tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/cameroon-3572/articlesCameroon – The Conversation2024-03-21T14:35:28Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2238782024-03-21T14:35:28Z2024-03-21T14:35:28ZPangolins in Africa: expert unpacks why millions have been traded illegally and what can be done about it<p>Pangolins are fascinating creatures known for their unique appearance and distinctive scales. They are mammals belonging to the order Pholidota and are <a href="https://www.savepangolins.org/what-is-a-pangolin">native to Africa and Asia</a>. Due to their primary diet of ants and termites, pangolins are often referred to as “scaly anteaters”.</p>
<p>The African pangolin species are dispersed throughout southern, western, central and east Africa. </p>
<p>Pangolins face rapid declines across Asia and Africa, with all eight species classified as <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/mammals/facts/pangolins#:%7E:text=There%20are%20eight%20species%20of,bellied%E2%80%94are%20listed%20as%20vulnerable.">vulnerable, endangered</a>, or critically endangered. They are <a href="https://www.savepangolins.org/threats">threatened</a> by poaching and habitat loss, driven by the demand for their meat and scales.</p>
<p>Pangolins are the <a href="https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2023-02-17-operation-pangolin-launches-save-world-s-most-trafficked-wild-mammal">most trafficked wild mammal in the world</a>. <a href="https://davidshepherd.org/species/pangolins/trade-statement/">Their meat is considered a delicacy</a> in Asia while their scales are also used in traditional medicines, fetching huge sums on the black market. As many as <a href="https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2023-02-17-operation-pangolin-launches-save-world-s-most-trafficked-wild-mammal">8.5 million pangolins</a> are estimated to have been removed from the wild in west and central Africa for the illegal trade between 2014 and 2021. </p>
<p>The trade route analysis of pangolin trafficking <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2665910720300876">points to</a> Lagos as the main connection point both domestically and worldwide, including south-east Asian countries. Malaysia, Laos and Singapore also serve as key transit countries for pangolin-scale shipments from Nigeria.</p>
<p>China and Vietnam are the main <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2665910720300876">destinations for these illegal shipments</a>.</p>
<p>I am a zoologist who’s passionate about the environment and biodiversity conservation. I am also the founder and chair of Pangolin Conservation Guild Nigeria. In my view, effective protection, law enforcement and changes in consumer behaviour are necessary to address the complex drivers of poaching and trafficking.</p>
<h2>What makes pangolins special</h2>
<p>Pangolins are interesting for a number of reasons. </p>
<p><strong>Scales:</strong> Unlike any other mammals, they are covered with keratin scales. This adaptation is a defence against predators. The scales, <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/mammals/facts/pangolins">made of the same material as human fingernails</a>, provide armour-like protection as they curl into a ball when threatened, shielding their vulnerable underbelly. The scales can account for up to <a href="https://www.awf.org/blog/5-things-you-didn%E2%80%99t-know-about-pangolin">20% of a pangolin’s total body weight</a>. A pangolin’s scales are a reminder of the incredible diversity of adaptations in the natural world. </p>
<p><strong>Habitats:</strong> Pangolins, as a group, are also adaptable to different environmental conditions. Their habitats include tropical forests, dry woodlands and savannahs. Some pangolin species, like the white-bellied, are adept climbers and spend much of their time in the canopy, foraging for insects among the branches. These arboreal habits provide them with both food and shelter, as well as protection from ground-dwelling predators. Other pangolin species, such as the ground pangolins, live on the forest floor or in grasslands. They may dig burrows underground where they retreat for rest and safety, particularly during the heat of the day or to escape potential threats.</p>
<p><strong>Defence:</strong> The name “pangolin” <a href="https://www.wwf.org.uk/learn/fascinating-facts/pangolins">originates</a> from the Malay word <em>pengguling</em>, which translates to “rolling up”. They tuck in their head and limbs and curl into a tight ball when faced with danger, wrapping their body in a protective layer of overlapping scales. This has helped pangolins survive predators such as big cats, hyenas and humans. </p>
<p><strong>Diet:</strong> <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9686612/#:%7E:text=The%20food%20of%20pangolins%20in,feeding%20%5B15%2C16%5D.">Pangolins primarily feed on ants and termites</a>, making them essential players in controlling insect populations within their ecosystems. They find the insects using their keen sense of smell and their tongues – which are often longer than their bodies. These long tongues are coated with sticky saliva, allowing them to probe deep into ant and termite nests to extract their prey. Their strong claws are also well-suited for tearing open insect nests and breaking through hard soil to uncover hidden prey. Pangolins’ diets play a crucial role in maintaining the health and stability of their environments.</p>
<h2>Pangolins in Africa</h2>
<p>In west and central Africa, the giant pangolin is distributed in a variety of habitats, including primary and secondary forests, swamp forests and wooded savannahs. Temminck’s pangolin (<em>Smutsia temminckii</em>) is the <a href="https://africanpangolin.org/discover/temmincks-ground-pangolin/#:%7E:text=Smutsia%20temminckii,to%20date%20weighing%2019%20kg">most widely distributed African pangolin</a>, occurring mainly in southern and east Africa. The <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/B9780128155073000083">black-bellied pangolin</a> (<em>Phataginus tetradactyla</em>) is an arboreal pangolin species, and occurs in west and central Africa. The <a href="https://pangolinsg.org/portfolio/white-bellied-pangolin/#:%7E:text=Distribution,%3B%20Togo%3B%20Uganda%3B%20Zambia">white-bellied pangolin</a> (<em>Phataginus tricuspis</em>) is the most frequently encountered pangolin in Africa. The white-bellied pangolin is <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S277281372200018X?via%3Dihub">found in north-central and south-western Nigeria</a>.</p>
<p>In Nigeria, pangolins are found in various habitats, including <a href="https://www.savepangolins.org/what-is-a-pangolin">forests, savannahs and grasslands</a>. Their distribution and abundance in Nigeria are uncertain, highlighting the need for further research and conservation efforts.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/400-000-african-pangolins-are-hunted-for-meat-every-year-why-its-time-to-act-111540">400,000 African pangolins are hunted for meat every year -- why it's time to act</a>
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<p>Lagos, Nigeria’s commercial capital, serves as a hub for the illegal trade of pangolins. It is a transit route to Cameroon and is involved in shipments of pangolins from sub-Saharan Africa to Asia. Cameroon is at <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/peace-poaching-and-pangolins-central-africa">the centre of wildlife trafficking in central Africa</a>. It is both a source country of animal products as well as a transit route for contraband from neighbouring Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic.</p>
<p>In 2022, Nigerian customs officials <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67134651">seized</a> 1,613 tonnes of pangolin scales and arrested 14 people. In October 2023, Nigeria <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-destroys-seized-pangolin-parts-deter-wildlife-trafficking-2023-10-17/">burned</a> four tonnes of seized pangolin scales, valued at US$1.4 million. Officials said this was the first time they had publicly destroyed seized wildlife products to discourage illegal trafficking. </p>
<h2>Why pangolin conservation is important</h2>
<p>Pangolin conservation is crucial for several reasons. </p>
<p>Firstly, pangolins play a vital role in ecosystems by controlling insect populations, particularly ants and termites, which helps maintain ecological balance. </p>
<p>They also contribute to soil health through their digging behaviour, which aerates the soil and promotes nutrient cycling.</p>
<p>Moreover, pangolins are indicators of ecosystem health. Their presence or absence can reflect the overall well-being of their habitats. Protecting pangolins helps safeguard biodiversity and the integrity of their ecosystems.</p>
<p>They also have cultural and economic value in many regions, contributing to ecotourism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223878/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olajumoke Morenikeji is affiliated with the Pangolin Conservation Guild Nigeria, which she founded. The organisation educates and creates awareness on pangolin conservation, conducts scientific research, collaborates with relevant organisations, advises policymakers, and facilitates pangolin rescue, rehabilitation and release into protected forest areas. I also chair the West Africa region International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Species Survival Commission (SSC) Pangolin Specialist Group.</span></em></p>Pangolins are among the most trafficked and poached mammals in the world.Olajumoke Morenikeji, Professor Department of Zoology, University of IbadanLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2230782024-02-28T13:31:51Z2024-02-28T13:31:51ZNigeria’s security problems deepen as Anglophone insurgency in Cameroon spills across border<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576415/original/file-20240219-30-q5d1lg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=25%2C0%2C8575%2C5729&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Grieving for the 140 victims of a January 2024 attack in north-central Nigeria.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/NigeriaArmedViolence/744fff9339094b5c858f3235bb986cf4/photo?Query=nigeria%20violence&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1261&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo/Sunday Alamba</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over the past two decades, Nigeria has grappled with multiple and complex national <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/world/nigeria-mulls-state-policing-to-combat-growing-insecurity">security threats</a>, each posing a significant challenge to its stability.</p>
<p>The nation finds itself fighting a <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2017/02/13/oil-and-violence-in-the-niger-delta-isnt-talked-about-much-but-it-has-a-global-impact/?sh=532d63f54dc6">violent militancy in the Niger Delta</a>, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/farmers-herders-conflicts-in-nigeria-a-role-for-fbos">conflicts between farmers and herders</a> across multiple regions, terrorism and insurgency in the northeast, banditry in the northwest and secessionist campaigns by groups such as the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-should-not-designate-nigerias-ipob-terrorist-group">Indigenous People of Biafra</a> in the southeast.</p>
<p>Now a new layer of complexity has emerged in the form of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/cameroons-anglophone-conflict-has-lasted-for-six-years-what-citizens-say-about-how-to-end-it-208381">Ambazonian secessionist group</a> from Cameroon. This group’s growing threat, most recently seen in the December 2023 violent invasion of the Nigerian <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/12/11/ambazonia-rebels-control-belegete-community-block-nigerian-troops/">borderline village of Belegete</a>, adds to the strain on Nigeria’s national security capabilities.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=KhygkzYAAAAJ&hl=en">scholar specializing in</a> radicalization, violent extremism and counterterrorism in West and Central Africa, I believe the latest threat raises concerns about Nigeria’s strategic preparedness and ability to confront growing challenges.</p>
<p><iframe id="Cwek2" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Cwek2/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>How the country responds could have far-reaching consequences. Nigeria is Africa’s <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1120999/gdp-of-african-countries-by-country/">largest economy</a> and <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/population/countries-in-africa-by-population/">most populous country</a>. Since its independence in 1960, Nigeria has played a crucial role in regional stability and security. It remains an <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-and-nigeria-partnering-for-prosperity">important diplomatic partner for the United States</a>, which provides support to the Nigerian government in its efforts to combat extremism in the region.</p>
<h2>Rise of a violent campaign</h2>
<p>Ambazonian separatists, seeking independence from the Republic of Cameroon, are mounting a bloody civil war that stems from the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/b188-second-look-cameroons-anglophone-special-status">Anglophone crisis</a>, a protracted conflict rooted in the colonization of Cameroon by both the French and British governments.</p>
<p>Separatists from Camaroon’s two English-speaking regions declared independence from the French-speaking majority in 2017, and war has been raging between the separatists and Cameroon government forces ever since.</p>
<p>The Ambazonian secessionist movement, fueled by grievances that include <a href="https://theconversation.com/cameroon-how-language-plunged-a-country-into-deadly-conflict-with-no-end-in-sight-179027">the perceived dominance of Francophone Cameroonians</a>, seeks to secede and establish an <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/cameroon-anglophone-crisis/">independent Federal Republic of Ambazonia</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Grievance over perceived Francophone bias is fueling Camaroon insurgency." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576417/original/file-20240219-16-blke3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576417/original/file-20240219-16-blke3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576417/original/file-20240219-16-blke3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576417/original/file-20240219-16-blke3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576417/original/file-20240219-16-blke3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576417/original/file-20240219-16-blke3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576417/original/file-20240219-16-blke3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A sign saying ‘Speak English and French for a bilingual Cameroon’ outside an abandoned school in a rural part of southwest Cameroon.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/sign-saying-speak-english-or-french-for-a-bilingual-news-photo/1154062017?adppopup=true%5C">Photo by Giles Clarke/UNOCHA via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Agitation over the past seven years has resulted in <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/cameroon/">violence and widespread human rights violations</a>. </p>
<p>Estimates by the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reveal that over <a href="https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/cameroon/">1.7 million</a> people are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, the Anglophone crisis has <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon">resulted in</a> over 6,000 deaths and displaced 765,000 people. About 70,000 of these refugees are in Nigeria, including a few in the village of Belegete. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://humanglemedia.com/survivors-of-ambazonia-militant-attack-in-nigeria-are-experiencing-the-festive-season-differently/">attack in Belegete</a> in December left two dead, including the traditional leader, Chief Francis Ogweshi, and 20 others kidnapped. </p>
<h2>Nigeria’s national security</h2>
<p>As Cameroon’s clash with separatists worsens in southwestern Cameroon, the Ambazonian insurgents have moved into Nigeria. </p>
<p>The violent attack on the Belegete community, which followed earlier incursions in Nigeria such as the <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/11/ambazonia-attack-death-toll-rises-to-12/">Manga village attack</a> of November 2021, suggests a growing cross-border element to Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis.</p>
<p>As well as presenting a violation of territorial integrity, the incident also suggests collaboration with Nigeria’s own secessionist groups, with evidence of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/20/separatists-nigeria-cameroon-biafra-ipob-ambazonia-anglophone-joining-forces/">links between Ambazonian secessionists</a> and the Indigenous People of Biafra.</p>
<p>Ambazonian insurgents are also <a href="https://doi.org//10.4236/aasoci.2021.111001">engaged in drugs, arms and human trafficking</a> and have brought that illegal trade across the border into Nigeria.</p>
<p>The incursion of Ambazonian activities has not only added to Nigeria’s security challenges. It has also intensified an ongoing humanitarian crisis in Nigeria’s border region, displacing thousands of people and straining the capacity of authorities to care for its internally displaced persons and refugees from neighboring countries, including Cameroon.</p>
<p>As of June 2023, Nigeria has an estimated <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/operations/nigeria">2.3 million internally displaced persons</a> and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/urban-refugees-nigeria-operational-update-may-2023-issue-2">93,130 refugees and asylum seekers</a>. The Belegete attack added to this by displacing the entire village of over 2,000 people, who took refuge in the neighboring village of Becheve.</p>
<h2>Confronting the emerging threat</h2>
<p>Nigeria’s capacity to confront the emerging Ambazonian threat is questionable, given multiple strategic, operational and tactical limitations. </p>
<p>The 2022 Afrobarometer <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/migrated/files/publications/Working%20papers/wp190-mapping_state_capacity_in_africa-professionalism_and_reach-afrobarometer_working_paper-22jan22.pdf">working paper</a>, which mapped states’ capacity to prepare for or respond to security threats, concludes that Nigeria – like several African states – “is widely seen to lack the necessary capacity for the physical and material security of its citizens or to command legitimacy.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in fatigues holding a gun Nigerian police officer stands guard." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576422/original/file-20240219-23-kh7yv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576422/original/file-20240219-23-kh7yv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576422/original/file-20240219-23-kh7yv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576422/original/file-20240219-23-kh7yv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576422/original/file-20240219-23-kh7yv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576422/original/file-20240219-23-kh7yv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576422/original/file-20240219-23-kh7yv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A police officer in Yola, Nigeria.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/police-officer-sits-inside-the-armoured-personnel-carrier-news-photo/1247496889?adppopup=true">Photo by PIUS UTOMI EKPEI/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Ambazonian separatist insurgency poses a threat not only to Cameroon and Nigeria but risks further degrading the security situation in West Africa.</p>
<p>The Nigerian government, undoubtedly, understands the magnitude of the security threats it faces, and its apparent limitations, and has called for assistance. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, in a January 2024 letter to the outgoing French ambassador to Nigeria, Emmanuelle Blatmann, <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/658605-tinubu-wants-greater-cooperation-between-nigeria-france.html">stressed the need for strengthened cooperation</a>. “On regional security, we want you to remind Paris at every opportunity that it is necessary to upgrade our technical cooperation,” he wrote.</p>
<p>The United States has said it remains committed to assisting Nigeria. In January 2024, U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan met with his Nigerian counterpart, Nuhu Ribadu, and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/18/readout-of-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivans-meeting-with-nigerian-national-security-adviser-nuhu-ribadu/">underscored the need</a> for continuous bilateral security cooperation.</p>
<p>And while Nigeria has in recent years partnered with Cameroon to ensure regional stability, the latest attack suggests a need to increase strategic cooperation between the neighboring countries to stem the growing threat. </p>
<p>However, countering the Ambazonian separatists and other internal security threats will remain a challenge for the Nigerian government. With a vast population and territory, security personnel are already stretched thin. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the existing security apparatus in the country is compromised. The military is beset by problems, including <a href="https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/documentary-reveals-low-morale-in-nigerian-army">low morale</a> <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2023-02-16-nigerias-military-is-broken/">and corruption</a>, and the national police force is perceived as largely <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/AD715-Nigerians-fault-police-for-corruption-and-lack-of-professionalism-Afrobarometer-10oct23.pdf">unprofessional and corrupt</a>. </p>
<p>These issues hamper Nigeria’s capacity to respond, and they undermine any attempt to counter the spiraling security threats faced by Nigeria, including the Ambazonian separatists.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223078/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Augustine Aboh works for the University of Calabar, Nigeria. He is affiliated with the Office for Strategic Preparedness and Resilience - National Early Warning Centre, Nigeria. </span></em></p>Nigeria is beset with security threats. Confronting them will take regional and international cooperation.Augustine Aboh, Ph.D. candidate in Global Governance and Human Security, University of MassachusettsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2230482024-02-27T14:07:04Z2024-02-27T14:07:04ZBenefits of using cleaner cooking fuels are blunted in urban areas where outdoor air is polluted: findings from Ghana, Cameroon and Kenya<p>Household air pollution from cooking, heating and lighting with fuels like wood, charcoal and kerosene poses a substantial global health problem. </p>
<p>Globally, <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/20-01-2022-who-publishes-new-global-data-on-the-use-of-clean-and-polluting-fuels-for-cooking-by-fuel-type">2 billion</a> people cook with polluting fuels and are exposed to high levels of household air pollution. The highest proportion live in sub-Saharan Africa, where <a href="https://www.nihr.ac.uk/news/new-research-could-help-boost-growth-of-clean-cooking-in-sub-saharan-africa/29340#:%7E:text=Approximately%20900%20million%20people%20cook,health%2Ddamaging%20and%20climate%20pollutants">about 900 million</a> people cook with polluting fuels.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanplh/article/PIIS2542-5196(20)30197-2/fulltext">Studies</a> have shown that use of cleaner cooking fuels, like electricity, ethanol and liquefied petroleum gas, reduces exposure to fine particulate matter (PM2.5), a damaging pollutant. But <a href="https://ehjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12940-021-00756-5">other studies</a> have also shown that the use of cleaner cooking fuels doesn’t necessarily reduce PM2.5 levels in people’s homes.</p>
<p>To understand why, our research looked at three rapidly urbanising communities in Cameroon (Mbalmayo), Ghana (Obuasi) and Kenya (Eldoret). We looked at differences in air pollutant levels across cooking fuel types as well as other environmental factors. We measured levels of PM2.5 as well as carbon monoxide (CO), another damaging air pollutant. </p>
<p>Half of the households that were part of our study were mostly cooking with LPG, which is considered a cleaner cooking fuel. The other half were cooking only with polluting fuels, including wood and charcoal.</p>
<p>Our findings showed that the type of cooking fuel households used did indeed affect levels of pollution inside people’s homes. But we found wide disparities between the three communities. For example, there was hardly any difference in average PM2.5 exposures between LPG and charcoal users in the Ghanaian setting. However, in the Kenyan and Cameroonian communities, women’s average PM2.5 levels were much higher among those cooking with wood, compared with those cooking with LPG. In Eldoret, Kenya, women cooking with charcoal were also exposed to substantially higher levels than those cooking with LPG. </p>
<p>We concluded from our results that this could be explained by the fact that environmental factors were also at play – air pollution levels outside people’s homes. In the Ghanaian area, outdoor air pollution levels were around double the levels in the other two communities. This difference is likely due in part to <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1352231099002964?via%3Dihub">increased levels</a> of Saharan dust in Ghana during the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/harmattan">harmattan</a> season. </p>
<p>In addition, most women in the Ghanaian setting usually cooked outdoors on a veranda. This increased their exposure to outdoor air pollution. In contrast, women in Kenya and Cameroon typically cooked indoors.</p>
<p>We also found that women, regardless of the cooking fuel they used, had higher exposure to PM2.5 if they lived closer to a busy road (less than a five minute walk away) and travelled outdoors during the day. This suggested that traffic emissions probably made up a substantial proportion of the air pollution that women were breathing in these urban areas. And emissions generated from cooking might have contributed less to overall PM2.5 exposures. </p>
<p>This may explain why there were minimal differences between PM2.5 exposures among women using LPG and charcoal stoves in the Ghanaian community, despite LPG stoves generally emitting lower levels of PM2.5. It follows that, in some areas with rapid urbanisation, outdoor air pollution is probably lowering the ability of clean cooking fuels to reduce PM2.5 exposures. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>As cities continue to urbanise and the African population increasingly migrates to cities, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41561-023-01311-2">evidence</a> points to the fact that localised levels of air pollution from industrial sources, traffic, and trash burning are likely to increase. This means that people will become increasingly exposed to air pollutants outdoors and that reductions in PM2.5 exposure that happens when people switch from polluting fuels to LPG may be lower. </p>
<p>Our findings show that clean cooking fuels can reduce indoor air pollution. However, a focus on reducing indoor pollution by switching cooking fuels may only have a limited effect on people’s exposure to damaging air pollutants. Our findings point to the need for developing strategies for reducing both indoor and outdoor air pollution levels. Lower outdoor PM2.5 concentrations can be achieved through stricter regulations on traffic emissions and limiting or eliminating trash burning in favour of less polluting methods for solid waste disposal.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, efforts to encourage a transition towards clean cooking fuels should remain an important policy priority, particularly in communities that are exposed to lower levels of outdoor PM2.5. The transition to clean cooking fuels can potentially have a greater health benefit in these settings. </p>
<p>A more targeted approach and prioritising certain areas in the drive for access to cleaner cooking fuels makes sense. As the <a href="https://cleancooking.org/">Clean Cooking Alliance</a> has pointed out, there are limited resources and funding to tackle the move towards cleaner cooking fuels. Targeting specific areas for clean cooking transitions may therefore be a useful strategy. </p>
<p>In the meantime, the global health community must devote more resources to providing universal access to clean cooking by 2030 <a href="https://www.unep.org/explore-topics/sustainable-development-goals/why-do-sustainable-development-goals-matter/goal-7">(United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 7)</a>].</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223048/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Shupler is also a researcher in the Department of Public Health, Policy and Systems at the University of Liverpool. This research was funded by the National Institute for Health and Care Research (NIHR) (ref: 17/63/155) using UK aid from
the UK Government to support global health research. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the NIHR or the UK government.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Esong Miranda Baame and Theresa Tawiah do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Dust and traffic pollution add to the health hazard posed by some cooking fuels.Matthew Shupler, Postdoctoral Research Associate in Environmental Public Health, Harvard UniversityEsong Miranda Baame, PhD Candidate, Université de DschangTheresa Tawiah, Health Economist ,Department of Environmental Health, Kintampo Health Research CenterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2238672024-02-22T12:01:17Z2024-02-22T12:01:17ZLearning in two languages: lessons from francophone Africa on what works best<p>Children living in multilingual communities often learn in a language at school that does not match the language they speak at home. This mismatch makes it challenging for them to participate in classroom discussions and learn to read. In turn, this contributes to poor learning outcomes, grade repetition, and dropping out of school.</p>
