tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/gukurahundi-42418/articlesGukurahundi – The Conversation2023-08-20T09:27:25Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116332023-08-20T09:27:25Z2023-08-20T09:27:25ZZimbabwe’s president was security minister when genocidal rape was state policy in 1983-4. Now he seeks another term<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543031/original/file-20230816-17-eic0p6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's President Emmerson Mnangagwa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tafadzwa Ufumeli/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Trigger warning: this article contains accounts of sexual violence.</em></p>
<p>Zimbabwe will hold its elections on 23 August. The current president of Zimbabwe, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-mnangagwa-presidency-would-not-be-a-new-beginning-for-zimbabwe-87641">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, is running for re-election. This is despite his having oversight in the execution of the genocide of a minority group of Zimbabweans in the south-west region, as evidenced in my <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">newly published study</a>. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Hazel-Cameron-2">genocide scholar</a>, I have studied the nature, causes and consequences of genocide and mass atrocities, as well as the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41917771?seq=6">role of external institutional bystanders</a>. Since 2011, I have researched the crimes of the powerful of Zimbabwe. Much of this has involved an <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316020728_The_Matabeleland_Massacres_Britain%27s_wilful_blindness">analysis of official British and US government communications</a>. This has shed new light on what knowledge was available to the British and US governments about <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325887696_State-Organized_Starvation_A_Weapon_of_Extreme_Mass_Violence_in_Matabeleland_South_1984">atrocity crimes targeting the Ndebele</a> in the early post-independence years of Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">latest study</a> explores a military operation, known as Gukurahundi, between 1983 and 1984 in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands in Zimbabwe. Drawing on 36 in-depth interviews with survivors, my study provides new insights into <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7388214.stm">Operation Gukurahundi</a>. It identifies systematic patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence in the operation. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/british-policy-towards-zimbabwe-during-matabeleland-massacre-licence-to-kill-81574">British policy towards Zimbabwe during Matabeleland massacre: licence to kill</a>
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<p>The study concludes that these patterns indicate a state policy of systematic genocidal rape in 1983 and 1984. This policy was deployed with the intent to destroy, in part, a specific ethnic group: the minority Ndebele of Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>My study acknowledges the immense suffering of the victims of the genocide and their descendants. It also illustrates that genocide creates victims across generations. Time cannot eliminate the trauma inflicted or the need for justice. </p>
<h2>The genocide</h2>
<p>In January 1983, the Zanu-PF government of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27519044">Robert Mugabe</a>, in the newly
independent Zimbabwe, launched a massive security clampdown on the Ndebele. This was <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-policy-towards-zimbabwe-during-matabeleland-massacre-licence-to-kill-81574">both politically and ethnically motivated</a>. At the heart of the operation was a strategy of state-ordered terror. It was perpetrated by a 4,000-strong all-Shona Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwean National Army led by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-minister-idUSKCN24U0MK">Perrance Shiri</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-mnangagwa-presidency-would-not-be-a-new-beginning-for-zimbabwe-87641">Mnangagwa</a> had oversight over both the army’s Fifth Brigade and the Central Intelligence Organisation in his role as minister of internal security and chairman of Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/17/could-mnangagwa-be-zimbabwes-comeback-crocodile">Joint High Command</a>. He <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-27-op-ed-mnangagwa-and-the-gukurahundi-fact-and-fiction/">reported directly to Mugabe</a>. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa, however, has <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-24-00-gukurahundi-ghosts-haunt-mnangagwa/">denied accusations</a> he played an active role in Operation Gukurahundi.</p>
<p>The stated objective of the campaign was to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jocelyn-Alexander/publication/250225505_Dissident_Perspectives_on_Zimbabwe%27s_Post-Independence_War/links/566858c308ae193b5fa0379f/Dissident-Perspectives-on-Zimbabwes-Post-Independence-War.pdf">rid the country of “dissidents”</a>. However, the overwhelming majority of those targeted by security forces were non-combatant Ndebele civilians. The government viewed them as supporters, or potential supporters, of the political opposition.</p>
<p>In 1983, the Fifth Brigade moved from village to village in Matabeleland North and some areas of the Midlands. Their presence led to <a href="https://www.pearl-insights.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/The-Matabeleland-Massacres-Britains-wilful-blindness.pdf">extreme violence</a>. The operation shifted to Matabeleland South in February 1984, where state-led atrocities and violence
continued. This included the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325887696_State-Organized_Starvation_A_Weapon_of_Extreme_Mass_Violence_in_Matabeleland_South_1984">orchestrated starvation of the Ndebele</a>. </p>
<p>Estimates vary on the number of non-combatant civilians massacred during Operation Gukurahundi. One conservative estimate is <a href="https://apnews.com/article/df5722c221bf4c5ca894e5e481413ca3">between 10,000 and 20,000</a>. However, Dan Stannard, the director internal of Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation during Operation Gukurahundi, believed that between <a href="http://researchdata.uwe.ac.uk/104/240/roh-oh-sta-da1-appr.pdf">30,000 and 50,000</a> Ndebele may have been killed. </p>
<p>Although the peak of the violence occurred between 1983 and 1984, the operation didn’t end until December 1987 with the signing of a <a href="https://commonwealthoralhistories.org/explandict/unity-accord-of-1987/">national unity accord</a>. </p>
<h2>Rape and sexual violence</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">My research</a> reveals what has, until now, been omitted from criminological scrutiny: a state policy of rape and sexual violence that targeted the Ndebele people during Operation Gukurahundi. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</a> made a <a href="https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTR,40278fbb4.html">historic judgment</a> which established that rape and other forms of sexual violence could be acts of genocide as defined by the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf#page=1">United Nations Convention on Genocide Article II</a>. The tribunal recognised how rape and sexual violence functioned to destroy the minority Tutsi group of Rwanda in 1994.</p>
<p>I gathered data for my <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">study</a> from 36 in-depth interviews with male and female survivors in a representative sample of geographical locations across Matabeleland. While small in comparison to the sheer scale of the violence and the numbers who were victimised, this study nonetheless establishes reliable conclusions about the nature of events. </p>
<p>The patterns I identified include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>public spectacles of multiple perpetrator rape targeting children and adults</p></li>
<li><p>people forced to witness the rape of female and male family members</p></li>
<li><p>rape and sexual violence followed by mass killing</p></li>
<li><p>forced intrafamilial rape</p></li>
<li><p>forced bestiality</p></li>
<li><p>forced nudity.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These are acts that can be interpreted as “deliberately inflicting on the (Ndebele) group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”, a contravention of <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf#page=1">Article II (c) of the UN Genocide Convention</a>.</p>
<p>The systematic dehumanisation and degradation of the Ndebele through forced intrafamilial rape was a recurring pattern of state harm. It was pervasive in both Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South.</p>
<p>One of the people I interviewed, Bukhosi, who was 19 in 1984 and living in Matabeleland South, <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">shared the cruelty</a> of knowing that the Fifth Brigade might force him to attempt to have sex with his relatives. They would threaten to shoot him if he refused. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>There were times we were afraid even to be in the company of our sister, even to go to the shop. Because I know when these guys come and see us together, they say ‘sleep with your sister’. Then you are afraid to go with your mother because something terrible would happen, they will say ‘do this to your mother’. You are afraid even to be with your brother at home, because they … these guys (Fifth Brigade), when they find the two of you. It is terrible … So we were all separated ….</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Such <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm">rituals of degradation</a> are found wherever a policy of genocidal rape is adopted. They cause shame and humiliation. They leave communities and individual families destroyed, their bonds crushed through the annihilation of social norms. </p>
<p>Forty years later, the intergenerational impacts of Operation Gukurahundi on the Ndebele group are profound. My interviewees widely reported mental health issues. Children born of survivors are angry and struggle to understand their family’s brutal history when questions about these painful experiences are met with silence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Mnangagwa
with Senior Royal Prince William in November 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kingston Royal</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I also identified patterns of reproductive violence targeting males and females. These included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>killing the foetuses of pregnant women</p></li>
<li><p>internment in concentration camps for sexual servitude (rape camps)</p></li>
<li><p>forced pregnancies </p></li>
<li><p>genital mutilation. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Fifth Brigade officers targeted the wombs of pregnant women with knives, bayonets or through stamping.</p>
<p>These acts can be interpreted as “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the (Ndebele) group”, a contravention of <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf#page=1">Article II (d) of the Genocide Convention</a>. </p>
<p>Every participant in my study reported the presence of a military rank structure – and complicity of senior officers in mass rapes and sexual violence. There was no evidence of sexual predation by army personnel for personal satisfaction. </p>
<p>Another study participant, Phindile, was 37 and lived in Matabeleland South in 1984. There were 21 homesteads in her village. She told me there were three commanders in her area. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Those were the ones who were giving the instructions. Rape was done (by) daylight and darkness but most were done in the evening. The commanders would be there eating. The chief commander would be sitting at a distance and giving instructions on what to do. They used to do the raping according to their rank.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>My <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">research</a> establishes that the policy of rape and other forms of sexual violence was systematic and predicated on the government’s intent to destroy the Ndebele in part. The policy reflects the ideology and strategic goals of those in high office. The fundamental human rights of many survivors remain affected <a href="https://www.zimlive.com/gukurahundi-the-election-dilemma-for-undocumented-victims/">to this day</a>. </p>
<h2>Swept under the carpet</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">Prosecution for genocide</a> extends to those who plan, instigate, order, commit or aid and abet in its <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/genocide">planning, preparation or execution</a>.</p>
