tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/economic-community-of-west-african-states-ecowas-34802/articlesEconomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – The Conversation2024-03-14T13:15:14Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2255172024-03-14T13:15:14Z2024-03-14T13:15:14ZBurkina Faso, Mali and Niger hint at a new west African currency: what it’ll take for it to succeed<p><em>On 11 February 2024, the head of Niger’s ruling military junta, General Abdourahmane Tiani, spoke of the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20240213-niger-hints-at-new-currency-in-step-out-of-colonialisation">possible creation of a common currency</a> with Burkina Faso and Mali. “The currency is a first step toward breaking free from the legacy of colonisation,” he said on national TV, referring to the CFA franc inherited from French colonisation.</em></p>
<p><em>Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, three former French colonies, have experienced military coups in recent years. They’re now all ruled by military regimes. They also formed a new defence alliance, known as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-have-a-new-defence-alliance-an-expert-view-of-its-chances-of-success-215863">Alliance of Sahel States</a> (AES).</em> </p>
<p><em>The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20240226-la-lev%C3%A9e-des-sanctions-contre-le-niger-un-net-changement-de-braquet-pour-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao">has condemned</a> these coups and imposed sanctions on the countries involved. In response, these countries decided to withdraw from Ecowas. However, they remain members of the <a href="https://www.umoatitres.org/en/commission-de-luemoa/">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a> (Uemoa). Uemoa has a common currency, the CFA franc, which is issued by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO).</em></p>
<p><em>The BCEAO and the Banque de France are bound by <a href="https://www.banque-france.fr/fr/banque-de-france/partenariats-afrique-france">cooperation agreements</a> that include the deposit of a portion of foreign exchange reserves at the Banque de France and France guaranteeing the CFA franc.</em></p>
<p><em>Thierno Thioune, an expert on <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352717047_Interdependance_entre_Politique_monetaire_et_politique_budgetaire_au_niveau_de_l4UEMOA?_tp=eyJjb250ZXh0Ijp7ImZpcnN0UGFnZSI6InByb2ZpbGUiLCJwYWdlIjoicHJvZmlsZSJ9fQ">monetary policies and unions between west African states</a>, analyses the potential implications and feasibility of launching a new currency for the AES member countries.</em></p>
<h2>What conditions must be met for a multilateral currency to work?</h2>
<p>To successfully launch and maintain a multilateral currency, several key factors must be considered.</p>
<p>First, macroeconomic and budgetary policies must be closely coordinated. Rigorous harmonisation of economic and budgetary policies between participating countries is imperative to guarantee the stability of the currency’s value and prevent trade imbalances. This will help maintain the confidence of economic players and promote regional growth.</p>
<p>Second, robust monetary management institutions must be established. Strong institutions responsible for currency management, like a common central bank, are essential. This central bank must have adequate authority to implement an independent and stable monetary policy. This will ensure the preservation of the currency’s value and address cyclical fluctuations. </p>
<p>Third, creating an integrated common market is vital. The unrestricted flow of goods, services, capital and labour is key to driving economic growth and enhancing regional cooperation. The current framework provided by the West African Economic and Monetary Union offers a significant advantage in this regard.</p>
<p>Finally, mechanisms to monitor and resolve crises need to be established. For instance, common reserve funds and <a href="https://www.abc-forex.net/contenu/swap-de-change/swap-devises.php">currency swap arrangements</a> could help address external and internal shocks that may affect the new currency. Currency swaps – when two parties exchange amounts in two different currencies for a certain period at a fixed rate – can be used to manage exchange rate risks and facilitate cross-border financing. </p>
<h2>Are these conditions met in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali?</h2>
<p>It’s difficult to say whether these conditions have been fully met in the three countries. It would mean having a firm understanding of whether these, among other, conditions have been met: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>harmonisation of government policies</p></li>
<li><p>macroeconomic stability through inflation control</p></li>
<li><p>limit on public debt</p></li>
<li><p>maintenance of a balanced current account.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>At this time, it’s hard to say whether these countries have done this. </p>
<h2>Does their monetary union membership make any difference?</h2>
<p>These three countries have been part of the West African Economic and Monetary Union since 1963. In theory, this should give them some experience in coordinating economic and monetary policies through the CFA franc. </p>
<p>They could have experience with infrastructure, like the Central Bank of West African States (which manages the single currency and monetary policy for member states), that would help them with the transition.</p>
<h2>What are the potential gains and risks of the initiative?</h2>
<p>Despite the risks involved, the initiative could bring several benefits. </p>
<p>Establishing a larger monetary zone can foster greater trade integration and improved resource allocation. </p>
<p>It could enhance the country’s “flexibility” in dealing with external partners. </p>
<p>By joining a new monetary union, these three countries could also benefit significantly from increased trade integration, independence from external partners, lower transaction costs and investor attractiveness. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, this initiative also entails risks, particularly with regard to their position within the West African Economic and Monetary Union and Ecowas. The latter could perceive the creation of a new currency as a threat to their regional influence. It could cause the fragmentation of existing economic blocs. In addition, the departure of the three countries could weaken the solidity of the West African Economic and Monetary Union and Ecowas in terms of economic and political influence. </p>
<p>There are also risks that the currency could quickly lose value. </p>
<p>The new currency could depreciate against the CFA franc. This could have substantial negative repercussions for exporters to other West African Economic and Monetary Union countries.</p>
<p>Second, without proper formal frameworks to control and manage the new currency, speculation and uncertainty regarding its value may emerge. This is why establishing robust institutions to support the management and supervision of the new currency is crucial.</p>
<h2>How will the new currency affect trade in the zone?</h2>
<p>The creation of a new currency by these three nations could, temporarily, have a negative impact on their trade with countries within the current bloc. It could even lead to some turbulence in trade with countries outside it.</p>
<p>The transition to a new currency typically introduces a level of uncertainty among economic actors and trading partners, as questions arise about the currency’s value, convertibility and stability. This adjustment phase can lead to a temporary slowdown in trade.</p>
<p>In addition, the introduction of a new currency often requires legislative and regulatory changes, especially regarding foreign exchange operations and customs duties. These can act as administrative and regulatory barriers and result in delays in commercial transactions.</p>
<p>During the transitional period, there may be fluctuations in exchange rates. This will lead to disparities between the old and new currencies. It can affect price competitiveness between exporters and importers and reduce the overall volume of trade.</p>
<p>The perceptions and attitudes of external partners matter when a new currency is announced. Some trading partners may exhibit reluctance or express doubts regarding its reliability and credibility. This could diminish their willingness to continue trading with member countries of the zone.</p>
<h2>Could the move isolate them?</h2>
<p>The creation of a new currency by these three countries may indeed raise questions about their potential isolation. However, such an initiative should not automatically lead to a diplomatic rupture or total marginalisation.</p>
<p>To avoid this, proactive communication, constructive cooperation and balanced, inclusive regional economic integration are key. This will help mitigate the risks of isolation for Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in their monetary project.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225517/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thierno Thioune has received funding from the Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF) and the Romanian Government for the "Eugen Ionescu" doctoral programme at the University "Dunarea De Jos" in Galati, Romania. CODESRIA also awarded him a prize as part of its thesis grant programme.</span></em></p>Several conditions must be met to ensure the successful launch and operation of a multilateral currency.Thierno Thioune, enseignant-chercheur, directeur du CREA, Université Cheikh Anta Diop de DakarLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2242092024-02-28T16:56:15Z2024-02-28T16:56:15ZEcowas: west African trade bloc shaken as three member states withdraw and form their own alliance<p>Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-68122947">announced</a> their immediate withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) on January 27. Ecowas, which was formed in 1975, is a regional political and economic union of 15 mainly former British and French colonies located in west Africa. </p>
<p>The withdrawals come as no surprise. Throughout west Africa, there is growing frustration with Ecowas over its struggle to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/26/over-1800-terrorist-attacks-in-west-africa-in-2023-ecowas">ensure security</a> in the region. Coups have become commonplace and west Africa has seen a dramatic increase in terrorist activity over recent years. Two west African states, Mali and Burkina Faso, are now among the the world’s five countries <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/sahel-now-accounts-43-global-terrorism-deaths">most affected</a> by terrorism. </p>
<p>The bloc’s <a href="https://www.liberationnews.org/what-is-the-new-alliance-of-sahel-states-challenging-neo-colonialism-in-west-africa/">perceived support</a> for leaders aligned with former colonial powers is also seen as contributing to the persistent poverty experienced by their populations. The leaders of several Ecowas member states have been accused of being <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/domino-effect-frances-disintegrating-influence-africa">“puppets”</a> under the influence of France, which critics <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/05/world/africa/niger-coup-france-west-africa.html">say</a> never really let go of its former colonies.</p>
<p>In Niger, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66406137">allegations</a> that the country’s president, Mohamed Bazoum, was a puppet for French interests were used to legitimise his removal from power in a military coup in July 2023. French colonial rule (1895–1958) established political systems designed to extract natural resources from African states.</p>
<p>The response to the coup marked a significant political shift in the region. Ecowas imposed economic sanctions on Niger and issued a seven-day <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/08/niger-ecowas-bazoum-nigeria-tinubu-military-intervention/">ultimatum</a>, vowing to use force to dislodge the military junta (a government led by a council of military officers) should it not restore Bazoum to power. But the junta refused to back down and Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-west-african-union-has-pledged-to-intervene-but-some-members-support-the-plotters-210990">pledged</a> to counter any action by Ecowas troops in Niger.</p>
<p>The agreement of these leaders and their readiness to take military action against Ecowas revealed the extent of their animosity towards the organisation and its leaders. These three countries, which are also governed by military rulers who have ousted democratically elected leaders in recent years, have all been hit with punitive sanctions since 2021.</p>
<p>On September 16 2023, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger signed a new <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-have-a-new-defence-alliance-an-expert-view-of-its-chances-of-success-215863">mutual defence pact</a> named the Alliance of Sahel States. Ecowas is encouraging these countries to return to the bloc by <a href="https://punchng.com/why-sanction-was-lifted-on-niger-mali-burkina-faso-ecowas/">lifting its sanctions</a>. But new partners like Russia, which is looking to <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">increase its influence</a> across the continent, are at the same time supporting their efforts to form a united front. </p>
<p>African governments have increasingly welcomed economic, diplomatic and security <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russias-growing-footprint-africa">ties</a> with Russia, facilitated in part by the state-backed <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/07/africa-corps-wagner-group-russia-africa-burkina-faso/">Wagner Group</a> (now called the “Expeditionary Corps”). The group is known for deploying paramilitary forces, running disinformation campaigns and propping up influential political leaders.</p>
<h2>The company of the old guards</h2>
<p>Ecowas has a patchy track record when it comes to ensuring cooperation and security across west Africa. In 1990, the military arm of Ecowas was deployed in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-west-african-union-has-pledged-to-intervene-but-some-members-support-the-plotters-210990">peacekeeping role</a> in Liberia. Despite some initial success, Ecowas was unable to prevent an escalation of hostilities that lasted for the best part of a decade. </p>
<p>Similarly, despite efforts by Ecowas to restore peace in Sierra Leone after a coup in 1997, a brutal civil war broke out, requiring the intervention of UN peacekeepers. </p>
<hr>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-west-african-union-has-pledged-to-intervene-but-some-members-support-the-plotters-210990">Niger coup: west African union has pledged to intervene – but some members support the plotters</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Ecowas has been instrumental in safeguarding democracy within the region as well. In 2016, Gambia’s incumbent leader, Yahya Jammeh, refused to leave office after losing a presidential vote to Adama Barrow. But, with Ecowas troops poised to march on the capital, Banjul, Jammeh <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ousted-gambia-president-jammeh-to-stand-down-adama-barrow-takes-power/a-37217907">relinquished power</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map showing the 15 member states of Ecowas." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ecowas is a regional political and economic union of 15 countries in west Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/ecowas-economic-community-west-african-states-2341602777">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, Ecowas has been inconsistent in its condemnation of military and civilian coups. And it has also been criticised for overlooking unlawful term extensions, a common practice among many entrenched leaders in the region. </p>
<p>In 2015, Ecowas leaders <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32808685">dropped a proposal</a> to limit west African presidents to a maximum of two terms in office. As a result, there is no established protocol for penalising leaders from member states who seek to remain in power indefinitely.</p>
<p>This paved the way for the presidents of both Ivory Coast and Guinea (<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201103-ivory-coast-president-ouattara-wins-re-election-to-third-term">Alassane Ouattara</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-54657359">Alpha Condé</a> respectively) to secure controversial third terms in 2020. The failure of Ecowas to intervene resulted in Condé being <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/09/09/alpha-conde-the-president-of-guinea-is-ousted-in-a-coup">ousted from power</a> by a military coup one year later.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/mali-niger-burkina-faso-ecowas-west-africa-5a5dc2180e39223c91b1820067db4011">Oge Onubogu</a>, the director of the Africa Program, a Washington-based think tank: “Ecowas is fast losing its effectiveness and support among citizens, who see it as representing only the interests of the leaders and not that of the masses.” </p>
<h2>The challenger group</h2>
<p>The loss of any member from Ecowas will affect <a href="https://theconversation.com/mali-burkina-faso-and-niger-want-to-leave-ecowas-a-political-scientist-explains-the-fallout-222388">trade</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/west-africa-trade-will-take-a-hit-as-mali-niger-and-burkina-faso-leave-ecowas-223098">economic development</a> and the movement of citizens within the bloc. But the decision by Ecowas to lift post-coup sanctions signals its readiness to negotiate and cultivate relationships with these countries, regardless of whether they rejoin the organisation. </p>
<p>Ecowas <a href="https://punchng.com/why-sanction-was-lifted-on-niger-mali-burkina-faso-ecowas/">says</a> that the decision to lift sanctions was based on considering their impact on citizens and the need to maintain regional unity and security. Ecowas also <a href="https://punchng.com/why-sanction-was-lifted-on-niger-mali-burkina-faso-ecowas/">noted</a> the period of Lent and the approaching month of Ramadan as factors influencing their decisions. </p>
<p>Millions of young Africans are being <a href="https://www.trtafrika.com/insight/ibrahim-traore-why-burkina-fasos-leader-attracts-attention-14479334">drawn</a> to the Alliance of Sahel States, signalling discontent with the ineffectiveness of Ecowas and disillusionment with the west. Russia has capitalised on this trend. The Wagner Group is reportedly <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/02/20/putin-wagner-mercenaries-regime-survival-package-africa/">offering</a> military support to willing African leaders in the form of “regime survival packages”.</p>
<p>A competitor to Ecowas appears to have emerged in west Africa, and this alliance is not backing down. Only time will tell whether the new alliance will favour the citizens of west Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224209/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ecowas has a patchy track record when it comes to ensuring cooperation and security across west Africa – member states are now starting to leave.Olumba E. Ezenwa, Doctoral Research Fellow, Conflict, Violence, & Terrorism Research Centre, Royal Holloway University of LondonOlayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2228262024-02-21T12:29:46Z2024-02-21T12:29:46ZFree movement in west Africa: three countries leaving Ecowas could face migration hurdles<p>For Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, a recent decision to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947">withdraw</a> from the <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States</a> (Ecowas) has thrown up questions about how they will navigate regional mobility in future. </p>
<p>Ecowas covers a variety of sectors, but migration is a major one. The bloc’s protocols since 1979 have long been seen as a <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-97322-3_2">shining example</a> of free movement on the continent. They gave citizens the right to move between countries in the region without a visa, and a prospective right of residence and setting up businesses.</p>
<p>As multidisciplinary scholars we have previously researched <a href="https://www.arnold-bergstraesser.de/en/political-economy-west-african-migration-governance-wamig-2">migration governance in west Africa</a>, at the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2022.2084452">regional level</a>, and in particular contexts like <a href="https://ecdpm.org/work/what-does-regime-change-niger-mean-migration-cooperation-eu">Niger</a>. </p>
<p>We argue that Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have much to lose if their departure from Ecowas curtails mobility. But it is likely that informal mobility will continue anyway. </p>
<h2>Why free movement matters</h2>
<p>In September 2023, the three countries created a <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-have-a-new-defence-alliance-an-expert-view-of-its-chances-of-success-215863">mutual defence pact</a>, named <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sahel-coups-niger-tchiani-mali-burkina-faso-insecurity-e96627c700aa4fcf8d060dd9d2d16667">the Alliance of Sahel States</a>. This indicated their solidarity in dealing with insecurity. </p>
<p>Yet they also depend on neighbouring countries in the region, which puts these three countries in a difficult position.</p>
<p>The three countries that announced their withdrawal from Ecowas are connected in a web of mobility. Notably, Niger, seen as a key transit country for refugees and other migrants on their way to Europe, received <a href="https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/migration-and-society/3/1/arms030107.xml">major funds and support</a> from the European Union to prevent onward migration to Libya and beyond. </p>
<p>One central measure was <a href="https://www.refworld.org/legal/legislation/natlegbod/2015/fr/123771">Loi 2015-36</a>, a law which punished people transporting migrants with fines and prison sentences. The law was <a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/european-dominance-of-migration-policy-in-niger-31383/">mostly developed</a> by external actors and had detrimental effects on the <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/multilateral-damage.pdf">local economy</a>. It also made migration journeys across the Sahara desert even <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc4138add1-visit-niger-report-special-rapporteur-human-rights-migrants">more dangerous</a>. </p>
<p>In November 2023, the law, which <a href="https://www.arnold-bergstraesser.de/sites/default/files/medam_niger_jegen.pdf">arguably violated</a> the principles of free movement under Ecowas, was repealed by the Nigerien coup leaders. </p>
<p>Mali is another major transit country in the region, as well as a country of origin for regional migration. It has a complicated history of <a href="https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/72355">migration cooperation</a> with Europe. </p>
<p>Of less relevance to Europe, but more for regional dynamics, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-39814-8_11">Burkina Faso</a> is at the centre for <a href="https://www.mideq.org/en/migration-corridors/burkina-faso-cote-divoire/">regional migration</a>, often seasonal. Labour migration supports Côte d'Ivoire’s cocoa industry. After withdrawal from Ecowas, such labour migration may be difficult unless people resort more to informal migration. </p>
<p>As we have shown in our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2022.2084452">previous research</a>, informal mobility has always existed along with formal mobility governance. Official border crossing points are often not used, despite the legal requirement to do so. </p>
<p>Hence, leaving Ecowas may increase corruption and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/imig.12766">problems of harassment</a> at formal border crossings as well as <a href="https://mixedmigration.org/resource/human-rights-migrants-smuggling-mali-niger/">increased use of mobility facilitators</a>, or “passeurs”. These are people who negotiate passage through formal border crossings and organise journeys through other routes. </p>
<p>The legal gaps that the current situation creates could be very expensive for businesses and individuals. People may in the near future require visas. And for those who have migrated regionally, the right to stay in a country of residency may soon be under threat. </p>
<h2>An immediate exit</h2>
<p>Days after they <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947">announced</a> their withdrawal from <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/">Ecowas</a>, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger <a href="https://www.ewn.co.za/2024/02/08/burkina-mali-and-niger-reject-one-year-period-to-quit-ecowas">insisted</a> they were not bound by <a href="https://ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Revised-treaty-1.pdf#page=53">rules stipulating</a> a one year notice period before their final exit. </p>
<p>The announcement about leaving Ecowas outside the normal regulations was dramatic, but not unexpected. Military governments that took power in a series of coups in August 2020 and May 2021 in <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/mali-un-coup-dans-le-coup">Mali</a>, September 2022 in <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-burkina-faso-latest-coup/">Burkina Faso</a> and July 2023 in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/armed-troops-blockade-presidential-palace-in-niger-mohamed-bazoum">Niger</a> rule the three countries.</p>
<p>Ecowas has exerted political and economic pressure on the three countries to return to constitutional rule, through sanctions and the <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/policy-briefs/military-intervention-niger-imperatives-and-caveats">threat</a> of military intervention. </p>
<p>In Niger, for example, Ecowas <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-bazoum-coup-sanctions-ecowas-c7bdfd06559f1cfbfb856bea5b11a55f">closed</a> official border crossings, cut off more than <a href="https://punchng.com/niger-nigeria-cuts-power-supply-ecowas-vows-to-confront-junta/">70% </a> of electricity, and suspended financial transactions with other countries in the region. </p>
<p>International assets <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/31/nigers-planned-51-mln-bond-issuance-cancelled-due-to-sanctions">were frozen</a> and international aid halted. Even before the coup, <a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/thousands-children-niger-risk-severe-nutritional-crisis-border-closures-leave-trucks-stranded#:%7E:text=Furthermore%2C%20prior%20to%20the%20political,least%20one%20form%20of%20malnutrition.">3.3 million people</a> in Niger experienced acute food insecurity. </p>
<p>The Ecowas sanctions made daily life even worse and in all likelihood added to the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate">popularity</a> of the coup leaders. </p>
<p>Similar sanctions were applied in Mali. The population has suffered as a result and the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-arent-sanctions-preventing-coups-in-africa">effectiveness</a> of the sanctions is questionable. </p>
<p>Sanctions in Burkina Faso included <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-arent-sanctions-preventing-coups-in-africa">travel bans</a> against members of the military government.</p>
<h2>Potential ways ahead</h2>
<p>For Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, there are several considerations when it comes to regional mobility in their post-Ecowas era. These may include exploring the provisions of the <a href="https://www.uemoa.int/en">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a>; a return to bilateral agreements with individual neighbours; or relying on the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">African Union Protocol on Free Movement</a>. </p>
<p><strong>Monetary union:</strong> The three countries are still part of the <a href="https://www.uemoa.int/en">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a> (Waemu), a union around the common currency, the CFA franc.</p>
<p>The regional monetary union also has provisions for free movement of people and goods across its member countries. With this option, access to seaports, a major issue for all three landlocked countries, is ensured through other members of the monetary union, including, for example, Senegal. </p>
<p>On the downside is the fact that a major argument for leaving Ecowas was the perceived role of external influence over the regional bloc. The strong anti-imperialist discourse of the military governments does not bode well for the regional monetary union either. The union is the institutional framework for regional monetary policy over which France <a href="https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745341798/africas-last-colonial-currency/">continues</a> to exert significant influence. </p>
<p>Burkina Faso has already <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-may-quit-west-african-currency-union-not-mali-2024-01-31/">announced</a> its intention to leave the monetary union too. </p>
<p>The West Africa Economic and Monetary Union also excludes major trading partners like Nigeria – of major importance to landlocked <a href="https://www.inter-reseaux.org/en/publication/51-special-issue-nigeria/nigerias-role-in-nigers-food-security/">Niger</a> for food supplies. Trade and commerce between Nigeria and Niger provides a lifeline and is among the most intense areas of cross-border activity in west Africa. </p>
<p>For these reasons, the regional monetary union option seems an unlikely alternative.</p>
