tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca-fr/topics/zimbabwe-elections-57002/articlesZimbabwe elections – La Conversation2023-08-22T13:19:50Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116152023-08-22T13:19:50Z2023-08-22T13:19:50ZZimbabwe election: Can Nelson Chamisa win? He appeals to young voters but the odds are stacked against him<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543288/original/file-20230817-27-gcauag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nelson Chamisa, leader of Zimbabwe's main opposition Citizens Coalition for Change, addresses supporters at a rally.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Auntony / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/7/28/profile-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-nelson-chamisa">Nelson Chamisa</a>, the 45-year-old leader of Zimbabwe’s main opposition party, the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), is making a second bid to be Zimbabwe’s next president. </p>
<p>A lawyer and a pastor, Chamisa is the most formidable candidate against the ruling Zanu-PF led by President Emmerson Mnangagwa. The incumbent took over after the coup that ousted the country’s founding president Robert Mugabe in 2017. </p>
<p>Chamisa is over three decades younger than his (<a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/08/03/profile-emmerson-mnangagwa-zimbabwe-s-crocodile-president//">81-year-old</a>) opponent, and the youngest person running for president in this election. His youthfulness has been a major issue in this election, as it was in the last. </p>
<p>At least 62% of the population is <a href="https://zimbabwe.unfpa.org/en/topics/young-people-2">under 25</a>. They are <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-youth-speak-out-independence-day/2718352.html">“born-frees”</a> who feel the brunt of Zimbabwe’s failing economy. The actual unemployment rate is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-42116932">unclear</a>; some claim it is as high as <a href="https://worldhelp.net/zimbabwe-unemployment-as-high-as-80-amid-pandemic/">80%</a>. The government claims it is <a href="https://www.zimstat.co.zw/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/2021_Fourth_Quarter_QLFS_Report_8032022.pdf#page=13">18%</a>. What is true is that many of Zimbabwe’s youth eke a living in the informal sector, estimated to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-informal-sector-organisations-in-zimbabwe-shape-notions-of-citizenship-180455">90% of the economy</a>. </p>
<p>Many young graduates have settled for being street vendors or have taken the dangerous <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-precarious-road-zimbabweans-travel-to-seek-a-new-life-in-south-africa-58911">illegal track</a> across the crocodile infested Limpopo River to find work in neighbouring <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/zimbabwe-immigration/">South Africa</a>. Others with some financial means seek work overseas, even if it’s below their qualifications.</p>
<p>It is to this demographic that Chamisa is speaking directly. He promises the young a <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2023/08/gift-mugano-unpacking-the-ccc-manifesto-launched-by-nelson-chamisa/">total revamp of the economy</a>. His messaging often includes glossy pictures of high-rise buildings and modernised highway networks that stand in contrast to many dilapidated roads and buildings in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>As a political scientist who focuses on voting behaviour, migration and social media, I think Chamisa would have a more than fair chance to win in a truly free and fair election. He resonates with the country’s large disenchanted youth, mainly because of the poor state of the economy. However, campaigning in autocratic conditions is not ideal for the opposition. His and his party’s weakness are also serious hurdles.</p>
<h2>Youth appeal</h2>
<p>According to the independent African surveys network <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>, 67% of Zimbabweans are <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/zimbabwe_r8_diss1-zs-bh-11june21-v2_17june2021finalreleaseversion.pdf">unsatisfied with the direction the country is taking</a>. </p>
<p>In its recently released <a href="https://www.zimeye.net/2023/08/09/download-ccc-manifesto-a-new-great-zimbabwe-blueprint/">election manifesto</a>, the Citizens Coalition for Change promises to transform Zimbabwe into a US$100 billion economy over the next 10 years. The World Bank puts the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-heads-to-the-polls-amid-high-inflation-a-slumping-currency-and-a-cost-of-living-crisis-209841">battered economy</a> at just under <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/country/ZW">US$ 21 billion</a>. </p>
<p>Chamisa defines himself as a social democrat who believes in providing substantial welfare. His party’s manifesto promises universal healthcare and basic education. He also promises to open Zimbabwe to international trade and re-engagement, ending over 20 years of <a href="https://www.commonwealthroundtable.co.uk/commonwealth/africa/zimbabwe/opinion-zimbabwes-continued-isolation/">isolation</a>. The country was suspended from the Commonwealth and excluded from debt relief programmes due to ongoing human rights abuses. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe was once Africa’s breadbasket but can no longer <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/dec/15/we-could-have-lost-her-zimbabwes-children-go-hungry-as-crisis-deepens">feed</a> its small population of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ZW">just over 16 million</a> people.</p>
<p>Chamisa’s appeal to the youth vote has been received along partisan lines. For supporters of the ruling party, he is too young, too naïve, <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/chamisa-incompetent-western-puppet-faking-political-bravery/">too western-leaning</a>, and lacks liberation credentials. For his support base of mostly young urbanites, Chamisa’s youth is his <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-02-07-zimbabwes-voters-favour-nelson-chamisa-over-president-mnangagwa-survey-shows/">trump card</a>. They have turned the age mockery from Zanu-PF into a campaign slogan, “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxqs4l0RGaA">Ngapinde Hake Mukomana</a>” (let the young man enter the state house). </p>
<p>Chamisa is popular, as shown by huge attendance at his rallies. But will this be enough to help him win his first election as the founding leader of CCC? </p>
<h2>Voter apathy, funding and harassment</h2>
<p>Chamisa and his party face a number of hurdles. The first is getting the youth to vote. </p>
<p>Youth political participation in Zimbabwe has historically been very <a href="https://mg.co.za/thoughtleader/2023-08-12-zimbabwes-2023-elections-who-votes-and-why/">low</a>. Although the election body, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, is still to release a full voter’s roll, analysis by the Election Resource Center shows that <a href="https://twitter.com/ercafrica/status/1692100040196575545?s=20">while 85%</a> (6.6 million) of eligible voters are registered, only a third are under the age of 35. </p>
<p>In addition to voter apathy, Chamisa must contend with other hurdles within the opposition movement and the usual obstacles of running for office in electoral authoritarian state. </p>
<p>Chamisa <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2022-01-25-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-nelson-chamisa-forms-new-political-party/">founded</a> the CCC following his forced exit from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2021. The married father of three had been mentored by the opposition movement’s founder, the late <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/19/zimbabwes-opposition-leader-died-heres-what-you-need-to-know/">Morgan Tsvangirai</a>. But Tsvangirai’s death <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43066175">in 2018</a> ended Chamisa’s career in the party as divisions grew between him and the old guard. </p>
<p>The formation of the CCC helped him draw in a younger generation of politicians like <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/longform/2022/7/7/the-zimbabwean-political-leader-fighting-for-her-countrys-future">Fadzayi Mahere</a>. But it also opened up Chamisa to new problems. The CCC has <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/politics-zimbabwe-elections-economy-human-rights-violations/">little money</a> against Zanu-PF’s elections war chest.</p>
<p>Chamisa lost access to state funds and opposition institutions when he left the MDC. His departure also left him with few friends at home or abroad. </p>
<p>He argues that what some see as disorganisation and isolation is <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/theindependent/local-news/article/200013680/chamisa-its-time-for-clarity-not-ambiguity">strategic ambiguity</a>. He claims that his party keeps its cards closely guarded against infiltration and manipulation.</p>
<p>Chamisa has valid reasons to do so. The ruling party has successfully co-opted opposition leadership by offering patronage. The ruling party also uses courts to their advantage and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/45b09177-bfbe-41ea-9cbd-ea4c0218f447">violence against</a> opponents. </p>
<p>In 2007, in the months leading up to the election, Chamisa suffered a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna17646957">fractured skull</a>. In 2021, his party reported threats to his life when his envoy was attacked using a <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-assailants-attack-nelson-chamisa-vehicle-leader-safe/6277026.html">homemade bomb</a>. Members of his party have been beaten up, and others have even lost <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/local-news/article/200014816/ccc-member-stoned-to-death-in-harare-violence">their lives</a>. Job Sikhala, a senior member of the opposition, has been in jail for over a year on <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/zimbabwe-conviction-and-sentencing-of-opposition-leader/">unclear charges</a>. </p>
<h2>One man show</h2>
<p>Chamisa’s vagueness on policy adds to his challenges. On the social platform X, where he has more than a <a href="https://twitter.com/nelsonchamisa?s=20">million followers</a>, he regularly only shares <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/chamisas-followers-says-they-are-tired-of-bible-verses/">Bible verses</a> or ambiguous messages. This is a lost opportunity for a candidate counting on the youth vote.</p>
<p>His party structures are unclear and it has yet to release its constitution. The only formal position in the party is his position of president. Everyone else is known only as a change agent. </p>
<p>Chamisa has not announced a running mate. This feeds into rumours that he has weak leadership skills and prefers to centre power on himself. One might even wonder if he does not trust his supporters.</p>
<p>Still, those supporting him say they do not need to know his structures. Zimbabweans are hungry for change after four decades of Zanu-PF rule. Many who hoped for change after Mugabe’s ouster are dismayed by the continuing economic challenges and increasing militarisation of the Zimbabwean politics. For these voters, Chamisa is the change they hope to see.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211615/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chipo Dendere receives funding from the American Association of University Women (AAUW) and Wellesley College to support research. </span></em></p>Nelson Chamisa defines himself as a social democrat who believes in providing substantial welfare to support healthcare and basic education.Chipo Dendere, Assistant Professor, Africana Studies, Wellesley CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116332023-08-20T09:27:25Z2023-08-20T09:27:25ZZimbabwe’s president was security minister when genocidal rape was state policy in 1983-4. Now he seeks another term<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543031/original/file-20230816-17-eic0p6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's President Emmerson Mnangagwa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tafadzwa Ufumeli/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Trigger warning: this article contains accounts of sexual violence.</em></p>
<p>Zimbabwe will hold its elections on 23 August. The current president of Zimbabwe, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-mnangagwa-presidency-would-not-be-a-new-beginning-for-zimbabwe-87641">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, is running for re-election. This is despite his having oversight in the execution of the genocide of a minority group of Zimbabweans in the south-west region, as evidenced in my <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">newly published study</a>. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Hazel-Cameron-2">genocide scholar</a>, I have studied the nature, causes and consequences of genocide and mass atrocities, as well as the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41917771?seq=6">role of external institutional bystanders</a>. Since 2011, I have researched the crimes of the powerful of Zimbabwe. Much of this has involved an <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316020728_The_Matabeleland_Massacres_Britain%27s_wilful_blindness">analysis of official British and US government communications</a>. This has shed new light on what knowledge was available to the British and US governments about <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325887696_State-Organized_Starvation_A_Weapon_of_Extreme_Mass_Violence_in_Matabeleland_South_1984">atrocity crimes targeting the Ndebele</a> in the early post-independence years of Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">latest study</a> explores a military operation, known as Gukurahundi, between 1983 and 1984 in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands in Zimbabwe. Drawing on 36 in-depth interviews with survivors, my study provides new insights into <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7388214.stm">Operation Gukurahundi</a>. It identifies systematic patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence in the operation. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/british-policy-towards-zimbabwe-during-matabeleland-massacre-licence-to-kill-81574">British policy towards Zimbabwe during Matabeleland massacre: licence to kill</a>
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</em>
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<p>The study concludes that these patterns indicate a state policy of systematic genocidal rape in 1983 and 1984. This policy was deployed with the intent to destroy, in part, a specific ethnic group: the minority Ndebele of Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>My study acknowledges the immense suffering of the victims of the genocide and their descendants. It also illustrates that genocide creates victims across generations. Time cannot eliminate the trauma inflicted or the need for justice. </p>
<h2>The genocide</h2>
<p>In January 1983, the Zanu-PF government of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27519044">Robert Mugabe</a>, in the newly
independent Zimbabwe, launched a massive security clampdown on the Ndebele. This was <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-policy-towards-zimbabwe-during-matabeleland-massacre-licence-to-kill-81574">both politically and ethnically motivated</a>. At the heart of the operation was a strategy of state-ordered terror. It was perpetrated by a 4,000-strong all-Shona Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwean National Army led by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-minister-idUSKCN24U0MK">Perrance Shiri</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-mnangagwa-presidency-would-not-be-a-new-beginning-for-zimbabwe-87641">Mnangagwa</a> had oversight over both the army’s Fifth Brigade and the Central Intelligence Organisation in his role as minister of internal security and chairman of Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/17/could-mnangagwa-be-zimbabwes-comeback-crocodile">Joint High Command</a>. He <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-27-op-ed-mnangagwa-and-the-gukurahundi-fact-and-fiction/">reported directly to Mugabe</a>. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa, however, has <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-24-00-gukurahundi-ghosts-haunt-mnangagwa/">denied accusations</a> he played an active role in Operation Gukurahundi.</p>
<p>The stated objective of the campaign was to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jocelyn-Alexander/publication/250225505_Dissident_Perspectives_on_Zimbabwe%27s_Post-Independence_War/links/566858c308ae193b5fa0379f/Dissident-Perspectives-on-Zimbabwes-Post-Independence-War.pdf">rid the country of “dissidents”</a>. However, the overwhelming majority of those targeted by security forces were non-combatant Ndebele civilians. The government viewed them as supporters, or potential supporters, of the political opposition.</p>
<p>In 1983, the Fifth Brigade moved from village to village in Matabeleland North and some areas of the Midlands. Their presence led to <a href="https://www.pearl-insights.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/The-Matabeleland-Massacres-Britains-wilful-blindness.pdf">extreme violence</a>. The operation shifted to Matabeleland South in February 1984, where state-led atrocities and violence
continued. This included the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325887696_State-Organized_Starvation_A_Weapon_of_Extreme_Mass_Violence_in_Matabeleland_South_1984">orchestrated starvation of the Ndebele</a>. </p>
<p>Estimates vary on the number of non-combatant civilians massacred during Operation Gukurahundi. One conservative estimate is <a href="https://apnews.com/article/df5722c221bf4c5ca894e5e481413ca3">between 10,000 and 20,000</a>. However, Dan Stannard, the director internal of Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation during Operation Gukurahundi, believed that between <a href="http://researchdata.uwe.ac.uk/104/240/roh-oh-sta-da1-appr.pdf">30,000 and 50,000</a> Ndebele may have been killed. </p>
<p>Although the peak of the violence occurred between 1983 and 1984, the operation didn’t end until December 1987 with the signing of a <a href="https://commonwealthoralhistories.org/explandict/unity-accord-of-1987/">national unity accord</a>. </p>
<h2>Rape and sexual violence</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">My research</a> reveals what has, until now, been omitted from criminological scrutiny: a state policy of rape and sexual violence that targeted the Ndebele people during Operation Gukurahundi. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</a> made a <a href="https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTR,40278fbb4.html">historic judgment</a> which established that rape and other forms of sexual violence could be acts of genocide as defined by the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf#page=1">United Nations Convention on Genocide Article II</a>. The tribunal recognised how rape and sexual violence functioned to destroy the minority Tutsi group of Rwanda in 1994.</p>
<p>I gathered data for my <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">study</a> from 36 in-depth interviews with male and female survivors in a representative sample of geographical locations across Matabeleland. While small in comparison to the sheer scale of the violence and the numbers who were victimised, this study nonetheless establishes reliable conclusions about the nature of events. </p>
<p>The patterns I identified include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>public spectacles of multiple perpetrator rape targeting children and adults</p></li>
<li><p>people forced to witness the rape of female and male family members</p></li>
<li><p>rape and sexual violence followed by mass killing</p></li>
<li><p>forced intrafamilial rape</p></li>
<li><p>forced bestiality</p></li>
<li><p>forced nudity.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These are acts that can be interpreted as “deliberately inflicting on the (Ndebele) group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”, a contravention of <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf#page=1">Article II (c) of the UN Genocide Convention</a>.</p>
<p>The systematic dehumanisation and degradation of the Ndebele through forced intrafamilial rape was a recurring pattern of state harm. It was pervasive in both Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South.</p>
<p>One of the people I interviewed, Bukhosi, who was 19 in 1984 and living in Matabeleland South, <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">shared the cruelty</a> of knowing that the Fifth Brigade might force him to attempt to have sex with his relatives. They would threaten to shoot him if he refused. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>There were times we were afraid even to be in the company of our sister, even to go to the shop. Because I know when these guys come and see us together, they say ‘sleep with your sister’. Then you are afraid to go with your mother because something terrible would happen, they will say ‘do this to your mother’. You are afraid even to be with your brother at home, because they … these guys (Fifth Brigade), when they find the two of you. It is terrible … So we were all separated ….</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Such <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm">rituals of degradation</a> are found wherever a policy of genocidal rape is adopted. They cause shame and humiliation. They leave communities and individual families destroyed, their bonds crushed through the annihilation of social norms. </p>
