tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/chinese-communist-party-2614/articlesChinese Communist Party – The Conversation2024-03-15T15:15:16Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2257492024-03-15T15:15:16Z2024-03-15T15:15:16ZIs TikTok’s parent company an agent of the Chinese state? In China Inc., it’s a little more complicated<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582050/original/file-20240314-28-369bin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C5%2C3553%2C2358&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some U.S. lawmakers have grown concerned about TikTok.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-walk-past-an-advertisement-featuring-the-tiktok-logo-news-photo/2075608549?adppopup=true">Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images.</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Does the Chinese government have officials inside TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, pulling the strings? And does the storing of data from the popular social media app outside of China protect Americans?</p>
<p>These questions appear to dominate the current thinking in the U.S. over <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/13/technology/tiktok-ban-house-vote.html">whether to ban TikTok</a> if its owner, Chinese technology giant ByteDance, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/14/tiktok-ban-china-would-block-sale-of-short-video-app.html">refuses to sell the platform</a>.</p>
<p>But in my opinion – forged through <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=vXeBa0kAAAAJ&hl=en">40 years as a scholar of China, its political economy and business</a> – both questions obscure a more interesting point. What’s more, they suggest a crucial misunderstanding of the relationship between state and private enterprise in China.</p>
<p>Simply put, there’s no clear line between the state and society in China in the same way that there is in democracies. The Chinese Communist Party – which is synonymous with the Chinese state – both owns and is the nation. And that goes for private enterprises, too. They operate like joint ventures in which the government is both a partner and the ultimate boss. Both sides know that – even if that relationship isn’t expressly codified and recognizable to outside onlookers.</p>
<h2>ByteDance under the microscope</h2>
<p>Take ByteDance. The company has become the focus of scrutiny in the U.S. largely due to the outsized influence that its subsidiary <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2024/02/22/how-u-s-adults-use-tiktok/">plays in the lives of young Americans</a>. Some <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-house-vote-force-bytedance-divest-tiktok-or-face-ban-2024-03-13/">170 million Americans</a> are TikTok users, and U.S. politicians fear their data has a direct route back to the Chinese state via ByteDance, which has its head offices in Beijing.</p>
<p>Location aside, concerned voices in the U.S. cite the evidence of former ByteDance employees who suggest <a href="https://apnews.com/article/tiktok-china-bytedance-user-data-d257d98125f69ac80f983e6067a84911">interference from the Chinese government</a>, and reports that the state has quietly <a href="https://www.theinformation.com/articles/beijing-tightens-grip-on-bytedance-by-quietly-taking-stake-china-board-seat">taken a direct stake and a board seat</a> at Beijing ByteDance Technology Co. Ltd., ByteDance’s Chinese subsidiary.</p>
<p>Grilled by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce in March 2023, TikTok’s Singaporean CEO Shou Zi Chew <a href="https://apnews.com/article/tiktok-ban-ceo-congressional-hearing-bytedance-china-44d948c5b0ba18e2a714e0fa62d52779">said unequivocally</a> that ByteDance was not “an agent of China or any other country.”</p>
<p>The history of the Chinese government’s dealings with private companies suggests something more subtle, however.</p>
<h2>The rise of China Inc.</h2>
<p>Over its century-long history, the Chinese Communist Party has sought to exercise control over all aspects of the country, including its economy. In its early days, this control took the form of a heavy-handed <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/command-economy.asp">command economy</a> in which everything was produced and consumed according to government planning.</p>
<p>China took a step in a more capitalist direction in the latter half of the 20th century after the death of Mao Zedong, founder of the People’s Republic of China. But even the <a href="https://www.cato.org/publications/chinas-post-1978-economic-development-entry-global-trading-system">reforms of Deng Xiaoping</a> in the late 1970s and 1980s – credited for opening up China’s economy – were in the service of party goals. Because China’s economy was in ruins, the party’s emphasis was on economic development, and it loosened its grip on power to encourage that. The continuation of party control was still paramount – it just needed to reform the economy to ensure that goal.</p>
<p>That didn’t mean the party wanted pluralism. After decades of economic growth, and with a GDP surpassing that of the U.S. when <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3085501/china-overtakes-us-no-1-buying-power-still-clings-developing">measured by purchasing power parity</a>, the Chinese government once again started to shift its focus to a comprehensive control of China.</p>
<p>In recent years, under the increasingly <a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/Chapter_1--CCP_Decision-Making_and_Xi_Jinpings_Centralization_of_Authority.pdf">centralized control of Xi Jinping</a>, the Chinese government has evidently opted to run the entire country as a <a href="http://doi.org/10.1108/IJOEM-12-2019-1103">giant corporation</a>, with the ruling party as its management.</p>
<h2>A party with unusual power</h2>
<p>Unlike political parties in democracies, which people freely join and leave, the Chinese Communist Party resembles a secret society. <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Constitution_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China.pdf">To join</a>, you need to be introduced by two party members and tested for an extended period, and then pledge to die for the party’s cause. Quitting it also <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2017-02/05/c_1120413145.htm">needs approval by the party</a>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12023">Orders are implicit</a>, and protecting one’s superior is crucial. </p>
<p>People who don’t cooperate face serious consequences. In 2022, an official warned a resident who disobeyed the official’s order in COVID-19 testing that three generations of the resident’s descendants <a href="https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/generation-05122022062839.html">would be adversely affected</a> if he were uncooperative. The same is true of businesses: Ride-sharing company Didi incurred the party’s displeasure by listing its stocks in the U.S., and was harshly punished and forced to delist as a result – <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/china-fines-didi-global-12-bln-violating-data-security-laws-2022-07-21/">losing more than 80% of its value</a>. </p>
<p>Since those who disobey the party are weeded out or are punished and seen to have learned their lessons, all surviving and successful private businesses are <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/jack-ma-makes-ant-offer-to-placate-chinese-regulators-11608479629?page=1">party supporters</a> – either voluntarily or otherwise.</p>
<p>The rapid emergence of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009076210">China Inc.</a> has caught even seasoned Chinese entrepreneurs off guard. Consider the case of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/07/28/1021651586/chinese-billionaire-sun-dawu-is-sentenced-to-18-years-for-provoking-trouble">Sun Dawu</a>, a successful agricultural entrepreneur known for advocating for rural reform and the rights of farmers. That offended the party, and in 2020, authorities confiscated all his assets and sentenced him to 18 years in prison.</p>
<p>As if that weren’t enough, China’s National Intelligence Law granted broad powers to the country’s spy agencies and obligates companies to assist with intelligence efforts. That’s why some American lawmakers are concerned that ByteDance could be <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/will-the-us-crack-down-on-tiktok-six-questions-and-expert-answers-about-the-bill-in-congress/">forced to hand over Americans’ private data</a> to the Chinese state. <a href="https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-au/the-truth-about-tiktok">TikTok denies</a> this is the case. However, recently <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/leaked-hacking-files-show-chinese-spying-on-citizens-and-foreigners-alike">leaked files</a> of I-Soon, a Chinese hacking firm, reveal public-private collusion in data sharing is common in China.</p>
<p>That’s why I’m not convinced by TikTok’s argument that American users’ data is safe because it’s stored <a href="https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/tiktok-facts-how-we-secure-personal-information-and-store-data">outside of China</a>, in the U.S., Malaysia and Singapore. I also don’t think it’s relevant whether the party has members on the ByteDance board or gives explicit orders to TikTok.</p>
<p>Regardless of whether ByteDance has formal ties with the party, there will be the tacit understanding that the management is working for two bosses: the investors of the company and – more importantly – their political overseers that represent the party. But most importantly, when the interests of the two bosses conflict, the party trumps.</p>
<p>As such, as long as ByteDance owns TikTok, I believe ByteDance will use TikTok to support the party – not just for its own business survival, but for the safety of the personnel of ByteDance and TikTok, and their families.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225749/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaomin Li does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In China, ‘private’ businesses aren’t entirely private and the ultimate boss is the CCP, not the CEO.Shaomin Li, Eminent Scholar and Professor of International Business, Old Dominion UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2206852024-01-09T17:02:27Z2024-01-09T17:02:27ZChina: Xi’s new year’s address wasn’t a threat against Taiwan – it was a strategic move for legitimacy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568260/original/file-20240108-19-vqrmp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3738%2C2678&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/moscow-russia-march-23-chinese-president-132906761">Kaliva/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In his <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202312/t20231231_11215608.html">new year address</a>, Chinese president Xi Jinping claimed that Taiwan would “surely be reunified” with China. Against the backdrop of increased Chinese military posturing in the Taiwan Strait, some western journalists are framing Xi’s remarks as an <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fc1dfe48-a390-48c3-b27c-7e405978c166">overt and direct threat against Taiwan</a>. They argue that Xi’s rhetoric validates concerns about a potential invasion.</p>
<p>This framing misses the point and overlooks the domestic political context of Xi’s speech. Xi also celebrated the successes of the Chinese nation and economy, while acknowledging the economic struggles of the Chinese people. Rather than threatening Taiwan, this rhetoric is intended to protect Xi’s regime.</p>
<p>Western governments draw their legitimacy from a popular mandate, which is established through elections. The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to govern China is also premised on a mandate. But instead of through elections, this mandate is established through the party’s record on ensuring continued economic prosperity and national success.</p>
<p>In this context, Xi’s emphasis on economic growth and the nation should be considered performative – an example of political theatre portraying the CCP in a carefully curated way for a Chinese audience.</p>
<p>Following the Cultural Revolution (which had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion">disastrous consequences</a> for China’s people and economy) and Mao’s death in 1976, the CCP re-established its legitimacy on <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/chinas-new-remembering-of-the-antijapanese-war-of-resistance-19371945/84F3184AF89EBA79F54561774379EAC6">twin pillars of economic prosperity and nationalism</a>. </p>
<p>Former leader Deng Xiaoping secured the economic pillar in the 1980s through reforms that <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview">raised 800 million people out of poverty</a>. The nationalist pillar involved retelling Chinese history. The regime emphasised historical achievements, commemorated national struggles and portrayed the CCP as the vanguard of the Chinese nation. </p>
<p>Under Mao, Japan’s invasion of China in the second Sino-Japanese war (the Chinese theatre of the second world war) was presented as an ideological class struggle. According to this narrative, both Chinese and Japanese workers were exploited by militaristic bourgeois elites. Nowadays, China’s nationalist narrative presents Japan as a foreign oppressor that China heroically resisted and overcame under the CCP’s leadership.</p>
<p>Such narratives of Chinese history have resulted in a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2004.44.2.276">contemporary Chinese nationalism</a> sensitive to what it considers renewed victimisation of the Chinese nation. This includes international opposition to reunification with Taiwan, a historic province of China.</p>
<h2>Relying on nationalism</h2>
<p>As China’s economy slows, the CCP has become increasingly reliant on the nationalist pillar to retain its legitimacy. This limits the CCP’s options in nationalistic disputes as it must act in such a way that upholds its nationalist credentials. </p>
<p>In 2005, China saw large anti-Japanese protests triggered by Japan’s downplaying of the atrocities it committed during its invasion of China. Within the context of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN">11.4% economic growth</a>, the CCP shut down public transport to block protesters from arriving in the largest cities and officials condemned the protests.</p>
<p>But, by 2012, China’s <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN">economic growth had slowed to 7.9%</a>. And the CCP was notably silent during similarly large anti-Japanese protests over the Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China) – a <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/98119">territorial dispute in the East China Sea</a> associated with the second Sino-Japanese war.</p>
<p>China’s nationalist movement <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-japan-politics-idUSBRE88I0AU20120919/">criticised the CCP</a> for being too soft on Japan, prompting then vice-president Xi to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/19/china-japan-senkaku-diaoyu-islands">publicly renounce</a> Japan’s territorial claim. This constitutes a performative acquiescence to nationalist pressure, with Xi acting to secure the nationalist pillar while the economic pillar faltered.</p>
<h2>Understanding Xi’s performance</h2>
<p>Xi’s mention of national reunification with Taiwan in his new year address is in keeping with the CCP’s increased reliance on nationalism to secure legitimacy as China’s economy slows.</p>
<p>This can also explain China’s posturing in the Taiwan Strait. China experienced <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN">3% economic growth in 2022</a>, the lowest growth rate since Deng’s reforms (excluding the height of the COVID pandemic). So to deflect scrutiny, the CCP is intensifying its embrace of brinkmanship in the Taiwan Strait.</p>
<p>Ultimately, this brinkmanship is unlikely to culminate in a war considering how an invasion could backfire on the CCP. In the event of an unsuccessful invasion, the CCP would suffer significant damage to its reputation. Even a successful but <a href="https://theconversation.com/taiwan-how-the-porcupine-doctrine-might-help-deter-armed-conflict-with-china-169488">prolonged conflict with heavy losses</a> would have a similar effect.</p>
<p>Either way, the near-certain economic consequences, such as sanctions and embargoes, would topple the party’s economic pillar.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/taiwan-how-the-porcupine-doctrine-might-help-deter-armed-conflict-with-china-169488">Taiwan: how the 'porcupine doctrine' might help deter armed conflict with China</a>
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<h2>Acknowledging economic shortcomings</h2>
<p>More interesting than Xi’s talk of reunification is his admission of the economic struggles of the Chinese people. In his address, Xi explained that “some people had difficulty finding jobs and meeting basic needs”. </p>
<p>There is very little precedent for acknowledging the shortcomings of the CCP’s delivery of economic prosperity. Doing so contradicts the economic pillar. It is particularly odd given that the CCP has recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/29/china-cracks-down-on-negativity-over-economy-in-bid-to-boost-confidence">suppressed negative commentaries</a> on China’s economy to avoid damaging public confidence in its economic stewardship.</p>
<p>As brinkmanship in the Taiwan Strait reaches its limits, it seems the CCP is shifting away from an over-dependence on the nationalist pillar. Instead, it may be pursuing a less immediately risky strategy, acknowledging current economic issues while emphasising the potential for economic growth under the CCP. This approach would be a safer way to maintain the party’s legitimacy than escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait.</p>
<p>Xi’s speech indicates a changing nuance in CCP discourse – one that may become increasingly apparent over the course of the coming year.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220685/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lewis Eves does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Xi’s New Year address wasn’t about threatening Taiwan – there’s more going on than we think.Lewis Eves, Teaching Associate in Politics and International Relations, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2165682023-11-09T18:04:53Z2023-11-09T18:04:53ZWhen Marx met Confucius: Xi Jinping’s attempt to influence China’s intellectual loyalties has met with a mixed reception at home and abroad<p>A new film series produced in China, <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/11/02/xi-jinping-is-trying-to-fuse-the-ideologies-of-marx-and-confucius">When Marx met Confucius</a>, was viewed more than 8 million times in the first two weeks after it was released online in October. But this is not another blockbuster drama of the sort China has been adept at producing in recent years, but a propaganda film aimed at popularising the latest version of what is known as “<a href="https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/7872">Xi Jinping thought</a>”.</p>
<p>Ever since Xi took power in March 2013, his regime has focused on introducing stricter ideological controls and banishing what it calls “false ideological trends, positions and activities”. The Chinese Communist Party has published regular communiques pushing Xi’s ideological line and When Marx met Confucius is the latest version of this propaganda drive. Its aim is to reconcile the regime’s official Marxist underpinnings with an appeal to a more specifically Chinese cultural heritage.</p>
<p>But 8 million views does not represent great box office in a market as large as China and its reception has been anything but positive with audiences and critics either in China or around the world.</p>
<p>The series primarily <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tcO7HSCXR9M">consists of dialogues</a> between Confucius and Marx in question-and-answer sessions. These comprise questions raised by a group of young Chinese students and elaborations on these conversations by official scholars and propagandists. The content, structure and aims of the films are unmistakably geared towards popularising Xi’s ideas, with a particular focus on the youth sector.</p>
<p>The films are distinctive in several ways. They combine some of the tropes and techniques of popular entertainment, including the employment of sophisticated AI and digital technologies, while mixing traditional cultural genres such as Chinese shadow play with modern genres such as rap music. </p>
<p>But perhaps they are most distinctive because of the unlikely idea of conversations between historical figures who lived more than 2,000 years apart: Confucius (551-479BC) and Marx (1818-1883). Comment in the west has <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/marx-meets-confucius-in-xis-confused-cheese-fest-80bkqskfc">tended to focus</a> on what is seen as the rather laughable nature of this device. But there is more at stake than the artistic shortcomings of the production.</p>
<p>The central theme of the series revolves around the notion of “<a href="https://english.news.cn/20230702/073894ef71c0431aabc2976bd07cdd82/c.html">second integration</a>”. This idea was introduced by Xi in July 2021, to mark the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. It emphasises the integration of the basic principles of Marxism with China’s specific realities and its rich traditional culture. </p>
<p>While Marxism has been the official party ideology since Mao’s era, Confucianism has been more recently invoked to build national cohesion. But this film elevates the significance of Confucius to the level of Marx. It’s a shift that would have been unlikely without the approval of Xi himself.</p>
<p>Some analysts view Xi’s propaganda efforts through the lens of his steady encouragement of a <a href="https://time.com/6287699/xi-jinping-personality-cult/">cult of personality</a> in China. But this perspective overlooks the deeper challenges faced by China’s one-party state.</p>
<h2>Challenges of legitimacy</h2>
<p>The political philosopher <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674238183">Ci Jiwei</a>, professor of philosophy at the University of Hong Kong, has argued that China’s propaganda campaigns and ideological repression can be seen as reactions to the party’s challenge of legitimacy. As Ci observes, the CCP “can have no other publicly avowable source of legitimacy than the one tied to its communist revolutionary past”. </p>
<p>But this legitimacy was significantly weakened after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. Since then, the party has depended on public acquiescence to its control in exchange for economic development and improvements in people’s living standards.</p>
<p>But this performance legitimacy, relying heavily as it does on economic success, contains inherent vulnerabilities that could undermine the regime. Chinese society has undergone significant and comprehensive shifts. </p>
<p>These have involved the emergence of different <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1478929915609475j">economic classes</a>, the development of pluralistic <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0920203X18759789?journalCode=cina">intellectual thought</a>, a revival of pluralistic <a href="https://ian-johnson.com/the-souls-of-china/">religious beliefs</a>, and awareness of <a href="https://www.thechinastory.org/yearbooks/yearbook-2014/forum-the-rights-and-wrongs-of-the-law/xu-zhiyong-and-the-new-citizens-movement/">citizen’s rights</a>. Meanwhile, for all its efforts at propaganda, China’s overall <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/07/27/chinas-approach-to-foreign-policy-gets-largely-negative-reviews-in-24-country-survey/">international image</a> is increasingly negative. </p>
<p>This prompts fear among the CCP leadership and explains the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/25/china-jails-liu-xiaobo">intensifying crackdown</a> on liberal values and ideological control that was taking place even before Xi took over in 2012. To some extent, the supercharging of this ideological offensive as represented in “Xi Jinping thought” is a consequence of this trend. It has earned him the popular nickname, the “<a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/space/%E6%80%BB%E5%8A%A0%E9%80%9F%E5%B8%88">chief accelerator</a>”. </p>
<p>But this has led to a vicious spiral in which government by diktat – as exemplified in the zero-COVID policy – has led to a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/chinas-economic-slowdown-was-inevitable">slowdown</a> in the Chinese economy and soaring rates of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-66506132">youth unemployment</a>. As Ci warns, without embracing democracy and opening up to dissenting views, the party’s legitimacy will continue to weaken due to the deep contradictions and flaws inherent in the CCP’s monopoly of power.</p>
<h2>Lukewarm public response</h2>
<p>These fissures have, if anything, been made more apparent by the project to recuperate Confucianism via When Marx Met Confucius. Outside of <a href="https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_14898451">official endorsements</a>, the film seems to have received few positive comments within China. Significantly, initial responses from two main ideological camps – the Maoists and the Confucianists – have diverged dramatically.</p>
<p>On two of the most popular hardline Maoist and Chinese Marxist websites, <a href="http://m.wyzxwk.com/content.php?classid=13&id=481970">Wuyouzhixiang</a> and <a href="https://m.szhgh.com/Article/opinion/xuezhe/2023-10-14/337946.html">Red Songs Association</a>, commentaries have strongly maintained Mao’s condemnation of Confucius and ridiculed the film’s perceived departure from Marxist principles. These commentaries emphatically reject the idea of recognising Confucianism as the root of the national culture and of equating the importance of Confucius with Marx. </p>
<p>On the two main Confucian websites, the <a href="http://www.kongzixuehui.org/front/xscg/20230605/358.html">Chinese Confucius Academy</a> and <a href="https://www.rujiazg.com/">Confucian Network</a> there has been a conspicuous absence of discussion of the widely circulated film.</p>
<p>Among the Chinese diaspora overseas, two prominent bloggers – <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SYoYeB-uz0k">Teacher Li</a> and <a href="https://www.ftvnews.com.tw/news/detail/2023A16W0033">Mr Shen</a> – each found the film both bizarre and cringeworthy in its conception and incoherent in its doctrine.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, China’s propaganda campaign, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-concerning-new-strategy-on-human-rights-unite-the-world-behind-a-selective-approach-212007">global civilisation initiative</a> is meeting with intense scepticism in the west. So this attempt to promote “Xi Jingping thought” to the Chinese public appears to be a hard sell.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216568/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tao Zhang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new series attempts to integrate traditional Chinese cultural ideas with the Communist Party’s official Marxist ideology, with mixed results.Tao Zhang, Senior Lecturer, School of Arts & Humanities, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2103672023-07-26T20:05:36Z2023-07-26T20:05:36ZThe ‘Mao suit’: how a military-style uniform changed the face of China – and clothed Australian prisoners during the Korean War<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539118/original/file-20230725-23-qc020l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=179%2C50%2C609%2C652&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A 1953 Chinese Korean War propaganda poster.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://chineseposters.net/">Chineseposters.net, accession no. PC-1953-003PC-1953-003</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the collection of the Australian War Memorial there is a photograph of four men in a North Korean prisoner of war camp, taken in the winter of 1952-3. Australian airman Ron Guthrie is in the group. He had been in captivity since August 1951.</p>
<p>More than 17,000 Australians took part in the Korean War, which began in June 1950 as a civil war between North and South Korea and quickly erupted into an international conflict involving China on the north side and the United States on the south. In Chinese, this war is known as the “resist America, support Korea” war. </p>
<p>On 27 July 1953, 70 years ago today, hostilities came to an indefinite halt with the signing of an armistice.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539119/original/file-20230725-23-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539119/original/file-20230725-23-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539119/original/file-20230725-23-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=833&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539119/original/file-20230725-23-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=833&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539119/original/file-20230725-23-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=833&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539119/original/file-20230725-23-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1047&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539119/original/file-20230725-23-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1047&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539119/original/file-20230725-23-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1047&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A group of POWs at Pyoktong, North Korea, winter 1952-53. Temperatures sometimes fell as low as -43° C. Warrant Officer Ron Guthrie of 77 Squadron, RAAF, is second from the left.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Australian War Memorial</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In this bitter, destructive and still unresolved conflict, one of the greatest challenges for both sides was how to deal with the weather. In the summer, men collapsed from the heat and humidity. Weapons became difficult to handle, blistering the hands. </p>
<p>Even worse were the winters. The men in this photo are wearing thickly padded clothes that would help them survive the extreme cold. A line in the 1970s TV series <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M*A*S*H_(TV_series)">MASH</a> sums up the likely weather conditions at the time: “The temperature is now two degrees below zero [°F]. Tonight’s forecast is cold, with a good chance of bad weather tomorrow.” </p>
<p>Australians had arrived in Korea unprepared for these conditions. They were initially helped out by the Americans and in due course, supplied with their own <a href="https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1101903">fit-for-purpose uniforms</a>: a string vest, thick fleece underclothing, a heavy jersey, and windproof combat jacket and trousers under a fur lined parka. All this, together with a down sleeping bag, cost over £100, (around $4000 in buying power today).</p>
<p>Clearly, the four POWs in the photo are not dressed in these made-in-Australia outfits. With the possible exception of the shoes, what they are wearing is not too different from ordinary dress worn by men in China at that time: a high-collared jacket with inset sleeves and five buttons paired with shapeless but nonetheless Western-style trousers, tailored at the crotch. </p>
<p>In a war dominated on the northern side by the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, the similarities are not surprising. The prisoners are in fact wearing a variety of what foreigners would come to call a “Mao suit”. In Chinese it fits into a category of clothing called <em>zhifu</em>, or uniform.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korean-pows-seeking-last-chance-to-return-home-after-decades-in-exile-79929">North Korean POWs seeking last chance to return home after decades in exile</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Mass mobilisation of sewing labour</h2>
<p>What is a Mao suit? The term was first used to describe the relatively undifferentiated clothing of people in China during the Mao years – “all dressed in blue boiler suits” in the view of foreigners, although a closer look would show fine gradations in the clothing system. There was a large social distance between the well-tailored suit of fine wool worn by a high official and the roughly-made ensemble in homespun cotton worn by a man on the street.</p>
<p>The fitted, military-looking jacket of the Mao suit resonates both with the longer coat worn by India’s first prime minister <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jawaharlal_Nehru">Jawaharlal Nehru</a> and with the <em>stalinka</em>, or <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stalin_tunic">Stalin tunic</a>. These items of clothing were all products of global militarisation in the 20th century.</p>
<p>The Chinese variant can be traced to a Japanese-influenced style of military jacket worn by “Father of the Republic” <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sun_Yat-sen">Sun Yatsen</a>, China’s most significant political leader before Mao Zedong. </p>
<p>Mao himself set the sartorial tone for Communist China by wearing a jacket in the Sun Yatsen style when he announced the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539122/original/file-20230725-15-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539122/original/file-20230725-15-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539122/original/file-20230725-15-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539122/original/file-20230725-15-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539122/original/file-20230725-15-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539122/original/file-20230725-15-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539122/original/file-20230725-15-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539122/original/file-20230725-15-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mao Zedong declares the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October, 1949.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The altered appearance of the crowd in any Chinese town after 1949 was one of the most immediate effects of regime change. Both the Chinese long gown and the Western suit were abandoned. Clothing regulations for employees in the state sector established the Sun Yatsen jacket or its poor relative, the “People’s jacket”, as standard dress.</p>
<p>Across China, tailors started cutting up old clothes to fashion these new-style garments. Much of this activity was undertaken while the Korean War was in progress.</p>
<p>For the civilian population, the provision of this new sort of clothing (literally <em>xinyi</em> or “new clothes”) was undertaken piecemeal, often by newly trained housewives given crash courses in the sewing and vocational schools that mushroomed across China in the early 1950s. For provisioning the armed forces, mass mobilisation of labour was required. </p>
<p>Vast quantities of clothing were required very quickly to outfit the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army. In July 1950, normally a slack month in clothing production, four regional military administrations were ordered to supply <a href="https://china.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202011/20/WS5fb7c472a3101e7ce9730d82.html">340,000 cotton padded uniforms</a> and comparable or greater numbers of shoes, vests, and greatcoats. Gloves (cotton-padded mittens) and socks were needed in greater quantities again. </p>
<p>In the longer-term, skills acquired in the production of army uniforms (fitted garments with pockets, belt hooks, buttons, buttonholes and other novel features) would be applied to the mass production of civilian wear, which was constructed along similar lines.</p>
