tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/abdelaziz-bouteflika-68275/articlesAbdelaziz Bouteflika – The Conversation2022-01-24T14:24:57Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1751452022-01-24T14:24:57Z2022-01-24T14:24:57ZFrom Algeria to Zimbabwe: how Africa’s autocratic elites cycle in and out of power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/441231/original/file-20220118-19-wv4nw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe greets supporters massed at his party headquarters shortly before his ouster in 2017.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jekesai Njikizana/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In 2021, coups d’état ousted four heads of state in sub-Saharan Africa. Army interventions in Chad, Mali, Guinea and Sudan halted a years-long decline in military takeovers. Some heralded this as the <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/new-military-wave-africa-could-it-turn-tide-32718">comeback of the army</a> in African politics.</p>
<p>Elsewhere in Africa, elected leaders in <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_tunisian-president-sacks-premier-suspends-parliament/6208718.html">Tunisia</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/28/rights-groups-accuse-tanzanias-magufuli-over-rising-repression">Tanzania</a> and <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/internationalrelations/2020/07/29/autocratic-entrenchment-as-the-world-turns-a-blind-eye-towards-zimbabwe/">Zimbabwe</a>, among others, were accused of pivoting to authoritarian rule. Common authoritarian measures include suspending parliamentary assemblies, confining opposition leaders, extending term limits and violently repressing opposition and dissent. </p>
<p>Here lies an apparent paradox: despite decades in which democratic institutions have become prevalent across the continent, African states continue to be vulnerable to military takeovers and autocratic forms of power.</p>
<p>Multiple interpretations aim to explain this seeming contradiction. A popular explanation suggests that the world, and especially Africa, is entering a new phase of ‘<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1045884">democratic backsliding</a>’. This follows a decades-long era during which several leaders were ousted by popular movements. </p>
<p>Nowhere was this more evident than in North Africa. Here, the democratic aspirations of the 2011 Arab Spring were overshadowed by a return to authoritarianism and conflict. Yet, in many of Africa’s <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/competitive-authoritarianism/20A51BE2EBAB59B8AAEFD91B8FA3C9D6">competitive autocracies</a>, the removal of leaders is not associated with revolutionary change. In fact, there is a remarkable stability of senior elites and institutional practices across regimes. This seems to point to their resilience in the face of a supposed trajectory towards democracy.</p>
<p>The literature on <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/logic-political-survival">political survival</a> provides a more compelling narrative to explain political change in competitive autocracies. A leader’s survival is conditioned on the support of senior elites. Leaders can typically spread power among their ‘rival allies’ to keep it and co-opt enough of those elites in exchange for political support. </p>
<p>These actors can in turn leverage their collective power to secure greater influence and rewards from the centre. The concept of a ‘<a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/projects/conflict-research-programme/political-marketplace">political marketplace</a>’ has aptly captured the transactional nature of regime strategies to determine association, loyalty and alliances with senior elites.</p>
<p>Drawing on these insights, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X21000240">our recently published paper</a> seeks to explain political change in African competitive autocracies using the notion of ‘regime cycles’. This framework, which produced rich insights into the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40060127">failed democratisation processes</a> of the post-communist states during the 1990s, suggests that elites must act collectively if they are to challenge the leader, identifying four stages within a regime cycle.</p>
<p>Our research seeks to explain political change in African autocracies by looking at the role of political elites, focusing on cycles of power between a leader and their rivals which determine their survival. In doing so, we propose an alternative conceptual framework to interpret dynamics of change in African autocracies.</p>
<h2>Four stages of the autocratic regime cycle</h2>
<p>Each stage of the cycle is determined by the nature of contestation between the incumbent and senior elites. The balance of power between these actors varies in each stage, according to the level of fragmentation of authority within and across those groups.</p>
<p>The four stages are accommodation, consolidation, factionalisation and crisis. But they do not necessarily follow a chronological order. </p>
<p>During the accommodation phase, leaders build coalitions by distributing rents and authority among senior elites. The intention of this stage is to reward loyalists and co-opt prospective allies. The incentive is integration and inclusion. </p>
<p>The narrowing of competitive influences leads to the consolidation stage. The leader seeks to assert authority over a coalition of ‘rival allies’. This phase coincides with the height of a leader’s authority, where the threat of being removed is lowest.</p>
<p>At this stage, the leader may be perceived to be excessively centralising power. One sign is, for example, replacing security chiefs with loyalists. This may be a threat to other elites. Senior elites may organise along factional lines to create opposition within the regime. This creates factions.</p>
<p>Factions can consist of rival senior elites, who tactically join forces to get the leader to spread power. The intention is not to depose the leader or split the regime, but rather to bargain the terms of inclusion. Leaders also use disorder to try to prevent elite cooperation to lessen the strength of senior elite coalitions.</p>
<p>However, a crisis may occur when factions decide to take advantage of a critical juncture to forcibly reshuffle the ruling coalition. The jostling for power among senior elites typically leads to such crisis moments. This can result in military takeovers, forced resignations, constitutional coups or power-sharing agreements. </p>
<p>Regime crises reshape the existing power structures by disposing of the old leader. They also reshuffle senior elites into a narrow ruling coalition.</p>
<h2>Culmination of ripened factionalism</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/regime-cycles-and-political-change-in-african-autocracies/E9F73B8C9C658DB171BD44F9FBDA32A3">our paper</a>, we apply these observations to the removal of three of the longest-serving heads of state in Africa. </p>
<p>Between 2017 and 2019, Algeria’s Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe were ousted after a combined 90 years in power. Our analysis shows that their removal was the culmination of ripened factionalism. In each case, this had blossomed after the leaders’ attempts to centralise power. It was not a direct consequence of mass protests and economic downturns. </p>
<p>Senior military and security elites took advantage of the crisis moment to dispose of the leaders and their loyalists and reshuffle the regime. Naturally, they were once regime insiders and allies of the ageing autocrats. Stages of accommodation, consolidation, factionalisation and crisis preceded and followed the removal according to a cyclical logic.</p>
<p>Our analysis emphasises elite dynamics over the role of mass protests and popular opposition. True popular demonstrations can spark crises within a regime. But leaders and senior elites are more likely to produce significant and durable changes. </p>
<p>Democratic breakthroughs cannot be ruled out. But they are typically the product of a <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/421307">political stalemate</a>. They are not ideological preferences or public appeals for political change. </p>
<p>The forceful removals observed in 2021 seem to conform to this cyclical logic of political change. Senior elites took advantage of a crisis moment to seize power and reconfigure the regime to their own advantage.</p>
<p><em>This is a reedited version of <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2022/01/13/what-causes-regime-change-in-african-autocracies-dictatorships-political-cycle/">this blog</a> first posted on January 13, 2022.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175145/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Carboni is affiliated with Mercy Corps, where he is a Humanitarian Analyst.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clionadh Raleigh receives funding from the European Research Council - ERC grant no. 726504. She is affiliated with ACLED, where she is the Executive Director. </span></em></p>Leaders typically spread power among their ‘rival allies’ to keep it and co-opt enough of those elites in exchange for political support.Andrea Carboni, Postdoctoral research fellow, University of SussexClionadh Raleigh, Professor of Political Geography, School of Global Studies, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1696112021-10-14T05:54:06Z2021-10-14T05:54:06ZLe règne de deux décennies de Bouteflika hanteront les Algériens pendant de nombreuses années<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425824/original/file-20211012-19-tejyd2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C926%2C596&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Le défunt président algérien, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, sur cette photo de 2004, est un dirigeant dont l'héritage restera longtemps dans les mémoires. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hocine Zaourar/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdelaziz-Bouteflika">Abdelaziz Bouteflika</a> a dirigé l'Algérie d'une main de fer pendant 20 ans, de 1999 à 2019. En tant qu'homme politique, il a été l'un des premiers architectes du système autoritaire de l'Algérie dans les décennies qui ont suivi son <a href="https://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/AlgeriaFINAL.pdf">accession</a> à l'indépendance vis à vis de la France en 1962.</p>
<p>Son parcours politique comporte différentes phases : pendant <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/international/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/bouteflika-abdelaziz-1937">la première</a> (1963-1979), il représentait le visgage de l'âge d'or de la politique étrangère du pays ; puis, au cours des années suivantes, il s’est exilé volontairement, ne revenant au pays qu'occasionnellement. En <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/world/ex-algerian-leader-bouteflika-ousted-amid-protests-dies/">1994</a>, il a refusé la présidence, avant de finir par l'accepter <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/4/3/abdelaziz-bouteflika-algerias-longest-serving-president">cinq ans plus tard</a>, en 1999.</p>
<p>Il a accédé au pouvoir à l'issue d'une élection très controversée ; la veille du scrutin présidentiel, six candidats se sont <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9904/14/algeria.03/index.html">retirés</a>, estimant – à juste titre – qu'il avait déjà été choisi par les tenants du pouvoir réel.</p>
<p>Son accession à la présidence a été un moment gratifiant pour Bouteflika. Vingt ans plus tôt, il était fermement convaincu d'être l'héritier légitime de son mentor, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Houari-Boumedienne">Houari Boumediene</a>, qui avait dirigé le pays de 1965 jusqu’à sa mort à la fin de 1978, des suites d'une grave maladie.</p>
<p>Mais cela n’a pas été le cas :comme il n’inspirait pas confiance, le chef des services de renseignement et d'autres memmbres puissants du régime l'ont empêché de succéder à Boumédienne.</p>
<p>Son accession au pouvoir en 1999 l'a certainement conforté dans sa conviction qu'il aurait dû être le successeur légitime de Boumédienne. Néanmoins, son règne de deux décennies a été à l'origine des dégâts les plus graves que le pays ait jamais connus depuis l'indépendance.</p>
<h2>Un homme assoiffé de pouvoir</h2>
<p>De nombreux Algériens continuent de se demander comment un homme comme Bouteflika a pu se maintenir au pouvoir, en exerçant non pas deux mandats – comme le prévoyait la Constitution de 1996 – mais quatre. Il voulait se présenter une cinquième fois lorsqu’il a été démis de ses fonctions par les militaires <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/04/10/why-algerias-army-abandoned-bouteflika/">le 2 avril 2019</a>, après <a href="https://merip.org/2019/12/from-protesta-to-hirak-to-algerias-new-revolutionary-moment/">des manifestations de masse </a>continues appelant à son départ et à celui de ses partisans.</p>
<p>Ses nombreux défauts ne sont pas passés inaperçus pendant son long règne.</p>
<p>En 2003, la veille de son second mandat, l'ancien ministre de la Défense, Khaled Nezzar, a critiqué de manière acerbe le président dans un livre intitulé <a href="https://www.amazon.fr/Alg%C3%A9rie-Sultanat-Bouteflika-Khaled-Nezzar/dp/291272807X/ref=sr_1_3?__mk_fr_FR=%C3%85M%C3%85%C5%BD%C3%95%C3%91&dchild=1&keywords=khaled+nezzar&qid=1632921332&qsid=257-5069052-1026663&sr=8-3&sres=9947392589%2C2866007964%2C291272807X%2C2866008359%2C2915161011%2C9947393224%2C9961633946%2C1243186356%2C1980727996%2CB07XVQ469Z%2C2707139009%2C2707171506%2CB01BW4C7ZI%2C2842721594%2CB0047UJZ0U%2CB0047TMXX2%2C9947886581%2C9961634586%2C9947393488%2C9947212017"><em>Algérie, le Sultanat de Bouteflika</em></a>.