<p><strong>Bilateral agreements:</strong> Another option for the three countries could be a return to bilateral agreements with individual countries to facilitate free movement. This can be likened to what former Ecowas member <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00083968.2014.936696">Mauritania</a>, which left in <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2000/12/28/mauritania-pulls-out-ecowas">2000</a>, did. </p>
<p>However, at the moment, given the sanctions, this option is off the cards, and could take many years to work out. </p>
<p><strong>African Union protocol:</strong> At a continental level the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">African Union Protocol on Free Movement</a> may offer a distant way forward. So far only <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-sl-PROTOCOL_TO_THE_TREATY_ESTABLISHING_THE_AFRICAN_ECONOMIC_COMMUNITY_RELATING_TO_FREE_MOVEMENT_OF_PERSONS-1.pdf">32 countries</a> have signed it and four have ratified it, among them Mali and Niger (Burkina Faso is a signatory). </p>
<p>One way to move forward would be for countries to ramp up ratifications of this document, to ensure that cooperation on free movement can continue whatever happens to Ecowas. </p>
<p>Of course, other countries within Ecowas could also unilaterally open up for visa-free entry like <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/11/03/rwanda-announces-visa-free-travel-for-all-africans//">Rwanda</a> or Kenya have done, though the process has had its <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/01/09/kenya-backlash-over-new-visa-free-entry-policy-many-describe-as-hectic//">hiccups</a>. </p>
<p>Such visa arrangements are also unlikely to include the rights of residence and establishment guaranteed under the Ecowas framework.</p>
<p>Given the current political context, an institutionalised option seems unlikely in the near future. The most likely option would be that migration will simply continue – informally.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222826/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Franzisca Zanker received funding from the Mercator Stiftung for a research project "The Political Economy of West African Migration Governace" in 2019 which provided relevant background for this piece.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amanda Bisong is a policy officer at the ECDPM, Maastricht, The Netherlands.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leonie Jegen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have much to lose if they cannot migrate to and from neighbouring countries in Ecowas.Franzisca Zanker, Senior research fellow, Arnold Bergstraesser InstituteAmanda Bisong, PhD candidate, Vrije Universiteit AmsterdamLeonie Jegen, PhD Candidate, University of AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2232532024-02-14T14:26:07Z2024-02-14T14:26:07ZWagner Group is now Africa Corps. What this means for Russia’s operations on the continent<p><em>In August 2023, Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin died after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/05/hand-grenade-explosion-caused-plane-crash-that-killed-wagner-boss-says-putin">his private jet crashed</a> about an hour after taking off in Moscow. He had been Russia’s pointman in Africa since the Wagner Group <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">began operating on the continent in 2017</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>The group is known for <a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-in-africa-russias-presence-on-the-continent-increasingly-relies-on-mercenaries-198600">deploying paramilitary forces, running disinformation campaigns and propping up influential political leaders</a>. It has had a destabilising effect. Prigozhin’s death – and his <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/24/timeline-how-wagner-groups-revolt-against-russia-unfolded">aborted mutiny</a> against Russian military commanders two months earlier – has led to a shift in Wagner Group’s activities.</em></p>
<p><em>What does this mean for Africa? <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=fvXhZxQAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">Alessandro Arduino’s research</a> includes mapping the evolution of <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538170311/Money-for-Mayhem-Mercenaries-Private-Military-Companies-Drones-and-the-Future-of-War">mercenaries</a> and private military companies across Africa. He provides some answers.</em></p>
<h2>What is the current status of the Wagner Group?</h2>
<p>Following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death, the Russian ministries of foreign affairs and defence quickly reassured Middle Eastern and African states that it would be <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/the-wagner-group-evolves-after-the-death-of-prigozhin/">business as usual</a> – meaning unofficial Russian boots on the ground would keep operating in these regions.</p>
<p><a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2024/01/with-new-name-same-russian-mercenaries-plague-africa/">Recent reports</a> on the Wagner Group suggest a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/12/russias-wagner-group-expands-into-africas-sahel-with-a-new-brand.html#:%7E:text=Wagner%20Group%20has%20been%20replaced,its%20new%20leader%20has%20confirmed.">transformation</a> is underway. </p>
<p>The group’s activities in Africa are now under the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-the-fallout-of-russias-wagner-rebellion/">direct supervision</a> of the Russian ministry of defence. </p>
<p>Wagner commands an estimated force of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa#:%7E:text=Rather%20than%20a%20single%20entity%2C%20Wagner%20is%20a,of%20former%20Russian%20soldiers%2C%20convicts%2C%20and%20foreign%20nationals.">5,000 operatives</a> deployed throughout Africa, from Libya to Sudan. As part of the transformation, the defence ministry has renamed it the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-01-30/russia-raises-the-stakes-in-tussle-over-africa">Africa Corps</a>. </p>
<p>The choice of <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/new-russian-military-unit-recruiting-former-wagner-fighters-ukraine-veterans-2023-12?r=US&IR=T">name</a> could be an attempt to add a layer of obfuscation to cover what has been in plain sight for a long time. That Russian mercenaries in Africa <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-canadian-owned-mine-seized-by-russian-mercenaries-in-africa-is-helping/">serve one master</a> – the Kremlin. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the direct link to Russia’s ministry of defence will make it difficult for Russia to argue that a foreign government has requested the services of a Russian private military company without the Kremlin’s involvement. The head of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-asked-private-russian-military-firm-help-against-insurgents-ifx-2021-09-25/">attempted to use this defence in Mali</a>.</p>
<p>The notion of transforming the group into the Africa Corps may have been inspired by World War II German field marshal <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/afrika-korps">Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps</a>. Nazi Germany wove myths around his <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/115/4/1243/35179?redirectedFrom=fulltext">strategic and tactical successes in north Africa</a>.</p>
<p>But will the Wagner Group under new leadership uphold the <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/wagner-group-africa-where-rubber-meets-road-206202">distinctive modus operandi</a> that propelled it to infamy during Prigozhin’s reign? This included the intertwining of boots on the ground with propaganda and disinformation. It also leveraged technologies and a sophisticated network of financing to enhance combat capabilities.</p>
<h2>What will happen to Wagner’s modus operandi now?</h2>
<p>In my recent book, <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538170311/Money-for-Mayhem-Mercenaries-Private-Military-Companies-Drones-and-the-Future-of-War">Money for Mayhem: Mercenaries, Private Military Companies, Drones and the Future of War</a>, I record Prigozhin’s adept weaving of disinformation and misinformation. </p>
<p>Numerous meticulously orchestrated campaigns flooded Africa’s online social platforms <a href="https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/yevgeniy-prigozhins-africa-wide-disinformation-campaign/">promoting</a> the removal of French and western influence across the Sahel. </p>
<p>Prigozhin oversaw the creation of the Internet Research Agency, which operated as the propaganda arm of the group. It supported Russian disinformation campaigns and was sanctioned in 2018 by the US government for meddling in American elections. Prigozhin <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/14/europe/russia-yevgeny-prigozhin-internet-research-agency-intl/index.html">admitted</a> to founding the so-called troll farm: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I’ve never just been the financier of the Internet Research Agency. I invented it, I created it, I managed it for a long time.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>From a financial perspective, Prigozhin’s approach involved establishing a <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1581">convoluted network of lucrative natural resources mining operations</a>. These spanned gold mines in the Central African Republic to diamond mines in Sudan. </p>
<p>This strategy was complemented by significant cash infusions from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/09/how-russia-recruiting-wagner-fighters-continue-war-ukraine">Russian state</a> to support the Wagner Group’s direct involvement in hostilities. This extended from Syria to Ukraine, and across north and west Africa.</p>
<p>My research shows Prigozhin networks are solid enough to last. But only as long as the golden rule of the mercenary remains intact: guns for hire are getting paid.</p>
<p>In Libya and Mali, Russia is unlikely to yield ground due to enduring geopolitical objectives. These include generating revenue from oil fields, securing access to ports for its navy and securing its position as a kingmaker in the region. However, the Central African Republic may see less attention from Moscow. The Wagner Group’s involvement here was <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/07/africa-corps-wagner-group-russia-africa-burkina-faso/">primarily linked</a> to Prigozhin’s personal interests in goldmine revenues.</p>
<p>The Russian ministry of defence will no doubt seek to create a unified and loyal force dedicated to military action. But with the enduring legacy of Soviet-style bureaucracy, marked by excessive paperwork and procrastination in today’s Russian officials, one might surmise that greater allegiance to Moscow will likely come at the cost of reduced flexibility.</p>
<p>History has shown that Africa serves as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-mercenaries-in-africa-why-there-hasnt-been-any-effective-opposition-to-drive-them-out-207318">lucrative arena for mercenaries</a> due to various factors. These include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the prevalence of low-intensity conflicts reduces the risks to mercenaries’ lives compared to full-scale wars like in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/13/russia-ukraine-war-list-of-key-events-day-720">Ukraine</a></p></li>
<li><p>the continent’s abundant natural resources are prone to exploitation</p></li>
<li><p>pervasive instability allows mercenaries to operate with relative impunity.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>As it is, countries in Africa once considered allies of the west are looking for alternatives. Russia is increasingly looking like a <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-essential-reads-on-russia-africa-relations-187568">viable candidate</a>. In January 2024, Chad’s junta leader, Mahamat Idriss Deby, met with Russian president Vladimir Putin in Moscow to “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/putin-meets-chad-junta-leader-russia-competes-with-france-africa-2024-01-24/">develop bilateral ties</a>”. Chad previously had taken a pro-western policy.</p>
<p>A month earlier, Russia’s deputy defence minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, who’s been tasked with overseeing Wagner’s activities in the Middle East and north Africa, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/12/04/russian-officials-visit-niger-to-strengthen-military-ties/">visited Niger</a>. The two countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">agreed to strengthen military ties</a>. Niger is currently led by the military after a <a href="https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic-comments/2023/the-coup-in-niger/">coup in July 2023</a>.</p>
<h2>Where does it go from here?</h2>
<p>There are a number of paths that the newly named Africa Corps could take.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>It gets deployed by Moscow to fight in conflicts meeting Russia’s geopolitical ends. </p></li>
<li><p>It morphs into paramilitary units under the guise of Russian foreign military intelligence agencies.</p></li>
<li><p>It splinters into factions, acting as heavily armed personal guards for local warlords. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The propaganda machinery built by Prigozhin may falter during the transition. But this won’t signal the immediate disappearance of the Russian disinformation ecosystem. </p>
<p>Russian diplomatic efforts are already mobilising to preserve the status quo. This is clear from Moscows’s <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/brief-russia-deepens-counter-terrorism-ties-to-sahelian-post-coup-regimes/">backing</a> of the recent Alliance of Sahelian States encompassing Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. All three nations are led by military rulers who overthrew civilian governments a recently announced <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-mali-burkina-faso-say-they-are-leaving-ecowas-regional-block-2024-01-28/">plans to exit</a> from the 15-member Economic Community of West African States.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223253/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alessandro Arduino is a member of the International Code of Conduct Advisory Group.</span></em></p>Will the Wagner Group under new leadership uphold the ruthless modus operandi that propelled it to the spotlight in Africa?Alessandro Arduino, Affiliate Lecturer, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2230982024-02-14T14:25:52Z2024-02-14T14:25:52ZWest Africa trade will take a hit as Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso leave Ecowas<p>The membership of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) has been whittled down from 15 to 12 following the unilateral withdrawal of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso in <a href="https://apnews.com/article/mali-niger-burkina-faso-ecowas-west-africa-5a5dc2180e39223c91b1820067db4011">February</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">Founded</a> in 1975, Ecowas is one of eight regional economic communities recognised by the African Union to foster regional integration on the continent. Its main objective is to <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">create</a> a single, large trading bloc through economic cooperation.</p>
<p>Since 1975, Ecowas and its sister organisation the West African Economic and Monetary Union (known by its French acronym, Uemoa) have implemented numerous policies aimed at improving how west African countries trade with each other and how they are connected to the world.</p>
<p>Yet, progress towards regional integration has been <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315712482-21/regional-integration-1-olivier-walther">slow</a>. Intra-regional trade remains well below the levels of other regions and the west African economies still rely a lot on informal activities. The limited results achieved in regional integration mean that there is a mismatch between <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Regionalism-in-Africa-Genealogies-institutions-and-trans-state-networks/Bach/p/book/9781138091054">regionalism</a> as it should be on paper and as it is experienced on a daily basis. Despite the many agreements signed between west African countries to foster integration, west Africa is one of the world’s most expensive <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0966692319302182">regions in which to do business</a>.</p>
<p>Political elites bear a great part of the blame for this. In a political system that relies on interpersonal relations, regional integration goes against the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/boundaries-communities-and-statemaking-in-west-africa/0A31250856228556B68B91639E3120A9">informal arrangements</a> that politicians have established with wealthy traders. These networks have encouraged the development of informal trade between west African countries and prevented the <a href="https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/incentives-and-constraints-of-informal-trade-between-nigeria-and-its-neighbours_7aa64379-en#page21">implementation of trade facilitation initiatives</a>. Much of the trade between Benin, Niger and Nigeria, for example, relies on <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2015.1010152">informal networks</a> that connect traders in border regions to state elites in the capital cities.</p>
<p>Why three landlocked countries, among the poorest in the world, would leave an organisation established to foster free movement of people, goods and capital across the region is a puzzling question, considering the potential consequences.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ecowas-why-withdrawal-of-mali-niger-and-burkina-faso-signals-fresh-trouble-for-the-sahel-222720">Ecowas: why withdrawal of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso signals fresh trouble for the Sahel</a>
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</p>
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<p>While the decision appears to have been made for political reasons, the economic consequences will be far-reaching. In the past, border closures between Sahelian and coastal countries have had devastating consequences on the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-effects-of-nigerias-closed-borders-on-informal-trade-with-benin/">regional economy</a>. They have also affected the livelihoods of millions of farmers, herders and city dwellers who depend on regional trade perhaps more than anywhere in the world. </p>
<p>It was precisely to foster these complementary relationships between the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea that Ecowas was established in Abuja nearly 50 years ago.</p>
<h2>The integration conundrum</h2>
<p>The Sahel is a large semi-arid region that stretches from Senegal in the west to Chad in the east. Subject to constant climatic uncertainties, it includes some of the poorest and <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI">least developed countries</a> in the world.</p>
<p>Sahelian countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger depend more on regional trade than coastal countries, such as Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana or Nigeria. This is because they are far less urbanised and industrialised than their neighbours. They tend to produce identical agricultural commodities, which they typically trade with other countries located on the Gulf of Guinea.</p>
<p>Livestock trade between the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea is also highly dependent on free movement between west African countries. Close to two thirds of the <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0232681">livestock movements</a> recorded in west Africa cross an international border. This is usually from the Sahel to big southern markets such as Abidjan in Côte d’Ivoire. </p>
<iframe title="" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-6qSwQ" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/6qSwQ/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="630" data-external="1" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>A purely Sahelian bloc, like the recently <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/16/mali-niger-and-burkina-faso-establish-sahel-security-alliance">created</a> Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), would never be able to replace Ecowas. This is simply because of the regional nature of human and economic flows in west Africa. The new bloc was established in 2023 by the military juntas that took power in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, in reaction to the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/2/8/economic-hardship-insecurity-spirals-in-mali-as-ecowas-exit-looms">sanctions</a> imposed by Ecowas.</p>
<p>Because Sahelian countries have hardly any industries, they <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2015.1010152">import</a> much of what they consume from the west African and global market, particularly from China. Much of the cement, petroleum products, cars, textiles, wheat, rice and plastics sold on the markets of Niamey, Ouagadougou and Bamako were produced elsewhere. They depend on the ports of the Gulf of Guinea to import them. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mali-burkina-faso-and-niger-want-to-leave-ecowas-a-political-scientist-explains-the-fallout-222388">Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger want to leave Ecowas. A political scientist explains the fallout</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<p>Coastal countries are far from being self-sufficient too. They import large quantities of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/9/8/a-coup-happened-in-niger-onion-prices-doubled-in-ghana-and-its-neighbours">onions</a> from the Sahel, for example. They also benefit enormously from import-export trade with the landlocked countries of the Sahel. </p>
<p>Some of them have transformed into “entrepot economies”. These are trading ports where goods from the world markets can be imported and stored before being re-exported with no customs duties imposed. Benin, for example, is specialised in importing goods that will eventually be <a href="https://www.karthala.com/economie-et-developpement/53-letat-entrepot-au-benin-commerce-informel-ou-solution-a-la-crise--9782865373604.html">re-exported illegally</a> to neighbouring countries where they are banned or subject to heavy taxes, such as Nigeria and Niger. </p>
<h2>The consequences</h2>
<p>Withdrawing from Ecowas is likely to have major consequences on the regional economy as a whole. Because of their landlocked situation, however, Sahelian countries will be more affected than the rest of the region by the reintroduction of tariff barriers. Without free access to the ports of Cotonou, Lomé, Abidjan or Tema, Sahelian imports will be far more expensive. </p>
<p>Informal trade is already the dominant form of economic exchange in the region. This will probably experience an unprecedented boom, particularly along the borders between <a href="https://anl.geog.ufl.edu/hausaland/">Niger and Nigeria</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, leaving Ecowas and its free movement protocol could have catastrophic consequences for millions of Sahelians who live in – or wish to migrate to – coastal cities. Migration is mostly intra-regional in west Africa. <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/identifying-the-factors-driving-west-african-migration_eb3b2806-en">Sahelians mostly tend to migrate</a> to the Gulf of Guinea. Migrants from coastal countries go to Europe through the Sahara and, increasingly, to the US.</p>
<p>Sahelian traders have also developed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2015.1010152">extensive trade networks</a> across west Africa. They take advantage of the liberalisation of trade that has characterised the region since the 1980s. </p>
<p>From Abidjan to Lagos, trade networks that rely on well-established diasporas would be particularly affected by trade restrictions and immigration policies.</p>
<h2>Political motivations</h2>
<p>The decision to leave Ecowas has little to do with economic considerations. It is primarily motivated by the fact that the bloc’s approach to region-building is not confined to economic integration. Ecowas is also well-known for its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Protocol-Relating-to-the-Mechanism-for-Conflict-Prevention-Management-Resolution-Peace-Keeping-and-Security-1999.pdf">robust involvement</a> in peacekeeping and security operations to end conflict in the region.</p>
<p>The bloc’s <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/ecowasprot.htm">protocol</a> on democracy and good governance, adopted in 2001, prescribes a zero tolerance policy “for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means”. Furthermore, its 1999 protocol <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Protocol-Relating-to-the-Mechanism-for-Conflict-Prevention-Management-Resolution-Peace-Keeping-and-Security-1999.pdf#page=11">authorises</a> external interventions without state consent under certain conditions, including “the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government”. </p>
<p>This, rather than trade liberalisation, is the main reason why the putschists in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have decided to leave Ecowas.</p>
<p><em>An <a href="https://anl.geog.ufl.edu/ecowas/?">earlier version</a> of this article was first published on the University of Florida blog.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223098/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olivier Walther receives funding from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. </span></em></p>Border closures between Sahelian and coastal countries have had devastating consequences for the regional economy.Olivier Walther, Associate Professor in Geography, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2227202024-02-07T13:27:05Z2024-02-07T13:27:05ZEcowas: why withdrawal of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso signals fresh trouble for the Sahel<p><em>On 27 January 2024, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-mali-burkina-faso-say-they-are-leaving-ecowas-regional-block-2024-01-28/">announced</a> their plan to withdraw from membership of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), despite repeated efforts at reconciliation.</em></p>
<p><em>Diplomacy scholar Nicholas Westcott explains how the decision may be the latest symptom of a deepening crisis in the Sahel, the area south of the Sahara desert stretching from Mauritania in the west to Chad in the east.</em></p>
<h2>Why does their decision pose a threat to the region?</h2>
<p>The coastal states in Ecowas fear <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f9c0ca66-8c32-4906-9e22-f2d3fc0e8c67">contagion</a> from both jihadism and political disorder in the Sahel. If the three Sahelian countries leave Ecowas, that risk increases. So does the risk of potential hostility to Malian and Burkinabe migrants in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. Stopping free movement between these three countries and the rest of west Africa would have serious economic consequences for all concerned.</p>
<p>Other governments in the region also fear damage to their own democracies – if not from coups, then from anti-western populists. </p>
<p>Guinea already has a military government. Others such as Cameroon, Togo and Sierra Leone may be vulnerable. </p>
<p>With elections ahead in <a href="https://ec.gov.gh/electoral-system/">Ghana</a>, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/6/senegal-parliament-delays-election-to-december-15-after-chaotic-vote">postponement</a> of the election in Senegal, this year will test democracy in the region.</p>
<p>This schism in Ecowas is also a risk for Africa’s partners in Europe and the US. Recent research in the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/advance-article/doi/10.1093/afraf/adad034/7564826?searchresult=1">African Affairs journal</a> showed that resentment of the increased French military presence was a key reason for the Nigerien military backing the coup led by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66430115">General Abdourahmane Tchiani</a> rather than elected <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/what-you-need-know-about-nigers-ousted-president-2023-08-14/">president Mohamed Bazoum</a>. </p>
<p>Other western countries risk being tarred with the same neocolonial brush unless they reform international institutions to reflect African concerns. They need to expedite the changes necessary to ensure that the multilateral system works for the benefit of small poor countries.</p>
<p>If this doesn’t happen, China’s narrative that the existing system works only to the benefit of “the west” will gain traction on the continent.</p>
<h2>What are the drivers?</h2>
<p>All countries in west Africa face a multilayered crisis. This has been brought on by years of sluggish growth following the <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/great-recession.asp">2008 financial crisis</a>, <a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1">COVID</a> and the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine">Ukraine war</a>, the impact of climate change and population growth. </p>
<p>Elected governments are finding it increasingly difficult to satisfy the expectations of their citizens. This is particularly true of the growing number of unemployed young people who have become disillusioned with democracy and are open to violent regime change, whether through jihad or a coup d’etat. </p>
<p>It is almost a re-run of the 1970s when drought, corruption and development failures led to a rash of coups in the region. People who cannot make a living legitimately will find other ways to do so.</p>
