tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/ethnic-violence-28572/articlesEthnic violence – The Conversation2023-08-08T19:26:14Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2107852023-08-08T19:26:14Z2023-08-08T19:26:14ZManipur violence: Why has India’s government been slow to respond?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540908/original/file-20230802-23-fhyvfk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=25%2C90%2C8601%2C5652&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Activists protesting ethnic violence in northeastern Manipur state shout slogans in Mumbai, India, on July 24, 2023. Violence between tribal communities in the state has flared up in recent months.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/manipur-violence-why-has-indias-government-been-slow-to-respond" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>A mass burial for 35 people from the Kuki tribe killed in ethnic violence in India’s Manipur state <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/postponed-mass-burial-of-35-kukis-delayed-as-ethnic-clashes-continue-in-manipur-meitei-groups-criticize-conglomerate-101691053524061.html">was recently put on hold</a> after opposition from the state’s Meitei community. </p>
<p>The dispute over the burial site is the latest episode in an ethnic conflict that has rocked Manipur. For months, Manipur in northeastern India has seen <a href="https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/manipur-violance-explained-what-triggered-and-why-is-peace-yet-to-return-528010">ethno-religious violence</a> between the majority Hindu Meitei community and the Kuki and Naga <a href="https://www.reuters.com/graphics/INDIA-VIOLENCE/movakzwygva/">tribal communities</a> who are predominately Christian. </p>
<p>Since May, the stream of violence has <a href="https://www.telegraphindia.com/north-east/manipur-bearing-brunt-of-violence-kukis-make-up-two-thirds-of-the-victims-says-reuters-analysis/cid/1955181">claimed the lives</a> of over 180 people and has displaced thousands. Despite the violence, the central government only responded with statements after images of a shocking attack on two women were shared online.</p>
<p>In late July, a <a href="https://thewire.in/communalism/manipur-video-two-kuki-women-paraded-naked-gang-raped">harrowing video</a> emerged of two Kuki women being paraded naked through the streets of a small Manipur village by a group of men. One of the women was then allegedly gang-raped. News reports stated the men were allegedly from the Meitei community.</p>
<h2>Government inaction</h2>
<p>Opposition Members of Parliament have brought a <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/world/asia/india-s-modi-faces-a-no-confidence-vote-over-silence-on-ethnic-violence-tearing-at/article_17541698-0883-527e-8b52-351450d565fa.html">no-confidence motion</a> against Prime Minister Narendra Modi, citing his government’s failure to respond to the violence. </p>
<p>After the video was widely shared online, and more than two months after the violence first broke out, Modi finally made a statement. He called it a “<a href="https://thewire.in/politics/seventy-nine-days-after-violence-broke-out-narendra-modi-finally-talks-about-manipur">shameful incident</a>,” and said state governments should strengthen their legal systems to protect India’s “mothers and sisters.”</p>
<p>However, his statement also <a href="https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/manipur-violence-video-narendra-modi-bjp-nirbhaya-moment/3184842/">included examples</a> of violence in states run by the opposition, and did not condemn the violence more broadly. The parliament has been in session since July 20, <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ask-pm-to-speak-in-parliament-on-manipur-give-roadmap-for-bringing-peace-in-state-opposition-urges-president/article67149804.ece">but the prime minister has yet to make an appearance to discuss the situation in Manipur</a>.</p>
<p>Many of India’s political elite have remained deafeningly silent or have <a href="https://thewire.in/politics/narendra-modi-manipur-response-humanity">engaged in whataboutism</a>. When the Minister of Women and Child Development, Smriti Irani, was questioned in parliament about the violence against women in Manipur, she <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/when-smriti-irani-shouted-at-opposition-over-manipur-in-parliament/articleshow/102181242.cms?from=mdr">evaded responsibility</a> and pointed to violence in opposition ruled states.</p>
<p>This most recent incident is yet another indication of India’s indifference towards violence against women. The current administration has also been clear and consistent in its apathy towards marginalized and minority communities. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540912/original/file-20230802-25-2d6d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man and woman pull a cart down a road lined with debris and damaged buildings." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540912/original/file-20230802-25-2d6d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540912/original/file-20230802-25-2d6d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540912/original/file-20230802-25-2d6d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540912/original/file-20230802-25-2d6d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540912/original/file-20230802-25-2d6d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540912/original/file-20230802-25-2d6d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540912/original/file-20230802-25-2d6d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A couple pulls a cart loaded with scavenged items from the debris of burnt houses following ethnic clashes and rioting in Sugnu, in the northeastern Indian state of Manipur, on June 21, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Altaf Qadri)</span></span>
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<p>The women in the video have since filed a petition with the Supreme Court of India. Lawyers representing them have <a href="https://thewire.in/law/we-cant-justify-what-happened-in-manipur-by-saying-this-happened-elsewhere-sc">alleged</a> that police collaborated with the perpetrators. In a statement, the Indian Supreme Court said violence against women in Manipur has reached an “<a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/supreme-court-says-violence-against-women-in-manipur-unprecedented-refuses-to-hear-cases-of-other-states/articleshow/102284901.cms?from=mdr">unprecedented magnitude</a>.”</p>
<h2>What’s behind the violence</h2>
<p>Manipur is a small state of around three million people in the northeast of India bordering Myanmar. Manipur’s proximity to international borders with Myanmar has made it prone to insurgency and conflict. Instances of ethnic violence are often attributed to decades of unresolved strife between various tribal and non-tribal groups. </p>
<p>This ongoing violence was triggered by the <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/manipur-high-court-directs-state-to-consider-inclusion-of-meitei-community-in-scheduled-tribes-list/article66756719.ece">Manipur High Court’s decision in April 2023</a> to include the state’s majority Meitei community in the list of <a href="https://ncst.nic.in/content/frequently-asked-questions">Scheduled Tribes</a>. Categorizing a group as a Scheduled Tribe provides members of the group with special constitutional safeguards — at least on paper. </p>
<p>The Meitei community <a href="https://www.reuters.com/graphics/INDIA-VIOLENCE/movakzwygva/">performs better</a> than other ethnic groups in Manipur on many social indicators, such as access to employment and educational opportunities.</p>
<p>Kuki and Naga tribal communities <a href="https://www.outlookindia.com/national/intricacies-of-meitei-s-st-status-demand-and-the-hill-valley-divide-in-manipur-news-290275">fear</a> that if the Meitei are categorized as Scheduled Tribes, that would strengthen their already greater political influence in the state. The tribal communities also fear it would allow Meiteis to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-66260730">buy land and settle</a> in Kuki areas. </p>
<p>This <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/08/01/modi-india-manipur-violence-rape/">strife</a> has led to churches being burned, sexual violence, killings and other atrocities.</p>
<p>In response to the outbreak of violence in May, the Manipur state government <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/an-internet-ban-will-not-restore-peace-in-manipur/article67106942.ece">shut down internet services</a>. The <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lV8EIpCIk0QausqzjphWvcNk4ejFujMi/view?ref=static.internetfreedom.in">order</a> issued by the government read that “anti-social elements” were using social media to incite the “passions of the public” and it was a necessary measure to stop the spread of disinformation. </p>
<p>Arbitrary internet shutdowns for a wide variety of reasons have become <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/india-internet-shutdown-idINL8N2YZ245">all too common</a>, despite a <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/82461587/">2020 Supreme Court of India ruling</a> that declared suspending the internet a “drastic measure” that state governments must employ only if “necessary and unavoidable.” </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540911/original/file-20230802-8013-2ag4le.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of people at a protest carry a banner that reads: Women against rape culture." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540911/original/file-20230802-8013-2ag4le.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540911/original/file-20230802-8013-2ag4le.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540911/original/file-20230802-8013-2ag4le.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540911/original/file-20230802-8013-2ag4le.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540911/original/file-20230802-8013-2ag4le.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540911/original/file-20230802-8013-2ag4le.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540911/original/file-20230802-8013-2ag4le.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Activists protesting against ethnic violence and the assaults of two women, who were paraded naked in northeastern Manipur state, walk in a procession in Kolkata, India, on July 24, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Bikas Das)</span></span>
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<h2>Why has Manipur been ignored?</h2>
<p>The states of northeastern India have long been seen as developmentally and geographically peripheral by the central government. States like Manipur have been subjected to “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1215/15366936-8913107">neocolonial governance</a>” and have not benefited from social, political or economic development because they are often viewed as “amorphous shadowlands” within India.</p>
<p>People in the region have often been <a href="https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/the-neglected-states-of-the-nation/220206">neglected</a> and positioned as outsiders by the rest of India. Successive central governments have often viewed those in the northeast as objects to be militarized, policed and disciplined. Manipur has also been subjected to abusive laws such as the <a href="https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/armed_forces_special_powers_act1958.pdf">Armed Forces Special Powers Act</a>, which grants the Indian Armed Forces special powers to maintain order in “disturbed areas.” This militarization has contributed to <a href="https://www.outlookindia.com/national/intricacies-of-meitei-s-st-status-demand-and-the-hill-valley-divide-in-manipur-news-290275">perpetual violence</a> in the region.</p>
<p>India’s democratic veneer has helped it evade international scrutiny for the ongoing ethnic violence in Manipur. International outrage at what has happened in Manipur has been minimal. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/india-is-using-the-g20-summit-to-further-its-settler-colonial-ambitions-in-kashmir-205166">India is using the G20 summit to further its settler-colonial ambitions in Kashmir</a>
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<p>In fact, Modi received a red carpet welcome in the so-called bastions of democracy, namely the United States in late June and France in mid-July.</p>
<p>In response to a question from a reporter about declining respect for human rights and democracy, Modi responded that <a href="https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/democracy-runs-in-our-veins-says-pm-to-question-on-rights-of-muslims-4144923">democracy is in India’s DNA</a> and has been delivered for all regardless of caste, creed, religion and gender. </p>
<p>Modi’s visit to France in July to pen new <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/13/military-deals-in-focus-as-france-rolls-out-red-carpet-for-modi">defence deals</a> coincided with European Parliament’s <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2023-0335_EN.html">adoption of a resolution</a> urging Indian authorities to take action to stop the violence in Manipur. However, there was no push back from the French president. </p>
