tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca-fr/topics/voting-machines-29858/articlesVoting machines – La Conversation2023-09-05T12:31:38Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2119892023-09-05T12:31:38Z2023-09-05T12:31:38ZPaper ballots are good, but accurately hand-counting them all is next to impossible<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545062/original/file-20230828-25-c4lypc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C157%2C5861%2C3737&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Maricopa County, Ariz., conducted a hand recount of the 2020 elections for president and U.S. Senate.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Elections2024MohaveCounty/0db09bc8d43e40ddaf56cfeb6dd42344/photo">AP Photo/Matt York, Pool</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Among people, mostly Republicans, who remain the most suspicious of the 2020 presidential election results, there’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/04/trump-hand-counted-ballots-dominion-machines/">something of a movement to return to the days when election ballots in the United States were counted by hand</a>. One 67,000-person county in Georgia recently <a href="https://www.governing.com/policy/election-skeptics-push-georgia-county-to-count-ballots-by-hand">required a hand count</a> of all ballots, for instance. But they, and others seeking similar changes around the country, are likely to find themselves disappointed – either by failure to mandate hand-counting or by how election results are handled if they succeed.</p>
<p>Requiring hand-counting of all ballots would take elections back many decades to practices that were common in the mid-1800s. In that era, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/american-ballot-box-in-the-midnineteenth-century/CAED117EB944D09422FC8AB82367BE39">political parties produced a variety of paper “tickets” that were counted at polling places on election night</a>. When states started taking responsibility for producing ballots in the late 19th century, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.053007.145205">automated machines began to be used for both casting and tabulating votes</a>.</p>
<p>In a 1930s review of voting processes, political scientist Joseph Harris concluded that “<a href="https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/itl/vote/chapter6.pdf">[p]robably no part of election administration is conducted so poorly as the count of ballots</a>.” Several of the improvements he suggested were in fact adopted after World War II, helped along by new technologies that were faster, more consistent and less prone to error – like optical scanning systems. Today, the overwhelmingly dominant technology <a href="https://verifiedvoting.org/verifier/#mode/navigate/map/ppEquip/mapType/normal/year/2024">uses paper marked ballots that are tabulated by scanner machines</a>.</p>
<p>It is easy to see why a hand-count system seems appealing to many people today. Having ballots scrutinized in person by representatives from the parties provides obvious transparency and accountability. The true result of the infamous 2000 Bush-Gore contest in Florida <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/31/politics/bush-gore-2000-election-results-studies/index.html">remains in doubt</a>, in part, because a hand recount of this kind was not ultimately conducted. States such as Georgia and Wisconsin have undergone hand recounts of the votes cast in their presidential elections. And other democracies such as <a href="https://apnews.com/article/covid-health-business-elections-france-e06fab5cde84f23d682013e1661caf35">France</a> hand-count ballots. In short, it seems possible.</p>
<p>But as a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=-GjN8kAAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">scholar of elections</a>, I know that despite the intuitive appeal of people physically counting pieces of paper, there are two good reasons to avoid hand-counting ballots: speed and accuracy.</p>
<h2>Hand counting is slower</h2>
<p>It takes a long time to count ballots by hand. Counters must pause for regular breaks to stay rested and sharp. Counting must periodically stop to resolve challenges and questions from observers. It is painstaking work. But, in part thanks to mechanical and technological counting systems, Americans have come to expect election results to be available very quickly, even just a few hours after the polls close.</p>
<p>Most U.S. election ballots are long and would require counting of many contests, from president down to county commissioner and probate judge. In other countries where hand counting is used, there is typically <a href="https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2022/french-election-results-faster-united-states/">just one race on the ballot</a>. But in many parts of the U.S., it is common for there to be <a href="https://www.vote411.org/ballot">a dozen contests or many more</a> during each election – and on a single piece of paper. Sometimes a ballot paper has two columns for voting, with candidates or ballot questions on both the front and the back of the ballot page.</p>
<p>In recent high-profile recounts, usually only one office is being recounted, so the rest of the ballot is ignored. When Georgia officials recounted the 2020 presidential race, it <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/georgia-election-recount/2020/11/14/7fc1c82e-25c9-11eb-952e-0c475972cfc0_story.html">required thousands of ballot counters working long shifts that spanned multiple days</a> for just that one contest. Even with such a dedicated effort, the hand count took almost a week to complete – and <a href="https://www.ajc.com/politics/election/georgia-recount-costs-some-counties-hundreds-of-thousands-of-dollars/YRMXKBAMTVG3ZMMQ4PW347B5S4/">cost the state millions of dollars</a>.</p>
<p>A hand count of more than one contest multiplies the amount of time needed to produce a preliminary election result. It might seem like having 10 races on the ballot would take about 10 times as long as counting a single contest. However, it is likely to take much longer than that. </p>
<p>This is because ballots are printed for very small groups of voters, and include only the specific legislative and municipal districts in which they live. Recounting a single statewide election is one thing, but hand-counting the entire ballot actually requires a different, more cumbersome procedure because <a href="https://bipartisanpolicy.org/explainer/how-ballot-tabulators-improve-elections/">hundreds or thousands of combinations of other contests need to be broken out</a>. If only a presidential race is being counted, workers can use a simpler “stack and count” procedure to make piles of votes for each candidate. But if multiple races are being counted, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2010.0098">a more complex “read and mark” procedure is required</a>. The reader must call out each race - from president down to probate judge – marked on the ballot so that other workers can keep tallies. This process requires more people and more time. </p>
<h2>Hand counting is less accurate</h2>
<p>Even if the public and the candidates were willing to tolerate the slowness of a hand count, its <a href="https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/elj.2017.0440">lower level of accuracy</a> is a serious problem. The point, after all, is to get the result right.</p>
<p>Humans are better than machines at many tasks, but people are not good at highly repetitive tasks such as ballot counting that require extreme accuracy. Humans reviewing thousands of ballots become tired and make many different kinds of mistakes, such as losing track of their counts.</p>
<p>In contrast, dedicated tabulator machines, which are used after voters have marked their ballots, are excellent at counting. The tabulators used in most election districts around the country are optical scanners that read standardized ballots and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00321.x">have lower error rates than most other technologies</a>. More importantly, detailed data from recounts shows that scanners and other tabulation devices are significantly <a href="https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2017.0440">more accurate than counting the same ballots by hand</a>.</p>
<h2>A place for hand counts</h2>
<p>Although hand-counting ballots on election night does not make sense in terms of speed or accuracy, there are parts of the election process where hand counts are extremely helpful.</p>
<p>Most states conduct <a href="https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/bestpractices/Election_Audits_Across_the_United_States.pdf">post-election audits</a> that review ballots to ensure that they were correctly tabulated. Recounts after close elections also frequently entail human review of ballots to verify the initial results. </p>
<p>In both of these situations, many of the problems of hand-counting are rendered irrelevant. For instance, many recounts focus on small batches of ballots rather than the full statewide collection of votes. Recounts also typically focus on a single contest and do not require a review of the entire ballot. With both audits and recounts, the speed of the count is not as important, so most participants are willing to wait a bit longer to verify the election night counts.</p>
<p>Nearly every voter in the next U.S. presidential election will be casting votes either on paper or on an electronic machine that has a paper backup. And almost all of those ballots will be counted by a machine. This approach balances security, accuracy, speed and voter confidence – and still allows for selected hand counts after election day.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211989/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Barry C. Burden does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hand-counting every ballot might sound like a great idea, but it’s both slower and less accurate than machine-counting votes.Barry C. Burden, Professor of Political Science, Director of the Elections Research Center, University of Wisconsin-MadisonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1460552020-09-14T11:52:33Z2020-09-14T11:52:33ZDefending the 2020 election against hacking: 5 questions answered<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357726/original/file-20200911-20-1200tfr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=46%2C0%2C5184%2C3453&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vote count machines are just one target of hackers looking to disrupt US elections.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/AmericaVotes/512f213da588491797e38759e2917f52/photo?boardId=6576eeb175bb4623a6e17828de4a73e8&st=boards&mediaType=audio,photo,video,graphic&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=4&currentItemNo=2">AP Photo/Ben Margot</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Editor’s note: Journalist Bob Woodward reports in his new book, “<a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Rage/Bob-Woodward/9781982131739">Rage</a>,” that the NSA and CIA have classified evidence that the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/09/politics/bob-woodward-rage-book-trump-coronavirus/index.html">Russian intelligence services placed malware in the election registration systems</a> of at least two Florida counties in 2016, and that the malware was sophisticated and could erase voters. This appears to confirm <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/26/us/florida-russia-hacking-election.html">earlier reports</a>. Meanwhile, Russian intelligence agents and other foreign players are already at work <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/09/10/1008297/the-russian-hackers-who-interfered-in-2016-were-spotted-targeting-the-2020-us-election/">interfering in the 2020 presidential election</a>. Douglas W. Jones, Associate Professor of Computer Science at the University of Iowa and coauthor of the book “<a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/B/bo13383590.html">Broken Ballots: Will Your Vote Count?</a>,” describes the vulnerabilities of the U.S. election system in light of this news.</em></p>
<h2>1. Though Woodward reports there was no evidence the election registration system malware had been activated, this sounds scary. Should people be worried?</h2>
<p>Yes, we should be worried. Four years ago, Russia managed to penetrate systems in several states but there’s no evidence that they “pulled the trigger” to take advantage of their penetration. One possibility is that they simply saw no need, having successfully “hacked the electorate” by damaging Hillary Clinton’s candidacy through <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-senate/senate-committee-concludes-russia-used-manafort-wikileaks-to-boost-trump-in-2016-idUSKCN25E1US">selective dumps of hacked documents on Wikileaks</a>. </p>
<p>We know that VR Systems, a contractor that worked for several Florida counties, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2019/12/26/did-russia-really-hack-2016-election-088171">was hacked</a>, and we know that there were <a href="https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article231199243.html">serious problems in Durham County, North Carolina,</a> during the 2016 election, including software glitches that caused poll workers to turn away voters during parts of Election Day. Durham county was also <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/federal-investigators-to-examine-equipment-from-2016-north-carolina-election-amid-renewed-fears-of-russian-hacking/2019/06/05/b70402e6-7816-11e9-b7ae-390de4259661_story.html">a VR Systems customer</a>. </p>
<p>I know of no post-election investigation of the problems in Durham County that was conducted with sufficient depth to assure me that Russia was not involved. It remains possible that they did pull the trigger on that county, but it is also possible that the problems there were entirely the result of “normal incompetence.”</p>
<h2>2. How does this change what we knew previously about Russian efforts to hack U.S. election systems?</h2>
<p>The specific counties compromised in Florida were never officially revealed. Previous leaks indicated that Washington County was one of them. Now we know that St. Lucie was the other. </p>