Un an plus tard, le journaliste algérien, Mohamed Benchicou, a publié un <a href="https://www.amazon.fr/Bouteflika-imposture-alg%C3%A9rienne-Mohamed-Benchicou/dp/2864772086/ref=sr_1_1?__mk_fr_FR=%C3%85M%C3%85%C5%BD%C3%95%C3%91&crid=2QZSID52O9427&dchild=1&keywords=bouteflika+une+imposture+algerienne&qid=1632920617&qsid=257-5069052-1026663&sprefix=bouteflika%2C+une+im%2Caps%2C227&sr=8-1&sres=2864772086%2C2268103188%2CB085V9QN1F%2C2266204939%2CB0862DPW5C%2CB07NJCHFYZ&srpt=ABIS_BOOK">livre</a> dans lequel il a expliqué point par point pourquoi il considérait que le président était un imposteur, se faisant l’écho de l'opinion exprimée par des dirigeants historiques crédibles qui estimaient qu'il avait joué un rôle insignifiant pendant <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ko7GMxQsdKE">la guerre d’indépendance.</a></p>
<p>Les partisans de Bouteflika en ont dressé un portrait très différent, le qualifiant de grand moudjahid et le comparant aux <a href="https://www.elmoudjahid.dz/fr/nation/abdelaziz-bouteflika-inhume-au-carre-des-martyrs-du-cimetiere-el-alia-l-adieu-a-un-moudjahid-15179">grands révolutionnaires</a> qui ont combattu la France coloniale. Un qualificatif qui lui a permis de légitimer son pouvoir ainsi que ceux qui ont <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Politics-of-Algeria-Domestic-Issues-and-International-Relations/Zoubir/p/book/9781138331006">usurpé</a> ce titre de «révolutionnaire» pour leurs propres interêts.</p>
<h2>Les premières années</h2>
<p>En 1963, le ministre algérien des Affaires étrangères, Mohamed Khemisti, est <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1963/05/06/archives/khemisti-is-dead-of-bullet-wound-algerian-foreign-minister-shot-by.html">assassiné</a> par un individu prétendument déséquilibré. Bouteflika, qui occupait le poste de ministre de la Jeunesse et des Sports, est alors devenu à 26 ans le plus jeune ministre des Affaires étrangères du monde, poste qu’il a occupé jusqu'en 1979 et qu’il doit à Boumediene, son mentor, qui l’a aussi protégé.</p>
<p>Durant son premier mandat présidentiel, Bouteflika est parvenu à redorer l'image de l'Algérie à l'étranger ; grand orateur, ses discours dans les forums internationaux, comme celui de Davos, étaient bien accueillis. Les événements du <a href="https://www.911memorial.org/911-faqs">11 septembre</a> lui ont donné l'occasion de positionner l'Algérie comme un partenaire crédible dans la lutte contre le terrorisme.</p>
<p>Cependant, alors que Bouteflika rétablissait les relations avec les puissances occidentales, il a totalement négligé les relations avec l'Afrique sub-saharienne, ce qui a desservi l'Algérie, qui a commencé à perdre le capital de sympathie qu'elle avait acquis sur le continent depuis la guerre d'indépendance. Étant donné qu'il estimait que la politique étrangère était son domaine réservé, personne ne pouvait contester son point de vue.</p>
<p>Pendant les premières années du mandat de Bouteflika, l'Algérie a connu une <a href="https://www.diploweb.com/Algerie-les-illusions-de-la.html">forte croissance</a> due à deux facteurs majeurs sans rapport avec lui : une <a href="http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=699041253&Country=Algeria&topic=Economy&subtopic=Fo_3">augmentation significative</a> des revenus pétroliers et des pluies abondantes. Il n'a pourtant pas su profiter de cette aubaine et n’a pas tenu les promesses qu'il avait faites, notamment la réforme des université de l'école, de la jusitice, l'administration nationale et du système bancaire.</p>
<h2>Le milieu et la fin</h2>
<p>Bouteflika <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/04/02/les-mille-et-une-vies-politiques-d-abdelaziz-bouteflika_5444690_3212.html">affirmait</a> avoir besoin d'un second mandat pour mener à bien les prétendues réformes, mais ce second mandat, qui avait débuté en 2004, n'a pas été uilisé à bon escient. Au lieu de développer son pays, il passait son temps à consolider son pouvoir et à remettre en question les avancées limitées de la démocratie que l'Algérie avait enregistrées depuis l’<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/25/world/algeria-approves-new-constitution.html">introduction</a> du multipartisme et de la liberté de la presse en 1989.</p>
<p>Pour ce faire, il a mis en place un système dans lequel les institutions étaient au service de quelques individus, dont des membres de sa famille, qui lui étaient fidèles.</p>
<p>En l'absence d'une véritable économie productive, l'Algérie de Bouteflika dépendait exclusivement de la <a href="https://www.alternatives-economiques.fr/lalgerie-malade-de-petrole/00088704">rente pétrolière</a>, qui était redistribuée à des clients cooptés, engendrant une corruption endémique jamais vue en Algérie.</p>
<p>Le régime de Bouteflika a mis à l'écart les partis d'opposition, sauf trois d'entre eux qui pouvaient difficilement être qualifiés de partis d'opposition. La soi-disant « coalition présidentielle » était composée de <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Liberation-Front-political-party-Algeria">l'ancien parti unique au pouvoir, le FLN</a>, de son frère jumeau, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Democratic-Rally">le RND</a>, qui avait été créé en 1997 pour fournir une assise populaire à <a href="https://plus.lesoir.be/art/apres-l-adoption-de-nouvelles-lois-electorales-algerie-_t-19970222-Z0DCF0.html">Liamine Zeroual</a>, <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/algeria-s-largest-islamic-party-eyes-national-unity-gov-t/2266857">et du parti islamiste, le MSP</a>.</p>
<p>Non content d’avoir obtenu ces deux mandats, Bouteflika a décidé en 2008 d'amender la Constitution pour supprimer la limite des deux mandats et préparer le terrain pour <a href="https://merip.org/2009/04/introducing-algerias-president-for-life/">sa présidence à vie</a>.</p>
<p>Cinq ans plus tard, bien qu'incapable de communiquer et confiné en raison du deuxième accident vasculaire cérébral dont il a été victime, Bouteflika, ou plutôt son entourage, a cherché à briguer un cinquième mandat afin de pouvoir rester au pouvoir jusqu'à sa mort.</p>
<p>Durant les sept dernières années de sa présidence, l'Algérie a donné l'impression d’être un navire sans capitaine ; le président apparaissant rarement en public, lorsque c'était le cas, il avait l'air pitoyable. Ses acolytes voulaient que le sultan se montre, même rarement, afin de pouvoir justifier son maintien au pouvoir pour conserver leurs privilèges et continuer à dilapider les ressources du pays.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/algeria/2016-02-09/algeria-after-arab-sprin">La chute du prix du pétrole</a> et la paupérisation de larges pans de la société ont exaspéré les Algériens. Toutefois, ce qui a déclenché le mouvement de protestation contre le cinquième mandat en 2019, c'est l’intensité de l’humiliation ressentie en voyant leur président tourné en dérision sur <a href="https://www.algerie360.com/video-une-nouvelle-fois-la-chaine-francaise-tf1-se-moque-de-bouteflika/">les chaînes de télévision étrangères</a> et <a href="https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/la-diffusion-d-une-photo-de-bouteflika-relance-le-debat-sur-sa-succession_1783542.html">exhibé</a> presque paralysé pour prouver qu'il était toujours vivant.</p>
<p>Les Algériens se sont, en outre, déchaînés en voyant le président devenir l’objet de l'idolâtrie de ses partisans, leur adoration faisant penser à des pratiques païennes, une offense dans une société islamique.</p>
<p>De toute évidence, Bouteflika a imposé de <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/opinionfr/algerie-incroyables-moeurs-republique-bouteflika-corruption">nouvelles mœurs</a> que l'Algérie aura du mal à abandonner dans les années à venir, et son héritage hantera les Algériens pendant de nombreuses années. Il n’est guère étonnant que sa mort, le 17 septembre, soit passée inaperçue. </p>
<p>Comme l’a dit <a href="https://www.sudouest.fr/international/algerie-l-ex-president-bouteflika-inhume-ce-dimanche-macron-lui-rend-hommage-5970968.php">un citoyen</a> : </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Ces funérailles sont un non-événement. Autour de moi, personne n'en parle en tout cas, comme s’il s’agissait de la mort d'un simple quidam, qui n'a jamais été président. Les Algériens donnent l'impression d'avoir oublié Bouteflika, d'avoir tourné la page de son règne.»</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169611/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yahia H. Zoubir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Les deux décennies de règne de Bouteflika ont été les plus dévastatrices que l'Algérie ait connues depuis son indépendance vis-à-vis de la France.Yahia H. Zoubir, Visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center and Senior Professor of International Studies and Director of Research in Geopolitics, Kedge Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1690452021-09-30T17:54:23Z2021-09-30T17:54:23ZBouteflika ruled for two decades: his legacy will haunt Algerians for many years to come<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/424048/original/file-20210930-26-2mrjd4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Late Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's, seen in this 2004 photograph, is one leader whose legacy will linger for long. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Hocine Zaourar/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdelaziz-Bouteflika">Abdelaziz Bouteflika</a> ruled Algeria with an iron fist for 20 years – from 1999 to 2019. </p>
<p>He was a political figure, one of the initial architects of Algeria’s authoritarian political system in the decades after <a href="https://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/AlgeriaFINAL.pdf">its independence from France in 1962</a>. </p>
<p>His journey passed through different phases. During the <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/international/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/bouteflika-abdelaziz-1937">first</a> (1963-1979), he was the visible face of the golden age of the country’s foreign policy. In the following years he lived in self-imposed exile, returning to the country only occasionally. In <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/world/ex-algerian-leader-bouteflika-ousted-amid-protests-dies/">1994</a> he turned down the presidency, but then accepted it <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/4/3/abdelaziz-bouteflika-algerias-longest-serving-president">five years later</a> in 1999. </p>
<p>He came to power through a highly controversial election. On the eve of the presidential poll six contenders <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9904/14/algeria.03/index.html">withdrew</a> believing – rightly – that he had already been chosen by the real powers. </p>
