tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca-fr/topics/volodymyr-zelensky-70055/articlesVolodymyr Zelensky – La Conversation2024-03-15T15:01:05Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2258502024-03-15T15:01:05Z2024-03-15T15:01:05ZUkraine war: ten years after Putin annexed Crimea, Russia’s grip on the peninsula looks shaky<p>It is ten years since Russia illegally <a href="https://theconversation.com/now-crimeas-in-the-bag-where-next-for-putin-and-russia-24521">annexed</a> Crimea on March 18 2014. Subsequent efforts to firmly integrate the peninsula into the Russian Federation, however, have been far from the success story that the Kremlin often likes to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60793319">portray</a>. </p>
<p>In fact, comparing the increasingly shaky grip that Moscow has on the peninsula today with the situation before the annexation would suggest that Russia’s strategic position has actually worsened over the past decade.</p>
<p>The Kerch bridge between Crimea and Russia opened to much fanfare in 2018 with the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgmJrvcKtVI&t=16s">driving</a> a truck across it. It has become a symbol not only of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66221252">Russian occupation</a> of Crimea, but also of Ukrainian resistance. Spectacular Ukrainian attacks in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63192757">October 2022</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/traffic-stopped-crimean-bridge-due-emergency-russian-backed-governor-2023-07-17/">July 2023</a> exposed the tenuousness of Russia’s connection to the peninsula. </p>
<p>Not only that, but <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66829826.amp">repeated missile and drone attacks</a> on Russian installations in Crimea and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/17/world/europe/ukraine-partisans-insurgency-russia.html">partisan activity</a> in Crimea have further heightened the sense of Russian vulnerability.</p>
<h2>Black Sea successes</h2>
<p>Most significant of all, Russia’s Black Sea fleet has suffered significant losses over the past two years. As a result of these Ukrainian successes, the Kremlin decided to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-attack-crimea-russia-ships-relocate/">relocate the Black Sea fleet</a> from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk on the Russian mainland. Compare that with the situation prior to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 when Russia had a secure lease on the naval base of Sevastopol until 2042. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Black Sea." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Since the invasion in February 2022, Russia and Ukraine have battled for supremacy in the Black Sea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/create/editor/CiRkZjY2ZjA5Yi1jM2RmLTRhM2MtYmUxZC1hZDFjZGQ4NTA5NmQ">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>Moreover, the Turkish closure of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles shortly after the start of Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 means that Russia can no longer freely move war ships in and out of the Black Sea. This makes losses, like those of the Black Sea fleet’s flagship cruiser <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61103927">Moskva</a> in April 2022 and recently the patrol boat <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68477318">Sergey Kotov</a> and the amphibian landing ship <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68292602">Caesar Kunikov</a>, even more of a strategic blow to Russian capabilities.</p>
<p>These attacks also have a significant symbolic value for Ukraine and its allies. While the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive on the mainland failed to deliver on expectations, Kyiv’s deft deployment of air and sea drones and of longer-range missiles ensured a remarkable <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/2023-review-ukraine-scores-key-victories-in-the-battle-of-the-black-sea/">change of fortunes</a> in the Black Sea. This was underlined recently when the <a href="https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1759145815946195025">Kremlin removed</a> its second commander of the Black Sea Fleet since the invasion of Ukraine. </p>
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<p>Momentum around Crimea clearly seems to be on Ukraine’s side. Earlier this month, Ukrainian intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov signalled that a major operation aimed at further loosening Russia’s grip on Crimea <a href="https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/budanov-announces-major-operation-in-crimea-1710143680.html">was imminent</a>.</p>
<p>Apart from the strategic military and symbolic value of these Ukrainian successes, there is also a clear economic benefit. After Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea grain initiative brokered by Turkey and the United Nations, the fact that Moscow lost naval superiority in the Black Sea enabled Kyiv to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/16/world/europe/odesa-cargo-ship-black-sea-ukraine.html">establish</a> its own shipping corridor. </p>
<p>This now carries key Ukrainian agricultural exports to global markets at levels <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/ukraines-dec-black-sea-food-exports-top-un-brokered-deal-its-peak-brokers-2024-01-10/">exceeding</a> those during the period when the grain deal was actually in operation.</p>
<h2>Russia nervous</h2>
<p>This is overall undeniably good news at a time when there are many grim assessments of Ukraine’s prospects in this illegal Russian war. The renewed and arguably more optimistic focus on Ukraine was also obvious in <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-must-reclaim-crimea-achieve-real-peace-macron-1879496">recent comments</a> by the French president, Emmanuel Macron. </p>
<p>Recognising the strategic importance of the peninsula, including for the security of EU members such as Romania and Bulgaria with their own Black Sea coastlines, Macron insisted that restoring Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea was essential for lasting peace in the region.</p>
<p>This contrasts sharply with a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-lawmakers-seek-nullify-soviet-transfer-crimea-ukraine-2024-03-11/">move by lawmakers in the Duma</a>, Russia’s parliament. Members introduced a draft bill on March 11 that seeks to annul the transfer of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine by former Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev in 1954. </p>
<p>It is not clear what, if any, effect such a law would have on the international legal status of Crimea as part of sovereign Ukrainian territory. But it suggests a degree of nervousness in Moscow regarding its grip on the peninsula.</p>
<p>This does not mean, however, that Russia is in any imminent danger of losing Crimea, let alone of losing the war that it has illegally fought against Ukraine both overtly and covertly for a decade now. The importance of Crimea in this war <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/514abee5-c09b-34f6-9a3a-865a64540a65">was established</a> long before the beginning of Moscow’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. </p>
<p>And Putin and his proxies have <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-moscow-could-go-nuclear-over-kyivs-threats-to-crimea-187188">threatened</a> the use of nuclear weapons on more than one occasion if Russian were in danger of being forced out of Ukraine. These threats may been overblown, but they indicate the level of determination with which Moscow is committed to holding onto Crimea. </p>
<p>Ukrainian efforts have clearly demonstrated, however, that the Kremlin’s, and Putin’s personal, commitment may not be enough to secure Russia’s hold forever. Kyiv’s western partners would do well to remember that among the spreading gloom over the trajectory of the war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225850/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.</span></em></p>While Ukraine’s fortunes on the battlefield have been mixed, its operations in Crimea and the Black Sea have been rather more successful.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2258352024-03-14T17:40:02Z2024-03-14T17:40:02ZUkraine recap: Russian election special – and the winner will be … Vladimir Putin<p>Russian voters have been heading to the polls this week. But it would be misleading to say they were voting to choose a president. That’s already been done for them – it’ll be Vladimir Putin. </p>
<p>If there had ever been any doubt that the president of 24 years would be returned for another six, Russia’s supreme court removed that earlier this month when it upheld a decision of the Central Election Commission to ban anti-war candidate Boris Nadezhdin from running. Not that he was going to win – the director of independent Russian pollster the Levada Center, Lev Gudkov, estimated that Nadezhdin would have won about 4% of the vote had he been on the ballot. Another anti-war candidate, television journalist Yekaterina Duntsova, was banned from running last December.</p>
<p>Anyone else who might be a focus for opposition is either in jail, dead or exiled. </p>
<p>This year votes will reportedly be cast using a new digital system, which many fear will allow voters to be monitored. But Natasha Lindstaedt, a Russian politics specialist at the University of Essex, believes that with Putin forecast to hoover up 75% of the votes cast, the Kremlin will be more concerned at the idea that people will indicate their opposition to the Russian president by <a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-elections-despite-fixing-the-opposition-vladimir-putin-wants-lots-of-people-to-vote-for-him-225626">failing to vote at all</a>.</p>
<p>Faced with a similar lack of opposition talent to back, Iranian voters recently stayed at home in droves. Turnout for the parliamentary election was a lacklustre 41% – the lowest for a parliamentary election since the inception of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Lindstaedt says the Kremlin has spent a reported €1 billion (£850 million) on propaganda in the lead up to the poll. It’s also important for Putin to reinforce the image of his legitimacy in case he needs to call on more Russians to fight.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-elections-despite-fixing-the-opposition-vladimir-putin-wants-lots-of-people-to-vote-for-him-225626">Russian elections: despite fixing the opposition, Vladimir Putin wants lots of people to vote for him</a>
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<p>If you want to read more about this week’s election, Adam Lenton – a Russia expert at Wake Forest University in North Carolina – offers this analysis which identifies <a href="https://theconversation.com/3-things-to-watch-for-in-russias-presidential-election-other-than-putins-win-that-is-225013">three key issues</a> to look out for.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/3-things-to-watch-for-in-russias-presidential-election-other-than-putins-win-that-is-225013">3 things to watch for in Russia's presidential election – other than Putin's win, that is</a>
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<p>If you are thinking that Putin will never relinquish his grip on power, you are probably right. Robert Person, a professor of international relations at the United States Military Academy West Point, says Putin’s got every reason to want to die in office – not least because any successor would likely want him out of the way. So, as <a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-has-no-successor-no-living-rivals-and-no-retirement-plan-why-his-eventual-death-will-set-off-a-vicious-power-struggle-224485">Person writes here</a>, there’s no succession plan and no public figures who – for the present at least – appear capable of mustering sufficient support to effect a seamless transfer of power. </p>
<p>Were Putin to die tomorrow, he’d be succeeded by the prime minister, Mikhail Mishustin. But Mishustin is a virtual nonentity, a former tax official with no base of his own and a trust rating of just 18%. It’s hard to see him having the momentum to take the reins on a permanent basis. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-has-no-successor-no-living-rivals-and-no-retirement-plan-why-his-eventual-death-will-set-off-a-vicious-power-struggle-224485">Putin has no successor, no living rivals and no retirement plan – why his eventual death will set off a vicious power struggle</a>
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<img alt="Ukraine Recap weekly email newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>One opposition group that is making its voice heard is made up of wives of Russian troops fighting in Ukraine. Previously, write Jennifer Mathers and Natasha Danilova, it had been soldiers’ mothers who were very vocal in their opposition to the war in Chechnya in the 1990s. This time round it’s the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russian-soldiers-wives-are-increasingly-outspoken-in-their-opposition-224325">wives of men who are serving</a>, reflecting perhaps the relatively older age profile of combatants in Ukraine. Many soldiers are in their 30s and 40s, rather than their late teens and early 20s, as in Chechnya.</p>
<p>Mathers and Danilova, experts in international relations at the universities of Aberystwyth and Aberdeen respectively, say the women have gradually increased the public pressure on the Kremlin as the conflict has moved into a third year, moving from largely online opposition to regular protests. Rather than set themselves against the war in itself, they are focusing on securing concessions such as more regular leave for their loved ones.</p>
<p>But, Mathers and Danilova note, there are signs that the Kremlin is beginning to up the pressure on these women, visiting their homes and mounting increasingly strident media attacks on their group.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russian-soldiers-wives-are-increasingly-outspoken-in-their-opposition-224325">Ukraine war: Russian soldiers' wives are increasingly outspoken in their opposition</a>
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<h2>British boots on the ground?</h2>
<p>Red faces among Germany’s political and military leadership recently when it emerged that an unencrypted phone call between senior Luftwaffe officers had revealed that British troops are in Ukraine helping with the deployment and targeting of Storm Shadow cruise missiles. The call had been intercepted and passed to Russian state broadcaster RT. </p>
<p>The Kremlin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, said the call was “proof” that the west was orchestrating the war against Russia. Closer to home, one question being asked was whether this makes the UK a co-combatant.</p>
<p>Christoph Bluth, professor of international relations at the University of Bradford, <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-troops-operating-on-the-ground-in-ukraine-what-international-law-says-224896?notice=Article+has+been+updated.">examines the international law involved</a> and finds that under principles established since the second world war, helping Ukraine in this limited way does not violate the UK’s neutrality. But Moscow will no doubt use it as a political opportunity to escalate its anti-Nato rhetoric, Bluth writes. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/british-troops-operating-on-the-ground-in-ukraine-what-international-law-says-224896">British troops operating on the ground in Ukraine – what international law says</a>
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<h2>Memory and culture</h2>
<p>There was some heartening news from Washington this week when it was revealed that Joe Biden had managed to scrape together US$300 million (£235 million) to supply the Ukraine military with at least some ammunition as it struggles to hold the line against better-supplied Russian forces. But the west’s slow response to pleas from the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, for more military aid remains a huge concern. As the map below shows, Russia continues to make gains west of the town of Avdiivka, which they captured in mid-February.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="ISW Map showing the battle lines around Adviivka in eastern Ukraine" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Russia continues to make gains west of the town of Avdiivka, which they captured in mid-February.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>Gervase Phillips, a historian at Manchester Metropolitan University, see parallels with the Polish uprising in November 1830. Initially, support for the Polish people against the oppressive rule of the autocratic Tsar Nicolas I was widespread, and early success on the battlefield made this seem a worthy cause in liberal salons across Europe. </p>
<p>But, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-a-warning-for-kyivs-western-allies-from-the-failed-polish-uprising-of-1830-31-225625">Phillips writes</a>, this was not to last. The Poles’ European allies failed to back their intentions with military aid, and the uprising developed into a war of attrition in 1831. Eventually Russian troops fought their way to Warsaw and the uprising failed. Will Ukraine suffer the same fate?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-a-warning-for-kyivs-western-allies-from-the-failed-polish-uprising-of-1830-31-225625">Ukraine war: a warning for Kyiv's western allies from the failed Polish uprising of 1830-31</a>
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<p>Pope Francis I certainly appears to think so. The Holy Father sparked outrage in Kyiv (and elsewhere) last weekend when in an interview with Swiss public broadcaster RSI, he said Ukraine should find the “the courage to raise the white flag”. “When you see that you are defeated … you need to have the courage to negotiate,” he added. This drew an immediate and caustic response from Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba: “Our flag is a yellow and blue one,” he said, adding: “This is the flag by which we live, die, and prevail. We shall never raise any other flags.”</p>
<p>Tim Luckhurst, a former BBC journalist now researching second world war newspaper history at the University of Durham, was reminded of the way Pope Pius XII <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-pope-francis-should-learn-from-his-wwii-predecessors-mistakes-in-appeasing-fascism-225491">failed to openly criticise Nazi Germany</a> during the worst excesses of the Holocaust, preferring instead to safeguard the rights of German Catholics. Meanwhile round-ups of Italian Jews took place within sight of the Vatican.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-pope-francis-should-learn-from-his-wwii-predecessors-mistakes-in-appeasing-fascism-225491">Ukraine war: Pope Francis should learn from his WWII predecessor's mistakes in appeasing fascism</a>
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<p>Meanwhile, as admirers of the late Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny gathered in Moscow for his funeral, the biggest festival of documentary film in the former Soviet countries opened in Latvia with a minute’s silence. Artdocfest was first held in Moscow in 2007 and showcased some of the best Russian and foreign-language documentaries. After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the Kremlin began to pressure its organisers and withdrew all state support. In March 2022, after Putin launched his invasion, the festival relocated permanently to Riga.</p>
<p>Jeremy Hicks, professor of Russian culture and film at Queen Mary University of London, gives us <a href="https://theconversation.com/artdocfest-is-a-crucial-outpost-of-free-expression-on-russias-doorstep-225515">a taste</a> of the best films being showcased at the festival.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/artdocfest-is-a-crucial-outpost-of-free-expression-on-russias-doorstep-225515">Artdocfest is a crucial outpost of free expression on Russia’s doorstep</a>
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<h2>Podcast: Putin’s conspiracy theories</h2>
<p>Aptly enough, the subject of our podcast The Conversation Weekly is how Putin has managed to exert such a firm grip on power in Russia. Host Gemma Ware talks with Ilya Yablokov, a specialist in disinformation at the University of Sheffield.</p>
<p>Yabolokov, who has written regularly for us on the Russian media, has been researching the way Russia’s conspiracy culture has become a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conspiracy-theories-help-to-maintain-vladimir-putins-grip-on-power-in-russia-225703">key tool for Putin’s regime</a>: “Conspiracy theories are one of the few ways of keeping the society together and to prevent the change of the regime,” he says. </p>
<p>Incidentally, one of those theories is that shadowy western agencies orchestrated Navalny’s death to make Putin look bad. True or not, that mission has been well and truly accomplished.</p>
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Read more:
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A selection of our coverage of the conflict from the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2256252024-03-14T16:25:45Z2024-03-14T16:25:45ZUkraine war: a warning for Kyiv’s western allies from the failed Polish uprising of 1830-31<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581600/original/file-20240313-26-eed233.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C3%2C1016%2C678&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Polish forces triumphed over a larger Russian force at the Battle of Stoczek, February 1831.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Maciej Szczepańczyk/Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-preparing-new-weapons-package-ukraine-officials-2024-03-12/">has been reported</a> that the US president, Joe Biden, has managed to scrape together US$300 million (£235 million) as an emergency measure to supply the Ukraine military with at least some ammunition as it struggles to hold the line against better-supplied Russian forces. </p>
<p>The news should stand as a reminder of just how urgent the situation is for Ukraine, which is begging its western allies to stand firm and maintain the levels of support that had given its army the edge over the invaders in the summer of 2022. After a few months of significant successes on the battlefield, growing shortages of weaponry stymied Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive in the late spring of 2023. The conflict has developed into a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-west-is-at-a-crossroads-double-down-on-aid-to-kyiv-accept-a-compromise-deal-or-face-humiliation-by-russia-223747">war of attrition</a>, giving Russia – which has a far larger population from which to recruit – the advantage if things don’t change soon.</p>
<p>There are valuable parallels to be had by considering the Polish uprising of 1830-1831. On <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/November-Insurrection">November 19 1830</a>, Polish insurgents rose to free their nation from the sovereignty of the autocratic Russian tsar, Nicholas I. This was not simply a nationalist uprising. As with the current war in Ukraine, ideological principles were at stake with implications for all of Europe. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-west-is-at-a-crossroads-double-down-on-aid-to-kyiv-accept-a-compromise-deal-or-face-humiliation-by-russia-223747">Ukraine war: the west is at a crossroads – double down on aid to Kyiv, accept a compromise deal, or face humiliation by Russia</a>
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<p>The officer cadets who led the revolt had been outraged by the tsar’s suggestion that Polish troops might be used to suppress <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Revolutions-of-1830">liberal revolutions</a> in France and Belgium. Poland itself was partitioned between Russia, Austria and Prussia. </p>
<p>Russia’s share, the Congress Kingdom of Poland, was technically a constitutional monarchy, with a liberal constitution: the <a href="https://courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-hccc-worldhistory2/chapter/the-napoleonic-code/#:%7E:text=The%201804%20Napoleonic%20Code%2C%20which,secular%20character%20of%20the%20state.">Napoleonic Code</a>, a free press and an elected assembly (the Sejm). </p>
<p>Yet the tsar held supreme power – he could dissolve the Sejm, veto legislation and send Polish troops to crush foreign revolutions. Nicholas’s own contempt for constitutional government manifested itself in the growth of an oppressive police state. The Poles rose in defence of their liberties.</p>
<p>As with Ukraine in 2022, liberal sentiment across Europe quickly rallied to their cause and <a href="https://www.porta-polonica.de/en/atlas-of-remembrance-places/german-polish-enthusiasm-1830">support for the Polish</a> was widespread. </p>
<p>The military history of the war also offers instructive parallels with the current war in Ukraine. The tsar’s determination to crush the insurrection and impose his will on the Poles in 1830 is a reminder of how deeply-rooted Russia’s <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/08/etched-in-stone-russian-strategic-culture-and-future-of-transatlantic-security-pub-82657">strategic goals</a> in eastern Europe are. </p>
<p>It is, therefore, most unlikely that the current autocrat in the Kremlin – who has often <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-rues-soviet-collapse-demise-historical-russia-2021-12-12/">lamented the loss of empire</a> with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s – will be sated with minor territorial gains in Ukraine. The resistance offered by the Poles, on the other hand, was redolent of the early successes won by Ukrainian arms in 2022.</p>
<h2>David v Goliath</h2>
<p>The odds seemed stacked heavily in Russia’s favour. A Polish army of 40,000 faced an invading Russian force of 120,000. Yet, as accounts by participants such as the Polish cavalryman <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/History_of_the_Late_Polish_Revolution.html?id=QEQCAAAAYAAJ&redir_esc=y">Joseph Hordynski</a> reveal, the skill and professionalism of Polish soldiers was enough to stall the Russian advance. </p>
<p>At battles such as <a href="https://securityanddefence.pl/The-canon-provider-starts-his-career-General-Jozef-Dwernicki-and-the-cavalry-battle,103157,0,2.html">Stoczek</a>, (February 14 1831), <a href="https://dbpedia.org/page/Battle_of_Bia%C5%82o%C5%82%C4%99ka">Białołęka </a>(February 24-25 1831) and <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/60867/pg60867-images.html#CHAPTER_XIII">Debe-Wielke</a> (March 30 1831) the Poles either defeated the Russians or fought them to a standstill. </p>
<p>Hordynski describes effective use of <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA528264.pdf">combined arms tactics</a>, skilful use of terrain, feigned retreats and ambushes. Russian forces seemed ponderous and uncoordinated in comparison, again echoing the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare">battlefields of 2022</a>. </p>
<p>In another parallel with the current conflict in Ukraine, widespread popular support fuelled Polish resistance. This extended even to areas outside Congress Poland, such as Lithuania, where <a href="http://museum.by/en/node/58511">Countess Emilia Plater</a> led insurgent forces against the Russians. Then, as now, the Russians faced attacks <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ukrainian-attacks-within-russia-challenge-putins-war-narrative">in areas they had thought secure</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Painting of Emilia Plater in a skirmish at Šiauliai by Wojciech Kossak." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Lithuanian resistance fighter Countess Emilia Plater led a small military unit during the uprising – she is now a national heroine in Poland and Lithuania.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
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<p>And yet the Polish uprising was crushed within a year. It is the circumstances of that defeat that perhaps demand the most scrutiny at this moment, as the war in Ukraine settles into a relentless attritional struggle, where Russia’s material advantages threaten to overwhelm Ukraine. </p>
<p>The Russian military performance improved in 1831, and they won an important victory at <a href="https://dbpedia.org/page/Battle_of_Ostro%C5%82%C4%99ka_(1831)">Ostrołęka</a>, (May 16 1831). The resolve of Polish leadership wavered; General Józef Chłopicki and his successor General Jan Skrzynecki favoured reaching a negotiated settlement with the tsar. </p>
<p>While Polish battlefield tactics were bold, their national strategy was defensive and conciliatory. The uprising lost its impetus. By September 1831, the Russians had closed on Warsaw. The defending army withdrew, finally crossing into Prussia in defeat. </p>
<h2>Waning support</h2>
<p>The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, is <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/zelenskyy-rejects-talks-with-putin-he-already-demonstrated-dialogue-format-in-port-of-odesa/ar-BB1jLaWb">showing no such inclination towards a negotiated peace</a> that would, as in 1831, effectively equate to a Russian victory.</p>
<p>Yet there is another aspect of Poland’s defeat that suggests troubling parallels. The widespread popular sentiment in support of the uprising across Europe did not result in any meaningful material aid for the Polish cause. The preoccupations of domestic politics and narrow national self-interest combined to deny the Poles the means of sustaining their struggle. </p>
<p>The British were distracted by the debates over the <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/houseofcommons/reformacts/overview/reformact1832/">reform bill</a>. In Vienna, the Austrian government was initially content to see Russia weakened but later, fearing the contagion of revolution, closed its border and handed over Polish refugees to the Russian authorities. </p>
<p>France’s government and new king, Louis-Philippe, presiding uneasily over a divided nation, settled on a policy of non-intervention. Prussia opted for pragmatism and opened its borders to Russian troops, allowed arms and provisions to cross its frontiers to alleviate Russian logistical weaknesses and arrested German volunteers travelling to join the Polish army. </p>
<p>Today, the wavering of international support for Ukraine echoes this situation. The Papacy <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/pope-says-ukraine-should-have-courage-white-flag-negotiations-2024-03-09/">calls for capitulation</a> thinly veiled as negotiation, while in the US House of Representatives, Republicans <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20240214-us-house-speaker-johnson-blocks-vote-ukraine-israel-taiwan-aid-passed-senate-donald-trump-republicans">block further aid to Ukraine</a>. European nations are also struggling to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-to-ukraine-half-is-better-than-nothing-when-it-comes-to-ammunition/">deliver the munitions promised to Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>Ukraine cannot prevail without international support. Will its allies provide it – or will they abandon them, as they did the Poles in 1831?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225625/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gervase Phillips does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Waning support from Poland’s allies meant the war descended to an attritional struggle, giving Russia the advantage it needed to win.Gervase Phillips, Principal Lecturer in History, Manchester Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2254162024-03-11T18:49:24Z2024-03-11T18:49:24ZRecent gains point to a growing Russian advantage in the Ukraine war<p>The ongoing war in Ukraine is not featuring as prominently in western news media these days as it was earlier in the war, because it has been overshadowed by the unfolding human tragedy of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-rising-death-toll-from-hunger-a-stark-reminder-of-starvation-as-a-weapon-of-war-225197">war in Gaza</a>. </p>