<p>Furthermore, previous reports mostly said that the systems had been penetrated. Woodward is saying that malware was installed on these machines. I am not sure whether I should interpret his use of terms in their narrow technical sense, but there is a significant difference between penetration, as in “they got the password to your system, broke in and looked around,” and installing malware, as in “they got in and made technical changes to the operation of your system.” </p>
<p>The latter is far more serious because voters could have been removed from registration rolls and therefore prevented from casting ballots, and that’s what I gather Woodward is describing.</p>
<h2>3. How have attempts to hack U.S. election systems changed since 2016?</h2>
<p>I do not have inside knowledge of what’s going on now, but my impression is that the Russians are getting more subtle. The basic Russian tactics of four years ago were only moderately subtle. Dumping all the stolen Democratic National Committee files on Wikileaks wasn’t subtle, but some of the narrowcasting of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/01/technology/facebook-russia-disinformation-election.html">targeted misinformation on social media</a> was brilliant, if utterly evil. For example, using Facebook, Russian propagandists were able to <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/russian-facebook-ads-targeted-us-voters-before-2016-election/">target prospective voters in swing states</a> with disinformation tailored for them.</p>
<p>My impression is that they’re getting better at disinformation campaigns. I think it’s safe to assume that they’re also getting better at digging into the actual machinery of elections.</p>
<h2>4. Have efforts to defend U.S. election systems against hackers improved?</h2>
<p>On the social media front, there has certainly been improvement. The obvious “<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-fake-accounts-constantly-manipulate-what-you-see-on-social-media-and-what-you-can-do-about-it-139610">sock puppet farms</a>,” large numbers of fake accounts controlled by a single entity, that Russia was running on U.S. social media are far more difficult to run these days because of the way the social media companies are cracking down. What I fear is that the country is defending against the attacks of four years ago while not really knowing about the attacks of today.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A mail-in election ballot partially obscured by its envelope" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357733/original/file-20200911-24-y04nty.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357733/original/file-20200911-24-y04nty.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357733/original/file-20200911-24-y04nty.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357733/original/file-20200911-24-y04nty.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357733/original/file-20200911-24-y04nty.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357733/original/file-20200911-24-y04nty.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357733/original/file-20200911-24-y04nty.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The COVID-19 pandemic is expected to lead to a large increase in mail-in ballots like this 2020 primary election ballot in Philadelphia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/wcn247/49946333537/">WCN 24/7/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the world of actual election machinery, the U.S. has made a little progress, but COVID-19 has thrown a monkey wrench in the system, <a href="https://theconversation.com/mail-in-votings-potential-problems-only-begin-at-the-post-office-an-underfunded-underprepared-decentralized-system-could-be-trouble-143798">forcing a massive shift to postal ballots</a> in states that permit this. That means that attacks on polling-place machinery will be generally less effective than in the past, while attacks on county election offices remain a real threat.</p>
<h2>5. What keeps you awake at night going into the 2020 presidential election?</h2>
<p>Oh dear. The list is long. Everything from crazies on the loony fringe of American politics shooting at each other in response to election results they don’t like, to people living in such closed media bubbles that we are effectively two different cultures living next door to each other while believing entirely different things about the world we live in. </p>
<p>Between those extremes, consider the possibility of results appearing to be reversed after polls have closed. If there is a demographic split between the vote-in-person crowd and the vote-by-mail crowd, election night results could go one way, while in states like Iowa, where postal <a href="https://sos.iowa.gov/elections/electioninfo/absenteemail.html">ballots received six days after the election get counted</a> if there is proof they were mailed on time, the final results could go another way. </p>
<p>Then, add in the possibility of hacked central tabulating software in key counties, and there’s plenty to lose sleep over.</p>
<p>[<em>Get our best science, health and technology stories.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/science-editors-picks-71/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=science-best">Sign up for The Conversation’s science newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146055/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Douglas W. Jones has received funding from the National Science Foundation for his work on voting technology; he is a member of the Democratic Party; he serves on the Board of Advisors of Verified Voting; and he is a member of the ACLU..</span></em></p>Russian agents reportedly placed malware in U.S. voter registration systems in 2016 and are actively interfering in the 2020 election. Here’s the state of election cybersecurity.Douglas W. Jones, Associate Professor of Computer Science, University of IowaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1416782020-07-21T17:10:39Z2020-07-21T17:10:39ZGeorgia’s election disaster shows how bad voting in 2020 can be<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/348016/original/file-20200716-29-1ypm0f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3000%2C1994&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Georgia voters brought folding chairs, books, laptop computers and plenty of patience to the polls on June.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-wait-in-line-to-vote-in-georgias-primary-election-on-news-photo/1218845744">Elijah Nouvelage/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the nation mourns <a href="https://theconversation.com/john-lewis-and-c-t-vivian-belonged-to-a-long-tradition-of-religious-leaders-in-the-civil-rights-struggle-142967">civil rights icon John Lewis</a>, a congressman and lifelong advocate of voting rights, the mayhem in his home state’s most recent election serves as another egregious example of how a citizen’s most sacred act in a democracy – voting – was undermined and even denied after a federal law protecting voters’ rights was abandoned by a 2013 Supreme Court ruling.</p>
<p>Georgia’s presidential primary election on June 9 was a nightmare mix of inefficiency and discrimination that shows how difficult it is for many Americans – particularly Black Americans – to participate in their democracy. </p>
<p>Hundreds of voters, many in majority Black areas, waited <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/09/georgia-election-primary-long-lines-broken-voting-machines">four, five and even seven hours</a> to cast their ballots. Some even <a href="https://lawandcrime.com/2020-election/police-were-called-on-predominantly-black-voters-waiting-to-cast-ballots-after-midnight-in-georgia/">faced down police</a> seeking to send them home without having voted.</p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://www.morehouse.edu/academics/polsci/ajonesbio/">scholar who studies voting rights and voter suppression</a>. When I spoke to longtime Georgia voters throughout the day, each one of them remarked that they “had never seen an election like this in the state of Georgia.” </p>
<p>The state’s primary was an example of what should not happen in a democratic country. It is an experience that has implications beyond Georgia, and that carries warnings for problems with the November presidential election and the legitimacy of the results.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1270730143884103681"}"></div></p>
<h2>Not enough places, ballots or help</h2>
<p>Georgia’s primary election was <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/06/09/2020-primary-georgia-voters-see-long-lines-machine-issues-amid-pandemic/5327909002/">postponed twice</a> from its original March 24 date, because of fears of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/us/politics/georgia-primary-virus-2020.html">spreading the coronavirus pandemic through in-person voting</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.11alive.com/article/news/politics/elections/what-if-i-never-got-my-absentee-ballot-in-georgia/85-b350bded-eeb3-4f1c-87b2-9ab3503364ba">A million and a half Georgians</a> applied to get absentee ballots that would have let them vote by mail. But an unknown number of them <a href="https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/absentee-ballot-requests-missing-fulton-ahead-georgia-primary/kkXUUbxL0wug5niqAvKTqM/">never received their ballots</a> and were forced to vote in person to ensure that their votes would be counted. Ultimately only <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/09/georgia-primary-election-voting-309066">943,000 ballots were cast by mail</a>.</p>
<p>Georgians didn’t always know where to go to vote: 10% of polling places – including 80 in the state’s most populous county alone – were closed because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The state-run website that let voters look up where they should vote was <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/06/09/873054620/long-lines-voting-machine-issues-plague-georgia-primary">down for several hours in the morning</a> and worked only intermittently throughout the day. When the site was up and running, some voters still <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-georgia-analysis/georgias-election-mess-offers-a-stark-warning-for-november-idUSKBN23I0CF">could not find their correct polling locations</a> and visited precincts where poll workers told them they couldn’t vote.</p>
<p>Experienced poll workers were ill or feared getting sick, so the state had to recruit, train and dispatch new ones right before the election. Many poll workers were <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/voting-debacle-in-georgia-came-after-months-of-warnings-went-unaddressed/2020/06/10/1ab97ade-ab27-11ea-94d2-d7bc43b26bf9_story.html">insufficiently trained and uninformed</a>, especially about when voters were entitled to absentee, emergency and provisional ballots.</p>
<p>There weren’t enough polling places, either. Several sites that normally serve 2,000 to 3,000 voters had to <a href="https://georgiarecorder.com/2020/06/09/long-lines-reported-across-metro-atlanta-as-voters-head-to-the-polls/">accommodate as many as 10,000</a> because of the consolidation. </p>
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<p>Some polling places, especially in majority Black areas, had major delays because new voting machines weren’t working correctly. Many polling places across the state <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-georgia-analysis/georgias-election-mess-offers-a-stark-warning-for-november-idUSKBN23I0CF">opened two and three hours late</a>. The new systems, including printers, scanners and tablets, had trouble throughout the day, causing additional delays.</p>
<p>Precincts ran out of provisional ballots and envelopes and printer paper. County governments, the <a href="https://www.ajc.com/news/local/lawsuit-filed-open-dozen-gwinnett-precincts-until/98XGG57SfT0BCmVvczI4pI/">NAACP and other civil-rights groups</a> appealed to county courts to get <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/voting-debacle-in-georgia-came-after-months-of-warnings-went-unaddressed/2020/06/10/1ab97ade-ab27-11ea-94d2-d7bc43b26bf9_story.html">orders extending polling hours</a> beyond the usual 7 p.m. to make up for the delays. One precinct <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/09/politics/georgia-primary-election-delays/index.html">didn’t close until 10:10 p.m.</a></p>
<p>As if that weren’t enough, it rained on voters in long lines with no shelter.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/348017/original/file-20200716-33-6ti6k2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A gloved hand holding out a sticker reading 'I'm a Georgia voter.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/348017/original/file-20200716-33-6ti6k2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/348017/original/file-20200716-33-6ti6k2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/348017/original/file-20200716-33-6ti6k2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/348017/original/file-20200716-33-6ti6k2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/348017/original/file-20200716-33-6ti6k2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/348017/original/file-20200716-33-6ti6k2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/348017/original/file-20200716-33-6ti6k2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">For those who withstood the confusion, lines and delays, a badge of achievement.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/polling-place-worker-holds-an-im-a-georgia-voter-sticker-to-news-photo/1218845897">Elijah Nouvelage/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A pattern of vote suppression</h2>
<p>Early in the day, Brad Raffensperger, Georgia’s Republican secretary of state, <a href="https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/secretary-states-office-blames-counties-poor-planning-poll-issues/PT2RPDXL5BAQTMNLCLLIR34VEE/">blamed the mayhem on the counties</a>, which administer the election, for not properly preparing for the state’s new electronic voting system. <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/georgia-secretary-state-launches-investigation-after-unacceptable-voting-problems-n1228541">County officials responded</a> that the state was the problem.</p>
