a strong incentive.</p>
<p>Let’s assume that someone will claim that reward for assisting the US. There are two possible scenarios. Despite being close to al-Qaida, the Mullah Brothers group had much to gain by revealing al-Zawahiri’s location. In addition to the rewards, they could advance their own influence by dealing a blow to Haqqani’s credibility while advancing their own political position.</p>
<p>The second scenario deals with regional dynamics. Traditionally, members of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) have enjoyed fairly <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/pakistans-support-taliban-what-know">strong ties with the Afghan Taliban</a>. These connections are reportedly still solid – particularly with the Haqqani network. </p>
<p>Both of the Afghan officers who spoke with me said that Pakistani intelligence would have come under strong political pressure to cooperate with the US. The intelligence officer told me that not only did Islamabad give Washington permission to use its airspace to carry out the attack, but “members of the ISI may have disclosed and/or confirmed al-Zawahiri’s location to avoid economic collapse in certain areas”.</p>
<h2>Bracing for the fallout</h2>
<p>Regardless of all this, al-Qaida has suffered a tremendous blow. Al-Zawahiri was there from the beginning – the most important figure after Osama bin Laden, inspiring and galvanising jihadists around the globe. He was considered a tactical genius, instrumental in planning spectacular attacks – including 9/11 – as well as in the identification and infiltration of new theatres of operation. </p>
<p>It will not be easy to replace an element of his calibre. But al-Qaida has previously shown a strong capacity for regrouping, and al-Zawahiri’s departure could represent a chance to bring in a younger and more technologically savvy leader who can speak to the next generation of aspiring jihadists around the world.</p>
<p>As for Afghanistan, al-Zawahiri’s death may have dire implications. Accusations of cooperating with the Americans will affect the already divided Taliban leadership – which could lead to bitter internecine fighting within it. And the presence of a terrorist as prominent as al-Zawahiri supposedly under the protection of senior Taliban cadres will not help US-Taliban relations. It is a direct breach of the Doha accords. </p>
<p>Any rift at the top of the Taliban would also allow other terror groups operating in Afghanistan, such as <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-58333533">ISIS-K</a>, to expand their influence and operations, with terrible consequences for ordinary Afghans.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188133/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michele Groppi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The assassination of the leader of al-Qaida in Kabul raises some important questions about divisions among the Taliban leadership.Michele Groppi, Teaching Fellow in Challenges to the International Order, Defence Studies Department, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1692812021-11-04T19:31:16Z2021-11-04T19:31:16ZWhy the Taliban must be held accountable for past atrocities<p>In August, after Taliban rapidly swept to power in Afghanistan, its fighters executed 13 people from the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58807734">Hazara minority</a> in Daikundi province, where I was born. Amnesty International has said these extrajudicial killings <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2021/10/afghanistan-13-hazara-killed-by-taliban-fighters-in-daykundi-province-new-investigation/">“appear to be war crimes”</a>.</p>
<p>This is just one example of the Taliban’s cruelty. In recent months, a further 20 civilians are thought to have been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58545892">massacred in the Panjshir valley</a> and Hazara farmers have been <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2021-10-05/why-don-t-you-have-mercy-afghanistan-s-hazara-people-increasingly-face-eviction">forced off their lands</a>, all while journalists are arrested and persecuted around the country.</p>
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À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-jihadism-could-thrive-under-the-taliban-in-afghanistan-169288">How jihadism could thrive under the Taliban in Afghanistan</a>
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<p>Since they first came to power in 1996, the Taliban have enjoyed near total impunity for such crimes. This past impunity has allowed them to continue to commit atrocities without fear of prosecution, punishment or any other form of accountability.</p>
<p>This has serious consequences for the future of Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>Crimes of the Taliban</h2>
<p>The Taliban are well known for <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/07/06/blood-stained-hands/past-atrocities-kabul-and-afghanistans-legacy-impunity">grave breaches of human rights</a> committed between 1996 and 2001. These included mass killings of civilians, <a href="https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6350172">burning villages and orchards</a>, torturing detainees and displacing civilians by force.</p>
<p>In 1998, one of the worst atrocities took place in the city of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/afghan/Afrepor0.htm">Mazar i-Sharif</a> in northern Afghanistan. At least 2,000 civilians were killed when Taliban militia captured the city, with the Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek ethnic minorities particularly targeted.</p>
<p>From January to November 2001, the Taliban carried out several massacres in the province of Bamyan. In one incident, <a href="https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/uploads/291156cd-c8e3-4620-a5e1-d3117ed7fb93/ajpreport_20050718.pdf">178 civilians</a> were killed in the city of Yakawlang in a single day.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425721/original/file-20211011-19-16x1aot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Members of Taliban stand in front of the site where the Shahmama Buddha statue once stood before it was destroyed by the Taliban in March 2001" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425721/original/file-20211011-19-16x1aot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425721/original/file-20211011-19-16x1aot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425721/original/file-20211011-19-16x1aot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425721/original/file-20211011-19-16x1aot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425721/original/file-20211011-19-16x1aot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425721/original/file-20211011-19-16x1aot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425721/original/file-20211011-19-16x1aot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Members of Taliban stand in front of the site where the Shahmama Buddha statue once stood before it was destroyed by the Taliban in March 2001.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bulent Kilic/AFP</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>After US invaded Afghanistan in November 2001 and overthrew the Taliban, the group continued to commit crimes during the armed conflict that broke out between the newly established US-backed government forces and its international allies and anti-government armed groups.</p>
<p>During this period, the Taliban <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-pe_eng.pdf">continued to oversee</a> the killing of civilians as well as abductions, imprisonment and attacks against humanitarian personnel and the destruction of protected sites such as mosques, place of worship, hospitals. They also <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-02/17-7-Red">conscripted and enlisted children</a> under the age of 15, forcing them to participate in the fighting.</p>
<h2>A collapsed justice system</h2>
<p>Despite the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47fdfad50.pdf">strong desire</a> for justice expressed by victims of Taliban crimes, no accountability mechanism has been adopted either within Afghanistan or internationally to address theses atrocities.</p>
<p>Since 2001, the Afghan judicial system has generally been considered a <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/asa110072007en.pdf">collapsed institution</a>, defined by a lack of resources, the nonexistence of adequate legal provisions and widespread corruption. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/03/10/afghanistan-repeal-amnesty-law">Amnesty laws</a> have protected the perpetrators of war crimes, while a lack of impartiality has dogged the criminal proceedings that do take place. At the same time, <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW84-Informal%20Justice%20and%20the%20International%20Community%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf">informal justice systems</a> proliferated throughout the country.</p>
<p>There was very little political will within the government to prosecute the Taliban when they were not in power, with peace and security justifications used to avoid prosecution.</p>
<p>Then, under the <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf">deal</a> struck between the Trump administration and the Taliban in February 2020, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/09/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-prisoners-peace-talks.html">5,000 Taliban members were released</a>, among them 400 members linked to major crimes.</p>
<h2>The role of the ICC</h2>
<p>With little hope of justice being served under Taliban rule in Afghanistan, it falls to the international community to provide accountability.</p>
<p>The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/afghanistan">examining the situation</a> in Afghanistan since 2007, and the court’s prosecutor sought permission in 2017 to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/20/afghanistan-and-international-criminal-court">investigate crimes</a> committed since 2003 by the Taliban, Afghan government forces and foreign forces.</p>
<p>Yet, it is unrealistic to expect that the ICC – which is heavily dependent on the member states’ cooperation in issuing arrest warrants, collecting evidence and information and enforcement of judgements – to achieve justice for Taliban on its own. It’s worth remembering that the US, the most important player in Afghanistan this century, is not a member of the ICC.</p>
<p>The case of Sudan demonstrates how difficult seeking justice through the ICC can be. Despite issuing <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir">two arrest warrants</a> for former president Omar Al-Bashir on allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, the ICC has not yet been able to prosecute him because of years of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/trials-war-crimes-middle-east-africa-khartoum-c6698024bdd7f1cade89b9b4101d25c1">non-cooperation of the states</a> to arrest him. It was only in 2020, Sudan’s transition government <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54548629.amp">agreed to cooperate</a> with ICC.</p>
<h2>Alternative justice</h2>
<p>Outside the international courts, members of the international community including national governments, NGOs, researchers and human rights activists can work together to seek accountability for the Taliban’s crimes. This could include measures such as establishing a truth and reconciliation commission, or using customary procedures to raise the voice of victims about past crimes.</p>
<p>In pursuing such an approach, it is important to consider the experiences of countries like South Africa, Uganda, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste in seeking alternative justice solutions. At the same time, the complexity of the political, social and cultural context of Afghanistan should not be ignored.</p>
<p>Accountability for past injustices is vital to prevent future atrocities. Providing ongoing immunity to the Taliban so far sends the message that, in their newly empowered form, they can continue committing the most appalling crimes without fear of prosecution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169281/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Je travaille pour la CPI en tant que stagiaire pour une période de six mois, d'octobre 2015 à avril 2016.</span></em></p>The Taliban is responsible for atrocities dating back to the 1990s, but has never been held responsible. The international community can play a role in ending the impunity.Latifa Jafari Alavi, PHD in international law, Université de StrasbourgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1650592021-08-16T19:12:34Z2021-08-16T19:12:34ZAfghans’ lives and livelihoods upended even more as US occupation ends<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416071/original/file-20210813-13-o5t0pw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C14%2C4792%2C3003&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Forced from their homes by fighting between the Taliban and Afghan government forces, thousands of families seek refuge in a Kabul park.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/thousands-of-displaced-families-suffer-hardships-in-a-park-news-photo/1234621883">Haroon Sabawoon/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United States invaded Afghanistan in late 2001 with the goal of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/afghanistan-war-us.html">destroying al-Qaida and its Taliban hosts</a> and, supposedly, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23524156">establishing a democratic Afghan state</a> and helping Afghan women and children.</p>
<p>Twenty years later, the U.S. and its coalition of 40 or so allies have shuttered their bases and withdrawn, with few exceptions, their last troops. The <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/16/middleeast/taliban-control-afghanistan-explained-intl-hnk/index.html">Taliban have taken over most of the country</a>, including its capital, Kabul.</p>
<p>More than 5,000 American <a href="http://icasualties.org/">soldiers</a> and <a href="https://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/dbaallnation.htm">contractors</a> were killed over that time. Another <a href="http://icasualties.org/">1,200 coalition soldiers</a> also died. Al-Qaida is not defeated; it’s still in Afghanistan and overall has considerably <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48056433">more members and operates in many more territories</a> around the world than it did in 2001. A careful reading of the February 2020 <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf">peace agreement</a> between the Trump administration and the Taliban, an agreement that the Biden administration <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55775522">is apparently adhering to</a>, reveals that the Taliban made almost no concessions in return for the U.S. withdrawal.</p>
<p>As a longtime <a href="http://sinno.com/publications---data.html">researcher of Afghanistan’s conflicts</a>, I have observed how Afghans’ lives and livelihoods have been affected by the failed 20-year Western occupation of their country.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416073/original/file-20210813-27-a98d4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Children sit on carpets outside a brick building" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416073/original/file-20210813-27-a98d4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416073/original/file-20210813-27-a98d4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416073/original/file-20210813-27-a98d4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416073/original/file-20210813-27-a98d4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416073/original/file-20210813-27-a98d4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416073/original/file-20210813-27-a98d4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416073/original/file-20210813-27-a98d4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Children are among the thousands of Afghans who have fled their homes, seeking refuge either elsewhere in Afghanistan or in other countries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/internally-displaced-afghan-families-who-fled-from-the-news-photo/1234651269">Wakil Kohsar/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>The state the US left behind</h2>
<p>When the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in late 2001, the Taliban were on the verge of controlling much of the country, which was then home to 21 million people. Their regime was brutal, but it managed to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11451718">clamp down on extreme lawlessness and to stabilize</a> a country that, by then, had endured 22 years of horrendous war against Soviet occupiers and among rival Afghan factions.</p>
<p>Until its demise in mid-August 2021, the Afghan government in Kabul was weak, corrupt, divided and vulnerable. It attempted to rule over a population of 38 million with <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/afghanistan">some of the most corrupt state institutions on Earth</a>. The regime established by the U.S. and its allies was <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/120.5.1811">so dysfunctional</a> that Afghan courts were known to judge for the party that paid the most, police forces extorted impoverished civilians on a regular basis, and little was done by civil servants <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf">without a bribe</a>. Many <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501746420/warlord-survival/">state officials were also predatory warlords</a> who recruited their followers to the civil service with the expectation that they would enrich themselves through bribes.</p>
<p>Foreign-backed Afghan political factions, such as the <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/us-withdraws-afghanistan-hazara-status-civil-war/">Hazara Fatemiyoun group</a> organized by Iran, had infiltrated all levels of government. And in a desperate attempt to limit the gains of the Taliban, the Afghan government began <a href="https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-taliban-business-race-and-ethnicity-99ce5fbb7b9a176b4662fbd04c7cb142">directly paying independent warlords</a> for their support, even as many were involved in the drug trade and abusing civilians.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416074/original/file-20210813-13-10tt6jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Men carrying rifles gather outside a building" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416074/original/file-20210813-13-10tt6jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416074/original/file-20210813-13-10tt6jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416074/original/file-20210813-13-10tt6jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416074/original/file-20210813-13-10tt6jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416074/original/file-20210813-13-10tt6jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416074/original/file-20210813-13-10tt6jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416074/original/file-20210813-13-10tt6jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Private militias run by independent warlords have taken sides in the conflict between the Taliban and the Afghan government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/afghan-militia-gather-with-their-weapons-to-support-news-photo/1233885666">Hoshang Hashimi/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Afghans’ lives and livelihoods</h2>