<p>Bilingual education programmes that include mother tongue languages have become increasingly popular for improving learning outcomes. Bilingual education is associated with better <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S1366728908003386">language and literacy skills</a>, reduced grade repetition and school dropout rates across the <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/10986/10331">globe</a>. Including mother tongue languages in education also places value on children’s cultural identities, improving confidence, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09500789808666737">self-esteem</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11159-012-9308-2">learning</a>. </p>
<p>But simply providing bilingual education does not guarantee better learning results. This is the conclusion of a recent <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13670050.2023.2290482">paper</a> we published in which we reviewed bilingual programmes in six francophone west African countries: Niger, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon. </p>
<p>We found mixed results, across and within countries and programmes.</p>
<p>We identified two sets of factors that constrain or contribute to the quality of bilingual education. These were: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>implementation factors, such as teacher training and classroom resources</p></li>
<li><p>socio-cultural factors, such as perceptions of mother tongue languages in education.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Our findings emphasise the need to consider the local context when applying bilingual education programmes. </p>
<h2>Bilingual education in francophone west Africa</h2>
<p>Our research team conducted research in Côte d’Ivoire from 2016 to 2018. We measured children’s language and reading skills in both their mother tongue and in French, and compared outcomes between children attending French-only or bilingual Projet École Intégrée schools. </p>
<p>Children in French-only schools outperformed their peers from bilingual schools on the language and reading <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/edu0000723">assessments</a>. Teachers revealed they had better teaching resources and felt better prepared in French-only schools. </p>
<p>We were interested in whether bilingual education programmes in other francophone countries in the region had had similar experiences. In 2022, we searched academic databases for literature in English and French that discussed programme implementation and measured learning and schooling outcomes within bilingual education programmes. We reviewed nine programmes from six countries: Niger, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Cameroon. </p>
<p>These countries are former French colonies or territories. French is the official or working language and often the language of instruction in school. However, these countries are highly multilingual. About 23 living <a href="https://www.ethnologue.com/">languages</a> are spoken in Niger, <a href="https://www.languagesoftheworld.info/geolinguistics/linguistic-diversity-in-africa-and-europe.html">39</a> in Senegal, <a href="https://www.languagesoftheworld.info/geolinguistics/linguistic-diversity-in-africa-and-europe.html">68</a> in Mali, <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1280625/number-of-living-languages-in-africa-by-country/">71</a> in Burkina Faso, <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1280625/number-of-living-languages-in-africa-by-country/">78</a> in Côte d’Ivoire and <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1280625/number-of-living-languages-in-africa-by-country/">277</a> in Cameroon. </p>
<p>Our review showed that children can benefit from learning in two languages. This is true whether they are two official languages like in Cameroon’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10993-019-09510-7">Dual Curriculum Bilingual Education</a> (French and English) schools, or in a mother tongue and French, like in Mali’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/447544">Community Schools</a>. Children can also benefit regardless of whether they are gradually introduced to a language throughout primary school or whether both languages are introduced at the same time.</p>
<p>But a lack of resources, and a failure to take into account local conditions, affected the outcomes. The programmes that resulted in positive schooling and learning outcomes recognised and targeted common school-related and community-related challenges.</p>
<h2>Teacher training and resources</h2>
<p>One common school-related challenge was teachers not having teaching materials in all languages of instruction.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000161121">Pédagogie Convergente</a> programme in Mali, for example, ensured teachers had materials in both French and the mother tongue. Children had better French and maths scores. </p>
<p>But some teachers from the same programme did not always have teaching <a href="https://books.google.ca/books/about/Patterns_of_French_literacy_development.html?id=MoNnAAAAMAAJ&hl=en&redir_esc=y">materials</a> in mother tongue languages. And some children struggled with literacy and writing skills. </p>
<p>Another common challenge was teachers not feeling prepared to teach in all languages, as teacher training often occurred in an official language, like French. The <a href="https://www.adeanet.org/clearinghouse/sites/default/files/docs/interieur_11_burkina_fre.pdf">Programme d’éducation bilingue</a> in Burkina Faso, for example, made an effort to train teachers in the mother tongue language so they felt confident following the bilingual curriculum. </p>
<p>Children in bilingual Burkina Faso schools had higher than average <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13670050802149275">pass rates</a> on the primary certificate exam, <a href="https://www.memoireonline.com/06/22/12997/m_Le-rapport-des-enseignants-aux-langues-nationales-en-tant-que-mdiums-et-matires-den.html">repeated grades less</a>, and stayed in school more than children in traditional French schools. </p>
<p>Both examples are in contrast to the bilingual schools in Côte d’Ivoire, where teachers lacked materials and training in mother tongue languages. In turn, children demonstrated worse language and reading skills compared to their peers in French-only schools.</p>
<h2>Socio-cultural factors</h2>
<p>We identified common community-related challenges, particularly related to community buy-in and perceptions of mother tongue instruction. </p>
<p>For example, families with higher socioeconomic status were worried that Niger’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13670050208667760">Ecole Experimentale</a> schools would hinder children’s French proficiency and compromise their entry into secondary school. </p>
<p>Programmes such as the <a href="https://ared-edu.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/DC-Senegal-Workshop-Findings_04.2019-FINAL-ENG.pdf">Support Program for Quality Education in Mother Tongues for Primary Schools</a> in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13670050.2020.1765968">Senegal</a> worked to combat negative perceptions by educating families about the benefits of bilingual education. Children in the Senegalese programme outperformed their peers in traditional French schools in all school subjects.</p>
<p>The same programmes sometimes experienced different outcomes depending on the community. For example, although children in Burkina Faso’s bilingual schooling showed favourable outcomes, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11159-021-09885-y">parents</a> felt that French programmes were better suited for continuing to secondary school. </p>
<h2>What does this mean for bilingual education?</h2>
<p>Efforts to provide teachers with the resources they needed, and efforts to foster community support, were both consistently linked with positive schooling and learning outcomes in our review. </p>
<p>However, these efforts might work better in some communities compared to others, due to different resource constraints and socio-cultural differences. Studies that found poorer outcomes also found common challenges present. Therefore, bilingual education has the potential to facilitate positive learning outcomes if efforts are made to overcome common challenges based on communities’ needs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223867/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Bilingual education can improve learning outcomes but it’s important to consider local context.Kaja Jasinska, Assistant Professor, Applied Psychology and Human Development, University of TorontoMary-Claire Ball, PhD student, Developmental Psychology and Education, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2204982024-01-16T14:14:16Z2024-01-16T14:14:16ZDangerous chemicals found in recycled plastics, making them unsafe for use – experts explain the hazards<p>Plastic pollution is a menace worldwide. Plastics are now <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abg5433">found</a> in every <a href="https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.est.1c04158">environment</a> on the planet, from the deepest seas to the atmosphere and human bodies. </p>
<p>Scientific evidence <a href="https://doi.org/10.5334/aogh.4056">describing harm</a> to the environment and humans is growing. Hence, the United Nations has <a href="https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/39812/OEWG_PP_1_INF_1_UNEA%20resolution.pdf">resolved</a> to <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/negotiations/international-legally-binding-instrument-plastics-pollution-including-marine#:%7E:text=The%20United%20Nations%20Environment%20Assembly,pollution%2C%20including%20in%20the%20marine">negotiate</a> a legally binding instrument to end plastic pollution. </p>
<p>Strategies to achieve this goal include provisions throughout the plastics lifespan: production, use, waste management and remediation. </p>
<p>In designing rules for managing plastic, it’s important to understand that plastic materials and waste streams are complex. Not all plastics are the same. And recycled plastics are not necessarily “better” – less harmful – than virgin plastics. If they contained harmful chemicals to begin with, recycling doesn’t make them less harmful. And sometimes they are contaminated by other substances.</p>
<p>We conducted a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352340923008090?via%3Dihub">study</a> identifying and measuring the concentration of contaminants in recycled pellets from 28 small-scale recycling facilities in the global south. Plastic waste is often exported from high income countries to less developed countries, with few to no requirements for reporting their makeup.</p>
<p>Our investigation covered facilities in Cameroon, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania and Togo in Africa as well others in Asia, Europe and South America. </p>
<p>We found 191 pesticides, 107 pharmaceuticals and 81 industrial compounds among many others in the recycled plastic pellets. Many of these chemicals could be hazardous and make the plastics unsuitable for reuse.</p>
<p>This finding can inform regulations for recycled plastics. The chemical composition of the plastic should be checked before it is recycled. </p>
<h2>Chemicals used in production of plastics</h2>
<p>More than <a href="https://www.unep.org/resources/report/chemicals-plastics-technical-report">13,000 chemicals</a> are currently used in the production of plastic materials and products. They can include thousands of plastics additives – but also substances that are added unintentionally. Some unwanted chemicals form during the production or life of plastics. Thousands of these chemicals have dangerous properties. The health risks of some others are unknown. </p>
<p>Throughout the plastics value chain, during production, use, waste and recycling, other chemicals can contaminate the material too. The result may be recycled materials whose chemical composition is unknown. </p>
<p>Previous studies have reported the presence of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhazmat.2017.10.014">plastics additives</a> in recycled materials. Among them were chemicals that are <a href="https://www.unep.org/explore-topics/chemicals-waste/what-we-do/emerging-issues/endocrine-disrupting-chemicals">known</a> to have <a href="https://www.epa.gov/endocrine-disruption/overview-endocrine-disruption">negative effects on health</a>. Examples include <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0055387">phthalates</a> (plastic softeners), bisphenols like <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0303720706002292">BPA</a>, and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969721044478?via%3Dihub">UV-stabilisers</a> used to protect plastics from sun damage and yellowing.</p>
<p>In our work, we established the presence of chemicals in recycled plastic that can cause harm to humans or other organisms. They include pesticides, pharmaceuticals and fragrances. Others are chemicals that result from burning natural materials, man-made organic chemicals used for industrial applications like paint, and ultraviolet filters.</p>
<p>We quantified a total of 491 different chemical substances. Some had specific uses and others formed from the breakdown of products.</p>
<p>Some national and regional policies <a href="https://www.basel.int/Implementation/Plasticwaste/Globalgovernance/tabid/8335/Default.aspx">regulate</a> the allowable concentration of hazardous chemicals in specific plastic products. But only 1% of plastics chemicals are subject to international regulation in existing multilateral environmental agreements. Policies don’t adequately address the issue of transparent reporting of chemicals in plastics across their value chain. Also, there are no laws to govern monitoring of chemicals in recycled materials. This is a <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.adk9846">serious gap</a> in oversight. Stronger and more globally coordinated measures are necessary. </p>
<p>Our findings emphasise the importance of regulating mechanical recycling, as many of the substances measured were contaminants and not plastic additives. Many of the chemicals we identified may have contaminated the materials during use. For example, a jug used for storing pesticides will absorb some of the pesticides and will contaminate the recycling waste stream. Plastics in the environment are also known to absorb <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0025326X11005960">organic pollutants</a>. </p>
<p>To assess the quality of recycled plastics, it’s crucial to know which chemicals are present and in what concentrations. This information can guide regulations about how recycled plastics may be used. It will also be valuable for plastics producers, waste management workers (including recyclers), consumers, and the scientific community.</p>
<h2>A path towards safer reuse of plastics</h2>
<p>To recycle more materials safely, several changes are necessary. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>increased transparency regarding the use of chemicals and their risks </p></li>
<li><p>chemical simplification of the plastics market, so that fewer and less toxic chemicals are permitted for use</p></li>
<li><p>improved waste management infrastructure with separated waste streams </p></li>
<li><p>improved recycling methods, including monitoring of hazardous chemicals.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Chemical simplification of plastic additives will promote sustainability, safety and regulatory compliance. It will help manufacturers to minimise the environmental impact and adverse health effects of complex chemical formulations. Simpler chemical structures also improve the recycling potential of plastics and make recycling more efficient and cost-effective.</p>
<p><a href="https://pubs.acs.org/doi/full/10.1021/acs.est.1c04903">Chemical simplification</a> can also reduce potential health risks in the disposal of plastic materials. </p>
<p>From a regulatory perspective, chemical simplification supports clearer and more enforceable safety guidelines.</p>
<p>It’s is a crucial step towards the sustainable production and use of plastics, as countries work towards a legal instrument to end pollution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220498/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bethanie Carney Almroth receives funding from the Swedish Research Council for Sustainable Development
FORMAS (grant number 2021-00913) and The Carl Tryggers Foundation (grant number 21:1234).
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Carmona Martinez received funding from Carl Trygger Foundation. </span></em></p>Recycled plastics are not safe if the chemicals used in creating them in the first place are harmful.Bethanie Carney Almroth, Associate Professor, Department of Biological and Environmental Sciences, University of GothenburgEric Carmona Martinez, Scientist, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research-UFZLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2164502023-11-15T14:30:06Z2023-11-15T14:30:06ZHealth risks at home: a study in six African countries shows how healthy housing saves children’s lives<p>Housing is a critical social determinant of health. The World Health Organization (WHO) <a href="https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/276001/9789241550376-eng.pdf?sequence=22">defines healthy housing</a> as a shelter that supports physical, mental and social wellbeing. </p>
<p>The WHO has developed <a href="https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/276001/9789241550376-eng.pdf?sequence=1">guidelines</a> outlining the attributes of healthy housing. These include structural soundness, as well as access to a local community that enables social interactions. Healthy housing protects inhabitants from the effects of disasters, pollution, waste and extreme heat or cold. It provides a feeling of home, including a sense of belonging, security and privacy. </p>
<p>Health risks in the home environment are important to think about because of the amount of time people spend there. In countries where unemployment levels are high or where most work is home based, people spend <a href="https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/276001/9789241550376-eng.pdf?sequence=23">more than 70% of their time indoors</a>. Children especially spend a large amount of time at home, which exposes them to any health risks in the home environment.</p>
<p>We are researchers from the African Population and Health Research Center with an interest in urbanisation and population dynamics. We recently set out to <a href="https://bmcpediatr.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12887-023-03992-5">study the link between housing and children’s health</a>. We found that healthy housing generally lowered the chances of children falling ill with three diseases that we tracked: diarrhoea, acute respiratory illnesses and fever. </p>
<p>The impacts of housing quality extend beyond health and can have significant implications for education and subsequent economic outcomes, particularly for children. </p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/can-rapid-urbanization-in-africa-reduce-poverty-causes-opportunities-and-policy-recommendations/">Rapid urbanisation and population growth</a> in Africa have pushed many people into informal settlements. Sub-Saharan Africa has <a href="https://blogs.afdb.org/fr/inclusive-growth/urbanization-africa-191">65%</a> of the world’s slum dwellers. This population generally lives in poor housing that lacks access to clean water, sanitation and hygiene services. The structures are overcrowded. They tend to have leaking roofs and damp walls, floors and foundations. They may also have indoor pollution, compromising the health of millions of people.</p>
<p>We set out to <a href="https://bmcpediatr.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12887-023-03992-5">evaluate</a> the relationship between healthy housing and the likelihood of children falling sick across six African countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa.</p>
<p>We studied the incidence of diarrhoea, acute respiratory illness and fever among children under the age of five. These three conditions can have severe consequences for child health and wellbeing. </p>
<p>Diarrhoea and acute respiratory infections are <a href="https://academic.oup.com/inthealth/advance-article/doi/10.1093/inthealth/ihad046/7210800">leading causes</a> of disease and deaths in children aged below five worldwide. Diarrhoea accounted for <a href="https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-health/diarrhoeal-disease/">9%</a> of all deaths among children under five in 2019. Acute respiratory illnesses caused about <a href="https://www.who.int/data/gho/indicator-metadata-registry/imr-details/3147">20%</a> of deaths among children in this age group. The burden of under-five deaths linked to diarrhoea and respiratory illnesses like pneumonia is <a href="https://childmortality.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/UN-IGME-Child-Mortality-Report-2022.pdf#page=4">higher</a> for children in developing countries than those in developed regions. </p>
<p>We selected the six countries in our study because they provided data on the three diseases we tracked. They also allow for a comparative analysis across African countries. Our study used the latest available demographic and health survey data at the time of our research: Burkina Faso (2010), Cameroon (2011), Ghana (2014), Kenya (2014), Nigeria (2018) and South Africa (2016). We sampled data on 91,096 children aged under five.</p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>Our study found that healthy housing was <a href="https://bmcpediatr.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12887-023-03992-5/tables/2">generally associated with reduced odds</a> of contracting the three illnesses we considered: diarrhoea, acute respiratory illness and fever. Our definition of healthy housing considered several attributes, including sanitation, drinking water sources and housing characteristics. </p>
<p>Homes that protect occupants from the elements, ensure access to adequate space and reduce overcrowding help keep children healthy. Homes that use cleaner cooking and lighting fuels reduce household air pollution, which leads to lower chances of respiratory infections.</p>
<p>Children living in healthy housing had fewer incidences of fever in all countries apart from South Africa. Here, children living in the healthiest homes are twice as likely to have fever than those living in unhealthy homes.</p>
<p>Fever is an indication of an underlying infection that could be viral or bacterial. Such infections are common in South Africa. In addition, the main causes of fevers among children under five are <a href="https://www.hindawi.com/journals/grp/2023/1906782/">diarrhoea and acute respiratory illnesses</a>. Among the countries included in the analysis, South Africa had the highest proportion of young mothers (aged below 25) and never-married mothers. This increases the chances that these mothers are engaged in work outside the home, leading to the early introduction of complementary feeding. This has been shown to increase the incidence of diarrhoea. These results call for addressing the causes of diarrhoea and respiratory illnesses by, for instance, ensuring South African homes have access to clean drinking water, adequate sanitation and clean energy for cooking.</p>
<p>While healthy housing is crucial, it’s not the sole determinant of a child’s health. Other factors, such as a sense of community, environmental exposure, parental education, income levels, healthcare access, and maternal and child-level factors <a href="https://bmcpediatr.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12887-023-03992-5/tables/3">also contribute to the overall health status of children</a>. For instance, we found that children in Burkina Faso who were not breastfed had higher chances of getting diarrhoea than those who were breastfed despite the condition of their housing. This tracks with studies that have documented that breastfeeding has a <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fped.2023.1086999">protective role</a> over gastrointestinal and respiratory tract infections among children. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>From our findings, parents can improve the wellbeing of their children by implementing simple strategies. This includes ensuring they use clean energy for cooking to reduce indoor air pollution and consequently reduce the incidence of acute respiratory illnesses. Similarly, using clean drinking water, hand washing and improving sanitation can help reduce cases of diarrhoea. </p>
<p>Bold but nuanced policy and programme government-level interventions can also help address the incidence of diseases affecting children under five in Africa. This requires efforts that go beyond just addressing the issue of housing to working with complementary sectors, like health, urban planning, environment and education.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216450/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hellen Gitau received funding from Wellcome Trust for this Complex Urban System for Sustainability and Health study. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Blessing Mberu received funding from Wellcome Trust for this Complex Urban System for Sustainability and Health study. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kanyiva Muindi received funding from Wellcome Trust for this Complex Urban System for Sustainability and Health study. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samuel Iddi received funding from Wellcome Trust for this Complex Urban System for Sustainability and Health study.</span></em></p>The impact of housing quality extends beyond health to education and subsequent economic outcomes, particularly for children.Hellen Gitau, Research officer, African Population and Health Research CenterBlessing Mberu, Head of Urbanisation and Wellbeing, African Population and Health Research Center, African Population and Health Research CenterKanyiva Muindi, Associate Research Scientist, African Population and Health Research CenterSamuel Iddi, Research Scientist, African Population and Health Research CenterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2143052023-10-04T13:43:08Z2023-10-04T13:43:08ZCocoa prices are surging: west African countries should seize the moment to negotiate a better deal for farmers<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/cocoa-prices-are-surging-west-african-countries-should-seize-the-moment-to-negotiate-a-better-deal-for-farmers-214305&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>The global price of cocoa is spiking, a direct response to <a href="https://fortune.com/2023/07/29/chocolate-inflation-wholesale-cocoa-west-africa-ghana-production/">dwindling cocoa output</a> in west Africa. In September, cocoa futures reached a <a href="https://www.confectioneryproduction.com/news/44853/ghana-and-ivory-coast-cocoa-prices-surge-to-46-year-high-as-concerns-remain-over-supply-deficits/">44-year price peak</a> due to mounting concerns over reduced supplies from the region. </p>
<p>The price surge could prove to be a critical moment for cocoa farming and policy in west Africa.</p>
<p>The cocoa-producing belt of west Africa is responsible for <a href="https://www.oecd.org/swac/publications/39596493.pdf">generating over 80%</a> of the total global output. Between them, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsufs.2021.732831/full#:%7E:text=Most%20of%20the%20world's%20cocoa,2019%3B%20Fairtrade%2C%202020">contribute</a> more than 60% to the global output. Ghana is the <a href="https://www.confectioneryproduction.com/news/42498/icco-reports-show-increase-in-ghana-and-ivory-coast-cocoa-crops-but-key-export-challenges-persist/">second-biggest producer</a> in the world and cocoa is a vital component of the country’s economy. </p>
<p>The global price spike has led west African governments to increase the guaranteed producer prices to farmers. Ghana recently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/ghana-hikes-20232024-cocoa-farmgate-price-supplies-tighten-2023-09-09/">raised</a> the state-guaranteed cocoa price paid to farmers by two thirds. The announcement means that Ghana’s cocoa farmers will be paid 20,943 cedis (US$1,837) per tonne for the upcoming 2023-2024 season, up from 12,800 cedis. </p>
<p>Cameroon, the world’s fourth-largest cocoa producer, raised the price cocoa farmers get to 1,500 CFA francs (US$2.50) per kilogram, a 25% jump from the previous rate of 1,200 CFA francs. This increase is even more significant than Ghana’s when factoring in Cameroon’s single-digit inflation. Additionally, the Cote d'Ivoire government has announced a <a href="https://thecocoapost.com/ivory-coast-sets-2023-24-cocoa-farmgate-price-at-1000-fcfa/">rise</a> in the producer price.</p>
<p>As an economics researcher who has extensively <a href="https://www.ucl.ac.uk/history/people/academic-staff/dr-michael-ehis-odijie">studied and written</a> about cocoa production in west Africa, I contend that the recent shortages can be harnessed to strengthen the position of cocoa producers. This will enable them to address the structural challenges ingrained in the cocoa production value chain. Rising production costs have not been recognised in the value of cocoa beans. Farmers therefore haven’t been able to earn enough income and this has led to unsustainable farming practices. </p>
<p>In my view, west African countries should use the cocoa shortage as negotiating leverage against multinational corporations to address these structural issues. Both Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire must recognise this pivotal moment. They must take the lead, and frame the current production challenges as deep-seated structural problems requiring solutions, rather than as short-term issues.</p>
<h2>What’s driving the change?</h2>