<p>The state’s Republican leadership <a href="https://www.salon.com/2020/06/10/gop-vows-to-probe-georgia-election-catastrophe-in-minority-areas-dems-say-it-was-no-accident/">did nothing to prevent this democratic disaster from happening</a>, even though it had happened before, just two years ago.</p>
<p>In the 2018 election, Republican Brian Kemp, then Georgia’s secretary of state, was running for governor. As the state’s chief election officer, since 2017 he prepared for the election by using a variety of voter-suppression tactics that could influence the results. </p>
<p>In 2017 Kemp <a href="https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/voter-purge-begs-question-what-the-matter-with-georgia/YAFvuk3Bu95kJIMaDiDFqJ/">purged more than half a million voters</a> from the rolls under the state’s rule that voters who have not voted in two or more previous elections could be required to re-register before voting again. And he applied another rule that disqualified voters whose names in election rolls <a href="https://www.politifact.com/article/2018/oct/19/georgias-exact-match-law-and-its-impact-voters-gov/">did not exactly match</a> their identification documents.</p>
<p>In addition, for the 2018 election, Georgia had <a href="https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/voting-precincts-closed-across-georgia-since-election-oversight-lifted/bBkHxptlim0Gp9pKu7dfrN/">fewer polling places open</a> than usual, reduced the availability of early voting and <a href="https://www.11alive.com/article/news/politics/elections/federal-judge-orders-georgia-to-allow-new-us-citizens-to-vote-clarify-process-at-polls/85-610750250">required proof of citizenship</a> before a person could register to vote.</p>
<p>Kemp’s efforts paid off. He won the election against Democrat Stacey Abrams by a nose in the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/11/16/668753230/democrat-stacey-abrams-ends-bid-for-georgia-governor-decrying-suppression">closest governor’s race since 1966</a>.</p>
<p>That narrow victory may have reinforced Georgia Republicans’ fear, shared by President Donald Trump, that if it’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/30/trump-voting-republicans/">easier for people to vote</a>, the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/08/trump-slams-mail-in-voting-says-it-doesnt-work-out-well-for-republicans.html">GOP will lose more elections</a> nationwide.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/348020/original/file-20200716-19-fzlk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man stands at the end of a line in a crowded room." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/348020/original/file-20200716-19-fzlk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/348020/original/file-20200716-19-fzlk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/348020/original/file-20200716-19-fzlk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/348020/original/file-20200716-19-fzlk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/348020/original/file-20200716-19-fzlk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/348020/original/file-20200716-19-fzlk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/348020/original/file-20200716-19-fzlk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Polling places were crowded, many with people waiting on voting machines that malfunctioned or stopped working.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Election-2020-Georgia/1e6f58a6d4d54da586685f20c2b479a5/12/0">AP Photo/Ron Harris</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The end of federal supervision</h2>
<p>All these manipulations and changes are legal. That’s because in 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court gutted the Voting Rights Act, removing the provision that protected people’s right to vote free from discrimination. </p>
<p>In their 5-4 <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-96">Shelby County v. Holder decision</a>, the justices removed the federal government’s power to evaluate, preapprove or block discriminatory voting laws in states like Georgia that have long histories of voter discrimination. That means there is no more federal oversight to ensure that qualified voters can gain access to the polls, and no recourse beyond state governments for voters who fear they have been unfairly denied their rights to vote.</p>
<p>In Georgia and other Republican-led states, officials have used the freedom provided by the Shelby decision to take <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/nov/13/voter-suppression-2020-democracy-america">official actions</a> that make it <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/10/23/659784277/republican-voter-suppression-efforts-are-targeting-minorities-journalist-says">harder for Americans to vote</a>, and more likely that future elections will look like Georgia’s did on June 9.</p>
<p>Despite all those barriers, though, Democratic voters and Black Georgians <a href="https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/georgia-democrats-set-new-primary-turnout-record-outpacing-gop-voters/fotxE4Udba0e0q6QvDBZ8M/">turned out in record numbers</a> last month. Enough of them waited, and cast their ballots, to surpass the 1.06 million votes cast in the 2008 primary when Barack Obama beat Hillary Clinton.</p>
<p>Whatever the reason for such large numbers overcoming such significant obstacles, it is thanks to the determination of countless individual voters – and not state or county election officials – that Georgians were able to vote in meaningful numbers.</p>
<p>With the Voting Rights Act gutted, other states may feel freer to suppress their citizens’ voting rights the way Georgia did. Voters across the nation may face similar circumstances in their communities – but there is still time for them to demand better from their officials.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141678/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrienne Jones has served as a volunteer for the Georgia Democratic Party.</span></em></p>Voters across the nation should prepare for similar circumstances in their communities – but there is still time for them to demand better from their officials.Adrienne Jones, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Morehouse CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1037202018-10-15T10:29:22Z2018-10-15T10:29:22ZWhy is it so hard to get an accurate vote count?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239970/original/file-20181009-72127-13ww6xc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Election workers unload a bag of ballots brought in a from a polling precinct to the Sacramento County Registrar of Voters office in Sacramento, California. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Election-2018-Ballot-Counting-West-Coast/30703a75afd5424d809bcd2b1421823f/15/0">AP/Rich Pedroncelli</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In Kansas this past August, <a href="http://www.kcur.org/post/kansas-vote-totals-flux-kobach-says-he-will-recuse-himself#stream/0">vote totals in the Republican primary</a> for governor fluctuated by more than 100 votes over the course of a few days, and the winner – <a href="https://www.vox.com/2018/8/14/17691178/jeff-colyer-kris-kobach-kansas-governor-primary-2018-midterms">Secretary of State Kris Kobach</a> – wasn’t declared until a week after the vote. </p>
<p>In Virginia, a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/21/politics/virginia-house-of-delegates-one-vote-yancey-simonds/index.html">hotly contested battle</a> last year for the commonwealth’s House of Delegates first gave the race to the Republican by 10 votes, and after a recount, the Democrat led by one vote. A court later decreed the election a tie, and it was decided in favor of the Republican by a random drawing.</p>
<p>Why are the vote totals for many political offices <a href="http://www.lowellsun.com/todaysheadlines/ci_32140442/trahans-lead-grows-3rd-district-recount">so hard to nail down</a>? </p>
<p>Shouldn’t it be easy to count ballots, the way they do <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-how-britain-counts-its-votes-41265">in Britain, for example</a>?</p>
<h2>Local control</h2>
<p>One major explanation is that we don’t really have a national election like they do in Britain. And with each state and local government running elections and counting ballots, often with the help of citizen volunteers, mistakes can happen.</p>
<p>In the United States, we have a series of simultaneous state and local elections held at around the same time. There is no national agency that administers American elections; they are overseen by more than <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/election-administration-at-state-and-local-levels.aspx">10,000 local jurisdictions</a>. </p>
<p>This means that there are different ballots, different voting machines, different registration and eligibility requirements, and different administrative procedures for counting votes all across the country. That’s a recipe for occasional confusion and miscounts.</p>
<h2>Goal is same; methods aren’t</h2>
<p>Sometimes the technology itself can confuse voters and cause them to make errors when voting. That was the case with the “butterfly ballot” used in Palm Beach County <a href="https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/ten-years-later-infamous-2000-election-ballot-recount-still-defines-palm-beach-county-many/uscC5niN1BtOOs7d33V8GL/">in the 2000 election</a>, whose “hanging chads” made it hard to determine for whom the ballot was cast. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/book/voting-technology/">Shifts to new technology</a> can produce problems and then errors in vote counts, as my colleagues and I showed in research supported by the National Science Foundation.</p>
<p>The cost of holding elections is paid from local tax revenue, so local governments have a disincentive to invest in upgrading voting systems. Since providing police and fire service, a good education and picking up garbage all have a higher priority than administering elections, financial support for election administration is often a low priority.</p>
<p>Ultimately, <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Secretary_of_State_(state_executive_office)">the secretary of state</a> in each of the 50 states (or the head of an election division within that office) is responsible for certifying the result of the election for each office, property tax or bond issue, or proposition appearing on the ballot. It’s in that office that conflicting vote totals ultimately get reconciled.</p>
<p>But how they get to a certified result varies by location as well.</p>
<h2>Changes in how votes are cast</h2>
<p>Voting used to take place on a single day. A voter had to show up in person to cast a ballot. </p>
<p>In 1993, in the interest of convenience and increasing turnout, Congress passed the National Voter Registration Act, also known as the <a href="https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-national-voter-registration-act">Motor Voter Act</a>. The legislation allows registration for voting at the same time a person applies for a driver’s license or renewal, as well as other registration opportunities when interacting with state and federal government agencies. </p>
<p>Turnout in the United States is <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/21/u-s-voter-turnout-trails-most-developed-countries/">lower than in most democracies</a>, and a number of procedures have been adopted in various states to allow people to use <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx">absentee ballots, cast votes at early voting sites</a>, and even to obtain <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/provisional-ballots.aspx">provisional ballots</a> for people who show up to vote in person but whose eligibility is questioned. </p>
<p>All of these parameters vary by location. For example, early voting can start as much as 46 days before Election Day <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/early-voting-in-state-elections.aspx">in some states</a>, like Minnesota and Illinois, while states like Michigan do not allow it at all.</p>
<p>In many states, different kinds of ballots are counted at different points in time. </p>
<p>In-person ballots are often counted on election night, and absentee ballots are counted then or shortly thereafter. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/provisional-ballots.aspx">Provisional ballots</a>, which are used when there are questions about a voter’s eligibility, are held confidentially in envelopes with signatures and other identifying information. They have to be checked for eligibility back in a local clerk’s office and may not be counted for a day or two. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.fvap.gov/">Military ballots</a> mailed in from overseas will be counted as long as they are postmarked by Election Day, but they could take several days to get to the local office. </p>
<p>Because of this complexity, election administrators must have a set of procedures in place to ensure the integrity of the voting system.</p>
<h2>Once the votes are in</h2>
<p>In each precinct on election night, there is <a href="https://www.eac.gov/documents/2017/08/03/six-tips-for-conducting-election-audits-from-eac-audit-election-administration/">an audit process</a> that the local election director oversees to insure the integrity of the ballots and the count. An initial count is made in a series of steps. Here is what that looks like:</p>
