tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/g20-750/articlesG20 – The Conversation2024-03-07T09:20:47Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2252742024-03-07T09:20:47Z2024-03-07T09:20:47ZGrattan on Friday: Treasurer Jim Chalmers prepares a new ‘growth’ script for his third budget<p>If Jim Chalmers were in television, he’d not just be the presenter and key producer of the show but the warm-up act as well. </p>
<p>May 14 – budget night – is the treasurer’s big occasion of 2024. He’s already publicly framing the script and getting out the early promos. </p>
<p>Chalmers gave an international audience a taste of the change in policy direction in his economic address when he was in Brazil at a G20 ministerial meeting last week. But it was in the wake of Wednesday’s December-quarter national accounts that we got a more detailed preview. </p>
<p>Ordinary people didn’t need the national accounts to tell them how things are in the Australian economy. Many know it through their own experience. They’ve responded, as the national accounts show, by cutting back on discretionary spending – for instance, by going to restaurants less. </p>
<p>Chalmers and his advisers had been holding their breath early this week, fearing the figures might show growth going negative, which could have been the first leg of a technical recession. There was a feeling of relief when encouraging export figures came out, signalling growth would fall on the positive side. </p>
<p>The growth figure came in at 0.2% for the quarter. Annually, it was 1.5% in the 12 months to December. That’s the lowest for more than two decades, leaving out the COVID period. </p>
<p>In light of minuscule growth and (on the upside) subsiding inflation, Chalmers is publicly throwing the switch to growth. In a cautious way, however, given he is (on his record so far) a conservative in budget matters. </p>
<p>Chalmers told his news conference: “Addressing inflation is still our primary concern, but these numbers show that the balance of risks in our economy are shifting from inflation to growth.”</p>
<p>That’s a green light for some more spending – but not a cash splash. </p>
<p>In deciding on the spending, the government is aware it does need to do more to alleviate the high cost of living. One area that it is considering is extra help for energy bills. </p>
<p>But Chalmers made it clear that, whatever extra is done, the reworked Stage 3 tax cuts, which don’t take effect until July 1, will be the big budget item to address cost of living. He also indicated the government isn’t contemplating additional income tax cuts. </p>
<p>In terms of spending generally, Chalmers nominated several areas where government spending could help growth without risking an increase in inflation. </p>
<p>These were the energy transformation, human capital (education, skills) and the care economy. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1765173373863338248"}"></div></p>
<p>We’d expect the government to provide incentives to encourage investment in clean energy. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese flagged this some weeks ago. </p>
<p>The United States has a huge fund to attract such investment. Albanese said the government has to be a partner in attracting investment. “We don’t have to go dollar-for-dollar in our spending, but we can go toe-to-toe on the quality and impact of our policies,” he said. </p>
<p>The budget is likely to make an early down payment on some proposals in Education Minister Jason Clare’s recently released universities accord. Some changes in the student loans scheme HELP and/or some financial assistance for student nurses and teachers on placements would be logical initiatives. </p>
<p>There will be pressure for some improvements in the welfare area. In 2022, Senate crossbencher David Pocock extracted (in return for his vote on industrial relations legislation) the PM’s agreement to set up an economic inclusion advisory committee, to report prior to each budget. </p>
<p>Before the 2023 budget, that group put forward ambitious recommendations for improving welfare benefits; it got only some of what it sought. Another set of bids is in the pipeline this year – these will be published at least a fortnight before the budget. </p>
<p>One area that remains an unknown is what will happen on aged care. The government has for months been sitting on a report from a group chaired by the Minister for Aged Care, Anika Wells, on the sustainability of aged care funding. It is likely to release the report as soon as next week, with the response later. One would expect the budget would have to begin addressing some of the report’s issues. </p>
<p>Aiming to keep budget expectations in check, Chalmers has warned the very large revenue upgrades that have marked his earlier budgets should not be anticipated this time. </p>
<p>Chalmers won’t yet say confidently there will be a budget surplus, only that it is “a reasonable chance”. But there is little doubt he has his mind set on delivering his second consecutive surplus.</p>
<p>Although budget planning is under way, most decisions are yet to be made. Ministers have put in their wish lists and these will be whittled down by the expenditure review committee. </p>
<p>The ERC comprises Albanese, Chalmers, Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles, Senate leader Penny Wong, Finance Minister Katy Gallagher, Health Minister Mark Butler, Infrastructure Minister Catherine King, Communications Minister Michelle Rowland and Assistant Treasurer Stephen Jones. </p>
<p>It is a committee dominated by the economic ministers but with the voice of spending ministers represented there too.</p>
<p>But some ministerial discontent about this year’s ERC process has leaked out. </p>
<p>Nine newspapers have reported some ministers were “frustrated that key spending proposals are being rejected” by the government’s inner circle. Specifically, Industry Minister Ed Husic has objected to ministers being excluded from the room while the expenditure review committee discusses their proposals. </p>
<p>Spending ministers railing against economic ministers’ tight grip on the money is nothing new – it happens in governments of both hues. But it is notable that in this highly disciplined, tightly controlled administration, the angst has reached the media. </p>
<p>For Chalmers, this is a transition budget, which has to be crafted carefully, given the uncertain economic times. It won’t be the last of the political cycle. Albanese has flagged there is likely to be another budget, next March, before the election. </p>
<p>If Chalmers loosens the purse strings in May, he may need to have them open wider in 2025.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225274/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If Jim Chalmers were in television, he’d be the presenter, key producer and the warm-up act. The Budget might be two months away, but Chalmers is preparing us for his night in the spotlight.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2239822024-02-22T07:45:37Z2024-02-22T07:45:37ZAfrica’s debt crisis needs a bold new approach: expert outlines a way forward<p>It hasn’t been easy for African states to finance their developmental and environmental policy objectives over the past few years.</p>
<p>Recent events suggest that the situation may be improving. For the first time in two years, three African states have been able <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/02/15/african-governments-return-to-international-bond-markets">to access international financial markets, albeit at high interest rates.</a> Kenya, for example, is <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-12/kenya-said-to-tap-eurobond-market-at-exorbitant-rate-for-buyback?sref=UnSQjRxb">now paying over 10%</a> compared to about 7% in 2014. </p>
<p>Many African countries continue to face challenging sovereign debt situations.</p>
<p>Total external debts as a share of Africa’s export earnings increased from <a href="https://unctad.org/publication/world-of-debt/regional-stories">74.5% in 2010 to 140% in 2022</a>. In 2022, African governments had to <a href="https://data.one.org/topics/african-debt/">allocate about 12% of their revenues to servicing their debt</a>. Between 2019 and 2022, <a href="https://unctad.org/publication/world-of-debt/regional-stories">25 African governments</a> allocated more resources to servicing their total debts than to the health of their citizens. And in late 2023 the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/09/26/cf-how-to-avoid-a-debt-crisis-in-sub-saharan-africa">International Monetary Fund estimated</a> that over half the low income African countries were either potentially or actually experiencing difficulties paying their debts. </p>
<p>This suggests that it will be very difficult for Africa to raise the US$1.6 trillion that <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/3269532b-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/3269532b-en#:%7E:text=Africa's%20sustainable%20financing%20gap%20until,Sustainable%20Development%20Goals%20by%202030">the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development estimates</a> it needs to reach the sustainable development goals by 2030.</p>
<p>One of the lessons of the COVID pandemic and the climate negotiations is that Africa can’t count on the global community to provide it with sufficient new funds or with debt relief to deal with either its development needs or the consequences of crises such as pandemics or extreme weather events. </p>
<p>Its official bilateral creditors appear more focused on their own needs and on other parts of the world than on Africa. Commercial creditors are happy to provide financing when conditions are favourable and African debt can help them satisfy their investment mandates. But they are less forthcoming when the going gets tough and the risks associated with the transaction – and for which they have been compensated – actually materialise.</p>
<p>This suggests that Africa needs to advocate more aggressively for its own interests. </p>
<p>This year offers some good opportunities to promote a more effective approach to African debt. </p>
<h2>Careful planning needed</h2>
<p>There are two <a href="https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/financing-for-development/">international</a> <a href="https://www.un.org/en/summit-of-the-future#:%7E:text=22%2D23%20September%202024,Solutions%20for%20a%20Better%20Tomorrow">conferences</a> where global economic governance will be on the agenda. This is also the first year that the African Union participates as a full member in the G20. In addition, South Africa, the G20 chair in 2025, currently serves on the troika that manages the G20 process. </p>
<p>Debt and development finance will be an important topic in all these forums. African representatives can use their participation to advocate for a new approach to sovereign debt that is more responsive to African needs and concerns. They can also lobby other participating states and non-state actors for their support.</p>
<p>But African states will need to plan carefully. Their starting point should be the well recognised fact that the current sovereign debt restructuring process is not working for anyone. The G20 agreed a <a href="https://clubdeparis.org/sites/default/files/annex_common_framework_for_debt_treatments_beyond_the_dssi.pdf">Common Framework</a> that was supposed to help resolve the sovereign debt crises in low income countries. <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/africas-debt-priorities-a-sustainability-perspective-required-support-from-the-g20/#:%7E:text=The%20Common%20Framework%20was%20established,applied%20include%20Ethiopia%20and%20Ghana.">Four African countries</a> applied to have their debts restructured through the framework. Despite years of negotiations, it has failed to fully resolve the debt crisis in three of them. </p>
<p>Countries outside the Common Framework, such as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/sri-lanka-bondholders-raise-concerns-over-debt-deal-transparency-2023-12-01/">Sri Lanka</a>, have not managed to fully resolve their debt crises either. This is costly for both debtors and creditors. It is therefore in everyone’s interest to look for a new approach.</p>
<p>This requires all parties to be willing to entertain new ideas and to experiment with new approaches to old problems. African states should offer their own innovative proposals. They should also state that they are willing to take on new responsibilities if their creditors are willing to do the same.</p>
<p>They can remind their creditors that these experiments would not be taking place in a vacuum. They can be guided by the many existing, but underutilised, international norms and standards applicable to responsible sovereign debt transactions, for example the Unctad principles on <a href="https://unctad.org/publication/principles-promoting-responsible-sovereign-lending-and-borrowing#:%7E:text=Sovereign%20lending%20and%20borrowing%20conducted,neighbors%20and%20its%20trading%20partners.">responsible sovereign debt transactions</a>. Some of these relate to the conduct of sovereign borrowers. Others focus on responsible lending behaviour and are often cited by creditors in their own policies dealing with environmental and social issues, social responsibility or human rights. </p>
<p>By basing any new approach on these international norms and standards, both debtors and creditors will merely be agreeing to implement principles that they have already accepted. </p>
<p>Working from this starting point, African states should make three specific proposals. </p>
<h2>Concrete proposals</h2>
<p>First, they should commit to making both the process for incurring debts and the terms of all their public debt transactions transparent. </p>
<p>This will ensure that their own citizens understand what obligations their governments are assuming on their behalf. It will encourage governments to adopt responsible borrowing and debt management practices. They should also agree that they can be held accountable for their failure to comply with these transparent and responsible sovereign debt practices and procedures.</p>
<p>Second, African states should point out that there is a fundamental problem with a sovereign debt restructuring process that only focuses on the contractual obligations that the debtor state owes its creditors. This focus means, in effect, that servicing its debt obligations will trump the debtor state’s efforts to deal with the country’s vulnerability to climate change and the loss of biodiversity, and with its poverty, inequality and unemployment challenges. This follows from the fact that their creditors can use the restructuring process to force sovereign borrowers in difficulty, unlike corporations in bankruptcy, to pay those who lend them money without regard, for example, to the impact on their obligations to pensioners, public sector employees or the welfare of their citizens. </p>
<p>This exclusive focus on debt contracts is inconsistent with the international community’s interest in addressing global challenges like climate and inequality. </p>
<p>This problem can be resolved if both creditors and debtors agree that they will adopt an approach to debt negotiations that incorporates the financial, economic, social, environmental, human rights and governance dimensions of sovereign debt crises.</p>
<p>Third, African states should propose that their creditors publicly commit to base the new approach to sovereign debt on an agreed list of international norms and standards relevant to responsible international financial practices. These will include those dealing with transparency, climate and environmental issues, and social matters, including human rights.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223982/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Danny Bradlow previously had a grant from ther Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa to work on issues relating to sovereign debt. </span></em></p>Africa needs to advocate more aggressively for its own interests when it comes to negotiating debt terms.Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2131882023-10-02T15:07:17Z2023-10-02T15:07:17ZFive things that the west doesn’t understand about China’s foreign policy<p>China’s capacity to surprise western politicians was demonstrated recently, when Chinese leader Xi Jinping was unexpectedly <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/09/g20-lives-mistrust-between-west-and-china-hampers-progress">absent</a> from the G20 summit. There were a few reasons why this G20 might have been less important for Xi, including the rising influence of the <a href="https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/08/18/brics-expansion-would-be-a-sign-of-chinas-growing-influence-says-oliver-stuenkel">Brics</a> (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) partnership. </p>
<p>But often western reactions to a Chinese decision can come from a lack of understanding of Beijing’s motivations. A deeper knowledge of China would help the west interpret Beijing’s actions more clearly, helpful at a time where <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/30/nato-names-china-a-strategic-priority-for-the-first-time">many analysts</a> see China as a potential challenger to the US as the dominant world power. With this in mind, here are five things that the west often gets wrong about Chinese foreign policy.</p>
<h2>1. It’s not a grand scheme</h2>
<p>In the western media, Chinese foreign policy has often been seen as a <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/hundred-year-marathon">grand scheme</a> to secure world leadership. Such an image has been popular with western politicians, such as South Dakota governor Kristi Noem, who claimed that China had a “<a href="https://twitter.com/barryeisler/status/1635058846317309954?lang=en-GB">2000-year plan to destroy the US</a>”.</p>
<p>However, Chinese policy is not quite the labyrinthine plot that it has often been presented as. An example of this can be seen in “<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/18681026221079841">Wolf Warrior diplomacy</a>”, which has often interpreted as a long-term, calculated strategy of Chinese aggression to western leaders. But another way of looking at Wolf Warrior diplomacy is as an opportunistic <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2023.2205163">response</a> to the bellicose rhetoric of the former US president Donald Trump’s administration as well as a need to cater to nationalism at home. Showing Chinese leaders “talking tough” to their foreign counterparts also plays well with a domestic audience, and can divert attention from a poorly performing economy.</p>
<p>Equally, grander Chinese initiatives, such as the Belt and the Road Initiative (BRI), which provides aid and finance to African and South American countries to create new infrastructure, may also have been created as a response to outside developments, particularly <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">the US</a> <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/">pivot</a> towards expanding its influence in Asia, from 2010. Chinese foreign policy has largely been devised in response to recent developments rather than being a <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2019/11/12/chinas-grand-plan-to-take-over-the-world/">long-term scheme</a> for domination.</p>
<h2>2. China deals with democracies</h2>
<p>Another common fear is that Beijing has <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-09-16/how-china-exports-authoritarianism">encouraged</a> the rise of political authoritarianism in other countries. The <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/08/how-china-is-reshaping-international-development-pub-80703">Chinese model of economic development</a> has racheted up fears of China attempting to <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3139351/could-chinas-model-be-its-biggest-export-world">spread</a> its political system beyond its national borders. But, some of the biggest advocates of the China model have been the <a href="https://theasiadialogue.com/2019/08/27/the-chinese-model-in-africa-and-its-wider-challenge/">political elites</a> in developing nations, many of whom have a colonial history, and who appreciate that China offers an alternative to the west in attracting investment.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-brics-cooperation-accelerates-is-it-time-for-the-us-to-develop-a-brics-policy-210021">As BRICS cooperation accelerates, is it time for the US to develop a BRICS policy?</a>
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<p>Overall though, Beijing generally takes a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/48615956">laissez-faire</a> approach towards the internal politics of its partners, with China being <a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2091502/how-chinas-foreign-policy-non-intervention-all-about">willing</a> to deal with democracies and dictatorships, rather than forcing its partners to fall in line with its own political system.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map showing China's historical trade routes." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An historical map of the Silk Road, linking China to its trade routes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/map-ancient-silk-road-between-china-2127092582">Dimitrios Karamitros/Shutterstock</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>3. China’s role in the world order</h2>
<p>One of the most common depictions of China in recent years has been of it as <a href="https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-607">a revisionist power</a> that seeks to overthrow the liberal rules-based world order and international bodies. Such an image was popularised by Graham Allison’s 2017 book <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/destined-war-can-america-and-china-escape-thucydidess-trap">Destined for War</a>, which warned of a China seeking to overthrow US domination. It presents the China/US relationship as the latest in the long line of great power relationships that follow the same pattern.</p>
<p>However, while China wishes to <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/10/responding-to-china-s-complicated-views-on-international-order-pub-80021">amend</a> certain areas of the post-Cold War system, most notably it being centred around the US and liberal values, it does not <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.2005462">wish</a> to fully overturn the whole system. For instance, China has played a significant part in established international bodies, such as the United Nations. China was also one of the primary <a href="https://www.capitaleconomics.com/blog/china-is-one-of-globalisations-winners-it-wont-throw-that-away-for-russia">beneficiaries</a> of post-Cold War globalisation, with China’s rapid development being achieved partially through this economic model.</p>
<h2>4. China’s historical experience</h2>
<p>One of the greatest challenges posed by Chinese foreign policy is that it questions many of the dominant understandings of international relations, which have been grounded in the <a href="https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-05-11/opinion-with-asias-rise-west-must-let-go-of-eurocentrism-101248061.html">experiences</a> of the west.</p>
<p>But China draws on a different history, one that includes its own dominant position internationally, but also its defeat and occupation. Beijing references this <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/chinas-never-again-mentality/">past</a> when talking of the “<a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/modernisation-and-chinas-century-humiliation">Century of Humiliation</a>” (1839-1949), a period when China was dominated and occupied by colonial powers. This powerful image can rally the domestic population as well as building a common cause with developing nations, many of which are former colonies themselves.</p>
<p>China’s golden ages of the Han, Tang and Song dynasties (202BC-1279) has also influenced Chinese thinking. This was a time of huge cultural and economic influence, with Asia trade centred around the Silk Road. The <a href="https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/silk-road/">Silk Road</a> refers to an historical network of highly lucrative trade routes linking a powerful China to the rest of the world, and used to sell its products for centuries. Its ambitions to build a new version of this can be seen in the BRI, which gives China a “<a href="https://madeinchinajournal.com/2021/11/08/the-chronopolitics-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-and-its-reinvented-histories/">new Silk Road</a>”. It is by understanding the logic behind these legacies that one can see Chinese foreign policy more clearly. </p>
<h2>5. The appeal of Chinese aid</h2>
<p>China’s financial aid and investment projects in developing countries are sometimes portrayed as simply <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-10-05/fight-against-chinas-bribe-machine">bribing</a> corrupt states or ensnaring them with “<a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/551337-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy/">debt trap diplomacy</a>”.</p>
<p>While these images have been popular in western media <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/21/china-debt-diplomacy-belt-and-road-initiative-economy-infrastructure-development/">coverage</a> of Chinese foreign policy, they overlook the role of the country receiving aid to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/02/china-debt-trap-diplomacy/617953/">choose to accept</a> Chinese finance and how this also appeals as an alternative to western aid packages which traditionally come with many conditions relating to governance. </p>
<p>Chinese military leader and strategist <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sun_Tzu">Sun Tzu</a> once emphasised the importance of knowing one’s enemies as well as oneself; these words are especially pertinent in understanding China today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213188/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Harper does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Understanding China’s history could help western observers see its foreign policy more clearly.Tom Harper, Lecturer in International Relations, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2137392023-09-21T12:43:34Z2023-09-21T12:43:34ZG20 summit proved naysayers wrong – and showed Global South’s potential to address world’s biggest problems<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549372/original/file-20230920-21-8kndta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Indonesian President Joko Widodo, left, presents Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi a tree sapling during the G20 summit in New Delhi.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/joko-widodo-president-of-indonesia-presents-prime-minister-news-photo/1671163483">Dan Kitwood/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Skepticism was running high ahead of the 2023 summit of the Group of 20, or G20, held in New Delhi in early September. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/06/opinions/putin-xi-skip-g20-delhi-opportunity-andelman/index.html">announced that they would not attend</a>. At one moment, it was <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/05/biden-tests-negative-for-covid-19-days-away-from-g20-summit.html">touch and go</a> whether U.S. President Joe Biden – whose wife, Jill, was ill with COVID-19 – would make the trip. The general consensus was the group <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/05/india-geopolitics-g20.html">would fail to come up with a final declaration</a>, largely because of differences over the war in Ukraine. </p>
<p>And yet, the assembled leaders did <a href="https://www.g20.org/content/dam/gtwenty/gtwenty_new/document/G20-New-Delhi-Leaders-Declaration.pdf">release a joint declaration</a> on giving a new impetus to the World Bank, fighting climate change and dealing with infectious diseases, among other issues. One of the main outcomes was the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au-and-g20-membership-will-give-africa-more-say-on-global-issues-if-it-speaks-with-one-voice-213737">admission of the African Union</a> as a full member, much as the European Union has been from the start.</p>
<p>The final G20 statement <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/09/world/asia/g20-biden-russia-ukraine-war.html">has been criticized</a> for not specifically condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But given Moscow’s and Beijing’s stance on that war – and New Delhi’s <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/india-remaining-neutral-russias-invasion-ukraine/story?id=97891228">studiously neutral position</a> on it – that was never much in the cards. </p>
<p>And perhaps that is the point. From its beginning, the G20 was established to <a href="https://www.uschamber.com/international/g20-was-born-out-of-economic-crisis-now-is-g20s-opportunity-to-help-avoid-a-new-one">deal with global economic governance</a> issues. Yet, over time, some members have attempted to hijack it to focus on geopolitics. </p>
<p>Perhaps the time has come for the G20 – which <a href="https://www.g20.org/en/about-g20/">now consists of</a> 19 leading economies, the European Union and the African Union – to go back to basics and deal with what it’s best at: the economic, environmental and developmental challenges facing our troubled world. After all, there are already plenty of international organizations that deal with geopolitics, not least the United Nations.</p>
<h2>India’s leadership of the Global South</h2>
<p>Politics of a domestic kind was certainly in evidence during the G20. Taking place as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/1/indias-opposition-parties-to-jointly-contest-2024-elections-against-modi">India gears up for its 2024 elections</a>, the country was plastered with G20 posters featuring Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The emblem of the gathering was the lotus flower, which happens to be that of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP.</p>
<p>It is estimated that some 100,000 foreign delegates visited India in the year running up to the meeting, and that 15 million Indians participated in G20-related activities. </p>
<p>As Indian diplomat <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/abhaykr/?originalSubdomain=br">Abhay Kumar</a> told me during my visit to New Delhi a week prior to the summit, cultural events were held in all Indian states as part of the official G20 program. New Delhi itself looked as clean and green as I have ever seen it since first setting foot there 20 years ago as Chile’s ambassador to India.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549392/original/file-20230920-23-4aptm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large poster for the G20 summit featuring India Prime Minister Narendra Modi" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549392/original/file-20230920-23-4aptm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549392/original/file-20230920-23-4aptm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549392/original/file-20230920-23-4aptm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549392/original/file-20230920-23-4aptm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549392/original/file-20230920-23-4aptm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549392/original/file-20230920-23-4aptm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549392/original/file-20230920-23-4aptm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">For Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the 2023 summit was a chance to promote his leadership ahead of the 2024 elections.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/indian-security-personnel-stands-guard-next-to-a-g20-news-photo/1651380232">Tauseef Mustafa/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Was all this a bit much? Perhaps. But at a time when some politicians revel in decrying anything that has to do with the outside world, there is something to be said for stressing the significance of a diplomatic summit – and its meaning for the people of what is today the most populated country on Earth. </p>
<p>There is little doubt that the world is undergoing an “<a href="https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/indias-moment-on-the-g-20-summit-outcomes/article67295264.ece">India moment</a>.” The recent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/science/india-moon-landing-photos.html">moon landing</a> of an Indian spaceship, the Indian economy growing at the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/08/indias-massive-expansion-to-be-a-driver-of-global-growth-sp-global.html">fastest clip of any major country</a>, and New Delhi flexing its diplomatic muscles big time during the G20 all burnish its credentials as a leader of what has <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-global-south-is-on-the-rise-but-what-exactly-is-the-global-south-207959">become known as the Global South</a> – and consists of various countries around the globe described as “developing.”</p>
<h2>What’s next for G20</h2>
<p>With G20 summits <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/16/g20-bali-leaders-declaration/">held in Indonesia in 2022</a> and India in 2023 – and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/rio-de-janeiro-host-g20-summit-2024-2023-05-09/">set for Brazil in 2024</a> – rising powers from the Global South have been able to set an agenda, stressing the priorities of the developing nations’ development, debt financing, food security and climate change. This is in contrast to the Group of Seven, or G7, which in recent years has focused on <a href="https://www.globalpolicy.org/en/news/2022-07-09/g7-summit-elmau-2022-intensified-geopolitics-overshadow-development-agenda">geopolitics and the war in Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>But questions about the role, purpose and ultimate effectiveness of the G20 remain.</p>
<p>The group certainly inhabits a world vastly different from the one in which it was originally designed for. The G20 at the leaders’ level got off to a promising start, <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Group-of-Twenty-G20/Cooper-Thakur/p/book/9780415780896">successfully managing the 2007-2008 financial crisis</a>. It served as both a steering committee for the world economy and a crisis committee to deal with threats to the world economy.</p>
<p>Yet, the G20 has struggled to stay relevant. A high point was the summit held in Hangzhou, China, in 2016, which led to a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/03/breakthrough-us-china-agree-ratify-paris-climate-change-deal">joint U.S.-China commitment</a> on lowering carbon emissions in the fight against climate change. </p>
<p>But in 2020, when the world first faced the COVID-19 pandemic, the G20 was <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/covid-19-failure-g20/">deemed to have failed miserably</a>, with very little international coordination to cope with the worst pandemic in a century, and “<a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9519117/">vaccine nationalism</a>” running rampant. </p>
<p>The fact that the host and chair that year was Saudi Arabia, an authoritarian regime with relatively little international credibility, did not help. Also, the inability of the G20 to come up with firmer commitments on what may be the most significant global challenge of our time – to halt the course of climate change – has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/06/world/asia/g20-summit-india.html">elicited skepticism among observers</a>.</p>
<p>From its origins as a steering and crisis committee, the G20 <a href="https://www.globalgovernanceproject.org/reinventing-the-g20/andrew-f-cooper/">has evolved into something else</a> as the world order itself has changed. In 1998-1999, when the G20 was founded at the finance ministers’ level, and in 2008-2009, when it was upped to leaders’ level, countries were, by and large, still in global governance mode: They worked together to deal with common problems. </p>
<p>In 2023, however, <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/global-development-era-great-power-competition">great power competition</a> is the order of the day, and a zero-sum rather than win-win mentality tends to prevail in the games nations play.
