tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/amhara-32756/articlesAmhara – The Conversation2023-11-26T08:40:58Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2172172023-11-26T08:40:58Z2023-11-26T08:40:58ZWhat is federalism? Why Ethiopia uses this system of government and why it’s not perfect<p><a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=0CQBBAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=Elazar,+federalism&ots=7_EoePhxVm&sig=vtSyxjKaMi8qqzhyHsk9Oj_OIrU#v=onepage&q=Elazar%2C%20federalism&f=false">Federalism</a> is a system of government where power is shared between a central authority and smaller regional governments. </p>
<p>Many countries adopt federalism to manage ethnic diversity within their borders and help promote unity. There are <a href="https://forumfed.org/countries/">25 federal countries globally</a>, representing 40% of the world’s population. </p>
<p>Federalism allows regions to govern some of their affairs – such as decisions regarding education or working languages – while being part of the larger country. </p>
<p>Ethiopia adopted federalism in 1991 when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) – a coalition of four major parties – came to power. This followed 17 years of insurgencies to depose the Derg, a communist military junta that ruled the country from 1974 to 1991.</p>
<p>The primary aim of Ethiopian federalism is to accommodate the country’s <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/history-of-modern-ethiopia-18551991/C0852BA84C34071333C899ACC8F1C863">diverse ethnic groups</a>. Before 1991, Ethiopia had a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">centralised unitary government</a> that suppressed diversity. It restricted ethnic groups from using their languages in official settings and schools. </p>
<p>Ethiopian federalism grants ethnic groups the <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=13">right to self-determination</a>. An ethnic group can form its own region or become an independent country. This approach has drawn both praise and criticism. </p>
<p>Some academics view it as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/524968">novel approach</a> to resolving conflicts and preventing state disintegration. It’s impossible to forge unity without the voluntary alliance and assurance of the right to self-determination. Others <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-african-law/article/abs/ethiopias-leap-in-the-dark-federalism-and-selfdetermination-in-the-new-constitution/A05454ABA30C4C79F78DD7397FF91BED">argue that it worsens tensions</a> and could eventually lead to disintegration. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad015">studied</a> Ethiopian politics for more than a decade, with a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjac039">focus</a> on <a href="https://kar.kent.ac.uk/92367/">the implementation of federalism</a>. After more than 30 years, ethnic conflict in Ethiopia hasn’t been resolved – but neither has the country disintegrated. </p>
<p>In my view, federalism remains the best approach for Ethiopia. It allows for cultural and language freedoms. It enables self-rule at regional levels, and has contributed to economic growth. The system, however, is not without its drawbacks. An increase in democratic space would allow more voices to be heard.</p>
<h2>How Ethiopian federalism works</h2>
<p>Ethiopia’s approach to federalism is bold <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad015">compared to other highly diverse African</a> federal states. Nigeria, for instance, has avoided constitutional recognition of ethnic diversity. <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=13">Article 39 of Ethiopia’s federal constitution</a>, adopted in 1995, explicitly acknowledges the country’s ethnic diversity.</p>
<p>Ethiopia is a federation comprising nations and nationalities, each possessing sovereignty as defined in <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=4">Article 8 of the constitution</a>. Nations and nationalities with defined territorial homelands have the right to establish their own regions or even seek independence. </p>
<p>There are 12 regions in the country, each with <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=20">extensive authority</a>. This includes policymaking, constitution making, choosing a working language, and maintaining regional police and civil services.</p>
<p>However, the exercise of these powers has been constrained by <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/ijgr/28/5/article-p972_972.xml">the dominance of the party system</a>. </p>
<p>Between 1991 and 2019, the EPRDF tightly controlled regional governments. It <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">suppressed any demands for self-rule</a>. The coming to power of Abiy Ahmed in 2018 helped open up the political space. The prime minister established the Prosperity Party by <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-50515636">merging three of the parties that made up the EPRDF</a>, as well as its smaller affiliates. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front refused to amalgamate. </p>
<p>Abiy addressed some of the demands from various ethnic groups for <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">regional status</a>. He created three <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/ethiopia-creates-a-12th-regional-state-/7168313.html">additional regions</a> between 2019 and 2023.</p>
<p>The working of Ethiopian federalism, however, depends on the party system. Party norms often supersede constitutional principles. Internal party crises tend to lead to government instability and potential conflict. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">Tigray war</a> between 2020 and 2022 is a stark example. It originated from tensions between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the federal government. Disagreement was triggered by <a href="https://doi.org/10.14321/nortafristud.21.2.011v">the dissolution of the EPRDF</a>.</p>
<h2>Major benefits</h2>
<p>Ethiopian federalism has had three major benefits. </p>
<p>First, it allows for language and cultural freedom. The country’s 80 ethnic groups fought long and hard to secure their rights to culture, language and identity. More than <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00219096221097663#tab-contributors">57 of Ethiopia’s 80 languages</a> are used as mediums of instruction in schools. </p>
<p>Second, the system has allowed many <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">ethnic groups to exercise self-rule</a> in areas where they constitute the majority. Ethnic minorities are also entitled to form local governments, such as district administrations. </p>
<p>Third, the federal system has contributed to the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview#:%7E:text=Ethiopia%20aims%20to%20reach%20lower-middle-income%20status%20by%202025.,one%20of%20the%20highest%20rates%20in%20the%20world.">country’s economic growth</a> and its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2091580">relative stability</a>. It achieved this by <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.2020">decentralising power and resources</a> to regions and local governments.</p>
<h2>Key challenges</h2>
<p>One of the primary challenges of Ethiopian federalism lies in its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2015.1124580">inability to entirely resolve conflicts</a>. </p>
<p>Some of these conflicts – for instance in the western region of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/world/africa/ethiopia-ethnic-killings.html">Benishangul-Gumuz</a> and in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/01/ethiopia-ethnic-cleansing-persists-under-tigray-truce">western Tigray</a> – are instigated partly by the system’s attempt to empower a particular ethnic group in an area. This has created divisions between empowered groups and others. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://ethiopia.iom.int/news/more-438-million-people-displaced-ethiopia-more-half-due-conflict-new-iom-report">recent report</a> by the International Organization for Migration found that more than half of the 4.4 million internally displaced people in Ethiopia left their homes due to conflict. </p>
<p>A second challenge is the gap between the constitution and the practice of political rights. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">Certain ethnic groups have not exercised their rights</a> due to political repression. </p>
<p>Since Abiy assumed power in 2018, ethnic groups’ demands for regions has increased. The government addressed some of these demands, but repression of certain requests has led to grievances and conflicts. Some ethnic groups are too small to have their own region. </p>
<p>A third challenge is the dominance of the ruling party and the lack of democracy. The tendency of party norms to undermine constitutional principles casts a shadow on the federal system. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>While federalism may exist in form, it struggles to operate effectively without democracy and a multiparty system.</p>
<p>In a democratic system, the rule of law and protection of individual rights complement federalism by ensuring respect for citizen rights. A multiparty system would include diverse voices in decision-making and help protect minorities. Following these principles would help build peace and unity in a country as ethnically diverse as Ethiopia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217217/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bizuneh Yimenu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After more than 30 years of federalism, ethnic conflict in Ethiopia hasn’t been resolved – but neither has the country disintegrated.Bizuneh Yimenu, Teaching Fellow, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2126262023-09-06T13:18:16Z2023-09-06T13:18:16ZEthiopia’s Amhara people are being portrayed as the enemy: the dangerous history of ethnic politics<p>The Ethiopian government <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/aug/04/ethiopia-declares-a-state-of-emergency-in-amhara-amid-increasing-violence">declared a state of emergency</a> on 4 August 2023 and sent the military into the Amhara region to engage the Fano, a local armed militia. Some suggested that Ethiopia <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/08/15/ethiopia-risks-sliding-into-another-civil-war">risked slipping into another civil war</a>.</p>
<p>It is only 10 months since <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-11-03/ethiopia-tigray-peace-deal-ends-two-year-war/101611324">the end of a civil war</a> in which around 600,000 Ethiopians were killed, <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-01-27/ethiopias-forgotten-war-is-the-deadliest-of-the-21st-century-with-around-600000-civilian-deaths.html">making it the deadliest war of the 21st century</a>.</p>
<p>The conflict was mainly between the federal government, led by the Oromo-dominated Prosperity Party, and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the party it succeeded in 2018. When the TPLF entered the Amhara region, committing <a href="https://editorials.voa.gov/a/tplf-must-be-held-accountable-for-atrocites-in-amhara/6477256.html">atrocities against civilians</a> and taking over <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tigrayan-forces-take-control-ethiopian-town-lalibela-un-world-heritage-site-2021-08-05/">towns</a>, the Fano worked with government forces to maintain local stability. With their support, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was able to push the TPLF back to Tigray.</p>
<p>During and after the war, massacres and mass displacement of Amhara occurred in the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/11/ethiopia-over-50-ethnic-amhara-killed-in-attack-on-village-by-armed-group/">Oromia</a> region, the <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2021/2/23/fear-runs-deep-after-ethnic-violence-in-western-Ethiopia">Benshangul Gumuz</a> region and other regions of Ethiopia. There were numerous <a href="https://www.amharaamerica.org/_files/ugd/e494ca_0403f104b0584c18b351291d33cfea45.pdf">reports of</a> rapes, arbitrary arrests, abductions, forced evictions and people being <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/ethiopia-horrific-massacre-400-ethnic-amhara-must-be-investigated-immediately">burned alive</a>. </p>
<p>One independent account <a href="https://www.lemkininstitute.com/statements-new-page/statement-on-ongoing-ethnic-massacres-of-the-amhara-people-in-the-oromia-region-of-ethiopia">reported</a> that Orthodox Christians, seen as synonymous with Amhara, were </p>
<blockquote>
<p>chopped with machetes, stabbed with spears, cut down with scythes, beaten with bats and stoned to death.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A <a href="https://igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Download-the-signed-agreement-here.pdf">peace agreement</a> between the TPLF and the government in November 2022 brought relative calm to Tigray and other regions. But the Amhara were left out of the agreement and continue to be targeted even by <a href="https://www.lemkininstitute.com/statements-new-page/statement-on-ongoing-ethnic-massacres-of-the-amhara-people-in-the-oromia-region-of-ethiopia">government forces</a>. </p>
<p>This is the context in which Amhara’s Fano militia rejected the federal government order <a href="https://thegeopolitics.com/why-are-amhara-militias-fighting-to-keep-their-weapons-it-all-boils-down-to-lack-of-protection/">to surrender their weapons</a> and be integrated into the police and federal army. </p>
<p>The government response was to bombard Amhara towns with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-amhara-arrests-emergency-d9e07bd51061c75e8436849085cd888e">drones</a> and heavy artillery. There have also been mass <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/aug/14/lawyers-and-witnesses-say-ethiopian-police-have-ar/">arrests</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cwlw3xz047jt/ethiopia?pinned_post_locator=urn:asset:6ea0c1ab-627f-4f55-9a80-938a4ac4fa2f&pinned_post_asset_id=64e44b1647bc945c1788d203&pinned_post_type=share#:%7E:text=The%20whereabouts%20of%20opposition%20Ethiopian%20lawmaker%20Christian%20Tadele%2C,in%20the%20capital%2C%20Addis%20Ababa%2C%20earlier%20this%20month.">detentions</a> of Amhara leaders. </p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://staffportal.curtin.edu.au/staff/profile/view/yirga-gelaw-woldeyes-b922d208/">scholar</a> of history, human rights and decolonisation in Africa with a keen interest in Ethiopia. The rhetoric that presents the Amhara people as a national enemy has gone on, <a href="https://www.resetdoc.org/story/identity-violence-abiy-ahmed-amhara-genocide-denial/">unchallenged</a>, for almost 50 years. What has changed now is that the rhetoric has shifted towards widespread, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-aims-end-illegal-administration-disputed-territory-2023-08-22/">government-sanctioned</a> violence. </p>
<p>Article 2 of the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml">UN Genocide Convention</a> defines genocide as acts “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”. Following widespread attacks on Amharas in 2021, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission <a href="https://ehrc.org/download/violence-human-rights-violations-following-musician-hachalu-hundessas-assassination-investigative-report/">warned</a> of “the risk of atrocity crimes, including genocide”. In February 2023, a US-based <a href="https://www.lemkininstitute.com/about-us">charity</a> focused on genocide prevention <a href="https://www.lemkininstitute.com/statements-new-page/statement-on-ongoing-ethnic-massacres-of-the-amhara-people-in-the-oromia-region-of-ethiopia">reported</a> that “all Oromia armed forces are conducting what appears to be a systematic policy of erasing the Amhara presence” in two administrative zones.</p>
<p>It is important to shine a light on what is happening and unpack the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/44873804">decades-long project</a> of ethnic politics that has allowed the Amhara to be targeted. </p>