<p>Ghana’s cocoa regulator recently <a href="https://www.wionews.com/business-economy/ghana-may-not-meet-demand-for-cocoa-after-weak-harvest-626238">indicated</a> that its farmers might not be able to meet some cocoa contract obligations for another season. Ghana’s <a href="https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/ghanas-2022-2023-cocoa-output-expected-to-be-lower-by-11-than-target-sources">projected cocoa yield</a> for the 2022/23 planting season was the lowest in 13 years, falling 24% short of the initial estimates of 850,000 metric tonnes. </p>
<p>This trend has been repeated across the region, with production falling in Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon.</p>
<p>Reduced output means demand can’t be met and global prices rise. </p>
<p>The reduction in cocoa output is attributed to short-term and long-term factors. </p>
<p>Commentators typically emphasise the short-term factors:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>poor weather conditions</p></li>
<li><p>black pod disease, which causes cocoa pods to rot</p></li>
<li><p>the decline in the number of cocoa farmers, some of them selling their land to <a href="https://thecocoapost.com/illegal-mining-an-existential-threat-to-cocoa-production-in-ghana/">illegal miners</a> </p></li>
<li><p>a <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/february-2023/one-year-later-impact-russian-conflict-ukraine-africa#:%7E:text=The%20Bank%20estimates%20that%20fertilizer,exacerbate%20food%20security%20throughout%202023.">shortage of fertilisers and pesticides</a>, especially since the conflict in Ukraine has curtailed Russia’s export of potash and other fertilisers. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>A number of long-term structural issues have beset cocoa farming in west Africa for decades. They shouldn’t be overshadowed by concerns with short-term problems.</p>
<p>The first is the <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-445X/9/12/524">declining availability</a> of forest land and its connection to increasing production costs.</p>
<p>Over the last two decades, depletion of forest land has led farmers to turn to grasslands for replanting cocoa plants. This requires extensive land preparation, regular weeding around the cocoa trees, pruning, and the application of fertilisers and pesticides. What’s more, the plants are highly susceptible to disease. All these things result in increased labour costs.</p>
<p>None of these additional burdens have been incorporated into the pricing for sustainable cocoa production. In light of the new cost structure, cocoa beans have been undervalued for decades. Farmers have become poorer and are exploring alternative sources of livelihood. </p>
<p>The cost of sustainably cultivating cocoa in grasslands must be reflected in the price that farmers receive. Relying solely on market forces will not achieve this. For instance, every year, typically in September, the Ghana Cocoa Board <a href="https://thecocoapost.com/ghana-pegs-farmgate-cocoa-price-at-ghs1308-for-2023-24-crop/">announces</a> the official producer price for cocoa beans for the upcoming cocoa season on behalf of the government. This official price is based on the anticipated export market price, with an understanding in Ghana that farmers should receive approximately 70% of it. However, the resulting market price, and consequently the producer price derived from it, often falls short of covering the costs of sustainable cocoa cultivation.</p>
<h2>A path forward</h2>
<p>What would it cost for cocoa farmers to cultivate cocoa beans sustainably, and ensure a living income, without contributing to deforestation or resorting to child labour? </p>
<p>If the market price falls below this cost (which isn’t static), then the farmers face exploitation, giving rise to many of the problems that plague the industry.</p>
<p>A few years ago, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-efforts-by-cote-divoire-and-ghana-to-help-cocoa-farmers-havent-worked-162845">pioneered the introduction</a> of the “living income differential” – a premium that cocoa buyers would pay on top of the market price to ensure that farmers earned a sustainable income from their produce. Despite its noble intent, the initiative <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/africas-fields-plan-pay-fair-wages-chocolate-withers-2023-04-04/">faltered</a>. It was not well thought through. And it came at a time when these countries had diminished bargaining clout in a saturated market. Now is a favourable moment.</p>
<p>The crisis in the sector puts cocoa producers in a stronger negotiating position. </p>
<p>Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire could collaborate with other regional countries, such as Nigeria and Cameroon, to negotiate a better position for their cocoa farmers, ensuring sustainable cultivation. There are many strategies these countries can explore, including supply management (such as buffer stocks, export controls, or quotas), price premiums and value addition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214305/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael E Odijie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ghana and other west African cocoa growing countries must harness their combined bargaining strength to address the challenges plaguing cocoa farming.Michael E Odijie, Research associate, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122022023-08-28T14:43:16Z2023-08-28T14:43:16ZNiger’s coup weakens regional fight against Boko Haram: four reasons why<p>Niger’s President Mohamed Bazoum was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/armed-troops-blockade-presidential-palace-in-niger-mohamed-bazoum">detained and deposed</a> on 26 July by his military guard under the command of General Abdourahamane Tchiani. </p>
<p>The unconstitutional change of government has been widely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-president-says-democracy-will-be-saved-following-coup-2023-07-27/">condemned</a> internationally. Ecowas, the regional group, also issued sanctions and <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/08/11/coup-review-your-military-threat-sanctions-against-niger-%E2%80%90-fulani-group-tells-ecowas/">threatened</a> military intervention. </p>
<p>However, other military juntas in the region have been <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/613369-burkina-faso-mali-guinea-declare-support-for-niger-coup-as-soldiers-arrest-politicians.html">sympathetic</a> to the cause of the coup leaders. </p>
<p>The Niger coup has changed the security priority of key actors in the Lake Chad region, from fighting Boko Haram to addressing the political crisis.</p>
<p>Boko Haram terrorism and insurgency emerged in Nigeria in 2009 and spread across the Lake Chad region: Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The group has directly or indirectly killed more than <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2021/09/23/boko-haram-war-over-300000-children-killed-in-northeast-unicef/">300,000 children</a> and displaced <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/boko-haram-five-million-displaced-in-lake-chad-buhari/">five million</a> people in the region.</p>
<p>At its peak in early 2015, the insurgents <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003211525-1/boko-haram-lake-chad-basin-temitope-oriola-freedom-onuoha-samuel-oyewole">controlled</a> about 20,000 square miles (over 50,000km²) of Nigerian territory. </p>
<p>Early in the fight against Boko Haram, especially between 2010 and 2013, neighbouring states in the Lake Chad region displayed inadequate interest in cooperating with Nigeria. </p>
<p>Regional discord allowed the terrorists to attack targets in Nigeria and escape to neighbouring countries.</p>
<p>From around 2013, the region showed growing interest in the fight against Boko Haram, as terrorist attacks spread beyond Nigeria. The 2014 Paris and London <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015.1047227">conferences</a> further encouraged common frontline and international support against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region.</p>
<p>Cameroon opened the second front against Boko Haram, deploying over <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/04/anatomy-boko-haram-rise-decline-violent-group-nigeria-180422110920231.html">3,000 troops</a> to its northern region in July 2014. Around the same time, Niger Republic <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015.1047227">granted</a> the Nigerian military the right to pursue terrorists across the border. </p>
<p>Niger later declared a state of emergency and deployed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">3,000 troops</a> to the Differ region, threatened by Boko Haram, in February 2015. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">Chad</a> deployed 4,500 troops against the insurgents in early 2015. At the same time, Nigeria and Cameroon <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">raised</a> their forces to 25,000 and 7,000 respectively. </p>
<p>In July 2015, the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/about/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a> became operational against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region. With headquarters in N’Djamena, Chad, the force established sectors in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The force is made up of 10,000 troops drawn from the four frontline countries and Benin Republic.</p>
<p>To support them, France, the US, Belgium, Italy and Germany maintain varying degrees of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2021.1868798">military presence</a> in Niger. </p>
<p>This coordinated response is now threatened by the shift in focus from fighting Boko Haram to removing the coup leaders in Niger. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=vU7aPGIAAAAJ&citation_for_view=vU7aPGIAAAAJ:43bX7VzcjpAC">researched</a> Boko Haram and its operations in the Lake Chad region for the last 13 years. Based on my <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Boko-Harams-Terrorist-Campaign-in-Nigeria-Contexts-Dimensions-and-Emerging/Oriola-Onuoha-Oyewole/p/book/9781032077840">research</a> and <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/04/anatomy-boko-haram-rise-decline-violent-group-nigeria-180422110920231.html">understanding</a> of the region, I see four ways in which the events in Niger will make the regional fight against Boko Haram more difficult:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Ecowas’s attention is divided</p></li>
<li><p>Niger’s attention is diverted</p></li>
<li><p>the gaps in security may give Boko Haram the opportunity to regroup and restrategise</p></li>
<li><p>suspension of western aid to Niger could fuel poverty and drive recruitment into Boko Haram.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Niger’s coup and its benefits to Boko Haram</h2>
<p>The member states of the Lake Chad security arrangement and their western partners have condemned the Niger coup, and become hostile to the junta. </p>
<p>Ecowas, led by Nigeria, has <a href="https://ecowas.int/final-communique-fifty-first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-of-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">sanctioned</a> Niger. Ecowas suspended financial and commercial relations, closed land borders and restricted flights to and from Niger. The regional bloc also threatened military intervention to restore constitutional order in the country. </p>
<p>This means the Nigerian military has been preoccupied with possible Ecowas intervention in Niger. Data extracted from the <a href="https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/">Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project</a> as of 23 August shows that the last offensive operation against Boko Haram by the Nigerian military was on 25 July. Since then, four insurgent attacks have been recorded, where 12 civilians were killed and 15 were kidnapped in Nigeria.</p>
<p>The military priority of Niger has also shifted from fighting against Boko Haram and other violent extremist groups. Now it is regime security. Niger’s military is preoccupied with a potential Nigeria-led Ecowas military intervention. </p>
<p>The junta has thus <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/07/africa/niger-coup-deadline-intl/index.html">prioritised</a> defence of the national capital and south-western borders. This is to the detriment of south-eastern borders, where Boko Haram is a threat. </p>
<p>Boko Haram is already taking advantage of this shift. On 15 August, <a href="https://punchng.com/17-niger-soldiers-killed-in-attack-near-mali-ministry/#google_vignette">17 Niger soldiers</a> were killed in an attack by suspected jihadists near the country’s border with Mali. The attack was described as the first in over a year. </p>
<p>Many western countries have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-loses-aid-western-countries-condemn-coup-2023-07-29/#:%7E:text=NIAMEY%2C%20July%2029%20">suspended</a> critical development and security aid to Niger. This is to the detriment of the country’s counter-insurgency capacity. </p>
<p>Niger’s military junta is mobilising anti-colonial and anti-imperial sentiment. It has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66365376">severed</a> defence cooperation with France and is aligning with pro-Russian forces. </p>
<p>Boko Haram can exploit the Niger crisis to regroup and re-strategise. Terrorist movement from Sahel to the Lake Chad region was recently <a href="https://dailytrust.com/niger-coup-iswap-migrating-from-sahel-to-lake-chad-north-west/#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20top%20ISWAP%20fighters%20and,of%20the%20Lake%20Chad%20region">reported</a>.</p>
<p>The humanitarian effects of Ecowas sanctions and suspension of western aid may also fuel terrorist recruitment and a new wave of insecurity in the region. </p>
<p>The anti-western mobilisation of the junta can advance Boko Haram’s agenda to end western influence and establish Islamic State in the Lake Chad region and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212202/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samuel Oyewole does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Boko Haram may be the unintended beneficiary of the crisis created by the recent coup in Niger.Samuel Oyewole, Lecturer, Political Science, Federal University, Oye EkitiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2083812023-07-30T11:11:43Z2023-07-30T11:11:43ZCameroon’s anglophone conflict has lasted for six years: what citizens say about how to end it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537335/original/file-20230713-15-vyok0a.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cameroonians want an end to the six year old armed conflict. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon">armed conflict</a> in Cameroon between separatist groups and the military is in its sixth year. Armed groups are fighting for <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/cameroon-civil-war-anglophone-crisis-paul-biya-politics/">secession </a>of the English-speaking north-west and south-west regions and establishment of the Republic of Ambazonia. The government rejected a Canadian <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2023/01/statement-on-peace-process-in-cameroon.html">peace initiative</a> in January 2023. </p>
<p>Cameroon is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13146029">officially bilingual</a>. However, the minority English-speaking population has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/world/cameroon-anglophone-crisis/">complained for decades </a>of unfair treatment by the francophone-dominated state. Periods of opposition and resistance have come and gone, <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8784587/#:%7E:text=Genesis%20of%20the%20Anglophone%20crisis&text=Cameroon%20became%20a%20German%20colony,Britain%20and%2080%25%20to%20France.">for instance</a> in the 1990s. But the current levels of violence are unprecedented.</p>
<p>The impact on the civilian population has been devastating. In almost six years of conflict, over <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon">6,000 civilians</a> have been killed. Hundreds of villages have been razed in the military’s counterinsurgency campaign. Hundreds of thousands have fled the violence. <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon">Recent figures</a> indicate 628,000 internally displaced people and 87,000 Cameroonian refugees in Nigeria, out of a total population of some four million in the anglophone regions. </p>
<p>Drawing from our personal experiences and <a href="https://www.coventry.ac.uk/globalassets/media/global/08-new-research-section/ctpsr/voices-from-ground-zero---report.pdf">research</a> on the conflict since 2017, we assessed the current situation and the prospects for resolution based on citizen feedback. Most citizens propose inclusive dialogue and a referendum.</p>
<h2>Current impasse in peace efforts</h2>
<p>A number of factors currently sustain the conflict and make peacemaking difficult. </p>
<p>The foremost obstacle is the Cameroon government’s desire to crush the separatists and achieve a military victory. While government forces are better equipped and more numerous, this is a guerrilla war fought in difficult terrain. Such wars are difficult to win. This is especially so when fighting mobile armed groups fuelled by decades of <a href="https://panafricanvisions.com/2019/11/cameroon-from-biya-a-mea-culpa-on-the-anglophone-crisis-in-paris/">grievances</a>. The grievances relate to policies of forceful political, social and cultural assimilation, economic deprivation and marginalisation. </p>
<p>Additionally, a war economy has developed. Military personnel, political leaders and some Ambazonian groups are all <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2022/07/19/Cameroon-anglophone-crisis-separatism-secession-elusive-peace">profiting</a> from the conflict. </p>
<p>On the Ambazonian side, other factors also go against peacemaking. Notably, the Ambazonian movement has become increasingly fragmented politically and militarily. The political leadership, based mainly in the diaspora, has long been split between the Ambazonian Governing Council and the Interim Government. The Interim Government is now <a href="https://www.ambazoniagov.org/index.php/press-room/173-one-interim-government-one-legitimate-leader-restoration-council-affirms">fragmented</a> further under competing leaders. </p>
<p>The apparent disconnect between the political leadership living securely in the diaspora and the longstanding suffering of the civilian population in the conflict zones is another factor that militates against peace talks.</p>
<p>Militarily, there is a proliferation of armed groups. This makes any ceasefire prospects more difficult. </p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.chrda.org/the-human-rights-situation-report-of-the-north-west-and-south-west-regions-of-cameroon-between-january-2023-march-2023-first-quarter-report">atrocities against civilians</a> are undoubtedly committed by both warring sides, the military in particular continues to exercise extreme <a href="https://mimimefoinfos.com/anglophone-crisis-mother-and-son-murdered-in-big-babanki">violence</a> against the civilian population. Arbitrary arrests and detentions are rampant. </p>
<p>All this has led to a palpable shift in the mood among local civilians, with war-weariness and a strong desire for conflict resolution.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Among our research participants from <a href="https://bit.ly/Voices-Ground-Zero-Report">Ground Zero</a> – the local name given to the conflict zones – an almost unanimous desire was expressed for an end to the violence through a political settlement. Perhaps it is time to listen to these voices from Ground Zero for their perspectives on how to resolve the conflict.</p>
<p>One research participant succinctly summed up a possible pathway:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Ceasefire is the first button that should be clicked … [and] all the political detainees should be released. After their release, dialogue and a referendum and the people will decide. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The call for “inclusive dialogue” was the most commonly voiced element of this peace strategy. As one respondent noted: “real, genuine, inclusive national dialogue”, inclusive of diaspora elements and their own grassroots voices. </p>
<p>While we found support for both secession and a two-state federation among our participants, there was consensus on a referendum among the English-speaking population as their preferred means of political decision-making. </p>
<p>Although research participants favoured a bottom-up approach that facilitated local participation in peace processes, a mediation role for the international community was perceived as important:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If there is no foreign intervention, it will be difficult.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The UN and African Union were most frequently mentioned. At the time of our study, the Canadian initiative was unknown.</p>
<p>However, the warring parties remain entrenched in their unwillingness to countenance a political solution that either challenges the status quo (government side) or does not entail independence (Ambazonian side). </p>
<p>While most separatist factions (though not all) have shown more willingness to commit to the Canadian peace process, all of them should now listen to the views of anglophone civilians that they purport to represent and respect their desire for a peace agreement.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208381/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gordon Crawford has received funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council for the project "Voices from 'Ground Zero': Interrogating History, Culture and Identity in the Resolution of Cameroon's 'Anglophone' Conflict".</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maurice Beseng received funding from Coventry University's International and Interdisciplinary Pilot Projects for the project: "The Shrinking Civic Space in Cameroon and the Role of Civil Society Organisations in Resolution of the ongoing ‘Anglophone’ Conflict".</span></em></p>The Cameroonian government’s pursuit of military victory is likely to prolong the war.Gordon Crawford, Professor, Coventry UniversityMaurice Beseng, Assistant Professor, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2082042023-07-05T13:26:30Z2023-07-05T13:26:30ZAfrica’s linguistic diversity goes largely unnoticed in research on multilingualism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533665/original/file-20230623-19-z0z2nh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The African continent is home to some of the world's most multilingual societies.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Roxane 134/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Language is a uniquely human skill. That’s why studying how people learn and use language is crucial to understanding what it means to be human. Given that most people in the world – an estimated 60% – <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/blog/life-bilingual/201011/bilingualisms-best-kept-secret">are multilingual</a>, meaning that they know and use more than one language, a researcher who aims to understand language must also grasp how individuals acquire and use multiple languages. </p>
<p>The ubiquity of multilingualism also has practical consequences. For example, in the early schooling years, children <a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-from-africa-prove-the-incredible-value-of-mother-tongue-learning-73307">learn more effectively</a> when they are taught in their mother tongue rather than a second or third language. Research also shows that <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364661316301218">people make different decisions</a> depending on whether they are thinking in their first or second language.</p>
<p>The problem is that much of the published research about multilingualism is not conducted in the world’s most multilingual societies. For example, the African continent is home to some of the most multilingual countries in the world. <a href="https://www.ethnologue.com/country/CM/">Cameroon</a> has a population of around 27 million people; over 250 different languages are spoken as first languages, often alongside English and French or both. </p>
<p>Studies of African multilingual contexts are almost non-existent in high-impact scientific journals, however. This matters because it is research published in these journals that receives the most attention globally and is therefore most likely to shape people’s understanding of multilingualism.</p>
<p><a href="https://academic.oup.com/applij/advance-article/doi/10.1093/applin/amad022/7179911">Our recent study</a> provides new empirical evidence of the geographic bias in multilingualism research published in high-impact scientific journals. We show that the regions most commonly studied are not particularly multilingual. The reverse is also true: the most multilingual regions are massively understudied in research on multilingualism.</p>
<h2>A glaring mismatch</h2>
<p>The mismatch that emerged in our research is neatly illustrated in this map.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533660/original/file-20230623-29-xdyrbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533660/original/file-20230623-29-xdyrbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533660/original/file-20230623-29-xdyrbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533660/original/file-20230623-29-xdyrbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533660/original/file-20230623-29-xdyrbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533660/original/file-20230623-29-xdyrbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533660/original/file-20230623-29-xdyrbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533660/original/file-20230623-29-xdyrbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Two maps showing the disconnect between where multilingual researchers conduct their work (top) and where the world’s most multilingual societies are located.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors supplied</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The top panel presents a world map of the most common sites of multilingualism research; regions that are more commonly studied appear in darker colours. The map shows that North America and Western Europe are the primary locations of research on multilingualism. China and Australia are also fairly well represented. </p>
<p>This is a stark contrast to the bottom panel, which represents the extent of societal multilingualism in different countries. In this map, the shading represents a country’s score on the Linguistic Diversity Index – a measure of the likelihood that two randomly selected individuals from a country will have different first languages. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with largely monolingual societies receiving low scores and largely multilingual societies receiving high scores. </p>
<p>The top and bottom panels are near mirror images of each other: for example, the African continent is almost entirely blank in the top panel and intensely shaded in the bottom panel.</p>
<p>Other highly linguistically diverse regions such as the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia are also underrepresented in the sample as sites of multilingualism research.</p>
<h2>Geographic bias is detrimental</h2>
<p>This geographic bias is not unique to multilingualism research. It <a href="https://theconversation.com/global-south-scholars-are-missing-from-european-and-us-journals-what-can-be-done-about-it-99570">echoes concerns</a> raised in many other scientific fields about the lack of representation of scholars and research locations in the <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2021/09/28/what-or-where-is-the-global-south-a-social-science-perspective/">so-called</a> “global south” (Africa, Latin America, and most countries in Asia and Oceania). </p>
<p>In this case, however, the underrepresentation is particularly detrimental. It is precisely in the global south that multilingualism is most common. The predominance of global north research locations, then, means that much of the knowledge of multilingualism stems from regions that are comparatively monolingual.</p>
<p>This is not to say that no research is being carried out in highly multilingual regions. We ourselves are currently conducting <a href="https://www.psytoolkit.org/c/3.4.4/survey?s=YMxJQ">a large-scale study on multilingualism in South Africa</a>, and we know of several (South) African scientific journals that regularly <a href="https://www.multimargins.ac.za/index.php/mm">publish</a> <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/journals/rlms20">studies</a> <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rall20/current">conducted</a> in African countries and other linguistically diverse areas. However, studies published in smaller journals may be less likely to shape the field of multilingualism research. </p>
<p>The reduced visibility of research conducted in the global south has a complex web of causes. These include the unequal distribution of resources (like research infrastructure and research funding), as well as bias in the academic publishing system, which is <a href="https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2119373119">dominated</a> by global north institutions and publishing houses. </p>
<p>As a consequence of this imbalance, the global north is often seen as the “default” site for research, while global south settings are <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41559-023-01999-w">perceived</a> as specific and a source of knowledge that is not generalisable to other contexts. This is simply untrue.</p>
<h2>Tackling the problem</h2>
<p>To address the geographic bias that we have identified, the systemic inequalities in academia will need to be targeted. In the meantime, we are pleased to see the smaller steps that are already being taken.</p>