<p>After the ballots are first counted in each precinct, often by volunteer poll workers with various <a href="https://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf/2017/02/secretary_of_state_audit_of_de.html">levels of experience and training</a>, those totals are transmitted in person to a secure location. Then, totals are added up for the ward, city, county and the state level.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239996/original/file-20181010-133328-1ufyg1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239996/original/file-20181010-133328-1ufyg1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239996/original/file-20181010-133328-1ufyg1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239996/original/file-20181010-133328-1ufyg1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239996/original/file-20181010-133328-1ufyg1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239996/original/file-20181010-133328-1ufyg1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239996/original/file-20181010-133328-1ufyg1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Election officials in Newport News, Virginia, examine ballots during a recount for the Yansey/Simonds House of Delegates race on Dec. 19, 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Virginia-Election-Recount/ae358c5cf1484bc294b1be0f48695311/24/0">AP/Ben Finley</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The ballots themselves – or devices with ballot totals like voting machine cartridges – are brought by precinct workers to a secure location. Sometimes, because of human error, a small number of ballots – typically one precinct or less – may be temporarily misplaced: for example, <a href="https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/08/09/ohio-special-election-how-franklin-county-lost-and-found-588-votes-tight-race/945772002/">one ballot box or one cartridge</a>. When they are recovered, the initial vote count will be adjusted. In all of these ways, a final preliminary vote count is generated. </p>
<p>After the initial vote tabulation, there is a period when the results can be challenged for various reasons and a recount requested. </p>
<p>In some jurisdictions, <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/automatic-recount-thresholds.aspx">a recount may be mandatory</a> when the winning margin falls within a certain small range. </p>
<p>All of these procedures must take place in a period from 30 days after the election to when <a href="https://fliphtml5.com/vgtx/kjxr">the state legislature next convenes</a> and the secretary of state certifies the results as final. The vote totals again have a chance of changing – typically by a small amount – but hardly anyone pays attention to these final adjustments.</p>
<h2>One more variable</h2>
<p>One final note: For decades the Associated Press provided county-level vote totals to news agencies on election night. </p>
<p>But starting this November, there will be two major exit poll operations and associated systems for collecting and disseminating the county-level votes.</p>
<p>The Associated Press will partner with Fox News, while Edison Research, which has been responsible for the <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/National_Election_Pool">National Election Pool</a>, the exit poll conducted for a combine of major news organizations since 2004, will <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/05/21/612844060/election-night-shakeup-here-come-the-new-exit-polls">tabulate raw vote totals as well</a>. </p>
<p>Because Edison Research will be new at providing vote totals, it could encounter some technical difficulties in collecting and disseminating the data. There could also be some variability in the speed with which the vote totals are released.</p>
<p>As a result, conflicting vote tabulations could appear in the 2018 general election. Remember – these are only preliminary vote counts for the benefit of news organizations, not the certified results.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103720/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Traugott received funding from the National Science Foundation to study voting technology. </span></em></p>There are different ballots, voting machines, registration and eligibility requirements and procedures for counting votes across the country. That’s a recipe for occasional confusion and miscounts.Michael Traugott, Research Professor at the Center for Political Studies, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1017652018-09-06T10:45:30Z2018-09-06T10:45:30Z4 ways to defend democracy and protect every voter’s ballot<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233981/original/file-20180828-86123-bdmwev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4297%2C3047&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">How confident should voters be that their ballots will be counted accurately?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Florida-Primary/0b1cdb68c2b5403fb0b1884673e55b55/12/0">AP Photo/Wilfredo Lee</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As voters prepare to cast their ballots in the November midterm elections, it’s clear that <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611830/hackers-are-out-to-jeopardize-your-vote/">U.S. voting is under electronic attack</a>. <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-russian-government-used-disinformation-and-cyber-warfare-in-2016-election-an-ethical-hacker-explains-99989">Russian government hackers</a> probed some states’ computer systems in the runup to the 2016 presidential election and are <a href="https://theconversation.com/securing-americas-voting-systems-against-spying-and-meddling-6-essential-reads-99986">likely to do so again</a> – as might <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/technology/facebook-political-influence-midterms.html">hackers from other countries</a> or nongovernmental groups interested in sowing discord in American politics.</p>
<p>Fortunately, there are <a href="http://homepage.divms.uiowa.edu/%7Ejones/voting/">ways to defend elections</a>. Some of them will be new in some places, but these defenses are not particularly difficult nor expensive, especially when judged against the value of public confidence in democracy. I served on the Iowa board that examines voting machines from 1995 to 2004 and on the <a href="https://www.eac.gov/about/technical-guidelines-development-committee/">Technical Guidelines Development Committee</a> of the <a href="https://www.eac.gov/">United States Election Assistance Commission</a> from 2009 to 2012, and <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/12/guardian-of-the-vote/544155/">Barbara Simons</a> and I coauthored the 2012 book “<a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/B/bo13383590.html">Broken Ballots</a>.”</p>
<p>Election officials have an important role to play in protecting election integrity. Citizens, too, need to ensure their local voting processes are safe. There are two parts to any voting system: the computerized systems tracking voters’ registrations and the actual process of voting – from preparing ballots through results tallying and reporting.</p>
<h2>Attacking registrations</h2>
<p>Before the passage of the <a href="http://legislink.org/us/pl-107-252">Help America Vote Act of 2002</a>, voter registration in the U.S. was largely decentralized across 5,000 local jurisdictions, mostly county election offices. HAVA changed that, requiring states to have centralized online voter registration databases accessible to all election officials.</p>
<p>In 2016, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/grand-jury-indicts-12-russian-intelligence-officers-hacking-offenses-related-2016-election">Russian government agents</a> allegedly tried to access <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/09/23/what-we-know-about-the-21-states-targeted-by-russian-hackers/">voter registration systems in 21 states</a>. Illinois officials have <a href="http://www.govtech.com/security/Hacked-Voter-Records-in-Illinois-Soar-to-Half-a-Million.html">identified their state</a> as the only one whose databases were, in fact, breached – with <a href="http://www.govtech.com/security/Hacked-Voter-Records-in-Illinois-Soar-to-Half-a-Million.html">information on 500,000 voters</a> viewed and potentially copied by the hackers. </p>
<p>It’s not clear that any information was corrupted, changed or deleted. But that would certainly be one way to interfere with an election: either changing voters’ addresses to assign them to other precincts or simply deleting people’s registrations.</p>
<p>Another way this information could be misused would be to fraudulently request absentee ballots for real voters. Something like that happened on May 29, 2013, when Juan Pablo Baggini, an overzealous campaign worker in Miami, <a href="https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/After-Raid-at-Home-of-Campaign-Worker-Mayoral-Candidate-Francis-Suarez-Says-No-Election-Laws-Were-Violated-211516981.html">used his computer to file online absentee ballot requests</a> on behalf of 20 local voters. He apparently thought he had their permission, but <a href="https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1952450.html">county officials noticed the large number of requests</a> coming from the same computer in a short period of time. Baggini and another campaign worker were <a href="https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1954359.html">charged with misdemeanors and sentenced to probation</a>.</p>
<p>A more sophisticated attack could use voters’ registration information to select targets based on how likely they are to vote a particular way and use common hacking tools to file electronic absentee ballot requests for them – appearing to come from a variety of computers over the course of several weeks. On Election Day, when those voters went to the polls, they’d be told they already had an absentee ballot and would be prevented from voting normally.</p>
<h2>Two defenses for voter registration</h2>
<p>There are two important defenses against these and other types of attacks on voter registration systems: provisional ballots and same-day registration.</p>
<p>When there are questions about whether a voter is entitled to vote at a particular polling place, federal law requires the person be issued a <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/provisional-ballots.aspx">provisional ballot</a>. The rules vary by state, and some places require provisional voters to bring proof of identity to the county election office before their ballots will be counted – which many voters may not have time to do. But the goal is that no voter should be turned away from the polls without at least a chance their vote will count. If questions arise about the validity of the registration database, provisional ballots offer a way to ensure every voter’s intent is recorded for counting when things get sorted out.</p>
<p>Same-day voter registration offers an even stronger defense. <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-registration.aspx">Fifteen states</a> allow people to register to vote right at the polling place and then cast a normal ballot. <a href="http://www.pewtrusts.org/%7E/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2009/uwisconsin1pdf.pdf">Research on same-day registration</a> has focused on turnout, but it also allows recovery from an attack on voter registration records.</p>
<p>Both approaches do require extra paperwork. If large numbers of voters are affected, that could cause long lines at polling places, which <a href="https://www.eac.gov/documents/2017/02/24/waiting-in-line-to-vote-white-paper-stewart-ansolabehere/">disenfranchise voters who cannot afford to wait</a>. And like provisional voting, same-day registration may have more stringent identification requirements than for people whose voter registrations are already on the books. Some voters may have to go home to get additional documents and hope to make it back before the polls close.</p>
<p>Further, long lines, frustrated voters and frazzled election workers can create the appearance of chaos – which can play into the narratives of those who want to discredit the system even when things are actually working reasonably well.</p>
<h2>Paper ballots are vital</h2>
<p>Election integrity experts agree that <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/defcon-election-threat-funding/">voting machines can be hacked</a>, even if the devices themselves are <a href="https://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/12/14/first_virus_elk_cloner_creator_interviewed/">not connected</a> <a href="https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/">to the internet</a>. </p>
<p>Voting machine manufacturers say their <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/tensions-flare-as-hackers-root-out-flaws-in-voting-machines-1534078801">devices have top-notch protections</a>, but the only truly safe assumption is that they have not yet found additional vulnerabilities. Properly defending voting integrity requires assuming a worst-case scenario, in which every computer involved – at election offices, vote-tallying software developers and machine makers – has been compromised.</p>
<p>The first line of defense is that in most of the U.S., <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/08/on-election-day-most-voters-use-electronic-or-optical-scan-ballots/">people vote on paper</a>. Hackers can’t alter a hand-marked paper ballot – though they could <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/08/2016-elections-russia-hack-how-to-hack-an-election-in-seven-minutes-214144">change how a computerized vote scanner counts</a> it, or what <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/an-11-year-old-changed-election-results-on-a-replica-florida-state-website-in-under-10-minutes">preliminary results are reported on official websites</a>. In the event of a controversy, paper ballots can be recounted, by hand if needed. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/08/on-election-day-most-voters-use-electronic-or-optical-scan-ballots/ft_16-11-07_votingtechnology/"><img width="640" height="600" src="http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology.png" class="attachment-large size-large" alt="" srcset="http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology.png 640w, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology-300x281.png 300w, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology-200x188.png 200w, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology-260x244.png 260w, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology-432x405.png 432w, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology-50x47.png 50w, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology-160x150.png 160w" sizes="(max-width: 640px) 100vw, 640px"></a></p>