<p>In the early 1990s, reports of state-organised rape, the detention of women in rape camps, enforced pregnancy and other sexual atrocities trickled out of Bosnia and Croatia. Securing indictments became an <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/abs/war-crimes-brutality-genocide-terror-and-the-struggle-for-justice-by-aryeh-neier-new-york-times-books-1998-pp-xiv-274-index-25-can35-between-vengeance-and-forgiveness-facing-history-after-genocide-and-mass-violence-by-martha-minow-boston-beacon-press-1998-pp-xiii-202-index-23/47336631C6CF464C84E5226AB62AD274">international political priority</a>. </p>
<p>Similar <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/uk/revealed-british-diplomats-pressured-bbcs-jeremy-paxman-understand-true-perspective-massacres-zimbabwe-61535">reports had trickled out</a> of Zimbabwe a decade earlier but were <a href="https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10023/16176/Cameron_2017_TIHR_BritainsWilfulBlindness_AAM.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">swept under the carpet</a>. </p>
<p>Intelligence on genocidal rape and other atrocities was <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316020728_The_Matabeleland_Massacres_Britain%27s_wilful_blindness">minimised by British representatives</a> in Zimbabwe. This was clearly politically influenced, as expressed in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316020728_The_Matabeleland_Massacres_Britain%27s_wilful_blindness">numerous diplomatic cables</a> between Harare and London.</p>
<p>The crimes of genocide committed by the Third Reich in Nazi Germany, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia or the Hutu government of Rwanda were subjected to investigation, prosecution and judgment in international courts. </p>
<p>Yet, 40 years after the mass atrocities of Operation Gukurahundi, there has been no official investigation, prosecution or judgment. The most senior surviving person accused of overseeing the genocide and other crimes against humanity, the incumbent president of Zimbabwe, enjoys impunity. He is endorsed and flattered – for example, he was <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202304190012.html#:%7E:text=Emmerson%20Mnangagwa%2C%20President%20of%20Zimbabwe%20.&text=President%20Emmerson%20Mnangagwa%20has%20been,ceremonial%20home%20of%20Britain's%20monarchy.">invited</a> to the May 2023 coronation of King Charles III of the UK.</p>
<p>Rather than being subjected to a process of international justice before a court with the jurisdiction to try the mass crimes of Gukurahundi, Mnangagwa will stand for re-election on 23 August. The survivors will continue their <a href="https://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/memory-and-erasure">search for justice and accountability</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211633/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hazel Cameron received funding for this research project from Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland, the British Academy and a Principal’s Special Award, University of St Andrews. </span></em></p>President Emmerson Mnangagwa has not faced official investigation or prosecution over his role in Operation Gukurahundi – 40 years on.Hazel Cameron, Honorary Senior Research Fellow, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2101992023-08-02T12:52:29Z2023-08-02T12:52:29ZZimbabwe’s rulers won’t tolerate opposing voices – but its writers refuse to be silenced<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539973/original/file-20230728-19-7tnmnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">NoViolet Bulawayo, Zimbabwean author of the politically charged novels We Need New Names and Glory.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Levenson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The ruling elite in Zimbabwe has always tried to <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/04/zimbabwe-43-years-independence-commemoration-marred-by-rapidly-shrinking-civic-space/">silence</a> opposing political voices and erase histories it does not wish to have aired. Although “democratic” elections have been held since 1980, the country has become what the scholar Eldred Masunungure <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24388181">calls</a> a state of “militarised, electoral authoritarianism”. </p>
<p>As Zimbabwe heads to the polls again in 2023, it’s worth considering the role that writers have played in engendering political resistance. Their voices have been important in challenging oppression, exposing social injustices and advocating for political change. </p>
<h2>The liberation struggle</h2>
<p>Literature was vital for raising awareness about the harshness of colonial rule. It was used to mobilise resistance against the white minority regime and garner international support for the liberation struggle. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover with an illustration of an African man against a spider's web, a needle stitching a wound on his forehead." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1137&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1137&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1137&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Heinemann African Writers Series</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Texts like <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/voices-of-liberation-ndabaningi-sithole">Ndabaningi Sithole’s</a> foundational 1955 novel Umvekela wamaNdebele (The Revolution of the Ndebele) and <a href="https://theconversation.com/dear-dambudzo-marechera-the-letters-zimbabweans-wrote-to-a-literary-star-144299">Dambudzo Marechera</a>’s 1978 magnum opus The House of Hunger were instrumental. Many others like <a href="https://www.gale.com/intl/databases-explored/literature/charles-mungoshi">Charles Mungoshi</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/tsitsi-dangarembga-and-writing-about-pain-and-loss-in-zimbabwe-144313">Tsitsi Dangarembga</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jul/21/chenjerai-hove">Chenjerai Hove</a> produced texts that encouraged resistance against colonial rule. </p>
<p>These works showcased the resilience of Zimbabweans in the face of adversity, inspiring the population to continue their fight for freedom.</p>
<h2>Independence</h2>
<p>Since independence in Zimbabwe, there has remained little space for dissenting voices – first under the leadership of <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life-108103">Robert Mugabe</a> and then <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-three-barriers-blocking-zimbabwes-progress-zanu-pf-mnangagwa-and-the-military-89177">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.fairplanet.org/story/zimbabwes-genocide-an-open-wound/">Gukurahundi genocide</a>, which novelist <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Novuyo_Rosa_Tshuma/">Novuyo Rosa Tshuma</a> called the country’s “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/aug/09/house-of-stone-novuyo-rosa-tshuma-review">original sin</a>”, marked the first instance in which the state quashed opposing voices. Between 1982 and 1987, the government sent a North Korean-trained brigade to quell dissenters in the provinces of Matabeleland and the Midlands. An estimated 20,000 civilians were killed. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover with an illustration of an African woman looking directly ahead with traditional hairstyle." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=950&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=950&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=950&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1194&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1194&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1194&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Women's Press</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Interestingly, despite the shrinking of the civic and political space in Zimbabwe, literary production has thrived in providing political resistance.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/tvl/article/view/168612">My research</a> as a scholar of African literature has demonstrated that literature in Zimbabwe has highlighted diverse forms of state sponsored violence. Through their works, writers have raised awareness, sparked dialogue, and inspired readers to engage in opposition and activism.</p>
<h2>The turbulent ‘lost decade’ (2000-2010)</h2>
<p>From around 2000, Zimbabwe <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-inflation-idUSL1992587420070919">experienced</a> economic meltdown, coupled with an increased shrinking of the civic space. The rise of a formidable opposition, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Movement-for-Democratic-Change">Movement for Democratic Change</a>, in 1999 <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/election-violence-in-zimbabwe/movement-for-democratic-change-was-number-one-enemy-in-2000/2CB944ACBCDB63C2311FDAB85ACD8037">was met with violence</a> by the state. </p>
<p>This period also saw a flourishing in literary production. Fresh voices emerged, among them <a href="https://writersmakeworlds.com/brian-chikwava/">Brian Chikwava</a>, <a href="https://novioletbulawayo.com/about/">NoViolet Bulawayo</a>, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e1fad84a-903e-44ec-b7c5-920e88a91eac">Petina Gappah</a>, <a href="https://www.poetryinternational.com/en/poets-poems/poets/poet/102-5757_Eppel">John Eppel</a>, <a href="https://www.icorn.org/writer/christopher-mlalazi">Christopher Mlalazi</a> and <a href="https://www.africanbookscollective.com/authors-editors/lawrence-hoba">Lawrence Hoba</a>.</p>
<p>Literature from this period captured the socioeconomic realities of the country. Gappah’s debut collection of short stories in 2009, <a href="https://soundcloud.com/faberbooks/petina-gappah-an-elegy-for">An Elegy for Easterly</a>, depicts the emotions experienced by Zimbabweans in the face of diverse challenges. Some characters express disillusionment and despair, while others maintain optimism and resilience, representing a complex reality.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover with illustrative fonts spelling the words " src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Random House</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Bulawayo’s award-winning 2013 novel We Need New Names depicts the political situation through the perspective of its teenage protagonist, Darling. The story delves into the effects of political turmoil, economic challenges and societal changes on regular lives. Her 2022 novel <a href="https://theconversation.com/noviolet-bulawayos-new-novel-is-an-instant-zimbabwean-classic-185783">Glory</a> parodies a dictatorship, protesting the irrationality of a police state.</p>
<p>White Zimbabwean writers have also criticised autocracy in books like Catherine Buckle’s <a href="https://www.google.co.za/books/edition/AFRICAN_TEARS/haxhDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0">African Tears: The Zimbabwe Land Invasions</a> (2000) and Graham Lang’s <a href="https://www.google.co.za/books/edition/Place_of_Birth/TzCsAAAAIAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0&bsq=Place%20of%20Birth%20graham%20lang">Place of Birth</a> (2006). </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover with an illustration showing the portrait of a woman with butterflies instead of hair." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=923&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=923&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=923&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1160&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1160&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1160&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Faber and Faber</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These novels portray the emotional effects of the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/zimbabwe/ZimLand0302-02.htm">Fast Track Land Reform Programme</a> on many white Zimbabweans, who found themselves dispossessed of their farms and their sources of income.</p>
<p>Writers from the 2000s have offered multifaceted portrayals, highlighting the interconnectedness of personal lives and political realities. The stories illuminate the human cost of political decisions and the resilience of ordinary people in the face of hardships.</p>
<h2>Literature in the Second Republic</h2>