<p>One is increasing the visibility of the research that is being conducted in the global south. An example of an attempt to do this is the 2023 edition of the International Symposium on Bilingualism, which has as its theme “<a href="https://www.isb14.com/">Diversity Now</a>”. Furthermore, several high-impact journals have issued <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/annual-review-of-applied-linguistics/article/sampling-bias-and-the-problem-of-generalizability-in-applied-linguistics/5218D7603611D668EFF7B9FC1581E7DC">calls for studies</a> conducted outside of the typical North American and western European settings. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-00150-2">Big team science</a>, in which many scientists spread across institutions and locations work together, and collaboration between north and south will also help. With these and similar efforts, the field ought to diversify in the years to come and thus increase the validity of our knowledge of the human capacity for language.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208204/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Studies of African multilingual contexts are almost non-existent in high-impact scientific journals.Robyn Berghoff, Lecturer in General Linguistics, Stellenbosch UniversityEmanuel Bylund, Professor of General Linguistics, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2089872023-07-04T11:00:48Z2023-07-04T11:00:48ZThe fascinating Cameroonian art of spider divination is on display at London exhibition<p><a href="https://www.serpentinegalleries.org/whats-on/tomas-saraceno-webs-of-life-exhibition/">Tomás Saraceno In Collaboration: Web(s) of Life</a>, which opened at London’s Serpentine South Gallery in June, explores how humans relate to spiders. It features installations of spider webs displayed and lit to be viewed as sculptures. There are also films: one made about Saraceno’s work with groups battling lithium mining in Argentina and another about <a href="http://nggamdu.org/">spider diviners</a> from Somié village in Cameroon.</p>
<p>That’s where I came in. <em>Ŋgam dù</em> (the Mambila term for spider divination) is one of many types of oracle or divination used by Mambila people in Cameroon. It is the most trusted form and – unlike other types which are sometimes dismissed as mere games – its results <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Mambila-Divination-Framing-Questions-Constructing-Answers/Zeitlyn/p/book/9781032174082">can be used as evidence in the country’s courts</a>. Variants of this form of divination are found throughout southern Cameroon and the long history of the word <a href="https://nggamdu.org/nggam-du/"><em>ŋgam</em></a> attests to the longevity of the practice.</p>
<p>I work as a social anthropologist in the Mambila village of Somié. I have visited almost every year since 1985, working on a variety of projects. Divination was the focus of a chapter in my PhD in 1990, but I never stopped working on the subject. As well as becoming an initiated diviner, I have continued to think about the wider implications of using divination or oracles.</p>
<p><em>Ngam dù</em> is a form of divination in which binary (either/or) questions are asked of large spiders that live in holes in the ground. The options are linked to a stick and a stone then, using a set of leaf cards marked with symbols, the spider is left to make its choice.</p>
<p>The hole plus the stick, stone and cards are covered up. The spider emerges and will move the cards so the diviner can then interpret the pattern relative to the stick and stone. If cards are placed on the stick, then the option associated with that has been selected, and vice versa if the cards are placed on the stone.</p>
<p>Things get more interesting (at least to me and other diviners) if both options are selected, or neither. Sometimes a contradictory response is interpreted to mean that the question posed is not a good one. The diviner is thereby told to go and discuss the issue with the client and reframe the problem, posing a different question.</p>
<p>The process is “calibrated” regularly by asking test questions such as “Am I here alone?” or “Will I drink tonight?”. Spiders that fail these tests are discarded as liars and not used for future consultations. It’s also common to ask the same question in parallel to get a consistency check, so more than one spider can be used at the same time. Sometimes the stick and stone option are reversed to ensure that the spider isn’t just moving the cards always in the same direction.</p>
<p>Mambila diviners rely on these tests to justify the system, although they also say (as do many groups in Cameroon) that spiders are a source of wisdom since they live in the ground where the “village of the dead” is found.</p>
<h2>Tomás Saraceno and spider divination</h2>
<p>As an anthropologist, I avoid questions about whether spider divination is true. For me the important question is: “Does it help?”</p>
<p>Sometimes the results of divination are considered, but rejected, and the advice is not followed. Even in these instances it can be helpful, however, since it enables people decide on a course of action.</p>
<p>People use the results as a tool to help them think through hard decisions such as who to marry, or where to go for treatment when a child is ill. The latter involves weighing up conflicting considerations about expense, the possibility an illness has been caused by witchcraft and the reputations for effective treatment of different traditional healers as well as of rival biomedical health centres.</p>
<p>I met the Argentine artist Tomás Saraceno when he had an exhibit at the Venice Bienale in 2018. He was intrigued by the <a href="http://www.era.anthropology.ac.uk/Divination/Spider/index.html">computer simulation of spider divination</a> that my colleague Mike Fischer had made. He invited me to Venice to demonstrate the simulation and talk about spider divination in front of his “sculptures”, which are made in collaboration with spiders. They are patterns of spiderwebs displayed as art.</p>
<p>As we talked, I said that if one day he wanted to visit Cameroon I would be happy to introduce him to the diviners I worked with. In December 2019, he came with his friend, the filmmaker Maxi Laina. We visited Somié, where he worked with the diviner Bollo Pierre Tadios and the Mambila filmmaker Nguea Iréné.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/FFesNa4qMXA?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Trailer for Tomás Saraceno in Collaboration: Web(s) of Life.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Saraceno and Laina came with some questions to ask from their friends. This included “Who would win the 2020 US election?” This was the Trump v Biden election, the results of which Trump went on to question. The answer was that there would be a new president but it would not be straightforward!</p>
<p>Saraceno liked the idea that spiders could help humans resolve their personal problems. It gave an example of a different way in which human-spider relationships are expressed. Bollo liked the idea of opening the process up to questions from outside the village. He already has some clients from other places in Cameroon who call him, so working internationally is very doable.</p>
<p>He suggested that Saraceno could make his work accessible via the internet, which he has now done <a href="http://nggamdu.org/">through a dedicated website</a>. Some of the first results are included in the Serpentine exhibition along with film made by Nguea Iréné of Bollo in action. The film will also be shown in the village later in the summer.</p>
<p><em><a href="https://www.serpentinegalleries.org/whats-on/tomas-saraceno-webs-of-life-exhibition/">Tomás Saraceno In Collaboration: Web(s) of Life</a> is on at London’s Serpentine South Gallery until 10 September.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208987/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Zeitlyn has received funding from AHRC, ESRC, EPSRC</span></em></p>Ngam dù is a form of divination in which questions are asked of large spiders that live in holes in the ground. The results of spider divination can be used as evidence in Cameroon’s courts.David Zeitlyn, Professor of Social Anthropology, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2044312023-04-29T13:49:20Z2023-04-29T13:49:20ZUganda’s anti-homosexuality bill wants to ‘rehabilitate’ LGBTIQ+ people – African psychologists warn of its dangers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523006/original/file-20230426-24-gec1ca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sukhomoy Sen/Eyepix Group/Future Publishing via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.psyssa.com/psyssa-sgd-hosts-meeting-of-african-mental-health-professionals/">Mental health professionals</a> from across Africa, including Kenya, Uganda, Cameroon, Nigeria and South Africa, have signed <a href="https://www.change.org/LGBTQ_Declaration2023">a declaration</a> against conversion practices that are used to forcibly change the sexual orientation, gender identity or expression of LGBTIQ+ people.</p>
<p>The declaration unambiguously rejects any attempts by mental health professionals to use conversion. The declaration has already been officially endorsed by expert organisations, such as the <a href="https://pathsa.org.za/">Professional Association for Transgender Health</a>.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the practices described in the declaration are included in the 2023 Anti-Homosexuality Bill <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/20/ugandas-president-museveni-refuses-to-sign-lgbtq-bill?traffic_source=KeepReading">proposed by Uganda’s parliament</a>. Ugandan lawmakers have proposed to “rehabilitate” people who are sexually or gender diverse. PsySSA president, professor Floretta Boonzaier, has described the bill to me as “an attack on human dignity, well-being, autonomy and self-determination”.</p>
<p>Conversion practices – or so-called reparative therapies – are <a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/nothing-to-cure-putting-an-end-to-so-called-conversion-therapies-for-lgbti-people">unscientific</a> and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/SexualOrientation/IESOGI/CSOsAJ/IFEG_Statement_on_C.T._for_publication.pdf">do not work</a>.</p>
<p>Yet they are widely used across the continent. <a href="https://outrightinternational.org/insights/fight-end-conversion-practices-africa">Research</a> conducted in three African countries in 2019 found that half of the respondents suffered some form of conversion. These included talk therapy, exorcism, drinking herbs, healing prayers, beatings or sexual assault.</p>
<p>South African psychologists with <a href="https://www.psyssa.com/practice-guidelines-for-psychology-professionals-working-with-sexually-and-gender-diverse-people/">expertise</a> in sexuality and gender have condemned the bill. It goes against <a href="https://work.chron.com/ethical-principals-psychologists-code-conduct-8203.html">a core ethical duty</a> to promote well-being and to minimise harm. </p>
<p>Two examples illustrate this. Firstly, psychologists will be expected to breach confidentiality if a client discloses that they are (or may be) LGBTIQ+. Professionals who don’t report these clients to the police risk six months imprisonment. Secondly, psychologists, and presumably other health workers, will be expected to “rehabilitate” LGBTIQ+ people.</p>
<p>Pierre Brouard, the acting director of the Centre for Sexualities, AIDS and Gender at the University of Pretoria, said in an email conversation that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>this climate of fear would be a betrayal of everything our profession stands for. It is unthinkable that any mental health professional could work in this climate, and we call on all in our profession to condemn this attack on us, and the clients we serve. Reporting clients to the authorities <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(23)00814-0/fulltext">would be harmful</a>, would inhibit wellness, would invalidate trust, would lack integrity, would be inherently unjust and would damage any relationship of confidentiality.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>No scientific grounding</h2>
<p>Uganda’s president Yoweri Museveni has requested a science-informed response to the bill. But he has ignored evidence-based critiques that have been presented to him over the years, dating back to <a href="https://www.psyssa.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/PsySSA-Press-release-statement-combined_25022010.pdf">2010</a> and <a href="https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/uganda-letter">2014</a>. Brouard has said the bill </p>
<blockquote>
<p>is anti-science and represents a backward step in contemporary understanding of human nature.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-science-behind-a-more-meaningful-understanding-of-sexual-orientation-42641">The science behind a more meaningful understanding of sexual orientation</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>For example, in 2015, The Academy of Science in South Africa, in collaboration with the Uganda National Academy of Sciences, concluded in a <a href="http://www.assaf.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/8-June-Diversity-in-human-sexuality1.pdf">comprehensive review of the evidence</a>, that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>contemporary science increasingly recognises the wide range of natural variation in human sexuality, sexual orientations and gender identities</p>
</blockquote>
<p>and that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>there is no justification for attempts to eliminate people who are not heterosexual from society.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Perpetuating harm</h2>
<p>The bill is an assault on already vulnerable sexual and gender minorities. </p>
<p>Professor Kopano Ratele, an acclaimed <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/liberating-masculinities">African psychology</a> scholar, said via email that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the bill is, at its core, inhuman. Contrary to the sentiment of homosexuality as unAfrican, the bill expresses an unAfrican spirit. It seems that the bill is essentially about some people desiring to control the bodies, relationships, and the inner lives of others. What is so frightening about people loving others?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>LGBTIQ+ people are consistently <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.4102/hsag.v26i0.1487">at a higher risk</a> of developing mental health disorders. This is due to homophobia, transphobia and prejudice against their very identities. </p>
<p>The bill goes beyond criminalising sexual behaviour between consenting adults. Dr Jarred Martin, a senior lecturer in the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Pretoria, said (via email):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It criminalises identity by prescribing prosecution for how people think, feel, identify, and, ultimately, who and how they love. This attempt to criminalise love is something that South Africans are all too familiar with, having lived under colonial and apartheid era laws which cast love in legal terms as moral or immoral.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Similar anti-LGBTIQ+ efforts are underway in other African countries. <a href="https://www.lgbtqnation.com/2023/04/kenya-safe-havens-at-risk-with-draconian-anti-gay-bill/">Kenya</a> is currently targeting people under a Family Protection Bill. And in <a href="https://www.mambaonline.com/2023/04/13/tanzania-mps-seek-to-tighten-anti-lgbt-laws/">Tanzania</a>, castration is being touted as a punishment for gay men.</p>
<p>Christian evangelical churches from the US have been <a href="https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/31262664/2011_conference_HIV_prevention_sexual_minorities-libre.pdf?1392249132=&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DHow_and_why_HIV_prevention_efforts_have.pdf&Expires=1682289428&Signature=HPkAAoCXK9uLKDHcT9jG3iaZ8H7m0CywRbiMSmwAdpiWpAeisMHZ%7EV8G3A3qp3ZbMCFF9uf9TimJ-q2m-TgD5nWV2-phfbndU%7EDl9ypRlrrz9qGn-CP5FvSUD0iw6wx1LgOWnie4LR2BSNMmj1I9qaay26xRPgqqyz3IUBdI4-ruxdwBmRNoc2JY3TWXlL7vb5Dx0KS%7EbcCQY2qrT69npfJWOVc8PP5%7EIAUCtPa2orpdhnoyXOP%7Em8CxADy26Cczp1dRV5NJyW1Uzge9umESc4rPivg0hCcfZPme-SJTxWtZ4zniDsYun8Vtk1oj7RGVVAkr0zT7enf-Mw3sIkiQdQ__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA">directly linked</a> to current anti-LGBTIQ+ ideologies in African countries. </p>
<h2>The next steps</h2>
<p>The message is clear: all psychologists, but especially those of us based on the African continent, should stand together in condemning Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Bill. </p>
<p>We call on mental health professionals from across Africa to <a href="https://chng.it/dFggtTSZkW">sign</a> and endorse the declaration and to join the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/19/africa/uganda-anti-lgbtq-bill-scientists-open-letter-intl/index.html">growing chorus of experts</a> who have condemned Uganda’s dangerous bill. </p>
<p>The PsySSA Sexuality and Gender Division, for example, has been at the forefront of leading a science-informed critique of the Ugandan bill. In 2017, PsySSA published a pioneering set of <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0081246319853423?journalCode=sapc">practice guidelines</a> for psychology professionals working with LGBTIQ+ people. This was a first in Africa and has been <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214109X22000018">translated and used</a> in other African countries as a global mental health resource. Psychologists, therefore, can and should show leadership in promoting human rights and LGBTIQ+ wellbeing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204431/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Suntosh R Pillay is affiliated with the Psychological Society of South Africa (PsySSA) as an executive member of its Sexuality and Gender Division.</span></em></p>The proposed law reinforces unscientific conversion practices – or so-called reparative therapies – that don’t work.Suntosh R Pillay, Clinical Psychologist, University of KwaZulu-NatalLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1999912023-03-02T14:25:26Z2023-03-02T14:25:26ZThe Lake Chad Basin is a security nightmare. 5 guidelines for finding solutions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510857/original/file-20230217-26-979ksn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The violence in north-east Nigeria has displaced thousands of people.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It is now 14 years since Boko Haram and other armed groups began to operate in the Lake Chad Basin. The region, which includes Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon, has become unstable and the people who live there are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. </p>
<p>Out of the <a href="https://www.downtoearth.org.in/blog/climate-change/climate-change-conflict-what-is-fuelling-the-lake-chad-crisis-75639">30 million</a> people in the Lake Chad region, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/icrc-urgent-efforts-needed-ensure-protection-11-million-people-lake-chad-region">11.3 million</a> have been displaced by the conflict and over <a href="https://www.unocha.org/lakechad2023">11 million</a> urgently need aid. </p>
<p>Drought and flooding are adding to the problem. Lake Chad, the primary source of water in the region, has <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-private-sector-is-shaping-the-future-of-lake-chad-and-the-congo-basin-162532">shrunk</a> significantly due to drought <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-private-sector-is-shaping-the-future-of-lake-chad-and-the-congo-basin-162532">since the 1960s</a>. In 2022, the region was hit by a severe flood. More than <a href="https://reliefweb.int/disaster/fl-2022-000287-tcd">600,000 people</a> and large areas of agricultural land were affected. These climate-related disasters pose a serious challenge to food security. <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2019-march-2020/drying-lake-chad-basin-gives-rise-crisis">Over 5 million people</a> in the region are struggling to get enough food to survive and <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2019-march-2020/drying-lake-chad-basin-gives-rise-crisis">half a million children</a> are suffering from acute malnutrition. </p>
<p>The Lake Chad Basin conflict affects everyone who lives there. But <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep12548.pdf">evidence</a> suggests that young people experience the greatest impact. The majority of the people who join Boko Haram are young men. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep12548.pdf">Poverty</a>, absence of basic services like education and healthcare, and loss of livelihoods push young men to join Boko Haram. </p>
<p>With the region’s population expected to <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/demographic-dynamics-and-crisis-countries-around-lake-chad">double</a> in the next two decades, the insecurity has serious implications for development and people’s well-being.</p>
<h2>Five focus areas for Lake Chad</h2>
<p>For many years, the governments of the affected countries have worked together with the international community to find solutions. Several <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2019-march-2020/drying-lake-chad-basin-gives-rise-crisis">high level conferences</a> have been organised to raise funds and discuss the crisis. In 2018, the affected countries adopted a five-year <a href="https://cblt.org/regional-strategy-stabilization/">regional strategy</a> to address the root causes of Boko Haram’s emergence and its consequences. But the crisis has continued, largely due to limited collaboration and underfunding.</p>
<p>In January 2023, as <a href="https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/projects/internationalrelationssecurity/dataanddisplacement/data-displacement/researchteam/team-members">researchers </a>and <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/people/chika-charles-aniekwe/">practitioners</a> working in the fields of stabilisation and displacement we visited Niamey, the capital of Niger, for the <a href="https://www.unocha.org/lakechad2023">3rd High Level Conference on the Lake Chad Basin Region</a>. </p>
<p>The aim of the conference was to take stock of the progress made in addressing the crisis and to forge pathways for a more coherent and collaborative response. A diverse range of voices was represented, from government officials to international agencies, researchers and civil society groups.</p>
<p>The importance of local ownership, social inclusion, civilian protection and climate action are key points that emerged from the conference.</p>
<p><strong>Regional and national ownership</strong></p>
<p>International partners, donors and other actors involved in stabilisation, peace, development and humanitarian aid agreed to work with the local communities, national governments and regional institutions to foster regional and national ownership of intervention programmes. This idea isn’t new: it was <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/fixing-the-lake-chad-crisis-from-the-bottom-up/">mooted</a> in 2021 at the third governors’ forum. Yet progress has been slow. </p>
<p>The idea is that the local communities who suffer the impact of the crisis and who know the context must participate actively in finding and implementing solutions, rather than having external solutions imposed. Solutions that are shaped by the culture and values of the affected populations are more likely to be relevant to them. This will help to build trust and sustain peace and development. </p>
<p><strong>Including young people, women and girls</strong></p>
<p>Young men face higher risk of joining Boko Haram. Women and girls face the risk of sexual violation and gender-based violence, including rape and forced marriage at the hands of extremist groups. The key message of this high-level conference was “leave no one behind”. Participants emphasised the need to create employment opportunities for young people to restore their hope and build shared prosperity. This can be achieved through entrepreneurship programmes, skills training and engaging youths in productive agriculture. Victims of sexual violations should receive mental health and psychosocial support.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003041566-10/violent-militancy-mended-masculinities-modestatochi-alozie">research</a> has shown that youth interventions can reinforce inequality if elites or youth representatives “capture” the programmes and less powerful youth groups are excluded. This must be avoided.</p>
<p><strong>Managing mass exit from Boko Haram</strong></p>
<p>Some programmes have been implemented to facilitate the voluntary exit of Boko Haram recruits and reintegrate them into the society. Nigeria’s <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/b170-exit-boko-haram-assessing-nigerias-operation-safe-corridor">Operation Safe Corridor</a> is one.</p>
<p>But if exits from violent groups are not handled well, social cohesion and community security could be undermined. <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/b170-exit-boko-haram-assessing-nigerias-operation-safe-corridor">Critics</a> point out that Operation Safe Corridor does not provide enough screening, training, support and reparations for Boko Haram members before reintegrating them into the community.</p>
<p><a href="https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/lake-chad-basin-crisis-response-plan-2022#:%7E:text=Lake%20Chad%20Basin%20Crisis%20Response%20Plan%202022,%24%2038.7M%20FUNDING%20CONFIRMED%20%24%20153.3M%20FUNDING%20GAP">Transitional justice mechanisms</a> will be needed to address the legacy of the conflict (including human rights violations and abuses) and ensure accountability, justice and reconciliation. The root causes of the conflict, such as poverty and lack of economic opportunities, must also be addressed so that those who return home can live dignified and better lives.</p>
<p>Consultation with the wider community is necessary to improve acceptance and to ensure peaceful reintegration. Prioritising the needs of former Boko Haram members over those of the victims is unfair. </p>
<p><strong>Protection of civilians</strong></p>
<p>Many civilians continue to face violent attacks not just from Boko Haram but also from military officials. In recent years, civilians‘ access to humanitarian assistance has decreased. In part, this is due to immigration obstacles and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/echo-crisis-report-n-19-lake-chad-basin-crisis-11-february-2021">increasing attacks</a> on humanitarian workers. Civilians could be better protected through training more military officers on human rights and by supporting communities to build their own coping mechanisms. </p>
<p><strong>Climate action</strong></p>
<p>Conference participants explained that more work is needed to address the link between climate change, violence and displacement in response planning. Drought and flooding are increasing competition for land, water and food. This has led to conflict and displacement, as seen in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g-fPEHUqhyA">Nigeria</a> and <a href="https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2023/1/18/climate-fueled-violence-and-displacement-in-the-lake-chad-basin-focus-on-chad-and-cameroon">Cameroon</a>.</p>
<p>An important first step will be to amend the <a href="https://cblt.org/regional-strategy-stabilization/">Regional Stabilisation Strategy</a> to respond to this link. More funds will also be required to manage the harmful consequences of climate change. Yet funding continues to shrink. In 2022, the <a href="https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/lake-chad-basin-crisis-response-plan-2022#:%7E:text=Lake%20Chad%20Basin%20Crisis%20Response%20Plan%202022,%24%2038.7M%20FUNDING%20CONFIRMED%20%24%20153.3M%20FUNDING%20GAP">International Organization for Migration</a> reported an 87% funding gap in addressing the drivers and longer term impacts of crises and displacement in the region, including climate change. </p>
<p>Achieving a peaceful future in the Lake Chad Basin requires more collaboration and financial commitment. Time, however, is running short.</p>
<p><em>This article was co-authored with Dr. Chika Charles Aniekwe. He is the Senior Advisor and Head of Stabilisation for the UNDP/Lake Chad Basin Stabilisation Strategy</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199991/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Modesta Tochukwu Alozie has Consulted for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as a Rapporteur and as a conflict analyst. </span></em></p>The insecurity in the area has serious implications for development and the well-being of people, especially young people.Modesta Tochukwu Alozie, Lead Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1990682023-02-06T17:17:42Z2023-02-06T17:17:42ZIs Canada back on the world stage — or irrelevant?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508353/original/file-20230206-31-rmkopb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4928%2C2973&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Canadian and German troops take part in a Canadian flag-raising ceremony as the first Canadian troops arrived at a UN base in Gao, Mali, in June 2018. Was the initiative just an exercise in box-checking for Justin Trudeau's government?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Sean Kilpatrick</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-34586005">“Canada is back,” Justin Trudeau proclaimed triumphantly just after being elected prime minister in 2015.</a> The insinuation was that his predecessor, Stephen Harper, had withdrawn Canada from its traditional role in the world and the Liberals would restore our rightful place of leadership in the global firmament. </p>
<p>After seven plus years in office, it’s time to assess the degree to which Trudeau’s rhetoric has been matched with action.</p>
<p>Out of the blocks, the Trudeau government mounted a vigorous campaign for a seat on the United Nations Security Council. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53087650">When the vote came down in 2020, Canada lost to Norway and Ireland.</a> The only consolation was that the Harper government had failed in its attempt to get on the council 10 years earlier, <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/99271/canada-loses-un-security-council-seat-despite-guarantees/">losing to Portugal.</a></p>