<p>Forty years later, the intergenerational impacts of Operation Gukurahundi on the Ndebele group are profound. My interviewees widely reported mental health issues. Children born of survivors are angry and struggle to understand their family’s brutal history when questions about these painful experiences are met with silence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Mnangagwa
with Senior Royal Prince William in November 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kingston Royal</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I also identified patterns of reproductive violence targeting males and females. These included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>killing the foetuses of pregnant women</p></li>
<li><p>internment in concentration camps for sexual servitude (rape camps)</p></li>
<li><p>forced pregnancies </p></li>
<li><p>genital mutilation. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Fifth Brigade officers targeted the wombs of pregnant women with knives, bayonets or through stamping.</p>
<p>These acts can be interpreted as “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the (Ndebele) group”, a contravention of <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf#page=1">Article II (d) of the Genocide Convention</a>. </p>
<p>Every participant in my study reported the presence of a military rank structure – and complicity of senior officers in mass rapes and sexual violence. There was no evidence of sexual predation by army personnel for personal satisfaction. </p>
<p>Another study participant, Phindile, was 37 and lived in Matabeleland South in 1984. There were 21 homesteads in her village. She told me there were three commanders in her area. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Those were the ones who were giving the instructions. Rape was done (by) daylight and darkness but most were done in the evening. The commanders would be there eating. The chief commander would be sitting at a distance and giving instructions on what to do. They used to do the raping according to their rank.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>My <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">research</a> establishes that the policy of rape and other forms of sexual violence was systematic and predicated on the government’s intent to destroy the Ndebele in part. The policy reflects the ideology and strategic goals of those in high office. The fundamental human rights of many survivors remain affected <a href="https://www.zimlive.com/gukurahundi-the-election-dilemma-for-undocumented-victims/">to this day</a>. </p>
<h2>Swept under the carpet</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">Prosecution for genocide</a> extends to those who plan, instigate, order, commit or aid and abet in its <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/genocide">planning, preparation or execution</a>.</p>
<p>In the early 1990s, reports of state-organised rape, the detention of women in rape camps, enforced pregnancy and other sexual atrocities trickled out of Bosnia and Croatia. Securing indictments became an <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/abs/war-crimes-brutality-genocide-terror-and-the-struggle-for-justice-by-aryeh-neier-new-york-times-books-1998-pp-xiv-274-index-25-can35-between-vengeance-and-forgiveness-facing-history-after-genocide-and-mass-violence-by-martha-minow-boston-beacon-press-1998-pp-xiii-202-index-23/47336631C6CF464C84E5226AB62AD274">international political priority</a>. </p>
<p>Similar <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/uk/revealed-british-diplomats-pressured-bbcs-jeremy-paxman-understand-true-perspective-massacres-zimbabwe-61535">reports had trickled out</a> of Zimbabwe a decade earlier but were <a href="https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10023/16176/Cameron_2017_TIHR_BritainsWilfulBlindness_AAM.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">swept under the carpet</a>. </p>
<p>Intelligence on genocidal rape and other atrocities was <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316020728_The_Matabeleland_Massacres_Britain%27s_wilful_blindness">minimised by British representatives</a> in Zimbabwe. This was clearly politically influenced, as expressed in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316020728_The_Matabeleland_Massacres_Britain%27s_wilful_blindness">numerous diplomatic cables</a> between Harare and London.</p>
<p>The crimes of genocide committed by the Third Reich in Nazi Germany, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia or the Hutu government of Rwanda were subjected to investigation, prosecution and judgment in international courts. </p>
<p>Yet, 40 years after the mass atrocities of Operation Gukurahundi, there has been no official investigation, prosecution or judgment. The most senior surviving person accused of overseeing the genocide and other crimes against humanity, the incumbent president of Zimbabwe, enjoys impunity. He is endorsed and flattered – for example, he was <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202304190012.html#:%7E:text=Emmerson%20Mnangagwa%2C%20President%20of%20Zimbabwe%20.&text=President%20Emmerson%20Mnangagwa%20has%20been,ceremonial%20home%20of%20Britain's%20monarchy.">invited</a> to the May 2023 coronation of King Charles III of the UK.</p>
<p>Rather than being subjected to a process of international justice before a court with the jurisdiction to try the mass crimes of Gukurahundi, Mnangagwa will stand for re-election on 23 August. The survivors will continue their <a href="https://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/memory-and-erasure">search for justice and accountability</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211633/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hazel Cameron received funding for this research project from Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland, the British Academy and a Principal’s Special Award, University of St Andrews. </span></em></p>President Emmerson Mnangagwa has not faced official investigation or prosecution over his role in Operation Gukurahundi – 40 years on.Hazel Cameron, Honorary Senior Research Fellow, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2101992023-08-02T12:52:29Z2023-08-02T12:52:29ZZimbabwe’s rulers won’t tolerate opposing voices – but its writers refuse to be silenced<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539973/original/file-20230728-19-7tnmnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">NoViolet Bulawayo, Zimbabwean author of the politically charged novels We Need New Names and Glory.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Levenson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The ruling elite in Zimbabwe has always tried to <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/04/zimbabwe-43-years-independence-commemoration-marred-by-rapidly-shrinking-civic-space/">silence</a> opposing political voices and erase histories it does not wish to have aired. Although “democratic” elections have been held since 1980, the country has become what the scholar Eldred Masunungure <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24388181">calls</a> a state of “militarised, electoral authoritarianism”. </p>
<p>As Zimbabwe heads to the polls again in 2023, it’s worth considering the role that writers have played in engendering political resistance. Their voices have been important in challenging oppression, exposing social injustices and advocating for political change. </p>
<h2>The liberation struggle</h2>
<p>Literature was vital for raising awareness about the harshness of colonial rule. It was used to mobilise resistance against the white minority regime and garner international support for the liberation struggle. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover with an illustration of an African man against a spider's web, a needle stitching a wound on his forehead." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1137&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1137&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1137&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Heinemann African Writers Series</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Texts like <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/voices-of-liberation-ndabaningi-sithole">Ndabaningi Sithole’s</a> foundational 1955 novel Umvekela wamaNdebele (The Revolution of the Ndebele) and <a href="https://theconversation.com/dear-dambudzo-marechera-the-letters-zimbabweans-wrote-to-a-literary-star-144299">Dambudzo Marechera</a>’s 1978 magnum opus The House of Hunger were instrumental. Many others like <a href="https://www.gale.com/intl/databases-explored/literature/charles-mungoshi">Charles Mungoshi</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/tsitsi-dangarembga-and-writing-about-pain-and-loss-in-zimbabwe-144313">Tsitsi Dangarembga</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jul/21/chenjerai-hove">Chenjerai Hove</a> produced texts that encouraged resistance against colonial rule. </p>
<p>These works showcased the resilience of Zimbabweans in the face of adversity, inspiring the population to continue their fight for freedom.</p>
<h2>Independence</h2>
<p>Since independence in Zimbabwe, there has remained little space for dissenting voices – first under the leadership of <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life-108103">Robert Mugabe</a> and then <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-three-barriers-blocking-zimbabwes-progress-zanu-pf-mnangagwa-and-the-military-89177">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.fairplanet.org/story/zimbabwes-genocide-an-open-wound/">Gukurahundi genocide</a>, which novelist <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Novuyo_Rosa_Tshuma/">Novuyo Rosa Tshuma</a> called the country’s “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/aug/09/house-of-stone-novuyo-rosa-tshuma-review">original sin</a>”, marked the first instance in which the state quashed opposing voices. Between 1982 and 1987, the government sent a North Korean-trained brigade to quell dissenters in the provinces of Matabeleland and the Midlands. An estimated 20,000 civilians were killed. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover with an illustration of an African woman looking directly ahead with traditional hairstyle." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=950&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=950&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=950&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1194&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1194&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1194&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Women's Press</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Interestingly, despite the shrinking of the civic and political space in Zimbabwe, literary production has thrived in providing political resistance.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/tvl/article/view/168612">My research</a> as a scholar of African literature has demonstrated that literature in Zimbabwe has highlighted diverse forms of state sponsored violence. Through their works, writers have raised awareness, sparked dialogue, and inspired readers to engage in opposition and activism.</p>
<h2>The turbulent ‘lost decade’ (2000-2010)</h2>
<p>From around 2000, Zimbabwe <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-inflation-idUSL1992587420070919">experienced</a> economic meltdown, coupled with an increased shrinking of the civic space. The rise of a formidable opposition, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Movement-for-Democratic-Change">Movement for Democratic Change</a>, in 1999 <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/election-violence-in-zimbabwe/movement-for-democratic-change-was-number-one-enemy-in-2000/2CB944ACBCDB63C2311FDAB85ACD8037">was met with violence</a> by the state. </p>
<p>This period also saw a flourishing in literary production. Fresh voices emerged, among them <a href="https://writersmakeworlds.com/brian-chikwava/">Brian Chikwava</a>, <a href="https://novioletbulawayo.com/about/">NoViolet Bulawayo</a>, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e1fad84a-903e-44ec-b7c5-920e88a91eac">Petina Gappah</a>, <a href="https://www.poetryinternational.com/en/poets-poems/poets/poet/102-5757_Eppel">John Eppel</a>, <a href="https://www.icorn.org/writer/christopher-mlalazi">Christopher Mlalazi</a> and <a href="https://www.africanbookscollective.com/authors-editors/lawrence-hoba">Lawrence Hoba</a>.</p>
<p>Literature from this period captured the socioeconomic realities of the country. Gappah’s debut collection of short stories in 2009, <a href="https://soundcloud.com/faberbooks/petina-gappah-an-elegy-for">An Elegy for Easterly</a>, depicts the emotions experienced by Zimbabweans in the face of diverse challenges. Some characters express disillusionment and despair, while others maintain optimism and resilience, representing a complex reality.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover with illustrative fonts spelling the words " src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Random House</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Bulawayo’s award-winning 2013 novel We Need New Names depicts the political situation through the perspective of its teenage protagonist, Darling. The story delves into the effects of political turmoil, economic challenges and societal changes on regular lives. Her 2022 novel <a href="https://theconversation.com/noviolet-bulawayos-new-novel-is-an-instant-zimbabwean-classic-185783">Glory</a> parodies a dictatorship, protesting the irrationality of a police state.</p>
<p>White Zimbabwean writers have also criticised autocracy in books like Catherine Buckle’s <a href="https://www.google.co.za/books/edition/AFRICAN_TEARS/haxhDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0">African Tears: The Zimbabwe Land Invasions</a> (2000) and Graham Lang’s <a href="https://www.google.co.za/books/edition/Place_of_Birth/TzCsAAAAIAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0&bsq=Place%20of%20Birth%20graham%20lang">Place of Birth</a> (2006). </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover with an illustration showing the portrait of a woman with butterflies instead of hair." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=923&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=923&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=923&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1160&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1160&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1160&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Faber and Faber</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These novels portray the emotional effects of the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/zimbabwe/ZimLand0302-02.htm">Fast Track Land Reform Programme</a> on many white Zimbabweans, who found themselves dispossessed of their farms and their sources of income.</p>
<p>Writers from the 2000s have offered multifaceted portrayals, highlighting the interconnectedness of personal lives and political realities. The stories illuminate the human cost of political decisions and the resilience of ordinary people in the face of hardships.</p>
<h2>Literature in the Second Republic</h2>
<p>Literature after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/when-the-state-is-the-man-and-that-man-is-mugabe-a-new-era-begins-with-his-fall-87868">demise</a> of Mugabe and his four-decade regime – a period referred to as the Second Republic – has continued to grapple with Zimbabwe’s prevailing sociopolitical environment. In the book <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Zimbabwean-Crisis-after-Mugabe-Multidisciplinary-Perspectives/Mangena-Nyambi-Ncube/p/book/9781032028149">The Zimbabwean Crisis after Mugabe</a>, my colleagues and I contend that today’s Zimbabwe is similar to the Mugabe years in many ways.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tsitsi Dangarembga was arrested in 2020 for staging a protest.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Autony/AFP/Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.batsiraichigama.com/">Batsirai Chigama</a>’s collection of poems Gather the Children captures the vicissitudes of contemporary life in Zimbabwe. In <a href="https://www.poetryinternational.com/en/poets-poems/article/104-29416_On-Chigama-8217-s-Gather-the-Children">his analysis</a> of this collection, literary scholar Tinashe Mushakavanhu explains: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Zimbabwe’s political crisis has been a different kind of catastrophe, one that has occurred in slow motion: its mechanisms abstract and impersonal, although the economic, physical, and psychological consequences have been very real and devastating. These strictures insinuate themselves into the ambience of everyday life and language, something that Chigama observes with careful attention. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In her poem Zimbabwe, Chigama writes:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Like eating olives</p>
<p>we have acquired the taste of discomfort</p>
<p>over the longest time</p>
<p>it has gently settled on our tongues</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Her poems highlight how Zimbabweans have normalised the abnormal.</p>
<p>Other writers from the post-Mugabe period like <a href="http://www.panashechigumadzi.com/bio">Panashe Chigumadzi</a> and <a href="https://novuyotshuma.com/about">Novuyo Rosa Tshuma</a> grapple with similar issues and themes. Writer and academic <a href="https://brittlepaper.com/2023/03/siphiwe-ndlovu-on-the-rise-and-rise-of-zimbabwean-literature/">Siphiwe Ndlovu</a> explains that in contemporary Zimbabwean fiction</p>
<blockquote>
<p>there is anger, outrage, disappointment, disillusionment, hope (and the loss of it), but most importantly, there is a call for reckoning and change that the politics of the country have failed to successfully address.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The power (and limits) of literature</h2>
<p>Despite its power, reading remains a luxury that many Zimbabweans cannot afford. Books are extremely expensive and few people have disposable income to read for pleasure. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover with an illustration of birds flying into a tree and down into a red backdrop." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=850&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=850&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=850&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1068&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1068&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1068&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ntombekhaya Poetry</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It’s for this reason that, since independence, the state has not banned the many novels which are critical of the situation in the country. Writer Stanley Nyamfukudza <a href="http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:240525/FULLTEXT02.pdf">explains</a>: “It has been suggested that one of the best ways to hide information in Zimbabwe is to publish it in a book.” </p>
<p>Literature can achieve greater effects if there is a robust culture of critical thinking and reading.</p>
<p>However, despite the continued oppression and the lack of a robust reading culture, Zimbabwean writers have been unrelenting in telling the world what is really happening in Zimbabwe. They have always spoken truth to power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210199/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gibson Ncube does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Writers have challenged oppression, exposed social injustices and advocated for political change.Gibson Ncube, Lecturer, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1624532021-06-10T14:44:35Z2021-06-10T14:44:35ZA new film about Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections is worth watching, but flawed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405442/original/file-20210609-14813-1i0akh7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A still featuring opposition leader Nelson Chamisa from the film President (2021).</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Louverture Films/President/Encounters South African International Documentary Festival</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Danish director <a href="https://www.imdb.com/name/nm1600828/">Camilla Nielsson</a>’s documentary <a href="https://www.encounters.co.za/film/president/#jp-carousel-242670"><em>President</em></a> (2021) is an up-close, intimate tale. It follows the election travails of Zimbabwe’s main <a href="https://www.mdcallianceparty.org">opposition party</a> the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance and its leader, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44741062">Nelson Chamisa</a>.</p>