<p>If states like the U.S. and France truly believe in human rights, they must take a much stronger stance on India’s draconian shift towards authoritarianism and illiberalism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210785/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jay Ramasubramanyam does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Indian central government has done little thus far to quell the ongoing ethnic violence in the state of Manipur.Jay Ramasubramanyam, Assistant Professor, Law & Society Program, York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2087742023-07-10T14:46:00Z2023-07-10T14:46:00ZDRC violence has many causes – the UN’s narrow focus on ethnicity won’t help end conflict<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535574/original/file-20230704-17-up8tx7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Soldiers from South Sudan prepare to be deployed to help restore peace in the DRC. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Samir Bol/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo’s <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/123/80/PDF/N2312380.pdf?OpenElement">2023 mid-term report</a> reduces the very complex causes of violence in the eastern part of the country to inter-communal violence. This widely disregards armed groups’ motivations to resort to violence. </p>
<p>This narrow approach will perpetuate the cycles of violence in a country whose population hasn’t known peace for <a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">three decades</a>. A failure to account for the other major reasons for the conflict in the experts’ brief to the <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/what-security-council">UN Security Council</a> could lead to the adoption of inappropriate measures to stabilise the DRC. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=4SlemykAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">researched</a> the micro and macro causes of conflict in eastern DRC since 2017 to understand the motivations of individuals, groups and communities. In my view, most of the violent confrontations are consequences of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-drcs-colonial-legacy-forged-a-nexus-between-ethnicity-territory-and-conflict-153469">legacy of colonialism</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/burundis-gatumba-massacre-offers-a-window-into-the-past-and-future-of-the-drc-conflict-191351">state fragility</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-drcs-army-and-police-arent-yet-ready-to-protect-citizens-114326">dysfunctional and corrupted security services</a>. </p>
<p>From South Kivu to North Kivu and Ituri in the eastern region, the legacy of colonialism has categorised local communities into native and non-native. This has created conflict along the lines of belonging and its associated rights. The Congolese state <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-banyamulenge-how-a-minority-ethnic-group-in-the-drc-became-the-target-of-rebels-and-its-own-government-201099">hasn’t tackled this issue</a> – and state authority is absent in many areas. </p>
<p>The Congolese army is largely dysfunctional and corrupted. It’s among those <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10246029.2018.1486719">feeding violence</a> at local levels. It has <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/16/dr-congo-kidnappings-skyrocket-east">failed to protect civilians</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/KivuSecurity/status/1304083139334156289">picked sides</a> in inter-community violence. </p>
<h2>Inside the report</h2>
<p>In recent years, the UN group of experts has narrowed all this complexity into inter-communal violence, with limited details on what drives it. Yet the mandate of the group – established in 2000 – is to <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/en/sc/repertoire/2000-2003/00-03_5.pdf#page=16">investigate and analyse</a> connections between resource exploitation and the persistence of conflict. Its reports should help the UN understand the bigger picture in eastern DRC. </p>
<p>This <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/123/80/PDF/N2312380.pdf?OpenElement">latest report</a> highlights five major events:</p>
<p><strong>Violence in the west</strong>: Maindombe, one of the western provinces, had appeared to be more stable than the north and south Kivus and Ituri in the volatile east. But it’s estimated that more than <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/30/dr-congo-rampant-intercommunal-violence-west">300 civilians have been killed</a> in Maindombe between June 2022 and March 2023. The violence is between the <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/123/80/PDF/N2312380.pdf?OpenElement#page=7">Teke and Yaka ethnic communities</a>. The former consider themselves the original inhabitants of the region and the Yaka as non-native. </p>
<p><strong>The Allied Democratic Forces:</strong> Designated as a <a href="https://www.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-isis-affiliates-and-leaders-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-mozambique/">terrorist organisation in 2021</a> by the US, this group is active in Beni (North Kivu) and parts of Ituri province. The group has secured strategic and financial support from other terrorist groups, including Somalia’s Da’esh and IS-Somalia. The report notes that dismantling the terror group’s complex funding mechanisms and networks needs greater collaboration among countries.</p>
<p><strong>Rwanda and M23:</strong> In North Kivu, the UN report has called attention to the violence perpetrated by the <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/123/80/PDF/N2312380.pdf?OpenElement#page=13">Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group</a>. The conflict has forced thousands of civilians to flee, deepening a humanitarian crisis. The UN experts warn that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-m23s-on-and-off-insurgency-tells-us-about-drcs-precarious-search-for-peace-182520">M23</a> has the military capacity to wage and sustain conflict due to recruitment campaigns in Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. This report is the first to name <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/123/80/PDF/N2312380.pdf?OpenElement#page=17">high-ranking Rwandan military generals</a> involved in fighting alongside M23 rebels.</p>
<p><strong>The rise of the Twirwaneho:</strong> In South Kivu, the UN report <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/123/80/PDF/N2312380.pdf?OpenElement#page=30">documents clashes</a> among groups claiming to be protecting their ethnic communities. The report highlights the Twirwaneho, an armed (self-defence) group affiliated to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-banyamulenge-how-a-minority-ethnic-group-in-the-drc-became-the-target-of-rebels-and-its-own-government-201099">Banyamulenge</a>, a minority ethnic group in South Kivu.</p>
<p><strong>The Codeco threat:</strong> The report also documents atrocities committed in Ituri province against civilians and internally displaced people. Here, it highlights the rebel group <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/123/80/PDF/N2312380.pdf?OpenElement#page=25">Codeco’s</a> attacks. It terms the violence inter-communal. </p>
<h2>The report’s loopholes</h2>
<p>The report is consistent with previous reports in terming ethnic communities’ “antagonism” as the source of violence. The DRC has more than 250 ethnic groups. But based on <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/category/article-type/working-paper/">my research</a>, it’s my view that violence in the country is intrinsically complex. Using a single lens can be misleading.</p>
<p>In my view, there are four major loopholes in the report. </p>
<p>First, the UN experts disregard the prominent roles played by other major actors in the conflict, such as the national army. It also ignores the <a href="https://theconversation.com/burundis-gatumba-massacre-offers-a-window-into-the-past-and-future-of-the-drc-conflict-191351">regional ramifications</a> of the violence. This includes the support provided by <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/b150-averting-proxy-wars-eastern-dr-congo-and-great-lakes">Rwanda to Burundian rebel groups in South Kivu</a>. State fragility also helps explain why the DRC’s conflict has persisted for three decades. Adding these factors would broaden understanding of the root causes of the conflict and its persistence. </p>
<p>Second, the UN experts tend to jump to conclusions based on largely questionable premises. For instance, evidence of “<a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/123/80/PDF/N2312380.pdf?OpenElement#page=34">mass recruitment</a>” and the <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/123/80/PDF/N2312380.pdf?OpenElement#page=32">formation of new alliances</a> between Twirwaneho, M23 and Red-Tabara rebel groups isn’t clear. Since 2017, Red-Tabara, for instance, has been <a href="https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/174098/1/05_GIC_Mayhem-in-the-mountains_WEB-2.pdf#page=79">attacking the Banyamulenge</a>. </p>
<p>Third, the report shows signs of bias. For instance, it highlights the Twirwaneho and ignores other groups active in South Kivu. I’ve covered this bias in <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/why-the-un-fails-to-prevent-mass-atrocities/">a study</a> that analyses 324 incidents recorded by <a href="https://kivusecurity.org/">Kivu Security Tracker</a> and 29 reports from the UN’s peacekeeping mission in the DRC, Monusco. Monusco is one of the main sources of the UN experts’ information. </p>
<p>Fourth, in North Kivu, the experts have only documented atrocities and human rights abuses committed by M23 and the Rwandan Defence Forces. They’ve left out those committed by the Congolese military, and other local and foreign militias. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>A close look at the UN report indicates that the experts struggle to document atrocities in a timely manner. It took more than a year to document violence in South Kivu and Ituri that erupted in 2017 and this is happening in Maindombe. </p>
<p>UN experts shouldn’t see violence in eastern the DRC as solely tit-for-tat militia confrontations, and fail to account for their motivations to resort to violence. For instance, some armed groups in the east exist to chase out those seen as “foreigners”. </p>
<p>A simplified perspective won’t help to bring peace if the negative role played by security services is superficially covered. Moreover, the DRC has failed to establish a comprehensive disarmament and demobilisation scheme.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208774/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Delphin R. Ntanyoma does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The causes of violence in the DRC are complex. Narrowing them down to the single lens of ethnicity can be misleading.Delphin R. Ntanyoma, Visiting Researcher, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1825222022-05-10T13:55:38Z2022-05-10T13:55:38ZKiir and Machar: insights into South Sudan’s strongmen<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461556/original/file-20220505-19-ego7xx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Sudan's President Salva Kiir (right) and his deputy Riek Machar shake hands in Addis Ababa to signify a peace deal in September, 2018.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Salva Kiir and Riek Machar loom large over South Sudan’s recent history. And they will keep holding the future of the young nation in their hands to a large extent.</p>
<p>So who are they? And what are the roots of their rivalry?</p>
<p>Kiir is the 70-year-old president of South Sudan, a nation of 11 million. Machar, a year younger, is his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/18/south-sudan-opposition-leader-riek-machar-drc-democratic-republic-congo">on-and-off vice-president</a>. The two men have been pivotal figures in negotiating and agreeing, disagreeing and breaking peace agreements over most of South Sudan’s first decade as an independent nation. </p>
<p>Their attitudes, behaviour and actions have shaped the country’s unwieldy road towards and away from democracy, peace and development, and national unity. To understand South Sudan’s contemporary and future political development, security and national unity, it’s important to take a closer look at these two towering political leaders.</p>
<h2>From rebel fighters to political kingpins</h2>
<p>Both Kiir and and Machar spent their formative years in the first and second South Sudanese civil war between South Sudanese rebel movements and the Sudanese armed forces and pro-government militias. These wars were <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23017651?seq=1">fought between 1955 and 1972</a>, and <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/sudan-2nd-civil-war-darfur/">1983 and 2005</a>.</p>
<p>Kiir belongs to the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/s-c-acaps_country_profile_southsudan_august2015.pdf">Dinka</a>, the largest ethnic group in South Sudan. He was an officer and second in charge in the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the main rebel movement and army in South Sudan. He led several successful military offensives against the Sudanese government, for instance capturing large parts of Western Equatoria from Sudanese control. </p>
<p>His military leadership made him popular within the military wings of the movement and he held a strong vision of an independent South Sudan. His vision, however, was in stark contrast to the late John Garang de Mabior, the charismatic SPLM leader who <a href="https://sudantribune.com/article23287/">envisioned a united Sudan</a> where South Sudanese had equal political and economic rights along North Sudanese. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8306.doc.htm">peace agreement</a> between the government of Sudan and the SPLM was eventually signed in 2005, paving the way to South Sudan’s independence. Garang became Vice-President of Sudan and president of the transitional government of South Sudan. </p>