<p>His ascendance to the presidency was a gratifying moment for Bouteflika. Twenty years earlier he had firmly believed that he was the rightful heir to his mentor, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Houari-Boumedienne">Houari Boumediene</a>, who ruled the country from 1965 until his death in late 1978 due to grave illness. </p>
<p>But it was not to be: Bouteflika was not trusted. And the head of intelligence and other powerful members of the regime barred him from succeeding Boumediene. </p>
<p>His ascension to power in 1999 might have comforted his conviction that he should have been the rightful ruler after Boumediene. Nevertheless, his two decades in power were the most damaging the country had experienced since independence.</p>
<h2>A man thirsty for power</h2>
<p>Many Algerians continue to wonder how a man like <a href="https://www.amazon.fr/Bouteflika-Lhistoire-secr%C3%A8te/dp/2268103188/ref=sr_1_1?__mk_fr_FR=%C3%85M%C3%85%C5%BD%C3%95%C3%91&crid=1893PZZ6BXHV8&dchild=1&keywords=farid+alilat&qid=1632922580&qsid=257-5069052-1026663&sprefix=farid+alil%2Caps%2C219&sr=8-1&sres=2268103188%2C2846120625%2CB085V9QN1F%2CB08C3MT5VZ%2CB07NJCHFYZ%2CB082PQ7221%2C2213701652%2C2358721921%2C2213706204%2C2360134906%2CB01M4S1ECL%2C2864772086%2C2353410146">Bouteflika</a> was able to stay in power, serving not two terms – as set down in the 1996 Constitution – but four. He was in the process of attempting to run for a fifth before being forcibly removed from office by the military on <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/04/10/why-algerias-army-abandoned-bouteflika/">April 2, 2019</a>.</p>
<p>This was preceded by massive and <a href="https://merip.org/2019/12/from-protesta-to-hirak-to-algerias-new-revolutionary-moment/">incessant marches</a> calling for his departure and that of his followers.</p>
<p>His many flaws did not go unnoticed during his prolonged stay in power.</p>
<p>In 2003, on the eve of his second term, former minister of defense Khaled Nezzar delivered a damaging criticism of the president in a book <a href="https://www.amazon.fr/Alg%C3%A9rie-Sultanat-Bouteflika-Khaled-Nezzar/dp/291272807X/ref=sr_1_3?__mk_fr_FR=%C3%85M%C3%85%C5%BD%C3%95%C3%91&dchild=1&keywords=khaled+nezzar&qid=1632921332&qsid=257-5069052-1026663&sr=8-3&sres=9947392589%2C2866007964%2C291272807X%2C2866008359%2C2915161011%2C9947393224%2C9961633946%2C1243186356%2C1980727996%2CB07XVQ469Z%2C2707139009%2C2707171506%2CB01BW4C7ZI%2C2842721594%2CB0047UJZ0U%2CB0047TMXX2%2C9947886581%2C9961634586%2C9947393488%2C9947212017"><em>Algérie, le Sultanat de Bouteflika</em></a>. </p>
<p>A year later Algerian journalist Mohamed Benchicou published a <a href="https://www.amazon.fr/Bouteflika-imposture-alg%C3%A9rienne-Mohamed-Benchicou/dp/2864772086/ref=sr_1_1?__mk_fr_FR=%C3%85M%C3%85%C5%BD%C3%95%C3%91&crid=2QZSID52O9427&dchild=1&keywords=bouteflika+une+imposture+algerienne&qid=1632920617&qsid=257-5069052-1026663&sprefix=bouteflika%2C+une+im%2Caps%2C227&sr=8-1&sres=2864772086%2C2268103188%2CB085V9QN1F%2C2266204939%2CB0862DPW5C%2CB07NJCHFYZ&srpt=ABIS_BOOK">book</a> in which he gave a blow-by-blow account of why he believed the president was a sham. </p>
<p>This echoed the views of credible former veteran leaders who were of the view that he had played an insignificant role in the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ko7GMxQsdKE">war of independence</a>. </p>
<p>Bouteflika’s supporters presented a very different picture, referring to him as the great Mujahid and compared to the <a href="https://www.elmoudjahid.dz/fr/nation/abdelaziz-bouteflika-inhume-au-carre-des-martyrs-du-cimetiere-el-alia-l-adieu-a-un-moudjahid-15179">great revolutionaries</a> who fought colonial France, a reference that helped him legitimise his rule and those who <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Politics-of-Algeria-Domestic-Issues-and-International-Relations/Zoubir/p/book/9781138331006">usurped</a> the revolutionary credentials for their personal gains. </p>
<h2>The early years</h2>
<p>In 1963 Algeria’s foreign minister Mohamed Khemisti was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1963/05/06/archives/khemisti-is-dead-of-bullet-wound-algerian-foreign-minister-shot-by.html">assassinated</a> by an allegedly mentally unstable individual. Bouteflika, who was serving as minister of youth and sports, became the foreign minister – the youngest foreign minister in the world at age 26. He held the position until 1979. </p>
<p>He owed his position to Boumediene his mentor, who also protected him. </p>
<p>During the first term of his presidency, Bouteflika was able to redress Algeria’s image overseas; a great orator, his speeches at international forums, such as Davos, were well received. The events of <a href="https://www.911memorial.org/911-faqs">9/11</a> offered him the opportunity to position Algeria as a credible partner in the fight against terrorism. </p>
<p>But, while he mended relations with Western powers, he totally neglected relations with sub-Saharan Africa. This did a disservice to Algeria, which had begun losing the capital it had accumulated on the continent since the war of independence. Given that he believed that foreign policy was his reserved domain, no one could challenge his views. </p>
<p>During Bouteflika’s first several years in office, Algeria benefited from <a href="https://www.diploweb.com/Algerie-les-illusions-de-la.html">increased wealth</a>. </p>
<p>Two major drivers of this had nothing to do with him – a <a href="http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=699041253&Country=Algeria&topic=Economy&subtopic=Fo_3">significant increase</a> in oil revenues and abundant rain. </p>
<p>But he didn’t capitalise on this boon and failed to act on promises he had made. These included reforming schools, universities, justice, the country’s administration and the banking system.</p>
<h2>The middle and the end</h2>
<p>Bouteflika <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/04/02/les-mille-et-une-vies-politiques-d-abdelaziz-bouteflika_5444690_3212.html">claimed </a> that he needed a second term to carry out the purported reforms. But he didn’t use his second term, which started in 2004, well either. Instead of developing the country he spent it consolidating his power and undoing the limited democratic advances that Algeria had made since <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/25/world/algeria-approves-new-constitution.html">introducing</a> a multiparty system and freedom of the press in 1989. </p>
<p>He did this by putting in place a system in which institutions served a few individuals, including members of his family, loyal to him. </p>
<p>In the absence of a genuine, productive economy, Bouteflika’s Algeria depended exclusively on <a href="https://www.alternatives-economiques.fr/lalgerie-malade-de-petrole/00088704">rent from oil</a>, which was redistributed to co-opt clients. In turn, this engendered endemic corruption never witnessed before in Algeria. </p>
<p>The Bouteflika regime isolated opposition parties, except for three. But these could barely be described as opposition parties. The so-called “presidential coalition” was made up of the old single <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Liberation-Front-political-party-Algeria">ruling party FLN</a>, its twin brother <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Democratic-Rally">the RND</a> that had been created in 1997 to provide <a href="https://plus.lesoir.be//art/apres-l-adoption-de-nouvelles-lois-electorales-algerie-_t-19970222-Z0DCF0.html">Liamine Zeroual</a> with a popular base, and the <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/algeria-s-largest-islamic-party-eyes-national-unity-gov-t/2266857">Islamist party, MSP</a>. </p>
<p>In 2008, Bouteflika, not content with the two mandates, decided to amend the Constitution to lift the two-term limit and prepare the ground for his <a href="https://merip.org/2009/04/introducing-algerias-president-for-life/">presidency for life</a>. </p>
<p>Five years later, though unable to communicate and confined due to the second stroke he had suffered, Bouteflika, or rather his entourage, sought a fifth term so he could rule until death. </p>
<p>In the last seven years of his presidency, Algeria gave the impression of a ship without a captain. The president was rarely seen in public and when he was, he looked pitiful. His cronies wanted the sultan to be seen, albeit rarely, so they could justify the extension of his rule and to maintain their privileges and the dilapidation of the country’s resources. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/algeria/2016-02-09/algeria-after-arab-sprin">drop in the oil price</a> and the pauperisation of large segments of society infuriated Algerians. But what triggered in 2019 the protest movement against the fifth term was the degree of humiliation they suffered seeing their president being mocked on <a href="https://www.algerie360.com/video-une-nouvelle-fois-la-chaine-francaise-tf1-se-moque-de-bouteflika/">foreign TV stations</a> and <a href="https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/la-diffusion-d-une-photo-de-bouteflika-relance-le-debat-sur-sa-succession_1783542.html">paraded</a> nearly paralysed to prove he was alive. </p>
<p>Algerians were also inflamed seeing the president becoming the subject of idolatry by his followers. The adoration resembled pagan practices, an offence in an Islamic society. </p>
<p>Clearly, Bouteflika had created <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/opinionfr/algerie-incroyables-moeurs-republique-bouteflika-corruption">new mores</a> which Algeria will have difficulty discarding for years to come. His legacy will haunt Algerians for many years. No wonder his death on September 17 went unnoticed. As a citizen <a href="https://www.operanewsapp.com/fr/fr/share/detail?news_id=dfa5b13716e58cf22d0d4ddb21a1041a&news_entry_id=783ee58210919fr_fr&open_type=transcoded&from=newseu&request_id=share_request">put it </a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This funeral is a non-event. Around me, nobody is talking about it anyway. It is as if it were the death of a simple person, who was never president. Algerians give the impression of having forgotten Bouteflika, of having turned the page of his reign.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169045/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yahia H. Zoubir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Bouteflica’s two decades in power were the most damaging Algeria had experienced since independence from France in 1962.Yahia H. Zoubir, Visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center and Senior Professor of International Studies and Director of Research in Geopolitics, Kedge Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1673132021-09-12T08:22:29Z2021-09-12T08:22:29ZWhy Algeria cut diplomatic ties with Morocco: and implications for the future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420075/original/file-20210908-25-1s4hkj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Moroccan foreign minister Nasser Bourita (R) welcomes his Israeli counterpart Yair Lapidis to Rabat, in August 2021.