<h2>The history of ethnic politics in Ethiopia</h2>
<p>Ethiopia has a long history of ethnic harmony. Historically, Ethiopian rulers came from different regions and were often of mixed lineage. For instance, King Menelik II (1844-1913) came from Amhara and Oromo ancestry. King Yohannes IV (1837-1889) was from Tigray. The Oromo king Mikael (1850-1918) ruled over the Amhara region of Wollo. His son, King Eyasu, inherited Menelik’s throne. </p>
<p>The last monarch, Emperor Haile Selassie, had Amhara and Oromo parents, as does Abiy himself. Until recently, mixing among ethnic groups wasn’t considered controversial. Indeed, it was Ethiopia’s ability to unite across ethnic, linguistic and religious boundaries that defeated Italy’s attempt at colonisation at <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-battle-of-adwa-an-ethiopian-victory-that-ran-against-the-current-of-colonialism-132360">the Battle of Adwa</a> in 1896.</p>
<p>When the fascist Italian prime minister Benito Mussolini invaded and occupied Ethiopia from 1935 to 1942 <a href="https://tassew.wordpress.com/2012/04/24/origin-of-tribalisation-of-ethiopian-politics-from-fascism-to-fascism-by-prof-aleme-eshete/">dividing the country</a> along ethnic lines took centre stage. It was carried out along plans <a href="https://archive.org/details/abyssinia-the-powder-barrel">devised</a> earlier by the Austrian Nazi Roman Prochazka to portray the Amhara as the enemy of all other ethnic groups. </p>
<p>After the expulsion of Italy, Haile Selassie sent Ethiopians from diverse ethnic groups overseas for higher education. During the 1960s <a href="https://arsof-history.org/articles/v4n4_1960s_page_1.html">decade of revolutions</a>, students formed the Ethiopian Student Movement to remove the monarchy. Two ideological positions of nation building <a href="https://jacobin.com/2019/12/ethiopian-student-movement-bahru-zewde-abiy-ahmed-1974-revolution">emerged</a>: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>The first viewed the monarchy as a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2021.1974698">class-based</a> feudal system that should be destroyed. It saw ethnic politics as a hindrance to achieving a socialist republic. </p></li>
<li><p>The second adopted the <a href="https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1929/03/18.htm">Stalinist approach</a> that defined cultural and linguistic groups within a country as nations. They saw the monarchy as an ethnic-based, colonial power.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Members from the first group created an alliance with the Derg, a committee of military officers, which overthrew Haile Selassie in 1974 but refused to create a civilian government. It ruled through dictatorship, destroying the monarchy and anyone <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/204000/afr250101978en.pdf">who opposed its power</a>.</p>
<p>The student groups who viewed the monarchy as an ethnic-based colonial power formed the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41931375">Tigray People’s Liberation Front</a>. The two combined, organised other ethnic allies, and removed the Derg from power in 1991. The TPLF led a transitional government which approved the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia and the adoption of the current constitution.</p>
<p>This set the stage for 27 years of <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/118/472/463/5505401">autocratic rule</a> in which the Amhara <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/118/472/463/5505401?login=false">were cast as the oppressor</a> of all ethnic groups and the TPLF placed itself at the centre of the liberation of all Ethiopians.</p>
<h2>The Amhara as national enemy</h2>
<p>Ethiopia’s 80-plus ethnolinguistic communities were framed as sovereign “nations” under the 1995 <a href="http://www.parliament.am/library/sahmanadrutyunner/etovpia.pdf#page=3">constitution</a> ostensibly to rectify “historically unjust relationships”. </p>
<p>Although the Ethiopian monarchy was established in Tigray and many Tigrayan (and, indeed, Oromo, Amhara and mixed) emperors ruled the country, the TPLF singled out the Amhara as the monarchical oppressor of all ethnic nations. This was partly convenient because Ethiopian emperors, regardless of ethnic origin, used Amharic as the language of their court. </p>
<p>Ethnic politics was enshrined in law. Once the TPLF came to power, all citizens were required to have ID cards stating their ethnicity. Individuals from mixed backgrounds must choose an ethnic identity. Regional states created their own constitutions, borders, flags and anthems. As Ethiopian historian Yohannes Gedamu <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1311288/ethiopia-amhara-persecution-stands-in-way-of-abiy-ahmed-reform-agenda/">notes</a>, many constitutions state that “the ownership of the region” is based on ethnicity, resulting in cases where</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the Amharas in various regional states are now considered settlers in their own country. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Amharic speaking people of the Amhara region and beyond have lived in Ethiopia for thousands of years, as evidenced by the millions of manuscripts written in their ancient language of Ge’ez, which is the basis of Amharic and Tigrinya. Their almost millennium-old rock churches, imbued with Ethiopian Orthodox architecture and artwork, speak to the Amhara’s ongoing connection to the land.</p>
<p>Labelling an indigenous group of people as “settlers” allows those perpetrating violence to co-opt the language of decolonisation to justify murder. The Amhara are labelled as <a href="https://bilisummaa.com/settler-colonial-neftenga-safaris-abyssinia-is-structural-not-an-event/"><em>neftegna</em></a>, which means a monarchical soldier, despite the monarchy being an institution led by kings from mixed ethnic groups. </p>
<p>Even if one believes that the Amhara were monarchical oppressors, the monarchy was destroyed almost 50 years ago and the Amhara have been excluded from power ever since. The thesis that they are oppressors does not correlate with reality.</p>
<h2>Heading towards genocide</h2>
<p>The federal government has strengthened its ties to its former enemy, the TPLF. The defence minister, Abraham Belay, announced that the Ethiopian army would <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-aims-end-illegal-administration-disputed-territory-2023-08-22/">dismantle</a> the Amhara administration in Wolkaite, a contested region between Tigray and Amhara.</p>
<p>In August 2023, Oromia state government representatives travelled to Tigray to <a href="https://twitter.com/HeranTigray/status/1694441667317633471">declare</a> war:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The war we just started [on the Amhara] is a major war. Right now, this group we are fighting wants to impose one religion, one country, and one language by force on all of us. We have reached the moment that Tigrayans and Oromos must join forces, along other Ethiopians, to defeat this force so that Ethiopia can prosper.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In fact, Amhara has no power to do that. </p>
<p>Ethiopia can draw a lesson from Rwanda. Similar demonisation of the Tutsi by Hutu genocide agitators led to genocide 30 years ago in which 800,000 Tutsis and Tutsi sympathisers were killed. The Tutsi were described as <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/25166069221084855#fn3-25166069221084855">foreigners</a> who had links with long-dead Belgian colonialism. ID cards listing ethnicity were used to identify the victims.</p>
<p>Since the demonisation of the Amhara has been built into constitutions, government policy and dehumanising nation-building rhetoric, it has filtered down to people who previously lived together in harmony. </p>
<p>This is the consequence of ethnic politics in Ethiopia. Without more attention and action from the media and global actors, Ethiopia could be heading towards a Rwandan-style genocide.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212626/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yirga Gelaw Woldeyes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The rhetoric that presents the Amhara people as a national enemy has gone on, unchallenged, for far too long.Yirga Gelaw Woldeyes, Senior Lecturer, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2117542023-08-24T09:09:44Z2023-08-24T09:09:44ZEthiopia’s Amhara crisis: Abiy’s political failures threaten a return to war<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-amhara-crisis-abiys-political-failures-threaten-a-return-to-war-211754&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>The federal government of Ethiopia declared a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/4/ethiopia-declares-state-of-emergency-following-clashes-in-amhara">state of emergency</a> in Amhara region on 4 August 2023. A special session of parliament endorsed this decision, placing the administration of the country’s second largest region under the military. This followed clashes between federal troops and Amhara forces resisting a government order to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopia-pm-vows-to-dismantle-regional-military-forces/7042661.html">disarm and demobilise</a> regional special forces. </p>
<p>Amhara region is the second most populous region in Ethiopia. Its northern neighbour is the Tigray region, which was the epicentre less than a year ago of the most <a href="https://www.brusselstimes.com/316661/tigray-at-two-years-the-worlds-deadliest-war">destructive civil war</a> in the history of modern Ethiopia. Combined with a political climate that is dominated by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/5/10/what-ethiopia-needs-is-less-not-more-ethno-nationalism">ethnic narratives</a>, ethnic parties and regional militias, the current crisis in Amhara has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-just-ended-one-war-is-another-one-beginning-2023-08-08/">sparked fears of another civil war</a>. </p>
<p>Political tensions with ethnic undertones have been high in Ethiopia. However, forced <a href="https://borkena.com/2023/04/15/amhara-displacement-the-ongoing-ethnic-cleansing-in-ethiopia/">displacements</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/6/massacre-of-hundreds-fuels-protests-resentment-in-ethiopia">massacres</a> targeting ethnic Amharas have continued under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s watch since 2018. </p>
<p>In 2019 Ethiopia was <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2019/05/13/ethiopia-is-global-leader-on-internally-displaced-persons-grid//">ranked first</a> in the world for the number of internally displaced people. This was more than those <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2022/05/28/1100469734/ethiopia-set-a-world-record-for-displacements-in-a-single-year-5-1-million-in-20">displaced</a> by wars in Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan.</p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-concerned-about-increasing-political-ethnic-polarization-ethiopia-2021-05-14/">ethnic polarisation</a> higher than ever, pan-Ethiopian unity forces and political parties lost their appeal long ago. Ethnic grievances are now the main organising principles in Ethiopia, which shows why Amharas who were mostly known for supporting national political movements are now organising just as Amharas. </p>
<p>In the last two years alone, ethnic Amharas were <a href="https://borkena.com/2023/04/15/amhara-displacement-the-ongoing-ethnic-cleansing-in-ethiopia/">displaced</a> from suburbs surrounding Addis Ababa, the capital. Amharas also continue to face harassment by Oromia’s security forces when travelling to Addis Ababa, which is a self administrating city but geographically an enclave of Oromia region. </p>
<p>Then there’s the government’s reliance on ethnic-based militias, such as Amhara Fano fighters whenever it deemed necessary to ensure its survival. During the federal government’s war on Tigray, for example, the overstretched Ethiopia National Defence Force mobilised Amhara youth to fight. Following the war, the Fano emerged well-armed and much stronger with somewhat obscure but seemingly centralised command. This unsettled Abiy and led directly to the present crisis. </p>
<p>For the Amhara Fano fighters, however, main causes for their struggle are the continued massacres targeting their group, displacements, and discriminatory treatments that Amharas face across Ethiopia. For example, they mention that the recent <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-amhara-arrests-emergency-d9e07bd51061c75e8436849085cd888e">mass arrest</a> of Amharas in Addis Ababa by the federal police are examples of Abiy’s continued mistreatment of their group. To make matters worse, families who are demanding to know about the <a href="https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/36028/">whereabouts</a> of their imprisoned children are facing harassment. </p>
<p>I am a political science scholar with a focus on the Horn of Africa countries. I have also authored a <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Politics-of-Contemporary-Ethiopia-Ethnic-Federalism-and-Authoritarian/Gedamu/p/book/9781032029054">book</a> on ethnic federalism and authoritarian survival in Ethiopia. Nine months into Abiy’s rise to power in Ethiopia, I warned that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/persecution-of-ethnic-amharas-will-harm-ethiopias-reform-agenda-98201">persecution of ethnic Amharas</a> could derail his then highly touted political reforms. At the time, he vowed to deal with political violence that targeted any ethnic group and impeded freedom of movement of citizens. Sadly, he failed to deliver.</p>
<p>Today, many in Ethiopia and especially citizens in the Amhara region believe that the incumbent Prosperity Party has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66496137">lost both the credibility and the administrative capacity</a> to lead the region. It’s my view that Abiy’s use of the military to address such a critical challenge will prove a failure. A military approach could result in more bloodshed.</p>
<h2>Ethiopia’s increasing challenges</h2>
<p>Once considered the lone hope to resolve Ethiopia’s problems, Abiy eluded scrutiny because of his <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/abiys-agenda-and-future-ethiopia">unifying</a> political rhetoric. But the political challenges continued to <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-political-crisis-plays-out-in-the-regions-why-its-a-federal-problem-144893">intensify</a>. It was not long before political dissent was met with <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/08/ethiopia-stop-the-use-of-deadly-force-on-protesters/">violence</a> by his security forces.</p>
<p>By 2021, the media reported that <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2022/05/28/1100469734/ethiopia-set-a-world-record-for-displacements-in-a-single-year-5-1-million-in-20">5.1 million people</a> had been displaced internally. People from all of Ethiopia’s regional states had experienced forced displacement, mainly due to their ethnic identity. A disproportionate number of these were Amharas <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2022/08/24/oromo-nationalism-should-cross-the-river-of-resentment/">targeted</a> in five regions. </p>
<p>The Tigray war was to follow. Two years of fighting, mainly between federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, intensified the destruction in the country. Hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2f385e95-0899-403a-9e3b-ed8c24adf4e7">have died</a> and the country needs at least <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2023/03/29/ethiopia-war-crimes-accountability">US$20 billion</a> for post conflict reconstruction.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/persecution-of-ethnic-amharas-will-harm-ethiopias-reform-agenda-98201">Persecution of ethnic Amharas will harm Ethiopia’s reform agenda</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>A peace <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/turning-pretoria-deal-lasting-peace-ethiopia">agreement</a> was eventually signed in Pretoria, South Africa, in November 2022. The political settlement brought relief in the country’s north. But Abiy’s regime did not attempt to find political solutions for all the country’s other challenges. For example, once peace in Tigray was achieved, the government did not also attempt to address the grievances of Amharas related to massacres, displacements and harassment they persistently had to endure. Even during the Tigray war, regions such as Afar and Amhara equally suffered from the destruction the war had caused. But the government seems to have ignored the suffering of Afar and Amhara Ethiopians. </p>