<p>Literature after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/when-the-state-is-the-man-and-that-man-is-mugabe-a-new-era-begins-with-his-fall-87868">demise</a> of Mugabe and his four-decade regime – a period referred to as the Second Republic – has continued to grapple with Zimbabwe’s prevailing sociopolitical environment. In the book <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Zimbabwean-Crisis-after-Mugabe-Multidisciplinary-Perspectives/Mangena-Nyambi-Ncube/p/book/9781032028149">The Zimbabwean Crisis after Mugabe</a>, my colleagues and I contend that today’s Zimbabwe is similar to the Mugabe years in many ways.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tsitsi Dangarembga was arrested in 2020 for staging a protest.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Autony/AFP/Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.batsiraichigama.com/">Batsirai Chigama</a>’s collection of poems Gather the Children captures the vicissitudes of contemporary life in Zimbabwe. In <a href="https://www.poetryinternational.com/en/poets-poems/article/104-29416_On-Chigama-8217-s-Gather-the-Children">his analysis</a> of this collection, literary scholar Tinashe Mushakavanhu explains: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Zimbabwe’s political crisis has been a different kind of catastrophe, one that has occurred in slow motion: its mechanisms abstract and impersonal, although the economic, physical, and psychological consequences have been very real and devastating. These strictures insinuate themselves into the ambience of everyday life and language, something that Chigama observes with careful attention. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In her poem Zimbabwe, Chigama writes:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Like eating olives</p>
<p>we have acquired the taste of discomfort</p>
<p>over the longest time</p>
<p>it has gently settled on our tongues</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Her poems highlight how Zimbabweans have normalised the abnormal.</p>
<p>Other writers from the post-Mugabe period like <a href="http://www.panashechigumadzi.com/bio">Panashe Chigumadzi</a> and <a href="https://novuyotshuma.com/about">Novuyo Rosa Tshuma</a> grapple with similar issues and themes. Writer and academic <a href="https://brittlepaper.com/2023/03/siphiwe-ndlovu-on-the-rise-and-rise-of-zimbabwean-literature/">Siphiwe Ndlovu</a> explains that in contemporary Zimbabwean fiction</p>
<blockquote>
<p>there is anger, outrage, disappointment, disillusionment, hope (and the loss of it), but most importantly, there is a call for reckoning and change that the politics of the country have failed to successfully address.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The power (and limits) of literature</h2>
<p>Despite its power, reading remains a luxury that many Zimbabweans cannot afford. Books are extremely expensive and few people have disposable income to read for pleasure. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover with an illustration of birds flying into a tree and down into a red backdrop." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=850&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=850&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=850&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1068&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1068&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1068&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ntombekhaya Poetry</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It’s for this reason that, since independence, the state has not banned the many novels which are critical of the situation in the country. Writer Stanley Nyamfukudza <a href="http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:240525/FULLTEXT02.pdf">explains</a>: “It has been suggested that one of the best ways to hide information in Zimbabwe is to publish it in a book.” </p>
<p>Literature can achieve greater effects if there is a robust culture of critical thinking and reading.</p>
<p>However, despite the continued oppression and the lack of a robust reading culture, Zimbabwean writers have been unrelenting in telling the world what is really happening in Zimbabwe. They have always spoken truth to power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210199/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gibson Ncube does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Writers have challenged oppression, exposed social injustices and advocated for political change.Gibson Ncube, Lecturer, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1857832022-07-27T14:52:14Z2022-07-27T14:52:14ZNoViolet Bulawayo’s new novel is an instant Zimbabwean classic<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475654/original/file-20220722-234-kbs6yj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Noviolet Bulawayo, Zimbabwean writer.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Leonardo Cendamo/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In Zimbabwean author <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2022/mar/19/noviolet-bulawayo-animal-farm-style-allegory-important-hope-zimbabwe-orwell-glory">NoViolet Bulawayo</a>’s new novel <a href="https://novioletbulawayo.com/books/glory/">Glory</a> – <a href="https://thebookerprizes.com/the-booker-library/prize-years/2022">longlisted</a> for the Booker Prize 2022 – animals take on human characteristics. Through this she explores what happens when an authoritarian regime implodes, using characters who are horses, pigs, dogs, cows, cats, chickens, crocodiles, birds and butterflies. </p>
<p>Bulawayo’s celebrated first novel, <a href="https://novioletbulawayo.com/books/we-need-new-names/">We Need New Names</a>, was a coming-of-age story about the escapades of a Zimbabwean girl named Darling who ends up living in America. Its hallmarks are accentuated in this new work: the troubled real world of class struggles, psychological dualities, colonial and postcolonial histories, war and the dog-eat-dog politics of contemporary Africa.</p>
<p>Glory is set in a kingdom called Jidada, which could be <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-gabriel-mugabe-a-man-whose-list-of-failures-is-legion-121596">Robert Mugabe</a>’s Zimbabwe, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Idi-Amin">Idi Amin</a>’s Uganda, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hastings-Kamuzu-Banda">Hastings Banda</a>’s Malawi, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mobutu-Sese-Seko">Mobutu Sese Seko</a>’s Zaire, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/12/1/the-hypocrisy-of-emmerson-mnangagwa">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>’s Zimbabwe or any other authoritarian regime in Africa, for there are many. The tropes Bulawayo makes fun of are so recognisable and familiar. </p>
<p>Perhaps as memorable as the names in her first novel (Bastard, Godknows) are those of these animal characters (Comrade Nevermiss Nzinga, General Judas Goodness Reza). There is also a Father of the Nation, Sisters of the Disappeared and Defenders of the Revolution, Seat of Power and the Chosen. And there’s the Soldiers of Christ Prophetic Church of Churches.</p>
<p>In fact, there is something almost playful about this book. When politics becomes a farce, it only requires a virtuoso like Bulawayo to marshal the faux pas into a memorable fictional narrative. </p>
<p>The novel fictionalises the real politics of Zimbabwe, from the removal of Mugabe to the rise to power of his former vice-president, Mnangagwa, in 2017 and the years since, during which Zimbabwe’s economy has suffered and the political promises of the “second republic” have gone unfulfilled. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475655/original/file-20220722-18-90zoy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover in bright red and green with black animals illustrated - a horse, cow, dog and a pig on a yellow moon with the words 'GLORY'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475655/original/file-20220722-18-90zoy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475655/original/file-20220722-18-90zoy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=907&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475655/original/file-20220722-18-90zoy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=907&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475655/original/file-20220722-18-90zoy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=907&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475655/original/file-20220722-18-90zoy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1139&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475655/original/file-20220722-18-90zoy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1139&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475655/original/file-20220722-18-90zoy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1139&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Chatto & Windus/Penguin Books</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But in order to transcend the particular, the novel is allegoric, capturing the essence of the matter as told by a bold, vivid chorus of animal voices that helps us see our human world more clearly. </p>
<p>In Jidada, the tyrannical Old Horse is ousted in a coup after a 40-year rule. At first there is excitement about the change that will come. But Tuvius Delight Shasha (a former vice-president) leads the country into despair. Destiny Lozikeyi Khumalo, a goat who returns to Jidada after a decade away, becomes a chronicler of her nation’s history and an advocate for its future. </p>
<h2>Humour as resistance</h2>
<p>In an interview in the immediate aftermath of the Zimbabwe <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/nov/15/zimbabwe-army-control-harare-coup-robert-mugabe-live">coup d’etat</a> in 2017, Bulawayo talked about attempting to write about the fall of <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life-108103">Mugabe</a> in nonfiction but <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2022/mar/19/noviolet-bulawayo-animal-farm-style-allegory-important-hope-zimbabwe-orwell-glory">abandoning that effort</a>. She found the novel to be a better form for political satire.</p>
<p>Bulawayo’s writing is distinctive. There is a lyricism to her prose, a poetics of language that mesmerises and surprises. This gives her fiction an applied, intense focus. </p>
<p>Translating a present-day political and cultural milieu is tricky. The political language of contemporary Zimbabwe is oppositional, underpinned in historically deep-seated ethnic “for or against” binaries. By refusing to limit her language, Bulawayo shows the shallowness and historical ignorance behind political power in her utopian African country. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/guide-to-the-classics-orwells-1984-and-how-it-helps-us-understand-tyrannical-power-today-112066">Guide to the classics: Orwell's 1984 and how it helps us understand tyrannical power today</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Bulawayo also knows how to use language to good effect by deploying irony and comedy. Her use of humour in the novel is a form of political resistance that splinters the make-believe world of an out-of-touch political class.</p>
<h2>Massacres</h2>
<p>Glory is an unforgettable book that goes beyond the obvious comparison to its inspiration, the UK author George Orwell’s 1945 classic <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Animal-Farm">Animal Farm</a>. His book reflects events leading up to the Russian Revolution of 1917 and provides a strong critique against <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Stalinism">Stalinism</a>.</p>
<p>Glory has a lively rhetorical idiom; it is full of colour and vigour. As <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/06/books/review/noviolet-bulawayo-glory.html">one reviewer</a> wrote: “Bulawayo is really out-Orwelling Orwell.” Both authors reference the disarray and traumatic conditions of the world in a distinct and powerful way. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-artists-have-preserved-the-memory-of-zimbabwes-1980s-massacres-143847">How artists have preserved the memory of Zimbabwe's 1980s massacres</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Bulawayo’s novel is also an epic that narrates the misdeeds and violent adventures of the past history of Jidada, such as the time of “Gukurahundi” when the rulers tortured, raped and executed the animals. The Gukurahundi was a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-artists-have-preserved-the-memory-of-zimbabwes-1980s-massacres-143847">genocide</a> that took place in Zimbabwe between 1983 and 1987 when more than 20,000 people were massacred in Matebeleland.</p>
<h2>A global story</h2>
<p>The challenge for Bulawayo, or any writer for that matter, was how to write about a coup still in progress that was described as <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-20-zimbabwe-when-is-a-coup-not-a-coup/">a-coup-not-a-coup</a>. How could one write about the events that started when Mugabe was overthrown with the promise of new Zimbabwe that is yet to come?</p>
<p>The end of his reign was a festival of dancing and singing for a generation that knew nothing else but his brutality. Young people posed for Instagram photos with friendly-looking gun-wielding soldiers. They welcomed back a disgraced former vice-president who – like Tuvius Delight Shasha – became the new “Ruler of the Nation and Veteran of the Liberation War, the Greatest Leader of Jidada, Enemy of Corruption, Opener for Business, the Inventor of the Scarf of the Nation, the Survivor of All Assassination Attempts…”</p>
<p>It’s a particular challenge to write about regimes that enforce everything with violence. And yet Bulawayo’s vibrant satire succeeds in telling a political parable that also reflects the times. </p>