<p>At least 100,000 Afghan civilians were <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/02/1057921">killed or injured</a> in the conflict between the U.S.-led coalition and Afghans resisting its occupation of their country. This number should be considered an undercount, as many Afghan casualties were buried quickly following Islamic customs, and records were not kept. Probably as many Afghan combatants have <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/FP_20200825_afganistan_index.pdf">also lost their lives</a>, and many more have been crippled or gravely wounded. Life expectancy in Afghanistan today is a mere <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/08/world/asia/us-misleads-on-afghanistan.html">48 years</a>.</p>
<p>Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/56779160">6 out of 10 Afghans</a> living in poverty and a <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=AF">GDP per capita of some $500 per year</a>, less than 1% of that in the U.S. Much property has been destroyed, and the war economy has forced many Afghans into deeper poverty, all while enriching drug barons and regime-linked warlords. Opium and heroin abuse <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/UNODC-DRUG-REPORT15-ONLINE-270116_1.pdf">skyrocketed in Afghanistan</a> over the 20-year occupation, with millions of Afghans turning to the drugs to escape their harsh reality.</p>
<p>There are <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/afghanistan.html">2.5 million registered Afghan refugees</a> in Pakistan, Iran and beyond. <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2020/Displacement_Vine%20et%20al_Costs%20of%20War%202020%2009%2008.pdf">Three million more Afghans are internally displaced</a>. These numbers are
very likely to skyrocket in the wake of the dramatic Taliban victories of mid-August 2021.</p>
<p>Many displaced Afghans, whether inside Afghanistan or outside its borders, lack the basics for minimal survival and are vulnerable to disease and exploitation. Among all the refugees in the world, only those from Palestine and Syria outnumber those from Afghanistan, and Afghans have been among the largest nationality groups <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44660699">seeking refuge in Europe</a>.</p>
<p>Rural Pashtun, the ethnic group that provides the Taliban with most of its manpower, were among those who suffered the most during the war because the bulk of the fighting took place in their areas. </p>
<p>Some urban Pashtun and members of minorities, particularly the historically disadvantaged Hazara ethnic group, took advantage of economic and educational opportunities made available by Western aid agencies and worked for foreign militaries and organizations. These beneficiaries of the foreign presence are now <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/06/19/1004991965/afghan-interpreters-who-await-visas-after-helping-the-u-s-now-fear-for-their-liv">some of the most vulnerable people</a> in Afghanistan, as the Taliban may consider them to be traitors.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416072/original/file-20210813-15-1n6o5mk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Armed men on motorcycles ride down a street" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416072/original/file-20210813-15-1n6o5mk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416072/original/file-20210813-15-1n6o5mk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416072/original/file-20210813-15-1n6o5mk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416072/original/file-20210813-15-1n6o5mk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416072/original/file-20210813-15-1n6o5mk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416072/original/file-20210813-15-1n6o5mk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416072/original/file-20210813-15-1n6o5mk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Taliban soldiers patrol the Afghan city of Ghazni on Aug. 12, 2021, after capturing it from government forces.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXAfghanistan/066f2a220b9d4da2899ead9882b87f36/photo">AP Photo/Gulabuddin Amiri</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Tens of thousands of Afghans who worked for the U.S. military, for example, are pleading with Washington <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/24/us/politics/afghan-interpreters-visas.html">to be allowed to come to the U.S. with their families</a>. The Biden administration admitted some, but many more are <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/08/02/biden-visa-program-afghan-interpreters-502085">still waiting to be relocated</a> in the U.S.</p>
<p>The situation of women and children in Afghanistan has not improved much. The rate of maternal mortality, with 1.6 women dying for every 100 births, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/08/world/asia/us-misleads-on-afghanistan.html">has hardly budged</a> since the Taliban ruled in the late 1990s. On the other hand, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/56779160">more women joined the labor force</a> and <a href="https://wenr.wes.org/2016/09/education-afghanistan">more children, particularly girls</a>, have had access to primary education in the past 20 years. Still, only 1 in 10 Afghan children finish high school.</p>
<p>In many rural areas, the situation of women and girls has gotten worse: Not only did they not receive quality aid or education, but they had to contend with <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/17/afghanistan-girls-struggle-education#">extreme poverty, threats of violence and the insecurity of war</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416075/original/file-20210813-6624-1e84rz7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of soldiers stands alongside armored vehicles with a Russian flag flying overhead." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416075/original/file-20210813-6624-1e84rz7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416075/original/file-20210813-6624-1e84rz7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416075/original/file-20210813-6624-1e84rz7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416075/original/file-20210813-6624-1e84rz7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416075/original/file-20210813-6624-1e84rz7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416075/original/file-20210813-6624-1e84rz7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416075/original/file-20210813-6624-1e84rz7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian troops were among a multinational force that conducted military exercises along Afghanistan’s northern border as the Taliban gained ground.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaTajikistanDrills/2f3d66f0d62d4708a2b3871bc9682dba/photo">AP Photo/Didor Sadulloev</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What will the future hold?</h2>
<p>The U.S. occupation caused Afghans to experience an additional 20 years of war and suffering. Ironically, the U.S. is leaving Afghanistan in a state very similar to when it invaded.</p>
<p>The Taliban are back <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/08/16/world/taliban-afghanistan-news">in control of much of Afghanistan</a>, including most of Kabul. Their erstwhile opposition, the militias and warlords of the <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/northern-alliance-or-united-islamic-front-salvation-afghanistan-uifsa">now-defunct Northern Alliance</a> are weaker than they were in 2001, just before the U.S. invasion.</p>
<p>Some members of minority groups, particularly the Hazara and those who cooperated with the foreign occupation, are likely to suffer. Urban Afghans will also have to contend with severe Taliban social strictures that affect women and girls in particular. Migration out of Afghanistan will rise as urbanites and minorities flee for their lives. On the other hand, the Taliban are likely to impose their strict law enforcement and establish courts that aren’t run by corrupt officials, which should deter crime.</p>
<p>As of now, the Taliban have expressed the desire to <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/afghan-soldiers-seek-taliban-amnesty-081333126.html">provide amnesty to state officials, soldiers</a> and other workers. If that happens, and if it is maintained, it would likely shore up Taliban support among the public. </p>
<p>If the U.S., as it often reflexively does against challengers in the international system, chooses to impose <a href="https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-oxio/e33.013.1/law-oxio-e33?prd=OPIL&result=3&rskey=4oKcce">harsh sanctions on Afghanistan</a> the way the U.S. and U.N. did in the 1990s, then it would contribute to even more suffering.</p>
<p>It is also possible that resistance to Taliban rule may develop over coming months and years in the north and in the center of the country. If civil war resumes, then I believe Afghans will experience even more exploitation, heart-wrenching poverty, death and suffering.</p>
<p>[<em>Understand key political developments, each week.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/politics-weekly-74/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=politics-understand">Subscribe to The Conversation’s politics newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165059/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdulkader Sinno does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When the US invaded Afghanistan in late 2001, Afghans had endured 22 years of war. The Taliban were on the rise. Little has changed after an additional 20 years of war and suffering.Abdulkader Sinno, Associate Professor of Political Science and Middle Eastern Studies, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1601372021-05-07T12:42:36Z2021-05-07T12:42:36ZFaces of those America is leaving behind in Afghanistan<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399027/original/file-20210505-19-12r3lst.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C2%2C659%2C488&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The people of Afghanistan that the author encountered live very different lives from Americans.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>U.S. troops are <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/04/29/politics/us-afghanistan-withdrawal-begun/index.html">already heading home from Afghanistan</a>, ending a two-decade-long war that saw as many as 100,000 American troops there. The withdrawal of the remaining few thousand is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/13/us/politics/afghanistan-troops-withdrawal.html">slated to be complete</a> by the symbolic date of Sept. 11, 2021.</p>
<p>I know this land well from my journeys across more than half of its provinces as a <a href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">professor of Afghan history</a> and as a former <a href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/pdfs/Steve%20Coll_Directorates_ch%2014-Williams.pdf">employee of the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center</a> <a href="https://mepc.org/journal/mullah-omars-missiles-field-report-suicide-bombers-afghanistan">tracking the movement</a> of Taliban and al-Qaida suicide bombers. I also <a href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/us_army_afg/field_us_army_afg.html">advised the military</a> on Afghan terrain, tribes, politics and history.</p>
<p>While on my solo missions for the CIA and U.S. Army beyond the safety of our base’s walls, in what my team described as the “red zone,” I also did something that none of my U.S. Army comrades – who traveled in convoys and were restricted by <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-military-rules-of-engagement-in-afghanistan-questioned-1454349100">formal rules of engagement</a> – could do. I freely photographed the fascinating Afghan people around me as they went about their lives in an active war zone.</p>
<p>Lately, I worry about the fate of the people in these photos and others I have taken. Their world may be destroyed if, or when, the fast-advancing Taliban reconquer the last remaining government-controlled zones. </p>
<p>These images show glimpses of the potentially doomed people and ways of life the U.S. is leaving behind as the troops depart.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398158/original/file-20210430-15-1wit0yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Armed men ride horses through rocky ground" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398158/original/file-20210430-15-1wit0yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398158/original/file-20210430-15-1wit0yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398158/original/file-20210430-15-1wit0yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398158/original/file-20210430-15-1wit0yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398158/original/file-20210430-15-1wit0yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398158/original/file-20210430-15-1wit0yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398158/original/file-20210430-15-1wit0yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Uzbek Mongol cavalry commander General Abdul Rashid Dostum, nicknamed ‘The Taliban Killer,’ rides his prized war stallion Surkun in 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The warlord</h2>
<p>In this photograph from 2003, General Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek Mongol cavalry commander, rides his prized war stallion Surkun. </p>
<p>Dostum, a legendary military leader who fought alongside the Soviets in the 1980s to extend modernity to Afghanistan and has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42908396">faced accusations of war crimes against the Taliban which he denies</a>, is a friend and the focus of my 2013 book, “<a href="https://www.chicagoreviewpress.com/last-warlord--the-products-9781613748008.php">The Last Warlord: The Afghan Warrior who Led US Special Forces to Topple the Taliban Regime</a>.” In 2001 he rode Surkun into combat alongside horse-mounted U.S. Special Forces Green Berets to overthrow his northern Turkic-Mongol people’s historic foes, the ethnic Aryan Pashtun Taliban regime.</p>
<p>Hundreds of his riders were killed in the <a href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/pdfs/930854297(3).pdf">desperate mountain campaign against their Taliban enemies</a>, as seen in the 2019 Hollywood blockbuster “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1413492/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1">12 Strong: The True, Declassified Story of the Horse Soldiers of Afghanistan</a>,” which was in part <a href="https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/168036">based on my book</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398162/original/file-20210430-14-1em1aa7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A young girl and her brother sit under a fabric tent" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398162/original/file-20210430-14-1em1aa7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398162/original/file-20210430-14-1em1aa7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398162/original/file-20210430-14-1em1aa7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398162/original/file-20210430-14-1em1aa7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398162/original/file-20210430-14-1em1aa7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398162/original/file-20210430-14-1em1aa7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398162/original/file-20210430-14-1em1aa7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A young Afghan girl sits with her younger brother in 2007.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The girl</h2>
<p>This cherubic nine-year-old girl at left was charged with babysitting her little brother while her parents worked in the fields in a remote desert region. I have no idea what her fate was, but many impoverished girls like her do not get the opportunity to get an education and are married off in arranged marriages when they are young.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398173/original/file-20210430-22-1kxb7f3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd of Afghans smile around a guest" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398173/original/file-20210430-22-1kxb7f3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398173/original/file-20210430-22-1kxb7f3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398173/original/file-20210430-22-1kxb7f3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398173/original/file-20210430-22-1kxb7f3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398173/original/file-20210430-22-1kxb7f3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398173/original/file-20210430-22-1kxb7f3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398173/original/file-20210430-22-1kxb7f3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In 2005, I (center) received warm welcomes all across northern Afghanistan, where the people were generally friendly toward Americans.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The hosts</h2>
<p>I was always amazed at the warm welcomes I received while traveling among the Uzbek-Mongol, Persian-Tajik and Hazara-Shiite Mongol tribes of northern Afghanistan, who are closely allied with the U.S. I was regularly invited into their simple homes, where my hosts would eagerly offer me lamb or goat, often after slaughtering their only source of meat for an honored guest. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398165/original/file-20210430-15-uw1ha6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two chickens fight in the center of a crowd of people, watching the action closely" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398165/original/file-20210430-15-uw1ha6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398165/original/file-20210430-15-uw1ha6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398165/original/file-20210430-15-uw1ha6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398165/original/file-20210430-15-uw1ha6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398165/original/file-20210430-15-uw1ha6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398165/original/file-20210430-15-uw1ha6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398165/original/file-20210430-15-uw1ha6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chicken fights were a popular – if bloody – form of entertainment in Kabul in 2005, but they were banned by the Taliban.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The chicken fighters</h2>
<p>On most Friday afternoons during my time in Kabul, there were chicken fights, like this one in the Garden of Babur, a popular park built around the marble grave of Babur, the founder of India’s magnificent Moghul Empire. At the fights, men bet on which chicken would win, but the pastime was banned by the Taliban as “un-Islamic” as all such “sinful” games distracted from the worship of God. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398174/original/file-20210430-23-fbv3b5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of Afghan middle school girls" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398174/original/file-20210430-23-fbv3b5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398174/original/file-20210430-23-fbv3b5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398174/original/file-20210430-23-fbv3b5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398174/original/file-20210430-23-fbv3b5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398174/original/file-20210430-23-fbv3b5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398174/original/file-20210430-23-fbv3b5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398174/original/file-20210430-23-fbv3b5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">After the Taliban were driven out of their area, these Afghan girls, pictured in 2005, were allowed to attend school.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The schoolgirls</h2>