<p>The Liberals also committed to bolster Canada’s contributions to United Nations “<a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2484248-liberal-party-of-canada-2015-platform.html">peace operations</a>.” So began a search for a comfortable mission fit for Canada. After three years of deliberations, Ottawa chose the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). </p>
<p><a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/op-presence.html">The Royal Canadian Air Force deployed eight helicopters into MINUSMA in 2018-19.</a> Ottawa’s decision to limit the operation to one year — to reduce both cost and risk — ensured it would have no meaningful impact on a UN mission that remains ongoing after a decade. </p>
<p>Canada’s sojourn into Mali isn’t evidence of getting back into UN peace operations. It is box-checking. <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/list.html">Today, Canada has fewer than 50 Canadian Armed Forces personnel scattered among about half of the 12 UN operations around the world.</a></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two soldiers in battle fatigues stand in a dusty field and watch as a helicopter approaches." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508384/original/file-20230206-25-vyfx33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508384/original/file-20230206-25-vyfx33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508384/original/file-20230206-25-vyfx33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508384/original/file-20230206-25-vyfx33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508384/original/file-20230206-25-vyfx33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508384/original/file-20230206-25-vyfx33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508384/original/file-20230206-25-vyfx33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Canadian soldiers watch as a Canadian helicopter provides air security during a demonstration for Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on the United Nations base in Gao, Mali in December 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Left out of AUKUS</h2>
<p>In 2021, the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia — Canada’s partners, along with New Zealand, in the <a href="https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-five-eyes-the-intelligence-alliance-of-the-anglosphere/">“Five Eyes” intelligence sharing alliance</a> — signed a deal known as AUKUS. </p>
<p>AUKUS is a trilateral agreement aimed at countering Chinese territorial ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/">It’s focused on the sharing of nuclear submarine technology, advanced cyber, hypersonics, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence and quantum technologies</a>.</p>
<p>It would be one thing if Ottawa took a hard look at this agreement and decided to take a pass. But Canada was neither considered for nor consulted on AUKUS. <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-canadian-government-surprised-by-new-indo-pacific-security-pact/">The Trudeau government learned about its existence through the media.</a> </p>
<p>Shortly after the AUKUS announcement, U.S. President Joe Biden, whose country shares with Canada the longest undefended border in the world, <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/biden-says-australia-closest-ally-at-inflection-point-in-history-20210922-p58tnb">stated that America has no closer ally than Australia.</a></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508362/original/file-20230206-19-zl2y0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508362/original/file-20230206-19-zl2y0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508362/original/file-20230206-19-zl2y0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508362/original/file-20230206-19-zl2y0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508362/original/file-20230206-19-zl2y0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508362/original/file-20230206-19-zl2y0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508362/original/file-20230206-19-zl2y0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and U.S. President Joe Biden attend the Japan-U.S.-Australia-India Fellowship founding celebration event in Tokyo in May 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Yuichi Yamazaki/Pool Photo via AP)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Indo-Pacific region</h2>
<p>On the Indo-Pacific file, the Trudeau government unveiled its <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique/index.aspx?lang=eng">strategy for the region</a> in November. <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/01/04/reinventing-the-indo-pacific">As <em>The Economist</em> recently pointed out</a>, numerous countries have joined the Indo-Pacific strategy bandwagon (though Canada was not mentioned in the article) owing to an increasingly threatening China. </p>
<p>So what does Ottawa’s Indo-Pacific strategy do to enhance Canada’s contribution to defence and security in that part of the world?</p>
<p>Under the pre-existing <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-projection.html">Operation PROJECTION</a>, Canada sent two frigates a year to take part in multinational naval operations in the Indo-Pacific. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/11/minister-anand-announces-defence-and-security-elements-of-canadas-indo-pacific-strategy.html">The government’s new Indo-Pacific Strategy will boost this frequency to three frigate visits per year.</a> It’s an increment that barely qualifies as symbolic in a region encompassing 235 million square kilometres of ocean, 40 countries and four billion people. </p>
<h2>Cameroon, tanks to Ukraine</h2>
<p>Recently, however, it appeared the Liberals had finally found their footing in an area of international affairs in which they feel comfortable — <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2023/01/statement-on-peace-process-in-cameroon.html">facilitating a peace process in Cameroon between the government and separatist groups</a>.</p>
<p>“Canada has accepted the mandate to facilitate this process as part of our commitment to promote peace and security and advance support for democracy and human rights,” <a href="https://www.cp24.com/news/canada-to-facilitate-cameroon-peace-process-foreign-affairs-minister-joly-1.6240370">Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly said on Jan. 20.</a></p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1616677145597677570"}"></div></p>
<p>Three days later, however, Cameroon’s government begged to differ. Cameroon <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/24/cameroon-denies-asking-for-help-to-mediate-separatist-conflict">“has not entrusted any foreign country or external entity with any role of mediator or facilitator to settle the crisis,”</a> a Cameroonian government minister stated. </p>
<p>More recently, there are tanks to Ukraine. </p>
<p>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) just crossed an important threshold. <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-invasion-day-336-1.6725190">More than a dozen member states have now agreed to supply Ukraine with strategically important main battle tanks</a> in the effort to drive Russian ground forces out of Ukraine. </p>
<p>The Canadian Army has 82 Leopard 2 tanks in its arsenal. They have not been deployed since the Canadian Armed Forces withdrew from Afghanistan a decade ago. <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2023/01/defence-minister-anita-anand-announces-that-canada-will-supply-ukraine-with-leopard-2-battle-tanks-training-and-sustainment.html">On Jan. 26, Defence Minister Anita Anand announced Canada would donate four Leopards to Ukraine</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A tank is seen on dusty terrain." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508390/original/file-20230206-23-gvbqjq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508390/original/file-20230206-23-gvbqjq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508390/original/file-20230206-23-gvbqjq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508390/original/file-20230206-23-gvbqjq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508390/original/file-20230206-23-gvbqjq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508390/original/file-20230206-23-gvbqjq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508390/original/file-20230206-23-gvbqjq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Canadian Forces Leopard 2A4 tank displays its firepower on the firing range at CFB Gagetown in Oromocto, N.B., in 2012.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/David Smith</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Tied with Portugal</h2>
<p>At least this time around Canada did not lose to Portugal … we tied them. </p>
<p>Canada <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/media-portugal-preparing-to-hand-over-four-leopard-2-tanks-to-ukraine">and Portugal</a> hold the distinction of committing the fewest number of tanks among the NATO states sending them to Ukraine. </p>
<p>The record seems clear under Trudeau’s leadership. Canada — a member of the G7, present at the creation of the UN and NATO, inventor of UN peacekeeping, co-inventor of the G20, and a founding member of the Five Eyes — is not back in the world. </p>
<p>Canada is largely irrelevant.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199068/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eugene Lang is a consultant/advisor to the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries; Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute; and Senior Fellow, Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History, Trinity College, University of Toronto. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not represent those of any organizations to which he is affiliated.</span></em></p>Far from Canada being back as a major player on the world stage, its presence has been diminished under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.Eugene Lang, Assistant Professor (Continuing Adjunct), School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, OntarioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1987982023-02-02T06:48:39Z2023-02-02T06:48:39ZThe body choosing Kenya’s election commission is being overhauled – how this could strengthen democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507316/original/file-20230131-4114-8kr9t0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">William Ruto (right) takes over from Uhuru Kenyatta as Kenya's president in 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya has new rules for choosing the people who run its elections.</p>
<p>President William Ruto has signed into law the <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/index.php/iebc-amendment-bill-2022-assented-law">Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (Amendment) Bill</a>. It changes the composition of the panel that selects people to serve on the country’s Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.iebc.or.ke/iebc/?mandate">commission</a> is a state institution that has the task of enhancing and supporting constitutional democracy in Kenya. It conducts elections, registers citizens as voters and maintains the voters’ roll. It also fixes the boundaries of electoral constituencies and wards. It settles electoral disputes, registers candidates for election and conducts voter education.</p>
<p>But since it was established in 2011, the commission has been at the centre of Kenya’s history of post-election violence. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/counties/article/2000203367/the-truth-lies-and-dangers-as-debate-on-iebc-rages-on">2013</a>, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20171018-kenya-election-chief-doubt-free-fair-poll-kenyatta-odinga-demonstrations">2017</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rigging-allegations-begin-kenyan-media-slow-tally-votes-tight-presidential-race-2022-08-12/">2022</a>, the losing political parties accused it of failing to administer elections fairly and lawfully. </p>
<p>In 2017, the Kenyan supreme court accused the commission of “<a href="https://www.zawya.com/en/economy/africa/kenyans-usher-in-year-of-political-reforms-i46ulluz">bungling</a>” the presidential election. In the 2022 elections, the then vice-chairperson of the commission, Juliana Cherera, <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/august-9/4-iebc-commissioners-disown-presidential-results-144903/">disowned the results</a> of the presidential poll before the official announcement. </p>
<p><a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/-raila-calls-for-constitutional-changes-and-iebc-reforms--4001430">Raila Odinga</a>, who lost that poll, called for reforms that would make the electoral commission a much fairer referee of the country’s elections. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/raila-odinga-should-be-thanked-his-election-losses-helped-deepen-kenyas-democracy-190044">Raila Odinga should be thanked - his election losses helped deepen Kenya's democracy</a>
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<p>The new law seeks to <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2022-11/Independent%20Electoral%20and%20Boundaries%20Commission%20%28Amendment%29%20Bill%2C%202022.pdf">streamline the process</a> of appointing members to the electoral commission, making the selection process more participatory and reflective of the country’s diversity.</p>
<p>And it comes at a critical moment. Seven commissioner positions are currently vacant.</p>
<p>A weak electoral agency poses four major threats to Kenya’s democracy: it will fail to deliver fair, free and credible elections; it will disrupt improvements in the country’s transition to democracy; it will prolong the culture of post-election violence; and it will divide the nation’s diverse ethnocultural groups.</p>
<p>It is, therefore, vital that the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission be a strong and fully functioning organisation staffed by Kenyans who are dedicated to democratic governance. </p>
<h2>What’s changing under the new law</h2>
<p>Selecting electoral commissioners is a complex job. </p>
<p>The new law brings more independent commissioners and associations into the selection process. Previously, only three agencies nominated the seven commissioners: the <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/psc/the-commission">Parliamentary Service Commission</a>, the <a href="https://interreligiouscouncil.or.ke/history/">Inter-Religious Council of Kenya</a> and the <a href="https://twitter.com/lawsocietykenya?lang=en">Law Society of Kenya</a>. Now there are five. The newcomers are the <a href="https://orpp.or.ke/index.php/services/political-parties-liaison-committees-pplc">Political Parties Liaison Committee</a> and the <a href="https://www.publicservice.go.ke/index.php/about-us/mandate">Public Service Commission</a>. They open the door for political parties and the public service to participate in this critical process.</p>
<p>It’s important that the selection panel includes state and non-state organisations that promote election integrity. Only individuals who are citizens of Kenya and meet the integrity requirements in <a href="http://www.kenyalaw.org:8181/exist/kenyalex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010#KE/CON/Const2010/chap_6">Chapter 6</a> of the constitution can serve on the selection panel. These individuals must hold a degree from a university recognised in Kenya.</p>
<h2>The vacancies</h2>
<p>Three of the current vacancies in the commission were expected: these commissioners’ terms had expired. But four other commissioners quit under a cloud of suspicion. </p>
<p>Cherera, Justus Nyang'aya and Francis Wanderi resigned after being <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/realtime/2022-12-06-cherera-four-should-be-probed-even-after-resigning-mp-kiarie/">suspended for their conduct</a> during the 2022 election. They had alleged that commission chairperson Wafula Chebukati had <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001462824/cherera-nyangaya-wanderi-and-masit-to-be-investigated-individually-muchelule-says">altered poll results</a> in favour of Ruto. Another commissioner, Irene Masit, was also suspended. She now has <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/irene-masit-breaks-silence-after-skipping-hearings-by-tribunal-probing-cherera-4-n311525">charges pending</a> against her before a tribunal investigating the matter.</p>
<h2>Why elections matter</h2>
<p>Elections are <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/10/30/threats-to-democracy-in-africa-the-rise-of-the-constitutional-coup/">a cornerstone of any democracy</a>. They help a nation build and sustain democratic and development-enhancing institutions. </p>
<p>They are a check on government. Elections put the power in ordinary people’s hands to change their government and choose more effective leaders for public service. They also give historically marginalised groups a voice.</p>
<p>To perform these functions, elections must meet certain minimum standards. They must be regular, fair, free, competitive, inclusive, transparent and credible. They must be conducted in strict conformity with the constitution. </p>
<p>That’s why a strong, independent and functioning electoral agency is so vital. </p>
<h2>Risks of dysfunction</h2>
<p>In Kenya, a weak and dysfunctional electoral commission would have dire consequences.</p>
<p>First, the failure to conduct elections that are considered by the majority of Kenyans as free, fair and credible could lead to the type of violence that the country experienced after the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/3/3/kenya-what-went-wrong-in-2007">2007 presidential election</a>. More than 1,000 people died. </p>
<p>Second, a weak commission can derail improvements in Kenya’s electoral system. A strong commission sets codes of conduct for candidates and political parties. This helps guard against various forms of political opportunism, including corruption. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fears-of-election-rigging-may-fuel-further-abuses-in-kenya-democracy-could-be-the-loser-176113">Fears of election rigging may fuel further abuses in Kenya: democracy could be the loser</a>
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<p>Third, a dysfunctional electoral commission can be manipulated by politicians and their supporters to monopolise political spaces. This situation has played out in <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2007-07-23-voa7-66781532/565192.html">Cameroon</a>, where the ruling party has marginalised the opposition to remain in power since 1990. Similarly, in <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20200224-togo-incumbent-re-elected-fourth-term-opposition-alleges-fraud">Togo</a>, President Faure Gnassingbé has monopolised political spaces since 2005. </p>
<p>Fourth, in Kenya, the electoral commission is responsible for creating electoral boundaries. Any weakness in the commission can be exploited to create boundaries that benefit certain politicians and their supporters. This would undermine democracy and create distrust in the country’s democratic institutions.</p>
<p>The new law <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/senators-split-on-proposal-to-change-law-on-iebc-selection-4090866">doesn’t meet the expectations</a> of all of Kenya’s political constituencies – some individuals and groups believe that their voice in the selection panel has been diluted. However, it’s important for all Kenyans to recognise these reforms as an effort in the right direction – towards a stronger and more inclusive commission.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198798/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Mukum Mbaku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya’s electoral agency is tasked with enhancing and supporting constitutional democracy – any dysfunctions would have dire consequences.John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1954882023-01-17T14:14:43Z2023-01-17T14:14:43Z7 million internally displaced people live in Central Africa – they need more support<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497944/original/file-20221129-12-irvzyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dozens of displaced people gather along the fence of the MONUSCO base in DRC. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexis Huguet/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/7-million-internally-displaced-people-live-in-central-africa-they-need-more-support-195488&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>Central Africa is host to the largest community of internally displaced persons in Africa. The countries in this region include Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda. </p>
<p>Just four of these account for <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1237268/number-of-internally-displaced-persons-in-africa/">more than</a> 7 million internally displaced people. At the top of the list, the DRC alone hosts more than <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-regional-refugee-response-plan-january-3">5.5 million</a>. </p>
<p>The main cause of these high numbers is conflict, both national and international. Conflicts have tormented the region for decades. </p>
<p>For example, the protracted armed conflicts and rebellions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic <a href="https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20Memo%205327">have contributed</a> to the instability of the region, with serious effects on their neighbours, some of which have been directly involved in the conflicts. </p>
<p>In addition, the militant Islamist group <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/boko_haram.html">Boko Haram</a> has emerged as a major threat in Central Africa. And Burundi faces <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/09/burundi-must-engage-credible-and-inclusive-democratisation-process-says-un">persistent political tension and violence</a>.</p>
<p>The internal displacement crisis is further driven by <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2021/">natural disasters</a>, such as <a href="https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/dtm/lake_chad_basin_dtm_201903.pdf">flooding</a>. </p>
<p>Displaced people are a <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14927.doc.htm">highly vulnerable group</a>. They’re forced to live in crowded and unsanitary camps. They’re also fleeing violence and are surrounded by active fighting situations. For example, in February 2022, in Plaine Savo camp (DRC), <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/01/17/drc-more-people-killed-in-two-militia-attacks-in-ituri/">a militia</a> group killed <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-statement-killing-dozens-displaced-people-plaine-savo-camp">more than 60 civilians</a>.</p>
<p>All over the world, the management of internally displaced people can be a challenge. It requires resources (for example, food and tents) and political will. </p>
<p>As a scholar with expertise in the legal promotion and protection of the rights of the people “on the move” in Africa, I argue that adopting a specific regional protocol could ease the management of displaced people in the region. A protocol is an instrument that creates legally binding obligations to international law. </p>
<p>In this case, the protocol would, among other things, legally bind countries to respect not only the new provisions contained in it but also the provisions of the <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/african-union-convention-protection-and-assistance-internally-displaced-persons-africa">Kampala Convention</a>. This is
a continent-wide treaty which the African Union (AU) adopted in 2009 to protect and assist internally displaced people in Africa.</p>
<p>The mechanism of enforcement established in the protocol should complement and help to enforce the provisions of the Kampala Convention.</p>
<h2>The Kampala Convention</h2>
<p>The Kampala Convention provides solutions for the return, relocation or resettlement of the internally displaced. It also provides for displaced people to seek redress for housing, land and property losses. Physical, mental and other types of harms are included too. </p>
<p>But it’s not clear whether these services are accessible in practice. The problem is that the Kampala Convention is for the whole continent and lacks clear enforcement mechanisms. </p>
<p>The Central African region has a massive problem with displaced people. Currently, the <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/globalreport2021/west-central-africa#:%7E:text=In%20addition%20to%20strengthening%20its,close%20to%208%2C000%20protection%20incidents">main actor</a> to provide assistance in the region is the UN refugee agency - UNHCR. And its regional budget for 2023 <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/globalappeal/west-central-africa">already looked insufficient</a>
by late October 2022, repeating a pattern seen in the past three years.</p>
<p>A sub-regional treaty, or protocol, could focus on this specific situation and create a better management plan. There’s no subregional regime for internally displaced people anywhere in Africa. Countries are focusing on other problems or consider the plight of displaced people to be a domestic affair.</p>
<p>My proposal is an attempt to do something concrete to change this.</p>
<h2>What it should say</h2>
<p>The protocol must include a number of articles dedicated to stringent enforcement of the provisions of the Kampala Convention. To do this, it should create an institution that monitors and ensures the implementation of the Kampala Convention specifically for the Central African region. </p>
<p>For instance, the Kampala convention states that though states bear the primary duty and responsibility for providing assistance and protection to internally displaced people within their territory, they must cooperate with each other in doing so. The proposed institution should ensure that states in the subregion share the financial and material burden of managing displacement situations. </p>
<h2>Who should drive it</h2>
<p>Drafting such a protocol requires a big effort and the strong political will of the <a href="https://archive.uneca.org/oria/pages/eccas-economic-community-central-african-states#:%7E:text=The%20member%20States%20of%20ECCAS,and%20Sao%20Tome%20and%20Principe.">Economic Community of Central African States</a> (ECCAS), made up of 11 countries.</p>
<p>The regional community should lead on the protocol. It is easier for 11 actors of the region to reach agreement than to include 55 AU members in discussions. For example, at the continental level discussions on free movement of people which <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policy-brief111.pdf">started in 1991</a> are <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-sl-PROTOCOL%20TO%20THE%20TREATY%20ESTABLISHING%20THE%20AFRICAN%20ECONOMIC%20COMMUNITY%20RELAT....pdf">still going on</a>. Only four countries
have ratified the 2018 <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-treaty-protocol_on_free_movement_of_persons_in_africa_e.pdf">Free Movement Treaty</a>. By contrast, in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) area, a Protocol on Free Movement <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/492187502.html">has existed since</a> 1979, and it has been implemented for the most part. </p>
<p>The protocol could enter into force after ratification by a number of ECCAS members and a “committee” of politicians and magistrates could be created to enforce its provisions. </p>
<p>This committee would hold primary responsibility for the enforcement of the protocol. </p>
<p>Funding for the protocol’s activities should come from the ECCAS Commission, which is financed by its member countries. Member countries must turn conversations about regional solidarity into solid obligations. These include financial commitments and assistance. A special fund to assist internally displaced people could be created. </p>
<p>This isn’t a far-fetched suggestion. Recently, quests for solidarity and responsibility sharing have been high on political agendas, especially in the aftermath of emergencies triggered by political tension in several ECCAS countries. The DRC, for example, acceded to the Kampala Convention only on <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36846-sl-AFRICAN_UNION_CONVENTION_FOR_THE_PROTECTION_AND_ASSISTANCE_OF_INTERNALLY_DISPLACED_PERSONS_IN_AFRICA_KAMPALA_CONVENTION_1.pdf">3 February 2022</a> – the day after the killing in Plaine Savo.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195488/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cristiano d'Orsi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A specific regional protocol could ease the management of internally displaced persons in the region.Cristiano d'Orsi, Lecturer and Senior Research Fellow at the South African Research Chair in International Law (SARCIL), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1956792022-12-15T09:38:03Z2022-12-15T09:38:03ZCameroon’s Anglophone crisis: how the common law court offers a ray of hope<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500980/original/file-20221214-11-4jpt5x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A lawyer in front of a Yaounde court</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reinnier Kaze/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Six years on, the crisis in the Anglophone (English-speaking) regions of Cameroon continues. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/11/cameroon-army-killings-disappearances-north-west-region#:%7E:text=The%20violence%20has%20caused%20about,to%20become%20refugees%20in%20Nigeria.">Recent reports</a> indicate that over 6,000 people have been killed. </p>
<p>A further 600,000 have been internally displaced, while over 7,700 people have become refugees in neighbouring Nigeria. </p>