<p>Glory is a tour de force. It is not a story about endings but about unravellings. It is not a book about the past, but a book about the present and the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185783/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tinashe Mushakavanhu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Playing out in an animal kingdom, Glory is a devastating political commentary on Zimbabwe today.Tinashe Mushakavanhu, Junior Research Fellow, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1779272022-04-04T14:04:45Z2022-04-04T14:04:45ZA street art mural in Zimbabwe exposes a divided society<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451563/original/file-20220311-26-1f2kx8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">King Lobengula holds Mbuya Nehanda in the mural.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Screenshot/Leeroy Spinx Brittain aka Bow</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Shona">Shona</a> and the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Ndebele-Zimbabwean-people">Ndebele</a> are Zimbabwe’s two most dominant ethnic groups. Explaining the ever-present tension between them, historian Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/nation-building-in-zimbabwe-and-the-challenges-of-ndebele-particularism/">points to</a> the abuse of the post-colonial state by the ruling Shona-dominated government “in its drive to destroy Ndebele particularism”. He explains, “This sets in motion the current Matabeleland politics of alienation, resentment and grievance.”</p>
<p>This continued marginalisation of Matabeleland (a region in southwestern Zimbabwe inhabited mainly by the Ndebele people) by the ZANU-PF-led government has rendered Zimbabwe so fragile a nation that even a street mural can expose its disunity. </p>
<p>The mural in question borrows two historical figures – King Lobengula and Mbuya Nehanda – to express the possibility of unity between the two dominant groups. How the mural was dealt with is the subject of this analysis.</p>
<h2>The mural that caused the trouble</h2>
<p>Over the weekend of 22 January 2022 a mural appeared at the Corner of Fife Street and 8th Avenue in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Bulawayo">Bulawayo</a>, Zimbabwe’s second largest city and the main city of Matabeleland. The mural was by <a href="https://www.facebook.com/leeroy.s.brittain">Leeroy Spinx Brittain</a>, popularly known as Bow (black or white). By the afternoon of the 24th, the city’s municipality had erased it.</p>
<p>King Lobengula is portrayed with an arm around the shoulders of Mbuya Nehanda, in life-sized images resembling popular archival reproductions of them. In his other hand Lobengula is holding a heart-shaped balloon instead of his usual spear. It’s derivative of UK-based street artist <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/the-story-behind-banksy-4310304/">Banksy</a>’s mural <a href="https://www.myartbroker.com/artist-banksy/series-girl-with-balloon">Girl With Balloon</a>.</p>
<p>Bulawayo deputy mayor Mlandu Ncube is <a href="https://www.chronicle.co.zw/king-lobengula-and-mbuya-nehanda-mural-erased/">reported</a> to say that the artist had not applied for permission and creating a mural without the city’s licence could attract a hefty fine or jail time. </p>
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<p>The artist was <a href="https://www.okayafrica.com/zimbabwe-street-art-debate/">calling</a> on Ndebeles and Shonas to begin a dialogue and unite. But judging from the divisive comments on social media platforms like <a href="https://twitter.com/zimlive/status/1485854215176130563?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1485933578554904579%7Ctwgr%5Ehb_0_8%7Ctwcon%5Es2_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.okayafrica.com%2Fzimbabwe-street-art-debate%2F">Twitter</a> and <a href="https://www.facebook.com/215170571826981/posts/5224165710927417/">Facebook</a>, few embraced his message.</p>
<p>According to online comments and news <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-214233.html">articles</a> some found the mural disrespectful and offensive – because of the contentious matter of the <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-gukurahundi-43923">Gukurahundi</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2b5iVGCDs0">massacres</a>. </p>
<h2>Echoes of Gukurahundi</h2>
<p>Gukurahundi refers to an ethnic cleansing atrocity which claimed up to 20,000 lives in Matebeleland and parts of Midlands in the 1980s. It’s <a href="https://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/shemurenga-the-zimbabwean-womens-movement-1995-2000">described</a> by feminist academic and activist Shereen Essof as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-gabriel-mugabe-a-man-whose-list-of-failures-is-legion-121596">Robert Mugabe</a> regime’s “first, and still unpunished genocide”. British author Hazel Cameron <a href="https://news.st-andrews.ac.uk/archive/wilful-blindness/">claimed</a> that the massacres were committed under the watchful eye of the British government eager to safeguard its significant economic and strategic interests in Southern Africa. </p>
<p>To this day, Zimbabwe’s leadership refuses to publicly acknowledge and address the massacres, with Mugabe once referring to them as a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057070.2021.1954356">moment of madeness</a>. I would argue that the unaddressed atrocities have left Zimbabweans failing to collectively embrace and appreciate even a harmless but constructive expression of art. As long as <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-artists-have-preserved-the-memory-of-zimbabwes-1980s-massacres-143847">Gukurahundi</a> continues to be ignored by the state, Zimbabweans will not find common ground.</p>
<h2>Who were Nehanda and Lobengula?</h2>
<p>Mbuya Nehanda is a <a href="https://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Zezuru">Zezuru</a> (Shona) ancestral spirit (mhondoro) said to possess different women at different times in history. The Nehanda in the mural is <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/zimbabwe-unveils-statue-anti-colonial-leader-mbuya-nehanda-180977835/">Charwe Nyakasikana</a>. She led the Shona resistance against <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cecil-john-rhodes">Cecil John Rhodes</a>’ colonising forces. For her role in the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/181122?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">1896-7 First Chimurenga Uprisings</a>, she was hanged. To emphasise her importance, the ruling regime erected <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/may/26/anger-in-zimbabwe-at-nehanda-statue-amid-collapsing-economy">her statue</a> in Harare last year.</p>
<p>A son and successor of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/king-mzilikazi">King Mzilikazi</a>, founder of the Ndebele Kingdom, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Lobengula">King Lobengula</a> ruled the nation from 1868 to the 1890s when his kingdom succumbed to the British. He was never captured. In polarised Zimbabwe, some Shona people blame him for signing the <a href="https://www.ipl.org/essay/The-Rudd-Concession-FJXAHDL4RG">Rudd Concession</a>. This paved the way for the colonisation of the country.</p>
<p>To this day Shonas and Ndebeles identify with these figures, who never met in the flesh.</p>
<h2>Public art in Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>This is the first major controversy around murals and graffiti in the country in years. Sometimes municipal authorities don’t erase work at all, despite it being created without permission. This is the case with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/mar/07/these-are-our-local-heroes-the-artist-painting-murals-of-hope-in-a-zimbabwe-township?fbclid=IwAR03t5tR74KcXwvd61LD5kFXJLhE7prCjW4k8rkA-UF7XGV9r-eym1R_0qE">Basil Matsika</a>’s murals in Mbare.</p>
<p>It is the state-sanctioned public art, mostly statues, that tend to attract controversy. Issues of patronage and who commissioned the work are crucial in determining whether it survives a critical and public onslaught. In 2010 people were generally unhappy when the government commissioned the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2010-09-30-north-korean-statues-open-wounds-in-zim/">North Koreans</a> for a pair of statues of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Joshua-Nkomo">Joshua Nkomo</a> for Bulawayo and Harare. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451700/original/file-20220312-21-1xs6hew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd with banners gathers around a statue of a man standing proudly on a plinth." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451700/original/file-20220312-21-1xs6hew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451700/original/file-20220312-21-1xs6hew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451700/original/file-20220312-21-1xs6hew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451700/original/file-20220312-21-1xs6hew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451700/original/file-20220312-21-1xs6hew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451700/original/file-20220312-21-1xs6hew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451700/original/file-20220312-21-1xs6hew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Protesters at the Joshua Nkomo statue in Bulawayo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">ZINYANGE AUNTONY/AFP via Getty Images</span></span>
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<p>Nkomo was a nationalist and revolutionary leader of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), which fought alongside (now ruling) ZANU in the country’s liberation struggle. Ndebele people in particular were incensed that Pyongyang had a hand in training the Fifth Brigade, a section of the Zimbabwe National Army responsible for unleashing Gukurahundi. Zimbabweans were also unhappy that no local sculptor was assigned to do the work.</p>
<p>Last year, the government withdrew the first statue of <a href="https://www.zimlive.com/2020/12/18/mnangagwa-rejects-youthful-and-big-booty-mbuya-nehanda-statue/">Nehanda</a> after a public outcry. The youthful, large-bottomed depiction of Nehanda went viral on the internet. The artist, David Guy Mutasa, was given a chance to amend his mistakes. The Nkomo and Nehanda statues went ahead because they were political posturing from the government, disguised as cultural revival initiatives. </p>
<p>The same cannot be said of Bow’s mural as an independent initiative. The artist has worked with advertising company <a href="https://www.facebook.com/caligraph.co/photos/?ref=page_internal">CaliGraph</a> to create murals of other figures like musician Sandra Ndebele and socialite Mbo Mahocs and these have not been removed. This would indicate that the authorities embrace his work as long as it is about aesthetics and not politics.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-artists-have-preserved-the-memory-of-zimbabwes-1980s-massacres-143847">How artists have preserved the memory of Zimbabwe's 1980s massacres</a>
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<p>Alongside the likes of Black Phar-I, <a href="https://twitter.com/aero5ol">Aero5ol</a>, <a href="https://www.instagram.com/ckombo/?hl=en">Kombo Chapfika</a>, the Bulawayo-based Bow is part of a new breed of street artists. He is <a href="https://www.chronicle.co.zw/muralist-behind-mbuya-nehanda-king-lobengula-bares-it-all/">reported</a> saying he was raised by a Ndebele grandmother and a Shona grandfather, which makes it difficult to assign him an ethnic group unless he identifies with one. </p>
<p>This makes him a neutral observer in the socio-political divide. Driven by his desire to see a more united Zimbabwe, Bow <a href="https://www.okayafrica.com/zimbabwe-street-art-debate/">promises</a> to do more poster art and murals that call for unity between the Shona and the Ndebele. This will continue challenging the status quo and initiating dialogue around the country’s history.</p>
<h2>Freedom of expression</h2>
<p>Instead of the mural brewing a fresh tribal storm or creating a bitter debate – as highlighted in articles in <a href="https://thestandard.newsday.co.zw/2022/01/30/erased-mural-brews-tribal-storm/"><em>The Standard</em></a> and <a href="https://www.okayafrica.com/zimbabwe-street-art-debate/"><em>Okay Africa</em></a> – I argue that Bow’s piece reminded the nation how polarised it has always been. </p>
<p>And the jail threats of the deputy mayor would certainly deter graffiti artists who desire to address contentious political matters that rattle the state. As long as the government continues to stifle freedom of expression, artists who do street art and graffiti are in danger of limiting their expression to commissions for social campaigns.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177927/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Barnabas Ticha Muvhuti is a Ph.D. candidate in Art History in the NRF SARChI Chair program in Geopolitics and the Arts of Africa, Rhodes University.