<p>As a result, the Amhara region is the centre of conflict with federal forces that has parallels with the Tigray war. The deployment of military drones – an important tool against Tigray – is responsible for the deaths of at least <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-amhara-arrests-emergency-d9e07bd51061c75e8436849085cd888e">26 civilians</a> in the Amhara city of Finote Selam. </p>
<p>Interestingly, now that the government’s peace deal with Tigray forces is holding, Abiy’s Oromo prosperity party officials are now openly <a href="https://twitter.com/addisinsight/status/1694082774217392178?s=20">inviting</a> Tigrayans to also arm against the Amhara, which shows that the government is only steadfast to respond to violence by way of more violence. </p>
<h2>Amhara region’s case</h2>
<p>Amhara’s popular president and top leadership were <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/6/23/ethiopias-amhara-state-chief-killed-amid-regional-coup-attempt">assassinated</a> months after they came to power in 2019. Since then, the region has not witnessed any semblance of normalcy. Successive Amhara leaders from incumbent Prosperity Party have also become failures. </p>
<p>Into this void stepped Amhara youth groups organised as impromptu militia units tasked with protecting and securing their localities. Over time these morphed into an Amhara popular resistance. A considerable number of disgruntled former Amhara special force members are <a href="https://borkena.com/2023/08/15/ethiopia-defunct-amhara-special-force-joined-fano-says-minister-for-peace/">now part of this Fano led resistance</a> after rejecting an offer to integrate with the federal defence force. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-political-crisis-plays-out-in-the-regions-why-its-a-federal-problem-144893">Ethiopia's political crisis plays out in the regions. Why it's a federal problem</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This rise in the strength of the Fano forces was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-just-ended-one-war-is-another-one-beginning-2023-08-08/">cited by Ethiopia’s spy chief</a> to be behind the federal government’s decision to dissolve regional special forces. </p>
<p>The order applies to all regions, but the Amhara view it as a ploy that only targets Amhara’s strong special forces while leaving others intact. They also believe that such a move could expose their region to possible attacks from Oromia and Tigray regions. These regions have claims over Amhara territory that have stoked longstanding tensions. </p>
<p>Amhara also see the move to disarm them as a betrayal, after they made sacrifices during the Tigray war to secure the prime minister’s survival.</p>
<h2>What happens next?</h2>
<p>Fears of another war that could match or even eclipse what happened in Tigray are not misplaced if a solution is not found. The international community must press all groups, especially Ethiopia’s federal government, to start political dialogue immediately and agree a ceasefire. Federal Authorities in Ethiopia must also learn that only dialogue and direct engagement with the public could help with conflict resolution.</p>
<p>It’s also time for Abiy to prove that Ethiopia can be at peace under his leadership. The impact of another civil war in the Horn of Africa, at the same time as Sudan’s, would be catastrophic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211754/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yohannes Gedamu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Abiy Ahmed’s use of the military to address a critical challenge is likely to fail.Yohannes Gedamu, Senior Lecturer of Political Science, Georgia Gwinnett CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1956012022-12-08T13:38:39Z2022-12-08T13:38:39ZAbiy Ahmed gained power in Ethiopia with the help of young people – four years later he’s silencing them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498761/original/file-20221203-16-gyawnf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopians celebrate Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's Nobel Peace Prize win in 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Minasse Wondimu Hailu/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Abiy Ahmed took power as Ethiopia’s prime minister in April 2018, he was the <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-new-ethiopian-leader-abiy-ahmed-youngest-in-africa-sparks-hope-of/">youngest head of government</a> in Africa. </p>
<p>At 42, he represented a stark contrast to <a href="https://theconversation.com/paul-biya-has-been-cameroons-president-for-40-years-and-he-might-win-office-yet-again-194856">many ageing African leaders</a> who had been in position for decades. These leaders often stake their claim to power by referring to their victories in revolutionary wars many decades back. </p>
<p>Before Abiy’s entry, Ethiopia had been governed by the same party for 27 years – the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. This was a coalition of parties established by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in 1991. The party claimed legitimacy by pointing to its victory in a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/Socialist-Ethiopia-1974-91">civil war in 1991</a>. </p>
<p>It took mass protests from the youth – and an elite split within the government – to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/20/ethiopia-mass-protests-rooted-in-countrys-history">overthrow this regime</a>.</p>
<p>After rising to power, Abiy replaced the old ruling party with the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/03/12/ethiopian-pm-abiy-calls-for-peace-at-launch-of-party-s-first-congress//">Prosperity Party</a>. This, along with his relative youthfulness, was seen as a break with the past. </p>
<p>The hope was that this change would bring the political and economic inclusion of young people in Ethiopia. This category includes those aged 15 to 29, who make up <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Fact_Sheet_Developing_Ethiopias_Youth_Jul_2017.pdf">28%</a> of Ethiopia’s population of <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ethiopia-population/">122 million</a>. </p>
<p>This group at the time experienced high unemployment levels and political marginalisation. Little has changed since then.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ethiopians-are-losing-faith-in-abiys-promises-for-peace-126440">Why Ethiopians are losing faith in Abiy's promises for peace</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>My co-researchers and I have been <a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">investigating</a> regime-youth interactions in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe since 2019. By exploring these interactions and the major policies addressing young people, we aim to see whether state policies empower the youth or keep them on the margins.</p>
<p>In Ethiopia, we <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7829-neglect-control-and-co-optation-major-features-of-ethiopian-youth-policy-since-1991">identified</a> two major policy responses to the youth. The first was job creation. The second was political representation through youth-specific representative bodies. </p>
<p>We found that while these responses are officially meant to address economic and political marginalisation, they have instead been used to repress or co-opt the youth. </p>
<p>We argue that regime strategies towards the youth in Ethiopia – as in the other countries in our study – are part of the “menu” of authoritarian strategies for incumbents to hold on to power. </p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>Our research in the four countries started with the question: are youth agency and regime policy leading to empowerment, or to suppression and old patterns of subordination? </p>
<p>The question was particularly intriguing in the context of Ethiopia, where <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-young-ethiopians-in-oromia-and-sidama-fought-for-change-161440">youth-dominated protests</a> were instrumental in bringing Abiy to power. </p>
<p>Recognising this, Abiy and his allies <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/08/abiy-ahmed-upending-ethiopian-politics">promised to address</a> the demands of the youth for inclusion. This naturally created high expectations. </p>
<p>But more than four years after this promise, the situation for Ethiopia’s large youth population looks bleak. It’s <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/ethiopia-fractured-after-two-years-of-war-4007368">arguably even more so</a> than before. A two-year war in the country’s northern region of Tigray reinforced ethnic divisions and created a humanitarian crisis. Unemployment rates are still high and the youth are still being mobilised for political ends.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-young-ethiopians-in-oromia-and-sidama-fought-for-change-161440">Why young Ethiopians in Oromia and Sidama fought for change</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Employment schemes, such as the <a href="https://chilot.me/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/995_2017-ethiopian-youth-revolving-fund-establishment.pdf">Youth Revolving Fund</a> and <a href="https://jobscommission.gov.et/who-we-are/">Job Creation Commission</a>, have been used as mechanisms to silence and co-opt the youth. Youth protest movements have either been co-opted into the established party machinery or turned into militarised vigilante groups. These became instrumental in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethnic-violence-in-tigray-has-echoes-of-ethiopias-tragic-past-150403">2020 war in Tigray</a>. </p>
<h2>Co-option</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7829-neglect-control-and-co-optation-major-features-of-ethiopian-youth-policy-since-1991">case study of the Youth Revolving Fund</a> shows that this government scheme failed to create sustainable job opportunities and improve livelihoods. </p>
<p>Introduced at the height of the youth-dominated protest in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2dj-EKYZ8AA">2017</a>, the scheme was used to pacify the youth. Consequently, it lacked sufficient capacity and skills training components. Loans were made without proper guarantees for repayment, preventing money from revolving and becoming available to fund new youth projects. </p>
<p>Our study of regime-youth interactions in Oromia and Amhara – the most populous regional states in Ethiopia and home to the youth protests – revealed that the government resorted to co-opting and repressing young people. </p>
<p>In Oromia, Ethiopia’s largest state, material co-option was seen in the distribution of credit, land, rights over resources and even condominium housing. </p>
<p>In Amhara, in north-west Ethiopia, rhetorical co-option was used. The worldview dominant among protesters was ostensibly adopted so as to get their support. Abiy appeared to castigate the country’s federal system and emphasise “national unity”. </p>
<p>We also observed institutional co-option: bringing activists and opposition leaders into government. </p>
<h2>Repression</h2>
<p>While the immediate post-2018 period saw a decline in repressive tactics, it resumed as the youth <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-oromos-insight-idUSKCN1N7108">started to challenge</a> the Abiy regime. </p>
<p>The Prosperity Party considers Oromia its home base – Abiy is considered an Oromo leader. The party was, therefore, less likely to tolerate dissent in the region. This, coupled with an active insurgency from the Oromo Liberation Army, made Oromia youth exceptionally vulnerable to repression. Arbitrary mass arrests and a crude counter-insurgency resulted in severe human rights violations. </p>
<p>In Amhara, the government resorted to repression as youth protests <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/05/villagers-massacred-western-ethiopia-says-state-appointed-body">returned</a> in 2019. </p>
<p>The government relaxed the use of force as it needed the Amhara youth following the outbreak of war in Tigray in 2020. Repression resumed when the government felt the initial threat from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front had been reversed.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Co-option and repression weakened and fragmented the youth movements responsible for the anti-government protests of 2014-2018 in Ethiopia. </p>
<p>The war in Tigray – which is <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/cease-fire-agreed-to-stop-ethiopias-tigray-conflict/a-63640781">currently on pause</a> – also resulted in the heavy militarisation of the youth, especially in the Amhara region. </p>
<p>Our research demonstrates that governments coming to power riding a wave of youth protests can nonetheless resort to authoritarian tactics to neutralise dissent from the same movements. In authoritarian contexts, translating protest gains into genuine political (and economic) gains is an uphill battle. </p>
<p>The alternative is to think strategically about young people’s potential to achieve the “prosperity” the ruling party promises. </p>
<p>We also found that youth employment schemes can be turned into instruments to silence the youth.</p>
<p>Deeper analyses of youth-specific policies should be contextually grounded to reveal possible authoritarian uses beyond official objectives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195601/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lovise Aalen receives funding from the Norglobal programme at Research Council of Norway (project no. 288489). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amanuel Tesfaye is an associate researcher under the Youth in Africa project, currently writing on regime-youth interactions in post-2018 Ethiopia.</span></em></p>Governments coming to power riding a wave of youth protests can employ authoritarian tactics to silence dissent from the same movements.Lovise Aalen, Senior Researcher, Political Science, Chr. Michelsen InstituteAmanuel Tesfaye, Lecturer, Addis Ababa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1922522022-10-16T07:51:53Z2022-10-16T07:51:53ZTigray has resisted Ethiopia’s far greater military might for two years – here’s why neither side is giving in<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489408/original/file-20221012-20-g31ivm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters in the UK demonstrate against Ethiopia's Tigray war in October 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mike Kemp/In Pictures via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/tigray-has-resisted-ethiopias-far-greater-military-might-for-two-years-heres-why-neither-side-is-giving-in-192252&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>The Ethio-Tigray war started on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">4 November 2020</a>. For almost two years, the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea – along with Amhara regional forces and militia – have waged war against Tigray’s regional government and society. </p>
<p>Tigray is a tiny ethnonational group that makes up about <a href="https://www.atlasofhumanity.com/tigray">6%</a> of Ethiopia’s population of <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ethiopia-population/">121 million</a>. Yet, it has been able to hold off well-armed military forces.</p>