As the world veers toward a <a href="https://global.upenn.edu/perryworldhouse/fracturing-world-future-globalization-report-and-thought-pieces">fragmented, if not downright fractured, order</a>, the G20 serves as a hub for world leaders to meet and sort out their differences. And there is certainly a need for that – although the absence of the presidents of China and Russia from the 2023 summit puts even that condition into question. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549395/original/file-20230920-25-ytrtws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of world leaders on a stage" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549395/original/file-20230920-25-ytrtws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549395/original/file-20230920-25-ytrtws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549395/original/file-20230920-25-ytrtws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549395/original/file-20230920-25-ytrtws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549395/original/file-20230920-25-ytrtws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549395/original/file-20230920-25-ytrtws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549395/original/file-20230920-25-ytrtws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">BRICS leaders convened in Johannesburg, South Africa, in August 2023 and agreed to invite Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to their bloc.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinese-president-xi-jinping-delivers-an-important-speech-news-photo/1622826269">Xie Huanchi/Xinhua via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Some developed nations might be tempted to retreat from this evolved and enlarged G20 to the comfort zone of the G7 – the group of most-developed nations, where everybody thinks and for the most part dresses alike – and attempt to steer global economic governance from there, as was done in the last quarter of the 20th century.</p>
<p>But that ship has sailed. The G7 today represents just <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/27687/g7-share-of-global-gdp-and-population">10% of humanity</a> and <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/economic-policy/how-brics-countries-have-overtaken-the-g7-in-gdp-based-on-ppps/">30% of the world’s Gross Domestic Product</a>. This is in contrast to the 42% of the world’s population and 36% of the world’s GDP <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/08/what-brics-expansion-means-blocs-founding-members">embodied by the newly expanded BRICS group</a>, consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The North Atlantic countries no longer rule the roost and must come to terms with the geoeconomic and geopolitical realities of the new century. </p>
<p>The very reason the G20 was set up in 1999 was because the <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/paul-blustein/the-chastening/9780786724697/?lens=publicaffairs">G7 could not deal with</a> the Asian financial crisis at the time, and needed a broader entity to cope with it. A quarter of a century later, with Asia <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/05/01/asia-poised-to-drive-global-economic-growth-boosted-by-chinas-reopening#:%7E:text=Growth%20in%20Asia%20and%20the,the%20rest%20of%20the%20world.">representing a much larger share</a> of the world economy than it did then, this is even truer now.</p>
<p>The G20 has its faults, but it still performs a useful function to help the world economy navigate perilous waters, as globalization beats a retreat and the dangers of a fractured international system loom larger. I believe the G20 should be further built up and nurtured, not cavalierly dismissed. The world would be poorer without it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213739/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jorge Heine is a research professor at the Pardee Schoom of Global Studies, Boston University. A past VP of the International Political Science Association ( IPSA) he was previously ambassador of Chile to China, to
India and to South Africa. He has also served as a Cabinet minister in the Chilean government.</span></em></p>The G20 has its critics, but an expert on international politics explains why it still performs a useful function – particularly in this period of great geopolitical divisions.Jorge Heine, Interim Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2137372023-09-20T08:43:58Z2023-09-20T08:43:58ZAU and G20: membership will give Africa more say on global issues – if it speaks with one voice<p>After seven years of advocating for full membership, the African Union (AU) <a href="https://apnews.com/article/g20-membership-africa-economy-india-ae58459261bc2722b54da422debc5b83">will join</a> the Group of 20 “<a href="https://www.g20.org/content/dam/gtwenty/gtwenty_new/about_g20/G20_Background_Brief.pdf#page=2">most important industrialised and developing economies</a>”. It becomes the second regional bloc to join the group after the <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/eu-g20_en">27-member European Union (EU)</a>.</p>
<p>The G20 was <a href="https://www.g20.org/en/about-g20/#overview">established</a> after the 1999 Asian financial crisis as an informal grouping of ministers of finance and central bank governors. It grew out of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/what-is-g7-who-are-its-members-what-does-it-do-2022-10-11/">G7</a>, which was formed in 1975 to deal with another complex global financial and economic crisis. </p>
<p>Since 2008, the G20 has met at the level of heads of state and government. Its agenda has been broadened beyond finance and economics to include, among other issues, climate change, disaster risk reduction and health.</p>
<p>The G20 is currently made up of 19 member states (including South Africa) plus the <a href="https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/country-profiles_en">EU</a>. <a href="https://www.g20.org/en/about-g20/">These members</a> collectively account for about 85% of global economic output, more than 75% of global trade and about two-thirds of the world population. The AU’s 55 member states, on the other hand, bring only about <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/02/africa-global-growth-economics-worldwide-gdp/">3%</a> of global economic output, <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/09/african-union-g20-world-leaders/">but a population of 1.4 billion</a>.</p>
<p>Based on my <a href="https://uni-leipzig.academia.edu/UlfEngel/">research</a> on the <a href="https://brill.com/display/serial/YBAU">AU</a>, and my experience as an adviser to the <a href="https://au.int/en/commission">African Union Commission</a> (the AU’s secretariat) for 18 years, my view is that membership of the G20 is an important complement to the union’s existing multilateral and bilateral strategic partnerships.</p>
<p>The AU hopes to use its G20 membership to give member states <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/g20-admit-african-union-permanent-member-new-delhi-summit-draft-declaration-2023-09-09/">a greater voice</a> on key global issues and to make a stronger contribution to the ongoing renegotiation of the global order. But a major challenge will be to find a structured way to arrive at common African positions and speak on behalf of member states.</p>
<h2>Strategic partnership</h2>
<p>The AU has developed its external relations primarily through <a href="https://au.int/en/partnerships">multilateral and bilateral strategic partnerships</a>. </p>
<p>Multilaterally, strategic partnerships with the United Nations and the EU are of <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/11/african-union-eu-un-partnership-project-launched-support-au-peace-support">key importance</a> (the League of Arab States plays less of a role). Bilaterally, China, India, Japan, South Korea and Turkey are currently considered key strategic partners. And last year, the African Union Commission participated in the <a href="https://www.state.gov/africasummit/#:%7E:text=Delegations%20from%20all%2049%20invited,private%20sector%20attended%20the%20summit.">United States-Africa Leaders summit</a>. </p>
<p>There is no routine process through which states are categorised as strategic partners. And to date the AU has struggled to develop a coherent policy for managing these partnerships. However, being a full member of the G20 now opens up the possibility to take <a href="https://x.com/AUC_MoussaFaki/status/1700423181104816554?s=20">collective African positions</a> on strategic questions to the global table. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1700423181104816554"}"></div></p>
<p>The continental concerns it can raise include debt relief, trade integration, financing the management of climate change and public health management.</p>
<h2>The African Union and the global order</h2>
<p>However, in the major global policymaking forums, member states of the AU don’t speak with one voice. This holds true for the UN General Assembly (as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-war-with-ukraine-five-reasons-why-many-african-countries-choose-to-be-neutral-180135">African vote on Russia’s war against Ukraine</a> demonstrates). And often also for the so-called A3 – the three African non-permanent members of the <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members">UN Security Council</a> (Gabon, Ghana and Mozambique).</p>
<p>Yet, in a limited number of policy fields, the AU has managed to come up with what it refers to as “common positions”. These have been created and legitimised in different ways, and have a mostly diffuse legal binding effect on member states.</p>
<p>The most prominent of these common positions is the <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/africas-quest-for-reform-of-the-united-nations-security-council/#:%7E:text=In%202005%2C%20the%20AU%20adopted,have%20strong%20representation%20in%201963.">2005 Ezulwini consensus on reform of the UN Security Council</a> to increase African representation in the council and provide the continent with two permanent seats with veto rights. But there are also common positions on other important global questions. These include <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/africa-report/common-african-positions-on-global-issues">mining, the post-2015 development agenda and asset recovery from illicit financial flows</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pan-africanism-remains-a-dream-four-key-issues-the-african-union-must-tackle-199791">Pan-Africanism remains a dream: four key issues the African Union must tackle</a>
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<p>The African Union Commission needs a clear definition of what “common positions” are, and how they can be achieved politically and domesticated legally by member states. </p>
<p>To develop more common positions, the 55 AU member states would have to delegate more state sovereignty to the union. There are some lessons from the EU’s experience. The EU has developed more than 300 common positions. These have been adopted by the EU Council and approved by the EU Parliament. In these cases, the union’s member states have ceded real sovereignty to the EU Commission.</p>
<p>It will be interesting to see how the AU will prepare African positions to be tabled to the G20. They will likely be prepared by the continental body’s <a href="https://au.int/en/pages/specialised-technical-committees-stcs-0">ministerial specialised technical committees</a>. In the G20 realm, I expect the committee on finance, monetary affairs, economic planning and integration to play a strong role. This will likely be in cooperation with the technical committee on economic development, tourism, trade, industry and mining.</p>
<p>However, the legal way in which member states can express their agreement or disagreement with common positions needs to be defined. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>Membership in the G20 represents a great opportunity. But Africa’s attempts to speak with one voice must be strengthened. And coordination processes must be created at the level of finance ministers and central bank governors, among others. These will ensure that the AU makes use of its membership in a global negotiating and decision-making platform.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213737/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ulf Engel receives research funding from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research for a project on African non-military conflict intervention practices (ANCIP, 2022-2026), and the German Research Council for a research project on inter-regionalism between ECOWAS, the AU and the EU on peace and security in the Sahel region (2020-2023).</span></em></p>The African Union’s membership in the G20 is an important complement to existing strategic partnerships.Ulf Engel, Professor, Institute of African Studies, University of LeipzigLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2139222023-09-19T22:19:19Z2023-09-19T22:19:19ZJustin Trudeau’s India accusation complicates western efforts to rein in China<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/justin-trudeaus-india-accusation-complicates-western-efforts-to-rein-in-china" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s allegation that the Indian government <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-indian-government-nijjar-1.6970498">was involved</a> in the assassination on Canadian soil of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Sikh independence advocate, will undoubtedly erode Canadian-Indian relations at a time when the West is trying to appeal to India. </p>
<p>Trudeau has made international headlines with his allegation in Parliament this week that India had a hand in the murder of Nijjar, who was <a href="https://bc.ctvnews.ca/police-tight-lipped-as-b-c-sikh-leader-s-slaying-flares-international-tensions-1.6568266#:%7E:text=Nijjar%20was%20the%20president%20of,the%20evening%20of%20June%2018.">gunned down last June in the parking lot of a gurdwara — a Sikh place of worship — in the Vancouver suburb of Surrey.</a></p>
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<p>Both government and opposition parties have unanimously condemned India, saying the allegations suggest an unacceptable violation of Canadian sovereignty. </p>
<p>Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9971043/canada-has-expelled-a-top-indian-diplomat-who-is-pavan-kumar-rai/">has announced</a> the expulsion of Indian diplomat Pavan Kumar Rai. The federal government says Rai led the Canadian branch of the Research and Analysis Wing, India’s foreign intelligence service. Joly says she’ll raise the issue with the G7 foreign ministers in New York. </p>
<p>India, meantime, has denied the allegation and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/19/india-expels-canada-diplomat-after-india-envoy-expelled-in-sikh-killing-row">expelled a Canadian diplomat</a> in retaliation.</p>
<h2>Tensions running high</h2>
<p>Tensions between Canada and India were apparent when Trudeau recently visited New Delhi for the G20 summit.</p>
<p>Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/aircraft-glitch-delays-canada-pm-trudeaus-departure-india-2023-09-10/">had raised concerns</a> to Trudeau about <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-khalistan-sikh-india-canada/">Sikh Khalistani protests in Canada</a>. The Sikh independence movement is considered a threat to Indian territorial sovereignty and integrity. </p>
<p>Canada has the largest Sikh diaspora outside Punjab, <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/who-was-hardeep-singh-nijjar-the-sikh-activist-whose-killing-has-divided-canada-and-india-1.6567734">and activists like Nijjar have been staging demonstrations</a> to demand an independent Khalistan state separate from India. Trudeau defended these demonstrations as freedom of expression, assembly and peaceful protest. </p>
<p>But Trudeau also made his allegations about India’s involvement in Nijjar’s death <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/canada-trudeau-khalistan-modi-g7-b2414088.html">to U.S. President Joe Biden, British Prime Minster Rishi Sunak and French President Emmanuel Macron at the G20</a>.</p>
<p>This complicates efforts by Canada and its allies to improve relations with India in a strategic attempt to counter-balance what they view as an increasing threat posed by China. </p>
<p>In response to China’s growing might, Canada unveiled its <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/11/canada-launches-indo-pacific-strategy-to-support-long-term-growth-prosperity-and-security-for-canadians.html">Indo-Pacific strategy</a> in 2022 that characterized China as a “disruptive power” and underscored the Canadian commitment to strengthening ties with countries in the Indo-Pacific region. That strategy has a particular focus on India.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/canadas-indo-pacific-strategy-the-same-old-starry-eyed-thinking-about-asian-trade-195491">Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy: The same old starry-eyed thinking about Asian trade</a>
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<h2>Improving India-Canada trade</h2>
<p>Canada has also committed to improving trade relations with India by negotiating a free-trade agreement. </p>
<p>There have been nine rounds of negotiations, but those talks stopped amid allegations about India’s role in Nijjar’s death. Canadian Trade Minister Mary Ng <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9963069/mary-ng-canada-india/">cancelled her planned visit to India</a> in October. </p>
<p>Despite the importance countering China’s influence, the Indian government’s authoritative tendencies, human rights violations and interference in Canadian internal affairs have created obstacles to Ottawa’s efforts to improve the India-Canada relationship.</p>
<p>It’s <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/britain-to-continue-trade-talks-with-india-despite-murder-of-sikh-leader-in-canada/ar-AA1gX58a">highly improbable</a> that Canada’s allies, including the U.S., the U.K. and France, will cut ties with India due to Trudeau’s allegations. India is simply too important for strategic and economic reasons. </p>
<p>India holds significant importance when it comes to countering China’s geopolitical influence. <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/country-pays/india-inde/relations.aspx?lang=eng">Ottawa has previously indicated India was a “priority” market for Canada</a>; in 2022, India was Canada’s 10th largest trading partner.</p>
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<h2>‘Democracy’ partnership</h2>
<p>A strategic agreement between the U.S. and India is primarily aimed at tempering China’s growing influence and has been called <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/fact-sheet-the-united-states-and-india-global-leadership-in-action/#:%7E:text=President%20Biden%20hosted%20Prime%20Minister%20Narendra%20Modi%20today%2C,freedom%2C%20pluralism%2C%20openness%2C%20and%20respect%20for%20human%20rights.">a partnership</a> between “the world’s oldest democracy” and “the world’s largest democracy” to highlight shared democratic values. </p>
<p>But the Modi government has been harshly criticized for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-56393944">democratic backsliding and authoritarian tendencies</a>, including fostering Hindu extremism, violating minority and human rights and cracking down on the media, academia and civil society.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, Biden refrained from criticizing Modi publicly when he visited the White House in June <a href="https://www.oneindia.com/international/these-lawmakers-are-boycotting-pm-modis-us-congress-address-3575665.html">despite being pressured</a> to raise human rights issues with the Indian leader. </p>
<p>Seventy-five U.S. congressional representatives wrote a letter to Biden urging him to do so. Half a dozen Democrats also boycotted Modi’s speech to U.S. Congress. But the Biden administration <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/sep/08/biden-india-modi-g20-autocrat">reportedly believes</a> expressing concerns about Modi’s autocratic policies would harm the relationship.</p>
<h2>Holding India accountable</h2>
<p>Indeed, Canada’s allies have often turned a blind eye to Modi’s misdeeds due to strategic considerations.</p>
<p>But it’s now time for Canada and its allies to assertively hold India accountable for its actions. </p>
<p>The strategic partnerships formed between western nations and India were originally founded on the premise of shared democratic values. As the world’s most populous country, with the fifth largest economy and second-largest military, India is still an invaluable partner to the West.</p>
<p>But if India is diverging from these apparent shared principles, it’s essential to maintain the integrity of these partnerships by ensuring that Indian officials remain committed to democratic ideals and human rights.</p>
<p>Even if Canada’s allies won’t publicly back Trudeau, the federal government should stay committed to its core values by ensuring India faces consequences for its authoritarian actions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213922/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Saira Bano does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s allegations that India was involved in the murder of a Canadian citizen complicates efforts by Canada and its allies to woo India to counter-balance Chinese might.Saira Bano, Assistant Professor in Political Science, Thompson Rivers UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2136032023-09-14T16:56:02Z2023-09-14T16:56:02ZUkraine recap: Kim Jong-un visits Putin for arms-for-tech talks while Kyiv urges west for longer-range missiles to aid counteroffensive<p>Vladimir Putin spent a few pleasant hours this week with one of his friends and allies – an increasingly exclusive club these days. Putin met up with North Korea’s supreme leader, Respected Comrade Kim Jong-un, who rode his armoured train 20 hours to the Vostochny space centre in the remote Amur region in to talk weapons programmes with the Russian president.</p>
<p>Kim confirmed that Putin had his full support for Russia’s “sacred fight” against the west: “We will always stand with Russia on the anti-imperialist front”, he said as the pair posed for a joint statement after a trip to the cosmodome and a two-hour meeting. Details of what the pair spoke about have not been disclosed but issues are thought to have included North Korea supplying Russia with arms and ammunition in return for advanced satellite and nuclear-powered submarine technology.</p>
<p>As Daniel Salisbury, a visiting research fellow at King’s College London, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-two-good-reasons-the-world-should-worry-about-russias-arms-purchases-from-north-korea-212714">has pointed out</a>, it’s no secret that the two countries have been engaged in weapons transfers for some time. There is evidence of arms deals going back several years. And when Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu was in Pyongyang recently, he was taken to an arms fair to look at the latest North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range hypersonic missiles and advanced drones.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>Salisbury is concerned that any sanctions-busting deal between the two countries could not only help Russia on the battlefield in Ukraine, but could significantly boost North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programme. Neither of these outcomes would be beneficial to international security.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-two-good-reasons-the-world-should-worry-about-russias-arms-purchases-from-north-korea-212714">Ukraine war: two good reasons the world should worry about Russia’s arms purchases from North Korea</a>
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<p>Ukraine is also urging its allies to step up supplies of weapons and according to reports from Washington the US president, Joe Biden, is close to reversing his stance on providing Kyiv with the long-range missiles systems it has been begging for. Biden was loath to provide Army Tactical Missile Systems, which have a range of up to 300kms, because of fears that Ukraine might use them against targets against Russia, with the prospect that might lead Putin to retaliate against Nato.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548399/original/file-20230914-21-smf9t2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ukraine with Russian-controlled areas in red." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548399/original/file-20230914-21-smf9t2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548399/original/file-20230914-21-smf9t2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548399/original/file-20230914-21-smf9t2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548399/original/file-20230914-21-smf9t2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548399/original/file-20230914-21-smf9t2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548399/original/file-20230914-21-smf9t2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548399/original/file-20230914-21-smf9t2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The state of the war in Ukraine, according to the Institute for the Study of War.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>But Ukraine has been using home-grown drones to attack targets in Russia and there are signs that sentiment is shifting. This, writes professor of international relations and security at the University of Bradford Christoph Bluth, has a lot to do with <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-us-and-allies-may-supply-longer-range-missiles-how-this-would-change-the-conflict-213318">the slow progress</a> of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. </p>
<p>More western equipment – including weapons better suited to attacking targets in Russia’s “deep rear” – would undoubtedly help Ukrainian troops make the breakthroughs it needs to achieve its strategic aims, the most important of which is to drive southwards to the Sea of Azov and cut Russia’s land bridge to Crimea.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-us-and-allies-may-supply-longer-range-missiles-how-this-would-change-the-conflict-213318">Ukraine war: US and allies may supply longer-range missiles – how this would change the conflict</a>
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<p>Ukraine has been supplied with UK-made Storm Shadow cruise missiles. And it’s believed to be a combination of these and unmanned boats that launched a successful attack on Russia’s naval facility at Sevastopol. The attack severely damaged two vessels, reportedly beyond repair: a large landing ship and a Kilo-class submarine. </p>
<p>As Gavin Hall – a teaching fellow in international security at the University of Strathclyde – notes, the attack on Sevastopol and a recent successful recapture of a number of oil and gas platforms off the coast of Crimea known as the “Boyko towers” will be <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-capture-of-key-black-sea-outposts-and-strike-on-crimea-show-kyivs-increasing-confidence-213380">considerable morale boosters</a>, given the slow progress on the battlefield itself.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-capture-of-key-black-sea-outposts-and-strike-on-crimea-show-kyivs-increasing-confidence-213380">Ukraine war: capture of key Black Sea outposts and strike on Crimea show Kyiv's increasing confidence</a>
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<p>The Storm Shadow missiles which Ukraine used against Sevastopol were developed as part of a joint venture between French manufacturer Matra and Britain’s BAE Systems. BAE, which has made a large proportion of the weapons supplied by the UK to Ukraine, recently announced its plan to set up branch business inside Ukraine. </p>
<p>As Martin Owens – a senior lecturer in international business at Sheffield Hallam University – notes, the company has <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-baes-ukraine-deal-shows-about-the-risks-and-opportunities-of-setting-up-a-business-in-a-war-zone-212744">done well out of the war</a>, winning a record £21.1 billion of new orders in the first six months of 2023 alone.</p>
<p>Clearly, writes Owens, establishing a business in a country at war comes with considerable risk, and BAE will begin by establishing a a management office to coordinate sales and services with a view to setting up a manufacturing operation in Ukraine if all goes well.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-baes-ukraine-deal-shows-about-the-risks-and-opportunities-of-setting-up-a-business-in-a-war-zone-212744">What BAE's Ukraine deal shows about the risks and opportunities of setting up a business in a war zone</a>
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<h2>Playing politics</h2>