<p>However, the war in Ukraine is still very much ongoing, and both sides are clearly suffering significant losses. Yet it appears that slowly but surely Russia is gaining ground on and off the battlefield. </p>
<p>The recent Ukrainian withdrawal from the stronghold of Avdiivka <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-withdraws-troops-avdiivka-1.7118227">did make the headlines</a>. On that sector of the front near the city of Donetsk, Russian forces have <a href="https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375">pushed beyond Avdiivka and continue to gain ground</a>. </p>
<p>Russian forces have also made limited gains <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682">on other sectors of the front line</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Russian economy is <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russias-economy-going-strong/video-68315706">increasingly mobilized for war</a>, and the government has been able to obtain <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-paused-shipments-russia-ukraine-report-2024-3">some military resources from abroad</a>, circumventing western sanctions.</p>
<p>All of this means that Russia is, relative to Ukraine, in an <a href="https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/a-year-later-and-things-are-very-different-in-moscow">increasingly strong position</a> as the war enters its third year.</p>
<h2>Russian advantage</h2>
<p>While Russian advances are clearly <a href="https://monitoring.stage.bbc.co.uk/product/c2050m20">costing their forces heavy losses</a>, the Ukrainian side too is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/20/us/politics/ukraine-prisoners-avdiivka-russia.html">taking significant losses</a>, often when defending increasingly untenable defensive positions. Russian forces typically have a <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/russia-army-ukraine-war-1.7122808">numerical advantage in terms of numbers of troops, artillery</a> and <a href="https://defence-industry.eu/russia-increases-artillery-ammunition-production-ukrainian-sources-say/">their munitions</a>. In terms of drones — where Ukrainian forces once had an advantage — <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/some-ukraine-drone-pilots-fear-early-advantage-over-russia-now-lost-2023-11-09/">Russian forces seem to have caught up or even outpaced Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>Some western commentators have portrayed Russian tactics as mindless attacks with hordes of infantry — <a href="https://cepa.org/article/surprised-that-ukraine-is-taking-combat-losses-you-shouldnt-be/">sometimes derogatorily described as orcs</a>. The reality is that the Russian army has adapted to the nature of the war today. It is now much better at co-ordinating the activities of artillery, drones and small groups of infantry. Even Ukrainian sources highlight how <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-skills-varied-avdiivka-from-well-trained-to-confused-soldiers-2024-3">at least some Russian troops are well-trained and capable</a>.</p>
<h2>Western support for Ukraine</h2>
<p>There is strong evidence of <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/cia-ukraine-russia/">western intelligence personnel already on the ground in Ukraine</a> — who were there long before February 2022. On top of NATO’s more overt military assistance, such revelations feed into the <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1567341">Russian narrative</a> that the war in the Ukraine is a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/mar/05/nato-ukraine-russia-germany-military-leak">proxy war between NATO and Russia</a>.</p>
<p>A growing challenge for Ukraine is decreasing western public support for military assistance. <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/513680/american-views-ukraine-war-charts.aspx">In a Gallup poll from November 2023</a>, 41 per cent of U.S. respondents said that the United States is doing too much to support Ukraine — an opinion that rose to 62 per cent among Republican voters. Back in August 2022, these figures were 24 and 43 per cent respectively. This trend is evident in different polls too, as a recent <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/12/08/about-half-of-republicans-now-say-the-us-is-providing-too-much-aid-to-ukraine/">Pew poll highlights</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-the-us-public-thinks-about-giving-military-and-other-aid-223064">Ukraine war: what the US public thinks about giving military and other aid</a>
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<p>While there is still strong support within the European Union for providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine, <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/eurobarometer/2022/public-opinion-on-the-war-in-ukraine/en-public-opinion-on-the-war-against-ukraine-20240223.pdf">surveys find that support for military assistance is decreasing</a>. </p>
<p>The Ukrainian government has stated its army’s problems can be solved with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-anniversary-ammunition-shortage-kyiv-a8909760655d83d2ffc0d67ad2a491ec">more western equipment and munitions</a>. Certainly, more of both would improve the Ukrainian position. However, western equipment is not a universal panacea for Ukraine’s problems. Recent reports suggesting Russian forces have destroyed <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/03/06/abrams-avdiivka-russian-propaganda/">a number of U.S.-supplied Abrams tanks on the Avdiivka sector</a> of the front highlight, unsurprisingly, that western equipment is far from infallible.</p>
<p>NATO countries continue to <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9477/">commit additional military assistance to Ukraine</a>, although additional U.S. assistance is <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2024/03/06/house-lawmakers-mike-johnson-ukraine-aid-gaza/72871579007/">being held up in Congress</a>. The recent scandal in Germany regarding the possible supply of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/germany-russia-taurus-missiles-4ff5e559c887448fc3ecd9e2e6f58812">Taurus missiles to Ukraine</a> highlights that a further escalation of western commitments to Ukraine is not a given. </p>
<p>Whether western countries are willing to commit their own personnel to increasingly active roles in the war is unclear. French President Emmanuel Macron recently stated that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/06/ukraine-war-briefing-macron-says-dont-be-cowards-as-he-digs-in-over-ground-troop-s">sending French combat troops to Ukraine remains an option</a>. However, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/macron-ukraine-russia-putin-1.7127500">most other NATO leaders</a> seem resolute that sending combat troops to Ukraine should not happen.</p>
<p>Yet, Macron’s position is apparently <a href="https://apnews.com/article/poland-nato-russia-france-abd144aee256a72388c196dae8acaf7f">not without some support</a>. Such a step would undoubtedly increase the possibility not only of a direct NATO-Russia war, <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-russia-increasingly-likely-to-use-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine-182368">but also the use of nuclear weapons</a>.</p>
<h2>Manpower issues</h2>
<p><a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/russia-ukraine-peace/">Availability of personnel</a> is also a significant problem for Ukraine. Western-supplied equipment still has to be crewed. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently stated that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68397525">31,000 Ukrainian troops have been killed since February 2022</a>, however, this at best only tells part of the story. This figure is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66581217">less than half U.S. estimates of Ukrainian troops killed</a>, likely does not include those missing in action, and certainly not those taken prisoner by Russia, nor the tens of thousands of wounded. <a href="https://cepa.org/article/ukraine-struggles-to-find-troops-for-the-frontline/">Replacing such losses is proving increasingly difficult</a>. </p>
<p>Zelenskyy recently gave permission for conscripts who have been serving since February 2022 to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-issues-decree-discharging-conscripts-2024-03-07/#">move into the reserves for at least 12 months</a> without further callup. Such a step will help improve wider morale, but won’t help with the recruitment crisis.</p>
<p>A significant number of Ukrainians <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/newsinteractives/features/desperate-to-avoid-the-draft">seek to avoid the draft by fleeing to neighbouring countries</a>. This is reminiscent of how <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-why-people-are-returning-despite-the-war-in-ukraine/a-67022321">young Russians fled</a> to avoid being conscripted in late 2022, although <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-why-people-are-returning-despite-the-war-in-ukraine/a-67022321">many have now returned</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="TiktokEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.tiktok.com/@cbcnews/video/7330765611217210629?is_from_webapp=1\u0026sender_device=pc\u0026web_id=7246426044156249606"}"></div></p>
<p>The sinking of Russian ships in the Black Sea has to some extent replaced less positive news for Ukraine from the front line. The loss of warships such as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2024/mar/05/ukraine-releases-footage-appearing-to-show-sinking-of-russian-warship-near-occupied-crimea-video">large patrol ship Sergei Kotov</a> to Ukrainian naval drone are setbacks for Russia. However, the war for the Donbas is primarily being fought on land, and such Ukrainian victories are unlikely to have a meaningful impact on the ground war. </p>
<p>As the Russian army advances, albeit slowly, the available evidence suggests that resolve remains strong on both the <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/2024/01/26/conflict-with-ukraine-assessments-for-november-2023/">Russian</a> and <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/512258/ukrainians-stand-behind-war-effort-despite-fatigue.aspx">Ukrainian</a> sides. Outwardly, the majority of NATO leaders <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm#">retain their commitments to support Ukraine</a>. Both sides are clearly still only willing to <a href="https://www.stopwar.org.uk/article/diplomacy-is-the-art-of-compromise-thats-whats-needed-for-peace-in-ukraine/">consider negotiations on their own terms</a>. How much longer that will continue to be the case remains to be seen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225416/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Hill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia’s armed forces continue to gain territory in Ukraine, at high cost to both sides.Alexander Hill, Professor of Military History, University of CalgaryLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248962024-03-05T14:18:54Z2024-03-05T14:18:54ZBritish troops operating on the ground in Ukraine – what international law says<p><a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/03/03/germany-intelligence-leak-uk-troops-ground-ukraine-nato/">Leaked communications</a> involving high-level German government and military figures appear to confirm that British army personnel are engaged on the ground in Ukraine. An unencrypted telephone call intercepted and leaked to Russian broadcaster RT suggested British troops were helping the defending forces in the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/british-soldiers-in-ukraine-germany-b2504462.html">use of Storm Shadow cruise missiles</a> the UK has supplied to help Kyiv’s war effort. </p>
<p>In response, the UK prime minister, Rishi Sunak, confirmed that there are a “small number” of British army personnel “supporting the armed forces of Ukraine”. But he added that “we haven’t got any plans for large-scale deployment”. </p>
<p>There have also been <a href="https://www.declassifieduk.org/polish-minister-saw-uk-special-forces-operating-in-ukraine/">unconfirmed reports</a> that British special forces personnel were operating inside Ukraine shortly after the beginning of Russia’s invasion in the spring of 2022. Again, this has not been confirmed by the UK ministry of defence. </p>
<p>Russia has consistently maintained that any non-Ukrainian military personnel training troops to operate weapons systems in-country would be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-medvedev-says-british-training-troops-ukraine-could-be-legitimate-2023-10-01/">legitimate military targets</a> for Russia – as would the factories producing those weapons systems in third-party countries.</p>
<p>The episode raises some important questions as to whether training Ukrainian troops on the battlefield comprises an act of war – and whether this means Britain risks being designated a co-combatant alongside Ukraine. </p>
<p>Konstantin Kosachev, the deputy speaker of Russia’s federation council, was reported by Russia’s state-run news agency Tass <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1752055">as saying</a> that by supplying weapons to Ukraine, Nato countries were progressing along a path towards direct confrontation. Sending troops to Ukraine, he said, “can be interpreted as the alliance’s direct involvement in hostilities, or even as a declaration of war”. </p>
<h2>What international law says</h2>
<p>The day after Russia invaded Ukraine, as Kyiv’s allies scrambled to find a response, it was reported that the US government was reviewing the legality of providing arms to help with the country’s defence.</p>
<p>Within days, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, had declared that even imposing economic sanctions would be an “act of war”. His defence ministry released a statement that if third-party countries allowed Ukraine to use their bases as a safe haven for Ukrainian aircraft, then “subsequent use against the Russian armed forces can be regarded as the involvement of these states in an armed conflict”.</p>
<p>Since the second world war, the laws of neutrality <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/supplying-arms-ukraine-not-act-war">have been interpreted</a> so that states can provide weapons and other support to a state unjustly attacked by a belligerent country, to enable it to defend itself. According to this definition, third-party countries would become co-combatants only if they resort to armed force against Russia.</p>
<p>Russia’s incursion into Ukraine has been ruled as a flagrant breach of Article 2(4) of the <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/purposes-and-principles-un-chapter-i-un-charter#">UN Charter</a>, which prohibits the “use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”. Russia’s war in Ukraine has been denounced as an act of aggression by the <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/un-general-assembly-demands-russian-federation-withdraw-all-military-forces-territory-ukraine_und_en#">UN general assembly</a> and the <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/91781/taking-stock-of-icj-decisions-in-ukraine-v-russia-cases-and-implications-for-south-africas-case-against-israel/#">International Court of Justice</a>. </p>
<p>Moreover, it is claimed that Russia has been implicated in <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/80709/why-china-giving-military-assistance-to-russia-would-violate-international-law/">breaches of international humanitarian law</a> through its apparent indiscriminate bombing and other violent attacks, and <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/80709/why-china-giving-military-assistance-to-russia-would-violate-international-law/">crimes against civilians</a>. This would mean that anyone supplying Russia – the belligerent in this conflict – with arms <em>is</em> in breach of international law.</p>
<p>But the question remains, if it is legal to supply Ukraine with weapons to help defend itself, would actually helping the Ukrainian military use them to hit Russian targets make the UK a co-combatant?</p>
<p>While the law is not settled, legal scholars believe supplying Ukraine with the means to defend itself against Russia does not in itself constitute a breach of international law – and nor does it make the UK a co-combatant. Any action by UK forces would only constitute a combat operation if these actions, carried out by UK personnel without any further action by Ukrainians, would launch a missile or any other kind of attack on Russian forces. </p>
<h2>Risk of escalation</h2>
<p>But there remains the question of escalation. Whatever the legal situation – and Russia has shown itself willing to ignore the rules of warfare by violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity since the incursions of 2014 and in the full-scale invasion in February 2022 – Putin and his senior ministers have regularly warned Kyiv’s western allies that their aid may constitute an escalation to which it would respond with all available means, including nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>Accordingly, to prevent a direct confrontation with Russia, Nato countries have been wary about the kinds of weapon they will supply to Ukraine. The guiding principle has been that western-supplied weapons should not be used in <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-general-jones-interview-long-range-weapons/32700251.html">attacks against Russian territory</a>. </p>
<p>But this may change. Germany has, up to now, been very reluctant to supply Ukraine with its <a href="https://apnews.com/article/germany-russia-taurus-missiles-4ff5e559c887448fc3ecd9e2e6f58812">Taurus missiles</a>, which have a range of 500km and could be used against targets deep in Russian territory. However, recent reports suggest the German government is considering supplying these missiles to Ukraine. </p>
<p>The German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, was quick, though, to insist that “German soldiers must at no point and in no place be linked to targets this system reaches”, making it absolutely clear that Germany would not risk its involvement being interpreted as a direct act of escalation.</p>
<p>And despite the Kremlin’s repeated threats, it is not eager to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/dec/17/russia-ukraine-war-live-vladimir-putin-volodymyr-zelenskiy-latest-updates-live?filterKeyEvents=false&page=with:block-657eb9f88f08a684d3bd8a12">engage Nato militarily</a>. So, despite all the strong words being exchanged by both sides, there has been no sign that Nato and Russia will face each other on the battlefield in Ukraine – for the moment, at least.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224896/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth received funding from the Volkswagen Foundation and the British Council.</span></em></p>Helping Ukraine defend itself against Russian aggression is not a violation of international law – but Russia might interpret it as escalation.Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2205812024-02-26T13:39:02Z2024-02-26T13:39:02ZAs war in Ukraine enters third year, 3 issues could decide its outcome: Supplies, information and politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577714/original/file-20240224-28-7jc86z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=49%2C37%2C8281%2C5508&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Will war fatigue be a factor?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/february-2024-ukraine-odessa-a-gepard-anti-aircraft-gun-news-photo/2022536165?adppopup=true">Kay Nietfeld/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In retrospect, there was perhaps nothing surprising about Russia’s decision to <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230214-february-24-2022-the-day-russia-invaded-ukraine">invade Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022</a>.</p>
<p>Vladimir Putin’s intentions were, after all, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/russia-ukraine-invasion/2021/12/03/98a3760e-546b-11ec-8769-2f4ecdf7a2ad_story.html">hiding in plain sight</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-western-military-backing-ukraine-threatens-russia-2021-10-21/">signaled in the months running up</a> to the incursion.</p>
<p>What could not be foreseen, however, is where the conflict finds itself now. Heading into its third year, the war has become bogged down: Neither is it a stalemate, nor does it look like either side could make dramatic advances any time soon.</p>
<p>Russia appears to be on the ascendancy, having secured the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68322527">latest major battlefield victory</a>, but Ukrainian fighters have exceeded military expectations with their doggedness in the past, and may do so again.</p>
<p>But as a <a href="https://facultyprofiles.tufts.edu/tara-sonenshine">foreign policy expert</a> and former journalist who spent many years covering Russia, I share the view of those who argue that the conflict is potentially at a pivotal point: If Washington does not continue to fully support President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his military, then Ukraine’s very survival could be at risk. I believe it would also jeopardize America’s leadership in the world and global security. </p>
<p>How the conflict develops during the rest of 2024 will depend on many factors, but three may be key: supplies, information and political will.</p>
<h2>The supplies race</h2>
<p>Russia and Ukraine are locked in a race to resupply its war resources – not just in terms of soldiers, but also ammunition and missiles. Both sides are desperately trying to shore up the number of soldiers it can deploy. </p>
<p>In December 2023, Putin <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-army-expansion-a2bf0b035aabab20c8b120a1c86c9e38">ordered his generals to increase troop numbers</a> by nearly 170,000, taking the total number of soldiers to 1.32 million. Meanwhile, Ukraine is said to be looking at plans to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-war-draft-b2ca1d0ecd72019be2217a653989fbc2">increase its military by 500,000 troops</a>.</p>
<p>Of course, here, Russia has the advantage of being able to draw on a population more than three times that of Ukraine. Also, whereas Putin can simply order up more troops, Zelenskyy must get measures approved through parliament.</p>
<p>Aside from personnel, there is also the need for a steady supply of weapons and ammunition – and there have been reports that both sides are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68364924">struggling to maintain</a> <a href="https://www.wbaltv.com/article/after-2-years-of-war-questions-abound-on-whether-kyiv-can-sustain-the-fight-against-russia/46940958">sufficient levels</a>.</p>
<p>Russia appears particularly eager to boost its number of ballistic missiles, as they are <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-sourcing-ballistic-missiles-to-bypass-ukraine-air-defense-isw-2024-1">better equipped for countering Ukraine air defense systems</a> despite being slower than cruise missiles.</p>
<p>Increasingly, Moscow appears to be looking to North Korea and Iran as suppliers. After Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, visited Russia in 2023, the U.S. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67888793">accused Pyongyang of supplying Russia</a> with ballistic missiles. Iran, meanwhile, has <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/arsenal-of-autocracy-north-korea-and-iran-are-arming-russia-in-ukraine/">delivered to Russia</a> a large number of powerful surface-to-surface ballistic missiles and drones.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Men in suits talk." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on Sept. 13, 2023, in Tsiolkovsky, Russia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-and-north-korean-leader-news-photo/1661841029?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Ukraine, meanwhile, is <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220610-ukraine-dependent-on-arms-from-allies-after-exhausting-soviet-era-weaponry">dependent on foreign military equipment</a>. </p>
<p>Supplies were stronger at the beginning of the war, but since then, Ukraine’s military has suffered from the slow, bureaucratic nature of NATO and U.S. deliveries. It wasn’t, for example, until the summer of 2023 that the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/europe-and-eurasia/ukraine">U.S. approved Europe’s request</a> to provide F-16s to Ukraine. </p>
<p>Ukraine needs more of everything, including air defense munitions, artillery shells, tanks and missile systems. It is also <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-ukraine-war-medical-care-frontlines/#:%7E:text=In%20an%20open%20letter%20recently,stabilization%20posts%20with%20supplies%20and">running short of medical supplies</a> and has seen hospital shortages of drugs at a time when <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/4371240-the-invisible-enemy-in-ukraine-superbugs/">rampant infections are proving resistant</a> to antibiotics.</p>
<p>Perhaps the biggest factor that remains in Russia’s favor when it comes to supplies is the onerous restrictions placed on Ukraine from the West, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-shouldnt-use-us-arms-inside-russia-us-general-says-2023-05-25/">limiting its ability</a> to attack Russian territory with U.S. or NATO equipment to avoid a wider war. For example, the Ukrainian military had a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System with a 50-mile range that could hit targets inside Russia, but it modified the range to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-altered-himars-rocket-launchers-to-keep-ukraine-from-firing-missiles-into-russia-11670214338">keep the U.S. military satisfied</a> that it would not cross a Russian red line.</p>
<p>If this policy could be relaxed, that might be a game changer for Ukraine, although it would raise the stakes for the U.S.</p>
<h2>The information war</h2>
<p>The Ukraine conflict is also a war of messaging.</p>
<p>To this end, Putin uses <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/putins-wartime-russia-propaganda-payouts-and-jail-151bb117">propaganda to bolster support</a> for the campaign at home, while undermining support for Ukraine elsewhere – for example, by planting stories in Europe that cause disenchantment with the war. One outrageous claim in the early weeks of the war was that <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/19/politics/pro-russia-disinformation-report/index.html">Zelenskyy had taken his own life</a>. The rumor came from pro-Russia online operatives as part of an aggressive effort to harm Ukrainian morale, according to <a href="https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/information-operations-surrounding-ukraine">cybersecurity firm Mandiant</a>.</p>
<p>More recently, in France, stories appeared that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/30/france-russia-interference-far-right/">questioned the value of assistance to Ukraine</a> and reminded the public of the negative impact of Russian sanctions on the French. Stirring dissent in this way is a classic Putin play to raise doubts.</p>
<p>And investigative reporting points toward <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/16/russian-disinformation-zelensky-zaluzhny/">a disinformation network</a> being run out of the Kremlin, which includes social media bots deployed on Ukrainian sites spreading stories of Zelenskyy’s team being corrupt and warning that the war would go badly.</p>
<p>Given that Putin controls the Russian media and is quick to crack down on dissent, it is hard to really know what Russians think. But one reputable polling agency recently reported <a href="https://www.norc.org/research/projects/russian-public-opinion-wartime.html">strong support in Russia</a> for both Putin and the war in Ukraine. </p>
<p>Ukrainians, too, still <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/512258/ukrainians-stand-behind-war-effort-despite-fatigue.aspx">support the fight against Russia</a>, polling shows. But some war fatigue has no doubt lowered morale.</p>
<p>There are other signs of domestic strain in Ukraine. At the end of 2023, tensions grew between Zelenskyy and his top military commander, General Valery Zaluzhny who had complained about weaponry. Zelenskyy <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/08/world/europe/zelensky-general-valery-zaluzhny-ukraine-military.html">ended up firing the military chief</a>, risking political backlash and underscoring that not all is well in the top chain of command.</p>
<p>Should disunity and war fatigue continue into the war’s third year, it could serious impair Ukraine’s ability to fight back against a resurgent Russian offensive. </p>
<h2>The politics of conflict</h2>
<p>But it isn’t just domestic politics in Ukraine and Russia that will decide the outcome of the war. </p>
<p>U.S. politics and European unity could be a factor in 2024 in determining the future of this conflict.</p>
<p>In the U.S., Ukraine aid has become politicized – with aid to Ukraine <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/12/08/about-half-of-republicans-now-say-the-us-is-providing-too-much-aid-to-ukraine/">becoming an increasingly partisan issue</a>.</p>
<p>In early February, the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/12/politics/senate-foreign-aid-bill-ukraine/index.html">Senate finally passed an emergency aid bill</a> for Ukraine and Israel that would see US$60.1 billion go to Kyiv. But the bill’s fate in the House is unknown.</p>
<p>And the looming 2024 presidential elections could complicate matters further. Former president Donald Trump has made no secret of his aversion to aid packages over loans, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/14/us/politics/trump-ukraine-biden.html">calling them “stupid</a>,” and has long argued that Americans shouldn’t be footing the bill for the conflict. Recently, he has made bombastic statements about NATO and <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2024/02/13/how-donald-trumps-re-election-would-threaten-natos-article-5">threatened not to adhere</a> to the alliance’s commitment to protect members if they were attacked by Russia.</p>
<p>And uncertainty about American assistance could leave Europe carrying more of the financial load.</p>
<p>European Union members have had to absorb the majority of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert/max-boot?utm_source=twtw&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=TWTW2024Feb23&utm_term=TWTW%20and%20All%20Staff%20as%20of%207-9-20">6.3 million Ukrainians who have fled the country</a> since the beginning of the conflict. And that puts a strain on resources. European oil needs also suffer from the sanctions against Russian companies.</p>
<p>Whether these potential war determinants – supplies, information and politics – mean that the Ukraine war will not be entering a fourth year in 12 months time, however, is far from certain. In fact, one thing that does appear clear is that the war that some predicted would be over in weeks looks set to continue for some time still.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220581/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tara Sonenshine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia appears to have seized the battleground initiative as the Ukraine war marks its second anniversary – but the conflict is far from over.Tara Sonenshine, Edward R. Murrow Professor of Practice in Public Diplomacy, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2230962024-02-21T01:01:09Z2024-02-21T01:01:09ZWhy 2024 could be a grim year for Ukraine – with momentous implications for the world<p>Two years after Russia’s full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, Ukraine’s resistance remains remarkable. Confident initial predictions of a swift Russian triumph were repeatedly proven wrong. Instead, Russia’s military was beset by <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2523-1.html">poor logistics</a>, corruption, a <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/">sclerotic command structure</a> and an inability to <a href="https://mickryan.substack.com/p/war-ukraine-and-adaptation">counter</a> Ukrainian tactics. </p>