<p>Winner of the prestigious Sundance Film Festival’s Special Jury <a href="https://www.sundance.org/blogs/news/2021-sundance-film-festival-awards-announced">Award</a> for Verité Filmmaking, the film deploys an “in the moment” technique as it follows the lead-up to the 2018 <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-zimbabwes-first-elections-after-the-mugabe-ouster-are-so-significant-100505">general elections</a>. </p>
<p>It documents Chamisa’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-mdc-faces-a-leadership-contest-but-can-it-be-peaceful-112967">battle</a> against the governing Zanu-PF party leader and acting Zimbabwean president <a href="https://theconversation.com/mnangagwa-and-the-military-may-mean-more-bad-news-for-zimbabwe-87646">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>. Mnangagwa ousted Zimbabwe’s 37-year ruler <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life-108103">Robert Mugabe</a> in 2017. As the film’s promotional material explains: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>As the election looms closer, it becomes increasingly clear that … an election is no guarantee of a democratic outcome.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If you have lingering hopes that the Zanu-PF soldiers’ coup replacing the doddering nonagenerian would leave <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/mugabes-legacy/">Mugabe’s legacy</a> behind, settle down for an intense viewing. </p>
<p>Your hopes will crash, with the opposition troops that <em>President</em> follows. They will die, shot down as brutally as the six demonstrators – and bystanders – displaying their anger at the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’s delayed <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-false-new-dawn-for-zimbabwe-what-i-got-right-and-wrong-about-the-mood-100971">election tallies</a>.</p>
<p>But perhaps enough Zimbabwean politics-watchers in southern Africa can move the discussion beyond the liberal <a href="https://www.screendaily.com/reviews/president-sundance-review/5156629.article">good vs evil</a> <a href="https://variety.com/2021/film/reviews/president-review-sundance-1234895097/">platitudes</a> repeated by the film’s reviewers to date. A local audience should offer critical and nuanced views.</p>
<h2>Political thriller?</h2>
<p>A Fulbright graduate of visual anthropology and filmmaking at New York University, director Nielsson has several socially conscious films under her belt, often about the plight of children, in <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0408818/?ref_=nm_flmg_dr_8">Afghanistan</a>, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2115303/?ref_=nm_flmg_dr_7">Darfur</a> and <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1641626/?ref_=nm_flmg_dr_6">India</a>. Her <a href="https://variety.com/2014/film/festivals/film-review-democrats-1201361085/">famed</a> documentary <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt4143306/?ref_=nm_flmg_dr_4"><em>Democrats</em></a> (2014) covered Zimbabwe’s 2010-2013 constitution-making excursion. </p>
<p><em>President</em> avoids feeding the audience a lot of background history and politics. Nielsson <a href="https://cineuropa.org/en/interview/397158/">says</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We … try to be there when things happen, instead of telling it all backwards and coming up with some sort of analysis. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The film is sold as a political thriller. But as Eric Kohn – perhaps the sole, though mild, critical voice – <a href="https://www.indiewire.com/2021/02/president-review-documentary-zimbabwe-election-1234614636/">writes</a>: the long meetings with Chamisa and company debating how to beat the unbeatable are “less thrilling than exhaustive, a kind of informational activism in feature form”.</p>
<p>Maybe 45 wasted minutes covering meetings could have been used to fill in some glaring gaps that local audiences will notice. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/hthioiO6i0A?wmode=transparent&start=41" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The trailer for the documentary, released in 2021.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Classic documentary moments</h2>
<p>One such moment might have followed the (unnamed) academic <a href="https://www.plaas.org.za/staff/phillan-zamchiya/">Phillan Zamchiya</a>. (The film does not identify enough of its characters.) In a hotel room, Chamisa’s lawyerly team debates the next steps. It becomes starkly apparent that this election will go down the drain too. </p>
<p>The camera catches Zamchiya from behind. No polite critic, he <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2013.858546">argues</a> that Zanu-PF are military. They are guerrillas, he says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If people are not prepared to die, to go to prison … you are not going to take power away from this regime, believe me or not. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>He might have qualified that Zanu-PF is especially so after the coup, when the pro-Mugabe ‘intelligentsia’ faction was dumped.</p>
<p>Once a student leader severely battered during the early struggles for Zimbabwe’s democracy – as is true for Chamisa, the film shows – Zamchiya knows of what he speaks.</p>
<p>The tortured polling agents filing affidavits about their beatings as they posted ballot reports speak eloquently of that plight. However, the film is silent about how ill-prepared they were for their crucial task. The deceased 1 August demonstrators, angry at the deliberately slow counting of the vote, speak for their last time. The timid <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-motlanthe-commissions-anniversary-of-shame">commission of inquiry</a> into their deaths muted them further.</p>
<p><em>President</em>’s filming of those moments is classic. It’s clear why a good documentary can beat the stills. Watch very closely as the officer claps the back of the soldier who shot at the dispersing crowd. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A chaotic street scene featuring half eight soldiers in camouflage and a policeman. One soldier has kneeled and is shooting his rifle. Behind him another has his hand up to slap him on the back, laughing." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A screen grab showing a soldier clapping the back of another who has fired on the crowd.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Louverture Films/President</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Yet Zamchiya’s challenge, if pursued, could have raised more questions of the film’s unfolding events.</p>
<h2>Ignored issues</h2>
<p>Like what other forces shaped this moment? During <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Rhodesia">Rhodesia</a>’s white rule the liberation armies’ military pressure forced the racist regime to the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/race-and-diplomacy-in-zimbabwe/0598BE6A7E9C4D1F0F1DCE36291EB473">negotiating table</a>. This would not have happened without the West because of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Cold-War">Cold War</a>. But the West’s post-1989 enthusiasm for democracy-lite <a href="https://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/25597">waned</a>. By 2017 it seemed the once opposition-friendly Brits were <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2017/11/08/zimbabwe-the-uks-misguided-role-in-the-rise-and-fall-of-mnangagwa/">backing</a> the sluggish thug Emmerson Mnangagwa who took over the country. </p>
<p>Or the context of how the original opposition’s <a href="https://weaverpresszimbabwe.com/store/history,-politics-and-development/building-from-the-rubble-the-labour-movement-in-zimbabwe-since-2000-by-lloyd-sachikonye-et-al-detail">trade union</a> roots disappeared due to devastating de-industrialisation after the fast track land reform started in the early 2000s – leading to the opposition party’s takeover by lawyers and neo-liberal fantasies.</p>
<p>Lawyers do argue well. <a href="https://lawyersforlawyers.org/en/thabani-mpofu-released-on-bail/">Thabani Mpofu</a>’s valiant, expertly filmed, attempts at the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe to challenge the vote counting amounted to nothing in the end. It was pleasurable, though, to watch electoral commission bosses and judges trying not to squirm. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">Fantasy that Mnangagwa would fix Zimbabwe now fully exposed</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But those who adored Nielsson’s previous film <em>Democrats</em> and its hero, the lawyer Douglas Mwonzora, will know that he has become a leader of a splinter opposition faction <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/mwonzora-dumped-accused-of-duping-supporters-to-join-zanu-pf/">allegedly</a> working with Zanu-PF. They will wonder how long this move brewed. </p>
<p>The Movement for Democratic Change’s earlier splits, patched up in the alliance only as elections approached, are ignored too. So too Chamisa’s rapid and contested <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/mdc-t-does-succession-the-zanu-pf-way">moves</a> to the top of the party after former opposition leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-morgan-tsvangirai-heroic-herald-of-an-epoch-foretold-91845">Morgan Tsvangirai</a> died.</p>
<p>Those 45 minutes could have offered much more meaning. Aside from avoiding Chamisa’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c6hfvMP7IE8">religious side</a> <em>President</em> could have screened its footage of Chamisa’s press conference in the wake of Zanu-PF’s chaotic <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/mugabes-legacy/">coup consolidator</a>, as 2019 began. </p>
<p>Dead: at least 17 demonstrators and bystanders. Raped: the same number. Meanwhile, Zanu-PF ‘youth’ set the opposition headquarters alight. The charred walls said it all. They would answer the question of why Chamisa’s pursuit of free and fair elections will not go far in 2023, but also why there are no other choices.</p>
<p><em>President</em> zooms in on the moment at the cost of the big picture. Zooming out could have helped.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>President opens the <a href="https://www.encounters.co.za">Encounters</a> South African International Documentary Festival in Johannesburg on 10 June and then plays in select South African cinemas from 11-21 June.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162453/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The award-winning documentary - now on in South Africa - follows opposition leader Nelson Chamisa. But it spends too much time in meetings instead of giving insight into the bigger picture.David B. Moore, Fellow, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge; Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1443092020-08-12T08:29:36Z2020-08-12T08:29:36ZRepression in Zimbabwe exposes South Africa’s weakness<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352286/original/file-20200811-18-i8su44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Emmerson Mnangagwa of Zimbabwe and President Cyril Ramaphiosa of South Africa in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South African president Cyril Ramaphosa’s <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2020/08/10/sa-special-envoys-get-red-carpet-welcome-in-zim-amid-tensions">despatch of envoys to Zimbabwe</a> in a bid to defuse the latest crisis, in which the government has engaged in a vicious crackdown on opponents, journalists and the freedoms of speech, association and protest, has been widely welcomed.</p>
<p>Such has been the brutality of the latest assault on human rights by President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s regime that something had to be done. And, as the big brother neighbour next door, South Africa is the obvious actor to do it. </p>
<p>It may be guaranteed that Ramaphosa’s envoys – <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/fholisani-sydney-mufamadi">Sydney Mufamadi</a>, a former government minister turned academic, and <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/baleka-mbete-honourable">Baleka Mbete</a>, a former deputy president of South Africa, former speaker of the National Assembly and former chairperson of the African National Congress (ANC) – were sent off to Harare with a very limited brief. They were accompanied by <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/who-is-ngoako-ramatlhodi-29368263">Advocate Ngoako Ramatlhodi</a> and diplomat <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/ndumiso-ntshinga-13b3a348/?originalSubdomain=ke">Ndumiso Ntshinge</a>.</p>
<p>The mission quickly ran into trouble. The envoys returned to South Africa without <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/ramaphosas-envoys-snub-zimbabwean-opposition-parties-after-meeting-president-mnangagwa-20200811">meeting members of the opposition</a>.</p>
<p>Observers and activists are rightly <a href="https://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/392334/zimbabweans-skeptical-as-past-envoys-in-mbeki-mugabe-era-used-as-a-whitewash-or-cover-up">sceptical</a> about how much will come out of it. The best that is seriously hoped for is that South African diplomacy will bring about immediate relief. This would include: the release of journalists, opposition figures and civil society activists from jail; promises to withdraw the military from the streets; perhaps even some jogging of the Mnangagwa government to meet with its opponents and to make some trifling concessions.</p>
<p>After all, the pattern is now well established: crisis, intervention, promises by the Zanu-PF regime to behave, and then relapse after a decent interval to the sort of behaviour that prompted the latest crisis in the first place. </p>
<p>But in a previous era, South Africa once made Zimbabwe’s dependence count.</p>
<h2>South Africa has done it once</h2>
<p>Back in 1976, apartheid South Africa’s Prime Minister John B. Vorster fell in with US plans to bring about a settlement in then Rhodesia, and hence relieve international pressure on his own government, by withdrawing military and economic support and closing the border between the two countries. </p>
<p>Ian Smith had little choice but to comply. Today, no one, not even the most starry-eyed hopefuls among the ranks of the opposition and civil society in Zimbabwe, believe that Ramaphosa’s South Africa will be prepared to wield such a big stick. The time is long past that Pretoria’s admonitions of bad behaviour are backed by a credible threat of sanction and punishment.</p>
<p>So, why is it that Vorster could bring about real change, twisting Smith’s arm to engage in negotiations with his liberation movement opponents that eventually led to a settlement and a transition to majority rule, and ANC governments – from the time of Nelson Mandela onwards – have been so toothless? </p>
<p>If we want an answer, we need to look at three fundamental differences between 1976 and now.</p>
<p>First, Vorster was propelled into pressuring Smith by the US, which was eager to halt the perceived advance of communism by bringing about a settlement in Rhodesia which was acceptable to the West. In turn, Vorster thought that by complying with US pressure, his regime would earn Washington’s backing as an anti-communist redoubt. Today there is no equivalent spur to act. It is unlikely that US president Donald Trump could point to Zimbabwe on a map. </p>
<p>Britain, the European Union and other far-off international actors all <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/arrest-of-zimbabwe-journalist-shows-mnangagwas-heavy-hand-4b45fffd-43a2-4f0f-a81b-0feca5ebb6eb">decry</a> the human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. But they have largely given up on exerting influence, save to extend vitally needed humanitarian aid (and thank God for that). Zimbabwe has retreated into irrelevance, except as a case study as a failed state. They are not likely to reenter the arena and throw good money and effort at the Zimbabwean problem until they are convinced that something significant, some serious political change for the good, is likely to happen.</p>
<p>Second, South African intervention today is constrained by liberation movement solidarity. They may have their differences and arguments, but Zanu-PF and the ANC, which governs South Africa, remain bound together by the conviction that they are the embodiments of <a href="https://theconversation.com/southern-africas-liberation-movements-can-they-abandon-old-bad-habits-101197">the logic of history</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-liberators-turn-into-oppressors-a-study-of-southern-african-states-57213">How liberators turn into oppressors: a study of southern African states</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>As the leading liberators of their respective countries, they believe they represent the true <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-insists-its-still-a-political-vanguard-this-is-what-ails-democracy-in-south-africa-141938">interests</a> of the people. If the people say otherwise in an election, this can only be because they have been duped or bought. It cannot be allowed that history should be put into reverse.</p>
<p>Former South African president Thabo Mbeki played a crucial role in forging a coalition government between Zanu-PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) after the latter effectively won the parliamentary election <a href="https://theconversation.com/sham-or-not-election-flaws-unlikely-to-unseat-mugabe-16737">in 2008</a>. But South Africa held back from endorsing reliable indications that MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai had also won the presidential election against Robert Mugabe. </p>
<p>As a result, Tsvangirai was forced into a runoff presidential contest, supposedly because he had won less than 50% of the poll. The rest is history. </p>
<p>Zanu-PF struck back with a truly vicious campaign against the MDC, <a href="http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1817057,00.html">Tsvangirai withdrew from the contest</a>, and Mugabe remained as president, controlling the levers of power. The ANC looked on, held its nose, and scuttled home to Pretoria saying the uneasy coalition it left behind was a job well done.</p>
<p>Third, successive Zanu-PF governments have become increasingly militarised. Mnangagwa may have put his military uniform aside, but it is the military which now calls the shots. It ultimately decides who will front for its power. There have been numerous statements by top ranking generals that they will never accept a government other than one <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics/zimbabwe-army-wont-allow-opposition-to-rule-minister-idUSKCN1IO2B9">formed by Zanu-PF</a>. The African Union and Southern African Development Community have both <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/lomedec.htm">outlawed coups</a>, but everyone knows that the Mnangagwa government is a military government in all but name.</p>
<h2>Lamentably inadequate</h2>
<p>So, it is all very well to call for a transitional government, one which would see Zanu-PF engaging with the opposition parties and civil society and promising a return to constitutional rule and the holding of a genuinely democratic election. But we have been there before.</p>
<p>The fundamental issue is how Zimbabwe’s military can be removed from power, and how Zimbabwean politics can be <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-beware-the-military-is-looking-after-its-own-interests-not-democracy-87712">demilitarised</a>. Without the military behind it, Zanu-PF would be revealed as a paper tiger, and would meet with a heavy defeat in a genuinely free and fair election.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Ibbo_Mandaza">Ibbo Mandaza</a>, the veteran activist and analyst in Harare, what Zimbabwe needs is the <a href="https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2020/05/03/no-way-national-transitional-authority/">establishment of a transitional authority</a> tasked with returning the country to constitutional government and enabling an economic recovery. Nice idea, but a pipe dream.</p>
<p>No one in their right mind believes that a Ramaphosa government, whose own credibility is increasingly threadbare because of its bungled response to the coronavirus epidemic, its corruption and its economic incompetence, has the stomach to bring this about. We can expect fine words and promises and raised hopes, but lamentably little action until the next crisis comes around, when the charade will start all over again.</p>