<p>After five years of being denied the right to an education by the Taliban, these middle school girls in the town of Sheberghan in 2005 were excited to return to school. One girl, third from the right, was crying: She had just told me the story of how the Taliban had killed her parents.</p>
<p>She fretted, “The day the Americans leave the Taliban will return and execute us girls if we try to learn to read and write, which is forbidden for females by their law.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398188/original/file-20210430-15-1s8y0h5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man and two boys stand in front of cliffs showing a large void where a Buddha statue used to be" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398188/original/file-20210430-15-1s8y0h5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398188/original/file-20210430-15-1s8y0h5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398188/original/file-20210430-15-1s8y0h5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398188/original/file-20210430-15-1s8y0h5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398188/original/file-20210430-15-1s8y0h5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398188/original/file-20210430-15-1s8y0h5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398188/original/file-20210430-15-1s8y0h5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Behind the boys and me is a massive cutout in the cliff, where a standing Buddha statue used to be, before the Taliban destroyed it.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The guardians of the Buddhas</h2>
<p>In the idyllic Vale of Bamiyan, at 8,000 feet above sea level in the remote Hindu Kush mountains, the Hazara Mongols for centuries cherished two massive statues of the Buddha, carved into the cliffs in the sixth century. In 2001, the Sunni <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/world/asia/afghanistan-bamiyan-buddhas.html">Taliban destroyed the statues</a>, defying international outcry, in a direct insult to the repressed Shiite Hazaras.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398172/original/file-20210430-17-1ukn8sn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A bearded man in a turban stands with an adult camel and a camel calf in front of a tent." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398172/original/file-20210430-17-1ukn8sn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398172/original/file-20210430-17-1ukn8sn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398172/original/file-20210430-17-1ukn8sn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398172/original/file-20210430-17-1ukn8sn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398172/original/file-20210430-17-1ukn8sn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398172/original/file-20210430-17-1ukn8sn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398172/original/file-20210430-17-1ukn8sn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Kuchis, Aryan Pashtuns, wandered the soaring mountains and vast deserts of Afghanistan, living their entire lives in tents without electricity or any modern conveniences.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The nomads</h2>
<p>As I traversed the soaring mountains and vast deserts of this ancient land that time seemingly forgot, I frequently encountered welcoming and curious Aryan Pashtun nomads known as Kuchis. These wanderers invariably invited me to join them for a simple meal in exchange for my stories about a different world known as America, a land that these humble people, who live out their entire lives in tents without electricity, could not imagine.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398170/original/file-20210430-18-1udoa9p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man with a rifle stands in front of a restaurant window" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398170/original/file-20210430-18-1udoa9p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398170/original/file-20210430-18-1udoa9p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398170/original/file-20210430-18-1udoa9p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398170/original/file-20210430-18-1udoa9p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398170/original/file-20210430-18-1udoa9p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398170/original/file-20210430-18-1udoa9p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398170/original/file-20210430-18-1udoa9p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">After Kabul was freed from Taliban rule, American-style restaurants started cropping up.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The burger and pizza chef</h2>
<p>An Afghan who worked on a U.S. base and came to love all things American opened this pizza and burger restaurant in Kabul which, like many businesses, featured an armed guard out front. Other American-style restaurants opened up after the Taliban were driven from Kabul, including the remarkably delicious KFC – Kabul Fried Chicken.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398176/original/file-20210430-14-h7e1f7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of bearded men stand behind a barred door." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398176/original/file-20210430-14-h7e1f7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398176/original/file-20210430-14-h7e1f7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=895&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398176/original/file-20210430-14-h7e1f7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=895&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398176/original/file-20210430-14-h7e1f7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=895&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398176/original/file-20210430-14-h7e1f7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398176/original/file-20210430-14-h7e1f7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398176/original/file-20210430-14-h7e1f7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Taliban fighters captured by General Dostum were imprisoned in the northern deserts of Afghanistan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The Taliban</h2>
<p>I interviewed several dozen Taliban members, who had been captured by General Dostum’s forces, in a fortress-like prison in the northern deserts of Afghanistan. One of the captives told me a common Taliban mantra: “You Americans may have the watches, but we have the time… We will outlast you.”</p>
<p>[<em>Over 100,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160137/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Glyn Williams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As American troops leave Afghanistan, a scholar of the country’s history and culture reexamines his photos of the nation’s people.Brian Glyn Williams, Professor of Islamic History, UMass DartmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1446522020-09-07T14:41:28Z2020-09-07T14:41:28ZAfghanistan’s future: the core issues at stake as Taliban sits down to negotiate ending 19-year war<p>A delegation from the Taliban <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/09/taliban-team-returns-doha-intra-afghan-peace-talks-200905122531188.html">has arrived</a> in the Qatari capital Doha to begin talks with delegates from the Afghan republic in Kabul. The goal is to reach a peace accord to end the world’s <a href="https://www.the-security-times.com/afghanistan-worlds-deadliest-conflict/">deadliest war</a>.</p>
<p>The long-delayed talks come after <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf">an agreement</a> in February between the US and the Taliban, which included a conditional US troop withdrawal within 14 months, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/03/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-prisoners.html">a controversial prisoner swap</a> and the Taliban’s promise to cut ties with al-Qaida. </p>
<p>The hope is that <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/afghanistan-needs-a-settlement/">a political settlement</a> could help reduce the likelihood of Afghanistan becoming a safe haven for terrorists once the US withdraws its troops. But the peace talks, known as the intra-Afghan negotiations, have a rocky road to success. Apart from <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/taliban-know-afghanistans-peace-negotiations-end-islamic-emirate-166914">fundamental differences</a> on the type of post-peace government and women’s rights, the challenge will be whether any agreement on a lasting ceasefire can be reached until political progress is made. </p>
<h2>Lasting ceasefire</h2>
<p>According to the UN, the 19-year war has taken at least <a href="https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_protection_of_civilians_annual_report_2019.pdf">35,000 civilian lives</a> with the majority of casualties inflicted by anti-government groups, mainly the Taliban. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356361/original/file-20200903-18-1h1ibfc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356361/original/file-20200903-18-1h1ibfc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=255&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356361/original/file-20200903-18-1h1ibfc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=255&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356361/original/file-20200903-18-1h1ibfc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=255&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356361/original/file-20200903-18-1h1ibfc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=320&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356361/original/file-20200903-18-1h1ibfc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=320&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356361/original/file-20200903-18-1h1ibfc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=320&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">UNAMA, February 2020</span></span>
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<p>After a series of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52785604">three-day ceasefires</a> during Muslim festivals in 2020, the warring parties have expressed willingness to negotiate a lasting ceasefire during the new talks, but disagreements remain on the timing and sequencing of it. Unlike the Afghan government, human rights bodies and the EU, who all put humanitarian imperatives first, the Taliban’s view is that a ceasefire can be negotiated only after a political agreement.</p>
<p>Governments usually advocate for an <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_713.pdf">early ceasefire</a> in order to minimise the number of concessions they are required to make in negotiations. But armed groups are often opposed, arguing an early ceasefire can favour the status quo and government.</p>
<p>Some ceasefires, such as in <a href="http://www.diva-portal.se/smash/get/diva2:1324869/FULLTEXT01.pdf">Aceh, Indonesia</a> in 2005, have been successfully agreed at the beginning of negotiations. But there are some examples, such <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2012/01/19/remembering-el-salvadors-peace-accord-why-was-that-peace-elusive/">as in El Salvador</a> in the early 1990s, where a ceasefire was only negotiated after progress had been made on the political front. </p>
<h2>A post-peace government</h2>
<p>Afghanistan’s <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Afghanistan_2004.pdf?lang=en">2004 constitution</a>, formed after the toppling of the Taliban Islamic Emirate in 2001, starts by calling Afghanistan “an Islamic Republic, independent, unitary and indivisible”. </p>
<p>It’s likely the negotiators will agree on all these broad principles – except the idea of Afghanistan as a republic. That’s because the Taliban still presents itself as an Islamic emirate <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/28/world/asia/taliban-peace-talks-constitution.html">forced into exile</a> by the US invasion.</p>
<p>The Afghan republic derives its legitimacy from a popular mandate, rather than the divine right vested in the Taliban’s Islamic emirate. The head of state and members of parliament are now elected, albeit with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/world/asia/afghan-voting-fraud-detailed-in-new-report.html">allegations of</a> electoral fraud and malpractice.</p>
<p>After capturing Kabul in 1996, the Taliban formed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2017.1374598">a two-track governance system</a>, made up of a political military leadership council and an executive bureau aiming to transfer its leadership system into state structures. But the group never succeeded in forming a functional state. </p>
<p>In 2020, little is known about the specifics of what the Taliban wants the future Afghan state to look like. However, the group does appear to want an <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/311-taking-stock-talibans-perspectives-peace">inclusive, Islamic political system</a> in which sharia laws are enforced – possibly akin to the theocratic government in Iran.</p>
<p>To ensure effectiveness and stability, any agreement on the structure of a post-peace government should make clear the role of the state institutions which have been set up since 2001. And it must also reflect the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/765882/Elite_Bargains_and_Political_Deals_Project_-_Synthesis_Paper.pdf">underlying configuration of power</a> in Afghanistan, which is predominantly based on consensus among elites than domination by one group over the rest.</p>
<h2>Rights and justice</h2>
<p>The Taliban claims to want to build an Islamic system in which all Afghans have equal rights, where the rights of women “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/05/crucial-moment-womens-rights-afghanistan">granted by Islam</a>” are protected. When Taliban leaders were asked whether women should be allowed to go outside alone, according to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2020/06/afghanistan0620_web_0.pdf">Human Rights Watch</a>, they said women would only be permitted to travel a short distance without a male companion. Such a restriction would be among the the world’s strictest interpretations of sharia law – comparable to Saudi Arabia’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/07/16/boxed/women-and-saudi-arabias-male-guardianship-system">guardianship system</a>.</p>
<p>The question is whether Taliban negotiators will be willing to acknowledge that there are multiple interpretations of sharia, as well as embrace the post-2001 realities of Afghanistan, which have changed significantly since the group was last in power. </p>
<p>The fact that all sides are now sitting down at the negotiating table doesn’t necessarily mean they all believe a mutually acceptable political settlement is feasible. It can be tactical, a way to show progress. </p>
<p>The success of peace negotiations depends partly on whether the parties involved now conclude they can no longer sustain the recent levels of violence. But it also depends on them changing their perception of the conflict as a zero-sum game – one in which what one side gains, the other loses.</p>
<p>While all parties express their willingness to end the prolonged war, there are doubts whether the peace efforts could have got this far <a href="https://twitter.com/WHNSC/status/1300534613773897730?s=20">without US pressure</a> for intra-Afghan negotiations to begin. But the US involvement – and Trump’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/02/15/an-afghan-peace-plan-will-test-trumps-political-instincts-against-his-responsibilities/">apparent push</a> to get a deal before the US election in November – could mean a peace agreement ends up being imposed on Afghanistan that is likely to fail, for example due to reluctance of the post-peace government to implement it. </p>
<p>The Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/event/virtual-meeting-conversation-mohammad-ashraf-ghani">recently said</a> that “Afghan society doesn’t have a deadline”. Given the frighteningly massive human cost of the war, these peace efforts must be given a genuine chance – along with the necessary time and space to succeed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144652/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kaweh Kerami does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After months of delays, talks between the Taliban and Afghan governnment are due to start in Doha. Here’s what is on the table.Kaweh Kerami, PhD Researcher in Development Studies, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1326972020-03-04T11:58:19Z2020-03-04T11:58:19ZThere’s no easy exit for the US in Afghanistan<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317833/original/file-20200228-24701-gb1vfy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">New Afghan National Army recruits march during their February graduation ceremony.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Afghanistan-Long-Road-to-Peace/1e5abf8ae81d4074b97c75cc77ed4165/28/0">AP Photo/Rahmat Gul</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After 18 months of negotiations, the U.S. and the Taliban signed a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/02/29/810537586/u-s-signs-peace-deal-with-taliban-after-nearly-2-decades-of-war-in-afghanistan">peace deal</a> on Feb. 29. It is expected that the deal will provide a plan for a comprehensive Afghan peace process. </p>
<p>The deal addresses the security of foreign troops; the Taliban’s commitments to sever ties with terrorist organizations; prisoner exchange; a gradual withdrawal of U.S. and foreign troops; and the beginnings of a negotiation between the Afghan government and the Taliban.</p>
<p>The Afghan government was not a party to the deal, and the Taliban must now negotiate a final peace agreement with that government. Yet that prospect is far from certain.</p>
<p>The U.S. approach of negotiating withdrawal first and initiate a peace process later is unheard of and has never been tested in the contemporary peace process. This nontraditional method is not necessarily doomed to fail, but it does not align with tactics of successful peace processes to date, as I know from <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=mAgFLCoAAAAJ&hl=en">my years of research on peace building</a>. </p>
<h2>An important deal</h2>
<p>After 17 years of fighting, there was a growing consensus among the U.S. military leaders and administration that, if they wish to end the conflict in Afghanistan, they must <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2019-03-01/negotiations-are-best-way-end-war-afghanistan">negotiate an agreement</a>, rather than continue to fight.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?country=4">The Taliban-led violent events</a> still taking place in Afghanistan illustrate that the Taliban are not slowing down. </p>
<p>The Taliban do not have <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?field_paregion_tid=All&field_paconflict_tid=All&field_pacountry_tid=Afghanistan&keys=">a history of negotiating</a> and maintaining peace. </p>