<p>Tragically, Garang <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/8/1/sudans-garang-dies-in-copter-crash">died in a helicopter crash due to a pilot error</a> in 2005. Kiir took over the SPLM leadership as well as Garang’s position as Vice-President of Sudan, and became the president of South Sudan. After a landslide referendum in 2011, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449057.2011.593364?scroll=top&needAccess=true">South Sudanese were granted independence</a>.</p>
<p>Kiir is generally known for his calm, mild tempered, and rather emotionless public appearances. But even during his years as subordinate to Garang he had a thirst for formal authority and power which he has expanded with stamina within the SPLM and South Sudanese state institutions over the past decades.</p>
<p>Machar belongs to the second-largest ethnic group in South Sudan, the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/s-c-acaps_country_profile_southsudan_august2015.pdf">Nuer</a>. He was a regional commander under Garang’s leadership in the SPLM during the 1980s. Like Kiir, he disagreed with Garang’s objectives, preferring an independent South Sudan. He also complained about <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/08/south-sudan-child-soldiers-riek-machar/">Garang’s authoritarian leadership</a>. After the 2005 peace agreement and Garang’s death, Machar became the Vice-President of South Sudan. </p>
<h2>The genesis of violent rivalry</h2>
<p>Frustrated with and opposed to Garang’s leadership of the South Sudanese resistance, Machar and members of other tribes formed an opposition rebel movement to the main rebel group SPLM in 1991. This they called the SPLM-Nasir faction. </p>
<p>Machar and his Nasir faction fought for South Sudanese independence. But at the same time they received financial and military support from the military government in Khartoum, the main opposition of the SPLM. Relying on a <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781847011510/the-root-causes-of-sudans-civil-wars/">divide-and-conquer strategy</a>, Khartoum used Machar and his troops to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/16/south-sudan-ethnic-targeting-widespread-killings">turn against the SPLM rebels</a> including Garang and Kiir. </p>
<p>During one known <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/4/23/south-sudans-massacre-among-many">massacre</a> in the town of Bor, Nasir troops killed thousands of civilians belonging to the ethnic Dinka, Kiir’s tribe. The result were reprisal attacks. Divisions within South Sudan became not only increasingly violent but were also increasingly ethnic in character. </p>
<p>The legacy of this ethnic violence remains largely unresolved and unaddressed. It continues to be a source of latent distrust and suspicion that’s exploited by political rhetoric and manipulation.</p>
<p>Since 2013 South Sudan has been embroiled in a civil war that is essentially a conflict between Kiir’s Dinka-dominated troops and Machar’s Nuer-dominated troops. Both Kiir and Machar are concerned about their own political future, their own security and that of their families and allies and ethnic kin. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://unmiss.unmissions.org/">United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)</a> has the mandate to support the implementation of several peace agreements as well as to protect civilians. It has a large presence: more than 14,000 military personnel, 1,500 police and at least 2,000 civilian staff. Nevertheless, it has often been <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2019/12/impact-un-mission-south-sudan-complicated-by-dilemmas-of-protection/">perceived</a> as doing too little too late to protect civilians. </p>
<h2>The Dinka and the Nuer</h2>
<p>Ideologically, Kiir and Machar do not seem to be that far apart. They have both always seen South Sudan’s future as that of an independent nation. The difficulty lies in agreeing on how to organise, distribute and cooperate within a nation that consists of dozens of ethnic groups and sub-tribes, different livelihoods, and cultural links across neighbouring countries. </p>
<p>It is clear, although they would never admit it, that the two men see themselves and their ethnic communities as the main heirs of the nation, and that they each hold a legitimate claim to leadership. These claims are nurtured through the relative population share of both groups and their role in the war with Sudan, largely due to their settlement areas along the South Sudan-Sudan border.</p>
<p>The Dinka are the largest ethnic group in South Sudan, representing around 35% of the population. The Nuer are the second largest with around 16%. Other groups represent much <a href="https://reliefweb.int/map/sudan/distribution-ethnic-groups-southern-sudan-24-dec-2009">smaller shares</a>.</p>
<h2>What legacy?</h2>
<p>In recent years, foreign aid has been cut back to humanitarian assistance, foreign investment has stalled due to insecurity, prices for everyday goods have skyrocketed due to reduced agricultural activities and increased import reliance. </p>
<p>These are just some of the things that make life for ordinary citizens in South Sudan harder than it already has been for most of their lives. At the end of the day, the question for Kiir and Machar is what legacy both want to be remembered for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182522/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlo Koos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kiir and Machar have been pivotal figures in most of South Sudan’s short history as an independent nation.Carlo Koos, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of BergenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1717852021-11-18T17:04:45Z2021-11-18T17:04:45ZEthiopia on the brink as crisis threatens ‘peace and stability’ of region – but what has fueled the conflict and criticism of Biden’s response?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432460/original/file-20211117-15-1pl7gfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=49%2C106%2C5472%2C3514&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A fighter loyal to the Tigray People's Liberation Front.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/EthiopiaCountingtheDeadVignettes/5d6542eadebb469aacaaf70b18e44696/photo?Query=tigray&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1334&currentItemNo=7">(AP Photo/Ben Curtis</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/17/blinken-ethiopia-conflict-threatens-security-in-horn-of-africa">is warning</a> that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/tigray-the-devastating-toll-of-ethiopias-vicious-year-of-war-podcast-171138">worsening situation in Ethiopia</a> puts at risk the “peace and stability” of the Horn of Africa.</em></p>
<p><em>The comments were made on Nov. 17, 2021, as Blinken began <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/15/us/politics/blinken-africa-ethiopia.html">a five-day trip to Africa</a> during which <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-africa-antony-blinken-kenya-war-ethiopia-sudan-coup-democratic-recession/">he will speak with regional leaders</a> about concerns of an all-out civil war in the continent’s second most populous nation. The diplomatic mission follows criticism of the <a href="https://bostonreview.net/global-justice/alex-de-waal-we-can-no-longer-deny-atrocities-ethiopia">U.S. and the international community over its reaction</a> to a conflict that has seen numerous accusations of war crimes.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked <a href="https://www2.ccsu.edu/faculty/emeagwali">Gloria Emeagwali, professor of African history at Central Connecticut State University</a>, to explain how the crisis in Ethiopia developed, and what hope there is for a path away from catastrophe.</em></p>
<h2>What is the current situation in Ethiopia?</h2>
<p>The conflict in the Tigray region in northern Ethiopia has now been <a href="https://theconversation.com/tigray-the-devastating-toll-of-ethiopias-vicious-year-of-war-podcast-171138">going on for more than a year</a>. While major fighting has been between the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-conflict-explained.html">Tigray People’s Liberation Front and Ethiopian government forces</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ethiopia-conflict-eritrea/">armed groups from neighboring Eritrea</a> have also been involved.</p>
<p>The fighting has been particularly intense. Both the TPLF and federal government forces have been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/un-ethiopia-rights-commission-release-report-abuses-tigray-2021-11-03/">accused by the United Nations of human rights violations</a>, including systematic ethnically based rape and massacres. Concern has recently turned to the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58921744">risk of starvation for hundreds of thousands of people</a> cut off from supplies.</p>
<p><iframe id="05pYl" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/05pYl/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>And things could get worse. There is a risk of an all-out civil war engulfing Ethiopia’s population of 110 million.</p>
<p>Fighting has spread from the Tigray region, which was the focus of the early part of the conflict. The TPLF and its allies <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/forces-ethiopias-tigray-region-say-they-are-say-pushing-south-2021-07-12/">continue to move south</a> from their base in Mekelle in the north, and have seized strategically important towns such as Lalibela and Dessie. The Ethiopian government has expressed fears that the fighting <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/11/07/1051940127/rebels-are-closing-in-on-ethiopias-capital-its-collapse-could-bring-regional-cha">may soon engulf the capital Addis Ababa</a>.</p>
<h2>What is the immediate cause of the conflict in Ethiopia?</h2>
<p>There is a long history to the fighting, but the spark to the current phase was an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/04/ethiopia-on-brink-as-pm-orders-military-response-to-attack">attack on federal troops based</a> in Mekelle, by the TPLF, on Nov. 4, 2020. At least <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202012110729.html">1,000 troops were kidnapped</a> and an undefined number were killed by TPLF insurgents. This sparked a retaliatory strike by government forces and a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/02/world/africa/ethiopia-state-of-emergency.html">declaration of a state of emergency</a> by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. </p>
<h2>What is the broader context of the crisis?</h2>
<p>For almost three decades, the TPLF controlled the government and military. During this period it gained <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/19/tigray-tplf-war-against-ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-isnt-about-autonomy-its-about-economic-power/">enormous control over the country’s economy and land</a> as well as over billions of dollars in aid received each year. The TPLF ruled in such a way that it redefined Ethiopia largely by ethnicity, with <a href="https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1390&context=jil">Tigrayans reaping most of the power</a>.</p>
<p>Opposition to the TPLF-dominated government contributed in April 2018 to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/4/2/abiy-ahmed-sworn-in-as-ethiopias-prime-minister">Abiy Ahmed’s election</a>. As prime minister, Abiy began limiting the economic dominance of the TPLF and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/12/7/abiys-efforts-to-unify-ethiopia-could-lead-to-its-disintegration">instituting more centralized federal policies.</a> </p>
<p>The Abiy administration promised a new level of transparency, freed thousands of prisoners and brokered peace with neighboring Eritrea – leading to <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2019/press-release/">his winning the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize</a>.</p>
<p>But even before then, political resentment was brewing. An <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/world/africa/ethiopia-explosion-abiy.html">assassination attempt on Abiy in June 2018</a> was followed by a deepening power struggle between the TPLF and the new administration.</p>
<h2>How could all-out civil war affect the region?</h2>
<p>A lengthy and bloody conflagration in Ethiopia would likely have ripple effects in neighboring Eritrea, Sudan and Kenya, with a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/12/12/945383928/i-have-lost-everything-ethiopian-refugees-flee-for-their-lives">steady flow of refugees</a>, weapons and displaced population groups.</p>
<p>Any further instability is likely to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/11/20/what-ethiopias-crisis-means-for-somalia/">embolden terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabab</a>, which could spread westward into Ethiopia and even Sudan from its base in Somalia. This would shatter the effective containment model put in place by the previous and current Ethiopian governments.</p>
<p>More peaceful regions of the Horn – such as Djibouti and Somaliland – could attract terrorists seeking prisoners of war or forced recruits. A civil war could also worsen instability in Sudan, which itself is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mobile-phone-lines-inside-sudan-are-cut-before-planned-protests-2021-11-17/">currently embroiled in a standoff</a> between pro-democracy activists and the military.</p>
<p>As for Ethiopia itself, all-out civil war could be catastrophic, igniting tensions in a country that consists of <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/11/04/act-now-to-avert-a-bloodbath-in-ethiopia">more than 80 ethnic groups, and potentially leading to the breakup</a> of the country into unviable political entities and enclaves.</p>
<h2>Why has there been criticism of the US response?</h2>