The normalisation of relations between the two precipitated the breakup of Moroccan-Algerian diplomatic ties. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Alal Morchidi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The breakup of diplomatic relations between Algeria and Morocco <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/algeria-says-cutting-diplomatic-ties-with-morocco-2021-08-24/#:%7E:text=Speaking%20at%20a%20news%20conference,on%20the%20Western%20Sahara%20issue">in August</a> is the product of a long history of tension. The two nations have never had long periods of friendship, notwithstanding the many factors that bring them together. Indeed, they belong to the same <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/report-regional-integration-maghreb-2019-challenges-and-opportunities-private-sector-synthesis">Maghreb region</a>, share the same religion (Sunni Islam and Maleki rite) and identity, and speak a similar dialect. They also share a <a href="https://artsandculture.google.com/entity/algeria%E2%80%93morocco-border/g1229dss0?hl=en">1,550km common border</a>.</p>
<p>In fact, Algerian and Moroccan people are so close that it is difficult to distinguish them. But, historical, political and ideological dissimilarities since their respective independence weigh heavily in the relations between these “brotherly” countries. </p>
<p>How can one account for the tensions that have characterised their relations, which have now gone through a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1169bh2">second breakup in diplomatic relations</a>? The first, initiated by Morocco, was from 1976 to 1988.</p>
<p>I have researched relations between Algeria and Morocco for more than 40 years and published studies on the topic. Relations between the Algerian and Moroccan governments have seldom been cordial. This is due to the different nature of their anti-colonial struggle, their dissimilar political systems, and opposite ideological orientations. </p>
<p>In the last decade, Morocco exploited the lethargy of Algeria’s diplomacy and the paralysis of the political system to advance its interests, often to the detriment of Algeria. The reawakening of Algeria’s diplomacy and its decision to counter what it considers Morocco’s “hostile acts” resulted in the latest breakup.</p>
<p>Their tumultuous relationship has been an impediment to the integration of the region, which could bring sizeable benefits to both. Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia founded the <a href="https://maghrebarabe.org/fr/union-du-maghreb-arabe/">Arab Maghreb Union in 1989</a>. But since 1996, the union has become moribund due to repeated tensions in Moroccan-Algerian relations.</p>
<p>The divergences of recent years are potentially far more consequential. They could threaten the stability of the whole North Africa region.</p>
<h2>History of Algerian-Moroccan relations</h2>
<p>Algerian nationalists had relatively good relations with <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-relations-internationales-2011-2-page-77.htm.">King Mohammed V of Morocco</a> He died in 1961, one year before Algeria gained its sovereignty. Morocco became independent <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2020/11/326269/morocco-celebrates-64-years-of-independence-from-european-colonizers">in 1956</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Algerian-War">Algeria</a> in 1962. </p>
<p>King Mohammed’s son, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hassan-II">King Hassan II</a>, who succeeded him, made claims over Algerian territory. He invaded the country <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-21026-8_19">in 1963</a>. This resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Algeria’s ill-equipped fighters.</p>
<p>Although short, this war shaped the minds of the Algerian military-political establishment. There was an era of cooperation between 1969 and the mid-1970s. But the conflict in Western Sahara, invaded by Morocco under the so-called Green March <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/magazine-34667782">in 1975</a>, resulted in another era of tensions.</p>
<p>Indeed, in March 1976, Algeria’s recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, proclaimed by the Sahrawi nationalist movement, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Polisario-Front">Polisario Front</a>, saw Morocco break diplomatic relations with Algeria. Many other African countries recognised the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Relations were restored <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14123260">in May 1988</a>. </p>
<p>The renewal of relations was based <a href="https://www.tsa-algerie.com/rupture-des-relations-avec-le-maroc-le-texte-integral-de-la-declaration-de-lamamra/">on a number of agreements</a>. These were:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>a commitment to enduring relations of peace </p></li>
<li><p>good neighbourliness and cooperation</p></li>
<li><p>hastening the building of the Great Arab Maghreb</p></li>
<li><p>Algeria’s noninterference in Morocco’s domestic affairs </p></li>
<li><p>solving the Western Sahara conflict through a referendum on self-determination. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>From Algeria’s perspective, Morocco has reneged on all of them. </p>
<p>In the background, there has been a continuous buildup of Algerian-Moroccan tensions.</p>
<h2>Growing tensions</h2>
<p>In the 1990s, Algeria underwent a bigger crisis than it had ever known. The country was <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/remembering-algeria-1992-first-arab-spring-never-became-summer">devastated</a> by civil strife opposing the state, and armed Islamist groups. In 1994, in the midst of that crisis, Moroccan authorities <a href="https://en.yabiladi.com/articles/details/56799/attack-hotel-asni-marrakech-straw.html">falsely accused Algerian intelligence</a> of being behind the deadly terrorist attacks at the Asni hotel in Marrakech.</p>
<p>Morocco imposed visas on Algerians, including those holding another citizenship. Algeria retaliated in imposing visas and closed its land borders with Morocco. In late 1995, Morocco froze the institutions of the Arab Maghreb Union due to Algeria’s support for the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.</p>
<p>A shift in relations seemed to have occurred when <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14118854">Abdelaziz Bouteflika</a> became president of Algeria in April in 1999. He planned on meeting King Hassan II to iron out differences. But the king died in July that year. His successor <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1559304">Mohammed VI</a> showed no inclination for a resolution of Western Sahara under United Nations terms.</p>
<p>Amazingly, during his presidency, Bouteflika not only neglected the question of Western Sahara, he also instructed officials not to respond to any Moroccan hostile actions.</p>
<p>Following his <a href="https://theconversation.com/bouteflika-steps-aside-as-algerians-push-to-reclaim-and-own-their-history-114380">forcible removal in April 2019</a>, Algeria reiterated its support for the principle of self-determination. </p>
<p>For its part, Morocco had been lobbying the <a href="https://au.int/en">African Union</a>, Europe and the US for support for its claims of sovereignty over Western Sahara. Two events in the last 10 months escalated tensions. The first was an attack on Sahrawi demonstrators <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/world/middleeast/morocco-military-operation-western-sahara.html">in El-Guergarat</a>, the buffer zone in the south of Western Sahara, by Moroccan troops. Then there was <a href="https://www.undispatch.com/western-sahara-conflict-upended-by-a-trump-tweet/">a tweet from President Donald Trump</a> announcing US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in Western Sahara.</p>
<p>These constituted part of Algeria’s decision to break up diplomatic relations with Morocco. </p>
<p>Trump had traded Moroccan occupied Western Sahara in exchange for <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Joint-Declaration-US-Morrocco-Israel.pdf">Morocco normalising relations with Israel</a>. Other Arab states did the same thing in the framework of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a> brokered by Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner. </p>
<p>Before the Abraham Accords, Moroccan officials displayed relentless hostility toward Algeria to which the Algerian government did not respond. Trump’s tweet on <a href="https://twitter.com/ap/status/1337069459551506432?lang=en">10 December</a> seemed to galvanise Morocco’s hostile attitude toward Algeria. </p>
<p>Algeria perceived both decisions as a real threat to its national security. </p>
<p>Algiers’ threshold of tolerance against acts it considered hostile came <a href="https://fr.sputniknews.com/amp/international/202107191045896006-soutien-marocain-aux-separatistes-kabyles-le-debut-dune-dangereuse-escalade-entre-alger-et-rabat/">in mid-July</a> when Morocco’s ambassador to the UN distributed a note expressing support for a group fighting for the secession of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24042103">Kabyle coastal region of Algeria</a>. The group is listed as a terrorist group by Algeria. This resulted in Algeria recalling its ambassador in Morocco for “consultations” and <a href="http://www.mae.gov.dz/news_article/6594.aspx">asking Morocco to clarify</a> whether this was the ambassador’s sole decision or the government’s. It never received a response. </p>
<p>Another hostile act in the eyes of Algeria was a <a href="https://www.afrik.com/pegasus-plus-de-6000-algeriens-espionnes-par-le-maroc-dont-lamamra">vast spying scandal</a> revealed by a consortium of international newspapers and human rights organisations. They found that Morocco had targeted more than 6,000 Algerians, including many senior political and military officials.</p>
<p>Algeria decided to break diplomatic relations with Morocco as of 24 August.</p>
<h2>Implications of the breakup</h2>
<p>The breakup may result in geopolitical realignments. But all will depend on whether Morocco will escalate tensions and use the Israeli card against Algeria, or whether it will seek to reduce tensions. </p>
<p>Algeria has already begun strengthening its control at the Algerian Moroccan border. It could create serious problems for Morocco if it decided to expel the tens of thousands of Moroccans (many of whom are illegal migrants) from Algeria. </p>
<p>There are wider implications too.</p>
<p>The breakup has marked the death knell of the Arab Maghreb Union, which was already dormant. The strained relations will either mean the regional grouping remains at a standstill or a new grouping might emerge.</p>
<p>And the rivalries between Algeria and Morocco can be expected to intensify at the African Union over <a href="https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/The-Admission-of-Israel-as-an-Observer-in-the-African-Union.aspx">Israel’s observer status at the AU</a>, and over Western Sahara. </p>
<p>In the economic realm, the Algerian energy minister announced in late August that the contract for the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline (GME), which goes through Morocco, will not be renewed after it <a href="https://www.algeriepatriotique.com/2021/08/26/lalgerie-ne-renouvellera-pas-le-contrat-du-gazoduc-traversant-le-maroc/">expires on 31 October 2021</a>. The decision has now <a href="https://www.olcnbvc4jz.com/renouvellement-du-gazoduc-maghreb-europe-lalgerie-a-tranche/">been confirmed</a>. The pipeline goes directly from northwest Algeria and then crosses Mediterranean.</p>
<p>Instead, Algeria will distribute natural gas to Spain and Portugal via the pipeline, MEDGAZ.</p>
<p>The term impact of this breakup is unpredictable. What’s certain, however, is that Algerian-Moroccan rivalry will intensify.</p>
<p><em>The views and opinions expressed in the article are the sole responsibility of the author and are not endorsed by Business Kedge School or those of the Brookings Doha Centre.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167313/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yahia H. Zoubir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the last decade, Morocco exploited the lethargy of Algeria’s diplomacy and the paralysis of the political system to advance its interests, often to the detriment of AlgeriaYahia H. Zoubir, Visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center and Senior Professor of International Studies and Director of Research in Geopolitics, Kedge Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1411582020-08-03T14:58:13Z2020-08-03T14:58:13ZFootball and politics: when Algeria won the 2019 Africa Cup of Nations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350476/original/file-20200730-17-8i069g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">ISLAM SAFWAT/NurPhoto/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>With African football on hold and the Africa Cup of Nations (Afcon) <a href="https://www.cafonline.com/news-center/news/decisions-of-caf-executive-meeting-30-june-2020">rescheduled</a> because of the COVID-19 pandemic, there’s plenty of nostalgia to go around. But memories of the Algeria’s biggest football wins can offer more than just nostalgia. The 2019 Afcon win in Egypt also offers insights into how governments co-opt the game.</p>
<p>Algeria’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2010/jun/13/1982-world-cup-algeria">victory</a> against West Germany in the 1982 FIFA World Cup, still in Algeria’s post-<a href="https://africasacountry.com/2017/05/the-past-flows-into-the-future">independence</a>, was an iconic moment. As was their first Afcon win in <a href="https://africanfootball.com/tournament/84/1990-Africa-Cup-of-Nations">1990</a> in Algiers.</p>
<p>A decade later the country entered one of its darkest times since independence. Under Abdelaziz Bouteflika – who would serve as president for <a href="https://theconversation.com/bouteflika-steps-aside-as-algerians-push-to-reclaim-and-own-their-history-114380">20 years</a> from 1999. Political violence caused the deaths of thousands and deeply affected Algerian society.</p>
<p>The 2019 Afcon trophy would be lifted 29 years after the first. This game, in Egypt, is especially worth recalling because of the political circumstances surrounding it. All the elements of a Greek tragedy were in place that day.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/bouteflika-steps-aside-as-algerians-push-to-reclaim-and-own-their-history-114380">Bouteflika steps aside as Algerians push to reclaim and own their history</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>On the streets</h2>
<p>On Friday 22 February 2019, after a campaign on social media following the announcement by the ruling National Liberation Front that an ailing Bouteflika would stand for a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/algeria-bouteflika-confirms-presidential-run-term-190210155112057.html">fifth term</a>, hundred of thousands of demonstrators took to the street to express their discontent. The prospect of enduring another five years of Bouteflikism was too dire.</p>