His Ph.D. research is partly funded by the Rhodes University African Studies Centre through its funding from the DFG, the German Research Foundation under Germany ́s Excellence Strategy, funding number EXC2052/1</span></em></p>The unity between Zimbabwe’s two main ethnic groups is so fragile that even an inspirational street mural can expose it.Barnabas Ticha Muvhuti, Ph.D. in Art History candidate, Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1225862020-09-17T08:01:03Z2020-09-17T08:01:03ZThousands of unidentified Zimbabweans lie in secret mass graves – and I want to find them<p>One of my earliest memories is of violence and death. It happened in Harare in 1984 when I was about seven years old. I was supposed to meet a friend to play at a dump site together. He got there before me and started playing with what turned out to be a hand grenade. The bomb exploded in his hands. He died. I was lucky to survive but I have no doubt that the incident shaped who I was to become.</p>
<p>The device, from my understanding now, had been left by either Rhodesian soldiers or guerrilla fighters during the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tribute-to-zimbabwean-liberation-hero-dumiso-dabengwa-117986">war of liberation</a> which raged between 1966 and 1979. Death from grenades and <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2017/landmine-monitor-2017/casualties.aspx.">landmines</a> was commonplace in Zimbabwe during and after the struggle against colonial rule. </p>
<p>My next exposure to serious violence came when I joined the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) as a constable in 1998. I was trained by former liberation war fighters and soldiers whom we suspected had been redeployed from the notorious “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-mugabe-violence/mugabes-legacy-thousands-killed-in-rain-that-washes-away-the-chaff-idUSKCN1VR18H">5th Brigade</a>”. This army unit was responsible for the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/19/mugabe-zimbabwe-gukurahundi-massacre-matabeleland">murder of thousands</a> of Ndebele speaking people and supporters of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union in the 1980s. I joined the police partly due to the lack of employment opportunities and the influence from my stepfather who was a police sergeant. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=861&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=861&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=861&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1082&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1082&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1082&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">ZRP officer Keith Silika in the late 1990s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>The police trainers would subject recruits like me to various forms of torture, including water boarding and battering the soles of our feet with rifle butts and sticks. There were other “endurance exercises” that went way over the top. For example, recruits would be ordered to lie down and forced to roll over repeatedly until we were dizzy and throwing up. Apparently, this was done to strengthen us – both physically and mentally – and to get rid of “civilian weaknesses”, as one trainer put it. I spent most of my post probation period with the Police Protection Unit – the agency responsible for the protection of prominent state ministers, judges and other VIPs.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>This article is part of Conversation Insights
<br><em>The Insights team generates <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218">long-form journalism</a> derived from interdisciplinary research. The team is working with academics from different backgrounds who have been engaged in projects aimed at tackling societal and scientific challenges.</em> </p>
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<p>But I only really began to realise the extent of the systemic violence in my home country when I left Zimbabwe and started looking up texts, documentaries and meeting surviving victims of atrocities. In the last 50 years, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289331331_When_a_state_turns_on_its_citizens_60_years_of_institutionalised_violence_in_Zimbabwe">five main conflicts</a> have taken place in Zimbabwe. The liberation war (1966-1979), political violence (1980-present day) and the Matabeleland democides (1981-1987) – this is also known as Gukurahundi which is a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shona_language">Shona</a> word meaning “early rain that washes the spring chaff”. </p>
<p>Finally there were the violent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jun/02/zimbabwe.andrewmeldrum">farm invasions</a> and the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/front_page/newsid_9556000/9556242.stm">Marange diamond massacre</a>. Hundreds of thousands of people who were caught up in these conflicts have been killed and gone missing – their deaths covered up and brushed under the carpet by the state.</p>
<p>By 2005 I had joined the police in the UK. But despite my new life I couldn’t stop thinking about how, when and where people were being kidnapped, killed and concealed back home. This had a profound influence on what I chose to do with the next chapter of my life in academia and research. I enrolled for a degree in Forensics and Criminology, pursued a master’s degree in Crime Scene Investigation and then a PhD in Forensic Archaeology.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15740773.2020.1729614#metrics-content">My research</a> has brought me full circle and taken me back to those dangerous playgrounds which I drifted in and out of as a child. I wanted to use my skills as a forensic investigator to find the secret mass graves, the clandestine burial spots. I wanted to know where “the missing” were being hidden. I realised that no systematic forensic investigation of that kind had ever been undertaken.</p>
<p>I was interested in forensic identification, exhumation and the cultural aspects of burial. I interviewed over 60 witnesses – including current and former MPs, human rights defenders and victim family members. I had to keep the identity of my witness a secret to protect them, as many were in fear of their lives. Speaking out can be fatal in Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>Some of what I discovered during my journey was startling. The sheer scale of the killing was shocking – so were the methods of torture. Some burial locations seemed to be selected at random, some were opportunistic interment while others took forethought and planning. The burial methods were dependent on which arm of the state had done the killing and when. Despite this, my research was able to uncover the tactics used by the state to hide thousands of bodies. Tactics including, stacking multiple bodies on top of each other at cemeteries, dumping bodies in mortuaries and burying them in forests, near schools, hospitals and in disused mine shafts. </p>
<h2>‘Fallen heroes’</h2>
<p>I discovered – mainly through witness testimony – that the Fallen Heroes Trust (FHT), which is aligned to the ZANU-PF government, has been on the forefront of dubious exhumation and identification practises since the early 1980s. It used approaches which made it almost impossible to find anyone accountable for the deaths. The <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1372034/Zimbabwes-killing-fields-Mass-grave-600-bodies-shaft.html">Monkey William Mine exhumation</a> of over 600 human remains in Chibondo is one such example. Here, standard anthropological identification methods where ignored. And when human remains are discovered, state <a href="https://www.news24.com/News24/Zim-mass-grave-becomes-propaganda-20110401">propaganda machinery</a> goes into overdrive. </p>
<p>Supporters of then President Robert Mugabe claimed the bodies were those of people killed between 1966 and 1979 under the regime of former president Ian Smith – the last white prime minister of the former colony of Rhodesia. Forensic tests and DNA analysis were not carried out. Instead, Saviour Kasukuwere, a government minister at the time, told the media that traditional African religious figures would perform rites to invoke spirits to identify the dead.</p>
<p>Mr Kasukuwere, <a href="https://africabriefing.org/2020/06/former-zimbabwe-minister-saviour-kasukuwere-says-coup-plot-allegations-laughable/">who is now in exile</a>, said the Chibondo remains were discovered in 2008 by a gold panner who crawled into the shaft. But spirits of war dead had long “possessed” villagers and children in the district. He said: “The spirits have refused to lie still. They want the world to see what Smith did to our people.”</p>
<p>I spoke to an anthropologist who attended the exhumation as an observer who told me that some of the bodies were wearing contemporary clothing which did not exist during the liberation war. Amnesty International advised the government to halt exhumation, pending <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/exhumation-of-bodies-at-chibondo-mine-causes-controversy-as-organizations-call-for-government-to-end-process-119348439/1458156.html">forensic investigation</a>. But this advice was ignored. </p>
<p>My research also found that the state of the human remains in Chibondo pointed to the presence of <a href="https://www.news-medical.net/life-sciences/What-are-Lipids.aspx#:%7E:text=Lipids%20are%20molecules%20that%20contain,not%20made%20up%20of%20protein.">lipids</a>, blood and decaying flesh. It is highly likely that these bodies are the remains of supporters of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and former Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) cadres. Since its formation 1999 hundreds of supporters have been killed, injured or <a href="http://mdc-youthassembly.blogspot.com/p/roll-of-honor.html">disappeared</a>.</p>
<p>The FHT routinely exhumes remains without following accepted and professional forensic approaches. For example, <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/humus/">black humus soil</a> was incorrectly attributed to human remains found at an exhumation at Castle Kopje farm in Rusape according to one witness I spoke to. During a different exhumation, another witness told me: “One member of the FHT picked up a walking stick and assigned the remains to the individual next to it.” No other identification was used to ascertain identity, according to my witness.</p>
<p>The FHT also claims to have exhumed over 6,000 bodies around the country using “<a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/man-with-a-rare-calling/">spirit mediums</a>” – who are seemingly deemed more effective than forensic science.</p>
<h2>‘Blood soaked human remains’</h2>
<p>One witness I spoke to described how they were detained at Bhalagwe Camp, which is south of Bulawayo where the 5th Brigade set up a <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/correspondent/1852133.stm">concentration camp</a> in 1985. The source, aged only 14 at the time, witnessed a daily routine of dead bodies <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7388214.stm">being dumped</a> into the disused Antelope mine shafts 5km away. They were dumped in the old gold mine after they had been tortured and killed in the camp. The man, now in his 50s, told me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I used to be selected, often to assist in dragging blood soaked human remains from the campsite to be deposited into toilet latrines or transported into nearby disused mineshafts.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another male victim I interviewed recalled how he was seized from a bus travelling from Kezi to Bulawayo at a roadblock. He was 20 at the time and was forced off the bus by the 5th brigade and made to stay at a makeshift detention centre.</p>
<p>It was here, he told me, that he saw a pile of human flesh decomposing and later set alight by soldiers. “Most were killed on the false allegation of harbouring and supporting army deserters or dissidents”, he said. This was quite a common narrative at the time. Up until the present day, vital documents and information about the <a href="https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/MURDER.HTM">democide</a> are not known due to the continued obfuscation of information surrounding the massacres by the government.</p>