<p>Jihadism and banditry have <a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/armed-conflict-survey/2023/from-global-jihad-to-local-insurgencies/">increased</a> despite western efforts to combat them. Western support has thus lost credibility, even if the real failure is primarily political and economic. </p>
<h2>Why have regional bodies like Ecowas not been able to help?</h2>
<p>Faced with the juntas’ threat of secession, African regional organisations, in this case Ecowas and the African Union, face a dilemma. Do they to stick to their principles and exclude states that have experienced unconstitutional changes of government until they re-establish governments accountable to their citizens? Or do they compromise their principles to preserve at least nominal unity, and allow authoritarian governments back into the club? </p>
<p>Reconciliation efforts by Togo, through its <a href="https://lpsf.africa/lpsf-2023/">Peace and Security Forum</a> in Lomé last November, and by Nigerian Islamic leaders have not borne fruit. Nevertheless, it’s possible that the departure announcement is a bargaining chip to get more lenient terms for their reintegration into Ecowas. </p>
<p>Ecowas <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-communique-on-burkina-faso-mali-niger/">responded</a> by saying that it had not yet received formal notification, which means, according to the regulations, that the countries can only leave in a year’s time. This provides all parties with negotiation time. The <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240130/communique-withdrawal-three-ecowas-member-states">AU</a> has also urged negotiation to keep Ecowas together. For its part, Nigeria’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-notifies-west-african-bloc-ecowas-decision-leave-2024-01-29/">response</a> has been less accommodating.</p>
<h2>What lies behind the military regimes’ announcement?</h2>
<p>Regime survival has become their overriding objective. Their explicit intention seems to be to undermine the principle that African nations should apply standards to each other. The fact that African governments themselves signed up to these principles is as irrelevant to the insurrectionists, who want to retain power, as it is to the jihadists, who want to seize it. </p>
<p>They have set out the following <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">justifications</a> for their withdrawal:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Ecowas provided no support against the jihadists</p></li>
<li><p>Ecowas has imposed “illegal” sanctions that are harming the people </p></li>
<li><p>Ecowas has fallen under the influence of foreign governments.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These arguments are weak. They reflect an attempt to look like defenders of the poor and opponents of western influence.</p>
<p>It seems to be working. Populations are being <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/burkina-faso/313-armer-les-civils-au-prix-de-la-cohesion-sociale">mobilised and armed</a> to fight the jihadists.</p>
<p>The juntas appear to be donning the mantle of <a href="https://www.thomassankara.net/facts-about-thomas-sankara-in-burkina-faso/?lang=en">Thomas Sankara</a>. The revered former president of Burkina Faso, who seized power himself, is seen as a hero for his opposition to corrupt elites and French influence, his modesty and principles, and his concern for the ordinary Burkinabe. </p>
<p>It also plays conveniently into a narrative that both <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/09/21/china-wants-to-be-the-leader-of-the-global-south">China</a> and Russia are promoting: that current global institutions have been set up to defend neocolonial western interests, that adherence to “western values” (such as democracy and human rights) denies countries their right to develop in their own way; and that only China and Russia are true defenders of the interests of the global south.</p>
<p>Russia is putting its guns where its mouth is. There are an estimated <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/20/russian-mercenaries-behind-slaughter-in-mali-village-un-report-finds">1,000</a> Russian troops in Mali – formerly Wagner, now state-run and re-branded the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/russian-troops-deploy-burkina-faso-2024-01-25/">Africa Corps</a> – and the first 100, with more to follow, have arrived in Burkina Faso. </p>
<p>Others are being recruited for Niger. Their official justification may be anti-terrorist duties, but their real purpose is to protect the regime from further threats of mutiny, coup or invasion. </p>
<p>The danger is that the Sahelian states could become unaccountable regimes, protected by Russia in return for gold, and living off the illicit trafficking of people and goods across the Sahara. </p>
<p>The migrant trade is already <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/54581/niger-migrants-return-to-the-route-towards-the-mediterranean">thriving again in Agadez</a>, the key transit point in northern Niger to the Mediterranean coast. And nothing worries European countries more than a dramatic increase in African migration. So they will be watching developments with concern.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222720/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Westcott does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger announced their intention to leave Ecowas. This may be a pointer to a deeper crisis in the Sahel region.Nicholas Westcott, Professor of Practice in Diplomacy, Dept of Politics and International Studies, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223882024-02-05T09:27:55Z2024-02-05T09:27:55ZMali, Burkina Faso and Niger want to leave Ecowas. A political scientist explains the fallout<p><em>Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have sent Ecowas, west Africa’s main political union of 15 countries, a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">formal notice</a> of their withdrawal from the bloc. The three countries are governed by military rulers who <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/coups-africa-even-ecowas">have overthrown</a> democratically elected leaders since 2021.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation Africa’s Godfred Akoto Boafo asked political scientist <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">Olayinka Ajala</a> about the implications of the withdrawal.</em></p>
<h2>Why are Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso withdrawing?</h2>
<p>The three countries have given <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240129-mali-and-burkina-faso-withdraw-from-ecowas">three main reasons</a>.</p>
<p>First is what they call the “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">illegal, illegitimate, inhumane and irresponsible sanctions</a>” imposed on them for truncating their democracies. </p>
<p>Second is the failure of Ecowas to assist them in their “existential fight against terrorism and insecurity”. </p>
<p>The juntas have also argued that Ecowas has deviated from the founding principles of the organisation and is now <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-68122947">controlled by foreign powers</a>. </p>
<p>In 2001, Ecowas adopted a protocol on democracy and good governance which included a mechanism for unconstitutional changes of government. <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/ecowas2001protocol.pdf">Article 1a</a> of the protocol maintains a “zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means”. </p>
<p>Ecowas cited this clause as its reason for suspending the three countries and for imposing sanctions against them.</p>
<p>Ecowas has made it clear that it won’t work with the regimes. Its statements make it clear that it has taken a strong stance because it wishes to deter military coups in other countries within the bloc. </p>
<p>The regional bloc is also clearly frustrated at the lack of interest the three countries have shown in returning to democratic rule. It has asked for a clear and definite transition timetable, especially for Mali and Burkina Faso. </p>
<h2>What impact will the withdrawal have on Ecowas?</h2>
<p>The main impact will be on trade and economic development. Ecowas is primarily an economic community and the loss of any member will affect trade and economic development.</p>
<p>The three countries collectively account for 8% of the <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/countries/groups/economic-community-west-african-states">US$761 billion</a> Ecowas gross domestic product (GDP). In 2022, the total trade volume from the Ecowas region totalled <a href="https://punchng.com/mali-b-faso-niger-exit-may-weaken-277bn-ecowas-trade-report/">US$277.22 billion</a>. </p>
<p>The concern is that the exit of these countries could affect the flow of goods and services in the bloc. </p>
<p>Leaving the bloc could have other knock-on effects too:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The economic collapse of the countries. These countries have strategic importance, especially in food security. Niger is a key source of onions while Burkina Faso exports tomatoes to the sub-region.</p></li>
<li><p>This would lead to an exodus of citizens to other Ecowas countries, further threatening the stability of the bloc. </p></li>
<li><p>Concerns that the three countries will enter into bilateral relationships with countries that might not be favourable to other Ecowas countries. For example, there are already concerns about Niger’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">alliance with Russia</a> after it severed ties with France. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What impact will it have on each of the countries?</h2>
<p>The main impact on the countries will be on the movement of people, goods and services. </p>
<p>Under Ecowas, members enjoy unrestricted movement of citizens within the bloc. Citizens of Ecowas countries can live and work in any country in the bloc. For instance, there are more than 5 million citizens of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger living and working in Côte d'Ivoire alone. Ghana, Togo and Republic of Benin also host large numbers of Nigeriens. </p>
<p>The citizens of all three landlocked countries would no longer be able to travel to other Ecowas states without impediments. Niger also shares a border of over 1,600km with seven states in Nigeria and <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-01-30/analysis-west-africas-brexit-moment-spells-trouble-for-the-region">80% of its trade</a> is done with Nigeria. </p>
<p>The sanctions imposed on Niger by Ecowas are <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate">already affecting</a> citizens of the country. Hardship is likely to increase after the exit if Nigeria decides to police its borders. </p>
<p>Also, depending on how Ecowas agrees to relate to the countries in future, there could be restrictions on goods and services which would further affect the economies of these countries. </p>
<h2>What impact will it have on security in the region?</h2>
<p>The security arrangement might not be affected in the short term. But it could be in the long term. There is already limited security cooperation between the three countries and other Ecowas members. For instance, they have all withdrawn from the G5 Sahel, resulting in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/6/chad-mauritania-pave-way-to-dissolve-g5-anti-rebel-alliance#:%7E:text=The%20G5%20was%20created%20in,major%20issue%20across%20the%20Sahel.&text=The%20two%20remaining%20members%20of,other%20three%20founding%20countries%20left.">collapse of the organisation</a>. </p>
<p>Although the lack of security support from Ecowas was stated as one of the reasons for exiting Ecowas, a total collapse of existing security infrastructure would affect not only the three countries but also other relatively stable states such as Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Benin. The three states have joined forces to form the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/military-led-sahel-states-rally-thousands-support-alliance-2023-12-30/">Alliance of Sahel States</a>, but without support from regional groups such as Ecowas, they will struggle to curtail insurgencies. </p>
<p>Currently, Mali has over 1,000 members of Africa Corps (formerly Wagner group), supported by Russia. There are <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-01-31/wagner-forces-under-a-new-flag-russias-africa-corps-burkina-faso">100 in Burkina Faso</a>. After months of Burkina Faso insisting it would not engage foreign mercenaries, the first contingent arrived in January 2024 and more are expected soon. Niger also recently agreed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">military cooperation</a> with Russia. </p>
<p>This indicates the three countries still require external assistance to combat insecurity. The problem is that Russia is fighting a huge war in Ukraine and might not be able to support the three countries as much as they would require. If the three countries fail to combat insurgence through the newly formed Alliance of Sahel States, the threat will spread to other countries in the bloc and beyond. </p>
<p>Ecowas leaders have indicated that they are willing to have a dialogue with the three countries. I think Ecowas granting some concessions to prevent them from exiting would be in the interest of the bloc and all the citizens of Ecowas countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222388/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The decision by the three countries could change the dynamics of Ecowas.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216962024-01-29T13:08:07Z2024-01-29T13:08:07ZNiger and Russia are forming military ties: 3 ways this could upset old allies<p>In July 2023, Niger’s military took over in <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">a coup</a> just two years after the country’s first transition to civilian power. The coup has brought into sharp focus the role of foreign countries in Niger’s politics.</p>
<p>Before the coup, France and the US were the <a href="https://www.gmfus.org/news/coup-niger">main security allies</a> of Niger. But the coup leaders, led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, were open about their antagonism to France, the country’s former colonial ruler, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/12/25/niger-suspends-cooperation-with-international-francophone-body">ordered the French military to leave</a>.</p>
<p>Now the attention of many people in Niger has shifted to Russia.</p>
<p>Since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">coup</a>, several analysts have <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/niger-russia-sahel/a-66494597">highlighted</a> the role of Russia. Some analysts and regional experts believe Russia might have played a role <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4135841-the-niger-coup-exposes-russias-grand-strategy-for-africa/">directly or indirectly</a> in the military takeover. </p>
<p>Others (including myself) <a href="https://theconversation.com/scramble-for-the-sahel-why-france-russia-china-and-the-united-states-are-interested-in-the-region-219130">argue</a> that Russia is increasing its grip on the country and actively seeking to benefit from the coup. This was evident when Russia and Niger recently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-niger-agree-develop-military-ties-moscow-says-2024-01-16/">agreed</a> to develop military ties. </p>
<p>Although the details of this partnership are still sketchy, Russia promised to increase the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-niger-agree-develop-military-ties-moscow-says-2024-01-16/">“combat readiness”</a> of Niger’s military. In addition, there are discussions to partner in the areas of agriculture and energy. </p>
<p>I have been <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">researching</a> the security dynamics of the region for over a decade. The Niger junta’s romance with Russia has potential implications for peace and security in the region and beyond. </p>
<p>I have identified three main potential implications for Niger and other allied countries:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>escalation of tensions between Niger and France</p></li>
<li><p>discontent between Niger and its regional allies</p></li>
<li><p>likely disruption of a <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/648851468123254494/pdf/957770PID0P1500Box391429B00PUBLIC0.pdf#page=3">US$13 billion</a> gas pipeline project from Nigeria to the European Union through Niger.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Russia in the region</h2>
<p>After the 2023 coup, France and the regional economic bloc Ecowas <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ecowas-threatens-use-of-force-against-niger-junta/a-66398008">threatened</a> to use force to reinstate the deposed president. </p>
<p>Russia <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66478430">warned</a> against such a move. </p>
<p>The military junta then expelled French soldiers. France responded by closing its embassy in Niger. </p>
<p>The US also reduced its military and economic cooperation. Washington cut aid to the country by more than <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231010-france-turns-a-page-as-troops-begin-leaving-coup-hit-niger">US$500 million</a> and removed the country from its <a href="https://credendo.com/en/knowledge-hub/usas-removal-uganda-niger-gabon-and-central-african-republic-agoa-has-only-limited">duty free export</a> programme. </p>
<p>The European Union also <a href="https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/eu-adopts-new-niger-sanctions-framework/">instituted sanctions</a>. Niger then cancelled its security and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231127-niger-junta-revokes-anti-migration-law-in-setback-to-eu-strategy">migration agreements</a> with the European bloc.</p>
<p>Ecowas <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/west-african-bloc-maintains-sanctions-against-niger/3079035">sanctioned</a> Niger. Another major ally, Nigeria, <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2023/08/03/coup-nigeria-cuts-off-power-supply-to-niger-republic/">cut electricity</a> and instituted further sanctions. </p>
<p>The sanctions, coupled with an increase in insecurity, weakened and isolated Niger. </p>
<p>Rather than budge, the junta looked for alternative partners – like Russia and China. It also recently joined Mali and Burkina Faso to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947">announce a withdrawal</a> from Ecowas. </p>
<p>For its part, Russia was positioning itself as a reliable ally. In December 2023, a <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/12/04/russian-officials-visit-niger-to-strengthen-military-ties/">Russian delegation visited Niger</a> and in January 2024, Niger’s Prime Minister Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-niger-agree-develop-military-ties-moscow-says-2024-01-16/">visited Moscow</a> to discuss military and economic ties. </p>
<p>Russia is no stranger to the region. Over the last three years it has set up <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">security arrangements</a> with the juntas running Niger’s neighbours: Mali and Burkina Faso. This has been done through the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877">Wagner group</a>, a private security company supported by Russia, whose operations in Africa were renamed <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/12/17/africa-corps-russia-s-sahel-presence-rebranded_6352317_124.html">Africa Corps</a> in early 2024. </p>
<p>Russian military advisers have been operating in Mali since 2021. In addition, the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">Wagner group has 400 mercenaries</a> in the country. Russia also <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/08/10/mali-gets-more-military-equipment-from-russia/">delivered military hardware</a> to the country in 2022. </p>
<h2>Implications</h2>
<p>There are three main potential implications for Niger and other allied countries. </p>
<p>First, a potential escalation of tensions between Niger and France. This will happen if Niger grants Russia uranium exploration rights that affect French companies with existing licences. Niger <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-24/top-uranium-producer-niger-launches-mining-sector-overhaul?leadSource=uverify%20wall&embedded-checkout=true">has suspended new mining licences</a> and is currently auditing existing ones. This could affect French companies. France has <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-emmanuel-macron-warn-attack-embassy-niger/">vowed</a> to protect its economic interests in Niger. </p>
<p>It depends on how the partnership between Russia and Niger develops, in particular how Niger intends to pay for its share of any military cooperation. If this involves the Wagner group, as is the case in security partnerships between Russia and Burkina Faso and Mali, the issue of <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/03/the-wagner-groups-playbook-in-africa-mali/">mining concessions</a> will come into play. Mali and Burkina Faso have paid for Wagner’s involvement by <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2023/03/a-heavy-price-to-pay-2/">offering</a> mining concessions in return for arms, ammunition and mercenaries. </p>
<p>Second, any security tie involving the Wagner group would create further discontent between Niger and its regional allies, especially Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon. </p>
<p>Following the coup, Niger announced it was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67605967">leaving</a> the G5 Sahel, which was set up to coordinate security operations in the Sahel. This has turned attention to the country’s participation in the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a>. </p>
<p>Both institutions were set up to fight insurgency in the region and Niger has been an active contributor. The other countries in the joint task force, such as Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Benin Republic, will be wary of working with Niger if it is in active partnership with Wagner, which is <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/massacres-executions-and-falsified-graves-wagner-groups-mounting-humanitarian-cost-mali">notorious</a> for human rights abuses.</p>
<p>The third likely major fallout from Russia’s involvement revolves around Niger’s relationship with the EU. The EU is currently constructing a <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/648851468123254494/pdf/957770PID0P1500Box391429B00PUBLIC0.pdf#page=3">US$13 billion</a> gas pipeline from Nigeria to the bloc through Niger. The pipeline project was designed to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russian gas.</p>
<p>Based on Russia’s animosity with the EU, I believe Russia could use the security alliance to disrupt the project in order to secure its gas delivery to the EU. </p>
<p>The junta can use the pipeline project as leverage against the EU by demanding major financial concessions, putting the delivery of the project at risk and strengthening Russia’s position. </p>
<p>Migration is another area of contention when it comes to the EU. Niger now <a href="https://www.ewn.co.za/2024/01/24/nigers-gateway-to-the-desert-open-again-for-migrants-1">allows</a> mass illegal migration through its territory for onward journey to Europe. This will create more problems for the EU. </p>
<p>The active presence of Russia in Niger could change the security and economic landscape of the region and affect all parties. </p>
<p>I maintain my <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-ecowas-must-do-these-3-things-to-break-the-stalemate-212403">initial position</a> that rather than use force, the Niger junta should be encouraged to restore democracy as soon as possible. At the same time, some of the sanctions should be lifted to encourage dialogue and reduce the influence of Russia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221696/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Niger’s recent military romance with Russia could escalate tensions with France, regional allies and the European Union.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2191302024-01-08T13:58:09Z2024-01-08T13:58:09ZScramble for the Sahel – why France, Russia, China and the United States are interested in the region<p>The Sahel, a region <a href="https://theconversation.com/sahel-region-africa-72569">3,860km wide located south of the Sahara Desert</a> and stretching east-west across the African continent, has been a focus of attention around the world recently. </p>
<p>In the last decade, issues such as <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15365.doc.htm#:%7E:text=drivers%20of%20insecurity.-,From%201%20January%20to%2030%20June%202023%2C%20the%20region%20recorded,displaced%20persons%20exceeding%206%20million.">terrorism</a>, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1132332#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CIndeed%2C%20the%20central%20Sahel%20continues,in%20Ukraine%2C%E2%80%9D%20she%20added.">insecurity</a> and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1137072">trafficking</a> have characterised the region. </p>
<p>Military takeovers have been a major source of concern in the region and beyond in the last few years. Since 2020, the region has had <a href="https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/understanding-crisis-democracy-west-africa-and-sahel">four successful coup d’états</a> and three failed ones. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://acleddata.com/2023/08/03/fact-sheet-military-coup-in-niger/">coup in Niger</a> particularly attracted attention. This is because Niger was seen as a “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/west-africa/nigers-coup-and-americas-choice">darling of the west</a>” and a model for democratic governance in the region. </p>
<p>Despite the challenges facing the region, the scramble for the Sahel remains intense. </p>
<p>The main actors in this scramble are the <a href="https://european-union.europa.eu/index_en">European Union</a>, France, Russia, China and the United States.</p>
<p>The EU relies on Sahelian countries, especially Niger, to stop mass illegal immigration into the bloc. Niger is a major transit country in the region. Niger had security and defence partnerships with the EU until recently when the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/niger-ends-security-and-defence-partnerships-with-the-eu/">country unilaterally cancelled the deals</a>. This is a source of concern to the EU. </p>
<p>Why are these foreign powers interested in the Sahel?</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">scholar</a> in international relations and having <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/scientific-contributions/Olayinka-Ajala-2181806326">researched</a> the region for over a decade, I see the main reasons as follows: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>availability of natural resources</p></li>
<li><p>strategic location of the region in Africa</p></li>
<li><p>economic interests of the countries involved in the scramble</p></li>
<li><p>defence and security cooperation in the form of arms sales.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Foreign powers all have their reasons to be involved in the scramble for the Sahel.</p>
<h2>France</h2>
<p>Most of the countries in the Sahel region were colonised by France. Unlike Britain, France has maintained strong links with former colonies. They cooperate in the economy, defence and resource extraction, to mention a few areas. </p>
<p>France has the <a href="https://www.ieri.be/en/publications/wp/2019/f-vrier/france-still-exploiting-africa">first right</a> to buy any natural resources discovered in all its former colonies. Although the relationship between France and its former colonies appeared cordial, recent coups in Francophone countries and <a href="https://theconversation.com/france-in-africa-why-macrons-policies-increased-distrust-and-anger-212022">anti-France sentiments</a> across Africa have revealed the opposite. </p>
<p>The coups have been followed by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/huge-protests-niger-call-french-forces-leave-after-coup-2023-09-02/">large demonstrations</a> against France and in support of the putschists. </p>
<p>Despite these cracks, France is keen to maintain its grip on these countries, especially pertaining to military cooperation and resource extraction. France was reluctant to pull its military out of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger despite the countries severing military partnerships. It continues to extract natural resources in these countries.</p>
<h2>Russia</h2>
<p>The relationships between Russia and many Sahelian countries were established during the cold war and colonial era. More recently, the emphasis by western countries on <a href="https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research-report-72-the-impact-of-counter-terrorism-measures-on-muslim-communities.pdf">human rights</a>, especially during counterterrorism operations, has pushed Sahelian countries closer to Russia.</p>
<p>While western allies demand the rule of law, democracy, and human rights in return for security and economic support, Russia portrays itself differently. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/2022-Russian-invasion-of-Ukraine">invasion</a> of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 also increased Russia’s interest in the Sahel because it is keen to maintain allies in Africa. </p>
<p>Russia has <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">openly backed</a> military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66478430">warned</a> against any military intervention in Niger when the military took power. Furthermore, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877">Wagner group</a>, the controversial private military company which is controlled by Russia, cooperates with some countries in the Sahel. Niger has <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231204-niger-s-junta-ends-key-security-agreements-with-eu-turns-to-russia-for-defence-deal">cancelled defence agreement with the EU</a> and switched to Russia. All of these factors explain Russia’s interest in the Sahel. </p>