<p>It may have been disappointing for western members of the G20, which met last weekend in New Delhi, to have to put their name to a declaration which failed to condemn Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. The corresponding statement made at the end of the 2022 summit in Bali, Indonesia last year was unequivocal, deploring “in the strongest terms” Russian aggression and demanding “its complete and unconditional withdrawal from the territory of Ukraine”. </p>
<p>But the statement emerging from the world leaders in New Delhi stopped short of that. It said all states must refrain from acting against the territorial integrity of other states and rules that use of nuclear weapons was “inadmissible”.</p>
<p>Jennifer Mathers, senior lecturer in international politics at Aberystwyth University, believes that this is a reflection of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-the-g20-refused-to-condemn-russian-aggression-and-how-that-might-change-213384">growing clout of the global south</a>, much of which sees climate change and inequality as more pressing issues than a war on the edge of Europe. She also believes that in agreeing to the wording, Biden was probably allowing Indian prime minister Narendra Modi a “win”, something to boost his stature as a counterbalance to China. </p>
<p>But she also believes Biden’s “soft diplomacy” by showing a degree of humility in this instance could be a sensible tactic which could in the long run help the US argue for more global unity around its opposition to Russian aggression in Ukraine.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-the-g20-refused-to-condemn-russian-aggression-and-how-that-might-change-213384">Ukraine war: why the G20 refused to condemn Russian aggression – and how that might change</a>
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<p>From one bloc to another, EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has given her strongest indication yet that Ukraine and other countries – including the western Balkans, Georgia and Moldova – are under serious consideration for membership. Her annual state of the union speech on September 13 envisaged a “union complete with over 500 million people living in a free, democratic and prosperous” EU.</p>
<p>Nora Siklodi and Nándor Révész, who lecture in politics at the University of Portsmouth, give us <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-signs-that-the-eu-has-completely-changed-its-perspective-on-adding-new-members-since-russia-invaded-ukraine-213429">their analysis of Von der Leyen’s speech</a>, which appears to be signalling that she believes the EU ought to streamline its membership process to allow new members to join without lengthy debates or treaty changes.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-signs-that-the-eu-has-completely-changed-its-perspective-on-adding-new-members-since-russia-invaded-ukraine-213429">The signs that the EU has completely changed its perspective on adding new members since Russia invaded Ukraine</a>
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<p>Meanwhile Russia pressed ahead with its local elections last weekend, including in some of the regions it occupied and annexed via “referemdums” last September which were characterised by a surprisingly high turnout and a near unanimous enthusiasm for joining Mother Russia. In the least surprising news this month, Putin’s United Russia Party did extremely well – unsurprising given most real opposition parties were banned from putting up candidates.</p>
<p>Stefan Wolff, an expert in international security from the University of Birmingham, and his writing partner Tetyana Malyarenko, a professor of international relations at the University of Odesa, point out that even by the Kremlin’s recent standards these <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russian-held-elections-seek-to-normalise-illegal-occupation-and-reveal-reality-of-a-long-war-ahead-212890">polls were risible</a>. Russia doesn’t even occupy large chunks of the annexed regions. </p>
<p>But they warn that this is all part of Putin’s playbook by which he plans to “Russify” the occupied territories. Electing a group of loyalists to do the Kremlin’s bidding in these areas aims to convey a sense of local participation without the risk of any real dissent, they write.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russian-held-elections-seek-to-normalise-illegal-occupation-and-reveal-reality-of-a-long-war-ahead-212890">Ukraine war: Russian-held elections seek to normalise illegal occupation and reveal reality of a long war ahead</a>
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<h2>Competing narratives</h2>
<p>Of course, Putin has also gone out of his way to marginalise dissent in Russia in recent years. One of his targets as part of this mission has been Russia’s once-lively independent theatre scene that flourished after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since the invasion, many of its leading lights have lost their jobs, been jailed on dubious charges or been forced to leave the country. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russias-theatre-scene-has-been-obliterated-by-putins-culture-war-212830">according to Julie Curtis</a>, a professor of Russian literature at the University of Oxford, state subsidised theatre has become the vanguard of the new agitprop, parroting patriotic messages. As one exiled director bitterly comments: “There is currently one country which certainly is engaged in cancelling Russian culture. And that country is Russia itself.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russias-theatre-scene-has-been-obliterated-by-putins-culture-war-212830">How Russia's theatre scene has been obliterated by Putin’s culture war</a>
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<p>One episode from Russia history that seems unlikely to be the subject of a rousing patriotic drama is the disastrous Soviet-Polish war of 1919-20 when Lenin, emboldened by some battlefield successes in what is now generally referred to as the “Russian civil war”, decided to embark on a full-scale invasion of Poland.</p>
<p>According to historian Peter Whitewood of York St John University, Lenin’s plan was to “sovietise” Warsaw before pressing on to build a bridge through to Germany. It wasn’t to be: in what became known as the “Miracle on the Vistula”, Polish leader Józef Piłsudski routed the Russians.</p>
<p>Whitewood believes the <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-disastrous-decision-to-invade-poland-in-1920-has-parallels-with-putins-rhetoric-over-ukraine-213016">parallels with Putin’s invasion of Ukraine are interesting</a>. Putin’s main justification for sending Russia’s war machine into Ukraine last year was that Ukraine is a pawn in a dastardly US plan to encircle and dismember Russia. </p>
<p>In 1919, Lenin and much of the Bolshevik leadership believed that Poland’s strings were being pulled by capitalist western powers in the shape of Britain and France. As Winston Churchill once told the UK’s House of Commons: “Those that fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-disastrous-decision-to-invade-poland-in-1920-has-parallels-with-putins-rhetoric-over-ukraine-213016">Russia's disastrous decision to invade Poland in 1920 has parallels with Putin's rhetoric over Ukraine</a>
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A selection of the best of our coverage of the conflict from the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2126702023-09-08T18:15:46Z2023-09-08T18:15:46ZG20 summit’s plan to scare off monkeys by mimicking their ‘natural enemies’ may work – but not for the reasons it’s supposed to<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546979/original/file-20230907-2965-p3r7t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3420%2C2258&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rhesus macaques are known for harassing people in cities. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/closeup-portrait-beautiful-rhesus-macaque-family-2150489585">Wirestock Creators/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The hosts of this year’s G20 summit in New Delhi, India, face a unique challenge: keeping monkeys from interfering with the event. The area’s <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/2023-08-31/monkey-impersonators-to-scare-off-troublesome-primates-at-new-delhi-g20">rhesus macaques</a> are bold and curious, but can be aggressive.</p>
<p>The municipal council’s strategy is to hire humans to imitate <a href="https://www.britannica.com/animal/langur">langur monkeys</a> and scare off the macaques. The langur is <a href="https://wildlifesos.org/rescue/langurs-against-monkeys-a-tale-of-poor-conflict-management/">traditionally believed</a> to frighten macaques as they are supposedly “natural enemies”. It may work, but not for the reasons it’s supposed to. </p>
<p>And the use of professional monkey mimics hints at a much bigger issue: as our cities grow we will only experience more challenges interacting with nature.</p>
<p>On Delhi’s parliamentary estate, near where the summit is being held, macaques are known for <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/monkeys-india-delhi-parliament-video-rhesus-macaques-government-offices-a8679151.html">stealing lunches and damaging property</a>. They often bite. In the city of Shimla in the Himalayan foothills <a href="https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/archive/himachal/three-to-four-people-being-bitten-by-monkeys-daily-in-shimla-617216">three to four people were bitten</a> by macaques every day in 2014-2018. </p>
<p>It’s good news for G20 visitors, then, that New Delhi’s municipal council <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/31/india-erects-life-size-cutouts-of-langurs-to-deter-monkeys-before-g20">has plans</a> to keep macaques at bay.
India <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/monkey-scarers-ape-langurs-sound-not-look/articleshow/39436940.cms">banned the use of langurs</a> for this purpose in 2012 because of concerns about their welfare in captivity, where they were often kept chained. </p>
<p>Instead, for the G20 summit, 40 people have been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/monkey-business-delhi-gets-cutouts-langurs-ease-menace-during-g20-2023-08-31/">hired as monkey mimics</a>. Their job will include positioning life-size langur cut-outs around key parts of the city and imitating langur calls to scare off the local macaques.</p>
<h2>Why might a monkey-mimic scare a macaque?</h2>
<p>Two animals might be called natural enemies if they <a href="https://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/species-interactions-and-competition-102131429/">compete</a> for the same foods, space or resources. But <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283345651_An_instance_of_inter_species_interaction_between_Hanuman_Langur_Semnopithecus_entellus_and_Rhesus_Macaque_Macaca_mulatta">research</a> shows this is unlikely to be the case for langurs and macaques. </p>
<p>Rhesus macaques are <a href="https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/12554/17950825#habitat-ecology">widely distributed</a> from Afghanistan to China. They eat a highly varied diet that includes a lot of fruit, plus bark, seeds, buds and animal foods like fish, shellfish, eggs, honeycomb and insects. </p>
<p>Langurs are <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9210017/">physically larger</a> than rhesus macaques, so might win in a face-off, but are more narrowly distributed. Langurs mainly eat leaves but also consume some fruit, flowers and insects. Their reliance on leaves, however, means that in the wild they would not usually compete with macaques for food. </p>
<p>Macaques and their close relatives thrive in urban environments and rapidly adapt to dealing with people. For example, baboons in Cape Town <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2424990/Baboon-steals-groceries-shopper-Cape-Town.html">mug people for groceries</a> while Bali’s long-tailed macaques have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/science/2021/jan/14/balis-thieving-monkeys-seek-bigger-ransoms-for-high-value-swag-study">learned to barter</a> tourists’ stolen phones for food. </p>
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<p>Langurs also seem to adapt less readily to urban areas than macaques, but can still be remarkably successful in cities. One group in Dakhineswar, for example, now consistently <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.649027/full">prefer bread to any plant</a>. </p>
<p>Cities have so much food available that urban macaques and langurs probably don’t need to fight for resources. Their ecological differences in the wild also mean they probably don’t have a long-term history of competition. </p>
<p>This is backed up by evidence of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283345651_An_instance_of_inter_species_interaction_between_Hanuman_Langur_Semnopithecus_entellus_and_Rhesus_Macaque_Macaca_mulatta">peaceful, even friendly interactions</a> between langurs and macaques in the wild. Juveniles sometimes play together. The adults are less friendly, but do not seem to object to one another’s presence. This is a far cry from what we’d expect reading about langurs’ supposed aggression towards macaques. </p>
<h2>The heart of the problem</h2>
<p>The ban on the capture of langurs is, in one way, a step forward for animal welfare. It’s good for conservation too as numbers of all seven langur species native to India are in decline. But this New Delhi approach may be bad for macaque welfare. </p>
<p>If langurs are not inherently scary to macaques, why do the authorities think that monkey-mimics’ calls and cut-outs will deter them? The most likely answer is that those calls and langur cut-outs are themselves intimidating. </p>
<p>New Delhi’s monkey mimics <a href="https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/govt-hires-humans-to-impersonate-langurs-to-scare-away-monkeys-114073101507_1.html">carry sticks</a>. Their langur calls are described as “<a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/08/05/337973461/india-makes-a-renewed-push-to-crack-down-on-monkey-business">ear-piercing</a>” screeches. Langur noises are already loud, and the mimics may make them louder to maximise their effect.</p>
<p>Taking the job seriously means working to cultivate fear so the effect doesn’t wear off. Being chased by a shouting, stick-wielding human is probably much scarier than seeing a langur. The cut-outs may be still and silent, but are associated with these scary humans, who macaques may see placing the cut-outs. These are probably intimidating as reminders of the monkey-mimics themselves. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546980/original/file-20230907-25-m2cfp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Grey female monkey cradles her baby." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546980/original/file-20230907-25-m2cfp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546980/original/file-20230907-25-m2cfp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546980/original/file-20230907-25-m2cfp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546980/original/file-20230907-25-m2cfp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546980/original/file-20230907-25-m2cfp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546980/original/file-20230907-25-m2cfp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546980/original/file-20230907-25-m2cfp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Langurs are supposed to scare off macaques.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/female-gray-langurs-called-hanuman-monkeys-2172877115">Albert Beukhof/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>Human-wildlife conflict is an almost inevitable consequence of human population growth and the expansion of urban areas. There are often negative effects for everyone. </p>
<p>Even if a macaque troop native to New Delhi was forced into urban life by human expansion, it’s not as if we can assume the humans had somewhere else to go. Urban expansion, poverty and inequality are <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/rode.12866">connected in complicated ways</a>, but people are now so <a href="https://www.un.org/en/dayof8billion">numerous</a> that we can’t just stop building cities. </p>
<p>Monkeys harassing visitors to a political summit may seem like a small problem but it’s interlinked with the <a href="https://21stcenturylab.lincoln.ac.uk/ten-grand-challenges/">major challenges of the 21st century</a>: climate change, inequality, sustainability and globalisation. </p>
<p>There are no easy solutions to human-wildlife conflict. You could argue that the New Delhi case is positive because the people involved are looking for a way to manage a conflict that considers the impact on all the species involved.</p>
<p>It is not, however, a perfect approach. It’s a step in the right direction rather than a solution. Each idea that focuses on improving quality of life for both people and animals brings us closer to living together peacefully. </p>
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<img alt="Imagine weekly climate newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Isabelle Catherine Winder does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Rhesus macaques are known for harassing people in New Delhi, where the G20 summit is being held, so authorities are taking action – but is it the right action?Isabelle Catherine Winder, Senior Lecturer in Zoology, Bangor UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2130042023-09-08T08:10:57Z2023-09-08T08:10:57ZG20: Xi Jinping’s snub of summit the latest in escalation of ambition between two assertive powers<p>It might be tempting to connect Xi Jinping’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/04/china-signals-xi-jinping-will-not-attend-g20-summit-in-india#:%7E:text=Xi%20Jinping's%20attendance%20at%20the,the%20country's%20premier%2C%20Li%20Qiang.">refusal to attend the G20 summit in India</a> with continuing border tensions. These reached a peak recently when China released an “official map” claiming as its territory several areas that have long been a matter of contention between the two countries. </p>
<p>But, in fact, a more likely explanation is the intense competition between Xi Jinping’s China and Narendra Modi’s India over leadership status when it comes to the global south. </p>
<p>The two countries have had a rocky relationship over the years, as seen in the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-53062484">sporadic military clashes</a> in border areas. But it is the wider – and more recent – question of which country holds the most influence in the developing world that consumes the two leaders at present. </p>
<p>Sino-Indian relations can be categorised in four phases. The first phase (1949-1962) was a delusional period that assumed mutual bonhomie. India-China relations were dubbed as <em><a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/18/the-rise-and-fall-of-hindi-chini-bhai-bhai/">Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai</a></em> (India and China are brothers). This continued even as China decided to <a href="https://www.noemamag.com/all-roads-need-not-lead-to-china/">illegally build a highway</a> connecting Xinjiang province in western China and Tibet through territory claimed by India as part of the Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir state. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sino-Indian-War">China invaded India in 1962</a> to protect the territory it had encroached upon. Notably, another more modern highway is now planned on a similar route, which is thought likely to <a href="https://theprint.in/opinion/chinas-new-g695-highway-across-aksai-chin-is-a-problem-india-cant-stay-quiet/1068465/">exacerbate tensions</a> even further. </p>
<p>This kicked off a second phase of animosity lasting till the 1980s and was triggered by China supporting Pakistan in the <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/09/27/chinas-role-in-1965-indo-pak-war/">1965</a> and <a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/explained-when-pakistans-ally-us-pushed-china-to-attack-india-during-indo-pak-war-of-1971-625741">1971</a> wars and support to the numerous insurgent groups operating in India’s north-east. </p>
<p>Then, in the mid to late 1980s relations between the two countries improved with talks between Deng Xiaoping, the then premier of China, and the Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi and a subsequent visit <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/200011/t20001117_697833.html">by her son Rajiv in 1988</a>, the first visit by an Indian prime minister in 34 years. </p>
<p>More recently though, China has become more confident after decades of strong economic growth – has actively pursued a more <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/02/20/why-has-chinese-foreign-policy-become-more-assertive/">assertive foreign policy</a>. In 2014 Xi described this as “major-power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics”. This has brought it into <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2023-06/are-china-and-india-bound-another-deadly-border-clash">confrontation with India</a>, once again over border territory. </p>
<h2>Border dispute</h2>
<p>In May 2020, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/world/asia/india-china-border.html">Indian and Chinese patrols clashed</a> near Pangong Tso (a lake spanning eastern Ladakh and western Tibet) after Indian troops found the Chinese entrenched in what was previously mutually patrolled territory. While some attribute China’s actions to its expansionist strategy through what commentators have criticised as “<a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/china-s-salami-slicing-tactics-displays-disregard-for-india-s-efforts-at-peace/story-ujHFW5zcwTbKiP7j0QghGL.html">salami slicing” tactics</a> (encroaching on small pieces of territory at a time), others believe the growing friendship between India and the US was the trigger for China’s actions. </p>
<p>Another reason speculated was that India’s <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/view-ladakh-will-greatly-benefit-from-governments-decision-to-make-it-into-a-union-territory/articleshow/70577272.cms?from=mdr">reconfiguration of Ladakh as a union territory in 2019</a> and reaffirmation that Aksai Chin (a portion of Ladakh in China’s control since the 1962 war) as an <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/pok-aksai-chin-part-of-kashmir-says-amit-shah-in-lok-sabha/article61587371.ece">integral part of India</a> might have provoked China’s border incursions. </p>
<p>At the end of August 2020, Indian troops <a href="https://stratnewsglobal.com/articles/why-kailash-range-operation-was-planned-and-executed/">occupied the Kailash Range</a>. This gave them tactical superiority over China in the region because of its dominating view across the Chinese side of the border. This kickstarted talks between the two sides, which had been dormant for some time. Nevertheless, after 19 rounds of discussions, nothing has been resolved. </p>
<p>In December 2022, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-63953400">Indian and Chinese troops clashed</a> in the Yangtse region of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh. This remains the most serious area of contention between India and China, as demonstrated by the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/10/china-criticises-indian-ministers-visit-to-arunachal-pradesh">fury expressed by the Indian government</a> recently released Chinese maps portraying the entire state as southern Tibet.</p>
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<p>Beijing, in turn, criticised a visit by India’s home affairs minister, Amit Shah, to the area, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/10/china-criticises-indian-ministers-visit-to-arunachal-pradesh">saying</a> it “violates China’s territorial sovereignty, and is not conducive to the peace and tranquillity of the border situation”. </p>
<h2>Modi reaches out to the world</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, Modi has pursued an expansive approach to foreign relations in recent years. You only have to look at Modi’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_international_prime_ministerial_trips_made_by_Narendra_Modi">list of overseas travel since 2020</a> to see that he has engaged with, and been hosted by, a wide range of world leaders. At the same time, hampered by COVID and facing a difficult economy, Xi’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_international_trips_made_by_Xi_Jinping#">foreign visits have been limited</a>.</p>
<p>This has attracted a certain amount of attention from commentators who are increasingly casting Modi’s diplomacy in terms of India’s rivalry with China. This was evident when the Indian prime minister visited Greece in late August, with the trip billed by some as an attempt to <a href="https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/modi-is-first-pm-in-40-years-to-visit-greece-why-this-trip-matters-13035672.html">limit China’s influence in the Mediterranean region</a> </p>
<p>So, contrary to China’s decades-old strategy of <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/india-and-chinas-rivalry-is-reshaping-south-asia/">containing India in the South Asian region</a>, India has begun to spread its strategic relationships in south-east Asia, Europe, Africa, Oceania and the US. This has significantly challenged China’s status in the international sphere.</p>
<p>Unable to find viable solutions to China’s faltering economic growth, Xi has instead opted for nationalistic fervour among its people, while cracking down on dissent. His administration has also introduced the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-land-border-law-a-preliminary-assessment/">Land Border Law</a> in 2022 to strengthen its border control and protection, leading to speculation it could be used to <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/china-passes-new-land-border-law-amid-military-standoff-with-india/articleshow/87245014.cms">support a more assertive stance</a> towards what Beijing views as its territory. </p>
<p>The release of China’s most recent map is aimed at fulfilling this objective and prompted speculation about its impact on the G20 summit. However, the true reason for Xi’s unwillingness to visit India stems from the fact that a successful joint communique from the summit would lend credence to <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/China-and-India-battle-for-leadership-of-Global-South">India’s emergence as a leader of the global south</a>.</p>
<p>In a forum representing two-thirds of the global population, India’s objective to build a consensus on several important issues such as debt restructuring – which China opposes but <a href="https://www.telegraphindia.com/business/india-aims-to-forge-global-consensus-on-tackling-debt-crisis-at-g20-summit/cid/1963505">most developing economies support</a> – is likely to significantly dent China’s international status. </p>
<p>So the effect of Xi’s refusal to attend the New Delhi G20 summit is effectively a statement contesting India’s coveted status as a global leader.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213004/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dheeraj Paramesha does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Chinese president’s absence at the New Delhi G20 summit sends a message about competition between the two countries.Dheeraj Paramesha, Lecturer in Intelligence, Security and Policing, School of Criminology, University of HullLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2126582023-09-06T14:51:05Z2023-09-06T14:51:05ZChina is switching away from its aggressive ‘wolf warrior’ foreign policy – here’s why<p>As India prepares to host the G20 summit on September 9, there’s one person not readying his plane for the gathering of world leaders. China’s president Xi Jinping, who has attended every meeting of this summit since 2013, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/04/china-signals-xi-jinping-will-not-attend-g20-summit-in-india#:%7E:text=Xi%20Jinping%27s%20attendance%20at%20the,the%20country%27s%20premier%2C%20Li%20Qiang.">is not going</a>.</p>
<p>Xi is busy dealing with significant <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview">economic problems</a> at home, while also rejigging his foreign policy approach away from the aggressive “<a href="https://www.nbr.org/publication/understanding-chinese-wolf-warrior-diplomacy/">wolf warrior</a>” diplomacy, a strategy he has pursued since 2017. He is now trying to position China as more of a global peacemaker and is testing out new ways of creating alliances with the west and in Asia.</p>
<p>The apparent abandonment of his previous wolf warrior policy, which typically had included shouting at foreign leaders and storming out of meetings, can be seen as a move away from the bellicose tone that characterised China-US relations and China’s wider relationship with the west in the mid to late 2010s. </p>
<p>It initially appeared that the abandonment of this approach, which took its name from the Chinese action <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/analysts-take-note-wolf-warrior-is-the-new-chinese-rambo/">series</a> starring Wu Jing as a Chinese soldier battling western foes in Asia and Africa, could be attributed to changes in China’s foreign ministry in the summer of 2023. </p>