<p>While the Biden administration <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/26/statement-by-president-joe-biden-on-the-crisis-in-ethiopia/">has called for</a> all “belligerents in the Tigray region” to agree to a cease-fire, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopians-rally-by-thousands-to-support-abiy-denounce-us/6303305.html">Ethiopia</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/8/eritrea-blames-us-support-for-tigrays-leaders-for-ethiopias-war">and Eritrea</a> have accused the U.S. of supporting the insurgents. </p>
<p>In a letter to the United Nations, Eritrean foreign minister Osman Saleh <a href="https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-eritrea-africa-98aa53d5ca10d5cd1992209ad4bbcb57">blamed the Biden administration</a> for “stoking further conflict and destabilization” in Tigray in a bid to “resuscitate the remnants of the TPLF regime.”</p>
<p>The Ethiopian government similarly <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopians-rally-by-thousands-to-support-abiy-denounce-us/6303305.html">accused the U.S. of meddling</a> in the region and of “treating on equal footing” the democratically elected government and the TPLF – which the Ethiopian government declared a terrorist group in May 2021.</p>
<p>After Washington <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/09/17/executive-order-on-imposing-sanctions-on-certain-persons-with-respect-to-the-humanitarian-and-human-rights-crisis-in-ethiopia/">announced sanctions against all sides in the conflict</a> in September, Abiy responded with an online letter to Biden accusing the U.S. administration of failing to “openly and sternly reprimand the terrorist group in the same manner it has been chastising my Government.”</p>
<p>A decision in early November to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-business-africa-united-states-global-trade-a3e49884bef0edb51bb9d8020f2b899b">remove Ethiopia from a U.S. trade program</a> over what Biden described as “gross violations” has only worsened relations with Abiy’s government.</p>
<p>Ethiopians suspect that U.S. foreign policy is being influenced in part by <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/water-war-america-losing-credibility-egypt-ethiopia-dam-dispute-170190">Washington’s support</a> for Egyptian president Abdul Fattah al-Sisi in a dispute over the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/08/05/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/">Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam</a>, an enormous hydroelectric power project on the Blue Nile that Ethiopia says it needs for a reliable electrical grid and economic development.</p>
<p>Ethiopia began filling the dam reservoir, which will take <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-55912-0_12">about five years</a>, in July 2020. Yet Egypt, which sees the dam as a threat to its freshwater supplies, has said the dam reservoir should not be filled without a legal agreement about allocation of the Blue Nile’s water. Former U.S. President Donald Trump <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54007123">cut aid to Ethiopia in September 2020, with officials in his administration saying the country had not abided</a> by its promise to resolve the dispute. It is important to note that the dam was pioneered by the TPLF-led government under Meles Zenawi. Critics argue that any disintegration of Ethiopia would strengthen Egypt’s position in negotiations over the dam.</p>
<h2>What can be done to avoid an all-out civil war?</h2>
<p>It may be almost too late to avert an all-out civil war in Ethiopia. But pressure from the African Union and member states that border Ethiopia, along with engagement with civil organizations within the country, may push the warring parties toward peace talks.</p>
<p>[<em>More than 140,000 readers get one of The Conversation’s informative newsletters.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140K">Join the list today</a>.]</p>
<p>Meanwhile, there are some actions that the main protagonists can take to bring down tensions. Declaring the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/1/ethiopia-to-designate-tplf-olf-shene-as-terror-groups">TPLF a terrorist organization</a> was likely a misguided policy by Abiy, and this could be rescinded as a gesture of goodwill. In return, the TPLF should recognize Abiy Ahmed as the democratically elected prime minister of Ethiopia – something it has refused to do so far.</p>
<p>As for the role of the U.S., the visit to the region by Secretary of State Blinken is long overdue. Rising anti-Americanism in Ethiopia resulting from the Biden administration’s stance on the Tigray conflict has helped push Ethiopia toward <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/13/russia-is-building-military-influence-in-africa-challenging-us-france.html">closer military and trade ties with Russia</a> <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/08/turkey-views-ties-ethiopia-key-influence-africa">and Turkey</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171785/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gloria Emeagwali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Violence in Ethiopia could cause ripples across the Horn of Africa, destabilizing the region.Gloria Emeagwali, Professor of History, Central Connecticut State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1528442021-01-20T13:57:34Z2021-01-20T13:57:34ZEthnic conflict could unravel Ethiopia’s valuable garment industry<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377733/original/file-20210108-21-1ujeina.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Garment factory at the Hawassa Industrial Park in Hawassa, southern Ethiopia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by EYERUSALEM JIREGNA/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ethiopia has long been considered one of Africa’s economic <a href="https://www.nomadafricamag.com/ethiopia-africas-wunderkind/">wunderkinds</a>. Until recently, it had relative political stability in comparison to other countries on the continent. And, with an average GDP growth rate of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=ET">10% in the past decade</a> and a government that <a href="http://www.unido.or.jp/files/Ethiopia-Investment-Policies-and-Incentives-and-Opportunities.pdf">instituted policies friendly to foreign investors</a>, the country was able to attract <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Asian-investment-is-turning-Ethiopia-into-textile-hub">South and East Asian clothing manufacturers</a>. These sell to international brands, such as Decathlon and H&M.</p>
<p>But, for the past two months, violent conflict in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region fuelled by ethnic power politics has threatened the country’s stability. According to the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2021">International Crisis Group</a>, the violence has likely killed thousands of people, including many civilians, displaced more than a million people internally, and led some 50,000 to flee to Sudan. </p>
<p>The scale of the conflict could scare off foreign investment in the country’s garment industry. This <a href="https://www.academia.edu/28903445/Ethiopian_Industrial_Development_Strategic_Plan_2013_2025_FDRE_Ministry_of_Industry">sector is hugely important to Ethiopia</a>, which aimed to propel its agricultural economy toward a more prosperous future built on providing clothing to consumers in the West.</p>
<p>While the Ethiopian textile and garment industry <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---sro-addis_ababa/documents/publication/wcms_737627.pdf">is still small</a> – its export share is not more than 10% of total exports, and its products only represent 0.6% of total GDP – the sector was <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---sro-addis_ababa/documents/publication/wcms_737627.pdf">expected</a> to grow by around 40% a year in the next few years.</p>
<p>In March 2019, I assessed Ethiopia’s garment industry alongside two colleagues from the New York University’s Stern Center for Business and Human Rights. We wanted to see whether Ethiopia – as the new frontier of garment manufacturing – had learnt from mistakes in other sourcing countries. We <a href="https://issuu.com/nyusterncenterforbusinessandhumanri/docs/nyu_ethiopia_final_online?e=31640827/69644612">analysed</a> the industry’s prospects and the working conditions with a close look at the flagship <a href="http://www.investethiopia.gov.et/about-us/how-we-can-help?id=466">Hawassa Industrial Park</a>. This is a vast and still only partly filled facility, which currently employs 25,000 workers about 225km south of the capital of Addis Ababa.</p>
<p>What we found was sobering.</p>
<p>Manufacturers told us about the many challenges of doing business in Ethiopia. These included bureaucratic and logistical hurdles and the problems that come with an unskilled workforce that had no prior experience of working in an industrial setting. </p>
<p>Workers reported that they could barely survive with their base monthly wage as low as US$26. The government’s eagerness to attract foreign investment led it to promote the lowest base wage in any garment-producing country.</p>
<p>In addition to this already-strained business context, the <a href="https://issuu.com/nyusterncenterforbusinessandhumanri/docs/nyu_ethiopia_final_online?e=31640827/69644612">report</a> we published points to what we saw as the greatest challenge of all: ethnic tensions.</p>
<p>In Hawassa, <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2019/11/07/Ethiopia-ethnic-autonomy-Sidama-Abiy">ethnic tension</a> erupted in July 2019 and caused disruptions to the industrial park. The new conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region could be the tipping point for foreign investors in the garment industry. Manufacturers had told us that further political instability in the country could jeopardise all future business.</p>
<p>The collapse of this sector would be disastrous. Tens of thousands of people would lose their jobs and the investments made in this enterprise wasted. In addition, foreign investors and the Ethiopian government need to understand that its collapse could have a symbolic knock-on effect in the region – Ethiopia’s garment sector is often seen as a pioneering experiment proving that structural transformation in Africa is possible.</p>
<h2>Unmet promises</h2>
<p>Garment manufacturers were already struggling to do business. We found that workers, unhappy with their working conditions and pay, were increasingly willing to protest by stopping work or even quitting. Attrition was high, and production was low.</p>
<p>There are also problems with raw materials, almost all of which need to be imported into Ethiopia from India or China. The <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-10-26/ethiopia-plans-to-rent-out-belgium-sized-land-area-to-produce-cash-crops">government advertised</a> the availability of more than 3 million hectares for cash crops, including cotton cultivation in 2010. In fact, only about 60,000 hectares were being used by 2019 to grow cotton, and that figure is falling as local farmers switch to sugar, sesame, and other more lucrative cash crops.</p>
<p>Ethnic tensions disrupted factory operations further. When Abiy Ahmed took over as Prime Minister in 2018, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48803815">his reforms</a> – which aimed to create a more ethnically inclusive government – unsettled the ruling coalition and opened a political space for ethnic tensions to resurface. For instance, in Hawassa, a group of the Sidama people – who are the majority ethnic group in the Hawassa state – <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2019/11/07/Ethiopia-ethnic-autonomy-Sidama-Abiy">pushed</a> for independence in 2019. </p>
<p>The political uncertainty due to ethnic tensions translates into economic uncertainty for investors. </p>
<p>In Hawassa, security concerns emerged for local workers and foreign staff. Night shifts had to be cancelled so that workers could get home safely before nightfall. Political demonstrations at the park’s fence and within the park disrupted production. Sidama people also mobilised within factories and demanded more jobs for their people resulting in <a href="https://www.just-style.com/news/workers-strike-at-ethiopias-hawassa-industrial-park_id135778.aspx">short strikes</a> and occasional <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-politics/unrest-over-autonomy-bid-kills-four-in-ethiopias-hawassa-city-idUSKCN1UE15Q">park-wide closings</a>.</p>
<p>Such disruptions are a wild card beyond the control of investors, which may set back further investments.</p>
<h2>By a thread</h2>
<p>When the COVID-19 pandemic broke out in early 2020, the sector was hanging by a thread. In June 2020, the International Labour Organisation published a <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---sro-addis_ababa/documents/publication/wcms_751045.pdf">report</a>, which described reduced orders and a situation for workers even more perilous than before.</p>
<p>By the end of 2020, many of the over 60,000 garment workers in Ethiopia had lost their jobs or were too afraid to return to work, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-garment-workers-feature-trfn/pay-cuts-and-forced-overtime-covid-19-takes-heavy-toll-on-ethiopias-garment-workers-idUSKBN28W1B5">fearing they would catch the coronavirus</a>.</p>
<p>The current ethnic conflict could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back. For instance, the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/china-and-ethiopia-part-4-mekelle-industrial-park/">industrial park in Mekelle</a> built for 20,000 workers – and with an occupancy in 2020 of around 3,500 workers – is currently closed. The current internet and phone blackout in the Tigray region now also makes any communication between buyers and the factories impossible.</p>