<p>The huge labour reserves available in China failed to avert a crisis in the supply of winter uniforms in the early months of the war. The Chinese clothing industry at that time was under-mechanised. Most clothes were still made at home or in the corner tailor shop. A sewing-machine industry was only just being developed. Cotton fields were only just being recultivated in wake of years of turmoil during the war against the Japanese (1937-1945) and the ensuing Civil War (1946-1949).</p>
<p>Accordingly, when the People’s Volunteer Army arrived in Korea, they were no better equipped than Australians. As summer turned to autumn, temperatures dropped precipitately. On the front, men cut up their bedding for protective clothing. In the winter, frostbite began to take its toll. Soldiers lost fingers, toes, noses and ears. In the decisive <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Chosin_Reservoir">Battle of Chosin Reservoir</a>, some 6,000 Americans and nearly 30,000 Chinese were immobilised by frostbite, 1,000 of them perished from the cold.</p>
<p>By the following spring, clothing production had been ramped up but supply lines were frequently affected by hostilities. Bombings in the Hwacheon Dam area in April 1951 took out a load of 280,000 summer-weight uniform jackets. Soldiers on the front were reduced to stripping their winter jackets of cotton wadding so that they had something serviceable to wear in the warmer weather.</p>
<p>Under these circumstances, clothing prisoners of war had low priority. What protective clothing they had at the time of capture was often taken from them. Cold was their constant companion. </p>
<p>After peace talks began in August 1951, conditions improved and the padded Mao suits of the photograph appear to have become standard issue. Thereafter, one of the main problems was living with lice, which secreted themselves in the seams. In the absence of a change of clothing, lice were almost impossible to eradicate.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539127/original/file-20230725-21-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539127/original/file-20230725-21-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539127/original/file-20230725-21-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539127/original/file-20230725-21-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539127/original/file-20230725-21-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539127/original/file-20230725-21-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=575&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539127/original/file-20230725-21-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=575&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539127/original/file-20230725-21-7rw3f8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=575&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A 1953 Chinese propaganda photograph taken at Camp 5, Pyoktong, North Korea, on the Yalu River near the Manchurian border, of four Australian POWs all captured while serving in Korea with the 3rd Battalion.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Australian War Memorial</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/m-a-s-h-50-years-on-the-anti-war-sitcom-was-a-product-of-its-time-yet-its-themes-are-timeless-190422">M*A*S*H, 50 years on: the anti-war sitcom was a product of its time, yet its themes are timeless</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>Unpicking and refluffing</h2>
<p>On both sides of the conflict, the punishing winter of 1950-51 concentrated the authorities’ attention on improving the quality of protective better clothing. The technological gap between the US and China is apparent in the outcomes. </p>
<p>Footwear was a prime concern. For the Americans and their allies under the United Nations Command, leather combat boots such as worn in World War II had at first been thought sufficient. By August 1951, the US had come up with an airtight, insulated rubber boot, popularly known as the Mickey Mouse boot on account of its large toe. It did not eliminate the problem of frostbite but with frequent changes of woollen socks sharply reduced its incidence. </p>
<p>The Chinese, too, developed something more effective, with a larger toe, providing room for extra padding. Padded cloth socks were widely used and sewing socks for soldiers became a common domestic pastime. </p>
<p>Cotton was core to keeping warm. Insulation of hats, coats, trousers and mittens was provided by inserts of cotton fluff. When newly made up, the proportion of air to cotton provides good insulation in a garment. </p>
<p>Over time, the cotton fluff becomes hard and matted, reducing its effectiveness against the cold. The clothes would need to be unpicked in the summer and the cotton refluffed for service the following winter, an arduous process that in China was a discrete cottage industry.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539124/original/file-20230725-25-4euho7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539124/original/file-20230725-25-4euho7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539124/original/file-20230725-25-4euho7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539124/original/file-20230725-25-4euho7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539124/original/file-20230725-25-4euho7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539124/original/file-20230725-25-4euho7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539124/original/file-20230725-25-4euho7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539124/original/file-20230725-25-4euho7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">How to secure cotton wadding in the body of a jacket.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">From a 1958 Chinese pattern book.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Fortunately for Guthrie and the other Australian prisoners, this would be their last winter in a POW camp. The armistice was signed in the summer of 1953. An exchange of sick and injured POWs had already taken place in April. The “Big Switch,” entailing an exchange of thousands of POWs from each side, followed in September. It was early autumn. The padded winter “Mao suit” had long since been discarded in favour of its summer equivalent – the plain, blue, high-collared jacket and trousers worn all over China by ordinary working men. </p>
<p>Photographed on release, Guthrie and his companions wear their clothes casually – half-buttoned up, collars gaping over white singlets, caps worn jauntily or backwards. They would shortly change these clothes for their service uniforms. Twenty-nine of the 30 Australians who became POWs returned home, a remarkable survival rate. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539125/original/file-20230725-21-qc020l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539125/original/file-20230725-21-qc020l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539125/original/file-20230725-21-qc020l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539125/original/file-20230725-21-qc020l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539125/original/file-20230725-21-qc020l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539125/original/file-20230725-21-qc020l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=590&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539125/original/file-20230725-21-qc020l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=590&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539125/original/file-20230725-21-qc020l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=590&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Prisoners of war on their release. Left to right (back row): Pilot Officer Ron Guthrie; Flight Lieutenant Olaf Bergh; Flight Lieutenant John ‘Butch’ Hannan. Front row: Pilot Officers Vance Drummond and Bruce Thomson.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Australian War Memorial</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Travelling in the opposite direction to Guthrie was a political officer of the People’s Volunteer Army, Xie Zhiqi. At the end of the war the majority of POWs from the People’s Volunteer Army chose to go to Taiwan. Xie was one of the minority who went back to China. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539142/original/file-20230725-29-dr3f9d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539142/original/file-20230725-29-dr3f9d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539142/original/file-20230725-29-dr3f9d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=898&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539142/original/file-20230725-29-dr3f9d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=898&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539142/original/file-20230725-29-dr3f9d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=898&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539142/original/file-20230725-29-dr3f9d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1129&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539142/original/file-20230725-29-dr3f9d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1129&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539142/original/file-20230725-29-dr3f9d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1129&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption"></span>
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<p>All repatriates to China were interned on arrival and subjected to investigation. Xie was accused of having participated in reactionary activities during his time as POW. Expelled from the Chinese Youth League (a Communist Party organisation) and discharged from the People’s Liberation Army, he had to surrender his army uniform. </p>
<p>He spent the rest of his working life, including seven years of it in a labour camp, wearing the plain blue trousers and high-collared jacket that is now indelibly associated with Mao’s China. </p>
<p><em>Antonia Finnane is the author of, most recently, How to Make a Mao Suit: Clothing the People of Communist China 1949-1976 (Cambridge University Press, 2023).</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210367/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Antonia Finnane has received funding from the Australian Research Council</span></em></p>The Mao suit has a fascinating history. Vast quantities of this ‘people’s uniform’ were made for soldiers during the Korean war – which ended 70 years ago today – including Australian POWS.Antonia Finnane, Professor (honorary), The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1932432023-05-09T15:28:22Z2023-05-09T15:28:22ZHow China makes economic plans: key moments explained<p>A meeting of some of China’s most senior politicians at the end of April 2023 concluded with a <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-xl/money/markets/china-s-politburo-meeting-says-demand-growth-key-to-durable-economic-recovery/ar-AA1at3ep">fairly cautious assessment</a> of the country’s economic recovery. Things are improving, they said, but domestic demand needs to improve. </p>
<p>The meeting in Beijing, headed by President Xi Jinping, was a review of China’s first-quarter economic performance and set the tone for how the Communist Party will respond. On this occasion, the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/04/28/chinas-top-leaders-say-the-economy-doesnt-have-enough-internal-drive.html">key message</a> was the need for a return to pro-growth policies. </p>
<p>Those policies, which will have enormous impact across the world, will be worked out over the coming months and years in a political system which can appear fairly bewildering to outsiders. </p>
<p>But there is a fixed structure in place, with key moments when China makes plans for its – and in effect the world’s – economic and political future. Here is a brief guide to some of the most important recurring events in China’s decision-making calendar.</p>
<h2>Two sessions</h2>
<p>The national legislature of China (around 3,000 delegates) meets for two weeks every March at the “two sessions”. A progress report of sorts, the two sessions often indicate the planned direction of Chinese policy. </p>
<p>For instance, after the 2019 event, <a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201903/20/WS5c91f568a3104842260b1a23.html">I wrote</a> about how the two sessions revealed China’s desire to improve its level of innovation. This involved <a href="https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/understanding-chinas-next-wave-of-innovation/">major investment in research</a> and development capability, a focus on modernising traditional industries through internet platforms, and becoming a major international player in artificial intelligence. </p>
<p>In 2023, the two sessions’ headline moment was the official declaration of President Xi Jinping’s <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/14/china/china-two-sessions-takeaway-intl-hnk/index.html">third term</a> as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. It was a historic moment, but entirely expected, as the move had already been agreed at the party’s congress last October. </p>
<p>The current Chinese policy focus on investing in technology and the urgent vying for microchip independence were both hinted at during two sessions events.</p>
<h2>Study sessions of the politburo</h2>
<p>The “politburo” is the name given to the top tier of the Communist Party’s “central committee”, and meets frequently to decide on relatively short term, day-to-day affairs. Its top ranking seven members also hold monthly meetings known as “study sessions”, where they learn from experts about subjects considered to be of strategic importance. </p>
<p>Afterwards the leaders publicly outline related policy preferences and priorities. For example, after years of studying new technologies to drive industrial policies and <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262547895/pioneers-hidden-champions-changemakers-and-underdogs/">encourage investment</a>, during one 2018 study session the focus turned to developing a new generation of artificial intelligence. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="AI graphic linking brain illustration to various industries." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524585/original/file-20230505-29-epn7ao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524585/original/file-20230505-29-epn7ao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524585/original/file-20230505-29-epn7ao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524585/original/file-20230505-29-epn7ao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524585/original/file-20230505-29-epn7ao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524585/original/file-20230505-29-epn7ao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524585/original/file-20230505-29-epn7ao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">AI investment is a priority.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/ai-concept-artificial-intelligence-various-industries-683800897">metamorworks/Shuttterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This led to a marked increase in government investment and a <a href="https://medium.com/geekculture/chinese-computer-vision-startups-riding-the-auto-wave-27cc536d997d">boom for companies</a> such as Sensetime, Hikvision and Dahua.</p>
<h2>The plenums</h2>
<p>Another key feature of the Chinese political calendar are the “plenums”, which follow the Chinese Communist Party congress. Seven plenary sessions, attended by a few hundred senior party officials, are convened over the five year period between each congress and are designed to establish a unified vision for China. </p>
<p>At one of the 2020 plenums, the perceived inequity of education was addressed. Later that year, a plan was proposed which <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/exclusive-china-unveil-tough-new-rules-private-tutoring-sector-sources-2021-06-16/">essentially banned</a> the private after school tutoring sector. This had global consequences, as almost overnight a whole sector of the economy, worth an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/03/chinas-crackdown-on-tutoring-leaves-parents-with-new-problems">estimated US$150 billion</a> (£108 billion), and involving many tech companies providing software for tutoring millions of Chinese children, was wiped out. </p>
<p>Of particular interest is the third plenum, roughly two years in, which typically introduces the new leadership’s economic and political goals. Perhaps the most notable third plenum <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/reflections-on-forty-years-of-china-reforms">took place in 1993</a>, kicking off China’s successful transition into a market driven economy.</p>
<p>The third plenary session of 2018 set the stage for <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-16-8356-5_2">increased cybersecurity</a> measures, which were further strengthened in 2022, and again <a href="https://wsj.com/articles/china-locks-information-on-the-country-inside-a-black-box-9c039928">in April 2023</a>. After each plenum, certain directions (normally formulated in ambiguous terms) go to the various government ministries. But before that happens, an important commission enters the stage. </p>
<h2>The central financial and economic affairs commission</h2>
<p>This leads the design of policy directives, before they are implemented as policies. The commission, which is chaired by President Xi and meets two or three times a year, represents the highest level of discussion on economic issues. </p>
<p>In April 2022, for example, the commission called for <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-08-25/how-china-will-spend-1-trillion-on-infrastructure-to-boost-economy">stronger investment in infrastructure</a> to beef up the economy. Key projects included new energy production, new water systems and large scale transportation projects. </p>
<p>All of these will be expected to happen on Xi’s watch as he looks ahead to many more years leading China. But challenges abound. </p>
<p>A maturing economy after decades of high growth brings friction, as does the increasingly dominant and visible role that China is taking on the world stage. How Xi deals with these issues in the various decision-making gatherings his party stages will be carefully observed by politicians, business leaders and citizens across the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193243/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Greeven does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The decision-making process can be difficult to follow.Mark Greeven, Professor of Innovation and Strategy, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2041832023-04-27T20:17:48Z2023-04-27T20:17:48ZFriday essay: Stan Grant on how tyrants use the language of germ warfare – and COVID has enabled them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522488/original/file-20230424-22-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C9%2C3020%2C2269&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Uighur woman protests before a group of paramilitary police in western China's Xinjiang region.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ng Han Guan/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It is 2019. There is a virus lurking in China. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is warning that if it is not contained, it could infect the entire country. It could turn the country upside down. Tear at the social fabric. The CCP’s dream of harmony cannot withstand this. So they tell their people: this must be wiped out. Memories are too fresh in China of what happens when things spiral out of control.</p>
<p>China is a nation that barely hangs together. Throughout time, empires have risen and fallen. Bloodshed beyond imagining – on a scale almost unseen in human history – marks each turn in China’s fate. </p>
<p>The hundred years between the mid-19th century and the Communist Revolution in 1949 were brutal. The Opium Wars with Britain, the fall of the Qing, the Taiping Rebellion, the Boxer Rebellion, the civil war between nationalists and communists, the Japanese occupation – tens of millions were slaughtered.</p>
<p>The CCP knows it should fear its own. It knows what happens when people rise up. The party seeks stability, but stability can only come with force and threats. Nothing can be tolerated that strays too far from the reach of the party.</p>
<p>Now, a virus is loose. In 2019, the world is not watching. Not really. Some warn of what is happening, what is to come. But who listens? It is too far away. We are trading with China and we grow rich as China grows rich.</p>
<p>So, the Communist Party goes to work in secret. It is rounding up people infected with the virus. It is locking them away in secret facilities. Prisons. Isolating them. Choking off the virus at its source. Nothing short of elimination will do.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-who-are-the-uyghurs-and-why-is-the-chinese-government-detaining-them-111843">Explainer: who are the Uyghurs and why is the Chinese government detaining them?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>An ideological virus</h2>
<p>This virus has a name. Uighur. Many, if not most, in the West cannot spell it. Nor can they pronounce it. Uighurs. Muslims. A people in the outer western regions of this vast country. People who have been yearning to be free. Who speak their own language. Practise their culture. Pray to their god.</p>
<p>They are a virus. At least, that’s what the CCP calls them.</p>
<p>The Communist Party transmits “health warnings”. As reported by Sigal Samuel <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/%2008/china-pathologizing-uighur-muslims-mental-illness/568525/">in The Atlantic</a>, and <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/infected-08082018173807.html">translated</a> by Radio Free Asia, it aims them at Uighurs via WeChat, a popular social media platform in China:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Members of the public who have been chosen for re-education have been infected by an ideological illness. They have been infected with religious extremism and violent terrorist ideology, and therefore they must seek treatment from a hospital as an inpatient […] The religious extremist ideology is a type of poisonous medicine, which confuses the mind of the people […] If we do not eradicate religious extremism at its roots, the violent terrorist incidents will grow and spread all over like an incurable malignant tumour. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In 2018, Human Rights Watch released a report, titled <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/10/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs">Eradicating Ideological Viruses</a>. The warnings are there. Even if the world is slow to wake to them. The report says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Perhaps the most innovative – and disturbing – of the repressive measures in Xinjiang is the government’s use of high-tech mass surveillance systems. Xinjiang authorities conduct compulsory mass collection of biometric data, such as voice samples and DNA, and use artificial intelligence and big data to identify, profile and track everyone in Xinjiang. <br></p>
<p>The authorities have envisioned these systems as a series of “filters”, picking out people with certain behaviour or characteristics that they believe indicate a threat to the Communist Party’s rule in Xinjiang. These systems have also enabled authorities to implement fine-grained control, subjecting people to differentiated restrictions depending on their perceived levels of “trustworthiness”. </p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Uighur Abudwaris Ablimit points to a photo of his brother during a gathering to raise awareness about loved ones who have disappeared in China’s far west.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Christina Larson/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Note the language. Biometric data. Voice sampling. DNA. This is ideological and it is biological. People are treated as viruses that transmit illness. If not stopped, they will threaten us all, is the message.</p>
<p>Human Rights Watch says in the name of stability and security, authorities will “strike at” those deemed terrorists and extremists, to rid the country of the “problematic ideas” of Turkic Muslims. Not just Muslims, but anyone not expressing the majority ethnic Han identity. As Human Rights Watch says: “Authorities insist that such beliefs and affinities must be ‘corrected’ or ‘eradicated’.”</p>
<p>This is not new. What the CCP is doing is what other tyrannical regimes have done. They seek to create what’s been called a “harmony of souls”. They want nothing less than to produce the perfect, subdued, sublimated human. Compliant. Passive. </p>
<p>In the words of Joseph Stalin: “The production of souls is more important than the production of tanks.” Historian Timothy Snyder says the Nazi and Soviet regimes turned people into numbers. And tyrants everywhere have used the language of germ warfare. They define their enemies as diseases or infections and they seek to inoculate their own societies.</p>
<p>Authoritarian regimes seek to sterilise and “purify” society. Listen to them.</p>
<p>Stalin’s henchman <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Vyacheslav-Molotov">Vyacheslav Molotov</a> spoke of purging or assassinating people who “had to be isolated” or, he said, they “would spread all kinds of complaints, and society would have been infected”.</p>
<p>The architect of Hitler’s Holocaust, Heinrich Himmler, in sending millions to the gas chambers, <a href="https://www.museumoftolerance.com/education/teacher-resources/holocaust-resources/what-is-holocaust-denial.html">said</a> he was exterminating “a bacterium because we do not want in the end to be infected by a bacterium and die of it”. He said: “I will not see so much as a small area of sepsis appear here or gain a hold. Wherever it may form, we will cauterise it.”</p>
<p>And then there is Adolf Hitler, who compared himself to the famed German microbiologist <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/medicine/1905/koch/biographical/">Robert Koch</a> who found the bacillus of tuberculosis. Hitler said, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I discovered the Jews as the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/27387/chapter-abstract/197176732">bacillus and ferment</a> of all social decomposition. And I have proved one thing: that a state can live without Jews.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>To Hitler, Jewish people were “no longer human beings”. He described the Holocaust as a “surgical task”, “otherwise Europe will perish through the Jewish disease”.</p>
<p>It is no mistake these regimes use the language of virus, disease and contamination. Just as a virus is to be eradicated, so too people are to be removed, eliminated or exterminated. These attitudes do not belong to a time past. There are leaders today who exploit the same fears, who focus on difference and create division using the same language of disease.</p>
<p>Remember what Donald Trump <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/06/donald-trump-mexican-immigrants-tremendous-infectious-disease">said</a> of Mexican immigrants? That they are responsible for “tremendous infectious diseases pouring across the border”.</p>
<p>And in China, the Communist Party <a href="https://theconversation.com/leaked-documents-on-uighur-detention-camps-in-china-an-expert-explains-the-key-revelations-127221">has locked up</a> a million Uighur Muslims in “re-education camps”, where human rights groups say they are brainwashed with Communist Party ideology. A virus to be eradicated.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/un-report-on-chinas-abuse-of-uyghurs-is-stronger-than-expected-but-missing-a-vital-word-genocide-189917">UN report on China's abuse of Uyghurs is stronger than expected but missing a vital word: genocide</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Virus of tyranny</h2>
<p>The virus of tyranny has haunted our world. Albert Camus warned us of this in his novel <a href="https://theconversation.com/guide-to-the-classics-albert-camus-the-plague-134244">The Plague</a>: the story of a rat-borne disease that overruns an entire city. His was a bleak vision of death and fear, of a city sealed off and a people locked down, then shot when they tried to escape. </p>
<p>Written in 1947, just two years after World War II, when the West was still celebrating the victory of freedom, Camus’s plague is an allegory of authoritarianism.</p>
<p>Camus wanted to tell us of the courage that swells within us, that when the plague was at its worst, brave people fought against it. But he cautioned us, too, that the plague can return. It is “a bacillus that never dies or disappears for good”, but bides its time “slumbering in furniture and linen”. It waits patiently “in bedrooms, cellars; trunks, handkerchiefs, old papers”, until one day it will rouse again. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1056&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1056&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1056&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Engraving of a plague doctor in 17th-century Rome.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Paul Furst/Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In coronavirus, tyranny may have found the perfect host: a fearful population and all-powerful government. French philosopher Michel Foucault long ago made the link between the plagues of the 17th century and authoritarian control. </p>
<p>Behind state-imposed discipline, <a href="https://www.penguin.com.au/books/discipline-and-punish-9780241386019">he wrote</a>, “can be read the haunting memory of contagions”: not just the memory of a virus but of rebellion, crime, all forms of social disorder, where people “appear and disappear, live and die”. It is the state that brings order to the fear: “everyone locked up in his cage, everyone at his window, answering to his name and showing himself when asked”. </p>
<p>In the response to the plague, Foucault saw the forerunner of the modern prison: the panopticon; the all-seeing eye.</p>
<p>The plague-stricken village, <a href="https://www.penguin.com.au/books/discipline-and-punish-9780241386019">wrote Foucault</a>, is </p>
<blockquote>
<p>traversed throughout with hierarchy, surveillance, observation, writing; the town immobilised by the functioning of an extensive power that bears in a distinct way over all individual bodies – this is the utopia of the perfectly governed city.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The coronavirus shutdowns remind us freedom is the province of the state. The crisis has centralised government control. Around the world, governments have used physical and biological surveillance to control the pandemic. To eradicate the virus.</p>
<p>We have all become, to varying degrees, a little bit like China.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/guide-to-the-classics-albert-camus-the-plague-134244">Guide to the Classics: Albert Camus' The Plague</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>A strange illness in Wuhan</h2>
<p>Coronavirus emerges out of China in the dying months of 2019. I remember reporting on it. A strange illness is being detected in the city of Wuhan. Dozens of people are being treated for pneumonia-like symptoms. In January 2020, there is the <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/27-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19">first reported death</a>. Then quickly, deaths in Europe, the United States, South Korea, Japan, Thailand.</p>
<p>We are still so blasé. It feels so far away. We have seen this before, haven’t we? SARS, swine flu, Ebola. They come and they go. Life goes on. We go to the beach. We get on planes. We have parties. And if we have a cough or feel a bit under the weather, we most likely still go to work.</p>
<p>We don’t realise what is happening. I am <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/qanda/2020-24-02/11983216">on ABC’s Q+A program</a> in February 2020. Footage is shown of lockdown in Wuhan. People are barricaded in their apartments while police forcibly remove and restrain. The audience is appalled.</p>
<p>It couldn’t happen here, could it? An epidemiologist on the panel says, actually, yes. We have laws to allow for just these extreme emergency measures. Surely though, we agree, it isn’t likely.</p>
<p>On the same program is China’s deputy ambassador to Australia, Wang Xining. Minister Wang, as he is known, is an old acquaintance. A sparring partner. When I was based in China for CNN, he was my minder. He was appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to watch everything that I did.</p>
<p>In China I was arrested and detained, taken to Chinese police cells for doing stories the authorities did not approve of. I was, on several occasions, physically attacked and beaten. My family was under constant surveillance. Now the man responsible was sitting next to me in an ABC studio.</p>
<p>In the audience, a Uighur man asks a question. He was separated from his wife and child. He had come to Australia ahead of them, hoping to settle and secure visas so they could follow. He didn’t know where they were. He had family in the Chinese “re-education” camps. He was clearly worried.</p>
<p>Minster Wang defends the China COVID lockdown. And he defends the lockdown – soon to be called the genocide – of the Uighurs.</p>
<p>In this moment were twinned the two crises – the two “viruses” – threatening our world. COVID-19 threatened our health. Soon, we would indeed follow China’s lead and introduce lockdowns. And the virus of tyranny was spreading.</p>
<p>In 2020, as COVID crossed borders, so, too, did tyranny. Liberal democracy was in retreat. Freedom House, which measures the health of democracy, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">now counted</a> 15 straight years of democratic decline. From the post–Cold War boom, freedom was now being crushed.</p>
<p>Within democracies, too, people were falling under the sway of autocrats and demagogues. This had been a slow burn. Growing inequality, war-fuelled refugee crises and a blowback against globalisation had eroded trust. The poor and left-behind felt abandoned.</p>
<p>The devil dances in empty pockets. From the early 2000s, anti-immigration attitudes grew. Racial division became even more stark. Far-right parties made a comeback in Europe as barbed wire went back up on borders. People wanted their countries back and they were primed for populists. Türkiye’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-20-year-rule-of-recep-tayyip-erdogan-has-transformed-turkey-188211">Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</a>, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, India’s
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-pressure-builds-on-indias-narendra-modi-is-his-government-trying-to-silence-its-critics-159799">Narendra Modi</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-philippines-is-set-for-a-fiery-election-even-without-any-dutertes-at-least-for-now-169535">Rodrigo Duterte</a> in the Philippines, Brazil’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-now-for-brazil-president-lula-strengthened-but-bolsonaro-supporters-wont-go-quietly-197530">Jair Bolsonaro</a> – all would come to power. Each spouted easy solutions to complex problems. Each divided to conquer.</p>
<p>Into the picture came a political circus act. A Manhattan real estate billionaire and reality television star. Donald Trump styled himself as the anti-politician. He promised to “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-drain-the-swamp/2020/10/24/52c7682c-0a5a-11eb-9be6-cf25fb429f1a_story.html">drain the swamp</a>” and “make America great again”. Eight years of the first Black president of the United States, Barack Obama, ended in 2016 <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-trumps-victory-will-mean-the-end-of-us-soft-power-68654">with the election</a> of a man who exploited racism.</p>
<p>To populists, COVID-19 initially was a boon. They seized on it to strengthen their grip on their countries. This was the state of the world in 2020, when the virus took hold. This was a perfect storm. A virus that robbed us of our freedom just as democracy was imploding and freedom was in retreat. And China was proudly boasting that its authoritarianism was ascendant.</p>