<p>Some of the most prominent “wolf warriors” were moved to posts outside foreign affairs. These include the former foreign ministry spokesperson, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-64218847">Zhao Lijian</a>, being shifted to the department of boundaries and ocean affairs, or being dismissed altogether, most notably in the case of <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/08/15/chinese-diplomat-qin-gang-fall-00110333">Qin Gang</a>, who was removed from his post as foreign minister in unclear circumstances.</p>
<p>Both Qin and Zhao were well known for their fiery <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/07/china-foreign-minister-qin-gang">rhetoric</a> from the days of the Sino-American <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/china-bares-teeth-in-wolf-warrior-trade-diplomacy/a-55720212">trade war</a>, which saw them spar with the equally belligerent administration of then US president Donald Trump. This period saw the dialogue between the US and China taking on a more coarse, hardline tone.</p>
<p>However, such a change has gone deeper than simply moving personnel around.</p>
<p>Another possible reason for the change in Chinese diplomacy has been Beijing’s efforts to deal with an increasingly difficult <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/experts-react-chinas-economic-slowdown-causes-and-implications">domestic economy</a>, where <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-66506132">youth unemployment</a> is at a record high. It can also be seen as an effort to establish more partnerships internationally, rather than <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomacy-is-fading/">antagonise</a> the entire western world. </p>
<p>The recent visit of UK foreign secretary <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-66656443">James Cleverly</a> to Beijing may have been indicative of China’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2023.2193150">new softly softly approach</a>.</p>
<p>Another example of this could be seen in Emmanuel Macron’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/4/5/frances-macron-visits-china-seeking-breakthrough-in-ukraine-war">visit</a> to China earlier in 2023, with the French president receiving a warm reception – far different from the previous era. Such a reception is also indicative of China’s preference to deal with individual states rather than international blocs as well as trying to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-china-america-pressure-interview/">ensure</a> that the major European economies do not follow Washington’s lead on China. An aggressive diplomacy style could be counterproductive for these goals.</p>
<h2>China the peacemaker?</h2>
<p>The move away from wolf warrior diplomacy has also been part of a changing image that China has sought to promote in recent years. This has seen Beijing present itself as an international peacemaker, as illustrated by its <a href="https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/06/23/saudi-iran-deal-a-test-case-of-chinas-role-as-an-international-mediator/">mediation</a> of the tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia as well as Beijing’s proposed <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/06/china-backs-further-ukraine-peace-talks-saudi-arabia-summit">peace plan</a> for the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Such an approach has appeared to give Beijing some diplomatic successes, which was illustrated by the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/brics-summit-2023-seeking-alternate-world-order">Brics summit</a> this year, where the bloc underwent the biggest expansion since its creation. As with China’s dealings with Europe, wolf warrior diplomacy here would again be contrary to Beijing’s aim of a new international image.</p>
<p>China’s move towards a new style of foreign policy has also echoed some changes in Washington. US rhetoric towards China during the Trump administration was as belligerent as the wolf warriors, which contributed to the crude nature of Sino-American interactions.</p>
<p>Since 2021 and the arrival of a new US president, this language has largely been <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/01/19/958472423/how-president-trumps-rhetoric-has-affected-u-s-politics">dialled back</a> and the more belligerent tone of the past has largely been confined to <a href="https://time.com/6242314/real-winners-of-the-2024-election-could-be-china-and-russia/">US domestic politics</a>, where aspiring presidential candidates have competed over who is seen to be the toughest over China. This has also been mirrored in China, where nationalist rhetoric has primarily been the preserve of Chinese <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/static/vdata/infographics/china-social-media/">social media commentators</a>, rather than the Chinese Communist Party.</p>
<p>While the rhetoric of the wolf warrior has been toned down on both sides, does this also change what both the west and China want to achieve?</p>
<p>The Biden administration, for instance, has <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/cost-trumps-trade-war-china-still-adding">continued</a> many of the previous administration’s policies towards China. It could be argued that the abandonment of wolf warrior diplomacy is simply a cosmetic change, so far.</p>
<h2>Is this a significant change?</h2>
<p>Wolf warrior diplomacy has largely fallen out of fashion. But some of China’s core aims have been retained, but in a different form. This can be seen in the recent ban on imports of Japanese seafood. </p>
<p>Unlike previous Chinese diplomatic manoeuvres, Beijing has used environmental and safety <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/27/business/japan-fukushima-water-china-import-ban-intl-hnk/index.html">concerns</a> over the release of treated radioactive water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant rather than relying on nationalist chest-thumping as it had done in the past. Such a message is likely to resonate with many in Asia, with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-66603831">several nations</a> in the region imposing similar bans on Japanese produce.</p>
<p>In this way, it adds Asian allies and ramps up anti-Japanese feeling, as well as extending China’s diplomatic influence further.</p>
<p>While the wolf warriors are no longer as powerful as they once were, the objectives they sought to achieve may well remain the same.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212658/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Harper does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China’s president Xi Jinping is testing out a “softer” foreign policy approach.Tom Harper, Lecturer in International Relations, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2129802023-09-06T07:14:16Z2023-09-06T07:14:16ZWord from The Hill: Danielle Wood to head Productivity Commission, Alan Joyce bows to public anger, PM jets off again<p>As well as her interviews with politicians and experts, Politics with Michelle Grattan includes “Word from The Hill”, where she discusses the news with members of The Conversation’s politics team.</p>
<p>In this podcast Michelle and politics + society editor Amanda Dunn discuss the latest national accounts and Jim Chalmers’ announcement that Grattan Institute CEO Danielle Wood will take over as head of the Productivity Commission. The appointment came as a surprise, after Chris Barrett, chosen for the position only recently, decided he had a better offer – he will become head of the Victorian Treasury.</p>
<p>They also canvass the QANTAS saga, which has seen its now former CEO Alan Joyce step down earlier than scheduled. The news came amid public anger over its poor customer service, and after the national carrier was taken to court by the consumer watchdog for selling more than 8000 tickets on flights already cancelled.</p>
<p>And finally, they discuss Anthony Albanese’s trip to Indonesia for the ASEAN summit, followed by a visit to the Philippines, before he attends the G20 meeting in India.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212980/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In this podcast, @michellegrattan and @amanda.dunn10 discuss the week in politicsMichelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2123752023-09-05T02:53:51Z2023-09-05T02:53:51ZEvery country can make a difference – but carbon reductions need to be realistic and fair<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546126/original/file-20230904-15-cssrkf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5130%2C3409&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This weekend, the world’s major economies will convene in Delhi for the G20 summit. On the table will be the common goal of limiting global temperature rise as climate chaos becomes ever more evident.</p>
<p>When we talk about limiting climate change, we’re really talking about the <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/">global carbon budget</a> set by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Basically, we have a two-thirds chance of holding global heating to 1.5°C if we keep future emissions under 400 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide. At current emission rates, we’ve got just <a href="https://www.mcc-berlin.net/en/research/co2-budget.html">under five years</a> left before we blow through that limit. </p>
<p>As our <a href="https://www.uts.edu.au/oecm/energy-pathways">new research</a> shows, getting to net zero isn’t going to be the same in each country. There are commonalities – halting new fossil fuel projects and funding renewables, storage and energy efficiency. But there will be significant differences in how manufacturing giants like China zero out emissions compared to India or Australia.</p>
<p>And then there’s the question of fairness. Some countries have emitted vastly more than others. If we divide up the remaining carbon budget while taking historic emissions into account, we find countries like America, France, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Japan and Australia have already gone past their fair carbon budgets. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, countries which have industrialised later like Mexico, China, Argentina, Turkey, India and Indonesia are sitting below their fair carbon budgets.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546129/original/file-20230904-25-nd26fv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="china windfarm" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546129/original/file-20230904-25-nd26fv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546129/original/file-20230904-25-nd26fv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546129/original/file-20230904-25-nd26fv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546129/original/file-20230904-25-nd26fv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546129/original/file-20230904-25-nd26fv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546129/original/file-20230904-25-nd26fv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546129/original/file-20230904-25-nd26fv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Some things are universal – boost renewables like this windfarm in China and steadily cut fossil fuel use. But there are many pathways to net zero.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
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<h2>What’s new about this?</h2>
<p>The G20 account <a href="https://www.oecd.org/tax/g20-economies-are-pricing-more-carbon-emissions-but-stronger-globally-more-coherent-policy-action-is-needed-to-meet-climate-goals-says-oecd.htm#:%7E:text=G20%20economies%20account%20for%20around,of%20total%20G20%20GHG%20emissions.">for 80%</a> of the world’s emissions. If each of these countries ended their reliance on fossil fuels and other emissions sources, we’d be most of the way to tackling the climate crisis. </p>
<p>We took into account how much each country has emitted historically, from industrialisation to 2019, and population size. Then we devised a per capita carbon index, which gives developing countries with little historic responsibility for climate change a fair distribution of carbon from 2020 to 2050. We did this to show how every country can make this energy transition in a timeframe realistic to their circumstances.</p>
<p><iframe id="Fwkye" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Fwkye/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>India: minimal historic impact but rising fast</h2>
<p>The world’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/24/india-overtakes-china-to-become-worlds-most-populous-country">most populous</a> country has historically been a very low emitter, producing just 25% of China’s emissions from 1750–2019. But in recent decades, it has <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/co2/country/india">begun to emit more</a> and its future emissions might rise substantially. </p>
<p>India has relied heavily on coal power, but its renewable sector is growing exceptionally fast. It’s now the <a href="https://www.ren21.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/GSR-2023_Energy-Supply-Module.pdf">fourth largest market</a> for solar, biomass and wind power </p>
<p>Steelmaking is rapidly growing. If this industry relies on old coal technology, it will add to emissions and eat away at the global carbon budget. New build steel plants should turn to hydrogen or other green steelmaking techniques. </p>
<p><strong>Power sector:</strong> not yet on track but positive trend</p>
<p><strong>Industry:</strong> not on track.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-has-vast-gas-reserves-heres-how-to-stop-them-adding-to-climate-change-194473">Africa has vast gas reserves – here’s how to stop them adding to climate change</a>
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<h2>China: giant of emissions, manufacturing – and renewables</h2>
<p>China produces over 30% of the world’s emissions with 18% of its population, making it the world’s biggest. </p>
<p>The North Asian nation’s cement, steel, chemical and aluminium industries rely heavily on coal, producing 60% of the global energy-related emissions from each of these sectors – vastly more than America’s 10%. </p>
<p>Cleaning up its enormous industrial sector through green steelmaking and other new techniques will be actually be harder than getting off coal power. </p>
<p>On the positive side, China has emerged as the world’s leading nation in solar and wind energy deployment and manufacturing. It’s <a href="https://www.eiu.com/n/china-road-to-net-zero-reshape-the-country-and-the-world/">surging forward</a> on electric cars and long-distance rail.</p>
<p><strong>Power sector:</strong> decarbonising slowly, not yet on track</p>
<p><strong>Industrial sector:</strong> well off track</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546128/original/file-20230904-17-kma1kg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="china heavy industry" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546128/original/file-20230904-17-kma1kg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546128/original/file-20230904-17-kma1kg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546128/original/file-20230904-17-kma1kg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546128/original/file-20230904-17-kma1kg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546128/original/file-20230904-17-kma1kg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546128/original/file-20230904-17-kma1kg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546128/original/file-20230904-17-kma1kg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">China’s heavy industry will be hard to clean up.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
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<h2>America: gas, inefficient cars and a clean energy boom</h2>
<p>The United States is the world’s largest single emitter of carbon emissions in the power sector, both historically as well as per capita. </p>
<p>Fossil gas plays a major role for power and heat generation, while America’s cars and trucks are the most inefficient in the world. The nation has just 4% of global population but its vehicles emit almost 25% of the world’s emissions from road transport. </p>
<p>The nation’s building sector accounts for 15% of all global emissions from buildings, due to large, inefficiently built houses and heating systems.</p>
<p>These sectors – power, transport and buildings – still need urgent attention. But, thankfully, America’s much-vaunted Inflation Reduction Act <a href="https://www.iea.org/policies/16156-inflation-reduction-act-of-2022">has triggered</a> an enormous investment boom in energy efficiency and renewable energy. </p>
<p><strong>Power sector:</strong> well on track to be largely decarbonised by 2040</p>
<p><strong>Transport and building sectors:</strong> not yet on track</p>
<h2>Australia: rich in renewables – and gas and coal</h2>
<p>Australia is one of the top five per capita emitters in the G20, both historically and today. Our relatively small population means we’re not one of the largest overall emitters. </p>
<p>Huge coal and gas reserves mean Australia has long profited from fossil fuel income. We’re the second largest coal exporter and <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/australias-lng-risk/">one of the top</a> liquefied natural gas exporters. </p>
<p>On the upside, Australia has some of the world’s best and largest solar and wind resources. We could play a leading role in the transition towards green steel and green hydrogen. At the rate things are going, we could decarbonise domestic energy supply in <a href="https://www.energynetworks.com.au/news/energy-insider/2022-energy-insider/hydrogen-super-power">just over</a> a decade. </p>
<p><strong>Power sector:</strong> broadly on track </p>
<p><strong>Transport sector:</strong> not yet on track</p>
<h2>Fair is possible – and necessary</h2>
<p>This weekend’s G20 summit gives an opportunity to build political momentum and formulate plans for concrete action among high-emitting countries. </p>
<p>An agreement to fairly split up the remaining carbon budget is unlikely, however, given <a href="https://www.g20.org/en/media-resources/press-releases/july-2023/etwgm-concludes/">debate over</a> whether cutting carbon will damage economic development in developing countries at the recent G20 meeting of foreign ministers.</p>
<p>It might be hard. But it is possible. Many rich countries have <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/energy-gdp-decoupling#:%7E:text=A%20number%20of%20rich%20countries,use%20per%20capita%20from%201995.">already broken</a> the link between GDP growth and energy demand. Developing countries can decarbonise while continuing to grow. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cop27-roundup-how-the-world-can-stick-to-its-carbon-budget-fairly-194876">COP27 roundup: how the world can stick to its carbon budget fairly</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212375/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sven Teske receives funding fromthe European Climate Foundation, 23 Rue de la Science, 1040 Brussels, Belgium (grant number 2101-61369).</span></em></p>Our carbon budget is shrinking fast. We crunched the data to find pathways for G20 nations to act fasterSven Teske, Research Director, Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2059932023-05-23T04:12:55Z2023-05-23T04:12:55ZDivided Indian diaspora in Australia tops concerns for Narendra Modi visit<p>Narendra Modi arrives this week for an official visit to Australia. When he first came to Australia in November 2014, the recently elected Indian prime minister was still to find his feet on the global stage. Keen to show the new government meant business, Modi worked hard to establish a <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/pm-narendra-modi-meets-world-leaders-on-sidelines-of-g20/articleshow/45159594.cms?from=mdr">rapport with other leaders</a> at the Group of 20 (G20) summit in Brisbane. </p>
<p>But in the limelight, Modi appeared nervous, not least in his <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XMGDefQDjKM">speech to the Australian parliament</a>. </p>
<p>Almost nine years on, things are very different. India is the focus of world attention, as the <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1882356">2023 G20 chair</a>, with an economy <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/29/business/india-economy-global-businesses-investment-intl-hnk/index.html#:%7E:text=The%20IMF%20projects%20India%27s%20GDP%20will%20grow%205.9%25%20in%202023.&text=But%20India%27s%20impressive%20GDP%20and,economics%20professor%20at%20Cornell%20University.">growing faster</a> than almost all its competitors.</p>
<p>And Modi, now a veteran of dozens of summits and visits, is far more confident abroad.</p>
<h2>Indifference and irritations</h2>
<p>In the meantime, the relationship between Australia and India has also changed. Twenty years ago, the two countries had very little to do with one another. China’s insatiable hunger for coal and iron ore was the main focus of Australia’s political and business leaders. New Delhi concerned itself with its own economic development and <a href="https://asiasociety.org/india-us-relations-emerging-global-environment">overcoming longstanding differences</a> with the United States.</p>
<p>Things started to shift in the late 2000s, as both Australia and India grew more <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/india-australia-security-relations-they-ve-only-just-begun">concerned</a> about Beijing’s burgeoning power and ambition. In 2007, both countries took part in a meeting of the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/india-australia-security-relations-they-ve-only-just-begun">Quad</a>, a diplomatic dialogue also involving the US and Japan. Two years later, Kevin Rudd went to New Delhi and signed a <a href="https://india.embassy.gov.au/ndli/pa5009jsb.html">new security agreement</a>.</p>
<p>A little later, Australia dropped a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-16027068">ban on uranium sales</a> to India, removing a longstanding irritant in the relationship.</p>
<p>These actions cleared the air, but weren’t quite enough to push the two sides to build a partnership. It took the shock of Donald Trump’s election as US president to provide the necessary impetus. The prospect of Trump putting “America First”, and the <a href="https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/america-first-us-asia-policy-under-president-trump">possibility</a> the US might not act as expected if a crisis occurred, led to a flurry of diplomatic activity by Australia and India and the <a href="https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/india-aus-us-japan-hold-first-meet-on-quad-coalition-117111200558_1.html">reconvening</a> of the Quad in late 2017.</p>
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<h2>Indo-Pacific partners</h2>
<p>Since then, the Australia-India relationship has advanced in leaps and bounds, despite the disruptions caused by COVID.</p>
<p>The biggest advances have been made in the areas of <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/india-confirmed-as-top-tier-security-partner-for-australia-20230309-p5cqpe">defence and security</a>. The two countries now hold <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/australia-india-annual-leaders%E2%80%99-summit">annual leaders’ summits</a> and talks between their <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/joint-statement-inaugural-india-australia-22-ministerial-dialogue">foreign and defence ministers</a>. The Australian army, air force, navy, and special forces <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/india-australia-defence-ties-grow-in-the-face-of-rising-strategic-challenges/">regularly exercise</a> with their Indian counterparts. </p>
<p>The economic relationship has also become stronger, assisted by the growing Indian diaspora and <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade-and-investment/india-economic-strategy/ies/index.html">concerted effort</a> by the Australian government. Education has been a particular highlight, with more <a href="https://www.afr.com/work-and-careers/education/why-india-is-driving-a-university-boom-in-australia-20230103-p5ca2x">Indian students flowing</a> to Australian universities and Australian institutions <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/language/punjabi/en/article/australian-university-to-open-a-campus-in-india-as-part-of-groundbreaking-education-deal/r81pe0zeu">opening campuses in India</a>.</p>
<p>The conclusion of an <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/australia-india-free-trade-deal-comes-into-force-what-does-it-mean-for-businesses-and-consumers/e71yc6y2j">interim trade deal</a> just prior to the 2022 election promises to further boost economic ties.</p>
<p>The Quad is opening up other possibilities for cooperation. Since 2017, it has <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/quad">expanded its agenda</a> to cover everything from artificial intelligence and semiconductors, to infrastructure and maritime security.</p>
<p>Closer collaboration in the mining and processing of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/india-australia-aim-boost-critical-mineral-trade-broader-deal-ministers-2023-03-11/">critical minerals</a> such as lithium, used in batteries, <a href="https://www.themandarin.com.au/220834-climate-clean-energy-emerging-tech-are-critical-priorities-for-quad/">discussed within the Quad</a>, particularly interests both countries.</p>
<h2>Deals and the diaspora</h2>
<p>These issues and more are on the agenda for Modi’s visit to Australia this week. Boosting economic ties is a key priority. A <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/negotiations/aifta/australia-india-comprehensive-economic-cooperation-agreement">comprehensive trade and investment deal</a> is the ultimate aim.</p>
<p>Both countries also want to draw on the connections and capabilities of the Indian diaspora in Australia, now almost a million strong, to advance this part of the relationship. The new <a href="https://www.australiaindiacentre.org.au">Centre for Australia-India Relations</a>, based in Sydney, will be central to this effort.</p>
<p>At the same time, Modi is also looking to the diaspora for more political reasons. His Bharatiya Janata Party (“Indian People’s Party”, or BJP) relies on people of Indian origin across the world, <a href="https://www.outlookindia.com/national/modi-madness-among-indian-diaspora-and-the-west-puts-spotlight-on-india-too-news-233544">especially in the US</a>, for funds, skills, and influence. With a national election looming in 2024, Modi wants to energise and mobilise this crucial constituency to help the BJP to a third consecutive victory.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/howdy-modi-in-houston-why-indias-narendra-modi-puts-so-much-effort-into-wooing-the-diaspora-123946">Howdy Modi in Houston: why India's Narendra Modi puts so much effort into wooing the diaspora</a>
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<p>In Australia, however, the diaspora is divided. Some have long opposed the BJP and criticised its policies, especially concerning India’s 200 million strong <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/what-happens-in-india-no-longer-stays-in-india/">Muslim minority</a>.</p>
<p>But lately, a new issue has surfaced in Australia and overseas: a campaign by some Sikh activists for a separate Sikh state, “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/22/india/india-separatist-khalistan-movement-explainer-intl-hnk/index.html">Khalistan</a>”. Unofficial “referendums”, organised to show support for the cause, have been held in Australian cities. Anti-India and anti-Modi slogans have been <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/chandigarh-news/another-temple-vandalised-by-pro-khalistan-supporters-in-australia-101677943842794.html">daubed on Hindu temples</a>.</p>
<p>Only a <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/language/punjabi/en/podcast-episode/what-is-the-khalistan-referendum-and-what-is-the-australian-governments-stand-on-the-issue/p9cepjlz7">small proportion</a> of Australian-based Sikhs support the Khalistan movement. But the issue is causing problems for the Modi government and for the relationship between Australia and India.</p>
<p>During Albanese’s recent visit to India, <a href="https://www.news.com.au/national/politics/indian-pm-criticises-albanese-over-recent-melbourne-hindu-temple-attacks/news-story/665a6a05266f7badcd3415e58027be9d">Modi reportedly pressed</a> his counterpart to rein in separatist activism in Australia.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1620507650223124480"}"></div></p>
<h2>Maintaining the balance</h2>
<p>The partnership built between Australia and India is sufficiently robust to manage challenges like the Khalistan movement. And it needs to be.</p>