<p>A worsening human rights situation creates reputational and operational risks for investors and buyers. It increases uncertainty over the ability to complete orders and ship them on time. It also increases security risks for staff and workers. This may all cause long-lasting damage to investor confidence and the opportunity for sustainable economic development.</p>
<h2>What must change</h2>
<p>To assure investors, buyers, and international stakeholders, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed needs to end the blackout in the Tigray region, better protect journalists and civilians, and allow for independent human rights monitors to assess conditions. </p>
<p>At this critical moment, clothing companies and manufacturers invested in Ethiopia need to double down on their commitments to business in Ethiopia. This means they need to stay in the country and speak up to support human rights. </p>
<p>Once ethnic tensions are defused, more work will still need to be done by both the government and foreign manufacturers to strengthen the sector. This includes developing a domestic supply chain and establishing a minimum wage that ensures decent living conditions for workers.</p>
<p>But first, the future of the industry must be secured.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152844/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dorothee Baumann-Pauly does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The new conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region could be the tipping point for foreign investors in the garment industry.Dorothee Baumann-Pauly, Adjunct Professor and Director of the Geneva Center for Business and Human Rights, Université de GenèveLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1214682019-08-06T12:56:13Z2019-08-06T12:56:13ZFrom across the globe to El Paso, changes in the language of the far-right explain its current violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/286974/original/file-20190805-36381-752a8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Law enforcement officers walking to the scene of a shooting at a shopping mall in El Paso, Texas, on Saturday, Aug. 3, 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Texas-Mall-Shooting/5987fafc0f114e34b2aa9553b955b983/165/0">AP/Rudy Gutierrez</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/05/us/el-paso-shooting-monday/index.html">shooting attack</a> in which a young white man is accused of killing 22 people in a Walmart in El Paso fits a new trend among perpetrators of far-right violence: They want the world to know why they did it. </p>
<p>So they provide <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/us/patrick-crusius-el-paso-shooter-manifesto.html">a comprehensive ideological manifesto</a> that aims to explain the reasoning behind their actions as well as to encourage others to follow in their steps.</p>
<p>In the past, only <a href="https://info.publicintelligence.net/CTC-ViolentFarRight.pdf">leaders of far-right groups did this</a>. Now, it’s common among <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-drives-lone-offenders-62745">lone-wolf perpetrators</a>, such as the alleged perpetrator in El Paso. </p>
<p>In the past decade, the language of white supremacists has transformed in important ways. It crossed national borders, broadened its focus and has been influenced by current mainstream political discourse. </p>
<p>I study <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=xBQYKHwAAAAJ&hl=en">political violence and extremism</a>. In my recent research, I have identified these changes and believe that they can provide important insights into the current landscape of the American and European violent far-right. </p>
<p>The changes also allow us to understand how the violent far-right mobilizes support, shapes political perceptions and eventually advances their objectives. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/286978/original/file-20190805-36395-y4q1ae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/286978/original/file-20190805-36395-y4q1ae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/286978/original/file-20190805-36395-y4q1ae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286978/original/file-20190805-36395-y4q1ae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286978/original/file-20190805-36395-y4q1ae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286978/original/file-20190805-36395-y4q1ae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286978/original/file-20190805-36395-y4q1ae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286978/original/file-20190805-36395-y4q1ae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A vigil to commemorate the 50 victims of a March 15 shooting in Christchurch, New Zealand, in which the accused shooter issued a 74-page manifesto prior to the massacre.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/New-Zealand-Mosque-Shooting-Free-Speech/0965b04afbdf442daabd9c5d24581e0a/2/0">AP/Vincent Yu</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>New identity crosses borders</h2>
<p>Since the early stages of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/white-supremacy">American white supremacy movement in the mid-19th century</a>, the movement has always emphasized <a href="http://insct.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Blessing_Roberts_Berlin_Report-mwedit070618.pdf">the superiority of Western culture and the need for segregation</a> between racial groups in order to maintain the purity and dominance of the white race. </p>
<p>For example, in the 1980s, <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Blood_in_the_Face.html?id=2MlmswEACAAJ&source=kp_book_description">a Ku Klux Klan affiliate published a map</a> allocating specific parts of the U.S. to specific ethnic communities. The map makers imagined Jews limited to the New York area, while Hispanics were to live in Florida. </p>
<p>But recently, a growing number of far-right activists have preferred to focus on cultural and social differences between communities, rather than on attributes such as race and ethnic origin. </p>
<p>They justify their violence as a way to preserve certain cultural-religious practices, rather than relying on their old justification – maintaining the genetic purity of the white race. In these activists’ view, the battle has moved from genes to culture. </p>
<p>For example, a member of the National Socialist Movement, an American neo-Nazi organization, wrote in a 2018 online post that white American is an identity like African American or Jewish American. In a statement that probably wouldn’t have been made by previous generations of neo-Nazis, the member wrote that all whites should come together, using their knowledge and weapons, to stop non-Europeans from pushing their secular agenda via government and media power. </p>
<h2>Countering liberal left’s cultural influence</h2>
<p>Another traditional theme of the far-right discourse – preserving the patriarchal order from attacks from the left – has grown in prominence. </p>
<p>Anders Breivik, who <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/26/world/europe/norway-terror-attacks/index.html">killed 77 people and injured more than 300</a> in July 2011 in Europe’s most lethal act of white supremacism, issued a manifesto shortly before his rampage. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/jul/27/breivik-anti-feminism">In it, he stated</a> that the politically correct terminology which is becoming more prevalent in the West intends to “deny the intrinsic worth of native Christian European heterosexual males” who were reduced to an “emasculate[d] … touchy-feely subspecies.” </p>
<p>Such sentiments are becoming more prevalent in the white supremacist forums, and reflect another component of what they perceived as an ongoing cultural war to preserve the white Christian way of life. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/286975/original/file-20190805-36367-dl0nng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/286975/original/file-20190805-36367-dl0nng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/286975/original/file-20190805-36367-dl0nng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=774&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286975/original/file-20190805-36367-dl0nng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=774&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286975/original/file-20190805-36367-dl0nng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=774&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286975/original/file-20190805-36367-dl0nng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=973&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286975/original/file-20190805-36367-dl0nng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=973&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286975/original/file-20190805-36367-dl0nng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=973&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Belgian Flemish right-wing party member Tanguy Veys holds a copy of a manifesto sent to him and written by Anders Behring Breivik, who killed 76 people in twin attacks in Norway in 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Belgium-Norway-Massacre/b65388d5ead04f36978b48545a27591f/36/0">AP/Virginia Mayo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>New transnational culture</h2>
<p>The declining emphasis by the far-right on nationalism has led to the adoption of a transnational identity based on race, culture and religion.</p>
<p>Simply put, they feel closer to whites in other countries than non-whites who live in their neighborhood. </p>
<p>This explains why we have seen a <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-03-20/white-nationalism-born-usa-now-global-terror-threat">global spread of violent white nationalism in recent years</a> as the far-right finds kinship with like-minded nationalists in other countries. </p>
<p>Racial identity was always a prime component in the identity of far-right activists, but it was usually framed by local politics. In the past, racist British skinheads focused mainly on what they perceived as the interests of the British white working class. Today the rhetoric of most skinheads focuses on international geopolitics, although local issues haven’t been abandoned. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/05/21/725390449/accused-shooter-in-new-zealand-mosque-attacks-charged-with-terrorism">attack in Christchurch, New Zealand, in which an Australian white supremacist killed 51</a> Muslim worshippers in a mosque on March 15, 2019, reflects that far-right activists seem to increasingly embrace a regional, if not global, perspective in the way they define their constituencies and the threats they are facing. </p>
<p>The Christchurch attacker’s manifesto was clearly <a href="https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/3/15/18267163/new-zealand-shooting-christchurch-white-nationalism-racism-language">inspired by far-right rhetoric from European and American groups</a>, such as notions of <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/03/what-the-christchurch-attackers-manifesto-tells-us.html">“white genocide</a>.” He specifically mentions Norway’s Breivik as a role model. </p>
<h2>Legitimizing far-right ideology in the US</h2>
<p>In the U.S., what’s different about the current rhetoric of the far-right is that they are now using terminology that can also be found in some mainstream political parties and movements, aiding their efforts to gain popular legitimacy. </p>
<p>For example, the United Northern and Southern Knights of the Ku Klux Klan released a new set of organizational goals a couple of years ago. Beyond their longstanding, bedrock belief – <a href="https://www.loc.gov/item/2015648259/">the protection of the white race</a> – they also declare support for restricting immigration and free trade and ending or limiting foreign aid. They want government to provide protection to small businesses, agricultural workers and gun owners.</p>
<p>This broad ideological shift also spilled over to some far-right skinhead organizations. <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/politics/legal-and-political-magazines/volksfront">Volksfront</a>, for example, declares in its online mission statement that beyond white nationalism, the organization will fight for economic issues, states’ rights, crime repression and labor rights. </p>
<p>U.S. President Donald Trump’s language about the need to restore order to the streets of America, as expressed <a href="https://www.npr.org/2017/01/20/510629447/watch-live-president-trumps-inauguration-ceremony">in his inaugural address</a>, is also evident in the language of American white supremacists. In a poster produced by the skinhead group <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/keystone-state-skinheadskeystone-united">Keystone United</a>, they call for harsher punishments for drug dealers. </p>
<p>The demand for stricter punishment of criminals is echoed in many racist group platforms. These include support of death penalty expansion, an important point of discussion mainly in skinhead message boards, and levying harsher punishments for sexual offenses. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/30/shrinking-gap-between-number-of-blacks-and-whites-in-prison/">Since minorities are overrepresented</a> among American incarcerated population, far-right activists see these criminal justice policies as a more “legitimate” way to “punish” members of minority groups. </p>
<h2>Two future trends</h2>
<p>These changes in the discourse of the far-right suggest two important trends. </p>
<p>The first is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/white-nationalism-born-in-the-usa-is-now-a-global-terror-threat-113825">growth in the international nature of far-right violence</a>, posing a challenge to law enforcement across borders. </p>