<h2>Conduct post-election audits</h2>
<p>Without paper ballots, there is not a way to be completely sure voting system software hasn’t been hacked. With them, though, the process is clear.</p>
<p>In a growing number of states, paper ballots are subject to routine statistical audits. In California, post-election audits have been required <a href="https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/28/AUDIT%20PILOT%20FINAL%20REPORT%20TO%20EAC%20FINAL.pdf">since 1965</a>. Iowa allows <a href="https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/50.50.pdf">election officials who suspect irregularities</a> to initiate recounts even if the result appears decisive and no candidate asks for one; these are called <a href="https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/28/recounts.pdf">administrative recounts</a>. </p>
<p>Based on that experience, some election officials have told me that they suspect the current generation of scanners may be misinterpreting 1 vote in 100. That might seem like a small problem, but it’s really way too much opportunity for error. Voting simulations show that changing <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1022594.1022621">just one vote per voting machine</a> across the United States could be enough to allow an attacker to determine which party controls Congress.</p>
<p>Recounts are expensive and time-consuming, though, and can create illusions of disarray and chaos that reduce public confidence in the election’s outcome. A better method is called a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/MSP.2012.56">risk-limiting audit</a>. It’s a straightforward method of determining how many ballots should be randomly selected for auditing, based on the size of the election, the margin of the initial result and – crucially – the statistical confidence the public wants in the final outcome. There are even <a href="https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/%7Estark/Vote/auditTools.htm">free online tools</a> available to make the calculations needed.</p>
<p>Preliminary experiences with risk-limiting audits are <a href="https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/28/AUDIT%20PILOT%20FINAL%20REPORT%20TO%20EAC%20FINAL.pdf">quite promising</a>, but they could be made even more attractive by <a href="https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/evt07/tech/full_papers/calandrino/calandrino_html/">small changes to ballot-sheet scanners</a>. The main problem is that the method is based in math and statistics, which many people don’t understand or trust. However, I believe relying on verifiable principles that any person could learn is far better than believing the assurances of companies that make voting equipment and software, or <a href="https://triblive.com/news/allegheny/11013043-74/machines-election-county">election officials who don’t understand</a> how <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/40448876/how-hackers-are-teaching-election-officials-to-protect-their-voting-machines-learned-from-hackers-to-improve-security-for-future-elections">their machines</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/21/magazine/the-myth-of-the-hacker-proof-voting-machine.html">actually work</a>. </p>
<p>Elections must be as transparent and simple as possible. To paraphrase Dan Wallach at Rice University, <a href="https://www.cs.rice.edu/%7Edwallach/pub/texas-senate-state-affairs-15oct08.pdf">the job of an election is to convince the losers that they lost fair and square</a>. The declared winners will not ask questions and may seek to obstruct those who do ask. The losers will ask the hard questions, and election systems must be transparent enough that the partisan supporters of the losers can be convinced that they indeed lost. This sets a high standard, but it is a standard that every democracy must strive to meet.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101765/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Douglas W. Jones was a co-principal investigator in the National Science Foundation funded ACCURATE (A Center for Correct, Usable, Reliable, Auditable, and Transparent Elections) project. He was a co-founder of the Open Voting Consortium, but is not currently affiliated with that group, and he is a registered Democrat.</span></em></p>Ensuring the integrity of democratic elections from hackers and electronic tampering, and boosting public confidence in democracy, isn’t very difficult, nor expensive.Douglas W. Jones, Associate Professor of Computer Science, University of IowaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/942422018-04-09T10:43:50Z2018-04-09T10:43:50ZElection security means much more than just new voting machines<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213456/original/file-20180405-189830-1e51o3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Testing a new voting machine is a good start.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Election-Security-Decentralized-Dangers/a81c014b860e43b39af3f95bd7b334ff/4/0">AP Photo/David Goldman</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In late March, Congress passed <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/us/politics/senate-intelligence-hearing-elections-security.html">a significant spending bill</a> that included US$380 million in state grants to improve election infrastructure. As the U.S. ramps up for the 2018 midterm elections, that may seem like a huge amount of money, but it’s really only a start at securing the country’s voting systems. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/americas-voting-machines-risk">A 2015 report by the Brennan Center</a> law and policy institute at New York University estimates overhauling the nation’s voting system could cost more than $1 billion – though the price could be partially offset by more efficient contracting. Most voting equipment hasn’t been updated <a href="http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/03/02/aging-voting-machines-cost-local-state-governments">since the early 2000s</a>. At times, election officials must <a href="https://statetechmagazine.com/article/2015/12/outdated-voting-machine-technology-poses-security-and-election-risks">buy voting machine hardware on eBay</a>, because the companies that made them are no longer in business. Even when working properly, those machines are not secure: At the <a href="https://www.defcon.org/html/defcon-25/dc-25-index.html">2017 DEF CON hacker conference</a>, <a href="https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/07/29/us_voting_machines_hacking/">attackers took control of several voting machines</a> in a matter of minutes.</p>
<p>Securing electoral systems across the U.S. is a big problem with high stakes. This federal money being provided to states now may not be the last of its kind, but it’s what’s available right away, and it must be used as efficiently as possible.</p>
<h2>1. A reliable backup system: Paper ballots</h2>
<p>The security community has been clamoring for <a href="https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/12/matt_blaze_on_s.html">paper ballots</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/MSPEC.2002.1038569">for years</a>. Now, with <a href="https://www.burr.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/One-Pager%20Recs%20FINAL%20VERSION%203-20.pdf">evidence of election hacking in 2016</a> and the vivid demonstration of <a href="https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/07/29/us_voting_machines_hacking/">voting machine vulnerability</a>, the idea is gaining traction.</p>
<p>Paper ballots aren’t perfect – remember “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chad_(paper)">hanging chads</a>”? – but they provide a physical record that can be compared to electronic records. And if there are discrepancies between the two, paper provides a way to track down the source of the problem. Even if votes are counted electronically, keeping paper ballots provides a way to validate and verify the results if they’re in question – rather than just hoping the electronics are secure. </p>
<h2>2. Examining the whole problem</h2>
<p>Discussing the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s investigation into Russian efforts to manipulate state election systems, Chairman Richard Burr, a North Carolina Republican, said, “<a href="https://www.sfchronicle.com/nation/article/Key-Senate-committee-concludes-Russian-12768554.php">It’s clear the Russian government was looking for vulnerabilities</a>.” U.S. election officials should do the same: Probe election systems to identify weaknesses, but then also fix them. </p>
<p>And like the Russians, the U.S. must think about the entire electoral system. Beyond the machines that tabulate votes, which have been at the center of the conversation, there are many other pieces in the system. These include the ways people register to vote, where their records are kept, and how they are verified at the polls as legitimate voters. And there’s what happens after votes are tabulated, as they’re being reported from individual polling places to central municipal records and up to state election officials.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/more-state-election-databases-hacked-than-previously-thought/">At least 10</a> <a href="http://time.com/4828306/russian-hacking-election-widespread-private-data/">states’ voting registration systems</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/09/23/what-we-know-about-the-21-states-targeted-by-russian-hackers/">were compromised</a>, most likely <a href="http://time.com/4472169/russian-hackers-arizona-voter-registration/">by the Russians</a> in the lead-up to the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Despite relief that votes themselves were not changed, these registration systems dictate who is allowed to vote and where, and how voting materials (like referendum information and absentee ballots) are distributed. Elections are often determined by small margins. <a href="https://theconversation.com/rebooting-the-mathematics-behind-gerrymandering-73096">Selectively disenfranchising a small percentage of voters</a> could very well swing the results.</p>
<h2>3. Securing voters, not just machines</h2>
<p>Election security isn’t a problem that will be solved just with technology. Democracy depends on people – specifically, their trust that the system is valid and secure. If that trust continues to erode, fewer of them will participate in elections, and some may begin to reject officially reported results. </p>
<p>In 2016, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/11/politics/popular-vote-turnout-2016/index.html">voter turnout was at a 20-year low</a>, with only <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/11/politics/popular-vote-turnout-2016/index.html">55 percent of eligible citizens casting votes</a>. <a href="http://www.electproject.org/home/voter-turnout/demographics">Younger voters have lower turnout than older voters</a> – for example, while more than 70 percent of eligible voters over the age of 60 cast votes in 2016, only 43 percent of people in the 18-to-29-year-old bracket did so. </p>
<p>The government must not only act, but also reassure the electorate that those actions reflect how seriously officials are taking public concerns. States may want to consider something similar to the <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/11/technology/hack-the-pentagon-synack-bug-bounty/index.html">“Hack the Pentagon” program</a>, which has been publicly visible as well as effective in flushing out security issues in specific Defense Department systems. “Whether you’re a well-funded government like the U.S. or anyone else, you have to work with the hacker community,” said <a href="http://lutasecurity.com/">Katie Moussouris</a>, who helped start “Hack the Pentagon” and also created Microsoft’s bug bounty program. It’s a bold move, but inviting <a href="https://theconversation.com/malwaretechs-arrest-sheds-light-on-the-complex-culture-of-the-hacking-world-82136">white-hat hackers</a> to publicly probe election systems – and paying them for information on the vulnerabilities they find – would show voters that states are serious about solving problems. </p>
<p>There is a lot of work to do to secure U.S. elections, but $380 million is a good way to start. If states spend it in the most meaningful ways – patching both their machines and the population’s trust – they will build a system that’s secure, trustworthy and works for all the people.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94242/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jamie Winterton is affiliated with New America as a Future Tense Fellow.</span></em></p>As millions in federal dollars flow to states to protect elections, what should the money help pay for?Jamie Winterton, Director of Strategy, Global Security Initiative, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/942432018-04-06T10:46:30Z2018-04-06T10:46:30ZPaper trails and random audits could secure all elections – don’t save them just for recounts in close races<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213234/original/file-20180404-95689-okiud6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Recounting very close races is not enough to ensure election integrity.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Virginia-Election-Recount/ae358c5cf1484bc294b1be0f48695311/14/0">AP Photo/Ben Finley</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-cybersecurity/2018/03/23/plenty-of-cyber-nuggets-in-the-omnibus-149206">states begin to receive millions of federal dollars</a> to secure the 2018 primary and general elections, officials around the country will have to decide how to spend it to best protect the integrity of the democratic process. If voters don’t trust the results, it doesn’t matter whether an election was actually fair or not.</p>
<p>Right now, the most visible election integrity effort in the U.S. involves conducting recounts in especially close races. A similar approach could be applied much more broadly.</p>
<p>Based on <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ptI-HHkAAAAJ&hl=en">my research into game theory as a way to secure elections</a>, I suggest that the proper first line of defense is auditing results. While an audit can only happen after Election Day, it’s crucial to prepare in advance.</p>