<p>The security and prosperity of both countries depends on closer cooperation to manage Beijing’s push to reshape our region to serve China’s interests.</p>
<p>Australia and India must work together – and with others across the Indo-Pacific – to maintain the balance of power that allows all countries in the region to determine their own futures.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205993/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Hall receives funding from the Department of Defence and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. </span></em></p>Nine years on from the Indian prime minister’s first visit to Australia, much has changed in the Indo-Pacific and in the bilateral relationship.Ian Hall, Acting Director, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2051662023-05-16T21:17:26Z2023-05-16T21:17:26ZIndia is using the G20 summit to further its settler-colonial ambitions in Kashmir<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526021/original/file-20230514-23610-wsa3ch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=64%2C64%2C4730%2C3127&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The 2023 G20 logo on display in New Delhi, India. By attending events in Kashmir, G20 delegates are tacitly condoning India's colonial control of the region. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Altaf Qadri)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In September, India will host the 2023 Group of 20 (G20) summit in the capital, New Delhi. Events and meetings are already taking place in other venues around the country. Under its <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/02/28/indias-g20-presidency-will-be-a-win-for-narendra-modi">G20 presidency</a>, India will host a <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/g20-tourism-working-group-set-to-finalise-ministerial-communique-at-meeting-in-srinagar-101682417087282.html">Tourism Working Group meeting</a> in Srinagar, in Indian-administered Kashmir, in late May.</p>
<p>New Delhi wants to show the world that <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/13/india-kashmir-g20-meeting-autonomy-repression-elections/">normalcy has returned</a> to the picturesque, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/india-mixed-reactions-to-major-lithium-discovery/a-65016836">resource-rich</a> region and that the disputed territory is <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/g20-meet-in-kashmir-inside-indias-plan-to-pitch-jk-as-a-tourist-destination-again/articleshow/99344682.cms">open to visitors</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indias-jammu-kashmir-gets-first-foreign-investment-dubais-emaar-2023-03-20/">investors</a>. </p>
<p>The iconic <a href="https://kashmirreader.com/2023/05/10/dal-lake-cleaning-on-in-double-shifts-for-g20-meeting-in-srinagar-officials/">Dal Lake will form the backdrop for the meeting</a>. International delegates will also visit <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/03/20/693517010/surrounded-by-military-barracks-skiers-shred-the-himalayan-slopes-of-indian-kash">Gulmarg</a>, a popular winter destination, under <a href="https://sundayguardianlive.com/news/security-increased-in-jk-ahead-of-srinagar-g20-meet">tight security provided by India’s Ministry of Home Affairs</a>.</p>
<p>The route to Gulmarg is lined with barbed wire. Armed soldiers keep watch from fortified bunkers. The resort town is near the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-263B-8246">Line of Control</a> that <a href="https://politicalandlegalanthro.org/2020/07/30/which-kashmir-pakistan-wala-ya-india-konsa-kashmir-pakistans-or-indias/">bifurcates Kashmir</a> into Indian-held and Pakistani-held areas. </p>
<p>Hosting G20 delegates in Srinagar is a step towards normalizing India’s occupation of Kashmir internationally. But Kashmiris continue to demand their right to self-determination in accordance with <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/declaration-granting-independence-colonial-countries-and-peoples">international law</a> and <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/47">United Nations resolutions</a>. </p>
<p>International attendance of the meeting will seriously undermine their efforts.</p>
<p>In Canada, the NDP has called on the federal government to <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/ndp-wants-boycott-of-g20-events-in-india-s-kashmir-region-citing-human-rights-issues-1.6177173">boycott any G20 meetings that take place in Kashmir</a>, citing the Indian government’s human rights abuses. However, the Trudeau government has reportedly <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/canada-trudeau-led-govt-pushes-back-against-pressure-from-key-political-ally-to-boycott-g20-events-in-india-101670217416714.html">ignored those calls</a>.</p>
<h2>Normalizing occupation</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/chandigarh-news/srinagars-lal-chowk-readies-for-g20-summit-with-smart-city-project-officials-set-10-day-deadline-for-completion-of-works-101681367122782.html">Beautification projects</a> are underway in Srinagar on an industrial scale. These revitalization campaigns are designed to <a href="http://risingkashmir.com/kashmir-getting-ready-to-showcase-its-beauty-to-g20-delegates">create a sanitized image of Kashmir</a> for foreign delegates. The region remains troubled by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/7/8/un-report-on-kashmir-calls-for-probe-into-human-rights-violations">violence and human rights abuses</a>, as well as <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/press-freedom-chilled-kashmir-reporting-criminalized-rcna35132">draconian media restrictions</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/21/kashmiri-journalist-irfan-mehraj-arrested-under-terrorism-charges">Human rights activists and journalists are being arrested</a> and there have been reports of hundreds of <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/chandigarh-news/former-j-k-cm-mehbooba-mufti-alleges-youth-arrests-ahead-of-g20-meeting-in-srinagar-questions-security-lapses-and-civilian-deaths-in-custody-101682795937372.html">young people being detained</a> by security forces. </p>
<p>Urban renewal in Srinagar is a tool of displacement and dislocation. I spoke with Asghar, a long-time Kashmiri resident of Srinagar, over the phone earlier this month. He described how urban redevelopment projects are changing certain sections of the city entirely. This, coupled with the government’s <a href="https://thewire.in/government/kashmir-name-changing">name-changing spree</a>, is creating a sense of alienation for locals who feel out of place in their own homeland.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526598/original/file-20230516-23757-xyaqib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A town on the banks of a lake with light blue waters. Green mountains are seen in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526598/original/file-20230516-23757-xyaqib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526598/original/file-20230516-23757-xyaqib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526598/original/file-20230516-23757-xyaqib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526598/original/file-20230516-23757-xyaqib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526598/original/file-20230516-23757-xyaqib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526598/original/file-20230516-23757-xyaqib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526598/original/file-20230516-23757-xyaqib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Kashmir’s iconic Dal Lake will form the backdrop for the upcoming meeting of the G20’s Tourism Working Group.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Indian government is planning to temporarily minimize the visible presence of troops in <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/explained-kashmir-the-most-militarised-zone-in-the-world/z9s3tx5cq">the heavily militarized region</a> by building <a href="https://www.news9live.com/india/j-k-smart-bunkers-to-be-constructed-in-srinagar-ahin9-2111941">“smart bunkers.”</a> These are bunkers painted in pastel tones and subtly positioned so they remain unnoticed by foreign visitors.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjxq9fD6Oz-AhWLFFkFHX9yCLYQFnoECAoQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fkashmircentral.in%2Fa-gift-of-smart-policing%2F&usg=AOvVaw3rHMSokt7ZZNdMAsoCifpq">“Smart policing”</a> is also underway. This includes security agencies monitoring social media, gathering local intelligence, and <a href="https://www.greaterkashmir.com/todays-paper/front-page/new-surveillance-system-in-offing-as-police-eye-major-reforms">surveillance through CCTV cameras and aerial drones</a>.</p>
<p>Police officers handling foreign delegates are being <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/smart-policing-slick-bunkers-for-upcoming-g-20-meeting-in-srinagar/article66759927.ece">trained to display a softer and more polite image</a>. This is in sharp contrast to the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa20/1874/2015/en/">treatment of Kashmiris by Indian security personnel</a>.</p>
<h2>G20 and tourism</h2>
<p>Founded in 2020, the G20’s <a href="https://www.g20.org/en/workstreams/sherpa-track/">Tourism Working Group</a> guides the development of local and global tourism among G20 countries with an eye to achieving the UN’s <a href="https://tourism4sdgs.org/tourism-for-sdgs/tourism-and-sdgs/">2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development</a>.</p>
<p>The G20 meeting is the first global event to be held in the Kashmir valley since India unilaterally removed the region’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/08/05/indias-settler-colonial-project-kashmir-takes-disturbing-turn/">semi-autonomous status in 2019</a>. Since then, the region has undergone significant <a href="https://scroll.in/article/946888/under-presidents-rule-jammu-kashmir-is-axing-1471-trees-in-designated-forests">rezoning and re-districting</a>.</p>
<p>Semi-autonomous status <a href="https://time.com/5644356/india-kashmir-article-370/">granted Kashmiris some territorial and cultural rights</a> while living under Indian rule. The designation recognized that India was only a <a href="https://adimagazine.com/articles/kashmir-a-historical-timeline/">temporary administrator of Kashmir</a>. And that <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/kashmir-in-the-aftermath-of-partition/idea-of-plebiscite-discontent-and-regional-dissidence/C848022634E0E26F304F22B0546DAD27">Kashmiris had the right to ultimately decide their own future</a>.</p>
<p>Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/11/what-is-secret-to-success-of-india-s-bharatiya-janata-party-bjp-pub-77477">Bharatiya Janata Party</a> (BJP) long opposed Kashmir’s special status. Revoking it was in the party’s <a href="https://www.indiatoday.in/elections/lok-sabha-2019/story/bjp-top-promises-1496617-2019-04-08">2019 election manifesto</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/1k7gGTGuQsw?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Kashmir is divided by the Line of Control that separates the Indian- and Pakistani-controlled areas. It is one of the world’s most militarized regions.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Tourism is big business</h2>
<p>India is seeking <a href="https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/india/tourism-revenue">to capitalize</a> on the scenic beauty of the Kashmir valley that it illegally occupies. Domestic tourists from India visited Kashmir in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indias-jammu-kashmir-receives-most-tourists-75-years-2022-10-07/">record numbers last year</a>. </p>
<p>Since coming into power in 2014, Modi’s government has also <a href="https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/is-india-trying-to-subdue-kashmir-through-religious-tourism--18963">heavily promoted religious tourism</a> in the disputed territory. Last year an estimated one million people from all over India <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/30/amarnath-yatra-pilgrimage-begins-amid-heavy-security-in-kashmir">attended the annual Amarnath Yatra</a>, a 43-day Hindu pilgrimage, amid heavy security.</p>
<p>With the return of <a href="http://risingkashmir.com/srinagarsharjah-direct-flight-a-runaway-success-for-economy-of-jk">direct international air travel to Indian-administered Kashmir</a> and the construction of railway infrastructure that <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/travel/article/india-worlds-highest-railway-bridge-intl-hnk/index.html">connects the region to India</a>, the Indian government is determined to <a href="https://www.dailyexcelsior.com/this-village-in-jk-has-indias-biggest-international-yoga-centre/">open Kashmir to the world</a>.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the mobility of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/13/kashmir-srinagar-a-maze-of-razor-wires-and-steel-barriers">local Kashmiris</a> remains severely restricted. Ultimately, we must question what kind of <a href="https://jnp.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/default/article/view/85/86">connectivity is desired, by whom and for what purpose</a>.</p>
<h2>Tourism and settler-colonialism</h2>
<p>The Indian government sees Kashmir as an <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/jk-was-is-and-shall-forever-remain-its-integral-part-india-tells-pakistan-at-unhrc-meeting/articleshow/74318873.cms">“integral part”</a> of the country and wants to make its occupation permanent. Tourism plays a direct role in legitimizing and expanding the Indian control of Kashmiri lands.</p>
<p>Kashmir scholar <a href="https://www.unco.edu/news/newsroom/expert/ather-zia.aspx">Ather Zia</a> cautions against <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/s41301-020-00234-4">uncritically accepting tourism as a form of development</a>. Tourism in settler-colonial contexts is an extension of imperial politics. It is the process by which colonized lands are absorbed by a hegemonic state. </p>
<p>This is achieved by fostering a sense of attachment for those with little or no connection to occupied lands. The Indian government has <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/property-/-cstruction/all-you-need-to-know-about-buying-property-in-jammu-kashmir/articleshow/70695987.cms?from=mdr">weaponized the law</a> to make it easier for Indians to visit and settle in Kashmir, disavowing and erasing Indigenous Kashmiri claims to the same lands.</p>
<p>The Indian government also aims to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/16/new-delhis-demographic-designs-in-kashmir/?link_id=25&can_id=ef6e9f45e275fbd2fe97ce05c408ec57&source=email-take-action-tell-ontario-ndp-to-apologize-to-sarah-jama-and-stand-in-solidarity-with-detained-palestinians&email_referrer=email_1911306&email_subject=take-action-canada-must-withdraw-from-the-g20-meetings-in-indian-occupied-kashmir">change the demographics</a> in the Muslim-majority region in favor of Hindus.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526020/original/file-20230513-99298-1vu8dp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A young woman wearing a white hijab waving a small banner with the G20 logo on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526020/original/file-20230513-99298-1vu8dp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526020/original/file-20230513-99298-1vu8dp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526020/original/file-20230513-99298-1vu8dp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526020/original/file-20230513-99298-1vu8dp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526020/original/file-20230513-99298-1vu8dp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526020/original/file-20230513-99298-1vu8dp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526020/original/file-20230513-99298-1vu8dp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Kashmiri students participate in an event ahead of the G20 Tourism Working Group meeting that will be held from May 22-24 in Srinagar, Indian-administered Kashmir.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Mukhtar Khan)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Decolonizing tourism</h2>
<p>All of this raises questions about the ethics of tourism in occupied territories.</p>
<p>Indigenous governance and Native Hawaiian scholar <a href="https://www.uvic.ca/hsd/igov/people/faculty/h%C5%8Dk%C5%ABlani--h%C5%8Dk%C5%ABlani.php">Hōkūlani K. Aikau</a> and <a href="https://manoa.hawaii.edu/undergrad/honors/3980-2/">Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez</a> argue that
colonialism is the <a href="https://read.dukeupress.edu/books/book/2667/DetoursA-Decolonial-Guide-to-Hawai-i">ultimate breach of guest protocol that violates a welcome that was never extended</a>. By visiting areas under occupation, tourists, unknowingly or knowingly, reproduce the violent colonization of peoples and places.</p>
<p>Those visiting Kashmir must first learn about the <a href="https://standwithkashmir.org/the-kashmir-syllabus/">decolonial history of the region</a>, one that honours Kashmiri calls for self-determination and sovereignty. They must follow the principle of <a href="https://bdsmovement.net/pacbi/ethical-tourism">do no harm</a> by not visiting tourist sites or using tour operators run by Indian authorities. They should support local Kashmiri-run businesses as much as possible.</p>
<p>There is no simple resolution for tourism on occupied lands. Tourism amid settler-colonialism manifests in exploitation, dispossession, commodification and other injustices and inequities. The goal of <a href="https://floridaseminoletourism.com/centering-anti-colonial-travel/">ethical travel</a> is not immediate perfection or self-exoneration. It is an invitation to think about our own actions and complicity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205166/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Omer Aijazi receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) to conduct research in Kashmir and Northern Pakistan.</span></em></p>In Indian-administered Kashmir, the Indian government is using tourism as a tactic to strengthen its colonial control of the region.Omer Aijazi, Visiting Researcher in Anthropology, University of VictoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2040522023-05-11T14:28:45Z2023-05-11T14:28:45ZSouth Africa walks a tightrope of international alliances - it needs Russia, China and the west<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524899/original/file-20230508-20523-doks87.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">China's President Xi Jinping, left, and Russian President Vladimir Putin cement bonds at the Kremlin in March. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Vladimir Astapkovich/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images.</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Relations between the People’s Republic of China and Russia on one hand and the west, specifically the US, on the other have become increasingly tense in recent times. For the US, China and Russia <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf#page=7">represent authoritarian regimes</a>. For China, the US is the <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230220_11027664.html">source</a> of global insecurity. </p>
<p>With a few exceptions like <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-china-america-pressure-interview/">France</a> and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-65382211">UK</a>, the west sees the presence of Russia and China in the BRICS bloc (which also includes Brazil, India and South Africa) as contaminating the entire bloc as well as their relations with the individual BRICS member countries. This is especially so for the US.</p>
<p>This view reflects the <a href="https://theconversation.com/united-states-the-end-of-an-illusion-of-omnipotence-186421">weakening global power</a> of the US, especially its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jul/29/putin-ruble-west-sanctions-russia-europe">inability to isolate Russia in Europe</a> and to contain the influence of China in Asia and the developing world. </p>
<p>The growing tensions pose a political and economic challenge for South Africa. This is especially so for US-South Africa relations. Part of my <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/84257">doctoral thesis</a> focused on BRICS and its efforts to democratise the post-Cold War international order, which, by US admission, has <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf">come to an end</a>. This is an important admission because the US is <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/04/27/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-renewing-american-economic-leadership-at-the-brookings-institution/?s=09">aware</a> that the unilateral power it used to interact with the rest of the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 is now subject to competition by many forces, both economic and political. </p>
<p>I argue that South Africa should not choose between its BRICS or EU and US partnerships. It should keep its relations with the west while remaining within BRICS because of its economic prospects. The west remains economically significant for South Africa, but the BRICS bloc is important for South Africa’s economic adaptability. </p>
<h2>The BRICS bloc</h2>
<p>BRICS is effectively a forum for cooperation among regional powers that seek to democratise the international political economy. The bloc has used the (<a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/organisations/g20">G20</a>) platform – the group of 19 industrialised countries plus the European Union – to establish cohesion on issues such as international financial stability, climate change mitigation and sustainable development. </p>
<p>At its 2011 summit, the bloc called for an end to the long reign of the US dollar as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-other-developing-brics-nations%20seek-change-in-global-economic-order/2011/04/14/AFarMgdD_story.html">the world’s reserve currency</a> (de-dollarisation). The <a href="https://www.thebalancemoney.com/2008-financial-crisis-3305679">2008 credit crisis</a> had illustrated the inadequacy of the world monetary system, with <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/brics-seek-lower-dependence-on-dollar-higher-scrutiny-of-commodity-futures/articleshow/7986576.cms?from=mdr">the US dollar at the centre</a>. But it was the Russia-Ukraine war, when <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/20/sanctions-war-russia-ukraine-year-on-vladimir-putin">US sanctions against Russia backfired</a>, which quickened efforts at de-dollarisation. </p>
<p>The emergence of BRICS not only strengthens south-south relations, it weakens the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/brandt-line-after-forty-years-the-more-northsouth-relations-change-the-more-they-stay-the-same/8646CE553D2F986BD33B67352FFC5814">inequality</a> that characterises north-south relations. Much of the global south is developing fast enough for it to not only demand a more equitable world order, but also to finance it. </p>
<p>This brings us to international governance.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-and-russia-president-cyril-ramaphosas-foreign-policy-explained-198430">South Africa and Russia: President Cyril Ramaphosa's foreign policy explained</a>
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<p>The BRICS bloc serves as a counterweight to some of the excesses of US unilateralism that’s been a feature of global governance since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-fall-of-the-berlin-wall-30-years-ago-resonated-across-africa-126521">end of the Soviet Union in 1989</a>. For instance, although the 2001 NATO invasion of Afghanistan was illegal under <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2013/11/06/was-the-nato-invasion-of-afghanistan-legal/">international law</a> and the 2003 invasion of Iraq was equally <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq">unlawful</a>, neither the US nor NATO have been prosecuted. Thus, the US has for some time undermined global governance. </p>
<p>The BRICS bloc’s efforts to democratise global governance will support international accountability.</p>
<p>Democratising financial and governance institutions is important in addressing many of the issues that concern the developing world.</p>
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<img alt="Two men shake hands in from of Chinese and South African flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524903/original/file-20230508-247781-sxlgnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524903/original/file-20230508-247781-sxlgnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524903/original/file-20230508-247781-sxlgnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524903/original/file-20230508-247781-sxlgnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524903/original/file-20230508-247781-sxlgnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524903/original/file-20230508-247781-sxlgnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524903/original/file-20230508-247781-sxlgnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">South African president Cyril Ramaphosa with President Xi Jinping.</span>
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<p>The emergence of the BRICS bloc has overshadowed the G7+ meetings while centralising the G20 as an international platform for political and economic coordination. So South Africa’s <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/japan-invites-african-union-to-g7-excludes-south-africa-20230417">exclusion</a> from May 2023’s G7+ meeting in Japan doesn’t count for much. </p>
<h2>South Africa and the west</h2>
<p>Pretoria’s biggest trading partners are the EU and the US. South Africa is the largest US and EU trading partner in Africa, with the US totalling R289 billion (about US$16 billion in 2021) and the EU totalling a trade of <a href="https://www.tralac.org/documents/publications/trade-data-analysis/4471-south-africa-global-trade-update-2021/file.html">R699 billion (about US$ 38 billion in 2021</a>. </p>
<p>South Africa also benefits from the preferential access to US markets for some of its exports in terms of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (<a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16131-agoa-time-as-2025-approaches-opportunities-for-improvements-eyed.html#:%7E:text=AGOA%20is%20set%20to%20expire,how%20it%20should%20be%20extended.">AGOA</a>.</p>
<p>But the country is politically tied to the emergent multipolar world led by China, and broadly BRICS.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-foreign-policy-new-paper-sets-the-scene-but-falls-short-on-specifics-188253">South Africa's foreign policy: new paper sets the scene, but falls short on specifics</a>
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<p>Even France and the UK have begun to understand the need to balance their own interests with China against their interests with their traditional ally, the US. </p>
<p>So South Africa’s national interests demand that it carefully navigate western anxieties caused by its BRICS ties. It needs to show that its membership of the bloc doesn’t make it anti-west.</p>
<h2>BRICS’ growing economic importance</h2>
<p>Immediately after South Africa joined BRICS in 2010, China invested in several projects, including expanding Durban’s <a href="https://orcasia.org/2022/07/china-in-the-indian-ocean-region-ports-and-bases/#:%7E:text=Port%20of%20Durban%2D%20The%20Durban,by%20Shanghai%20Zhenhua%20Heavy%20Industries.">port</a>. This is the largest and busiest shipping terminal in sub-Saharan Africa. </p>
<p>Trade and investment links between South Africa and China have improved too. By the end of 2021, South Africa’s exports to China reached over US$33 billion and China’s investment into South Africa <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/202204/t20220416_10668699.html">totalled</a> over US$25 billion, creating over 400,000 local jobs since 2008. </p>
<p>Investments from South Africa into BRICS countries have surged since it became a bloc member. BRICS total trade amounted to <a href="https://www.tralac.org/documents/publications/trade-data-analysis/4471-south-africa-global-trade-update-2021/file.html">R666 billion</a> (about US$36 billion] in 2021. And China is an important trading partner for South Africa standing at R479 billion (about US$26 billion), above the US. </p>
<p>Trade between South Africa and BRICS has yet to reach the level of trade with the EU and the US, but the BRICS bloc gives the country an opportunity to diversity its investment portfolio and destination. </p>
<p>China has <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CN">1.4 billion people</a> and the US has just over <a href="https://www.census.gov/popclock/">300 million</a>, so market access to China is important to any emerging economy. BRICS countries are currently responsible for roughly 31.5% of the global <a href="https://thenewscrypto.com/economic-power-shift-brics-nations-outpace-g7-in-global-gdp/">GDP</a> while the G7 have come down to roughly 30%. </p>