<p>The group’s willingness to now stop <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/opinion/taliban-afghanistan-war-haqqani.html">killing and engage in dialogue</a> with the U.S. and the Afghan government is a good sign for all sides, including the U.S., that the end of the conflict may be near. This new deal is an opportunity for the Taliban to demonstrate their commitment to restrain from the use of violence.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318369/original/file-20200303-66089-1jvfqgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318369/original/file-20200303-66089-1jvfqgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318369/original/file-20200303-66089-1jvfqgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318369/original/file-20200303-66089-1jvfqgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318369/original/file-20200303-66089-1jvfqgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318369/original/file-20200303-66089-1jvfqgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318369/original/file-20200303-66089-1jvfqgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318369/original/file-20200303-66089-1jvfqgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, center, arrives with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper for a joint news conference in Kabul, Afghanistan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-United-States-Afghanistan-Peace-Deal/89b2ff4946484d358e877731d201f4ca/23/0">AP Photo/Rahmat Gul</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The evidence on peacemaking</h2>
<p>In my research, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/nejo.12077">I have explored the content of peace agreements</a> by looking at nearly 200 real peace accords. I wanted to understand: Why do some agreements result in lasting peace, while others fall apart?</p>
<p>While the steps of a successful peace process do not need to unfold in a particular order, my research and that of others shows that there are several clear steps that any process should take to maximize the chances of success. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf">The deal with the Taliban</a> contains many elements that do not conform to patterns of successful peacemaking.</p>
<p>First, the deal does not address <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/DosAndDontofCeasefireAgreements_HaysomHottinger2010.pdf">key ceasefire elements</a> of successful peace deals, such as new recruitment in security forces, weapons transportation, or a mechanism to settle disputes from ceasefire violations. </p>
<p>Without these elements, it’s less likely that violence will diminish or that a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/02/29/810537586/u-s-signs-peace-deal-with-taliban-after-nearly-2-decades-of-war-in-afghanistan">ceasefire will hold</a>. That, in turn, makes the peace process more difficult. </p>
<p>For example, in South Sudan’s 2017 <a href="https://igad.int/attachments/article/1731/1712%2021%20Signed%20CoH%20Agreement.pd">ceasefire agreement</a>, parties refrained from disseminating hostile propaganda and laid out rules for troop movement, new recruitment and training. They established a joint monitoring and verification body to settle ceasefire-related disputes. </p>
<p>Second, the U.S. and the Taliban deal does not provide a framework for how the negotiation with the Taliban will continue. Unlike Colombia’s <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/IPI-Rpt-Made-in-Havana.pdf">Havana Process</a> or the Philippines’ <a href="https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1059598">Bangsamoro peace process</a> in Malaysia, there are no agreed-upon negotiation issues – like resettlement of refugees and displaced people, eradication of poppies or women’s rights – to guide the Afghan peace process. Often, finalizing such issues is a contentious and lengthy process in itself.</p>
<p>Without a framework like this, the proposed deal with the Taliban may or may not lead to any progress. For example, last year in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/15/yemen-ceasefire-broken-as-fresh-fighting-breaks-out-in-hodeidah">Yemen</a>, Houthi rebel fighters and Saudi-backed pro-government forces reached a ceasefire settlement but did not stop fighting. Evidence from other past ceasefires suggests that a formal ceasefire agreement alone is neither necessary nor sufficient to initiate a peace process. </p>
<p>Third, a ceasefire deal can be negotiated in <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?keys=&field_padate_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field_pacountry_tid=">any phase of the negotiation process</a>. </p>
<p>In Nepal, after a broader political understanding was reached by political parties with the Maoists, a ceasefire with a code of conduct was negotiated before reaching a final agreement. In Colombia, a ceasefire deal was negotiated at the end of the Havana process. </p>
<p>It is easier to agree on ceasefire protocols when parties are making progress in negotiating other issues. The Taliban and the U.S. deal does not touch on political issues. The current Afghan government and the Taliban have different political visions – a recipe for a stalemate.</p>
<p>Even a failed peace process can help to improve future negotiation. For example, the Filipino government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front negotiated several peace agreements between 1997 and 2010 that failed. They finally were able to negotiate a framework agreement in 2012, leading to a comprehensive agreement in 2014. (In the intervening years, some 3,200 people <a href="https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/657">were killed</a>.)</p>
<p>Turning failure into success in a peace process takes time. It is not clear what strategies the U.S. will take, should the Taliban fail to comply with the terms of the proposed deal. There is also a significant risk of stalemates in negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318368/original/file-20200303-66060-hhi78h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318368/original/file-20200303-66060-hhi78h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318368/original/file-20200303-66060-hhi78h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318368/original/file-20200303-66060-hhi78h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318368/original/file-20200303-66060-hhi78h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318368/original/file-20200303-66060-hhi78h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318368/original/file-20200303-66060-hhi78h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318368/original/file-20200303-66060-hhi78h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Afghan civil society activists chant slogans against U.S. agreement with the Taliban during a March 2 protest in Kabul.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Afghanistan-Peace-Deal-Impact/c7aef212039d4cfc8cc4aeb70f4e5cf7/4/0">AP Photo/Rahmat Gul</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>Instead of identifying negotiating agendas, the deal focuses on the withdrawal of U.S. troops within 14 months. </p>
<p>The withdrawal of foreign forces has never been part of an agreement negotiated in the early phase of a peace process. After all, it means giving up political leverage.</p>
<p>A deal that sets a clear agenda for further negotiations holds more promise than a deal that focuses on the deadlines for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. <a href="https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/search?search_api_views_fulltext=&type=provision&field_provision_type%5B%5D=37&sort_by=search_api_relevance&sort_order=DESC">Deadlines in peace processes</a> are rarely met.</p>
<p>As the evidence from many peace deals shows, the only factor that matters for peace and stability is the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123415000381">implementation of the negotiated agreement</a>, regardless of many missed deadlines. Therefore, the U.S. needs to show unparalleled commitment to support the peace process, if it wants to protect its security interests.</p>
<p>[<em>Like what you’ve read? Want more?</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=likethis">Sign up for The Conversation’s daily newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132697/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Madhav Joshi is associated with a project that receives funding from the U.S. State Department for the work in Colombia. The funding has nothing to do with this article.</span></em></p>The US is taking an untraditional approach in its peace talks with the Taliban. The new deal does not contain many of the elements that are typically key to a successful peace negotiation.Madhav Joshi, Research Associate Professor & Associate Director, Peace Accords Matrix (PAM), University of Notre DameLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1323032020-02-21T20:57:55Z2020-02-21T20:57:55ZAfter US and Taliban sign accord, Afghanistan must prepare for peace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317883/original/file-20200229-24664-9177yh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=21%2C14%2C4842%2C2844&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban co-founder Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar sign an agreement ending the US's 18-year war in Afghanistan, Doha, Feb. 29, 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/special-representative-for-afghanistan-reconciliation-news-photo/1204133093?adppopup=true">GIUSEPPE CACACE/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United States has <a href="https://apnews.com/491544713df4879f399d0ff5523d369e?utm_medium=AP&utm_source=Twitter&utm_campaign=SocialFlow">signed a peace deal</a> with the <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/afghan-taliban">Taliban</a>, an armed insurgency promoting an ultra-conservative form of Sunni Islam of Afghanistan. </p>
<p>The Taliban has <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-taliban-talks-resume-raising-prospect-end-war-afghanistan-n1097981">battled the Afghan government</a> for power for three decades. Since the U.S. invasion of 2001 following the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks, it has also fought the United States – an 18-year war that killed <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-confidential-documents/">2,300 American soldiers and more than 43,000 Afghan citizens</a>. </p>
<p>The accord, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/taliban-set-sign-deal-war-afghanistan-200228055452287.html">signed on Feb. 29</a> in Doha, Qatar, follows a week-long truce and 18 months of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49729612">stop-and-go</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/resurrected-taliban-peace-talks-open-qatar-191207105319486.html">negotiations</a>. It sets the terms for the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/02/world/asia/us-withdrawal-afghanistan-taliban.html?module=inline">withdrawal</a> of the remaining roughly 13,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan over 14 months. In exchange, the Taliban must enter talks with Afghan government officials and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-taliban-talks-resume-raising-prospect-end-war-afghanistan-n1097981">cut ties</a> with terrorist groups like al-Qaida. </p>
<p>But peace in Afghanistan will take more than an accord. History shows that <a href="https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/undp-cpr-post-conflict-economic-recovery-enable-local-ingenuity-report-2008.pdf">economic growth</a> and better job opportunities are necessary to <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=GXIGCAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=peacebuilding+in+post-conflict+countries+jobs+economic+growth&ots=wUBmA_dxxg&sig=0Td9VUiuEADEdC4iJuBrNghWkLA#v=onepage&q=peacebuilding%20in%20post-conflict%20countries%20jobs%20economic%20growth&f=false">rebuild stability after war</a>. My <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Elizabeth_Hessami">work</a> on armed conflict, the environment and peacebuilding indicates that careful and sustainable use of Afghanistan’s <a href="https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Afghanistan_NRM_guidance_chart.pdf">abundant natural resources</a> could be one path toward recovery.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305944/original/file-20191209-90609-1cb5fgw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=35%2C0%2C4000%2C2664&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305944/original/file-20191209-90609-1cb5fgw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=35%2C0%2C4000%2C2664&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305944/original/file-20191209-90609-1cb5fgw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305944/original/file-20191209-90609-1cb5fgw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305944/original/file-20191209-90609-1cb5fgw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305944/original/file-20191209-90609-1cb5fgw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305944/original/file-20191209-90609-1cb5fgw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305944/original/file-20191209-90609-1cb5fgw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A market in the Old City of Kabul, Afghanistan, Sept. 8, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Afghanistan-Daily-Life/a9c73acd22884f5d83b007a534f699b4/9/0">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Building a lasting peace</h2>
<p>Insurgent groups recruit people who desperately need an income. As <a href="https://www.wired.com/2010/07/taliban-pays-its-troops-better-than-karzai-pays-his/">Wired magazine reported back in 2007</a>, the Taliban paid its soldiers far better than the Afghan government. Today, salaries for members of ISIS-KP, the Islamic State’s local branch, are reportedly even higher. </p>
<p>Creating well-paid alternatives to extremist groups, then, is a critical piece in solving Afghanistan’s national security puzzle.</p>
<p>And since many fighters for insurgent groups in Afghanistan come from a <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/turning-former-afghanistan-warlord-fighters-farmers">farming background</a> – and agriculture accounts for <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/publication/unlocking-potential-of-agriculture-for-afghanistan-growth">40% of total jobs</a> in Afghanistan – rural development will be particularly important for peacebuilding. </p>
<p>“Strengthening natural resource-related livelihoods can [provide] a future for youth who might otherwise join rebel forces,” says Carl Bruch, president of the <a href="https://environmentalpeacebuilding.org/">Environmental Peacebuilding Association</a>, a nonprofit organization that studies the relationship between armed conflict and natural resources. </p>
<p>The United States Agency for International Development, which also funds <a href="https://www.chemonics.com/projects/building-economy-promoting-peace-colombia/">efforts to build the economy of post-conflict countries like Colombia</a> and <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/democratic-republic-congo/fact-sheets/peace-and-security">Democratic Republic of the Congo</a>, sees sustainable economic growth as <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/economic-growth">crucial for a peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316671/original/file-20200221-92502-1j826ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3696%2C2248&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316671/original/file-20200221-92502-1j826ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3696%2C2248&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316671/original/file-20200221-92502-1j826ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316671/original/file-20200221-92502-1j826ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316671/original/file-20200221-92502-1j826ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316671/original/file-20200221-92502-1j826ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316671/original/file-20200221-92502-1j826ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316671/original/file-20200221-92502-1j826ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Taliban fighters surrender their weapons in Jalalabad, Nangarhar province, Afghanistan, Feb. 8, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/feb-9-2020-taliban-fighters-attend-a-surrender-ceremony-in-news-photo/1199763068?adppopup=true">Saifurahman Safi/Xinhua via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Figs, saffron and pine nuts</h2>
<p>The export market for coveted Afghan agricultural products like cashmere, pine nuts, figs and saffron is one potentially lucrative sector of the rural economy.</p>
<p>In November 2019, several Chinese importers finalized a deal with Afghan <a href="https://www.avapress.com/en/news/196297/afghanistan-to-export-62-000-tonnes-of-pine-nuts-china-over-next-five-years">companies</a> to buy US$2.2 billion in Afghan pine nuts over the next five years. </p>
<p>Other agricultural exports from Afghanistan are finding their place in the world market, too. <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/country/afg/">Grape sales</a> brought Afghanistan $143 million in 2017. Tropical fruits earned $101 million. Afghanistan’s economy <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/01/22/afghanistan-improves-its-growth-despite-uncertainty">grew 2.9% in 2019</a>, largely driven by agriculture.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305946/original/file-20191209-90552-pqvmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305946/original/file-20191209-90552-pqvmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305946/original/file-20191209-90552-pqvmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305946/original/file-20191209-90552-pqvmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305946/original/file-20191209-90552-pqvmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305946/original/file-20191209-90552-pqvmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305946/original/file-20191209-90552-pqvmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305946/original/file-20191209-90552-pqvmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Afghan women work in a saffron field in Herat, Afghanistan, Nov. 27, 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Afghanistan-US-Spending/8e4d2f9194de4c85809339acf7c6665a/3/0">AP Photo/Hoshang Hashimi, File</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Afghan government recognizes its potential as a global source of fine foods. </p>
<p>Eight months after Afghan president Ashraf Ghani created several <a href="https://tolonews.com/business/afghan-exports-through-air-corridors-total-100m">new air corridors in 2018</a> – safe and direct flight paths created for trade and other purposes – <a href="https://www.themigrantproject.org/afghanistan-opens-air-cargo-corridors/">exports from Afghanistan increased 32%</a>. These air routes connect Afghanistan to India, Turkey, China, Saudi Arabia, Europe, Russia, China, the United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan – commercial hubs that give Afghan products access to other trade destinations. </p>
<p>Recently, browsing in a local health food store in Los Angeles, I was surprised to come upon a bright red bag of Kandahar figs. </p>
<p>The distributor, Ziba Foods, told me that 80% of their workforce – both management and staff positions – is female, and that the company provides English lessons and other professional development to staff. </p>