<h2>State brutality</h2>
<p>Police are seen by some as being just another partisan arm of the state. But Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/zimbabwe1108/7.htm">has reported</a> that people “routinely” die in police custody. Human Rights Watch and my own interviews found that the police and Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) often refuse to transfer the bodies of the dead through normal burial processes and sometimes even refuse victims access to their deceased relative. There have also been cases where they denied further investigation. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the army has been killing people on behalf of the state with impunity since 1980. Witnesses <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k9Bk5VIhjiY">have reported</a> seeing the army digging mass grave in Dangamvura cemetery and piling the human remains inside them. On one occasion, a witness saw the army using prisoners to dig the graves.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/k9Bk5VIhjiY?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
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<p>The state intelligence services are much more elusive and wield authority over other security departments. They have more resources and can use other apparatus to <a href="https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2019/09/01/history-abductions-assassinations/">transfer abductees or human remains</a>. They own properties for training and logistics and some of these locations are are believed to have been used for torture and even burial of human remains, according to <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2011/10/cio-offices-torture-centres-exposed/">surviving witness testimony</a>. This was also confirmed with a witness I spoke to.</p>
<p>Another witness I interviewed went to the Marange diamond fields at the height of government operation in 2008 – <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/epic/gemd/5644252/Zanu-PF-and-Zimbabwe-military-profiting-from-diamond-massacre.html">Operation Hakudzokwi</a> (“do not return” in Shona). He travelled all the way to Marange, about 120 miles from Chitungwiza, with three friends and got introduced to a syndicate leader who turned out to be a police officer. They were then given a map and some equipment and were directed where to go. He told me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We spent three days in the fields playing cat and mouse with security details. We often heard gunshots in the night. In the day we would see police officers collecting bodies in metal coffins.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Since 2000, there have been more than 5,000 abductions by the state with about 49 abductions recorded in 2019 alone, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25944&LangID=E">according to the UN</a>. I spoke to three witnesses who were abducted, tortured, stripped naked and then dumped near lake Chivero, which is 37km south-west of Harare. One said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I was bundled into a Toyota Land Cruiser vehicle after being trailed by the unmarked vehicle in Harare. When we arrived near the lake they started beating me up with boots and fists.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The man said the thugs were demanding to know what the opposition plan was on an upcoming demonstration. When he could not confirm anything, they left him to walk naked to the main road for help.</p>
<h2>What happened to the dead?</h2>
<p>According to my study of the Gukurahundi killings, bodies were thrown down mine shafts in Antelope, Chibondo, Silobela, Filabusi and Nkayi. Human remains have been found at schools, hospitals, river banks, dams and caves. They have been dumped near business centres, disused airports and at former detention centres like Bhalagwe and Sun Yet Sen, which were set up during elections by war veterans and ZANU-PF youths. In 2011, for instance, a mass grave containing the remains of 60 people collapsed on a field while <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/05/mass-grave-found-zimbabwe-school">children played football</a>. Victims who are not claimed at mortuaries are given pauper burials. This makes the search and recovery process even more difficult. </p>
<p>The use of cemeteries, like Hanyani and Kumbudzi, for stacking bodies in mass graves, is a particularly nefarious method. Cultural myths associated with the dead mean people very rarely venture into cemeteries. There is a belief that the spirits of the dead roam those places.</p>
<p>The victims of the Marange fields atrocities were killed by criminal syndicates attached to certain military personnel. They were either buried in the mines or taken away. Those taken away were buried by prisoners in cemeteries in Dangamvura, which is 22km away from the mining fields. The army dug two mass graves in Dangamvura cemetery in 2008 and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/06/26/diamonds-rough/human-rights-abuses-marange-diamond-fields-zimbabwe">buried over 60 bodies</a> there.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Missing person Miriam Gonzo" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1010&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1010&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1010&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Miriam Gonzo, 50, from Rushinga, Zimbabwe, listed as missing by Interpol.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-Yellow-Notices#2019-104770">Interpol</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many of these things are common knowledge in Zimbabwe. Yet despite the alarming number of deaths and kidnaps, the official missing person database for Zimbabwe with Interpol currently stands <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-Yellow-Notices">at just 15</a>. It includes my cousin, <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-Yellow-Notices#2019-104770">Miriam Gonzo</a>, who went missing in South Africa. </p>
<p>Curiously it excludes people missing from the various democides, including journalist and human rights defender <a href="https://www.amnestyusa.org/journalist-and-activist-disappeared-in-zimbabwe">Itai Dzamara</a> who was kidnapped by state agents in broad daylight in 2016 while having a haircut. </p>
<h2>Clouded in secrecy</h2>
<p>Another layer of deception that emerged during the Mugabe era was the issuing of death certificates for the Gukurahundi democide. The vice president at the time, Phelekezela Mphoko, started a programme of issuing <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-government-gukurahundi-atrocities/4868914.html">death certificates</a> to surviving families without any investigation. Such processes will add to the conundrum of trying to identify and reconcile records of the missing in future.</p>
<p>The state often denies all killings and blames them on “insurgents”, “malcontents” and “third parties”. This is the narrative that was offered for the January and August 2019 state killings that saw over 18 people murdered by men in army uniforms. A subsequent <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/zimbabwe/motlanthe-commission-s-anniversary-shame.">inquiry</a>, led by former South African president, Kgalema Motlanthe, concluded that the army was culpable – but there are still no prosecutions as a result.</p>
<p>Despite the death of Mugabe, the government continues to mislead the population. In May three women, including MP Joana Mamombe, said they <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/10/zimbabwe-charges-activists-with-lying-about-police-torture">were kidnapped</a>, tortured and sexually assaulted by state agents. Not only did the state deny the abductions but they charged the women with breaking COVID-19 lockdown regulations and presenting false information to police.</p>
<p>In 2018 President Emmerson Mnangagwa enacted the <a href="http://www.nprc.org.zw/">National Peace and Reconciliation Act</a>: legislation that facilitated the formation of a commission to look into previous human rights abuses. In addition, the Zimbabwean Parliament is debating the <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/coroners-bill-tightens-noose-on-cops-zpcs-and-doctors/">Coroners Act Bill</a> which will establish the office of the coroner to investigate suspicious deaths.</p>
<p>There is a pressing need for human rights groups to compile a comprehensive missing persons database. An independent regulatory authority must oversee this whole process. International organisations, such as the <a href="https://oic.icmp.int/index.php?w=mp_reg">International Commission for Missing Persons</a>, could help.</p>
<p>I hope my research will support this effort and help correct the <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0259-01902018000100003">inaccurate historical record</a>. More importantly, I want to help grieving relatives bury their loved ones and finally achieve some sort of closure. </p>
<p>When I finished my research, the image of my school friend was even more ingrained in my consciousness. It is for people like him, that investigations like mine must be allowed to continue.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith K Silika does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A forensic archaeologist and former Zimbabwe police officer uses his investigative skills to find the missing and the dead in his homeland.Keith K Silika, PhD Candidate in Forensic Archaeology, Staffordshire UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1438472020-08-04T15:24:33Z2020-08-04T15:24:33ZHow artists have preserved the memory of Zimbabwe’s 1980s massacres<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350897/original/file-20200803-14-1vcb9b8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A scene from a play about the Gukurahundi genocide, 1983 The Dark Years, performed in Harare in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">JEKESAI NJIKIZANA/AFP/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>“Let people vent,” lamented performing artist and television personality <a href="http://almasiartsalliance.org/category/kudzai-sevenzo/">Kudzai Sevenzo</a> in a <a href="https://twitter.com/KudzaiSevenzo/status/1288407558097641472?s=20">tweet</a> as Zimbabweans on social media reacted to the death of <a href="https://apnews.com/7afe3ad83057f11f793dd54228e8e8d9">Perence Shiri</a>. Shiri was the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/profile/zenzele-ndebele">Zenzele Ndebele</a>, an investigative journalist, also spoke out in a <a href="https://twitter.com/zenzele/status/1289075563236413441?s=20">tweet</a>: “Shiri gets to be buried like a hero. We never got a chance to mourn our relatives who were killed by the 5th Brigade.”</p>
<p><a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/zimbabwe/who-is-perrance-shiri-black-jesus-dead-29-july-2020/">Shiri</a> was a military man who commandeered a praetorian army that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/19/mugabe-zimbabwe-gukurahundi-massacre-matabeleland">killed</a> over 20,000 civilians in the provinces of Matabeleland and the Midlands between 1983 and 1987. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2b5iVGCDs0">Gukurahundi</a> saw his North Korean-trained unit, the <a href="https://gijn.org/2018/12/03/digging-up-zimbabwes-gukurahundi-massacre-dossier/">Fifth Brigade</a>, descend on provinces inhabited by the Ndebele people to quell dissent. <a href="https://bit.ly/2Po03WA"><em>Gukurahundi</em></a> is a Shona term referring to the early summer rains that remove chaff and dirt from the fields.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1289075563236413441"}"></div></p>
<p>The death of Shiri on 29 July 2020 has kindled flames of debate that the ruling party has tried to shut down for many years. </p>
<p>I argue, in a <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021989415615646">paper</a> on Gukurahundi, that writers and artists have left behind a richly textured memory on what writer <a href="https://www.novuyotshuma.com/">Novuyo Rosa Tshuma</a> has called the country’s “<a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2018/12/06/old-faces-new-masks-zimbabwe-one-year-after-the-coup/">original sin</a>”.</p>