<p>Any relief, any improvement on the present situation will be welcomed warmly in Zimbabwe. But no one in Harare – whether in government, opposition or civil society – will really believe that Ramaphosa’s increasingly ramshackle government will be prepared to tackle the issue that really matters: removing the military from power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144309/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall is author of Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa.</span></em></p>The time is long past that Pretoria’s admonitions of bad behaviour by Zimbabwe’s leaders are backed by a credible threat of sanction and punishment.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1129672019-03-11T14:18:25Z2019-03-11T14:18:25ZZimbabwe’s MDC faces a leadership contest. But can it be peaceful?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262465/original/file-20190306-100793-m9f32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of MDC's Nelson Chamisa believe he could win Zimbabwe's 2023 elections.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance, Zimbabwe’s largest opposition party, has announced that it will hold its elective congress in May 2019. The announcement has stirred interest – inside and outside the party. This is because there could be an intriguing contest for the presidency of the party between the incumbent <a href="https://informationcradle.com/africa/nelson-chamisa/">Nelson Chamisa</a> and the secretary-general <a href="https://pindula.co.zw/Douglas_Mwonzora">Douglas Mwonzora</a>. The two have a history of rivalry.</p>
<p>Mwonzora is Chamisa’s political nemesis. In 2014 Mwonzora unexpectedly won a contest for the position of secretary-general even though Chamisa, as organising secretary, was in a position to influence party structures in his favour and had been nominated by 11 out of 12 provinces. One theory is that the MDC’s former leader Morgan Tsvangirai, who died of cancer in <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/zimbabwean-opposition-leader-tsvangirai-dies">February 2018</a>, engineered Mwonzora’s victory by influencing the voting patterns of congress delegates. The reason given for this is that he wanted to curtail Chamisa’s political ambitions because of his perceived role in the MDC’s surprising poor showing in the 2013 national elections.</p>
<p>After his defeat, Chamisa was relegated to an ordinary party member, until Tsvangirai brought him back into the MDC’s executive. The speculation is that Tsvangirai did this because he sensed that Chamisa was still popular within the party’s structures, especially among younger members. </p>
<p>A Mwonzora victory is worrying for some of Chamisa’s most fervent supporters. This is because they believe Chamisa is the future of the party. He’s only 41 years old. Also, they believe he gave Zanu-Pf candidate Emmerson Mnangagwa a run for his money in the 2018 presidential elections. Chamisa’s camp believes he’s better placed to defeat Mnangagwa in the 2023 elections because of his <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/2018zimelections-who-is-nelson-chamisa-16237399">widespread national appeal</a>. </p>
<p>Mwonzora too has his fair share of supporters. He’s also widely respected within the MDC because of his easy going temperament. </p>
<p>What this all adds up to is that a victory by either candidate could split the party for the umpteenth time. Even a contest carries risks because the MDC has a chequered history in which violence has been used regularly against opposing factions. If the two do contest the party presidency in May – and Mwonzora in the past few days has <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/i-will-be-tougher-for-zanu-pf-says-mwonzora/">hinted that he might</a> – their supporters’ tactics could heighten the danger of violence and intimidation. This could further divide or damage the party and set Zimbabwean democracy back after decades of authoritarian rule. </p>
<h2>Troubled past</h2>
<p>Tsvangirai’s MDC had a “T” at the end – which stood for Tsvangirai himself. This was to distinguish his MDC from the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/MDC-Welshman_Ncube">Welshman Ncube MDC</a> which had cut ties with Tsvangirai. Ncube was the founding secretary-general of the MDC. </p>
<p>Just before he died Tsvangirai had agreed to bring back former “rebels” who had been founding members of the party. This included Welshman Ncube, Tendai Biti and Job Sikhala. For his part, Chamisa agreed to accommodate and rope in his former “comrades-in-arms” into his election campaign. </p>
<p>The coalition under their umbrella became known as <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zim-chamisa-forced-to-register-mdc-alliance-as-a-political-party-amid-squabbles-20180616">the MDC-Alliance party</a> just before Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections. The reason for the name change was that former MDC member Thokozani Khupe was arguing in the courts that her formation was the bona fide MDC-T. </p>
<p>A succession puzzle was created in the MDC-Alliance when Tsvangirai, as president and before his death, appointed Chamisa as head of policy and research and then as one of three deputy presidents of the party. This muddying of the waters appears to have been deliberate. It meant that Tsvangirai could easily play his deputies against each other if he felt threatened by any one of them. </p>
<p>But having three vice-presidents – Chamisa, Elias Mudzuri and Thokozani Khupe – didn’t do the party any favours. After Tsvangirai’s death a bloody battle for succession ensued, and led to another split in the party.</p>
<h2>The contest hots up</h2>
<p>The MDC’s May congress has inevitably sucked in the ruling Zanu-PF. The two have been at loggerheads since 1999 when the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad8338.html">original MDC was formed</a>. A succession of bruising electoral contests, including the highly disputed 2008 elections which the MDC-T was <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-are-elections-really-rigged-mr-trump-consult-robert-mugabe-68440">widely believed to have won</a>, galvanised the ruling Zanu-PF party into resolving to weaken, if not destroy, the MDC brand. </p>
<p>It’s against this backdrop that Zanu-PF is being accused of having a role in the unfolding MDC-Alliance drama ahead of the impending congress. </p>
<p>Some top MDC-Alliance leaders in Chamisa’s camp have been claiming that the governing Zanu-PF has set aside between US$ 4 million to US$6 million to pay MDC delegates to vote for Mwonzora <a href="https://nehandaradio.com/2019/03/03/zanu-pf-pouring-millions-to-influence-mdc-congress/">at the party congress</a>. Biti, who is currently the party’s vice-chairperson, has said he will reject any candidates sponsored by Zanu-PF.</p>
<h2>Best case scenario</h2>
<p>As party leader Chamisa has the opportunity to foster peace, tolerance and democracy. He should make sure that the lead up to the congress is violence- free and that party members who are in good standing can contest any post without being intimidated.</p>
<p>He needs to be wary of political sycophants within his party who want to turn him into a demigod, as was the case during Mugabe’s long reign as the leader of Zanu-PF. Chamisa has already shown that he has nothing to fear from a fair contest.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112967/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tapiwa Chagonda has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>Nelson Chamisa has the opportunity to foster peace, tolerance and democracy within Zimbabwe’s main opposition party.Tapiwa Chagonda, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1016172018-08-21T07:26:42Z2018-08-21T07:26:42ZZimbabwe is still in trouble, but it’s under too little pressure to change<p>Zimbabwe reached a major milestone this year, holding its <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-zimbabwes-messy-election-get-messier-or-will-a-new-path-be-taken-101196">first parliamentary and presidential elections</a> since Robert Mugabe was removed from power after 37 years of continuous rule. Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party was led on the ballot by his usurper, Emmerson Mnangagwa, who promised the elections would be free and fair. In a refreshing change, for the first time this millennium, both Western election observer groups and the international media were allowed into the country.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe’s Electoral Commission delayed announcing the election results, but eventually declared that the ruling ZANU-PF party had won an absolute parliamentary majority against its main opponent, the MDC-Alliance, giving it the power to change the constitution. It declared a rather closer outcome in the presidential competition, with Mnangagwa besting the MDC-Alliance leader Nelson Chamisa at 50.8% to 44.3%.</p>
<p>The international response was prompt and warm enough – the president of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, who came into office in February as a representative of a new guard of anti-corruption leaders, <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ramaphosa-congratulates-mnangagwa-on-zimbabwe-election-victory-20180803">congratulated Mnangagwa</a> as soon as the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission declared him victorious. Ramaphosa was joined by an array of African heads of state, and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/SOMNIA-idUSKBN1KS0EF">China’s Xi Jinping</a> sent his congratulations, too. But within Zimbabwe itself, the atmosphere was very different.</p>
<h2>Tension and violence</h2>
<p>The day after the elections, when opposition supporters took to the streets to protest the announcement that the ruling party had won, Mnangagwa <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/02/zimbabwe-tense-calm-in-harare-after-post-election-violence">released soldiers</a> who used live ammunition in the streets of the capital city Harare. Six were reportedly killed, and an unknown number injured. Violence, much of it unreported by the international media, also occurred in other cities.</p>
<p>After riot police <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2018/08/03/riot-police-disrupt-nelson-chamisa-press-conference-after-fake-zimbabwe-election-results/">interrupted a Chamisa press conference</a>, the government started to clamp down on opposition members, charging that its protesters and leaders were responsible for the post-election violence. Even though international observers concur that the election campaign and the voting itself were satisfactory, what happened during the vote counting is less clear – leading to a challenge in Zimbabwe’s High Court by the opposition.</p>
<p>After the 2008 elections, numerous allegations of wrongdoing started to surface – for instance, that after the local vote count for some constituencies the results were changed in favour of the ruling party. The MDC-Alliance claims that similar rigging occurred after this year’s presidential vote and has submitted what the opposition considers to be convincing evidence to the court. Their claims have now been legally challenged by ZANU-PF.</p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zim-president-mnangagwa-wants-court-to-toss-opposition-challenge-20180815">reports</a> that opposition members are still being beaten and detained, the US has declared that sanctions on Zimbabwe dating from the Mugabe era <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-ambassador-to-zimbabwe-sanctions-removal-genuine-reforms/4529865.html">will be extended</a>. They will only be lifted on three conditions: if there is wide recognition that last month’s elections were free and fair, if the opposition is treated with respect, and if the Zimbabwe Defence Forces show regard for human rights. But what are the chances these conditions will be met?</p>
<h2>Holding back</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s economy is still stuck at the standstill it hit back in the year 2000. Hyperinflation became so bad that the government eventually abandoned its own currency. With Mugabe gone, the country is slowly attracting foreign investors again. For now, China still controls its significant platinum and lithium deposits, while the future of the long-contested Marange diamond fields is <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201804240627.html">still unclear</a>. Meanwhile, gold, coal and asbestos mining have been on their knees for 20 years – not to mention the agricultural sector, which has the potential to once again make Zimbabwe the world’s largest producer of tobacco.</p>
<p>With Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/24/africa/zimbabwe-president-emmerson-mnangagwa-davos-intl/index.html">slogan</a> “Zimbabwe is open for business” raising hopes at last, it is easy to see why larger economies have for the most part not made more of this latest political crisis. But it does not explain why African leaders and organisations have not stepped up to protest against the ZANU-PF government’s post-election violence, or why the election observers have been silent about the lack of transparency in the vote counting.</p>
<p>Two days after the elections, the international election observer commissions – including those of the African Union, the Southern African Development Corporation, the Commonwealth Observer Group, the European Union, and the Carter Centre – said in a <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/zimbabwe/joint-statement-international-election-observation-missions-zimbabwes-harmonised">joint statement</a> that they “stand in solidarity” with “the people of Zimbabwe” while calling on all sides to condemn violence and asking the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission to release the full election results “expeditiously”. This was followed on August 7 by a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-on-post-elections-human-rights-situation-in-zimbabwe">joint condemnation</a> from the EU, the US, Canada, and Switzerland of “the violence, attacks, and acts of intimidation targeted at opposition leaders and supporters”, urging all sides “to pursue peaceful and legal resolution”. </p>
<p>These are positive moves, but they are far from enough. It is hard to understand why, nearly two decades into the 21st century, the African Union and African heads of state are not standing up to demand democratic accountability from their neighbours. An even more puzzling question is why election observers did not consider it their responsibility to observe the vote counting. Observer groups only deserve their name if they observe the full election process from beginning to end, and that has to include the counting process, too.</p>
<p>In a country like Zimbabwe, where travel is both easy and safe, there is no reason for the international media to focus so overwhelmingly on the capital city, Harare. By the time the election and its aftermath began to wind down, it had become almost comical to see various global news stations sharing the same rooftop view of downtown Harare. But that is what Africa and the wider world offered the Zimbabwean nation: a detached bird’s eye view without any true engagement with the real problems on the ground.</p>
<p>Now all attention is on the High Court, which will hear the opposition’s challenge to the election results on August 22. Whatever the outcome of the legal challenge, the Zimbabwean nation yet again stands alone without the African Union or African heads of state at its side as it tries to heal the wounds of state sponsored violence and human rights abuses.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101617/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Heike I. Schmidt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The messy and violent aftermath of Zimbabwe’s recent elections met with only muted international criticism.Heike I. Schmidt, Associate Professor in Modern African History, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1015102018-08-16T10:36:47Z2018-08-16T10:36:47ZZimbabwe’s coup did not create democracy from dictatorship<p>Many citizens and international observers <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-zimbabwes-first-elections-after-the-mugabe-ouster-are-so-significant-100505">cautiously hoped</a> that the southern African nation of Zimbabwe would find its way from dictatorship to democracy this year. President Robert Mugabe was militarily removed from office in November 2017 <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-coup-will-zimbabwe-see-democracy-or-dictatorship-87563">after 37 years in office</a>, opening the door for the country’s first real leadership transition since 1980.</p>
<p>Elections were set for July 30. And, for the first time in many Zimbabweans’ lives, Mugabe was not on the ballot. </p>
<p>Election turnout was high, with over 70 percent of the country’s 16 million eligible voters participating. Zimbabweans waited in <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/zimbabwe-votes-for-first-time-without-mugabe-on-ballot-long-lines-at-some-polling-stations/">long lines</a> to choose between Mugabe’s replacement, the 75-year-old acting President Emmerson Mnangagwa, and a young lawyer named Nelson Chamisa who promised <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-election-chamisa-newsmaker/young-contender-chamisa-promises-zimbabwe-break-from-the-past-idUSKBN1KG1R0">economic revival and political change</a>.</p>
<p>“What everyone had hoped for was a turning of the page in Zimbabwe,” observed Michelle Gavin, an Africa specialist at the <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/08/zimbabwe-is-free-from-mugabe-but-that-doesnt-mean-its-a-democracy-yet.html">Council on Foreign Relations</a>.</p>
<h2>A quick crackdown</h2>
<p>Election day was peaceful enough, but the high spirits wouldn’t last long. </p>
<p>After Chamisa’s party <a href="http://time.com/5354721/zimbabwe-election-results/">alleged fraud</a>, the election commission said it would take days to finalize the vote count. When people in the capital of Harare protested the delay, police and soldiers fired, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/zimbabwe-holds-funerals-for-victims-of-election-violence/a-44961507">killing seven unarmed citizens</a>. </p>
<p>On Aug. 2, the election commission <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45053412">declared Mnangagwa president</a> with 50.8 percent of the vote – just enough to avoid a run-off. Chamisa’s party rejected the results and, a week later, filed a legal challenge in court.</p>
<p>Mugabe was a violent, repressive ruler. And Mnangagwa – whose nickname is “the Crocodile” – was <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-coup-will-zimbabwe-see-democracy-or-dictatorship-87563">his vice president and enforcer</a>. In the weeks since the election, the government has ruthlessly cracked down on the opposition. </p>
<p>Police have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/05/zimbabwean-opposition-reports-human-rights-abuses">beaten and arrested</a> dozens of Chamisa supporters, and groups of Mnangagwa’s backers have conducted house-to-house searches for opposition leaders. </p>
<p>Tendai Biti, a well-known opposition figure, fled to Zambia, but was turned over by the Zambian government to Zimbabwe’s security forces. Mnangagwa’s government <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/zimbabwe-opposition-tendai-biti-charged-asylum-bid-fails-180809162846974.html">charged him with inciting public violence</a>. He was released on a US $5,000 bond only after a global outcry. </p>
<p>Today, Zimbabwe remains tense as it awaits the results of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-historic-elections-a-case-of-leopards-not-changing-their-spots-100956">court battle over the presidency</a>. Most observers expect Chamisa’s case will fail, and that Mnangagwa will officially be installed as Zimbabwe’s third president since 1963.</p>
<h2>Mnangagwa’s political pantomime</h2>
<p>Having spent considerable time studying Zimbabwe’s politics as a <a href="https://zw.usembassy.gov/senior-state-department-officials-visit-zimbabwe/">U.S. State Department official</a>, I found the contested result and election-day violence saddening but not surprising. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa struck a conciliatory tone in the months leading up to the election. Declaring that Zimbabwe was “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics/zimbabwes-mnangagwa-says-new-investment-law-to-open-economy-idUSKBN1HP1S6">open for business</a>,” he amended a law requiring local ownership of diamond and platinum mines. He signaled his intent to end farm seizures and vowed to sell off failing state enterprises. </p>
<p>He even wrote a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/11/opinion/zimbabwe-emmerson-mnangagwa.html">New York Times op-ed</a> calling for democracy and equal rights for all citizens. </p>
<p>But Mnangagwa is tied to numerous human rights abuses, including overseeing a series of government-ordered massacres between 1982 and 1986 known as the “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/19/mugabe-zimbabwe-gukurahundi-massacre-matabeleland">Gukurahundi</a>.” An estimated 20,000 civilians from Zimbabwe’s Ndebele ethnic group were killed.</p>
<p>And behind his seemingly reasonable rhetoric, there were signs that Mnangagwa would stoop to win Zimbabwe’s election at any cost.</p>
<p>Human rights groups reported <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/zimbabwe/2018-07-25/zimbabwes-upcoming-election-political-charade">widespread voter intimidation</a>, especially in rural areas, where the government deployed plainclothes security forces to “remind” people to vote – for Mnangagwa. Zimbabwe’s state-controlled media relentlessly broadcast pro-Mnangagwa messages. </p>