<h2>China</h2>
<p>Like Russia, China portrays itself as an alternative to the traditional ally (France) of Sahelian countries. With a mantra of “<a href="https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=94683">non-interference</a>” and “<a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/praxis/files/2020/05/1.-Condon.pdf">respecting sovereignty</a>”, China has entrenched itself as a “partner” of countries in the Sahel. </p>
<p>The Sahel region is rich in natural resources such as oil, uranium, natural gas and lithium. Chinese state-owned enterprises <a href="https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/the-future-of-strategic-competition">operate</a> in Niger, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso. </p>
<p>For instance, Mali potentially has <a href="https://www.mining-technology.com/features/top-ten-biggest-lithium-mines/?cf-view">one of the largest</a> lithium reserves in the world and China’s Ganfeng Lithium has <a href="https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/the-future-of-strategic-competition">invested</a> heavily in the country. In addition, despite China’s development in military hardware, most of the weapons are untested. China is keen to use the conflicts in the Sahel to <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/WF_93_Rajosefa_The_Future_of_Strategic_Competition_in_the_Sahel_Region.pdf">test</a> its arms products. </p>
<h2>The United States</h2>
<p>In 2019, the US opened its <a href="https://intellinews.com/us-in-danger-of-losing-control-of-its-extensive-drone-base-in-niger-289069/#:%7E:text=The%20Agadez%20drone%20base%2C%20officially,by%20the%20US%20Air%20Force.">largest drone base</a> in Africa in Agadez-Niger. A year before that, I had <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">written</a> about the security implications of the base for the region. </p>
<p>Unlike France and China, which both have extensive economic interests in the Sahel, the US has a strong military interest. Niger, in particular, is strategically located and the US can easily fly surveillance and reconnaissance drones from the country to cover the Sahel, west and central Africa. </p>
<p>As France is being militarily dislodged by its former colonies in the region, the US has been trying to fill the void to prevent Russia and China from establishing further military presence. </p>
<p>The US took several months to label the military takeover in Niger a coup so as not to lose strategic military cooperation and dominance. </p>
<p>The year 2023 has been particularly challenging for the countries in the Sahel. With issues ranging from economic instability to insecurity, the region remains fragile. Despite the instability and fragility, the scramble for the region remains intense with traditional allies such as France losing its grip and other powers stepping up. </p>
<p>The Sahel is one to keep an eye on in 2024 and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219130/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Foreign powers’ interest in the Sahel is driven by its natural resources and strategic location for security and illegal migration control.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2172012023-11-10T09:18:21Z2023-11-10T09:18:21ZVisa-free travel for Africans: why Kenya and Rwanda have taken a step in the right direction<p>President William Ruto of Kenya recently <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67254349">announced</a> that Kenya’s borders would be open to visitors from the entirety of Africa, with no visas required, by the end of 2023. He said</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When people cannot travel, business people cannot travel, entrepreneurs cannot travel, we all become net losers.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A few days later, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda <a href="https://apnews.com/article/rwanda-visa-africans-actfa-africa-09edb93691babd5e0cebd2e131fd7ecb">followed suit</a>, saying all Africans would be able to enter Rwanda without visas.</p>
<p>Neither Kenya nor Rwanda will be the first. By the end of 2022, <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/africa-visa-openness-report-2022#page=38">Benin, The Gambia and Seychelles</a> had already implemented a system of visa-free access for all Africans. Perhaps more will follow soon. Some regions, some sub-regional groups and some bilateral arrangements have also resulted in visa-free access and even passport-free access in certain cases. </p>
<p>Within the broader East African Community, Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya <a href="https://immigration.go.ug/services/interstate-pass">allow</a> cross border travel without passports. Botswana and Namibia recently <a href="https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/15940-botswana-and-namibia-concluded-an-agreement-on-the-movement-of-persons.html">signed</a> a similar agreement. </p>
<p>Despite this progress, by the end of 2022 <a href="https://www.visaopenness.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/VOI%E2%80%932022_final2_9dec22.pdf#page=12">only 27%</a> of African routes allowed Africans to travel visa-free. </p>
<p>Actions such as those of Kenya and Rwanda take the African Union’s agenda further. Regularising freer movement of people across African borders is one of the continent’s great developmental challenges. It is one of the flagship projects of the African Union’s <a href="https://au.int/agenda2063/flagship-projects">Agenda 2063</a>. </p>
<p>But even if all African countries no longer required visas from Africans, this would not necessarily give the visitors a right to apply for jobs, establish a business or build a home in the receiving country. The 2018 African Union Free Movement of Persons protocol <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">aims</a> for full free movement, through three phases – entry, residence and establishment. This includes full economic rights, including employment. It has not been widely ratified, however. </p>
<p><a href="https://nsi.org.za/publications/analysis-trends-patterns-migration-africa/">Our new study of migration trends</a> underscores the potential contributions of migration to economic development in the countries of origin and destination. This is realised through the transfer of skills, knowledge and remittances. The study also shows that intra-African migration is firmly rooted in geographical, social and economic ties. Movement is predominantly within regions, and moderately between them.</p>
<h2>Free trade and movement of people</h2>
<p>African Union policies support freer intracontinental trade, investment and movement of people to promote the continent’s economic, social and political development. The continent has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">made progress</a> on the aspects of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement that deal with trade and investment. There hasn’t been much progress on the free movement of people. And yet the success of the trade agreement requires freer movement of people.</p>
<p>This interdependence between trade and free movement of people was the focus of the recent <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20231031/8th-pan-african-forum-migration-pafom8-kicks">Pan-African Forum on Migration</a> held in Gaborone, the Botswana capital. The forum brings together African Union member states, the continent’s regional economic communities, UN agencies and intergovernmental organisations <a href="https://www.iom.int/pan-african-forum-migration-pafom">to deliberate on migration and human mobility issues</a> in Africa. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/free-movement-of-people-across-africa-regions-are-showing-how-it-can-work-197199">Free movement of people across Africa: regions are showing how it can work</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The conference noted that most African countries had failed to ratify the African Union’s <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-treaty-protocol_on_free_movement_of_persons_in_africa_e.pdf">Free Movement of Persons protocol</a>. At the same time, there was evidence of improvements in policies and practices at national, bilateral and multilateral levels that facilitate the freer movement of Africans.</p>
<p>Apart from recent announcements by Rwanda and Kenya, other instances would be a growing number of <a href="https://theconversation.com/free-movement-of-people-across-africa-regions-are-showing-how-it-can-work-197199">reciprocal</a> arrangements between countries.</p>
<h2>Regional migration a norm</h2>
<p>The history of African statehood, with strong social ties across national boundaries, makes regional mobility a norm rather than an exception. This can be seen from the migration routes, mostly found within the same regions and which proceed in both directions. </p>
<p>For example, Burkina Faso to Côte d’Ivoire is the largest migrant route in the continent and within the Economic Community of West Africa (<a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/regional-economic-communities-rec/economic-community-west-african-states">Ecowas</a>) – the economic bloc of 15 west African states. Côte d’Ivoire to Burkina Faso is equally popular. This trend is ubiquitous throughout the continent, except within the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/">Southern African Development Community</a> region, where most migrant routes tend to lead to South Africa.</p>
<p>Among the major regional economic communities, Ecowas has the most intense regional migration. It is followed by the Southern African Development Community and the East African Community. By contrast, Ecowas has the least inter-regional migration while the East African Community has the most.</p>
<p>Variations in development across Africa mean that some countries experience contrasting patterns, particularly in extra-continental migration. While most African migrants migrate to and from other parts of the continent, in middle income countries such as South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria extra-continental emigration is greater.</p>
<p>Immigration and emigration are generally <a href="https://nsi.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/An-analysis-of-trends-and-patterns-of-migration-in-Africa.pdf#page=6">low in low income countries</a> and higher in middle income countries. In rich countries, people tend not to emigrate. The relatively low level of migration in Africa follows this pattern.</p>
<p>Only <a href="https://nsi.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/An-analysis-of-trends-and-patterns-of-migration-in-Africa.pdf#page=11">14% of total world emigrants</a> come from Africa. The average migrant density, or percentage of migrants living on the continent, is 1.89% compared to a global average of <a href="https://nsi.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/An-analysis-of-trends-and-patterns-of-migration-in-Africa.pdf#page=6">3.6%</a> where Europe and North America are at 12% and 16% respectively. African migration is thus not only comparatively low compared with the global averages, but characteristically depicts low income.</p>
<p>High income countries tend to have more immigrants than emigrants. The converse is true for low income regions. Africa as a whole has more emigrants than immigrants, confirming the link between migration and development. </p>
<h2>Legal restrictions matter little</h2>
<p>Much migration in Africa is impervious to legal constrictions or definitions of national boundaries, and even to logistical constraints. Government dictates succeed in making much of this migration irregular but fail to stop it. Though regional integration and liberalisation of migration rules are helpful, they do not yet solve this challenge.</p>
<p>The main migrant sending country to Kenya is Somalia, despite not being in the same regional economic community. And despite efforts by the government of Kenya to deter Somali migrants to Kenya. The main destination country for Nigerian emigrants in Africa is Cameroon, even though it does not belong to Ecowas.</p>
<p>While African migration governance reforms are making <a href="https://theconversation.com/free-movement-of-people-across-africa-regions-are-showing-how-it-can-work-197199">considerable progress</a> it will still be a while till they catch up and are able to deal fairly and rationally with the reality of migration patterns in Africa.</p>
<p><em>Michael Mutava of the New South Institute authored the report on which this article is based.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217201/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Hirsch is employed as a research fellow at the New South Institute where he supervised some of the research on which this article is based.</span></em></p>Regularising freer movement of people across African borders is one of the continent’s great developmental challenges.Alan Hirsch, Research Fellow New South Institute, Emeritus Professor at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2134932023-10-08T08:11:01Z2023-10-08T08:11:01ZEcowas rules to protect pastoralists discourage investments in modern livestock farming<p>A common sight around west Africa is to see cattle grazing freely, even in <a href="http://sunnewsonline.com/cows-everywhere-herdsmen-defied-security-invaded-national-assembly/">major cities</a>, on <a href="https://punchng.com/the-dark-side-of-nomadic-pastoralism-in-nigeria-today/">highways</a> and in <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/259039-cows-stray-into-nigeria-airport-runway-delay-aircrafts-landing.html">airports</a>. </p>
<p>Every year, about <a href="https://acting-for-life.org/app/uploads/AFL-10-Findings-March2018.pdf">300 million</a> head of livestock (mostly cattle) move across west Africa. Based on seasonal factors, they leave their usual grazing areas in search of water and pasture.</p>
<p>These practices, called pastoralism, or transhumance, go back millennia. They helped maximise land use in dry regions. </p>
<p>In a bid to support these practices, the <a href="https://ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African State (Ecowas)</a> drew up <a href="https://ecpf.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Decision-1998-English.pdf">regulations in 1998</a> and <a href="https://ecpf.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Regulation-2003-English.pdf">2003</a>. All Ecowas member states were to apply the regulations.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://openair.africa/person/jane-ezirigwe/">expert</a> in food and agricultural law, natural resources development and international trade, I <a href="https://www.jutajournals.co.za/from-subsistence-to-commercialisation-legal-implications-of-ecowas-regulations-on-transhumance-on-livestock-investment-options/">examined</a> the regulations to see what effects they might be having on investments in the livestock sector.</p>
<p>My findings show that livestock productivity has not <a href="https://www.au-ibar.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/doc_20160524_livestock_policy_lanscape_africa_en.pdf">improved</a> in the region since the introduction of the new rules. Cattle productivity has fallen and milk production has improved very minimally. Clashes between farmers and herders have <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/252-herders-against-farmers-nigerias-expanding-deadly-conflict">increased</a>, along with insecurity. Elites take advantage of the regulations to exploit poor herders.</p>
<p>I conclude that the regulations may be discouraging meaningful large-scale investments such as ranching that could increase productivity, create jobs and ensure peace in the region.</p>
<h2>Movement of livestock across west Africa</h2>
<p>Ecowas is the only regional economic community in Africa with specific regulations <a href="https://publications.iom.int/books/regional-policies-and-response-manage-pastoral-movements-within-ecowas-region">governing transhumance</a>. The regional body is made up of 15 states.</p>
<p>Its regulations aim to improve livestock productivity and food security, enhance the environment and reduce poverty. </p>
<p>The regulations allow free movement of livestock across the borders of member states under certain conditions. For example, herders must possess the Ecowas International Transhumance Certificate, and a minimum of two herders must accompany the herds. The herders must be at least 18 years old. </p>
<p>Member states are obligated to apply the regulations. But they’re not doing so uniformly. Some coastal states don’t allow the herders into their countries. For instance, Benin Republic recently <a href="https://sojagnon-benin.org/2020/02/20/prohibition-of-cross-border-transhumance-benin-grant-a-two-months-moratorium-to-niger/#:%7E:text=Benin%20government%20deplore%20the%20numerous,Ministers%20prohibited%20cross%2Dborder%20transhumance">banned</a> the entry of foreign herders into its territory. Togo and Côte d’Ivoire <a href="https://publications.iom.int/books/regional-policies-and-response-manage-pastoral-movements-within-ecowas-region">control</a> the number of herders that enter their territories annually. </p>
<p>For its part, Nigeria is moving towards more <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/302-ending-nigerias-herder-farmer-crisis-livestock-reform-plan">sedentary cattle farming</a>. Several states in Nigeria, such as Benue and <a href="https://punchng.com/oyo-assembly-passes-anti-open-grazing-bill/">Oyo</a>, have also banned pastoralism.</p>
<p>These countries have restricted the movement of herds because of negative experiences such as <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/252-herders-against-farmers-nigerias-expanding-deadly-conflict">farmer-herder clashes</a>, <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/cattle-rustling-instability-nigeria/#:%7E:text=In%20Nigeria's%20North%2DWest%20and,stealing%20large%20herds%20of%20cattle.">cattle rustling</a> and other forms of criminality. </p>
<h2>Impact of Ecowas transhumance regulations</h2>
<p>In my paper, I argue that Ecowas regulation allows transhumance to exist in a form that is inimical to other business investment options – like ranching – for livestock production in the region. </p>
<p>Investors want profit, safe environments and certainty in rules. Pastoralism, on the other hand, encourages cheap labour and other practices that put large-scale investment in livestock at risk. </p>
<p><strong>Bad business environment</strong></p>
<p>Transhumance has been commercialised – and criminalised – in ways that produce a negative environment for the livestock business.</p>
<p>Movement of herds has contributed to <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/transhumance_and_un_pkos_final_web.pdf">conflicts</a> between farmers and pastoralists, <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jsdlp/article/view/204801">gender-based violence</a>, insecurity and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/rising-insecurity-in-northwest-nigeria-terrorism-thinly-disguised-as-banditry/">other forms of criminality</a>. </p>
<p>Traffickers, smugglers, bandits and drug peddlers <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajosi/article/view/244730/231480">capitalise</a> on livestock movement to commit crimes. </p>
<p>Proliferation of arms, terrorism, kidnapping and drug use have also increased in the guise of transhumance. </p>
<p>In Nigeria, for instance, it has been alleged that <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2018/05/09/amaechi-reveals-behind-herdsmen-killings-speaks-plans-islamise-nigeria/">Boko Haram insurgents disguise</a> themselves as pastoralists to convey improvised explosive devices to attack communities.</p>
<p><strong>Limits modern methods</strong></p>
<p>I also argue that the Ecowas regulations, by allowing herds to move around the region, discourage investment in modern methods of livestock production. This is because the cost of production in transhumance is low. Land and fodder are free. Labour is cheap and exploitative. All this makes other business models, such as ranching, relatively unattractive by comparison. It affects their profits and investment risks. </p>
<p>Some countries which practise pastoralism, such as Mongolia and Tibet, restrict it to arid regions.</p>
<h2>What should be done</h2>
<p>In my view, the practice of transhumance in west Africa should be gradually phased out. By this I mean a gradual – and then finally a total – ban on herder movements across borders.</p>
<p>This is because it is not an efficient use of land. About <a href="https://www.fao.org/3/i4337e/i4337e.pdf">a third</a> of west Africa’s land area is used for agriculture. Two-thirds of this serves as rangeland and pastures while one-third is used for crop production. Designated rangelands should be established in semi-arid areas of the region. Pastoralism should be restricted to these rangelands. </p>
<p>In my view conflict will be reduced if transhumance is restricted to arid and semi-arid regions. This in turn will make ranching more attractive, making room for large-scale investments that could create jobs and improve food security. </p>
<p>In the immediate future focus should be given to:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the strict implementation of the <a href="https://www.un-ilibrary.org/content/books/9789210041539c008">International Transhumance Certificate</a>. The certificate usually contains particulars on the composition of the herd, the vaccinations given, the itinerary of the herds, and the destination of the pastoralist. The responsibility of issuing the certificate rests on the country of origin. This should reduce incidences of criminal elements disguised as herders. </p></li>
<li><p>limiting the number of cattle that people can have in a moving herd. This will help avoid herds straying, and resultant conflicts. </p></li>
<li><p>introducing new rules requiring the use of ear-tags. This would help with traceability when cattle are stolen or when they destroy farmlands.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213493/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Ezirigwe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ecowas regulations on pastoralism discourage big investment in livestock and need to be reformed in line with present day realities.Jane Ezirigwe, Postdoctoral Fellow, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2127302023-09-01T15:07:57Z2023-09-01T15:07:57ZCoup in Gabon: Ali Bongo the eighth west African leader to be ousted by military in two years<p>Gabon’s prime minister, Ali Bongo, has become the latest in a string of African leaders to be <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66652015">ousted by a military coup</a> in recent years. Bongo, who had just won a third term in power, was ousted by a junta of senior officers who have named <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66666585">General Brice Oligui Nguema</a> – the former head of the presidential guard and Bongo’s cousin – as the country’s new “interim president”.</p>
<p>The coup in Gabon is the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/recent-coups-west-central-africa-2023-08-30/">eighth in west and central Africa since 2020</a>, and the second – after Niger – in as many months. He is being held under house arrest from where he made an emotional plea for help for him and his family from international “friends of Gabon” to “make noise”.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/NKiY-AXSf5k?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Deposed Gabonese president, Ali Bongo, makes an emotional plea for help after being placed under house arrest.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The coup appears to have brought an end to his family’s <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2023/08/30/timeline-gabon-since-independence-in-10-dates/">55-year hold on power in Gabon</a>. His father, El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, was president for almost 42 years from 1967. When he died in hospital in 2009, his son won the presidency in an election criticised at the time as little more than a dynastic handover.</p>
<p>News of Bongo’s removal from power was greeted by many with jubilation, with crowds taking to the streets in support of the military junta. There has long been talk of corruption in Gabon, with many believing that revenues from the country’s considerable oil wealth are not being distributed evenly, leaving many in poverty.</p>
<p>Gabon, a <a href="https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/3520.htm">member of Opec</a>, produces more than 200,000 barrels of oil a day, but – despite having one of Africa’s highest incomes per capita – more than one-third of the population of 2.3 million are thought to be living below the poverty line, according to the UN <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/MPI/GAB.pdf">Development Programme</a>. </p>
<h2>Contested election</h2>
<p>The result of the August 26 election, which appeared to hand Bongo his third term in power, was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66620070">widely disputed</a>. Before polls even closed there were complaints that many of the polling stations did not have papers bearing the name of Bongo’s main opponent, former university professor and one-time education minister, Albert Ondo Ossa. </p>
<p>There were reported long delays in polling stations being opened, the internet was shut down, and a curfew was imposed as polls closed. It took three days for the electoral authorities to announce that Bongo had won with 64.3% of the vote compared with 30.8% for Ossa. The coup is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/30/a-coup-in-gabon-who-what-and-why">reported to have taken place</a> within an hour of the results being announced.</p>
<p>This was not an attempt to unseat Bongo. In 2016, there were <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20160831-gabon-bongo-wins-presidential-election-commission-ping">outbreaks of violence</a> which resulted in more than 50 deaths after an extremely tight election result which Bongo won by 49.8% of the vote against his main opponent, Jean Ping with 48.2%. </p>
<p>There was also a coup attempt in January 2019, when a group of army officers tried to take power while Bongo was undergoing treatment for a stroke in Morocco. The 2019 botched coup attempt was an <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190108-gabon-botched-coup-ali-bongo-disputed-elections">early signal</a> of Bongo’s weakening grip on the military. He responded in December 2019 by arresting his chief of staff, Brice Laccruche Alihanga, on corruption charges.</p>
<p>But this time, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/8/30/photos-hundreds-celebrate-in-gabons-capital-after-soldiers-seize-power">loud celebrations</a> in the capital Libreville would seem to indicate that, for now at least, the military junta enjoys a level of popular support.</p>
<p>Any unrest is likely to be met with a military clampdown. Gabon’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/gabon/">human rights record</a> has been mixed, with reports of abuse and violence, especially <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/gabon/report-gabon/">against dissident voices</a> after the 2016 election. All of which have serious consequences for governance and stability in the short to long term, both in Gabon and across the region. Under Bongo, Gabon had a Freedom House score of <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/gabon/freedom-world/2023">20 out of 100</a>, reflecting the tight grip held by Bongo through his control of the military. Now the military has control.</p>
<h2>International reaction</h2>
<p>The African Union has responded by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/31/african-union-meets-on-gabon-situation-after-military-coup">suspending Gabon’s membership</a> and, if the EU and other western countries react the same way as they have to other recent coups, sanctions are likely to be imposed. France, which has maintained close economic, diplomatic and military ties with Gabon, and has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/30/gabon-coup-military-takeover-gabonese-election-disputed">400 soldiers stationed in the country</a>, has roundly condemned the coup and called for the election result to be respected, as has the UK. The US has called the events in Gabon “deeply concerning”, while the EU has said the coup would be discussed by ministers this week, according to its top diplomat, Josep Borrell, who said: “If this is confirmed, it’s another military coup, which increases instability in the whole region.”</p>
<p>Gabon is not a member of west Africa’s regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas). But the events in Libreville will put pressure on the regional body which is already discussing ways to reverse the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/armed-troops-blockade-presidential-palace-in-niger-mohamed-bazoum">recent coup in Niger</a> which occurred barely a month ago. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Map of central and west African countries." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Troubled region: political instability is rife across central and west Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/west-central-africa-political-map-capitals-212454859">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The coup puts France in a difficult position, given its <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/08/31/gabon-crisis-is-another-challenge-to-frances-african-strategy">close relationship with Ali Bongo</a>, and it might feel pressure to intervene militarily, given that Ecowas already has its hands full with Niger. French influence in a region it once saw as its imperial backyard has <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/analysis-france-losing-its-diplomatic-grip-on-west-africa-hsxhq6k0v">taken a battering</a> in the past two years with coups in francophone countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and now Niger.</p>