<p>Since then, every Tuesday for students, and every Friday after the prayer, Algerians of all ages and regions have <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-after-one-year-protests-continue-to-rock-algeria-133238">returned</a> to the streets. The peaceful protesters want real change, including the end of the army-backed establishment that has ruled since independence in 1962. On March 8, Women’s Day, the number of demonstrators, men and women of different age and class in the <em>hirak</em> (the Arabic word for “movement”), reached an unprecedented level. </p>
<p>The army, led by General Major Gaïd Salah, Minister of Defense, pushed for Bouteflika’s resignation and the postponement of the election. This led to the disintegration of Bouteflika’s high profile entourage, called the <em>essaba</em> (gang), who accumulated colossal fortunes in exchange for financially backing political manoeuvres to maintain Bouteflika’s regime.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350479/original/file-20200730-19-iyrbno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350479/original/file-20200730-19-iyrbno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350479/original/file-20200730-19-iyrbno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350479/original/file-20200730-19-iyrbno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350479/original/file-20200730-19-iyrbno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350479/original/file-20200730-19-iyrbno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350479/original/file-20200730-19-iyrbno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350479/original/file-20200730-19-iyrbno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators in Algiers in October 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mustafa Hassona/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>In the stadia</h2>
<p>This money was also used to co-opt sport, football in particular. Each election, photos of Bouteflika would adorn football stadia and be displayed at the opening of matches. It was not unusual for club bosses and former players to be seen at political rallies for Bouteflika, who famously claimed during a 2009 <a href="http://www.dzfoot.com/video/bouteflika-lalgerie-peut-accueillir-deux-coupes-du-monde-avril-2009-x2lei7b">speech</a> that Algeria “has the means to organise two football World Cups”.</p>
<p>One example of this interplay between football, business and politics is a long-time backer of Bouteflika, construction magnate Ali Haddad, who purchased the football club USM Alger in 2010 and became its president. Interestingly, the club’s <a href="https://repository.lboro.ac.uk/articles/Football_sub-culture_and_youth_politics_in_Algeria/9625070">fans</a> continued with their chanting attacks on the symbols of Bouteflika’s privileged class or “<em>les nouveaux riches</em>” who controlled the networks of politics, media and business in Algeria.</p>
<p>Football fans have been active in the hirak from the beginning, and their politicised football chants have been embraced as an expression of popular resentment with political systems and socio-economic conditions.</p>
<p>Following on the heels of Bouteflika’s resignation amid massive protests and the nomination of a caretaker president, the <a href="https://www.cafonline.com/total-africa-cup-of-nations/">2019</a> Africa Cup of Nations came in the right time. It was for the new decision makers, led by General Salah, an opportunity to reconcile with the population and rebrand the new ruling elite as guarantors of stability and the fight against corruption. </p>
<p>For the Algerian national football team, after years of instability and management changes, it was another opportunity to reconcile with supporters at home and among the large Algerian diaspora in Europe and in North America.</p>
<h2>On the Afcon field</h2>
<p>In 2014, Algeria experienced its first time in a knockout round at the FIFA World Cup. But when Djamel Belmadi <a href="https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/45035424#:%7E:text=Algeria%20appoint%20former%20international%20Djamel%20Belmadi%20as%20new%20coach,-By%20Maher%20Mezahi&text=Djamel%20Belmadi%20led%20Al%2DDuhail,agreed%20a%20four%2Dyear%20deal.">was appointed</a> as new coach in August 2018, the team had plunged into a crisis of confidence. Results were absent and critics were present and acerbic. So when Belmadi announced that Algeria would go to Egypt to lift the cup, few took him seriously.</p>
<p>The tournament was being played in Egypt, one of the favourites for the title. For Algeria, Egypt was a rather hostile sporting environment. The two countries had been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2009/oct/10/egypt-algeria-repeat-hate-match">football</a> <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8369983.stm">foes</a> for decades – and at political loggerheads over the Libyan conflict – and the animosity was tangible. The hostility continued especially after Egypt failed to reach the second qualifying round. Yet opposition to Algeria’s opponents in the final, Senegal, was also <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2019/07/sport-history-and-politics-at-the-african-cup-of-nations">great</a>.</p>
<p>With the logistic support of the army, the new Algerian leadership organised the airlifting of Algerian supporters from different regions of the country into Egypt, even offering them free tickets once in Cairo.</p>
<p>In the stadium Algerian fans cheered a team that was “<a href="https://www.newframe.com/what-does-an-afcon-final-mean-to-algeria/">reborn alongside the hirak</a>”.</p>
<h2>Back on the streets</h2>
<p>And so the celebrations of Algeria’s second Afcon cup happened in a unique context. They extended to the Algerian community around the world, in Europe, Canada and the US, and in France in particular. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350478/original/file-20200730-27-ltf7xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350478/original/file-20200730-27-ltf7xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350478/original/file-20200730-27-ltf7xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350478/original/file-20200730-27-ltf7xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350478/original/file-20200730-27-ltf7xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350478/original/file-20200730-27-ltf7xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350478/original/file-20200730-27-ltf7xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350478/original/file-20200730-27-ltf7xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Algeria’s supporters in France celebrate after Algeria beat Senegal 1-0 in the final.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Estelle Ruiz/NurPhoto/Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And, as always, raising the Algerian flag in French cities fuelled the debate on French identity and the question of alliance with Algeria’s former colonisers. </p>
<p>Algeria’s captain Ryad Mahrez, after scoring a winning free kick against Nigeria to qualify for the final, had <a href="https://twitter.com/Mahrez22/status/1150536510640406528">tweeted</a> “the free kick was for you, we are together” with Algerian and French flag emojis. There were a number of French-Algerian dual nationals on the team. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1150536510640406528"}"></div></p>
<p>The tweet was in <a href="https://www.essentiallysports.com/riyad-mahrez-silences-french-politician-following-afcon-heroics/">response</a> to a far-right tweet “to avoid the tide of Algerian flags, to preserve our national holiday … Trust the 11 Nigerian players.” </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1150117079045066752"}"></div></p>
<p>You could also <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190720-algeria-afcon-title-sparks-street-parties-across-france-football">read</a> how around 2,500 police officers had been mobilised in Paris to “prevent street clashes”. The situation led French-Algerian coach Belmadi to urge Algerian supporters in France to celebrate in an “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190719-africa-cup-nations-algeria-football-coach-belmadi-fans-france-celebrations-orderly">orderly</a>” way – a reference to the peaceful and orderly hirak protests. </p>
<p>A number of supporters were nonetheless <a href="https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2019/7/15/hundreds-detained-in-france-riots-following-algerian-afcon-win">arrested</a> after clashes with police. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-after-one-year-protests-continue-to-rock-algeria-133238">Why, after one year, protests continue to rock Algeria</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Looking back, the 2019 Afcon win underscores how the Algerian regime has long understood how to mobilise the national football team victories for its own agenda. But the regime is also now very aware of the liberty football can bring. </p>
<p>For years young Algerians have understood that stadiums are the ideal venue to freely voice their socio-political and economic discontent. These football chants and slogans reached their zenith when they were eventually repeated by thousands every Friday during hirak marches.</p>
<p><em>Abdelkader Abderrahmane contributed to this article. He is a geopolitical researcher and international consultant on African peace and security issues.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141158/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahfoud Amara does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Algerian regime has long understood how to mobilise the national football team’s victories for a political agenda.Mahfoud Amara, Associate Professor in Sport Policy & Management, Qatar UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1332382020-03-12T14:02:07Z2020-03-12T14:02:07ZWhy, after one year, protests continue to rock Algeria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319611/original/file-20200310-61107-1vou9vq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Algerian protesters wave the national flag during a demonstration in the capital Algiers.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Ryad Kramdi/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>There have been weekly peaceful protests in Algeria <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/algeria-protests-hirak-one-year-anniversary">for the past year</a>. Early last year protests demanding political transformation, led to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47795108">the removal by the military</a> of veteran leader, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Elections were held, and a new president - Abdelmadjid Tebboune - was voted in. But the protests continue. Zoubir Yahia explains why.</em></p>
<p><strong>What are the grievances that led to the start of the protests last year?</strong></p>
<p>The protests were ignited by a combination of things. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/books/the-politics-of-algeria-domestic-issues-and-international-relations/">Under</a> Abdelaziz Bouteflika - who served as President of Algeria for 20 years, from 1999 to his forced resignation in 2019 - the country <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/01/15/can-algeria-overcome-its-long-lasting-political-crisis/">suffered from</a> corruption, nepotism and many of its resources were dilapidated. </p>
<p>Despite this, Bouteflika’s party pushed him to run for a fifth term, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47456114">even though</a> he was aged 82 at the time and in extremely poor health. His cronies were keen to keep power and preserve the privileges they’d acquired.</p>
<p>But the general public wasn’t blind to what was happening. The president had suffered a stroke in 2013 and the very few times he appeared in public, he looked very frail. When it was announced that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/bouteflika-confirms-bid-term-ongoing-protests-190303193608358.html">he would be</a> running for a fifth term in February 2019, he wasn’t even able to register his candidacy in person.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/protests-grow-algeria-aging-leader-eyes-5th-term">Algerians felt</a> he was no longer fit to rule, were fed up with the political status quo, were humiliated and <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/759110/politique/algerie-histoire-secrete-de-la-revolution-qui-it">felt pity</a> for the ageing leader as it seemed like he was <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/a-fifth-presidential-term-for-bouteflika">pushed</a> into this fifth term. They <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/04/10/why-algerias-army-abandoned-bouteflika/">poured onto</a> the streets to demand he not serve another term and be removed from office. As a result, on 2 April 2019, the military removed Bouteflika from office. </p>
<p><strong>Why are the protests still happening?</strong></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2019/12/algeria-hirak-protests/">“<em>Hirak</em>”</a>, as the leaderless movement in Algeria is known, continues because grievances haven’t been addressed. Although there are many different people - of all ages and gender - that take part in the weekly marches, the massive movement is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47927296">dominated</a> by young people. </p>
<p>In Algeria, 70% of the population <a href="https://www.youthpolicy.org/factsheets/country/algeria/">is below</a> the age of 30. Many of these young people feel like they don’t have a future in the country because of a lack of work - <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/algeria-economy/algeria-blighted-by-youth-unemployment-despite-recovering-oil-prices-idUSL5N1VY41A">more than</a> one in four Algerians under the age of 30 are unemployed. </p>
<p>Algeria is a rich country. <a href="https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=Algeria-Oil-and-Gas-Hydrocarbons">It has</a> huge natural gas reserves and is the sixth-largest gas exporter in the world. It also globally ranks 16th in proven oil reserves and third in shale gas reserves. But this wealth is controlled by the regime and the oligarchs, <a href="https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/algeria/">who benefit</a> from government contracts. For instance, the state-owned national oil company - Sonatrach - <a href="https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=Algeria-Oil-and-Gas-Hydrocarbons">owns roughly</a> 80% of total hydrocarbon production and generates more than 90% of the country’s foreign earnings. </p>