<p>And, according to civil society groups, the election commission kept the voter registration roll under wraps until it was <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/07/01/battle-lines-drawn-over-voters-roll/">too late</a> for voters who discovered their names were missing to re-register.</p>
<h2>Electoral autocracy</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s recent history mirrors a pattern familiar to other authoritarian countries undergoing a transition.</p>
<p>Research shows that authoritarian leaders almost always contend with <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/politics-authoritarian-rule?format=HB&isbn=9781107024793">two major political pressures</a>: challenges from within their regime, which <a href="https://theconversation.com/latin-american-history-suggests-zimbabwes-military-coup-will-turn-violent-87648">rarely trigger a democratic transition</a>, and popular challenges from outside the system, which might.</p>
<p>Mugabe succumbed to pressure from within his party last year after a succession battle between his wife, Grace, and Mnangagwa’s faction. The military settled this struggle decisively in November 2017, putting Mugabe under house arrest. Grace fled the country, and <a href="https://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00040824.html">Mnangagwa was installed as acting president</a>.</p>
<p>Once he assumed office, Mnangagwa worked resolutely to guarantee he could quash the next challenge facing him: popular opposition.</p>
<p>Even as he cited the importance of human rights and invited international observers to monitor Zimbabwe’s presidential election, he was methodically working with allies to <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/zimbabwe/2018-07-25/zimbabwes-upcoming-election-political-charade">lay a repressive groundwork</a> that would ensure he stayed in power as the standard-bearer of the ruling ZANU-PF party. </p>
<p>After the electoral commission announced his tenuous victory, Mnangagwa reacted in classic authoritarian fashion: he deployed police and military forces to repress street protests, driving would-be challengers into hiding.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe held an election without Mugabe. Unfortunately, all it got was another despot in Mugabe’s mold.</p>
<h2>What’s next for Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>It wasn’t crazy to imagine things turning out differently. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe’s political system had actually been getting slightly more democratic in Mugabe’s final years. According to the <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/3f/19/3f19efc9-e25f-4356-b159-b5c0ec894115/v-dem_democracy_report_2018.pdf">Varieties of Democracy index</a>, one of the world’s largest social science databases on democracy, Zimbabwe’s electoral system remains squarely in the “illiberal” category. But its score has improved 20 percent since 2007, particularly on freedom of expression. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://infographics.economist.com/2018/DemocracyIndex/">Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index</a> shows Zimbabwe making similar modest progress since 2006.</p>
<p>These small improvements in Zimbabwe’s political system, coupled with Mugabe’s demise, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/15/we-have-a-new-chance-zimbabwe-gears-up-for-elections-after-mugabe">convinced some diplomats and experts</a> that the July 31 election might open the door for real democratic change rather than a continuation of electoral autocracy.</p>
<p>But recent events have confirmed that Mnangagwa and his allies did not force the ailing Robert Mugabe out of office to transform Zimbabwe’s political system. Rather, they sought to ensure their continued control over the nation. </p>
<p>After 38 years of authoritarian rule, one election simply does not create democracy from dictatorship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101510/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Feldstein is a nonresident fellow with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</span></em></p>Violence and uncertainty has followed Zimbabwe’s first modern election without Robert Mugabe. That’s not surprising: After 38 years of dictatorship, it takes more than a vote to build democracy.Steven Feldstein, Frank and Bethine Church Chair of Public Affairs & Associate Professor, School of Public Service, Boise State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1011962018-08-07T11:31:17Z2018-08-07T11:31:17ZWill Zimbabwe’s messy election get messier – or will a new path be taken?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230868/original/file-20180807-191019-1v7huj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's "The NewsDay" after violent protests in Harare.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This is no way to end an election that promised to bring a bright new post-coup and post Robert Mugabe <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/24/emmerson-mnangagwa-sworn-in-as-zimbabwes-president">dawn</a> to a blighted Zimbabwe – 50.8% for Zanu-PF’s Emmerson Mnangagwa to 44.3% for the contending Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance’s (MDC-Alliance) Nelson Chamisa. </p>
<p>After a drawn out count for the last constituency, <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/live-tense-zimbabwe-awaits-vote-results-after-troops-fire-on-protesters-20180802">a suspect tally</a> for the supreme ruler. As for the Zanu-PF MPs’ sweeps across the rural areas resulting in a more than two thirds majority in the lower house of assembly (155 to 53), fears triggered by memories <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008eom.htm">of the violent 2008 run-off</a> remain real. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa has been making gestures to Chamisa <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/2018zimelections-mnangagwa-calls-for-unity-as-chamisa-cries-foul-16400187">for “unity”</a> <a href="https://harareblitz.com/2018/08/06/watch-video-ed-laughs-at-idea-of-gnu-with-chamisa/">or to</a> play a </p>
<blockquote>
<p>crucial role in Zimbabwe’s present and in its unfolding future. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>He seemed furious when the police converged on journalists attending Chamisa’s presser at the subtly luxurious Bronte Hotel: the police <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pkjOG-xFcEk">apologised</a> on Twitter very quickly.</p>
<p>Yet <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/05/zimbabwean-opposition-reports-human-rights-abuses">dozens or more MDC-Alliance supporters</a> are running for their lives, or hiding in safe houses. This, just days after <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-false-new-dawn-for-zimbabwe-what-i-got-right-and-wrong-about-the-mood-100971">soldiers</a> – not police – <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/three-victims-zimbabwe-post-election-violence-buried">shot and killed</a> at least six protesters and innocent bystanders. Some were shot in the back.</p>
<p>What start is this for a regime promising <a href="http://www.sundaymail.co.zw/life-lessons-for-a-man/">Lazarus-like</a> revival for the ruling party and <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-03-16-00-lord-hains-zimbabwe-hypocrisy">its friends</a> around the world – not to mention ordinary Zimbabweans?</p>
<p>Yet there is an alternative: if Mnangagwa actually has the power he could call off the attack dogs and let the courts decide the merits, or not, of Chamisa’s case that the poll was rigged. This might not itself result in a peaceful resolution, given rumblings that a coup is in the making led by Vice-President and (unconstitutionally) Minister of Defence, Constantino Chiwenga. But it would be better than allowing the soldiers out onto the streets in force. </p>
<p>And it just could be that this is the tack. The MDC-Alliance’s lawyers will present their case <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/mdc-lawyers-to-challenge-zim-presidential-poll-results-16408858">on August 10</a>. Mnangagwa is facing a sharp fork in the road. One hope he takes the right one.</p>
<h2>The crackdown</h2>
<p>The crackdown’s current phase started on August 2. As the election results were trickling in, drunken soldiers beat up equally inebriated MDC-Alliance supporters in the “high density suburbs” (poverty-riddled townships or locations) <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/soldiers-go-berserk-beat-up-revellers-in-harare-chitungwiza/">around Harare</a>, where the opposition party did <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/08/vimbayi-tsvangirai-java-a-chip-off-the-old-block/">overwhelmingly well</a>. </p>
<p>So much for the hypothesis that the poor soldiers would support their <a href="https://www.zimbabwebriefing.org/single-post/2018/07/27/So-what%E2%80%99s-a-post-coup-pre-election-like-Zimbabwe%E2%80%99s-Democracy-after-Mugabe-%E2%80%93-Phase-I">equally suffering</a> brothers and sisters with the long-struggling opposition, poised to take the chalice only a few months after <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-morgan-tsvangirai-heroic-herald-of-an-epoch-foretold-91845">Morgan Tsvangirai’s death</a>.</p>
<p>The crackdown continued the next day. An MDC-Alliance candidate in Chegutu challenged his loss, won on the recount, and proceeded to run away <a href="https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/28995-just-in-zanu-pf-chegutu-west-candidate-dexter-ndunas-win-reversed.html">from rabid soldiers</a>. Many more <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/mnangagwa-opponents-disappear-after-election-h079sksf7">were chased</a> in Harare’s townships, Marondera, and Manicaland. The Financial Times <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7c3463b8-98bf-11e8-ab77-f854c65a4465">reported</a> over 60 arrests, pointing to Chiwenga as the leader of the shakedown. It hinted at a coup – no surprise to many Zimbabweans.</p>
<h2>A vice-president’s coup?</h2>
<p>Chiwenga has been the elephant in the room for a very long time. Many Zimbabweans say that Mnangagwa lives in fear of him. Lower ranking members of Zanu-PF in propaganda and intelligence don’t dare challenge this mercurial man <a href="http://www.kentonline.co.uk/sittingbourne/news/zimbabwe-takeovers-kent-connection-135528/">with a history of suicide attempts</a>, and <a href="https://robertrotberg.wordpress.com/2012/02/14/who-killed-solomon-mujuru-the-mystery-in-zimbabwe-deepens/">more</a>. </p>
<p>Promoted to armed forces head by Mugabe well beyond his seniority and capability, but kept to one-year contracts to ensure his fealty, he waited until Grace Mugabe pushed her doddering husband into firing his long-time ally <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cVxZ-DAsDZY">Mnangagwa</a> – who was then vice-president – in early November last year. </p>
<p>Chiwenga returned from a China trip and then helped Mnangagwa in what the American Jesuit magazine <a href="https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2017/12/14/interview-zimbabwean-jesuit-who-mediated-mugabes-fall-power">called the</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>unexpected, but peaceful, transition </p>
</blockquote>
<p>away from the <a href="http://transformationjournal.org.za/">nonagenarian ruler</a>.</p>
<p>Chiwenga has kicked out a good number of Central Intelligence Organisation operatives, suspected of loyalty to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics-g40-factbox/factbox-key-figures-in-zimbabwe-first-lady-grace-mugabes-g40-faction-idUSKBN1DF1DX?il=0">“Generation-40”</a> faction, which lost out with the coup. So too with the police, pared down through the year, That’s why the soldiers <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/08/chamisa-divides-police-military/">were called in last week</a>.</p>
<p>He’s been awaiting his due – the presidency – ever since, and he might be in a hurry. A demotion could ensue if Mnangagwa takes the royal road to respectability via a pleasant deal with the MDC-Alliance, whom the recalcitrant “war-vets” consider a cabal of <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/running-to-america-mdc-t-exposes-its-puppet-nature/">imperialist puppets</a>. </p>
<p>It’s surprising that the local and international cheerleaders for the “military assisted transition”, with a lot riding on peace and goodwill after the election, seemed blissfully unaware of the power behind the already tarnished throne. </p>
<p>South African military intelligence are supposed to be well-connected with their counterparts to the north, and should not be prone to think like the British. The defenders of diminishing empire are more likely to think like Lord Soames, temporary governor of Rhodesia as Zimbabwe was on the cusp. His comments as Robert Mugabe came to power on the wave of a violent election in 1980 included the fact that he wasn’t surprised <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/live-zim-parliament-begins-session-to-remove-mugabe-20171121">at bit of bloodshed</a>.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This isn’t Puddleton-on-the-Marsh. Africans think nothing of sticking poles up each others whatnot and doing filthy things. It’s a very wild thing an (African) election.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>British officials, and their global compatriots, presumably don’t think like that anymore. But even if they don’t, they should have known that coups are prone to eat their own children.</p>
<p>Yet there could be another road to take.</p>
<h2>The other fork</h2>
<p>There is still time for Mnangagwa to change tack. The MDC-Alliance’s contention that the election was cooked will be tested in the courts. </p>
<p>This, say Zimbabweans on the run, is what the soldiers are after: they are chasing copies of the V11 forms. These are the results of every polling station that were posted after the local count: they can be captured by anyone on site but are also transported to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’s headquarters for the final count. The V11s might be Chamisa’s ace: he claims to possess a tally that will invalidate Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/news-africa/1988993/nelson-chamisa-claims-zecs-results-are-unverified-and-fake/">slim victory</a>. </p>
<p>If the presidential praetorians are sure their man has won, why didn’t they allow Chamisa to present the papers to the constitutional court – <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/08/legal-ramifications-of-the-july-30-elections/">stacked with Zanu-PF judges as it is</a>? In any case this will happen at the end of the week and the presidential inauguration should be postponed.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa is used to waiting for the right moment. He will have to move faster against Chiwenga than he did against Mugabe.</p>
<p>If he’s too slow there could be a real coup, soldiers running rampant again. Or an electoral rerun? The choice might be Mnangagwa’s. Or it could be Chiwenga’s. No matter: it will be a game-changer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101196/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What start is this for a regime promising Lazarus-like revival for the ruling party and its friends around the world – not to mention ordinary Zimbabweans?David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies and Visiting Researcher, Institute of Pan-African Thought and Conversation, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1010472018-08-04T12:31:57Z2018-08-04T12:31:57ZTwo narratives are being spun about Zimbabwe’s poll. Which one will win the day?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230639/original/file-20180803-41357-qy8nh5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A triumphant Zanu-PF supporter celebrates the Emmerson Mnangagwa's victory in the presidential race.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It is said that two things are inevitable in life: death and taxes. To these a third might be added – election victories for former southern African liberation parties. This is especially true in Zimbabwe, whose governing Zanu-PF party is steeped in the politics of entitlement. One with a <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-zimbabwe-finally-ditch-a-history-of-violence-and-media-repression-99859">brutal history</a> whenever it is confronted by dissent and opposition.</p>
<p>It came as no great surprise, therefore, that it secured a resounding victory in the recent <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/997207/Zimbabwe-election-results-2018-Mnangagwa-Chamisa-who-won">parliamentary elections</a>, followed by a narrower but still decisive win for Emmerson Mnangagwa over Nelson Chamisa in the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-45053412">presidential poll</a>. But – 50.8% to 44.3% – was suspiciously convenient, just nudging Mnangagwa past the point required to avoid a <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2018-08-03-zanu-pfs-emmerson-mnangagwa-wins-zimbabwean-election/">run-off contest</a>. This was akin to the contrived result of 2008, which denied Morgan Tsvangirai the presidency by pushing him <a href="https://eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008results5.htm">below 50%</a>. </p>
<p>The standard features of Zimbabwean elections were all evident again. A slavish state media acting as praise singers for Zanu-PF, rather than as a forum for diverse opinions, the open allegiance of the security forces, and the misuse of the state apparatus for <a href="https://www.biznews.com/briefs/2018/05/03/life-mugabe-zim-opposition-credible-election">party purposes</a>. </p>
<p>What was missing this time was a full-blown campaign of state intimidation and violence to ensure that voters ‘did the right thing’. The post-Robert Mugabe administration is astute enough to understand that such tactics would drive a coach and horses through its key policy objectives. These are to secure global rehabilitation, gain access to International Monetary Fund and World Bank support, and to entice investors and business back to the country.</p>
<p>Thus, the balancing act was to retain power while still doing enough to convince the global community that Zimbabwe was on an upward curve. The kind of approach used in previous elections could only be deployed in extreme circumstances. It posed a fundamental threat to the wider national interest, and shows how the <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/economic-analysis/zimbabwe-dire-need-economic-reform-nation-must-act-quickly-post-mugabe-say-imf/">precarious economic situation</a> has compelled a political reappraisal within Zanu-PF about strategy and tactics.</p>
<p>There has been no Damascene conversion here. Mnangagwa was an architect of previous election campaigns rooted in intimidation and he has been implicated in the atrocities of the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Gukurahundi</a>. </p>
<p>His was merely a pragmatic recognition that less crude tactics were necessary due to the country’s untenable economic situation. </p>
<p>Will this strategy work? It is currently too early to say. What’s clear though is that two narratives have already begun to emerge. Mnangagwa’s is that there <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/03/africa/zimbabwe-election-mnangagwa-chamisa-intl/index.html">needs to be</a> national unity, that he’s a centrist and pragmatist and needs the West’s support to get the country back on its feet. For his part, Chamisa has already begun to write his script: <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/03/africa/zimbabwe-election-mnangagwa-chamisa-intl/index.html">the election was rigged</a> and Zimbabweans were robbed of a fair election. </p>
<h2>Election observers</h2>
<p>While the Southern African Development Community and African Union monitors have <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/sadc-au-comesa-endorse-zim-elections-16352866">approved the elections</a>, those endorsements must be placed in their proper historical context. Both bodies have a long history of endorsing Zimbabwean elections in the face of the most egregious vote rigging and violence. And both have a structural bias towards protecting the interests of incumbents. </p>
<p>There is a strong ‘leaders club’ mentality in both organisations. And a ‘liberation club’ mentality remains exceptionally strong within the SADC. These organisations still lack a thorough democratic character and remain unable to translate the noble aspirations of their charters into a consistent defence of democratic principles on the ground. </p>