<p>If the 20th century was a triumph of democracy, the 21st century, to China’s Xi Jinping, would crown the China dream.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kafkaesque-true-stories-of-ordinary-people-inside-the-first-days-of-covid-19-in-wuhan-china-180039">'Kafkaesque' true stories of ordinary people: inside the first days of COVID-19 in Wuhan, China</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Plagues, political repression and violence</h2>
<p>Plagues have historically been a harbinger of political repression and violence. The Spanish flu after World War I <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/06/1918-flu-pandemic-boosted-support-for-the-nazis-fed-study-claims.html">contributed to</a> the rise of the extreme right in Germany. The Black Death in the 14th century <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-black-death">unleashed violence</a> against Jews.</p>
<p>Sydney University Professor of Jurisprudence Wojciech Sadurski, in his book <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/pandemic-of-populists/E75407A3309F868636BBA65F9F1ED783">A Pandemic of Populists</a>, says COVID has been a “powerful accelerator of many of the pre-existing trends, both negative and positive, in business, culture and politics”. </p>
<p>Populist leaders declared states of emergency and, as Sadurski writes, pushed them “well beyond the limits of the necessary”. Viktor Orbán <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-europe/how-viktor-orban-used-the-coronavirus-to-seize-more-power">set aside parliament</a>. He was a one-man government. People critical of him could be arrested. In <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-19_misinformation_in_the_Philippines">the Philippines</a>, as <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/17/fake-news-real-arrests/">in India</a>, police were given powers to detain anyone “spreading misinformation” or inciting mistrust.</p>
<p>Sadurski points out that, in most cases, these authoritarian leaders used militaristic language. Fighting COVID was a war. The people were conscripted.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán set aside parliament and became a one-man government during COVID. He’s pictured here with medical supplies flown from China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tomas Kovacs/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Xi Jinping is not a populist leader. He doesn’t seek legitimacy at the ballot box. He is an authoritarian. And he believes his system is better. To Xi, the battle against coronavirus is <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/02/13/805760466/china-declares-peoples-war-on-covid-19-including-reporting-family-and-friends">also a war</a>: a “people’s war”.</p>
<p>It has been a war without end. Xi cannot allow the virus to win. Long after lockdowns passed elsewhere, Xi continued to keep a stranglehold on COVID flares. It has weakened the economy. It is straining nerves. People are angry. There have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-strict-covid-zero-policy-are-sweeping-china-its-anyones-guess-what-happens-now-195442">protests</a>. Some are even calling for Xi to go.</p>
<p>But Xi has strengthened his grip. By <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/26/asia/china-xi-jinping-president-intl/index.html">altering the constitution</a> and scrapping two-term presidential limits, he is now leader for life. Under cover of fighting COVID, he has used <a href="https://melbourneasiareview.edu.au/covid-19-and-the-rise-of-the-surveillance-state-in-china/">enhanced surveillance</a> and tracking technology to peer into every part of people’s lives. The COVID crackdown <a href="https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d00829/">coincided</a> with crushing democracy in Hong Kong. He has arrested dissidents. Silenced rivals. He is <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/china-ready-fight-after-3-days-large-scale/story?id=98494152#:%7E:text=TAIPEI%2C%20Taiwan%20%2D%2D%20China's,McCarthy%20in%20the%20United%20States.">threatening</a> war on Taiwan.</p>
<p>And Uighurs remain a target. Still a “virus” to be eliminated.</p>
<h2>A hinge point of history</h2>
<p>We are at a hinge point of history. Thirty years after the end of the Cold War, there is <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/03/06/sliding-toward-a-new-cold-war">talk</a> of Cold War 2.0. The United States is staring down a new rival: China. We are witnessing a return of great power rivalry. It is a supercharged great power rivalry. </p>
<p>China is <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-soviet-union-containment-polarization-foreign-policy-11639526097">more powerful</a> today than the Soviet Union was then, and the United States is unquestionably diminished. America is politically fractured, it is deeply divided along racial and class lines; it has <a href="https://theconversation.com/american-exceptionalism-the-poison-that-cannot-protect-its-children-from-violent-death-184045">an epidemic</a> of gun violence and it has been devastated by coronavirus.</p>
<p>Donald Trump thought he was bigger than COVID. He was slow to act, he was dismissive and his populism was eventually revealed as reckless. Yes, he fast-tracked vaccine research and production. But he was a master of mixed messaging and so much damage was done. At the time of writing, in the United States there have been more than <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/12/28/us-records-100-million-covid-cases-but-more-than-200-million-americans-have-probably-had-it.html#:%7E:text=The%20U.S.%20has%20officially%20recorded,even%20more%20difficult%20to%20control.">100 million cases</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/15/1-million-us-covid-deaths-effects">one million deaths</a>. The only country to reach that number. Trump lost office.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Donald Trump thought he was bigger than COVID – and lost office.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">zz/Dennis Van Tine/STAR MAX/IPx/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By contrast, Xi Jinping is entrenched in power. The country where COVID first emerged is the world’s biggest engine of economic growth. It is on track <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/dereksaul/2022/12/06/china-and-india-will-overtake-us-economically-by-2075-goldman-sachs-economists-say/?sh=3f8d5a358ea9">to usurp the United States</a> as the single biggest economy in the world. It is extending its influence and economic reach via the <a href="https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance-landscape.pdf">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, the biggest investment and infrastructure program the world has ever seen.</p>
<p>Xi is building an army to match his economic might. And he is leading the way on artificial intelligence research. The numbers tell the story. In the 20 years between 1997 and 2017, China’s global share of research papers <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/china-rises-first-place-most-cited-papers">increased</a> from just over 4 per cent to nearly 28 per cent. And what is it focusing on? Speech and image recognition. The Chinese Communist Party can track anyone, anywhere, anytime.</p>
<p>Technology was meant to liberate us. Some saw the death knell for authoritarian regimes. How can you control the internet? But China has. Cyberspace has become a tool of tyranny. China has taken the digital age and put it in service of genocide.</p>
<p>There are lessons here for journalists. Our job is not to simply report events, it is to connect them. To join the dots. To reveal the big forces at play in our world. We missed this opportunity.</p>
<p>We cannot understand the COVID pandemic and its impact without understanding the currents shaping our world. COVID emerged out of China at a time when Xi Jinping had his eyes on global supremacy. He had shown how far he would be prepared to go to “harmonise” the nation. He had trialled his lockdown measures on what he callously called the “virus” of the Uighurs. </p>
<p>Around the world, democracy was in retreat and authoritarianism on the march. And now a virus was spreading that would attack the liberal democratic West where it believed it was strongest: its freedom.</p>
<p>Media can so easily be overwhelmed by events. One of the most common failings – particularly of television – is to report what we see, not what it means. Images can drive coverage. And images of people in white suits locking down entire cities obscured what was even more important. COVID was a 21st-century virus; a virus of a globalised world, of high-speed travel and borderless trade. It was also a virus of an increasingly authoritarian world.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=917&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=917&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=917&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic was a stress test. It revealed and accelerated fault lines already there. Populists were stripped bare. Their slogans, easy answers and arrogance meant they were slow to act. Millions died who might otherwise have lived. In strong democracies where there is trust in science and authority, countries emerged stronger. Yet they, too, walked a fine line between surrendering liberty and saving lives.</p>
<p>In China, Xi Jinping believes the People’s War is <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/china-declares-victory-over-both-the-coronavirus-and-critics-of-the-communist-party-at-the-biggest-political-event-of-the-year">a victory</a> for the Communist Party. The Party – the all-seeing eye – can control everything. It sits at the heart of everything. Xi believes he is the fulfilment of prophecy. The man who follows the great leaders, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. The one who delivers on China’s greatness.</p>
<p>Xi walks a tightrope, too. He has strained the nation to breaking point. The relentless, cruel lockdowns have slowed the economy and crushed the spirit of Chinese people. And they are angry and rising. China, like the rest of the world, is also reaching a tipping point.</p>
<p>In December 2022, Xi felt the pressure from the Chinese people, following mass demonstrations and unrest, and lifted the lockdowns abruptly. COVID quickly ran rampant. However, though the COVID lockdowns have ended, the Uighurs continue to suffer.</p>
<p>The virus of tyranny sleeps within democracy, too. It has always been in our bloodstream. China has edged us, the democracies, closer to what political scientist Vladimir Tismaneanu <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520282209/the-devil-in-history">has called</a> “the age of total administration and inescapable alienation”.</p>
<p>The COVID pandemic has passed, at least as a political crisis. Our minds are turned now to <a href="https://theconversation.com/essentialising-russia-wont-end-the-war-against-ukraine-might-real-and-credible-force-be-the-answer-195938">war in Ukraine</a> and economic strife. But journalists must remember that, as in contagions past, COVID will shape us. It leaves behind the trace of tyranny. And that is the true virus. The virus that will not die.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This is an edited extract from <a href="https://publishing.monash.edu/product/pandemedia/">Panemedia: How Covid Changed Journalism</a> (Monash University Press).</em></p>
<p><em>This essay was originally written in November 2022.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204183/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stan Grant does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China’s Xi Xinping had trialled his COVID lockdown measures on what he callously called the ‘virus’ of the Uighurs, writes Stan Grant. COVID lockdowns are now over, but the trace of tyranny remains.Stan Grant, Vice Chancellors Chair Australian/Indigenous Belonging, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1999892023-03-21T02:59:12Z2023-03-21T02:59:12ZTaoist rituals via video call and Tarot readings over WeChat: China’s spiritual market is going digital<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514623/original/file-20230310-22-c4fw8d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4808%2C3205&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Alexander Schimmeck/Unsplash</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since its inception in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has officially promoted <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/religion-china">an atheist and materialist ideology</a>. But belief systems in China are making a comeback – and this comeback is largely happening online.</p>
<p>From traditional Taoist rituals conducted via video call to Western-influenced practices like online tarot reading, the digital spiritual market is growing and new online cultures are emerging.</p>
<p>China has a diverse spiritual landscape with five <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/religion-china">officially recognised religions</a> including Taoism, Buddhism and Islam, as well as various folk belief systems. </p>
<p>Spiritual practices have evolved with political, social and cultural changes throughout China’s history. The origins of Chinese spirituality can be found in a variety of sources like <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315129662-5/ancestor-worship-two-facets-chinese-case-maurice-freedman">ancestor worship</a>, <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9780824873981-004/html?lang=de">Heavenly worship</a>, and <a href="https://culturalatlas.sbs.com.au/chinese-culture/chinese-culture-religion">traditional philosophies</a>, shaped by <a href="https://academic.oup.com/chinesejil/article/4/2/441/490029?login=true">the nation’s multi-ethnic nature</a> and <a href="https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202208/16/WS62fadc4aa310fd2b29e7253f.html">cultural integration</a>.</p>
<p>Now, China’s spiritual landscape is undergoing a transformation in the digital age. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/finding-your-essential-self-the-ancient-philosophy-of-zhuangzi-explained-196215">Finding your essential self: the ancient philosophy of Zhuangzi explained</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Diversity and evolution</h2>
<p>Identifying this increasing spiritual trend through official government data is challenging. </p>
<p>Many Chinese people practice spirituality without officially identifying with a religion or belief system. This is because most Chinese have learned <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0048721X.2011.624691">practical ways of religion</a>, without necessarily being taught these as part of a specific set of beliefs. </p>
<p>One common practice is <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wqgqz">burning incense money</a>, believed to provide financial assistance to spirits in the afterlife.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514624/original/file-20230310-14-6erjx1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Burning money" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514624/original/file-20230310-14-6erjx1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514624/original/file-20230310-14-6erjx1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514624/original/file-20230310-14-6erjx1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514624/original/file-20230310-14-6erjx1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514624/original/file-20230310-14-6erjx1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514624/original/file-20230310-14-6erjx1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514624/original/file-20230310-14-6erjx1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Burning incense money is believed to provide financial assistance to spirits in the afterlife.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The growing popularity of online fortune-telling applications such as <a href="https://pitchbook.com/profiles/company/416699-38">Cece</a>, and spiritual influencers on social media, such as the astrologist <a href="https://walkthechat.com/case-study-uncle-tongdao-3-years-5-million-wechat-followers-300m-rmb-valuation/">Uncle Tongtao</a> with millions of followers, provide a glimpse into the diverse and vibrant spiritual landscape in modern China.</p>
<p>Online spiritual practice <a href="https://chinamktginsights.com/what-do-chinese-young-people-love-nowadays-fortune-telling/">is associated</a> with youth culture, and the shift towards digital spaces is largely due to the <a href="https://www.cnnic.com.cn/IDR/ReportDownloads/202204/P020220424336135612575.pdf">growth of social media in China</a>. </p>
<p>Before social media, online religions were limited to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10714421.2018.1535729?casa_token=fy4gabou7o8AAAAA%3Avxk0tjx-lzpUJPzCmvVEIHMHZvXMV2fPPTiXmzYh95uJtjcktQ4uL3EgPVs_TGf88_6wWEa70On2hA">static websites with little interaction</a>. Now, social media platforms allow users to connect and engage with others who share similar spiritual interests and beliefs. </p>
<p>This has also enabled practitioners to reach a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jcmc/article/12/3/956/4583017">wider audience</a>. </p>
<h2>New practices</h2>
<p>Currently, China’s online spirituality market comprises both old and new, indigenous and foreign practices. </p>
<p>Online spiritual services like <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/taoism/practices/talismans.shtml">Taoist talismans</a> and virtual rituals are making more money than traditional temple practices.</p>
<p>As part of my PhD research, Taoist Luosong* told me how 300 rituals were performed for people in the temple during Zhongyuan Jie (Hungry Ghost Festival). During the same time frame, they received more than 2,700 orders on WeChat.</p>
<p>In the past, Taoists would perform lengthy rituals in temple that required worshippers to kneel and bow. </p>
<p>Today, Taoists can offer their services more conveniently by sharing recordings or performing rituals via video call.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1012017/love-is-in-the-cards-young-chinese-turn-to-tarot-for-guidance?source=channel_home">Tarot divination</a> is popular among young people. Yanzi*, a Buddhist and tarot reader, provides advice and guidance online for people’s emotions, career and education. </p>
<p>Yanzi explained her service process to me. Texting on WeChat, Yanzi asks her clients what questions they would like to ask. She then texts back a picture of the <a href="https://www.womenshealthmag.com/life/a41319340/beginner-tarot-spreads/">tarot spread</a> with an interpretation and report.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514626/original/file-20230310-20-9hwpw0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Three tarot cards." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514626/original/file-20230310-20-9hwpw0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514626/original/file-20230310-20-9hwpw0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514626/original/file-20230310-20-9hwpw0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514626/original/file-20230310-20-9hwpw0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514626/original/file-20230310-20-9hwpw0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514626/original/file-20230310-20-9hwpw0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514626/original/file-20230310-20-9hwpw0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tarot readings can now be shared online.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The online divination market in China has created new and unique businesses such as “fortune-telling outsourcing”. Some social media fortunetellers secretly outsource divination work to religious personnel in traditional institutions such as Taoist temples via agents. </p>
<p>Luosong introduced this business to me and showed me his chat with an agent who forwarded birth time and other information of the seeker to him for a financial fortune reading.</p>
<h2>Regulation and self-censorship</h2>
<p>Despite the rising popularity of spirituality in China, practitioners of both officially recognised and folk belief systems face <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_voa-news-china_china-stepping-its-control-over-religion/6197335.html">strict censorship and moderation</a>. </p>
<p>The Chinese government tightly controls online content related to religion and spirituality. Websites and applications that display such content must clearly label it as “entertainment only”. </p>
<p>Online platforms have to actively <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-10-31/wechat-data-cybersecurity-threat-china/10418874">monitor and remove</a> any material deemed to be in violation of government laws and regulations. </p>
<p>As a result, some spiritual practitioners <a href="https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/chinese-take-creative-approach-internet-censorship">self-censor</a> their discussions around sensitive topics to avoid being flagged. </p>
<p>This could mean replacing sensitive keywords in text content and using heavy filters in video content. They also avoid posting on specific days such as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-consumerday-explainer-idUSKBN2B403G">March 15</a>, a day for cracking down on fraudulent practices. Such measures are taken to prevent their services or products being labelled as fraudulent or in violation of the law.</p>
<p>While there is a tension between the diversified spiritual practices and mainstream ideology in China, the flourishing spiritual market continues to highlight the ongoing evolution of China’s spiritual landscape in the digital era.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/theres-a-religious-revival-going-on-in-china-under-the-constant-watch-of-the-communist-party-164211">There's a religious revival going on in China -- under the constant watch of the Communist Party</a>
</strong>
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<p><em>*Names have been changed.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199989/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Haoyang Zhai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Digital media is facilitating spiritual practices in China, leading to the emergence of new online cultures and businesses.Haoyang Zhai, PhD Candidate, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1963002022-12-13T18:02:58Z2022-12-13T18:02:58ZChina and Russia’s uneven relationship can be explained with one word<p>Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China’s reaction in response to the Russian aggression has been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-escalates-ukraine-war-china-stands-awkwardly-by-him-2022-09-22/">fiercely debated</a> in the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/24/china-refuses-to-call-attack-on-ukraine-an-invasion-blames-us.html">western media</a>. The majority of the discussions have focused on one particular term: “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-09-15/putin-discovers-the-limits-of-xi-s-limitless-friendship-in-samarkand">no-limits friendship</a>” – a phrase believed to have been taken from a Sino-Russian <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770">joint statement</a> issued a few months before the war. </p>
<p>But there is one problem with this phrase. While the Russian version of the statement indeed used the word “friendship”, the Chinese version used “friendliness”. Is this just an issue of translation, or did China deliberately avoid using the word “friendship”?</p>
<p>As a researcher who investigates problems of translations in international relations, I traced the usage of the word “friendship” in Chinese and Russian documents when describing their relationship. I discovered that the disconnect between the two nations’ view of the nature of their relationship first appeared in a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Soviet_Treaty_of_Friendship_and_Alliance">treaty</a> signed between the pre-communist government of China and the Soviet Union in 1945. </p>
<p>The treaty was named differently in its Chinese and Russian version. In the Russian edition, the treaty is “the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance”, whereas in the Chinese version, it is “the Treaty of Friendliness and Alliance”. </p>
<p>Such an asymmetrical way of labelling their partnership persisted in two more treaties signed after the founding of the current People’s Republic of China in 1949. The first is (in Russian) the “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Soviet_Treaty_of_Friendship,_Alliance_and_Mutual_Assistance#:%7E:text=The%20signing%20of%20the%20Sino,China%20and%20the%20Soviet%20Union.">Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance</a>”, signed in 1950, and the other is the “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001_Sino-Russian_Treaty_of_Friendship#:%7E:text=The%20Treaty%20of%20Good%2DNeighborliness,%2C%20on%20July%2016%2C%202001.">Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation</a>”, signed in 2001. In both cases, the Chinese editions replaced the word “friendship” with “friendliness”, indicating that, despite the fall of USSR, the nature of Sino-Russian relations remained the same. </p>
<p>What is more, the <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/oz_678770/1206_679110/1207_679122/201906/t20190606_9337173.shtml">2019 Chinese statement</a> regarding the development of the Sino-Russian comprehensive strategic partnership used the word “friendliness” repeatedly to describe the bilateral relationship between the two states. The word “friendship”, on the other hand, appeared only once when it was used specifically to refer to the “friendship” between Chinese and Russian people. This proves that it was not a translation mistake but rather a Chinese intention to differentiate “friendliness” from “friendship”.</p>
<h2>Uneven relationship</h2>
<p>Why is China so reluctant to use the “friendship” label? What does a Russian “friendship” mean to China? My research has indicated that Chinese resistance to the Russian “friendship” could be related to their experience with one particular organisation that had demonstrated through its conduct what a Soviet – and therefore by extension, Russian – “friendship” entailed for China. This organisation was the Soviet friendship fociety.</p>
<p>Formally <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2746051">established in 1927</a>, the Soviet friendship societies were a network of communist organisations which sought to mobilise people outside of the socialist bloc who were sympathetic to Soviet ideology. With the rise of fascism in the 1930s and the consequent Soviet alignment with the United States, the societies were rebranded as facilitators of global cultural exchange and sought to influence a non-communist audience. The Sino-Soviet friendship societies grew out of these cultural exchanges. </p>
<p>In 1945, the Society for Chinese-Soviet Friendship was <a href="https://books.google.com.hk/books?id=DS_BAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=sino-soviet+alliance&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=sino-soviet%20alliance&f=false">founded in Dalian</a>, a city in northern China which was under Soviet control at the time. It immediately became popular among the locals. By 1949, there were more than 50 friendship societies across China.</p>
<p>But Chinese enthusiasm for these societies didn’t last long, as people came to realise what they represented. Chinese communists who had just led the country out of a devastating civil war wanted the Sino-Soviet relationship to be “mutually beneficial”. Through these friendship societies, they had <a href="https://books.google.com.hk/books?id=JBCOecRg5nEC&printsec=frontcover&dq=decisive+encounters&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=decisive%20encounters&f=false">hoped</a> that the Soviets could teach China some know-how of socialist statecraft. </p>
<p>As Liu Shaoqi, then vice-president of the Chinese Communist Party, <a href="https://books.google.com.hk/books/about/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E4%B8%8E%E8%8B%8F%E8%81%94%E5%85%B3%E7%B3%BB%E6%96%87%E7%8C%AE%E6%B1%87%E7%BC%96_1949.html?id=gf3JYgEACAAJ&redir_esc=y">said</a> in 1949, “The Soviet Union is China’s teacher. Chinese people should be pupils of the Soviet people.” </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A stamp showing Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong shaking hands, Chinese characters and the date 1950" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500692/original/file-20221213-14408-576dx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500692/original/file-20221213-14408-576dx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500692/original/file-20221213-14408-576dx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500692/original/file-20221213-14408-576dx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500692/original/file-20221213-14408-576dx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500692/original/file-20221213-14408-576dx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500692/original/file-20221213-14408-576dx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Striking up a ‘friendship’: Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong depicted on a Soviet stamp in 1950.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">withGod via Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But Chinese officials were soon made aware of their own naiveté, as it became clear that the main purpose of these friendship societies was to propagate Soviet superiority and emphasise how grateful China should be for Soviet aid. The Shenyang society, for instance, <a href="https://books.google.com.hk/books?id=DS_BAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=sino-soviet+alliance&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=sino-soviet%20alliance&f=false">often sponsored</a> lectures with topics such as “How great is the Soviet Union?” and “Why does the Soviet Union help the Chinese people?”</p>
<p>By the end of the 1950s, it had become evident that instead of being “mutually beneficial”, there was a mutual misunderstanding of what the relationship between China and the Soviet Union was supposed to be. The Chinese believed that their hard-won communist victory should have earned the respect from and an equal footing with the Soviet Union. But for the Soviets, the newly-founded People’s Republic was just another satellite state within the vast Soviet system. </p>
<p>National borders and sovereignty did not matter in this socialist bloc. As far as the Soviets were concerned, the source of authority of this system had been – and would always come from – Moscow.</p>
<p>This suggests the Chinese reluctance to call the Sino-Russian partnership a “friendship” may be rooted in its previous interactions with the Soviet friendship societies. By deliberately not translating the word as “friendship”, China was showing its minimum resistance against a label that could make them once against susceptible to the Russian imperialist ambition.</p>
<p>In light of this, and given how much the Chinese statements about the war in Ukraine have stressed the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-chinas-lukewarm-support-for-russia-is-likely-to-benefit-kyiv-heres-why-191790">importance of national sovereignty</a>, it is clear that Chinese sympathy towards the Ukrainians comes from a slightly different place than that of the west. It comes not from a sense of morality or responsibility, but from the position of a fellow country who had to fight for equality and its own national identity within what was obviously an unequal relationship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196300/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ariel Shangguan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Different translations show the nuances in the relationship between China and Russia over nearly a century.Ariel Shangguan, Assistant Professor, Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1956752022-12-01T14:06:51Z2022-12-01T14:06:51ZJiang Zemin propelled China’s economic rise in the world, leaving his successors to deal with the massive inequality that followed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498354/original/file-20221130-22-odddv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C551%2C2809%2C1485&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jiang Zemin oversaw the economic transformation of China.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinese-pres-jiang-zemin-at-state-visit-arrival-ceremony-on-news-photo/50410308?phrase=jiang%20zemin&adppopup=true">Diana Walker/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>By the summer of 1989, a series of problems were threatening China’s stability. <a href="https://www.marketplace.org/2019/06/05/economics-helped-spur-tiananmen-square-protests/">Soaring inflation</a> was undermining the economy at home while the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48445934">violent suppression of Tiananmen Square demonstrations</a> had left it largely a pariah state abroad. Yet within a few years the nation rebounded – beginning two decades of high economic growth, <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm">membership in the largest trading club in the world</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tiananmen-timeline-landmarks/timeline-chinas-post-tiananmen-re-emergence-onto-the-world-idUSKCN1SX0IE">international acceptance on the global stage</a>.</p>
<p>That transition came thanks in no small part to an underestimated, Soviet-trained electrical engineer – former Chinese President Jiang Zemin, who <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/30/china/jiang-zemin-china-president-obit-intl-hnk/index.html">died on Nov. 30, 2022, at the age of 96</a>.</p>
<p>I <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty/edward-cunningham">first traveled to and studied</a> in China in 1992. At that time, the still powerful former leader Deng Xiaoping was publicly criticizing Jiang’s more conservative approach to the economy in a <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2645086">series of visits and talks he gave</a> during what became known as Deng’s “Southern Tour.” Eventually Jiang fell in line and supported Deng’s liberalization measures and the idea of economic transformation. Yet while Jiang’s subsequent policies laid a strong foundation for China’s growth, they also likely sowed the seeds of excess that set the stage for current President Xi Jinping’s rise.</p>
<h2>The grand experiment</h2>
<p>Jiang <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/30/world/asia/jiang-zemin-dead.html">was picked to lead the country</a> as general secretary in June 1989, after the ouster of former leader Zhao Ziyang for Zhao’s conciliatory approach towards the Tiananmen Square protesters.</p>
<p>Within three years Jiang embarked on a grand experiment together with Deng and then-Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, which required Jiang to do what others had been unable or unwilling to do: force the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/zhu-rongjis-promise/">restructuring of inefficient state-owned enterprises</a> in a wide range of sectors. This resulted in the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a9796c68-e108-11e5-9217-6ae3733a2cd1">laying off of millions of workers</a> who had expected such jobs to be lifelong “iron rice bowls.”</p>
<p>From 1998 to 2002, approximately <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/iduskbn2o106c">34 million people were fired</a> as China privatized hundreds of state-owned enterprises and shuttered thousands more.</p>
<p>This concerted effort proved an important and necessary step toward <a href="https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/China_and_the_WTO_The_Politics_Behind_the_Agre.htm">preparing Chinese companies for more direct market competition</a> and integration with the world economy by the turn of the century.</p>
<h2>Ascending on the world stage</h2>