<p>Russia, on the other hand, has been steadily <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135#:%7E:text=Russian%20military%20advisers%20arrived%20in,2022%2C%20it%20delivered%20arms%20shipments.">trying to strengthen its influence in the region</a> and might see an opportunity to gain further influence by supporting Gabon’s military junta. China, too, is keen to play a growing role in the region – although Beijing tends mainly to concentrate on building economic ties on the resource-rich continent.</p>
<p>But the aftermath of recent events in Libreville will no doubt be watched most closely by the various other longstanding rulers in the region whose democratic mandate might be weaker than their dependence on their armies or foreign mercenaries to keep them in power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212730/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ali Bongo is the latest in a string of leaders to be ousted in military coups since 2020.Folahanmi Aina, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122022023-08-28T14:43:16Z2023-08-28T14:43:16ZNiger’s coup weakens regional fight against Boko Haram: four reasons why<p>Niger’s President Mohamed Bazoum was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/armed-troops-blockade-presidential-palace-in-niger-mohamed-bazoum">detained and deposed</a> on 26 July by his military guard under the command of General Abdourahamane Tchiani. </p>
<p>The unconstitutional change of government has been widely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-president-says-democracy-will-be-saved-following-coup-2023-07-27/">condemned</a> internationally. Ecowas, the regional group, also issued sanctions and <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/08/11/coup-review-your-military-threat-sanctions-against-niger-%E2%80%90-fulani-group-tells-ecowas/">threatened</a> military intervention. </p>
<p>However, other military juntas in the region have been <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/613369-burkina-faso-mali-guinea-declare-support-for-niger-coup-as-soldiers-arrest-politicians.html">sympathetic</a> to the cause of the coup leaders. </p>
<p>The Niger coup has changed the security priority of key actors in the Lake Chad region, from fighting Boko Haram to addressing the political crisis.</p>
<p>Boko Haram terrorism and insurgency emerged in Nigeria in 2009 and spread across the Lake Chad region: Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The group has directly or indirectly killed more than <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2021/09/23/boko-haram-war-over-300000-children-killed-in-northeast-unicef/">300,000 children</a> and displaced <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/boko-haram-five-million-displaced-in-lake-chad-buhari/">five million</a> people in the region.</p>
<p>At its peak in early 2015, the insurgents <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003211525-1/boko-haram-lake-chad-basin-temitope-oriola-freedom-onuoha-samuel-oyewole">controlled</a> about 20,000 square miles (over 50,000km²) of Nigerian territory. </p>
<p>Early in the fight against Boko Haram, especially between 2010 and 2013, neighbouring states in the Lake Chad region displayed inadequate interest in cooperating with Nigeria. </p>
<p>Regional discord allowed the terrorists to attack targets in Nigeria and escape to neighbouring countries.</p>
<p>From around 2013, the region showed growing interest in the fight against Boko Haram, as terrorist attacks spread beyond Nigeria. The 2014 Paris and London <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015.1047227">conferences</a> further encouraged common frontline and international support against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region.</p>
<p>Cameroon opened the second front against Boko Haram, deploying over <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/04/anatomy-boko-haram-rise-decline-violent-group-nigeria-180422110920231.html">3,000 troops</a> to its northern region in July 2014. Around the same time, Niger Republic <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015.1047227">granted</a> the Nigerian military the right to pursue terrorists across the border. </p>
<p>Niger later declared a state of emergency and deployed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">3,000 troops</a> to the Differ region, threatened by Boko Haram, in February 2015. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">Chad</a> deployed 4,500 troops against the insurgents in early 2015. At the same time, Nigeria and Cameroon <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">raised</a> their forces to 25,000 and 7,000 respectively. </p>
<p>In July 2015, the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/about/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a> became operational against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region. With headquarters in N’Djamena, Chad, the force established sectors in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The force is made up of 10,000 troops drawn from the four frontline countries and Benin Republic.</p>
<p>To support them, France, the US, Belgium, Italy and Germany maintain varying degrees of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2021.1868798">military presence</a> in Niger. </p>
<p>This coordinated response is now threatened by the shift in focus from fighting Boko Haram to removing the coup leaders in Niger. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=vU7aPGIAAAAJ&citation_for_view=vU7aPGIAAAAJ:43bX7VzcjpAC">researched</a> Boko Haram and its operations in the Lake Chad region for the last 13 years. Based on my <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Boko-Harams-Terrorist-Campaign-in-Nigeria-Contexts-Dimensions-and-Emerging/Oriola-Onuoha-Oyewole/p/book/9781032077840">research</a> and <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/04/anatomy-boko-haram-rise-decline-violent-group-nigeria-180422110920231.html">understanding</a> of the region, I see four ways in which the events in Niger will make the regional fight against Boko Haram more difficult:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Ecowas’s attention is divided</p></li>
<li><p>Niger’s attention is diverted</p></li>
<li><p>the gaps in security may give Boko Haram the opportunity to regroup and restrategise</p></li>
<li><p>suspension of western aid to Niger could fuel poverty and drive recruitment into Boko Haram.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Niger’s coup and its benefits to Boko Haram</h2>
<p>The member states of the Lake Chad security arrangement and their western partners have condemned the Niger coup, and become hostile to the junta. </p>
<p>Ecowas, led by Nigeria, has <a href="https://ecowas.int/final-communique-fifty-first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-of-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">sanctioned</a> Niger. Ecowas suspended financial and commercial relations, closed land borders and restricted flights to and from Niger. The regional bloc also threatened military intervention to restore constitutional order in the country. </p>
<p>This means the Nigerian military has been preoccupied with possible Ecowas intervention in Niger. Data extracted from the <a href="https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/">Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project</a> as of 23 August shows that the last offensive operation against Boko Haram by the Nigerian military was on 25 July. Since then, four insurgent attacks have been recorded, where 12 civilians were killed and 15 were kidnapped in Nigeria.</p>
<p>The military priority of Niger has also shifted from fighting against Boko Haram and other violent extremist groups. Now it is regime security. Niger’s military is preoccupied with a potential Nigeria-led Ecowas military intervention. </p>
<p>The junta has thus <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/07/africa/niger-coup-deadline-intl/index.html">prioritised</a> defence of the national capital and south-western borders. This is to the detriment of south-eastern borders, where Boko Haram is a threat. </p>
<p>Boko Haram is already taking advantage of this shift. On 15 August, <a href="https://punchng.com/17-niger-soldiers-killed-in-attack-near-mali-ministry/#google_vignette">17 Niger soldiers</a> were killed in an attack by suspected jihadists near the country’s border with Mali. The attack was described as the first in over a year. </p>
<p>Many western countries have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-loses-aid-western-countries-condemn-coup-2023-07-29/#:%7E:text=NIAMEY%2C%20July%2029%20">suspended</a> critical development and security aid to Niger. This is to the detriment of the country’s counter-insurgency capacity. </p>
<p>Niger’s military junta is mobilising anti-colonial and anti-imperial sentiment. It has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66365376">severed</a> defence cooperation with France and is aligning with pro-Russian forces. </p>
<p>Boko Haram can exploit the Niger crisis to regroup and re-strategise. Terrorist movement from Sahel to the Lake Chad region was recently <a href="https://dailytrust.com/niger-coup-iswap-migrating-from-sahel-to-lake-chad-north-west/#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20top%20ISWAP%20fighters%20and,of%20the%20Lake%20Chad%20region">reported</a>.</p>
<p>The humanitarian effects of Ecowas sanctions and suspension of western aid may also fuel terrorist recruitment and a new wave of insecurity in the region. </p>
<p>The anti-western mobilisation of the junta can advance Boko Haram’s agenda to end western influence and establish Islamic State in the Lake Chad region and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212202/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samuel Oyewole does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Boko Haram may be the unintended beneficiary of the crisis created by the recent coup in Niger.Samuel Oyewole, Lecturer, Political Science, Federal University, Oye EkitiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122092023-08-25T11:17:05Z2023-08-25T11:17:05ZNiger’s resource paradox: what should make the country rich has made it a target for predators<p>A month after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">coup in Niger</a> that toppled the democratically elected civilian government of Mohamed Bazoum, the country’s neighbours are still debating the possibility of <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-why-an-ecowas-led-military-intervention-is-unlikely-211136">military intervention</a>. </p>
<p>The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) – a coalition of west African countries, which includes Niger – has said it intends to send in a taskforce to topple the military junta led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, which ousted Bazoum on July 26.</p>
<p>But the plan to intervene is not without controversy. Niger, a landlocked nation, shares borders with Mali, Algeria, Libya, Chad, Benin and Burkina Faso. These countries <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/6/niger-coup-divisions-as-ecowas-military-threat-fails-to-play-out">have expressed solidarity with the military junta</a> and have committed to oppose any potential Ecowas intervention. </p>
<p>France, which <a href="https://capstone.ndu.edu/Portals/83/20-2%20Africa%20Field%20Study%20Book%20II%20Final%20reduced%20Part%20II.pdf">occupied Niger</a> from 1890 until independence in 1960, has also considered intervention – it has a small contingent of troops in the country ostensibly to combat jihadi insurgency in the Sahel region – which the junta has given them <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/08/23/niger-group-calls-for-withdrawal-of-french-troops//#:%7E:text=Some%201%2C500%20French%20soldiers%20have,its%20Sahel%20operation%20last%20year.&text=On%20August%203%2C%20Niamey's%20ruling,a%20one%2Dmonth%20notice%20period.">notice to withdraw</a>. Algeria has also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/22/african-union-issues-ambiguous-view-on-possible-niger-military-intervention#:%7E:text=While%20the%20AU%20issued%20a,diplomatic%20efforts%20to%20restore%20democracy">denied France permission</a> to fly over the country.</p>
<p>For now, the situation remains fluid and uncertain. But beneath the surface of daily news headlines is an intricate web of geopolitical competition and strategic agendas that have profound consequences for the Nigerien people. </p>
<p>The recent coup underscores <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/niger-and-the-collapse-of-frances-empire/">a geopolitical rivalry</a> deeply rooted in colonial and neo-colonial legacies and intensified by some western nations’ drive for the control of Niger’s resources.</p>
<p>Although Niger <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/niger-and-the-collapse-of-frances-empire/">grapples with extreme poverty</a>, leading to widespread malnutrition and hunger among its citizens, it is the world’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/01/uranium-niger-france-coup/">seventh-biggest producer of uranium</a>. This juxtaposition of mineral wealth and societal poverty underscores the irony of a nation abundant in resources yet plagued by profound economic hardships.</p>
<p>First <a href="https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/niger.aspx#:%7E:text=Uranium%20was%20discovered%20at%20Azelik,(CEA)%20initiated%20further%20studies.">discovered in 1957 at Azelik</a> by a French colonial expedition looking for copper deposits, Uranium now ranks as Niger’s second-largest export in monetary value – <a href="https://www.powerengineeringint.com/nuclear/coup-in-niger-brings-countrys-uranium-resources-into-sharper-focus/">surpassed only by gold</a>. The country is a <a href="https://www.powerengineeringint.com/nuclear/coup-in-niger-brings-countrys-uranium-resources-into-sharper-focus/">principal supplier of uranium to the European Union (EU)</a> and contributes between 15% and 17% of the uranium fuelling France’s electricity generation. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the country <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20230814-power-cuts-worsen-in-niger-following-sanctions-from-ecowas">struggles to produce its own electricity</a> because Nigeria <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-west-african-union-has-pledged-to-intervene-but-some-members-support-the-plotters-210990">recently terminated</a> its power supply to the nation as a sanction against the military junta, leaving much of the country in darkness.</p>
<h2>Western exploitation</h2>
<p>Given its abundant natural resources, it seems counterintuitive for Niger to rank among the world’s poorest nations. Yet its economic and political struggles have deep roots in historical <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/05/world/africa/niger-coup-france-west-africa.html">foreign interventions, exploitation and resource extraction</a>. This situation has, for decades, been further compounded by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/27/timeline-a-history-of-coups-in-niger">misguided and ineffective leadership</a>, often conniving in exploitation by foreign interests.</p>
<p>While some Ecowas members oppose the coup in Niger and have threatened <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/18/africa/niger-ecowas-d-day-military-intervention-intl-hnk/index.html">military intervention against the coup leaders</a>, some western countries are manoeuvring to uphold their interests. The Nigerian senate <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/nigeria-senate-cautions-against-niger-military-intervention/a-66450388">opposes military intervention</a>, with one of its <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/niger-coup-dont-allow-us-france-push-you-to-unnecessary-war-orji-kalu-tells-tinubu/">members alleging</a> that Ecowas would merely be doing France and America’s bidding. Senator Orji Uzor Kalu suggested that if there is to be military action, it should be carried out by French and US troops.</p>
<p>Colonial powers and other major geopolitical actors have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ee6fb170-3284-46fa-9eb7-da64212c4989">profoundly influenced</a> Niger’s contemporary situation. France, referred to by the New York Times recently as the “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/05/world/africa/niger-coup-france-west-africa.html">Former Coloniser that Stayed</a>”, has already warned that any attack on its interests in Niger will be <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/07/30/france-warns-attacks-on-its-interests-in-niger-will-not-be-tolerated">met with retaliation</a>. Meanwhile the reported presence of Wagner Group mercenaries in the country, after a request from the coup leaders, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/08/05/niger-junta-wagner-group-mali-mohamed-bazoum-ecowas/">is a proxy for Russian interests in Niger</a>. </p>
<p>But following the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66599733">reported death of Wagner Group boss, Yevgeny Progozhin</a>, after his private jet is understood to have crashed on a trip from St Petersburg to Moscow on August 23, the status of the Wagner Group activities in Niger – and Africa generally – is uncertain. However, their operations may come under the direct control of Russia’s military. </p>
<h2>African resources, western interests</h2>
<p>Another important resource issue threatened by instability in Niger is the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/african-countries-seek-to-revive-trans-saharan-gas-pipeline-dream/a-62778681">trans-Saharan gas pipeline (TSGP)</a>, designed to transport natural gas from Nigeria through Niger and on to Algeria and then to Europe. One of the drivers of this project in the past two years has been the European need to wean itself off Russian gas supplies in light of the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Yet again, western resource needs are dictating events in supposedly independent and sovereign African countries.</p>
<p>The dominant narrative in west Africa frequently presents foreign interventions as benevolent efforts to stabilise the Sahel region, in particular, against the threat of jihadi insurgency. Yet a deeper examination <a href="https://journal.iag.ir/article_118383_en.html">uncovers a more intricate reality</a>. As western powers strive to shape political dynamics in Niger – driven not just by a desire for stability but also to preserve their dominance and <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/niger-and-the-collapse-of-frances-empire/">control over resource allocation</a> – they portray Niger, and by extension, Africa, as mere markets within the global economy. This ignores the potential <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/niger/niger-coup-could-exacerbate-humanitarian-crisis">humanitarian consequences</a> of such interventions for the people of Niger and west Africa in general.</p>
<p>As Niger faces political instability and possible violent conflict, there’s a pressing need to critically evaluate the motives and repercussions of foreign intervention. </p>
<p>Beyond the veneer of the quest for democracy and stability, the various players’ deeper strategic intentions must be scrutinised. This is the key to understanding the multifaceted dynamics in the Sahel region and their broader global implications.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212209/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A geopolitical struggle for valuable resources such as uranium is behind the wrangling over Niger.Francis Okpaleke, PhD Candidate, Politics and International Security, University of WaikatoOlumba E. Ezenwa, Doctoral Research Fellow, Conflict, Violence, & Terrorism Research Centre, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2115492023-08-17T10:20:48Z2023-08-17T10:20:48ZNiger: Ecowas military intervention could trigger 3 bad outcomes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542849/original/file-20230815-21-ogk7ja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigeria-led Ecowas artillerymen land by helicopter on 10 January, 1999 in Freetown. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jean-Philippe Ksiazek/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66465146">threat</a> of military force to end the coup in Niger has led to significant divisions in the region.</p>
<p>It has heightened tensions in Niger itself, as well as among its neighbours. </p>
<p>There are more and more signs that any military intervention is likely to be met with stiff opposition. <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/niger-coup-supporters-rally-as-regional-force-mulls-intervention-/7222246.html">Growing support</a> for the junta has emboldened the coup plotters to stay in power and call the bluff of the <a href="https://ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States</a>, Ecowas. </p>
<p>In reaction to the threat of force, more Nigeriens took to the streets to show their opposition, with one <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2023/08/military-junta-thousands-of-coup-supporters-gather-near-french-military-base-in-niger/">protest</a> held close to a French military base in Niamey. </p>
<p>The option of military force has divided countries in west Africa and the Sahel. Ecowas members are fully aware that an all-out war would increase the fragility of the region. A meeting of Ecowas military chiefs in Ghana on <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230817-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-ecowas-military-chiefs-to-meet-over-niger-coup">17 and 18 August</a> will discuss intervention options. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Ecowas parliament is <a href="https://punchng.com/ecowas-parliament-divided-over-planned-military-action-in-niger/">divided</a> over a military intervention. Member countries such as Nigeria, which currently holds the rotating chair, are also being put under internal pressure. <a href="https://punchng.com/niger-kano-residents-protest-planned-standby-force/">Protesters</a> took to the streets in Kano, the biggest city in northern Nigeria, against a possible invasion of Niger. </p>
<p>For their part, countries that neighbour Niger but do not belong to Ecowas, such as Chad and Algeria, have <a href="https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/niger-chad-and-algeria-opposed-to-military-intervention-would-aggravate-the-situation/">opposed</a> the use of force. </p>
<p>As a scholar of <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">politics and international relations</a>, I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329456894_US_Drone_Base_in_Agadez_A_Security_Threat_to_Niger">researched</a> the implications of foreign military bases in Niger. My view remains as I have <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-why-an-ecowas-led-military-intervention-is-unlikely-211136">previously argued</a> that a military intervention in Niger is unlikely. </p>
<p>However, the threat of force means tensions remain high. This is understandable as a great deal is at stake. I have identified three major implications of a full-blown war. </p>
<p>The first casualty would be the ongoing regional war against terrorism because countries currently committed to this fight would have their armies and resources diverted. </p>
<p>The second is that there would be a mass influx of refugees into the seven countries bordering Niger. This would have a knock-on effect as more refugees seek to find their way to Europe. </p>
<p>The third is that the conflict would heighten tensions between Niger and France. The junta blames France for the country’s insecurity and economic woes. </p>
<h2>Counting the cost of war</h2>
<p>Nigerien soldiers, through the <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Terrorism/Counter-terrorism-projects/G5-Sahel">G5-Sahel</a> and <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a>, are involved in the fight against <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/boko_haram.html">Boko Haram</a>, <a href="https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/terrorist-organisations/listed-terrorist-organisations/islamic-state-west-africa-province">Islamic State West Africa Province</a> (ISWAP) and other terrorist groups around the Lake Chad Basin and other regions of the country. An attack led by Ecowas on Niger would distract the soldiers and divert critical resources. </p>
<p>Terrorist groups could then take advantage of borders weakened by conflict. They could also benefit from a situation where armies which previously fought side by side against insurgents such as Boko Haram and ISWAP were now fighting one another.</p>
<p>The example of Syria and how ISIS <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets/">quickly emerged</a> in the region gives a glimpse of what could happen. </p>
<p>Most of the Nigerien population lives in the southern part of the country next to the borders with Nigeria, Republic of Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali. These countries would suffer an influx of refugees, further destabilising what are already fragile states.</p>
<p>A war between the Nigerien military and Ecowas would embolden human traffickers and lead to more Africans taking advantage of the chaos to travel north towards Europe. </p>
<p>Niger has several bilateral and multilateral arrangements with the European Union and other countries in Europe to <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_4536">curb mass migration</a> through Libya and the Mediterranean sea.</p>
<p>Agadez in central Niger used to be a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20171213-focus-niger-agadez-desert-migrant-hub-people-smuggling-sahel-hotspots-route-libya">major hub for illegal migration</a> but this has changed as a result of the concerted effort between Niger and its European allies. </p>
<p>Military intervention would lead to a total collapse of the relationship between France and Niger’s people. There is already anger among a large part of the Nigerien public against the former colonial master and its activities in the country. </p>
<p>Niger was a French colony from 1922 till independence in 1960 and Paris has <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230803-niger-coup-brings-france-s-complicated-relationship-with-its-former-colonies-into-the-spotlight">continued</a> to play a critical role in the domestic political and economic affairs of the country.</p>
<p>If people believe that Ecowas is being pushed to take military action by France and its allies, Nigeriens could look to Russia which has issued its own <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66478430">warning</a> against military intervention.</p>
<p>While Russia might not have the capacity and resources to fully mobilise in support of the junta, it might engage the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-60947877">Wagner Group</a>, the Russia-backed private military contractor, which already has a <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/tracking-arrival-russias-wagner-group-mali">presence</a> in neighbouring Mali. </p>
<p>Russia has been careful not to support the coup plotters so as not to upset its allies in Africa, such as South Africa and Namibia, who both oppose the coup. But a full-scale military intervention would provide Moscow with an opportunity to get involved and “gain another ally”. The military leaders in Burkina Faso for instance have been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/5/interim-burkina-faso-president-hails-russia-as-strategic-ally">strengthening </a> their relationship with Russia.</p>
<h2>Limited options</h2>
<p>Ecowas is desperate to “do something” after the junta defied its <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/ecowas-threatens-force-gives-7-day-ultimatum-for-return-to-democracy-in-niger">seven-day ultimatum</a> to step down.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the junta is not showing any signs of backing down. </p>
<p>I think the best option is to rule out military action and to negotiate a short transition period to restore democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211549/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The use of force to end the coup in Niger would come at great cost and cripple the regional fight against terrorism.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2111362023-08-08T12:28:33Z2023-08-08T12:28:33ZNiger coup: why an Ecowas-led military intervention is unlikely<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541537/original/file-20230807-34367-f6znll.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Niger's coup leaders waving at a crowd of supporters in Niamey on August 6, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Balima Boureima/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hopes are fading for a quick resolution of Niger’s coup or the potential use of force by the <a href="https://ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">Economic Community of West African States</a> (Ecowas) to free Nigerien president Mohammed Bazoum and restore him to power.</p>
<p>Ecowas leaders gave the Nigerien military junta <a href="https://ecowas.int/final-communique-fifty-first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-of-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">an ultimatum</a> to cede power within seven days of 30 July or face a military intervention.</p>
<p>The deadline of 6 August came and went, and the putschists remained. Ecowas meets again on <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/7/ecowas-calls-for-second-emergency-summit-to-discuss-niger-coup">10 August</a> to discuss the situation in Niger. However, hopes of a Nigeria-led Ecowas military intervention in Niger now appears dim. </p>