<p>For its part, the European Union was less generous. The EU was allowed to monitor a Zimbabwean election for the first time <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/eu-observe-zimbabwe-polls-first-time-16-years-182429480.html?guccounter=1">in 16 years</a> and it highlighted structural inequalities in the electoral process, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-08-01-history-is-repeating-itself-in-zimbabwe/">concluding that </a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>a truly level playing field was not achieved which negatively impacted on the democratic character of the electoral environment. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>One must also place explanations for any Zimbabwean election in the wider context of a dominant party state which is highly authoritarian. Zanu-PF has embedded itself in power over almost four decades. It has entrenched itself in the state and its behaviour has shown that any result defying ‘the revolution’ - that is its own defeat - is unacceptable and will be resisted with the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1">full might of the state</a> </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwe police outside the Bronte Hotel during the opposition MDC- Alliance leader Nelson Chamisa’s press conference in Harare.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In short, everything can change in Zimbabwe except the rule of the dominant party. That is the limit of its ‘reform process’. This inevitably affects the wider population, it grinds a people down, exhausts them and compels them to make their own often resigned and unhappy accommodation with a status quo which seems immovable. This is particularly so as people struggle daily to make ends meet.</p>
<p>People have learned what a serious challenge to Zanu-PF power actally entails, and naturally flinch from inviting such retribution on themselves. In short, there is an awareness that behind Mnangagwa’s conciliatory discourse is a steely <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/02/mnangagwas-zanu-pf-on-track-to-pull-off-narrow-win-in-zimbabwe-election">determination never to yield power</a>.</p>
<h2>How should the West respond?</h2>
<p>Western support is needed to unlock the doors to the main global financial institutions whose support Zimbabwe desperately needs to pull it from the economic abyss. </p>
<p>Two contrasting narratives are being spun, each seeking to shape the Zimbabwean reality for a Western audience. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s pitch is that Zimbabwe is moving on after the disasters of the Mugabe era. While the election may be acknowledged as imperfect, it’s a good start and a clear advance on previous polls. In the coming days and weeks he will suggest that, with strong external support and by fully welcoming Zimbabwe back into the family of nations, further progress is likely. </p>
<p>The opposition MDC-Alliance and Chamisa, by contrast, has already begun to advance a narrative that this is simply more of the same – <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/news-africa/1988993/nelson-chamisa-claims-zecs-results-are-unverified-and-fake/">rigged elections</a> falling lamentably short of democratic standards. Their argument is that behind the smokescreen of soothing rhetoric is the same implacable determination by Zanu-PF to remain in power at any cost, as shown by the deadly shooting of <a href="https://www.news.com.au/world/africa/army-opens-fire-on-opposition-protests-in-zimbabwe-capital-during-wait-for-election-results/news-story/197e63b58f92e98d15f25aee087a7dd9">unarmed protesters</a>. </p>
<p>In short, Mnangagwa is a wolf in sheep’s clothing and Western states should hold him at arm’s length and deny him the legitimacy he craves. Saying this, of course, will open the MDC-Alliance to the familiar Zanu-PF charge that it is ‘treasonous’ and is collaborating with foreign powers and ‘imperialist forces’. </p>
<p>Which of these proves to be the more compelling narrative will turn on whether Western states insist on full respect for the democratic process, and on certain democratic benchmarks as being non-negotiable; or whether they will view Mnangagwa and Zanu-PF as the only game in town and deal with them, albeit reluctantly. </p>
<p>In that event, like the Zimbabwean population, they too will have been worn down by the attritional politics of Zanu-PF.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101047/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Hamill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Winners and losers are both trying to win the West’s support for their view.James Hamill, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1010452018-08-03T14:45:59Z2018-08-03T14:45:59ZZimbabwe: victory for ZANU-PF but this election marks the end of the liberation era<p>The counting of the votes in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/zimbabwe-6565">Zimbabwean elections</a> lurched from tragedy to farce. The tragedy came when military over-reaction left three demonstrators dead. Soldiers had fired into the crowds that were gathering outside the Electoral Commission, accusing it of counting <a href="https://reportfocusnews.com/2018/07/30/zimbabwe-opposition-warns-of-slow-voting-through-the-zimbabwe/">too slowly</a> and with having a bias towards the government.</p>
<p>Indeed it seemed the Electoral Commission was trying to stage manage the process of counting and announcing the results. It released the parliamentary results first – revealing a two-thirds majority for the ZANU-PF government. That was seen as a psychological ploy to dampen opposition (MDC) expectations of a presidential victory for its youthful candidate, <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/nelson-chamisa-46879">Nelson Chamisa</a>.</p>
<p>If that was the intention, it served only as incitement – and angry crowds gathered outside the Commission’s headquarters. Although water cannon trucks were on standby, the police also stood by as soldiers swept into the area on armoured vehicles and trucks with guns blazing as they hurtled down the streets. It was a disaster for the image of the “reformed” ZANU-PF. All the pragmatism and near-liberalism projected by president Emmerson Mnangagwa disappeared in the gun smoke and tear gas. Instantly, all the <a href="https://frontpageafricaonline.com/diaspora/former-president-ellen-johnson-sirleaf-leads-observer-mission-to-zimbabwe/">foreign observer groups</a> injected a new note of concern and a degree of scepticism into their preliminary judgements of the election.</p>
<p>Among the observers were two former African presidents – John Mahama from Ghana and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf from Liberia. Both had stood down gracefully after electoral defeat in their own countries – and they brought gravitas to their concerns that, although this election was a huge improvement over previous ones, there were still shortcomings in preparations by the Electoral Commission. And while the playing field was more level for the opposition than it had been in the past, it remained uneven. The implication was that the observer reports would stop shy of declaring the elections free and fair.</p>
<p>In the end, the perceived, alleged, and actual shortcomings of the Electoral Commission were such that Mnangagwa’s narrow presidential victory – 50.8% (2.46 million votes) to Chamisa’s 44.3% (2.14 million votes) – meant he just avoided having to take part in a run-off vote. Were irregularities just enough for his extra 0.8%?</p>
<h2>Scraping through</h2>
<p>To be fair, if ZANU-PF had been rigging the election, it would have been much harder to disguise than in the past. Observer groups and embassies brought in computer experts who were hard at work in back rooms checking all the figures. A count of 49% to 50.8% would have been well within their margin of error. But ZANU-PF would not have rigged things with avoiding a runoff in mind. The accusations in the past were against efforts to win by comfortable to large margins. The clear late surge by Chamisa confounded almost everyone’s pre-poll predictions and caused enough panic in the minds of the government for someone high in its ranks to send in soldiers with deadly intent.</p>
<p>The overwhelmingly critical reaction from observers and foreign governments made a repetition of deadly intent impossible. Even so, the Electoral Commission finally released the presidential results in the dead of night with the centre of the city of Harare under lockdown. It was like a Shakespearian play where the ghosts of the dead hovered over what was meant to have been a ZANU-PF triumph. It became a scrape-through under cover of darkness.</p>
<p>The MDC will challenge the count in the courts, but may have difficulty in providing clear evidence for its claims. There are rumours flying that Chamisa will be offered a seat in an inclusive government. Whether or not that happens, Mnangagwa must now be seen as the last of the ZANU-PF liberation figures to become president. He is in his 70s. The country hungers for fresh ideas. The young want jobs, not war stories from the past. Mnangagwa’s deputy, the former army general Chiwenga, has no civilian common touch and is unpopular. ZANU-PF would itself have to make a generational jump to avoid the repetition of old men like Mugabe going on and on for election after election.</p>
<p>As for Chamisa, can he keep his MDC together? He is young and talented, if maladroit and terrifyingly raw – but he lacks talented youth for his front bench. His team is instead made up of opposition veterans who hate each other. He too may have to force a generational jump.</p>
<p>In Zimbabwean political history since 1980, the old resist needing to go. Chamisa is no Justin Trudeau, Emmanuel Macron or <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-45027923">Jacinta Adern</a>. But he will need to reinvent himself and his party to become more like the youthful trailblazers of a new international politics. Mnangagwa can try to repair the damage to his efforts to reinvent his and his party’s image, but he cannot become youthful again. He might truly go down in history as the last of the ZANU-PF liberation leaders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101045/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Chan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The government has won another term but voters have been clear that they want fresh faces and new ideas.Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1009712018-08-02T12:41:25Z2018-08-02T12:41:25ZA false new dawn for Zimbabwe: what I got right, and wrong, about the mood<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230374/original/file-20180802-136676-1oflqw5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zanu-PF banners being burnt during a protests against parliamentary polling results in Harare, Zimbabwe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The afternoon after Zimbabwe’s historic <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-poll-the-bar-for-success-is-low-the-stakes-are-high-and-its-a-close-race-100100">Monday July 30 elections</a>, I was trying to assuage the fears of Jason Burke, the correspondent for the London newspaper, the Guardian, that chaos and violence would <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/31/zimbabwe-opposition-leader-claims-he-is-on-course-for-election-win">ensue any time</a>. </p>
<p>The military-dominated Zimbabwe Electoral Commission was <a href="https://263chat.com/mdc-piles-more-pressure-on-zec/">dragging out the counting</a>. Meanwhile civil society election monitoring networks were filling the information void. Their preliminary reports said that 21% of the presidential results meant to be posted on the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/07/29/election-results-to-be-posted-outside-polling-stations">polling stations’ walls</a> were not available: this was against the law and warranted the election <a href="https://twitter.com/DavidColtart/status/1024248453583593473">nullified</a>. The parliamentary and municipal ward results, however, were pasted for all to see.</p>
<p>Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance (MDC-Alliance) leaders were calling foul – and coming too close to comfort to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-07-31-weve-won-say-both-the-opposition-mdc-and-ruling-zanu-pf/">declaring a win</a> that they would defend. This too fell foul of the country’s electoral laws. </p>
<p>Folks were rumbling. But I repeated the cliché to Burke that Zimbabweans were too peaceful to mount a full-fledged revolt, and that anyway their equally suffering brothers in the lower ranks of the military would not shoot them if they did resort to a war of the poor and disenfranchised.</p>
<p>The electoral commission had by that relatively quiet Tuesday afternoon announced only seven results for the MPs – resounding successes in very rural constituencies for the governing Zanu-PF. However, within 24 hours (Tuesday August 1), the electoral commission was able to release all the parliamentary results, proclaiming a massive victory in the national parliament: 155 seats for Zanu-PF and only 53 for the long-time aspirants,<a href="https://zwnews.com/zim-latest-voting-winners-results-zec-elections/">the MDC-Alliance</a>. All were still on tenterhooks for the presidential results.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A man fires a catapult outside the gates of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Zanu-PF thus had more than the two thirds majority in parliament needed to change the constitution – again – so the renewed Zanu-PF president might be able to continue in power for ever. That is what Mugabe thought would be his destiny, until the coup only eight months ago changed his mind. </p>
<p>The long <a href="http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/films/democrats/">participatory process</a> from 2010 until 2013 that produced the lovely liberalism of the <a href="http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/constitutions/zimbabwe_constitution.pdf">contemporary constitution</a> could be for naught. That whole legal framework - albeit barely implemented by the last regime - could be replaced by one more amenable to a dictatorship. </p>
<p>On Wednesday August 1 the electoral commission postponed announcing the presidential results. Later it said it was ready to announce them, but had to wait until all the presidential candidates were <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/polling-agents-to-verify-presidential-returns-zec/">present</a>. By evening the MDC-Alliance’s Nelson Chamisa and some of the 21 motley crew of candidates finally arrived to bow to the final straw, opening the way to the electoral commission being able to release the results which it did the next day.</p>
<p>But by Wednesday evening the carnage on the streets had been waged.</p>
<p>Thus my attempt to calm the British journalist was partly right – the people did not launch a war. They did, however, lunge at the gates surrounding the electoral commission centre at the Rainbow Towers, demonstrated at the commission’s headquarters in town, hit out at the <a href="http://www.702.co.za/shows/109/karima-brown-show">Zanu-PF headquarters</a>, threw rocks at cars and scared away some informal vendors. </p>
<p>But I was wrong in my belief – <a href="https://www.zimbabwebriefing.org/single-post/2018/07/27/So-what%E2%80%99s-a-post-coup-pre-election-like-Zimbabwe%E2%80%99s-Democracy-after-Mugabe-%E2%80%93-Phase-I">based on</a> mid-July chats with newspaper vendors, car-park security guards, petrol attendants, liberation guerrilla soldiers who had borne the brunt of Mugabe’s wrath in the seventies, and those higher up the divided Zimbabwe hierarchy in MDC circles – that soldiers would refuse orders to shoot their compatriots. The junior officers submitted indeed. Zimbabwe’s history of ruling group violence against the slightest signs of a shift against it rose once again to stifle democratic challenge.</p>
<p>The police – decimated because they were on the wrong side of the security split <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-military-coup-is-afoot-in-zimbabwe-whats-next-for-the-embattled-nation-87528">during the coup</a> and, so we were told, out around the country securitising the election – decided to bow out, calling in their military superiors. </p>
<p>By the end of the day only blood remained. At least three people had <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/latest-zimbabwes-presidential-results-expected-shortly-56958220">been killed</a> (friends in Harare told me five) and many, many more beaten and injured. By Thursday the soldiers were called to their barracks.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">MDC-Alliance supporters vent their anger after losing the parliamentary poll.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">. EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The MDC-Alliance leaders were no more angelic than their competitors, even though Chamisa may think he has <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c6hfvMP7IE8">divine guidance</a>. One wonders: what leverage would have been gained by sending their followers to death? As the violence waned I hoped that they would not unleash the fabled “hot squads” purportedly trained in Rwanda and Uganda (Mugabe preferred the <em><a href="https://networks.h-net.org/node/10670/reviews/11050/kriger-campbell-reclaiming-zimbabwe-exhaustion-patriarchal-model">interahamwe</a></em>). </p>
<p>The presidential results were due to be <a href="https://zwnews.com/zim-votes-latest-winners-elections-2018/">announced</a> by Thursday afternoon. Advance copies were sent to me, and the NGO monitors have them <a href="https://erczim.org/#1523430338575-54c77f69-8af4">too</a>. It’s expected to be a Mnangagwa win.</p>
<p>What should the MDC-Alliance do when the loss is digested?</p>
<p>If, as is widely discussed, both Mnangagwa and Guveya Dominic Nyikadzino Chiwenga, his co-director in the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/20/africa/zimbabwe-military-takeover-strangest-coup/index.html">coup against Robert Mugabe</a>, are sick men, would it not be better to consolidate the poorly organised MDC-Alliance to prepare for the next elections in 2023? Zanu-PF could quite well implode (again) by then. </p>
<p>For now, there are two destroyed parties to leave space for the ever-strengthened military-business conglomerate.</p>
<p>Lastly, how will the regional neighbours and global powers react? They seem to have been foiled by the crafty Zimbabwean comrades once again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100971/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zanu-PF’s more than two-thirds majority win in the parliament poll gives it the power to change the constitution if it wishes.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies and Visiting Researcher, Institute of Pan-African Thought and Conversation, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1009562018-08-02T08:46:52Z2018-08-02T08:46:52ZZimbabwe’s historic elections: a case of leopards not changing their spots<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230371/original/file-20180802-136664-1fjyzcn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A protest against polling results in Harare, Zimbabwe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe’s general elections on July 30 <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-zimbabwes-first-elections-after-the-mugabe-ouster-are-so-significant-100505">were being labelled</a> as “historic”. For the first time since independence in 1980, the ballot paper featured the faces of new presidential candidates, Emmerson Mnangagwa and Nelson Chamisa. And, prior to the poll, there was no large scale violence by security institutions and youth militia, as had happened previously.</p>
<p>Indeed, the elections were peaceful and voters turned out in large numbers. But that’s where the good news ended <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/01/zanu-pf-wins-majority-of-seats-in-zimbabwe-parliament-elections">as violence broke out</a> after the release of the parliamentary results. </p>
<p>Supporters of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)- Alliance led by Chamisa marched to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’s command centre protesting against the slow release of the presidential election results. The parliamentary results were released early in the day, <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/997207/Zimbabwe-election-results-2018-Mnangagwa-Chamisa-who-won">giving Zanu-PF (68%) of the seats</a>. The MDC-Alliance was insinuating that the presidential results were being rigged. </p>
<p>The day before any results were released MDC-Alliance leaders had upped the ante <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/mdc-alliance-has-won-zimbabwe-elections-says-proud-chamisa-16330459">by announcing they’d won</a>, and saying that they wouldn’t accept any other result.</p>
<p>The army and police responded to protesters with the familiar brutality, leaving <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/latest-zimbabwes-presidential-results-expected-shortly-56958220">three people dead</a>. In the space of two hours Zimbabwe went from having peaceful, free and fair elections, to ones marred by violence and accusations of fraud. The promise of a new dawn seemed to vanish instantaneously. </p>
<p>What went wrong? Are the parliamentary election results a reflection of voter rigging or of the MDC-Alliance’s own weaknesses?</p>
<p>Zimbabwe needed these elections to be credible, no matter who won. A legitimate government – with a strong mandate – can develop and implement a much needed national development plan to fix the country’s shattered economy. </p>
<p>Both presidential candidates and political parties promised peace and a new beginning. But, when the chips were down and the votes began to show a familiar trend of Zanu-PF dominance, both parties resorted to old tactics. MDC-Alliance resorted to disruption and discrediting the elections while Zanu-PF, through the security establishment, used undue force.</p>