<p>Jiang’s real influence began upon <a href="http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9702/19/deng.obit/">Deng’s death</a> in February 1997.</p>
<p>In July of that year, he presided over the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/hong-kong-handover-25-anniversary-photos/">handover of Hong Kong</a> to the mainland. He then proved an able leader during the macroeconomic storm of the Asian financial crisis that began that same month. China quickly recovered and by 2001 had both <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/issues-in-chinas-wto-accession/">acceded to the World Trade Organization</a> and won the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/14/sports/olympics-beijing-wins-bid-for-2008-olympic-games.html">bid to host the 2008 Summer Olympic Games</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two men in suits shake hands" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498484/original/file-20221201-6668-q3l6s5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498484/original/file-20221201-6668-q3l6s5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498484/original/file-20221201-6668-q3l6s5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498484/original/file-20221201-6668-q3l6s5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498484/original/file-20221201-6668-q3l6s5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498484/original/file-20221201-6668-q3l6s5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498484/original/file-20221201-6668-q3l6s5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Under Jiang, China was embraced by the international community.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinese-president-jiang-zemin-greets-us-president-bill-news-photo/1245223707?phrase=jiang%20zemin%20WTO&adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By 2002 China’s economy had <a href="https://www.nationalbanken.dk/en/publications/Documents/2003/12/2003_MON4_china61.pdf">grown to represent over 4% of the global economy</a>. Jiang sought to reinforce such economic dynamism through more formal means, and revised the constitution that same year to formally <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2020.101431">allow corporate elite and private business entrepreneurs</a> into the Chinese Communist Party.</p>
<h2>Growing inequality</h2>
<p>This economic liberalization was paired with <a href="https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/china-housing-reform-and-outcomes-chp.pdf">housing privatization policies</a>. Combined, they spurred the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt6wpd8c">creation of a burgeoning middle class</a> and large-scale private wealth generation.</p>
<p>What was missing, though, was adequate regulation to provide a check on the often-wild results of unbridled growth. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/jiang-zemin-made-china-richer-more-unequal-2022-11-30/">Economic inequalities grew dramatically</a> in the 1990s and on through 2005, when Jiang formally relinquished his final title as the head of the military. </p>
<p>This created large social fissures, as rampant corruption began to permeate central and local governments, crime rates rose, and even the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741004000670">military itself got into business schemes</a>. Local governments resorted to rafts of arbitrary and extra-budgetary fees levied on citizens to pay for critical public goods and services, as well as infrastructure, which had eroded over time.</p>
<h2>Return of the state</h2>
<p>Jiang’s successors needed to respond to the problems his policies created. They did so by elevating the role of the state in social and economic life, promoting what they described as a more “<a href="https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/iaps/documents/cpi/briefings/briefing-1-chinas-11th-five-year-plan.pdf">balanced development</a>” model.</p>
<p>Hu Jintao, who succeeded Jiang, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00927670903355196">focused resources and policy priorities</a> on transferring more resources to the poorer regions of China, shoring up a weak medical and social insurance system and promulgating more egalitarian measures as part of a “putting people first” program. In just five years, the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741019000377">percentage of China’s population covered by health insurance</a> more than doubled, from 43% in 2006 to 95% in 2011.</p>
<p>Hu also <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-12-15/president-xi-jinping-s-next-moves-dictate-china-s-economic-future">moderated Jiang’s growth at any cost focus</a>, pushing through policies that provided assistance to groups who had not benefited as much from China’s economic reforms, such as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741019000377">migrants, the rural poor and laid-off urban workers</a>.</p>
<p>Xi has provided a <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/10/24/559004647/what-is-the-motivation-behind-chinese-president-xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-driv">more pointed response</a> to what he likely views as the costs of Jiang’s governance. While continuing the shift toward greater centralization, he has deepened and widened the state’s role in not only the economy but other spheres of Chinese life, such as society and the military.</p>
<h2>A smooth transition?</h2>
<p>But Jiang’s legacy is more than just soaring economic growth and staggering inequality. It is also important to note that the end of his leadership marked China’s <a href="https://thechinaproject.com/2021/09/22/jiang-zemin-and-the-prcs-first-orderly-transfer-of-power/">first orderly transition of political power</a> since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. </p>
<p>That precedent was, and continues to be, important. While he initially maintained some influence for several years after formally stepping down as general secretary, Jiang’s most singular legacy may be showing the world – and the Chinese people – that smooth transitions of power were indeed possible. Whether they still are possible remains an open question.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195675/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edward Cunningham does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Jiang oversaw China’s reemergence on the global stage, and sustained growth at home. But his policies also set the scene for excess and the growth of President Xi Jinping.Edward Cunningham, Director of Ash Center China Programs, Harvard Kennedy SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1931222022-10-24T12:48:49Z2022-10-24T12:48:49ZChina: echoes of authoritarian past as Xi Jinping cements his place at the heart of a Communist Party now entirely built around him<p>It has been suggested that the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-63358627">removal of Hu Jintao</a>, Xi Jinping’s predecessor, from the closing ceremony of the 20th Communist Party congress could overshadow all other news from Beijing during the past week. Was there a health reason for this dramatic development – or was it a live purge, planned or even spontaneously decided by the Chinese president to send a clear message to everyone in the party? We may never find out. </p>
<p>But the photo capturing the moment of Hu being escorted out of the congress, looking desperately at an apparently cold and indifferent Xi, depicts well the end of what Hu (and Deng and Jiang before him) came to be associated with: collective leadership, internal democracy and consensus building. </p>
<p>During the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/23/xi-jinping-to-rule-china-for-precedent-breaking-third-term">week-long congress</a> several changes in people, guiding ideas and policy priorities have been announced, all pointing to the same direction. Xi Jinping is now in full control of the Chinese Communist Party as his decade-long effort to centralise his power over the communist regime has been completed.</p>
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<p>The composition of the 20th <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-new-elite-communist-party-leadership-2022-10-23/">Politburo Standing Committee (PSC)</a>, the seven-member strong leading organ of the party and the country, offers the most straightforward example of Xi’s domination of China’s political system. Announced on October 23, all the positions of the PSC were given to politicians with long political and personal connections to Xi and proven loyalty. </p>
<p>Li Qiang (party secretary of Shanghai) and Cai Qi (party secretary of Beijing), are tenacious supporters and implementers of the unpopular <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-63112996">zero-COVID policy</a>. Ding Xuexiang (Xi’s chief of staff) has been close to the Chinese president since serving with him in Shanghai in 2007, and Li Xi (party secretary of Guangdong) is one of the most longstanding supporters and a family friend of the president. These four new members joined the existing loyalists from the 19th PSC, Zhao Leji (head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection) and Wang Huning (Xi’s top theorist). </p>
<p>The new Politburo, the 24-member-strong pool from which the PSC is selected, also demonstrates Xi’s complete control of the party’s political elite. To achieve that, long-established rules and customs on the career progression of politicians have been only selectively applied or ignored completely, setting a precedent for future congresses. And, for the first time in decades, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/23/world/asia/women-china-party-congress.html">no women have been included</a> in the group.</p>
<h2>Doubling down on stability and control</h2>
<p>On guiding ideas and policy priorities, the congress adopted Xi’s entire agenda, which was subsequently enshrined in the party’s constitution, and elected him for an unprecedented third term as general secretary. In terms of the economy, we had the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/10/20/china-economy-what-cpc-party-congress-this-week-means-for-growth.html">reaffirmation of existing policies</a>. No relaxation of the zero-COVID policy was announced, while the decisive interference of the state – a trend that has intensified in recent years – will continue. There was no change in reference to “common prosperity”, the idea of a more equitable growth for all, and to the emphasis on the domestic market and its capabilities for innovation as well as for self-reliance. </p>
<p>The underlying vision is that of China as a more inward-looking country, with a more selective engagement with the world and a universal equation of policymaking with the “core” of the party – Xi himself. For the first time since the death of Mao, there appear to be few (if any) institutional or political checks on the leader’s power.</p>
<p>But any <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-xi-jinping-poised-for-a-third-term-with-no-plans-to-relinquish-power-any-time-soon-192560">comparison with Mao</a> is somewhat simplistic. Mao thought of himself as being above the party, which he viewed as a vehicle to implement his irrational ideas and settle scores with other leaders. He surrounded himself with sycophants who knew nothing about governing a country, not loyal technocrats as Xi has. And of course, Mao did not hesitate to throw the CCP into the abyss of radicalism when he lost its control.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-xi-jinping-poised-for-a-third-term-with-no-plans-to-relinquish-power-any-time-soon-192560">China: Xi Jinping poised for a third term with no plans to relinquish power any time soon</a>
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<p>The havoc and anarchy of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion">Cultural Revolution</a> that Mao created, became the context in which Xi grew up. It left deep personal wounds (his father Xi Zhongxun was abducted by Red Guards and elder sister Xi Heping committed suicide) and a distaste for disorder. </p>
<p>When Xi came to power in 2012, he saw laxity in party discipline and ineffective control of society as two trends that had to be tamed. A decade later, he has managed to significantly expand the party’s capacity for surveillance and repression of society, he has purged a great number of cadres who were either corrupt, potentially disloyal to him or both, and has centralised control of the communist regime.</p>
<h2>The rise of ‘XiCP’</h2>
<p>Xi’s version of centralisation is very different to Mao’s as it is taking place within the party. But it shares one key characteristic: collective leadership, internal democracy and consensus building are sacrificed in favour of discipline and loyalty to the “core” leader. In a setting with almost no checks on power, the personal charisma, judgment, strengths and failings of the leader have a much greater impact on the future direction and resilience of the regime than when rules and the constant need for consensus-building constrain the ruler. </p>
<p>In addition, history tells us that the more centralised a system is the more bitter the fight for succession is likely to be. Without a clear heir, a top leadership only united by their loyalty to Xi and reform-era succession rules and conventions gone, it will be much harder to secure a stable and orderly passing of power from Xi to the next leader. We should expect that at the first hint of Xi’s retirement or poor health, his men will draw their knives and fight for the top job. </p>
<p>Through centralisation, Xi has replaced the CCP with his own control-obsessed version, but at the cost of undermining the operating principles that have played an important role in the party’s longevity and success so far. It remains to be seen whether this new “XiCP” will be as successful in securing the prosperity of a dynamically changing society as the party we knew up until recently.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193122/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Konstantinos Tsimonis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Xi is now the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong.Konstantinos Tsimonis, Lecturer in Chinese Society, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1928472022-10-23T08:25:37Z2022-10-23T08:25:37ZXi cements his power at Chinese Communist Party congress – but he is still exposed on the economy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491155/original/file-20221023-41683-h1jvue.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wu Hao/EPA/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Xi Jinping’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-communist-party-politburo-standing-committee-unveiled-2022-10-23/">clean sweep</a> in elevating trusted allies to the commanding heights of the Chinese Communist Party is a political outcome that has implications beyond China’s borders.</p>
<p>Xi sits virtually unchallenged, for the time being, at the apex of a political organisation that oversees a country with the world’s second largest economy, a rapidly modernising military and, perhaps most importantly, global ambitions to match its growing economic and military strength.</p>
<p>In a ritual that would not have been out of place in a traditional Peking opera, the 69-year-old Xi led his new team of seven members of the ruling Standing Committee of the Politburo (SCP) onto the stage in front of the world’s media.</p>
<p>All of those who are to serve on China’s ruling body are Xi loyalists. All six have worked with him over many years.</p>
<p>Most significant is Li Qiang, the Shanghai party secretary. He will replace Premier Li Keqiang, who is being bundled into retirement.</p>
<p>The new SCP reflects the further ascendancy of a harder line Xi faction in the Chinese leadership and a setback for the party’s liberalising wing.</p>
<p>This is a seminal moment in China political history with unpredictable consequences.</p>
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<h2>Xi in charge</h2>
<p>No-one observing <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/China-s-party-congress/Transcript-President-Xi-Jinping-s-report-to-China-s-2022-party-congress">deliberations of the 20th National Party Congress</a> could be left in doubt that China under Xi will continue to assert itself forcefully in what he calls “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”.</p>
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<p>At present, momentous changes of a like not seen in a century are accelerating across the world [in] a significant shift in the international power balance presenting China with strategic opportunities.</p>
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<p>This was hardly a subtle reference to Chinese perceptions of a superpower rival beset with challenges at home and abroad against a background of a disrupted global environment. The Ukraine crisis is merely one example of a global order that is fragmenting.</p>
<p>In a “work report” delivered every five years at the most important political gathering on China’s calendar, it would be surprising if a Chinese leader did not avail himself of the opportunity to assert his country’s global ambitions.</p>
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<span class="caption">Xi Jinping has unveiled the new Politburo Standing Committee - all Xi loyalists.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kydpl Koyodo/AP/AAP</span></span>
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<p>However, Xi’s assertiveness – in contrast to his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao – is unsettling for China’s regional neighbours, including Australia, and for a US-led western alliance more generally.</p>
<p>The Chinese thrust into the western Pacific in a region long-regarded as free of big power tensions is one example.</p>
<p>China’s aggressive push into the South China Sea, sometimes referred to in propaganda as a “Chinese lake”, is another.</p>
<p>Still another is Beijing’s sabre-rattling towards Taiwan.</p>
<p>Since Xi’s tenure may last well into the 2030’s, Taiwan will remain his most pressing unresolved issue for the foreseeable future. As years pass, pressure for some sort of resolution, whether by force or otherwise, will increase.</p>
<p>Xi’s words will not have eased concerns about China’s intentions.</p>
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<p>The wheels of history are rolling on towards China’s reunification […] Complete reunification of our country must be realised, and it can, without doubt, be realised.</p>
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<h2>Economic woes still loom large</h2>
<p>In all of this, the critical question is whether Xi will become a more abrasive global figure unbound by restrictions on his tenure, and surrounded in the leadership by allies who are unlikely to challenge him?</p>
<p>Are there risks that his reach on issues like Taiwan will exceed his grasp?</p>
<p>The short answer is we don’t yet know. But Xi will likely have been further emboldened by his continued rise.</p>
<p>Xi is also a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Xi-Jinping">relentless aggregator of power</a>. Since his elevation in 2007 to the Standing Committee of the Politburo, he has moved relentlessly.</p>
<p>In the decade since he was confirmed in 2012 as the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party he has, step by step, consolidated power.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/little-red-children-and-grandpa-xi-chinas-school-textbooks-reflect-the-rise-of-xi-jinpings-personality-cult-168482">Little red children and 'Grandpa Xi': China's school textbooks reflect the rise of Xi Jinping's personality cult</a>
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<p>This all comes with the important caveat that behind the scenes in an opaque Chinese system, politicking can be brutal. Power struggles, sometimes violent, have scarred Chinese Communist Party history since its founding in Shanghai in 1921.</p>
<p>Xi would not need reminding that what the Communist Party giveth, it can also taketh away.</p>
<p>His own family’ experience is a case in point. Xi’s father Xi Zhongxun, a member of the first generation, with Mao Zedong, of Communist leaders, was purged in 1962. He was accused of being a member of a rightist clique.</p>
<p>Xi Jinping tasted the bitterness of that experience. He was shipped off to Shaanxi province, south-west of Beijing, in the early 1960s, where he spent six years in the countryside.</p>
<p>Xi senior was rehabilitated after the Cultural Revolution. Xi junior completed a degree in chemical engineering at Tsinghua University, one of China’s premier universities, before making his way up party ranks with various provincial assignments.</p>
<p>History will not be absent from Xi’s calculations, nor will he overlook the historical significance of the National Party Congress just concluded in Beijing.</p>
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<span class="caption">But will China’s ‘COVID zero’ policy come back to haunt Xi economically?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alex Pavevski/EPA/AAP</span></span>
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<p>In the annals of Communist Party history, the 2022 NPC will likely be regarded as a landmark event. The anointing of Xi as party leader, effectively for life, or at least until his age catches up with him, has echoes in the dominance of Mao Zedong, and to a lesser degree Deng Xiaoping.</p>
<p>Both were described as “paramount” leaders, even though Deng chose not to burden himself with the full panoply of titles that would have been available to him. Apart from his honorary presidency of the Chinese Bridge Association, he served in the powerful position of chairman of the Central Military Commission.</p>
<p>In Xi’s case, he is general secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, chair of the Central Military Commission, and president. This is a “full-house” of leadership positions.</p>
<p>If there is an historical reference point for the 20th NPC, it is the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-history-factbox-idUSKBN1CF35B">11th National Party Congress of 1982</a>. This event crowned Deng protégé Hu Yaobang as general secretary of the Communist Party.</p>
<p>What is different this time is that whereas Hu was an economic liberaliser committed to Deng’s mantra of “reform and opening”, Xi Jinping has shown himself to be less of a reformer and more of a consolidator. He has sought to rein in entrepreneurial impulses unleashed under his predecessors in the interests of stabilising China and fighting corruption. This has been in pursuit of his “common prosperity” policy aimed at narrowing a yawning rich-poor gap.</p>
<p>Finally, there is one important respect in which Xi is exposed. This is in his management of the economy.</p>
<p>His <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-63274391">“zero covid” policy</a> has weighed heavily with its nationwide shutdowns. This has contributed to a stuttering economy to the point where GDP growth is faltering for the first time in decades.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview">World Bank</a> has cut its forecast for 2022 GDP growth to just 2.8%, from a previous forecast of 5.5%. GDP growth in 2021 was 8.1%.</p>
<p>With a collapsing real estate sector weighing on a stretched banking system, the economy is Xi’s vulnerability. Getting the numbers from his comrades to endorse himself and his underlings in leadership roles is one thing; shifting the economy back on track is quite another.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192847/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tony Walker is a board member of The Conversation.</span></em></p>Chinese President Xi Jinping has effectively become “leader for life” at this weekend’s congress. But his strict COVID zero policy may bring economic turmoil.Tony Walker, Vice-chancellor's fellow, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1925942022-10-18T06:37:20Z2022-10-18T06:37:20ZHow will China interact with the world over the next 5 years? Xi’s new speech holds clues<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/15/what-to-know-about-chinas-20th-communist-party-congress">The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China</a>, currently underway in Beijing, is China’s <a href="https://www.neican.org/guide-1-what-is-the-national-party-congress/">most significant political event</a> in half a decade.</p>
<p>Like the pre-election leaders’ debates in Western democracies, the party congress, held once every five years, provides valuable opportunities for us to learn more about the country’s political leaders and their policies.</p>
<p>It’s unlikely any heated political debate will occur during the congress, as most <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-63210545">political arrangements</a> are made behind the scenes beforehand. However, the general secretary’s report to the party congress often sets the tone of what China’s leadership will prioritise in the coming years.</p>
<p>Over the weekend, President Xi Jinping delivered a speech to the congress. In <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/16/xi-jinping-vision-china-next-five-years-key-takeaways-from-speech">over 104 minutes</a>, Xi summarised the “great achievements” of his first decade as China’s top leader and coined the phrase “<a href="https://www.aap.com.au/aapreleases/cision20221017ae05062/">Chinese-style modernisation</a>”. He laid out his vision for China for the next five years and beyond, signalling how the country will engage with the world.</p>
<h2>Continuity is key</h2>
<p>Five years ago, Xi’s report to the previous party congress indicated China would become <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/get-ready-for-an-even-more-assertive-china/">a more assertive shaper of international orders</a>.</p>
<p>Many foreign policy narratives in this year’s report are similar or identical to those in his 2017 report. This includes key phrases such as “upholding world peace”, “promoting common development”, and “working to build <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670564.2021.1926091?journalCode=cjcc20">a community with a shared future for humankind</a>”.</p>
<p>The continuity in Xi’s narratives indicates China is unlikely to embrace rapid foreign policy changes in the foreseeable future. Keeping the existing foreign policy narratives may also be a deliberate choice. After all, Xi is widely expected to secure <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/10/14/asia-pacific/xi-third-term/">a historic third term</a> as China’s top leader, so his policies will likely stay.</p>
<p>According to Xi, China will “remain firm in pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace”. Xi also pledges “China will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion”.</p>
<p>However, Xi stresses that China won’t compromise on issues over Taiwan. Following the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/understanding-beijings-motives-regarding-taiwan-and-americas-role/">established party line on Taiwan</a>, Xi reiterated in his report that “resolving the Taiwan issue is the Chinese people’s own business, and it up to the Chinese people to decide”.</p>
<p>Xi voiced the support for “a peaceful reunification” with “the greatest sincerity and utmost effort”. But he also said China will “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/16/xi-jinping-speech-opens-china-communist-party-congress">never promise to renounce use of force</a>”.</p>
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<p>It would be naive to assume the lack of new keywords in Xi’s foreign policy narratives means China will return to being a “quiet achiever” in the international arena. On the contrary, given China’s mighty economic, military, and technological capacities, the country has already become an essential shaper of international orders, whether its diplomats act as “<a href="https://theconversation.com/behind-chinas-newly-aggressive-diplomacy-wolf-warriors-ready-to-fight-back-139028">wolf warriors</a>” or keep a low profile.</p>
<p>Though not directly confrontational, Xi’s report signals China does not adhere to the “<a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-does-rules-based-order-mean">rules-based international order</a>” advocated by the United States and its Western allies. Instead, according to Xi, China will “promote the democratisation of international relations”.</p>
<h2>Ambiguity</h2>
<p>One of the few noticeable new foreign policy phrases in Xi’s report is that China will “decide its position and policy on issues based on their own merits”.</p>
<p>China’s <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202203/t20220306_10648426.html">foreign minister</a> and <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/202202/t20220228_10646378.html">ministry spokespersons</a> have frequently used this phrase to justify the country’s position of refraining from condemning Russia for its invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Including this phrase in Xi’s report indicates China is likely to keep its <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-24/zelenskiy-says-china-s-position-on-russian-invasion-ambiguous#xj4y7vzkg">ambiguous</a> <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/chinas-strategic-calculations-russia-ukraine-war">position</a> on the war in Ukraine. It won’t follow the West in cutting ties with Russia, nor will it explicitly support Russia’s military operations.</p>
<p>Introducing this new phrase also gives China’s foreign policymakers more space to manoeuvre in complicated issues in the future.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1577388474646368261"}"></div></p>
<h2>National security an essential focus</h2>
<p>According to a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-open-20th-communist-party-congress-2022-10-15/">Reuters count</a> based on the not-yet-published full written report, which is much longer than Xi’s speech, the terms “security” and “safety” appear 89 times.</p>
<p>Compared with Xi’s report five years ago, the frequency of these two words increased by over 60%.</p>
<p>A whole chapter of Xi’s report is devoted to national security. The report calls for “<a href="https://english.news.cn/20221016/fa268ecece4246a6bd9a35aa6a3c5c27/c.html">a holistic approach to national security</a>”, which involves coordinating China’s “external and internal security”.</p>
<p>His report also indicates China will not only look after its own security, but also work on “common security”, primarily through the “<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/202205/t20220519_10689356.html">Global Security Initiative</a>” raised by Xi in April 2022. This initiative, though still <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/will-chinas-global-security-initiative-catch-on/">lacking in details</a>, stresses that any state shouldn’t pursue its own security in the expanse of other states’ security.</p>
<p>It will likely become China’s new foreign policy framework to take on the US’s <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/02/11/fact-sheet-indo-pacific-strategy-of-the-united-states/">Indo-Pacific Strategy</a>, which China <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202205/t20220523_10691136.html">believes</a> “aims to contain China and attempts to make Asia-Pacific countries ‘pawns’ of US hegemony”. </p>
<p>Xi’s report also explicitly <a href="https://www-takungpao-com.translate.goog/news/232108/2022/1016/776050.html?_x_tr_sch=http&_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp">states</a> China will protect the “legitimate rights and interests” of its “overseas citizens and legal persons”. Linking this with the report’s emphasis on securing China’s industrial chains and supply chains, it’s expected China will make more efforts to extend its protection over state-owned and private entities beyond its physical borders.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-takes-a-renewed-interest-in-the-pacific-and-chinas-role-in-it-190053">US takes a renewed interest in the Pacific – and China's role in it</a>
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<h2>Engaging via ‘development’</h2>
<p>As the country was hit hard by COVID in mid-2020, many observers <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/RAMJ-03-2021-0016/full/html">speculated</a> China would gradually cut its economic ties with the external market and seek to be <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3110184/what-chinas-dual-circulation-economic-strategy-and-why-it">economically self-reliant</a>.</p>
<p>Xi’s report, however, reiterates that China will keep its door open. Echoing Xi’s report, Zhao Chenxin, deputy director of China’s macroeconomic management agency the National Development and Reform Commission, clarified that <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-17/china-wants-to-be-part-of-global-economy-despite-domestic-focus">China isn’t seeking to become a self-sufficient economy</a>.</p>
<p>According to Xi’s report, China also intends to “create new opportunities for the world with its own development”. As China’s development-driven international engagement continues, the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/understanding-china-s-belt-road-initiative">Belt-and-Road Initiative</a> is likely to remain a significant policy platform for China’s foreign relations.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-there-so-much-furore-over-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-139461">Why is there so much furore over China's Belt and Road Initiative?</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192594/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yu Tao does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A Chinese studies expert analyses Xi Jinping’s 104-minute speech opening the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.Yu Tao, Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1897952022-09-02T02:10:19Z2022-09-02T02:10:19ZUN report on Xinjiang abuses leaves no room for plausible deniability<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482260/original/file-20220901-23-84vlza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C800%2C5000%2C2514&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mark Schiefelbein/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Chinese regime’s treatment of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim groups in the province of Xinjiang may constitute crimes against humanity, says a long-awaited report from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.</p>
<p>It describes as “credible” allegations of torture, including rape and sexual violence, discrimination, mass detention, forced labour and widespread surveillance.</p>
<p>Multiple reports over the past five years have documented human rights abuses in the far-western province. These include the arbitrary detention of at least <a href="https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/120418_Busby_Testimony.pdf">800,000 people</a>, and possibly millions.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/leaked-documents-on-uighur-detention-camps-in-china-an-expert-explains-the-key-revelations-127221">Leaked documents on Uighur detention camps in China – an expert explains the key revelations</a>
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<p>Former detainees have testifed about being forced to work in textile factories, producing goods possibly supplied to foreign companies. </p>
<p>In January 2021 the then US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, said he believed the Chinese government <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/determination-of-the-secretary-of-state-on-atrocities-in-xinjiang/index.html">was committing genocide</a> in a “systematic attempt to destroy Uyghurs”. </p>
<p>But this latest report, published just minutes before midnight on High Commissioner Michelle Bachelet’s last day in office, comes with the imprimatur of the United Nations. </p>
<p>It is no longer possible for anyone – including the many companies that continue to source products from Xinjiang – to claim plausible deniability. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-who-are-the-uyghurs-and-why-is-the-chinese-government-detaining-them-111843">Explainer: who are the Uyghurs and why is the Chinese government detaining them?</a>