<p>“We are committed to providing our Afghan staff with year-round employment despite the cyclical nature of the agricultural sector,” Ziba partner Raffi Vartanian said. </p>
<h2>Emerald mining</h2>
<p>Emeralds are another Afghan product with the potential to drive economic growth. High up in the Hindu Kush mountains of Panjshir Province are buried vivid green emeralds of <a href="https://www.gia.edu/doc/SP91A2.pdf">noted color and purity</a>. </p>
<p>The inhabitants of Panjshir once sold these famous emeralds <a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/09/09/140333732/in-afghanistan-assessing-a-rebel-leaders-legacy">to finance</a> their <a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/09/09/140333732/in-afghanistan-assessing-a-rebel-leaders-legacy">resistance to Soviet occupation</a>. In a more stable future, these precious stones could provide substantial incomes for people in an area that’s too mountainous for farming or herding.</p>
<p>Afghanistan exported an estimated $100 million in emeralds in 2018, according to <a href="https://www.gemstone.org/publications/incolor">InColor Magazine</a>, a publication of the International Colored Gemstone Association. In 2015, <a href="http://www.lj24magazine.com/article/article_000516/1.aspx">Christie’s</a> auction house sold an Afghan emerald for <a href="https://www.gemstone.org/incolor/40/85/">$2,276,408</a>, a <a href="https://magazine.stregis.com/the-emerald/">record price for Christie’s</a>. </p>
<p>Despite some <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/01/02/access-to-all-weather-road-allows-afghan-valley-inhabitants-to-flourish">recent road repairs</a>, the mountainous and remote Panjshir region remains <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world/la-xpm-2013-dec-22-la-fg-afghanistan-panjshir-20131222-story.html">extremely difficult to get in and out of</a>. With better access, improved technology and <a href="https://money.cnn.com/2016/08/29/smallbusiness/afghanistan-emeralds-panjshir-aria/">more training for miners</a>, analysts estimate Panjshir could produce <a href="https://www.gemstone.org/incolor/40/86/">$300 to $400 million</a> worth of emeralds each year. </p>
<h2>Good timing</h2>
<p>Afghanistan’s peace deal comes just over 40 years after the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7883532.stm">1979 Soviet Invasion</a> that triggered a cycle of armed conflict that has destabilized this Central Asian nation since. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305945/original/file-20191209-90603-gyukz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305945/original/file-20191209-90603-gyukz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305945/original/file-20191209-90603-gyukz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305945/original/file-20191209-90603-gyukz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305945/original/file-20191209-90603-gyukz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305945/original/file-20191209-90603-gyukz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305945/original/file-20191209-90603-gyukz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305945/original/file-20191209-90603-gyukz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Afghan rebels on top of knocked out Russian armored vehicle in Afghanistan in February 1980.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Watchf-AP-I-AFG-APHS302628-Soviet-Invasion-and-/9b7e7023102b4486998be9caab7ca1df/155/0">AP Photo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>An estimated <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2004-dec-26-op-soviet26-story.html">2.5 million Afghans</a> were killed or wounded during the decade-long Soviet occupation. The <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/afghanistan-russia-programs/2019-02-27/soviet-withdrawal-afghanistan-1989">withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989</a> left the country in chaos, vulnerable to the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2010/12/07/131884473/Afghanistan-After-The-Soviet-Withdrawal">eventual rise</a> of militant groups like the Taliban, al-Qaida and, eventually, IS-KP.</p>
<p>Though the 27.5 million Afghans <a href="https://afghanistan.unfpa.org/en/news/young-people-make-their-voices-heard-through-afghan-youth-parliament">under the age of 25</a> have only known war, the population is eager for peace. A late 2019 survey by the Asia Foundation of <a href="http://heartofasia.af/peace-talks-instilled-hopes-in-afghans/">18,000 Afghans</a> found that <a href="http://heartofasia.af/peace-talks-instilled-hopes-in-afghans/">90% of those</a> surveyed strongly supported negotiations with the Taliban.</p>
<p>Older Afghans remember happier times. My husband, who left Afghanistan as a young man after the Soviet invasion, has photo albums showing his family grilling kebabs and lounging in the rose-filled Paghman Gardens, just outside the city. Back then, beautiful Kabul was known as “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/weekinreview/18bumiller.html">the Paris of Central Asia</a>.” </p>
<p>Many of <a href="http://www.bakhtarnews.com.af/eng/culture/item/38569-president-ghani-inspects-restoration-process-of-paghman-historic-palaces.html">Paghman’s lawns and palaces</a> are now in the process of careful restoration – a hopeful sign after decades of destruction. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305943/original/file-20191209-90603-1wtozv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C13%2C2995%2C1980&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305943/original/file-20191209-90603-1wtozv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C13%2C2995%2C1980&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305943/original/file-20191209-90603-1wtozv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305943/original/file-20191209-90603-1wtozv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305943/original/file-20191209-90603-1wtozv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305943/original/file-20191209-90603-1wtozv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305943/original/file-20191209-90603-1wtozv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305943/original/file-20191209-90603-1wtozv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Visitors in 2009 at at a lake in Band-e-Amir, Afghanistan’s first national park.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Afghanistan-Bring-On-The-Tourists/ecfab6a615744d3ab911d7a39ac284b2/16/0">AP Photo/Rahmat Gul</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the 1960s and 1970s, Afghanistan’s spectacular natural landscapes attracted thousands of tourists each year, <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.af/about-afghanistan/tourism.html">according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan</a>. Young travelers who took the famous “Hippie Trail” – a <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/europe/the-lonely-planet-journey-the-hippie-trail-6257275.html">4,660-mile</a> journey from London to Goa, India – would pass through Afghanistan. </p>
<p>Ecotourism is another industry that could develop in Afghanistan if armed conflict there ends. </p>
<p>A Taliban accord ends America’s Afghanistan war. But only in creating meaningful jobs and sustainable economic development will a <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/economic-growth">durable peace</a> take root. </p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of an <a href="https://theconversation.com/taliban-negotiations-resume-feeding-hope-of-a-peaceful-more-prosperous-afghanistan-127772">article</a> originally published Dec. 10, 2019.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132303/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elizabeth B. Hessami is a Visiting Attorney for the Environmental Law Institute and a founding member of the Environmental Peacebuilding Association.</span></em></p>A peace deal with the Taliban has been signed. But rebuilding Afghanistan after three decades of conflict will take much more than an accord, says a scholar of peacebuilding.Elizabeth B. Hessami, Faculty Lecturer, Johns Hopkins UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1296412020-01-20T14:36:30Z2020-01-20T14:36:30ZAfghanistan voted in September and final results are still not out – what’s happening?<p>It’s been nearly four months since Afghans went to the polls in an election fraught with security threats and overshadowed by the faltering progress of <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-failure-of-us-taliban-peace-talks-looms-over-elections-123713">US-Taliban peace talks</a>. Although the preliminary results of the election were announced in late December, the final results are yet to be confirmed. </p>
<p>The incumbent, President Ashraf Ghani, <a href="https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/afghanistans-2019-elections-27-the-preliminary-result-finally-but-no-end-to-controversy/">was declared</a> the winner of the preliminary results with 50.6% of the vote – a paper-thin majority. His main opponent, Abdullah Abdullah, chief executive in the national unity government led by Ghani since 2014, came second. </p>
<p>The introduction of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-election-technology/biometric-machines-in-afghan-vote-improve-after-last-years-glitches-idUSKBN1WD0DM">biometric</a> voting machines that used fingerprint scans and photographs in the 2019 election was expected to overcome past allegations of fraud and manipulation. But this did not stop similar allegations <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/12/world/asia/abdullah-afghanistan-election.html">emerging over the 2019 election</a>, leading to the eruption of protests and warnings of a crisis.</p>
<p>More than 16,000 complaints were filed about the conduct of the election, although 10,000 were <a href="https://tolonews.com/elections-2019/nearly-10000-election-complaints-rejected-iecc">declared invalid</a> by the Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (IECC) on January 14. Still, around <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/22/world/asia/afghanistan-election-ghani.html">300,000 votes remain contested</a> – 16.4% of the total number of votes deemed valid – including 102,000 votes that the biometric election data shows were cast outside of the allocated voting time, between 7am and 5pm on September 28.</p>
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<p>Under the current system, the winner needs 50% plus one vote to secure a majority. If a significant number of these disputed votes are invalidated – a decision that will be taken by the IECC in early February (if all goes well) – it’s possible Ghani’s vote share could dip below 50%. If that happened, there could be a run-off between Ghani and his main opponent Abdullah Abdullah, chief executive in the national unity government. </p>
<h2>Legitimacy</h2>
<p>Turnout at the election was a record low, with less than 19% of the 9.6 million registered voters going to the polls. Only 31% of those who voted were women, down from <a href="https://unama.unmissions.org/women%E2%80%99s-participation-elections-vital-afghanistan%E2%80%99s-democracy">38% in 2014</a>. The low turnout was largely attributed to widespread security threats from the Taliban and a lack of trust in the electoral process and presidential candidates. </p>
<p>The use of biometric technology in the presidential election for the first time could also have led to a lower number of valid votes – nearly one million votes were <a href="https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/afghanistans-2019-election-23-disputed-biometric-votes-endanger-election-results/">reportedly</a> invalidated due to irregularities.</p>
<p>The low turnout rate has sparked discussions <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/dismal-turnout-in-afghan-election-could-leave-government-in-even-weaker-position/2019/09/29/130b97a4-e2b9-11e9-a6e8-8759c5c7f608_story.html">on the legitimacy of the next government</a> if there is no run-off. </p>
<p>In Afghanistan, political legitimacy is not based simply around formal election results but also material resources, power and political alliances that <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2016.1246142">emerge from such processes</a>. In a divided society affected by war, legitimacy can also stem from the power of elites to mobilise and their capacity for violence. </p>
<p>The legitimacy of the political system also depends on whether the losers eventually accept the election results, even if they initially challenge them to gain political advantage. The only time a losing candidate in Afghan elections accepted he hadn’t won was in 2004. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Zalmy Khalilzad, the US envoy for the Afghan peace process, is waiting to hear <a href="https://swn.af/english/Article.aspx?a=52315">whether the Taliban</a> will agree to reduce violence, deemed a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49642655">precondition</a> for the resumption of US-Taliban peace talks. </p>
<p>The Taliban continues to categorically reject the legitimacy of the Afghan government, calling it a “US-puppet regime” and labelling the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-threatens-violent-disruption-of-afghan-presidential-election/30096318.html">election a “sham”</a>. If a peace deal is eventually reached between the US and Taliban, the next stage of peace negotiations between the different parties in Afghanistan will be even more complicated, with clashes expected on whether to maintain the current democratic, republic system or opt for an Islamic emirate. With the Taliban refusing to sit down with the Afghan government, resolving these issues looks a long way off. </p>
<p>Achieving sustainable peace in Afghanistan requires sufficient time as well as a show of genuine will from the parties involved in the armed conflict – both at the national and regional level. </p>
<h2>A potential run-off</h2>
<p>If a run-off is eventually needed, it would happen in either April or September. But it’s questionable whether holding another costly election in the country’s difficult situation is worth it. </p>
<p>Given the prolonged electoral process and its implications on people’s daily lives, many Afghans are also experiencing electoral fatigue. Ethnic bloc voting is a prevalent feature of Afghanistan presidential elections and results usually follow ethno-regional lines. With the security threat also likely to be the same as in September 2019, a run-off would be unlikely to produce a significantly different outcome. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309633/original/file-20200113-103982-lduk7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309633/original/file-20200113-103982-lduk7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309633/original/file-20200113-103982-lduk7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309633/original/file-20200113-103982-lduk7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309633/original/file-20200113-103982-lduk7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309633/original/file-20200113-103982-lduk7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309633/original/file-20200113-103982-lduk7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Preliminary presidential election results per province: Ashraf Ghani in green, Abdullah Abdullah in blue. The result is calculated for the whole country, rather than by province.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Source: Independent Election Commission</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A runoff may <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/afghan-elections-bring-no-peace">revive calls</a> for the formation of an interim government, which could include the Taliban and other politicians. These calls have especially come by those political elites who feel disenfranchised from the state’s resources and privileges and see the formation of an interim government as an opportunity to renegotiate the distribution of power and resources.</p>
<h2>Ways to prevent potential conflict</h2>
<p>The logic of a run-off would be to encourage candidates to appeal to voters across ethnic groups mainly by forging multi-ethnic alliances. But evidence from the 2014 run-off – which was between Ghani and Abdullah – shows that it can easily become <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2016.1248431">ethnicised</a> and spiral into a crisis. That election was resolved in a US-brokered deal that <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/01/forging-afghanistans-national-unity-government">created the national unity government</a>, which continues to exist amid the election result delay. But <a href="https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/miscellaneous/aan-resources/the-government%20-of-national-unity-deal-full-text/">provisions</a> in the deal for formalising the chief executive role as well as an official leader of the opposition were never realised. </p>
<p>One way forward would be to look beyond the current 50% plus one vote majority <a href="http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/afg/images/pliki/TheConstitution.pdf">required</a> to find a political approach that could reduce the winner-takes-all nature of Afghanistan’s presidential elections. One way to do this could be to include the candidate with second most votes in the government. But instead of focusing on sharing government positions as in 2014 – a situation which led to <a href="https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/afghanistans-national-unity-government-rift-2-the-problems-that-will-not-go-away/">intra-government rivalries</a> – inclusion should be done with an eye to ensuring both representation and improving the government’s effectiveness.</p>
<p>Another way to reduce the costs of losing the election could be to make political opposition a more attractive path by better defining the opposition’s responsibilities for scrutiny and oversight of the government. The opposition should be treated as a government in waiting, and receive enough funding to fulfil its responsibilities. </p>
<p>Either of these scenarios could prevent a potential electoral conflict, ensure relative legitimacy and stability and boost the effectiveness of the government for Afghans. Then the new government with its relative legitimacy could roll up its sleeves to negotiate a political deal with the Taliban, aiming to achieve a sustainable peace. Even if the peace efforts fail, the government would still enjoy the support of elites co-opted in the state apparatus which in turn may reduce political instability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129641/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kaweh Kerami does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Why Afghanistan is still waiting to hear who its next president will be – nearly four months after the election.Kaweh Kerami, PhD Researcher, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1277722019-12-10T13:56:52Z2019-12-10T13:56:52ZUS-Taliban truce begins, feeding hope of a peaceful, more prosperous Afghanistan<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305944/original/file-20191209-90609-1cb5fgw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=35%2C0%2C4000%2C2664&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A market in the Old City of Kabul, Afghanistan, Sept. 8, 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Afghanistan-Daily-Life/a9c73acd22884f5d83b007a534f699b4/9/0">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>If a <a href="https://apnews.com/62c7a74076796c180677d0826a5da506">seven-day truce</a> between the United States and the Taliban holds until Feb. 28, 2020, Afghanistan’s decade-long conflict may finally end. A peace deal could be signed as soon as Feb. 29, according to the State Department. </p>