<p>In 2014, Algeria had <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/countingthecost/2019/03/algeria-economy-money-190323072227306.html">currency reserves</a> of $179 billion. But oil prices have been falling and the country’s oil and petroleum production has also been in decline due to a lack of investment. The reserves have now <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/countingthecost/2019/03/algeria-economy-money-190323072227306.html">shrunk to</a> about $79.8billion. Bouteflika’s government <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/algeria/2016-02-09/algeria-after-arab-spring">failed to</a> use the wealth generated from these resources to diversify the economy. This would have created jobs for the country’s young people.</p>
<p>In December 2019, Algeria’s Former Prime Minister - Abdelmadjid Tebboune - <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/abdelmadjid-tebboune-algeria-president-191213161923647.html">was elected</a> as the country’s new president. But this was a contentious election denounced by the protesters. </p>
<p>Though Bouteflika had stepped down, the political class <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/countingthecost/2019/03/algeria-economy-money-190323072227306.html">that served</a> his regime is still in power. Tebboune is a close ally of Bouteflika’s, having served as a minister and prime minister in his regime. His government is made up mostly of ministers that served under Bouteflika. </p>
<p>The same authoritatian-style system, <a href="https://www.iris-france.org/140130-who-rules-algeria-right-now-an-analysis-on-the-current-state-of-state-power-and-how-it-is-changing-after-the-ousting-of-president-bouteflika/">that relies</a> on the military and intelligence services - and was instituted at independence in 1962 - is also still in place. Algeria does have a parliament, but <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/11/hirak-protests-algeria-presidential-election-save-democracy/">this is a façade</a> for the regime to claim that the country has a democratic system. </p>
<p>In addition to this, civil liberties – such as the freedom of expression, right of assembly, and freedom of the press – are still curtailed, and opposition leaders are being <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/algeria-opposition-parties-discuss-ways-challenge-bouteflika-190308070649829.html">suppressed</a>. </p>
<p>The protesters have made clear that they no longer accept cosmetic changes, but the regime <a href="https://www.tsa-algerie.com/face-a-la-crise-djerad-appelle-a-attenuer-l-occupation-excessive-de-la-voie-publique/">doesn’t appear</a> to be moving towards genuine democratisation despite the rhetoric. </p>
<p>For instance, <a href="http://www.aps.dz/algerie/99890-president-tebboune-la-constitution-amendee-sera-soumise-a-un-referendum-populaire">Tebboune’s government tabled an intiative</a> to revise the constitution and fight corruption. But it fails to resolve the main issue: the same deputies who approved Bouteflika’s tailor-made constitution - which <a href="https://merip.org/2009/04/introducing-algerias-president-for-life/">allowed him</a> to remain in power by removing the two-term limit - are still making decisions in parliament and will thus be called in to approve it. </p>
<p>Algerians now seem determined to continue protesting unless there are more fundamental political changes. </p>
<p><strong>What needs to happen for the situation to improve?</strong></p>
<p>It probably won’t improve until authorities undertake genuine changes. But because there are too many entrenched political and business interests against change, I think that only continued pressure from the <em>hirak</em> and a crumbling economy will work.</p>
<p>There needs to be a total transformation. A new constitution approved by the people should be brought in, corrupt rulers must be removed from office (and stand trial), parliament must be dissolved and true reformers should be brought on board to effect actual change. </p>
<p>These reforms include serious economic reforms that support the country’s young people and a new constitution that makes it difficult for any future presidents to over stay their time in office. </p>
<p>In addition to this, electoral laws must be revised and take into account authentic democratic principles such as free and fair elections, genuinely independent political parties, political participation, and freedom of expression. </p>
<p>Until these core reforms happen, the crisis will endure. Algerians will continue fighting for a new republic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/133238/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yahia H. Zoubir is affiliated as Visiting Fellow with Brookings Doha Center . </span></em></p>They protest to have a sound economic system based on healthy competition and free enterprise.Yahia H. Zoubir, Visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center and Senior Professor of International Studies and Director of Research in Geopolitics, Kedge Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1163152019-05-05T07:34:43Z2019-05-05T07:34:43ZPopular protests pose a conundrum for the AU’s opposition to coups<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/272187/original/file-20190502-103075-ttyu2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Unyielding protesters put an end to Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir's 26-year old authoritarian rule. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sudan’s President Omar al Bashir was overthrown in April following months of incessant countrywide protests. Less than two weeks earlier, protesters forced Algeria’s long-time President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/02/algeria-latest-news-president-abdelaziz-bouteflika-resigns">step down</a>. </p>
<p>The ultimate push in both instances came from the army. </p>
<p>The crucial distinction is that the involvement of the army in Algeria was very <a href="https://www.apnews.com/20f0eaa9a1a24d6db435b32acb459583">subtle</a>, with the head of the army suggesting that Bouteflika should step down. In contrast, the Sudanese army threw the decisive punch that abruptly ended al-Bashir’s regime. </p>
<p>In this sense, the role of the Sudanese military may be more appropriately compared with the situation in Zimbabwe when the army’s involvement led to the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">resignation</a> of Robert Mugabe in November 2017. It is also similar to the coup that toppled Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Compaore in November 2014 which also followed days of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/31/burkina-faso-president-blaise-compaore-ousted-says-army">protests</a>.</p>
<p>Nineteen years ago the African Union (AU) adopted a declaration that rejected “unconstitutional changes of government” (known as the <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/lomedec.htm">Lome Declaration</a>. The policy was followed by the <a href="http://www.achpr.org/instruments/charter-democracy/">African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance</a>, which formalised the rules.</p>
<p>But the tail-end involvement of the military after intensive and popular protests raises questions about how this should be applied. While there have been some hiccups and inconsistencies, the rule has allowed the AU to reject coups d’état and suspend governments from its membership. But the recent round of popular protests that finally led to the toppling of authoritarian presidents is a reminder of the conundrum the AU faces.</p>
<h2>Gaps</h2>
<p>Gaps emerged with the intervention of the Egyptian military in the removal of President Mohammad Morsi <a href="https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/456743-world-leaders-ditched-by-army-amid-popular-revolts">in 2012</a> following days of extensive popular protests. The intervention of the military was the decisive last step that ended Morsi’s rule.</p>
<p>The AU labelled the events a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-protests-africa/african-union-suspends-egypt-idUSBRE9640EP20130705">coup</a> and condemned the military. It demanded a return to civilian rule. Egypt was also suspended from AU membership. </p>
<p>In 2014 the leader of the coup, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, ran for the presidency and won. This went against the AU rule that coup leaders be <a href="http://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/1143/Assembly%20AU%20Dec%20269%20%28XIV%29%20_E.PDF?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">banned from occupying political positions</a>. </p>
<p>In the end the AU blinked, and later that year Egypt’s membership was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/07/egypt-vs-african-union-mutually-u-2014714687899839.html">reinstated</a>. It even went one step further, allowing Sisi to take over as the rotational <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/egypt-sisi-takes-head-african-union-190210140131428.html">head of the AU</a> in 2019.</p>
<p>The events in Egypt and the subsequent AU response underscored the unique dilemma that a combination of popular protests and military intervention pose for the continental body’s policy against coups. </p>
<p>A 2014 report from an <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/final-report-of-the-african-union-high-level-panel-for-egypt">AU High Level Panel</a> considered the compatibility of popular uprisings with the AU’s framework against unconstitutional changes of government.</p>
<p>The report said that a necessary condition for the removal of government to not constitute a coup was that the military shouldn’t be involved. The other criteria were that the protests be popular and peaceful. </p>
<p>But the report was never formally adopted by the AU. This means that it doesn’t have a definitive policy on the issue.</p>
<h2>Confusion in the ranks</h2>
<p>Two other instances point to a lack of clarity on the AU’s part – Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>When President Blaise Compaore fled Burkina Faso in November 2014, the military took advantage of the political vacuum and arrogated power. The AU <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burkina-politics/burkina-faso-opposition-parties-african-union-reject-army-takeover-idUSKBN0IJ0NZ20141101">rejected</a> the military takeover and demanded the establishment of a civilian authority. </p>
<p>The military was given two weeks to ensure a civilian-led transition, which it honoured. One of the military leaders was then named prime minster. </p>
<p>The AU’s response to events in Zimbabwe was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/african-union-wrong-zimbabwe-171204125847859.html">confused</a>. The country was never suspended from AU membership. And the army general who led the military intervention <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/zimbabwe-military-power-grows-as-general-promoted-to-vice-president-1514038547">subsequently became vice-president</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/272194/original/file-20190502-103049-1q99x6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/272194/original/file-20190502-103049-1q99x6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272194/original/file-20190502-103049-1q99x6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272194/original/file-20190502-103049-1q99x6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272194/original/file-20190502-103049-1q99x6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272194/original/file-20190502-103049-1q99x6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272194/original/file-20190502-103049-1q99x6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former President Robert Mugabe, in power for 37 years, was forced to resign following a ‘soft coup’ in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The events in Sudan have created another troubling scenario for the AU. The chairperson of the AU Commission <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20190411/statement-chairperson-commission-situation-sudan">labelled</a> the move a “military take-over” and noted that a “coup is not the appropriate response” to Sudan’s myriad challenges.</p>
<p>On 15 April, the AU Peace and Security Council endorsed the chairperson’s statements and demanded the establishment of a civilian-led transitional authority within 15 days, failing which Sudan would be suspended. </p>
<p>Yet, in a joint communique of the “consultative meeting of the regional partners of Sudan” on 23 April, led by Egyptian President Sisi, and attended by the AU Commission chairperson Moussa Faki, the participants recommended the peace and security council <a href="http://sis.gov.eg/Story/139654/President-El-Sisi's-Closing-Statement-at-Consultative-Summit-of-Regional-Partners-of-Sudan?lang=en-us">extend</a> the transition period by three months. The council later <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-846th-psc-meeting-held-in-tunis-tunisia-on-30-april-2019-on-the-situation-in-the-sudan?fbclid=IwAR34e_F2nenA8vowbJlDd5Koh2EpiEqIPPQtzeeLJZHXDGjXVoaiae53ydY">extended</a> the period of such transition by 60 days.</p>
<p>Under the Lome Declaration, once the Peace and Security Council labels a change of government as unconstitutional, it must immediately suspend the relevant government. But, apparently because of the gaps in the applicable norm on unconstitutional change of government relating to popular protests, this does not always happen. </p>
<h2>Complex questions</h2>
<p>The Sudanese situation raises complex issues. Given unfolding events, the initial two-week deadline for a return to civilian rule appeared to have been impractical. An extension was therefore understandable. But it creates the danger that military rule might become entrenched. The Peace and Security Council needs to agree on a schedule for the transition to civilian authority within the provided timeline. </p>
<p>To ensure consistency in future, the AU should clear the dust on the report of the <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/final-report-of-the-african-union-high-level-panel-for-egypt">High Level Panel on Egypt</a>. It should clarify the rules on whether tail-end military intervention to support sustained popular protests against despots may in some instances constitute an exception to unconstitutional change of government. </p>
<p>In addition, the AU standards speak about the removal of “democratically elected governments”. In practice, it never asks whether the removed government was democratic, and does not have mechanisms to make a proper determination on the issue. </p>
<p>The AU should give equivalent focus to the pervasive problem of unconstitutional retention of government power. But, in cases where coups occur, it should continue to insist on civilian-led and controlled transitions within a reasonable time to allow for diplomatic efforts, regardless of the nature of the regime that was removed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116315/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adem K Abebe also works at the Constitution Building Processes Programme of International IDEA and is the editor of ConstitutionNet.