<h2>Announcing the event</h2>
<p>Before the election, officials should make clear public statements that they will be auditing the results. But not every district should have an equal chance at being audited. </p>
<p>For instance, it may be more difficult to influence vote counts in some districts, such as those with <a href="https://theconversation.com/aging-voting-machines-threaten-election-integrity-54523">newer voting equipment</a>. Also, attackers may have different goals: They might seek to defeat a particular candidate as a U.S. senator, for instance. Or they might be trying to control the balance of power in the whole Senate, caring more about the overall split than which candidates get elected where.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/using-randomness-to-protect-election-integrity-74139">Applying the principles of game theory</a> would let election officials assign each district – from an entire state down to a municipal precinct – a rating combining a range of factors, including how hard a district’s machines are to tamper with, and how much power that district’s outcome has in determining whether a specific candidate is elected, or the exact political split in a legislative body.</p>
<p>That rating would determine the likelihood a particular district would have of being audited. For example, if a district had taken special precautions to prevent tampering with its election machines, or was not expected to be a swing district in a broader election, it may be less likely to be audited. Narrowly divided districts that also had vulnerable hardware would be much more likely to be audited, because they would also be more susceptible to tampering.</p>
<p>The prospect of audits will in itself deter anyone with malicious intent, reducing the likelihood of an attack. And the audits themselves will help the voting public be sure any tampering is likely to be discovered.</p>
<h2>Creating a paper trail</h2>
<p>For audits to be meaningful, each vote must be recorded on paper – which is much harder to alter than a digital record, and is the only way to have an independent record of votes that can be compared to digital voting results. Ballots can still be tallied using computers, however. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/08/on-election-day-most-voters-use-electronic-or-optical-scan-ballots/ft_16-11-07_votingtechnology/"><img width="640" height="600" src="http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology.png" class="attachment-large size-large" alt="" srcset="http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology.png 640w, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology-300x281.png 300w, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology-200x188.png 200w, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology-260x244.png 260w, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology-432x405.png 432w, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology-50x47.png 50w, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology-160x150.png 160w" sizes="(max-width: 640px) 100vw, 640px"></a></p>
<p>In some districts, <a href="http://stateandcapitol.bangordailynews.com/2018/02/21/with-one-exception-maines-election-system-is-about-as-secure-as-possible/">voters mark paper ballots</a> and insert them into an optical scanner, which counts the votes and secures the paper records if needed for later examination.</p>
<p>In other districts, people select their votes <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/08/on-election-day-most-voters-use-electronic-or-optical-scan-ballots/">directly on computerized systems</a>. In those cases, election officials should ensure the machine prints out a paper record of how a person is voting, which must be <a href="https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/vvpr-legislation/">confirmed by the voter</a> before the ballot is officially cast. There are <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voter-verified_paper_audit_trail">several different mechanisms</a> by which this can happen – such as displaying the paper record through a glass window in the voting machine, and then saving it in a secure compartment for later recounting or auditing.</p>
<p>It’s also important for election officials to prepare for problems generating that paper record – whether innocuous inconveniences like printer jams or a malicious attack that disables a machine’s ability to print. This may mean having alternative paper ballots on hand for voters to use if electronic systems break down.</p>
<p>Then, after the election, auditors can compare electronic voting results to the results documented in the paper trail. If they don’t agree, then something has gone wrong – either accidentally or as a result of outside interference – and a newly verified tally of the actual paper votes can be used to determine the winner. Often, this is done in the form of a recount for elections with close outcomes. But it needs to happen in other elections too.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94243/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eugene Vorobeychik receives funding from the National Science Foundation, the Department of Defense, and the National Institutes of Health. </span></em></p>The best way to protect elections is to plan and prepare for an audit of the results after the votes are cast.Eugene Vorobeychik, Assistant Professor of Computer Science and Computer Engineering, Vanderbilt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/681002016-11-09T19:21:49Z2016-11-09T19:21:49ZAmerica’s aging voting machines managed to survive another election<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145129/original/image-20161109-16724-wwjvc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Depending on old technology.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/robpegoraro/20339783219/">Rob Pegoraro/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>During this year’s voting, the vast majority of states used outdated voting machines perilously close to the end of their projected lifespan. Back in April, we warned that <a href="https://theconversation.com/aging-voting-machines-threaten-election-integrity-54523">42 states use machines</a> that are at least a decade old. Given that a high percentage of these machines have projected lifespans of between 10 and 15 years, we argued something needs to be done soon to prevent a real crisis.</p>
<p>We also pointed out, though, that the fact that the machines are aging does not mean they will all break down at once. Fortunately, on Election Day, most Americans were able to vote on machines that functioned properly, though in a few areas like <a href="http://www.fox2detroit.com/news/elections-2016/216159836-story">Detroit</a>, problems were widespread.</p>
<p>In addition, <a href="https://www.eac.gov/election_management_resources/beready16.aspx">election officials were well-prepared</a>. Keenly aware of the potential problems associated with using antiquated equipment during a high-turnout election, they were generally able to keep voting going smoothly when <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/competing-claims-of-voter-fraud-intimidation-raise-tensions/2016/11/08/2342e93a-a58e-11e6-ba46-53db57f0e351_story.html">problems did arise</a>.</p>
<p>Still, the failures that we did see serve as a warning of how bad things could get if we don’t replace our aging voting equipment soon. In <a href="https://www.rti.org/sites/default/files/resources/3327.pdf">a 2010 report</a>, one state’s Department of Legislative Services found that the “nature and frequency of equipment failure beyond the manufacturer’s life expectancy cannot be predicted.” As machines approach the 15-year mark, we are likely to see progressively worse and more frequent problems.</p>
<h2>Problems started early</h2>
<p>Machine problems had already cropped up at the start of this year’s early voting.</p>
<p>Many difficulties tended to affect paperless computerized voting machines, or direct recording electronic machines (DREs), on which voters make their selection on a touchscreen, with a button or a dial. In <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/voting-machine-issue-georgia-officials-blame-testing-43116795">Georgia</a>, <a href="http://www.npr.org/2016/10/26/499450796/some-machines-are-flipping-votes-but-that-doesnt-mean-theyre-rigged">Nevada</a>, <a href="http://www.npr.org/2016/10/26/499450796/some-machines-are-flipping-votes-but-that-doesnt-mean-theyre-rigged">North Carolina</a>, <a href="http://www.newschannel10.com/story/33558990/voting-official-admits-numerous-occasions-of-machine-malfunctions">Tennessee</a> and <a href="http://www.npr.org/2016/10/26/499450796/some-machines-are-flipping-votes-but-that-doesnt-mean-theyre-rigged">Texas</a>, early voters reported calibration problems, or “vote flipping.” It’s a problem unique to touchscreen machines, where a voter intends to pick one candidate, but another shows up as her choice. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.fox13memphis.com/top-stories/problems-at-the-polls-on-first-day-of-early-voting-in-tn/458784577">Shelby County, Tennessee</a>, 30 smart cards failed, making it impossible to pull up the correct electronic ballot on voting machines. In <a href="http://kxan.com/2016/10/25/hays-county-reports-issues-with-voting-machines-at-one-location/">Hays County, Texas</a>, voters waited for over an hour because a “faulty cable connection” caused voting machines to fail on the second day of early voting.</p>
<p>Voting machine problems persisted through Election Day. <a href="https://electionlandtrends.appspot.com/">Reports of malfunction</a> came from several voting locations. Calibration errors were reported in the key swing state of <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/2016/11/08/some-pennsylvania-voters-pick-trump-but-screen-says-clinton/93491844/">Pennsylvania</a>. In one <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-election-voting-problems-20161108-story.html">Utah county</a>, due to widespread memory card failure, 75 percent of the county’s nearly 400 voting machines failed. In the <a href="http://www.fox2detroit.com/news/elections-2016/216159836-story">Detroit</a> area, optical scan machines would not accept ballots. </p>
<p>But at least in some cases, there were ways to work around these sorts of problems. In Durham County, North Carolina, computer problems caused delays for poll workers checking in voters. They switched to backup paper documents, and after litigation, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/08/politics/north-carolina-durham-county-glitch/index.html">extended voting hours in eight precincts</a> to make up for the difficulties.</p>
<p>A full accounting of <a href="http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/11/election-2016-voter-intimidation-tracker-live-blog">Election Day’s problems</a> will likely take months to sort out.</p>
<p>We can’t say how many votes were affected by these problems, but they no doubt contributed to long lines. We likely saw at least as many machine problems as we saw in 2012, when approximately 500,000 to 700,000 people <a href="https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/08/Waiting-in-Line-to-Vote-White-Paper-Stewart-Ansolabehere.pdf">did not vote because of long lines</a>. Of course, there are many potential causes of long lines, including <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/end-long-lines">misallocation of poll workers</a>. But other causes are definitely failures both of election officials to provide enough machines and of the machines themselves in certain polling places.</p>
<h2>Preventing another Bush v. Gore</h2>
<p>As machines get older, these functionality problems will likely multiply. Context matters. Imagine if these problems had taken place in an extremely close race, decided by just a few hundred or thousand votes. The fallout would be disastrous.</p>
<p>We don’t have to imagine what this would look like, because it has already happened. In 2000, problems with <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/19/us/counting-the-vote-the-machine-new-focus-on-punch-card-system.html">faulty voting machines</a> contributed to an electoral meltdown of epic proportions.</p>
<p>One key difference between 2000 and today is that we live in a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/24/the-two-key-factors-behind-our-polarized-politics/">much more polarized political climate</a>, where discussion of “rigged” elections has become far too common. </p>
<p>Making matters worse, there are more <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-machines-idUSKCN11Q0EU">computerized voting machines</a> in use today that do not provide a paper record. In parts of the country using paperless computerized machines – <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/fact-sheet-voting-system-security-and-reliability-risks">where more than 40 million registered voters reside</a> – voters are asked to trust a system of which they are increasingly skeptical. </p>
<p>Those concerns merge when, on Election Day, a major party candidate takes to <a href="http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/8/13567060/trump-voter-fraud-2016-election">cable news</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/08/translating-donald-trumps-voter-fraud-talk-into-reality/">Twitter</a> to cast doubt on the outcome.</p>