<p>Kyiv’s armed forces successfully prevented a rash <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/08/the-battle-of-hostomel-airport-a-key-moment-in-russias-defeat-in-kyiv/">Russian attempt</a> to seize the Ukrainian capital and then stopped the entire Russian advance. After six months, they began turning the Russian invaders back, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/29/ukraine-offensive-kharkiv-kherson-donetsk/">recapturing</a> swathes of territory around Kharkov in the north and Kherson in the south. </p>
<p>Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was feted by Western leaders, parlaying his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/09/zelensky-rhetoric-appeals-west-nato/">personal popularity</a> into commitments of military aid and insisting Ukraine could prevail with a more sophisticated arsenal.</p>
<p>Yet for all these early successes, the war soon devolved into repeated <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/human-wave-tactics-are-demoralizing-the-russian-army-in-ukraine/">human waves</a> of attacks by Russian conscripts against well-defended Ukrainian positions. The slow drip-feed of Western weapons forced Kyiv to significantly delay its 2023 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-ukraines-counteroffensive-has-struggled-so-far-2023-11-03/">counteroffensive</a>. This gave Russia’s armed forces time to design deep and elaborate defensive fortifications, minefields and tank traps. </p>
<p>Indeed, thanks largely to Russian efforts, Ukraine is now the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/22/ukraine-is-now-most-mined-country-it-will-take-decades-make-safe/">most heavily mined</a> country in the world.</p>
<p>Once Ukraine’s counteroffensive commenced, its forces made <a href="https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/MAPS/klvygwawavg/2023-12-21/four-factors-that-stalled-ukraines-counteroffensive/">little headway</a> and took heavy losses, especially given the lack of air support. </p>
<p>Facing personnel and equipment shortages, Zelensky dramatically <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/02/zelensky-ukraine-russia-war-leadership-zaluzhny/677334/">fired his military chief</a>, Valerii Zaluzhny, earlier this month, opting for a new strategy that seeks to build Ukrainian strength while blocking further Russian advances.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1757419394269941855"}"></div></p>
<h2>Russia: weakened, but determined</h2>
<p>After being humiliated by failing to immediately achieve the objectives of its “special military operation” in early 2022, the Kremlin attempted to cow an obstinately united West through bluff and bluster, while bludgeoning Ukrainian cities and military positions. </p>
<p>It repeatedly <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russia-nuclear-threats-and-nuclear-signaling/">rattled nuclear sabres</a>, mobilised isolationist and far-right groups throughout <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/russias-far-right-campaign-europe">Europe</a> and warned of a looming <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/25/putin-ally-we-are-probably-on-the-verge-of-a-new-world-war">world war</a>. President Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric bordered on unhinged, punctuated by rants about the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSS8N2Z80G1/">moral decrepitude</a> of “Satanic” Western culture that only Russian traditional values could resist. </p>
<p>Tellingly, in a rare moment of honesty, Putin also admitted the obvious: invading Ukraine was about <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/10/putin-compares-himself-to-peter-the-great-in-quest-to-take-back-russian-lands">restoring</a> what he saw as Russia’s “historic lands”. </p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/second-mobilization-russia-men-vladimir-putin-ukraine-war/">mobilising</a> hundreds of thousands of men for sacrifice in the Ukrainian meat-grinder, the Kremlin sought to project an image of a society <a href="https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/pulpit-propaganda-machine-tracing-russian-orthodox-churchs-role-putins-war">overseen</a> by a stable, albeit xenophobic troika. Putin was the wise tsar, the Orthodox Church was the steward of Russia’s conservative soul and the military served as Russia’s armoured bulwark. </p>
<p>With no good news to report, Kremlin propagandists created a bizarre narrative in which Russia was defending itself against NATO aggression, liberally labelling Russia’s opponents as “<a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2022/11/27/commentary/world-commentary/russia-nazi-propaganda/">Nazis</a>”. </p>
<p>But this failed to mask the reality that Russia itself was increasingly becoming Nazified, as its hyper-nationalist <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-letter-z-fascist-symbol/31758267.html">“Z” movement</a> made clear. So, too, did repeated genocidal and antisemitic language: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-61296682">crude observation</a> that both Adolf Hitler and Zelensky had Jewish blood</p></li>
<li><p>comparisons between Ukrainians and <a href="https://snyder.substack.com/p/playing-the-victim">vermin</a> </p></li>
<li><p>and overt calls by Kremlin-sponsored propagandists for a “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/09/russia-putin-propaganda-ukraine-war-crimes-atrocities/">solution of the Ukrainian question</a>”.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Simultaneously, Russia’s draconian crackdown on internal dissent resulted in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-court-jails-kremlin-critic-kara-murza-25-years-treason-2023-04-17/">lengthy jail terms</a> for anyone found guilty of criticising the war or army.</p>
<p>Russia’s failures also brought the audacious revolt in June 2023 by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner mercenary group, and one of Putin’s closest confidantes. And despite Prigozhin’s subsequently convenient death, the fact he had managed to march largely unchallenged through Russia until voluntarily stopping 200 kilometres from Moscow made Putin look <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/prigozhin-dead-putin-still-weakened">considerably weakened</a>.</p>
<p>However, with the start of 2024, Russia’s forces have started pressing again on the battlefield, making small territorial gains.</p>
<p>A recent report puts the <a href="https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russian-military-objectives-and-capacity-ukraine-through-2024">current number</a> of Russian military personnel in Ukraine at 470,000. And although it is believed to have lost a staggering <a href="https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/02/equipment-losses-in-russias-war-on-ukraine-mount/">8,800 armoured fighting vehicles</a> and some 315,000 dead and wounded – fully <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-intelligence-assesses-ukraine-war-has-cost-russia-315000-casualties-source-2023-12-12/">90% of the forces</a> it began the war with – the Russian armed forces have finally begun to adapt. </p>
<h2>What will the coming year bring?</h2>
<p>How the war unfolds in 2024 will have momentous implications for the world – a fact not receiving near enough attention in Western media coverage.</p>
<p>It will determine whether Ukraine is able to retain its territory and begin the painful rebuilding process. </p>
<p>It will be decisive for Putin’s wager that conquest comes without consequences, perhaps emboldening him to sets his sights on other states on its periphery. </p>
<p>It will confirm whether Europe can remain stabilised, secure and united, and whether America will continue to be seen as a reliable ally.</p>
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<p>For the Kremlin, the key question is whether it can keep domestic discontent muted long enough for the West to lose interest in the war and withdraw its support for Ukraine. It is unlikely to run out of weapons, having massively ramped up domestic production of armaments and sourcing drones and ammunition from a <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/arsenal-of-autocracy-north-korea-and-iran-are-arming-russia-in-ukraine/">rogues’ gallery</a> of pariahs: Iran and North Korea. </p>
<p>Ukraine, which is fighting for national survival, faces a tougher and grimmer 2024. It will need to continue absorbing relentless Russian attacks, keep its economy afloat and rebuild its military strength for yet another attempt to evict Russia’s forces.</p>
<p>Zelensky’s <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/26/europe/ukraine-zelensky-evacuation-intl/index.html">famous</a> “I need ammunition, not a ride” response to a US offer to evacuate him in 2022 holds just as true two years later. Without a constant stream of military aid, Ukrainian resistance will be very hard to sustain.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-west-is-at-a-crossroads-double-down-on-aid-to-kyiv-accept-a-compromise-deal-or-face-humiliation-by-russia-223747">Ukraine war: the west is at a crossroads – double down on aid to Kyiv, accept a compromise deal, or face humiliation by Russia</a>
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<p>Aid from Ukraine’s most crucial supporter, the United States, has been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68284380">stymied</a> by the extreme right wing of the Republican Party. This is causing <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6594e548-8b2e-4c95-a589-7d9e358062d2">ammunition shortages</a> that are already being measured in Ukrainian lives and territory. </p>
<p>But a far greater threat lies on the horizon, in the real prospect of a second Donald Trump presidency. Putin is well aware Trump will give him a free hand in Ukraine and <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/12/europe/trump-nato-putin-europe-analysis-intl/index.html">probably beyond it</a>, too. </p>
<p>Accordingly, he is investing significant efforts to back his candidacy. The extraordinary spectacle of Putin – the leader of a hostile foreign power – using an “<a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-history-lecture-reveals-his-dreams-of-a-new-russian-empire/">interview</a>” with ex-Fox News personality Tucker Carlson to rally the Trump base was a keen indicator of that.</p>
<p>Europe is finally beginning to wake up to the reality a Trump-led US could abandon NATO, in addition to Ukraine. But whether European nations are able to overcome their institutional inertia and webs of entangled interests to stoutly resist Russia on their own remains an open question.</p>
<p>It’s an old adage, but wars are world-shaping. Their outcomes are far-reaching: redrawing maps, establishing new fault lines, and ushering in the birth and death of nations. </p>
<p>Russia’s war against Ukraine is proving to be no different.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/unmarked-graves-violent-repression-and-cultural-erasure-the-devastating-human-toll-of-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-223337">Unmarked graves, violent repression and cultural erasure: the devastating human toll of Russia's invasion of Ukraine</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223096/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Sussex has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Fulbright Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, the Lowy Institute and various Australian government departments and agencies.</span></em></p>Ukraine has fought off relentless waves of Russian attacks over the past two years, but if its Western support dries up, its resistance will be very hard to sustain.Matthew Sussex, Associate Professor (Adj), Griffith Asia Institute; and Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2237472024-02-20T15:56:55Z2024-02-20T15:56:55ZUkraine war: the west is at a crossroads – double down on aid to Kyiv, accept a compromise deal, or face humiliation by Russia<p>In the summer and autumn of 2022, there was much <a href="https://theweek.com/russo-ukrainian-war/1014090/the-debate-over-putins-off-ramps-explained">discussion</a> about finding an “off-ramp” to allow Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, a face-saving way out of an unwinnable war. Now, as Ukraine heads into the third year of defending itself against Russia’s aggression, the suggestion persists – but increasingly, it’s the west that needs the off-ramp.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s prospects, after two years of a gruelling war that have taken an enormous human toll, are uncertain. Its population losses, both in terms of battlefield casualties and the flood of emigration that followed the invasion, will be difficult to remedy, and could have crippling <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/ukrainian-businesses-fear-new-mobilisation-law-could-paralyse-economy-2024-02-19/">consequences</a> for Ukraine’s already struggling economy. </p>
<p>Not only that but the cost of the war is increasing at a staggering rate. The latest joint <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/02/15/updated-ukraine-recovery-and-reconstruction-needs-assessment-released">assessment</a> by the EU, World Bank and UN of Ukraine’s recovery needs puts these at US$486 billion (£385.6 billion), up $75 billion since last year. This means Ukraine’s needs have grown in 12 months by one and a half times the total amount the EU has made <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ac_24_621">available</a> in support for Ukraine over the next four years. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://securityconference.org/assets/01_Bilder_Inhalte/03_Medien/02_Publikationen/2023/Munich_Security_Index_2023.pdf">annual index of risks for 2023</a> produced by the <a href="https://securityconference.org/en/">Munich Security Conference</a>, a global forum for debating international security policy, Russia was perceived as the top risk by five of the G7 countries. In <a href="https://securityconference.org/assets/01_Bilder_Inhalte/03_Medien/02_Publikationen/2024/MSR_2024/MunichSecurityIndex2024.pdf">2024</a>, this perception is only shared by two G7 members. </p>
<p>Given the absolutely critical dependence of Ukraine on G7 political, economic and military support, this is worrying. It does not bode well for the ability of Europe’s political leaders to sustain the necessary public backing for continued aid transfers. Voters in France and Germany, for example, are significantly more <a href="https://securityconference.org/assets/01_Bilder_Inhalte/03_Medien/02_Publikationen/2024/MSR_2024/MunichSecurityIndex2024.pdf">concerned</a> about mass migration and radical Islamic terrorism than Putin’s designs for Ukraine. </p>
<p>Moreover, Ukraine is not the only crisis demanding the attention of the collective west. The war in Gaza and wider conflagration across the Middle East is, and will remain, high on the agenda. But there are numerous other flashpoints that often fail to grab global news headlines. </p>
<p>The ongoing civil war in <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-armed-forces-are-on-a-path-to-self-destruction-risking-state-collapse-223487">Sudan</a>, the intensifying conflict in the eastern <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-to-lead-new-military-force-in-the-drc-an-expert-on-what-its-up-against-219264">Democratic Republic of Congo</a>, and rising <a href="https://theconversation.com/somaliland-ethiopia-port-deal-international-opposition-flags-complex-red-sea-politics-221131">tensions</a> between Ethiopia and Somalia all have the potential to feed directly into the fear of western publics about yet another mass migration crisis.</p>
<p>Nuclear sabre rattling by <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-ramps-up-military-rhetoric-as-kim-gives-up-on-reunification-with-south-213696">North Korea</a>, Iranian <a href="https://www.navigatingthevortex.com/p/bidens-iran-dilemma-punish-and-deter">sponsorship</a> of terrorist proxies across the Middle East, and the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/arsenal-of-autocracy-north-korea-and-iran-are-arming-russia-in-ukraine/">apparent consolidation</a> of a new “axis of evil” between these two and Russia are unlikely to calm nerves in western capitals.</p>
<h2>Costly distraction</h2>
<p>Against this background, the war in Ukraine has become a major and increasingly costly distraction. Many leaders – in Europe in particular – are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/12/european-leaders-call-for-stronger-defence-ties-donald-trump-nato-remarks-russia">worried</a>, perhaps disproportionately, about a return of Donald Trump to the White House and the possible end of a meaningful transatlantic alliance. If the US withdraws support, there is a fear that a continuation of the war in Ukraine could expose Europe even more to Russian aggression than is already the case.</p>
<p>The key problem is that mere rhetorical commitments to supporting Ukraine are not just meaningless but counterproductive. They uphold the mirage of a winnable war without providing the required capabilities. As the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68325022">told the Munich Security Conference</a> on February 17, the military equipment shortages that Ukraine has experienced over the last several months were a key factor in the recent loss of the town of <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/world/russia-takes-full-control-of-avdiivka-coke-plant-defence-ministry-says/ar-BB1iv085">Avdiivka</a> to Russian forces. </p>
<p>The frontline may not have shifted more than a few hundred metres as a result of this loss, but the psychological impact is significant – including in the west, where <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/19/europe/ukraine-russia-war-avdiivka-defeat-intl/index.html">doubts</a> over the will and ability to sustain Ukraine’s efforts are on the rise again. If the conflict continues on its current trajectory – and even more so if the narrative of an unwinnable war gains more traction – western support is unlikely even to prevent Ukraine from losing badly, possibly leading to the kind of total defeat Putin <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-history-lecture-reveals-his-dreams-of-a-new-russian-empire/">imagined</a> in his recent interview with Tucker Carlson.</p>
<p>A Ukrainian defeat would be a dangerous humiliation for the west. In light of the continuing rhetoric about the west’s <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/europe/583980-blinken-us-commitment-to-ukraines-territorial-integrity-is/">“iron-clad commitment”</a> to a just peace for Ukraine, a Russian victory would accelerate the decline of the current international order. It would usher in a drawn-out transition period to something far less favourable – and not just to western interests. </p>
<p>A return to the bloc confrontation of the cold war – but with a probably stronger Chinese-led alliance with Russia, Iran and North Korea facing off against a weakening and less united western alliance – would leave little room to address problems such as climate change and food security. This should also be a warning to those in the global south who think they have little, if anything, at stake in Ukraine. </p>
<h2>Compromise solution</h2>
<p>Searching for an off-ramp does not mean letting Putin win. It means enabling Ukraine to defend the areas currently still under its control. This will require more western aid, but also serious consideration of negotiating a ceasefire. An end to the fighting would buy western Europe and Ukraine time to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3c87ef13-122f-4e78-a7af-54c75c30a91d">build up</a> stronger domestic defence capabilities. </p>
<p>Ukraine has concluded bilateral security deals with the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-britain-sign-security-agreement-kyiv-2024-01-12/">UK</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-says-security-deal-with-france-is-ambitious-substantive-2024-02-16/">France</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-and-ukraine-sign-security-agreement-scholz-zelenskyy/">Germany</a> – and deals with other G7 members are likely to follow. These deals would provide more of a guarantee for Ukrainian democracy and sovereignty than the currently futile attempt to restore the country’s territorial integrity in full – or its hopes for imminent Nato membership that are <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-ambassador-nato-expectations-summit-david-quarrey/">unlikely</a> to be fulfilled. </p>
<p>Reassessing current realities on the battlefield in this way will undoubtedly be seen as appeasement by some. But a more fitting analogy might be that of <a href="https://europe.unc.edu/the-end-of-wwii-and-the-division-of-europe/">West Germany in 1949</a> and, even more so, of <a href="https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/armistice-agreement-restoration-south-korean-state">South Korea in 1953</a>, both of which needed to establish internationally recognised borders in order to establish sovereignty in the face of hostile neighbouring powers. The challenge for Ukraine and its western partners is to establish the equivalent of the Korean peninsula’s 38th parallel. </p>
<p>The alternative, short of the west seriously doubling down on military support for Kyiv, is a slow and agonising defeat on the battlefield, with far-reaching consequences beyond Ukraine.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223747/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.</span></em></p>Ukraine is just one of a daunting number of security issues facing Nato and the west.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2236822024-02-15T18:10:44Z2024-02-15T18:10:44ZUkraine recap: prospect of renewed US funding a boost for beleaguered Zelensky<p>It’s appropriate, a fortnight out from the second anniversary of the full-scale Russian invasion, to look back and see what the mood was this time last year as we marked the end of the first year of all-out war in Ukraine. We had just published a piece by two security analysts from the Paris-based research university Sciences Po, who had outlined <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-year-on-russias-war-against-ukraine-could-go-in-three-different-directions-199556">three possible scenarios</a> for the 12 months ahead. </p>
<p>The first two options were major military setbacks for Russia or Ukraine, with major losses of troops and territory. The third was almost uncannily prescient, envisaging – as it did:</p>
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<p>a drawn-out conflict leading to exhaustion and war weariness – not only in Russia and Ukraine, but also among those Kyiv is depending on for the military supplies that are keeping the country afloat.</p>
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<p>Which, broadly speaking, fairly neatly sums up the current state of the war in February 2024. Ukraine’s much-anticipated spring 2023 counteroffensive got under way later than had been hoped and when it did, Ukrainian troops found themselves facing extensive and well thought-out Russian defensive lines. Months of bitter, attritional fighting resulted in few Ukrainian gains at a significant cost in terms of both manpower and precious materiel. </p>
<p>Worse, Ukraine’s forces found themselves being pushed back in various areas along the frontline and, in others, caught up in desperate and bloody defensive efforts around towns and cities long since reduced to rubble. The town of Avdiivka, in the eastern Donetsk Oblast with a pre-war population of more than 32,000 people, now looks set to join placenames such as Bakhmut and Soledar as costly and morale-sapping defeats.</p>
<p>In an attempt to change the momentum, which in recent months has been with Russia, Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky last week replaced his commander-in-chief Valeriy Zaluzhnyi with Gen Oleksandr Syrskyi – who masterminded the defence of Kyiv in May 2022 and the successful counter-offensive in late summer which saw Ukraine recapture significant territory.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575994/original/file-20240215-24-epce1z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="ISW map showing the battle lines around Avdiivka and Donetsk in eastern Ukraine, February 2024." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575994/original/file-20240215-24-epce1z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575994/original/file-20240215-24-epce1z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575994/original/file-20240215-24-epce1z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575994/original/file-20240215-24-epce1z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575994/original/file-20240215-24-epce1z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1151&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575994/original/file-20240215-24-epce1z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1151&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575994/original/file-20240215-24-epce1z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1151&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The battle for Avdiivka and Donetsk, February 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>But, as Stefan Wolff and Tetyana Malyarenko <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-kyiv-needs-a-fundamental-rethink-of-its-strategy-not-just-a-reshuffle-of-military-leadership-223236">point out</a>, Syrskyi is also associated with the defence of Bakhmut, a battle that consumed so many lives on either side. Wolff, an expert in international security from the University of Birmingham, and Malyarenko of the University of Odesa, are concerned that there are as yet few signs of any fresh strategic thinking from Ukraine’s military planners which might begin to turn things around. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-kyiv-needs-a-fundamental-rethink-of-its-strategy-not-just-a-reshuffle-of-military-leadership-223236">Ukraine war: Kyiv needs a fundamental rethink of its strategy, not just a reshuffle of military leadership</a>
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<p>They also point to the fact that Ukraine’s remarkable battlefield successes in 2022 came when western support for Ukraine was in full swing. But fresh supplies of weapons and ammunition from the EU and the US began to dry up in 2023, seriously hamstringing the Ukraine army’s ability to gain the initiative on the battlefield.</p>
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<img alt="Ukraine Recap weekly email newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>In both cases there was an identifiable rogue element: in the case of the EU it was Hungarian president, Viktor Orbán, who vetoed EU military aid to Ukraine for some months, only relenting in Janaury under intense pressure from other EU heads of government. In the US, it was Donald Trump. Trump, who famously said he could bring an end to the war “in a day”, has strongly opposed giving more aid to Ukraine and for months has bullied his wing of the Republican party into obstructing Joe Biden’s US$95 billion (£75 billion) aid package in the US Senate.</p>
<p>After months of bitter debate the bill finally passed the senate this week. But, as Dafydd Townley, an expert in US politics from the University of Portsmouth, <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-senate-passes-us-95-billion-aid-package-for-ukraine-what-this-tells-us-about-republican-support-for-trump-223502">writes here</a>, there is no guarantee that the bill will even be brought before the House of Representatives, let alone receive the House’s approval, given the GOP’s majority there.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-senate-passes-us-95-billion-aid-package-for-ukraine-what-this-tells-us-about-republican-support-for-trump-223502">US Senate passes US$95 billion aid package for Ukraine – what this tells us about Republican support for Trump</a>
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<p>Incidentally, it’s worth looking at what surveys of the American public say about whether their government should support Ukraine and, if so, in what way. Paul Whiteley, a professor in the department of government at the University of Essex, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-the-us-public-thinks-about-giving-military-and-other-aid-223064">found that</a> support for Ukraine tended to divide down party lines, with Democrats tending to think the US should continue – or do more – to support Ukraine, while by contrast many Republicans thought the US had already spent too much on aid. </p>
<p>A fair few independent voters felt the same way, which probably helps explain Republican obduracy over supplying more arms and ammunition, despite the fact – as has been regularly pointed out – that much of the $60 billion-plus provided for by Biden’s latest bill will never leave the US and will go straight to buy American arms. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-the-us-public-thinks-about-giving-military-and-other-aid-223064">Ukraine war: what the US public thinks about giving military and other aid</a>
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<h2>Friends and enemies</h2>
<p>You may well remember when Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin met in Helsinki in 2018 in the wake of allegations that Russia had interfered in the 2016 election that had sent Trump to the White House. The then US president raised eyebrows (and a few hackles in the US intelligence community) when he said he believed Putin’s assertion that Russia had done nothing to mess with US democracy, seemingly content to take the Russian leader’s word over his own intelligence agencies.</p>
<p>One of Trump’s greatest allies in the media, former Fox News host Tucker Carlson, sat down with Putin for a two-hour interview last week. Inderjeet Parmar, an expert in US politics at City, University of London, watched the interview and <a href="https://theconversation.com/tucker-carlsons-putin-interview-gave-russian-leader-a-platform-to-boost-his-own-cause-and-that-of-donald-trump-223108">gives us his verdict</a>. </p>
<p>Given Carlson’s core audience, it was a chance for the Russian president to speak directly to the Make America Great Again (Maga) constituency and he took the opportunity – with a fair bit of help from Carlson – to repeat Kremlin talking points (namely: if America stops sending weapons to Ukraine the war will be over in no time), while picking holes in the Biden administration’s performance.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/tucker-carlsons-putin-interview-gave-russian-leader-a-platform-to-boost-his-own-cause-and-that-of-donald-trump-223108">Tucker Carlson's Putin interview gave Russian leader a platform to boost his own cause – and that of Donald Trump</a>
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<p>Putin began the interview with a half-hour primer on Russian history designed to back his oft-repeated assertion that Ukraine has always been part of Russia and that the two countries have a shared history going back to the 8th century. He followed this a few days later by placing sanctions on a group of UK historians – “so-called academics” who “make a significant contribution to the subversive work of London against Russia”.</p>
<p>Nick Mayhew, an expert in Russian history and culture, is familiar with the foundational myths that Putin is so fond of and says it’s “so spurious that it requires the silencing of credible historians”. Much of the story comes from a 12th-century chronicle which, among other things, attempts to trace the origins of the Slavic people back to Noah’s Ark. He <a href="https://theconversation.com/vladimir-putins-history-war-where-truth-is-the-first-casualty-223365">concludes</a>: “Putin’s early history of Ukraine is part of a Russian imperialist story that has been told for centuries. Only it is exactly that, a story.”</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/vladimir-putins-history-war-where-truth-is-the-first-casualty-223365">Vladimir Putin's history war where truth is the first casualty</a>
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<p>Incidentally, Putin’s origin story includes Belarus as a land that was also part of early Russia. And there’s little doubt that the Kremlin has a large amount of influence over the government there with Belarus president Alexander Lukashenko counted among his closest allies and most faithful supporters.</p>