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<h2>Companies implicated in slave labour</h2>
<p>Xinjiang is China’s largest region. Along with mining resources such as coal, gas, lithium, zinc and lead, it produces <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/solar-pv-global-supply-chains">about 45%</a> of the world’s polysilicon, a key component in photovoltaic solar panels.</p>
<p>It also produces the vast majority of cotton (<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/21/us-ban-on-cotton-from-forced-uyghur-labour-comes-into-force">84% is a commonly cited number</a>) for China’s textiles and garment manufacturing industry.</p>
<p>A September 2018 report from the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/concluding-observations/cerdcchnco14-17-concluding-observations-combined-fourteenth">UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination</a>, published estimates of the numbers detained in Xinjiang – between tens of thousands and a million. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417728/original/file-20210825-23-1jren5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A 2018 satellite image shows detention camps built near the Kunshan Industrial Park in China's Xinjiang region." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417728/original/file-20210825-23-1jren5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417728/original/file-20210825-23-1jren5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417728/original/file-20210825-23-1jren5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417728/original/file-20210825-23-1jren5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417728/original/file-20210825-23-1jren5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=679&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417728/original/file-20210825-23-1jren5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=679&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417728/original/file-20210825-23-1jren5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=679&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A 2018 satellite image shows detention camps built near the Kunshan Industrial Park in China’s Xinjiang region.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Planet Labs/AP,</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>The following month the Chinese government finally acknowledged the existence of what it called “<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ohchr-assessment-human-rights-concerns-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region">vocational training centres</a>”. </p>
<p>But it justified these as necessary to counter “terrorism” and “extremism”. </p>
<p>The latest UN report leaves no doubt large-scale arbitrary detention has occurred. Attempts to pass off camps as vocational or training centres are simply not credible.</p>
<p>As well the possibility of goods sourced directly from Xinjing being made with slave labour, this new UN report also notes the “labour transfer schemes” that force people from Xinjiang to work elsewhere in China.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/four-corners-forced-labour-expose-shows-why-you-might-be-wearing-slave-made-clothes-115462">Four Corners’ forced labour exposé shows why you might be wearing slave-made clothes</a>
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<p>These transfers mean goods produced in factories throughout China may be tainted with modern slavery. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale">2020 report</a> by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute identified 83 Chinese and foreign companies that allegedly benefit from the use of Uyghur workers outside Xinjiang. </p>
<p>The list featured Adidas, Amazon, Apple, BMW, Calvin Klein, Dell, Google, H&M, Hisense, Hitachi, Huawei, Lacoste, Mercedes-Benz, Microsoft, Mitsubishi, Nike, Nintendo, Sony, Victoria’s Secret, Volkswagen and Zara. </p>
<h2>So where to next?</h2>
<p>The UN report calls on the Chinese government to release those who have been arbitrarily detained, and to investigate the allegations of human rights violations. This is like asking a fox to guard the hen house.</p>
<p>What is needed is international action and pressure to force change. </p>
<p>The UN Human Rights Council, composed of representatives from 47 member states, should be spurred by this report to start a comprehensive investigation, in line with the obligations of the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide</a>.</p>
<p>This should also be a catalyst for individual nations to do more to stamp out modern slavery from supply chains, ensuring goods produced with forced labour – in China or elsewhere – cannot be imported. </p>
<p>This is also provides a clear signal for anyone doing business with China (not just Xinjiang) on the need to conduct adequate due diligence to ensure they are not benefiting indirectly from human rights abuses. </p>
<p>This includes technology companies that sell surveillance and security products to China.</p>
<p>Until there is broader access and independent verification of working conditions in Xinjiang, business should now assume that goods connected with this region are tainted with modern slavery.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189795/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Justine Nolan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Chinese government’s action in Xinjiang may constitute crimes against humanity, says a long awaited report from UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.Justine Nolan, Professor of Law and Justice and Director of the Australian Human Rights Institute, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1777932022-08-02T17:01:52Z2022-08-02T17:01:52ZHong Kong’s 1922 general strike: when the British empire struck back<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448256/original/file-20220224-19-zlktij.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1198%2C797&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">International trade hub: Hong Kong Harbour in 1922</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Following last year’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-communist-party-at-100-revolution-forever-163665">centenary of the foundation</a> of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 2022 marks the 100th anniversary of the <a href="https://libcom.org/article/1922-hong-kong-strike">first general strike</a> to shut down a British colonial territory – Hong Kong. </p>
<p>The strike began with the grievances of the British territory’s seamen, but rapidly spread to other sectors, effectively shutting Hong Kong down. It represents the first major episode of industrial unrest in the territory, to which the colonial authorities responded with emergency anti-strike legislation. The law introduced by the colonial authorities, which allowed the governer to pass “any regulations whatsoever which he may consider desirable in the public interest”, was <a href="https://qz.com/1721951/anti-mask-law-the-1922-origins-of-hong-kongs-emergency-powers/">used in 2019</a> to ban the use of face masks by protesters.</p>
<p>The CCP was founded only a few months before the strike began, but there is little evidence that the strike was led by the party. But many militants later joined the CCP and were very influential in much larger strikes in 1925 and 1926. It was the militancy of the strikes of 1920 to 1925 in China that shaped the formative years of Chinese communism rather than the party being in the vanguard of revolutionary activism.</p>
<p>The General Industrial Federation of Chinese Seamen (<em>Zhonghua Haiyuan Gongye Lianhe Zonghui</em>) had been established in March 1921 and its grievances were largely about payment. Inequity in payment between Chinese and non-Chinese seamen was stark – there was clearly an anti-imperialist dimension to the strike. The wage workers of Hong Kong were taking direct action against colonial businesses supported by the colonial government.</p>
<h2>Gathering unrest</h2>
<p>In 1921, demands for wage rises were generally ignored by shipping companies. The seamen’s union became increasingly determined. On January 12 1922 it again pressed the case for wage increases, setting a 24-hour limit for a response. The following day, 1,500 deck hands and stokers went on a 52-day strike. During the second half of January the number on strike grew to about 30,000. By early February, 167 steamers were moored and disabled causing serious losses to shipping companies.</p>
<p>Solidarity strikes had been planned from the start, with agreements to support the seamen. About 50,000 workers of all kinds were involved by the middle of February, including office workers, cooks, bakers, rickshaw pullers and even the Chinese staff of Government House. Transport services were halted. </p>
<p>By the end of the strike there was a complete paralysis of economic life in Hong Kong. It was estimated by the main English-language paper in Hong Kong, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) – whose archives are unfortunately not available online – that 120,000 workers went on strike.</p>
<p>More than 50% of the strikers were not part of the shipping industry. So this this movement represented a “general strike”, rather than just a seamen’s strike. </p>
<h2>Violent reaction</h2>
<p>Britain’s colonial administration – with support from the Westminster government – declared the strike illegal on February 1 and the government tried to repress industrial action by introducing emergency regulations. Hong Kong’s governor was given power to make “any regulations whatsoever which he may consider desirable in the public interest”. </p>
<p>According to the Government Gazette from February 28 1922, departures from Hong Kong without travel passes were forbidden. This was a critical issue. The union had moved its organisation to nearby Canton (now Guangzhou) on the Chinese mainland, where the local government gave support to strikers, including strike pay.</p>
<p>On March 3, according to a subsequent report in the SCMP of proceedings at the coroner’s court, more than 2,000 strikers decided to walk to Canton. When they tried to break through a cordon, an order to fire was given to troops. Four people were seriously injured and died at the scene.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474923/original/file-20220719-12-1u3bal.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Tearout from HK Telegraph" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474923/original/file-20220719-12-1u3bal.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474923/original/file-20220719-12-1u3bal.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474923/original/file-20220719-12-1u3bal.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474923/original/file-20220719-12-1u3bal.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474923/original/file-20220719-12-1u3bal.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474923/original/file-20220719-12-1u3bal.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474923/original/file-20220719-12-1u3bal.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">HOw the Hong Kong Telegraph reported the strike.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hong Kong Telegraph</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The SCMP maintained good coverage. Only at the end of the strike was its own printing press closed temporarily. After being unable to publish on the previous day, the March 7 edition was a single page with the headline “Peace Celebrations”.</p>
<h2>Temporary truce</h2>
<p>The chairman of the Shipowners’ Committee wrote to the Hong Kong governor on March 15 with details of the settlement. At least on paper, the strikers were victorious. Wage rises of 15% to 30% were promised. Restrictions on the seamen’s union were lifted. There were to be no reprisals and imprisoned strikers would be released.</p>
<p>There may have been some temporary material improvement, but labour was engaged through contractors who took a big “top slice” known as the “squeeze”. Formal wage rises would have been notional because workers were paid indirectly using a “labour gang” system. </p>
<p>Management rarely had any reliable record of its workers. Companies agreed a fixed sum with an intermediary who would do the hiring, pay the workers, and often found their accommodation when not at sea. </p>
<p>Similar systems persisted throughout China until 1949, because there were large numbers willing to migrate from the impoverished agrarian sector. An economic strike was turned into a major political confrontation by government repression and inept response. </p>
<p>Union militancy drove CCP development rather more than the party leading the strikers. The CCP in Hong Kong only became an organised group during the next three years.</p>
<p>The Hong Kong general strike demonstrated to the recently created CCP that union militancy could be very powerful. Connected with other outbreaks of strike action – and at a time of optimism that the Russian example would be followed in other countries – CCP leaders became increasingly confident that revolution would soon sweep though the cities of China. </p>
<p>But after urban uprisings of 1927 were crushed, a new view – Mao’s advocacy of rural insurgency – began to take root. By 1949 the CCP took control across China. Hong Kong itself returned to Chinese rule in 1997, where – 22 years later – the government of the special administrative region themselves used the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-10-04/hong-kong-bans-masks-for-protesters-explainer/11573842">1922 Colonial Emergency Laws</a> to deal with unrest and activism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177793/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Law does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Strikes in the British colony 100 years ago were to provide the first flourishing of militancy that would bloom into full-scale revolution in China.David Law, Academic Director: Global Partnerships, Keele UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1825812022-07-27T12:00:17Z2022-07-27T12:00:17ZAn antidemocratic philosophy called ‘neoreaction’ is creeping into GOP politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470364/original/file-20220622-44261-k6jyri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=529%2C324%2C6649%2C4476&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">J.D. Vance, who won Ohio's GOP Senate primary, calls neoreactionist Curtis Yarvin a friend.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/vance-a-republican-candidate-for-u-s-senate-in-ohio-speaks-news-photo/1240188584?adppopup=true">Drew Angerer/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Donald Trump’s efforts to overturn the results of the 2020 election were brazenly antidemocratic. Yet Trump and his supporters nonetheless justified their actions under the dubious pretense <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-speech-election-north-carolina-b1860537.html">of preserving American democracy</a> – as a matter of getting the vote right, of reversing voter fraud. </p>
<p>There’s a good reason they took this approach. Authoritarianism <a href="https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publication/follow-the-leader">has long been rejected across the political spectrum</a>. Democrats and Republicans routinely lob insults like “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/10/12/politics/paul-lepage-donald-trump-obama-dictator/index.html">dictator</a>” or “<a href="https://freebeacon.com/politics/olbermann-i-probably-owe-an-apology-to-george-w-bush/">fascist</a>” to describe politicians of the other party who are in power.</p>
<p>But in recent months, a strand of conservative thought whose adherents are forthright in their disdain for democracy has started to creep into GOP politics. It’s called “neoreaction,” and its leading figure, a software engineer and blogger named <a href="https://medium.com/@charles_91491/analysis-on-the-dark-enlightenment-and-of-curtis-yarvin-mencius-moldbug-160c6151366a">Curtis Yarvin</a>, <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2022/04/inside-the-new-right-where-peter-thiel-is-placing-his-biggest-bets">has ties</a> to at least two GOP U.S. Senate candidates, along with Peter Thiel, a major GOP donor. </p>
<p>In my years <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/George-Michael-8">researching the far right</a>, I see this as one of the more significant developments in right-wing politics. Someone who calls himself a monarchist isn’t being relegated to the fringes of the internet. He’s being interviewed by Fox News’ Tucker Carlson and has U.S. Senate candidates repeating his talking points.</p>
<h2>A political philosophy is born</h2>
<p>In 2007, Yarvin launched his blog, “Unqualified Reservations.” Writing under the pseudonym Mencius Moldbug, he produced a prodigious corpus of political philosophy. </p>
<p>In his writings, Yarvin cites his political influences. They include the 19th-century political philosopher <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2022.2026906">Thomas Carlyle</a>, who disdained democracy and thought it could too easily veer into mob rule; American 20th-century political theorist <a href="https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/02/james-burnhams-managerial-elite/">James Burnham</a>, who became convinced that elites would come to control the country’s politics while couching their interests in democratic rhetoric; and economist Hans-Hermann Hoppe, who, in his 2001 book “<a href="https://mises.org/library/democracy-god-failed-1">Democracy: The God That Failed</a>,” wrote of how all organizations – irrespective of size – are best managed by a single executive. </p>
<p>Yarvin is perhaps best known for his concept of “<a href="https://graymirror.substack.com/p/a-brief-explanation-of-the-cathedral?s=r">the cathedral</a>” – his term for the U.S. ruling regime. <a href="https://graymirror.substack.com/p/a-brief-explanation-of-the-cathedral?s=r">Yarvis argues that</a> virtually all opinion-makers, most notably those in academia and journalism, are essentially “reading the same book.” <a href="https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/the-cathedral-or-the-bizarre">In an essay for Tablet Magazine</a>, Yarvin wrote that what’s often characterized as the “marketplace of ideas” is actually a “monoculture” that props up an oligarchy.</p>
<p>The cathedral is self-reinforcing: Individual journalists and professors are rewarded when they follow the ruling ethos. Those who do otherwise risk being punished or at the very least face diminished career prospects.</p>
<p>Another important neoreactionary figure is <a href="https://tripleampersand.org/nick-land-accelerationism/">Nick Land</a>, whose main contribution to the philosophy is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/11/accelerationism-how-a-fringe-philosophy-predicted-the-future-we-live-in">the concept of accelerationism</a>. In essence, accelerationism is based on <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/1980/0423/042334.html">Vladimir Lenin’s notion</a> that “worse is better.” The Russian revolutionary maintained that the more chaotic conditions became, the greater the likelihood that his Bolshevik party could accomplish its goals.</p>
<p>Analogously, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-are-white-supremacists-protesting-the-deaths-of-black-people-140046">right-wing accelerationists</a> believe that they can hasten the demise of liberal democratic governments by stoking political tension.</p>
<h2>Smashing the cathedral</h2>
<p>Both Yarvin and Land believe that gradual, incremental reforms to democracy will not save Western society; instead, a “hard reset” or “reboot” is necessary. To that end, Yarvin has coined the acronym “RAGE” – Retire All Government Employees – as a crucial step toward that goal. The acronym is reminiscent of former White House chief strategist Steve Bannon’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-wh-strategist-vows-a-daily-fight-for-deconstruction-of-the-administrative-state/2017/02/23/03f6b8da-f9ea-11e6-bf01-d47f8cf9b643_story.html">vow to deconstruct the administrative state</a>.</p>
<p>Yarvin advocates for an entirely new system of government – what he calls “<a href="https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Neocameralism">neocameralism</a>.” He advocates for a centrally managed economy led by a monarch – perhaps modeled after a corporate CEO – who wouldn’t need to adhere to plodding liberal-democratic procedures. Yarvin <a href="https://quillette.com/2022/06/11/curtis-yarvin-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/">has written approvingly</a> of the late Chinese leader <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/9780815737254_ch1.pdf">Deng Xiaoping</a> for his pragmatic and market-oriented authoritarianism. </p>
<p>While not explicitly fascist, Yarvin’s worldview does, at times, appear to have a fascistic bent. As the historian Roger Griffin <a href="https://www.libraryofsocialscience.com/ideologies/resources/griffin-the-palingenetic-core/">once argued</a>, the essence of fascism was a nationwide process of death and rebirth. Yarvin’s rhetoric of “reboots” and “hard resets” evokes the imagery of national renewal.</p>
<p>Moreover, though he maintains that he is not a white nationalist, he <a href="https://www.inc.com/tess-townsend/why-it-matters-that-an-obscure-programming-conference-is-hosting-mencius-moldbug.html">has echoed</a> racist views like the belief that white people, on average, have higher IQs than Black people.</p>
<h2>Follow the money</h2>
<p>Though neoreaction has long eschewed involvement in electoral politics, it seems to be be gradually penetrating mainstream right-wing spaces. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.unqualified-reservations.org/2007/04/case-against-democracy-ten-red-pills/">Yarvin is said</a> to have helped popularize the “<a href="https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/red-pill-prince-curtis-yarvin">red pill</a>” meme in alt-right subcultures. Pulled from the 1999 film “The Matrix,” to take the red pill is to no longer live under the spell of delusion. In the context of politics, it means breaking free from the spell of liberal orthodoxy.</p>
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<p>In September 2021, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K_8aT3pQo_I">Yarvin made an appearance on</a> “Tucker Carlson Today,” during which he explained the concept of the cathedral. When Yarvin called himself a monarchist, Carlson didn’t bat an eye. </p>
<p>Then, in May 2022, Vanity Fair <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2022/04/inside-the-new-right-where-peter-thiel-is-placing-his-biggest-bets">reported on the relationship</a> among Yarvin, GOP megadonor and venture capitalist Peter Thiel and U.S. Senate candidates J.D. Vance and Blake Masters. </p>
<p>Thiel, who <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/the-libertarian-logic-of-peter-thiel/">is often described as a libertarian</a>, holds views <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/09/20/peter-thiel-book-facebook-trump-jd-vance-blake-masters-josh-hawley-513121">that can appear to be contradictory or mysterious</a>. Reporter Max Chafkin, who wrote a biography of Thiel, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/09/20/peter-thiel-book-facebook-trump-jd-vance-blake-masters-josh-hawley-513121">told Politico in September 2021</a> that the investor has an authoritarian streak – “a longing” for a “more powerful chief executive.” </p>
<p>Thiel, like Yarvin, has expressed frustration with American democracy. As far back as 2004, <a href="https://uvcygnus.com/peter-thiel-the-straussian-moment/">Thiel lamented</a> that “America’s constitutional machinery” prevents “any single ambitious person from reconstructing the old Republic.” In 2013, the Silicon Valley entrepreneur <a href="http://distributedweb.care/posts/who-owns-the-stars/">invested</a> in Yarvin’s firm, the Tlon Corp., best known for developing a decentralized personal server platform. And <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/josephbernstein/heres-how-breitbart-and-milo-smuggled-white-nationalism">according to Yarvin</a>, he and Thiel watched the returns of the 2016 U.S. presidential election together.</p>
<p>During the 2022 election cycle, Thiel <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/543242-billionaire-peter-thiel-gives-10-million-to-super-pac-backing-potential-jd/">has donated more than $10 million</a> to super PACs supporting Vance and Masters, who also serves as the president of the Thiel Foundation.</p>
<p>Vance, who won his primary in June, is perhaps best known for his memoir, “<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-chattering-classes-got-the-hillbilly-elegy-book-wrong-and-theyre-getting-the-movie-wrong-too-150937">Hillbilly Elegy</a>.” Though Vance <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/10/23/jd-vance-ohio-senate-trump-comments-516865">once denounced Trump</a>, he has since embraced the former president <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2022/04/inside-the-new-right-where-peter-thiel-is-placing-his-biggest-bets">and now calls</a> for a “De-Ba'athification program” for the civil service – a reference <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2013/3/12/iraqs-de-baathification-still-haunts-the-country">to the purging of Saddam Hussein’s loyalists</a> after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. He cites Yarvin <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2022/04/inside-the-new-right-where-peter-thiel-is-placing-his-biggest-bets">as a friend and mentor</a>.</p>
<p>Yarvin, meanwhile, has given $5,800, the maximum amount allowed for individual contributions, <a href="https://jewishinsider.com/2022/06/blake-masters-arizona-senate-livejournal/">to Blake Masters’ Senate campaign</a>. Masters, for his part, has echoed one of Yarvin’s maxims – “RAGE,” or “Retire All Government Employees” – <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2022/04/inside-the-new-right-where-peter-thiel-is-placing-his-biggest-bets">on the stump</a>.</p>
<p>To be fair, neither Masters nor Vance has called for the dismantling of U.S. democracy. Yet they espouse a brand of apocalyptic rhetoric that depicts a governing system on its last legs. “Psychopaths,” Masters earnestly explains <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1atFzbwVqSs">in one web ad</a>, “are running the country.”</p>
<p>The current order, Vance proclaimed <a href="https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2022/05/jd-vance-ohio-trump-carlson-comments-fentanyl-hillbilly-elegy/">in a podcast interview</a>, will meet its “inevitable collapse.” </p>
<p>“There’s this guy, Curtis Yarvin, who has written about some of these things,” Vance added.</p>
<h2>Democracy in crisis</h2>
<p>Why might neoreactionary ideas be gaining currency among right-wing candidates and donors? </p>
<p>Trump’s electoral success <a href="https://www.bu.edu/articles/2022/are-trump-republicans-fascists/">illustrated the acute dissatisfaction</a> the American far right has had with the establishment wing of the Republican Party. </p>
<p>But more broadly, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2022/06/06/public-trust-in-government-1958-2022/">public trust in government</a> has eroded to the point where only 2 in 10 Americans say they trust the federal government to do the right thing. <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx">A Gallup Poll</a> published on July 5, 2022, found that only 7% of Americans had “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in Congress – the legislative body’s lowest recorded rating in 43 years of polling. A Monmouth University poll released that same day reported that <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/3546548-88-percent-say-us-is-on-wrong-track-survey/">88% of Americans</a> believe the U.S. is on the wrong track. And in a July 2022 New York Times/Siena College poll, <a href="https://dnyuz.com/2022/07/13/as-faith-flags-in-u-s-government-many-voters-want-to-upend-the-system/">58% of those polled</a> said the government needs major reforms or a “complete overhaul.”</p>
<p>With confidence in government at historic lows, a window opens for other ideologies to seed the political imagination. Neoreaction <a href="https://www.axios.com/2021/06/25/americas-continued-move-toward-socialism">is but one of them</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182581/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>George Michael does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The explicitly anti-democratic movement seems to have the ear of a major GOP donor – along with at least two GOP front-runners for the US Senate.George Michael, Professor of Criminal Justice, Westfield State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1862112022-07-05T19:57:07Z2022-07-05T19:57:07ZConcerns over TikTok feeding user data to Beijing are back – and there’s good evidence to support them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472146/original/file-20220703-36817-ipi26m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C5%2C1908%2C1270&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">amrothman from Pixabay</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When English statesman <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/francis-bacon/">Sir Francis Bacon</a> famously <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientia_potentia_est">said</a> “knowledge is power”, he could hardly have foreseen the rise of ubiquitous social media some 500 years later. </p>
<p>Yet social media platforms are some of the world’s most powerful businesses – not least because they can collect massive amounts of user data, and use algorithms to turn the data into actionable knowledge. </p>
<p>Today, TikTok has some of the best <a href="https://blog.hootsuite.com/tiktok-algorithm/">algorithms</a> in the business, and a suite of <a href="https://www.reviews.org/internet-service/what-data-does-tiktok-collect/">data-collection</a> mechanisms.</p>
<p>This is how it manages to be so addictive, with some 1.2 billion <a href="https://www.businessofapps.com/data/tik-tok-statistics/">users</a> as of December 2021. This number is expected to rise to 1.8 billion by the end of the year.</p>
<p>It’s against the background of these huge numbers that the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) wrote a strongly worded <a href="https://www.billboard.com/business/tech/fcc-commissioner-apple-alphabet-ban-tiktok-1235109116/">letter</a> to the chief executives of Apple and Google last Tuesday, urging them to remove <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/foryou?is_copy_url=1&is_from_webapp=v1">TikTok</a> from their app stores on the grounds that the company – or more precisely its Chinese parent ByteDance – can’t be trusted with US users’ data.</p>
<h2>What are the concerns?</h2>
<p>In his letter, FCC commissioner Brendan Carr says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>TikTok is owned by Beijing-based ByteDance — an organisation that is beholden to the Communist Party of China and required by the Chinese law to comply with the PCR’s [(People’s Republic of China)] surveillance demands.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>TikTok’s <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy-policy-row?lang=en">privacy policy</a> says it won’t sell personal information to third parties, but reserves the right to use information internally for business development purposes. That internal use may include use by its parent company, ByteDance. </p>
<p>TikTok US has repeatedly <a href="https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/statement-on-tiktoks-content-moderation-and-data-security-practices">denied</a> breaching US data privacy regulations. It says user data are stored on US servers and not shared with ByteDance. But Carr says these measures fall short of guaranteeing the privacy of US users:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>TikTok’s statement that ‘100% of US user traffic is being routed to Oracle’ (in the US) says nothing about where that data can be accessed from.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Following robust questioning by US senators, TikTok has <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-07-04/australian-user-data-security-in-doubt-after-tiktok-admission/101206630">admitted</a> its US-stored data are in fact accessible from China, subject to unspecified security protocols at the US end. </p>
<p>Australian users also have their data stored on US servers, with backups in Singapore. But it’s not known whether these data – which could include users’ browsing habits, images, biographical information and location – are subject to the same safeguards as the US data. </p>
<h2>Leaked audio</h2>
<p>The unusually blunt language from Carr may have been occasioned by leaked audio obtained by <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/emilybakerwhite/tiktok-tapes-us-user-data-china-bytedance-access">Buzzfeed</a> from more than 80 internal TikTok meetings.</p>
<p>According to a Buzzfeed report from mid-June, China-based employees of ByteDance have repeatedly accessed non-public data about US TikTok users. The tapes overwhelmingly contradict TikTok’s earlier data privacy <a href="https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/statement-on-tiktoks-content-moderation-and-data-security-practices">assurances</a>. </p>
<p>For example, in a September 2021 meeting a senior US-based TikTok manager referred to a Beijing-based engineer as a “master admin” who “has access to everything”. That same month a US-based staffer in the Trust and Safety Department was heard saying “everything is seen in China”. </p>
<p>In short, the recordings <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/emilybakerwhite/tiktok-tapes-us-user-data-china-bytedance-access">corroborate</a> the claim that China-based employees have often accessed US data, and more recently than earlier statements asserted. </p>
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<h2>Might it all be harmless?</h2>
<p>On the one hand TikTok is in the business of entertaining users, with a goal to keep them on the platform and expose them to targeted advertising. On the other hand, TikTok can be used to spread <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220406-tiktok-is-having-a-bad-war-say-disinformation-experts">misinformation</a> and influence users to their detriment.</p>
<p>It has been shown to host <a href="https://publichealth.nyu.edu/events-news/events/featured-past-events/misinformation-goes-viral-tiktok-covid19-disinformation">COVID</a> conspiracy theories and other medical <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1477513122000961">misinformation</a>, and was <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2022/06/07/tiktok-found-to-fuel-disinformation-political-tension-in-kenya-ahead-of-elections/">reportedly</a> used with a goal to influence Kenya’s general elections coming up in August.</p>
<p>Seen in this weaponized context, the US government’s strenuous objections to TikTok come into clearer focus.</p>
<p>Moreover, past events have also raised good reason to suspect Chinese actors of mass data harvesting online.</p>
<p>In 2020, Australian media outlets <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-14/chinese-data-leak-linked-to-military-names-australians/12656668">reported</a> on a data leak from Zhenhua Data, a Chinese company with clients including the Chinese government and the People’s Liberation Army.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/keep-calm-but-dont-just-carry-on-how-to-deal-with-chinas-mass-surveillance-of-thousands-of-australians-146103">Keep calm, but don't just carry on: how to deal with China's mass surveillance of thousands of Australians</a>
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<p>The leak was said to contain data on more than 35,000 Australians – including dates of birth, addresses, marital status, photographs, political associations, relatives and social media accounts. This information was gathered from a range of sources, including TikTok.</p>
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<h2>Would banning TikTok be effective?</h2>