<p>The conflict’s <a href="https://jhumanitarianaction.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s41018-022-00114-1">origins</a> lie partly in the fact that Cameroon applies two different systems of law. Anglophone lawyers say the system marginalises the common law.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/why-international-players-have-a-duty-to-help-the-search-for-peace-in-cameroon-142012">Cameroon was colonised</a> by Great Britain and France, which occupied 20% and 80% of the territory respectively. They <a href="https://theconversation.com/cameroon-how-language-plunged-a-country-into-deadly-conflict-with-no-end-in-sight-179027">introduced both their language</a> and their legal traditions in their respective spheres of influence. </p>
<p>So, the Anglophone regions apply the common law. The Francophone regions apply the civil law. </p>
<p>In Cameroon, the common law and the English language have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-it-would-take-to-break-the-impasse-in-cameroons-deadly-crisis-122134">systemically undermined</a> by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/history-explains-why-cameroon-is-at-war-with-itself-over-language-and-culture-85401">predominantly Francophone government</a>. At the level of the Supreme Court, the predominant application of the civil law often left common law litigants without justice. </p>
<p>In October 2016, <a href="https://theconversation.com/cameroon-how-language-plunged-a-country-into-deadly-conflict-with-no-end-in-sight-179027">a peaceful protest over this by Anglophone lawyers</a> was met with <a href="https://saisreview.sais.jhu.edu/cameroon-anglophone-crisis-global-response/">disproportionate force</a> from the government. </p>
<p>By early 2017 the protests had become a violent separatist conflict. The government tried to address some of the concerns by creating the <a href="https://cameroon-tribune.cm/article.html/9799/en.html/supreme-court-common-law-division-soon.">Common Law Division</a> within the <a href="http://www.minjustice.gov.cm/index.php/fr/2-non-categorise/3-cour-supreme">Supreme Court</a>. The division is meant to hear final appeals from courts in the Anglophone regions in matters relating to the common law. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.prc.cm/en/news/the-acts/laws/2360-law-no-2017-014-of-12-july-2017-to-amend-and-supplement-some-provisions-of-law-no-2006-16-of-29-december-to-lay-down-the-organization-and-functioning-of-the-supreme-court">law states</a> that judges in the Common Law Division should have an “Anglo-Saxon” legal background. By implication, they should understand the common law principles and should speak English. </p>
<p>As part of an ongoing <a href="https://www.dmu.ac.uk/research/centres-institutes/iljs/projects.aspx">project</a> on judicial institutions and conflict resolution, we carried out <a href="https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/projects/humanities-social-sciences-tackling-global-challenges-reconstructing-judicial-institutions-for-conflict-transformation/">a study</a> of the Common Law Division between July 2021 and February 2022. </p>
<p>We examined records from the registry of the Courts of Appeal in the Anglophone regions and the Common Law Division. We also interviewed 32 Anglophone lawyers and Supreme Court judges. </p>
<p>The purpose was to assess how the Common Law Division was addressing the concerns raised about the limited influence of the common law in the Supreme Court. </p>
<p>Below are some of the <a href="https://dora.dmu.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/2086/22333/PoliCy%20Brief%20-%20The%20Common%20Law%20Division%20of%20the%20Supreme%20Court%20of%20Cameroon.docx?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">key findings</a> which we discuss further in our <a href="https://dora.dmu.ac.uk/handle/2086/22333">report</a>.</p>
<h2>Performance of the Common Law Division</h2>
<p>The Common Law Division began functioning fully in 2018. As of <a href="https://dora.dmu.ac.uk/handle/2086/22333">September 2022</a>, it had received 450 cases, 200 of which were appeals made directly from the Anglophone regions. </p>
<p>The other 250 were appeals that were pending in other divisions of the Supreme Court before the Common Law Division was established. The cases were predominantly civil and criminal matters. </p>
<p>The Common Law Division has made final decisions in 125 cases. In a further 178 cases, it has decided on admissibility – whether claims can be heard. </p>
<p>That is due partly to concerted efforts by the judges to deal with cases in a timely manner.</p>
<p>In the past, as we uncovered in our <a href="https://dora.dmu.ac.uk/handle/2086/22333">study</a>, appeals from the Anglophone regions could remain in the Supreme Court without a decision for up to 34 years. One reason was that French-speaking civil law judges could not hear the appeals. Submissions were written in English and based on common law principles which they did not understand. </p>
<p>The common law and civil law systems are quite distinct in legal practices, principles and procedures. For instance, the common law is developed by judicial precedent. This is a legal principle which requires lower courts to follow the decision made by a higher court, when hearing a later case with similar facts. The civil law depends on codified law (legal texts). </p>
<p>Another difference is that, in the common law, submission of arguments in court is generally oral. This gives the court the opportunity to seek clarification, before it considers the matter and makes a decision. In the civil law system, submissions are written in full and provide limited room for oral debate.</p>
<h2>Cautiously optimistic</h2>
<p>The lawyers are cautiously optimistic about the Common Law Division. The majority have more confidence in making appeals to it because their submissions are written in English and are based on common law principles applied in the Anglophone regions. They know their cases are heard by judges who understand the law and the language. </p>
<p>The judgements are also written in English, mostly in the common law style of setting out the facts, the applicable law and the reasoning of the court. </p>
<p>This is important because judicial precedent cannot be influential if the court does not provide reasons for its decisions. </p>
<h2>Challenges</h2>
<p>Despite the successes registered so far, the Common Law Division still faces a number of challenges. </p>
<p>Foremost is the issue of procedure. The division applies civil law procedures especially in the key area of admissibility. This is because the <a href="http://www.minjustice.gov.cm/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=177%3A2018-06-18-11-25-32&catid=1&Itemid=46&lang=en">2006 Supreme Court Law</a> lays out the procedure to be applied throughout the Supreme Court. </p>
<p>According to the lawyers, submitting an appeal following civil law procedures is legalistic and technical. Moreover, civil law procedures are not particularly consistent with common law procedures. So, appeals tend to be dismissed at the admissibility stage for technical reasons. Lawyers say this undermines justice for their clients. In the common law, they say, such technicalities would not prevent a court from hearing a case.</p>
<p>Another important concern raised is that the Common Law Division is still under the Judicial Bench of the Supreme Court. This has a number of unfavourable consequences. </p>
<p>First, the division cannot develop the common law sufficiently if it continues to rely on the Judicial Bench, which is civil law oriented. </p>
<p>Second, the division’s broad jurisdiction means it needs a lot of financial and other resources – almost as much as a bench itself.</p>
<p>Third, as a result of the limited resources, Francophone judges may be appointed to the division to alleviate the pressure on the Anglophone judges. That would defeat the purpose of creating the Common Law Division. </p>
<h2>What should the government do?</h2>
<p>From our research and considering the views expressed by Anglophone lawyers and judges in the study, three recommendations stand out.</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Elevating the Common Law Division to a Common Law Bench. That would require a constitutional amendment.</p></li>
<li><p>Amending the Supreme Court Law of 2006 so that common law procedures can be applied in the Common Law Division. </p></li>
<li><p>Appointing more common law trained judges to the Common Law Division to alleviate the pressure on existing judges. </p></li>
</ol>
<p>The government should consider the above recommendations as part of the approach to resolving the conflict. </p>
<p><em>Ashu Eware, State Prosecutor of the High Court of Manyu Division, Cameroon contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195679/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laura-Stella Enonchong and Ashu Eware receive funding from The British Academy. </span></em></p>The common law and civil law systems are quite distinct in legal practices, principles and procedures. How government manages the difference has implications for the Cameroon Anglophone crisis.Laura-Stella Enonchong, Senior Lecturer in Law, De Montfort UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1948562022-11-28T14:30:17Z2022-11-28T14:30:17ZPaul Biya has been Cameroon’s president for 40 years – and he might win office yet again<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497897/original/file-20221129-20-mvzru9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cameroon's President Paul Biya </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Ludovic Marin/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At 89 years old, one of the oldest leaders in the world, <a href="https://www.prc.cm/en/the-president/biography">President Paul Biya</a> of Cameroon has marked <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20221106-cameroon-s-paul-biya-marks-40-years-as-president">40 years</a> as head of state. He assumed office in 1982.</p>
<p>He is the second longest serving leader in Africa. The longest is <a href="https://saharareporters.com/2022/09/24/80-year-old-equatorial-guinea-president-run-sixth-term-amid-human-rights-abuses">Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang Nguema</a>, in power since 1979.</p>
<p>Cameroon experienced a long spell of political stability under Biya’s iron hand. But this eventually unravelled when an <a href="https://theconversation.com/cameroon-how-language-plunged-a-country-into-deadly-conflict-with-no-end-in-sight-179027">Anglophone rebellion</a> broke out in the south-west and north-west and when <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/iswap-takes-aim-at-the-state-in-cameroon">radical Islamists</a> entered from Nigeria. <a href="https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/cameroon-a-transition-in-crisis.pdf">Domestic pressure</a> for Biya to accept a transition has also been persistent.</p>
<p>But Biya remains <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/02/for-the-sake-of-cameroon-life-president-paul-biya-must-be-forced-out">non-committal</a> about relinquishing power in 2025, which would be the end of his current seventh term of office.</p>
<p>What explains Biya’s longevity in office and why is Cameroon unable to marshal a transition?</p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-old-mens-club-out-of-touch-with-continents-suave-burgeoning-youth-48618">scholar</a> of democratic studies and regime types in Africa and a commentator on African political developments. I’m interested in why the continent is saddled with ageing presidents who ought to be enjoying their retirement when it desperately needs young, agile and innovative leaders equal to its challenges. </p>
<h2>A bright start</h2>
<p>Biya succeeded <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ahmadou-Ahidjo">Ahmadou Ahidjo</a>, Cameroon’s president from 1960 to 1982, after his surprise <a href="https://www.prc.cm/en/the-president/the-first-president">resignation</a>. Ahidjo had been struggling with an economic crisis and widespread corruption. He had superintended a one party state and an <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/AJA02562804_435">exceptional centralisation</a> of power in the presidency. </p>
<p>When Biya became president in 1982, he <a href="https://theconversation.com/cameroons-biya-is-africas-oldest-president-assessing-his-38-years-in-power-156221">promised</a> political liberalisation, including democracy, civil and human rights and economic advancement in Cameroon. </p>
<p>For a while, he worked to achieve some of these goals. The country achieved political stability and unity, and relative economic transformation through his “<a href="https://www.africabib.org/rec.php?RID=112384137">new deal</a>”. There was even a momentary easing of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45193445?seq=11#metadata_info_tab_contents">draconian police state</a>. </p>
<p>But in the late 1990s, there was a gradual halt to political liberalisation, fiscal discipline and government accountability. This happened after the <a href="https://mimimefoinfos.com/april-06-1984-how-president-paul-biya-survived-cameroons-only-coup-attempt/">1984 bloody coup attempt</a> by the Republican Guards.</p>
<p>Biya became increasingly unyielding to political accommodation. First he purged Ahidjo’s faction within the ruling <a href="https://dbpedia.org/page/Cameroon_People's_Democratic_Movement">party</a> and eventually he locked out any meaningful challenge to his leadership from within or outside the party. Ultimately though, under external pressure, he <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/AJA02562804_435">agreed</a> to a multiparty dispensation in 1990.</p>
<p>This has gradually and systematically been hollowed out, creating a monolithic system that entrenched Biya in office for the last 40 years. </p>
<h2>Biya’s staying power</h2>
<p>Cameroon’s politics has long been dominated by Biya’s <a href="https://dbpedia.org/page/Cameroon_People's_Democratic_Movement">Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounaise</a>, which rebranded from the <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/identities/lccn-n50078477/">Cameroon National Union</a> in 1985. It had been the dominant party since 1966. After a formal opening up of the political space to <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/the-anglophone-problem-in-cameroon-the-change-from-crisis-to-conflict-and-a-possible-way-forward-to-resolution/">multipartyism</a>, this has gradually been weakened. </p>
<p>There has been a failure of political party institutionalisation. Hundreds of small parties mushroomed - <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/political-parties-in-cameroon-3390930">300 to date</a>, many allegedly secretly bankrolled and controlled by Biya. They provide a façade of democratic competitiveness. In reality, they have weakened legitimate political opposition. </p>
<p>The absence of a united and consolidated opposition has enabled the entrenchment of a dominant party system. The ruling party has a <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/04/05/cameroon-ruling-party-wins-90-percent-of-elective-senate-seats//">dominant majority</a> in both the National Assembly and the Senate (63 seats of 70). This erodes any chance of genuine checks and balance. </p>
<p>The party has also used electoral mechanics like redrawing boundaries for electoral advantage and in places outright <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15238067">fraud</a> to expand victories and consolidate majorities. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-upcoming-polls-in-cameroon-wont-end-the-violence-131160">Why upcoming polls in Cameroon won't end the violence</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Elections have become little more than a procedural inconvenience, where Biya runs with no possibility of losing.</p>
<p>For instance, in 2004 Biya won with <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2004/10/25/biya-officially-declared-winner-presidential-election">70.9%</a> of the vote. After the 2008 <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/global-constitutionalism/article/unconstitutional-constitutional-amendment-or-constitutional-dismemberment-a-reappraisal-of-the-presidential-term-limit-amendment-in-cameroon/DE4EC3A5CE737200F5A93AA35A2E9F1B">constitutional revision</a> to remove term limits, he was re-elected with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15574922">78%</a> of the vote in 2011. </p>
<p>In 2018, he got <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/10/22/paul-biya-wins-cameroon-presidential-election-with-7128-percent-official//">71.28%</a> against his challenger, opposition leader <a href="https://www.africanews.com/tag/maurice-kamto/">Maurice Kamto</a>.</p>
<p>Biya has created a rent seeking political class that not only does his bidding but keeps him in power with minimum resistance. Cameroon is a <a href="https://preferredbynature.org/sourcinghub/timber/timber-cameroon">leading exporter</a> of timber in Africa and <a href="https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/top-5-cocoa-producing-countries-in-africa/ywtkgdd#:%7E:text=4.-,Cameroon,and%20more%20in%20savannah%20areas">fifth largest</a> cocoa producer in the world. </p>
<p>The country should have enough resources to reduce extreme poverty and underdevelopment. Yet the proceeds are plundered through corruption and to maintain a clientelist network.</p>
<p>Politicians must show allegiance and loyalty to Biya. The alternative is being out in the cold or in jail. Biya has also filled senior positions in the administration, the military and security agencies and the civil service with people from his southern ethnic group. Most notably he has relied on the <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/06/making-a-killing-israeli-mercenaries-in-cameroon/">Rapid Intervention Battalion</a>, a highly trained military commando unit, to ensure the regular army is unable to move against him.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon">Anglophone conflict</a> has also enabled Biya to deflect attention from his misrule. The violent conflict has left <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon">thousands dead</a> in a civil war against the <a href="https://theconversation.com/history-explains-why-cameroon-is-at-war-with-itself-over-language-and-culture-85401">secessionist</a> English-speaking regions of the country. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/african-union-needs-a-more-robust-response-to-conflict-in-cameroon-132449">African Union needs a more robust response to conflict in Cameroon</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Biya, relying on <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/OXAN-DB271874/full/html">French</a> and recently <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/27/cameroon-russia-military-deal-biya-putin-france/">Russian</a> backers, used the conflict to strengthen his domestic hand and deflect international criticisms.</p>
<p>Another factor is the concentration of power in Cameroon. Nothing substantive gets done without the sign-off of the president. No arm of government or entity of the state has gone unpoliced, including the judiciary: judges are nominated directly by the president. </p>
<p>Simply put, there is no facet of public life untouched by the Biya regime. </p>
<h2>Contemplating a post Biya era</h2>
<p>The president’s mandate runs out in 2025, at which time he will be 92. While he has shown no signs of exiting the stage, talk of a post Biya era is rising. </p>
<p>Although the ruling party has not held a party congress since 2011, hence dampening the transition debate, there is periodical internal party reorganisation. The president has used it to reward and check potential threats to his supremacy.</p>
<p>Biya’s stewardship has long run its course. Its longevity relies on ruthlessness and political astuteness. </p>
<p>Sadly, the real cost is to the country’s democracy, which has long suffered fissures that can only be healed by political renewal through a change of guard. And this change is one that even Biya can do little to forestall.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194856/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David E Kiwuwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After 40 years in office, Cameroon’s 89 year old Paul Biya is the second longest serving leader in Africa. He is already eyeing another contest in 2025.David E Kiwuwa, Associate Professor of International Studies, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1508912022-11-15T13:31:26Z2022-11-15T13:31:26ZWhy it’s important to understand the unique plight of internally displaced people in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389813/original/file-20210316-13-1r1i3cl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Internally displaced people from the Dinka ethnic group at the Minkamman camp in South Sudan in 2014.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Jim Lopez</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/african-union-convention-protection-and-assistance-internally-displaced-persons-africa">adopted</a> an agreement more than 13 years ago to prevent the arbitrary displacement of people and to uphold the dignity of such victims.</p>
<p>Yet the problem has remained notoriously <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/afrrev/article/view/129846">persistent in Africa</a>. In 2018, out of a global estimate of over <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data">45.6 million internally displaced people</a>, close to <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/2019-africa-report-internal-displacement">19 million</a> were on the continent.</p>
<p>Globally, conflict and violence are the main <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/conflict_and_displacement-_voices_of_displacement_and_return_in_central_african_republics_neglected_crisis.pdf">drivers of internal displacement</a>. Africa accounted for <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/africa-report">almost 70%</a>, of the world’s internal displacement statistics in 2018, due to armed conflict and related human rights abuses.</p>
<p>Environmental disasters were the <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/africa-report">second most important cause</a> of internal displacement in Africa, <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/africa-report">at 15%</a>.</p>
<p>Victims of internal displacement often <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/population-displacement-africa/">outnumber refugees</a> from other countries. Yet they receive less attention from the major aid bodies, researchers and the media.</p>
<p>Their vulnerability has been well documented. But most of the literature generalises their experiences, regardless of the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20050923_em_idp_supplement.pdf">underlying causes of their displacement</a>. Or it simply conflates their experiences. Displaced people are often wrongly seen as better off than refugees. This heightens their vulnerability and prolongs their displacement.</p>
<p>A more nuanced understanding may benefit aid and development practitioners in their efforts to help displaced people. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-92474-4_55">study</a> of internally displaced and refugee populations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and South Sudan showed that those who were displaced within their nations’ borders faced peculiar risks. </p>
<h2>Falling through the cracks</h2>
<p>Refugees are usually well regulated, whether freely settled or in designated refugee camps (making them more visible and accessible). In contrast, internally displaced people are usually scattered about. This makes it more challenging to reach out to them or to <a href="https://www.unocha.org/es/themes/internal-displacement">identify them</a>. </p>
<p>In the face of limited attention from the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/south-sudan-a-neglected-conflict-and-donor-fatigue/a-44927742">global peace and security apparatus</a>, civil conflict, oppressive governments and human rights violations are some of the major causes of displacement.</p>
<p>A good historical example is <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/8.htm">Sudan, where in the 1980s</a> agro-pastoral Nuer and Dinka people were displaced from their oil-rich traditional homelands by the state. State-backed militias and later government soldiers erected garrisons, occupied land and prevented those displaced from returning to the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-focus-oil-related-clashes-western-upper-nile">western Upper Nile</a>.</p>
<p>When displacement is induced by the state, the victims often lack protection, and some end up <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/new-challenges-for-refugee-policy-internally-displaced-persons/">avoiding detection altogether</a>. This makes it even harder to accord them the protections due to them.</p>
<p>Where governments are responsible for internal displacement, the sensitivity of the matter often leads to attempts to <a href="https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/Publicaciones/2014/9958.pdf?view=1">keep the displacements a secret</a>. This affects the collection of precise data. Without reliable data, it is hard for aid and development partners to implement the <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/stdtlp38&div=7&g_sent=1&casa_token=H-ThM8NP5iQAAAAA:b4peZJZB76GEk-qv7-8kbHDYlLNu1tDVKRkftI2Fhmd-PJanOIdcteXHc1KCL5oY9_c2EuMu&collection=journals">UNHCR guidelines</a> for national responsibility towards preventing displacement and finding durable solutions. </p>
<p>The longer displacement lasts, the more difficult it becomes to resolve. <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0503_displacement_africa_ferris.pdf">More than 15 countries</a> in Africa have protracted displacement situations lasting over five years.</p>
<h2>Data and protection gaps</h2>
<p>There is <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.html">a single UNHCR definition for a refugee</a>. Not so with internally displaced people. Each country has its own <a href="https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/Publicaciones/2014/9958.pdf?view=1">definition</a>. </p>
<p>These disparities have resulted in numerous protection gaps for those who do not fit the criteria in each country. Particularly at risk in such situations are those fleeing from environmental disasters, poverty, underdevelopment and overpopulation. These factors are called the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42864338?casa_token=uZmgIctRUaAAAAAA%3AEfqcN3K656mStsyNqcHbKbqvpnubAItPkmWa1qbvMowPyhcDEc1lMpFtNrLOnp9guAPvxyziIPy0vrzi4AT4k9ow0zVtvUBUebJKngVcsQXSbol_N-0&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">root causes of displacement</a>.</p>
<p>Where people are fleeing because of a number of factors, profiling them can become even more complex. For example, in the case of pastoralists in Somalia, displacement may be the result of a combination of drought, inter-clan conflicts and insecurity that <a href="https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/Publicaciones/2014/9958.pdf?view=1">imperil their livelihoods</a>. Many people may not be able to articulate the complex interaction of factors that <a href="https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/Publicaciones/2014/9958.pdf?view=1">led them to flee their homes</a>. </p>
<p>These issues make reporting on the internal displacement statistics <a href="https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/Publicaciones/2014/9958.pdf?view=1">a challenge</a>. </p>
<p>Where the state has its own data collection challenges, it may not grasp the full extent of the humanitarian situation, nor the need to form partnerships with external agencies to <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/stdtlp38&div=7&g_sent=1&casa_token=H-ThM8NP5iQAAAAA:b4peZJZB76GEk-qv7-8kbHDYlLNu1tDVKRkftI2Fhmd-PJanOIdcteXHc1KCL5oY9_c2EuMu&collection=journals">augment national capacity</a>. </p>
<p>The Sudanese government, for instance, has been blamed for <a href="https://bmchealthservres.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12913-018-3609-5?optIn=false">poor disaster preparedness</a> and <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-03721-5_1">lack of capacity</a> in coordinating essential aid relief for its <a href="https://www.wfp.org/emergencies/sahel-emergency">millions of internally displaced people</a>. In the absence of holistic, long-term responses, recurring droughts have periodically displaced people in <a href="https://knowledge.unccd.int/sites/default/files/country_profile_documents/1%2520FINAL_NDP_Sudan.pdf">Sudan</a>. </p>
<p>Where internal displacement drivers remain unresolved, as seen in <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/afrrev/article/view/129846">Cameroon</a>, they not only recur but can also <a href="https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/nrcs-list-of-the-worlds-most-neglected-displacement-crises/nrcs-list-of-the-worlds-most-neglected-displacement-crises.pdf">contribute to regional insecurity</a>.</p>
<h2>Addressing the problem</h2>
<p>The heightened vulnerability, limited visibility and limited protection of internally displaced people, <a href="https://www.humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/files/2014/02/190715e.pdf">relative to refugees</a>, results from a poor appreciation of their peculiar plight. As seen in <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/south-sudan">Sudan, the DRC, Nigeria, Somalia and other countries</a>, this often results in their displacement becoming protracted and cyclical. </p>