<p>Confidence in election outcomes and the integrity of our electoral system is the currency of our democracy. It is no exaggeration to say that without that confidence, our democracy will cease to function. Anyone who cares about the legitimacy of our elections in future years will work to ensure our oldest, least reliable and verifiable equipment is replaced.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68100/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Where problems arose, voting was generally able to keep going smoothly. But those failures serve as a warning of how bad things could get if we don’t replace our voting machines soon.Lawrence Norden, Deputy Director, Democracy Program, Brennan Center for Justice, New York UniversityChristopher Famighetti, Voting Rights Researcher, Democracy Project, Brennan Center for Justice, New York UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/675112016-11-09T11:06:30Z2016-11-09T11:06:30ZThis election was not hacked – but it was attacked<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145121/original/image-20161109-16727-dq8tug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">All indications are that voting was not subject to a cyberattack.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-184143842/">Ballot box via shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The presidential campaign of 2016 thankfully – and we can only hope officially – ended this evening. As of when this article was posted, there are no reports of widespread cyberattacks or other digital interference against state voting systems. Of course, since votes are still being tallied, we’re not in the clear yet. But current indications are that this was a fairly uneventful election, from a cybersecurity perspective at least.</p>
<p>So far, we’ve seen no public evidence of Russian hackers, <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/09/27/tech-crowd-goes-wild-trumps-400-pound-hacker/91168144/">400-pound</a> or otherwise, attacking individual voting machines from their bedrooms (to use a very tired old trope). There have been reports of <a href="http://www.denverpost.com/2016/11/08/colorado-reports-voting-system-briefly-crippled-by-computer-problem/">brief computer problems</a>, but they were easily remedied. And there’s no indication that state voter registration databases were compromised by hostile third parties.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, cybersecurity units of several states’ <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/01/politics/election-hacking-cyberattack/">National Guard forces were mobilized</a> ahead of the election, in a manner reminiscent of the reassuring and public show of force when airports reopened following 9/11. The military’s hackers at <a href="https://theconversation.com/should-nsa-and-cyber-command-have-separate-leadership-65986">U.S. Cyber Command</a> reportedly <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-hackers-ready-hit-back-if-russia-disrupts-election-n677936">stood ready to retaliate</a> against cyberattacks on the election – in particular, <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-cyber-play-what-are-all-these-russian-hackers-up-to-65777">from Russia</a> as well.</p>
<p>These possibilities and preparations reinforce the need for America to place a greater emphasis on election-related cybersecurity, if not also cybersecurity more generally. Even though nothing suspicious appears to suggest the election was “hacked,” we must still make improvements. At stake is the trustworthiness of the electoral systems and processes of the world’s leading democracy. </p>
<h2>Time for governments to act</h2>
<p>Politically motivated digital attacks during the latter months of election 2016 raised concerns about the electronic security of the American electoral process. These events included the hacking of the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/21/politics/dnc-hack-russians-guccifer-claims/">Democratic National Committee</a> and the ongoing <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/06/wikileaks-emails-hillary-clinton-campaign-john-podesta">Wikileaks disclosures</a> of email accounts of Clinton advisers. These events increased public interest in cybersecurity beyond the effects of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/the-nsa-files">revelations</a> of NSA contractor Edward Snowden in 2013 and many high-profile <a href="http://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/DataBreachReport_2016.pdf">data breaches</a>.</p>
<p>In recent months, <a href="https://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-ElectionCyberThreats.pdf">government agencies</a> and experts (including myself) <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/04/how-hackers-are-trying-to-cast-their-ballots-for-president-this-election-season.html">have recommended improvements</a> to the electronic security of our <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/we-dont-want-voters-to-be-terrified-officials-play-down-fears-of-a-rigged-election/2016/10/23/091d9bf8-949b-11e6-bc79-af1cd3d2984b_story.html">hodgepodge collection</a> of voting systems.</p>
<p>Among our suggestions are that states ensure their <a href="https://theconversation.com/aging-voting-machines-threaten-election-integrity-54523">voting systems are modernized</a>, properly updated, tested and secured from both physical and network-based tampering. States must continually ensure the integrity of their <a href="https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/voter-registration-technology/">voter databases</a> to help minimize the potential for voter fraud. And they must provide a trusted audit trail (for example, <a href="http://votingmachines.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=000291">paper receipts</a>) for election officials and the public to fall back on. There must be a way to clearly resolve questions about the security and integrity of the system, process or reported results.</p>
<p>All of this requires strong political will for <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/voting-machines-cybersecurity-homeland-security-230773">meaningful action</a>. It also means we’ll need to ensure the necessary money and expertise are available to make it happen in communities all across the country – admittedly not an easy task during a period of widespread budget constraints.</p>
<p>These concerns align with the basic principles of cybersecurity that apply to any organization. Information resources and their data must remain available and accessible to authorized users, confidential from unauthorized users, and protected from intentional and accidental tampering or modification. In meeting these challenges, organizations must find the resources to implement those safeguards in a proactive, effective, and ongoing fashion.</p>
<p>But there is a crucial difference that makes these particular cybersecurity efforts especially important: Election systems are truly critical foundations for our nation’s underlying social and political infrastructure.</p>
<h2>Rhetoric attacked legitimacy</h2>
<p>Although this election does not appear to be “hacked” in the manner that <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/russian-hackers-change-election-result-160917041811733.html">many predicted</a>, I do believe that it was successfully and directly attacked, repeatedly. These attacks did not come in the form of hackers altering vote counts. Rather, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/election-legitimacy-at-risk-even-without-a-november-cyberattack-64418">attacks on this election’s integrity</a> came from assorted and perhaps nontraditional threats, both foreign and domestic.</p>
<p>Over the past year, Republican Donald Trump repeatedly made vague claims of a “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/06/donald-trump-accuses-democrats-of-voter-in-nevada">rigged</a>” system, possibly related to unsubstantiated allegations of <a href="http://www.factcheck.org/2016/10/trumps-bogus-voter-fraud-claims/">widespread voter fraud</a> or Russian <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-aggressive-power-is-resurgent-online-and-off-64336">influence</a>. In addition, politically sensitive information was regularly revealed by groups and <a href="https://wikileaks.org/Assange-Statement-on-the-US-Election.html">organizations</a> believing themselves to be above the rules of law and common sense. And, the media itself became the recurring <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/08/business/media/tv-networks-big-worry-voters-wont-trust-them-on-election-night.html">target of scorn</a> as <a href="http://www.politico.com/blogs/on-media/2016/02/les-moonves-trump-cbs-220001">enablers</a> of the alleged election “rigging.”</p>
<p>These claims targeted the <a href="http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG654.pdf">public’s behavioral and cognitive systems</a>. Consequently, many Americans believe that the voting “system” in America cannot be trusted – even though there is no such thing. Rather, the country’s elections <a href="https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/voting-equipment/">operate on a patchwork</a> of local and state rules, procedures and technologies. </p>
<p>To wit: Some states use fully electronic voting while others retain the traditional paper ballot. Polls open and close at different times across the country. Some states may offer a window for early voting while others do not. There is no unified national election “system” that could be attacked or disrupted in a single effort.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, refuting claims of vote-rigging or offering contrary views – even when based on documented evidence – was <a href="http://politicsmadepublic.com/living-in-a-post-factual-era/">dismissed by believers</a> as further proof of a “rigged” system.</p>
<p>Oddly, Trump made these “rigging” claims despite the fact that he was the nominee of a <a href="http://www.salon.com/2016/10/18/donald-trumps-rigged-election-talk-rebuked-by-republican-secretaries-of-state/">party whose own members oversee voting matters</a> in many states. That means his allegations suggested his own party’s officials and election procedures were conspiring against him.</p>
<p>All this made it more difficult to discuss legitimate voting security concerns objectively, rationally or meaningfully. When everyone believes their own set of “facts,” it is hard to address collective problems.</p>
<p>For these reasons, I believe election 2016 demonstrated the fragility of the American electoral process. It is susceptible to various types of attacks, overt and subtle, technical and nontechnical.</p>
<h2>Protecting the voting system</h2>
<p>Efforts to protect the American voting system can learn from the practice of cybersecurity. Cybersecurity professionals work to prevent attacks, and to respond to those that happen, <a href="http://programs.online.utica.edu/articles/moulden-info-security-interview">in several ways</a>. They identify threats and vulnerabilities in their systems and networks. They create and execute procedures to operate those systems. And they otherwise work to provide a secure cyberspace for their organizations. </p>
<p>They also <a href="http://www.nationalisacs.org/">share threat information</a> and best practices across companies and government agencies. This is because they recognize that cybersecurity is a shared responsibility and collective efforts are more helpful than working alone.</p>
<p>The electoral equivalent of this problem involves much more than identifying and reducing the technical vulnerabilities with electronic voting machines from their assembly all the way to when they’re used on Election Day. We must also ensure the integrity of all election data and systems, from the time a citizen submits their personal information when registering to vote, through casting their ballot, and on into counting the vote, tabulating it, and having it formally recorded by state election officials.</p>
<p>Elections, like cybersecurity, are a shared effort involving many different people and organizations from industry and all levels of government. To carry the metaphor further, let’s also take steps to ensure that the <a href="https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/2000/0915.html#1">proverbial “window of vulnerability”</a> is as small as possible. In the electoral process, reducing the potential time for an attacker to cause mischief is a valuable thing to consider. For example, is there <a href="http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-05-14/opinion/ct-oped-0514-british-20100514_1_campaign-spending-candidates-election-day">really a need</a> to have a multi-year presidential campaign that can be swayed regularly by any number of hacks in the cyber or cognitive domains?</p>
<h2>Errors still happen</h2>
<p>As of this evening, the process of voting appears to have encountered minimal, if any, cybersecurity-related problems. However, we may not learn about them immediately – unless attackers claim responsibility or government agencies make a public statement. Again, trust in the system, and trust in the people, processes and technologies, is crucial.</p>
<p>Yes, there will be <a href="http://www.the-dispatch.com/news/20050730/lawmakers-shouldnt-experiment-with-ballots---remember-carteret-county">human or procedural errors</a> made in vote-casting and vote-counting. They, like any human process or organizational system, are not totally foolproof or errorproof. We must accept that fact. Will there be voter fraud somewhere? Perhaps. But in widespread numbers? Doubtful. And will votes be changed by overseas hackers? Probably not.</p>
<p>Certainly, there will be periodic and likely very minor errors, glitches, and hiccups in the overall election process – there almost always are. The <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/voting-machine-problems-reported-tenn-n-states-article-1.2864094">media will report</a> on them, social media will <a href="http://www.thv11.com/news/local/what-is-the-impact-of-social-media-on-voting/349534749">amplify</a> them, and certain <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/2016-election-glitches-trump-230953">candidates</a> or their supporters might use those reports as evidence of a larger conspiracy and evidence of a system “rigged” against them.</p>