<p>Removing TikTok from Google’s and Apple’s app stores can only be done on a country-by-country basis. India <a href="https://www.indiatoday.in/technology/news/story/after-ban-tiktok-now-blocked-in-india-as-isps-act-on-govt-order-1695567-2020-06-30">banned</a> the platform in June 2020.</p>
<p>If the Australian government were to make the TikTok domain inaccessible from Australia, it could still be accessed through a <a href="https://www.vpnmentor.com/blog/different-types-of-vpns-and-when-to-use-them/">virtual private network</a> (VPN). A VPN service allows users to create a secure private network within a public one, thus disguising their country of origin. It’s the same tool that allows file-sharing on Pirate Bay and access to other countries’ Netflix programs.</p>
<p>But even if TikTok was banned in Australia and had access removed, or if users mass-terminated their accounts, existing data on the company’s US and Singapore-based servers would remain there. And we now know these data are accessible to TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, in Beijing. </p>
<h2>What should TikTok users do?</h2>
<p>Like any technology, TikTok itself is neither good nor bad. But the way in which it’s used creates potential for both. </p>
<p>The best defence with any potentially dangerous technology is to approach it with healthy scepticism and share as little as possible. In the case of TikTok (and other social media) this may <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/is-tiktok-safe">involve</a>: </p>
<ul>
<li>not disclosing your full name</li>
<li>not disclosing your age and birthday</li>
<li>not disclosing your physical location (including through pictures or video)</li>
<li>turning off the “suggest your account to others” setting.</li>
</ul>
<p>You can also request an account <a href="https://www.theverge.com/22933815/how-to-delete-tiktok-account-backup-data-recover">deletion</a>. But don’t expect TikTok to delete all the data associated with it. That’s TikTok’s data now, and you agreed to handing it over when you signed up. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-could-be-using-tiktok-to-spy-on-australians-but-banning-it-isnt-a-simple-fix-142157">China could be using TikTok to spy on Australians, but banning it isn’t a simple fix</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186211/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Tuffley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>TikTok has admitted its Chinese employees have access to user data collected outside China.David Tuffley, Senior Lecturer in Applied Ethics & CyberSecurity, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1768732022-02-16T20:02:25Z2022-02-16T20:02:25ZThe International Olympic Committee and China are using politics to obscure human rights abuses<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446644/original/file-20220215-24208-msgcd4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C8403%2C5597&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Actors cheer as President of the China, Xi Jinping, arrives for the opening ceremony of the 2022 Winter Olympics on Feb. 4 in Beijing. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/David J. Phillip)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>China is using yet another Olympic Games as a political tool to reinforce its position as a global power and <a href="https://theconversation.com/2022-winter-olympics-will-help-beijing-sportwash-its-human-rights-record-154911">sportwash</a> its dismal human rights record. </p>
<p>This was first seen in 2008, when China and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) made <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/01/31/china-olympic-promises-are-not-being-kept">opaque promises</a> about the Olympic Games improving human rights in the authoritarian regime. But since then, the situation has worsened and continues to deteriorate. </p>
<p>The IOC continues to claim it is an <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-olympic-movement-claims-political-neutrality-in-reality-that-ideal-is-often-selectively-applied-164558">apolitical organization</a>, while <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-sanctioning-a-refugee-team-to-letting-china-host-does-the-international-olympic-committee-support-human-rights-172467">allowing China to host</a> and use the Olympics as a distraction from its <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/8591242/beijing-olympics-china-human-rights/">industrial scale human rights abuses</a>. Few nations know how to politicize the Olympics quite like China.</p>
<h2>A new sort of Cold War</h2>
<p>In the United States, critiques of China have started to feel more like <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2022/jan/13/beijing-winter-olympics-human-rights-politics">hypocritical warmongering</a>, leveraged for domestic political pandering, rather than a sincere desire to improve human rights in China, or the United States for that matter. </p>
<p>What is needed, as sportswriter Dave Zirin and political scientist Jules Boykoff aptly observed in <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/society/beijing-olympics-china/">The Nation</a>, is: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“a mass independent current that can stand with the oppressed in the United States and in China, and that refuses to paper over structural inequalities on either side in order to win political points.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Those familiar with Teng Biao (one of the authors of this piece) know that he has experienced both the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/12/world/asia/12china.html">politics and physical brutality</a> of the Chinese state first hand. </p>
<p>As a vocal human rights lawyer, Teng resisted the authoritarian regime’s crackdowns on the freedoms of speech and expression, resulting in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/08/china.olympicgames2008">three forced disappearances</a> and a physical beating by authorities prior to the 2008 Olympic Games. He knows the stakes, and the costs, of standing up for human rights in China.</p>
<h2>Boycott, boycott, boycott</h2>
<p>For much of its existence, Communist China has <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674028401">boycotted the Olympic Games</a>. After the Chinese Civil War, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) made its debut at the 1952 Helsinki Olympics, leading the Republic of China (ROC) to withdraw in protest, furious that the Communist mainland was permitted to enter under the name of “China.” </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-taiwan-competing-in-the-olympics-under-chinese-taipei-175895">Why is Taiwan competing in the Olympics under 'Chinese Taipei'?</a>
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</p>
<hr>
<p>This <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2759241">two-China debate</a> was a recurring theme at the Olympics until the 1980s. At the 1956 Melbourne Olympics, the the ROC competed while the PRC stayed home. And in 1958, the PRC formally withdrew from the Olympic Movement, rejoining in 1979. They only participated in the 1980 Winter Olympics however, joining the U.S.-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics.</p>
<p>The PRC’s politicization of the Games worked. The IOC has made the ROC — now more commonly known as Taiwan — compete as Chinese Taipei since the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, under an Olympic flag rather than the flag of Taiwan. </p>
<p>This has remained the Olympic status quo for over thirty years, despite the obvious fact that Taiwan functions as an independent, democratic nation.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of people wearing matching uniforms waving at a crowd." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446626/original/file-20220215-17-14og2iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446626/original/file-20220215-17-14og2iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446626/original/file-20220215-17-14og2iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446626/original/file-20220215-17-14og2iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446626/original/file-20220215-17-14og2iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446626/original/file-20220215-17-14og2iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446626/original/file-20220215-17-14og2iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Taiwan delegation parades during the opening ceremonies for the Olympic Games in Los Angeles.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/File)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Beijing 2008 as a boon to high-tech totalitarianism</h2>
<p>The 2008 Beijing Olympics has a grim legacy. In <a href="https://publicseminar.org/essays/oppression-resistance-and-the-high-tech-totalitarianism/">Public Seminar</a>, Teng Biao convincingly argued that China governs through “high-tech totalitarianism,” using artificial intelligence and other technologies to maintain “total control of Chinese society.” </p>
<p>Although Italian philosopher <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/S/bo3534874.html">Giorgio Agamben’s</a> “states of exception” theory has typically been applied to disasters and other emergencies, political scientist <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Celebration-Capitalism-and-the-Olympic-Games/Boykoff/p/book/9781138805262">Jules Boykoff</a> has made a strong case for the extension of Agamben’s work to moments of jubilation and euphoria, particularly the Olympic Games. </p>
<p>A “state of exception” is similar to a state of emergency, except instead of the state’s ability to transcend the rule of law being invoked in an emergency, it is done in the name of public good.</p>
<p>It can open the door to a legally sanctioned eradication of not just political opponents, but anyone living on the margins of society. For Tibetans and Uyghurs, this rings all too true. In Tibet in particular, the Chinese government used the Olympic Games as an excuse to <a href="https://journals.library.brocku.ca/index.php/jess/article/view/3589/2727">dramatically escalate</a> its suppression of language, religion, speech and peaceful protest. </p>
<p>As international relations scholar <a href="https://www.google.ca/books/edition/The_War_on_the_Uyghurs/Nqw_EAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=sean+r+roberts&printsec=frontcover">Sean R. Roberts</a> has shown, the Chinese government leveraged both the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. and the 2008 Olympics to re-frame peaceful Uyghur cultural protests — typically labelled as separatism — as a terrorist threat to justify their mass incarceration. </p>
<p>Since 2008, Tibet has been closed off to foreigners, but details of <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/1982067779619">boarding schools</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-54260732">arbitrary detentions</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/xi-jinping-is-my-spiritual-leader-chinas-education-drive-tibet-2021-06-11/">restrictions on religion</a> and a general assault on Tibetan culture are well-documented. For some, the situation has become too untenable to bear. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of people holding protest signs stand around a flag that's on fire." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446627/original/file-20220215-21-ri04oh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446627/original/file-20220215-21-ri04oh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446627/original/file-20220215-21-ri04oh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446627/original/file-20220215-21-ri04oh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446627/original/file-20220215-21-ri04oh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446627/original/file-20220215-21-ri04oh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446627/original/file-20220215-21-ri04oh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Exiled Tibetans burn a Chinese flag during a protest against Beijing Winter Olympic Games in New Delhi, India on Feb. 4.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Altaf Qadri)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A total of 157 Tibetan monks and nuns have <a href="https://savetibet.org/tibetan-self-immolations/">self-immolated in protest</a> since 2009. </p>
<h2>The IOC, politics and human rights</h2>
<p>Despite China’s history of using the Olympics for political gain, the IOC has refused to intervene, going so far as to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/04/world/asia/ioc-china.html">cut off talks with human rights groups</a> concerned with the possibility that official merchandise for the Beijing Olympics was being made with forced labour in the Uyghur Region.</p>
<p>Both the IOC and China have started framing all criticism as political matters, unfit for discussion at a so-called apolitical event like the Olympic Games. </p>
<p>Criticism of the disappearance, silencing and carefully choreographed re-emergence of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/peng-shuai.html">Peng Shuai</a> is “just politics.” Criticism of policies aimed at the cultural eradication of Uyghurs and Tibetans, as well as China’s decision to have a Uyghur light the Olympic cauldron, are more “politics.” </p>
<p>But there must be a line drawn between politics and human rights. While the definition of politics depends on the context, the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights">United Nations</a> is quite clear when it comes to what is, and what is not, a human right. Violations of these rights are not merely political wranglings of foreign diplomacy, but rather real, tangible assaults on people and their cultures. </p>
<p>But the two — politics and human rights violations — are obviously intertwined. The former can be used to hide the latter. Unfortunately, that’s precisely what the IOC and China have done with Beijing 2022.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176873/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Few nations know how to politicize the Olympics as effectively as China does.MacIntosh Ross, Assistant Professor, Kinesiology, Western UniversityBiao Teng, Pozen Visiting Professor, Human Rights Scholar, University of ChicagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1759222022-02-10T02:46:33Z2022-02-10T02:46:33ZCan China use the Beijing Olympics to ‘sportwash’ its abuses against the Uyghurs? Only if the world remains silent<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445328/original/file-20220209-15-1m9dj2m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=65%2C23%2C3766%2C3083&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kazuki Wakasugi/Yomiuri Shimbun/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many issues have cast a shadow over the Beijing Winter Olympics in recent weeks, from China’s controversial “zero-COVID” <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/covid-free-fortress-for-the-2022-olympics-china-faces-ultimate-test-for-beijing-games/ar-AATm3eZ?ocid=uxbndlbing">approach</a> to the looming possibility of a <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/putins-wager-in-russias-standoff-with-the-west/">Russian invasion of Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>One issue should be getting more attention: what I and other scholars are calling the “<a href="https://manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/9781526153111/">Xinjiang emergency</a>” – the mass detention of between one million and two million Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim minorities in China’s western Xinjiang region. </p>
<p>To many observers, China attempted to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/08/sports/olympics/china-uyghur-olympics.html">sportwash</a> its human rights abuses in Xinjiang by selecting a cross-country skier of Uyghur origin to take part in the lighting of the Olympic cauldron during the opening ceremonies of the games. </p>
<p>Although the move attracted criticism from human rights activists, there’s been virtual silence from <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/02/muslim-countries-uyghurs-beijing-olympics/621461/">governments</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/olympics/2022/01/16/olympics-sponsors-china-human-rights/">corporate sponsors</a> on the Uyghur issue since the Olympics began. Without any real action to put pressure on Beijing, China’s propaganda machine will continue to deflect accountability, instead touting the false narrative that Uyghurs enjoy a “peaceful, harmonious and happy life”.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1489657694587867148"}"></div></p>
<h2>How China is persecuting the Uyghurs</h2>
<p>In a recently published book I edited, <a href="https://manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/9781526153111/">The Xinjiang Emergency</a>, some of the world’s top scholars on Uyghur history, culture, politics and identity provide a detailed examination of the long-term causes and consequences of China’s repression in Xinjiang. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445560/original/file-20220210-27-1ocogtw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445560/original/file-20220210-27-1ocogtw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=940&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445560/original/file-20220210-27-1ocogtw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=940&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445560/original/file-20220210-27-1ocogtw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=940&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445560/original/file-20220210-27-1ocogtw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1182&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445560/original/file-20220210-27-1ocogtw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1182&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445560/original/file-20220210-27-1ocogtw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1182&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Manchester University Press</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Since the mass detention of Uyghurs began in 2016, it has become clear the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has embarked on a systematic and coordinated effort to erase Uyghur culture and <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/turning-ghosts-into-humans-surveillance-as-an-instrument-of-social-engineering-in-xinjiang/">remake</a> the Uyghurs into pliable and “productive” citizens through “reeducation”. </p>
<p>As part of this process, children have been <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/03/18/china/xinjiang-uyghur-families-china-amnesty-report-exclusive-dst-intl-hnk/index.html">separated</a> from their parents to be placed in state care, Uyghur women subjected to <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/family-deplanning-birthrates-xinjiang">invasive</a> birth control and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">sexual abuse</a>, and detainees “graduated” into a system of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep25656.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Ftest&refreqid=fastly-default%3Aaf490b03183dc0ecc112cc3d2f971678">forced labor</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-an-independent-tribunal-came-to-rule-that-china-is-guilty-of-genocide-against-the-uyghurs-173604">How an independent tribunal came to rule that China is guilty of genocide against the Uyghurs</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The state has also <a href="https://supchina.com/2019/01/02/the-patriotism-of-not-speaking-uyghur/">prohibited</a> the use of the Uyghur language, script and signage, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2017.1330199">imposed</a> new legal restrictions on religious practice, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/07/revealed-new-evidence-of-chinas-mission-to-raze-the-mosques-of-xinjiang">razed</a> mosques and other religious sites, <a href="https://supchina.com/2019/08/07/uyghur-love-in-a-time-of-interethnic-marriage/">used financial inducements</a> to encourage intermarriage with the dominant Han ethnic group, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/world/asia/china-xinjiang-uighur-intellectuals.html">persecuted</a> the Uyghur intelligentsia. </p>
<p>A high-tech surveillance apparatus has also been <a href="https://theintercept.com/2021/01/29/china-uyghur-muslim-surveillance-police/">erected</a> across Xinjiang to monitor everyday life. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1489482432583774210"}"></div></p>
<h2>A genocide is taking place</h2>
<p>Our group of scholars has concluded the Chinese state’s actions are consistent with the attempted <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/gr2p/13/1/article-p9_9.xml?ebody=abstract%2Fexcerpt">cultural genocide</a> of Uyghurs. </p>
<p>Only a few governments around the world have gone as far as to label it a “genocide”. The French parliament <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220120-french-lawmakers-officially-recognise-china-s-treatment-of-uyghurs-as-genocide">was the latest to do so</a> on the eve of the Olympics, following in the footsteps of the US government and parliaments in Canada, the Netherlands and the UK.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1484475723704254469"}"></div></p>
<p>But what has the international community done about it? So far, it has been long on hand-wringing and rhetorical “concern” for Uyghurs, but short on practical measures beyond the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56487162">sanctions</a> <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-imposes-sanctions-on-china-over-human-rights-abuses-of-uighurs">imposed</a> on Chinese individuals and entities responsible for the repression. </p>
<p>A small group of countries also took part in a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/boycott-winter-olympics-beijing-2022/">diplomatic boycott</a> of the Beijing Olympics, but this was largely seen as a symbolic gesture. These countries still sent teams to compete in an event that Chinese President Xi Jinping <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/china/Off_the_Wire/2022-02/01/content_78023469.htm">has declared</a> will </p>
<blockquote>
<p>help present China as a positive, prosperous and open nation committed to building a community with a shared future for mankind. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Not since the <a href="https://time.com/4432857/hitler-hosted-olympics-1936/">1936 Berlin Olympics in Nazi Germany</a> have the games been held amid such a wanton violation of basic human rights. And the CCP’s actions against the Uyghurs have been well-documented for nearly five years.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-chinas-denials-its-treatment-of-the-uyghurs-should-be-called-what-it-is-cultural-genocide-120654">Despite China's denials, its treatment of the Uyghurs should be called what it is: cultural genocide</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Although there is evidence <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/09/uyghurs-subjected-to-genocide-by-china-unofficial-uk-tribunal-finds">some Uyghurs have been killed</a> in detention, genocides aren’t just defined by mass killings. The CCP’s actions in Xinjiang do meet the criteria for genocide under the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide</a>. </p>
<p>This document deems a range of acts to constitute “genocide” if the intent is to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, including: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group </p></li>
<li><p>deliberately inflicting “conditions of life” intended to bring about a group’s physical destruction (such as withholding food, medical care, shelter or clothing)</p></li>
<li><p>imposing measures intended to prevent births </p></li>
<li><p>forcibly transferring children to another group. </p></li>
</ul>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Protesters outside the Chinese embassy in Seoul." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445558/original/file-20220210-19735-e9jltz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445558/original/file-20220210-19735-e9jltz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445558/original/file-20220210-19735-e9jltz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445558/original/file-20220210-19735-e9jltz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445558/original/file-20220210-19735-e9jltz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445558/original/file-20220210-19735-e9jltz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445558/original/file-20220210-19735-e9jltz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters rally against the Beijing Olympic Games in front of the Chinese embassy in Seoul, South Korea, this week.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ahn Young-joon/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Moral platitudes or real action?</h2>
<p>The failure of the international community to respond to the Uyghurs’ plight speaks to the self interest of governments, <a href="https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/features/here-are-fortune-500-companies-doing-business-xinjiang">multinational corporations</a> and organisations like the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/04/world/asia/ioc-china.html">International Olympic Committee</a> to retain profitable relations with Beijing. It also shows the hollowness of many governments’ commitments to the much touted “rules-based order”. </p>
<p>Australia’s foreign minister, <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/speech/australia-and-world-time-covid-19">Marise Payne</a>, for example, made this a priority when she said in June 2020 that Australia was committed to the “norms that underpin universal human rights, gender equality and the rule of law”. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-winter-olympics-are-so-vital-to-the-chinese-communist-partys-legitimacy-176130">Why the Winter Olympics are so vital to the Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This is a sentiment shared by many of the states that have condemned China’s actions in Xinjiang. Yet, it has not been translated into real action likely to increase pressure on Beijing. </p>
<p>Is this trumpeting of a commitment to “universal human rights” little more than a moral platitude? If not, then the international community must ask itself why there has not been stronger action against the largest and most systematic repression of an ethnic or religious minority in the world today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175922/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Clarke has in the past received funding from the Australian Research Council, Australian Political Studies Association, Australian Centre on China in the World (ANU), and the US State Department.</span></em></p>The international community trumpets its commitment to ‘universal human rights’. Yet, it has failed to take real action against Beijing for its treatment of minorities in Xinjiang.Michael Clarke, Visiting Fellow, Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1754692022-02-07T16:14:02Z2022-02-07T16:14:02ZHow American singer, actor and civil rights activist Paul Robeson became a hero in China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443482/original/file-20220131-124991-1ad6k13.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=3%2C19%2C1274%2C657&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In 1941, Robeson recorded an album of Chinese fighting and folk songs with activist Liu Liangmo with the Chinese People’s Chorus — organized among members of the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance in New York City’s Chinatown. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Gordon Parks for the U.S. Farm Security Administration/Office of War Information/Wikimedia/Keynote records)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Chinese broadcasters have aired shows featuring <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Paul-Robeson">Paul Robeson (1898-1976)</a>, one of the most popular African American <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wnet/americanmasters/paul-robeson-about-the-actor/66/#:%7E:text=Paul%20Robeson%20was%20the%20epitome,erased%20him%20from%20popular%20history.">singers and actors of his era</a> and a well-known <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/what-paul-robeson-said-77742433/">civil rights activist</a>, several times in recent years.</p>
<p>China National Radio and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dv3YykCcg70&t=1516s">various channels</a> of the widely influential China Central TV showcased Robeson on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dv3YykCcg70&t=1516s">programs</a> in 2021, 2012 <a href="https://tv.cctv.com/2009/11/30/VIDE1372319800852972.shtml">and 2009</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dv3YykCcg70&t=1516s">narrating China’s resistence to foreign military aggressions</a>. This could seem like unusually frequent coverage related to an American who passed away decades ago. </p>
<p>My book, <a href="https://uncpress.org/book/9781469664606/arise-africa-roar-china"><em>Arise, Africa! Roar, China! Black and Chinese Citizens of the World in the Twentieth Century</em></a>, unpacks the little-known yet important relationship between Paul Robeson and China, which continues to resonate powerfully today. </p>
<h2>New York City meeting</h2>
<p>Robeson is long remembered in China partly due to his contribution to popularizing the country’s future national anthem after the singer’s 1941 recording of an album of Chinese fighting and folk songs <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l9JsXtKmmlU">with Liu Liangmo (ca. 1909-88)</a>, a prolific journalist, musician and Christian activist. </p>
<p>In November 1940, in New York City, Robeson received a phone call asking him to meet Liu, recently arrived from China. Liu’s accounts of his acquaintance with Robeson would be published in various Chinese-langauge periodicals.</p>
<p>Robeson met Liu within half an hour. When Robeson inquired about the mass singing movement that Liu had initiated in China, Liu related the backstory behind the new genre of Chinese fighting and folk songs he helped invent for war mobilization, singing some examples. </p>
<p>Liu noted Robeson’s favourite was the signature piece, “Chee Lai!” or “March of the Volunteers,” because, as Robeson explained, its lyric “arise, ye who refuse to be bond slaves!” expressed the determination of the world’s oppressed, including Chinese and Black people, to struggle for liberation. </p>
<p>In November 1941, Robeson, Liu and the Chinese People’s Chorus — which Liu had organized among members of the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance in New York City’s Chinatown — recorded <em>Chee Lai! Songs of New China</em> for Keynote Records. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/T8UYP8y1-gY?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Keynote Records album, ‘Chee Lai! Songs of New China.’</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Solidarity album</h2>
<p>Liu’s liner notes for the album relay that he saw the collaboration as “a strong token of solidarity between the Chinese and the Negro People.” Robeson’s notes said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Chee Lai! (Arise!) is on the lips of millions of Chinese today, a sort of unofficial anthem, I am told, typifying the unconquerable spirit of this people. It is a pleasure and a privilege to sing both this song of modern composition and the old folk songs to which a nation in struggle has put new words.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In December 1941, the <em>New York Times</em> lauded the album as one of the year’s best and noted that profits went to <a href="https://archives.nypl.org/mss/3078">the China Relief Fund</a>, chartered in the state of New York that same year by founding aid organizations.</p>
<p>Robeson reprised this song in his numerous concerts in North America and Europe, sometimes amid entangled racial and ideological controversies. </p>
<p>“Chee Lai!” was eventually adopted by Hollywood. Robeson’s version of the song was featured in MGM’s film <em>Dragon Seed</em> (1944), an adaptation of <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/1938/summary/">Nobel laureate Pearl S. Buck’s</a> <a href="https://openroadmedia.com/ebook/dragon-seed/9781453263518">bestselling novel on China’s resistance against Japan</a>, starring Katherine Hepburn. </p>
<p>The U.S. Army Air Force Orchestra played the tune at the start and end of a film produced by the U.S. state department, <em>Why We Fight: The Battle of China</em> (1944), directed by the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Frank-Capra">Oscar-winning Frank Capra</a>. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/m4Ebv-FzP60?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. State Department film, ‘Why We Fight.’</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘March of the Volunteers’</h2>
<p>Robeson’s long-term alliances with sojourning leftist Chinese artists such as Liu, <a href="http://bdcconline.net/en/stories/lin-yutang">writer and philosopher Lin Yutang</a> and “The King of Beijing Opera,” <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinese-american-actresses-soo-yong-and-anna-may-wong-contrasting-struggles-for-recognition-in-hollywood-159174">Mei Lanfang</a> — along with American supporters like <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Agnes-Smedley">Agnes Smedley, the American journalist</a> based in Shanghai in the 1930s — led to his mutual embrace with the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). </p>
<p>Chinese news sources reported that to celebrate the announcement of the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev#:%7E:text=On%20October%201%2C%201949%2C%20Chinese,Republic%20of%20China%20(PRC).&text=The%20%E2%80%9Cfall%E2%80%9D%20of%20mainland%20China,Communists%20entering%20Beijing%20in%201949.">PRC’s establishment on Oct. 1, 1949</a>, Robeson sang “Chee Lai!” on the streets of Harlem. </p>
<p>Robeson famously telegrammed Mao Zedong to congratulate the new regime: “We celebrate the birth of the People’s Republic of China, because it is a great force in the struggles for world peace and human freedom.” The contents of the telegram were immediately published in <em>The People’s Daily</em>, the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party.</p>
<h2>Robeson as role model</h2>
<p>Liu wrote an article, “People’s Singer Robeson,” that was widely circulated across China and Chinatowns in the United States between 1949 and 1950. After promoting the causes of China to the American public, particularly African Americans, for nearly a decade, Liu had just returned to China to serve as a high-level cultural official. </p>
<p>Liu’s article helped alter the narrative about Robeson within China from that of an “exotic entertainer” to a heroic role model for socialist citizens there. In the years leading up to the founding of the PRC, the representation of Black people in the media was dominated by coverage of Jazz musicians in nightclubs of treaty ports, who were dismissed as “foreign musical instrumental devils” — a view which
echoed with long-held <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/aug/28/racist-africans-stereotypes-tv-colonial">stereotypes of the “primitive” African</a>.</p>
<p>Liu’s article focused on Robeson as an internationalist who “embodied the perfect marriage between art and politics.” It was subsequently followed by a body of printed materials about Robeson — such as stories in state-owned newspapers, biographies, collections of his songs and even a cartoon series for children —<br>