<p>Second, the growing overlap between the language of the far-right and the rhetoric of elected officials illustrates how the current polarization in the political system, and delegitimization of minorities by political leaders, can provide legitimacy for radical practices and violence and broader acceptance of ideas, concepts and statements that in the past were the domain of the far-right. </p>
<p>I fear these dynamics are likely to encourage additional far-right activists to express their views via violence. The emerging evidence that the <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/el-paso-shooting-patrick-crusius-manifesto-texas-white-nationalist-1452579">El Paso shooter was inspired by popular theories in the far-right rhetorical universe</a>, such as that of the “great replacement,” is a clear warning sign. </p>
<p>[ <em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121468/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arie Perliger does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Major changes in the language of white supremacists have happened in the last decade that provide a window into how the groups mobilize support, shape political perceptions and advance their cause.Arie Perliger, Director of Security Studies and Professor, UMass LowellLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1069882018-11-20T11:34:21Z2018-11-20T11:34:21ZFear, more than hate, feeds online bigotry and real-world violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/246013/original/file-20181116-194497-p8hl57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">When online information causes fear, it can spark hatred and violence.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/cyber-bulling-concept-fingers-screen-blame-1061278154">UVgreen/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When a U.S. senator asked Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, “<a href="https://www.usatoday.com/videos/tech/2018/04/10/sasse-zuckerberg-define-hate-speech/33717315/">Can you define hate speech?</a>” it was arguably the most important question that social networks face: how to identify extremism inside their communities.</p>
<p>Hate crimes in the 21st century follow a familiar pattern in which an online tirade escalates into violent actions. Before opening fire in the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, the accused gunman had vented over far-right social network <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/pittsburgh-synagogue-shooter-spewed-his-hate-on-gab-the-alt-rights-favorite-social-network">Gab</a> about Honduran migrants traveling toward the U.S. border, and the alleged Jewish conspiracy behind it all. Then he declared, “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/us/gab-robert-bowers-pittsburgh-synagogue-shootings.html">I can’t sit by and watch my people get slaughtered. Screw your optics, I’m going in</a>.” The pattern of extremists <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/watch-santa-barbara-shooter-elliot-rodgers-chilling-youtube-video">unloading their intolerance</a> online has been a disturbing feature of some <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/12/us/orlando-shooter-omar-mateen/index.html">recent hate crimes</a>. But most online hate isn’t that flagrant, or as easy to spot. </p>
<p>As I found in my 2017 study on <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9783319514239">extremism in social networks and political blogs</a>, rather than overt bigotry, most online hate looks a lot like fear. It’s not expressed in racial slurs or calls for confrontation, but rather in unfounded allegations of Hispanic invaders pouring into the country, black-on-white crime or Sharia law infiltrating American cities. Hysterical narratives such as these have become the preferred vehicle for today’s extremists – and may be more effective at provoking real-world violence than stereotypical hate speech.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/246027/original/file-20181116-194506-5q7eh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/246027/original/file-20181116-194506-5q7eh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/246027/original/file-20181116-194506-5q7eh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=214&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/246027/original/file-20181116-194506-5q7eh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=214&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/246027/original/file-20181116-194506-5q7eh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=214&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/246027/original/file-20181116-194506-5q7eh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/246027/original/file-20181116-194506-5q7eh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/246027/original/file-20181116-194506-5q7eh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Spreading fear on Facebook.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Screenshot from Facebook by The Conversation</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The ease of spreading fear</h2>
<p>On Twitter, a popular meme traveling around recently depicts the “<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20181115180807/https://twitter.com/LyndaAtchison/status/855268368475013124">Islamic Terrorist Network</a>” spread across a map of the United States, while a Facebook account called “America Under Attack” shares an article with its 17,000 followers about the “Angry Young Men and Gangbangers” <a href="https://theconversation.com/dozens-of-migrants-disappear-in-mexico-as-central-american-caravan-pushes-northward-106287">marching toward the border</a>. And <a href="https://www.thewrap.com/far-right-social-network-gab-back-online-after-finding-new-host/">on Gab</a>, countless profiles talk of Jewish plans to sabotage American culture, sovereignty and the president. </p>
<p>While not overtly antagonistic, these notes play well to an audience that has found in social media a place where they can express their intolerance openly, as long as they color within the lines. They can avoid the exposure that <a href="https://www.splcenter.org/20150125/speak-responding-everyday-bigotry">traditional hate speech</a> attracts. Whereas the white nationalist gathering in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/far-right-groups-blaze-into-national-view-in-charlottesville.html">Charlottesville</a> was high-profile and revealing, social networks can be anonymous and discreet, and therefore liberating for the undeclared racist. That presents a stark challenge to platforms like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube.</p>
<h2>Fighting hate</h2>
<p>Of course this is not just a challenge for social media companies. The public at large is facing the complex question of how to respond to inflammatory and prejudiced narratives that are stoking racial fears and subsequent hostility. However, social networks have the unique capacity to turn down the volume on intolerance if they determine that a user has in fact breached their terms of service. For instance, in April 2018, <a href="https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/vbxqea/richard-spencer-kicked-off-facebook">Facebook removed two pages</a> associated with white nationalist Richard Spencer. A few months later, Twitter suspended several accounts associated with the far-right group The Proud Boys for violating its policy “<a href="http://fortune.com/2018/08/11/twitter-suspends-proud-boys/">prohibiting violent extremist groups</a>.” </p>
<p>Still, some critics argue that the networks are not moving fast enough. There is <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/hate-speech-tied-to-suspect-in-synagogue-massacre-rekindles-calls-for-regulating-social-media/2018/10/29/38235396-dbd1-11e8-b732-3c72cbf131f2_story.html">mounting pressure</a> for these websites to police the extremism that has flourished in their spaces, or else <a href="https://theconversation.com/regulate-social-media-platforms-before-its-too-late-86984">become policed themselves</a>. A recent Huffpost/YouGov survey revealed that two-thirds of Americans wanted social networks to prevent users from posting “<a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/social-media-harassment-fake-news-poll-alex-jones_us_5b7b1c53e4b0a5b1febdf30a">hate speech or racist content</a>.”</p>
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<p>In response, Facebook has stepped up its anti-extremism efforts, reporting in May that it had removed “<a href="https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/05/enforcement-numbers/">2.5 million pieces of hate speech</a>,” over a third of which was identified using artificial intelligence, the rest by human monitors or flagged by users. But even as <a href="https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-blueprint-for-content-governance-and-enforcement/10156443129621634/">Zuckerberg promised more action</a> in November 2018, the company acknowledged that teaching its technology to identify hate speech is extremely difficult because of all the <a href="https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/05/removing-content-using-ai/">contexts and nuances</a> that can drastically alter these meanings.</p>
<p>Moreover, public consensus about what actually constitutes hate speech is ambiguous at best. The libertarian Cato Institute found <a href="https://www.cato.org/blog/82-say-its-hard-ban-hate-speech-because-people-cant-agree-what-speech-hateful">broad disagreement among Americans</a> about the kind of speech that should qualify as hate, or offensive speech, or fair criticism. And so, these discrepancies raise the obvious question: How can an algorithm identify hate speech if we humans can barely define it ourselves? </p>
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<h2>Fear lights the fuse</h2>
<p>The ambiguity of what constitutes hate speech is providing ample cover for modern extremists to infuse cultural anxieties into popular networks. That presents perhaps the clearest danger: Priming people’s racial paranoia can also be extremely powerful at spurring hostility. </p>
<p>The late communication scholar George Gerbner found that, contrary to popular belief, heavy exposure to media violence did not make people more violent. Rather, it made them <a href="http://web.asc.upenn.edu/gerbner/Asset.aspx?assetID=412">more fearful of others doing violence to them</a>, which often leads to corrosive distrust and cultural resentment. That’s precisely what today’s racists are tapping into, and what social networks must learn to spot.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Why do so many people watch violent TV and never commit a violent act?</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The posts that speak of Jewish plots to destroy America, or black-on-white crime, are not directly calling for violence, but they are amplifying <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/us/gab-robert-bowers-pittsburgh-synagogue-shootings.html">prejudiced views</a> that can <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/01/10/508363607/what-happened-when-dylann-roof-asked-google-for-information-about-race">inflame followers to act</a>. That’s precisely what happened in advance of the deadly assaults at a historic black church in Charleston in 2015, and the Pittsburgh synagogue last month. </p>
<p>For social networks, the challenge is two-fold. They must first decide whether to continue hosting non-violent racists like Richard Spencer, who has called for “peaceful ethnic cleansing,” and <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/richard-spencer-david-duke-twitter-895539">remains active on Twitter</a>. Or for that matter, Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan, who recently compared Jews to termites, and continues to post to <a href="https://dailycaller.com/2018/10/18/facebook-twitter-farrakhan-hate/">his Facebook page</a>. </p>
<p>When Twitter and Facebook let these profiles remain active, the companies lend the credibility of their online communities to these provocateurs of racism or anti-Semitism. But they also signal that their definitions of hate may be too narrow.</p>
<p>The most dangerous hate speech is apparently no longer broadcast with ethnic slurs or delusional rhetoric about white supremacy. Rather, it’s all over social media, in plain sight, carrying hashtags like #WhiteGenocide, #BlackCrimes, #MigrantInvasion and #AmericaUnderAttack. They create an illusion of imminent threat that radicals thrive on, and to which the violence-inclined among them have responded.</p>
<p><em>This article has been updated to correct the political characterization of the Cato Institute.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106988/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam G. Klein does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hysterical narratives promoting fear among some Americans may be more effective at sparking violence than hate speech is. Social media companies are expected to guard against both.Adam G. Klein, Assistant Professor of Communication Studies, Pace University Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/725382017-02-08T07:33:27Z2017-02-08T07:33:27ZIndonesia should support interfaith community programs to help Myanmar end ethnic violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155800/original/image-20170207-27194-imizkh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Indonesia can assist Myanmar to find a long-term solution for peace in Rakhine state.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After years of refusing to protect ethnic Rohingya from persecution, Myanmar’s government is seemingly showing signs of change.</p>
<p>Following <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/21/burma-rohingya-recount-killings-rape-and-arson">reports of massacre, arson and rape</a> targeting ethnic Rohingya in Myanmar’s Rakhine state late last year, the government led by Aung San Suu Kyi <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/myanmars-suu-kyi-launches-rohingya-abuse-panel/a-19497808">set up a panel to resolve conflicts in that state</a>. The government also held a closed-door meeting for ASEAN foreign ministers to discuss aid for ethnic Rohingya. This followed a visit by Yanghee Lee, the UN special rapporteur on human rights, to Myanmar in mid-January. </p>