<p>The same can’t be said for the Belarus people, who are by and large fairly sick of Lukashenko and dead set against joining the war on Moscow’s side. Natasha Lindstaedt, an expert on post-Soviet eastern Europe at the University of Essex, says 97% of Belarusians are opposed to deploying their country’s troops in Ukraine and the vast majority wouldn’t blame a soldier who refused to fight on Russia’s side.</p>
<p>As she <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-propaganda-doesnt-work-as-well-in-belarus-as-it-does-in-russia-222038">notes here</a>, despite Russia’s iron grip on their country’s economy and the Kremlin’s influence over their government, the people of Belarus are not inclined to believe Russian propaganda about the war. In fact, she writes, they tend to disbelieve pretty much everything their own government says.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-propaganda-doesnt-work-as-well-in-belarus-as-it-does-in-russia-222038">Ukraine war: why propaganda doesn't work as well in Belarus as it does in Russia</a>
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<p>It’s unavoidable though, in the intense battle for hearts and minds, that some in Ukraine have opted to side with Russia for one reason or another. Ronald Niezen of the University of San Diego says that in areas occupied by Russia and now retaken by Ukraine, <a href="https://theconversation.com/enemy-collaboration-in-occupied-ukraine-evokes-painful-memories-in-europe-and-the-response-risks-a-rush-to-vigilante-justice-212416">the search is on for collaborators</a>. He says more than 7,000 criminal cases have been opened accusing Ukrainians of giving aid to the enemy. </p>
<p>Some, he writes, are fairly clear-cut instances of Ukainians providing the invaders with information about Ukrainian targets or those among their neighbours who might become partisans and fight behind the lines. Others are less so: people who continued to do their jobs after their town was occupied: local government officials, garbage collectors and the like. </p>
<p>Niezen, who writes that his own father died leaving his family with doubts about his conduct in occupied Netherlands during the second world war, cautions against the same outbreaks of vigilante violence that broke out in many countries once the Nazi occupiers were driven out.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/enemy-collaboration-in-occupied-ukraine-evokes-painful-memories-in-europe-and-the-response-risks-a-rush-to-vigilante-justice-212416">Enemy collaboration in occupied Ukraine evokes painful memories in Europe – and the response risks a rush to vigilante justice</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223682/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of our coverage of the conflict from the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223532024-02-15T15:11:44Z2024-02-15T15:11:44ZDomestic and international developments risk undermining Ukraine in a critical year<p>As Ukraine approaches the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine-faqs-about-the-conflict-that-has-shocked-the-world-177963">second anniversary of conventional warfare</a> and the 10th anniversary of unconventional conflict against Russia, the situation is less than ideal. </p>
<p>International attention, partially diverted by the war in Gaza, appears <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/29/europe/ukraine-war-victory-hopes-dim-intl/index.html">to be waning</a>. Furthermore, domestic politics within Ukraine are threatening to undermine its war aims.</p>
<p>But the situation, while bleak, is not as dire as some analysts predict. In what is shaping up to be a <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-could-tip-the-balance-in-the-war-in-ukraine">critical year</a> in the war, it’s essential that Ukraine’s supporters provide the right aid to the country and that Ukrainian domestic politics don’t undermine the urgent needs of its military.</p>
<h2>Russian morale</h2>
<p>An initial reading of Ukraine’s strategic position <a href="https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-12-29-23/h_eccd90a4b682c8cd825e9abc84d4838e">appears grim</a>. There are elements of the war and political situation, however, that work in its favour.</p>
<p>First, the Russian economy, while on a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-31/russian-manufacturing-booms-with-economy-on-war-footing">war footing</a>, is not as strong as it appears. The growth in the Russian economy shocked most analysts, but it was primarily due to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-gdp-boost-military-spending-belies-wider-economic-woes-2024-02-07/?taid=65c397760d4e6700011c7ca9">armament production</a>. Spending in this area is unlikely to bring long-term prosperity.</p>
<p>Crucially, other segments of the economy did not perform as well. Inflation is diminishing the purchasing power of the average Russian citizen. </p>
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<p>Putin was forced to make a <a href="https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/why-russias-economy-is-doing-well-despite-ukraine-war-and-western-sanctions-13701692.html">rare public apology</a> as the price of eggs has risen by <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russias-egg-crisis-is-spiraling-out-of-control/ar-AA1mcC0j">more than 40 per cent</a> in the past year. While this is an inconvenience for the middle class, it is a crisis for the poorer segments of Russian society.</p>
<p>Russian soldiers, furthermore, are not an inexhaustible supply. Russia has suffered significantly <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-suffered-dramatic-casualties-ukraine-us-intelligence-says-rcna129354">more casualties</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-group-says-more-than-30000-troops-have-died-russias-invasion-2023-11-15/">than Ukraine</a>. This disparity is despite Ukraine’s material shortcomings.</p>
<p>The precise effect of these casualties on Russian morale is debatable. The Russian army has been relying on <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/audio/buryatia-and-high-toll-russias-war-ukraine-ethnic-minorities">non-Russian minorities</a> to fight the war, a policy that appears to be an effort to maintain Putin’s popularity among Russian nationalists. So far it’s been <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/">largely successful</a>.</p>
<p>It could, however, prove problematic in the long-term. As Mark Galeotti, a historian and expert on the region, <a href="https://www.buzzsprout.com/1026985/14390770-in-moscow-s-shadows-132-a-view-from-the-provinces">has noted</a>, outside observers rarely visit, much less study, the Russian provinces. As those areas have borne a <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/russias-ethnic-minorities-disproportionately-conscripted-to-fight-the-war-in-ukraine">disproportionate portion of the casualties</a>, more research is needed into their morale and the implications for Russia’s war effort.</p>
<h2>The need for smarter aid</h2>
<p>International aid to Ukraine in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion in February 2022 was both significant in the short term and problematic in the long term. </p>
<p>International aid was substantial early on <a href="https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9914/CBP-9914.pdf">as several</a> <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/16/fact-sheet-on-u-s-security-assistance-for-ukraine/">states rushed to support Ukraine</a>. This aid provided both material necessities and a significant morale boost.</p>
<p>In the long term, however, the aid has proven problematic.</p>
<p>The issue is one of army training and doctrine. Weapons systems that Ukraine could easily integrate into its existing armed forces, like <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-60774098">anti-tank Javelins and anti-aircraft Stingers</a>, have been useful.</p>
<p>Much of the equipment, however, does not fit easily within Ukraine’s existing doctrine and training. The equipment, along with its associated training, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-war-army-nato-trained-them-wrong-fight/">proved inadequate</a> for the Ukrainian battlefield. </p>
<p>In particular, the emphasis on western arms — and the associated training required to operate and employ them effectively — was arguably <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/western-trained-ukrainian-troops-are-abandoning-us-tactics-report-2023-8?op=1">a primary cause of failure</a> in the 2023 Ukrainian summer offensive.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-can-still-defeat-russia-but-it-needs-the-right-tools-to-do-it-220092">Ukraine can still defeat Russia, but it needs the right tools to do it</a>
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<h2>Justifying the expense of sending aid</h2>
<p>Providing the wrong type of aid creates two problems. The most obvious problem is that it does not help Ukrainian soldiers on the battlefield. In some ways, it actually proves detrimental, as it causes soldiers to turn away from <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2022/11/ukraines-lessons-for-the-future-of-hybrid-warfare.html">areas and techniques</a> that led to success.</p>
<p>Donor states, however, must justify their expenditures to their own citizens. Although in most instances the amount donated <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts">represents a small fraction</a> of a country’s defence budget, even this amount is commonly in millions, or even billions, of dollars. </p>
<p>Given the disparity between this amount and an average citizen’s earnings, it’s difficult for nations to justify spending that kind of money on another country to voters. The ongoing debates in the United States congress over <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/feb/12/senate-procedural-vote-ukraine-israel-aid">providing aid to Ukraine</a> partly reflect this issue.</p>
<p>That’s not to suggest aid should be stopped. Rather, it’s important to acknowledge the limitations of the aid provided so far to Ukraine. Ukraine needs fewer M1 Abrams tanks, which are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62002218">logistically problematic</a>, and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/155mm-howitzer-ukraine-ammunition-russia-7d966c85046b73db2b013f93c51af2a5">more 155 mm artillery rounds</a>.</p>
<p>External support for Ukraine will <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/cia-chief-kyiv-faces-tough-battle-this-year-us-aid-flows-vital-2024-01-30/">be vital</a> to its combat capabilities this year. Currently, Russia’s domestic defence production, having transitioned to a war footing, significantly outpaces Ukraine’s.</p>
<p>Ukrainians themselves, including the former commander-in-chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi, recognize that Ukraine will <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/01/opinions/ukraine-army-chief-war-strategy-russia-valerii-zaluzhnyi/index.html">need to increase</a> its domestic production. </p>
<p>Its importance is such that it’s influencing Ukrainian domestic politics, as Zaluzhnyi’s critical assessments on Ukraine’s needs finally provoked President Volodymyr Zelenskyy into action.</p>
<h2>Domestic shakeups</h2>
<p>Zelenskyy recently announced a significant political and military shakeup. This included <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ukraines-volodymyr-zelensky-removes-his-top-general-valery-zaluzhny/ar-BB1hZDsd">replacing the popular Zaluzhnyi</a> with Col.-Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi, who previously served as commander of the Ukrainian ground forces.</p>
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<p>Many observers, <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-zelenskys-tensions-with-his-top-military-commander-could-undermine/">myself included</a>, have questioned the wisdom of the move. Replacing Zaluzhnyi at such a critical juncture in the war signals to Ukraine’s allies that the war isn’t going well.</p>
<p>Zelesnkyy’s move, however, demonstrates the importance of international support in 2024. Zaluzhnyi’s <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-general-runs-out-of-road-kyiv-washington/">frank commentary often undermined</a> Zelesnkyy’s messaging. The question now is if the unity of message was worth losing a valuable wartime general.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222353/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With the Ukraine-Russia war entering its third year, Ukraine’s supporters must provide the right aid to the country and domestic politics cannot undermine the urgent needs of the country’s military.James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2232362024-02-12T15:58:05Z2024-02-12T15:58:05ZUkraine war: Kyiv needs a fundamental rethink of its strategy, not just a reshuffle of military leadership<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-popular-iron-general-replaced-war-grinds-2024-02-08/">recent replacement</a> of Valeriy Zaluzhnyi as commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces may have put a temporary end to the increasingly public disagreements between the very popular “iron general” and the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky. But it has not answered the fundamental question of what a winning – or even surviving – strategy in the war with Russia could look like as it moves into its third year.</p>
<p>Several dynamics have come together that are deeper and more complex than just a major <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-fleshes-out-rebooted-military-team-2024-02-10/">reshuffle of the military leadership</a>. The bigger picture that will shape the future of the war – and with it the future of Ukraine and the European and international security order – comprises four main factors. These need to be analysed together to understand the present, and – most importantly – the future predicaments of Ukraine and its western partners. </p>
<p>First, the failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive in 2023 and the increasing pressure that Russia has put on Ukraine’s frontlines and hinterland put into serious question the ability of Kyiv to win. This is especially the case if victory for Ukraine means forcing Russia’s complete withdrawal from all territory occupied since 2014. </p>
<p>The impending fall of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-attacks-avdiivka-all-directions-situation-difficult-mayor-2024-02-08/">Avdiivka</a>, a town about 20kms to the west of Donetsk in the east of Ukraine, suggests that Kyiv ultimately has a weaker hand to play in a battle of attrition when confronted by a ruthless adversary with greater resources.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575000/original/file-20240212-28-7avo7e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of the battlefront in eastern Ukraine showing heavy fighting along a long frontline." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575000/original/file-20240212-28-7avo7e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575000/original/file-20240212-28-7avo7e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=884&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575000/original/file-20240212-28-7avo7e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=884&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575000/original/file-20240212-28-7avo7e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=884&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575000/original/file-20240212-28-7avo7e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1111&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575000/original/file-20240212-28-7avo7e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1111&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575000/original/file-20240212-28-7avo7e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1111&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">There is heavy fighting around the town of Avdiivka which is expected to fall to Russian forces in the next few days.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>Much like the loss of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/25/world/europe/bakhmut-ukraine-russia-war.html">Bakhmut</a> in May 2023, or <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-bloody-battle-for-soledar-and-what-it-tells-us-about-the-future-of-the-conflict-197625">Soledar</a> in January 2023, this was a symbolic rather than strategic defeat for Ukraine. It also represents, at best, pyrrhic victories for Russia – as in the case of <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2023">Bakhmut</a>.</p>
<p>But taken together, and seen in the context of the failed 2023 counter-offensive, these were not just symbolic defeats. They marked a real and extremely wasteful loss of financial resources, manpower and military equipment. </p>
<p>Zelensky’s dismissal of Zaluzhny puts the blame for last year’s disappointed hopes clearly on the latter. It also indicates, more worryingly, a lack of learning the lessons of these setbacks on the part of the Ukrainian president. The fact that the new commander-in-chief, Oleksandr Syrskyi, is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/five-facts-about-oleksandr-syrskyi-ukraines-new-army-chief-2024-02-08/">associated</a> with several of these costly defeats – notably Bakhmut – does not bode well for the necessary change in Ukrainian strategy.</p>
<p>To his credit, Syrsky also masterminded the defence of Kyiv in the early days of the war in 2022 and the successful counter-offensive the following summer which saw Ukraine <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-push-to-recover-kherson-in-the-south-is-on-will-it-succeed-189640">recapture</a> significant territory first around Kharkiv in the north and then Kherson in the south. Notably, these successes happened before Russia <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putin-calls-up-more-troops-and-threatens-nuclear-option-in-a-speech-which-ups-the-ante-but-shows-russias-weakness-191044">embarked</a> on the first of several mobilisations and shifted its economy to a war footing.</p>
<h2>Faltering international support</h2>
<p>The second key factor to keep in mind is that Ukraine’s battlefield successes in 2022 occurred at a time when western support for Ukraine was in full swing. Those days are long gone. This has been evident in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-senate-faces-new-test-ukraine-aid-bill-2024-02-11/">protracted battles</a> in the US congress over sending more military aid to Ukraine. The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-comments-russia-nato-appalling-unhinged-white-house-spokesperson-2024-02-11/">comments</a> by former president – and 2024 Republic nominee-apparent – Donald Trump on his lack of commitment to Nato should he be reelected in November are equally worrisome.</p>
<p>Despite some <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/hungary-slovakia-criticise-more-aid-to-ukraine-as-eu-fights-over-budget/">detractors</a>, the EU remains committed to support for Ukraine. This became clear following the recent <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ac_24_621">agreement</a> on a new €50 billion (£42.7 billion) funding package for Ukraine through 2027. But this will barely cover Ukraine’s budget deficit, let alone make up for a potentially significant drop in US military aid. Combined with Ukraine’s own shrinking domestic capabilities to mobilise further resources, the war will have to be fought in far more difficult conditions than in the first two years.</p>
<h2>War fatigue</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, Ukrainian society is increasingly suffering from war fatigue. Military setbacks, economic decline, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-increasingly-seen-as-fought-by-the-poor-as-zelensky-raises-taxes-and-proposes-strict-mobilisation-laws-220433">deteriorating</a> living conditions, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-corruption-scandals-and-high-level-rifts-could-become-an-existential-threat-as-kyiv-asks-for-more-military-aid-222432">corruption</a> and the scale of the loss of lives – among troops and civilians alike – makes sustaining the war effort at present levels more difficult as well. Especially if the goal remains retaking all the land that Russia has occupied since 2014.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/embattled-ukraine-moves-tighten-army-mobilisation-rules-2024-01-31/">amended law on mobilisation</a>, intended to underpin this strategy, was <a href="https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-verhovna-rada-voiennyi-stan-mobilizatsia/32807577.html">adopted</a> in the Ukrainian parliament on February 6. Its provisions, including lowering the conscription age from 27 to 25 years, mandatory digital certificates and electronic prescription notifications and stricter penalties for evading military service, are further evidence of the waning enthusiasm in Ukrainian society for the war effort.</p>
<p>Together with yet another 90-day extension of martial law and several financial measures designed to tighten the government’s control over the economy, the more draconian provisions in the new mobilisation law also heighten the sense of uncertainty over Ukraine’s political direction. </p>
<p>Zelensky’s presidential term comes to an end in May 2024 and new parliamentary elections would normally be due in the autumn. While it is generally agreed that elections are close to impossible at present, both the president’s and parliament’s legitimacy after the expiry of their constitutional terms will be open to question. </p>
<p>This will ultimately be an issue for the constitutional court to resolve. But it has not stopped political forces within Ukraine opposed to Zelensky and his Servant of the People political party to pile pressure on the president to agree to a government of national unity. </p>
<p>Given the lack of popularity of this opposition, associated primarily with former president Petro Poroshenko – who Zelensky defeated in a landslide election in 2019 – this is hardly driven by popular demand. But it nonetheless signals further political turmoil at a time when Ukraine needs unity. </p>
<p>It is not clear whether Zelensky’s dismissal of Zaluzhny will strengthen or weaken any political opposition. In the short term, it is likely to benefit Zelensky whose popularity still dwarfs that of Poroshenko. Yet, because replacing Zaluzhny has not come with a signal that Ukraine’s war strategy will fundamentally change, this is a very risky move on the part of Zelensky. </p>
<p>Maintaining the current direction asks Ukrainians for yet more sacrifices. What Zelensky is offering in return depends on a range of at best highly uncertain returns that depend on many factors beyond the Ukrainian president’s control.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223236/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko receives funding from Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and University of Regensburg, Germany </span></em></p>As the war against Russia moves towards its third anniversary, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky is facing a growing list of problems.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2225492024-02-01T17:41:08Z2024-02-01T17:41:08ZUkraine recap: Zelensky battles corruption and a major row with his commander-in-chief<p>The Russian winter offensive flagged here a fortnight ago appears to be under way, according to the Institute for the Study of War, which has noted operations in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts resulting in small Russian gains of territory. Ukrainian intelligence reports that the aim is to push towards Kharkiv while occupying the whole administrative areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. </p>
<p>But the feeling is that Russia is unlikely to be able to fulfil this ambition. Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, or GUR, said he expected Russian forces would be “completely exhausted” by spring. As ever, the key will be whether Ukraine can obtain enough ammunition to survive until then. According to a recent report by Bloomberg, the EU is expected to deliver only just over half the 1 million shells it has promised Ukraine by March 1. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, both the EU and US have been struggling to get their aid packages agreed – although it has been reported that Hungarian president Viktor Orbán has bowed to pressure from other EU members and agreed not to obstruct their €50 billion (£42.7 billion) military aid package. But this leaves the US president, Joe Biden, trying to find ways to convince recalcitrant Republican senators to fall into line over his plans to provide Ukraine with US$60 billion (£47.3 billion) of military aid.</p>
<p>It has been reported that Biden has managed to circumvent the senate by giving Greece a large cache of older surplus weapons, with the understanding that Greece then passes on its own surplus weaponry to Ukraine – a variation of what is known as Germany’s <em>Ringtausch</em> (ring transfer) programme, by which it supplied tanks to Ukraine via Slovakia, circumventing its own security policy.</p>
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<span class="caption">The state of the war in Ukraine, January 30 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>But it’s widely hoped that Biden will be able to bring the senate round to his way of thinking. One possible snag is the military corruption scandal that has broken round Volodymyr Zelensky’s ears in recent days. </p>
<p>The Ukrainian president came to power in 2019 on a platform of rooting out corruption and fraud in one of Europe’s most corrupt countries. That this latest episode concerns senior defence officials and managers of an arms supplier allegedly colluding to pocket £31 million that was meant to buy artillery shells will not make it any easier for Biden to persuade sceptical senators to fall into line, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-corruption-scandals-and-high-level-rifts-could-become-an-existential-threat-as-kyiv-asks-for-more-military-aid-222432">write Stefan Wolff and Tetyana Malyarenko</a>.</p>
<p>Wolff, an expert in international security at the University of Birmingham, and Malyarenko, from the University of Odesa, also highlight a rift between Zelensky and his military commander, General Valeriy Zaluzhny, which has developed since November when Zaluzhny said publicly the war was in a stalemate. None of this will give Kyiv’s western allies a great deal of confidence about the future of their investment.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-corruption-scandals-and-high-level-rifts-could-become-an-existential-threat-as-kyiv-asks-for-more-military-aid-222432">Ukraine war: corruption scandals and high-level rifts could become an existential threat as Kyiv asks for more military aid</a>
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<img alt="Ukraine Recap weekly email newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>Ukrainians remain committed to beating Russia, although polling taken in November 2023 revealed that an increasing number would be willing to accept a negotiated deal to end the fighting, which would inevitably involve the loss of territory to Russia.</p>
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<p>Gerard Toal, professor of government and international affairs at Virginia Tech, believes this resolve <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-latest-polling-says-about-the-mood-in-ukraine-and-the-desire-to-remain-optimistic-amid-the-suffering-221559">may be tested</a> once the next round of recruitment, which aims to add as many as 500,000 fresh troops to Ukraine’s armed forces in the field, gets under way.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-latest-polling-says-about-the-mood-in-ukraine-and-the-desire-to-remain-optimistic-amid-the-suffering-221559">What latest polling says about the mood in Ukraine – and the desire to remain optimistic amid the suffering</a>
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<p>Meanwhile Elis Vilasi, who lectures in national security and foreign affairs at the University of Tennessee, <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-western-imposed-peace-deal-in-ukraine-risks-feeding-russias-hunger-for-land-as-it-did-with-serbia-217517">warns against</a> any peace deal which would involve Russia gaining territory. He points to Serbia, which – more than two decades on from the settlement of hostilities in the Balkans – continues to attempt to destabilise the region.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-western-imposed-peace-deal-in-ukraine-risks-feeding-russias-hunger-for-land-as-it-did-with-serbia-217517">A Western-imposed peace deal in Ukraine risks feeding Russia's hunger for land – as it did with Serbia</a>
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<h2>Beating the drum for war</h2>
<p>Increasingly common media coverage in the UK pointing to the likelihood of a major war in Europe has encouraged some commentators and military types to consider the precipitous decline in the UK’s troop numbers, which are forecast to fall below 70,000 within two years.</p>
<p>Mark Lacy, a philosopher at Lancaster University, notes a <a href="https://theconversation.com/new-fortnite-style-recruitment-video-shows-how-uk-armed-forces-are-getting-serious-about-prospects-of-nato-war-with-russia-221890">new recruitment video</a> for the British army which uses a Fortnite-style computer game to target more tech-savvy young people. The nature of war is changing, Lacy believes, so strong tech skills will inevitably be part of most future soldiers’ armoury.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-fortnite-style-recruitment-video-shows-how-uk-armed-forces-are-getting-serious-about-prospects-of-nato-war-with-russia-221890">New Fortnite-style recruitment video shows how UK armed forces are getting serious about prospects of Nato war with Russia</a>
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<p>All this talk of a major impending European – even world – war bears comparison to the years in the lead-up to the second world war. History tells us that most people in Britain realised by the late 1930s that a fresh conflict with Germany was inevitable. </p>
<p>Tim Luckhurst, who researches newspaper history at Durham University, has had a <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-press-warns-of-nato-war-with-russia-newspapers-are-clearly-keen-to-avoid-mistakes-of-wwii-221888">trawl through some of the coverage from 1938</a> when the then-prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, flew to Munich for talks with Adolf Hitler and came back with a “piece of paper” promising “peace in our time”. Liberal and left-leaning papers such as the Daily Mirror and The Guardian decried Chamberlain’s deal for abandoning Czechoslovakia (and of course, with hindsight, we know how disastrous a decision it turned out to be).</p>
<p>The more conservative press, including the Times and the Daily Mail, were four-square behind Chamberlain. The Mail, which in its chequered past featured headlines such as “Hurrah for the Blackshirts” in praise of homegrown fascist Oswald Mosley, appeared to be particularly convinced of Hitler’s bona fides.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-press-warns-of-nato-war-with-russia-newspapers-are-clearly-keen-to-avoid-mistakes-of-wwii-221888">UK press warns of Nato war with Russia – newspapers are clearly keen to avoid mistakes of WWII</a>
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<h2>Meanwhile in Russia …</h2>
<p>In his quest to ensure he retains control over the hearts and minds of as many Russian people as possible, Vladimir Putin has mandated a rewriting of school history textbooks. Among other things, the new books extol the memory of Comrade Joseph Stalin – who we know as a murderous tyrant, but who a new generation of Russians (and Ukrainians in occupied territories) now know to be a kindly old gentleman who did a good deal to make Russia the great nation that Putin aims to restore.</p>