<p>The draft accord follows months of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49729612">stop-and-go</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/resurrected-taliban-peace-talks-open-qatar-191207105319486.html">negotiations</a> between the United States and the <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/afghan-taliban">Taliban</a>, an armed insurgency promoting an ultra-conservative form of Sunni Islam. </p>
<p>The Taliban has <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-taliban-talks-resume-raising-prospect-end-war-afghanistan-n1097981">battled the Afghan government</a> for power for three decades. Since the U.S. invasion of 2001 following the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks, it has also fought the United States – an 18-year war that killed <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-confidential-documents/">2,300 American soldiers and more than 43,000 Afghan citizens</a>. </p>
<p>A peace deal with the Taliban would set the terms for a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/02/world/asia/us-withdrawal-afghanistan-taliban.html?module=inline">staged withdrawal</a> of the remaining 14,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan. In exchange, the Taliban must agree to enter talks with Afghan government officials and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-taliban-talks-resume-raising-prospect-end-war-afghanistan-n1097981">cut ties</a> with terrorist groups like al-Qaida. </p>
<p>But peace in Afghanistan will take more than an accord. History shows that <a href="https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/undp-cpr-post-conflict-economic-recovery-enable-local-ingenuity-report-2008.pdf">economic growth</a> and better job opportunities are necessary to <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=GXIGCAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=peacebuilding+in+post-conflict+countries+jobs+economic+growth&ots=wUBmA_dxxg&sig=0Td9VUiuEADEdC4iJuBrNghWkLA#v=onepage&q=peacebuilding%20in%20post-conflict%20countries%20jobs%20economic%20growth&f=false">rebuild stability after war</a>. My <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Elizabeth_Hessami">work</a> on armed conflict, the environment and peacebuilding indicates that careful and sustainable use of Afghanistan’s <a href="https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Afghanistan_NRM_guidance_chart.pdf">abundant natural resources</a> could be one path towards recovery.</p>
<h2>Building a lasting peace</h2>
<p>Insurgent groups recruit people who desperately need an income. As <a href="https://www.wired.com/2010/07/taliban-pays-its-troops-better-than-karzai-pays-his/">Wired magazine reported back in 2007</a>, the Taliban paid its soldiers far better than the Afghan government. Today, salaries for members of ISIS-KP, the Islamic State’s local branch, are reportedly even higher. </p>
<p>Creating well-paid alternatives to extremist groups, then, is a critical piece in solving Afghanistan’s national security puzzle.</p>
<p>And since many fighters for insurgent groups in Afghanistan come from a <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/turning-former-afghanistan-warlord-fighters-farmers">farming background</a> – and agriculture accounts for <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/publication/unlocking-potential-of-agriculture-for-afghanistan-growth">40% of total jobs</a> in Afghanistan – rural development will be particularly important for peacebuilding. </p>
<p>“Strengthening natural resource-related livelihoods can [provide] a future for youth who might otherwise join rebel forces,” says Carl Bruch, president of the <a href="https://environmentalpeacebuilding.org/">Environmental Peacebuilding Association</a>, a nonprofit organization that studies the relationship between armed conflict and natural resources. </p>
<p>The United States Agency for International Development, which also funds <a href="https://www.chemonics.com/projects/building-economy-promoting-peace-colombia/">efforts to build the economy of post-conflict countries like Colombia</a> and <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/democratic-republic-congo/fact-sheets/peace-and-security">Democratic Republic of the Congo</a>, sees sustainable economic growth as <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/economic-growth">crucial for a peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan</a>.</p>
<h2>Figs, saffron and pine nuts</h2>
<p>The export market for coveted Afghan agricultural products like cashmere, pine nuts, figs, and saffron is one potentially lucrative sector of the rural economy.</p>
<p>In November 2019, several Chinese importers finalized a deal with Afghan <a href="https://www.avapress.com/en/news/196297/afghanistan-to-export-62-000-tonnes-of-pine-nuts-china-over-next-five-years">companies</a> to buy US$2.2 billion in Afghan pine nuts over the next five years. </p>
<p>Other agricultural exports from Afghanistan are finding their place in the world market, too. <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/country/afg/">Grape sales</a> brought Afghanistan $143 million in 2017. Tropical fruits earned $101 million. Afghanistan’s economy <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/01/22/afghanistan-improves-its-growth-despite-uncertainty">grew 2.9% in 2019</a>, largely driven by agriculture.</p>
<p>The Afghan government recognizes its potential as a global source of fine foods. </p>
<p>Eight months after Afghan president Ashraf Ghani created several <a href="https://tolonews.com/business/afghan-exports-through-air-corridors-total-100m">new air corridors in 2018</a> – safe and direct flight paths created for trade and other purposes – <a href="https://www.themigrantproject.org/afghanistan-opens-air-cargo-corridors/">exports from Afghanistan increased 32%</a>. These air routes connect Afghanistan to India, Turkey, China, Saudi Arabia, Europe, Russia, China, the United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan – commercial hubs that give Afghan products access to other trade destinations. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305946/original/file-20191209-90552-pqvmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305946/original/file-20191209-90552-pqvmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305946/original/file-20191209-90552-pqvmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305946/original/file-20191209-90552-pqvmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305946/original/file-20191209-90552-pqvmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305946/original/file-20191209-90552-pqvmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305946/original/file-20191209-90552-pqvmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305946/original/file-20191209-90552-pqvmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Afghan women work in a saffron field in Herat, Afghanistan, Nov. 27, 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Afghanistan-US-Spending/8e4d2f9194de4c85809339acf7c6665a/3/0">AP Photo/Hoshang Hashimi, File</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Recently, browsing in a local health food store in Los Angeles, I was surprised to come upon a bright red bag of Kandahar figs. </p>
<p>The distributor, Ziba Foods, told me that 80% of their workforce – both management and staff positions – is female, and that the company provides English lessons and other professional development to staff. </p>
<p>“We are committed to providing our Afghan staff with year-round employment despite the cyclical nature of the agricultural sector,” Ziba partner Raffi Vartanian said. </p>
<h2>Emerald mining</h2>
<p>Emeralds are another Afghan product with the potential to drive economic growth. High up in the Hindu Kush mountains of Panjshir Province are buried vivid green emeralds of <a href="https://www.gia.edu/doc/SP91A2.pdf">noted color and purity</a>. </p>
<p>The inhabitants of Panjshir once sold these famous emeralds <a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/09/09/140333732/in-afghanistan-assessing-a-rebel-leaders-legacy">to finance</a> their <a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/09/09/140333732/in-afghanistan-assessing-a-rebel-leaders-legacy">resistance to Soviet occupation</a>. In a more stable future, these precious stones could provide substantial incomes for people in an area that’s too mountainous for farming or herding.</p>
<p>Afghanistan exported an estimated $100 million in emeralds in 2018, according to <a href="https://www.gemstone.org/publications/incolor">InColor Magazine</a>, a publication of the International Colored Gemstone Association. In 2015, <a href="http://www.lj24magazine.com/article/article_000516/1.aspx">Christie’s</a> auction house sold an Afghan emerald for <a href="https://www.gemstone.org/incolor/40/85/">$2,276,408</a>, a <a href="https://magazine.stregis.com/the-emerald/">record price for Christie’s</a>. </p>
<p>Despite some <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/01/02/access-to-all-weather-road-allows-afghan-valley-inhabitants-to-flourish">recent road repairs</a>, the mountainous and remote Panjshir region remains <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world/la-xpm-2013-dec-22-la-fg-afghanistan-panjshir-20131222-story.html">extremely difficult to get in and out of</a>. With better access, improved technology and <a href="https://money.cnn.com/2016/08/29/smallbusiness/afghanistan-emeralds-panjshir-aria/">more training for miners</a>, analysts estimate Panjshir could produce <a href="https://www.gemstone.org/incolor/40/86/">$300 to $400 million</a> worth of emeralds each year. </p>
<h2>Good timing</h2>
<p>If signed, the Afghanistan peace deal would come just over 40 years after the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7883532.stm">1979 Soviet Invasion</a> that triggered a cycle of armed conflict that has destabilized this Central Asian nation since. </p>
<p>An estimated <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2004-dec-26-op-soviet26-story.html">2.5 million Afghans</a> were killed or wounded during the decade-long Soviet occupation. The <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/afghanistan-russia-programs/2019-02-27/soviet-withdrawal-afghanistan-1989">withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989</a> left the country in chaos, vulnerable to the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2010/12/07/131884473/Afghanistan-After-The-Soviet-Withdrawal">eventual rise</a> of militant groups like the Taliban, al-Qaida and, eventually, IS-KP.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305945/original/file-20191209-90603-gyukz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305945/original/file-20191209-90603-gyukz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305945/original/file-20191209-90603-gyukz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305945/original/file-20191209-90603-gyukz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305945/original/file-20191209-90603-gyukz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305945/original/file-20191209-90603-gyukz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305945/original/file-20191209-90603-gyukz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305945/original/file-20191209-90603-gyukz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Afghan rebels on top of knocked out Russian armored vehicle in Afghanistan in February 1980.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Watchf-AP-I-AFG-APHS302628-Soviet-Invasion-and-/9b7e7023102b4486998be9caab7ca1df/155/0">AP Photo</a></span>
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<p>Though the 27.5 million Afghans <a href="https://afghanistan.unfpa.org/en/news/young-people-make-their-voices-heard-through-afghan-youth-parliament">under the age of 25</a> have only known war, the population is hopeful about their country’s prospects for peace. A recent survey by the Asia Foundation of <a href="http://heartofasia.af/peace-talks-instilled-hopes-in-afghans/">18,000 Afghans</a> found that <a href="http://heartofasia.af/peace-talks-instilled-hopes-in-afghans/">90% of those</a> surveyed strongly support efforts towards a deal with the Taliban.</p>
<p>Older Afghans remember happier times. My husband, who left Afghanistan as a young man after the Soviet invasion, has photo albums showing his family grilling kebabs and lounging in the rose-filled Paghman Gardens, just outside the city. Back then, beautiful Kabul was known as “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/weekinreview/18bumiller.html">the Paris of Central Asia</a>.” </p>
<p>Many of <a href="http://www.bakhtarnews.com.af/eng/culture/item/38569-president-ghani-inspects-restoration-process-of-paghman-historic-palaces.html">Paghman’s lawns and palaces</a> are now in the process of careful restoration – a hopeful sign after decades of destruction. </p>
<p>In the 1960s and 1970s, Afghanistan’s spectacular natural landscapes attracted thousands of tourists each year, <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.af/about-afghanistan/tourism.html">according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan</a>. Young travelers who took the famous “Hippie Trail” – a <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/europe/the-lonely-planet-journey-the-hippie-trail-6257275.html">4,660-mile</a> journey from London to Goa, India – would pass through Afghanistan. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305943/original/file-20191209-90603-1wtozv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C13%2C2995%2C1980&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305943/original/file-20191209-90603-1wtozv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C13%2C2995%2C1980&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305943/original/file-20191209-90603-1wtozv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305943/original/file-20191209-90603-1wtozv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305943/original/file-20191209-90603-1wtozv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305943/original/file-20191209-90603-1wtozv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305943/original/file-20191209-90603-1wtozv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305943/original/file-20191209-90603-1wtozv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Visitors in 2009 at at a lake in Band-e-Amir, Afghanistan’s first national park.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Afghanistan-Bring-On-The-Tourists/ecfab6a615744d3ab911d7a39ac284b2/16/0">AP Photo/Rahmat Gul</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Ecotourism is another industry that could develop in Afghanistan if <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan">armed conflict ceases</a>. </p>
<p>A Taliban accord is necessary to end the Afghanistan war. But creating meaningful jobs and sustainable economic growth will <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/economic-growth">help create a durable peace</a>. </p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of an <a href="https://theconversation.com/taliban-negotiations-resume-feeding-hope-of-a-peaceful-more-prosperous-afghanistan-127772">article</a> originally published Dec. 10, 2019.</em></p>
<p>[<em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127772/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elizabeth B. Hessami is affiliated with the Environmental Law Institute as a visiting attorney and for the Environmental Peacebuilding Association as a volunteer.</span></em></p>Building a lasting peace in Afghanistan will take much more than an accord with the Taliban. In post-conflict nations, economic development and job creation are critical to national security.Elizabeth B. Hessami, Faculty Lecturer, Johns Hopkins UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1215582019-09-26T20:12:21Z2019-09-26T20:12:21ZAfghanistan’s suffering has reached unprecedented levels. Can a presidential election make things better?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/293990/original/file-20190925-51414-m49nem.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A supporter of Ashraf Ghani takes part in an election rally in Kabul last month.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jawad Jalali/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After months of delays and uncertainty, Afghanistan is set to hold its presidential election on Saturday. This election, the fourth since the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, has critical implications for the political stability and security of the country. </p>
<p>Most importantly, it will test the resilience of the country’s fragile democratic process and shape the conditions under which the now-defunct negotiations between the United States and the Taliban can be resumed with more meaningful participation from Kabul. </p>
<p>And if the vote produces a broadly acceptable and functioning government – which is not a guarantee after the last presidential election in 2014 and parliamentary elections in 2018 – it will have profound repercussions for the Afghan people.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-end-afghanistan-war-as-longest-conflict-moves-towards-fragile-peace-116587">How to end Afghanistan war as longest conflict moves towards fragile peace</a>
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<p>Nearly two decades after the US-led coalition invaded the country and ousted the Taliban, Afghanistan is still in a downward spiral. In June, the country replaced Syria as the world’s least peaceful country in the Institute for Economics and Peace’s <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-peace-index-2019">Global Peace Index report</a>. The BBC tracked the violence in the country in August and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49662640">found that on average, 74 Afghan men, women and children died each day</a> across the country.</p>
<p>Further, the number of Afghans below the poverty line <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-economy/afghanistans-poverty-rate-rises-as-economy-suffers-idUSKBN1I818X">increased</a> from 33.5% in 2011 to nearly 55% in 2017. </p>
<p>And in another bleak assessment of where things are at the moment, Afghan respondents in a recent Gallup <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/266825/inside-afghanistan-nearly-nine-afghans-suffering.aspx">survey</a> rated their lives worse than anyone else on the planet. A record-high 85% of respondents categorised their lives as “suffering”, while the number of people who said they were “thriving” was zero. </p>
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<h2>Tests of democracy in Afghanistan</h2>
<p>Despite the major challenges posed by insecurity and risks of electoral fraud, Afghanistan’s recent elections have been serious contests between the country’s various political elites. </p>
<p>Ordinary voters take extraordinary risks to participate in the polls. Thanks to a dynamic <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12013942">media sector</a>, these contests involve spirited debates about policy-making and the visions of the candidates. This is particularly true when it comes to presidential elections, as the country’s 2004 Constitution concentrated much of the political and executive power in the office of the president.</p>
<p>There have been serious tests of Afghanistan’s nascent democracy before, however.