<h2>Navitaging anxieties</h2>
<p>Of course, the problem of South Africa’s strained relations with the west is not South Africa’s. The problem is that the west, specifically the unilateral power that the US represents, approaches the global order as if it’s a process that flows from its benevolence. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-values-interests-and-power-must-shape-south-africas-foreign-policy-150478">How values, interests and power must shape South Africa's foreign policy</a>
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<p>For its own interests, South Africa must carefully navigate western anxieties about BRICS, and demonstrate that there is a common future for both the west and others in a multipolar world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204052/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thapelo Tselapedi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US’s negative attitude towards BRICS reflects its own weakening global power, especially its inability to isolate Russia in Europe and to contain China’s growing influence.Thapelo Tselapedi, Politics lecturer, Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2000342023-02-23T19:57:31Z2023-02-23T19:57:31Z$1 trillion in the shade – the annual profits multinational corporations shift to tax havens continues to climb and climb<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512027/original/file-20230223-2492-ja174s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=45%2C32%2C1033%2C685&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Looks like paradise – especially if you're a multinational corporation in need of a tax haven.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/relaxing-on-hammock-after-a-beach-day-in-the-royalty-free-image/897476216?phrase=cayman%20islands">LeoPatrizi/E+ via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512024/original/file-20230223-18-7m6a9x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512024/original/file-20230223-18-7m6a9x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=255&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512024/original/file-20230223-18-7m6a9x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=255&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512024/original/file-20230223-18-7m6a9x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=255&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512024/original/file-20230223-18-7m6a9x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=321&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512024/original/file-20230223-18-7m6a9x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=321&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512024/original/file-20230223-18-7m6a9x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=321&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>About a decade ago, the world’s biggest economies <a href="https://www.oecd.org/g20/summits/los-cabos/">agreed to crack down</a> on multinational corporations’ abusive use of tax havens. This <a href="https://doi.org/10.1787/23132612">resulted in a 15-point action plan</a> that aimed to curb practices that shielded a large chunk of corporate profits from tax authorities.</p>
<p>But, according to our estimates, it hasn’t worked. Instead of reining in the use of tax havens – countries such as the Bahamas and Cayman Islands with very low or no effective tax rates – the problem has only gotten worse. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2022/254-6">By our reckoning</a>, corporations shifted nearly US$1 trillion in profits earned outside of their home countries to tax havens in 2019, up from $616 billion in 2015, the year before the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1787/23132612">global tax haven plan was implemented</a> by the group of 20 leading economies, also known as the G-20. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2022/254-6">In a new study</a>, we measured the excessive profits reported in tax havens that cannot be explained by ordinary economic activity such as employees, factories and research in that country. Our findings – which you can explore in more detail along with the data and an interactive map in <a href="https://missingprofits.world">our public database</a> – show a striking pattern of artificial shifting of paper profits to tax havens by corporations, which has been relentless since the 1980s. </p>
<h2>Global crackdown</h2>
<p>The current effort to curb the legal corporate practice of using tax havens to avoid paying taxes began in June 2012, when world leaders at the <a href="https://www.oecd.org/g20/summits/los-cabos/">G-20 meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico</a>, agreed on the need to do something.</p>
<p>The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a group of 37 democracies with market-based economies, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1787/23132612">developed a plan that consisted</a> of 15 tangible actions it believed would significantly limit abusive corporate tax practices. These included creating a single set of international tax rules and cracking down on harmful tax practices.</p>
<p>In 2015, the G-20 adopted the plan officially, and implementation began across the world the following year.</p>
<p>In addition, following leaks like the <a href="https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/">Panama Papers</a> and <a href="https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/">Paradise Papers</a> – which shed light on dodgy corporate tax practices – public outrage led <a href="https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-a-comparison-for-businesses">governments in the U.S.</a> and Europe to initiate their own efforts to lower the incentive to shift profits to tax havens. </p>
<h2>Profit-shifting soars</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2022/254-6">Our research shows</a> all these efforts appear to have had little impact. </p>
<p>We found that the world’s biggest multinational businesses shifted 37% of the profits – or $969 billion – they earned in other countries (outside the headquarter country) to tax havens in 2019, up from about 20% in 2012 when G-20 leaders met in Los Cabos and agreed to crack down. The figure was less than 2% back in the 1970s. The main reasons for the large increase were the growth of the tax avoidance industry in the 1980s and U.S. policies that made it easier to shift profits from high-tax countries to tax havens.</p>
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<p>We also estimate that the amount of corporate taxes lost as a result reached 10% of total corporate revenue in 2019, up from less than 0.1% in the 1970s. </p>
<p>In 2019, the total government tax loss globally was $250 billion. U.S. multinational corporations alone accounted for about half of that, followed by the U.K. and Germany.</p>
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<h2>Global minimum tax</h2>
<p>How do policymakers fix this?</p>
<p>So far, the world as a whole has been trying to solve this problem by cutting or scrapping corporate taxes, albeit in a very gradual way. In the past 40 years, the global effective corporate tax rate <a href="http://globaltaxation.world/">has fallen from 23% to 17%</a>. At the same time, governments have relied more heavily on <a href="https://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/PikettySaezZucman2022RKT.pdf">consumption taxes</a>, which are regressive and tend to increase income inequality.</p>
<p>But the root cause of profit-shifting is the incentives involved, such as generous or lenient corporate tax rates in other countries. If countries could agree on a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24437292">global minimum corporate tax rate</a> of, say, 20%, the problem of profit-shifting would, in our estimation, largely disappear, as tax havens would simply cease to exist. </p>
<p>This type of mechanism is exactly what more than <a href="https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/130-countries-and-jurisdictions-join-bold-new-framework-for-international-tax-reform.htm">130 countries signed onto in 2021</a>, with implementation of a 15% minimum tax set to begin in 2024 in the EU, U.K., Japan, Indonesia and many other countries. While the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-biden-poland-2577a450b3cb18f325d61e9920e2593d">Biden administration has helped spearhead</a> the global effort to implement the tax, the U.S. <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/15/manchin-rejects-global-tax-plan-00046103">has notably not been able</a> to get legislation through Congress. </p>
<p>Our research suggests implementing this type of tax reform is necessary to reverse the shift of ever-greater amounts of corporate profits going to tax havens – instead of being taxed by the governments where they operate and create value.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200034/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ludvig Wier is also Head of Secretariat at the Danish Ministry of Finance, holds a PhD from the University of Copenhagen and does research for UNU-WIDER, which provided funding for the underlying research in this story. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ministry of Finance of Denmark, UNU-WIDER, the United Nations University, nor its program/project donors. All data are available online at <a href="https://missingprofits.world">https://missingprofits.world</a>.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabriel Zucman receives funding from the Stone Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, the European Research Council, and the European Commission grant TAXUD/2020/DE/326.</span></em></p>New research shows that companies are shifting record amounts of their profits to tax havens, despite a global effort to crack down on the practice.Ludvig Wier, External Lecturer of Economics, University of CopenhagenGabriel Zucman, Associate Professor of Economics, University of California, BerkeleyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1990682023-02-06T17:17:42Z2023-02-06T17:17:42ZIs Canada back on the world stage — or irrelevant?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508353/original/file-20230206-31-rmkopb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4928%2C2973&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Canadian and German troops take part in a Canadian flag-raising ceremony as the first Canadian troops arrived at a UN base in Gao, Mali, in June 2018. Was the initiative just an exercise in box-checking for Justin Trudeau's government?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Sean Kilpatrick</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-34586005">“Canada is back,” Justin Trudeau proclaimed triumphantly just after being elected prime minister in 2015.</a> The insinuation was that his predecessor, Stephen Harper, had withdrawn Canada from its traditional role in the world and the Liberals would restore our rightful place of leadership in the global firmament. </p>
<p>After seven plus years in office, it’s time to assess the degree to which Trudeau’s rhetoric has been matched with action.</p>
<p>Out of the blocks, the Trudeau government mounted a vigorous campaign for a seat on the United Nations Security Council. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53087650">When the vote came down in 2020, Canada lost to Norway and Ireland.</a> The only consolation was that the Harper government had failed in its attempt to get on the council 10 years earlier, <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/99271/canada-loses-un-security-council-seat-despite-guarantees/">losing to Portugal.</a></p>
<p>The Liberals also committed to bolster Canada’s contributions to United Nations “<a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2484248-liberal-party-of-canada-2015-platform.html">peace operations</a>.” So began a search for a comfortable mission fit for Canada. After three years of deliberations, Ottawa chose the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). </p>
<p><a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/op-presence.html">The Royal Canadian Air Force deployed eight helicopters into MINUSMA in 2018-19.</a> Ottawa’s decision to limit the operation to one year — to reduce both cost and risk — ensured it would have no meaningful impact on a UN mission that remains ongoing after a decade. </p>
<p>Canada’s sojourn into Mali isn’t evidence of getting back into UN peace operations. It is box-checking. <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/list.html">Today, Canada has fewer than 50 Canadian Armed Forces personnel scattered among about half of the 12 UN operations around the world.</a></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two soldiers in battle fatigues stand in a dusty field and watch as a helicopter approaches." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508384/original/file-20230206-25-vyfx33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508384/original/file-20230206-25-vyfx33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508384/original/file-20230206-25-vyfx33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508384/original/file-20230206-25-vyfx33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508384/original/file-20230206-25-vyfx33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508384/original/file-20230206-25-vyfx33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508384/original/file-20230206-25-vyfx33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Canadian soldiers watch as a Canadian helicopter provides air security during a demonstration for Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on the United Nations base in Gao, Mali in December 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Left out of AUKUS</h2>
<p>In 2021, the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia — Canada’s partners, along with New Zealand, in the <a href="https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-five-eyes-the-intelligence-alliance-of-the-anglosphere/">“Five Eyes” intelligence sharing alliance</a> — signed a deal known as AUKUS. </p>
<p>AUKUS is a trilateral agreement aimed at countering Chinese territorial ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/">It’s focused on the sharing of nuclear submarine technology, advanced cyber, hypersonics, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence and quantum technologies</a>.</p>
<p>It would be one thing if Ottawa took a hard look at this agreement and decided to take a pass. But Canada was neither considered for nor consulted on AUKUS. <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-canadian-government-surprised-by-new-indo-pacific-security-pact/">The Trudeau government learned about its existence through the media.</a> </p>
<p>Shortly after the AUKUS announcement, U.S. President Joe Biden, whose country shares with Canada the longest undefended border in the world, <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/biden-says-australia-closest-ally-at-inflection-point-in-history-20210922-p58tnb">stated that America has no closer ally than Australia.</a></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508362/original/file-20230206-19-zl2y0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508362/original/file-20230206-19-zl2y0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508362/original/file-20230206-19-zl2y0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508362/original/file-20230206-19-zl2y0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508362/original/file-20230206-19-zl2y0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508362/original/file-20230206-19-zl2y0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508362/original/file-20230206-19-zl2y0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and U.S. President Joe Biden attend the Japan-U.S.-Australia-India Fellowship founding celebration event in Tokyo in May 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Yuichi Yamazaki/Pool Photo via AP)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Indo-Pacific region</h2>
<p>On the Indo-Pacific file, the Trudeau government unveiled its <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique/index.aspx?lang=eng">strategy for the region</a> in November. <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/01/04/reinventing-the-indo-pacific">As <em>The Economist</em> recently pointed out</a>, numerous countries have joined the Indo-Pacific strategy bandwagon (though Canada was not mentioned in the article) owing to an increasingly threatening China. </p>
<p>So what does Ottawa’s Indo-Pacific strategy do to enhance Canada’s contribution to defence and security in that part of the world?</p>
<p>Under the pre-existing <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-projection.html">Operation PROJECTION</a>, Canada sent two frigates a year to take part in multinational naval operations in the Indo-Pacific. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/11/minister-anand-announces-defence-and-security-elements-of-canadas-indo-pacific-strategy.html">The government’s new Indo-Pacific Strategy will boost this frequency to three frigate visits per year.</a> It’s an increment that barely qualifies as symbolic in a region encompassing 235 million square kilometres of ocean, 40 countries and four billion people. </p>
<h2>Cameroon, tanks to Ukraine</h2>
<p>Recently, however, it appeared the Liberals had finally found their footing in an area of international affairs in which they feel comfortable — <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2023/01/statement-on-peace-process-in-cameroon.html">facilitating a peace process in Cameroon between the government and separatist groups</a>.</p>
<p>“Canada has accepted the mandate to facilitate this process as part of our commitment to promote peace and security and advance support for democracy and human rights,” <a href="https://www.cp24.com/news/canada-to-facilitate-cameroon-peace-process-foreign-affairs-minister-joly-1.6240370">Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly said on Jan. 20.</a></p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1616677145597677570"}"></div></p>
<p>Three days later, however, Cameroon’s government begged to differ. Cameroon <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/24/cameroon-denies-asking-for-help-to-mediate-separatist-conflict">“has not entrusted any foreign country or external entity with any role of mediator or facilitator to settle the crisis,”</a> a Cameroonian government minister stated. </p>
<p>More recently, there are tanks to Ukraine. </p>
<p>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) just crossed an important threshold. <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-invasion-day-336-1.6725190">More than a dozen member states have now agreed to supply Ukraine with strategically important main battle tanks</a> in the effort to drive Russian ground forces out of Ukraine. </p>
<p>The Canadian Army has 82 Leopard 2 tanks in its arsenal. They have not been deployed since the Canadian Armed Forces withdrew from Afghanistan a decade ago. <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2023/01/defence-minister-anita-anand-announces-that-canada-will-supply-ukraine-with-leopard-2-battle-tanks-training-and-sustainment.html">On Jan. 26, Defence Minister Anita Anand announced Canada would donate four Leopards to Ukraine</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A tank is seen on dusty terrain." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508390/original/file-20230206-23-gvbqjq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508390/original/file-20230206-23-gvbqjq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508390/original/file-20230206-23-gvbqjq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508390/original/file-20230206-23-gvbqjq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508390/original/file-20230206-23-gvbqjq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508390/original/file-20230206-23-gvbqjq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508390/original/file-20230206-23-gvbqjq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Canadian Forces Leopard 2A4 tank displays its firepower on the firing range at CFB Gagetown in Oromocto, N.B., in 2012.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/David Smith</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Tied with Portugal</h2>
<p>At least this time around Canada did not lose to Portugal … we tied them. </p>
<p>Canada <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/media-portugal-preparing-to-hand-over-four-leopard-2-tanks-to-ukraine">and Portugal</a> hold the distinction of committing the fewest number of tanks among the NATO states sending them to Ukraine. </p>
<p>The record seems clear under Trudeau’s leadership. Canada — a member of the G7, present at the creation of the UN and NATO, inventor of UN peacekeeping, co-inventor of the G20, and a founding member of the Five Eyes — is not back in the world. </p>
<p>Canada is largely irrelevant.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199068/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eugene Lang is a consultant/advisor to the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries; Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute; and Senior Fellow, Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History, Trinity College, University of Toronto. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not represent those of any organizations to which he is affiliated.</span></em></p>Far from Canada being back as a major player on the world stage, its presence has been diminished under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.Eugene Lang, Assistant Professor (Continuing Adjunct), School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, OntarioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1948992022-11-18T16:56:01Z2022-11-18T16:56:01ZWhy did Xi scold Trudeau? Maybe because Canada spent years helping China erode human rights<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496020/original/file-20221117-19-o0udct.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=173%2C40%2C5264%2C4426&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Prime Minister Justin Trudeau talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping after taking part in the closing session at the G20 Leaders Summit in Bali, Indonesia on Nov. 16, 2022</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Sean Kilpatrick</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Chinese president Xi Jinping has given Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau a <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-justin-trudeau-xi-1.6653939">well-publicized dressing-down</a>, accusing him of leaking to the media the contents of a meeting between the two leaders about <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/mps-probe-chinese-interference-elections-1.6651121">alleged Chinese interference in the 2019 federal election. </a></p>
<p>The confrontation has grabbed attention around the world and sparked debate about the ways diplomatic conversations are communicated to the public.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1593387487447384064"}"></div></p>
<p>It’s also an object lesson in diplomatic communication as Xi was apparently trying to push Canada back towards an earlier Canadian stance that accepted closed-door discussion. Chinese leaders believe they can push Canada around, because Canadian governments have been broadcasting for decades that they don’t mind being pushed around.</p>
<p>That’s one reason why China feels free to <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-which-canadians-are-left-in-chinese-prisons-as-kovrig-and-spavor-are/">arrest Canadian citizens</a> like <a href="https://www.amnesty.ca/huseyin-celil/">Huseyin Celil</a>, “re-educate” Uighurs and thumb its nose at the global human rights system.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-diplomatic-boycott-of-the-2022-beijing-olympic-games-could-bring-huseyin-celil-home-170167">A diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Beijing Olympic Games could bring Huseyin Celil home</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Started with Jean Chrétien</h2>
<p>To see how we got here, we need only look to <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/chretien-too-timid-on-human-rights-activists-say/article1030171/">Jean Chrétien’s Liberal government of the 1990s</a>. </p>
<p>Canada was among the world’s top enablers for Chinese Communist Party rights violations. In the 1990s, it helped the CCP undermine the international human rights system. We’re now living with consequences of an eroded, weakened rights system.</p>
<p>Beginning in 1997, Canada, along with other countries, began to hold what they called “<a href="https://www.dd-rd.ca/canadas-bilateral-human-rights-dialogue-with-china-considerations-for-a-policy-review-page-1/">bilateral human rights dialogues</a>.” Under the Chrétien government, Canada opened three dialogues — with China, Cuba and Indonesia. Not coincidentally, all three were countries that were then criticized by Canadian human rights activists for their poor human rights records. </p>
<p>The three new “dialogues” were a government effort to demonstrate some action on rights without actually imposing any sort of sanctions.</p>
<p>The Chrétien Liberals <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/03/29/canada-eyeing-vast-chinese-market-deemphasizes-rights-issues/5f505745-00e7-4dcc-90ab-49f63b98944e/">opposed any sort of concrete action to pressure China on human rights, and just embraced trade</a>. After all, they argued, trade would make everybody wealthier, and that would lead to more democracy.</p>
<p>How did that work out?</p>
<p>Judging by recent events, not so well.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two men in suits chat. A Canadian flag is in front of one and the Chinese flag is in front of the other." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496023/original/file-20221117-13-pn6wl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496023/original/file-20221117-13-pn6wl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496023/original/file-20221117-13-pn6wl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496023/original/file-20221117-13-pn6wl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496023/original/file-20221117-13-pn6wl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496023/original/file-20221117-13-pn6wl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496023/original/file-20221117-13-pn6wl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jean Chrétien and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao chat at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing in October 2003 as the prime minister at the time kicked off a visit to China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(CP PHOTO/Paul Chiasson)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Scant results</h2>
<p>Far from changing things, these supposed human rights dialogues became an end in their own right, showing few measurable results and freezing out meaningful participation by civil society. They became an excuse to avoid multilateral action. </p>
<p>The dialogue with China ended in <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwix9emxlrb7AhXyj4kEHdYqALcQFnoECAkQAQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fspartan.ac.brocku.ca%2F%7Ecburton%2FAssessment%2520of%2520the%2520Canada-China%2520Bilateral%2520Human%2520Rights%2520Dialogue%252019APR06.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1iyy6mJNYzi5_dpTeRR0YY">ignominious failure</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496032/original/file-20221117-16464-o6lv70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man and a dark-haired woman disembark from a plane that says Team Canada in both official languages." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496032/original/file-20221117-16464-o6lv70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496032/original/file-20221117-16464-o6lv70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496032/original/file-20221117-16464-o6lv70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496032/original/file-20221117-16464-o6lv70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496032/original/file-20221117-16464-o6lv70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496032/original/file-20221117-16464-o6lv70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496032/original/file-20221117-16464-o6lv70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In February 2001, Jean Chrétien and his wife Aline, followed by Ontario Premier Mike Harris, arrive in Beijing for the start of the Team Canada Trade mission.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(CP PHOTO/Fred Chartrand)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/canadas-fruitless-human-rights-dialogue-with-china">Canada opened a “dialogue” with China in 1997</a>. At the same time, it stopped sponsoring an annual resolution on human rights in China at the United Nations <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/treaty-bodies/ccpr">Human Rights Committee</a>. The Chrétien government called this u-turn <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2010.9687296">“constructive engagement.”</a> </p>