<p>Displacements due to poverty and natural disasters on the one hand, and caused by conflict and human rights abuses on the other, are both on the rise. But conflict and abuses still account for <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/africa-report">most displacements in Africa</a>. Thus, to work, any intervention needs to address human rights abuses, underdevelopment, socio-economic inequities and conflict to <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?hl=en&lr=&id=BQ9kDgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT9&dq=Duffield,+M.,+2014.+Global+governance+and+the+new+wars:+The+merging+of+development+and+security.+Zed+books+Ltd.&ots=rgkrWSmaUW&sig=b6i4n1WNd2dc1pdZlBfF0payaqs&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Duffield%2C%20M.%2C%202014.%20Global%20governance%20and%20the%20new%20wars%3A%20The%20merging%20of%20development%20and%20security.%20Zed%20books%20Ltd.&f=false">ensure a sustainable end to internal displacements in Africa</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150891/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sikanyiso Masuku is a Research fellow in the Institute for Democracy Citizenship and Public Policy in Africa (IDCPPA) at the University of Cape Town. He also receives funding from the African Centre for Migration Studies (ACMS) and the African Academy for Migration Research (AAMR).</span></em></p>In 2018, Africa accounted for 70% of the world’s people displaced by armed conflict and human rights abuses.Sikanyiso Masuku, Research Fellow at The Thabo Mbeki African School of Public and International Affairs (TM-School), University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1927772022-10-23T08:34:40Z2022-10-23T08:34:40ZNigeria floods: government’s mismanagement of dams is a major cause<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490862/original/file-20221020-26-7i5z1i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C24%2C5455%2C3612&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The flooding wiped out farms in Kogi and other affected states. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/farmer-walks-by-his-flooded-cornfield-following-heavy-rain-news-photo/1033290226?phrase=flooding%20in%20kogi&adppopup=true">Sodiq Adelakun/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Parts of Nigeria face severe flooding every year, particularly <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/09/we-didnt-deny-anyone-the-opportunity-to-get-permanent-voter-card-inec/">states located</a> along the courses of the Niger and Benue rivers. The release of excess water from a dam in neighbouring Cameroon contributes to the flooding. Olayinka Ogunkoya unpacks Nigeria’s mismanagement of its dams.</em></p>
<hr>
<h2>What impact does poor dam management have on flooding in Nigeria?</h2>
<p>The operations management of dams and reservoirs depends on what purpose the dam was built for. If a dam was built for water supply, irrigation or hydro-electric power, the aim would be to keep the dam as close to full pool capacity as possible so as to maximise resource availability.</p>
<p>If the dam was constructed for flood control, then the aim would be to de-water the reservoir before the flood season. This is why flood control reservoirs and dams have temporary reservoir storage space for storing spate flow to alleviate downstream flood damage. </p>
<p>The water is subsequently released downstream at rates that will not create flood conditions.</p>
<p>Most dams serve multiple purposes. For example, the dams on the River Niger, Kainji and Jebba, and its tributaries, Shiroro and Zungeru on the River Kaduna; and those on the tributaries of the River Benue – Dadin Kowa and Kiri on the River Gongola, and Kashimbila on the River Katsina Ala – were built for hydro-electric power generation, fisheries and flood control.</p>
<iframe title="" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-iDrTZ" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/iDrTZ/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="700" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>Managing reservoirs for flood control requires keeping the maximum possible empty space before the flood season. <a href="https://www.engr.colostate.edu/ce/facultystaff/salas/us-italy/papers/43valdes.pdf">Water storage</a> is required for the remaining objectives of water supply, irrigation and hydropower. </p>
<p>In the Nigerian situation, hydropower generation dominates the functions of many large dams. This means that the management of reservoirs would focus on keeping the level at full pool. </p>
<p>This runs against the grain of what’s needed for flood control. If there’s no storage space then incoming flood waters won’t be contained. </p>
<h2>What measures should be in place to avert flooding?</h2>
<p>Nigeria needs to create structures along the River Benue and its tributaries that will serve primarily for flood control, and secondarily for hydro-electric power.</p>
<p>Given the lack of resources, it would be difficult to build dams for only flood control. Efforts should therefore be made towards the realisation of 1970s plans for the construction of large hydropower dams at Makurdi,
Lokoja and Onitsha. These dams, apart from supplying electricity (3300 MW), would have significant flood control and mitigation capability.</p>
<p>A few more dams could be constructed upstream of Makurdi on River Benue. One is the Dasin Hausa Dam. This has been designed to detain excess spillage from the Lagdo Dam, and also generate 300 MW, irrigate 150,000 hectares, and make it possible to navigate the River Benue all year.</p>
<p>Many flood control dams and reservoirs should be built along the tributaries of River Benue since these are also high-discharge rivers and contribute to the flooding potential of their principal.</p>
<p>Flood control structures provide for temporary storage of flood waters upstream so that downstream areas are protected against inundation. The flood waters are gradually released when the threat of flooding has declined.</p>
<p>Secondly, urban and settlement growth involving building on lower lying areas that receive runoff should be zoned off unless the areas are reclaimed and significantly elevated.</p>
<h2>How can affected communities be better protected?</h2>
<p>Abatement measures. These involve enforcing policies and the construction of structures that inhibit flooding – or at the least significantly reduce its impact. Such measures include zoning regulation, catchment afforestation, desilting of channels, and construction of flood control reservoirs.</p>
<p>Protection measures should also be taken. These include strengthening the natural levees or construction of artificial levees (flood embankments). A levee is a “dike” along the banks of a river formed by sediments deposited during flood events. The crest of the levee is higher than the floodplain, and thus protects the floodplain from inundation or flooding where the levee is sturdy.</p>
<p>Flood embankments or artificial levees are usually built of alluvial material dug out of pits on site. Other types of embankments are flood walls made of reinforced concrete, sheet pile and masonry.</p>
<p>During exceptionally severe flood events, embankments may be gradually increased in height, for instance by sand-bagging, to prevent them from being overtopped and damaged. However, flood embankments can have a number of negative effects. They can:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>reduce storage capacity of the river channel and flood plains by restricting flow from the channel to the flood plain</p></li>
<li><p>protect only against moderate floods, since extreme floods could
readily over-top the walls </p></li>
<li><p>inhibit the continuing build-up and nutrient enhancement of the
floodplain, which would have occurred naturally as a result of inundation and
siltation.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What can Nigeria do to make better use of its dams?</h2>
<p>Large dams in Nigeria are fully owned by the government. The states and federal governments can make better use of their dams by ensuring that the dam structure, reservoir and related equipment and canals are maintained properly. </p>
<p>Currently, most plants and equipment have broken down or are functioning well below installed capacity. This is because dam management doesn’t adhere to operation manuals. </p>
<p>Many dams in south-western Nigeria have been so neglected that mature trees are growing on their faces.</p>
<p>All dam projects under construction must be urgently completed. There are dams uncompleted since the 1980s. </p>
<p>A main challenge in Nigeria is policy discontinuity by successive governments. The result is the accumulation of abandoned projects in all spheres of national development: dam, power, water supply and irrigation, steel industry and roads.</p>
<p>It appears it is yet to be appreciated that government is a continuity, whether it is the green or red party that is in control, and all projects initiated by the previous administration have to be completed by succeeding administrations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192777/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Olatokunbo Ogunkoya does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Proper dam management can help check flooding in Nigeria.Olayinka Olatokunbo Ogunkoya, Professor of Geomorphology, Obafemi Awolowo UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1927502022-10-19T15:17:03Z2022-10-19T15:17:03ZFloods in Nigeria: building dams and planting trees among steps that should be taken to curb the damage<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490321/original/file-20221018-4535-2h6fgi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Floods have hit 27 of Nigeria's 36 states this year. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/men-steer-a-dugout-canoe-past-a-flooded-house-following-news-photo/1033290244?phrase=floods%20in%20nigeria&adppopup=true">Sodiq Adelakun/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Nigerians are no strangers to flooding. In some parts of the country, flooding is an annual event. But the intensity varies from one year to the next. In some years, the effects are minimal, in others, devastating. The 2022 floods have caused massive damage, like those experienced in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/disaster/fl-2012-000138-nga">2012</a>. Ten years ago more than 7.7 million people in 32 out of 36 states were affected. The recent floods have <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/10/15/heavy-flooding-in-nigeria-claims-at-least-500-lives-and-displaces-14m//#:%7E:text=About%20500%20people%20are%20believed,from%20all%20walks%20of%20life.">affected 1.4 million people</a> in 27 states. Water researcher Nelson Odume explains what’s responsible for the flooding and what Nigeria should do to prevent future occurrences.</em> </p>
<h2>Causes of flooding in Nigeria</h2>
<p>There are different types of flooding. One is <a href="https://www.caro.ie/knowledge-hub/climate-action-adaptation/flooding/fluvial-flooding">fluvial flooding</a>, which occurs when rivers overflow their banks. </p>
<p>The second is <a href="https://www.studysmarter.co.uk/explanations/geography/coasts-geography/coastal-flooding/">coastal flooding</a>, which occurs when water from the marine environment submerges low-lying adjoining lands. </p>
<p>The third is <a href="https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/pluvial-rain-related-flooding-urban-areas-invisible-hazard">pluvial flooding</a>, which occurs due to intense, heavy rains. </p>
<p>In Nigeria, the three types of flooding are <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00207233.2022.2081471">interrelated</a> because the peaks of all three flooding types can coincide seasonally. </p>
<p>Some of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigeria-has-a-flooding-challenge-heres-why-and-what-can-be-done-169044">principal causes of flooding in Nigeria</a> are rapid urbanisation, poor spatial planning and poor solid waste management, including drainage systems being used as dump sites.</p>
<p>Nigeria’s population has been growing rapidly – <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/nigeria-population/#:%7E:text=The%20current%20population%20of%20Nigeria,the%20latest%20United%20Nations%20data.">it’s currently estimated to be over 200 million</a> from <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=nigeria+population+in+2000&oq=nigeria+population+in+&aqs=chrome.6.0i512j69i57j0i512l5j69i60.8505j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8">122.3 million in 2000</a>. There has also been rapid urbanisation in the last six decades. Today <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15487733.2021.2004742">about 55% of the population lives in urban centres</a>. </p>
<p>The rapid population growth combined with urbanisation and poor spatial planning means that people are building on flood-prone areas such as river banks, wetlands and low-lying areas. </p>
<p>Another consequence of poor spatial planning is that storm water and drainage systems are built that aren’t fit for purpose. In many of Nigeria’s cities, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312458086_Flood_menace_in_Nigeria_impacts_remedial_and_management_strategies">the storm water systems are inadequate to handle flooding peaks</a>. As a result, communities living downstream are sometimes flooded. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jswt/jswt/2018/00000044/00000002/art00008;jsessionid=2chpgg2pc0a7r.x-ic-live-01">Poor solid waste management</a> is a key contributor to the problem of flooding. Often, drainage systems are used as dump sites, blocking the flow of water.</p>
<p>Another factor has been a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272469245_An_analysis_of_rainfall_patterns_in_Nigeria#:%7E:text=While%20the%20vegetation%20map%20of,area%20is%20experiencing%20slight%20increase.">change in rainfall patterns in the country</a>, particularly an increase in extreme events. Rainstorms lasting up to five days are becoming more common. And it’s <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10661-016-5549-z">predicted that they will increase</a> due to climate change. These extreme rainstorm events cause serious flooding.</p>
<p>Another feature of the country that adds to flooding risk is that it has numerous rivers, including transboundary river systems such as the Rivers Niger and Benue. Poor water infrastructure developments such as dams, reservoirs and bank protection contribute to the annual flooding.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-flooding-in-nigeria-is-an-increasingly-serious-problem-82272">Why flooding in Nigeria is an increasingly serious problem</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>For example, <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/nema-13-states-to-record-heavy-flooding-as-cameroon-opens-lagdo-dam">the release of excess water from the Lagdo Dam in Cameroon</a>, which often contributes to flooding in Nigeria, was supposed to be contained by a dam, the <a href="https://www.nigeriainfo.fm/port-harcourt/news/morningcrossfireph/nigeria-floods-what-happened-to-the-dasin-hausa-dam/">Dasin Hausa Dam in Adamawa State</a>, north-east Nigeria. But after more than 40 years the dam still isn’t complete. </p>
<p>Many of the rivers in Nigeria are poorly managed and regulated. Siltation of major rivers such as the River Niger, as well as removal of vegetation from river banks and wetlands for agricultural purposes, are all outcomes of poor water resources management which have also contributed to flooding.</p>
<h2>The impact</h2>
<p>The most important consequences are socio-economic, health-related, ecological and cultural. </p>
<p>Socio-economic consequences include the loss of lives, emotional and psychological distress, and destruction of property, social amenities and infrastructure worth billions of naira. </p>
<p>For example, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/death-toll-widespread-nigeria-floods-tops-500-ministries-2022-10-14/">the 2022 flooding</a> has claimed the lives of more than 500 people, destroyed more than 200,000 homes and left around 90,000 homes under water. It has also displaced over 1.4 million people. The congregation of people in camps for the internally displaced and their separation from their ancestral homes and loved ones often causes emotional and psychological trauma. This gets little attention in the Nigerian scientific literature. But <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13548500903483478">empirical evidence suggests</a> that victims of natural disasters such as flooding often suffer emotional and psychological trauma. </p>
<p>Another effect of flooding is the loss of economically productive time, which may cost the economy billions of naira daily. </p>
<p>Flooding has been linked to an increase in the number of people contracting water-borne diseases such as <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/deadly-floods-niger-and-nigeria-affect-75000-children-and-leave-communities-disarray">cholera</a>. Due to poor sanitation infrastructure, floods can distribute faecally contaminated water. Widespread outbreaks of cholera in Nigeria in 2010 <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-72196-1_14">were linked</a> to exposure to contaminated water after flooding. </p>
<p>Another consequence is ecological and environmental. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10406638.2017.1403329">A study</a> has shown that flooding tends to increase the spread of chemical pollutants in soils on floodplains.</p>
<p>Flooding also destroys <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/apr/01/the-losses-could-be-profound-how-floods-are-wreaking-havoc-on-wildlife-aoe">wildlife habitats</a>, depletes fishery stock and alters biodiversity and ecosystem functions critical to socio-economic development.</p>
<h2>What should Nigeria do?</h2>
<p>The country can address the flooding menace and minimise its effect through a multi-pronged approach.</p>
<p>First, a combination of hard infrastructural solutions and ecosystem-based adaptation should be pursued. Examples include the construction of dams and reservoirs to hold excess water, riverbank protection, construction of levees and spillways, appropriate drainage systems and storm water management regimes, and dredging of some of the major rivers in Nigeria. </p>
<p>Of particular interest is the completion of the Dasin Hausa Dam in Adamawa State and prioritisation of an appropriate stormwater management regime. </p>
<p>Examples of ecosystem-based solutions could include reforestation in important river catchments, planting native vegetation on flood plains that have been claimed for cropping, and creating riparian buffers through vegetation. </p>
<p>Each of these options would need to be carefully studied and implemented.</p>
<p>Nigeria also needs to strengthen its regulatory, governance and institutional capacity in the area of spatial planning, regional cooperation on transboundary water resources management, emergency response time, flood prediction, and enforcement of environmental and spatial planning laws. </p>
<p>Building on flood plains must be avoided at all costs. Awareness raising, education and disaster risk communication and messaging need to be strengthened to minimise flooding effects in Nigeria. The Nigerian Hydrological Services Agency, the <a href="https://nimet.gov.ng/">Nigerian Meteorological Agency</a> and the <a href="https://nema.gov.ng/">National Emergency Management Agency</a> are all important institutions that need resources and capacity to avert flooding in Nigeria.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192750/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nelson Odume receives funding from Water Research Commission, National Research Foundation, International Science Council, Network of Africa Science Academies, European Union, GIZ. </span></em></p>Nigeria must adopt a multi-pronged approach to address its flooding menace and minimise the effects.Nelson Odume, Associate professor, Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1901542022-09-09T12:26:24Z2022-09-09T12:26:24ZCameroon’s ‘exploding’ lakes: disaster expert warns deadly gas release could cause another tragedy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483254/original/file-20220907-4832-d8ir62.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The waters of Lake Nyos, Cameroon, turn a murky brown following a deadly release of toxic gas.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Thierry Orban/Sygma via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/cameroons-exploding-lakes-disaster-expert-warns-deadly-gas-release-could-cause-another-tragedy-190154&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>A sudden change on 29 August 2022 in the colour and smell of Lake Kuk, in north-west Cameroon, <a href="https://theindependentghana.com/2022/09/stench-from-lake-kuk-in-cameroon-causes-panic-among-residents/">has caused</a> anxiety and panic among the local residents. Fears are driven by an incident that happened 36 years ago at Lake Nyos, just 10km away. </p>
<p>On 21 August 1986, Lake Nyos emitted lethal gases (mainly carbon dioxide) that suffocated 1,746 people and around 8,300 livestock. It wasn’t the first incident like this. Two years earlier, Lake Monoum, about 100km south-west of Lake Nyos, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1108/09653561211256189">killed</a> 37 people.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483251/original/file-20220907-26-euhx78.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483251/original/file-20220907-26-euhx78.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483251/original/file-20220907-26-euhx78.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483251/original/file-20220907-26-euhx78.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483251/original/file-20220907-26-euhx78.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483251/original/file-20220907-26-euhx78.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483251/original/file-20220907-26-euhx78.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Desolation around Lake Nyos on 1 August 1986.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Eric Bouvet via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-0273(89)90056-5">Research</a> into the cause of the Lake Nyos disaster concluded that carbon dioxide gas – released from the Earth’s mantle – had been accumulating at the bottom of the lake for centuries. A sudden disturbance of the lake’s waters due to a landslide <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-0273(89)90056-5">resulted in</a> a sudden release of around 1.24 million tonnes of carbon dioxide gas. </p>
<p>Survivors briefly heard a rumbling sound from Lake Nyos before an invisible gas cloud emerged from its depths. It killed people, animals, insects and birds along its path in the valley before dispersing into the atmosphere where it became harmless.</p>
<p>Both Kuk and Nyos are crater lakes located in a region of volcanic activity known as the Cameroon Volcanic Line. And there are 43 other crater lakes in the region that <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-663-05239-5">could contain</a> lethal amounts of gases. Other lakes around the world that pose a similar threat include Lake Kivu at the border of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lake Ngozi in Tanzania and Lake Monticchio in Italy.</p>
<iframe title="" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-xecAT" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/xecAT/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="483" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>After Lake Nyos erupted, its water turned a deep red colour and survivors reported the smell of rotten eggs. These are the same characteristics to have recently manifested at Lake Kuk. The change in colour of Lake Nyos was only noticed after the gas burst. </p>
<p>In an official <a href="https://voiceofnaturenews.info/sdo-indigenes-advance-opposing-reasons-for-sudden-change-in-colour-odour-of-lake-kuk/">press release</a>, heavy rainfall was linked to the odour and change in colour of Lake Kuk. The <a href="https://www.citypopulation.de/en/cameroon/admin/0704__menchum/">tens of thousands</a> of people living around the lake were urged to “remain calm while being vigilant to continuously inform the administration of any other incident noted”. </p>
<p>As a geologist and disaster management expert, I believe that not enough is being done to address and manage the potential danger from crater lakes in the region. </p>
<p>Through my <a href="https://doi.org/10.1108/09653561211256189">experience and research</a> I’ve <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2012.705315">identified</a> several key steps that policymakers <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12061">must take</a> to prevent another tragedy from happening. </p>
<h2>Preventing disaster</h2>
<p>To start with, it’s important to know which lakes are at risk of “exploding”.</p>
<p>Initial checks in some of the lakes were done <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-663-05239-5">more than</a> 30 years ago and not thoroughly – it was just one team and on one occasion. Further investigations and regular monitoring are required.</p>
<p>Currently it’s believed that, of the 43 crater lakes on Cameroon’s Volcanic Line, <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-663-05239-5">13 are deep and large enough</a> to contain lethal quantities of gases. Although 11 are considered to be relatively safe, two (Lakes Enep and Oku) are dangerous. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483689/original/file-20220909-19-7lw38v.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483689/original/file-20220909-19-7lw38v.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=696&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483689/original/file-20220909-19-7lw38v.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=696&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483689/original/file-20220909-19-7lw38v.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=696&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483689/original/file-20220909-19-7lw38v.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=874&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483689/original/file-20220909-19-7lw38v.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=874&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483689/original/file-20220909-19-7lw38v.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=874&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map showing the Cameroon Volcanic Line and other hazards in Cameroon.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Research <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0883-2927(93)90036-G">has revealed</a> that the thermal profile (how temperature changes with depth), quantity of dissolved gases, surface area or water volume and depth are key indicators of the potential for crater lakes to store large quantities of dangerous gases. </p>
<p>The factors that lead to the greatest risk include: high quantities of dissolved gases, held under high pressures, at great depths, in lakes with large volumes of water. They are at an even greater risk of explosion when the lakes sit in wide or large craters where there are disturbances. </p>
<p>The two lakes that caused fatalities (Nyos and Monoum) are deep and have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0883-2927(93)90036-G">thermal profiles</a> that increase with depth. Other lakes are too shallow (less than 40 metres) and have uniform thermal profiles, indicating they do not contain large amounts of gases.</p>
<p>Investigating all the crater lakes in Cameroon would be a logistical challenge. It would require significant funding, a diverse scientific team, technical resources and transportation to the lakes. Since most of the crater lakes are in remote areas with poor communication network (no roads, rail or airports), it would take a couple of years for the work to be completed. </p>
<p>Since Cameroon has many potentially dangerous crater lakes, it is unsatisfactory that 36 years after the Lake Nyos disaster, not much has been done to mitigate the risks in other gas-charged hazardous lakes. </p>
<h2>Managing dangerous lakes</h2>
<p>Lake Kuk <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-663-05239-5">was checked</a> shortly after the 1986 Lake Nyos disaster and found not to contain excess carbon dioxide. Its relatively shallow depth and surface area means the risk of gas being trapped in large quantities is low.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, authorities should have immediately restricted access to Lake Kuk pending a thorough onsite investigation. The official press release urging calm was sent just one day after the incident was reported. It’s not possible that a scientist could have carried out a physical examination of the lake. The release said that rainfall was responsible for the changes, but this will be based on assumptions. </p>
<p>Lake Kuk <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-663-05239-5">might be considered safe</a>, but due to the dynamic and active nature of the Cameroon Volcanic Line, there is a possibility that volcanic gases can seep into the lake at any moment. </p>
<p>An onsite scientific investigation would determine with certainty the abnormal behaviour of Lake Kuk. Keeping people away from the lake until a swift and credible investigation had been done would be the most rational decision.</p>
<p>An additional step would be for a carbon dioxide detector to be installed near Lake Kuk and other potentially dangerous crater lakes. This would serve as an early warning system for lethal gas releases. </p>
<p>A carbon dioxide early warning system is designed to detect high concentrations of gases in the atmosphere and to produce a warning sound. Upon hearing the sound, people are expected to run away from the lake and onto higher ground. After the Lake Nyos disaster, carbon dioxide detectors and warning systems were installed near Lakes Nyos and Monoum. Nevertheless, no simulation has been conducted to determine their effectiveness. </p>
<p>The Directorate of Civil Protection is the designated agency responsible for coordinating disaster risk management in Cameroon. The agency should liaise with other stakeholders in the government and private sector to ensure the safety of Cameroon’s dangerous lakes. If the authorities are not proactive, the Lake Nyos disaster scenario may repeat where thousands of people and livestock are suddenly killed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190154/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henry Ngenyam Bang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Cameroon has many potentially dangerous gas-charged lakes. But not much has been done to mitigate the risks they pose.Henry Ngenyam Bang, Disaster Management Scholar, Researcher and Educator, Bournemouth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1891752022-08-25T09:16:45Z2022-08-25T09:16:45ZMacron in Africa: a cynical twist to repair the colonial past while keeping a tight grip<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480624/original/file-20220823-11-sz325m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">French President Emmanuel Macron (L) and Guinea-Bissau's President Umaro Sissoco Embalo (R) during Macron's visit in July 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Ludovic Marin/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In late July 2022 French president Emmanuel Macron <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220725-macron-embarks-on-african-visit-to-renew-relationship-with-continent">concluded a tour</a> of Cameroon, Benin and Guinea-Bissau. And he visits <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220820-five-years-after-last-visit-macron-to-return-to-algeria-in-bid-to-reset-ties">Algeria</a> between 25 and 27 August.</p>