<p>As a sociologist who has <a href="https://works.bepress.com/asafa_jalata/">written extensively</a> on the cultures of nationalism in the region, I have studied the deep and complex roots of this conflict. I believe that understanding its history is key to comprehending how Tigray has developed the resolve to hold off a far greater military might than its own.</p>
<p>Neither the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea nor those of Tigray accept the principles of compromise, peaceful coexistence or equal partnership. According to their political cultures, winners take all. It’s zero-sum politics.</p>
<h2>The war today</h2>
<p>The Ethiopian National Defence Force <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/battle-mekelle-and-its-implications-ethiopia">captured Mekelle</a>, Tigray’s capital city, on 28 November 2020. The Ethiopian army was helped by Eritrean and Amhara military forces. </p>
<p>Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s prime minister, congratulated his army and allied forces for what looked like a quick victory. </p>
<p>However, the Tigrayan Defence Force made a <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/battle-mekelle-and-its-implications-ethiopia">tactical retreat</a>. Its troops moved to rural areas and used guerrilla operations supported by war veterans. This strategy demonstrated Tigray’s effective fighting force, which was first developed in the 1970s.</p>
<p>As a result, eight months after the start of the war, Tigrayan troops returned to their capital. The Ethiopian army <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/world/asia/tigray-mekelle-ethiopia-retreat.html">retreated</a> from Mekelle and other cities.</p>
<p>Tigrayan troops then invaded the neighbouring Afar and Amhara regions, and almost made it into Finfinnee (<a href="https://www.dw.com/en/tigrayan-forces-advance-toward-ethiopian-capital/av-59712725">Addis Ababa</a>) in November 2021. However, they soon retreated to their region.</p>
<p>Since then, Tigrayan forces have controlled and administered most of Tigray. </p>
<iframe title="The regions of Ethiopia" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-yEyyR" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/yEyyR/2/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="650" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>The Ethio-Tigray war has been <a href="https://mereja.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=305544#p1331271">devastating</a> for Tigrayans. They have faced mass killings, military bombardment, rape, looting and the destruction of property. The conflict has denied them access to food, electricity, telecommunications, medicine, banking services and other necessities. </p>
<p>Yet they support the Tigray Defence Force. To understand why requires a deeper reading of Ethiopia’s history.</p>
<h2>A complex history</h2>
<p>Two Amhara emperors and one Tigrayan emperor laid the foundation of the modern imperial state of Ethiopia. The first emperor of Abyssinia/Ethiopia was Tewodros (1855-1868). He was followed by Yohannes IV (1872-1889) of Tigray and then Menelik II (1889-1913). </p>
<p>Under Menelik II, the Amhara state elite replaced Tigray’s leaders. They made Tigrayan society a junior partner in building the Ethiopian empire. </p>
<p>But Tigrayan nationalists believe their society was the foundation of the Ethiopian state. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-war-in-tigray-risks-wiping-out-centuries-of-the-worlds-history-179829">Ethiopia's war in Tigray risks wiping out centuries of the world's history</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In the last decades of the 1800s, the Ethiopian empire <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/isbn/9781685855772/html?lang=en">expanded</a> from its northern core of Tigray and Amhara by colonising the Oromo and other ethnonational groups. </p>
<p>It established slavery, the nafxanya-gabbar system (semi-slavery) and the colonial land-holding system by taking the land of conquered people. </p>
<p>The nafxanya (gun-carrying settlers) elite – led by the Amhara – dislodged the Tigrayan elite from Ethiopian state power. Tigray was pushed to the periphery of an Amhara-dominated society. This created <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/isbn/9781685855772/html?lang=en">political rivalry</a> between the two groups. </p>
<p>The status and living conditions of the Tigrayan elite and people deteriorated. This, along with several wars in the region, aggravated political, economic and social problems. </p>
<p>Accumulated grievances and many forms of resistance produced the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in 1975. It aimed to <a href="https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/a-political-history-of-the-tigray-peoples-liberation-front-1975-1">liberate Tigrayans</a> from Amhara-led governments. This helped develop Tigrayan nationalism. </p>
<h2>Tigray’s two nationalisms</h2>
<p>Tigrayans maintain two forms of nationalism. </p>
<p>The first promotes Tigrayan autonomy, self-reliance and development. </p>
<p>The second is Tigrayan Ethiopianism. This theoretically maintains Ethiopia’s current geopolitical boundary, with its decentralised political structures where different population groups have some autonomy. </p>
<p>After building military power in the 1980s, Tigrayan elite <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Cultural-Capital-and-Prospects-for-Democracy-in-Botswana-and-Ethiopia/Jalata/p/book/9780367786373">dominated</a> other ethnonational groups, particularly the Oromo, the empire’s largest ethnonational group. </p>
<p>Between 1991 and 2018, the Tigrayan elite <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-the-war-in-tigray-150147">controlled</a> state power and the political economy. The Tigrayan elite created a pseudo-democracy. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front was the mover and shaker of the Ethiopian state. </p>
<p>The Oromo expressed their collective grievances with this political arrangement through the struggles of the Oromo Liberation Front. The Qeerroo/Qarree (Oromo youth) movement got involved between 2014 and 2018. This eventually <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">dislodged Tigrayan leadership</a> from Ethiopian central power in 2018. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-young-ethiopians-in-oromia-and-sidama-fought-for-change-161440">Why young Ethiopians in Oromia and Sidama fought for change</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Abiy was a member of the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation, a subsidiary political party of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. The Tigrayan Front, alongside its allied organisations, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/3/28/abiy-ahmed-elected-as-chairman-of-ethiopias-ruling-coalition">elected Abiy</a> as Ethiopia’s prime minister in April 2018. He later turned on his support base. </p>
<p>Once he came to power, Abiy and his allies believed they wouldn’t stay in control if they did not destroy Tigrayan and Oromo nationalists. These were symbolised by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the Oromo Liberation Front and the Oromo youth movement. </p>
<h2>Zero-sum politics</h2>
<p>Tigrayan and Amhara elites express and practice Ethiopianism differently.</p>
<p>The Amhara elite dominated Ethiopia from 1889 to 1991. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front overthrew them in 1991. </p>
<p>The wealth and experience Tigrayan elite accumulated over nearly three decades increased their national organisational capacity. This has helped them in the current war. </p>
<p>The Oromo have rejected the dominance and tyranny of both these groups. They have carried out their <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">liberation struggle</a>.</p>
<p>Abiy and his Amhara collaborators are fighting Tigrayans, Oromos and others to control Ethiopian state power. Their winning the war in Tigray and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-other-conflict-whats-driving-the-violence-in-oromia-187035">Oromia</a> would allow the Abiy regime to continue a modified version of Ethiopia’s pre-1991 policy. </p>
<p>For Tigrayans, losing this battle would be equivalent to losing political power and returning to victimisation, poverty and the threat of annihilation. </p>
<h2>Uncertain future</h2>
<p>Given their complicated political history, reconciling the central government and the Tigrayan regional government is challenging. Even if these two groups negotiate a peace deal, conflict will continue if the Oromo are left out of the process. </p>
<p>If Tigray and Oromia’s political problems aren’t correctly understood and resolved, conflicts will continue until the collapse of the Ethiopian state.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192252/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asafa Jalata does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Leaders at the centre of the Ethio-Tigray war don’t believe in equal partnership. In their political cultures, winners take all.Asafa Jalata, Professor of Sociology and Global and Africana Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1870352022-07-20T13:56:51Z2022-07-20T13:56:51Z‘Ethiopia’s other conflict’: what’s driving the violence in Oromia?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474614/original/file-20220718-16-r6d178.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Oromo women protest against Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed over violence in their homeland in 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keith Mayhew via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In November 2020 an outbreak of violence in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/02/ethiopia-1900-people-killed-in-massacres-in-tigray-identified">Ethiopia’s Tigray region</a> captured worldwide attention. The conflict was between Tigrayan forces and the forces of the Ethiopian government and its allies. </p>
<p>Since then, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has been under <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/abiy-walks-fine-line-in-possible-peace-talks-in-ethiopia-20220619">increasing global pressure</a> to negotiate with Tigrayan officials to stop the carnage in the region. </p>
<p>Even before fighting broke out in Tigray, though, the government had established military command posts in Oromia, Ethiopia’s largest state. Oromo people were <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">protesting</a> and calling for self-determination. </p>
<p>In Oromia’s latest wave of violence in June 2022, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/program/inside-story/2022/6/25/whats-behind-the-recent-ethnic-violence-in-ethiopia">Al Jazeera</a>, the <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/more-than-200-feared-dead-in-ethiopia-massacre/">New York Times</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-says-gunmen-killed-338-people-oromiya-region-june-2022-06-30/">Reuters</a> reported that hundreds of people had been killed by the Oromo Liberation Army in Wallaga, Oromia.</p>
<p>These news reports labelled all the victims Amharas, members of Ethiopia’s second-largest ethno-national group. The Oromo are the largest. </p>
<p>As a scholar of Ethiopian politics and society, I’ve <a href="https://works.bepress.com/asafa_jalata/">researched and written extensively</a> on the Oromo movement, and identified the historical forces that have shaped its current politics. </p>
<p>My understanding – taking into account the history of oppression of the Oromo in Ethiopia and numerous reports by rights groups of attacks against the community – is that the violence in Oromia is mainly driven by the federal government and its agents. The <a href="https://olacommunique.com/">Oromo Liberation Army</a> is responding to state terrorism and gross human rights violations.</p>
<p>Oromo voices are <a href="https://minorityrights.org/minorities/oromo/">not represented</a> in the Ethiopian government, the global system or the media. The federal government and its allies, particularly Amhara elites and forces, blame the Oromo movement for the violence. This is a <a href="https://borkena.com/2022/06/24/creeping-genocide-in-ethiopia-dawit-w-giorgis/">strategy</a> to delegitimise the Oromo struggle for self-determination. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/genocide-in-ethiopia-why-answering-the-question-will-be-a-challenge-160872">Genocide in Ethiopia? Why answering the question will be a challenge</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Oromo identity</h2>
<p>The Oromo <a href="https://www.unrepresentedunitednations.org/en/unrepresented-united-nations-directory/oromo-en">consider themselves a nation</a>. They are estimated to make up between 35% and 50% of Ethiopia’s <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ethiopia-population">115 million people</a>. An exact figure is difficult to come by as the government doesn’t provide this data. </p>
<p>Ethiopia has about 80 ethno-national groups. The Amhara make up about 27% of the population. Their language, culture, history and religion have dominated other ethno-national groups. Their warlords and leaders have dominated Ethiopia’s political economy for almost 150 years. </p>
<p>Despite their numbers, the Oromo consider themselves colonial subjects. This is because, like other subjugated ethno-national groups, they have been denied access to their country’s political, economic and cultural resources. </p>
<p>Habasha (Amhara-Tigray) warlords <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Invention-Ethiopia-Dependent-Colonial-Northeast/dp/093241558X">colonised</a> Oromia. The region was then incorporated into Abyssinia (the Ethiopian Empire) in the late 19th century. </p>
<p>Menelik II, the Ethiopian emperor, established a form of colonialism that settled Amhara, Tigrayan and other ethnic soldiers in Oromia. Most Oromos were reduced to serfs, providing free labour and tax revenue.</p>
<p>The colonial government claimed about three-quarters of Oromo lands for its officials and soldiers. It granted the remaining quarter to Oromo collaborators.</p>
<p>In the 1970s, to oppose political, economic and cultural marginalisation, Oromo nationalists created the Oromo Liberation Front. Its military wing is the Oromo Liberation Army. They wanted national self-determination and democracy, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/mar/13/freedom-oromo-activists-qeerroo-ethiopia-standstill">participated</a> in the failed revolutions of 1974, 1991 and 2018. </p>
<p>The Ethiopian state has continued to subject the Oromo people to violence and human rights violations. Successive Ethiopian governments have <a href="https://www.scirp.org/pdf/SM20110100003_59514457.pdf">caused</a> deep social, political, cultural and economic crises in Oromo society.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ethiopians-are-losing-faith-in-abiys-promises-for-peace-126440">Why Ethiopians are losing faith in Abiy's promises for peace</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Drivers of violence</h2>
<p>The government and the Oromo Liberation Front have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/5/new-killings-in-ethiopias-oromia">blamed each other</a> for the latest outbreak of violence in Oromia, particularly in Wallaga.</p>
<p>A sub-group of the Oromo, the Macha, live in Wallaga. They have been targets of the Ethiopian government and expansionist Amharas, who <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2X2UIvv6Jac">claim</a> to be the original owners of the region. </p>
<p>During the famine of the 1970s, desperate Tigrayans, Amharas and Oromos from elsewhere settled in Wallaga. Amhara expansionists began to call all these people Amharas to justify their claim to the territory.</p>
<p>Prime Minister Ahmed has <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2021/01/23/the-peace-that-delivered-total-war-against-tigray/">taken the side</a> of Amhara expansionists. </p>