<p>Accusations and counter accusations of who was to blame became the order of the day as they both plunged the country back into familiar chaos. These leopards were now revealing that they had not changed their spots, in full view of an international community they were hoping would come and invest after an election. </p>
<h2>Zanu-PF</h2>
<p>Last November the governing Zanu-PF ushered in a new political dispensation, via a military assisted transition that <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-mugabe-why-the-role-of-zimbabwes-army-cant-be-trusted-87872">ousted former president Robert Mugabe</a>. The party was never going to hand over power on a silver platter and would have been preparing for a win in what they no doubt expected to be a competitive race. </p>
<p>Zanu-PF always had the upper hand given its 38 years in power since independence. It had access to more funding, including state resources, that enabled it to run a more effective campaign. Its many huge billboards, advertising a re-imaged Mnangagwa, new vehicles and a flood of green party paraphernalia all indicated that it had invested large amounts of money in these elections. </p>
<p>The party also benefited from a <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-vicious-online-propaganda-war-that-includes-fake-news-is-being-waged-in-zimbabwe-99402">biased state media</a>. And it could also still ride on the wave of the sweeping changes it had brought about from November 2017, which included opening up the democratic space in terms of freedom of speech and association and movement. </p>
<p>The fact that these elections were held in full view of international and regional observers, that political parties were allowed to campaign freely, and that the run up to the polling day was largely peaceful, could all be credited to their new form of governance.</p>
<h2>MDC-Alliance</h2>
<p>The MDC-Alliance went into the elections on a weak footing. They were fractured, having brought five parties together very recently in an alliance through the efforts of the young Chamisa. They didn’t have enough resources, nor time to mobilise effectively, though they still attracted thousands to their rallies in urban areas.</p>
<p>But the MDC-Alliance ran a campaign that focused mainly on the presidential elections. They pinned their hopes on Chamisa being able to woo a predominantly young Zimbabwean population eager to see change. </p>
<p>But after votes had been caste, the behaviour of the alliance’s two leaders left a lot to be desired. Tendai Biti and Chamisa <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-07-31-weve-won-say-both-the-opposition-mdc-and-ruling-zanu-pf/">declared themselves</a> the winners of the presidential poll well before election results were announced by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. They also said they would not accept any result that did not declare them the victors.</p>
<p>This could have been partly responsible for the violence that erupted.</p>
<p>At a time when they needed to show good leadership, they employed the usual tactics of discrediting electoral processes before results were even announced. The situation wasn’t helped by the fact that the electoral commission took a long time to release the presidential results (citing procedures for the delay). This was bound to exacerbate tensions in a country with such very low trust in the electoral process. </p>
<p>The electoral commission has always been accused of being <a href="https://zwnews.com/chigumba-wears-ed-mnangagwas-scarf/">biased towards Zanu-PF</a>. It should have developed mechanisms to alleviate distrust, and come up with a strategy to ensure that results were released without delay and through proper channels, and not through social media.</p>
<p>There were a few irregularities that were noted by all the observer missions. These included the voters’ roll not being available on time, too many assisted voters, the lack of an effective communication strategy by the electoral commission, media bias, and intimidation of voters, especially of women candidates.</p>
<p>It was certainly not a level playing field. But, the environment and irregularities were not deemed to be at a scale big enough to jeopardise the credibility of the elections. </p>
<h2>What now?</h2>
<p>It’s time political parties and individuals put their narrow self interests aside and act on behalf of Zimbabwe as a whole. This is the only way for the country to move forward. </p>
<p>If the MDC-Alliance claims Zanu-PF rigged the elections with the help of the electoral commission, the onus is on them to prove it. Till then, both parties need to sort out their differences as quickly and as peacefully as possible for the sake of the people of Zimbabwe, who have endured much hardship because of political elites intent on serving their own interests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100956/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cheryl Hendricks does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If the MDC-Alliance claims Zanu-PF and Zimbabwe’s electoral commission rigged the elections, the onus is on them to prove it.Cheryl Hendricks, Executive director, Africa Institute of South Africa, Human Sciences Research CouncilLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1006052018-07-30T13:54:25Z2018-07-30T13:54:25ZHow peace journalism can help the media cover elections in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229634/original/file-20180727-106524-1l7k42k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Voting in the presidential run-off elections in Mali, recently.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Tanya Bindra</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Several countries in Africa, including Zimbabwe, Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Cameroon, hold crucial elections this year. Some of the polls are likely to be marked by protests as well as clampdowns on dissenting voices as well as the news media and internet access. All this amid the spread of <a href="https://portland-communications.com/pdf/How-Africa-Tweets-2018.pdf">fake news</a>. </p>
<p>It’s important to consider the role of the media in this heady mix.</p>
<p>A great deal of attention has been paid to the role of the media in <a href="https://www.sfcg.org/articles/media_for_conflict_prevention.pdf">instigating, maintaining, and exacerbating violence</a> through their news coverage. War and conflict <a href="https://www.macmillanihe.com/page/detail/the-media-at-war-susan-l-carruthers/?sf1=barcode&st1=9780230244566">sell and make the headlines</a>. </p>
<p>And, the news media are predisposed to using frames and a language that conform to what peace scholar Johan Galtung has labelled <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01296612.2003.11726720">“war journalism”</a>. This is reporting that emphasises conflict over peaceful resolutions, differing viewpoints over common ground, and sensationalism over depth and context. The result is that audiences are given the impression that conflict is inevitable, and that peace or conflict resolution are beyond reach.</p>
<p>This can also happen during the coverage of elections when a great many things can go wrong leading to best practice and ethics being overlooked. When this happens the media can be party to <a href="http://www.undp.org/content/dam/brussels/docs/Other/JTF%202011.06_Summary_report-Barcelona_workshop_Elections&conflict.pdf">exacerbating conflict and violence</a>. </p>
<p>A different approach is therefore required. The media are responsible for reporting accurately and efficiently on different political parties, candidates, political party programmes and policies. This also extends to providing platforms for debate between contesting parties as well as forums for discussions with the public.</p>
<p>A few simple criteria can be used to judge whether or not the media are doing a good job. How balanced and fair are they in their coverage. Are all parties getting a fair share of coverage? Are the media playing a role in monitoring fair play by all parties before, during and after elections? And are the results covered fairly?</p>
<p>The media can play a role in creating <a href="https://www.idea.int/data-tools/tools/electoral-risk-management-tool">peaceful and non-violent elections</a>. They can do so by following some simple approaches set out under the alternative model of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01296612.2003.11726720">peace journalism</a>. This puts emphasis on conflict resolution, analysis of the underlying causes of conflict, the use of alternative news sources, and the use of language that doesn’t over-emphasise or play up conflict. </p>
<h2>Where the media has played a negative role</h2>
<p>The media were implicated in fuelling violence in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-media-covered-kenyas-general-election-82324">Kenyan elections in 2007-2008</a>, playing up divisions between the two main contesting coalitions parties and their candidates. Importantly, the Kenyan media failed to mitigate hate speech, spreading violent imagery pitting communities against one another. </p>
<p>Equally, the media were implicated in the controversies surrounding the controversial <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/election-observers-in-zambia-report-media-biased-in-vote/a-19473207">Zambian presidential elections in 2016</a>. They were accused of waging a propaganda war, with the private media backing opposition parties, and the public media supporting the governing Patriotic Front party and its incumbent candidate, President Edward Lungu.</p>
<p>In Africa, biased media coverage in favour of incumbent presidents has been cited as among the reasons voters have little faith that <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-role-of-the-media-is-so-important-to-free-and-fair-elections-in-africa-77568">elections are credible</a>, and the outcomes legitimate.</p>
<p>Here, social media, and Twitter in particular, have reinforced the role that the media play as a force for both <a href="https://www.vox.com/world/2017/12/8/16690352/social-media-war-facebook-twitter-russia">good and bad in elections</a>. No more evident is this through the spread of <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-vicious-online-propaganda-war-that-includes-fake-news-is-being-waged-in-zimbabwe-99402">fake news</a>. </p>
<p>How can elections be covered differently?</p>
<h2>Doing things differently</h2>
<p>The media can play a role in creating <a href="https://www.idea.int/data-tools/tools/electoral-risk-management-tool">peaceful and non-violent elections</a>. Research <a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/mediaandcommunication/article/view/365">shows</a> that journalists are well aware of the pitfalls of playing up conflict at the detriment of conflict resolution. There is an openness to change, and to adopt new reporting practices, including entirely new models of journalism. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01296612.2003.11726720">Peace journalism</a> has been highlighted as such an alternative model because it emphasises conflict resolution, analysis of the underlying causes of conflict, the use of alternative news sources, and the use of language that does not over-emphasise or play up conflict. </p>
<p>But peace journalism has also been <a href="http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2007_2/pdf/loyn_reply.pdf">criticised</a> for being too philosophical and idealistic. In some instances critics have likened it to “sunshine journalism”. Foremost, it’s the model’s practical application and implementation that has been queried.</p>
<p>So, can the peace journalism model work?</p>
<p><a href="http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/83770208/reframing-south-african-tv-news-as-peace-journalism-interim-findings-from-field-experiment">Research </a> in South Africa shows that audiences who were shown television news inserts reworked according to the peace journalism model, were more likely to pick up on as well as understand the underlying causes of conflict and to see opportunities for conflict resolution; rather than seeing conflict as inevitable and without any chance of being resolved.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2007_1/pdf/lynch.pdf">Research</a> from the Philippines and the Middle East shows similar results. </p>
<h2>Solutions</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/mediaandcommunication/article/view/365">Research</a> among journalists shows that they are well aware of the many pitfalls of covering conflict. But they also argue that it’s not their role to act as “peacemakers”. </p>
<p>That said, there is agreement that <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23736992.2015.1020379">journalism practices could be changed</a> to reflect alternative views, thus showing that consensus or common ground can exist, even between two warring or opposing factions. </p>
<p>It seems peace journalism provides a good model for reflection and for training journalists to be more sensitive when <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1750635210378944?journalCode=mwca">reporting on conflict</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100605/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ylva Rodny-Gumede does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In Africa, biased media coverage is one of the reasons voters have little faith in credible elections.Ylva Rodny-Gumede, Professor of Journalism in the Department of Journalism, Film and Television, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/994022018-07-24T10:00:45Z2018-07-24T10:00:45ZA vicious online propaganda war that includes fake news is being waged in Zimbabwe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228219/original/file-20180718-142408-1pgb4gt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters from the MDC-Alliance march in Harare demanding electoral reforms. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Fake news is <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/03/2018-elections-of-fake-news-social-media/">on the upsurge</a> as Zimbabwe gears up for its watershed elections on 30 July. Mobile internet and social media have become vehicles for spreading a mix of fake news, rumour, hatred, disinformation and misinformation. This has happened because there are no explicit official rules on the use of social media in an election.</p>
<p>Coming soon after the 2017 military coup that ended Robert Mugabe’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">37 years in power</a>, these are the first elections <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/30/africa/zimbabwe-elections-july-intl/index.html">since independence</a> without his towering and domineering figure. They are also the first elections in many years without opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai, who <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/zimbabwean-opposition-leader-tsvangirai-dies">died in February</a>. </p>
<p>The polls therefore potentially mark the beginning of a new order in Zimbabwe. The stakes are extremely high. </p>
<p>For the ruling Zanu-PF, the elections are crucial for legitimising President Emmerson Mnangagwa (75)‘s reign, and restoring constitutionalism. The opposition, particularly the MDC-Alliance led by Tsvangirai’s youthful successor, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44741062">Nelson Chamisa (40)</a>, views the elections as a real chance to capture power after Mugabe’s departure.</p>
<p>The intensity of the fight has seen the two parties use desperate measures in a battle for the hearts and minds of voters. They have teams of spin-doctors and “online warriors” (a combination of bots, paid or volunteering youths) to manufacture and disseminate party propaganda on Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp. </p>
<p>Known as <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/eds-office-speaks-on-sms-campaign/?PageSpeed=noscript">“<em>Varakashi</em>”</a>, (Shona for “destroyers”) Zanu-PF’s “online warriors” are pitted against the <a href="http://www.thegwerutimes.com/2018/05/15/of-zimbabwe-and-toxic-politics/">MDC’s “<em>Nerrorists</em>”</a> (after Chamisa’s nickname, “Nero”) in the unprecedented online propaganda war to discredit each other.</p>
<p>Besides the fundamental shifts in the Zimbabwean political field, the one thing that distinguishes this election from previous ones is the explosion in mobile internet and <a href="https://t3n9sm.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Annual-Sector-Perfomance-Report-2017-abridged-rev15Mar2018-003.pdf">social media</a>. Information is generated far more easily. It also spreads much more rapidly and widely than before. </p>
<p>What’s happening in the run-up to the polls should be a warning for those responsible for ensuring the elections are credible. </p>
<h2>Seeing is believing</h2>
<p>Images shared on social media platforms have become a dominant feature in the spread of fake news ahead of the elections. Both political parties have used doctored images of rallies from the past, or from totally different contexts, to project the false impression of overwhelming support. </p>
<p>Supporters of the MDC-Alliance, which shares the red colour with South Africa’s Economic Freedom Fighters <a href="https://www.effonline.org/">EFF</a>, have been sharing doctored images of EFF rallies – and claiming them as their own – to give the impression of large crowds, according to journalists I interviewed in Harare.</p>
<p>Doctored documents bearing logos of either government, political parties or the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission are being circulated on social media to drive particular agendas. Examples include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>A purported official letter announcing the resignation of the president of the newly formed <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/chaos-rock-mugabe-party-spokesman-denies-interim-leader-resignation/">National Patriotic Front</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>The circulation of a fake sample of a ballot paper aimed at discrediting the <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/fake-ballot-paper-sample-in-circulation/">electoral commission</a>, and</p></li>
<li><p>A sensational claim that Chamisa had offered to make controversial former first Lady Grace Mugabe his <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/ill-never-appoint-grace-mugabe-as-my-deputy-says-mdc-leader-chamisa-20180710">vice president</a> if he wins. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>A number of these fake images and documents have gained credibility, after they were picked up as news by the mainstream media. This speaks to the diminishing capacity of newsrooms to <a href="https://www.sla.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Information-Verification.pdf">verify information</a> from social media, in the race to be first with the news.</p>
<p>And, contrary to electoral <a href="https://www.mediasupport.org/new-guidelines-prepare-zimbabwean-media-for-up-coming-elections/">guidelines for public media</a> partisan reporting continues unabated. The state media houses are endorsing Mnangagwa while the private media largely roots for the <a href="https://www.mediasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MONITORS-BASELINE-REPORT-3.pdf">MDC-Alliance</a>. </p>
<h2>Explosion of the internet</h2>
<p>These are the first elections in a significantly developed social media environment in Zimbabwe. Mobile internet and social media have been rapidly growing over the years. </p>
<p>Internet penetration has increased by 41.1% (from 11% of the population to 52.1%) <a href="https://t3n9sm.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Mar-2014-Zimbabwe-telecoms-report-POTRAZ.pdf">between 2010 and 2018</a>, while mobile phone penetration has risen by 43.8% from 58.8% to 102.7% <a href="https://t3n9sm.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Sector-Perfomance-report-First-Quarter-2018-Abridged-9-July-2018.pdf">over the same period</a>.</p>
<p>That means half the population now has internet access, compared to 11% in 2010. </p>
<p>Ideally, these technologies should be harnessed for the greater good – such as voter education. Instead, they are being used by different interest groups in a way that poses a great danger to the electoral process. This can potentially cloud the electoral field, and even jeopardise the entire process. </p>
<p>A good example are the attacks on the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, which has become a major target of fake news. These attacks threaten to erode its <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/03/african-agriculture-expresses-differences-men-women/">credibility as a neutral arbiter</a>. For example, an app bearing its logo, prompting users to “click to vote”, went viral on WhatsApp. But, responding to the prompt led to a message congratulating the user on <a href="https://www.techzim.co.zw/2018/05/zimbabwe-electoral-commission-distances-itself-from-fake-whatsapp-message/">voting for Mnangagwa</a>, suggesting that the supposedly independent electoral body had endorsed the Zanu-PF leader.</p>