<p>At first glance, his choice of countries is difficult to understand. Three former French colonies – Cameroon, Benin and Algeria – and a former Portuguese colony, Guinea-Bissau, seem very different.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, taken together, Macron’s visits tell a story in which France is doing penance for its colonial crimes while simultaneously trying to maintain the influence it gained through colonialism. </p>
<p>These two themes also emerged at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/france-wants-to-fix-its-relations-with-africa-but-its-going-about-it-the-wrong-way-171234">New France Africa Summit</a> in October 2021 in Montpelier. There, Macron promised investments in African technology startups as a way to increase the influence of French private business, while also promoting the scholar Achille Mbembe’s <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/admin/upload/default/0001/11/47114246c489f3eb05ab189634bb1bf832e4ad4e.pdf">report</a> on the new relationship between France and Africa. </p>
<p>Macron got another chance to show off his good relationship with African leaders at the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2022/02/17-18/">European Union-African Union summit of February 2022</a>. This was hosted by Macron – France held the presidency of the European Union at the time – and EU Council president Charles Michel.</p>
<p>The penance efforts were on show in each of the recent country visits. At a press conference with Cameroon’s president Paul Biya, Macron said France’s archives on colonial rule in Cameroon would be <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220726-macron-says-france-remains-committed-to-africa-s-security-on-first-stop-of-three-nation-tour">opened</a> “in full”. He said he hoped historians from both countries would work together to investigate “painful moments”.</p>
<p>In Benin the French president <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/27/macron-contin-to-visit-benin-to-talk-about-security-and-culture">accompanied</a> Benin’s president, Patrice Talon, on a visit to an exhibition devoted to the royal treasures of Abomey. These had been robbed by France 139 years ago and were returned in November 2021. In Guinea-Bissau he <a href="https://newsaf.cgtn.com/news/2022-07-29/French-president-wraps-up-Africa-tour-in-Guinea-Bissau-1c2SjqOqiqs/index.html">announced</a> the opening of a French school and a sports exchange programme, in line with his increased emphasis on cultural diplomacy. </p>
<p>The effort to maintain influence was evident in all three visits too. With the presence of French troops in Mali dwindling, Paris is looking for new military options and hoping to find those with Macron’s hosts. In Benin the French president therefore talked about security while in Yaoundé he restated France remained <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/07/26/macron-promises-to-open-archives-on-cameroon-colonial-era_5991547_4.html">committed</a> to the security of the continent. </p>
<p>In Guinea-Bissau Macron declared France should “<a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20220729-macron-promises-to-revive-relations-with-guinea-bissau-and-help-region-battle-terrorism">contribute</a> to the fight against terrorism everywhere in the region”.</p>
<p>In my view Macron exploits the increased call for the more fundamental decolonisation of African societies as a cover to exercise continued influence on the continent.</p>
<h2>Rectifying the colonial past</h2>
<p>The project for <a href="https://www.londonmet.ac.uk/about/equity/centre-for-equity-and-inclusion/race/decolonising-academia/what-does-decolonising-mean/">decolonial justice</a> has recently been used by other former colonial powers to brush up their image in Africa. Belgium recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/20/belgium-returns-patrice-lumumba-tooth-congolese-independence">returned a tooth</a> of Patrice Lumumba, the Congo’s first prime minister, 61 years after enabling his assassination. </p>
<p>Rectifying the colonial past has become a popular way for northern governments to do their diplomacy in Africa. In the past there were calls for new relationships and a forgetting of the colonial past. Now heads of state showcase their willingness to face colonial crimes head on. US secretary of state Antony Blinken, for instance, talked about the need to become “<a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16039-transcript-us-secretary-of-state-s-address-at-south-africa-s-future-africa-institute.html">equal partners</a>” and acknowledge </p>
<blockquote>
<p>generations of Africans whose destiny had been determined by colonial powers. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In my view this is a smart way to flip the script the Russians and the Chinese employ. They stress that they never colonised the continent, a claim already put forward in the 1960s when <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/zhou-enlais-african-safari-1963-1964/">Zhou Enlai and Leonid Brezhnev</a> visited the continent. </p>
<p>In his bid to reset this narrative, Macron went as far as to brand Russia “one of the last imperial colonial powers” for its invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p>It’s all part of the cynical twist of Macron’s version of decolonisation, which seeks to repair the old while setting back the cause of decolonisation through intervention. </p>
<h2>Renewed interest in Africa</h2>
<p>What separates France from the US and Belgium is that the Elysée is trying to offset a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-60419799">dwindling military position</a> in Mali. Its troops are leaving and are being replaced by Russian mercenaries, the so-called <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/31/world/europe/wagner-group-russia-ukraine.html">Wagner Group</a>. </p>
<p>France intervened in the north of Mali in 2013 with <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ_French/journals_E/Volume-06_Issue-3/spet_e.pdf">Operation Serval</a>. Paris also brought in allied nations like Belgium and Sweden to provide additional capacity and training. The aim was to push out Islamic fighters in the Sahel. </p>
<p>The Cold War logic that has been imposed on this trip, however, is far too simplistic. It overlooks the regional politics of West Africa, where the Economic Community of West African States (<a href="https://ecowas.int/">ECOWAS</a>) has increasingly felt the need to intervene against the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">coups</a> that have plagued the region: Mali in August 2020 and May 2021, Guinea in September 2021, Burkina Faso in January 2022 and the failed coup attempt in Guinea-Bissau in February 2022.</p>
<p>The West African coups, rather than the intervention in Ukraine, also explain what brought Macron to Guinea-Bissau, which took over the rotating presidency of ECOWAS in July. The organisation <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62037317">lifted sanctions</a> when the junta in Mali promised to hold elections in February 2024. </p>
<p>ECOWAS has also managed to reach an agreement with Burkina Faso’s military junta on a timetable for a transition back to democracy. A return to civilian rule is scheduled for July 2024.</p>
<p>With a combined promise of increased cultural investments and weapons for Guinea-Bissau, Macron is seeking to meddle with the regional organisation. That’s despite claiming France “always respected” the position of ECOWAS in regional matters. It is an easy way for the Élysée to blanket West Africa without having to engage in shuttle diplomacy to different West African capitals when it has a vital interest to protect.</p>
<p>Keeping the focus on Ukraine and Lavrov’s mission was therefore in the interest of the French president, who was also conveniently asked questions about why African countries had not received weapon shipments as easily as Ukraine. The delivery of weapons could then be presented as something positive, rather than a disastrous policy that hardly ever works. </p>
<p>As always, it will be regular people who will pay the price because they are forced to live in increasingly heavily armed societies. The <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/destabilization-mali">uprising</a> in the north of Mali in 2013, which Macron is now seeking to manage through ECOWAS, was the consequence of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/19/libya-air-strikes-gaddafi-france">2011 military intervention</a> by France and its allies in Libya and the subsequent overthrow of Libyan leader <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Muammar-al-Qaddafi">Muammar Gaddafi</a>. </p>
<p>It might set these countries back for years, preventing them from joining the African Lion economies – Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, and South Africa – countries that were avoided by Macron.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189175/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Gerits receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) in the United Kingdom </span></em></p>Macron’s recent visits to Africa tell a story in which France is doing penance for its colonial crimes while trying to maintain influence gained through colonialism.Frank Gerits, Research Fellow at the University of the Free State, South Africa and Assistant Professor in the History of International Relations, Utrecht UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1863362022-08-08T13:42:10Z2022-08-08T13:42:10ZThe environment is the silent casualty in the Cameroon Anglophone crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476734/original/file-20220729-24-78zea6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women displaced from rural villages in the Anglophone region gather to wash clothes in a stream. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Giles Clarke/UNOCHA via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most analysis of Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis has been skewed towards the socioeconomic, cultural and political ramifications of the conflict. </p>
<p>But, based on my work on natural, environmental hazards and disaster management in Cameroon over the past two decades, I would argue that the environment in the Anglophone region is a silent casualty of the conflict. And it has largely been ignored.</p>
<p>Our recently <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s41018-022-00114-1">published research</a> on the crisis showed that over 900,000 people had been internally displaced. Eighty percent of the inhabitants of villages that were conflict hot spots had fled into adjacent forests. The research investigated the consequences of the Cameroon Anglophone crisis and determined it to be an <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/168071/research%20brief%20no%2016_final.pdf">acute complex emergency</a>. </p>
<p>These developments are leaving huge environmental footprints and causing serious damage. This will get worse if the armed conflict escalates into a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s41018-022-00114-1">“complex disaster emergency”</a>. </p>
<p>I have identified six environmental consequences of the Cameroon Anglophone crisis. These range from failures in environmental governance to increases in deforestation, unmet measures in <a href="https://www.preventionweb.net/publication/cameroon-national-climate-change-adaptation-plan">Cameroon’s climate action plan</a>, poor municipal waste management, the effects of scorched earth tactics and the impact of improvised explosive devices. </p>
<p>There is a need to address these environmental oversights and build them into resolving the crisis. This would prevent the environmental legacies of the armed conflict from haunting the region’s population after the crisis has ended. </p>
<h2>The fallout for the environment</h2>
<p>One of the effects of the fighting <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/cameroon">since 2016</a> was that it brought conservation activities to a halt in the country’s biodiversity hot spots in the Anglophone regions. Cameroon has around <a href="http://www.parks.it/world/CM/Eindex.html">14 national parks</a>, 18 wildlife reserves, 12 forest reserves and three wildlife sanctuaries hosting rare and threatened species. </p>
<p>Before the crisis, many of these protected areas were still in a pristine condition because Cameroon had less tourism than other regions of Africa. </p>
<p>But the crisis has stalled several environmental projects. </p>
<p>For example, violence forced environmentalists and NGOS operating in the Tofala Hill Wildlife Sanctuary in Lebialem to flee. The Tofala Hill Wildlife Sanctuary is home to the critically endangered <a href="https://www.berggorilla.org/en/gorillas/general/ecology/articles-ecology/survey-of-the-cross-river-gorilla-at-the-tofala-hill-wildlife-sanctuary-in-cameroon/">Cross River gorillas</a> and other endangered wildlife like the African chimpanzee and elephant. </p>
<p>These gorillas are also under increased threat from militias such as the “Red Dragons” which have set up camps within the sanctuary (see Figure 1). </p>
<p>Likewise, efforts to protect the Mount Cameroon National Park, which hosts endangered primates, have been <a href="https://news.mongabay.com/2022/03/civil-conflict-in-cameroon-puts-endangered-chimpanzees-in-the-crosshairs/">hampered</a>. This poses a threat to the <a href="https://www.savetheelephants.org/about-elephants-2-3-2/elephant-news-post/?detail=cameroon-anglophone-crisis-environmentalists-express-fear-over-future-of-endangered-species-as-population-invade-forests">Nigerian-Cameroon chimpanzee</a>, which already faces extinction.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="A map" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472342/original/file-20220704-18-ezj1kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472342/original/file-20220704-18-ezj1kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472342/original/file-20220704-18-ezj1kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472342/original/file-20220704-18-ezj1kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472342/original/file-20220704-18-ezj1kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472342/original/file-20220704-18-ezj1kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472342/original/file-20220704-18-ezj1kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 1: Landscape of the Lebialem Highlands hosting the Tofala Hill Wildlife Sanctuary.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GSAC (2022)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Insecurity in areas hosting wildlife has led to a rise in uncontrolled illegal hunting. <a href="https://alliance-gsac.org/archives/1644">Poaching</a> of endangered chimpanzees (see Figure 2) and elephants increased in the Tofala Hill Wildlife Sanctuary and the Takamanda and Korup National Parks after state rangers and eco-guards fled.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="An ape sitting on a tree." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472343/original/file-20220704-24-t8g5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472343/original/file-20220704-24-t8g5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472343/original/file-20220704-24-t8g5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472343/original/file-20220704-24-t8g5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472343/original/file-20220704-24-t8g5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472343/original/file-20220704-24-t8g5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472343/original/file-20220704-24-t8g5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 2: Endangered ape species in Cameroon’s protected reserves.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Julie Langford courtesy of the Limbe Wildlife Centre.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The rise in the number of internally displaced people has had a number of consequences.</p>
<p>Deforestation has risen as relocated communities have cut down trees to provide shelter and firewood. </p>
<p>They are also putting pressure on access to water. Toilet facilitates are inadequate in areas hosting large numbers of people. Drilling of wells, sometimes in unhygienic surroundings, and defecation in streams are also responsible for the <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/cameroon-s-english-speaking-region-facing-water-shortage-cholera-epidemic/2565585">poor water quality</a> in the region. </p>
<p>The southwest region has recently experienced a <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2022-DON374">cholera epidemic</a>. </p>
<p>Thirdly, measures in <a href="https://www.preventionweb.net/publication/cameroon-national-climate-change-adaptation-plan">Cameroon’s climate action plan</a> have been halted by the crisis. The measures include providing fertilisers and improved seeds to farmers; installing renewable energy in rural areas; and restoring mangrove forests along the Limbe coast.</p>
<p>Fourthly, the crisis has worsened the problem of municipal waste management.</p>
<p>Separatists have threatened to burn the garbage collection company, <a href="https://www.proparco.fr/en/ressources/hysacam-countrys-number-one-waste-management-contractor-cameroon-immersion-360deg">HYSACAM</a>. Some of its workers have been attacked. This has affected the collection of municipal waste in Bamenda and Buea, capitals of the Anglophone northwest and southwest regions.</p>
<p>Fifth, military forces are using <a href="https://onpolicy.org/scorched-earth-policy-in-the-anglophone-conflict-in-cameroon-a-crime-against-humanity/">scorched earth tactics</a> that could create serious environmental harm. The military has destroyed houses, crops and livestock in several villages perceived to be strongholds of militia groups.</p>
<p>Likewise, militias have destroyed property owned by the state and that of civilians suspected to be colluding with security forces. </p>
<p>Satellite images from February and March 2021 <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/07/cameroon-satellite-images-reveal-devastation-in-anglophone-regions/">confirm</a> the destruction of multiple villages in the northwest region. </p>
<p>Lastly, the use of improvised explosive devices by militia groups against Cameroon’s military vehicles has been <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_cameroon-military-says-rebels-turning-ieds-numbers-fall/6205704.html">increasing</a> and getting more sophisticated. </p>
<p>Explosive remnants and munitions can make the land uninhabitable, severely harm wildlife, and contaminate the soil and watercourses. Clearance of devices can also cause localised pollution, soil degradation and negative land use consequences.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A destroyed military vehicle." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472349/original/file-20220704-3924-osguz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472349/original/file-20220704-3924-osguz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472349/original/file-20220704-3924-osguz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472349/original/file-20220704-3924-osguz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472349/original/file-20220704-3924-osguz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472349/original/file-20220704-3924-osguz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472349/original/file-20220704-3924-osguz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 5: Military vehicle destroyed by IED.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo courtesy of SBBC (2022).</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Contingency plans being put in place by the Cameroon government for a potential complex disaster emergency should consider the environmental aspects of the conflict. </p>
<p>First it’s necessary to empirically diagnose the environmental ramifications and how they can be resolved. </p>
<p>When seeking political solutions to the crisis, stakeholders should also incorporate measures to mitigate the environmental consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186336/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henry Ngenyam Bang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis could escalate into a complex disaster emergency with dire environmental consequences.Henry Ngenyam Bang, Disaster Management Scholar, Researcher and Educator, Bournemouth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1854282022-06-30T13:35:49Z2022-06-30T13:35:49ZCOVID hurt West and Central Africa’s small-scale fishers. They need more support<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470582/original/file-20220623-51187-g5ccgx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Coastal communities in West and Central Africa were severely affected by COVID which brought many aspects of food and seafood supply chains to a halt. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>From Senegal through Ghana to Cameroon, small-scale fishing is both a livelihood and a way of life for people in coastal parts of West and Central Africa, with more than <a href="https://tbtiglobal.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/TBTI_SSF-in-Africa-e-book_F.pdf">two million small-scale fishers</a>. It has been this way for centuries – but that is changing.</p>
<p>Fishers are faced with diminishing fish stocks, competition from foreign industrial fleets, <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40152-020-00197-9">illegal fishing</a>, unstable governance, and a lack of infrastructure to support fishing operations. Small-scale fisheries in these countries, as in other areas of the global south, are often part of the <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2019.00171">informal economy</a>. Despite being critical to local livelihoods – across sectors, informal employment <a href="https://www.undp.org/africa/events/informal-economy-africa-which-way-forward">accounts for over 80%</a> of all employment on the continent – small-scale fisheries are generally not regulated or protected by the state. </p>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic only worsened the situation. It brought many aspects of <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fsufs.2021.614368">food and seafood supply chains to a halt</a>. Fisherfolk and coastal communities in West and Central Africa were severely affected.</p>
<p>Our newly published <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0308597X22001518?casa_token=YW10ykXN-KoAAAAA:MVmbgKAz2xswpVdmSLlwp6KeqNwgB_GoX5etAFHtaJbfiFk_KwL19_pBm3eD2LLj7ZxjYEGMwsk">research from Cameroon and Liberia</a> studied these effects. We found that small-scale fisheries brought in fewer fish and less income. Fish wastage was also a bigger problem than usual because storage facilities weren’t available for fisherfolks. </p>
<p>These experiences, coupled with the sector’s bigger systemic problems before the pandemic, deserve attention. Fishing communities in West and Central Africa receive little attention from academics and policymakers despite their contribution to the region’s <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0964569115001039?casa_token=paf9-SZLVNAAAAAA:m-ynoIRAH-ebWv7P3ZS7CenFGKBGbgTN7Z_vGda7zwSgVbU9_mphXxi6Kvwepr6PIjsQmxBGI4w">food security and employment economics</a>.</p>
<p>From better <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2022.873397/full">ocean stewardship activities</a> to better governance of these resources and those who depend on them, there is much to be done for small-scale fisheries in this region. There is a need for better innovations and policies to help improve the fisheries sector in this region.</p>
<h2>Vibrant, diverse fisheries</h2>
<p>Small-scale fishers in West and Central Africa have a great deal to tell researchers. Small-scale fisheries are <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-94938-3_4">central to food and nutritional security</a>. </p>
<p>They are also remarkably multicultural. It is common to see people from other nationalities settled and fishing in a neighbouring country. In Cameroon, for example, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X22001518?casa_token=YW10ykXN-KoAAAAA:MVmbgKAz2xswpVdmSLlwp6KeqNwgB_GoX5etAFHtaJbfiFk_KwL19_pBm3eD2LLj7ZxjYEGMwsk">our research</a> has shown that many fisherfolks are migrants from Ghana and Nigeria. Similarly, fishers in Liberia are mostly Ghanaians who have obtained fishing permits to fish in the country.</p>
<p>These patterns of migration result in highly culturally diverse fishing communities; fishers bring not just their families to these neighbouring countries but also their traditions and customs. However, this brings in problems in terms of access and mobilisation of collective efforts to address problems as they arise.</p>
<p>COVID-19 exacerbated existing threats to this important informal sector. For instance, it confirmed how the lack of robust governance systems at the state level leaves workers vulnerable to shocks like pandemics and climate change impacts. Workers in these fisheries rarely benefit from any sort of state protections or services related to their employment and occupational safety. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-covid-affected-markets-and-livelihoods-in-kenyas-fisheries-sector-171748">How COVID affected markets and livelihoods in Kenya's fisheries sector</a>
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<p>They also don’t have access to the kind of infrastructure that might have kept fish fresh for longer during periods when markets weren’t open or people were afraid to leave their homes because of the pandemic. One Liberian fisher told us:</p>
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<p>COVID-19 affects our business greatly. Like before, we used to have many customers coming to buy our fresh fish at the beach, but currently, our mothers dry the fish we caught and take to the market. After weeks from drying the fish and they are not bought it gets spoiled.</p>
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<p>So, how can small-scale fishers in these countries be better supported?</p>
<h2>The need for action</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www1.undp.org/content/singapore-global-centre/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-14-life-below-water.html?utm_source=EN&utm_medium=GSR&utm_content=US_UNDP_PaidSearch_Brand_English&utm_campaign=CENTRAL&c_src=CENTRAL&c_src2=GSR&gclid=Cj0KCQjwhqaVBhCxARIsAHK1tiP4qYip1RjSbIiTdNgbJ2tYxbG7KzwE1IvrI5ju5f8klfPMCNSu-KQaAhbZEALw_wcB">UN Sustainable Development Goal 14</a> emphasises the need to conserve ocean resources and to use them sustainably.</p>
<p>Coastal populations are <a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/1-4020-3880-1_115#:%7E:text=Sub%2DSaharan%20Africa's%2081%25%20increase,thirds%2Dof%20all%20population%20growth.">growing</a>, and the dependency on fishing and the ocean in these places will continue to increase. Coastal dwellers’ wellbeing and livelihood are at risk – and that’s a threat to both the short and long-term resilience of the fish food system in West and Central Africa.</p>
<p>With increasing environmental stresses and emerging systemic shocks such as COVID-19, there is a need for action to not only achieve this but also to ensure the well-being of those who depend on these resources.</p>
<p>For example, the digitalisation of the fisheries sector could be a sustainable response approach to shocks. In North America, fisherfolks use digital services such as smartphone apps to sell and deliver seafood <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsufs.2021.614368/full?&utm_source=Email_to_authors_&utm_medium=Email&utm_content=T1_11.5e1_author&utm_campaign=Email_publication&field=&journalName=Frontiers_in_Sustainable_Food_Systems&id=614368">to the consumer</a>. This could be replicated in West and Central Africa. Fisherfolks can use local telephone networks and e-money services to facilitate communications and transactions.</p>
<p>Also, the establishment of <a href="https://www.fao.org/in-action/globefish/market-reports/resource-detail/en/c/346469/">community supported fisheries</a> programmes can help reorganise local fish marketing, reduce fish losses across the value chain, and build community resilience to shocks.</p>
<p>Whatever approach is taken, it’s crucial to include the fishers themselves in discussing possible pathways forward. They can help guide policy makers on how to ensure <a href="https://www.au-ibar.org/au-ibar-projects/enhancing-sustainable-fisheries-management-and-aquaculture-development-africa">sustainable fisheries practices</a>. Regional and international bodies also need to get more involved by providing funding and institutional support to enhance the fisheries sector.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185428/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard A. Nyiawung receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the University of Guelph, Canada.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philip A Loring receives funding from the Arrell Food Institute, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada. </span></em></p>There is a need for better innovations and policies to help improve the fisheries sector in this region.Richard A. Nyiawung, PhD Candidate in Geography and International Development Studies, University of GuelphPhilip A Loring, Associate Professor and Arrell Chair in Food, Policy, and Society, University of GuelphLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.