<p>Ahmed came to power in 2018 mainly because of the Oromo struggle but later <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-oromos-insight-idUSKCN1N7108">turned against</a> the movement. His vision is of a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/12/7/abiys-efforts-to-unify-ethiopia-could-lead-to-its-disintegration">centralised state</a> rather than self-determination for Ethiopia’s different groups. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/eritrea-is-involved-in-tigray-to-boost-its-stature-why-the-strategy-could-backfire-175591">Eritrea is involved in Tigray to boost its stature. Why the strategy could backfire</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The state’s <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/oromia-and-ethiopia-state-formation-and-ethnonational-conflict-1868-2004/oclc/938275015?referer=di&ht=edition">ideology</a> of “Ethiopianism” has been used to justify the subordination of the Oromo and other colonised peoples. It has empowered the class that dominates the bureaucracy, army, culture, Orthodox Christianity and Ethiopian colonial-political economy.</p>
<p>The Oromo Liberation Army, which has been <a href="https://apnews.com/article/africa-race-and-ethnicity-kenya-ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-16cef83f823be6f0d485d9e8eddd4792">outlawed and labelled a terror group</a>, asserts that the government has created a clandestine security structure that <a href="https://olacommunique.com/2022/06/20/the-abiy-regimes-militia-are-responsible-for-the-tole-massacre-of-west-wollega/">masquerades</a> as the Oromo army. It says this structure is responsible for the latest attack and those before it.</p>
<p>Between December 2018 and December 2019, in southern Oromia, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/may/29/ethiopias-security-forces-accused-of-torture-evictions-and-killings-report">government soldiers</a> displaced 80,000 Oromos and detained more than 10,000. </p>
<p>An Amnesty International <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/05/ethiopia-rape-extrajudicial-executions-homes-set-alight-in-security-operations-in-amhara-and-oromia/">report</a> found that state soldiers executed 52 people over this period on suspicion that they supported the Oromo Liberation Army. </p>
<p>The government additionally took incarcerated Oromos through mandatory training for several months. These detainees were trained on the constitution and the history of the Oromo people. These “lessons” were intended to get the detainees to abandon the quest for nationalism.</p>
<p>A July 2022 Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/04/ethiopias-other-conflict">report</a> termed the government’s actions in western Oromia “abusive”. It documented communication shutdowns, executions and arbitrary detentions. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>The global community must pressure the Ethiopian government to reach peace with the Oromo Liberation Army. However, this will only be successful if a neutral body mediates on behalf of the United Nations. </p>
<p>Ahmed’s government is willing to negotiate with the Tigrayan defence forces mainly because of the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/ethiopia-giving-talks-chance">pressure</a> from global powers. However, it refuses to reconcile with the Oromo Liberation Front and is determined to solve a political problem militarily. </p>
<p>Ethiopia cannot be at peace without an independent reconciliation body that solves the Oromo political problem fairly and democratically.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187035/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asafa Jalata does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ethiopia’s largest region is pushing for self-determination - it hasn’t gone down well with Abiy Ahmed’s vision of a centralised state.Asafa Jalata, Professor of Sociology and Global and Africana Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1818662022-05-09T13:35:17Z2022-05-09T13:35:17ZFamine in Ethiopia: the roots lie in Eritrea’s long-running feud with Tigrayans<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461524/original/file-20220505-14-mcsp8r.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman receives food aid at a distribution centre in Ethiopia. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jemal Countess/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The war in northern Ethiopia that began in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">November 2020</a> has left millions in Tigray on the brink of famine. </p>
<p><a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/aid-convoys-ethiopias-tigray-truce-180227148.html?guccounter=1">Reports</a> suggest that nearly 40% of the region’s six million inhabitants face “an extreme lack of food”. Shortages have forced aid workers to deliver medicines and other crucial supplies “sometimes by foot”. </p>
<p>A few convoys have been allowed to enter Tigray, but the United Nations <a href="https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/ethiopia">says</a> convoys of at least 115 trucks are required daily, yet the entire region is classified “hard to reach”. This indicates that it is effectively inaccessible. </p>
<p>This is not the result of a natural disaster: it is a famine induced by the closure of the borders of Tigray by Ethiopian, Eritrean and Somali forces, reinforced by militia from Ethiopia’s Amhara and Afar ethnic groups. </p>
<p>Since the Tigrayans’ army <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/20/tplf-rebels-announce-retreat-to-ethiopias-tigray-region">retreated</a> into their region in December 2021, they have been surrounded by armies that have blockaded Tigray. </p>
<p>A handful of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/aid-convoy-enters-ethiopian-territory-controlled-by-tigray-forces-first-time-3-2022-04-01/">aid convoys</a> have been allowed through. They have been far fewer than the humanitarian assistance required daily to feed the population. </p>
<p>The blockade and resulting famine are well recognised. What is poorly understood are the origins of this crisis. </p>
<p>They lie in a bitter feud between Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki and Tigrayans that dates back to the 1970s, and the president’s determination not to allow them to rebuild their forces by cutting their supply lines to Sudan. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2021.1981630?src=&journalCode=rusi20">paper</a> I wrote last year, <a href="https://eritreahub.org/the-tigray-famine-lessons-from-1984-85">I revisited this history</a>, in particular the seminal moment in relations between the Eritrean and Tigrayan liberation movements. </p>
<h2>Lessons from the 1983-1985 famine</h2>
<p>The Ethiopian famine of 1983 to 1985 was the result of a combination of a devastating drought and a ferocious war as Eritreans fought for their independence and Tigrayans for their rights. </p>
<p>Both liberation movements used a lifeline through Sudan to provide aid to millions. They also brought in supplies essential for their war efforts. </p>
<p>It is the memory of the utility of these supply lines that explains why the Eritrean, Ethiopian and Somali <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-another-regional-alliance-what-the-horn-needs">alliance</a> fought so hard to sever ties between Tigray and Sudan when the current conflict began in November 2020. </p>
<p>Their aim was clear: to cut possible routes to Sudan, as well as meet the grievances of the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/28/ethiopia-tigray-war-amhara-abiy-ahmed-expansionism/">Amhara community,</a> who claimed that Western Tigray was part of its ancestral lands. </p>
<p>Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/11/ethiopia-unlawful-shelling-tigray-urban-areas">reported</a> that the attack on Humera (at the tri-point of Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea) began on 9 November 2020. Within two days, the town was in the hands of the invading forces. </p>
<p>Tigrayan forces were forced northwards and eastwards. Tens of thousands of Tigrayan civilians were <a href="https://www.iom.int/news/over-1-million-people-displaced-due-conflict-northern-ethiopia-iom-dtm">forcibly expelled</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-people-from-war-torn-tigray-told-us-about-the-state-of-their-lives-amid-the-war-180594">What people from war-torn Tigray told us about the state of their lives amid the war</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Afwerki’s determination to crush the Tigrayans – who are, after all, the government of a region in a neighbouring state – needs unravelling. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2003.9659773">enmity</a> between the Afwerki-led Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) – now renamed the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice – and the governing Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) is longstanding, complex and visceral. </p>
<h2>A toxic fued between rebel groups</h2>
<p>Afwerki’s loathing came about because of deep-seated differences over political strategy, which originated in student politics in Addis Ababa in the <a href="https://africaworldpressbooks.com/without-troops-and-tanks-humanitarian-intervention-in-ethiopia-and-eritrea-by-mark-duffield-john-prendergast-hardcover/">1970s</a>. But – perhaps above all else – there was the question of which liberation movement was the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/peasant-revolution-in-ethiopia/E3B7988793DC3063511E3765B026EE16">region’s ‘top dog’</a>. </p>
<p>This feud festered over time, but came to the fore at the worst possible moment: the famine that struck Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa in 1983 to 1985. Their quarrel peaked just as huge quantities of aid were being trucked from Sudan into the remote areas of Eritrea and Tigray held by the respective liberation movements. </p>
<p>Both rebel groups had established relief subsidiaries – the Eritrean Relief Association and the Relief Society of Tigray – to work with international humanitarian organisations to provide the resources needed to feed their people. They were remarkably successful. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-legal-implications-of-humanitarian-aid-blockades-154847">The legal implications of humanitarian aid blockades</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Some three-quarters of a million tonnes of supplies, worth around $350 million at the time, were transported into rebel-held areas from Sudan before, during and after the famine, from 1981 to 1991. </p>
<p>The relief operation was not immune to divisions between the Eritrean and Tigrayan political organisations that had established them. </p>
<p>In the mid-1980s, these divisions spilled over into an open dispute. There was a complete <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/10149208-historical-dictionary-of-eritrea">suspension of communication</a> between the Eritrean and Tigrayan liberation fronts from 1985 to 1988. </p>
<p>Afwerki, determined to show the Tigrayans that the Eritrean movement was the most powerful actor in the region, ordered his forces in 1985 to cut the road through territory they held and on which vital supplies from Sudan got into Tigray.</p>
<p>Closing the border became etched on Tigrayan consciousness. Recalling the suffering the Eritreans inflicted, a Tigrayan leader <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/abs/alemseged-abay-identity-jilted-or-reimagining-identity-the-divergent-paths-of-the-eritrean-and-tigrayan-nationalist-struggles-trenton-nj-red-sea-press-1998-232-pp-1499-isbn-1-56902-072-8-paperback/5EFF1C492081169A49828C0EAB235BB7">declared</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I do not hesitate to categorise it a ‘savage act’. It must be recorded in history like that! </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Tekleweini Assefa, the head of the Relief Society of Tigray, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/abs/alemseged-abay-identity-jilted-or-reimagining-identity-the-divergent-paths-of-the-eritrean-and-tigrayan-nationalist-struggles-trenton-nj-red-sea-press-1998-232-pp-1499-isbn-1-56902-072-8-paperback/5EFF1C492081169A49828C0EAB235BB7">made clear</a> the bitterness he felt about the Eritrean front’s decision.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>They closed the road for about two years and we had no access to the Sudan for one month until we built a new road ourselves. And that was at the height of the famine!</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Tigrayan movement was forced to march more than 100,000 Tigrayans across the difficult terrain of western Tigray into Sudan where they could receive international assistance. Many of those who made the journey were old, children, frail or ill. As many as 13,000 people are <a href="http://www.harep.org/Africa/7219.pdf">reported</a> to have died along the way. </p>
<p>Relations were eventually repaired and the two movements went on to coordinate their offensives against the Ethiopian government. This culminated in the capture of their respective capitals in coordinated operations in 1991. The Eritrean liberation front was in power in Eritrea, while the Tigrayan front led a coalition government in Ethiopia. </p>
<p>But the rift never really healed. Rather, the wounds festered, leading to the disastrous <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44004212">Ethiopia-Eritrea border war</a> of 1998 to 2000. It also underlies Afwerki’s unwavering determination to destroy the Tigrayans as a political force. </p>
<h2>Unresolved tensions</h2>
<p>In 2018, Afwerki welcomed the end of the Tigray-led government and the entry of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea was <a href="https://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/ethiopia-and-eritrea-sign-peace-agreement-in-saudi-arabia/">sealed</a> in Saudi Arabia on 16 September 2018. </p>
<p>However, Afwerki continued to plot against the Tigrayans. In his <a href="http://www.afrikakomitee.ch/eritrea/2018_08_Eritrea-Ethiopia.pdf">2018 speech</a> to the Eritrean nation, he declared that <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Politics-of-Contemporary-Ethiopia-Ethnic-Federalism-and-Authoritarian/Gedamu/p/book/9781032029047">their loss of power</a> had critical implications for the region and that the “TPLF’s toxic and malignant legacy” needed to be removed. It was an attitude that contributed to the November 2020 war. </p>
<p>But Afwerki knew from experience that winning that war required cutting the links between Tigray and Sudan. </p>
<p>Western Tigray, linking the region and Sudan, remains the most deeply contested question and will be extraordinarily difficult to resolve. It is claimed by both the Tigrayan and Amhara people. </p>
<p>Whoever holds Western Tigray holds the future of Tigray. This is the key lesson from the famine of 1983-85 and one reason it is such a complex question. As the Crisis Group <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/building-ethiopias-fragile-truce">put it</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The future of Amhara-occupied Western Tigray is the thorniest issue to resolve.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181866/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Plaut is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Commonwealth Studies of the University of London</span></em></p>The origins of Ethiopia’s food crisis can be traced to a bitter feud between Eritrean and Tigrayan liberation fighters.Martin Plaut, Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1774712022-03-28T15:12:55Z2022-03-28T15:12:55ZWar in Ethiopia: addressing mental health needs to be made a priority<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448331/original/file-20220224-23-1r9ngbz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopian refugees fleeing the Tigray region.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The effects of war on the mental wellbeing of people is given much less attention than the physical harms of conflict.</p>
<p>We have been <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27036945/">researching</a> and working on the <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s12889-020-8293-9">mental health challenges faced by different sub-populations</a>.