<p>But even if tonight’s vote count isn’t hacked, the damage is done. We must acknowledge that the integrity of America’s election system has been attacked successfully. Accordingly, once people have recovered from election 2016, we must implement a series of bipartisan, nationwide, rational and objective discussions about our election processes and technologies so that citizen trust in this most cherished national infrastructure – and feature of American democracy – can be restored.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67511/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Forno has received research funding related to cybersecurity from the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the State of Maryland during his academic career. He is a registered independent voter and was quite disgusted by the nature of the 2016 presidential campaign.</span></em></p>Though there is no indication hackers affected the outcome of the election, we still must act to improve the cybersecurity of American elections.Richard Forno, Senior Lecturer, Cybersecurity & Internet Researcher, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/632412016-07-29T16:58:37Z2016-07-29T16:58:37ZHow vulnerable to hacking is the US election cyber infrastructure?<p>Following the hack of Democratic National Committee emails and reports of a new <a href="http://www.computerworld.com/article/3102024/security/fbi-probing-possible-hack-of-another-democratic-party-organization.html">cyberattack against the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee</a>, worries abound that foreign nations may be clandestinely involved in the 2016 American presidential campaign. <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/clues-dnc-hacking-point-russia-trump-claims-40965742">Allegations swirl that Russia</a>, under the direction of President Vladimir Putin, is secretly working to undermine the U.S. Democratic Party. The apparent logic is that a Donald Trump presidency would result in more pro-Russian policies. At the moment, the <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-07-25/fbi-investigating-dnc-cyber-hack-some-democrats-blame-on-russia">FBI is investigating</a>, but no U.S. government agency has yet made a formal accusation.</p>
<p>The Republican nominee added unprecedented fuel to the fire by <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/us/politics/donald-trump-russia-clinton-emails.html">encouraging Russia to “find”</a> and release Hillary Clinton’s missing emails from her time as secretary of state. Trump’s comments drew sharp rebuke from the media and politicians on all sides. Some suggested that by soliciting a foreign power to intervene in domestic politics, his musings bordered on criminality or treason. Trump backtracked, saying his <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/28/politics/donald-trump-russia-hacking-sarcastic/">comments were “sarcastic,”</a> implying they’re not to be taken seriously.</p>
<p>Of course, the desire to interfere with another country’s internal political processes is nothing new. Global powers routinely monitor their adversaries and, when deemed necessary, will try to clandestinely undermine or influence foreign domestic politics to their own benefit. For example, the Soviet Union’s foreign intelligence service engaged in so-called “<a href="http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/kgb/su0523.htm">active measures</a>” designed to influence Western opinion. Among other efforts, it spread conspiracy theories about government officials and fabricated documents intended to exploit the social tensions of the 1960s. Similarly, U.S. intelligence services have conducted their own secret activities against foreign political systems – perhaps most notably its repeated attempts to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/12/11/the-history-of-absurd-american-plots-in-cuba/">help overthrow</a> pro-communist Fidel Castro in Cuba.</p>
<p>Although the Cold War is over, intelligence services around the world continue to monitor other countries’ domestic political situations. Today’s “<a href="http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG654.pdf">influence operations</a>” are generally subtle and strategic. Intelligence services clandestinely try to sway the “hearts and minds” of the target country’s population toward a certain political outcome.</p>
<p>What has changed, however, is the ability of individuals, governments, militaries and criminal or terrorist organizations to use internet-based tools – commonly called <a href="https://theconversation.com/america-is-dropping-cyberbombs-but-how-do-they-work-58476">cyberweapons</a> – not only to gather information but also to generate influence within a target group.</p>
<p>So what are some of the technical vulnerabilities faced by nations during political elections, and what’s really at stake when foreign powers meddle in domestic political processes? </p>
<h2>Vulnerabilities at the electronic ballot box</h2>
<p>The process of democratic voting requires a strong sense of trust – in the equipment, the process and the people involved.</p>
<p>One of the most obvious, direct ways to affect a country’s election is to interfere with the way citizens actually cast votes. As the United States (<a href="https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/electronic-voting-and-counting-around-the-world">and other nations</a>) embrace electronic voting, it must take steps to ensure the security – and more importantly, the trustworthiness – of the systems. Not doing so can endanger a nation’s domestic democratic will and create general political discord – a situation that can be exploited by an adversary for its own purposes.</p>
<p>As early as 1975, the U.S. government <a href="http://votingmachines.procon.org/sourcefiles/saltman1975.pdf">examined the idea of computerized voting</a>, but electronic voting systems were not used <a href="http://votingmachines.procon.org/view.source.php?sourceID=001042">until Georgia’s 2002 state elections</a>. Other states have adopted the technology since then, although given ongoing fiscal constraints, those with aging or problematic electronic voting machines are <a href="http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/222470-states-ditch-electronic-voting-machines">returning to more traditional</a> (and cheaper) paper-based ones.</p>
<p>New technology always comes with some glitches – even when it’s not being attacked. For example, during the 2004 general election, North Carolina’s Unilect e-voting machines <a href="http://www.the-dispatch.com/news/20050730/lawmakers-shouldnt-experiment-with-ballots---remember-carteret-county">“lost” 4,438 votes</a> due to a system error.</p>
<p>But cybersecurity researchers focus on the kinds of problems that could be intentionally caused by bad actors. In 2006, Princeton computer science professor <a href="https://www.cs.princeton.edu/%7Efelten/">Ed Felten</a> demonstrated how to install a self-propagating piece of vote-changing malware <a href="http://citpsite.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/oldsite-htdocs/pub/ts06full.pdf">on Diebold e-voting systems</a> in less than a minute. In 2011, technicians at the Argonne National Laboratory showed <a href="http://www.computerworld.com/article/2511508/security0/argonne-researchers--hack--diebold-e-voting-system.html">how to hack e-voting machines remotely</a> and change voting data. </p>
<p>Voting officials recognize that these technologies are vulnerable. Following a 2007 study of her state’s electronic voting systems, Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer L. Brunner <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=4008511">announced that</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>the computer-based voting systems in use in Ohio do not meet computer industry security standards and are susceptible to breaches of security that may jeopardize the integrity of the voting process.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As the first generation of voting machines ages, even maintenance and updating become an issue. A 2015 report found that electronic voting machines in 43 of 50 U.S. states <a href="http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Americas_Voting_Machines_At_Risk.pdf">are at least 10 years old</a> – and that state election officials are unsure where the funding will come from to replace them. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/80kUed21j9s?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A rigged (and murderous) voting machine on ‘The Simpsons’ satirized the issue in 2008.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Securing the machines and their data</h2>
<p>In many cases, electronic voting depends on a distributed network, just like the electrical grid or municipal water system. Its spread-out nature means there are many points of potential vulnerability.</p>
<p>First, to be secure, the hardware “internals” of each voting machine must be made tamper-proof at the point of manufacture. Each individual machine’s software must remain tamper-proof and accountable, as must the vote data stored on it. (Some machines provide voters with a paper receipt of their votes, too.) When problems are discovered, the machines must be removed from service and fixed. Virginia did just this in 2015 once numerous glaring <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/15/virginia-hacking-voting-machines-security">security vulnerabilities were discovered</a> in its system. </p>
<p>Once votes are collected from individual machines, the compiled results must be transmitted from polling places to higher election offices for official consolidation, tabulation and final statewide reporting. So the network connections between locations must be tamper-proof and prevent interception or modification of the in-transit tallies. Likewise, state-level vote-tabulating systems must have trustworthy software that is both accountable and resistant to unauthorized data modification. Corrupting the integrity of data anywhere during this process, either intentionally or accidentally, can lead to botched election results.</p>
<p>However, technical vulnerabilities with the electoral process extend far beyond the voting machines at the “edge of the network.” Voter registration and administration systems operated by state and national governments are at risk too. Hacks here could affect voter rosters and citizen databases. Failing to secure these systems and records could result in fraudulent information in the voter database that may lead to improper (or illegal) voter registrations and potentially the casting of fraudulent votes.</p>
<p>And of course, underlying all this is human vulnerability: Anyone involved with e-voting technologies or procedures is susceptible to coercion or human error.</p>
<h2>How can we guard the systems?</h2>
<p>The first line of defense in protecting electronic voting technologies and information is common sense. Applying the <a href="http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf">best practices</a> of cybersecurity, data protection, information access and other objectively developed, responsibly implemented procedures makes it more difficult for adversaries to conduct cyber mischief. These are essential and must be practiced regularly.</p>
<p>Sure, it’s unlikely a single voting machine in a specific precinct in a specific polling place would be targeted by an overseas or criminal entity. But the security of each electronic voting machine is essential to ensuring not only free and fair elections but fostering citizen trust in such technologies and processes – think of the chaos around the infamous <a href="http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2008/01/17/the-legacy-of-hanging-chads">hanging chads</a> during the contested 2000 <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bush_v._Gore">Florida recount</a>. Along these lines, in 2004, Nevada was the first state to mandate e-voting machines <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5937115/ns/politics-voting_problems/t/paper-trail-voting-system-used-nevada/">include a voter-verified paper trail</a> to ensure public accountability for each vote cast. </p>
<p>Proactive examination and analysis of electronic voting machines and voter information systems are essential to ensuring free and fair elections and facilitating citizen trust in e-voting. Unfortunately, some <a href="https://www.eff.org/cases/online-policy-group-v-diebold">voting machine manufacturers have invoked</a> the controversial <a href="http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf">Digital Millennium Copyright Act</a> to prohibit external researchers from assessing the security and trustworthiness of their systems.</p>
<p>However, a 2015 <a href="https://community.rapid7.com/community/infosec/blog/2015/10/28/new-dmca-exemption-is-a-positive-step-for-security-researchers">exception to the act</a> authorizes security research into technologies otherwise protected by copyright laws. This means the security community can legally research, test, reverse-engineer and analyze such systems. Even more importantly, researchers now have the freedom to publish their findings without fear of being sued for copyright infringement. Their work is vital to identifying security vulnerabilities before they can be exploited in real-world elections.</p>
<p>Because of its benefits and conveniences, electronic voting may become the preferred mode for local and national elections. If so, officials must secure these systems and ensure they can provide trustworthy elections that support the democratic process. State-level election agencies must be given the financial resources to invest in up-to-date e-voting systems. They also must guarantee sufficient, proactive, ongoing and effective protections are in place to reduce the threat of not only operational glitches but intentional cyberattacks.</p>
<p>Democracies endure based not on the whims of a single ruler but the shared electoral responsibility of informed citizens who trust their government and its systems. That trust must not be broken by complacency, lack of resources or the intentional actions of a foreign power. As famed investor <a href="http://business.time.com/2010/03/01/warren-buffetts-boring-brilliant-wisdom/">Warren Buffett once noted</a>, “It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it.” </p>
<p>In cyberspace, five minutes is an eternity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63241/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Forno has received research funding related to cybersecurity from the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the State of Maryland during his academic career.</span></em></p>With the DNC email leak and Trump calling on Russia to hack Clinton’s emails, concern about foreign meddling in the 2016 presidential election process is rising. Is e-voting the next cyber battleground?Richard Forno, Senior Lecturer, Cybersecurity & Internet Researcher, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.