</span></em></p>The role of the military in toppling authoritarian rulers, after intensive popular protests, raises questions about how the AU’s policy against coups should be applied.Adem K Abebe, Extraordinary Lecturer and editor of ConstitutionNet, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1143802019-04-04T14:21:27Z2019-04-04T14:21:27ZBouteflika steps aside as Algerians push to reclaim and own their history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267547/original/file-20190404-123431-8xsqf2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Algerians protest against President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in Algiers, Algeria, 29 March 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE/Mohamed Messara</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Algeria’s long-time leader Abdelaziz Bouteflika has agreed to <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-algeria-protests/algerias-bouteflika-to-resign-before-mandate-ends-april-28-state-media-idUKKCN1RD2WA">step down</a> following a series of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-algeria-protests/hundreds-of-thousands-march-against-algerias-bouteflika-idUSKCN1RA0VV">mass protests</a> against his original plan to bid for a fifth term. </p>
<p>After weeks of uncertainty, the country’s military chief Ahmed Gaed Salah <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/algeria-army-chief-demands-bouteflika-declared-unfit-rule-190326144555792.html">declared</a> the 82-year-old leader constitutionally unfit to rule. An interim leadership will be formed under the supervision of the army. Everything seems to suggest that the country is heading towards <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-algeria-protests-referendum/new-constitution-for-algeria-will-be-submitted-to-a-referendum-idUKKBN1QS2CW">elections and a constitutional referendum</a>. </p>
<p>Some observers have <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/puppet-wanted-why-algerias-ruling-elite-sought-oust-abdelaziz-bouteflika-50462">drawn parallels</a> between events in Algeria and the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/general/2011/04/20114483425914466.html">“Arab Spring”</a>. These mass demonstrations against corruption and acts of police brutality which <a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/12/17/143897126/the-arab-spring-a-year-of-revolution">swept through North Africa</a> from 2011. The pro-democracy uprisings led to the overthrow of three authoritarian regimes: Tunisia’s Ben Ali, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak. </p>
<p>Political pundits and analysts drawing these comparisons may be tempted to speculate about hidden agendas, or deplore the lack of a common ideological framework for the opposition. This is because, in countries where opposition forces failed to cohere in a meaningful way, the 2011 revolutionary momentum was easily <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2012/04/24/book-review-after-the-arab-spring-how-islamists-hijacked-the-middle-east-revolts-by-john-r-bradley/">hijacked</a> by counter-revolutionaries.</p>
<p>But these debates miss the point. They overlook the social and cultural value of the Algerian protests. They also reveal that the international community has remained centred on the question of political stability since the civil war of 1991-2002. In fact, the singular achievement of these demonstrations is that Algerians have reclaimed ownership of their past. </p>
<p>This is apparent in the way that protesters invoked <a href="http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/38442">the memory of the war of independence</a>. It could also be seen in their allusions to slogans or songs from that time, calling for <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=blYMUHRtZ9Y">“Algeria’s liberation”</a>. </p>
<p>The memory of Algeria’s liberation was politically hijacked by the elites who’ve held power since the 1954-1962 Algerian war of independence. </p>
<h2>The Oujda Group</h2>
<p>During the independence war against France, the National Liberation Army placed Bouteflika in charge of the western border, close to the Moroccan city of Oujda. He became part of the Oujda group led by Houari Boumédiène. It was Boumédiène who helped Ahmed Ben Bella unseat the first post-independence provisional government in 1962.</p>
<p>Boumédiène then became defence minister, and had much influence over the government through the army. Bouteflika became foreign minister. Following political tensions at the top Boumédiène <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/07/05/algeria-frees-ben-bella-after-14-year-detention/e724cd76-0f6d-4fc4-a138-50a448d25c84/?utm_term=.de6c8c04cd64">overthrew</a> Ben Bella in a 1965 military coup. </p>
<p>Under the military-led National Liberation Front, Algeria was a one party state until the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/25/world/algeria-approves-new-constitution.html">1989 constitution</a> introduced a multiparty system. Bouteflika became a member of the Front’s central committee when serving as a foreign minister. With the help of interior minister and the head of intelligence, he <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/abdelaziz-bouteflika-profile-algeria-ailing-leader-190304193802355.html">took office in 1999</a>. </p>
<p>Bouteflika was initially able to gain popularity by acting as if he intended to break with his predecessors’ anti-colonial and pan-Arab traditions. He capitalised on the imperative of national security to build legitimacy in the aftermath of the civil war. Algeria remained under a state of emergency for almost 10 years after the end of the civil war. This was known as Algeria’s “black decade”.</p>
<p>Beyond the country’s borders, Bouteflika proved popular. The international community was particularly receptive to this narrative in the context of the post-9/11 “war on terror”. </p>
<h2>Under Bouteflika</h2>
<p>Under Bouteflika, the penal code was amended to impose punishments for any <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/algeria">“insulting or defamatory” statement</a> likely to harm the president. This law saw independent journalists and human rights advocates repressed in the name of national security.</p>
<p>During the same period, a law was promulgated which <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/AI-Algeria.pdf">granted amnesty</a> to terrorists guilty of committing crimes during the civil war. Implicitly, this new law exonerated members of the Algerian secret services. Many of them had served with the Armed Islamic Group. This was one of the two main Islamist insurgent groups that fought the Algerian government and army in the Algerian civil war. </p>
<p>Historically, the power elite – made up of the military, the secret services and the Political Bureau of the National Liberation Front – built its legitimacy on a distorted memory of the war of independence. This arguably added to Algeria’s post-colonial identity crisis and the climate of polarisation that laid the ground for civil war. </p>
<p>Bouteflika later capitalised on the trauma of the “black decade”, while <a href="https://www.librairie-gallimard.com/livre/9782204127967-ou-va-l-algerie-mohamed-sifaoui/;%20https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056240600842651">depriving</a> Algerians of the economic and social resources they needed to cope with the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2012.632855">growing challenges</a> regarding migration, climate, water scarcity and security. Ironically, this is partly the reason why the question of political stability still prevails today. </p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>This history demonstrates why the debate around today’s political crisis often misses the mark and ignores the real issues. It’s important to fully appreciate what it means for Algerians to reclaim ownership of their history with confidence – and to consider a world beyond Bouteflika’s troubled leadership.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114380/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dounia Mahlouly works for the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London.</span></em></p>Algeria’s elite has built its legitimacy on a distorted memory of the war of independence.Dounia Mahlouly, Senior Teaching Fellow, Social & Political Sciences, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1055392019-04-03T10:47:50Z2019-04-03T10:47:50ZHow Twitter and other social media can draw the US into foreign interventions<p>Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/algerian-leader-to-resign-from-office-by-end-of-april-after-weeks-of-street-protests/2019/04/01/776ed2f8-549b-11e9-aa83-504f086bf5d6_story.html?utm_term=.54b784295ab8">promised to resign by the end of the month</a>. That announcement came after thousands of Algerians <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/world/africa/algeria-protests-bouteflika.html">took to the streets</a> in March to protest his decision to run for a fifth term.</p>
<p>Social media played a crucial role in those demonstrations, allowing protesters to coordinate the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-algeria-bouteflika/thousands-of-algerians-protest-against-bouteflikas-re-election-bid-idUSKCN1QB1QW">place and time</a> of the mass gatherings. </p>
<p>We do not yet know whether President Bouteflika will keep his promise. Perhaps even more uncertain, will the international community hold him accountable if he does not? </p>
<p>The answer might depend on how active Algerians will be on Twitter. In at least one case, Twitter usage had a dramatic impact abroad during a country’s civil unrest. </p>
<p>My colleague <a href="http://benjamintjones.com/Home.html">Benjamin T. Jones</a> <a href="https://www.eleonoramattiacci.com/">and I</a> found that during the 2011 Libyan civil war, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/manifesto-in-140-characters-or-fewer-social-media-as-a-tool-of-rebel-diplomacy/82518E669A274B26E898A567FE22531F">social media</a> helped convince other countries such the U.S. to intervene in favor of protesters.</p>
<h2>Winning support one tweet at a time</h2>
<p>The Libyan civil war exploded in February 2011. Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi had been <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya">in power</a> since 1969, and those who opposed him wanted to <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Libya-Revolt-of-2011">implement reforms</a> aimed at reducing government corruption and providing greater political transparency.</p>
<p>Protests began on Feb. 15 in Benghazi and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Libya-Revolt-of-2011">spread to other cities</a>. By Feb. 27, the opposition announced it had organized itself into the <a href="http://ntclibya.org/">National Transitional Council</a>, or the NTC. They claimed to be the true representative of the Libyan people.</p>
<p>A few days later, the NTC established a <a href="https://twitter.com/ntc_of_libya?lang=en">Twitter account to publicize their version of the conflict</a>. </p>
<p>Up to the civil war, Gadhafi had <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12544624">meticulously controlled</a> most of the communication coming out of Libya. He sought to project an image of the country as a place where political order prevailed and citizens supported him. </p>
<p>Twitter became a powerful instrument to air the rebels’ account of the conflict and present themselves to the international community as a viable – even preferable – alternative to Gadhafi.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"44399829903867904"}"></div></p>
<h2>Tweets and US policy changes</h2>
<p>In our research, we collected data on all the tweets by Libyan rebels. We then used statistical techniques to measure how the rebels’ Twitter feed affected both U.S. behavior toward the Libyan government and relations with the rebels. </p>
<p>We found that messages that denounced Gadhafi’s atrocities against civilians were significantly correlated with the decision of the U.S. to adopt more cooperative behaviors with the rebels – for example, to praise their activities and to agree to meet with them. </p>