that stressed his heroism and model status.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Black and white comic showing Paul Robeson speaking at a microphone." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443472/original/file-20220131-27-qx3ua1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443472/original/file-20220131-27-qx3ua1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=666&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443472/original/file-20220131-27-qx3ua1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=666&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443472/original/file-20220131-27-qx3ua1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=666&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443472/original/file-20220131-27-qx3ua1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=838&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443472/original/file-20220131-27-qx3ua1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=838&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443472/original/file-20220131-27-qx3ua1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=838&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A sample 1949 page from the children’s cartoon series, ‘Today’s Hero: Black Singer Robeson.’ The caption on the top left reads: ‘He gets along very well with Chinese friends in the United States.’ Robeson says, ‘I salute the democratic revolution in China.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Yunxiang Gao/Xin ertong banyuekan 23, 2)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Film, meanwhile, also contributed to Robeson’s popularity as a hero in China. While the newly created communist nation generally rejected Hollywood and European films, a 1939 British film <em><a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0031828/">The Proud Valley</a></em>, starring Robeson, was brought to Chinese audiences around 1956 and was well received. The film showcased the popular singing and performance of a muscular Robeson playing an American miner in Wales struggling with local miners in a labour dispute. </p>
<p><a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781466841505/w-e-b-du-bois-1919-1963">African American writer, sociologist and civil rights activist W.E.B. Du Bois</a>, who was later welcomed in <a href="https://medium.com/fairbank-center/arise-africa-roar-china-black-and-chinese-citizens-of-the-world-in-the-twentieth-century-b9839359b467">China in 1959</a>, wrote in the publication <em>Crisis</em> in 1930 about how “some white folk are frightened of the naked manhood of Paul Robeson.” For Chinese audiences, Robeson provided an inspiring model of masculinity.</p>
<h2>Enduring legacy</h2>
<p>Robeson’s version of “Chee Lai!” was played in the Grand Hall of the People’s Congress in Beijing during Nie Er Music Week in 2009. Nie Er was the <a href="https://uhpress.hawaii.edu/title/composing-for-the-revolution-nie-er-and-chinas-sonic-nationalism">talented musician who composed “Chee Lai!”</a>.</p>
<p>Various state organs including China Society for People’s Friendship Studies and <em>China Daily</em> organized a tribute <a href="https://thesanghakommune.org/2017/05/26/beijing-110th-celebration-of-paul-robesons-birthday-in-photographs-2008/">on April 9, 2008, marking Robeson’s birthday</a>.</p>
<p>Robeson continues to be remembered as a loyal friend to China. He is celebrated for globalizing China’s national anthem, for his songs that set hearts stirring, for his contributions to the Chinese nation’s liberation — and to the friendship between peoples of China and the United States, <a href="https://medium.com/fairbank-center/black-power-in-china-maos-support-for-african-american-racial-struggle-as-class-struggle-7673f2a6abb">particularly African Americans</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175469/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gao Yunxiang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In China, Robeson continues to be remembered as a loyal friend celebrated for popularizing what became China’s national anthem and building solidarity between peoples of China and African Americans.Gao Yunxiang, Professor, Department of History, Toronto Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1758952022-02-02T13:07:09Z2022-02-02T13:07:09ZWhy is Taiwan competing in the Olympics under ‘Chinese Taipei’?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443832/original/file-20220201-21-13igsg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4992%2C3323&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Taiwanese independence activists call for a boycott of the Beijing Games.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/activists-holding-signs-and-olympic-rings-calling-for-the-news-photo/1237989217?adppopup=true">Walid Berrazeg/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the Beijing Olympics opens with <a href="https://olympics.com/en/beijing-2022/ceremonies">a glitzy ceremony on Feb. 4, 2022</a>, a tiny contingent of Taiwanese athletes will be in attendance. But they won’t be marching under the Taiwanese flag. And they will be announced as the team from “Chinese Taipei.” </p>
<p>They almost weren’t going to be there at all. Officials from the island <a href="https://www.reuters.com/lifestyle/sports/team-taiwan-wont-be-winter-games-opening-ceremony-2022-01-28/">had intended their athletes to be absent</a> from the opening or closing ceremony, citing the complexity of pandemic travel. But on Feb. 1, at the behest of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/team-taiwan-says-it-will-be-beijing-games-opening-ceremony-2022-02-01/">Taiwanese authorities reversed course</a>.</p>
<p>COVID-19 isn’t the main issue. Behind the changing plans is a <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Sports/Beijing-Winter-Olympics/Team-Taiwan-to-skip-Olympic-ceremonies-amid-name-row">dispute</a> over the name of the Taiwanese delegation in Olympic competition. It has its roots in the long history of contention over the status of Taiwan.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://history.umbc.edu/facultystaff/full-time/meredith-oyen/">scholar of relations between the United States and East Asia</a>, I also know that it is a particularly sensitive time. World attention on the Beijing Games comes amid heightened tension over Taiwan’s status, with <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/01/28/1076246311/chinas-ambassador-to-the-u-s-warns-of-military-conflict-over-taiwan">warnings of “military conflict</a>” if the contested island moves toward formal independence.</p>
<h2>Competing Chinas</h2>
<p>The status of Taiwan has been disputed since the founding of modern Communist China.</p>
<p>The Chinese Communist Party <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev">won its civil war</a> against the Nationalist Party then governing as the “Republic of China” in 1949. The latter fled across the approximately 100-mile strait to the island of Taiwan, which was then still <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/liao13798">transitioning from decades of Japanese colonization</a>.</p>
<p>There, the exiled Republic of China enjoyed <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/biding-time-the-challenge-of-taiwans-international-status/">two decades of international support</a> as the government of “Free China.”</p>
<p>Led by the United States, many countries <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/25/chinas-un-seat-50-years-on#:%7E:text=Taipei%2C%20Taiwan%20%E2%80%93%20Fifty%20years%20ago,the%20country's%20civil%20war%20in">and the United Nations</a> recognized this government on Taiwan as “China,” while refusing to recognize the new People’s Republic of China controlling the far larger mainland.</p>
<p>The IOC similarly only recognized the Taiwan-based government. As a result, the mainland was not represented at the Olympics throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The only Chinese team competing came from Taiwan.</p>
<p>In the 1970s, however, the tide began to shift. Until then, recognition of Communist China had been limited to Soviet bloc countries and newly decolonized nations in Asia and Africa.</p>
<p>First, in 1971, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/25/chinas-un-seat-50-years-on#:%7E:text=Taipei%2C%20Taiwan%20%E2%80%93%20Fifty%20years%20ago,the%20country's%20civil%20war%20in">U.N shifted recognition</a> from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China. Nation after nation followed suit over the course of the decade, with the U.S. switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to Beijing in 1979.</p>
<p>Throughout this period, both the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan agreed on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38285354">the principle of “one China</a>.” Both governments argued that Taiwan was part of China, and neither would allow countries or organizations to recognize both.</p>
<p>When the UN chose to admit the People’s Republic of China, the government in Taiwan ceased membership in the international body.</p>
<p>When Beijing sought admission into the IOC, it was clear that any formula that allowed athletes from both territories to compete would have to take into account the commitment to the principle of “one China.”</p>
<p>In 1979, the executive committee of the IOC <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/sports/1979/11/27/ioc-gives-approval-to-china/1d8f1d65-c1c4-4d68-8afa-a2e35c29d703/">passed a resolution</a> that both governments ultimately agreed to follow. It admitted the People’s Republic of China under the name “Chinese Olympic Committee” and the government of Taiwan as the “Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A flag-bearer at the 2018 Winter Olympic Games holds aloft the emblem of the Chinese Taipei team." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443835/original/file-20220201-27-1ltzg0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443835/original/file-20220201-27-1ltzg0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443835/original/file-20220201-27-1ltzg0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443835/original/file-20220201-27-1ltzg0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443835/original/file-20220201-27-1ltzg0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443835/original/file-20220201-27-1ltzg0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443835/original/file-20220201-27-1ltzg0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Flying the flag of Chinese Taipei.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/flag-bearer-te-an-lien-of-chinese-taipei-leads-the-team-news-photo/916136592?adppopup=true">Ronald Martinez/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This arrangement allowed Beijing to accept Taiwan’s inclusion in the Games by framing the island contingent as a regional branch of its national team, even though their medal counts were separate. </p>
<p>Taiwanese athletes would be required to compete under an alternate anthem and flag to that used by Taiwan, so as not to display Republic of China emblems.</p>
<p>The Republic of China in Taiwan finally agreed to compete under these terms in 1981. It had few other options, given its own past recalcitrance on the issue of allowing both governments in any formal organization. A similar formula was later adopted to allow an independent Olympic team from Hong Kong to compete after the British handed its former colony back to China in 1997.</p>
<h2>Pushback to independence</h2>
<p>Over the last four decades, the Republic of China on Taiwan has <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwans-democracy-and-the-china-challenge/">transformed from a colonial authoritarian regime to a democracy</a>.</p>
<p>But at the same time, its international recognition as an independent government has dwindled. From 2000 to 2008 and again starting in 2016, political parties advocating Taiwan’s independence achieved electoral success at the highest levels. But this served to trigger a pushback from Beijing as it seeks to stave off what it views as growing separatism.</p>
<p>These tensions have spilled out into the Olympic arena.</p>
<p>Just last year, during the opening ceremony of the Tokyo Games, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/sport/hong-kong/article/3142403/tokyo-olympics-taiwan-happy-not-being-called-chinese-taipei-opening">a Japanese announcer referred to</a> the “Chinese Taipei” Olympic team as “the team from Taiwan,” lining up in the opening ceremony under “Taipei” instead of “Chinese.”</p>
<p>This angered mainland Chinese officials concerned about a shift away from the one China principle.</p>
<p>And in the run-up to the 2022 Beijing Olympics, Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Sports/Beijing-Winter-Olympics/Team-Taiwan-to-skip-Olympic-ceremonies-amid-name-row">used a slight variation</a> in the Chinese name for the team from “Chinese Taipei” to stress that it considered Taiwan to be a part of China. They used “zhongguo” (China) instead of “zhonghua” (Chinese). While “Zhonghua” is a broad term that refers to anything Chinese by ethnicity or heritage, “Zhongguo” refers to the country itself.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 140,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>The Taiwan government vehemently opposed the altered name. </p>
<p>Because Taiwan is a subtropical island, it does not have a significant presence at the Winter Olympics – only four of its athletes have qualified for the forthcoming competition. </p>
<p>Regardless of the team’s size, Chinese authorities will be keen not to allow the issue to be a media distraction during the Beijing Games.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175895/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meredith Oyen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Taiwanese authorities are allowing its tiny contingent to attend the opening ceremony in Beijing despite a long-running dispute over its name in the Olympics.Meredith Oyen, Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1692282022-02-01T13:13:46Z2022-02-01T13:13:46ZChina has no plan for who will succeed Xi Jinping – leaving the nation and the world in uncertainty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432508/original/file-20211117-23-xmkt5p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=160%2C24%2C8021%2C5470&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Since becoming China's top leader in late 2012, President Xi Jinping has centralized power to the point that it's unclear when he'll step down, or who might succeed him.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/large-screen-displays-chinas-president-xi-jinping-during-a-news-photo/1353609270?adppopup=true">Kevin Frayer/Getty Images AsiaPac via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since becoming China’s paramount leader in 2012, Xi Jinping has overseen enormous economic growth and solidified China’s standing as an economic and geopolitical superpower. He has also <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2018/0228/Xi-for-life-China-turns-its-back-on-collective-leadership">centralized his power</a> over domestic politics. In 2018, Xi oversaw the <a href="https://theconversation.com/xis-indefinite-grasp-on-power-has-finally-captured-the-wests-attention-now-what-92721">repeal of</a> the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-term-limit-explainer.html">two-term limit on holding presidential office</a>, which has opened a path for him to stay in power after 2023. </p>
<p>Xi is arguably the most powerful leader of China since <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674725867">Deng Xiaoping</a>, the architect of the economic reforms that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/12/19/40-years-ago-deng-xiaoping-changed-china-and-the-world/">transformed China</a> from a poor agrarian nation into a major economic powerhouse. Before Xi became the leader of China, the Chinese Communist Party had a <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/china-in-xis-new-era-the-return-to-personalistic-rule/">system in place</a> for the peaceful transfer of power. This system was, for the most part, adhered to by <a href="http://en.people.cn/data/people/jiangzemin.shtml">Jiang Zemin</a> and <a href="http://en.people.cn/data/people/hujintao.shtml">Hu Jintao</a>, the two leaders who preceded Xi in office.</p>
<p>In the past, a lack of faith in a succession plan for the peaceful transition of power has led to <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-rise-of-the-xi-gang/">dissension within the ruling party</a>, domestic political interference by the <a href="https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-2.pdf">Chinese military</a> and tendencies toward a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">greater centralization of power</a> by Chinese leaders. Because of China’s <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/22/china-has-two-paths-to-global-domination-pub-81908">major role on the world stage</a>, the lack of a plan to succeed Xi is likely to affect other nations. It is causing uncertainty about issues including <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s41072-020-00076-w">potential trade disruptions</a>, foreign policy changes resulting from <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">domestic instability</a> and the potential for a <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/after-xi#sec44501">military coup</a>.</p>
<p>I’ve found in my <a href="https://people.rit.edu/aabgsh/">research</a> on Chinese <a href="https://rsaiconnect.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rsp3.12193">economics</a> and <a href="https://rsaiconnect.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rsp3.12123">politics</a> that knowing more about how peaceful transfers of power have taken place in the past in China is key to fully grasping what might happen if Xi Jinping <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/23/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-successor.html">does not name</a> a successor.</p>
<h2>How power is supposed to transition</h2>
<p>Since the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chinese-Communist-Party">Chinese Communist Party</a> has held sole control of the government, and the general secretary, the top leader of the party, has ruled the nation. That role usually includes being chairman of the nation’s military, and holding the largely ceremonial title of “president.”</p>
<p>On paper, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/02/08/the-chinese-communist-partys-experiment-with-transparency/">here’s how</a> <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">power passes without struggle from one top leader to another</a>: At the National Congress, a meeting held every five years, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41250273">delegates elect</a> members to the party’s Central Committee. </p>
<p>This committee then elects the general secretary and a body called the Politburo Standing Committee to lead the nation for the next five years.</p>
<h2>How power really transitions</h2>
<p>Yet since the era of <a href="http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1900_mao_early.htm">Mao Zedong</a>, the founding father of Communist China and its ruler from 1949 to 1976, the nation’s top leader has typically <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/23/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-successor.html">wielded significantly more influence</a> over these processes than the written rules suggest.</p>
<p>For many years, Mao did not name a successor. But in the final months of his life, Mao <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-china-has-a-succession-problem/">named and then discarded</a> one successor after another. He was attempting to avert the ascension to top leadership of a powerful Communist Party leader named <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Deng-Xiaoping">Deng Xiaoping</a>, fearing that <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">Deng would overturn</a> the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion">Cultural Revolution</a>, Mao’s movement to forcefully eradicate all remnants of capitalist and traditional elements from Chinese society. </p>
<p>Mao’s chosen successor, Hua Guofeng, did become the nation’s top leader following Mao’s death in 1976. But he accomplished relatively little, and by 1977, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">pressure was on to oust him</a> in favor of Deng. By 1981, <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674725867">Deng had seized power</a>.</p>
<p>Deng instituted several <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674725867">social and economic reforms</a> that created the foundation for China’s blistering economic growth over the past few decades. In the process, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/09/24/whats-next-for-poverty-reduction-policies-in-china/">hundreds of millions of Chinese</a> citizens have progressed from poverty into the middle class, and China has become the <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/insights/worlds-top-economies/">second-largest economy</a> in the world. </p>
<p>When Deng stepped down in 1989, he created his own succession crisis. Deng tagged a relatively obscure politician named <a href="http://en.people.cn/data/people/jiangzemin.shtml">Jiang Zemin</a> to succeed him but also declared that politician <a href="http://en.people.cn/data/people/hujintao.shtml">Hu Jintao</a> should succeed Jiang after two terms. Jiang and Hu became <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/01/world/analysts-see-tension-in-china-within-the-top-leadership.html">powerful rivals</a> for the next two decades.</p>
<p>Tensions with Jiang slowed Hu’s attempts to introduce reforms seeking economic growth in China’s <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">western and northeastern regions</a> instead of its more dynamic east coast. They also hurt Hu’s ability to carry out <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/01/world/analysts-see-tension-in-china-within-the-top-leadership.html">political changes</a> desired by China’s liberal intellectuals.</p>
<p>The Hu era came to an end in 2012 with a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">peaceful transfer of power to Xi Jinping</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Photos of four men" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A museum in Beijing displays portraits of Chinese leaders, from left, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/ChinaUSLeadersVisits/bbfa65769f234c279a83bd49f66ecbe6/photo">AP Photo/Andy Wong</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A potential ruler for life</h2>
<p>Xi <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-party-term-limit.html">moved speedily</a> to <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT500/CT503/RAND_CT503.pdf">centralize power</a> to an extent not seen since Deng. He <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">purged political enemies</a> from influential party positions. He also positioned his <a href="https://www.soas.ac.uk/china-institute/events/seminars/02nov2020-what-is-xi-fighting-the-dynamics-of-corruption-in-post-mao-china.html">campaign against corruption</a> as critical to the <a href="https://www.soas.ac.uk/china-institute/events/seminars/02nov2020-what-is-xi-fighting-the-dynamics-of-corruption-in-post-mao-china.html">ongoing existence of the party</a> and the nation.</p>
<p>Expert observers believe it likely that Xi is intent on keeping the power he’s amassed, by remaining in office for an <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Xi-s-third-term-plans-in-focus-ahead-of-China-s-party-conclave">unprecedented third term</a> and possibly longer.</p>
<p>Xi’s authoritarian rule has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-works-to-stifle-dissent-amid-concerns-about-chinas-economy-11551609000">stifled domestic dissent</a>, resulted in the <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/xi-jinping-successor-sun-zhengcai-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-2018-5">jailing</a> of many of his political rivals, led to the widespread <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang">persecution of Uyghurs</a> in Xinjiang and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/19/world/asia/taiwan-china-identity.html">alienated the Taiwanese people</a> – whom the Communists wish would reunify with China.</p>
<p>Expert China watchers are now assessing the risks of a potential <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/after-xi">leadership challenge or a coup</a> to oust Xi, which could be resisted by Xi’s own supporters. Observers believe this could lead to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/02/27/7-things-you-need-to-know-about-lifting-term-limits-for-xi-jinping/">public turmoil and repression</a> of the sort seen in Tiananmen Square in 1989, when <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48445934">peaceful student-led protests</a> were <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/tiananmen-square-tank-man-china/">harshly put down</a> by troops armed with assault rifles and accompanied by tanks.</p>
<p>To prevent this, Xi has expanded the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/03/how-has-tiananmen-changed-china/">existing security regime</a> into an elaborate <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/chinas-paper-tiger-surveillance-state/">surveillance state</a> in which digital technologies and artificial intelligence are used to maintain the government’s <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/china-ai-surveillance/614197/">totalitarian control</a>.</p>
<h2>Global reach</h2>
<p>Finally, the Chinese succession problem could also become a global problem. China has the world’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/business-12445925">second-largest economy</a>. Uncertainty stemming from domestic political instability is likely to hurt <a href="https://hbr.org/2006/11/hedging-political-risk-in-china">global markets and interest in investing in China</a>. This could mean <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/ifdp/files/ifdp1260.pdf">financial stress</a> in China, trade disruptions and the <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/economy/asia-pacific/china-supply-chain.html">rerouting of supply chains</a> out of China. Nations closely tied to China would also see their <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/ifdp/files/ifdp1260.pdf">trade and financial pictures change for the worse</a>.</p>
<p>China has become a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/09/04/what-the-pentagons-new-report-on-china-means-for-u-s-strategy-including-on-taiwan/">potent military power</a>. A domestic power crisis may lead to a chaotic transfer of leadership, whether or not the People’s Liberation Army <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/china-s-looming-succession-crisis">stages a coup</a>. </p>
<p>Globally, China’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/us-china-tensions-explained.html">relations with the U.S.</a> and its present desire for <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2021/10/09/chinas-xi-jinping-calls-peaceful-reunification-taiwan/6072388001/">peaceful reunification with Taiwan</a> may both change. In addition, China may be less able to manage <a href="https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2011/09/CPA_memos_Managing_Instability_China_Periphery.pdf">unstable neighbors</a> like North Korea, Myanmar, Kazakhstan and Pakistan.</p>
<p>In 1980, at age 75, Deng Xiaoping <a href="https://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/on-the-reform-of-the-system-of-party-and-state-leadership/">said</a>, “We must take the long-term interest into account and solve the problem of the succession in leadership.” Unfortunately, this has not happened. Since instability in China is likely to have global impacts, Xi and the Chinese Communist Party have an obligation to establish a credible system for an orderly transfer of power.</p>
<p>[<em>There’s plenty of opinion out there. We supply facts and analysis, based in research.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=politics&source=inline-politics-no-opinion">Get The Conversation’s Politics Weekly</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169228/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amitrajeet A. Batabyal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the past, the lack of a succession plan for China has led to political unrest in the country. If it happens again, it will also affect the world.Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, Arthur J. Gosnell Professor of Economics, Rochester Institute of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1724672022-01-25T15:46:39Z2022-01-25T15:46:39ZFrom sanctioning a refugee team to letting China host: Does the International Olympic Committee support human rights?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/440770/original/file-20220113-15-1wivzs7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C0%2C6694%2C5026&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A protest against the 2022 Beijing Olympics is held in Berlin, Germany on Jan. 4, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Michael Sohn) </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) position on refugees is contradictory and confusing. </p>
<p>The organization has <a href="https://olympics.com/ioc/refugee-olympic-team">its own Refugee Team</a> competing at the 2022 Beijing Olympics. It’s a relatively new initiative, happening first at the 2016 Rio Olympics. </p>
<p>On the surface, it seems like a noble humanitarian effort. Refugee athletes recognized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are permitted to compete at the Games under the Olympic flag. One would think, based on this newfound commitment to refugees, that the IOC would only hold the Olympics in nations that respect the rights of refugees. </p>
<p>With the 2022 Beijing Olympics now less than a month away, it’s difficult to square the IOC’s Refugee Team initiative with <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/china-and-tibet">China’s abysmal track record on refugees</a>. Is there any substance to the IOC’s refugee efforts or is this all for show?</p>
<h2>No simple task</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://journals.library.brocku.ca/index.php/jess/article/view/3589/2727">a recent article</a>, a team of academics and activists — including ourselves — outlined many of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CPP) human rights offences, hoping to spark a more extensive boycott action against the 2022 Beijing Olympics. </p>
<p>Under Xi Jinping, the <a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2021/07/28/under-xi-jinping-the-number-of-chinese-asylum-seekers-has-shot-up">number of refugees fleeing China has exploded</a> — from 15,362 in 2012, the year Xi came to power, to a staggering 107,864 in 2020. </p>
<p>For Tibetans, Uyghurs and others facing <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-02-10/roots-cultural-genocide-xinjiang">the CCP’s policies of cultural genocide</a>, asylum in a foreign nation is often a last, desperate attempt to secure their rights and freedoms. But getting out is no simple task. </p>
<p>China persistently pursues its own refugees abroad, while at the same time ignoring international calls to follow UNHCR protocols for refugees from <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108669474">North Korea and Myanmar</a>.</p>
<h2>Tracking and repatriating Uyghurs</h2>
<p>In his recent book <a href="https://globalreports.columbia.edu/books/in-the-camps/"><em>In the Camps: China’s High-Tech Penal Colony</em></a>, international relations researcher Darren Byler details the vast surveillance apparatus inflicted upon the Muslims of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. </p>
<p>The system serves, in part, to identify so-called “pre-criminals” — accused of infractions as minor as an international student using a virtual private network (VPN) to access school emails — to undergo political re-education in the state’s extensive camp system. For the most part, Uyghurs and other Muslims are prevented from becoming refugees.</p>
<p>The CCP has made <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/03/the-nightmare-of-uyghur-families-separated-by-repression/">obtaining a passport increasingly difficult</a> for those in Xinjiang. As <em>TIME Magazine</em> journalist <a href="https://time.com/6111315/uyghur-refugees-china-biden/">Jasmine Aguilera explains</a>, “It’s next to impossible for Uyghurs in China, most of whom are under extraordinary state surveillance, to access refugee resettlement systems.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A road leads up to a building where police officers stand, the building looks like a large prison, the walls are cement and tall." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/440767/original/file-20220113-955-iu8f4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/440767/original/file-20220113-955-iu8f4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/440767/original/file-20220113-955-iu8f4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/440767/original/file-20220113-955-iu8f4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/440767/original/file-20220113-955-iu8f4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/440767/original/file-20220113-955-iu8f4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/440767/original/file-20220113-955-iu8f4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Police officers stand at the outer entrance of the Urumqi No. 3 Detention Center in Dabancheng, part of western China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Escaping China, however, is just the beginning. The case of <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-diplomatic-boycott-of-the-2022-beijing-olympic-games-could-bring-huseyin-celil-home-170167">Huseyin Celil</a> is instructive. After successfully <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-forgotten-canadian-languishing-in-a-chinese-jail-111736">fleeing Xinjiang</a> and obtaining UN refugee status in 2001, Celil was granted Canadian citizenship in 2005. </p>
<p>The CCP tracked Celil abroad in 2006, ultimately convincing authorities in Uzbekistan to detain and repatriate the UN-recognized refugee. Celil <a href="https://www.amnesty.ca/huseyin-celil/">has been imprisoned</a> in China ever since. </p>
<p>In fact, China has routinely convinced nations — including Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand, Pakistan and Cambodia — <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html">to ignore or forgo UNHCR protocols</a>, which are a precondition to compete on the refugee team, effectively excluding would-be Olympic athletes from the Games.</p>
<h2>China, Nepal and Tibetan refugees</h2>
<p>Tibetans are also experiencing a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/running-out-time-tibetan-president-elect-warns-cultural-genocide-2021-05-21/">cultural genocide</a> at the hands of the CCP. Like Uyghurs and other Muslims in Xinjiang, Tibetans find themselves contained by CCP forces, pinned down by the oppressive state security apparatus. </p>
<p>The CCP has severely restricted Tibetans’ freedom of movement by <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2021-04-20/prison-called-tibet">limiting access to passports</a> and requiring “pre- and post-trip debriefings with the police as a condition of international travel.” With their options limited, many would-be refugees end up fleeing to Nepal in hopes of receiving asylum. </p>
<p>In the years since the 2008 Beijing Olympics, or “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/24/opinion/24kristof.html">China’s genocide Olympics</a>,” which coincided with <a href="https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/tibetans-dont-let-genocide-olympics/">a brutal CCP crackdown on human rights in Tibet</a>, China has reinforced its border with Nepal, detaining refugees before they can reach foreign assistance. </p>
<p>For its part, Nepal accepts China’s demands, refusing to grant refugee status to newly arrived Tibetans. An annual average of 2,200 Tibetans <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/04/01/under-chinas-shadow/mistreatment-tibetans-nepal">fled China for Nepal prior to 2008</a>. In 2013, the year after Xi’s ascension to power, the number of refugees entering Nepal from Tibet collapsed to 171. </p>