<p>Anya Free, a scholar of Russian and Soviet history at Arizona State University, writes that this is part of a wider move to <a href="https://theconversation.com/back-in-the-ussr-new-high-school-textbooks-in-russia-whitewash-stalins-terror-as-putin-wages-war-on-historical-memory-216255">control memory in Russia</a>, which also involves the creation of a network of “historical memory” centres across Russia and occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian students will, for example, get to read a collection of documents on the “historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians” – where they will find out that Comrade Putin was right all along about Ukraine being part of Russia.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/back-in-the-ussr-new-high-school-textbooks-in-russia-whitewash-stalins-terror-as-putin-wages-war-on-historical-memory-216255">Back in the USSR: New high school textbooks in Russia whitewash Stalin's terror as Putin wages war on historical memory</a>
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<p>Of course, a new generation of patriotic young Russians will want to explore the wonders of their country, so Putin also plans to turn his country’s untamed and isolated far east into a new tourism hotspot.</p>
<p>Natasha Kuhrt, a Russia expert at King’s College London, says the region – which has hitherto been a massive centre for the production of energy and raw materials, much of which have been exported to China – will depend on domestic visitors and tourists from China. And there’s no disputing its natural beauty, including 23 national parks.</p>
<p>The problem, as <a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-wants-to-transform-russias-far-east-into-a-tourist-hotspot-but-history-shows-it-wont-be-easy-220953">Kuhrt notes</a>, is that many Chinese visitors to Russia’s “wild east” in the past have engaged in large-scale hunting and poaching of wildlife. This would seem at odds with Putin’s plan to encourage development of the region as a centre for ecotourism.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-wants-to-transform-russias-far-east-into-a-tourist-hotspot-but-history-shows-it-wont-be-easy-220953">Putin wants to transform Russia's far east into a tourist hotspot – but history shows it won't be easy</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222549/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of our coverage of the war in Ukraine over the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2224322024-02-01T12:42:38Z2024-02-01T12:42:38ZUkraine war: corruption scandals and high-level rifts could become an existential threat as Kyiv asks for more military aid<p>The latest revelations about corruption in Ukraine tell a complex story. A <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68120973">scandal</a> has engulfed the Ukrainian ministry of defence, where 100,000 mortar shells worth about $40m (£31m) were paid for but never delivered. But within days of this story emerging, Ukraine achieved its best-ever <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023/index/ukr">ranking</a> in the annual corruption perceptions index complied by Transparency International (TI). </p>
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<p>The improved standing in the TI index demonstrates that efforts by Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky to crack down on corruption – including in his <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/graft-accusations-dog-top-zelenskiy-aides-2023-09-19/">inner circle</a> – have led to some improvements. On the other hand, the ammunition scandal is a clear indication of how pervasive and normalised corruption has become when senior defence officials and managers of an arms supplier collude to deprive their country of vital military supplies at a time when their country is facing an existential crisis.</p>
<p>Corruption has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/feb/04/welcome-to-the-most-corrupt-nation-in-europe-ukraine">long been a problem</a> in Ukraine. But over the past ten years, since annual corruption perceptions scores have been collated, the country has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/bd7c9cfb-56ea-40e2-ad67-96cc9739c955">steadily improved</a>. Yet, with the exception of Russia and Azerbaijan, no other European country is perceived as <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023">more corrupt</a> than Ukraine.</p>
<p>Ukraine has survived two years of bitter conflict, despite this endemic corruption, and has showed remarkable resilience in the face of Russia’s aggression. But these high-profile scandals – and the general perception that Ukraine still battles everyday corruption – have become more existential threats at a time when Ukraine’s survival has, to a large extent, become dependent on the continued supply of western military and financial aid.</p>
<p>Sceptics in the EU – above all Hungary <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/hungary-slovakia-criticise-more-aid-to-ukraine-as-eu-fights-over-budget/">and Slovakia</a>, but also influential right-wing populists currently in opposition like Germany’s AfD – have used undeniable corruption as one argument against further aid for Ukraine. Similarly, in the United States, Republicans have <a href="https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2023/02/19/oversight-ukraine-russia-military-aid/11271555002/">argued</a> that a lack of oversight could mean that US aid is diverted to line the pockets of corrupt officials. </p>
<p>As this debate becomes more heated and increasingly entangled with election campaigns for the European parliament and the US presidency, any alleged evidence of the misuse of funds makes it harder for Kyiv’s international supporters to win the argument for continued support. Moreover, it becomes less attractive to even make the argument. </p>
<p>This is likely to feed further into the sense of defeatism that has surrounded public debates on Ukraine since Ukraine’s performance on the battlefield in 2023 failed to live up to either Kyiv’s aspirations or the west’s expectations.</p>
<h2>Zelensky’s vulnerabilities</h2>
<p>Beyond the precariousness of continued western support, Zelensky has also become more vulnerably domestically. Repeated high-profile corruption scandals undermine one of his key election promises back in 2019 that he would <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ukraines-zelenskiy-ran-on-a-reform-platform-is-he-delivering/">root out graft</a>.</p>
<p>While the Ukrainian president has strengthened anti-corruption agencies and been open about the problems Ukraine <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/zelenskiy-says-he-will-propose-tougher-corruption-measures-this-week-2023-08-27/">continues to face</a>, his continued crackdown can now also be framed as politically motivated by his domestic detractors. This will only serve to deepen and entrench political divides in Ukraine. And that’s the last thing Zelensky needs at a time when there is already a highly divisive debate over war strategy and when disagreements between the country’s political and military leaderships have become increasingly public.</p>
<p>On that front, it remains unclear whether Zelensky will replace his commander-in-chief, General Valeriy Zaluzhny, as has been <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/aa9aacfc-c248-4550-bf28-d79ad4c553cb">widely reported</a>, or does not have the power to do so. The Ukrainian president is said to have offered Zaluzhny a new role as a defence adviser, which the military chief is understood to have refused. Relations between the two have soured in recent months, partly as a result of the failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive to score any significant battlefield successes.</p>
<p>The president castigated his top general in November 2023 for publicly saying that the war was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/05/zelenskiy-denies-ukrainian-generals-claim-war-is-at-stalemate">in a “stalemate”</a>. There has also been speculation that <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2024/01/31/zelenskyys-top-general-presents-political-puzzle-00138647">Zaluzhny might enter politics</a> and stand against Zelensky for the presidency. A <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/poll-ukrainians-trust-in-zelensky-declines-trust-in-zaluzhnyi-is-high/">poll in December</a> found that while 62% of Ukrainians said they trusted Zelensky, 88% said they trusted Zaluzhny.</p>
<p>Taken together, the corruption scandal and the reported rift at the top of Ukraine’s power structure will do nothing to restore or sustain western confidence about whether Ukraine has a credible pathway to avoiding defeat, let alone to achieving victory. Without such confidence, more aid looks increasingly doubtful.</p>
<p>Without real headway being made in the fight against corruption, the broadly pro-western and pro-European constituency from which Zelensky draws most of his support is also likely to weaken. A European future will look less attractive to people who see western support as simply propping up a corrupt elite. </p>
<p>And even if, as is likely, support for European and transatlantic integration will remain high, Zelensky may no longer be seen as its only or most likely champion.</p>
<p>Corruption, therefore, remains central to Ukraine’s existential crisis. It is not the only problem that the country faces, and objectively it may not even be the biggest one. What makes it so critical for Ukraine to fight corruption more effectively, and to be seen to do so, is that corruption and the perception of corruption exacerbates other problems and undermines critical domestic and western support. </p>
<p>On its own hence, corruption is unlikely to break Ukraine. But in the midst of a war, it may be the final straw that breaks the country – because of the knock-on effects at home and abroad.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222432/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As a new Russian offensive gets under way, Ukraine can ill afford to be mired in scandal and disunity.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2214452024-01-18T18:06:27Z2024-01-18T18:06:27ZUkraine recap: possibility of imminent Russian offensive focuses minds on Kyiv’s weapons shortages<p>As you’d expect, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has been working the room at the World Economic Forum in Davos this week. After a disappointing end to 2023 on the battlefield, with signs of battle fatigue among some of his key allies, Zelensky will be aware of the need to press his country’s case to so many world leaders. An estimated 60 heads of state and government are thought to have made the trip to Switzerland for this global forum, more than in previous years. </p>
<p>It was preceded by a meeting of more than 90 national security advisers, for whom a key agenda item was coming up with a viable peace plan for the conflict in Ukraine. Zelensky will also have been aware of the way the focus of global attention has moved to events in the Middle East, so a chance to get in front of his allies at this point is like gold dust. </p>
<p>There were positive noises from Nato’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, as well as US national security adviser Jake Sullivan, who emphasised Ukraine’s success in winning back more than half the territory Russia had occupied since February 2022, as well as – for now at least –
breaking Russia’s blockade in the Black Sea to allow grain ships in and out of its ports. Sullivan also praised the way Ukraine had managed to establish a viable defence industrial base. </p>
<p>The fruits of this were demonstrated this week when a hybrid “FrankenSAM” air defence system, which merges advanced western missiles with a Soviet-era launcher, successfully shot down an Iranian-made Shahed drone. Ukraine is also reported to be ramping up domestic production of Nato-compatible ammunition.</p>
<p>All of which will be doubly important if, as is now being widely reported, Russia is preparing to launch a major new ground offensive in the coming weeks. As Stefan Wolff and Tetyana Malyarenko report, Russian forces have intensified their attacks on various sectors along the frontline in Ukraine, and have made some small territorial gains in the past week or so. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570144/original/file-20240118-29-s87ycg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="ISW map showing Ukraine and the main areas of fighting and control January 17 2024." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570144/original/file-20240118-29-s87ycg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570144/original/file-20240118-29-s87ycg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570144/original/file-20240118-29-s87ycg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570144/original/file-20240118-29-s87ycg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570144/original/file-20240118-29-s87ycg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570144/original/file-20240118-29-s87ycg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570144/original/file-20240118-29-s87ycg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The state of the war in Ukraine, January 17 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Wolff and Malyarenko, international security experts from the universities of Birmingham and Odesa respectively, highlight the extent to which shortages of weapons and ammunition are making it <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-talk-of-russian-spring-offensive-raises-fears-that-kyiv-is-ill-prepared-to-face-it-221142">increasingly difficult for Ukraine to hold the line</a>, let alone deliver the sort of battlefield breakthroughs that Kyiv – and its western allies – so desperately need. </p>
<p>Both sides are also short on manpower. Zelensky has said he wants to be able to field an additional 500,000 troops this year, and has introduced more stringent measures to clamp down on draft dodging.</p>
<p>Meanwhile Russia, which can currently rely on a steady supply of 30,000 extra troops a month, has also signalled it’s intentions to boost troop numbers by switching off the heating at many of its prisons – the better to encourage criminals to swap their jail sentences for a spell at the frontline.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-talk-of-russian-spring-offensive-raises-fears-that-kyiv-is-ill-prepared-to-face-it-221142">Ukraine war: talk of Russian spring offensive raises fears that Kyiv is ill-prepared to face it</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<hr>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Ukraine Recap weekly email newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
<hr>
<h2>War in the air</h2>
<p>Given all this, it’s easy to understand why Kyiv raced to announce what it claims as a major coup in the air war. The reported (though not yet confirmed) destruction of a Russian A-50 radar early-warning plane and an Ilyushin Il-22M airborne command post on January 14 will seriously degrade Russia’s ability to provide real-time aerial intelligence to its troops on the ground, according to Matthew Powell, a specialist in aerial warfare at the University of Portsmouth.</p>
<p>Powell <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-kyiv-is-cock-a-hoop-about-shooting-down-two-russian-aircraft-221339">writes here</a> that Russia is reported to only have three A-50s in service. They cost an estimated US$330 million (£260 million) to replace. But it isn’t so much the expense of replacing the aircraft that will hamstring Russia. They are a very specialised piece of equipment and the 15-person crew takes years to train – so replacing that capability will be very difficult.</p>
<p>It’s been reported that the two aircraft were caught by a Patriot ground-based air defence system, of the kind provided by the US late in 2022. If correct, this will give Joe Biden’s administration a chance to parade the effectiveness of US military aid to recalcitrant members of Congress who continue to block the president’s US$110 million aid package for Ukraine.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-kyiv-is-cock-a-hoop-about-shooting-down-two-russian-aircraft-221339">Ukraine war: why Kyiv is cock-a-hoop about shooting down two Russian aircraft</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>Death to Spies!</h2>
<p>Anyone who, like me, grew up on James Bond will be familiar with the sinister Soviet counter-espionage organisation, Smersh. Who can forget the end of From Russia With Love, when Bond has to fight for his life against the dastardly Rosa Klebb and her fiendish poison-tipped shoes?</p>
<p>In reality, Smersh was established by Josef Stalin during the second world war to trap German spies. The name Smersh (a blend of Russian words <em>Smert’ Shpionam</em> which translates into English as “death to spies”) was supposedly coined by Stalin himself.</p>
<p>As you’d expect, Smersh did a fair bit of spying on ordinary Russians, too. In all, an estimated 30,000 German “spies” within the Red Army and at least 594,000 other Soviet soldiers were arrested, most of whom would have been either executed or consigned to the gulags.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman's legs in a pair of shoes with aknife sticking out of the toe of the right foot." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570185/original/file-20240118-27-vc4vp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570185/original/file-20240118-27-vc4vp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570185/original/file-20240118-27-vc4vp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570185/original/file-20240118-27-vc4vp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570185/original/file-20240118-27-vc4vp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570185/original/file-20240118-27-vc4vp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570185/original/file-20240118-27-vc4vp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Fiendish: Rosa Klebb’s poisoned shoes from the film From Russia with Love.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">United Artists</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Mothballed in 1946, Smersh has now reportedly been reactivated by Vladimir Putin to root out any signs of dissent in Crimea or behind Russia’s lines in Ukraine. Marina Miron and Rod Thornton, intelligence and security experts at King’s College London, trace the organisation’s history and conclude from its revival that Putin considers the possibility of subversion and dissidence – or even plain old opposition to the war – to be a sufficient problem to warrant such a sinister move.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://theconversation.com/smersh-why-putin-has-reinstated-stalins-notorious-and-much-feared-anti-spy-unit-220627">they conclude</a>, the resurrection of the name Smersh is “clearly the reaction of an increasingly oppressive state. Russian authorities, it can only be assumed, want to invoke fear again. This does not bode well for the Russian people.”</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/smersh-why-putin-has-reinstated-stalins-notorious-and-much-feared-anti-spy-unit-220627">Smersh: why Putin has reinstated Stalin's notorious and much-feared anti-spy unit</a>
</strong>
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<h2>… and oppression for LGBTQ+ people</h2>
<p>Meanwhile Russia has moved to make life more difficult for another of Putin’s pet hates. In December 2023, a judgment of Russia’s supreme court banned what it referred to as the “LGBTQ+ movement” as an “extremist organisation”. </p>
<p>This effectively means that even identifying as LGBTQ+ in Russia is dangerous as it will lay a person open to charges of supporting extremism, <a href="https://theconversation.com/30-years-of-lgbtq-history-in-russia-from-decriminalisation-in-1993-to-extremist-status-in-2023-220569">writes Sergey Katsuba</a>, whose research at University College Dublin focuses on Russia’s growing authoritarianism and the persecution of sexual minorities in the Putin era.</p>
<p>Katsuba traces a 30-year cycle from 1993 – when, under pressure from the Council of Europe, Boris Yeltsin’s government decriminalised consensual sex between men – to December’s supreme court decision. He finds a strong correlation between Putin’s increasing authoritarianism and the demonisation of sexual minorities in Russia.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/30-years-of-lgbtq-history-in-russia-from-decriminalisation-in-1993-to-extremist-status-in-2023-220569">30 years of LGBTQ+ history in Russia: from decriminalisation in 1993 to 'extremist' status in 2023</a>
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<h2>Time to dig your bunker?</h2>
<p>There have recently been warnings emerging from a number sources, including the governments of Germany, Sweden and Estonia, that Putin is actively planning to extend his “special military operation” into a confrontation with Nato – something that everyone fears could quickly spiral out of control.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, as anyone following our coverage of the conflict in the Middle East will know, fears that the Gaza war could escalate into a regional conflagration pulling in Iran, Saudi Arabia and the US mount daily. And that’s before we factor in China’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric about Taiwan, and North Korea’s bloodcurdling threats against the South.</p>
<p>If you feel as if all the wars in the world are about to join hands, you would not be alone. Mark Lacy of Lancaster University, who is presently writing a book on the future of war, considers what is often referred to as the “threat horizon”. </p>
<p>He believes the situation is made more complicated by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-worlds-conflicts-spread-should-you-be-digging-a-bunker-how-to-think-about-the-future-of-war-221418">changing nature of conflict</a>. Economic warfare, cyberwar and the increasing influence of artificial intelligence in the way conflicts are waged mean that the next major war will probably look completely different to what we might expect, yet be equally as devastating. So, while you may not feel the need to start digging your bunker quite yet, it may be best to keep a spade handy just in case.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-worlds-conflicts-spread-should-you-be-digging-a-bunker-how-to-think-about-the-future-of-war-221418">As the world's conflicts spread, should you be digging a bunker? How to think about the future of war</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221445/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of our coverage of the war in Ukraine over the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2211422024-01-18T16:05:49Z2024-01-18T16:05:49ZUkraine war: talk of Russian spring offensive raises fears that Kyiv is ill-prepared to face it<p>Analysis suggests that Russia may be in the early stages of a new offensive in Ukraine. On the ground, Moscow’s forces have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/fighting-intensifies-ukraines-east-russia-steps-up-offensive-action-2024-01-17/">intensified their attacks</a> along major sections of the frontline. They have made small territorial gains over the past few weeks, <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024">taking new territory or reclaiming territory</a> liberated by Kyiv’s forces during last year’s Ukrainian counteroffensive.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Ukrainian troops have switched to “active defence”, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-ground-commander-says-his-troops-now-active-defence-can-still-surprise-2024-01-15/">according</a> to the commander of the country’s ground forces, Colonel-General Oleksandr Syrskyi. </p>
<p>Does this imply that Ukrainian efforts to resist and ultimately defeat Russia’s aggression are in serious peril should the offensive begin? This will depend on an assessment of both Russian and Ukrainian capabilities and political will. Regarding the latter, neither side shows any signs of backing down.</p>
<p>Russian president, Vladimir Putin, was unequivocal at a <a href="http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73275">forum with local government leaders</a> on January 16 that he was unwilling to enter into any negotiations with Ukraine. Instead he predicted <a href="http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73275">“a very serious blow”</a> to Ukrainian statehood as a result of the war.</p>
<p>Putin’s Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-urges-western-unity-stop-russia-2024-01-16/">speaking at the World Economic Forum</a> in Davos this week, left little doubt about his determination to continue fighting for the complete liberation of all of Ukraine’s currently Russian-occupied territories.</p>
<h2>Men and materiel</h2>
<p>But do Russia and Ukraine have the military capabilities to match their leaders’ rhetoric? This is an issue of both equipment and manpower. As is obvious from the repeated and increasingly successful Russian airstrikes against a wide range of targets across Ukraine, including <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-launches-massive-air-attack-ukraine-least-10-dead-kyiv-2023-12-29/">Kyiv</a> and the country’s second-largest city, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-missiles-hit-ukraines-kharkiv-wounding-4-officials-say-2024-01-16/">Kharkiv</a>, Russia has the arms and ammunition to continue its air campaign while Ukraine still lacks adequate air defence capabilities. </p>
<p>Similarly, Ukrainian ground efforts are hampered by increasingly serious ammunition shortages. Summarising several press reports, non-profit policy organisation the Institute for the Study of War <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-8-2024">reported</a> on January 8 2024, that Ukrainian troops “are struggling to completely compensate for artillery ammunition shortages” while their use of small drones for combat purposes was hampered by “insufficient electronic warfare capabilities”. </p>
<p>When it comes to manpower, both sides are struggling. In his year-end press conference Putin <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/72994">ruled out</a> any further mobilisation. And, <a href="https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/interview/russians-motivated-to-fight-for-money-1000-1705323575.html">according</a> to Vadym Skibitskyi, the deputy head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Moscow can rely on a steady stream of some 30,000 volunteers a month. As a consequence, however, the question facing the Kremlin is how the Russian economy will deal with manpower shortages as workers are diverted to the frontlines. </p>
<p>The planned mobilisation of around 500,000 additional troops in Ukraine is also likely to be difficult and divisive for very similar reasons.</p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-increasingly-seen-as-fought-by-the-poor-as-zelensky-raises-taxes-and-proposes-strict-mobilisation-laws-220433">Ukraine war increasingly seen as 'fought by the poor’, as Zelensky raises taxes and proposes strict mobilisation laws</a>
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<h2>Friends and partners</h2>
<p>Russia has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1d1eb1dd-4fa0-4693-9512-23a219de5d77">benefited</a> enormously from Iranian and North Korean military supplies. As is obvious from the <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/north-koreas-top-diplomat-in-moscow-for-talks-on-ties-amid-concerns-over-alleged-arms-deal/ar-AA1n3i6G">recent visit</a> of the North Korean foreign minister, Choe Son-hui, to Moscow, these links are likely to grow and further boost Russia’s war effort against Ukraine.</p>
<p>Ukraine is, in many ways, even more dependent on foreign aid to sustain its defence against Russia’s aggression – yet this aid has become much <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-stalemate-on-the-battlefield-and-shaky-international-support-putting-pressure-on-zelensky-216930">more precarious</a>. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-stalemate-on-the-battlefield-and-shaky-international-support-putting-pressure-on-zelensky-216930">Ukraine war: stalemate on the battlefield and shaky international support putting pressure on Zelensky</a>
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<p>With no clear pathway to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d35e1a68-9bcc-43d3-80a1-ff6aeeebff3d">unlocking</a> further US military aid and <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/video/news/orban-versus-the-eu-on-ukraine-how-can-other-member-states-break-the-deadlock/vi-AA1mT2Xp">uncertainty</a> over future EU financial commitments, Ukraine has become dependent on a <a href="https://app.23degrees.io/view/tAuBi41LxvWwKZex-bar-stacked-horizontal-figure-2_csv_final">small number</a> of donors, including <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/olaf-scholz-raises-pressure-eu-countries-beef-up-military-aid-ukraine-budget-germany/">Germany</a> and the <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9914/">UK</a>.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s predicament is exacerbated by the fact that its own defence sector is not yet fully on a war footing, which is partly why it has struggled to manufacture sufficient ammunition for its troops in the field. Even if this were to <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base">change soon</a>, including with the help of western investment, Ukraine’s lack of strategic depth would remain an impediment. Russian drones and missiles have the reach to target military production facilities anywhere in Ukraine. Ukraine, for now, lacks the air defence systems to effectively counter such attacks.</p>
<h2>Security guarantees</h2>
<p>This leaves the question of deterrence as potentially the last obstacle in the path of a Russian counteroffensive that could deliver Putin’s threatened serious blow to Ukraine’s statehood. First raised in a G7 joint <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/12/06/g7-leaders-statement-6/#:%7E:text=We%20continue%20to%20support%20Ukraine,term%20security%20commitments%20and%20arrangements.">declaration of support</a> for Ukraine in July 2023, bilateral agreements between Ukraine and several of its western allies to strengthen defence and security cooperation are now beginning to take more concrete shape. </p>
<p>The UK-Ukraine <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65a14a6ae96df50014f845d2/UK-Ukraine_Agreement_on_Security_Co-operation.pdf">agreement</a> on security cooperation was signed on January 12 2024. French president, Emmanuel Macron, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/frances-macron-travel-ukraine-february-finalise-bilateral-security-deal-2024-01-16/">has announced</a> that a similar deal between France and Ukraine will be finalised in February. </p>
<p>The UK-Ukraine agreement <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65a14a6ae96df50014f845d2/UK-Ukraine_Agreement_on_Security_Co-operation.pdf">provides for</a> “comprehensive assistance to Ukraine for the protection and the restoration of its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders”. It pledges “prevention and active deterrence of, and counter-measures against, any military escalation and/or a new aggression by the Russian Federation”. It also promises “support for Ukraine’s future integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions”. </p>
<p>Considered side-by-side, enthusiasm in the west for supporting a Ukrainian victory on the battlefield and for Nato membership is, at best lukewarm. However, if this is a model for similar deals in the future, if the US and other key Nato members reach similar agreements with Ukraine, and if these – as yet untested – commitments are followed through and don’t suffer the fate of the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-explainer-budapest-memorandum/25280502.html">Budapest memorandum</a> (a 1994 document that Ukraine agreed to remove all of its nuclear weapons in return for recognition from Russia and others of its statehood) whose <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203007/Part/volume-3007-I-52241.pdf">security assurances</a> proved useless, this would indicate a clear western determination to prevent a major Russian counteroffensive resulting in yet another illegal Russian land grab. </p>