<p>But the investigations and political peace processes are only taking place at the government level. There is no grassroots participation, even when the problem exists at the community level. </p>
<p>Unless reconciliation efforts involve people at the grassroots level, persecution of ethnic Rohingya will not stop. The Indonesian government should look into supporting dialogues between communities in Myanmar. </p>
<h2>Institutionalised discrimination</h2>
<p>To understand the root of violence against the Rohingya minority in Myanmar, we must understand the narrative that fuels the majority prejudice against them.</p>
<p>Following Myanmar’s independence from the British, the military regime <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/burmas-muslims-primer">propagated a view that equates Muslim Rohingya with colonial rule</a>. They associated Muslims with the exploitation of Burma by foreigners because the regime perceived that the Rohingya arrived in Rakhine state during the British colonial period. </p>
<p>The public bought the idea of Rohingya as foreigners and supported systematic discrimination against them. Under Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law, Rohingya is not recognised as one of the nation’s ethnic groups. They are barred from serving in public offices and the military. </p>
<p>The majority Buddhist community in Myanmar supports the discrimination against Muslim Rohingya. They did not protest the Citizenship Law as the government associated it with “Buddhist nationalism”. Thein Nyunt, chair of the New National Democracy party, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/04/201342910920804170.html">affirmed that this law was intended “to protect” the Burmese race</a>. </p>
<p>Even though the military regime has collapsed, the perception of Muslims that it fostered persists.</p>
<p>To this day, there is almost no facilitated discussion or dialogue between ethnic Rohingya and the Buddhist majority to dismantle inter-ethnic prejudices.</p>
<h2>How Indonesia can help</h2>
<p>Following the reports of violence in Rakhine, Indonesia, where the majority of the population is Muslim, <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/world/indonesia-sends-aid-to-rohingya-muslims-in-rakhine">donated humanitarian aid in December</a>. In 2013, Indonesia donated US$1 million to build school buildings in the state. </p>
<p>If the Indonesian government is serious about assisting Myanmar to deal with ethnic violence, its aid should include a project designed to foster inter-ethnic cooperation in Myanmar. Indonesia, a multi-ethnic and multi-faith country, can share with Myanmar programs that can help deal with the complexity of multiculturalism. </p>
<p>Indonesia has more than 350 ethnic groups, 700 local languages and six religions that are recognised by the state. Indonesia has its share of experience of ethnic violence and a number of community initiatives have been carried out to support reconciliation. </p>
<p>In Ambon, the capital of Indonesia’s Moluccas islands, the local government, security forces, religious and community leaders re-introduced <em>pela</em>, a traditional inter-village friendship agreement, after the conflict between Christians and Muslims ended in 1999.</p>
<p><em>Pela</em> was utilised to foster cooperation between Christian and Muslim villages. Various projects were introduced, such as mosque or church constructions, which require workers from different faiths to become partners in building houses of worship. </p>
<p>The government and other stakeholders have also established interfaith dialogue. This includes forums such as MADIA (Society for Interreligious Dialogue), Dian Interfidei, Interfaith Women’s Forum in Bali, and the Young Interfaith Forum in Bali. </p>
<p>The partnership of Heru Karyanto, a Chinese Indonesian community leader, and K.H. Thaifoer, a Muslim religious leader, offers a successful example. They initiated a communication forum (FKML) in Lasem, Central Java, to strengthen relationships between Javanese and Chinese Indonesians. </p>
<p>The two set up the forum as a precaution after seeing ethnic Chinese being targeted during riots in Jakarta, Surabaya and other big cities following the end of Suharto’s rule in 1998. Due to the relationship-building by Karyanto and Thaifoer, Lasem, with its significant Chinese community, was free from ethnic violence. </p>
<p>Indonesia has initiated bilateral interfaith dialogue forums with several countries, such as <a href="http://www.kemlu.go.id/en/berita/siaran-pers/Pages/Indonesia-Italy-Interfaith-Dialogue-Monday-23-April-2012.aspx">Italy</a> and <a href="http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/91788/indonesia-promotes-and-enhances-interfaith-dialogues">Serbia</a>. Indonesia can create a similar forum with the Myanmar government. </p>
<p>Indonesia should also engage various stakeholders, such as humanitarian NGOS in Southeast Asia. NGOs incorporated with the SEAHUM (Southeast Asia Humanitarian) committee network, for example, may be able to design and run community-based programs in Myanmar.</p>
<p>Through a grassroots, multi-stakeholder approach, Indonesia can assist Myanmar to find a long-term solution for peace in Rakhine state.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72538/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dio Herdiawan Tobing does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Unless reconciliation efforts involve people at the grassroots, persecution of ethnic Rohingya will not stop. Indonesian should offer support for dialogue between communities in Myanmar.Dio Herdiawan Tobing, Research Manager at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/637792016-08-14T21:06:17Z2016-08-14T21:06:17ZWhy the Oromo protests mark a change in Ethiopia’s political landscape<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133938/original/image-20160812-16324-1o53k9g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopian migrants, all members of the Oromo community living in Malta, protest against the Tigray-minority government</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The Oromo in Ethiopia are campaigning for a new political and economic arrangement in the country. The Conversation Africa’s Samantha Spooner asked Professor <a href="https://works.bepress.com/asafa_jalata/">Asafa Jalata</a> about their demands.</em> </p>
<p><strong>Who are the Oromo people?</strong></p>
<p>The Oromo are the single largest ethno-national group in northeast Africa. In Ethiopia alone they are estimated to be 50 million strong out of a total population of 100 million. There are also Oromo communities living in Kenya and Somalia. </p>
<p>Ethiopia is said to <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2075.html">have about</a> 80 ethno-national groups. The Oromo represent 34.4% while the Amhara (Amara) 27%. The rest are all less than 7% each. </p>
<p>The Oromo call themselves a nation. They have named their homeland “<a href="http://www.oromodictionary.com/aboutOromo">Oromia</a>”, an area covering 284,538 square kms. It is considered to be the richest area of northeast Africa because of its agricultural and natural resources. It is often <a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?id=DbBm2WpVwUkC&pg=PA38&dq=oromia+breadbasket&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj5rLeQn8HOAhWF1BoKHaRtAVsQ6AEIJTAA#v=onepage&q=oromia%20breadbasket&f=false">referred to</a> as the “breadbasket” of the region. 60% of Ethiopian economic resources are <a href="http://www.gcftaskforce.org/content/training_program/2014/ethiopia1/documents/presentations/Ethiopia_JNR_and_the_Emerging_Oromia_Program.pdf">generated</a> from Oromia.</p>
<p>The capital city of Ethiopia is located in the heart of Oromia. What the world knows as Addis Ababa is also known to the Oromo as their capital, “Finfinnee”. When the Abyssinian warlord, <a href="http://www.academia.edu/5768951/The_Abyssinian_Regional_Expansion_during_the_Reign_of_Emperor_Menelik_II_1889_1913_By">Menelik</a>, colonised the Oromo during the last decades of the 19th century he established his main garrison city in Oromia and called it Addis Ababa. </p>
<p>Despite being the largest ethno-national group in Ethiopia, the Oromo <a href="https://books.google.com/books?isbn=9004265481">consider themselves</a> to be <a href="https://books.google.com/books?isbn=9004265481">colonial</a> subjects. This is because they have been denied equal access to their country’s political, economic and cultural resources. It all started with their colonisation by, and incorporation into, Abyssinia (the former Ethiopian empire) during the <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Scramble_for_Africa">Scramble for Africa</a>. </p>
<p>Today, comprising <a href="http://www.ciaworldfactbook.us/africa/ethiopia.html">just</a> 6% of the population, Tigrayans dominate and <a href="http://zethiopia.com/index/?p=362">control</a> the political economy of Ethiopia with the help of the West, particularly the US. This relationship is strategic to the US who <a href="http://www.tesfanews.net/u-s-policy-ethiopia-a-failing-state/">use</a> the Tigrayan-led government’s army as their <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33671340">proxy</a> to fight terrorism in the Horn of Africa and beyond. </p>
<p><strong>The Oromo community has been demonstrating since November last year. What triggered the protests?</strong></p>
<p>The Oromo demonstrations have been underway for over eight months, first surfacing in Ginchi (about 80 kms southwest of the capital) in November 2015. It began when elementary and secondary school students in the small town began protesting the privatisation and confiscation of a small <a href="http://www.ayyaantuu.net/the-oromo-movement-the-effects-of-state-terrorism-and-globalization-in-oromia-and-ethiopia/">soccer field</a> and the selling of the nearby <a href="http://ethioforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Assefa-Jalata-piece.pdf">Chilimoo forest</a>. </p>
<p>The sentiment <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201512161676.html">quickly spread</a> across Oromia. The entire Oromo community then joined the protests, highlighting other complaints such as the so-called <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/293119265/The-Integrated-Master-Plan-of-Addis-Ababa-and-the-Nearby-Oromia-towns">Integrated Addis Ababa Master Plan</a> and associated land grabbing. The master plan was intended to expand Addis Ababa by 1.5 million hectares onto surrounding Oromo land, evicting Oromo farmers.</p>
<p>Last year’s demonstrations were the product of over 25 years of accumulated grievances. These grievances arose as a result of the domination by the minority Tigrayan ethno-national group. Because of this dominance the Oromo people have <a href="http://genocidewatch.net/2016/02/01/land-grabbing-in-ethiopia/">become aliens</a> in their own country, lost ownership of their land and have become impoverished. </p>
<p>What was different about these demonstrations was that, for the first time, all Oromo branches came together in coordinated action to fight for their national self-determination and democracy. </p>
<p><strong>Which part of the Oromo community is organising the rallies?</strong></p>
<p>It is believed that underground activist networks, known as Qeerroo, are organising the Oromo community. The Qeerroo, also called the Qubee generation, first emerged in 1991 with the participation of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in the transitional government of Ethiopia. In 1992 the Tigrayan-led minority regime pushed the OLF out of government and the activist networks of Qeerroo gradually blossomed as a form of <em>Oromummaa</em> or Oromo nationalism. </p>
<p>Today the Qeerroo are made up of Oromo youth. These are predominantly students from elementary school to university, organising collective action through social media. It is not clear what kind of relationship exists between the group and the OLF. But the Qeerroo clearly articulate that the OLF should replace the Tigrayan-led regime and recognise the Front as the origin of Oromo nationalism. </p>
<p><strong>What are their demands?</strong></p>
<p>Their immediate demands are for the Ethiopian government to halt the so-called Addis Ababa Master Plan, land grabbing, corruption, and the violation of human rights. </p>
<p>Their extended demands are about achieving self-determination and sovereignty by replacing the Tigrayan-led regime with a multi-ethno-national democratic government. These demands gradually emerged to create solidarity with other ethno-national groups, such as the Amharas, who also have grievances with the regime. </p>
<p><strong>How has the government reacted to the protests?</strong></p>
<p>The government reaction has been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/21/ethiopia-no-let-crackdown-protests">violent and suppressive</a>. Despite Oromia being the largest regional state in Ethiopia, it has been under <a href="https://oromianeconomist.com/2016/03/23/martial-law-in-oromia-the-state-is-now-under-8-military-divisions-controlled-by-fascist-tplf-warlords-from-tigray/">martial law</a> since the protests began. The government has been able to use this law to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/06/16/such-brutal-crackdown/killings-and-arrests-response-ethiopias-oromo-protestsholding%20them%20in%20prisons%20and%20concentration%20camps">detain</a> thousands of Oromos, holding them in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/06/16/such-brutal-crackdown/killings-and-arrests-response-ethiopias-oromo-protests">prisons</a> and concentration camps. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/ethiopia0505/2.htm">Security structures</a> called tokkoo-shane (one-to-five), garee and gott have also been implemented. Their responsibilities include spying, identifying, exposing, imprisoning, torturing and killing Oromos who are not interested in serving the regime.</p>