<h2>Enforced ‘collective amnesia’</h2>
<p>In the aftermath of Gukurahundi, <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-gabriel-mugabe-a-man-whose-list-of-failures-is-legion-121596">former president</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-gabriel-mugabe-a-man-whose-list-of-failures-is-legion-121596">Robert Mugabe</a> enforced collective forgetting of this period in Zimbabwe’s history. He referred to it simply as a “<a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/mugabes-moments-of-madness">moment of madness</a>” and suggested that discussing the events would undermine attempts to nurture national unity. </p>
<p>His successor, <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-mnangagwa-usher-in-a-new-democracy-the-view-from-zimbabwe-88023">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, Minister of State Security at the time of the Gukurahundi <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml">genocide</a>, has also implored Zimbabweans to “let bygones be bygones”. At his 2017 <a href="https://bit.ly/2PqhhSY">inauguration</a> he said that the past cannot be changed, but “there is a lot we can do in the present and the future to give our nation a different positive direction”.</p>
<p>However, as l contend in another <a href="https://journals.assaf.org.za/index.php/tvl/article/view/1548">paper</a>, silence on Gukurahundi has not led to any national cohesion. Instead, it has been a part of what’s responsible for the culture of state violence and impunity in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980. </p>
<h2>Writing against forgetting</h2>
<p>Yet, a rich body of literary and visual artworks has emerged thematising the genocide. There have been books in indigenous languages such as <em><a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Uyangisinda_lumhlaba.html?id=U80JAQAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">Uyangisinda Lumhlaba</a></em> (This world is unbearable) in Ndebele by Ezekiel Hleza and <em><a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Mhandu_dzorusununguko.html?id=jBAkAQAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">Mhandu Dzorusununguko</a></em> (Enemies of independence) in Shona by Edward Masundire. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1126&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1126&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1126&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Farrar, Straus and Giroux</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There has been an even bigger corpus of texts written in English. Among them is the late Yvonne Vera’s 2002 novel <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781466806061"><em>The Stone Virgins</em></a>. It details the horrors faced by villagers from a ruthless army. In <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/zimbabwe-running-with-mother-robert-mugabe"><em>Running with Mother</em></a>, a 2012 novel by Christopher Mlalazi, a child narrator, Rudo, recounts the arrival of the Fifth Brigade in her village.</p>
<p>Peter Godwin’s largely autobiographical <a href="https://www.orwellfoundation.com/book-title/mukiwa-a-white-boy-in-africa/"><em>Mukiwa: A White Boy in Africa</em></a>
in 1996 gives a picture of Gukurahundi from the eyes of a young white journalist. And <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/08/books/review/house-of-stone-novuyo-rosa-tshuma.html"><em>House of Stone</em></a>, the 2018 novel by Novuyo Rosa Tshuma, tells the story of an orphaned young man trying to explore his past. He’ll find out that his father is Black Jesus (a name by which Shiri was known). Tshuma’s descriptions of the genocide are detailed, graphic and ghastly. </p>
<p>Literary creativity has made it possible to remember, commemorate and document experiences that otherwise would have been forgotten or dispersed through wilful omission. In doing so, literary texts create narratives of Zimbabwe’s history and national identity. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">W. W. Norton & Company</span></span>
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<p>“To write is to banish silence,” writes Vera in her 1995 <a href="https://ocul-yor.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/01OCUL_YOR/q36jf8/alma991010694059705164">doctoral thesis</a> on colonialism and narratives of resistance. “As a writer, you don’t want to suppress history, you want to be one of the people liberating stories.” </p>
<p>She explains that “to write is to engage possibilities for triumphant and repeated exits, inversion and recuperation of identity”. In this line of thinking, writing can offer victims of Gukurahundi a voice which the state continues to deny them. </p>
<h2>Art of torture</h2>
<p>Visual artworks have also engaged with Gukurahundi, such as in the exhibition <em>Sibathontisele</em> by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/04/zimbabwe-artist-arrest-mugabe-censorship">Owen Maseko</a>, which has stood for years as a material text-under-erasure in Zimbabwe. <em>Sibathontisele</em> is a Ndebele word meaning “we drip it on them”. It refers to an infamous torture technique used by the Fifth Brigade in which they dripped hot and melted plastic on victims.</p>
<p>Unlike literary texts, which have remained unbanned and uncensored, Maseko’s 2010 exhibition was banned by state security a day after its opening at the <a href="http://www.nationalgallerybyo.com/">National Arts Gallery</a> in Bulawayo and the artist was arrested. Visual art, it appears, is deemed more subversive than written texts. In spite of such restrictions, Maseko’s exhibition has been hosted outside Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>The artist explains in this <a href="http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/artcul/osisa_trials_tribulatn_of_artist_110630.pdf">article</a> that art, justice and human rights are intricately interrelated. Visual art plays a role in bringing to the surface narratives on Gukurahundi, which have been buried for almost three decades.</p>
<h2>The rich memory</h2>
<p>Writers and visual artists are able to create alternative spaces for marginalised and forgotten stories. And Zimbabwe’s artists have created a rich memory and archive that counters the culture of forgetting and criminalising open discussion of Gukurahundi. </p>
<p>Through their works, histories are revisited so that they can be better understood and can be accorded their rightful recognition. They have opened new spaces of discussion and have gestured towards the importance of remembering and learning from the past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143847/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gibson Ncube does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Artists are filling the state’s silence by revisiting history so that it can be discussed.Gibson Ncube, Associate Professor, University of ZimbabweLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1236112019-09-17T12:32:18Z2019-09-17T12:32:18ZMugabe is dead, but old men still run southern Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292643/original/file-20190916-19030-ryoxe2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa at the funeral of his predecessor, Robert Mugabe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The death of Robert Gabriel Mugabe (95) saw another of the first-generation leaders of newly independent southern African states leave the world stage. </p>
<p>Southern Africa was the last region on the continent to obtain majority rule. The independence of Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1990) and democracy in South Africa (1994) ended white settler minority regimes. They were <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24487678?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">replaced in power by liberation movements</a>. The Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu, later Zanu-PF), the South West African People’s Organisation (Swapo) and the African National Congress (ANC) have been in government since then. </p>
<p>Mugabe’s death invites a look at the succession – or lack of – in these three countries.</p>
<p>Despite the cultivation of heroic narratives and patriotic history, the first-generation freedom fighters who took over the state offices are not immortal. <a href="https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/gerontocratic">Mugabe’s</a> male-dominated leadership structures based on liberation struggle credentials remain entrenched.</p>
<p>In all three countries a second struggle generation is gradually entering the higher echelons of party and state. But the “born free” – people who were born after liberation – as well as women have hardly made significant inroads into the meritocratic, male-dominated core structures of power. </p>
<p>The question is how much longer the “old men syndrome” will remain alive and kicking in the three countries, despite growing frustration among the politically powerless.</p>
<h2>Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>Celebrated by many as an <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/obituary-zimbabwes-robert-mugabe-a-revolutionary-20190906">icon of the anti-colonial struggle</a>, Mugabe was nevertheless an autocratic ruler who overstayed his time in office. The military finally replaced him with his longtime confidante Emmerson Mnangagwa in <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2017/11/16/understanding-the-military-takeover-in-zimbabwe/">a soft coup</a> in November 2017.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/06/zimbabwe-robert-mugabe-vice-president-emmerson-mnangagwa-grace-mugabe">sidelining</a> was initiated by Mugabe’s younger wife Grace (born in 1965, she was 40 years his junior) to hijack the succession of her husband. She led a group of Zanu-PF members, dubbed the <a href="https://www.zimbabwebriefing.org/single-post/2018/07/13/Thinking-after-Zimbabwe%E2%80%99s-ConCoup-Now-Then-and-Then-Again">G40</a> (for Generation 40). The name referred to a constitutional clause that everyone above the age of 40 qualified as a presidential candidate. But, the military and security apparatus and its leadership was still firmly rooted in the struggle generation and opted for <a href="https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/11/21/what-is-behind-the-military-coup-in-zimbabwe/">“Team Lacoste”</a> named after “the Crocodile”, which is Mnangagwa’s nickname. </p>
<p>This ended the political careers of the G40. So far, the “elders” remain in charge and in firm control.</p>
<p>Morgan Tsvangirai (born 1952) founded the <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/zimbabwe-went-wrong-mdc/">Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai</a> in 1999. The opposition party has been denied electoral victory several times <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/14/obituaries/morgan-tsvangirai-zimbabwe-dead.html">since 2002</a>. </p>
<p>After Tsvangirai’s death earlier this year the much younger Nelson Chamisa (born in 1978) won the internal party <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/mdc-t-endorses-nelson-chamisa-as-morgan-tsvangirais-successor-13558886">power struggle</a>. He challenged Mnangagwa in the elections in July last year. </p>
<p>Thanks mainly to rural area results, Zanu-PF recorded a landslide victory in the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimelections2018-full-details-of-parliament-results-16378869">parliamentary elections</a>. Mnangagwa also secured a (disputed) and much more narrow first term in office as elected head of state. </p>
<p>This is partly due to a continued stricter social control in rural areas. Political interaction and activities in villages can be much more easily monitored than in urban areas. But it also suggests that traditional values – such as respect for elders – remain alive. This gives the generation in power a comparative advantage over younger competitors. </p>
<p>Similar generational constellations also benefited the governing parties in Namibia and South Africa.</p>
<h2>Namibia</h2>