<p>These are many and significant “ifs” and Nato’s goal of preventing Ukraine’s defeat is far more modest than Zelensky’s war aims. Yet, precisely because they are more modest, and therefore more credible, they could prevent a much more dangerous broader escalation between Russia and west without condemning Ukraine to a permanent defeat.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221142/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ukraine is short of men and military equipment. It urgently needs security guarantees from the west.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2205712024-01-04T17:53:57Z2024-01-04T17:53:57ZUkraine recap: Zelensky’s defiant new year speech foreshadows tough 2024 as government tightens conscription laws<blockquote>
<p>Ukraine is alive. Ukraine lives. Ukraine fights. Ukraine advances, Ukraine overcomes the path. Ukraine gains. Ukraine works. Ukraine exists.</p>
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<p>In his <a href="https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/novorichne-privitannya-prezidenta-ukrayini-volodimira-zelens-88037">new year’s speech</a> this week, Volodymyr Zelensky was characteristically bullish about his country’s prospects as the war heads towards its second anniversary next month and as the Ukrainian people descend into what many of us in the northern hemisphere – even without a war to contend with – think of as the bleakest months of winter. </p>
<p>Following some of the worst airstrikes of the war so far in recent weeks, Zelensky reminded his listeners that they had seen this all before last year – and faced it down. The cold, the dark, shortages of power and food. Uncertainty. He said: “Ukrainians will cope with any energy shortage as they have no shortage of resilience and courage. We did not fade away in the darkness. The darkness did not engulf us. We defeated the darkness.”</p>
<p>He took time to thank the Ukrainian people, talking up the country’s unity in the face of existential threat. But there was also a flavour of Shakespeare’s Henry V <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NrvKGA5h1vo">Agincourt speech</a> with a superficially coded message to the estimated 600,000 Ukrainian men of fighting age “now a-bed” – living in other European countries – rather returning home to fight alongside their heroic compatriots: “I know that one day I will have to ask myself: who am I? To make a choice about who I want to be. A victim or a winner? A refugee or a citizen?”</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Volodymyr Zelensky delivers his new year address, 2024.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The cold hard fact is that 2023 ended badly on the battlefield for Ukraine. The anticipated advances from spring and summer counteroffensives failed to materialise and instead Ukraine was forced to engage in bitter and attritional fighting against an enemy with a far greater pool of men from which to recruit or conscript more troops. As late as the beginning of December Russia announced it was calling up another 170,000 troops.</p>
<p>Stefan Wolff, of the University of Birmingham, and Tetyana Malyarenko, of the University of Odesa, report that Zelensky and his cabinet have <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-increasingly-seen-as-fought-by-the-poor-as-zelensky-raises-taxes-and-proposes-strict-mobilisation-laws-220433">proposed new bills</a> calling for stricter conscription laws with an aim to add 500,000 fresh troops. </p>
<p>This, they say, could be about levelling the playing field after heavy losses towards the end of last year, or it could be an attempt to compensate or insure against the possibility of a sharp decrease in the volume of western military aid in 2024. </p>
<p>With Russian presidential elections coming up in March, they write, it seems likely that Vladimir Putin will want to celebrate his inevitable victory by boasting of some fresh battlefield success, so perhaps Zelensky and his advisers are bracing for a possible spring offensive.</p>
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<span class="caption">The state of the conflict in Ukraine, January 3 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>The new laws would bring in harsh penalties for avoiding conscription, including heavy fines, seizure of real estate and the freezing of bank accounts and cancelling of passports for Ukrainian men of fighting age living abroad.</p>
<p>In the meantime, a raft of new economic measures will increase the tax burden on ordinary Ukrainians, while at the same time radically reducing public spending. Wolff and Malyarenko observe that Zelensky’s parallel efforts to combat corruption among the political and military elites will need to bear some obvious fruit if Zelensky wants to continue to bring the Ukrainian people with him.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-increasingly-seen-as-fought-by-the-poor-as-zelensky-raises-taxes-and-proposes-strict-mobilisation-laws-220433">Ukraine war increasingly seen as 'fought by the poor’, as Zelensky raises taxes and proposes strict mobilisation laws</a>
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>James Horncastle, of Simon Fraser University in British Columbia, meanwhile, believes that while Ukraine has suffered setbacks over the past six months or so, it can still prevail. But he stresses that they will <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-can-still-defeat-russia-but-it-needs-the-right-tools-to-do-it-220092">need to be given the tools</a> to do so. </p>
<p>He also believes that Zelensky, for all his admirable leadership qualities, has backed his country into a corner by maintaining his maximalist stance: refusing to countenance any peace deal which doesn’t involve his country regaining every metre of its territory before 2014, including Crimea. As a result, he argues, Ukraine’s military has found itself bogged down in places such as Bakhmut in the country’s east, losing far too many troops for small rewards. </p>
<p>The key, he writes, is that Ukraine redefines its immediate goals – a return to the pre-February 2022 borders would be appropriate. And then works out exactly what it will take in terms of western military aid to achieve that initial goal. And a rethink in Ukraine’s western-oriented military doctrine to counter Russia’s “defence in depth”, which will require more artillery rather than fast-moving mechanised brigades, is also appropriate.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-can-still-defeat-russia-but-it-needs-the-right-tools-to-do-it-220092">Ukraine can still defeat Russia, but it needs the right tools to do it</a>
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<h2>Do they know it’s Christmas?</h2>
<p>Until the middle of last year, most Orthodox Christians in Ukraine celebrated Christmas in early January, according to the ancient Julian calendar, which was discarded by most of the western world in the 16th century. Accordingly Ukrainians celebrated Easter and other important religious festivals and saints days at different times as well.</p>
<p>But in May 2023, the Ukrainian government took the decision to adopt the revised Julian – what we know as the Gregorian – calendar. It was part of a move to break away from the authority of the Moscow Orthodox Patriarch Kirill, whose slavish support for the Putin regime and the war in Ukraine was intolerable for most Ukrainians – certainly in the west of the country where the sense of nationalism has traditionally always been stronger.</p>
<p>But this is by no means popular with all Ukrainians, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraines-churches-are-adopting-the-western-calendar-but-not-everyone-is-happy-220506">writes Chris Hann</a> of the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology – especially those families who may have members who pay allegiance to different branches of the church. As Hann reports, the old religious calendar survived the Soviet era, but has now been swept away by decree from Kyiv. In a country divided in its outlook between east and west, this reform is not without its risks.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraines-churches-are-adopting-the-western-calendar-but-not-everyone-is-happy-220506">Ukraine’s churches are adopting the western calendar – but not everyone is happy</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220571/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Nearly two years into the war, Ukraine remains strong but faces challenges on and off the battlefield.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2204332024-01-04T16:21:56Z2024-01-04T16:21:56ZUkraine war increasingly seen as ‘fought by the poor’, as Zelensky raises taxes and proposes strict mobilisation laws<p>After the failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive, Kyiv finds itself at a major crossroads and with no easy options. </p>
<p>The demand late last year by the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, for the mobilisation of an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-military-asks-additional-450000-500000-people-be-mobilised-zelenskiy-2023-12-19/">additional 500,000 troops</a> over the next few months signals both resolve and desperation. It will likely make Ukrainian domestic politics more fractious but it could also buy Zelensky time to reconsider his own endgame and how to get there.</p>
<p>Since the beginning of Russia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-invasion-2022-117045">full-scale invasion in February 2022</a>, Ukraine’s armed forces have had a strength of around a million soldiers, with continuous regular mobilisation compensating for losses on the battlefield. Against this background, the target of an additional half a million troops constitutes a significant increase of 50% above the current baseline. There are several possible reasons for this.</p>
<p>First, it could be an indication of the real scale of losses at the front over the past year. Ukraine suffered high rates of attrition as a result of relentless Russian counterattacks, <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2024">including</a> along the long stretch of frontline in Donbas. </p>
<p>There is also increasing concern over the sustainability of western support. Kyiv may be anticipating a need to compensate for an expected decrease in western supplies of arms and ammunition by increasing human resources on the ground. </p>
<p>Russia’s recent mobilisation of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-army-expansion-a2bf0b035aabab20c8b120a1c86c9e38">170,000 new troops</a> brings the total strength of its armed forces to around 1.3 million. So Zelensky’s announcement may simply be an attempt to level the playing field in terms of troop numbers. </p>
<p>Taken together, all three of these possible explanations also indicate a concern about the likelihood of a new Russian offensive in 2024. Whatever the ultimate Russian war aims might be, Moscow’s territorial claim to the whole of the Ukrainian regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia is one of the more concrete – and hitherto unachieved – objectives. </p>
<p>With the Kremlin’s relative military strength growing, denying Putin this success – which he is likely to want to achieve before his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/03/vladimir-putin-will-use-election-to-show-war-weary-russia-hes-still-calling-the-shots">all-but-certain re-election</a> in March and likely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-run-again-president-2024-2023-12-08/">inauguration</a> in May – will require a serious Ukrainian defence effort.</p>
<p>In turn, this implies that the Ukrainian leadership is currently less concerned about strategic prospects, but is motivated by the need to mobilise all available resources for this effort. </p>
<p>The two complementary <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/cabinet-of-ministers-submits-draft-law-on-mobilization-to-verkhovna-rada/">bills regarding on mobilisation</a> which were submitted by the government to parliament on December 30 2023, indicate that Zelensky and his inner circle are serious about this. At the same time, if adopted and implemented, the new approach to mobilisation will also add significant strain for already stretched the Ukrainian state institutions and society.</p>
<h2>Running out of men to mobilise?</h2>
<p>As publicly confirmed by senior Ukrainian officials, large numbers of volunteers for frontline service simply no longer exist. So the government proposes coercive measures to ensure continuing enlistment. These range from high fines for draft dodging, to seizure of real estate and the freezing of private bank accounts, to the cancellation of passports of Ukrainian refugees abroad. </p>
<p>The latter group in particular, including an <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?oldid=572558">estimated</a> 600,000 fighting-age men living in the EU, will become a key target of Kyiv’s mobilisation efforts. Addressing them directly in his <a href="https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/novorichne-privitannya-prezidenta-ukrayini-volodimira-zelens-88037">new year’s speech</a>, Zelensky didn’t mince his words: “You need to decide whether you are a refugee or a citizen.” </p>
<p>In parallel, there will be further efforts to put Ukraine’s economy on a war footing, as <a href="https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/6745">announced</a> by Ukraine’s prime minister, Denys Shmyhal. The planned mobilisation will be accompanied by a <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraines-budget-2024">new economic strategy</a> to increase the tax burden on individual citizens and small and medium-sized businesses, while social spending will be radically reduced.</p>
<h2>Deepening social divisions</h2>
<p>These measures are undoubtedly necessary from a strategic perspective – especially if Ukraine wants to regain the initiative on the battlefield. But taken together, these actions by the government have revived potentially divisive discussions in Ukrainian society about social justice, corruption and the social contract between elites and society. The level of public trust in elites is already <a href="https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1335&page=1">low, and decreasing further</a>, and the war is increasingly seen as a “war fought by the poor”. </p>
<p>What is more, the demographic trends in Ukraine’s society further exacerbate the unfavourable long-term prospects of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/world-bank-says-ukraine-has-tenfold-increase-poverty-due-war-2022-10-15/">ever-increasing</a> number of people living in poverty. Life expectancy of men has reduced from an already low 65 years in 2021 to <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-12-11/ukraines-demographic-drain-puts-its-post-war-recovery-at-risk.html">57 years</a> in 2023. </p>
<p>Birth rates remain very low, with some demographers <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/22/1155943055/ukraine-low-birth-rate-russia-war">estimating</a> a fall to 0.55 babies per family in 2023. Meanwhile, emigration of the most skilled and economically active population has <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/ua/wp-content/uploads/sites/38/2023/07/UNHCR-LIVES-ON-HOLD-4-INTENTIONS-AND-PERSPECTIVES-OF-REFUGEES-FROM-UKRAINE.pdf">accelerated</a> since the war began. This leaves predominantly the poor to do the fighting while seeing their living standards further decline.</p>
<p>Forced mobilisation, the reduction of the rights and freedoms of the population, further economic disruption and social hardship contrast sharply with what is widely perceived as the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-zelenskyy-government-30e547e614babcacff2e68cecd62b551">corruption-fuelled lifestyle</a> of an entrenched and unaccountable elite. Zelensky himself may not (yet) be directly associated with this – and his relative lack of success in rooting out corruption has yet to significantly harm his own popularity. </p>
<p>But several people in his inner circle have been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/graft-accusations-dog-top-zelenskiy-aides-2023-09-19/">associated</a> with corrupt practices. If nothing else, more fractious domestic politics, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3ce63abc-9a71-427b-8e11-ab5309288845">including</a> between military and political elites, will undermine Ukraine’s resilience and combat effectiveness from the inside, further playing into Russian hands. </p>
<p>Thus, Ukraine needs a new social contract between elites and society as much as it needs a re-assessment of its military strategy. Yet, neither are likely. Zelensky and his foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-no-plan-b-unblocking-us-funding-2024-01-04/">insist</a> that there is a path to victory and that they “do not have a plan B”. This uncompromising position is reflected in the current mobilisation plans. </p>
<p>More men, however, do not constitute a strategy. At best, they can be part of a strategy. To justify the undoubted sacrifice that Zelensky is asking of Ukrainian society, he needs to articulate a clearer purpose and direction. Simply reiterating the desirable – Ukraine’s complete liberation – will sooner or later come to be seen in Ukraine and in western partner capitals as a fantasy dangerously detached from realities on the ground.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220433/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Ukrainian president has called for another half a million troops this year and his government has introduced strict conscription laws in an attempt to deter draft-dodging.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2202462023-12-21T17:42:28Z2023-12-21T17:42:28ZUkraine recap: as cracks appear in western support, 2024 looks set to be a desperate fight for survival<p>While it may seem glib to repeat the notion of a new cold war, winter 2023-2024 has brought with it the sense that there is now an ever-more uncertain faultline between the west and an increasingly aggressive Russia – perhaps more vividly than at any time since the late 1980s. While it is considered a given that a united and determined response from Nato would have the capacity to outgun Russia in the event of the war in Ukraine escalating, US military planners need to factor in the need to maintain a sufficient deterrent force to counter any Chinese moves on Taiwan.</p>
<p>All of which increases the stakes in Ukraine. If Russia were to conquer the whole of Ukraine (remembering it already effectively controls neighbouring Belarus), its border with Nato would extend across Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. Moldova, which – while having cordial relations with Nato is not a member, so not protected by the group’s mutual self-defence principle – would be more exposed. There have already been attempts to destabilise the country via the Russian separatist enclave of Transnistria.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/567062/original/file-20231221-21-z08ndo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of eastern Europe showing what military dispositions will look like if Russia conquers UKraine." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/567062/original/file-20231221-21-z08ndo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/567062/original/file-20231221-21-z08ndo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=882&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/567062/original/file-20231221-21-z08ndo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=882&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/567062/original/file-20231221-21-z08ndo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=882&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/567062/original/file-20231221-21-z08ndo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1109&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/567062/original/file-20231221-21-z08ndo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1109&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/567062/original/file-20231221-21-z08ndo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1109&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">What Europe will look like if Russia conquers the whole of Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>These are the harsh realities that the Nato as a whole – as well as the US and the European Union separately – must confront as members debate the extent to which they will continue to supply Ukraine with armaments. They will be conscious that Russia has ramped up its military production significantly, allocating one-third of its 2024 budget to defence spending. Meanwhile both the US and the EU are deeply divided over continuing to supply Kyiv with the weapons it needs.</p>
<p>In his end-of-year press conference this week, Volodymyr Zelensky called for a further 500,000 new troops next year. But the concern is that they will have nothing to fight with, given the struggles going on both within the US congress and the EU to pass bills to provide more than £100 billion in further aid for Kyiv. </p>
<p>Stefan Wolff of the University of Birmingham and Tetyana Malyarenko of the University of Odesa believe the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-kyiv-digs-in-for-the-long-haul-with-prospects-looking-bleak-for-2024-220005">key for Ukraine in 2024</a> will be to hold their lines and prevent Russia from occupying any more territory, while they train their new conscripts. This would give Kyiv’s western allies an opportunity to find a way around the roadblock in funding Ukraine’s war effort. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-kyiv-digs-in-for-the-long-haul-with-prospects-looking-bleak-for-2024-220005">Ukraine war: Kyiv digs in for the long haul with prospects looking bleak for 2024</a>
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<p>Neither Ukraine nor Russia have rowed back on their war aims. Zelensky stressed that his ten-point peace plan was the only acceptable position, while Vladimir Putin, in his own end-of-year press conference, insisted that his plan was still “denazification, demilitarisation and a neutral status for Ukraine”. That Putin held a press conference at all is an indication he thinks Russia’s position is more favourable than it was this time last year, when he didn’t.</p>
<p>Accordingly, it was a bullish Russian president who fronted up for a four-hour combined press conference and phone-in. It made for required viewing for Russian television audiences, in that it appeared on every network. Precious Chatterje-Doody, an expert in international affairs from the Open University, says that despite questions such as “Tell us, when will our lives get better?” and “Hello, How can one move to the Russia that they talk about on Channel One?”, the affair was clearly carefully stage-managed to give the impression of a leader who is in complete control and confident of success.</p>
<p>And, with an economy that looks to be in pretty robust shape and an approval rating north of 80%, he can afford to be, <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-four-hour-qanda-is-a-valuable-insight-into-the-russian-presidents-version-of-reality-219985">she writes here</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-four-hour-qanda-is-a-valuable-insight-into-the-russian-presidents-version-of-reality-219985">Putin's four-hour Q&A is a valuable insight into the Russian president's version of reality</a>
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<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Ukraine Recap weekly email newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>Zelensky was recently in Washington to plead Ukraine’s case for continuing US backing. But he had to leave empty handed for now after meetings at the White House and a closed-door sessions with senators as well as Republican House leader, Mike Johnson. “I admire him, but he didn’t change my mind at all about what we need to do,” Republican senator Lindsey Graham told the BBC. “I know what needs to happen to get a deal. I want to secure our border.”</p>
<p>Jessica Trisko Darden, an associate professor of political science at Virginia Commonwealth University has the background on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/5-things-to-know-about-us-aid-to-ukraine-219872">US aid roadblock</a> and what Ukraine might need to do to overcome it.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/5-things-to-know-about-us-aid-to-ukraine-219872">5 things to know about US aid to Ukraine</a>
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<h2>Nato divisions</h2>
<p>When Zelensky arrived in Washington, Republican congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene made her position clear on X (formerly Twitter): “With Zelensky in town and Ukraine money running dry, why doesn’t anyone in Washington talk about a peace treaty with Russia??” she tweeted. “A deal with Putin promising he will not continue any further invasions. Answer: Washington wants war, not peace. Isn’t that awful?! I’m still a NO.”</p>
<p>Setting aside the fact that Putin had already invaded Georgia, years before he sent his war machine into Ukraine and has broken a host of treaties in recent years, Greene also seems blissfully unaware that the4 vast majority of funding earmarked for military aid to Ukraine stays in the US and pays for US military materiel which is used to degrade Russia’s military capabilities.</p>
<p>But the possibility of years of increased defence spending is certainly putting pressure on Ukraine’s western allies, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-with-stalemate-on-the-battlefield-nato-needs-unity-and-commitment-more-than-ever-219761">writes Kenton White</a>, an expert in strategic studies and international relations at the University of Reading. Apart from anything else, the arms already donated to Kyiv have come close to exhausting the production capacity of Nato member states. (Apparently the number of Javelin missiles sent by the US to Ukraine in the first six months of the war represented seven years of regular production.)</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-with-stalemate-on-the-battlefield-nato-needs-unity-and-commitment-more-than-ever-219761">Ukraine war: with stalemate on the battlefield Nato needs unity and commitment more than ever</a>
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<p>The EU is also experiencing difficulties in getting its own aid package through. Hungary is the main stumbling block here. Hungary’s president, Viktor Orbán, is firmly in Putin’s camp and is not only wielding his country’s veto when it comes to the €50 billion (£25.7 billion) EU financial package for Ukraine, but has signalled he will make trouble for Ukraine when it comes to joining the EU.</p>
<p>Last week he “left the room” when the European Council voted to begin accession talks with Kyiv. But, as <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-opening-eu-accession-talks-is-an-important-boost-for-zelensky-despite-orbans-obstruction-219987">Stefan Wolff writes</a>, these talks are likely to last a decade or more and will be subject to the final agreement of all member states. Still, Wolff believes that the EU will find a way of “working around” the barriers put up by Hungary and the fact that it has signalled it wants Ukraine in the tent cannot but be a fillip for Zelensky at a time of uncertainty.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-opening-eu-accession-talks-is-an-important-boost-for-zelensky-despite-orbans-obstruction-219987">Ukraine: opening EU accession talks is an important boost for Zelensky despite Orbán's obstruction</a>
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<p>Luigi Lonardo, an expert in EU legal matters at University College Cork, meanwhile. details the military, economic and political imperatives <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-ukraine-needs-from-its-european-partners-and-the-us-in-2024-220252">facing Kyiv next year</a>, as well as some key issues that could affect continuing western support.</p>
<p>Lonardo spells out the clear European interest in preventing Russia from seizing any more territory in Ukraine and points to the critical need for countries such as Slovakia and Hungary, which have signalled they may not continue to support EU aid for Kyiv, to fall into line with the majority of members. Without EU support, he says, and in the event Donald Trump wins office at the end of the year and cuts off US military backing, Ukraine’s prospects for regaining control of its pre-2014 borders look all but impossible.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-ukraine-needs-from-its-european-partners-and-the-us-in-2024-220252">What Ukraine needs from its European partners (and the US) in 2024</a>
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<h2>Putin’s popularity</h2>
<p>Meanwhile Putin’s polling numbers remain strong. According to Russian research institute the Levada Center, the president’s approval rating is 85%, while in September the war in Ukraine received an approval rating northwards of 70%. Of course, it’s tempting to assume that you can’t trust opinion polling coming out of Russia, but – as Alexander Hill, a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-russians-still-support-vladimir-putin-and-the-war-in-ukraine-219484">Russia specialist from the University of Calgary notes</a> – Levada is deemed a “foreign agent” by the Russian government. And its results are backed by other polling organisations.</p>
<p>As already noted, Russia’s economy has handled the western sanctions remarkably well, news from the battlefield is a great deal better than it was this time last year and of course there’s a “rally round the flag” effect you’d expect in any country. That and the fact that the media is now almost completely under the control of the Kremlin.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-russians-still-support-vladimir-putin-and-the-war-in-ukraine-219484">Why Russians still support Vladimir Putin and the war in Ukraine</a>
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<p>So when Putin runs for election for a fifth term of office early next year, you’d get pretty short odds on him winning again. His strategy is straight out of the autocrats’ playbook. Rule number one: first eliminate the opposition.</p>
<p>It was with this principle in mind no doubt that Putin had dissident politician Alexei Navalny poisoned in 2020 and then arrested when he returned to Russia in 2021. Navalny has since been found guilty of an array of charges, the most recent of which was “extremism”, which carries a sentence of 19 years. Added to the sentences he was already serving, this leaves him facing more than three decades inside.</p>
<p>If he survives that is. At present nobody seems to know where Navalny is after he is reported to have disappeared a fortnight ago, leading to speculation he may have been done away with. Kevin Riehle, an expert in intelligence and security at Brunel University London, thinks it more likely that Navalny has been transferred to a more remote and secure prison complex where his contact with the outside world will be minimal.</p>
<p>But as Riehle concedes, Putin’s opponents have a <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-disappears-from-jail-another-in-the-long-line-of-russian-dissidents-to-fall-foul-of-vladimir-putin-220147">habit of coming off badly</a> and the more prominent the opponent, the worse fate they can expect.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-disappears-from-jail-another-in-the-long-line-of-russian-dissidents-to-fall-foul-of-vladimir-putin-220147">Alexei Navalny disappears from jail – another in the long line of Russian dissidents to fall foul of Vladimir Putin</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220246/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A round up of our coverage of the war in Ukraine over the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2200052023-12-21T11:58:15Z2023-12-21T11:58:15ZUkraine war: Kyiv digs in for the long haul with prospects looking bleak for 2024<p>Almost two years after Russia launched its <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/search?q=ukraine+invasion+2022">full-scale invasion of Ukraine</a>, there are no signs of a military victory for either side. Nor are there clear prospects of a ceasefire, let alone a negotiated settlement. Neither Kyiv nor Moscow are willing to compromise on their stated war aims – but neither has a clear path to achieving them. </p>
<p>All that Russia and Ukraine can muster for now are the resources to prevent the other side from winning, at the cost of more human suffering, in particular in Ukraine.</p>