<p>The first indication that it would be difficult to immediately restore democracy in the country surfaced when <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/6/thousands-in-niger-rally-in-support-of-coup-leaders">demonstrations</a> in support of the coup started. </p>
<p>An <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-coup-mohamed-bazoum-military-junta-sahel-88ccaa2f004db44601e59475199c5fbe">attack</a> on the French embassy in Niamey was followed by a daily protest in support of the coup. The size of the protest increased daily. </p>
<p><a href="https://indepthnews.net/niger-coup-reflects-anti-french-sentiment-in-the-region/">Anti-France sentiments</a> also increased, with more people supporting the junta. </p>
<p>Niger shares a border with <a href="https://www.worlddata.info/africa/niger/index.php">seven countries</a> in the region, four of which are members of Ecowas. Of those four, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230801-burkina-faso-and-mali-say-intervention-in-niger-would-be-declaration-of-war">Mali and Burkina Faso</a> have been suspended due to similar coups d'etat. </p>
<p>Both countries have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/1/burkina-faso-and-mali-warn-against-foreign-intervention-after-niger-coup">threatened</a> to support Niger if Ecowas tries to use force. The remaining two countries in the bloc bordering Niger are Nigeria and Benin. Outside Ecowas, Chad and Algeria have <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230806-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-pressure-mounts-on-niger-coup-leaders-as-ecowas-deadline-approaches">both ruled out</a> participating in any military action and Libya has its own challenges. </p>
<p>The likelihood of a military intervention further diminished when Nigerian legislators <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/318122/nigerias-senate-rejects-military-intervention-in-niger-as-ultimatum-to-coup-leaders-expires/">rejected</a> the idea. They argued for the use of “other means” than force. Nigeria is the largest country in the Ecowas bloc and <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/118585-nigeria-ecowas-largest-donor-continually-outsmarted-by-smaller-west-african-countries.html">principal financier</a> of the bloc. </p>
<p>It will be difficult for Ecowas to carry out military intervention without the full support of Nigeria. As a scholar of <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">politics and international relations</a> I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329456894_US_Drone_Base_in_Agadez_A_Security_Threat_to_Niger">researched</a> the implications of foreign military bases in Niger. I have also previously <a href="https://isij.eu/article/interorganizational-cooperation-and-fight-against-terrorism-west-africa-and-sahel">analysed the role Nigeria plays</a> in regional organisations such as Ecowas and the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Taskforce</a> in the region. </p>
<p>My view is that the unwillingness of Nigeria’s politicians to support military intervention, coupled with growing local support for the junta in Niger, will make the use of force almost impossible. This leaves Ecowas with little or no option than to pursue a diplomatic resolution. </p>
<h2>Why military intervention is unlikely</h2>
<p>There are three main reasons why the use of force is becoming more unlikely.</p>
<p>First, the increasing popularity of the putschists in the country is a cause for concern. The growth of protests in support of the coup is an indication of a wider acceptance than previously envisaged.</p>
<p>Hundreds of youths <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/deadline-arrived-nigers-junta-reinstate-president-residents-brace-102053037">joined</a> military personnel to stand guard at the entrance to Niamey. Some of these youths vowed to join the military to fight any incursion.</p>
<p>Second, politicians in Nigeria and Ghana fear that any military intervention would result in human catastrophe, which would further destabilise the region. Politicians from Nigeria <a href="https://north-africa.com/nigerian-president-tinubu-under-pressure-to-avoid-war-with-northern-neighbor-niger/">argue</a> that any war in Niger will have a serious impact on northern Nigeria, a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2020.1811662">region that is already strained</a> by insurgency. </p>
<p>Apart from Islamist terror organisation, <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/boko_haram.html">Boko Haram</a>, which has ravaged the north-eastern part of the country, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2020.1811662">clashes</a> between farmers and pastoralists have also destabilised other parts of northern Nigeria. </p>
<p>Seven Nigerian states share borders with Niger. An attack on Niger would lead to a large influx of refugees into Nigeria. This has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66420693">created anxiety</a> in northern Nigeria. President Bola Tinubu, who took office only recently, will find it difficult to ignore the senators from the region who <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/614494-niger-coup-nigerian-senators-reject-tinubus-request-for-troops-deployment.html">rejected</a> any military intervention.</p>
<p>Third, Niger has fought terrorism in the region and has been a reliable partner. The country is a member of the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a> and the <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Terrorism/Counter-terrorism-projects/G5-Sahel">G5 Sahel</a>, two key organisations tasked with countering terrorism and fighting trafficking in the region. </p>
<p>A military intervention in Niger which could result in a full blown war would embolden terrorist groups. It will also result in soldiers previously fighting side by side against terrorist groups now fighting against each other.</p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/terrorist-organisations/listed-terrorist-organisations/islamic-state-west-africa-province">Islamic State West Africa Province</a>, an Isis affiliate, already operating in the region, an attack on Niger could create a situation similar to what happened in Syria. Isis took advantage of the fighting in Syria to establish a caliphate in 2014.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Since military intervention to restore democracy in Niger is unlikely, diplomacy remains the only solution. </p>
<p>The de facto leader General Abdourahamane Tiani was on the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/318026/10-things-to-know-about-niger-coup-leader-general-abdourahamane-tiani/">verge of being removed</a> as leader of the presidential guard before the coup d'etat. Many high-ranking military officers in the country are involved in the mutiny and it is almost impossible they will be able to work with Bazoum again. They could be <a href="https://www.pgaction.org/ilhr/adp/ner.html">tried for treason</a>, which is punishable by death in Niger.</p>
<p>As I have <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721#:%7E:text=In%20addition%20to%20insecurity%20and,labelled%20as%20having%20foreign%20origins.">explained</a> elsewhere, the mutiny was partly a result of the large presence of foreign military troops in the country. It has further weakened the relationship between the Nigerien military and France. </p>
<p>The military junta has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/niger-coup-leaders-end-military-cooperation-with-france-deepening-concerns-over-anti-western-turn-e7fae57e">cancelled</a> military cooperation with France. </p>
<p>If Bazoum is released and restored as president, he will have to remove several military leaders who participated in the coup or renegotiate Niger’s military alliance with France. Both options are fraught with difficulties. </p>
<p>The most likely diplomatic option is for Ecowas to negotiate a short transition window with the military junta. This will include a quick return to democratic rule. </p>
<p>This will calm the tension and give some assurance to partners within and outside the region. With the level of support the junta has received from the Nigerien public and outside the country, Ecowas negotiators must be open to making concessions. </p>
<p>Third party countries with lower stakes in Niger must lead these negotiations and France must be willing to change its relationship with the country to one of mutual benefit. At the moment, Nigeriens see France as an exploiter and are keen to end their long-held relationship. </p>
<p>In all, there’s no easy solution to the impasse in Niger.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211136/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A combination of Nigerian and Nigerien factors dim prospects of Ecowas military intervention in Niger.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2111392023-08-07T15:30:39Z2023-08-07T15:30:39ZNiger: with a key deadline passed, Nigeria must take decisive steps to prevent a civil war in its neighborhood<p>The deadline set by the <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/regional-economic-communities-rec/economic-community-west-african-states#:%7E:text=The%2015%20members%20of%20the,%2C%20Sierra%20Leone%2C%20and%20Togo.">Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas)</a> for the elected president of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum – who was deposed in a coup on July 26 – to be reinstated to office <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/niger-coup-junta-closes-airspace-as-deadline-to-reinstate-ousted-president-passes-12935276">has passed</a>. West Africa is now bracing to see how Ecowas, which has threatened to take all steps, including military intervention, will react.</p>
<p>The situation is complicated by the fact that several member states of Ecowas, including Mali and Burkina Faso, both of which have also had recent military coups, have <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230807-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-niger-junta-closes-airspace-as-ecowas-deadline-expires">publicly supported the coup plotters</a>.</p>
<p>The military junta, led by the former leader of the presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tiani, is understood to have <a href="https://apnews.com/article/wagner-russia-coup-niger-military-force-e0e1108b58a9e955af465a3efe6605c0">asked for assistance</a> from the Russian-owned mercenary Wagner Group.</p>
<p>Niger’s coup bears serious consequences for regional peace, security, and stability in west Africa, especially as it affects Nigeria and the already <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66322914">troubled Sahel region</a>. Niger, which has been described as the “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/how-military-coup-niger-threatens-stability-west-africa-2023-07-27/">only hope</a>” for stability in the Sahel, is struggling to contain two insurgencies in the south of the country involving jihadi groups which have spilled over from Mali and Nigeria.</p>
<p>In its response to the coup, a <a href="https://statehouse.gov.ng/news/first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">summit held in Nigeria by Ecowas</a> issued a seven-day ultimatum to the coup leaders calling on them to relinquish political power. But thus far the military junta has shown no signs of backing down and is supported by a significant number of Niger’s population. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ecowas countries" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Strife-torn neighbourhood: the Ecowas group of west African countries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ecowas.png">Scantyzer1/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The options now before Ecowas are to extend the deadline to give mediation and diplomatic efforts a chance, or to proceed with the threatened military intervention. The Nigerian Senate <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/08/06/coup-nigerian-senate-rejects-tinubus-proposal-for-military-intervention-in-niger-republic/">voted against military action</a> on August 5 and public opinion appears to favour further mediation.</p>
<p>Having called on the Wagner Group for assistance in the event of an Ecowas military intervention, it appears likely that Niger’s coup leaders will look to Moscow to fill the gaps resulting from the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-loses-aid-western-countries-condemn-coup-2023-07-29/">suspension of humanitarian and security aid</a> by western powers. This would further entrench Russia’s influence in the region. </p>
<h2>Jihadi insurgency threats</h2>
<p>Despite Niger being seen in the west as a “poster-child” for stability in the region following the peaceful transition of power in elections in 2021, parts of the country are afflicted by ongoing violence. In the southwestern Tillabéri region, which borders Mali and Burkina Faso, more than 2,500 people have been killed and 100,000 displaced by fighting involving a number of armed insurgent groups.</p>
<p>Elsewhere in southern Niger there is overspill from violence in northern Nigeria involving jihadist groups, including Boko Haram and its breakaway faction, the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel">Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP)</a>.</p>
<p>As with elsewhere in the Sahel, Russia’s Wagner Group mercenaries are keen to <a href="https://theconversation.com/mapping-the-contours-of-jihadist-groups-in-the-sahel-168539">exploit the turmoil</a> to help Moscow increase its influence in the region at the expense of the former colonial power, France, as well as the US. Both have had peacekeeping troops in the region. </p>
<p>To add to the instability, there are estimated to be as many <a href="https://dailytrust.com/matawalle-there-are-30000-armed-bandits-across-the-north/">30,000 “bandits”</a>, mainly operating in and around northern Nigeria. While described as “terrorists” by the Nigerian government, these are generally driven by economic and criminal, enterprises. There is already a <a href="https://unidir.org/sites/default/files/publication/pdfs//the-complex-dynamics-of-small-arms-in-west-africa-en-329.pdf">flourishing trade</a> in illegal small arms and light weapons in the region, made easier by the porous border between Niger and its neighbouring countries.</p>
<p>The net result of this violence is an explosion in the number of refugees and displaced people, which would only increase were civil war to break out in Niger. This would put intense pressure on Nigeria’s already strained social and medical infrastructure. Niger is already hosting an estimated <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/ner">influx of 30,000 refugees</a> from the conflict in Mali who would be likely to flee into Nigeria were violence to spread in Niger.</p>
<h2>All eyes on Nigeria’s response</h2>
<p>Nigeria, which currently holds the chair of Ecowas, has taken some decisive steps intended at reversing the coup in Niger, such as backing the Chadian leader who is acting as a mediator. </p>
<p>It has also <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20230801-coup-d-%C3%A9tat-au-niger-une-d%C3%A9l%C3%A9gation-de-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao-avec-le-sultan-de-sokoto-leader-religieux-influent-attendue-%C3%A0-niamey">dispatched a team of mediators</a> which includes the former military leader of Nigeria, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdusalam-Abubakar">General Abdulsamali Abubakar</a>, and the Sultan of Sokoto, <a href="https://themuslim500.com/profiles/muhammadu-saadu-abubakar-iii/">Sa'adu Abubakar</a>, who leads the Sokoto Caliphate, a Sunni Muslim community of West Africa.</p>
<p>Military action from Ecowas would come at a heavy cost to Nigeria, whose economy is in the process of a <a href="https://businessday.ng/news/article/world-bank-imf-others-back-tinubus-economic-reforms/">long-overdue programme of economic reform</a> and cannot afford to fund such a military intervention. The cost of previous Ecowas interventions, particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone, has largely been borne by Nigeria. Ecowas must ensure that all options for a negotiated peace settlement are fully explored and at most should deploy a contingent of special operations forces on high alert to Nigeria’s border with Niger.</p>
<p>So despite the passing of the Ecowas deadline, member states must take great care not to allow the situation to descend into a civil war which could draw in the rest of the Sahel on either side. That would have calamitous consequences for the region and major implications for global security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211139/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>All eyes are on Nigeria where west African countries are discussing the possibility of military intervention to reverse the coup.Folahanmi Aina, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2109902023-08-03T15:15:11Z2023-08-03T15:15:11ZNiger coup: west African union has pledged to intervene – but some members support the plotters<p>When the Nigerian president, <a href="https://businessday.ng/columnist/article/questionable-mandate-tinubu-lacks-legitimacy-to-govern-nigeria/">Bola Tinubu</a>, was elected as chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) on July 10, he asserted that the organisation would no longer be a “<a href="https://pmnewsnigeria.com/2023/07/10/tinubu-asks-ecowas-leaders-to-stop-being-toothless-bulldogs-against-coup-plotters/">toothless bulldog</a>”. Tinubu insisted that Ecowas would work collectively to <a href="https://leadership.ng/ecowas-must-rise-against-coup-detat-tinubu/">combat terrorism and promote democracy</a> in west Africa, explaining:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We must stand firm on democracy. There is no governance, freedom and rule of law without democracy. We will not accept coup after coup in west Africa again. Democracy is very difficult to manage but it is the best form of government.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Within a month, however, the democratically elected leader of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum, was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/26/africa/niger-presidency-attempted-coup-intl/index.html">overthrown by his own palace guard</a>.</p>
<p>As Tinubu noted when taking on the leadership of Ecowas, <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/01/a-deeper-look-into-the-west-african-coup-wave/">coups and counter-coups</a> have become commonplace within the region in recent years. Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso (twice in eight months) have all experienced military takeovers that have ousted their elected governments. Now the same fate has befallen Niger, where the election of Bazoum in April 2021 was considered to be a rare case of successful and democratic transition of power in west Africa. </p>
<p>The coup – which installed the former leader of the presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, as leader – has been roundly condemned by the US, France, the EU and the United Nations. The US, which has has had troops in Niger for more than a decade advising the country’s military on counter-terrorism, said it would “take measures” to restore democratic government in the country. </p>
<p>On July 30, Ecowas issued a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ecowas-threatens-use-of-force-against-niger-junta/a-66398008">seven-day ultimatum</a> vowing to use force to dislodge the junta should they not restore Bazoum to the presidency. </p>
<p>Ecowas has also <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/7/29/23812389/niger-coup-africa-ecowas-tchiani-bazoum">closed its countries’ borders</a> with Niger, instituted a no-fly zone, and frozen the country’s assets and those of those involved in the coup and their families. In addition, Nigeria has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66383119">discontinued electricity supplies to Niger</a>, leading to blackouts in its major cities. But the junta has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-reopens-borders-with-several-neighbours-week-after-coup-2023-08-02/">pledged not to back down</a> despite these “inhumane sanctions”.</p>
<h2>What is Ecowas?</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/002190961557095">Ecowas</a>, a 15-member regional group formed in 1975 and comprising mainly former British and French colonies, aims to “<a href="https://ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">promote cooperation and integration</a>” among members in the form of an economic union. Over the years, it has expanded its remit to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-gambia-is-testing-west-africas-resolve-to-protect-democracy-71173">include a security role</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ecowas nations" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ecowas: a community of west African nations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Scantyzer1 via Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 1990, the group’s military wing, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (Ecomog), was deployed in a peacekeeping role in the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13533319408413509">civil war in Liberia</a>, enjoying initial success but ultimately failing to prevent the outbreak of further hostilities that lasted through most of the 1990s – only ending with the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2005.</p>
<p>In neighbouring Sierra Leone, Johnny Paul Koroma, an army major, led a military coup on May 25 1997, overthrowing the government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Ecomog troops stationed in Liberia were <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45194480">deployed to restore peace and democracy there</a>, but were unable to prevent a bitter civil war <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094419">breaking out</a>, requiring intervention from UN peacekeepers and British troops.</p>
<p>In both Gambia and Côte d’Ivoire, Ecowas has again intervened to ensure the democratic transition of power when it appeared that the incumbent leaders would not respect election results.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-gambia-is-testing-west-africas-resolve-to-protect-democracy-71173">How The Gambia is testing West Africa's resolve to protect democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Stretching military capacity</h2>
<p>It remains to be seen whether Ecowas will follow through with its pledge to intervene if Bazoum is not restored to office in Niger. But conditions are very different in the region now from when the organisation successfully led the interventions described above.</p>
<p>West Africa is riddled with violence associated with <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2021.1888082?casa_token=cDR2sgiLEKoAAAAA%3ASTrfRYVK_ZnNjGov4jaEa82EoITfidvU_FtyHW-zZfPFxLZDo-6oJ_-_oEBSBR-V1RhMeA6lFg">jihadi terrorism</a> involving Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram. There are also regular <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2022.2129015">outbreaks of violence</a> between herders and farmers over land in the face of droughts and scarcity of resources. These issues have <a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-islamic-state-affiliate-attempts-to-assassinate-nigerian-president">stretched the military capacity</a> of Ecowas member states, many of whom have their own problems to deal with.</p>
<p>And then there’s the prospect of the involvement of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">the Wagner Group</a>. The coup junta is reported <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/02/africa/niger-coup-mali-wagner-intl-afr/index.html">to be engaged in discussions</a> with this Russia-backed mercenary army, which has been active across the region. Several countries where the Wagner Group is involved <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/613369-burkina-faso-mali-guinea-declare-support-for-niger-coup-as-soldiers-arrest-politicians.html">have declared their backing</a> for the coup, rejected the Ecowas sanctions, and pledged support for the coup leaders if Ecowas intervenes militarily.</p>
<p>As in Burkina Faso and Mali, there is also growing <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/africa/protesters-attack-french-embassy-niger-west-african-governments-threat-rcna97181">anti-French sentiment</a> on the streets of Niger. This is being fuelled by the Wagner Group’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who has hailed the coup as a blow against colonialism – a message which resonates with many in Niger, where France maintains a 1,500-strong peacekeeping force to combat jihadist terrorism. </p>
<h2>Unpopular leader</h2>
<p>Much has been made by Bazoum’s opponents of his membership <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/02/19/who-is-nigerien-presidential-candidate-mohamed-bazoum/">of a minority ethnic Arab group</a>, which led to him being dubbed as “foreign” during Niger’s election campaign. His election was also condemned in some quarters as cronyism, as he was the handpicked successor of the outgoing president Mahamadou Issoufou. Bazoum’s decision to ban members of his government from <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202206160312.html">having more than one wife</a> has also ruffled powerful feathers.</p>
<p>All these factors will complicate any decision by Ecowas to use force to restore Bazoum to power. But Nigeria, under the leadership of Tinubu, appears determined to take this opportunity to prove that Ecowas still wields muscle in the region.</p>
<p>His chief of staff, General Christopher Musa, has assembled Ecowas defence ministers for a <a href="https://leadership.ng/just-in-ecowas-defence-chiefs-meet-in-abuja-over-niger-coup/">two-day summit in Abuja</a>. Representatives from Nigeria, Benin, Ghana, Togo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, The Gambia, Cote D’Ivoire, Cabo Verde, and Senegal attended, while Niger, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau were not represented.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russia and the west – which harbours fears about Moscow’s intentions in the region – are both watching closely to see whether yet another west African country will descend into the pit of instability and violence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olumba E. Ezenwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The coup in Niger has the potential to further destabilise the whole of west Africa.Olumba E. Ezenwa, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2107212023-07-31T13:33:38Z2023-07-31T13:33:38ZWhat caused the coup in Niger? An expert outlines three driving factors<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540134/original/file-20230731-17-4d3tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Niger's Gen Abdourahamane Tchiani declares himself head of state on 28 July 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">ORTN-Télé Sahel/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>At an emergency meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, on 30 July, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/pro-coup-protests-niger-west-african-leaders-meet-2023-07-30/">demanded</a> the “immediate release and reinstatement” of Niger’s elected president, Mohamed Bazoum. He had been held by the military since 19 July.</p>
<p>The regional bloc gave the military in Niger a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/30/west-african-govts-give-niger-coup-leaders-a-week-to-cede-power">one-week ultimatum</a> to comply and warned it would take all measures necessary – including force – to restore constitutional order. </p>
<p>On 28 July, the head of Niger’s presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230726-presidency-sealed-off-in-coup-prone-niger">declared himself</a> head of state after the military seized power. </p>
<p>Beyond warning against any regional and foreign interventions, the military leaders in Niger have given no indications of ways forward. </p>
<p>This coup d’etat will have a significant impact on peace and stability in Niger and the entire Sahel region. </p>
<p>Although Niger has recently enjoyed its longest democratic rule since independence, there has been a constant threat of coups. When Bazoum was elected president in 2021, there was a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-56589168">coup attempt</a> about 48 hours before his inauguration. It failed as presidential guards fought off the coup plotters. </p>
<p>As a political scientist with expertise on international security, conflict analysis and governance in Africa, including knowledge on Niger, I <a href="https://theconversation.com/botched-coup-in-niger-points-to-deep-fissures-in-the-country-158330">explained</a> then, the coup attempt pointed to deep fissures in the country. It suggested that the military had not fully embraced democracy. </p>
<p>The current coup plotters have blamed rising insecurity and a lack of economic growth. They <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/soldiers-nigers-presidential-guard-blockade-presidents-office-security-sources-2023-07-26/">stated</a> that the intervention was necessary to avoid “the gradual and inevitable demise” of the country. I believe, however, there are other issues that precipitated the latest coup d’etat. These are: ethnicity; the presence of foreign forces; and the weakness of regional bodies.</p>
<h2>Factors that led to the coup</h2>
<p>There are no doubts that the rise in insecurity and <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/niger/overview">declining economic prospects</a> contributed to fragility in the country. </p>
<p>Despite the increase in foreign forces, especially from the <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/02/20/niger-military-base-contractor/">US</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/which-western-countries-have-foreign-forces-niger-2023-07-28/#:%7E:text=FRANCE,in%202021%20and%202022%2C%20respectively.">France</a>, and military bases in Niger, the leadership has been unable to stop insurgent attacks.