The 2014 election was tainted by allegations of widespread fraud, <a href="https://www.economist.com/banyan/2014/09/22/divide-and-rule">pushing the country to the brink of a civil war</a>. </p>
<p>The political crisis was averted by the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29299088">formation of the national unity government</a>, in which Ashraf Ghani became president and his main challenger in the election, Abdullah Abdullah, took the position of chief executive officer, with powers similar to a prime minister.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/293995/original/file-20190925-51414-1klvynz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/293995/original/file-20190925-51414-1klvynz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293995/original/file-20190925-51414-1klvynz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293995/original/file-20190925-51414-1klvynz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293995/original/file-20190925-51414-1klvynz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293995/original/file-20190925-51414-1klvynz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293995/original/file-20190925-51414-1klvynz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Abdullah Abdullah is again the main challenger for President Ashraf Ghani, similar to the 2014 vote.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jalil Rezayee/EPA</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Negotiations with the Taliban</h2>
<p>Since the withdrawal of most of the US and NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014, the Taliban has considerably expanded the areas under its influence. Nonetheless, the insurgent group has been unable to score any strategic military victories by gaining control of provincial or population centres.</p>
<p>In 2016, President Donald Trump came to the White House with the promise of ending the war in Afghanistan. However, after a meticulous assessment of the risks associated with a complete troop withdrawal, he backed away from that pledge. </p>
<p>Trump instead called the 2014 departure of most US troops a “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/timeline-military-presence-afghanistan-190908070831251.html">hasty withdrawal</a>” and declared a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-south-asia/">new strategy</a> that included an increase in the number of US forces in Afghanistan.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/293997/original/file-20190925-51463-1f3ucew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/293997/original/file-20190925-51463-1f3ucew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293997/original/file-20190925-51463-1f3ucew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293997/original/file-20190925-51463-1f3ucew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293997/original/file-20190925-51463-1f3ucew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293997/original/file-20190925-51463-1f3ucew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293997/original/file-20190925-51463-1f3ucew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Afghan President Ashraf Ghani (centre) has adopted a populist style in his re-election campaign to connect better with voters.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ghulamullah Habibi/EPA</span></span>
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<p>The deployment of additional troops significantly escalated the military campaign against the Taliban but failed to decisively change the security dynamics in the country. </p>
<p>Then, in 2018, the Trump administration formally began engaging the Taliban in a series of direct negotiations in Qatar. The process was called off by Trump earlier this month when it was <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/28/khalilzad-edges-closer-to-pact-with-taliban-zalmay-khalilzad-negotiations-afghanistan-war-diplomacy-new-details-on-peace-negotiations-ashraf-ghani-elections-kabul/">reportedly at the threshold of an agreement</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-peace-agreement-in-afghanistan-wont-last-if-there-are-no-women-at-the-table-111820">A peace agreement in Afghanistan won't last if there are no women at the table</a>
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<p>Critics <a href="http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/caution-rather-than-haste-afghanistan/">noted</a>, however, the many flaws of this approach and the haste with which the negotiations were conducted by Zalmay Khalilzad, the US special representative for Afghan reconciliation.</p>
<p>Ironically, at the insistence of the Taliban, the process excluded the government of Afghanistan, which the Taliban refuses to recognise as the legitimate authority in the country. This led to phased negotiations, whereby a deal between the US and the Taliban was expected to be followed by an intra-Afghan dialogue and eventually a ceasefire. </p>
<p>A successful presidential election that produces a broadly acceptable outcome can significantly strengthen the position of the new government in negotiating and implementing a peace process with the Taliban. This is one reason why Ghani does not want to be <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/struggle-peace-talks-taliban-181210135032300.html">sidelined</a> from the negotiations.</p>
<h2>Challenges for the upcoming vote</h2>
<p>The election involves a significant number of political players and coalitions, but is essentially a replay of the 2014 poll between Ghani and Abdullah. While none of the other 13 candidates have a realistic chance of winning, they can split the votes to prevent one of the leaders from claiming victory in the first round. A run-off was required in the last two presidential elections in 2009 and 2014.</p>
<p>Another factor is the threat of violence from the Taliban. The group has already vowed to violently disrupt the election. In recent weeks, it has claimed responsibility for deadly attacks on <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-09-18/taliban-suicide-bomber-targets-afghanistan-election-rally/11522278">election rallies</a>, including a devastating attack on the campaign <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/29/world/asia/afghanistan-campaign-attack-amrullah-saleh.html">office of Amrullah Saleh</a>, the first vice-president on Ghani’s ticket.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/293996/original/file-20190925-51405-1smd2fb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/293996/original/file-20190925-51405-1smd2fb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293996/original/file-20190925-51405-1smd2fb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293996/original/file-20190925-51405-1smd2fb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293996/original/file-20190925-51405-1smd2fb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293996/original/file-20190925-51405-1smd2fb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293996/original/file-20190925-51405-1smd2fb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Supporters of incumbent President Ashraf Ghani at a rally in Jalalabad this month.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ghulamullah Habibi/EPA</span></span>
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<p>Insecurity will also likely prevent significant numbers of people from participating in the process. The number of polling stations has significantly <a href="https://www.tolonews.com/elections-2019/aan-has-concerns-about-rural-voters%E2%80%99-access-polling-centers%E2%80%8B">dropped to less than 5,000 this year compared to 7,000 in 2014</a>, highlighting the deteriorating security conditions. </p>
<p>There <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/taliban-threats-poll-closures-raise-fears-for-credibility-of-afghan-elections/2019/09/23/c819b7c8-d8b6-11e9-a1a5-162b8a9c9ca2_story.html?outputType=amp&">are also fears</a> that more polling stations will be closed on election day, both for security reasons and <a href="https://www.tolonews.com/elections-2019/critics-call-security-report-polling-stations-%E2%80%98suspicious%E2%80%99">political reasons</a> (the latter in areas that are likely to vote for opposition candidates). </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-election-with-kabul-in-lockdown-we-watch-and-wait-26719">Afghanistan election: with Kabul in lockdown, we watch and wait</a>
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<p>This election is unlikely to be a game changer in the face of the magnitude and complexity of the challenges facing Afghanistan and its people. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the election presents a rare opportunity for the country’s people to exercise their rights to choose who governs the country. </p>
<p>And if the supporters of the leading candidates stay committed to a transparent process, even a reasonably credible outcome can go a long way in restoring confidence in the country’s shaky institutions and strengthening the position of the government in any future peace negotiations with the Taliban.</p>
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<p><em>This article was corrected on September 27, 2019. The forthcoming election is the fourth since the Taliban was overthrown in 2001, not the third as originally stated.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121558/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>According to a recent survey, Afghans rate their lives worse than anyone else on the planet. The election is unlikely to be a game changer considering the magnitude of challenges facing the country.Safiullah Taye, Phd. Candidate and Research Assistan, Deakin UniversityNiamatullah Ibrahimi, Associate Research Fellow, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1237132019-09-25T12:03:44Z2019-09-25T12:03:44ZAfghanistan: failure of US-Taliban peace talks looms over elections<p>While Kabul was asleep early on the morning of September 8, Donald Trump abruptly <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-49624132">cancelled peace negotiations</a> with the Taliban. In a statement 17 hours later, the insurgent group said that the US would “lose the most”. But for Ashraf Ghani, the Afghan president bidding for a second term in office at elections on September 28, it was a massive relief. For his sidelined administration, a peace deal with the Taliban would mean losing everything.</p>
<p>A peace agreement between the US and the Taliban, which had been “<a href="https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/us-and-taliban-reach-agreement-principle-khalilzad">agreed in principle</a>” was due to be signed in Doha. But the US president called it off, also cancelling a planned visit by Taliban leaders to Camp David. He tweeted that no deal would be achieved unless a <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1170469621348098049?s=20">ceasefire was reached first</a>. This poured cold water over the heads of those Taliban who had already started beating the drum of victory. </p>
<p>In Afghanistan, Trump’s decision was cheered by opponents of the potential peace deal but raised concerns among many other Afghans who hoped the days of war were numbered, regardless of how imperfect the peace deal would be.</p>
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<p>What made the recent negotiations significantly different from previous peace efforts was the US government’s willingness to negotiate with an insurgent group that has claimed responsibility for the deaths of at least <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-47391821">2,300 American soldiers</a>. The Taliban’s longstanding condition for any peace talks has been to negotiate directly with the US, which played a significant role in toppling their regime in 2001.</p>
<h2>Growing suspicion</h2>
<p>After the initial rounds of the US-Taliban peace <a href="https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/afghan-taliban-representatives-us-officials-meet-uae">started in December 2018</a>, the Ghani administration began to become suspicious about its role in the negotiations. As the peace talks approached their endpoint, the administration faced mounting insecurity, realising that the US, its patron, was giving it a cold shoulder. The main reason the US sidelined the Kabul administration appeared to be the Taliban’s strong opposition to the government, which the group labels both a “puppet” and “illegitimate”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-as-taliban-and-us-near-peace-deal-its-far-too-soon-to-commit-to-returning-refugees-121788">Afghanistan: as Taliban and US near peace deal, it's far too soon to commit to returning refugees</a>
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<p>The Taliban’s rigid stance against the Afghan government added to the intricacy of the job of US peace envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad. He was left with two choices: either support the current political status quo – the National Unity Government and the upcoming presidential election – or take a risky path with the Taliban on board which could potentially lead to a new political settlement.</p>
<p>Ghani was left pushing for the presidential election, in which he believed he had an upper hand. But the US, which had brokered the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-29299088">formation of the unity government</a> in the aftermath of a contested presidential run-off in 2014, clearly had a different priority: the peace process. Its reasoning is that without peace and stability, Afghanistan cannot embrace growth and economy development.</p>
<p>While the US never took a public stance against the election, it was <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/afghan-presidential-candidates-face-election-uncertainty-campaign-controversy-and-danger/30083700.html">reported</a> that Khalilzad, in private meetings with Afghan elites, had implicitly hinted that the vote could be cancelled and an interim government would be formed. At this point many Afghans started believing that the elections would not happen – including the vast majority of the presidential candidates.</p>
<p>However for Ghani’s team, given that the administration was being sidelined in the peace talks, holding election was a matter of life or death. To reconcile peace with elections on his own terms, in November 2018, Ghani <a href="https://president.gov.af/en/SP/789012781234">presented a new set</a> of peace proposals with a five-year implementation period – equal to a five-year presidential term that he hopes will be his own. The move was criticised and discredited by other presidential hopefuls. </p>
<p>But Ghani is not the sole leader of the Afghan government. Abdullah Abdullah, his main electoral opponent on September 28, is Afghanistan’s current chief executive who claims nearly 50% of the government based on the National Unity Government deal. During Khalilzad’s July trip to Kabul, Ghani was initially reluctant to sign <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-taliban-set-finalize-agreement-ahead-intra-afghan/story?id=64682102">an agreement</a> related to the US-Taliban peace deal, but then the US envoy approached Abdullah for it. All of a sudden, Ghani changed his mind. </p>
<h2>Fate of elections</h2>
<p>In August, with the US-Taliban peace talks on the verge of conclusion and elections just a month away, an average of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49726088">74 people were killed every day</a> in the country, according to the BBC. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49662640">One-fifth of these were civilians</a>, including children. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistans-suffering-has-reached-unprecedented-levels-can-a-presidential-election-make-things-better-121558">Afghanistan’s suffering has reached unprecedented levels. Can a presidential election make things better?</a>
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<p>One of the reasons why Trump pulled out of the agreement was a Taliban attack in Kabul on September 6 in which a US soldier and 11 others were killed. But the Taliban had <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49642655">never agreed</a> to end its violent campaign against foreign forces until a peace deal was signed. The withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and a verifiable Taliban guarantee to fight terrorism were the main topics of the “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49642655">dead</a>” peace talks.</p>
<p>It’s still possible that the talks with the Taliban will resume, with Trump pushing for a “better” deal ahead of the US presidential election in 2020. Both <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49729612">the Taliban</a> and Pakistan have been <a href="https://www.voanews.com/usa/pakistans-pm-urges-trump-restart-peace-talks-afghan-taliban">urging the US</a> to resume the peace negotiations. </p>
<p>For his part, Abdullah has taken the US’s side by prioritising peace. He has said <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-election-abdullah/top-challenger-of-afghan-president-says-ready-to-quit-elections-for-peace-idUSKCN1VJ0UQ?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews">over and over</a> that if he wins the election and the next day, the Taliban shows genuine willingness for peace, he would step down – in stark contrast to Ghani. </p>
<p>With polling day approaching, a group of Kabul elites, including the former president Hamid Karzai, still think the presidential <a href="https://www.apnews.com/0219011cc97741a8b700faf86daebe91/gallery/f68a8fcf1c614e389566f130ccb34bd6">election threatens peace</a>. They feel disenfranchised from the state resources and privileges and see a negotiated political settlement as an opportunity to renegotiate the distribution of power and resources. </p>
<p>For its part, the Taliban labelled the upcoming elections <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-afghanistan-taliban-election/taliban-threaten-afghan-election-hail-progress-on-pact-with-u-s-idUKKCN1UW0MO">a “sham”</a>. The poll has high stakes and may be fairly destabilising, given the likelihood of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2016.1246142">threats of violence</a>, accusations of fraud and breakdown of the political order. It will be very difficult for Afghanistan to have a transparent, free and fair election – at least in the current climate. Still, without elections it’s hard to secure a sustainable peace and stability. </p>
<p>The halted peace talks and upcoming election have one critical point in common: they both operate with a “winner-takes-all” political logic. To ensure a sustainable peace and stability in Afghanistan, it is of paramount importance to design an inclusive set-up in which the distribution of power and resources align with the realities of the country’s power structures. </p>
<p>Otherwise, the costs of excluding key groups with the capacity for violence, including the Taliban, will prolong even further a war that has taken a huge death toll.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123713/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kaweh Kerami does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Afghans head to the polls on September 28, peace still remains elusive.Kaweh Kerami, PhD Researcher, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1217882019-08-23T13:11:06Z2019-08-23T13:11:06ZAfghanistan: as Taliban and US near peace deal, it’s far too soon to commit to returning refugees<p>Signals emerging from ongoing peace talks between the US and the Afghan Taliban indicate a peace agreement could be imminent. Although the eighth round of peace talks, taking place in Doha, ended on August 13 <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/taliban-talks-peace-afghanistan-190510062940394.html">without an agreement</a>, both sides appear to be working through the final technical details of an agreement. </p>
<p>In the meantime, the Afghan Taliban <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/world/asia/americans-killed-afghanistan-taliban.html">continues to fight</a> its 18-year-long war against the US and NATO forces supporting the current Afghan government of President Ashraf Ghani. </p>
<p>US President Donald Trump has vowed to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/17/trump-hints-america-close-to-deal-with-taliban-others-question-peace">reach an agreement</a> on a road map to a comprehensive settlement of the Afghan conflict, as has his envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad. Suhail Shaheen, spokesman for the Taliban’s political office in Qatar, via his <a href="https://twitter.com/suhailshaheen1/status/1162811450110414853">Twitter account</a>, has also indicated that an agreement is near.</p>
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<p>The Trump administration is <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/16/trump-afghanistan-peace-1668390">desperate to</a> begin <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/taliban-talks-peace-afghanistan-190510062940394.html">withdrawing</a> its forces from Afghanistan, but the details of a withdrawal timeline are yet to be finalised.</p>
<p>In July, the seventh round of peace talks facilitated by <a href="https://thedefensepost.com/2019/06/20/germany-qatar-inter-afghanistan-peace-talks/">Qatar and Germany</a> in Doha concluded with a <a href="https://twitter.com/US4AfghanPeace/status/1148388647357636608">joint statement</a>, a declaration of intent highlighting a road map for the peace deal. In the document, the US accepted the Taliban’s demand for the implementation of Islamic sharia law in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>In return, the Taliban agreed not to let anyone use Afghan soil to carry on terrorist attacks against other countries, and to respect the civil and political rights of Afghan citizens. However, the Taliban has refused to negotiate with the current Afghan government until the US withdraws it forces from Afghanistan, insisting it is illegitimate and a puppet of the US and NATO forces. </p>