<p>At the end of 2022, momentum appeared to be on Ukraine’s side. A successful counteroffensive had delivered significant territorial gains around Kharkiv in the north and forced Russia to withdraw from Kherson in the south. </p>
<p>Over the following months, Russia made a number of symbolic gains, capturing <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-bloody-battle-for-soledar-and-what-it-tells-us-about-the-future-of-the-conflict-197625">Soledar</a> in January 2023 and <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2023">Bakhmut</a> in May. Both came at a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2023/aug/10/how-bakhmut-became-a-pivot-in-the-ukraine-war">huge cost</a> to Moscow, especially in terms of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/18/us/politics/ukraine-russia-war-casualties.html">human lives</a>. But they also demonstrated the Kremlin’s determination – and ability – to prevail. </p>
<p>A much-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive began in June. But it took longer to get underway than had been planned and failed to replicate the successes of the previous year. As a result, Ukraine was able to make only small <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2023">territorial gains</a> by the end of the year – especially along the frontline in the Zaporizhia region in the south. </p>
<p>More successful, albeit less consequential for the overall war, were Ukraine’s <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-reports-fresh-success-in-the-battle-of-the-black-sea/">successful efforts</a> to diminish Russian naval capabilities in the Black Sea and forcing the Black Sea fleet to redeploy from Crimea to bases on the Russian mainland. </p>
<p>Over the past few weeks, some of the most intensive fighting has been focused on Donbas, where Russia has made small territorial gains in its effort to consolidate control of the Luhansk region and capture all of the Donetsk region. Apart from its superiority in manpower, Russia also benefits from Ukrainian <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-troops-face-artillery-shortages-scale-back-some-operations-commander-2023-12-18/">shortages</a> of artillery munitions, something <a href="https://kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/files/setting_transatlantic_defence_up_for_success_0.pdf">likely</a> to continue into 2024. </p>
<p>This will not only put future Ukrainian offensives at risk but potentially also increase the likelihood of a new Russian offensive. For now, the Kremlin’s offensive operations <a href="https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1737401933919351290/photo/1">appear</a> localised and there is no expectation of major breakthrough. However, this could change as Russia ramps up its own war economy and receives more imports from allies such as North Korea. </p>
<p>It is not surprising that the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-four-hour-qanda-is-a-valuable-insight-into-the-russian-presidents-version-of-reality-219985">insisted</a> at his annual end-of-year press conference on December 14 that there will be no peace until Russia achieves its goals of “denazification, demilitarisation and a neutral status for Ukraine”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-four-hour-qanda-is-a-valuable-insight-into-the-russian-presidents-version-of-reality-219985">Putin's four-hour Q&A is a valuable insight into the Russian president's version of reality</a>
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<p>This is hardly a basis for negotiations as Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JsYLnj0rhwU">made clear</a> in his own press conference. Insisting that his own ten-point peace formula was the only way forward to a just and stable peace, Zelensky, however, also admitted that he could see no clear end to the conflict. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/JsYLnj0rhwU?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Volodymyr Zelensky: no end in sight to the conflict.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Both Zelensky’s foreign minister, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/path-victory-ukraine-dmytro-kuleba">Dmytro Kuleba</a>, and chief of staff, <a href="https://www.usip.org/events/ukraines-peace-formula-just-and-lasting-peace">Andriy Yermak</a>, have been more upbeat in recent public pronouncements about the likelihood of a Ukrainian victory. And recent opinion polls <a href="https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1332&page=2">confirm</a> that almost three-quarters of Ukrainians are unwilling to make any territorial concessions to Russia in exchange for peace. </p>
<p>Yet, the prospect of another year of mostly attritional warfare is particularly worrying for Kyiv as doubts over the sustainability of western military and financial support persist.</p>
<p>Western rhetorical support of Ukraine’s war aims – the complete restoration of its sovereignty and territorial integrity – appears in stark contrast with the continuing hesitation to provide Ukraine with the resources needed to win on the battlefield. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566867/original/file-20231220-23-eo1pgl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="ISW map showing Ukraine and the main areas of fighting and control." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566867/original/file-20231220-23-eo1pgl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566867/original/file-20231220-23-eo1pgl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566867/original/file-20231220-23-eo1pgl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566867/original/file-20231220-23-eo1pgl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566867/original/file-20231220-23-eo1pgl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566867/original/file-20231220-23-eo1pgl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566867/original/file-20231220-23-eo1pgl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The state of the war in Ukraine as of December 19, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>Not only has this <a href="https://time.com/6548816/ukraine-biden-administration-military-aid/">hampered</a> Ukraine’s efforts to liberate territories illegally occupied by Russia, it has likely also <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/12/18/west-s-inaction-over-ukraine-risks-dangerous-conclusions-in-moscow-pub-91290">emboldened</a> the Kremlin to refuse to engage in any meaningful negotiations. Unless there is a significant step-change in the quantity and quality of western military support for Ukraine, this is <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/2024-preview-the-west-must-decide-if-it-wants-ukraine-to-win/">unlikely to change</a>.</p>
<p>With the current deadlock in the US <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d35e1a68-9bcc-43d3-80a1-ff6aeeebff3d">congress</a> and the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/52c67ea0-876c-43cf-9d9a-4bd84463d161">EU</a> over further funding for Ukraine, 2024 is unlikely to be the year in which Putin will be defeated in Ukraine. </p>
<h2>Cause for optimism</h2>
<p>But another year of stalemate, costly though it will be, could also provide an opportunity for Ukraine. </p>
<p>Focusing on defence against further Russian attempts to occupy more Ukrainian territory will be a more realistic and more attainable campaign goal for Kyiv. It will create opportunities for an urgently needed rethink and refresh of military and political strategies for how to end the war. </p>
<p>This would also allow Ukraine to properly train and make the best strategic use of a possible 500,000 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-military-asks-additional-450000-500000-people-be-mobilised-zelenskiy-2023-12-19/">newly recruited</a> soldiers to beef up its <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraines-front-line-troops-are-getting-older-physically-i-cant-handle-this-46d9b2c7">ageing and exhausted</a> frontline troops. </p>
<p>It will also give Kyiv’s European allies time to find a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/13ae7d1b-5d6c-4180-8e89-bccae8993276">way out</a> of the current impasse over funding for Ukraine. This would not only be an important lifeline for Ukraine’s economy but also a necessary contingency should US funding continue to be blocked in the run-up to, and possibly after, the 2024 election cycle. </p>
<p>At the same time, efforts in Ukraine to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/12/ukraine-corruption-issues-defense-industry/676337/">improve</a> its own defence production and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-says-israel-hamas-war-shows-west-must-ramp-up-arms-production/">joint ventures</a> with western defence companies could be important steps in creating a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1f9383b5-5cef-4e23-b7b1-c497727dc53c">military-industrial complex</a> in Ukraine. </p>
<p>Cumulatively, these individual steps could allow Ukraine not only to deny Russia further territorial gains in 2024 but also change Moscow’s overall calculus about what its own endgame in the war will be. Like most other wars, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine will most likely also end at the negotiation table. Even if this does not happen in 2024, it does not mean that diplomatic efforts should be neglected. </p>
<p>While fighting may still be intense, yet inconclusive, in 2024, informal, unofficial, quiet diplomacy can explore the parameters of a future settlement that keeps Ukraine safe from future Russian aggression and deters the Kremlin from similar <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-russia-war-latest-putin-could-target-baltics-and-moldova-next-army-chief-warns-mouse-fever-outbreak-hits-hitting-russian-troops-12541713">adventures</a> in the Baltic states or Moldova. </p>
<p>To achieve this will require political and military leaders in Kyiv and in Ukraine’s western partner capitals to take a hard and honest look at what they really want, and can, achieve. If their aims remain victory in Ukraine and a renewed and stable European security order in the long term, they need to contemplate scaling down military objectives and scaling up diplomatic efforts in the short term.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220005/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK, a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky admits there is no end in sight to the war with Russia.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2197612023-12-19T16:53:53Z2023-12-19T16:53:53ZUkraine war: with stalemate on the battlefield Nato needs unity and commitment more than ever<p>As the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, arrived in Washington earlier this month for talks aimed at securing further military aid, Republican congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene <a href="https://twitter.com/RepMTG/status/1734267150628724931">posted on X</a> (formerly Twitter): “With Zelensky in town and Ukraine money running dry, why doesn’t anyone in Washington talk about a peace treaty with Russia?? A deal with Putin promising he will not continue any further invasions. Answer: Washington wants war, not peace. Isn’t that awful?! I’m still a NO.” </p>
<p>Greene and her hard-right Republican colleagues have been attempting to leverage domestic politics to influence the US response to an international crisis without truly understanding the consequences. What is not being made clear by those who argue an isolationist “America first” line to a receptive conservative audience is that a significant proportion of the aid given to Ukraine, possibly as much as 90%, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/11/29/ukraine-military-aid-american-economy-boost/">stays within the US</a>. It is used to buy American-made armaments and other goods. </p>
<p>But the geopolitical repercussions are very clear and very significant. If the US stops providing Ukraine with military aid, it will lose the war and leave Putin with the message that it has everything to gain from military aggression. </p>
<p>Greene and her ilk clearly haven’t grasped the coldblooded ease with which Putin has broken both Russia’s treaty obligations and international law with the illegal invasion of Ukraine. It demonstrates a clear lack of understanding of the realities of relations with Russia. </p>
<p>But it’s an ominous sign for Ukraine that a growing number of its allies within Nato are having these internal discussions over supplying Kyiv with military aid. It goes to the heart of Nato’s core task of crisis management and cooperative security, as described in its <a href="https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/">2022 Strategic Concept</a>, which identifies Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as the key crisis facing the alliance.</p>
<p>The key question now is whether Nato can continue to provide a coherent and coordinated response to Russia’s aggression. </p>
<h2>Nato capabilities</h2>
<p>The war has put enormous pressure on Nato’s weapons manufacturing capability. Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Nato strategy was to produce and stockpile a limited supply of weapons and ammunition to fight small or <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1021906">“come-as-you-are” wars</a> – a term often used to describe the sort of conflict that doesn’t require a shift to a wartime economy. </p>
<p>The question now is whether the west can ramp up its manufacturing capacity to fight what is in essence a proxy war. To give just one example, the number of Javelin missiles sent by the US to Ukraine from the end of February 2022 to August 2022 represented <a href="https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-01/230119_Jones_Empty_Bins.pdf?VersionId=mW3OOngwul8V2nR2EHKBYxkpiOzMiS88">seven years</a> of regular production.</p>
<p>Perhaps Nato could learn from the experience of South Korea, which for the whole of its existence has been familiar with border tensions and the need to maintain a strong military capability. </p>
<p>For decades it has stockpiled weapons and ammunition and has shipped more 155mm shells to Ukraine than <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-us-planning-russia-war/">all of Kyiv’s European allies combined</a>. Seoul now has one of the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremybogaisky/2022/11/07/south-korea-has-quietly-become-one-of-the-worlds-biggest-weapons-suppliers/">world’s biggest stockpiles</a> of weapons and ammunition. Perhaps Nato needs to do likewise.</p>
<p>But the main problem that this conflict presents to Nato is that on the one hand it is willing and ready to share its military doctrine with Ukraine, but on the other it has not been able – or willing, in some cases – to provide the wherewithal for Ukraine to fight the war accordingly.</p>
<p>Nato’s combined arms doctrine relies on the coordination of land and air power. Without one, the other will not provide the results demanded. And, as yet, Ukraine cannot control the skies above the battlefield as it has insufficient fighter jets and trained pilots. </p>
<p>The third element of a combined military doctrine is sea power, which is where Ukraine has enjoyed a degree of success, denying Russia control of the northwestern Black Sea and launching several attacks on Russia’s Black Sea fleet at Sevastopol, which has compelled Russia to move its naval assets to safer ports further afield.</p>
<p>Britain, the Netherlands and Norway have agreed to <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/12/11/ukraine-allies-provide-ships-to-ward-off-russia-in-the-black-sea/">send mine clearing ships to Ukraine</a> to help secure shipping lanes against Russian attempts to set a blockade. </p>
<p>Significantly, access to the Black Sea through the Dardanelles is controlled by Turkey, a Nato member, and transit of warships of belligerent nations can be refused. Turkey has denied at least one Russian request to <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Most-read-in-2022/Turkey-rejects-Russia-s-request-for-navy-ships-to-pass-Bosporus">transit warships through the straits</a>, but it cannot refuse access to Russian ships which are based in the Black Sea.</p>
<h2>Playing politics</h2>
<p>The key concern, though, is political. In recent months – and certainly since the conflict in Gaza exploded into life on October 7 – there have been signs that support for Ukraine’s war effort from western countries may have a limit. </p>
<p>In the US, Republican senators <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-67637679">blocked the passage</a> of an aid bill which would have delivered up to US$60 billion (£47 billion) for Ukraine as well as funds for Israel and aid for Gaza. Meanwhile Hungary <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-67724357">recently vetoed</a> a EU aid package of a further €50 billion (£43 billion).</p>
<p>Both the EU and the Biden administration in the US <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/the-limits-of-as-long-as-it-takes-why-ukraines-allies-need-to-update-their-strategy/">are confident</a> that they will eventually get their funding bills through, but voices calling for Ukraine to seek a ceasefire with a possibility of a territorial settlement with Russia have grown larger since it became clear that Kyiv’s summer counter-offensive would not be the success that had been hoped for.</p>
<p>Putin signalled in his <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-four-hour-qanda-is-a-valuable-insight-into-the-russian-presidents-version-of-reality-219985">annual press conference</a> recently that Russia’s war aims had not changed, saying: “There will be peace when we achieve our goals. They haven’t changed. Denazification of Ukraine, the demilitarisation of Ukraine.”</p>
<p>Nato needs to be equally clear about what it wants the outcome of this conflict to look like.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219761/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kenton White does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nato is showing ominous signs of becoming war weary. It must maintain its support for Ukraine.Kenton White, Lecturer in Strategic Studies and International Relations, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2188882023-12-11T15:50:07Z2023-12-11T15:50:07ZUkraine war: stakes are high for EU and Ukraine ahead of crucial European summit<p>When the EU’s heads of state and government come together in Brussels for their final European Council meeting of the year on December 14 and 15, their <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2023/12/14-15/">agenda</a> is likely to be dominated by the war in Ukraine. </p>
<p>As you’d expect, the war has an agenda item of its own – but it is also central to discussions on enlargement, the budget and European defence. Decisions made at this meeting will have far-reaching implications – not only for Ukraine but also for the EU.</p>
<p>The EU has to balance its internal cohesion with its foreign and security policies, including preserving its appetite and capacity for further enlargement. This presents Brussels and member states with some important challenges.</p>
<p>First, Hungary’s prime minister, Victor Orbán, has been very <a href="https://twitter.com/PM_ViktorOrban/status/1731619765909647867">clear</a> that he does not support continued EU funding of Ukraine’s war effort. This is partly a gambit by Orbán to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/billions-frozen-funds-hungary-table-eu-seeks-ukraine-support-2023-10-03/">unlock</a> approximately €22 billion (£19 billion) of EU aid to Hungary <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/12/rule-of-law-conditionality-mechanism/">frozen</a> because of concerns over judicial independence, academic freedom and LGBTQ+ rights in Hungary. </p>
<p>Another issue concerns the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/08/ukraines-hungarians-in-spotlight-as-orban-threatens-to-block-eu-accession">situation</a> of Ukraine’s Hungarian minority, which Orbán claims has been neglected and discriminated against by Kyiv. </p>
<p>There <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6fabd355-c8ca-4ea6-b905-8a536f8d087b">appears</a> to be some progress on unfreezing EU aid to Hungary, with the European Commission approving an initial payout of about €900 million in November. And, in terms of minority rights, a bill addressing this issue was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-parliament-approves-minorities-bill-seen-key-eu-talks-2023-12-08/">signed into law</a> on December 8 as part of a tranche of legislation designed to ease Ukraine’s entry to the EU. </p>
<p>But given Orbán’s close <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-vladimir-putin-us-concerned-over-hungary-relationship-with-russia/">relationship</a> with Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, it is not clear whether this will be enough to get Orbán to drop his veto.</p>
<p>Should the Hungarian premier persist, the EU’s next budget is also in peril. This would prevent the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6cd69168-aef4-4c8c-950c-62d7465fe5bb">unlocking</a> of €50 billion of <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_3345">aid</a> for Ukraine and block a proposed <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/european-parliament-supports-increase-in-2024-defence-budgets/">increase</a> in the EU’s defence spending. </p>
<p>This will have to increase significantly in the years to come because developing European capabilities to deter future Russian aggression is essential for the EU’s security. </p>
<p>A potential second Trump presidency puts question marks on US commitments to Nato and there is a danger of further increasing tensions with China in the Pacific distracting the US from Euro-Atlantic defence. </p>
<h2>Where does this leave Ukraine?</h2>
<p>These and other challenges faced by the EU leave Ukraine in increasing peril. With US funding <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ca16e42d-fda9-4c1d-b2c9-410d764745b7">running out</a> by the end of the year and no clear path to its renewal, Kyiv depends more and more on its European partners. Equally <a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/news/ukraine-support-tracker-new-aid-drops-to-lowest-level-since-january-2022/">worrying</a>, new aid commitments are now at their lowest level since January 2022. </p>
<p>The EU has <a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/Media/Images/News_Press_Releases/2023/mi2023-12-07_Cumulative-heavy-weapon-v02-EN.svg">overtaken</a> the US as the largest donor of committed military aid. However, this is not an indication of broad European support, but the result of the efforts of a small core of countries, including Germany and Scandinavia.</p>
<p>Military aid is essential to Ukraine’s survival, but it is not sufficient. If the EU does not approve its proposed €50 billion support for Kyiv, the country’s economic survival would be at risk because of the massive <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/will-western-aid-plug-ukraines-gaping-budget-deficit-2024-2023-12-05/">budget deficit</a> that Ukraine keeps accumulating due to its war effort. </p>
<p>A failure by the EU to open accession negotiations would also exacerbate the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91182">blame game</a> at the top between Ukraine’s political and military leaders and the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-ex-president-says-he-was-blocked-leaving-country-2023-12-01/">squabbling</a> between government and opposition over Kyiv’s war strategy.</p>
<h2>Is Kyiv fighting a losing battle?</h2>
<p>For now, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has doubled down on his efforts to defeat Russia militarily by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/zelenskiy-says-change-needed-ukraines-mobilisation-system-2023-12-01/">announcing</a> more, and more effective, mobilisation of troops. But, in light of a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-ukraines-counteroffensive-has-struggled-so-far-2023-11-03/">failed</a> counteroffensive this year, he has also <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-67587331">conceded</a> that more needs to be done to increase defences across the entire almost 1,000km frontline with Russia.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ukraine showing Russia's territorial demands and the territory it actually holds in Ukraine." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Ukraine’s largely unsuccessful counter-offensive in the summer may mean that Kyiv has to cede territory to Moscow.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>With Russia <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-increases-maximum-size-armed-forces-by-170000-servicemen-2023-12-01/">announcing</a> a further increase in its armed forces by 170,000 new recruits to over 1.3 million servicemen in total, there can be little doubt that the <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4350776-ukraine-stalemate-shifts-war-putin-russia/">shift</a> on the battlefield in Russia’s favour is gaining momentum.</p>
<p>Even if the European Council meeting in Brussels later this week delivers the opening of accession negotiations and more financial aid, further territorial losses, such as around <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/whats-stake-russias-assault-avdiivka-2023-12-01/">Avdiivka</a>, and another Russian <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/12/zelenskiy-warns-ukrainians-to-prepare-for-russian-attacks-on-infrastructure">campaign</a> against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure over the winter would prove difficult for Kyiv and raise more questions about the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2447a4b4-bbff-4439-a96c-e3c5404ed105">sustainability</a> of western support.</p>
<p>This leaves Ukraine and the EU with difficult choices to make. The accession process will be long, costly and protracted. Major <a href="https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/10.5771/9783748917366-06/supporting-recovery-reintegration-and-accession-opportunities-and-challenges-for-the-osce-in-ukraine?page=1">challenges</a> lie ahead in terms of the necessary reforms Kyiv needs to carry out, the financial burden that the country’s post-war recovery will involve and the difficulties that Ukraine will face when it comes to reintegrating liberated territories and populations. </p>
<p>Depending on when and how the war will end, there are four scenarios that Kyiv and Brussels can contemplate. </p>
<p>If the war ends soon and with a ceasefire that freezes the current frontline, a German scenario of prolonged division but eventual reunification is conceivable that would integrate at least part of Ukraine early into the EU, probably with credible security guarantees against further Russian aggression. </p>
<p>Along similar lines, a Cyprus scenario could unfold where the EU membership issue is fudged at the time of accession. In both cases, the government-controlled part of Ukraine could see further democratic consolidation and economic recovery.</p>
<p>Two alternatives are possible to think of if the war ends soon and with the restoration of all or part of currently Russian-occupied territories to Ukrainian sovereignty. </p>
<p>A Croatia-style scenario would imply a military defeat of Russia and reintegration of the country as a result. Given the current realities on the battlefield, this is highly unlikely. A Bosnia-style negotiated settlement leading to a dysfunctional state and no reintegration, by contrast, may be more likely, but is undesirable because it would all but rule out EU accession. </p>
<p>The challenge for EU leaders at their year-end summit will be above all to find a way forward that enables Ukraine to survive militarily and economically what will be a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-are-both-sides-preparing-for-stalemate-217848">challenging</a> winter and year ahead. This could then open a pathway to both a negotiated settlement with Russia and EU membership.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218888/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK, a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With the prospect of a second Trump presidency halting military aid for Ukraine, it is vital for Kyiv that the EU finds a way to unlock more funding.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2194382023-12-07T17:19:40Z2023-12-07T17:19:40ZUkraine recap: western divisions an ominous sign for Kyiv as the aid funding tap begins to dry up<p>For the past week or so it has felt as if Ukraine’s fate is more likely to be decided in Washington and Brussels than on the battlefield as US president Joe Biden struggles to get his US$111 billion (£88 billion) package of aid through the senate and EU members quibble over a €50 billion euro (£43 billion) lifeline for Kyiv.</p>
<p>“History is going to judge harshly those who turn their back on freedom’s cause. We can’t let Putin win,” Biden said after a video meeting with G7 leaders. But with all 49 Republican senators voting against the aid package, it remains stalled. And the recent electoral triumph of far-right candidates in Slovakia and the Netherlands and the intransigence of Hungary means that European solidarity behind Ukraine appears to be beginning to crumble.</p>
<p>Meanwhile Russia continues to be a diplomatic wrecking ball. Last week foreign minister Sergei Lavrov attended the annual ministers’ meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which is fast becoming an oxymoron. Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states refused to send their foreign ministers to the meeting over Lavrov’s presence, while the US’s Antony Blinken and UK’s David Cameron attended a pre-conference dinner but avoided any contact with Lavrov. </p>
<p>Meanwhile Lavrov blocked the appointment of Estonia as chair for the OSCE in 2024 (a non-Nato member – Malta – has been chosen instead). A three-year extension to the mandate of the OSCE’s secretary general and other top officials was planned. But rather than nodding this through, the meeting reached what Stefan Wolff – professor of international security at the University of Birmingham – has called a “<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russias-hard-line-at-european-security-meeting-ratchets-up-tensions-another-notch-218938">messy compromise</a>”. It allows the OSCE to carry on for only another nine months without a fresh agreement, which looks unlikely at this point.</p>
<p>Lavrov’s insistence that OSCE is becoming “an appendage of Nato and the EU” and finds itself “on the brink of the abyss” sounded an ominous note for the future of security and cooperation in Europe, Wolff says. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russias-hard-line-at-european-security-meeting-ratchets-up-tensions-another-notch-218938">Ukraine war: Russia's hard line at European security meeting ratchets up tensions another notch</a>
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<p>Over the past 22 months, Lavrov and his master, the Russian president Vladimir Putin, have proved themselves adept at manipulating the narrative over the invasion of Ukraine. Lavrov’s statement to the OSCE was peppered with references to Ukraine’s “Nazi regime” and Ukrainian “fascism” being given “a new lease on life through the Ukrainian elite with active encouragement from quite a few Nato and European Union member countries”.</p>
<p>Julia Khrebtan-Hörhager, associate professor of critical cultural & international studies at Colorado State University, has taken a <a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-attempt-to-control-narrative-in-ukraine-employs-age-old-tactic-of-othering-the-enemy-206154">detailed look</a> at Moscow’s strategy of “othering” its enemies, especially since the invasion began in February last year. This is, she says, “a framing that fits well the Russian phrase that translates in English as ‘who is not with us, is against us,’ forms of which have been popularized through czarist and Soviet years and have returned with a vengeance under Putin”.</p>
<p>She traces the way Putin and his allies have effectively fused a “Nazi” Ukraine with the “decadent” west bent on corrupting the soul of Russia.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-attempt-to-control-narrative-in-ukraine-employs-age-old-tactic-of-othering-the-enemy-206154">Russian attempt to control narrative in Ukraine employs age-old tactic of 'othering' the enemy</a>