<p>Instead of public criticism, the defence of this tactic went, Chrétien would bring up human rights quietly and privately while he was visiting China on his travelling jamborees to promote Canada-China trade — trips that he insisted on calling <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Feb/7372.htm">“Team Canada.”</a></p>
<h2>Providing an assist to China</h2>
<p>Dialogue with China sounded good. What “dialogue” actually meant, though, was Canada helped China achieve its major goal — <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/14/chinas-influence-global-human-rights-system">changing how the UN human rights system addresses rights violations</a>.</p>
<p>After the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48445934">Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989</a>, the Communist government in China started calling for “dialogue” about human rights with western countries. Premier Li Peng, the “butcher of Tiananmen,” <a href="https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/jia/jia_win9619.html">told the UN</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“China values human rights and stands ready to engage in discussion and co-operation with other countries on an equal footing on the question of human rights.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>What that meant was talking, quietly, in closed sessions, one-on-one. In open sessions, countries can advocate together with human rights groups. Behind closed doors, with only two governments present, Canada’s voice is that of a pipsqueak — and easy for the CCP to ignore.</p>
<p>“Bilateral human rights dialogues” replaced multilateral pressure. China could not have succeeded on its own. The system changed because governments like Canada’s helped it.</p>
<p>The result: China managed to alter international human rights norms at the UN, so much so that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/7/un-human-rights-council-rejects-debate-on-treatment-of-uighurs">it’s no longer possible</a> to even hold a debate on Uighur rights at the UN Human Rights Committee.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/un-report-on-chinas-abuse-of-uyghurs-is-stronger-than-expected-but-missing-a-vital-word-genocide-189917">UN report on China's abuse of Uyghurs is stronger than expected but missing a vital word: genocide</a>
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<hr>
<h2>Trade trumped rights</h2>
<p>Why did Canada help China’s leaders undermine human rights at the UN? The Chrétien government wanted trade with China. </p>
<p>Though Stephen Harper would criticize this valuing of “the almighty dollar” ahead of human rights, <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/how-harpers-foreign-policy-focus-evolved-from-human-rights-to-the-almighty-dollar/article15631389/">his own government ended up hugging China just as closely</a>. </p>
<p>As foreign affairs minister, John Baird shamelessly (and falsely) called China <a href="https://nationalpost.com/opinion/national-post-editorial-board-baird-shouldnt-refer-to-china-as-an-ally">an “ally.”</a> Harper signed a major <a href="https://thenarwhal.ca/harper-government-ratifies-controversial-canada-china-foreign-investment-deal/">trade deal with China</a>, returning to the bipartisan status quo on the Chinese.</p>
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<img alt="A dark-haired man whispers into the ear of a grey-haired man with glasses as a Chinese man stands next to them. The Canadian and Chinese flags are seen in front of them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496030/original/file-20221117-13-ov4wv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496030/original/file-20221117-13-ov4wv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496030/original/file-20221117-13-ov4wv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496030/original/file-20221117-13-ov4wv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496030/original/file-20221117-13-ov4wv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496030/original/file-20221117-13-ov4wv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496030/original/file-20221117-13-ov4wv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Stephen Harper speaks with John Baird while they stand next to Wen Jiabao, premier of the People’s Republic of China, in Beijing in February 2012.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld</span></span>
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<p>Governments of both parties wanted trade. And both were willing to sacrifice human rights to get it. If previous governments had not aided and abetted China’s campaign to undermine the UN human rights system, we might not be where we are today with China.</p>
<p>It is this closed-doors style of bilateral relationship that Xi wants to force Trudeau back into, as he publicly showed in hectoring Trudeau in Bali. </p>
<p>He thought he could do so, because this is the lesson that the Chrétien and Harper governments conveyed to China’s leaders: don’t take us seriously when we talk about rights. </p>
<p>It’s a lesson that it will take a long time to overhaul – if the Trudeau government even truly wants to.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194899/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Webster receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p>Xi Jinping thought he could chastise Justin Trudeau because this is the lesson the Jean Chrétien and Stephen Harper governments had conveyed: Don’t take us seriously when we talk about rights.David Webster, Associate professor, Human Rights Studies, King's University College, Western UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1948732022-11-17T17:37:43Z2022-11-17T17:37:43ZUkraine recap: Poland missile scare a timely reminder of how dangerous this war is for everyone<p>The world held its breath on Tuesday afternoon when news reports came out of Poland that a missile had exploded in a village called Przewodów a few miles inside the the country’s border with Ukraine, killing two farmers. Could this be the moment that everyone has feared since the war began in February? For a time it appeared that this was a crisis that could spark escalation of the conflict beyond Ukraine’s borders into a Nato country, pulling the alliance inexorably into war with Russia and all that would entail.</p>
<p>It’s still not entirely clear how the missile was fired into Poland. All sides agree that the missile appears to have been a Russian-made S-300, a Soviet-era missile used by both Russia and Ukraine and designed for shooting down aircraft, drones and incoming cruise and ballistic missiles. </p>
<p>Examination of the missile’s trajectory made it clear the missile hadn’t been fired from Russia. There’s a growing consensus that it was most likely fired by Ukraine in self-defence against Russia’s massive missile bombardment, which Moscow declared had targeted military installations and energy infrastructure and had come no closer to the Polish border than 35km (22 miles).</p>
<p><strong><em>This is our weekly recap of expert analysis of the Ukraine conflict.</em></strong>
<em>The Conversation, a not-for-profit newsgroup, works with a wide range of academics across its global network to produce evidence-based analysis. Get these recaps in your inbox every Thursday. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapTop">Subscribe here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>But, as Nato expert Kenton White of the University of Reading writes, the fault-line that runs across Ukraine’s borders with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova and Romania – all Nato members – give these accidents an added sense of danger. Article 5 of the Nato treaty enshrines the principle of collective defence whereby an attack on one member is viewed as an attack on all members. </p>
<p>White believes that, while desperate not to allow this conflict to escalate into an intercontinental war, the alliance is bound to react by <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-poland-missile-incident-shows-how-dangerous-the-conflict-could-be-for-nato-194760">increasing its assistance</a> – military and otherwise – to Kyiv.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-poland-missile-incident-shows-how-dangerous-the-conflict-could-be-for-nato-194760">Ukraine war: Poland missile incident shows how dangerous the conflict could be for Nato</a>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495920/original/file-20221117-16-ib8v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ukraine and its neighbouring countries." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495920/original/file-20221117-16-ib8v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495920/original/file-20221117-16-ib8v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495920/original/file-20221117-16-ib8v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495920/original/file-20221117-16-ib8v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495920/original/file-20221117-16-ib8v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495920/original/file-20221117-16-ib8v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495920/original/file-20221117-16-ib8v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Dangerous neighbourhood for a war.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">olenadesign via Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>Article 5 has only been invoked once in Nato’s history: after the terrorist attacks in New York on September 11 2001. This led to the Nato-led mission in Afghanistan. Many analysts believed Poland would be more likely to invoke article 4 of the Nato treaty, which enjoins members to come together to consult “whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened”. But that seems unlikely now.</p>
<p>John Deni, an expert in security affairs – particularly in Nato – from the American University School of International Service, <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-poland-demand-nato-act-in-event-of-russian-attack-an-expert-explains-article-4-and-5-commitments-following-missile-blast-194714">discusses the two Nato articles</a> and how they apply to this crisis.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/could-poland-demand-nato-act-in-event-of-russian-attack-an-expert-explains-article-4-and-5-commitments-following-missile-blast-194714">Could Poland demand NATO act in event of Russian attack? An expert explains Article 4 and 5 commitments following missile blast</a>
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<p>The most important thing Kyiv is looking for, of course, is more military aid from Nato and the west. State-of-the-art western defence systems and other weapons have given Ukraine the edge on the battlefield. But, as Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, never tires of reminding us, his country’s stocks of this equipment constantly need to be replenished. </p>
<p>Christoph Bluth, an international security expert from the University of Bradford, looks at <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-polish-missile-scare-has-given-nato-fresh-resolve-to-continue-its-support-for-kyiv-194761">Zelensky’s shopping list</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-polish-missile-scare-has-given-nato-fresh-resolve-to-continue-its-support-for-kyiv-194761">Ukraine war: Polish missile scare has given Nato fresh resolve to continue its support for Kyiv</a>
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<h2>On the diplomatic circuit</h2>
<p>Zelensky, as is his wont, delivered this message by video link at the G20 summit in Bali this week. It was a curious summit, bringing together the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, and the US president, Joe Biden – who would have been feeling pretty chipper after his party’s surprisingly good performance in the US midterms. Russia was represented by foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, who apparently chose to sit out Zelensky’s message at his hotel.</p>
<p>Of course, Ukraine was high on the G20 agenda. But for a while all eyes were on Xi and Biden, who had their first face-to-face meeting in five years on the sidelines of the summit and emerged to deliver their respective messages. Happily for the rest of the world, the pair agreed that nuclear war was out of the question and, in an aside that would have given Vladimir Putin heartburn, Xi emphasised the need to respect countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. Birmingham University’s Stefan Wolff was <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-china-talks-biden-and-xi-attempt-to-play-down-superpower-tensions-but-ukraine-and-taiwan-loom-large-194471">watching the proceedings</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-china-talks-biden-and-xi-attempt-to-play-down-superpower-tensions-but-ukraine-and-taiwan-loom-large-194471">US-China talks: Biden and Xi attempt to play down superpower tensions but Ukraine and Taiwan loom large</a>
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<p>One of the concerns about the US midterms was that if the Republicans took control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, this could affect Biden’s ability to sign off on continuing massive military and humanitarian aid packages for Ukraine. </p>
<p>Indeed, hard-right Trumpist congresswoman, Marjorie Taylor Greene, had promised that “not another penny [would] go to Ukraine” if that was the case. But Dafydd Townley, a teaching fellow in international security at the University of Portsmouth, believes that the poor performance of Donald Trump’s congressional proxies means that this is now <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-midterms-what-the-result-means-for-us-backing-of-the-ukraine-war-194287">unlikely to happen</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-midterms-what-the-result-means-for-us-backing-of-the-ukraine-war-194287">US midterms: what the result means for US backing of the Ukraine war</a>
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<p>Elsewhere on the diplomatic circuit, Russia has announced plans to begin direct flights to Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus, a state recognised only by Turkey. Ross Bennett-Cook, a Turkey expert at the University of Westminster, and Bradford University’s Christopher Bluth, look at Ankara’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/northern-cyprus-russia-opens-up-direct-flights-as-putin-builds-turkish-alliance-194005">increasingly friendly relationship with Russia</a> and the tensions between Turkey – a Nato member – and the rest of the alliance.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/northern-cyprus-russia-opens-up-direct-flights-as-putin-builds-turkish-alliance-194005">Northern Cyprus: Russia opens up direct flights as Putin builds Turkish alliance</a>
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<h2>Rave and rebuild</h2>
<p>Finally, after nearly nine grim months of war, Ukraine’s rave scene appears to be dusting itself off and getting a groove on once again. A group of young activists has launched Repair Together, a movement that is committed to rebuilding some of Ukraine’s public entertainment spaces while dancing to their favourite DJs.</p>
<p>Clare M. Cooper, a lecturer in design at the University of Sydney who is passionate about both music and activism, <a href="https://theconversation.com/raves-repairs-and-renewal-how-young-ukrainians-are-bringing-joy-to-the-rebuilding-effort-193842">brings us the story</a> – which has a refreshing spin on the idea of whistling while you work.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/raves-repairs-and-renewal-how-young-ukrainians-are-bringing-joy-to-the-rebuilding-effort-193842">Raves, repairs, and renewal: how young Ukrainians are bringing joy to the rebuilding effort</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a weekly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194873/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Some of the key articles from our coverage of the war in Ukraine over the past week.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1946332022-11-16T10:07:00Z2022-11-16T10:07:00ZG20 scientists urge pandemic preparedness and climate action: 4 steps countries can take following Bali summit<p>As the <a href="https://theconversation.com/3-things-a-climate-scientist-wants-world-leaders-to-know-ahead-of-cop27-193534">climate crisis worsens</a>, and after being <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-recovery-some-economies-will-take-longer-to-rebound-this-is-bad-for-everyone-162023">ravaged by the COVID-19</a>, the world is becoming more aware of the importance of pandemic preparedness and the need for immediate climate action. However, despite their <a href="https://theconversation.com/one-health-why-we-need-to-combine-disease-surveillance-and-climate-modelling-to-preempt-future-pandemics-187923">wide-ranging and interrelated impacts</a> on us all, there are still relatively few effective and collaborative science-based solutions from countries in place to address these two challenges.</p>
<p>Indonesia’s role in <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-g20-summit-in-bali-whos-there-and-what-are-the-top-3-topics-on-the-agenda-194593">this year’s G20 events</a> provides strategic momentum for the country, along with G20 member states and the global scientific community, to continue and intensify this effort.</p>
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Baca juga:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-g20-summit-in-bali-whos-there-and-what-are-the-top-3-topics-on-the-agenda-194593">What is the G20 summit in Bali? Who’s there? And what are the top 3 topics on the agenda?</a>
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<p>Pandemic preparedness and global climate resilience are key priorities of the <a href="https://s20indonesia.org"><em>Science20</em> (S20)</a> – one of many G20 engagement groups – whose leadership this year is held by the Indonesian Academy of Sciences (AIPI). Through a series of official forums between G20 members’ scientific communities, we S20 scientists have published a number of global health and climate policy recommendations outlined in the <a href="https://www.science.org.au/files/userfiles/about/documents/%20s20-communique-final-22-sept-2022.pdf">S20 Communique</a>.</p>
<p>We recommend several priorities for G20 leaders, including: building a resilient global health system, bolstering the use of multidisciplinary science and technology, and strengthening evidence-based policies on climate, pandemics, and the economy.</p>
<p>As the holder of this year’s G20 presidency, how can Indonesia encourage the international community to make good on this critical agenda? Together with S20 scientists, I recommend four steps that Indonesia and other countries can take.</p>
<p><strong>1. Declare commitment to science-based policies</strong></p>
<p>In this year’s G20, Indonesia needs to call on other state leaders to commit to implementing the recommendations of S20 scientists. Without a shared vow from world leaders, the thoughts and consensus of world scientists gathered during the long process of the G20 will lack bite.</p>
<p>Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, in particular, must also commit to putting an end to the <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/indonesia-bans-five-foreign-scientists-shelves-conservation-data">anti-science trend</a> that has occured during his administration – including the repression of criticism from scientists regarding the government’s <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/08/20/epidemiologist-pandu-rionos-twitter-account-hacked.html">handling of the pandemic</a> and also <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/wildfire-researcher-deported-amid-growing-rift-between-indonesian-government-and">deforestation</a> and <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/indonesia-bans-five-foreign-scientists-shelves-conservation-data">conservation</a> efforts.</p>
<p>Amid stark warnings from global scientists regarding the earth’s worsening climate during <a href="https://theconversation.com/3-things-a-climate-scientist-wants-world-leaders-to-know-ahead-of-cop27-193534">the UN’s climate conference (COP27)</a> currently taking place in parallel to the G20, in addition to our experience with the COVID-19 pandemic, it is paramount for Indonesia and other countries to place science at the centre of health and climate policies.</p>
<p><strong>2. Establish a resilient global health system</strong></p>
<p>As stated in our S20 Communique, the COVID-19 pandemic is an alarm telling us that our health infrastructure – from the national to the global level – is <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-were-on-a-global-panel-looking-at-the-staggering-costs-of-covid-17-7m-deaths-and-counting-here-are-11-ways-to-stop-history-repeating-itself-190658">pretty fragile</a>.</p>
<p>Reliance on reactive policies, rather than global prevention and preparedness, has prevented many countries from being able to control the recent global health crisis.</p>
<p>Indonesia needs to encourage G20 countries and the global scientific community to ensure that the World Health Organization (WHO) establishes and coordinates a resilient health system able to counter global health threats.</p>
<p>Several global health initiatives that align with this principle have started to emerge. One example is the <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/17-10-2022-one-health-joint-plan-of-action-launched-to-address-health-threats-to-humans--animals--plants-and-environment"><em>‘One Health’ Joint Plan of Action</em></a> initiated by the WHO and other UN agencies aimed at addressing threats to human, animal, and environmental health in an integrated way. The principles contained in the S20 Communique could strengthen similar initiatives and lay the foundation for others.</p>
<p>The WHO also needs to map out centres of excellence for health research in each country and ensure connectivity between these health systems. During the pandemic, for instance, we began to see a variety of collaborations that were crucial in containing COVID-19 – from <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/research-and-innovation/en/horizon-magazine/covid-19-how-unprecedented-data-sharing-has-led-faster-ever-outbreak-research">the rapid sharing of viral genome data</a> via genetic banks to <a href="https://myhealth.ucsd.edu/Coronavirus/134,263">collaborative vaccine development</a>.</p>
<p>Along with other principles in the S20 Communique, such as the need of a global “pandemic alarm system”, accessibility to open data between various research institutions, and a more robust vaccine and mediicine supply chain, we hope that countries can respond more quickly to crises at the local level.</p>
<p><strong>3. Build a sustainable post-pandemic economy</strong></p>
<p>The third step that Indonesia and world leaders must take, particlularly in building global climate resilience, is to emphasise sustainability in the rebuilding of G20 economies following the pandemic.</p>
<p>World leaders need to strengthen and enforce <a href="https://theconversation.com/inequality-and-climate-change-the-rich-must-step-up-119074">their respective climate commitments</a> – for instance, as described in each country’s climate pledge (<a href="https://theconversation.com/kesepakatan-cop26-glasgow-memuat-4-poin-penting-apakah-aksi-iklim-indonesia-sudah-sesuai-jalur-172206"><em>National Determined Contribution</em></a>, or NDC) – to ensure cuts to carbon emissions and a green transition in all economic activities that are also tailored to local situations.</p>
<p>The climate crisis is an existential threat, as we have outlined in the S20 Communique, and this must serve as a reminder to G20 countries to fulfil the climate targets of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/cop27-explained-by-experts-what-is-it-and-why-should-i-care-193727https://theconversation.com/apa-itu-cop27-ini-penjelasan-istilah-istilah-rumit-dalam-konferensi-iklim-tahunan-dunia-193744">Paris Agreement</a> and the <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/goals">Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs 2030)</a>.</p>
<p>This year’s G20 slogan – “Recover Together, Recover Stronger” – would be difficult to achieve if in their attempt to boost productivity and build infrastructure, policymakers don’t also pursue a state of carbon-free emissions (<em>net-zero</em>).</p>
<p><strong>4. Initiate a multidisciplinary health and climate research funding network</strong></p>
<p>Preventing, anticipating, and responding to complex challenges such as pandemics and climate change, requires a multisectoral and <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-one-health-concept-must-prevail-to-allow-us-to-prevent-pandemics-148378">multidisciplinary</a> approach. Research funding among G20 countries and around the world needs to do more to support interdisciplinary health, energy, and climate research initiatives.</p>
<p>Indonesia, through its science academy that sits as the leader of this year’s S20, can push for the creation of a multidisciplinary research consortium and funding system between G20 countries and beyond, particularly for research aiming to mitigate the climate crisis and support pandemic preparedness.</p>
<p>This is vital as climate and pandemic policies require <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-science-needs-the-humanities-to-solve-climate-change-113832">perspectives from the social sciences and humanities</a> to remain inclusive and ensure that <a href="https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/download-524-The-Impact-of-Climate-Change-on-Minorities-and-Indigenous-Peoples.pdf">no one is left behind</a>.</p>
<p>Sharing financial, knowledge, and technological resources – in addition to principles of openness and data access – is a crucial step to support a multidisciplinary research agenda to tackle global health and climate issues.</p>
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<p><em>Zalfa Imani Trijatna from Universitas Indonesia (UI) translated this article from Indonesian.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194633/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Berry Juliandi tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>As the climate crisis worsens, and after being ravaged by the COVID-19, it is paramount for Indonesia and G20 countries to strengthen global pandemic preparedness and climate action.Berry Juliandi, Dean, Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, IPB UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1947302022-11-16T02:22:54Z2022-11-16T02:22:54ZWord from The Hill: Albanese-Xi meeting is the first step on long march<p>As well as her interviews with politicians and experts, Politics with Michelle Grattan includes “Word from The Hill”, where she discusses the news with members of The Conversation politics team.</p>
<p>In this podcast Michelle and politics editor Amanda Dunn discuss the significant thaw in Australia-China relations that’s come with the Albanese-Xi meeting, held on the sidelines of the G20 in Bali. The last such top-level meeting was between President Xi Jinping and then PM Malcolm Turnbull in 2016.</p>
<p>It’s now a question of whether this breakthrough will lead to serious follow-through, with a relaxation of China’s damaging restrictions on a range of Australia’s exports. </p>
<p>Meanwhile next week, the prime minister will be back into the hurly-burly of domestic politics, with the government battling to secure its controversial industrial relations bill through the Senate before Christmas. All eyes are on Senate independent crossbencher David Pocock, from the ACT.</p>
<p>This final sitting fortnight of the year will put the parliamentary stamp on the anti-corruption commission and also see a free vote in the upper house on a bill (already through the House of Representatives) to allow the ACT and Northern Territory to legislate for voluntary assisted dying.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194730/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In this podcast Michelle and politics editor Amanda Dunn discuss the significant thaw in Australia-China relations that's come with the Albanese-Xi meeting, held on the sidelines of the G20 in Bali.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1944712022-11-15T14:32:41Z2022-11-15T14:32:41ZUS-China talks: Biden and Xi attempt to play down superpower tensions but Ukraine and Taiwan loom large<p>Presidents Xi Jinping of China and Joe Biden of the United States have held their first face-to-face <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/ahead-tense-g20-summit-biden-xi-meet-talks-2022-11-14/">meeting</a> since 2017. The pair met on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, to discuss their joint obligation for charting a new course towards a better a bilateral relationship. </p>