<p>There have also been deaths and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/06/16/such-brutal-crackdown/killings-and-arrests-response-ethiopias-oromo-protests">reports</a> of thousands of Oromos who have been maimed as a result of torture, beatings or during the suppression of protests. For example, during the Oromia-wide day of peaceful protest on July 6 the regime army, known as Agazi, massacred <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37015055">nearly</a> 100 Oromos. According to Amnesty International, 400 Oromos were <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/ethiopia-hundreds-killed-excessive-force-oromo-protests-says-hrw-470800">killed</a> before July 6. But in reality nobody knows exactly how many Oromos have been victims of violence. </p>
<p><strong>What impact have these protests had on the country?</strong></p>
<p>The Oromo protest movement has started to change the political landscape of Ethiopia and shaken the regime’s foundations. <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2016/08/06/ethiopias-unprecedented-nationwide-oromo-protests-who-what-why/">Erupting</a> like “a social volcano”, it has sent ripples through the country with different groups changing their attitudes and standing in solidarity with the Oromo. The support of the Ahmaras has been particularly significant as they are the second largest ethno-national group in Ethiopia. </p>
<p>For the first time in history, the plight of the Oromo people has also received worldwide attention. International media outlets have reported on the peaceful protests and subsequent government repression. </p>
<p>This has brought about diplomatic repercussions. In January the European Parliament <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&refer">condemned</a> the Ethiopian government’s violent crackdown. It also called for the establishment of a credible, transparent and independent body to investigate the murder and imprisonment of thousands of protesters. Similarly, the UN Human Rights Experts <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16977&LangID=E">demanded</a> that Ethiopian authorities stop the violent crackdown. </p>
<p>Not all global actors are taking a strong stance. Some are concerned about maintaining good relations with the incumbent government. For example, the US State Department expressed <a href="http://ethiopia.usembassy.gov/statement-by-the-u.s.-embassy.html">vague concern</a> about the violence associated with the protest movement. In sharp contrast they signed a security partnership with the Ethiopian government. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the momentum of the Oromo movement looks set to continue. The protests, and subsequent support, have seen the further development of activist networks and Oromo leadership, doubling their efforts to build their organisational capacity. </p>
<p><strong>Is this the first time that the Oromo have demonstrated their grievances in this way?</strong></p>
<p>No. The Oromo have engaged in scattered instances of resistance since the late 19th century when they were colonised. </p>
<p>In the 1970s the Oromo started to engage in a national movement under the leadership of OLF. The front was born out of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mecha_and_Tulama_Self-Help_Association">Macha-Tulama Self-Help Association</a>, which was banned in the early 1960s and other forms of resistance such as the Bale Oromo armed resistance of the 1960s. Successive Ethiopian regimes have killed or sent Oromo political and cultural leaders into exile.</p>
<p><strong>How do you believe their grievances can be resolved?</strong></p>
<p>Critics believe the Tigrayan-led minority regime is unlikely to resolve the Oromo grievances. Oromo activists believe that their national struggle for self-determination and egalitarian democracy must intensify. </p>
<p>I am sure that, sooner or later, the regime will be overthrown and replaced with a genuine egalitarian democratic system. This is because of the size of the Oromo population, abundant economic resource, oppression and repression by the Tigrayan-led government, the blossoming of Oromo political consciousness and willingness to pay the necessary sacrifices.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63779/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asafa Jalata does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For the first time, all Oromo branches have come together to fight for their national self-determination and democracyAsafa Jalata, Professor of Sociology and Global and Africana Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/613052016-06-21T14:09:03Z2016-06-21T14:09:03ZHate speech raises its ugly voice as Kenya drifts into election mode<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/127338/original/image-20160620-8894-1614rbs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A survivor stands in the graveyard where a church was torched in Eldoret, 300km west of Kenya’s capital, Nairobi. The consequences of hate speech are evident in the country.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Noor Khamis </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000205252/cord-jubilee-mps-locked-up-for-four-days-over-hate-speech">unprecedented arrests and detentions</a> in Kenya of seven members of parliament and a senator capped a wave of rising political tensions and violence on the streets. These tensions were inflamed when a member of President Uhuru Kenyatta’s Jubilee political party appeared to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_H1fXVWX6Rw">call for the assassination</a> of opposition leader Raila Odinga.</p>
<p>Police arrested Member of Parliament Moses Kuria, along with the others, pending court hearings on charges of incitement to violence. A university student leader was also held. Prosecutors said more specific charges of hate speech and inciting ethnic hatred could follow. The detention of senior politicians is highly unusual – they are usually given bail and rarely see the inside of a jail.</p>
<p>The history of hate speech and incitement to violence in Kenya is a long, widespread and unhappy one. Hate speech and the fanning of ethnic discord was <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/africa/31kenya.html?_r=0">linked with violence</a> after the fraudulent 2007 elections that left nearly 1,500 dead and 600,000 displaced. </p>
<p>That violence led to the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya">failed prosecution</a> by the International Criminal Court of President Kenyatta, Deputy President William Ruto and broadcaster and political activist Joshua arap Sang. Sang was specifically charged with using Kalenjin-language radio station Kass FM to broadcast incitement of hatred of the Kikuyu and incitement to violence.</p>
<h2>Long and unhappy history</h2>
<p>Politicians have sought to manipulate community grievances to whip up support in every contested election since the restoration of a multiparty system in Kenya in 1992. The grievances revolve around land, employment and access to the material benefits of political office. Criminal gangs or unemployed youths are often used to intimidate opponents and evict their supporters from areas the politicians claim to be theirs. This manipulation has routinely involved the creation and escalation of ethnic suspicion and hatred.</p>
<p>Former President <a href="http://global.britannica.com/biography/Daniel-arap-Moi">Daniel arap Moi</a> can be said to have started this when, ahead of the 1992 elections, he perceived a threat to his dominance in the Rift Valley. He and his Kenya African National Union party sought to incite his Kalenjin-speaking support base against Kikuyu and other non-Kalenjin speakers in the area. This led to <a href="https://www.issafrica.org/pubs/ASR/8No4/AfricaWatch.html">widespread killings and effective ethnic cleansing</a>. This was repeated in subsequent elections. More than 2,000 people died and 500,000 were displaced in the Rift Valley in deliberately incited violence in the 1990s.</p>
<p>Ethnic stereotyping and stoking suspicions between communities was used extensively during the bitterly fought <a href="http://www.cmi.no/publications/2368-of-oranges-and-bananas">constitutional referendum</a> in 2005. On one side were supporters of Moi’s successor, President Mwai Kibaki. On the other, those of Raila Odinga and William Ruto. </p>
<p>The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights reported that political leaders on both sides had used <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=Bp4C3_YLk_UC&lpg=PA252&ots=LTv-zqg0jt&dq=Keith%20Somerville%2C%20Radio%20Propaganda%20and%20the%20Broadcasting%20of%20Hatred%20%2B%20kenya%20commission%20of%20human%20rights&pg=PA226#v=onepage&q&f=false">dehumanising descriptions</a> of opposing political groups and the ethnic communities that supported them. </p>
<p>This was also the case in 2007, according to the commission’s report <a href="http://www.rwi.lu.se/NHRIDB/Africa/Kenya/Kenya_KNCHR_Election_Report_2007.pdf">Still Behaving Badly</a>. The commission said that the election campaign had been marked by hate speech and incitement to violence. The messages were often delivered in vernacular languages to specific communities to generate hatred of other communities.</p>
<p>The vernacular radio stations, which had come into being after the millennium with the relaxation of media controls, played a role in broadcasting hate speech by politicians. Some broadcasters targeted the Luo, Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities. Many of the local radio stations, while ostensibly independent, were closely linked with political leaders. These included Ruto, Kenyatta and Odinga. </p>
<p>The violence that followed the very obviously rigged election results was marked by ethnic conflict incited and manipulated by politicians for their own political ends. It did not represent a well of endemic ethnic hatred. </p>
<p>During the elections many Kikuyu politicians regularly referred to the Luo supporters of Odinga as “<a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/200801220692.html">beasts from the west</a>”. The Kalenjin supporters of William Ruto (then in alliance with Odinga) called the Kikuyu vermin. They used the expression “<a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/200801220692.html">the mongoose has stolen the chickens</a>” to refer to alleged Kikuyu seizure of land that the Kalenjin claimed as theirs. </p>
<p>The Kalenjin propagandists also referred to themselves, because of their pastoralist traditions, as the “people of the milk”. They called on people to go out and clear the weeds from the grass, a coded reference to clearing non-Kalenjin from the Rift Valley. </p>
<p>This had echoes of the language used by the murderous <a href="http://blogs.library.duke.edu/rubenstein/2013/05/10/radio-in-the-rwandan-genocide/">Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines</a> during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. But it must be stressed that the scale and nature of hate broadcasting in Kenya has never reached the proportions seen in Rwanda.</p>
<h2>Social media propagandists</h2>
<p>Hate speech in the form of widely disseminated text messages or the use of social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook was prevalent in the years running up to the 2013 elections. This time around Ruto and Kenyatta were allies targeting their propaganda against Odinga and his supporters. </p>
<p>Some bloggers and tweeters became notorious. The <a href="http://www.cohesion.or.ke/">institution set up to monitor hate speech</a> after the 2008 election violence identified the six most notorious. It said they were particularly active in creating suspicion, disseminating inflammatory statements and spreading hate speech by social media. Two of the six accused of spreading hate speech over the web were named and one was formally charged with incitement. </p>
<p>The other four suspects were not named but were identified as a military officer, a teacher, a student and a prison warder.</p>
<p>The London-based <a href="https://iwpr.net/global-voices/kenya-too-little-action-hate-speech">Institute for War and Peace Reporting</a> said that there were hundreds of cases where offensive material had been posted on social media sites to incite hatred or suspicion before or during the 2013 elections.</p>
<h2>Impunity breeds hate propaganda</h2>
<p>The nature, extent and consequences of inflammatory and hate speech in Kenya are pretty evident. They emerge at times of political tension or conflict and in the run-up to and during election campaigns. Those charged or accused of hate speech are rarely successfully prosecuted. Cases either drag on without result or are dropped – often for political reasons.</p>
<p>Successful propagandists become valuable instruments for political leaders and for their parties. The failure of prosecutions, such as the international case against Joshua arap Sang, gives those who engage in hate speech for political ends a feeling of impunity. The violence that often accompanies political disputes or elections is testimony to the efficacy of hate propaganda as a tool in the political arsenal of Kenyan politicians.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61305/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Somerville does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The violence that often accompanies political disputes or elections is testimony to the efficacy of hate propaganda as a tool in the political arsenal of Kenyan politicians.Keith Somerville, Visiting professor, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.