<p>Numerous other unverified stories have also been doing the rounds on social media, <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/06/its-a-fake-voters-roll/">labelling the voters’ roll “shambolic”</a>. This, and claims of bias against it, have forced the commission to persistently issue statements refuting what it dismisses as “fake news”.</p>
<p>Events in Zimbabwe and <a href="https://portland-communications.com/pdf/How-Africa-Tweets-2018.pdf">elsewhere on the continent</a> point to the need for measures to guard against the abuse of social media, and bots to subvert democratic processes. There’s also a need for social media literacy to ensure that citizens appreciate the power the internet gives them - and to use it responsibly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99402/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dumisani Moyo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zimbabwe’s upcoming elections potentially marks the start of a new order in the country, where the stakes are extremely high.Dumisani Moyo, Associate Professor, Department of Journalism, Film and Television, and Vice Dean Faculty of Humanities, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1001002018-07-20T11:06:31Z2018-07-20T11:06:31ZZimbabwe poll: the bar for success is low, the stakes are high and it’s a close race<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228455/original/file-20180719-142432-1pyjir6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of the opposition MDC Alliance in Unity Square before marching to protest outside the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Moore</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa and the ruling Zanu-PF hope a credible victory in the <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/top-africa-stories-zim-election-date-set-kagame-on-chamisa-20180531">July 30 election</a> will legitimise the power (both party and state) they gained from the “soft coup” that toppled his predecessor Robert Mugabe <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabweans-must-draw-on-years-of-democratic-struggle-to-stop-a-repeat-of-mugabes-militarism-87961">last November</a>.</p>
<p>With victory, they say, the <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2018/07/14/infighting-between-mnangagwa-and-chiwenga-factions-frustrating-eager-investors/">donors and dollars</a> will flood in to the country they have resurrected from <a href="http://country.eiu.com/zimbabwe">nearly two moribund decades</a>. Zimbabwe is now <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwe-is-open-for-business-says-mnangagwa-12913367">“open for business”</a> and will thrive. Zanu-PF’s resurrection will thus be complete.</p>
<p>But a new <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r7_dispatchno223_zimbabwe_presidential_race_tightens.pdf">survey</a> suggests Zanu-PF should stall any premature celebration plans. The latest one showed that, in the space of one month, Nelson Chamisa’s MDC-Alliance has closed the gap with Zanu-PF. The surveys are conducted by Afrobarometer, an independent research network that conducts public attitude surveys across Africa and its Zimbabwean partner, Mass Public Opinion Institute, a non-profit, non-governmental research organisation.</p>
<p>If the respondents were to cast their ballot now Mnangagwa would take 40% of the votes and opposition leader Nelson Chamisa would take 37%. The still undecided or not-saying potential voters are at 20%. Split that and you get a 50/47 race. </p>
<p>The numbers are very close indeed. If not a victory for the MDC-Alliance, this looks like a presidential runoff. The MDC-Allaince has a 49% to 26% lead in the cities and towns and in the countryside the figures are 30% for the opposition to Zanu-PF’s 48%. In parliament Zanu-PF would get 41% to the MDC-Alliance’s 36. This is a big change from <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/media-briefings/findings-pre-election-baseline-survey-zimbabwe-aprilmay-2018">May’s survey</a>.</p>
<p>Given the MDC-Alliance momentum, the post-Mugabe Zanu-PF’s hopes of a resurrection may be dashed. A great deal hangs on both parties’ ability to manage this interregnum.</p>
<p>Big trade-offs will be negotiated, ranging from coalition governments, which the poll shows has the backing from 60% of respondents, to amnesties for the chief crooks and killers.</p>
<p>Striking deals might indeed lie at the centre of whether or not the election is a success. That’s because this election is about grabbing back the core of hardwon democracy from a military dominated regime. It’s about cleansing out <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-zimbabwe-finally-ditch-a-history-of-violence-and-media-repression-99859">generations of fear</a>. </p>
<p>That is a hard task at any time. It’s harder still when it took a coup to retire its prime source.</p>
<h2>A divided Zanu-PF</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa has been spectacularly unsuccessful at winning past elections in <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2015/05/26/mnangagwa-cannot-win-elections">his own constituencies</a>, standing for parliament three times and losing twice. </p>
<p>The factions in Zanu-PF that squared up against one another prior to the coup - the <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/03/18/what-does-g40-want/">Generation-40 group</a> that supported Grace Mugabe for the party and state president and <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">Lacoste</a>, which supported Mnangagwa – are <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwes-mnangagwa-says-zanu-pf-legislators-plotting-to-impeach-him-15237903">still battling</a> along lines more ethnically drawn <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/02/19/ethnicity-zanu-pfs-messy-predicament/">than ever</a>. Some of the losers in the Generation-40 group have left the party to form the <a href="https://news.pindula.co.zw/2018/07/14/mugabes-offered-24-million-12-cars-for-chamisas-campaign-in-exchange-of-82-parliamentary-seats-vice-presidents-post/">National Patriotic Front</a>. </p>
<p>Although the perpetrators have not been found, the <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/africa/zimbabwe-blast-feared-to-herald-pre-election-violence-1.3543607">blast</a> at Zanu-PF’s Bulawayo rally in late June that killed two people and only narrowly missed a whole stage of luminaries, could suggest that the party’s wounds have yet to <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/06/29/bulawayo-bomb-blast-escalates-mnangagwa-chiwenga-tensions/">heal</a>. </p>
<p>And the soldiers are not of one mind. </p>
<p>If the military side of the somewhat shaky post-coup pact in Zanu-PF fears losing an election, and thus access to more of the wealth more power can bring, the free and fair dimensions of the electoral contest would be <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2018-05-23-fears-of-armys-readiness-to-influence-zimbabwes-elections/">drastically diminished</a>. Would a repeat of <a href="https://public.tableau.com/profile/acled6590#!/vizhome/Zimbabwe_1/ProportionZiminTotal">mid-2008’s post-electoral mayhem</a>, when at least 170 people were killed and nearly 800 beaten or raped, ensue?</p>
<p>To make matters more complex, there are no guarantees that <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/07/15/military-pay-hike-angers-teachers">hungry and angry junior army officers</a> would follow their seniors’ attempts to alter the peoples’ will.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa could be at some of the soldier’s mercy. Some suggest that Constantino Chiwenga, the <a href="https://minbane.wordpress.com/2018/04/19/https-wp-me-p1xtjg-6lv/">mercurial vice-president</a> and – unconstitutionally – defence minister <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/chiwenga-exposes-mnangagwas-great-escape-yarn/">might be among them</a>. </p>
<p>Others argue that the two leaders need each other if the régime is going to deliver on promises of a clean <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/05/zim-2018-election-trading-democracy-for-neoliberal-foreign-policy/">election</a> </p>
<p>And as George Charamba, Zimbabwe’s permanent secretary for information, put it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This election is about restoring international re-engagement and legitimacy …. It must be flawless, it must be transparent, it must be free, it must be fair, it must meet international standards, it must be violence free and therefore it must be universally endorsed because it is an instrument of foreign policy … It’s about re-engagement and legitimacy; we are playing politics at a higher level.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is a clarion call for a free and fair poll. If the election fails to meet these expectations and its results are tight, legitimacy could be maintained with carefully calculated deals. Perhaps the unity government widely expected during the coup could <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN1DG1RL-OZATP">reappear</a>. </p>
<h2>A rising opposition</h2>
<p>Chamisa and the MDC (the alliance is made up of seven parties, most having split from the late Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC), appear to be building on the <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/nelson-chamisa-threatens-to-take-zec-headon-elections-zimbabwe/4486127.html">momentum</a> they seem to have gained by challenging the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’s management of the contest. The alliance has challenged the commission’s neutrality and raised concerns over the accuracy of the voters’ <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-07-19-new-rules-and-ghost-voters-threaten-zimbabwes-vote">roll</a>.</p>
<p>Not all its allegations necessarily stand up to scrutiny. The 250,000 alleged ghosts may be a canard, but as Derek Matyszak, the Institute for Security Studies man in Harare, argues, the roll was not released in time for the primaries so none of the candidates are constitutionally valid. </p>
<p>Emboldened by the lack of police, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics/zimbabwe-opposition-marches-on-electoral-agency-to-demand-reforms-idUSKBN1K11FW">thousands of protesters</a> led by the MDC-Alliance marched to the commission’s headquarters on July 11, showing no fear. </p>
<p>If this impetus keeps building over the next week, a victory is conceivable. So is a presidential run-off. To be sure, the ruling party might win fairly, but the opposition will have to be convinced of that. The mode of politics for the next round should be peacemaking, not war. </p>
<h2>Low bars, high stakes</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/zimbabwes-elections-a-turning-point/">bars are low</a> – ‘the west’, led in this case by the UK, seemed to be happy with the winners of the coup, perhaps hoping for a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/zimbabwes-future-rests-on-a-free-and-fair-election-speech-by-ambassador-catriona-laing">renewed Zanu-PF</a>. <a href="https://www.newdawnmagazine.com/articles/perfidious-albion-an-introduction-to-the-secret-history-of-the-british-empire">Perfidious Albion</a> (Treacherous England) could end its schizophrenic career in Zimbabwe with a whimper about the <a href="https://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/25597">end of a liberal democratic dream</a>. But the stakes are high for Zimbabweans: much higher than the reputation of a minor global power past its glory. </p>
<p>The people of Zimbabwe face a lot more than reputational damage: maybe the former colonial power will have a Plan B that helps more than hinders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100100/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new survey suggests opposition Zimbabwean leader Nelson Chamisa is closing in on the ruling Zanu-PF’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies and Visiting Researcher, Institute of Pan-African Thought and Conversation, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/998592018-07-16T14:15:04Z2018-07-16T14:15:04ZCan Zimbabwe finally ditch a history of violence and media repression?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227563/original/file-20180713-27045-2alah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zanu-PF supporters at a peace rally in Harare.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe’s governing Zanu-PF is earnestly courting international legitimacy as the country approaches its first post-independence elections <a href="https://www.apnews.com/baee38cf5cd24282be5d7c332848a8b2">without Robert Mugabe</a>. </p>
<p>The party frequently uses clichés like “fresh start”, “new dispensation”, and “open for business” to signal its willingness to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/24/africa/zimbabwe-president-emmerson-mnangagwa-davos-intl/index.html">engage with the West</a>. The talk has been matched by some action.</p>
<p>The government has repudiated most of its <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/govt-amends-indigenisation-law/">indigenisation legislation</a>, and recently <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/62f28a38-5d0a-11e8-9334-2218e7146b04">applied to re-join</a> The Commonwealth. Additionally, <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimbabwe-invites-46-countries-to-observe-2018-polls/">46 countries and 15 regional bodies</a> have been invited to observe the elections. This includes many Western nations that had been excluded in recent years.</p>
<p>Their assessments will probably not be decided by technical factors. It seems unlikely that ongoing debates over <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/06/zec-under-fire-over-undelivered-voters-roll/">the voter’s roll</a> or the prominence of ex-military personnel in the <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/02/soldiers-make-15-zec-staff/">Zimbabwe Electoral Commission</a> will have much impact on the final judgements passed by the monitoring missions.</p>
<p>It’s more likely that the credibility of the elections will be shaped by issues such as political violence and media freedom. In both spheres, the legacy of colonialism and the liberation struggle weigh heavily. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-71015.html">breakaway party</a> from the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu) in 1963, the Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu) emerged in a very fragile position. It endured violence against its members and was denied access to a free media. In later years, the party perpetrated and perpetuated the same tactics under which it was conceived – both as a liberation movement and in government.</p>
<p>There are a number of examples of how Zanu-PF drew on colonial-era repressive tactics in its post-independence quest for political primacy. These include the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/01/31/gukurahundi-is-mugabe-s-baby">Gukurahundi violence</a> under the Mugabe led government in the 1980s against areas predominantly supporting Zapu, the government’s 2005 <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/zimbabwe/zimbabwe-operation-murambatsvina-overview-and-summary">Operation Murambatsvina</a> which targeted properties belonging mostly to urban opposition supporters, and the 2008 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1">election run-off violence</a> after Mugabe lost the first round of voting.</p>
<p>As Zimbabweans head to the polls on July 30, this history looms large over the electorate and those responsible for overseeing its successful execution.</p>
<h2>History of political violence</h2>
<p>In July 1960, unprecedented protests in Zimbabwe’s two largest cities ushered in a new era of political violence in the British colony. A year later violence erupted within the liberation movement itself. In June 1961, the first significant attempt to form a breakaway nationalist movement in Zimbabwe was thwarted. Members of the <a href="https://zimhistassociation.wordpress.com/2018/03/27/the-first-split-in-zimbabwes-anti-colonial-struggle-continues-to-cast-shadows-over-contemporary-politics/">Zimbabwe National Party</a> (ZNP) were physically prevented from launching the party at their own press conference by <a href="http://www.sundaynews.co.zw/events-leading-to-banning-of-ndp/">National Democratic Party</a> (NDP) sympathisers.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
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<p>The ill-fated efforts of the ZNP would have been prominent in the minds of Zanu founders when it was formed two years later. </p>
<p>Zapu, which replaced the NDP after it was banned, went to great lengths to beat Zanu into submission. The houses of Mugabe and Ndabaningi Sithole, the top leaders in Zanu, <a href="http://cba1415.web.unc.edu/files/2014/07/zapu.pdf">were stoned</a> after the new party was launched.</p>
<p>As other African nations became independent and Zimbabwe remained under minority rule, frustration mounted. This led to a determination to achieve majority rule by any means. A <a href="https://www.pambazuka.org/arts/roots-political-violence-go-deep-zimbabwe">culture of political violence</a> became institutionalised.</p>
<h2>Media Repression</h2>
<p>Assaults on the media were particularly prominent under white minority rule following the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/40-years-on-from-udi-zimbabwe-is-still-paying-the-price-1-1101979">Censors </a> redacted broad swathes of news stories, littering papers with blank pages.</p>
<p>This overt censorship was but a new manifestation of a repressive media heritage. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/wmss/online/blcas/welensky.html">Political papers</a> of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/07/world/sir-roy-welensky-84-premier-of-african-federation-is-dead.html">Roy Welensky</a>, the second Prime Minister of the Federation to which Southern Rhodesia belonged from 1953 - 1963, reveal the invidious nature of attempts to control the press. His government covertly worked with journalists and editors to produce articles critical of the white opposition in newspapers that were nominally independent. He also consulted with the white publishers of newspapers geared toward a black audience about ways to promote his government.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://pdfproc.lib.msu.edu/?file=/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Journal%20of%20the%20University%20of%20Zimbabwe/vol23n2/juz023002004.pdf"><em>Central African Examiner</em></a>, a news magazine that was theoretically independent and had links with <em>The Economist</em>, changed editors in the middle of the 1958 elections. The new editor, David Cole, was Welensky’s public relations adviser. </p>
<p>In 1961 the government considered blocking the sale of the colony’s newspaper titles catering to a predominantly black audience to the Thomson Newspaper Group. The concern was that it would be difficult to influence the editorial policy of papers with foreign ownership. Meanwhile, newspapers geared toward a predominantly white audience and owned by the South African based Argus Press were not seen as posing a threat.</p>
<p>The sale went ahead. But in August 1964 both the African Daily News (which had a pro-Zapu bias) and Zanu <a href="http://pdfproc.lib.msu.edu/?file=/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Journal%20of%20the%20University%20of%20Zimbabwe/vol6n2/juz006002015.pdf">were banned</a>. </p>
<p>Zanu learnt the importance of media control in its early years. Once in power it exerted its own influence. Forty years after Zanu and the <em>African Daily News</em> were proscribed, Zanu-PF replicated the tactics when it <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2004/jan/22/pressandpublishing.Zimbabwenews">banned a newspaper, also known as the Daily News</a> amid a media clampdown.</p>
<h2>Eyes on Mnangagwa</h2>
<p>While President Emmerson Mnangagwa has backtracked from Mugabe’s more confrontational rhetoric, his political career is nearly as long as his predecessor’s. His political upbringing was profoundly shaped by the repressive measures the nationalists endured and took up in the 1960s to dismantle the unjust system that governed them.</p>
<p>Zanu-PF’s assaults on the media and penchant for violence are reflective of similar tactics that were used against the party during the colonial era. And they have been critical to its ability to <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/06/10/violence-dominates-zim-political-history/">obtain and retain power</a> for 37 years. </p>
<p>Will Zimbabwe be able to turn the corner and move toward a more equitable election campaign in which the historic trajectory of media repression and political violence is fundamentally altered? If the answer is yes, Mnangagwa will have made a significant stride in truly ushering in a “<a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/the-first-100-days-of-the-new-dispensation/">new dispensation</a>”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99859/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brooks Marmon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The credibility of Zimbabwe’s elections will depend on issues like political violence and media freedom.Brooks Marmon, PhD Student, Centre of African Studies, The University of EdinburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.