In a recent opinion piece in The Lancet our group applied some of our earlier findings to the situation in Ethiopia.</p>
<p>The country is the second most populous in Africa. It has a total population of approximately 115 million and 12 administrative regions. <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanpsy/article/PIIS2215-0366(22)00013-X/fulltext#bib1">Conflict broke out</a> in late 2020 between the central government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. The war has been ongoing ever since, with battles spreading out to the regions of Afar and Amhara.</p>
<p>Mental health problems are major indirect consequences of armed conflicts. They can have short-term and long-term effects on the wellbeing of individuals living in war-affected areas. </p>
<p>In a new report the World Health Organization (WHO) <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673619309341">estimates</a> a high burden of mental health problems in conflict settings. This includes depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder and schizophrenia.</p>
<p>There has been limited data on the potential mental health consequences of the war in Ethiopia. To try and bridge the gap we applied the WHO’s estimates to the populations in the war-affected regions of Afar and Amhara in the country. </p>
<p>What we found suggests that a minimum of 28, 560 individuals are facing severe forms of mental health disorders that require immediate intervention. Of these 12, 566 are children and 14, 565 are women.</p>
<p>Treatment of these people has been impossible. The war led to <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(22)00337-3/fulltext?dgcid=raven_jbs_etoc_email">the damage and looting</a> of more than 40 hospitals, 453 health centres, 1,850 health posts in Amhara and one hospital, 17 health centres and 42 health posts in the Afar region. </p>
<p>We argue that the burden of mental disorders and their short-term and long-term consequences in communities in the war-affected regions of Amhara and Afar should be a priority in the post-war period. </p>
<p>Given the large population in need of mental health interventions in northern Ethiopia, there is an urgent need to offer effective collaborative care that’s affordable and accessible. </p>
<h2>The impact</h2>
<p>Over 12 months of sustained conflict has resulted in massive internal displacement, homelessness, financial and family loss, and disruption of the culture and values of millions of people living in Amhara and Afar.</p>
<p>Several <a href="https://www.fanabc.com/english/terrorist-tplf-destroys-historical-church-heritage-sites-of-checheho-medhanealem-cathedral/">religious institutions</a> that have been playing a crucial role in maintaining public resilience and the mental wellbeing of the community have been destroyed. This has been in the absence of government and community-based facilities, which have been looted.</p>
<p>Women and children have borne the brunt of the conflict. This can be directly due to violence or indirectly due to various health consequences.</p>
<p>All of these issues exacerbate the mental health problems of individuals living in the war-affected regions and indirectly affect their families and friends. </p>
<p>Another adversity that could increase the risk of mental health problems in the population is gender-based acts of violence and assault. This includes <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/15/africa/amnesty-ethiopia-tigray-report-intl/index.html">rape and gang rape</a>. </p>
<p>The intergenerational effects of armed conflict are also of concern. Sexual violence can lead to family breakdown, leaving children unattended, uncared for, and traumatised throughout their childhood and adulthood.</p>
<h2>What can be done</h2>
<p>Awareness raising, psychoeducation, skills training, rehabilitation, and psychological treatments are considered effective interventions in post-war settings. These <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11920-019-1017-0">could be provided</a> in homes, schools, communities, and religious and health institutions. </p>
<p>In addition: training health care workers, leaders and educators; using social or community support as well as methods that are sensitive to people’s faith and culture, and equipping them with the knowledge and competency to provide trauma-informed care. The engagement of community leaders – such as religious leaders, elders and public figures – and the use of cultural institutions, would further help these interventions to reach the broader population. </p>
<p>Several UN agencies (the UN Population Fund, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF, WHO, and the International Organization for Migration) have been actively working to identify women affected by different types of violence, and training community-based counsellors who provide dignity kits and psychological support such as counselling in the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/unfpa_extsitrep_15-31_august_tigrayresponse.pdf">Tigray region</a>. </p>
<p>These post-war mental health services should also be scaled up for affected populations in Amhara and Afra regions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177471/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mental health problems are major indirect consequences of armed conflicts and can have short-term and long-term effects on people.Abel Fekadu Dadi, Outstanding Future Researcher, Menzies School of Health ResearchTesfaye B. Mersha, PhD, Associate Professor, UC Department of Pediatrics, Cincinnati Children's, University of Cincinnati Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1647142021-07-20T14:42:30Z2021-07-20T14:42:30ZAs Ethiopia and Tigray face tough options, the West needs to be even-handed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412109/original/file-20210720-17-1jukg29.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed arrives to cast his vote during the country's parliamentary elections in Beshasha, Oromia, in June.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Stringer/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>War broke out in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/19/ethiopia-says-its-forces-closing-in-on-tigray-capital">Tigray in November 2020</a>, pitting the Ethiopian National Defence Force alongside Eritrea against the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front. </p>
<p>The conflict has caused <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/02/ethiopia-1900-people-killed-in-massacres-in-tigray-identified">colossal damage </a> to human life, economy and the nation’s social fabric. Following the government’s recent <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/28/ethiopian-government-agrees-immediate-ceasefire-in-tigray">declaration of a unilateral ceasefire</a> the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front has declared a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/06/29/world/tigray-ethiopia">victory</a>. </p>
<p>After two weeks of relative calm, another round of war <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-14/ethiopia-s-tigray-conflict-deepens-as-abiy-s-cease-fire-fails">is on the horizon</a>. The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front is claiming that it’s determined to “liberate” Tigray from the “occupation” of the Amhara and federal forces. For its part, the government has also declared that it will <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/ethiopia-s-abiy-vows-to-crush-tigray-fighters-3478012">vanquish</a> Tigrayan forces once and for all. </p>
<p>TPLF is emboldened by the support of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-official-warns-washington-will-not-stand-by-face-horrors-tigray-2021-06-29/">international community</a>. But it is already clear from how both sides are regrouping themselves that the second wave of war will open another – and perhaps more devastating – chapter in this tragic saga. The question is: what is the end game?</p>
<p>Several factors could be in play in charting out the next phase. This includes a constitutional arrangement which gives Tigray the right to self-determination including cessation – becoming an independent country. But they might have not achieved unanimity in the Tigrayan camp on this yet.</p>
<p>Another element that could influence the outcome is the continued palpable animosity between individual politicians in both isles. This could get in the way of any dialogue.</p>
<p>And lastly, many Tigrayans see themselves as an integral part – indeed a founding part – of Ethiopia. </p>
<p>So how could the future unfold?</p>
<h2>Secession</h2>
<p>The first possible scenario is secession. In his interview with The New York Times Debretsion Gebremichael, the Vice President of Tigrayan Regional State, cast doubt on Tigray’s future as a part of Ethiopia. He claimed that “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/03/world/africa/tigray-leader-interview-ethiopia.html">the trust has been broken completely</a>”. </p>
<p>If the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front opts for this, it will have to get over several hurdles. The first is internal. It’s not clear all the members of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front leadership would endorse secession because there are some moderates among them. Influential figures – including the commander of rebel forces Tsadkan Gebretensae, and perhaps, Debretsion himself – might see this war as a means of finding a more favourable settlement for the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front within Ethiopia rather than secession. </p>
<p>Secondly, Tigrayans pride themselves on being the birthplace of Ethiopia’s statehood, religion and civilisation. This would make walking away from the federation hard.</p>
<p>The third hurdle is political and economic. </p>
<p>Politically, if Tigray seceded it would be landlocked. It would also be surrounded by hostile nations in the north (Eritrea) and south (Ethiopia). It could, conceivably, open a corridor through Sudan to connect with more friendly countries. But, in the long run, Sudan would benefit more from a strong relationship with Ethiopia given the country’s resources. </p>
<p>The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front has made it clear that it is determined to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopias-amhara-region-vows-go-offensive-new-phase-civil-war-looms-2021-07-14/">reclaim disputed territory</a> in the west - which is fertile farmland - from Amhara regional forces. This might have to do with ensuring food security as a stepping stone for secession. However, the reclaiming process would be contentious, and possibly even bloody, if it happens at all, because the regional government of Amhara is as determined to retain it. </p>
<p>The West seems to be on their side for now. But, for one, it is not clear for how long the support from the West will last. For another, the disintegration of the federation that makes up Ethiopia might not be the best outcome for the West because it could have a catastrophic impact on the region. Full-blown political chaos in <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/81417/ethiopia-eritrea-somalia-djibouti-the-constant-instability-in-the-horn-of-africa/">an already volatile Horn of Africa</a> means that the region would become fertile ground for extremist groups. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, cessation is an extreme scenario, but it is not far-fetched. </p>
<h2>Controlling the centre</h2>
<p>Controlling the centre of power in Ethiopia might be another bridge that’s too far for the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, which, they might think, can be realised through Western <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/27/us-official-condemns-violence-in-tigray-warns-of-new-sanctions">support</a>. This is rooted in the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19332646">West’s historical alliance</a> with former Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. The intellectual legacy and the diplomatic network he left behind has proven to be very beneficial to the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front in garnering support from the West. </p>
<p>It is becoming <a href="https://euobserver.com/world/152370">increasingly clear</a> that Western powers want the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front as part of Ethiopia’s future. It is not clear, however, if they envisage this within Ethiopian Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy’s administration or without it. </p>
<p>But at what cost? </p>
<p>If the West is determined to resurrect its trusted client to control the centre of Ethiopian politics it could unleash other ethno-federalist forces – especially in Oromia – who might be willing to forge an alliance with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front. In addition, former satellite groups embedded in each ethnic group could be reactivated, increasing tension and possibility of conflict.</p>
<p>Another related risk is if the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front comes back riding on foreign support. This could create a sense of resentment. Abiy Ahmed, is still popular in some regions, including in parts of Oromia, Amhara region and the capital Addis Ababa. The recent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/10/prosperity-party-declared-winners-of-ethiopian-election">elections </a>, however imperfect, are a testament to the fact he has the popular mandate. </p>
<p>However, the government in Addis Ababa remains vulnerable despite winning the elections. This war has been riddled with miscalculations and blunders on both sides. The government promised to end the military campaign in weeks. It hasn’t done so.</p>
<h2>A constructive option – dialogue</h2>
<p>Violence has brought tremendous loss. People need peace, security and a return to normal life. </p>
<p>It would, therefore, be wise for both sides to pursue a more fruitful direction.</p>
<p>Both parties need to commit to a ceasefire. This should start with putting an end to branding each other as “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/28/ethiopia-tigray-war-amhara-abiy-ahmed-expansionism/">expansionist</a>” or “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nnLD9QB01kA">terrorist</a>. Such narratives create excuses for violence”. </p>
<p>A settlement only happens when politicians put their egos aside and heed the plight of the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/194a494a-e596-4dbe-a21e-f7e9d8daed92">suffering people</a> – the big losers in this tragic war. </p>
<p>This should lead to dialogue as to how to reconfigure the union of the nation. More importantly, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front would be wise to reinvent itself as an opposition party that leads a peaceful struggle. The only choice should not be between either taking the control of the government or leading the whole nation to an endless abyss. The voice of Tigrayans need to be represented - Ethiopia without Tigrayans is not complete. Leaders of the central government should do away with dehumanising rhetoric.</p>