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<img alt="Ukraine Recap weekly email newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<h2>War crimes</h2>
<p>Russia is also taking a wrecking ball to much of Ukraine’s cultural heritage, writes Derek Matravers, professor of philosophy at the Open University. He cites a recent report published by the journal Antiquity, which lists damage to a number of historic sites. These include the Unesco-listed Vasyl Tarnovsky Museum of Ukrainian Antiquities and the burial mound at Boldyni Hory – one of the largest 11th-century Ukrainian necropolises.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564309/original/file-20231207-21-ranice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ukraine with Russian-occupied territory in red and claimed Ukrainian counteroffensives in blue." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564309/original/file-20231207-21-ranice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564309/original/file-20231207-21-ranice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564309/original/file-20231207-21-ranice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564309/original/file-20231207-21-ranice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564309/original/file-20231207-21-ranice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564309/original/file-20231207-21-ranice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564309/original/file-20231207-21-ranice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The state of the war in Ukraine according to the Institute for the Study of War.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>Since the war began, Unesco has verified damage to 329 sites, while museum collections have been stolen and shipped back to Russia. This, Matravers <a href="https://theconversation.com/destruction-of-ukrainian-heritage-why-losing-historical-icons-can-leave-a-long-shadow-218558">points out</a>, amounts to a war crime under the Hague convention of 1954 – or to give it its proper title, the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/destruction-of-ukrainian-heritage-why-losing-historical-icons-can-leave-a-long-shadow-218558">Destruction of Ukrainian heritage: why losing historical icons can leave a long shadow</a>
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<p>In terms of war crimes in general, investigators are working hard to gather evidence of crimes committed by both sides in this bitter conflict. Olivera Simic of Griffith University and Anastasiia Chupis of Zaporizhzhia National University in Ukraine have been talking with activists who are engaged in fieldwork, <a href="https://theconversation.com/an-inside-look-at-the-dangerous-painstaking-work-of-collecting-evidence-of-suspected-war-crimes-in-ukraine-214725">documenting evidence</a> of attacks and other suspected crimes on Ukrainian educational facilities. </p>
<p>As of November, 365 educational establishments across Ukraine had been destroyed completely and another 3,800 institutions either partially destroyed or severely damaged from bombing and shelling, according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Education. As you’d expect, attacks on educational establishments and students are prohibited under international humanitarian law. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/an-inside-look-at-the-dangerous-painstaking-work-of-collecting-evidence-of-suspected-war-crimes-in-ukraine-214725">An inside look at the dangerous, painstaking work of collecting evidence of suspected war crimes in Ukraine</a>
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<h2>Who foots the bill?</h2>
<p>All of which begs the question of who will foot the bill for rebuilding once the fighting stops. And of course that will depends very much on the outcome. But there is a growing push to use Russian state assets, including central bank reserves, to pay. Jon Unruh from McGill University in Canada and Geoffrey Goodell from UCL have taken a look at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/seizing-russian-state-assets-to-rebuild-ukraine-will-it-prolong-the-war-or-end-it-218224">pros and cons of this approach</a>. </p>
<p>Russia’s frozen state assets reportedly amount to about €300 billion, which represents a fair bit of leverage when it comes to peace negotiations. This is in line with the idea that most of the measures taken to try to deter Russia from its war of aggression (sanctions, embargoes, asset freezes and international exclusion) are designed to be reversible. Agreeing to funnel such a sum into the rebuilding of Ukraine removes it as a lever.</p>
<p>You have to imagine it would be a popular move with western taxpayers who might otherwise have to stump up yet more money to help Ukraine get back in its feet.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/seizing-russian-state-assets-to-rebuild-ukraine-will-it-prolong-the-war-or-end-it-218224">Seizing Russian state assets to rebuild Ukraine: Will it prolong the war, or end it?</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219438/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of the best of our coverage of the conflict from the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2178482023-11-22T11:49:34Z2023-11-22T11:49:34ZUkraine war: are both sides preparing for stalemate?<p>US president Joe Biden <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/11/18/joe-biden-gaza-hamas-putin/">took</a> to the pages of the Washington Post last week to assure the American people that continuing economic and military support to Ukraine is an investment in US security. On October 20, the US defence secretary, Lloyd Austin, visited Kyiv to give the Ukrainian leadership a similar assurance together with the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-secretary-defense-austin-us-will-stand-with-ukraine-2023-11-20/">promise of</a> an additional US$100 million (£80 million) in <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3594318/biden-administration-announces-new-security-assistance-for-ukraine/">military aid</a>. </p>
<p>A day later, his German counterpart, Boris Pistorius, <a href="https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3789791-german-defense-minister-announces-eur-13b-military-aid-package-for-ukraine.html">announced</a> a new €1.3 billion (£1.1 billion) support package, focused on defensive equipment including four more IRIS-T SLM air defence systems and anti-tank mines. </p>
<p>This is an indication of a growing realisation that western emphasis is shifting to sustaining Ukraine’s defence against Russian aggression – contrary to the <a href="https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/10/f8cbb26f1c68-no-cease-fire-until-russia-returns-ukrainian-territory-security-head.html">insistence</a> by Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky and his closest political allies that victory on the battlefield is not just possible but probable. This view is now even contested in Kyiv. </p>
<p>In an interview with <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/11/01/ukraines-commander-in-chief-on-the-breakthrough-he-needs-to-beat-russia">The Economist</a>, Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, said: “There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough.” The US defence secretary echoed this view in Kyiv, <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3594984/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-holds-a-press-gaggle-kyiv-ukraine/">emphasising</a> that Ukraine needs to “make the right adjustments” to its strategy. </p>
<p>Similar doubts have been voiced in western capitals for months. In July 2023, the then chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, General Mark Milley, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66075786">warned that</a> that Ukraine’s counteroffensive, then in its fourth week, would be “very long” and “very, very bloody”. </p>
<p>Less than two weeks later, a Nato <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm">communique</a> after its summit in Vilnius [failed to provide] more than the vague promise of future membership. The next day, the G7 leaders’ joint declaration of support for Ukraine <a href="https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100527905.pdf">noted that</a> G7 members were launching negotiations on “bilateral, long-term security commitments and arrangements” to support Ukraine.</p>
<p>There are further sobering signs of a significant reset of western strategy on Ukraine. An article in <a href="https://time.com/6329188/ukraine-volodymyr-zelensky-interview/">Time magazine</a> painted a bleak picture of deliberations in Zelensky’s inner circle over how difficult the war will be to win. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, an <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-european-officials-broach-topic-peace-negotiations-ukraine-sources-rcna123628">NBC</a> story revealed mounting western pressure on Ukraine to consider a peace deal with Russia that would involve at least some territorial concessions.</p>
<h2>No appetite for endless conflict</h2>
<p>The underlying premise of this reset in western attitudes is that the outcome of this war will ultimately not be decided for a long time. </p>
<p>Bilateral security guarantees – especially from the US, UK, Germany and France – would go some way in assuring Ukraine that the west would continue to have its back while kicking the thorny issue of Nato membership into the long grass. </p>
<p>The west could also remain rhetorically committed to Zelensky’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-is-zelenskiys-10-point-peace-plan-2022-12-28/">peace formula</a>. And support for EU membership – likely to be a long and slow process – could also continue and assist Ukraine with both reforms and recovery. Such an approach would anchor Ukraine more clearly in the west in ways that might be less unacceptable to Russia than Nato membership.</p>
<h2>Stalemate reached?</h2>
<p>All of this, however, is predicated on the assumption of a stalemate on the ground, which Moscow and Kyiv would need to accept. It also assumes that neither side can see a clear opportunity to either escalate militarily to victory or do enough to have the advantage should the two sides end up at the negotiation table. </p>
<p>Both sides would also need to have grounds to believe that they have the political will and material resources to at least sustain the status quo. They must also be able to credibly signal this to the other side. </p>
<p>For Ukraine, the recent G7 statement, Biden’s article in the Washington Post, and Austin’s comments in Kyiv all contribute to this message without contradicting Zelensky’s stance of no surrender, which still has clear <a href="https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1301&page=3">majority support</a> in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine 20 months ago. It has been a year since any significant movements on the battlefield. No major third-party peace initiatives are on the horizon that could change the calculations of the belligerents. Taken together, a status quo is emerging on the ground.</p>
<p>For this to become a preference for both Moscow and Kyiv over futile and costly attempts of escalation, several conditions need to be met. </p>
<p>For Ukraine, the kind of credible bilateral security guarantees embodied in the G7 Leaders’ joint declaration of support are required. For Russia, it would mean no Ukrainian Nato membership and no significant escalation of western support that could give Kyiv the technological edge it might need to defeat Moscow on the battlefield. </p>
<p>Making the current stalemate sustainable would imply thinking about the situation on the ground – not so much in terms of temporary stalemate to be overcome through military escalation, but more in terms of an acceptable, if imperfect, status quo that is worth preserving. </p>
<p>In practical terms, this would imply no significant fighting and no further mobilisations. As such, it would also likely have an immediate and tangible effect on the lives of people on both sides of the lines of contact.</p>
<p>Progress in this direction will not be linear, especially given upcoming presidential elections in Russia, the US, and – possibly – Ukraine. As the election campaigns get underway, there will be periods of escalation not only along the frontline but also in rhetoric. Neither side is likely to commit in public to a ceasefire. And neither side will disown their articulated maximum demands. </p>
<p>Yet, beyond this, there appears to be a realisation now on all sides that a stable status quo is in everybody’s interest. Moscow, Kyiv, and the west are likely to work towards such stabilisation, pursue humanitarian issues and possibly <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/redefining-success-ukraine">begin</a> negotiations on a ceasefire. </p>
<p>None of this is equivalent to the just and lasting peace that Ukraine and Ukrainians deserve. But it does embody the hope of ultimately achieving such a peace at the negotiation table and not on the battlefield.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217848/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK, a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After nearly two years of bloody battle, there are signs that both sides are nearing exhaustion and might be prepared, for now, to accept a stalemate and an end to the fighting.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2174192023-11-17T14:05:45Z2023-11-17T14:05:45ZUkraine and Moldova have taken a huge step towards EU membership – but these hazards lie ahead<p>The European Commission has confirmed its support for <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_699%20Ukraine%20report.pdf">opening the formal accession process</a> for Ukraine and Moldova to become members of the European Union and for other nations in the western Balkans to move forward with their own bids.</p>
<p>The wider context of war in Ukraine is a potent setup for commission president Ursula von der Leyen’s preference for a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/files/2-24_Lehne-EU_Geopolitics.pdf">geopolitical union</a> and a <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world_en">stronger voice for Europe in the world</a>. <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-signs-that-the-eu-has-completely-changed-its-perspective-on-adding-new-members-since-russia-invaded-ukraine-213429">Enlargement</a> into the east is seen as a <a href="https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15094-2023-INIT/en/pdf">“geostrategic investment”</a>.</p>
<p>The initial reaction of member states has, however, been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/nov/08/eu-ukraine-moldova-kosovo-turkey-member-states-russia-europe-live?filterKeyEvents=false&page=with:block-654bad398f081362db4f964a#block-654bad398f081362db4f964a">mixed</a>. Finland and Lithuania, which border Russia, are supportive. Germany and some other key players prefer to offer an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/02/germany-proposes-giving-eu-candidate-countries-ukraine-observer-status-at-summits">observer rather than full membership status</a> for the foreseeable future. </p>
<p>Others are more overtly opposed. Viktor Orbán, prime minister of Hungary, says he intends to veto any attempt to start negotiations with Ukraine in 2024. Although Orbán’s stance might partly be explained by his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/20/european-leaders-seethe-over-putin-orban--meeting">friendliness</a> with the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, he also opposes rules that restrict non-Ukrainian language education in Ukrainian schools. </p>
<p>These rules were mainly designed with cultural and educational de-Russification in mind following the Russian invasion but they also had a negative impact on minority Hungarian communities in Ukraine. Although Ukraine has already stated its <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-ready-compromise-eu-councils-decision-start-accession-membership-talks/">willingness to compromise</a> on the thorny issue, it’s evidence of how national grievances and agendas among individual member states can represent a significant stumbling block for any candidate country on the road to EU membership.</p>
<h2>Stretched framework</h2>
<p>There are also concerns about whether the existing EU institutional framework is capable of absorbing new member states. For example, Ukraine would be the largest EU member state in territorial terms but it would also be the poorest economically. That has considerable implications for the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a8834254-b8f9-4385-b043-04c2a7cd54c8">EU’s budget</a> and the functioning of the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/744078f2-0895-44d9-96f9-701c13403df0">single market</a>. </p>
<p>Without institutional reform, Ukraine is set to become one of the EU budget’s biggest beneficiaries. It has farmlands eligible for subsidies from the common agricultural policy that cover an area larger than the whole of Italy. Ukraine’s accession under these conditions would seriously undermine the competitiveness of agricultural production in current member states. </p>
<p>Some central and eastern member states have <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eastern-europe-poland-deal-with-eu-clear-ukrainian-grain-glut/">already had to be compensated</a> for their inability to sell their own grain when Ukrainian agricultural products flooded their markets. These countries will be highly reluctant to allow Ukraine’s accession without assurances on protecting their economies. </p>
<p>Reform itself would also be potentially <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8de02993-9713-4350-9bc5-9bd9e8e91b44">divisive</a> among EU member states and debates on the matter could further hold up accession.</p>
<h2>New rules</h2>
<p>Ukraine and Moldova will be among the first nations to start accession under a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_181">new methodology</a> for the process. This reform reflects states’ concerns about <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/649332/EPRS_BRI(2020)649332_EN.pdf">the</a> <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/649332/EPRS_BRI(2020)649332_EN.pdf">suitability</a> of the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/649332/EPRS_BRI(2020)649332_EN.pdf">accession methodology</a> used in previous waves of enlargement, which came to a head when North Macedonia and Albania were <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2019/11/12/north-macedonia-president-meets-macron-after-french-veto-on-eu-accession-talks">refused candidate status</a> in 2019.</p>
<p>Meeting pre-accession requirements under the previously used negotiating approach and over a decade of subsequent membership did little to resolve endemic rule of law and corruption issues in <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022/">member states that joined after 2004</a>. As a result, EU leaders lost trust in the transformative potential of accession processes. When member states that had been admitted under this process turned out not to be ready for membership, negotiations with other candidates stalled in the second half of the 2010s. The new accession methodology aims to restore that trust by making the requirements of the accession process more credible, transparent and predictable.</p>
<p>During accession, a candidate country must adapt their legal system to conform to EU laws. All EU law is divided into thematic chapters within negotiations. Accession only happens if a country meets conditions in relation to all of these chapters. The new methodology emphasises the rule of law as a priority. </p>
<p>Candidates must meet the EU’s requirements on the rule of law, economic criteria, public procurement and public administration reform – grouped together as <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_181">“fundamental conditions”</a> – before they even start to show they’ve met other criteria. Negotiations in relation to these fundamental principles do not close when related criteria are met. These issues remain under constant monitoring under the whole of the accession process. </p>
<p>Under the new rules, if a candidate country is stalling or backsliding on its reforms, progress can be undone – and chapters <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20_182">re-opened</a> for negotiation. This means that candidates cannot treat aligning their legal systems to EU standards as a tick-box exercise. Of course there are still no guarantees against democratic backsliding after accession (as seen in <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/rule-of-law-eu-reprimands-poland-and-hungary/a-66165982">the case of Hungary and Poland</a>) but this new rule should go some way to making post-membership backsliding harder by ensuring the substantial adoption of EU norms during the negotiation process.</p>
<p>The methodology also strongly encourages member states to take ownership of the process. Previously, accession negotiations were seen as a primarily technical process managed by the European Commission. The new approach encourages member states and EU institutions to convene regular summits with candidate countries to enable closer scrutiny. </p>
<p><a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20_182">Phased opt-ins</a> in areas where candidate states make exceptional progress will also now be possible. That means that they could be able to become members of certain European Union policy areas before full membership. Moldova, for example, is currently in the <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-moldova-roam-home-closer-reality-2023-09-01_en">process of joining the EU roaming area</a>.</p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>The political will seems to be there on all sides for Ukraine and Moldova to go ahead. And all appear to see the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_5646">need to act quickly</a>. There is palpable concern about <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/putin-erdogan-and-raisi-make-visits-in-central-asia-/7347892.html">Turkey, Russia and Iran </a> seeking to entrench their influence in other potential candidate countries such as Georgia and Armenia. Starting negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova shows these countries that EU accession is possible.</p>
<p>However, every stage of the process requires a <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/">unanimous vote at the European Council</a>. So while the commission has brought Ukraine and Moldova closer to EU membership than ever seemed possible, the speed of the next stages will be set by member state governments.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217419/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Unless the EU itself reforms, Ukraine’s membership would make it one of the biggest beneficiary of the bloc’s budget.Nora Siklodi, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of PortsmouthNándor Révész, Lecturer in Politics, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2169302023-11-06T13:01:44Z2023-11-06T13:01:44ZUkraine war: stalemate on the battlefield and shaky international support putting pressure on Zelensky<p>More than 20 months into the war in Ukraine and over five months into Ukraine’s latest counteroffensive, the situation on the front is bleak and no breakthrough imminent, the country’s commander-in-chief <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/11/01/ukraines-commander-in-chief-on-the-breakthrough-he-needs-to-beat-russia">admitted in a recent interview</a> with the Economist. </p>
<p>With <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-mixed-signals-among-kyivs-allies-hint-at-growing-conflict-fatigue-213913">doubts increasing</a> over the sustainability of western aid to Ukraine amid a shift of attention to the war in the Middle East, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b5e575fd-7bc2-4359-84d6-f2ed0196ffa9">continuing Russian air strikes</a> across Ukraine as far as the western city of <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/russian-strike-drones-hit-infrastructure-103100019.html">Lviv</a> do not bode well for the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/aea600e6-2c19-42ab-ad13-5c6507c00579">winter ahead</a>.</p>
<p>Little wonder then that there are apparently new efforts underway to push Ukraine towards <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-european-officials-broach-topic-peace-negotiations-ukraine-sources-rcna123628">negotiations with Russia</a>. This is unlikely to lead to actual talks between Moscow and Kyiv for now, but calls to end the war at the negotiation table will not go away. Both Kyiv and its western allies need a clearer vision of an endgame.</p>
<p>Domestically, Zelensky has no incentives to enter into negotiations with Russia at the moment. As he is apparently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-ponders-idea-2024-election-during-war-2023-11-03/">considering elections next spring</a>, the Ukrainian president will keep an eye on public opinion polls in Ukraine. </p>
<p>According to a survey <a href="https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1301&page=3">published in October 2023</a>, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are opposed to making any territorial concessions to Russia, even if this means a longer and costlier war. This is the case across all sections of the population. Even among Russian speakers, 65% said they rejected a compromise that involved trading Ukrainian territory for peace, as did people living close to the frontlines in the east (73%) and south (74%) of the country. </p>
<p>Challengers of Zelensky for the presidency, such as his <a href="https://english.nv.ua/nation/zelenskyy-s-former-advisor-arestovych-to-stand-in-future-elections-50365048.html">former adviser Oleksiy Arestovich</a>, right now stand little chance of advancing their prospects of defeating the incumbent president in elections if they push for negotiations.</p>
<p>However, this might change over the coming months. First, Ukrainians’ support for Zelensky’s course of no concessions to Russia is predicated on at least the maintenance of the status quo, which is far from certain. The Ukrainian <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-ukraines-counteroffensive-has-struggled-so-far-2023-11-03/">counteroffensive</a> has made few gains over the past several months. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Russian onslaught on <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-67095103">Avdiivka</a> in eastern Ukraine has made steady progress. Russian forces are likely to capture the city – despite the enormous human cost of the operation – like they did <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2023">Bakhmut</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-bloody-battle-for-soledar-and-what-it-tells-us-about-the-future-of-the-conflict-197625">Soledar</a> before. </p>
<p>On the political front, the absence of China from the recent <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/23605">meeting in Malta</a> on Zelensky’s ten-point peace plan represents a significant blow to efforts to convene an international peace conference on Ukraine’s terms. Significantly, China participated in a similar gathering in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-talks-in-jeddah-give-kyiv-an-opportunity-to-push-its-ten-point-plan-to-brics-and-the-global-south-211049">Jeddah</a> as recently as August. </p>
<h2>Doubts over international support</h2>
<p>Second, maintaining the status quo depends heavily on continuing western military, economic and political support. This cannot be taken for granted, especially in the US. In May 2022, the then Democrat-led House of Representatives <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/10/politics/house-vote-ukraine-aid-bill/index.html">passed</a> a US$40 billion (£32 billion) support bill with 368 votes to just 57 opposing. In September this year, a US$300 million bill was also <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4229414-house-overwhelmingly-approves-ukraine-aid/">approved</a>, but with more than twice the no votes (117). </p>
<p>Now, the Republican-majority House <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/us-house-to-vote-on-republicans-143-billion-israel-aid-bill/ar-AA1jhHos">has passed a bill</a> excluding aid for Ukraine, which is unlikely to succeed in the Democrat-led Senate and will probably be vetoed by the US president, Joe Biden. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/white-house-says-us-sending-smaller-military-packages-ukraine-due-congress-2023-11-03/">stalemate over aid to Ukraine</a> in the US is particularly problematic as the last US$425 million from the US$18 billion Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative has now been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-send-additional-weapons-aid-ukraine-2023-11-03/">committed</a>. Given the contentious nature of US politics, aid to Ukraine will be a political football to be kicked around between the House, Senate and White House. As the US heads into an election year, this is likely to get worse, not better.</p>
<p>In Europe, the situation is only slightly better. The Italian prime minister, Georgia Meloni, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/giorgia-meloni-ukraine-fatigue-prank-call-russia-war/">admitted</a> to widespread “Ukraine fatigue” in a prank call with two Russian comedians in which she thought she was speaking with officials with the African Union. </p>
<p>As EU leaders <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/positions-not-matching-yet-eu-leaders-fight-slice-budget-pie-2023-10-26/">debated their next four-year budget</a> at the end of October in Brussels, Hungary and Slovakia both opposed more aid for Ukraine. Meanwhile, EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eus-von-der-leyen-visits-kyiv-ahead-report-accession-progress-2023-11-04/">expressed continuing support</a> for Ukraine. </p>
<p>This includes a proposal for the opening of accession talks on the country’s EU membership, likely to be agreed by EU leaders at a summit in December, subject to a favourable <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-eu-membership-bid-be-assessed-report-due-nov-8-2023-10-24/">assessment</a> by the commission. </p>
<p>While the EU can provide Zelensky with political support in the form of opening accession talks and keep Ukraine financially afloat, its €5bn (£4.3bn) military aid package <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/02/eu-foreign-ministers-convene-kyiv-ukraine-russia-war">pales in comparison</a> to US support hitherto.</p>
<h2>Uncertain outcome</h2>
<p>There is a third issue which illustrates the pressure on Zelensky. He may have <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/no-pressure-from-us-or-eu-for-concessions-to-russia-zelensky-says/ar-AA1jnGBx">swiftly denied</a> that he is under pressure to contemplate negotiations with Russia and one of his officials <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/presidential-office-on-zaluzhnyis-article-military-should-refrain-from-disclosing-front-line-situation/">reprimanded</a> Zaluzhny for his comments in the Economist. </p>
<p>But he has yet to demonstrate that his political and military strategy will achieve their aim of restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in full. </p>
<p>How long this window of opportunity will remain open for Zelensky, will significantly depend on the level of western support over the coming months. Even if western countries are disillusioned after 20 months of war, they must continue, and arguably increase, their support for Ukraine. </p>
<p>The likely alternative to this is no longer simply a stalemate on the ground. Withdrawing support brings with it the very real possibility of a Ukrainian defeat on the battlefield and a subsequent humiliation at the negotiation table.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216930/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ukraine needs some successes on the battlefield if it is to maintain international support.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.