<p>When the CCP catches Tibetans trying to cross the Nepalese border, they are “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/04/01/under-chinas-shadow/mistreatment-tibetans-nepal">imprisoned and physically abused</a>.”</p>
<h2>Cancel the 2022 Beijing Olympics</h2>
<p>The CCP’s draconian treatment of refugees seemingly puts it at odds with the IOC’s own efforts to assist refugees, making an Olympics in Beijing unjustifiable in 2022. That is, unless the IOC’s refugee initiative is merely superficial and intended more as a marketing campaign than a human rights initiative. </p>
<p>How else could Beijing be approved — for the second time in less than two decades — to host the Olympics in the first place? </p>
<p>IOC member Dick Pound’s <a href="https://www.sportsnet.ca/olympics/article/dick-pound-defends-iocs-decision-award-olympics-china/">recent comments</a> are telling. In an interview with <a href="https://share.deutschlandradio.de/dlf-audiothek-audio-teilen.html?audio_id=dira_DLF_c7da403a">Germany’s <em>Deutschlandfunk</em></a>, Pound said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“When we award the Games to a country … we don’t do it as an indication we support the political objectives of that country. It’s done on the basis of the importance of the country as a sporting nation and its ability to organize the Games at the level the world now expects for an Olympic Games.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The IOC’s position is clear. Human rights be damned. Refugees be damned. The Games must go on. The rest is window dressing.</p>
<p>Enough is enough. Cancel the 2022 Beijing Olympics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172467/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shakiba Moghadam is affiliated with Refugym charity.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>MacIntosh Ross does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The International Olympic Committee’s position is clear. Human rights be damned. Refugees be damned. The Games must go on. The rest is window dressing.MacIntosh Ross, Assistant Professor, Kinesiology, Western UniversityShakiba Oftadeh-Moghadam, PhD Researcher, School of Sport, Health and Exercise Science, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1722612021-11-25T16:33:20Z2021-11-25T16:33:20Z#WhereisPengShuai: Totalitarianism, violence against women and an overdue Olympic boycott?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433301/original/file-20211122-15-raf961.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=26%2C8%2C5964%2C3979&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The editor of a Communist Party newspaper posted a video online that he said showed missing tennis star Peng Shuai as the ruling party tried to quell fears abroad while suppressing information in China about Peng after she accused a senior leader of sexual assault. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Andy Brownbill)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Content warning: This article contains mention of sexual assault and rape.</em></p>
<p>On Nov. 2, 2021, Chinese tennis pro Peng Shuai took to Weibo — a Chinese microblogging site — to recount her alleged sexual assault at the hands of high-ranking Chinese Communist Party (CCP) member and former vice premier of China, Zhang Gaoli.</p>
<p>The post was removed after about 20 minutes and Peng’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-peng-shuai-zhang-gaoli-metoo/2021/11/03/79c0f308-3c4f-11ec-bd6f-da376f47304e_story.html">account was suspended</a>.</p>
<p>After an international outcry, Chinese state media released what they claim was an <a href="https://twitter.com/CGTNOfficial/status/1461025491842916358?s=20">email from Peng to Women’s Tennis Association CEO Steve Simon</a>, but the note’s <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/peng-shuai-naomi-osaka-joins-calls-answers-metoo-allegations-rcna5827">authenticity was questioned</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1462115626424705028"}"></div></p>
<p>China Global Television Network, the state’s international media platform, said Peng wrote directly to Steve Simon but the <a href="https://safeguarddefenders.com/en/scripted-and-staged%22%22">email inexplicably addressed “everyone</a>.” In a screenshot of the letter, a cursor is visible, raising questions about <a href="https://twitter.com/StephenMcDonell/status/1461040454913437714?s=20">when and where this email originated</a>.</p>
<p>Simon himself doubted its authenticity. “Whether she was coerced into writing it, someone wrote it for her, we don’t know,” <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/11/18/china/wta-ceo-peng-shuai-steve-simon-intl-hnk/index.html">Simon told <em>CNN</em></a>. “But at this point I don’t think there’s any validity in it and we won’t be comfortable until we have a chance to speak with her.” </p>
<p>Chinese state media then released a few photos of Peng, heightening concerns that the tennis star is not, in fact, free. Those concerns seem to be widely shared, except for one glaring exception — the International Olympic Committee (IOC).</p>
<h2>The IOC and CCP are acting as one</h2>
<p>According to the <a href="https://stillmed.olympics.com/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-Olympic-Charter.pdf?_ga=2.4482545.358704646.1637603417-1484801982.1626721502">Olympic Charter</a>, the IOC is supposed to be working toward a “peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.” When push came to shove, however, the IOC rushed to the CCP’s defence, publicly accepting the regime’s email as proof that Peng was safe and free. IOC President Thomas Bach even <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/11/21/sport/peng-shuai-video-call-thomas-bach-spt-intl/index.html">participated in a video call</a> with Peng. </p>
<p>Since Nov. 2, Peng hasn’t been asked about the alleged sexual assault — as if it was erased from the narrative. As <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/ioc-call-with-chinese-tennis-star-peng-raises-more-questions-1.5675079">Yaqiu Wang of Human Rights Watch explained</a>, the IOC is now “actively playing a role in the Chinese government’s enforced disappearance, coercion and propaganda machinery.”</p>
<p>The IOC and CCP now appear to be acting as one. Any hope for the “preservation of human dignity” at the 2022 Beijing Olympics is gone.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1462704006359359489"}"></div></p>
<h2>Totalitarian China and violence against women</h2>
<p>Mao Tse Tung famously stated “women hold up half the sky,” but male domination <a href="https://www.google.ca/books/edition/Betraying_Big_Brother/_MctEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=patriarchy+and+chinese+communism&printsec=frontcover">has been the norm</a> in China. Its political system <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/10/china-xi-jinping-totalitarian-authoritarian-debate/">is totalitarian</a> and patriarchal, standing in stark opposition to the nation’s <a href="https://www.google.ca/books/edition/Betraying_Big_Brother/_MctEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=China+women+big+brother&printsec=frontcover">growing, and thoroughly suppressed, feminist movement</a>.</p>
<p>In China, <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/24/605188107/chinese-women-face-rampant-gender-discrimination-from-employers-report-says">discrimination against women is rampant and institutionalized</a>. What Peng alleged she experienced is familiar to many Chinese women. </p>
<p>The CCP uses International Women’s Day as an opportunity to identify, harass and detain feminist activists. In 2015, a group of activists known as the Feminist Five — Li Maizi, Wu Rongrong, Zheng Churan, Wei Tingting and Wang Man — <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-to-release-three-of-five-womens-rights-activists-fate-of-two-unclear/2015/04/13/4c1195b2-e1e2-11e4-ae0f-f8c46aa8c3a4_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_22">were detained for 37 days</a> just for planning to give out anti-sexual harassment stickers on public transport during the event. </p>
<p>The social media accounts for <a href="https://www.cfr.org/event/feminist-voices-china-metoo-censorship">the group Feminist Voices</a> have also attracted the ire of the CCP. In 2015, Feminist Voices launched a campaign protesting China’s annual Spring Festival Gala on Chinese Central Television, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/02/25/chinas-feminists-stand-up-against-misogynistic-tv-gala/">securing 1,300 signatures</a> before being censored. </p>
<p>On March 8, 2018 — again on International Women’s Day — Feminist Voices <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2018/03/09/prominent-chinese-feminist-social-media-account-censored-international-womens-day/">was banned from Weibo</a>. A similar ban was <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2018/03/09/prominent-chinese-feminist-social-media-account-censored-international-womens-day/">carried out by WeChat</a> the following day.</p>
<p>In Xinjiang, where Muslim women are held for so-called “re-education,” rape remains a common means of torture and coercion. Tursunay Ziawudun, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">who spent nine months in a camp there</a>, told the <em>BBC</em> that “women were removed from the cells ‘every night’ and raped by one or more masked Chinese men.” </p>
<p>This has been verified by former camp physician and teacher Sayragul Sauytbay, who told reporters that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">guards rape women in full view of other detainees</a> in hopes of coercing confessions.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman stands holding her child in front of a blown-up, flipped-over car" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433300/original/file-20211122-27-1mkwg23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433300/original/file-20211122-27-1mkwg23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433300/original/file-20211122-27-1mkwg23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433300/original/file-20211122-27-1mkwg23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433300/original/file-20211122-27-1mkwg23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433300/original/file-20211122-27-1mkwg23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433300/original/file-20211122-27-1mkwg23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Uyghur woman and child walk past a burned car following riots in Urumqi, western China’s Xinjiang province in July 2009. One million Uyghur, Kazakhs and other Muslims are estimated to be held in heavily guarded internment camps, also called ‘re-education’ camps, which the Chinese government describes as vocational training centres.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Eugene Hoshiko)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>It’s time for the governments to take action</h2>
<p>It is morally and politically wrong to let Beijing host the Olympic Games. Silence is complicity, but endorsement — by actually sending athletes to the Games — is something much worse. </p>
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/serenawilliams/status/1461408866697105413?s=20">Serena Williams</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/naomiosaka/status/1460723353174433793?s=20">Naomi Osaka</a> and many other high-profile athletes are speaking out in support of Peng, but they need the backing of world governments to help prevent what stands to be the worst case of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-repressive-states-and-governments-use-sportswashing-to-remove-stains-on-their-reputation-100395">sport-washing human rights violations</a> since <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/the-nazi-olympics-berlin-1936">the Nazis hosted the 1936 Berlin Olympics</a>. </p>
<p>To many human rights activists, the disappearance of Peng further underlines the need for an international boycott of the 2022 Beijing Olympics. The CCP’s assaults on democracy activists in China and Hong Kong deserve more than wilful blindness.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172261/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The disappearance of Peng further underlines the need for an international boycott of the 2022 Beijing Olympics. The CCP’s assaults on democracy activists deserve more than willful blindness.MacIntosh Ross, Assistant Professor, Kinesiology, Western UniversityBiao Teng, Pozen Visiting Professor, University of ChicagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1723752021-11-24T13:41:23Z2021-11-24T13:41:23ZWhat the Peng Shuai saga tells us about Beijing’s grip on power and desire to crush a #MeToo moment<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433556/original/file-20211123-19-1v6two5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C88%2C4217%2C2719&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Forced into the darkness?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/shuai-peng-of-china-serves-during-her-ladies-singles-second-news-photo/964537912?adppopup=true">Cameron Spencer/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Chinese tennis star <a href="https://www.espn.com/tennis/story/_/id/32671331/photos-missing-chinese-tennis-star-peng-shuai-posted-online">Peng Shuai’s apparent disappearance</a> may have ended with a <a href="https://www.espn.com/tennis/story/_/id/32671331/photos-missing-chinese-tennis-star-peng-shuai-posted-online">smattering of public events</a>, which were <a href="https://www.insider.com/videos-peng-shuai-missing-chinese-tennis-star-questions-remain-2021-11">carefully curated</a> by state-run media and <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/china/peng-shuai-video-china-tennis-b1961474.html">circulated</a> in online clips. But many <a href="https://www.insider.com/videos-peng-shuai-missing-chinese-tennis-star-questions-remain-2021-11">questions remain</a> about the three weeks in which she was missing, and concerns linger over her well-being.</p>
<p>Peng, a former Wimbledon and French Open doubles champion, had been out of the public eye since Nov. 2. 2021 when she penned <a href="https://nypost.com/2021/11/04/peng-shuai-accuses-zhang-gaoli-of-sexual-assault-in-deleted-post/">a since-deleted social media post</a> accusing former Chinese Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli of sexual misconduct.</p>
<p>In the U.S. and Europe, such moments of courage from high-profile women have built momentum to out perpetrators of sexual harassment and assault and give a voice to those wronged. But in the political context of today’s People’s Republic of China (PRC) – a country that tightly controls political narratives within and outside its borders – something else happened. Peng was seemingly silenced; her #MeToo allegation was censored almost as soon as it was made. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://ccc.princeton.edu/people/yan-bennett">scholars of</a> <a href="https://www.cdu.edu.au/staff/john-garrick">Chinese legal culture</a> who have watched as the nation has become increasingly repressive under the premiership of Xi Jinping, we believe the mysterious disappearance – and brief reappearance – of Peng should be viewed within a broader sociolegal context. The episode shows that when presented with a potential pivotal #MeToo moment, Beijing is prepared to violate its own legal principles and respond with a state-media controlled operation aimed to chill any challenge to CCP authority.</p>
<h2>Claim of a sexual assault</h2>
<p>Peng’s Nov. 2 post on Weibo, the popular Chinese social media platform, reads like an open letter to Zhang, a retired but still powerful member of China’s Communist Party elite. </p>
<p>In it, the tennis star alleges coercion, duress and sexual assault. <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/11/03/china/china-metoo-peng-shuai-zhang-gaoli-intl-hnk/index.html">Peng wrote</a> to the 75-year-old Zhang:
“Why did you have to come back to me, took me to your home to force me to have sex with you? … I couldn’t describe how disgusted I was, and how many times I asked myself am I still a human? I feel like a walking corpse.”</p>
<p>The post was quickly taken down and Peng disappeared. But it sparked widespread international outrage. <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/world/peng-shuai-tennis-stars-leaders-demand-boycotts-serena-williams-naomi-osaka">Current</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/BillieJeanKing/status/1459985672715046913">former athletes</a> expressed <a href="https://twitter.com/ChrissieEvert/status/1459848382307086342">concern</a> over Peng’s safety, including <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/sports/2021/11/17/shocked-tennis-star-osaka-posts-where-is-peng-shuai">Naomi Osaka</a> and <a href="https://people.com/crime/serena-williams-joins-athletes-speaking-out-about-missing-chinese-tennis-player-as-un-asks-for-proof-of-whereabouts/">Serena Williams</a>. The hashtag #WhereIsPengShuai started trending.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1460723353174433793"}"></div></p>
<p>Chinese state media responded by publishing a message purportedly from Peng, stating that “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-59325399">everything is fine</a>.” But it was met with <a href="https://nypost.com/2021/11/17/china-state-media-release-supposed-message-from-peng-shuai/">deep skepticism</a> across the international community. Even with her reemergence at public events, concerns over her safety remain.</p>
<p>Behind the saga, however, is a clear message: It is dangerous to publicly criticize even a former senior Chinese Communist Party official. The party does not want any American-style <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/11/china/sexual-assault-mic-intl-hnk/index.html">#MeToo movement in China</a>, as it is hostile to any grassroots movements that challenge its authority.</p>
<h2>Being ‘disappeared’</h2>
<p>Peng’s disappearance also shows how authoritarian instruments of control are triggered by politically sensitive matters that contradict Communist Party narratives.</p>
<p>Such control of any sensitive narrative in China is commonplace with the CCP. Just ask <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-56448688">Jack Ma</a>, the former head of Alibaba, or movie star <a href="https://global.tuidang.org/2021/09/14/who-was-behind-the-mysterious-disappearance-and-reappearance-of-international-star-fan-bingbing/">Fan Bingbing</a>. Ma, who was the richest man in China and a worldwide celebrity, criticized the Chinese financial industry. This criticism led to his <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgecalhoun/2021/06/24/what-really-happened-to-jack-ma/?sh=40f4ced47c7e">quick disappearance from public view</a>. Thereafter, his <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgecalhoun/2021/06/07/the-sad-end-of-jack-ma-inc/?sh=653e68e7123a">ANT Group IPO was quashed and assets disassembled and appropriated by government-controlled entities</a>. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/film/2018/oct/04/fan-bingbing-mysterious-disappearance-chinese-film-star-elite">Fan also disappeared</a> from public view and eventually resurfaced, only to be fined for tax evasion. It appeared that the Communist Party considered her conduct may have had a <a href="https://www.vogue.com/article/,fan-bing-bing-missing-chinese-government-social-responsibility-hollywood">corrupting influence on socialist values</a> with displays of wealth and glamour out of sync with Xi’s revival of Maoist concepts such as “<a href="https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2021/11/22/chin-n22.html">common prosperity</a>.” </p>
<p>In Peng’s case, her story directly contradicted the Communist Party’s <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/reconsidering-the-history-of-the-chinese-communist-party">official narrative</a> of harmonious relations between people and Party. In particular, her allegations contradict the narrative that women, who <a href="https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-1/ol-women.htm">purportedly “hold up half the sky in China”</a>, enjoy <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/world/feminist-activism-china-social-death-amid-clampdown-women-speaking-out-1307000">gender equality under this government</a>.</p>
<p>Peng, for challenging this view, was given a taste of being canceled from China’s history and stripped of her rights under the Chinese constitution to seek justice in relation to her serious allegations. Indeed, the Chinese government has a history of unjustly detaining people involved in contentious cases, limiting their capacity to talk freely, and <a href="https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/china/after-wta-us-rights-group-questions-chinese-media-claiming-peng-shuais-safety.html">forcing statements</a>. </p>
<p>Under Xi, China enjoys a self-described “<a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/18/c_136688445.htm">socialist democracy with 'Chinese characteristics’</a>,” in which “<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cegv//eng/bjzl/t225536.htm">the citizens’ basic rights are respected and guaranteed</a>.”</p>
<p>But the response to Peng, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-01-14/china-control-covid-origin-message-detention-zhang-zhan/13056420">amongst others</a>, shows that rule of law has become a ruthless, blunt force instrument wielded by party leadership. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.hoover.org/press-releases/hoover-institution-releases-essay-former-chinese-communist-party-insider-about">Cai Xia</a>, former professor at the Central Party School of the CCP, argued in June 2021: “the regime has degenerated further into a political oligarchy bent on holding on to power through brutality and ruthlessness [and] has grown ever more repressive and dictatorial.”</p>
<p>Cai continued: “A personality cult now surrounds Xi, who has tightened the Party’s grip on ideology and eliminated what little space there was for political speech and civil society.”</p>
<p>In Peng’s case, her “being disappeared” appears to be an attempt to kill several birds with one arrow: crush dissent, stem any Chinese #MeToo momentum and instill fear about criticizing CCP officials because, as the vanguard of the Communist Party under <a href="https://www.visiontimes.com/2021/09/01/in-china-xi-jinping-thought-now-compulsory-learning-for-students-in-primary-schools-to-graduate-programs.html">Xi Jinping Thought</a>, they must always be seen as virtuous. In short, “Xi Jinping Thought” is a set of policies and ideas taken from the various writings and speeches of General Secretary <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202111/24/WS619d6b6da310cdd39bc7715e.html">Xi</a>. </p>
<h2>‘Fight to the end’</h2>
<p>Peng’s allegations came at a particularly sensitive time for the CCP. It came just as Xi was preparing to deliver a <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2021/11/12/china-ruling-party-leaders-pass-historic-xi-resolution/">historical resolution</a> aimed at further cementing his grip on power.</p>
<p>“The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has entered a key phase, and risks and challenges we face are conspicuously increasing,” <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-xl/news/other/don-t-expect-an-easy-life-and-be-ready-to-struggle-chinese-president-xi-jinping-warns-officials/ar-AAO1Dbb?ocid=uxbndlbing">Xi remarked</a>, while vowing to “fight to the end” with any forces that attempt to subvert the party’s leadership.</p>
<p>“Any forces” apparently includes anyone who criticizes or challenges the Communist Party – even one of its own international sports stars making serious allegations against a former party official.</p>
<p>[<em>Science, politics, religion or just plain interesting articles:</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-checkoutweekly">Check out The Conversation’s weekly newsletters</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172375/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What happens when a Chinese #MeToo moment meets authoritarian legality?Yan Bennett, Assistant Director for the Paul and Marcia Wythes Center on Contemporary China, Princeton UniversityJohn Garrick, University Fellow in Law, Charles Darwin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1684822021-11-22T19:08:50Z2021-11-22T19:08:50ZLittle red children and ‘Grandpa Xi’: China’s school textbooks reflect the rise of Xi Jinping’s personality cult<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432329/original/file-20211117-17-8jltky.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/group-asian-elementary-school-children-one-591940196">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When students in China returned to classrooms in September 2021, they were provided with a <a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/lingli_vienna/status/1413865821319860224">new series of textbooks</a> outlining China’s president Xi Jinping, or “Grandpa Xi’s”, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/1/chinas-pupils-get-schooled-in-xi-jinping-thought">political philosophy</a>. </p>
<p>Each textbook on “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era”, as Xi’s political philosophy is officially called, is tailored to students at primary, secondary, and tertiary levels.</p>
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<p>“Xi Jinping Thought” was enshrined into the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-10/29/c_136713559.htm">Constitution</a> in 2017. Although the main stated aims are to remain committed to reform and build a “moderately prosperous society”, the <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/7872#bodyftn4">realities</a> of this political philosophy has been a tightening of party discipline and curtailing of social freedom. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-sixth-plenum-will-consolidate-xi-jinpings-power-and-chart-the-countrys-ambitions-for-the-next-5-years-171395">China's sixth plenum will consolidate Xi Jinping's power and chart the country's ambitions for the next 5 years</a>
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<p>While prior textbooks were focused on the CCP, the new versions centre on China’s paramount leader. In this way they reflect the growing personality cult of Xi Jinping, eerily reminiscent of the days of China’s founding father Mao Zedong.</p>
<h2>The rise of the personality cult</h2>
<p>According to China’s <a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202108/25/WS61259859a310efa1bd66aea6.html">National Textbook Committee</a>, the </p>
<blockquote>
<p>textbooks reflect the will of the Communist Party of China and the nation and directly impact the direction and quality of talent cultivation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In particular, the <a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202108/25/WS61259859a310efa1bd66aea6.html">Committee</a> stated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Primary schools should foster love and right understanding for the Party, country and socialism in students.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-10/12/content_33160115.htm">core socialist values</a> highlighted in the textbooks include prosperity, patriotism and friendship. </p>
<p>Targeted at children, the moniker of “Grandpa Xi” is part of the ongoing strategy towards creating a personality cult in China. Authoritarian regimes like the Soviet Union also used the grandfather figure (“Grandpa Lenin”) as part of propaganda aimed at children. This enhanced Lenin’s <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230518216_6">personality cult</a> across the Soviet nations. </p>
<p>Political scientist <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1q1crzp.7?seq=5#metadata_info_tab_contents">Pao-min Chang</a> defines the personality cult as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The artificial elevation of the status and authority of one man […] through the deliberate creation, projection and propagation of a godlike image.</p>
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<p>Like Lenin, a personality cult around Mao Zedong emerged during China’s Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Although later leaders Deng Xiaoping, the architect of China’s economic reform, and Wen Jiabao, who was Premier between 2003 and 2013, are popularly known as “Grandpa Deng” and “Grandpa Wen,” they did not overtly push for this image. </p>
<p>Xi returns to Mao in his efforts to build a <a href="https://utsynergyjournal.org/2019/03/16/the-cult-of-xi-chinas-return-to-a-maoist-personality-cult/">personality cult</a> around himself. Since coming to power, he has cultivated the image of being “a man of the people” in a bid to make his authoritarianism more palpable to the masses. </p>
<h2>Little red children and Grandpa Xi</h2>
<p>The new primary school textbooks emphasise Xi’s wisdom, friendliness and care for the children. Early signs of this strategy can be seen in government propaganda video, Grandpa Xi is Our Big Friend, that circulated online in 2015. </p>
<p>The video was <a href="https://www.dwnews.com/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD/59660857/%E5%BB%B6%E5%AE%89%E5%AD%A6%E7%AB%A5%E6%AD%8C%E9%A2%82%E4%B9%A0%E7%88%B7%E7%88%B7%E7%BD%91%E5%8F%8B%E8%B5%9E%E4%BA%BA%E6%89%8D">recorded</a> at Yan'an Yucai Primary School in Shaanxi. The location is significant because the school was founded by Mao Zedong in 1937. </p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-jinping-puts-his-stamp-on-communist-party-history-but-is-his-support-as-strong-as-his-predecessors-170874">Xi Jinping puts his stamp on Communist Party history, but is his support as strong as his predecessors?</a>
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<p>In the video, Xi Jinping is not presented as a distant authority figure. Instead, Grandpa Xi is a caring “big friend.” The children sing that his “warm smile” is “brighter than the sun.” Images of children waving sunflowers and lyrics that describe Xi’s visit as “better than the warmth of a spring day” serve to accentuate his friendly disposition. </p>
<p>Most importantly, the children sing about the need to “study diligently” to “achieve the Chinese Dream”. This dream is Xi Jinping’s vision for China to become a prosperous society.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433031/original/file-20211122-13-1wujt62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Statue of Mao Zedong" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433031/original/file-20211122-13-1wujt62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433031/original/file-20211122-13-1wujt62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433031/original/file-20211122-13-1wujt62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433031/original/file-20211122-13-1wujt62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433031/original/file-20211122-13-1wujt62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433031/original/file-20211122-13-1wujt62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433031/original/file-20211122-13-1wujt62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A personality cult around Mao Zedong was a large part of the propaganda during China’s Cultural Revolution.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/lijiang-china-march-8-2012-statue-531870715">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The children wear red scarves and red stars in the video. These <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/220558">symbols</a> represent the national flag. The colour red alludes to the blood of revolutionary <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17482798.2011.587293">martyrs</a>. They remind children of their connection to the nation and the Party. </p>
<p>Xi wears a red scarf in the video. In one scene, he places a red scarf over the shoulders of a child. This accessory and gesture are depicted in the 2021 primary school textbooks as well. The act of placing a scarf on a child signifies children taking on the mantle of happily fulfilling Grandpa Xi’s vision. </p>
<h2>The CCP’s Young Pioneers</h2>
<p>The textbook for lower primary students contain photos of Xi planting trees with children and meeting them at school. </p>
<p>The books include statements such as: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Grandpa Xi Jinping is very busy with work, but no matter how busy he is, he still joins our activities and cares about our growth.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Xi shares his memories of being emotional when joining the Young Pioneers of China (the CCP’s youth organisation) in 1960. He then invites readers to describe their own feelings about becoming a part of the Young Pioneers, thus encouraging young people to join.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422845/original/file-20210923-1932-oof5br.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422845/original/file-20210923-1932-oof5br.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=693&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422845/original/file-20210923-1932-oof5br.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=693&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422845/original/file-20210923-1932-oof5br.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=693&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422845/original/file-20210923-1932-oof5br.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=871&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422845/original/file-20210923-1932-oof5br.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=871&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422845/original/file-20210923-1932-oof5br.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=871&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Xi Jinping tying a red scarf around a child at a Beijing primary school.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">'Page from Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics For the New Era' textbook for lower primary.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The textbooks use illustrations with speech bubbles to make the ideological content more interesting. Some illustrations are of students sitting around a table teaching each other Grandpa Xi’s expectations to become a person of “good moral character” and who is “diligent and thrifty”. </p>
<p>The books also emphasise acquiring knowledge about “science and technology,” as well as being “creative and innovative”. </p>
<p>The children must cultivate these markers of good citizenship to become what the books refer to as “qualified builders and successors of socialism”. This rhetoric of children as the <a href="https://cup.cuhk.edu.hk/index.php?route=product/product&product_id=394">hope of the nation</a> has been in use since the late nineteenth century. </p>
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Read more:
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<p>The emphasis on being “qualified” suggests children must live up to the expectations set out by Xi. The textbooks imply this is only possible because of Grandpa Xi’s continued care for them. </p>
<p>This image of Grandpa Xi as a “big friend” is a gentler form of propaganda than that seen during Mao’s Cultural Revolution. Propaganda aimed at children during the Cultural Revolution positioned the Party as the surrogate parent. It also highlighted <a href="https://books.google.co.nz/books/about/Picturing_Power_in_the_People_s_Republic.html?id=I3S6mlTj1K4C&redir_esc=y">children’s violence</a> as they fought for the socialist cause. Young Red Guards sang patriotic songs and read the Little Red Book. These rituals fostered Mao’s cult of personality. </p>
<p>It remains to be seen whether the new school curriculum is a harbinger of future deification of Xi Jinping.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168482/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New school textbooks in China focus less on the Chinese Communist Party and more on its figurehead Xi Jinping. The growing cultivation of a personality cult is reminiscent of the days of Mao Zedong.Shih-Wen Sue Chen, Senior Lecturer in Writing and Literature, Deakin UniversitySin Wen Lau, Senior Lecturer in China Studies, University of OtagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.