<p>For its part, instead of fanning the flames, the West needs to be even-handed in bringing the warring sides to the table.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164714/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohammed Girma is affiliated with International Bible Advocacy Centre (IBAC).</span></em></p>Instead of fanning the flames, the West needs to be even-handed in bringing the warring sides to the table.Mohammed Girma, Visiting Lecturer, University of RoehamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1314912020-02-24T13:19:34Z2020-02-24T13:19:34ZSocial norms stop Ethiopian girls from making safe choices about pregnancy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/315298/original/file-20200213-11005-1ldto3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Most young, married girls in Ethiopia don't have the family planning information they need. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Despite progress in reducing the rate of adolescent pregnancy, more than <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/publications/adolescent-pregnancy">16 million</a> adolescent girls globally become parents each year. According to the World Health Organisation, 90% of these young mothers live in the global South. </p>
<p>Girls in countries with the highest adolescent fertility rates, many of which are in <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/publications/adolescent-pregnancy">sub-Saharan Africa</a>, are also the most likely to be malnourished without access to quality maternity care or safe abortions. This leads to complications and consequences that can last a lifetime. </p>
<p>Maternity is a <a href="https://apps.who.int/adolescent/second-decade/files/1612_MNCAH_HWA_Executive_Summary.pdf">leading cause</a> of disability for girls aged 15-19, according to the World Health Organisation. </p>
<p>The maternal mortality rate for girls under 16 years is around four times that of women in their early <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15695970">20s</a>. In low and middle-income countries, the overwhelming majority of adolescent pregnancies occur in marriage. </p>
<p>In developing countries, an <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/530891498511398503/pdf/116829-WP-P151842-PUBLIC-EICM-Global-Conference-Edition-June-27.pdf">estimated 75%</a> of babies born each day to girls under the age of 18 are born to those who are already married. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.gage.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Adolescent-health-nutrition-and-sexual-and-reproductive-health-in-Ethiopia-1.pdf">report</a> on Ethiopia released last year corroborates this. In Ethiopia <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/SR241/SR241.pdf">60%</a> of girls are married by the age of 18. This is a significant factor in the high rate of pregnancy among 15 to 19 year olds.</p>
<p>However, many adolescent girls don’t get the care they need. Free contraceptives are available in most communities in Ethiopia, but many girls lack social access because of conservative <a href="https://www.gage.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Adolescent-health-nutrition-and-sexual-and-reproductive-health-in-Ethiopia-1.pdf">cultural and religious norms</a>. A dominant norm is that girls need to give birth as quickly as possible after marriage to <a href="https://www.gage.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Adolescent-health-nutrition-and-sexual-and-reproductive-health-in-Ethiopia-1.pdf">prove their fertility</a>.</p>
<p>Adolescent girls and community health workers also <a href="https://www.gage.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Adolescent-health-nutrition-and-sexual-and-reproductive-health-in-Ethiopia-1.pdf">report</a> that service providers — contrary to their official mandate — are also unwilling to provide advice on contraceptives because of these powerful norms.</p>
<p>What this means is that young, married girls too often don’t get the family planning information they need. They also don’t get support in negotiating with their husbands and families to take control of their own fertility. </p>
<h2>What we found</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.gage.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Adolescent-health-nutrition-and-sexual-and-reproductive-health-in-Ethiopia-1.pdf">research in Ethiopia</a> found that access to contraceptive information and supplies varies by region, but that cultural and gender norms are still a barrier to use of contraception even where it is made available. </p>
<p>As one 14-year-old married girl <a href="https://www.gage.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Adolescent-health-nutrition-and-sexual-and-reproductive-health-in-Ethiopia-1.pdf">explained</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I am not using (family planning) now – before I have one child. If you stay without a child for a longer time, they will tell you, you are barren. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Our evidence highlights that these realities need to inform efforts to reduce adolescent pregnancies and improve maternal and child health.</p>
<h2>What can be done</h2>
<p>Gender and Adolescence: Global Evidence <a href="https://www.gage.odi.org">research</a>, a longitudinal research initiative in low and middle-income countries, focuses on the consequences of early motherhood and reviewed some of the strategies already in place in some regions of Ethiopia. </p>
<p>We found promising practices in Amhara, a rural area in northern Ethiopia which has historically had the lowest average age of marriage. These included the <a href="https://globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12992-019-0470-1">expansion</a> of a health extension programme, in which the government funds training for female secondary school graduates and employs them to deliver health care in rural regions. </p>
<p>Another good example is the <a href="https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/9/5/e025937">Women’s Development Army</a>, a government-supported initiative involving women volunteers. It spreads messages about family planning and maternal care at the grassroots level. </p>
<p>Another effective model was developed in Amhara <a href="https://www.care.org/work/health/sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-rights/what-we-do/adolescent-health/tesfa">to improve</a> relationships between young women, their husbands and in-laws, to increase their uptake of contraceptives. <a href="https://www.care-international.org/">Care International</a>, a non-profit organisation working to end poverty by empowering women and girls, did this by engaging with community gatekeepers such as religious leaders, health workers and village elders to critically reflect on gender norms and find ways to support girls’ groups.</p>
<p>These strategies have helped improve outcomes for girls in Amhara. Our report found that adolescents there were more likely to identify a form of family planning than in other study localities.</p>
<p>There’s an urgent need to scale these efforts to tackle both adolescent pregnancy and early marriage. </p>
<p>But there are still obstacles to severing the link between marriage and early motherhood. In Oromia in central Ethiopia, girls <a href="https://www.gage.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Adolescent-health-nutrition-and-sexual-and-reproductive-health-in-Ethiopia-1.pdf">reported</a> fears about contraceptive use. Some cited concerns that it could make them ill, cause their hair to fall out and make them permanently infertile. </p>
<p>These fears, combined with a lack of access to reliable sexual and reproductive health information, low education rates and the pervasive social norms linking adolescent marriage and early childbirth, are all driving high adolescent fertility rates. </p>
<p>Another major barrier to breaking the link between marriage and early motherhood is in situations where large families are considered economically important. This is the case in pastoralist communities such as in Afar, a north east region of the country. </p>
<p>All these dynamics underline the need to continue to address the wider set of social norms that underpin early adolescent fertility while promoting access to education and female role models who have made different life choices. This must happen alongside the expansion of adolescent-friendly sexual and reproductive health services.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131491/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kate Pincock works for the Gender and Adolescence: Global Evidence programme. She has previously received funding from UKRI.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicola Jones, is a principal research fellow at the Overseas Development Institute and the director of the Gender and Adolescent: Global Evidence (GAGE) programme, which receives funding from the UK Department for International Development’s Research and Evaluation Division.</span></em></p>Over 60% of girls in Ethiopia are married by the age of 18. Many don’t have support in negotiating with their husbands and families to take control of their own fertility.Kate Pincock, Research Associate, Refugees Studies Centre, University of OxfordNicola Jones, Research Fellow, Overseas Development InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/973862018-06-03T09:21:18Z2018-06-03T09:21:18ZEthiopia’s Ahmed has inspired calm. But he must act quickly on promises<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221007/original/file-20180530-120487-y9q8ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There are still lingering questions hanging over Ethiopia's Premier Abiy Ahmed.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ethiopia has been rocked by a series of protests over the past <a href="https://www.hrw.org/tag/ethiopian-protests">four years</a>. These <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/ethiopia-mass-protests-rooted-country-history-180219130441837.html">rallied against</a> public corruption, the economic marginalisation of some ethnic groups, and youth unemployment. </p>
<p>The government responded with <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ethiopia-state-emergency-hailemariam-desalegn-siraj-fegessa-a8215271.html">a heavy hand</a>. <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-39619979">Hundreds</a> of lives were lost; businesses and properties were destroyed. Instead of dialogue and fundamental changes, the regime kept on deploying an odd combination of promises of <a href="https://medium.com/@amnestyusa/ethiopia-and-human-rights-reform-another-mirage-for-2018-41109e714c18">reform</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f86aec8a-be01-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080">crackdowns</a>. </p>
<p>The repressive measures gave <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0DItZOY_E0I">common ground</a> to local movements which cropped up in different regions. These included <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/mar/13/freedom-oromo-activists-qeerroo-ethiopia-standstill">Qeerroo of Oromia</a>, <a href="https://www.borkena.com/2018/02/10/three-days-protest-planned-next-week-grenade-attack-debark-gonder/">Fanno of Amhara</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z1XHkgxl2ck">Zerma</a> of Gurague. Anchored on issues rather than personalities, the movements were able to outwit the regime with their narrative and strategy. They blocked the roads and shut businesses, undermining the regime’s ability to control and ensuring the masses were informed of looming government actions. </p>
<p><a href="https://ethsat.com/">Media</a> outlets in the diaspora, energetic <a href="https://www.opride.com/">bloggers</a> and internet savvy youth also provided alternative narratives to the regime’s. </p>
<p>The main casualty from the regime’s side was Prime Minister <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ethiopia-prime-minister-resigns-hailemariam-desalegn-protests-oromia-mass-unrest-a8212106.html">Hailemariam Desalegn</a>. His downfall, however, came with a touch of irony. He was arguably the least corrupt member of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and was keen to purge corrupt leaders. But he was outmanoeuvred and finally resigned in the hope that his departure would pave the way for genuine <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ethiopia-politics/ethiopias-prime-minister-resigns-to-smooth-path-for-political-reform-idUKKCN1FZ1CP">reform</a>.</p>
<p>The interregnum between Hailemariam’s departure and the election of Abiy Ahmed was filled with foreboding. Some warned of the country’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/under-a-new-state-of-emergency-ethiopia-is-on-the-brink-of-crisis-again/2018/03/03/5a887156-1d8f-11e8-98f5-ceecfa8741b6_story.html?utm_term=.cf18f7a66716">imminent collapse</a>.</p>
<p>Ahmed’s appointment has triggered mixed reactions among the anxious establishment and citizens: trust, doubt, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-survival-ruling-eprdf-180528082306152.html">excitement – and fear</a>. </p>
<p>Amid the hope, lingering questions hover over his leadership. Ethiopia would face insurmountable problems if he fails to deliver on his promises. On the other hand, he has the opportunity to forge a new movement that can lead Ethiopia away from identity politics to the politics of ideas. </p>
<h2>Popular tide</h2>
<p>Despite being nurtured within the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, Ahmed doesn’t sound like any of its former leaders. </p>
<p>Unlike the Ethiopian politicians of the last four decades his rhetoric mimics neither <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/little-trace-of-marxism-in-africa/a-43654592">Albanian Marxism</a> nor <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=wLQFDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA63&lpg=PA63&dq=maoism+in+ethiopia&source=bl&ots=KJYpGdiB0v&sig=D7LJCBxYIfFrE6oO_-7jtdtwQE0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiNm-7R2K_bAhWpBcAKHTgcAUsQ6AEIjAEwCw#v=onepage&q=maoism%20in%20ethiopia&f=false">Maoism</a>. He has anchored his story on local cultural innovations.</p>
<p>He comes across as remarkably authentic and engaging. In addition, he has distanced himself, at least in his political outlook, from his party’s maligned old guards. </p>
<p>Amid the turmoil leading up to his election, his routine visits and open conversations with people made them feel their grievances were being heard. The nation, including opposition parties, stopped protesting and started listening.</p>
<p>He also did not hide that reconciliation was his biggest, and the most urgent, project. </p>
<p>But Ahmed remains an enigma. There are lingering doubts about him. For example, the Oromo nationalist movements dislike the that fact he’s from the establishment. At the same time they see reason to protect him because he came out in support of them during a critical period of <a href="https://www.opride.com/2018/04/15/all-that-glitters-is-not-gold-can-ethiopias-new-pm-deliver/">Qeerroo’s movement</a>.</p>