<h2>The fate of refugees</h2>
<p>In the joint statement, the US and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-germany-taliban/germany-in-push-to-resurrect-afghan-talks-with-taliban-idUSKCN1SW0C9">Germany</a> also obliged the Taliban to accept back all Afghan refugees who have claimed asylum in other countries. </p>
<p>After Pakistan and Iran, EU countries are the major destination for Afghan refugees. The EU has long been trying to <a href="https://theconversation.com/kabul-is-still-not-safe-but-the-eu-is-deporting-people-there-anyway-66933">return</a> Afghan refugees, despite continued war throughout the country. In 2016, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/afghanistan-refugees-forty-years/">nearly 10,000 people</a> were returned from EU countries to Afghanistan. </p>
<p>In October 2016, the EU signed an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/oct/03/eu-european-union-signs-deal-deport-unlimited-numbers-afghan-asylum-seekers-afghanistan">agreement</a> with the Afghanistan government to return all asylum seekers whose asylum applications have been rejected and are not willing to go back. The agreement was signed despite the fact that the US and Afghan forces <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/us-stops-taliban-territory-tracking-in-afghanistan/a-48559989-0">lacked control</a> over 45% of Afghan territory, and despite international law prohibiting the return of refugees to places where their lives or freedoms could be at risk, or where they could be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment.</p>
<p>If a ceasefire agreement is announced in the coming months, more negotiations will be needed to finalise what kind of role the Taliban will play in the future governance of Afghanistan, if any.</p>
<p>Under the joint statement, the Taliban pledged to respect the civil, political, economic, educational and cultural rights of all Afghan citizens including women, in accordance with the framework of Islamic sharia law. The details on how it will do this remain unclear. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-sharia-law-and-how-does-it-operate-14130">Explainer: what is sharia law and how does it operate?</a>
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<p>Going by the Taliban’s past record in power, any return of refugees to areas of Afghanistan under Taliban control could undermine the fundamental rights and freedoms of the refugees. In particular, it would have a significant chance of causing inhuman and degrading treatment of women, religious and ethnic minorities, and former employees of the Afghan armed forces. </p>
<p>The Taliban has a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-36236567">history</a> of conducting informal trials, extrajudicial killings, segregation of women, and suppression of religious and ethnic minorities. The <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html">1951 Refugee Convention</a> regarding the status of refugees prohibits the return, or refoulement, of refugees to territories where their life or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, politics, or membership of a particular social group. </p>
<h2>Protecting human rights</h2>
<p>Before making any plan to return refugees to areas of Taliban control, or to an Afghanistan where the Taliban are in government, the EU must ensure a minimum standard is established for the protection of human rights in the country. This could be partially achieved by codifying sharia law and human rights into the Afghanistan legal system, and by creating an independent judicial system outside the influence of the Taliban. </p>
<p>Such measures could stop laws from being used as tools to take personal revenge or to cause injustice, and could also discourage <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/the-disturbing-trend-of-taliban-justice-in-afghanistan/a-37950678">informal public trials</a> and executions at the hands of the Taliban. But due to political differences in Afghan society and the likely opposition of introducing sharia law into the legal system, achieving these measures remains very unlikely in the near future. </p>
<p>If the EU plans to return more Afghan refugees following a peace agreement between the US and the Taliban, it must ensure the agreement assures the protection of all Afghans. Without a roadmap that does this, it would be against international law to send asylum seekers and refugees back to Afghanistan.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121788/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tasawar Ashraf does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A ceasefire with the Taliban won’t make it safe to send more refugees back to Afghanistan.Tasawar Ashraf, PhD Candidate, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1209532019-07-26T11:11:11Z2019-07-26T11:11:11ZWhy Afghanistan peace is key to rebuilding relations between the US and Pakistan<p>At times, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-49032495">the press conference in the White House</a> was surreal. While Imran Khan, Pakistan’s prime minister, looked on, Donald Trump said he could “kill 10m people” in Afghanistan to “win a war within a week”, but had decided not to. And the US president said he could be the mediator to solve the decades-long Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India.</p>
<p>Khan glanced at Trump a few times with a look of resignation over his host’s rambling, often irrelevant hyperbole. But, generally, the prime minister said nothing as Trump leapt to answer questions directed at his guest. Khan carefully kept his hands in front of him, all his fingers touching in a sign of steadiness. </p>
<p>For this was his moment, after 11 months in office, to bring Islamabad out of the cold with the Trump administration and US agencies. Khan was claiming his place on the political centre-stage and looking to restore the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/trump-admin-cancels-300m-aid-pakistan-over-terror-record-n905786">$300m in aid cancelled</a> by the US military in September 2018, over claims Pakistan wasn’t doing enough to combat militants in the Afghan border region.</p>
<p>Khan’s official visit appeared to go exceptionally well, with warm greetings from key figures including US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Trump responded well to Khan’s compliment that he was president of the most powerful nation of the world. And Khan established Pakistan’s key place with regard to Afghanistan, not as the oft-alleged “supporter of terrorism”, but as the broker of a settlement.</p>
<h2>Bringing the Taliban to the table</h2>
<p>The first interaction between Khan and Trump was a frosty Twitter spat, after the US delivered its slap in the face with the aid suspension.</p>
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<p>But circumstances changed when Trump <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20181203-trump-letter-imran-khan-seeks-pakistans-help-afghanistan">wrote a letter</a> to Khan in December 2018 requesting Islamabad’s help to bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. Pakistani officials have since developed a constructive partnership with the US Special Representative for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, as he and the Taliban have held multiple rounds of negotiations in Qatar. Representatives of the Afghan government participated in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/08/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-peace-talks.html">the latest phase on July 8</a>, pointing to the possibility of a national resolution involving all major parties.</p>
<p>This positive engagement was made possible only by a re-calibration and alignment of the strategic goals of both sides in Afghanistan. For the first time, a US administration has recognised that it cannot effectively stay in Afghanistan indefinitely. Washington now accepts that the eventual resolution of the conflict will only come from a political process that includes the Taliban. The US has accepted the rationale of the Pakistanis – supported by other regional players such as Iran, Russia, and China – that the Taliban must be part of the government.</p>
<p>Trump has played his part with his simple mantra that US troops must be brought home. In his press conference with Khan, he said the US must not be the region’s policeman, looking instead to regional partners to settle conflicts.</p>
<p>That line gives Khan leverage. In return for the declaration that Pakistan will serve as the top cop on the regional block, Islamabad can pursue the restoration of US aid, take the lead in political manoeuvres in Afghanistan, and gain a tactical advantage over its neighbour, India.</p>
<h2>Imran’s great game</h2>
<p>For Pakistan, the icing on the cake was Trump bringing the K-word before the press. When Khan raised Kashmir, Trump not only jumped to claim his mediation prowess but said a similar request had been made by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Delhi <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/23/india-denies-asking-for-donald-trumps-mediation-in-kashmir">swiftly and sharply denied the claim</a>, but its insistence that Kashmir is an issue for Pakistan and India to sort out together without any external third-party mediation, has been shaken.</p>
<p>Then there was Khan’s personal victory, as Trump declared Pakistan a great country and its prime minister a great leader. While rebuilding links with US security agencies, Khan also capitalised on the special circumstance of playing politics from the top table by his appeals to Trump’s ego.</p>
<p>Both Republican senator Lindsey Graham, a close friend of Trump’s, and Saudi crown prince Mohammad Bin Salman <a href="https://www.khaleejtimes.com/international/pakistan/imran-khan-has-saudi-crown-prince-to-thank-for-us-visit-report">connected Khan with Trump</a>. Graham, impressed by his first meeting with Khan, speculated that he and Trump had similar personalities and would get along well. Bin Salman built extremely cordial ties with Khan, particularly as he defied the informal diplomatic boycott of the crown prince following <a href="https://theconversation.com/jamal-khashoggi-disappearance-a-defining-moment-for-saudi-arabias-relations-with-the-west-105064">condemnation</a> of the 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Bin Salman is close to Trump’s son-in-law and Middle East adviser Jared Kushner, which led to Khan’s invitation to visit the White House. </p>
<p>On the domestic front, Khan and his government have been reaping the political dividends of the Trump endorsement. The daily newspaper Dawn ran with the headline: “<a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1496137/imran-khan-in-washington-he-came-he-saw-he-conquered">He Came, He Saw, He Conquered</a>”. Khan’s address to members of the Pakistani-American community also fired up his base of supporters, catching the opposition and government critics by surprise. </p>
<p>Afghanistan now becomes the catalytic issue to test the Pakistani-US rapprochement. Any peace settlement there would strengthen Khan’s persona as a regional builder of peace and security – and even if this is not immediate, Pakistan’s presence at the head of negotiations yields political capital. </p>
<p>Then comes the bigger test of personalities and politics. For now, Pakistan wants to resolve the Afghan conflict in line with its own strategic perspective – and it’s very aware that Trump wants to take US troops home before going into the 2020 US presidential election campaign. On his trip to Washington, Khan also <a href="https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/press-releases/72319-4/">met with</a> the Democratic speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi – so he’s aware he must play the long game. Nonetheless, Pakistan considers it can get the best deal on a renewed strategic partnership with the US from Trump during his first term, both for regional security and for the economic challenges facing Islamabad.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120953/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Umer Karim is affiliated with the Royal United Services Institute London as a Visiting Fellow. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After Imran Khan’s visit to the White House, what lies ahead for his relationship with Donald Trump?Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University of BirminghamUmer Karim, PhD Candidate, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1165872019-05-14T04:50:40Z2019-05-14T04:50:40ZHow to end Afghanistan war as longest conflict moves towards fragile peace<p>The longest-running war appears to be coming to an end. </p>
<p>The Taliban has been running an armed rebellion in Afghanistan since being dislodged from power in a US-led invasion following September 11 2001. Recent high-level negotiations between the two sides in the 18-year war did not produce a breakthrough, but “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47015794">significant progress</a>”, leading to “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/breakthrough-taliban-hail-progress-doha-talks-190312171834928.html">improved</a>” conditions for peace.</p>
<p>The fact that the primary belligerents, the Taliban and the United States, are talking directly is essential. Any peaceful pathway going forwards without their direct involvement is impossible. But to end the killing, all sides are going to have to give up something, to achieve their greater goals.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-will-come-after-a-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-111036">What will come after a US withdrawal from Afghanistan?</a>
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<h2>Longest-running conflict</h2>
<p>Although the losses in the Afghanistan war are not as bad as either the American war in Vietnam (just over <a href="https://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics">58,000 military casualties</a> and between 1 and 3 million civilians or enemy) or the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (maybe <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/08/the-soviet-war-in-afghanistan-1979-1989/100786/">1 million civilians</a>, 90,000 Mujahideen, 18,000 Afghan troops and 14,500 Soviet soldiers), the record in Afghanistan is still difficult reading. The American death toll is a <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/News/Casualty-Status/">little over 2,200</a>, while the wider losses (civilians and enemy) are well over 100,000. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47005558">Reliable estimates</a> suggest more than 45,000 Afghani military have been killed since 2014 alone. The annual civilian death toll continues to climb, with 3,804 deaths recorded in 2018. At the same time, the amount of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/08/afghanistan-controls-160823083528213.html">territory that rebel groups control</a> (14.5%) or is contested (29.2%) or under government control (56.3%) is an unexpected result, given nearly two decades of combat.</p>
<p>The significance of talking to the Taliban directly cannot be overstated. When the Mujahideen were not directly involved in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/15/world/key-sections-of-accords-on-afghanistan-as-signed-in-geneva.html">Geneva Accords</a> that ended the Soviet conflict in Afghanistan, the results were a disaster. No sooner had the Soviets left the country, the Mujahideen denounced the agreement (even though Pakistan had been negotiating on their behalf), saying <a href="http://www.afghanistans.com/Information/History/GenevaAccords.htm">they were not part of it</a>. Their forces then took three years to overrun most of the country. </p>
<h2>Negotiated peace</h2>
<p>The fact that it will be a negotiated end to the conflict, as opposed to an imposed and unconditional one, is significant. Negotiated and conditional agreements are often cast as “peace with honour”, whereby the side that wants to exit the most prioritises what it is willing to give away while still appearing to be in control. </p>
<p>For example, with the end of the American involvement in the Vietnam war, the core of the <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/volume-935-I-13295-English.pdf">Paris Peace Accords</a> of early 1973, the primary goal of the North Vietnamese was the withdrawal of all US and allied forces from the region. The primary goal for Nixon was the <a href="https://www.dpaa.mil/portals/85/Documents/VietnamAccounting/2019_stats/Statistics%20as%20of%20January%2015,%202019.pdf">return of 1,056 prisoners of war</a>.</p>
<p>When the Geneva Accords ended the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the primary exchange was about an exit of Russian soldiers, in return for mutual commitments from the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan not to interfere in each other’s country. In both instances, a swag of secondary considerations formed part of the package. </p>
<p>In the case of Vietnam, there were supplementary provisions for a ceasefire that was to be monitored by independent countries and a <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/volume-935-I-13295-English.pdf">National Council of Reconciliation and Concord</a> to implement democracy and organise free elections in the south. In the case of the Geneva Accords, the return of Afghani refugees was an important consideration, as were <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/15/world/key-sections-of-accords-on-afghanistan-as-signed-in-geneva.html">mutual commitments</a> “to prevent any assistance to … or tolerance of terrorist groups, saboteurs or subversive agents against the other High Contracting Party”.</p>
<h2>Main considerations</h2>
<p>In the current deliberations, the most important thing the Taliban want is the exit of all foreign troops from Afghanistan. This is possible, with both the Paris and Geneva accords providing precedents. The most important thing the Americans want is not only an exit of their troops, but a commitment that the Taliban will not, again, host any groups involved in terrorist activities against the US. </p>
<p>This demand is consistent with the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13">original American war aims</a> and the Geneva precedent is useful. The harder part will be working out the assurances that such promises are kept.</p>
<p>Where negotiations will get much more difficult is with the plethora of secondary considerations. In the context of Afghanistan, this will cover issues such as direct dialogue with the Afghani government and a comprehensive ceasefire. This is easier said than done as it will require the Taliban to accept the legitimacy of the Afghani political system (and whichever government is in power) and the democracy that placed them in power. </p>
<p>The flip side of this, both nationally and internationally, is that the Taliban will have to lose their “terrorist” classification, which the UN Security Council has applied <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2255">consistently</a> <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1267">since the end of the 20th century</a>. This designation has placed strong military, financial and diplomatic restrictions on the Taliban, which made them outlaws in the eyes of the international community. This will have to be reversed, as the declared terrorists of yesterday become the legitimate powerbrokers of tomorrow. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-peace-agreement-in-afghanistan-wont-last-if-there-are-no-women-at-the-table-111820">A peace agreement in Afghanistan won't last if there are no women at the table</a>
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<p>The agenda should cover commitments to the most basic <a href="https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/">human rights</a> (<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cedaw/pages/cedawindex.aspx">women’s rights</a> in particular), what to do about <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/afghanistan.html">almost 2.5 million refugees from Afghanistan</a>, and how to deal with the fact that Afghanistan is now the world’s leading (and rapidly expanding) <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/5.Heroin.pdf">producer of illegal opium</a>. </p>
<p>The opposing sides need to work out how to ensure a comprehensive ceasefire, as well as its links to ongoing economic, diplomatic and military support for any future governing regime in Kabul, especially if the ceasefire is breached. </p>
<p>When the Americans exited Vietnam, they promised their allies in South Vietnam that American support in all other avenues would continue. But once the Americans returned home and their country became engrossed in other matters such as Watergate, the promises were forgotten. Saigon fell, a few years later, to the very enemy they had negotiated a peace treaty with.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116587/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Gillespie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A ceasefire and peace agreement in Afghanistan may mean that the Taliban would have to lose their “terrorist” classification and turn from despised outlaws to legitimate powerbrokers.Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of WaikatoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.