There are several insurgent groups, such as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/al-Qaeda">Al-Qaeda</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29052144">Islamic State</a> affiliates, as well as <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/boko_haram.html#:%7E:text=Boko%20Haram%2C%20which%20refers%20to,replace%20it%20with%20a%20regime">Boko Haram</a> operating in the country. </p>
<p>These attacks have resulted in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel">thousands of deaths and displacements</a> in the last decade. Hundreds of youths in the capital, Niamey, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/28/power-impasse-continues-in-niger-48-hours-after-coup">gathered to celebrate</a> the July coup, waving Russian flags and chanting “Wagner”. This suggests that some people in Niger believe the military, supported by Russia and the private military contractor, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-60947877">Wagner group</a>, would do a better job of fighting insurgents.</p>
<p>In addition to insecurity and economic stagnation, three other issues help explain the recent coup d’etat.</p>
<p>First, the debate over the ethnicity and legitimacy of Bazoum was an issue during the last election campaign. Bazoum is from Niger’s ethnic Arab minority and has always been <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/02/19/who-is-nigerien-presidential-candidate-mohamed-bazoum/">labelled</a> as having foreign origins. </p>
<p>This did not sit well within the military circle, which is predominantly composed of the larger ethnic groups – even though Bazoum got <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/22/nigers-top-court-confirms-mohamed-bazoums-election-win">about 56%</a> of the vote and is from the same party as former president Mahamadou Issoufou. </p>
<p>There is a lot of emphasis on ethnic military composition in the country; understanding this helped Issoufou complete two terms as president. Appointments in the military are made <a href="https://theconversation.com/botched-coup-in-niger-points-to-deep-fissures-in-the-country-158330">along ethnic lines</a>. </p>
<p>Second, the large number of foreign military troops and bases in the country has not been well received by the military. They believe this undermines them. Niger is a key ally of western countries in the fight against insurgency in the region. France’s <a href="https://www.africanleadershipmagazine.co.uk/france-eyes-africas-mining-industry-with-550m-investment/">huge investments</a> in Niger’s mining sector are another reason for its interest in security. </p>
<p>In 2019, the US opened a <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/02/20/niger-military-base-contractor/">drone base</a> in Niger despite protests. As I have <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">pointed out</a> before, the drone base could make Niger a target for terrorists and increase instability.</p>
<p>In 2022, France and other European allies withdrew their forces from neighbouring Mali. Bazoum was quick to invite them to Niger. The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/18/after-mali-exit-niger-accepts-foreign-forces-to-secure-border">Nigerien military leadership</a> and some influential individuals in the country denounced the increase in foreign forces. </p>
<p>Third, I suggest the failure of regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the African Union to take a firm stance against military power seizures in Guinea, Burkina Faso and Mali emboldened the Nigerien military. ECOWAS leaders have <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/07/31/ecowas-leaders-give-niger-one-week-ultimatum-to-restore-president/">now threathened to use force</a> to restore Bazoum if the coup plotters do not reinstate him. </p>
<p>In the last four years, there have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">seven coup d’etats</a> in the region. Three were successful. Leaders of ECOWAS and the African Union have threatened sanctions on these three countries, but nothing much has been done to deter other opportunistic military leaders. </p>
<p>In a round table organised by the think tank Chatham House London on the impact of military intervention in west Africa, one of the leaders from the region stated that they kept avenues of communication open with the three military presidents as a courtesy. This creates an impression that there is no deterrence for military takeovers. </p>
<h2>Implications for Niger and the region</h2>
<p>The latest coup d’etat has severe consequences for Niger and the entire Sahel region. Niger is a strong ally of western nations, especially France, the US and the European Union in fighting insurgency and curbing illegal migration to Europe. </p>
<p>Efforts to address these issues will be affected. And the new military leaders will want to use these issues as leverage in negotiations and to force acceptance of the new regime. </p>
<p>The new leaders in Niger might also engage with the Wagner group to combat the Islamist insurgency. The leader of the group has already <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exiled-russian-mercenary-boss-prigozhin-hails-niger-coup-touts-services-2023-07-28/">praised</a> them for seizing power. The influence of Russia and Wagner in the region could grow. </p>
<p>Yet Wagner has been unable to halt terrorist advancement in Mali and Burkina Faso.</p>
<p>Finally, a successful military takeover in Niger would be a major drawback for democracy in the region and Africa as a whole. The military regimes of Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso already plan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-guinea-mali-juntas-plan-three-way-partnership-2023-02-10/">to form a “military alliance”</a>, supposedly to combat insecurity. </p>
<p>African leaders need to do more to prove that they are working for the masses.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210721/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ethnic politics, the presence of foreign troops and the weaknesses of past responses to coups encouraged Niger’s recent military takeover.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2098842023-07-21T07:13:53Z2023-07-21T07:13:53ZZimbabwean migrants: South Africa’s anti-immigrant sentiments are hindering policy reform<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538522/original/file-20230720-17-fba5cm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Effective African economic development depends on economic integration and free movement of people.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The South African Minister of Home Affairs, Aaron Motsoaledi, recently <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2023/490.pdf">lost a court case</a> that anyone could have anticipated was unwinnable. He probably expected to lose it too. He lost it on humanitarian and technical grounds. It prevents him from terminating the South African government’s concession to refugees from neighbouring Zimbabwe nearly fifteen years ago.</p>
<p>In April 2009, South Africa provided legalised shelter for Zimbabweans hit by economic and political crisis in their country across the Limpopo River. The <a href="http://www.dha.gov.za/index.php/statements-speeches/506-remarks-by-minister-malusi-gigaba-on-the-announcement-of-the-zimbabwean-special-dispensation-permit-in-pretoria-12-august-2014">Zimbabwe Dispensation Project</a> was the first form of a policy to temporarily accommodate Zimbabwean refugees. It became the Zimbabwean Special permit in 2014 and after 2017 it was known as the <a href="http://www.dha.gov.za/index.php/immigration-services/gazetted-extension-of-zep">Zimbabwe Exemption Permit</a>. Zimbabweans who had arrived during the crisis period of 2008-09 had full freedoms, but no rights to citizenship even for their children, for as long as the permits allowed.</p>
<p>In 2021, Home Affairs decided to end the special dispensation after a period of grace lasting till the end of 2022 to allow Zimbabweans to regularize their circumstances. Some were expected to be able to obtain residence and work rights based on their skills and occupations, and others were to return to Zimbabwe. The number of people affected by the ruling is estimated at around 178 000 who remained on their ZE permits. Children born in South Africa were expected and allowed to obtain Zimbabwean citizenship and were not allowed South African citizenship.</p>
<p>178 000 is a relatively small number compared with the total number of immigrants in South Africa, <a href="https://africacheck.org/fact-checks/spotchecks/are-there-15-million-undocumented-immigrants-living-south-africa-no-another">estimated at 3.96 million by StatsSA</a>. Many of the registered Zimbabweans are educated and skilled. Most have been successfully living in South Africa for 15 years. Why not simply regularize all the law-abiding Zimbabweans living under the permit?</p>
<p>Elsewhere in Africa and <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ejml16&div=4&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals">around the world </a> larger numbers of irregular migrants have been regularised. In South Africa, <a href="https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1063&context=samp">Mozambican refugees</a> were regularized after the end of the Mozambican civil war. But the current <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/anti-foreigner-sentiment-wont-solve-south-africas-labour-woes">anti-migrant sentiment</a> in South Africa made such a course difficult for the Minister of Home Affairs. This is why he opposed a court action he pretty much knew he would lose.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-free-movement-of-people-is-an-au-ambition-whats-standing-in-its-way-100409">The free movement of people is an AU ambition: what's standing in its way</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<p>I have been studying migration policy on the continent, including the African Union’s adoption of a protocol on the free movement of people in 2018 which <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-free-movement-of-people-is-an-au-ambition-whats-standing-in-its-way-100409">I have argued</a> could facilitate economic growth and the trade integration. </p>
<p>Migration policy in South Africa seems constantly in flux. Most of the <a href="http://www.dha.gov.za/WhitePaperonInternationalMigration-20170602.pdf">immigration policy white paper</a> passed by cabinet in 2017 has never been implemented. Policy documents and a <a href="https://pmg.org.za/call-for-comment/1138/">law amendment on labour migration</a> published a year and a half ago are still in limbo. A promised new white paper on immigration has not yet been published. Some of the proposals could have simplified migration rules such as a proposal to replace the critical skills list with a points system, while others such as the quota system proposed in the draft law would have added further complexities.</p>
<p>Will any reforms be implemented before the general election of 2024? Probably not. This is the fundamental problem. Immigration policy is so highly politicised that the government seems afraid to move. <a href="https://nsi.org.za/projects/migration-governance-reform/">Our programme of research </a> seeks to show how South Africa could learn positive lessons on migration reform from other African countries and elsewhere. </p>
<h2>Hostility to migration</h2>
<p>While politicians <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/sareport/Adv5a.htm">frequently voice sentiments </a> hostile to migration and migrants, sensible policies in practice and on the table are shrouded in camouflage and occasionally sneaked through. One example is the <a href="https://www.southafrica-usa.net/homeaffairs/permit_corporate.htm">corporate labour permit</a>, another is the rising number of <a href="http://www.dha.gov.za/index.php/immigration-services/exempt-countries">African countries with visa-free access to South Africa</a>. Access to skilled employees needed from beyond our borders is being simplified. Reforms will be hidden behind a veil of hostility to foreigners.</p>
<p>This is hardly unique to South Africa. In the UK, while the government threatens to deport illegal migrants to Rwanda and stakes its fate on “stopping the boats” in deference to its political base, “long-term immigration … <a href="https://blog.ons.gov.uk/2023/05/25/international-migration-hits-new-high-in-2022-but-there-are-signs-of-change/">rose to 1.2 million</a> for the year ending December 2022, an increase of 221,000 from the previous year”.</p>
<p>Similarly, Georgia Meloni who was elected Prime Minister of Italy at least in part for her anti-immigrant views, has set aside work permits for 425 000 non-EU migrants to immigrate into Italy up to 2025. Laura Boldrini, of the centre-left Democratic Party, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/07/08/italy-grants-work-permits-425k-non-eu-migrant-workers/">said the high quotas</a> were a surrender and </p>
<blockquote>
<p>a bitter dose of reality for those who have built their political careers by demonising immigration as a national security threat.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.guilford.com/books/The-Age-of-Migration/Haas-Castles-Miller/9781462542895">A textbook on migration</a> warns us, when it comes to migration policies, “not to equate political rhetoric with policy practice”. It is not surprising that in many countries migration policies seem confused or incomprehensible. Migration policy reform seems elusive in the context of such opacity.</p>
<p>And yet, effective African economic development depends on economic integration. Most countries are pretty small, especially economically, and effective integration entails the movement of persons across borders without excessive hindrances.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/free-movement-of-people-across-africa-regions-are-showing-how-it-can-work-197199">Free movement of people across Africa: regions are showing how it can work</a>
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<p>Not all African governments, even of richer countries, have been as hesitant as South Africa to reform migration policies. Members of both the East African Community and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have made greater progress than the regions at the southern and northern ends of the continent. Countries in Africa can learn not only from experiences in the EU or in South America, but also from other African countries and regions.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://nsi.org.za/about/">New South Institute</a> is running the <a href="https://nsi.org.za/projects/migration-governance-reform/">Migration Governance Reform in Africa</a> project, or MIGRA. The rationale and framework for the MIGRA project are set out in <a href="https://nsi.org.za/publications/migration-governance-reform-first-report/">our new working paper </a>.</p>
<p>We are studying migration policy and practice in four African countries, South Africa, Mozambique, Kenya and Nigeria, and in four regional organisations, <a href="https://www.sadc.int/">SADC</a>, <a href="https://www.eac.int/">the EAC</a>, <a href="https://ecowas.int/">ECOWAS</a> and the African Union. We believe that countries and regions in Africa can learn as much from each other as they can from experiences elsewhere. Papers on these eight cases will be published over the next year or so, as they are completed, and we will also be preparing other forms of media to engage in conversation with the wider public as well as with policymakers.</p>
<p><a href="https://nsi.org.za/publications/migration-governance-reform-first-report/">The work we have already done </a> shows us some exciting examples of reform on the African continent. In east and west Africa there are many ways to allow cross border migrants access for different periods and reasons. Even in southern Africa the recent <a href="https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/15940-botswana-and-namibia-concluded-an-agreement-on-the-movement-of-persons.html">agreement between Namibia and Botswana on travel</a> by citizens of the two countries across their common border with identity documents alone shows what progress is possible. Visa-free travel is proliferating in Africa, as the recent bilateral agreement between South Africa and Kenya shows. There are many more examples.</p>
<p>Our project grows as much out of optimism about recent developments on migration governance around the African continent, as from the frustration and confusion about migration policy in many places. Perhaps it will make a small contribution to improving the practice, and maybe even the political rhetoric. And perhaps the South African cabinet will decide to grant the Zimbabwean exemption permit holders and their children <a href="https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1063&context=samp">the same kind of amnesty that was offered to 220 000 Mozambican refugees</a> in December 1996.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209884/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Hirsch is Leader of the Migration Governance Reform Program of the New South Institute; Emeritus Professor of Development Policy and Practice at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town; and Research Associate at School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.</span></em></p>Immigration policy is so highly politicised that the South African government seems afraid to move.Alan Hirsch, Research Fellow New South Institute, Emeritus Professor at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2054982023-05-31T13:28:36Z2023-05-31T13:28:36ZWest African countries show how working together over decades builds peace and stops wars breaking out<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528872/original/file-20230529-17-fnjtie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">From left; Prime Minister of Cote d'Ivoire Patrick Achi, President of Togo Faure Gnassingbe, President of Benin Patrice Talon, and President of Ghana Nana Akufo-Addo.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nipah Dennis/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Africa is often portrayed as a continent ravaged by war, terrorism, poverty and political instability. But over the past five decades few violent conflicts have occurred between states. In Europe, for comparison, there have been more than 25 inter-state conflicts since 1945. </p>
<p>It’s true that Africa has seen <a href="https://projects.voanews.com/african-coups/">214</a> coups, the most of any region; 106 have been successful. Out of <a href="https://projects.voanews.com/african-coups/">54 countries</a> on the African continent, 45 have had at least one coup attempt since 1950. </p>
<p>West Africa, a region of 16 independent states, has <a href="https://projects.voanews.com/african-coups">experienced</a> 53 successful and 40 failed coups since 1950. There are also cross-border security challenges such as terrorism, banditry, piracy and the wide presence of <a href="https://theconversation.com/west-africa-has-a-small-weapons-crisis-why-some-countries-are-better-at-dealing-with-it-than-others-203085">arms</a>. </p>
<p>But, since independence in the late 1950s, the region’s countries have not gone to war with one another – <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/69">except</a> for a minor armed confrontation between Burkina Faso and Mali in 1985.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10246029.2023.2193165">recent paper</a> we explored the possible reasons for this. As scholars studying the political dynamics of west Africa, we arrived at our insights by analysing historical data, diplomatic interactions and scholarly research. </p>
<p>We found evidence that the principles of non-aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes defined the relationships between west African countries. The 15 states under the <a href="https://ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Revised-treaty-1.pdf">umbrella</a> of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) positively identify with the fate of others in the bloc. The regional body was formed in 1975 by west African countries seeking to promote economic development. </p>
<p>We found a strong correlation between decades of regional cooperation and the rarity of conflicts between states in west Africa.</p>
<p>We conclude that systemic cooperation between states in the region has led to a collective identity forming over time. A sense of community has developed. The community has developed conflict management mechanisms. This has prevented members from going into war. </p>
<p>This finding highlights the importance of collaboration and diplomacy in maintaining peace and resolving conflicts. </p>
<h2>Making sense of the ECOWAS peace</h2>
<p>Regional dynamics and historical factors shape conflict, as can be seen in the Horn of Africa. That region has witnessed conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and between Ethiopia and Somalia, for example.</p>
<p>In the west African region, we found that the security arrangements agreed under ECOWAS have helped to foster peace between states. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Revised-treaty-1.pdf">ECOWAS agreement</a> was updated in 1993. It includes principles that were absent in the earlier pact. Among them are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>solidarity and collective self-reliance </p></li>
<li><p>non-aggression between member states </p></li>
<li><p>promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness to maintain regional peace, stability and security </p></li>
<li><p>peaceful settlement of disputes among member states</p></li>
<li><p>active cooperation between neighbouring countries </p></li>
<li><p>promotion of a peaceful environment as a prerequisite for economic development.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>This has led to west African countries choosing peaceful dispute resolution over sovereignty. For example, a <a href="https://foleyhoag.com/news-and-insights/news/2017/september/ghana-wins-maritime-boundary-dispute-against-cote-divoire/">border dispute</a> between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire was settled in 2017 through an international tribunal. This approach has prevented violent conflicts. </p>
<p>A key factor is that member states have mechanisms for settling disputes peacefully. In both <a href="http://www.peacebuildingdata.org/research/liberia/results/civil-war/root-causes-civil-war">Liberia’s</a> and <a href="http://peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/Sierraleone.pdf">Sierra Leone’s</a> wars, which threatened to engulf other countries in the region, ECOWAS used these settlement mechanisms. It deployed military troops to supervise <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/peace-agreements-and-the-termination-of-civil-wars/">ceasefires brokered</a> by the then Ghanaian <a href="https://theconversation.com/some-ghanaians-hate-him-some-love-him-the-mixed-legacy-of-jerry-john-rawlings-163310">president, Jerry Rawlings</a>.</p>
<p>Another factor is what in our study we call pan-West Africanism. We describe this as a regional version of pan-Africanism that emphasises unity and collaboration among countries. In practice it has facilitated trade, cultural exchanges and diplomatic collaborations. It has also created a sense of shared identity and solidarity among member countries. </p>
<p>We argue that the idea of pan-West Africanism has promoted regional solidarity and reduced the possibility of violence in inter-state relations. It is not just a philosophy, but a practical approach to regional integration and cooperation. </p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Our paper supports the argument that systemic cooperation among states can lead to a collective identity forming over time.</p>
<p>This has happened with the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Their collective identities are based on norms that reflect the history and political cultures of their member states.</p>
<p>The importance of shared identity and peaceful coexistence is often overlooked in explaining complex international relations. But it’s essential in understanding the relations of west African states.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205498/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abubakar Abubakar Usman is a research fellow with International Islamic University Malaysia Institute of Islamic Banking and Finance (IIiBF) and affiliated with the Asia Middle East Centre for Research and Dialogue (AMEC). </span></em></p>Africa has been relatively peaceful in terms of inter-state violent conflicts.Abubakar Abubakar Usman, Researcher, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (National University of Malaysia)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2030852023-05-11T14:27:39Z2023-05-11T14:27:39ZWest Africa has a small weapons crisis – why some countries are better at dealing with it than others<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525193/original/file-20230509-23793-fiq7oo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Small arms and light weapons recovered from bandits in Jos, north central Nigeria. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Research has found that globally, small arms and light weapons <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_08-09/mkas98">increase</a> the likelihood, intensity and longevity of conflict. </p>
<p>Small arms and light weapons <a href="https://unidir.org/sites/default/files/publication/pdfs//the-complex-dynamics-of-small-arms-in-west-africa-en-329.pdf#page=9">account</a> for most of the African continent’s conflict-related deaths. An estimated <a href="https://oneearthfuture.org/news/stemming-tide-african-leadership-small-arms-and-light-weapons-control">100 million</a> light weapons circulate in Africa. About <a href="https://www.giaba.org/media/f/613_519_giaba%20salw%20nexus-final.pdf#page=4">8 million</a> are in the hands of non-state actors in west Africa. </p>
<p>In 1998 the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) <a href="https://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/citation/quotes/3219">established</a> the world’s first small arms and light weapons moratorium. It became a legally binding convention in <a href="https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/112514/fp2p-cs-from-moratorium-convention-small-arms-ECOWAS-140608-en.pdf;jsessionid=C4DBF8CCB40D00B0DF8EA04B2C754F49?sequence=1">2006</a>. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14702436.2023.2188199?journalCode=fdef20">recent paper</a>, I assessed how ECOWAS members had applied the convention on small arms and light weapons. Compliance varied between countries and the paper looked at domestic political legitimacy as an explanation of these differences. </p>
<p>I used the case studies of Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire to test the explanation. </p>
<p>The study revealed that domestic political legitimacy was paramount for effective application and compliance. Legitimacy influences how states and domestic groups behave. A lack of legitimacy can lead to illegal purchases of small arms and light weapons. </p>
<p>The findings suggest that political legitimacy is important for states’ ability to implement collective security agreements such as the one on small arms and light weapons. ECOWAS members with legitimacy challenges must be given support around implementation, because they cannot do this individually. </p>
<h2>State legitimacy as a differentiator</h2>
<p>When a state is seen as legitimate, it’s because those who hold power got it in widely accepted ways and wield it rightfully. A legitimate state is lawful and has authority to issue orders. Citizens obey them because the leaders have moral authority. The path to state legitimacy is through the integrity of elections or the degree to which governments represent the populations they govern. </p>
<p>Where a state does not act legitimately, organised political opposition and sustained armed struggles or insurgencies follow. When a government lacks popular support, it will use strong-arm tactics like illegally obtaining small arms and light weapons to rule.</p>
<p>I examined Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana’s compliance trends and the role of state legitimacy. The countries are neighbours and have plenty in common, but they differ in two ways: their domestic legitimacy; and their records of implementing the region’s small arms convention. </p>
<p>I assessed compliance by looking at what countries do about illegal production and possession of weapons.</p>
<h2>Côte d'Ivoire</h2>
<p>Côte d’Ivoire was one of the top violators of the small arms conventions. </p>
<p>For instance, Laurent Gbagbo’s government between 2000 and 2011 brazenly purchased weapons using <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14702436.2023.2188199?af=R&journalCode=fdef20">illegal documents</a>. United Nations weapons experts uncovered vast quantities of ammunition and weapons that Gbagbo’s government had bought illegally. A company linked to Gbagbo appointees unlawfully traded <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/biometric-bribery-semlex/how-semlex-and-gunvor-armed-the-ivorian-civil-war">US$16.3 million</a> worth of weapons to the government. </p>
<p>Legal purchases also rose abruptly, accounting for more than <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14702436.2023.2188199?journalCode=fdef20">50%</a> of small arms imported to the region in 2003 alone. </p>
<p>Non-compliance by Gbagbo’s government’s corresponded with domestic legitimacy problems. Legitimacy crises around electoral processes provoked the first and second Ivorian civil wars between 2002 and 2011, increasing the demand for small arms. Gbagbo, under whose watch the small arms convention regime kicked in, chose not to implement it because of low political legitimacy. </p>
<p>Weakened political legitimacy in Côte d’Ivoire sidetracked compliance by diverting Gbagbo’s focus and rerouting opposition energy towards grabbing political power, which requires more weapons. </p>
<p>Gbagbo contested the results of the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2010/12/07/131870188/Ivory-Coast-s-President-Lost-Election-But-Won-t-Concede">2010 election</a>, won by Alassane Ouattara. He bought more weapons illegally to hold on to political power. In response, Ouattara’s fighters used a military offensive to drive Gbagbo from power. </p>
<p>Ouattara’s fighters solicited illicit small arms from foreign and from neighbouring sources. When forces loyal to Ouattara emerged victorious, rebels elevated to military commands used illegal weapons, while troops loyal to Gbagbo fought the state from bases in Liberia. </p>