<p>The Fanno movement from Amhara are equally sceptical about him. On his visit to <a href="http://addisstandard.com/commentarythe-birth-of-amhara-nationalism-causes-aspirations-and-potential-impacts/">Gondor and Bahir Dar</a> in Northern Ethiopia he had tense exchanges with the people from the region who didn’t hold back their frustration and anger over economic marginalisation of the Amharas. </p>
<p>But they also feel he can deliver an arrangement of peaceful coexistence between ethnic groups. Ahmed’s speeches about a unitary state are music to the ears of people who have fought for national integration.</p>
<p>Finally, some Tigrayans were quick to air their doubts about his premiership. They pointed out that he wasn’t vocal enough in condemning the alleged atrocities committed against Tigrayans in different regions <a href="https://www.abyssiniadaily.net/ethiopia-residents-of-mekelle-on-abiy-ahmed_0d4dd575c.html">during the protests.</a>. Others said he lacked the experience to occupy the top position in the land. </p>
<p>But they also see him as a calming factor and the voice of <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2018/04/18/ethiopia-a-nation-in-need-of-a-new-story-abiy-ahmed-ethiopiawinet/">moderation</a> precisely because they realise things could have spiralled out of control without his conciliatory voice. </p>
<h2>After the confusion?</h2>
<p>Ahmed has portrayed himself as a great storyteller, unifier, motivator, and at times an “educator-in-chief”. Those qualities were necessary to buy Ethiopians’ patience. The nation has taken time and listened to him. </p>
<p>Now he needs to convert his vision into concrete policies. He has shown signs of resilience in bringing about reconciliation. He pardoned political prisoners including <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/andargachew-tsige-pardoned-ethiopia-180526163642586.html">Andargachew Tsige</a>, a prominent leader of an opposition party, Ginbot 7. Such decisive moves in other areas would enhance public trust in him. </p>
<p>As he moves forward, he needs constructive criticism to keep him grounded. Popular support will also ensure his efforts are not derailed by the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7b3bb0a6-325d-11e8-b5bf-23cb17fd1498">deep state</a>. But he also needs to persuade Ethiopians, in practical terms, that the distance he created between himself and the ruling elites is genuine. Reappointing deeply unpopular members of his party or pardoning former politicians previously convicted of <a href="https://hornaffairs.com/2018/05/25/ethiopia-release-melaku-fenta-and-other-detainess/">corruption</a> would cost him his political capital and make the reform process untenable.</p>
<p>It is also well known that the Ethiopian military, security and judiciary are <a href="https://www.nazret.com/2018/05/13/the-quandary-of-ethiopias-bicephalic-government/">controlled</a> by the Tigrayans People Liberation Front (TPLF). He needs to demonstrate that he can take command of these institutions and ensure they serve the nation independently, in an ideologically neutral way. </p>
<p>His reform efforts are advancing towards the centre of power – controlling military and security. In the last few days, he has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/ethiopia-set-lift-state-emergency-months-early-180602164123443.html">lifted</a> the State of Emergency and challenged the military apparatus to transcend party politics. Such a change has a direct bearing on the freedom of speech and press freedom. Moreover, it also creates a political space to foster active civic participation and ensure accountable governance"</p>
<p>And finally, if he’s serious about forming a unitary state without undermining ethnic identities, he needs to amend the highly contested <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ethiopia_1994.pdf?lang=en">Article 39</a> of the constitution which grants all people of Ethiopia self-determination including the right to secession. This unbalanced emphasis on ethno-nationalism might lead the nation towards possible splintering and balkanisation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97386/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohammed Girma is affiliated with British and Foreign Bible Society.</span></em></p>Ethiopia has taken time and listened to the new prime minister. Now he needs to convert his vision into concrete policiesMohammed Girma, Visiting Lecturer at London School of Theology and Research associate, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/671662016-10-31T18:51:06Z2016-10-31T18:51:06ZEthiopia’s state of emergency: both sides are determined to fight to the finish<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/143416/original/image-20161027-11256-zjn5ma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Demonstrators chant slogans while flashing the Oromo protest gesture during Irreecha, the thanksgiving festival of the Oromo people, in Bishoftu town, Oromia region, Ethiopia, October 2, 2016. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Tiksa Negeri</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Waves of protests have gripped Ethiopia since last <a href="http://ecadforum.com/2015/11/30/oromo-students-protest-in-mattu-ethiopia/">November</a>. In response the government has declared a six month <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2016/10/09/ethiopia-declares-6-months-state-of-emergency-over-oromia-protests/">state of emergency</a>. In an interview with The Conversation Africa’s Samantha Spooner, Asafa Jalata describes the impact of the state of emergency and what it could mean for the future of the country.</em></p>
<p><strong>Who are the main players and what are the main grievances of the Ethiopian protest movement?</strong></p>
<p>The Oromo protest movement emerged in November 2015. It has been fomenting for decades because the Oromo consider themselves <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=cfjYAgAAQBAJ&pg=PR4&dq=isbn:+9004265481&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=colonial%20subjects%20&f=false">colonial subjects</a>. They are the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">largest ethno-national group</a> in Ethiopia and have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">denied</a> equal access to their country’s political, economic and cultural resources.</p>
<p>For almost 25 years Tigrayan state elites have dominated different structures of the government, including the military. They have also had total control over other institutions such as the media. And they have <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UAWrm0ecCTM">confiscated fertile land</a> and other <a href="http://www.ayyaantuu.net/the-oromo-movement-the-effects-of-state-terrorism-and-globalization-in-oromia-and-ethiopia/">valuable resources</a> such as gold and other minerals.</p>
<p>Over the last few months, the protests spread across the country. Other ethno-national groups, which also <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/09/ethiopia-protests-amhara-oromiya/">feel</a> politically and economically excluded by the Tigrayan-led minority government, have also joined the movement. </p>
<p>The Amhara, the second largest ethno-national group, <a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/world/world-news/ethiopias-ethnic-amhara-stage-mass-anti-government-protest-2947164/">started</a> to protest peacefully against the Tigrayan-led minority government in August this year. They <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/who-are-amhara-people-involved-ethiopias-anti-government-protests-1575177">expressed</a> their grievances and support for the Oromo protests in the Amhara regional state. Other ethno-national groups, known as the <a href="http://ecadforum.com/2016/09/14/konso-people-under-attack-by-ethiopian-regime-forces/">Konso</a>, Sidama, and <a href="http://ecadforum.com/2016/10/08/ethiopia-five-people-killed-mosques-attacked-in-dilla/">Gedeo</a> joined more recently. </p>
<p>The protests gained further traction as the state’s reaction became violent. For example, in early October millions of Oromo gathered at Hora Arsadii, south east of Addis Ababa, for “Irreechaa” - the Oromo national holiday of thanksgiving. The Tigrayan-led regime’s army <a href="https://www.opride.com/2016/10/02/irreecha-massacre-several-dozens-feared-dead-bishoftu/">killed</a> more than 700 Oromos and injured hundreds. This was <a href="https://www.opride.com/2016/10/02/irreecha-massacre-several-dozens-feared-dead-bishoftu/">sparked</a> by peaceful, anti-government chants by young Oromos.</p>
<p>After the massacre, Oromo protesters <a href="http://nazret.com/blog/index.php/2016/02/14/ethiopia-oromo-protesters-burned-down">burned</a> property and both locally and internationally owned businesses that had been built on the land seized from the Oromo by Tigrayan state and business elites. </p>
<p>The Ethiopian regime’s response was to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/ethiopia-declares-state-emergency-protests-161009110506730.html">declare</a> the state of emergency. Set to last six months, its aim is to curb the growing anti-government protest movement.</p>
<p><strong>What impact has this state of emergency had on the various communities in the country?</strong></p>
<p>The current state of emergency is the last attempt by the Tigrayan-led regime to stop the Oromo and Amhara protests and to stay in power. The government is therefore <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/ethiopia-declares-state-emergency-101402875.html">using</a> this situation to gain total control over information, use heavy force and <a href="http://www.ayyaantuu.net/the-genocidal-massacres-of-oromos-at-the-irreechaa-fesival-the-lies-of-the-tigre-led-ethiopian-government/">deny</a> the freedom of organisation and association. </p>
<p>As a result, the regions of Oromia, Amhara, Ogaden, Konso, and Gedeo have become <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/firms-attacked-ethiopia-protests-continue-160902064459286.html">conflict zones</a> with the regime indiscriminately imprisoning, looting and <a href="http://ecadforum.com/2016/10/08/ethiopia-five-people-killed-mosques-attacked-in-dilla/">killing</a> protesters.</p>
<p>According to the state of emergency <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/ethiopia-government-unveils-rules-state-emergency-112046842.html">rules</a>, Oromos, Amharas and Konsos have restricted access to media. They are not allowed to listen to radio stations, such as the Oromo Voice Radio, or to watch media channels, like the Oromia Media Network. Ethiopian soldiers are enforcing these rules and have been seizing or breaking satellite dishes. </p>
<p>The emergency rules also <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/ethiopia-government-unveils-rules-state-emergency-112046842.html">prevent</a> citizens from associating with political organisations that the regime has branded as “terrorist”. One of these is the Oromo Liberation Front which was established in 1973 by Oromo nationalists to promote self-determination. </p>
<p>The situation for the Oromo people is dire. For several months the region has been under a crackdown <a href="http://www.ayyaantuu.net/ethiopia-oromia-regional-state-under-siege/">enforced</a> by special police groups and the army known as “Agazi”. According to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/ethiopia0505/">rights organisations</a>, more than 2 000 Oromos have been killed in eleven months. Several thousand more have been imprisoned, tortured, blinded and raped. </p>
<p>The rule of law no longer seems to apply to the Oromo and their supporters. To <a href="http://ecadforum.com/2016/10/06/internet-blocked-in-ethiopia/">hide</a> its crimes from the international community, the regime has blocked the internet and collected phones from thousands of Oromos.</p>
<p>Until the regime is overthrown they will continue to suffer <a href="http://qz.com/781063/ethiopia-runner-feyisa-lilesas-us-press-conference-highlight-the-oromo-protest-crackdown/">immensely</a>. They are being <a href="http://agensir.it/mondo/2016/10/12/ethiopia-state-of-emergency-the-repression-of-the-oromo-people-in-broad-daylight/">excluded</a> from state support in relation to protection, food, shelter, clothing, medicine and other necessary services. </p>
<p><strong>As a group is the Oromo community concerned about their future?</strong></p>
<p>Because the current regime fears the size of the Oromo population, it <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr25/006/2014/en/">tries</a> to minimise their influence through hidden policies and war. The regime has already <a href="https://www.change.org/p/united-nations-human-rights-committee-human-rights-campaign-stop-massacre-of-oromo-people-and-suppression-of-human-rights-in-ethiopia">prevented</a> Oromo representatives from coming into political power through systematic killings, imprisonment or exile. For these reasons, the Oromo are very concerned about their future. </p>
<p>In addition, little looks set to change as a result of external pressure because international powers such as the <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/us-ethiopia-relationship-strong-but-complicated-/2880154.html">United States</a> as well as organisations such as <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/ethiopia">USAID</a> have a close relationship with the regime. This gives rise to concerns within the Oromo community that their grievances will not be heard and that they will not be given support.</p>
<p>Nevertheless the Oromo people are determined to change their status quo and better their future. That is why they <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopia-protests-continue-despite-call-for-calm/3538412.html">continue</a> with their movement, despite massive incidents of death and imprisonment.</p>
<p><strong>What are the prospects for the government and leaders of the protest movement meeting to resolve the political issues between them?</strong></p>
<p>Resolving the conflict requires the implementation of social justice and democracy. But the Ethiopian regime has demonstrated that it will dictate everything to the Oromo people and its leadership through the barrel of the gun. </p>
<p>The Oromo are rejecting this heavy-handed approach. So, in this conflict, there are two options – either the regime must go, and the Oromo be victorious, or the Oromo people must be destroyed to serve the interest of the regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67166/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asafa Jalata does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The current state of emergency in Ethiopia is the last attempt by the Tigrayan-led regime to stop the Oromo and Amhara protests and maintain political power.Asafa Jalata, Professor of Sociology and Global and Africana Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.