<p>Correlation, of course, does not mean causation.</p>
<p>However, even after we accounted for other factors, such as the behavior of the rebels toward Gadhafi and U.S. intelligence on the field, we found that the rebels’ tweets contributed to the U.S. becoming more cooperative with the rebels. </p>
<p>This happened despite the fact that President Barack Obama was <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist">reluctant to intervene</a> at the outset of the conflict.</p>
<p>How were they so successful in gaining U.S. support?</p>
<p>Rebels tweeted in English to communicate directly to both U.S. policymaking elites and the broader public. They voiced their support for democracy and human rights while <a href="https://twitter.com/NTC_of_Libya/status/78171104727941120">publicizing</a> Gadhafi’s atrocities against civilians. </p>
<p>Examples provided by the rebels included <a href="https://twitter.com/NTC_of_Libya">violations of international law</a> by the regime and <a href="https://twitter.com/NTC_of_Libya/status/72043616331239424">attacks on civilian homes</a>. Apparently in response and often just a few days later, U.S. officials voiced public support for the rebels’ cause and aims.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"78171104727941120"}"></div></p>
<p>When elites have access to privileged information – gained, for example, in private, secret meetings – elites will know something that the public will not. In technical terms, that’s known as information asymmetry. </p>
<p>Because the public is not privy to this information, elites cannot use it to justify their <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00567.x">foreign policy choices</a>. So elites might make choices that seem arbitrary to the public. This process erodes public support for those policies. </p>
<p>Instead, the fact that rebels could communicate to both rebels and elites at the same time via social media enabled rebels to build a coalition of support that included both elites and the public.</p>
<p>That support turned into intervention. Beginning in March 2011, NATO countries, including the U.S., staged air and naval strikes against Gadhafi’s forces, who were attacking civilians. </p>
<p>The intervention <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_71652.htm">paved the way</a> for the rebels’ victory.</p>
<h2>Does social media rush interventions?</h2>
<p>Since Libya’s civil war, the use of social media across the globe to draw attention to foreign crises has only grown stronger. </p>
<p>In 2013, dozens of videos distributed via YouTube documenting a possible <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23927399">chemical attack</a> on Syrian civilians shook the international community. More videos on <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/08/world/middleeast/syria-chemical-attacks-assad.html">those attacks</a> have been posted since 2013.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/56-Z6u_kuo0?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Graphic content: A video distributed by Syrian Civil Defense White Helmets of civilian victims of the Khan Shaykhun chemical attack in Syria in 2017.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/dozens-killed-in-apparent-chemical-weapons-attack-on-civilians-in-eastern-ghouta--rescue-workers/2018/04/08/231bba18-3ac0-11e8-af3c-2123715f78df_story.html?utm_term=.6e9db898266a">Similar attacks happened in April 2018</a> and <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/04/14/evidence-shows-syria-attacked-people-chemical-weapons-say-us/">were documented on social media</a>. And just like Obama did in 2011 when intervening in Libya, President Trump bypassed Congress when <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/us/politics/trump-war-powers-syria-congress.html">authorizing strikes</a> in Syria in <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/13/trump-to-address-the-nation-about-syria-nbc-news.html">response to such attacks</a>. </p>
<p>This raises the question of whether social media is rushing U.S. leaders to intervene with very little planning for what comes after. </p>
<p>In the process of bypassing Congress, the president had made an important decision on the use of force all alone, without consulting the Congress, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-foreign-policy-powers-congress-and-president">as is required by U.S. law</a>.</p>
<p>Here, as with Obama, President Trump was responding to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/us/politics/trump-war-powers-syria-congress.html">a sense of urgency</a>. Our research suggests that social media helped create that sense; whether it was good policymaking is another question entirely.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105539/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eleonora Mattiacci does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When the 2011 Libyan civil war erupted, Twitter became a major instrument to air the rebels’ account of the conflict and present themselves internationally as a viable alternative to Moammar Gadhafi.Eleonora Mattiacci, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Amherst CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1134022019-03-26T10:19:13Z2019-03-26T10:19:13ZAlgeria: how peaceful protests can change a troubled nation<p>Peaking after Friday prayers, streets across Algeria have been flooded with <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/fresh-anti-bouteflika-protests-algeria-allies-turn-190315115305675.html">protesters demanding change</a> in recent weeks. They are demanding an end to the 20-year rule of president Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who has now pledged – not entirely convincingly – to stand down.</p>
<p>Whether genuine change will now come remains to be seen. But what is most notable about this mass “hirak” (the Arabic word for “movement”) is both its distrust of any politician who seeks to speak on behalf of the protesters – and its rejection of violence. </p>
<p>The importance of these two factors is grounded in the long struggle the nation has faced. Algerians, although determined and hopeful, are well acquainted with the dangers of striving for a change of this magnitude. Their shared past offers many lessons about nation building, many of which came at a heavy price. </p>
<p>Experts are divided over the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1469-8219.00109">definition of a “nation”</a>, but many agree that two factors are important. On one hand, a collective memory serves as a record of the triumphs and failures from which the nation derives its lessons. On the other, <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/2259-imagined-communities">imagination</a> helps to instil a deep bond between the nation’s different members and cultivate an enveloping sense of community. Both of these factors have played a role in Algeria’s ongoing quest for nationhood.</p>
<h2>Independence</h2>
<p>Algeria won its independence from France in 1962 after a seven-year war that left <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/09/15/france-may-have-apologied-atrocities-algeria-war-still-casts/">more than a million dead</a>. In Algeria, the memory of the martyrs is both a source of grief over the magnitude of the loss, and a source of pride, over the willingness of some to sacrifice everything for the nation’s freedom.</p>
<p>The FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) played a significant role in steering the country towards independence. But the war, and the role the FLN played in it, became a means for the party to legitimise its rule for decades afterwards, and a narrative behind which it could obscure its numerous failures.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/Identity_in_Algerian_Politics_The_Legacy_of_Colonial_Rule">The economic crisis of the 1980s</a> played a major role in forcing the state to move from a single party system, which had allowed the FLN to monopolise power, towards a multi-party system. And the people took the chance to express their desire for radical change.</p>
<p>The FIS (Front Islamique du Salut), an Islamist party, took advantage of the situation, grew in popularity and in 1991 looked like it would defeat the FLN in the elections. But the Algerian army intervened, claiming it was protecting the nation from the dangers of FIS ideology, and blocked the electoral process. The FIS took extreme measures, a militarised wing was formed, and the country was plunged into chaos and civil war during a period known as <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/history-of-algeria/fragile-and-resilient-country-19922012/A220763020A7441AF1270934B2C5C9F9">Algeria’s “Black Decade”</a>. Around 200,000 people lost their lives.</p>
<p>Abdelaziz Bouteflika, whose recent bid for a fifth term (despite ongoing illness) sparked the current hirak, was elected for the first time in 1999. His Civil Concord law, followed by the 2005 <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/46fb72f6a.html">Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation</a>, which came during his second term in power, helped end the civil war. But this achievement yet again became a way to legitimise his rule for years afterwards.</p>
<h2>No Arab Spring</h2>
<p>Memories of the Black Decade also became a shackle, long hindering any widespread opposition. When the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12813859">Arab Spring</a> swept the wider region from 2011, fears of a return to the bloodshed of the civil war prevented many Algerians from seeking change which might trigger violence. Indeed, on February 28 this year, in <a href="https://www.tsa-algerie.com/ouyahia-commente-les-manifestations-en-syrie-ca-a-commence-avec-des-roses/">an address to parliament</a>, former prime minister Ahmed Ouyahia tried to use the Arab Spring to caution the Algerian people against turning the nation into another Syria.</p>
<p>But the peaceful protests that followed have sent a clear reply: this is not Syria. Change through non-violent means is possible. </p>
<p>Algerians are well aware of their own past. And they don’t want to replicate the bloodshed Tunisia had to endure, the military seizure of power in Egypt, the unstable situation in Libya, or the devastation of Syria. The nation’s previous experiences, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/black-decade-weighs-heavily-algeria-151102100541203.html">especially those of the Black Decade</a> and the fatal manipulation of extremist ideology which sought to snuff out the diverse nature of Algerian society, are reminders of how a spark of change can easily, and often bloodily, be extinguished.</p>
<p>But Algerians also believe in the possibility of a different future, one that brings to fruition a nation imagined by them. The hirak is the people’s expression of this, one removed from the interference of politicians or foreign governments.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.aps.dz/algerie/86748-le-president-bouteflika-adresse-un-message-a-la-nation-annoncant-le-report-de-l-election-presidentielle">a letter addressed to the people</a>, Bouteflika has now declared that he will not run for a fifth term. But he has also cancelled the upcoming elections and extended his current term.</p>
<p>He has promised to oversee a peaceful transition to a new republic, but Algerians have rejected this and plan to continue the non-violent hirak. Remembering their past while striving for a better future, they are determined to translate their ideals into a new state. The struggle goes on – but its medium remains “silmiya” (peaceful).</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113402/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdelbaqi Ghorab is on a full scholarship provided by the Algerian Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research.</span></em></p>Algerians are working to change their future while avoiding the bloodshed of their past.Abdelbaqi Ghorab, PhD Candidate, Department of Languages and Cultures, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.