<p>Biden <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/11/14/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-before-bilateral-meeting/">emphasised</a> their shared responsibility to “prevent competition from becoming anything ever near conflict”. Xi, in turn, <a href="https://english.news.cn/20221114/923108c461a54a9daab22a63803de343/c.html">acknowledged</a> that “the two presidents need to play the leadership role, set the right course for the China-US relationship and put it on an upward trajectory”. </p>
<p>This, of course, is easier said than done given the key areas of bilateral disagreement: Taiwan, North Korea and Ukraine, to name but the top three. The two leaders also face a raft of pressing global challenges in the climate, economic, food and energy crises. And while the tone of the their opening remarks was amicable enough, it cannot disguise the fact that US-China relations have been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-53517439">at their lowest</a> point in decades. </p>
<p>Taiwan is a particularly sensitive issue. The US remains committed to its <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/">one-China policy</a> of not having diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but has provocatively strengthened its unofficial relationship. From Beijing’s perspective, supporting the status quo is one thing. But it’s quite another when the speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, makes a <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/pelosis-taiwan-visit-the-substance-and-the-aftermath/">highly publicised visit</a> to Taipei in which she reiterates US security guarantees for Taiwan. </p>
<p>Washington, in turn, takes a dim view of <a href="https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000183-e6a2-d425-a58b-e6ebcc840000">Xi’s statement</a> in his report to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-echoes-of-authoritarian-past-as-xi-jinping-cements-his-place-at-the-heart-of-a-communist-party-now-entirely-built-around-him-193122">20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party</a> last month that: “Resolving the Taiwan question and realising China’s complete reunification is, for the Party, a historic mission and an unshakeable commitment.” </p>
<p>According to China’s Xinhua news agency, Xi reiterated this point in his meeting with Biden, <a href="https://english.news.cn/20221115/72c2d122221e4c9e94cc483654981aea/c.html">adding</a> that: “The Taiwan question is at the very core of China’s core interests, the bedrock of the political foundation of China-US relations, and the first red line that must not be crossed in China-US relations.” Biden, in response, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/14/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/">assured</a> Xi that the one-China policy had not changed and that the US continued to oppose “any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side”.</p>
<p>North Korea is similarly contentious for Beijing and Washington, and arguably more prone to unwanted escalation. North Korea’s reclusive regime is hard to predict and even harder to control, including for its Chinese allies. A series of missile tests since late September led to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/experts-north-korea-s-expected-nuclear-missile-test-likely-to-involve-miniature-warheads-/6805278.html">speculation</a> that Pyongyang could also test nuclear warheads themselves, not just the missiles capable of carrying them. </p>
<p>This fear has not materialised so far. But it triggered the <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/11/05/north-korea-launches-more-missiles-as-us-flies-supersonic-bombers-in-support-of-south_6003057_4.html">largest-ever</a> joint US-South Korean air force drills, including supersonic bombers. This prompted more North Korean missile tests. It also <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/asia-and-pacific/article/2022/11/13/biden-huddles-with-japan-and-south-korea-in-the-face-of-china-and-north-korea_6004084_153.html">led</a> to intensified defence cooperation between the US, South Korea and Japan.</p>
<p>In the context of the existing three-way strategic defence pact between Australia, the UK and US (<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/sep/16/what-is-the-aukus-alliance-and-what-are-its-implications">Aukus</a>) and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue of the US, Australia, India and Japan (the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/24/what-is-the-quad-and-how-did-it-come-about">Quad</a>), it is easy to see how an increase in US military presence and activities in China’s neighbourhood at a time of already tense bilateral relations with the US is perceived as more than just a potential threat in Beijing. This is the case even if it is related to North Korea rather than directly to China.</p>
<h2>Focus on Ukraine</h2>
<p>While Taiwan and North Korea have been on the US-China agenda for some time, Ukraine is a more recent problem on which the two sides do not see eye-to-eye either over whose fault the war is or how to end it. On the one hand, China – and Xi personally – has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/04/xi-jinping-meets-vladimir-putin-china-russia-tensions-grow-west">supported</a> Mosocow’s narrative of a western threat to Russia. But China has also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-premier-li-emphasised-irresponsibility-nuclear-threats-asia-summit-us-2022-11-14/">repeatedly emphasised</a> the need to respect countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity and has spoken out against irresponsible threats to use nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/14/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/">US account</a> of the meeting, Biden and Xi “reiterated their agreement that a nuclear war should never be fought and can never be won and underscored their opposition to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine”. Chinese state media <a href="https://english.news.cn/20221115/72c2d122221e4c9e94cc483654981aea/c.html">additionally reported</a> that: “China supports and looks forward to a resumption of peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, and hopes that the United States, Nato and the European Union will conduct comprehensive dialogues with Russia.” </p>
<p>This is a far from unequivocal condemnation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. Nor is it a sign that China will abandon a position that it considers as “balanced”. This much was obvious when China voted against a subsequent <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N22/679/12/PDF/N2267912.pdf?OpenElement">draft resolution</a> at the UN general assembly that had proposed to impose reparations on Russia “for damage, loss or injury, and arising from the internationally wrongful acts of the Russian Federation in or against Ukraine”. </p>
<p>But what it does demonstrate is that, under Vladimir Putin – and especially since the invasion of Ukraine – Russia has lost more of its former great-power status. It is now a problem for the only two remaining major powers to manage rather than to accommodate.</p>
<h2>A road to détente?</h2>
<p>There are three key takeaways from the Biden-Xi meeting. First, neither side has an interest in the further escalation of tensions in their bilateral relations. On the contrary, the statements by both leaders before and after their meeting point towards efforts to improve relations.</p>
<p>Second, there are areas where both countries will be able to work together. The resumption of the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/57aad7fd-de16-4f76-bac0-7db5b4863698">US-China climate security dialogue</a> is a clear sign of this. Planned follow-up talks during a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/state-dept-says-blinken-visit-china-tentatively-planned-early-next-year-2022-11-14/">visit of US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, to China</a> next year indicate that both sides see scope for further cooperation elsewhere.</p>
<p>Third, relations between the US and China may be heading towards more stability and cooperation, but this will not end competition between them. While Xi <a href="https://english.news.cn/20221115/72c2d122221e4c9e94cc483654981aea/c.html">outwardly opposes</a> the “democracy versus authoritarianism” narrative, it is equally clear from the Biden-Xi meeting that the US-China relationship will remain the defining feature of the international system.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194471/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grants from the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow of the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>Ukraine was just one of a number of potential areas of conflict that the two leaders discussed at their face-to-face meeting in Bali.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1943902022-11-14T14:00:35Z2022-11-14T14:00:35ZG20: tensions likely to emerge as world leaders gather for Bali summit<p>The leaders of the world’s biggest economies <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/14/g20-summit-2022-explainer-everything-you-need-to-know-about-this-weeks-crucial-summit">assemble in Bali this week</a> for the annual G20 summit. They do so facing multiple interconnected global crises. Russia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-invasion-2022-117045">war in Ukraine</a>, economic slowdown <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/the-impact-of-china-economic-slowdown-6499397">in China</a>, heightened Sino-American tensions <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-us-tensions-how-global-trade-began-splitting-into-two-blocs-188380">over Taiwan</a>, precipitous worldwide increases in costs of living, and growing global food shortages provide a worrying backdrop to the summit. </p>
<p>Beyond this perfect storm of predicaments, the G20’s Indonesia hosts have set <a href="https://sdg.iisd.org/events/g20-leaders-summit-2022/">an ambitious agenda</a>. Leaders are set to discuss issues spanning the environment, health, security and development. Busy and contentious days at the top table of global governance await. </p>
<p>Despite it being the most powerful political leaders sitting around the summit table, there is actually little that G20 leaders can do to address the multitude, magnitude and complexity of crises the world now faces. They meet at a time of conflict over the most dangerous geopolitical flashpoints and without consensus on how to respond to political, economic and social upheaval. </p>
<p>While the G20 has always been composed of competitors on the world stage, in Bali the likes of China, Russia and the US will meet with open antagonism. The G20 can govern as a club of rivals, but not as one of adversaries. As a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-does-g20-do">consensus-based forum</a>, it’s simply not designed for an international domain riven with such geopolitical tension. </p>
<h2>From crisis committee to committee in crisis</h2>
<p>The G20 began life as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00909.x">crisis committee</a>. It first formed as a group of finance ministers responding to regional economic instabilities <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Social-Closure-and-International-Society-Status-Groups-from-the-Family/Naylor/p/book/9781032094106">in the mid-1990s</a> and was subsequently elevated to the leaders’ level to counter the global financial crisis in 2008. </p>
<p>The G20 was effective in its trial-by-fire infancy because its members agreed on the nature of the financial problems and on how to address them. The club was premised on its members subscribing to the “<a href="https://www.intelligenteconomist.com/washington-consensus/">Washington consensus</a>” of neoliberal economic management. This has been typified by commitments to debt reduction, deficit elimination and trade liberalisation. </p>
<p>It was also underpinned by a belief that economic governance could be essentially depoliticised, such that financial upheaval could be addressed by technocratic means. In the post-cold war “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24027184#metadata_info_tab_contents">end of history</a>” moment, stewardship of the global economy could <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20048208#metadata_info_tab_contents">largely be left to</a> central bankers, state bureaucrats, and international financial institutions. </p>
<p>The neoliberal consensus and narrow focus served the group well for a time. But “mission creep in the years since has enlarged the G20’s remit well beyond economic and financial matters. A key problem with such an expanded remit is that as the range of topics the group seeks to manage grows, so too do the opportunities for <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-022-00379-8">policy divergence</a>. </p>
<p>Moreover, even the neoliberal consensus has weakened – most notably with dramatic policy reversals by the US during the Trump administration. While the US appears to be returning to its usual positions under his successor Joe Biden, the dynamics that drove Trump’s nationalist protectionism have further accelerated and intensified globally. Combined with resurgent authoritarian willingness to flex military muscle, history has come roaring back. </p>
<p>In contrast to <a href="https://www.g7germany.de/g7-en/g7-summit/g7-members">the G7</a>, the G20 was designed to be more diverse and representative, while maintaining the G7’s consensus-based <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-does-g20-do">decision-making model</a>. There are no votes, no majority rule – if the club is to take a position, promote a policy, or support a project, all its members must unanimously agree to it. The G20’s varied membership makes it more legitimate as a global institution. But with its leading members now directly at odds with one another, precisely when the world needs its crisis committee, the G20 has tied its own hands. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the western-focused G7, which increasingly seemed like an anachronism, has now found <a href="https://www.globalgovernanceproject.org/a-chance-to-lead/tristen-naylor/">a renewed sense of purpose</a>. While lacking the G20’s legitimacy and diversity, the G7 unanimously shares a commitment to the rules-based international order and the protection of democratic institutions. This is not to say that this club’s ideals are better, but to note that a tight-knit, like-minded group of allies can function – if not thrive – in a turbulent international domain, while a much larger club, with little ideologically holding them together and much driving them apart, cannot. </p>
<h2>Relic of a bygone era</h2>
<p>If we are in a new era of intense geopolitical competition, we will need to revisit the institutions that were created during post-cold war moment of unipolarity. They were not built for this world. The return of great power politics does not necessarily mean that multilateral governance cannot work. But it does mean that the type of governance groups that have any hope of being useful are those that look somewhat different from the G20 and more like the G7 – smaller clubs made up of politically aligned states. </p>
<p>The G20’s ambition for global, representative and legitimate governance remains admirable, but the world in which it finds itself has changed. The harsh reality of today’s international politics means that unless there is a sudden and dramatic reversal in political trends, the G20 may soon find itself consigned to the past as a utopian relic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194390/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tristen Naylor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The G20 meets this week as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, soaring energy prices and economic slowdown places leaders at odds with one another.Tristen Naylor, Assistant Professor of International Politics and History, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1866502022-07-12T14:11:43Z2022-07-12T14:11:43ZUkraine war: Russia’s G20 walkout heightens tensions at fractious summit as China’s rise continues<p>While G20 foreign ministers were meeting in Bali, Indonesia, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, threatened further escalation in his war against Ukraine, <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68836">announcing</a> to the world that “by and large, we have not started anything in earnest yet”. What he meant became quickly clear when a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/12/chasiv-yar-death-toll-rises-to-33-in-one-of-russias-deadliest-attacks-so-far">missile attack</a> hit an apartment building in Chasiv Yar in Ukraine’s Donetsk region, killing 33 people. Further indiscriminate attacks <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-62106446">followed</a> against Kharkiv in northern Ukraine and Mykolaiv in the south. </p>
<p>Against this background, the <a href="https://g20.org/g20-foreign-ministers-meeting-to-be-held-in-bali/">G20 summit</a> on July 7 and 8 was the first time the foreign ministers of Russia, China and leading western democracies have come face-to-face with each other since the invasion of Ukraine in February.</p>
<p>The gathering followed a round of high-level meetings between western leaders in the wake of the invasion. These included the G7 and Nato <a href="https://theconversation.com/g7-and-nato-summits-lay-bare-deep-and-hostile-divide-between-russia-and-china-and-the-west-185964">summits</a> in Germany and Spain at the end of June, the virtual <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-61894760">meeting</a> of the BRICS leaders, and the Quad’s face-to-face <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-61547082">conference</a> a month earlier. </p>
<p>The participants may have been different at the G20, but the agenda items were very similar, including the war in Ukraine and the global food and energy crisis that it has further exacerbated. </p>
<p>But, contrary to earlier G20 summits, the prospects for any concrete outcomes were negligible. The G20 managed to agree the <a href="http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2021/210629-matera-declaration.html">Matera Declaration</a> on food security only a year ago in June 2021 and reached consensus on their <a href="http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2021/211012-chairs-summary.html">approach to the crisis in Afghanistan</a> at an extraordinary summit in October 2021. But the war in Ukraine has had such a divisive impact that it was clear from the beginning that the foreign ministers’ meeting in Bali would not even produce the kind of <a href="http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2022/220218-finance.html">joint communique</a> that the G20 finance ministers managed to conclude at their meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia, just a week before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.</p>
<p>These low expectations were all easily <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/war-looms-large-over-g20-event-russia-meets-rivals-bali-2022-07-07/">met</a>. Foreign ministers from the G7 boycotted the welcome reception on Thursday, to make clear that the meeting was not a return to “business as usual” with Russia, but <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/not-business-usual-g20-foreign-ministers-meeting-bali-2022-07-06/">decided</a> to participate in all formal sessions so as not to leave the stage to Russia. </p>
<p>The first session on Friday was, predictably, highly confrontational, with western leaders challenging the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lawrov, on Ukraine. Lavrov’s subsequent press conference <a href="https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1821243/">gave a flavour</a> of the ill-tempered encounters he had.</p>
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<p>It was to get no better. <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/tension-simmer-at-g20-as-foreign-ministers-refuse-to-be-photographed-with-russias-lavrov/">Lavrov walked out</a> of the second session as soon as he had delivered his prepared remarks and did not attend any subsequent discussions, while western leaders refused to share the stage with him for a summit photograph. </p>
<h2>China to the fore</h2>
<p>Yet, despite the failure to deliver a joint message on anything much, the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting should not be dismissed as an outright failure. On the contrary, the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting in Bali is noteworthy for the bilateral meetings that occurred at its margins at a time when diplomatic encounters in other multilateral forums such as the UN or the OSCE are not taking place or are unproductive.</p>
<p>Predictably, the meeting between the Lavrov and Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister on the evening before the summit, confirmed both sides’ commitment to continuing cooperation, according to a <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202207/t20220708_10717317.html">statement</a> from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Wang’s <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202207/t20220710_10718093.html">subsequent statement</a> in the first session of the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting reiterated China’s stance on the need to find a negotiated exit from the war. He urged Nato and the EU to engage with Russia on a “balanced, effective and sustainable security architecture for Europe”, rather than imposing “limitless unilateral sanctions” which “heighten tensions and stoke confrontation”. Yet, Wang also emphasised that “Russia and Ukraine are both friends of China” and that Beijing will continue to deliver humanitarian aid to Ukraine.</p>
<p>The Chinese foreign minister also met, among others, with his <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202207/t20220708_10717362.html">Indian</a>, <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202207/t20220710_10718115.html">Australian</a> and <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202207/t20220710_10718070.html">German</a> counterparts. While these meetings provided few substantive outcomes, they are indicative of the importance that China continues to attach to bilateral diplomacy. This at a time when China also persists with its policy of not condemning Russia’s war in Ukraine and, alongside India, Brazil and South Africa, offered Moscow a major international platform at the BRICS summit <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202206/t20220623_10709037.html#:%7E:text=1.,on%2023%2D24%20June%202022.">in Beijing in June</a>. </p>
<p>Perhaps the most important bilateral meeting was that <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202207/t20220709_10718037.html">between</a> Wang and the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, which lasted for more than five hours. Blinken <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-press-availability-21/">described the discussions</a> as “useful and constructive”. While disagreements between the sides remain, the Chinese <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202207/t20220709_10718037.html">statement</a> on the meeting also noted several areas of agreement and a commitment by Washington and Beijing to improve cooperation on issues such as climate change and public health.</p>
<h2>No easy answers</h2>
<p>If there were any hopes that two months of global summitry would be able to fix a deep crisis in the current international order, these were sorely disappointed. The G20 did, however, bring together the world’s leading powers, which are currently effectively locked into their respective silos, with the G7, Nato, the EU and the Quad on one side, and the BRICS on the other. India is the only major power to partially straddle this divide through its membership in both the Quad and the BRICS. </p>
<p>At the end of a succession of these summits, the G20 meeting in Bali is further evidence of the trend towards a <a href="https://theconversation.com/g7-and-nato-summits-lay-bare-deep-and-hostile-divide-between-russia-and-china-and-the-west-185964">new bipolar system</a> dominated by the US and China and replacing the liberal international order of the post-cold war period. While China may appreciate the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine as hastening the rise of this new order, it also has an interest in ensuring that Russia emerges weakened from its aggression and unable to become an independent power centre.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/g7-and-nato-summits-lay-bare-deep-and-hostile-divide-between-russia-and-china-and-the-west-185964">G7 and Nato summits lay bare deep and hostile divide between Russia and China and the west</a>
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<p>Beijing also recognises that in the bipolar system, there is a clear need for diplomacy. This, in turn, creates an opportunity for the US and its allies to engage with China and shape a transition to a new international order that reforms – rather than replaces – the current system.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186650/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace. He is a past recipient of grants from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow of the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>This was the first time Russia, China and the west have come face to face since the invasion of Ukraine. It did not go well.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1781652022-03-01T04:41:37Z2022-03-01T04:41:37ZMorrison would favour expelling Russia from G20, as Australia provides $105 million for Ukraine assistance<p>Scott Morrison has announced A$105 million in a package of military and humanitarian assistance for Ukraine, and flagged he would support Russia being thrown out of the G20. </p>
<p>The Prime Minister has also warned people not to go from Australia to fight for Ukraine, saying this would probably be illegal as well as suicidal. </p>
<p>The assistance package includes $70 million for lethal and non-lethal assistance and $35 million in humanitarian aid.</p>
<p>The military assistance, through NATO, will include missiles and ammunition. </p>
<p>Morrison said he wouldn’t give further details “because I don’t plan to give the Russian government a heads-up about what is coming their way”.</p>
<p>The humanitarian aid will go to international organisations for shelter, food, medical care, water and education support. </p>
<p>“This will be our opening contribution. We expect over time there will be further requests,” Morrison told a news conference after cabinet’s national security committee was briefed on the war and ticked off on the measures. </p>
<p>Asked about Russia’s membership of the G20, Morrison said, “We are seeking to impose maximum cost together with our allies and partners on Russia, and they have self-selected themselves as a pariah state. That’s how they should be known.” </p>
<p>To expel Russia from the G20 would take a consensus of its members guided by the chair which this year is Indonesia. China is a member of the G20 and presumably would oppose the removal of Russia. </p>
<p>Ukraine has urged people from other countries to join its fight against the invading Russians. “Anyone who wants to join the defence of Ukraine, Europe and the world can come and fight side by side with the Ukrainians against the Russian war criminals,” President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said. </p>
<p>But Morrison said people should not travel from Australia to Ukraine, and especially not to fight. </p>
<p>“The legal position of those who may seek to do that, I think, is very unclear,” he said. This was particularly so as the extent to which the informal militia would be part of the Ukrainian official armed forces would be unclear. </p>
<p>Under Australian law it is not legal to go to fight in another country other than in that country’s official forces. </p>
<p>Morrison said people could not assume going to fight was a legal act. “On the evidence that we have it is unlikely." </p>
<p>"What I would also argue is anyone seeking to do that would find themselves on the wrong end of some very, very violent attacks,” Morrison said.
“Others have described those sorts of things as suicide missions and that’s not an unreasonable assessment.” </p>
<p>In his statement after Tuesday’s meeting of the Reserve Bank Board, Governor Philip Lowe said that while the global economy continued to recover from the pandemic, the Ukraine war was “a major new source of uncertainty”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178165/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Scott Morrison has announced A$105 million in a package of military and humanitarian assistance for Ukraine, and flagged he would support Russia being thrown out of the G20.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.