<p>In Côte d’Ivoire, political illegitimacy morphed into territorial violence, undermining the country’s compliance records.</p>
<h2>Ghana</h2>
<p>In Ghana, no known evidence exists of Ghanaian authorities or organised groups purchasing weapons illegally. My argument is that this is due to the relatively strong legitimacy of the state and its institutions. </p>
<p>Some Russians and Ukrainians <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3568892">allegedly registered</a> front companies in Ghana and tried to use false letterheads from the Ghanaian defence and foreign ministries to sell weapons in 2003. However, these have been foiled. </p>
<p>Since embracing the ECOWAS convention, Ghana has experienced increased political stability and democratic consolidation. Ghana’s relative state legitimacy is grounded in the elite’s willingness to regulate the competition for political power. </p>
<p>The consensual and efficient management of social differences and electoral processes can explain this avoidance of state legitimacy crises. Ghana’s relative stability minimises the use of weapons.</p>
<p>While Ghana has seen high compliance at the national level, the country has a highly developed artisanal weapon market. People make weapons in Ghana and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2023.2188199?af=R&journalCode=fdef20">sell them to buyers in other countries</a> where state legitimacy has been questioned. </p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>In Côte d’Ivoire, domestic legitimacy problems have fuelled small arms and light weapons-seeking behaviours by state and non-state groups. In Ghana, a better record of applying the weapons convention stemmed from the country’s domestic legitimacy. </p>
<p>The findings suggest that in troubled regions like the ECOWAS zone, the state’s domestic characteristics matter for a state-level application of collective security regimes and, at the regional level, for their overall success.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Banini does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A lack of political legitimacy can lead governments to illegal purchases of small arms and light weapons.Daniel Banini, Researcher and analyst, Eastern Illinois UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1956642022-12-22T06:14:50Z2022-12-22T06:14:50ZWest Africa has experienced a wave of coups - superficial democracy is to blame<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501303/original/file-20221215-19-ea9qw6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A small group of protesters holds Russia and Burkina flags as they protest against the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Issouf Sanogo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>West Africa has seen <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">coups</a> and military takeovers in three countries in 2022. Like those of the past, they came with promises of a quick return to civilian regimes once socio-economic and political challenges had been met. The challenges are usually listed as inept governance, corruption, rising insecurity and popular revolts amid economic hardship.</p>
<p>One <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-49348-6_1">view</a> of governance on the African continent is that liberal democracy has spread since the 2000s, bringing an end to dictatorships. Most African countries, it’s argued, have multiparty democracies with elected governments.</p>
<p>My own <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-49348-6_2">view</a> is that a mere introduction of electoral democracy is not sufficient. A strong democracy needs strong institutions to build resilience against fragility. Poverty and insecurity are an indication of fragility. They show that institutions are not efficiently distributing wealth. Civil rule is under threat as long as institutions remain fragile.</p>
<p>In my opinion, based on <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-49348-6_2">my research</a>, is that the failure of civilian governments to improve living conditions, provide leadership and protect citizens is a major threat to democracy in the west African sub-region.</p>
<h2>The military never left</h2>
<p>The military continues to wield huge influence in governance in the region. Citizens don’t seem willing or able to challenge this.<br>
In Nigeria, for example, since the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/abacha-abiola-and-nigerias-1999-transition-civilian-rule">return to civil rule in 1999</a>, former military generals have largely led the country. By the end of the current regime in May 2023, former military rulers will have been civilian presidents too for 16 out of 24 years of civil rule. </p>
<p>Similarly, in Sierra Leone, former military head of state <a href="https://embassyofsierraleone.net/about-embassy/brig-rtd-julius-maada-wonie-bio-president-republic-sierra-leone">Brigadier Maada Bio</a> returned as elected civilian president in 2018.</p>
<p>Election periods in these countries see frequent trips by candidates to the homes of previous military or autocratic leaders, seeking their endorsement. </p>
<p>An example is the move by the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Adama-Barrow">Gambian president Adama Barrow</a> to form an alliance with the hitherto sit-tight dictator <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58924630">Yahya Jammeh</a>. Jammeh ruled the country for 22 years, starting with a 1994 coup, and sustained himself in office through incessant <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/24/gambia-commission-uncovered-ex-presidents-alleged-crimes">human rights violations</a>. </p>
<p>Barrow gave Jammeh a soft landing before going on to renege on his agreement to resign and transfer power. He is now relying on support from the old order to stay in power, knowing that his popularity with the people has diminished. </p>
<h2>A toothless regional bloc</h2>
<p>The return of civil rule to Nigeria in 1999 ushered in a sense that military coups and autocratic regimes in the region would end. </p>
<p>The presidency of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Olusegun-Obasanjo">Olusegun Obasanjo</a> and the <a href="https://ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States</a> (ECOWAS) were diplomatically active against military coups. But more recently it appears that the regional bloc is <a href="https://dailytrust.com/of-coup-detat-and-political-fragility-in-west-africa/">relatively weak and individual countries are challenged by economic, social, political and security issues</a>. </p>
<p>Citizens are dissatisfied with multilateral institutions – such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2018.1417899?journalCode=rsaj20">ECOWAS</a> and the <a href="https://au.int/">African Union</a>. These bodies may be quick to condemn military takeovers, but they are slow to express concern about poor governance, such as altering of constitutions for regime survival. </p>
<p>Governments have failed to deliver on the promises that got them elected. This failure has led to growing dissatisfaction and a quest for alternatives. In some cases, citizens welcome the military, as witnessed in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-crowd-celebrates-west-africas-latest-coup-2022-01-25/">Burkina Faso</a>.</p>
<p>Common to most of the military takeovers in the sub-region is the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/07/contagious-coups-what-is-fuelling-military-takeovers-across-west-africa">failure of the civilian regimes to deliver</a>. Rising insecurity and worsening living conditions remain the fate of the people. These factors have acted as incubators for the return of the military. </p>
<p>In the last 24 months, governments in <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/08/five-things-know-about-malis-coup">Mali</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58461971">Guinea</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/5/coup-in-burkina-faso-what-you-need-to-know">Burkina Faso</a> were toppled in quick succession. </p>
<p>In Mali, outrage over the erstwhile <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60015898">president Ibrahim Keita’s</a> ineffective leadership in the face of rising insecurity and corruption led to his ousting. </p>
<p>In Guinea, the attempt to stay in power by altering the constitution, even in the face of rising inequality, corruption, gross under-performance and human rights violations, led to the ousting of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alpha-Conde">President Alpha Conde</a>. </p>
<p>In Burkina Faso, civilian <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Roch-Marc-Christian-Kabore">president Roch Marc Christian Kabore</a> was removed because of rising internal displacement, widespread poverty, inequality and insecurity. Security forces were also <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60112043">discontented</a> over his failure to adequately support them against militants linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.</p>
<h2>Democracy is not necessarily good governance</h2>
<p>Although the region has made some headway with efforts to propagate democracy, it remains superficial. Its dividends, in the form of good governance, remain elusive. </p>
<p>Periodic elections are held, which legitimises civilians in power. But the critical fundamentals that foster democracy are missing: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>informed and active participation</p></li>
<li><p>separation of powers</p></li>
<li><p>respect for the rule of law</p></li>
<li><p>fundamental human rights</p></li>
<li><p>accountability. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>As insecurity rises and living conditions worsen, will the region experience more military takeovers? </p>
<p>Democracy appears to have come to stay in parts of the region, such as Nigeria, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. Others still have work to do in getting the military back to the barracks permanently. </p>
<p>Even governments in the rather more stable nations cannot afford to be complacent. They will have to intensify efforts to deliver the dividends of democracy, if they are to avoid civil unrest or military incursion. </p>
<h2>What will shape the future of democracy in the region</h2>
<p>Nigeria still exhibits fault lines of religion and ethnicity, as well as abuse of privilege by the elites over the rest of the citizens. </p>
<p>Failure to protect the lives, property and rights of citizens fuelled the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2021/02/nigeria-end-impunity-for-police-violence-by-sars-endsars/">“EndSARS” protest</a>, which is fast crystallising into a social movement with potential to make a strong political statement in the <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/514001-updated-inec-changes-dates-for-2023-general-elections.html">February 2023</a> elections. </p>
<p>In Ghana, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/police-disperse-protest-over-economic-hardship-ghana-2022-06-28/">local lobby groups have staged street protests</a> amid growing anxiety over <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/business-news/560180-ghanaian-cedi-world-worst-performing-currency-as-naira-also-struggles.html">economic conditions</a> in the country and rising allegations of corruption and government lethargy.</p>
<p>The future of democracy in the region will depend on the level of development in democratic institutions, level of military sophistication and professionalism, level of literacy, and presence of a broad based elite class that is not self-serving. </p>
<p>Elected civilians need to respect their social contracts with citizens. Citizens need to feel better off with civilians in power. </p>
<p>Nepotism, graft, outright theft of public funds and constitutional manipulations create grounds for military coups.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195664/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Temitope J. Laniran does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Although West Africa has made some headway with efforts to propagate democracy, its dividends, in the form of good governance, remain elusive.Temitope J. Laniran, Research Associate, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1880292022-08-25T15:30:23Z2022-08-25T15:30:23ZNigeria’s efforts to help victims of trafficking are failing. We found out why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479000/original/file-20220813-4682-q7vfwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A protest against human trafficking in Lagos. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/mindful-giving-changes-lives-activists-walk-in-recognition-news-photo/1227845187?adppopup=true">Olukayode Jaiyeola/NurPhoto via Getty Images.</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most countries have anti-trafficking laws, policies and programmes to prevent human trafficking. There are also international treaties to address the problem. Yet it’s still thriving. </p>
<p>Human trafficking is the recruitment, transportation, harbouring and control of a person using force and other methods of coercion. The aim is to exploit them. It could be through prostitution or sexual exploitation, forced labour, forced marriage, indentured servitude, and the removal and sale of human organs. </p>
<p>It is also described as a form of modern slavery.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.unodc.org/toc/en/crimes/human-trafficking.html">Human trafficking affects millions of people globally</a>. Victims are vulnerable due to poverty, war and conflict, political instability, natural disasters, unemployment and gender inequality. </p>
<p>Human trafficking involves severe exploitation and inhumane ordeals. Victims may experience physical and mental torture, malnourishment, rape, physical confinement, forced drug abuse, forced abortion or poor labour conditions. </p>
<p>When people leave, or are freed, from these situations, they tend to have an array of physical and psychological needs. Neglect of their needs can hinder their reintegration into society. Survivors of human trafficking may suffer from fatigue, sexually transmitted infections, depression, anxiety, insomnia, post-traumatic stress disorder, suicidal thoughts, panic attacks and substance addiction. </p>
<p>Some countries offer rehabilitation and reintegration services to support survivors and promote their wellbeing. </p>
<p>Nigeria, for example, has done so. It sees rehabilitation as essential to protect the human rights of survivors and to help them recover after trafficking. Empowering survivors is <a href="https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/european-good-practice-recovery-return-and-integration-trafficked">a process</a> in which they cease to be victims and start being in control of their lives. </p>
<p>Rehabilitation has become a core component of the Nigerian government’s anti-trafficking policies. But only limited efforts have have been made to assess these programmes and whether they help survivors in Nigeria. To address this gap, we <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23322705.2020.1777382">did research</a> into the experiences and perceptions of survivors. </p>
<p>We found that the Nigerian government’s rehabilitation efforts seem to simultaneously empower and disempower survivors. Understanding how well the programmes work is key to helping survivors and preventing re-trafficking. </p>
<h2>The programmes</h2>
<p>Nigeria’s rehabilitation programmes target the immediate, ongoing and long-term needs of people who have been trafficked. Their goal is to facilitate physical and mental recovery, empowerment and social inclusion. </p>
<p>Providing survivors with shelter, personal hygiene products, physical healthcare, mental healthcare and counselling are some of the ways to do this. Legal counsel, education, vocational training and employment are also part of rehabilitation. </p>
<p>Nigeria has a reputation as one of the major origin, transit and destination countries for human trafficking. The US State Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons in 2017 placed the country in the “Tier 2 Watchlist” of <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2017-trafficking-in-persons-report/">trafficked people globally</a>.</p>
<p>In response, the government enacted a law against <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/women-and-justice/resource/trafficking_in_persons_(prohibition)_enforcement_and_administration_act">trafficking</a> in 2003. That year it also established <a href="https://naptip.gov.ng/about-us/">the National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons</a>. </p>
<p>For our study, we examined the impact of the rehabilitation and reintegration programmes offered by the government and civil society organisations.</p>
<p>Our study is based on three months of ethnographic fieldwork in Lagos. We conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with over 150 female survivors of trafficking aged between 20 and 46. They were all former beneficiaries of rehabilitation programmes at least one year before the study.</p>
<p>We also interviewed rehabilitation officials in the government and civil society who were directly involved in the design and execution of the programmes. </p>
<h2>What’s working, what’s not</h2>
<p>In our research, three main findings emerged. </p>
<p>First, various government agencies and local non-governmental and international organisations collaborate to provide services. This synchronised approach is useful, especially in a context of limited capacity. It allows for the use of core competencies of the different stakeholders. </p>
<p>We also found the rehabilitation and reintegration programmes in Nigeria simultaneously empower and disempower survivors. Service providers tend to see and treat trafficked persons as vulnerable victims without agency. And they fail to adequately address long-term needs. </p>
<p>Lastly, we found that regardless of the protection services that survivors could access, Nigeria’s socioeconomic conditions limit the reintegration of survivors into society.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>The Nigerian government and civil society stakeholders now lean towards a human rights approach in their efforts to protect trafficked persons. But the tendency to treat survivors as helpless victims is doing more harm than good for their reintegration.</p>
<p>An over-emphasis on reaction rather than prevention, and the poor socioeconomic conditions in the country, also limit the programmes’ effectiveness. </p>
<p>The result is that the government’s ability to support survivors is limited.</p>
<p>Moving forward, collaborative efforts among stakeholders should focus on operational and logistical priorities as well as rehabilitation outcomes. Crucially, investment is needed in monitoring and evaluation to assess the effectiveness of the programmes.</p>
<p>In addition, most of the support tends to be geared towards addressing immediate or short-term needs. Addressing long-term needs is crucial for survivors’ ability to avoid re-trafficking and for their full reintegration into society. A focus on long-term needs will give survivors better control over their lives.</p>
<p>Finally, service providers need to change their perception of survivors of human trafficking as passive, vulnerable “victims”. This perception accounts for the disempowering elements of the programmes. Survivors should rather be viewed and treated as rational people with the ability to make sound and beneficial decisions for themselves.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188029/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Uwafiokun Idemudia receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nnenna Okoli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Human trafficking has become a global concern. Nigeria’s efforts at reintegrating survivors into society have been largely unsuccessful.Uwafiokun Idemudia, Professor of African Studies and International Development Studies, York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1891752022-08-25T09:16:45Z2022-08-25T09:16:45ZMacron in Africa: a cynical twist to repair the colonial past while keeping a tight grip<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480624/original/file-20220823-11-sz325m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">French President Emmanuel Macron (L) and Guinea-Bissau's President Umaro Sissoco Embalo (R) during Macron's visit in July 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Ludovic Marin/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In late July 2022 French president Emmanuel Macron <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220725-macron-embarks-on-african-visit-to-renew-relationship-with-continent">concluded a tour</a> of Cameroon, Benin and Guinea-Bissau. And he visits <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220820-five-years-after-last-visit-macron-to-return-to-algeria-in-bid-to-reset-ties">Algeria</a> between 25 and 27 August.</p>
<p>At first glance, his choice of countries is difficult to understand. Three former French colonies – Cameroon, Benin and Algeria – and a former Portuguese colony, Guinea-Bissau, seem very different.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, taken together, Macron’s visits tell a story in which France is doing penance for its colonial crimes while simultaneously trying to maintain the influence it gained through colonialism. </p>
<p>These two themes also emerged at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/france-wants-to-fix-its-relations-with-africa-but-its-going-about-it-the-wrong-way-171234">New France Africa Summit</a> in October 2021 in Montpelier. There, Macron promised investments in African technology startups as a way to increase the influence of French private business, while also promoting the scholar Achille Mbembe’s <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/admin/upload/default/0001/11/47114246c489f3eb05ab189634bb1bf832e4ad4e.pdf">report</a> on the new relationship between France and Africa. </p>
<p>Macron got another chance to show off his good relationship with African leaders at the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2022/02/17-18/">European Union-African Union summit of February 2022</a>. This was hosted by Macron – France held the presidency of the European Union at the time – and EU Council president Charles Michel.</p>
<p>The penance efforts were on show in each of the recent country visits. At a press conference with Cameroon’s president Paul Biya, Macron said France’s archives on colonial rule in Cameroon would be <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220726-macron-says-france-remains-committed-to-africa-s-security-on-first-stop-of-three-nation-tour">opened</a> “in full”. He said he hoped historians from both countries would work together to investigate “painful moments”.</p>
<p>In Benin the French president <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/27/macron-contin-to-visit-benin-to-talk-about-security-and-culture">accompanied</a> Benin’s president, Patrice Talon, on a visit to an exhibition devoted to the royal treasures of Abomey. These had been robbed by France 139 years ago and were returned in November 2021. In Guinea-Bissau he <a href="https://newsaf.cgtn.com/news/2022-07-29/French-president-wraps-up-Africa-tour-in-Guinea-Bissau-1c2SjqOqiqs/index.html">announced</a> the opening of a French school and a sports exchange programme, in line with his increased emphasis on cultural diplomacy. </p>
<p>The effort to maintain influence was evident in all three visits too. With the presence of French troops in Mali dwindling, Paris is looking for new military options and hoping to find those with Macron’s hosts. In Benin the French president therefore talked about security while in Yaoundé he restated France remained <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/07/26/macron-promises-to-open-archives-on-cameroon-colonial-era_5991547_4.html">committed</a> to the security of the continent. </p>
<p>In Guinea-Bissau Macron declared France should “<a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20220729-macron-promises-to-revive-relations-with-guinea-bissau-and-help-region-battle-terrorism">contribute</a> to the fight against terrorism everywhere in the region”.</p>
<p>In my view Macron exploits the increased call for the more fundamental decolonisation of African societies as a cover to exercise continued influence on the continent.</p>
<h2>Rectifying the colonial past</h2>
<p>The project for <a href="https://www.londonmet.ac.uk/about/equity/centre-for-equity-and-inclusion/race/decolonising-academia/what-does-decolonising-mean/">decolonial justice</a> has recently been used by other former colonial powers to brush up their image in Africa. Belgium recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/20/belgium-returns-patrice-lumumba-tooth-congolese-independence">returned a tooth</a> of Patrice Lumumba, the Congo’s first prime minister, 61 years after enabling his assassination. </p>
<p>Rectifying the colonial past has become a popular way for northern governments to do their diplomacy in Africa. In the past there were calls for new relationships and a forgetting of the colonial past. Now heads of state showcase their willingness to face colonial crimes head on. US secretary of state Antony Blinken, for instance, talked about the need to become “<a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16039-transcript-us-secretary-of-state-s-address-at-south-africa-s-future-africa-institute.html">equal partners</a>” and acknowledge </p>
<blockquote>
<p>generations of Africans whose destiny had been determined by colonial powers. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In my view this is a smart way to flip the script the Russians and the Chinese employ. They stress that they never colonised the continent, a claim already put forward in the 1960s when <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/zhou-enlais-african-safari-1963-1964/">Zhou Enlai and Leonid Brezhnev</a> visited the continent. </p>
<p>In his bid to reset this narrative, Macron went as far as to brand Russia “one of the last imperial colonial powers” for its invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p>It’s all part of the cynical twist of Macron’s version of decolonisation, which seeks to repair the old while setting back the cause of decolonisation through intervention. </p>
<h2>Renewed interest in Africa</h2>
<p>What separates France from the US and Belgium is that the Elysée is trying to offset a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-60419799">dwindling military position</a> in Mali. Its troops are leaving and are being replaced by Russian mercenaries, the so-called <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/31/world/europe/wagner-group-russia-ukraine.html">Wagner Group</a>. </p>
<p>France intervened in the north of Mali in 2013 with <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ_French/journals_E/Volume-06_Issue-3/spet_e.pdf">Operation Serval</a>. Paris also brought in allied nations like Belgium and Sweden to provide additional capacity and training. The aim was to push out Islamic fighters in the Sahel. </p>
<p>The Cold War logic that has been imposed on this trip, however, is far too simplistic. It overlooks the regional politics of West Africa, where the Economic Community of West African States (<a href="https://ecowas.int/">ECOWAS</a>) has increasingly felt the need to intervene against the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">coups</a> that have plagued the region: Mali in August 2020 and May 2021, Guinea in September 2021, Burkina Faso in January 2022 and the failed coup attempt in Guinea-Bissau in February 2022.</p>
<p>The West African coups, rather than the intervention in Ukraine, also explain what brought Macron to Guinea-Bissau, which took over the rotating presidency of ECOWAS in July. The organisation <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62037317">lifted sanctions</a> when the junta in Mali promised to hold elections in February 2024. </p>
<p>ECOWAS has also managed to reach an agreement with Burkina Faso’s military junta on a timetable for a transition back to democracy. A return to civilian rule is scheduled for July 2024.</p>
<p>With a combined promise of increased cultural investments and weapons for Guinea-Bissau, Macron is seeking to meddle with the regional organisation. That’s despite claiming France “always respected” the position of ECOWAS in regional matters. It is an easy way for the Élysée to blanket West Africa without having to engage in shuttle diplomacy to different West African capitals when it has a vital interest to protect.</p>
<p>Keeping the focus on Ukraine and Lavrov’s mission was therefore in the interest of the French president, who was also conveniently asked questions about why African countries had not received weapon shipments as easily as Ukraine. The delivery of weapons could then be presented as something positive, rather than a disastrous policy that hardly ever works. </p>
<p>As always, it will be regular people who will pay the price because they are forced to live in increasingly heavily armed societies. The <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/destabilization-mali">uprising</a> in the north of Mali in 2013, which Macron is now seeking to manage through ECOWAS, was the consequence of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/19/libya-air-strikes-gaddafi-france">2011 military intervention</a> by France and its allies in Libya and the subsequent overthrow of Libyan leader <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Muammar-al-Qaddafi">Muammar Gaddafi</a>. </p>
<p>It might set these countries back for years, preventing them from joining the African Lion economies – Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, and South Africa – countries that were avoided by Macron.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189175/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Gerits receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) in the United Kingdom </span></em></p>Macron’s recent visits to Africa tell a story in which France is doing penance for its colonial crimes while trying to maintain influence gained through colonialism.Frank Gerits, Research Fellow at the University of the Free State, South Africa and Assistant Professor in the History of International Relations, Utrecht UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.