<p>Namibia has had three state presidents <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290429183_From_Nujoma_to_Geingob_25_years_of_presidential_democracy">since independence in 1990</a>. Sam Nujoma, co-founder of Swapo in 1960, was its president until 2007 and the country’s first head of state for three terms until 2005. In May he celebrated his 90th birthday in seemingly good health. Though he remains influential, he has been less visible lately.</p>
<p>In a heavy-handed inner-party battle he ensured that his crown prince Hifikepunye Pohamba (born 1936) followed for <a href="https://brill.com/view/title/33326">two terms</a>. Pohamba was succeeded by Namibia’s first Prime Minister Hage Geingob (born 1941).</p>
<p>After a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2002-09-01-geingob-out-in-the-cold-before-demotion">clash with Nujoma</a>, Geingob left Namibia to <a href="http://ahibo.com/ticad/en/LP2_8GlobalCoalition_E.pdf">head the Global Coalition for Africa</a> in Washington. Returning to Namibia’s parliament, he made a comeback under Pohamba. Reappointed as Prime Minister <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-12-07-namibias-geingobs-comeback-paves-way-for-swapo-moderates">in 2012</a>, he became state president in 2015 and party leader in 2017.</p>
<p>Geingob is tipped to be reelected as head of state for another five-year term in the next presidential and parliamentary elections <a href="https://www.nbc.na/news/namibias-general-elections-be-held-27-november.20811">in November</a>. His current Vice President <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=axBhO1aqECg">Nangolo Mbumba</a> is the same age. In the Swapo electoral college on 7 September he secured another top ranking on the party’s candidate list for the National Assembly and will remain in the inner circle of <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/82885/read/Geingobs-loyalists-win-big-at-the-pot">“Team Hage”</a>.</p>
<p>Five years ago the delegates, in a surprise move, ousted some of the old party cadres. But the elders remained <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/116/463/284/2760214">dominant in cabinet</a>. This time the expected further <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/82880/read/Swapo-concludes-electoral-college">generational shift did not happen</a>.</p>
<p>Party president Geingob could also fill ten secure seats on the electoral list and brought some of those seniors back, who <a href="https://www.nbc.na/news/president-geingob-throws-old-guard-party-list-lifeline.23864">did not make the cut</a>. As the head of state <a href="http://www.tfd.org.tw/export/sites/tfd/files/publication/journal/155-173-How-Democratic-Is-Namibias-Democracy.pdf">he can appoint</a> another eight non-voting members to parliament. This will allow him to retain several more of the trusted old cadres.</p>
<p>Despite this, Namibia’s second struggle generation (those who went into exile in the mid-1970s) is gradually taking over. </p>
<h2>South Africa</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/nelson-rolihlahla-mandela">Nelson Mandela,(1918-2013)</a> served only one term as state president. His successors <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki">Thabo Mbeki</a> and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma">Jacob Zuma</a> (both born 1942) were recalled by the ANC and did not survive the full two terms in office. </p>
<p>Zuma was succeeded by <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cyril-matamela-ramaphosa">Cyril Ramaphosa</a>. Born in 1952, he is ten years younger than his predecessor.</p>
<p>Inter-generational tensions have begun to show in South Africa. In the latest national elections young South Africans, or “born frees”, showed their disdain for the ANC’s old guard and agenda by staying away from the polls as a <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1614389/south-africa-election-young-voters-stay-away-from-polls/">form of protest</a>. </p>
<p>This younger generation has shown its frustration with the limits to liberation. Many <a href="https://theconversation.com/study-shows-young-south-africans-have-no-faith-in-democracy-and-politicians-118404">dismiss formal politics</a>. Their preference is to engage in social movements or other parties.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/study-shows-young-south-africans-have-no-faith-in-democracy-and-politicians-118404">Study shows young South Africans have no faith in democracy and politicians</a>
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<p>One such choice is to support Julius Malema (born 1981) and his Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) which was <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/economic-freedom-fighters-eff">founded in 2013</a> and appeals to a smaller pan-African segment of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-eff-excellent-politics-of-props-and-imagination-59918">younger generation</a>. But the party’s election results remained behind its expectations and kept it in a distant third place, garnering <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/App/dashboard.html">only 10,80% in the latest polls</a>.</p>
<h2>The future</h2>
<p>For obvious reasons, the first-generation freedom fighters, who took over the state offices after liberation, continue to place a high value on seniority in age. </p>
<p>Younger generations of leaders and women make only limited inroads into the structures of power, and the “born free” are not represented. </p>
<p>Rather, the second struggle generation is moving upward to take over, maintaining a system which leaves little room for renewal beyond the confines of individual credentials within the ranks of the former liberation movements.</p>
<p>The continued cultivation of a heroic narrative and patriotic history includes the internalised conception that freedom fighters never retire. Theirs is a lifelong struggle. <em>“A luta continua”</em> remains alive as long as they are. </p>
<p>But this is a backward looking perspective, nurtured by a romanticised past. It blocks new ideas and visions by younger generations contributing to governance, which would create ownership and make them feel represented. It prevents rather than creating a common future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123611/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber has been a member of Swapo since 1974. </span></em></p>It remains to be seen how much longer the ‘old men syndrome’ will persist in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, despite growing frustration among the politically powerless.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1215962019-09-06T09:08:13Z2019-09-06T09:08:13ZRobert Gabriel Mugabe: a man whose list of failures is legion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287334/original/file-20190808-144862-11u42pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Robert Mugabe, former President of Zimbabwe, addressing media in Harare, in July 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One wishes one could say “rest in peace”. One can only say, “may there be more peace for Zimbabwe’s people, now that <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/robert-mugabe">Robert Gabriel Mugabe</a> has retired permanently”. Zimbabwe’s former president <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life-108103">has died</a>, aged 95.</p>
<p>His failures are legion. They might start with the 1980s Gukurahundi massacres in Matabeleland and the Midlands, with perhaps <a href="https://www.sithatha.com/books">20 000 people killed</a>. Next, too much welfare spending <a href="http://weaverpresszimbabwe.com/reviews/59-becoming-zimbabwe?start=10">in the 1980s</a>. Then crudely implemented <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289336044_The_Economic_Structural_Adjustment_Programme_The_Case_of_Zimbabwe_1990-1995">structural adjustment programmes</a> in the 1990s, laying the ground for angry war veterans and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a strong labour union and civil society based opposition party.</p>
<p>In 1997 Mugabe handed out unbudgeted pensions to the war-vets and promised to really start the “fast track land reform” that got going <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287199114_The_impact_of_land_reform_in_Zimbabwe_on_the_conservation_of_cheetahs_and_other_large_carnivores">in 2000</a>, when the MDC threatened to defeat Zanu (PF) at the polls. That abrogation of property rights started the slide in the Zimbabwean dollar’s value.</p>
<p>From 1998 to 2003 Zimbabwe’s participation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s second war cost US$1 million a day, creating a military cabal used to getting money fast. Speedy money printing presses led to <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/file%20uploads%20/hany_besada_zimbabwe_picking_up_the_piecesbook4you.pdf">unfathomable hyperinflation</a> and the end of Zimbabwe’s sovereign currency, still the albatross around the country’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48757080">neck</a>. </p>
<p>In 2008, the MDC’s electoral victory was reversed with a presidential run-off when at least 170 opposition supporters were murdered. Hundreds more were beaten and <a href="http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/elec/rau_critique_zec_elec_report_090612.pdf">chased from their homes</a>. Even Mugabe’s regional support base could not stand for that, so he was forced to accept a <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2013/07/15/review-the-hard-road-to-reform-the-politics-of-zimbabwes-global-political-agreement-reviewed-by-timothy-scarnecchia/">transitional inclusive government</a> with the MDC.</p>
<p>Over the next decade, Mugabe was unable to stop his party’s increasing faction fighting. His years of playing one group off against the other to favour himself <a href="https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f05aec20-6d98-425a-8d82-56688ea93246/download_file?file_format=pdf&safe_filename=State%2Bintelligence%2Band%2Bthe%2Bpolitics%2Bof%2BZimbabwe%2527s%2Bpresidential%2Bsuccession.pdf&type_of_work=Journal+article">finally wore too thin</a>. When in early November 2017, at his wife Grace’s instigation, he fired his long-time lapdog Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa, the generals with whom he’d colluded for decades turned on him. A <em>coup petit</em> ensued and returned Mnangagwa from exile, soon to be elevated to the presidency and heavily indebted to his comrades.</p>
<p>Where did Mugabe gain his proclivity for factionalism? And how did he learn to speak the language all wanted to hear – only to make them realise they had been deluded in the end? </p>
<h2>The beginning</h2>
<p>Mugabe and many other Zimbabwean nationalists were jailed in 1964. Ian Smith was preparing for the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, and the first nationalist party had split into Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union and Ndabaningi Sithole’s Zanu. Mugabe had been Nkomo’s Publicity Secretary. </p>
<p>As far back as 1962, Mugabe was registering on the global scales: Salisbury’s resident British diplomat <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/de/book/9781137543448#aboutAuthors">thought Mugabe was</a> “a sinister figure” heading up a youthful “Zimbabwean Liberation Army … the more extreme wing of Zapu”. </p>
<p>But almost as soon as Mugabe was imprisoned, a man in her majesty’s employ travelled down from his advisory post in newly free Zambia to visit the prisoner. Dennis Grennan returned to Lusaka having <a href="http://archive.kubatana.net/html/archive/opin/080120dm.asp?sector=OPIN&year=2008&range_start=571">promised</a> to look after Mugabe’s wife Sarah, known as “Sally”. Grennan and people like Julius Nyerere’s British friend and assistant <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3518465.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A4d7659d7e9f1b2a3dd3124c9a249a47c">Joan Wicken</a> played an important role in Mugabe’s rise. </p>
<p>The Zimbabwean nationalists emerged from Salisbury’s prisons late in 1974, as Portugal’s coup led to Angola and Mozambique emerging from colonialism into the Soviet orbit. The fifties generation of Zimbabwean nationalists were to participate in the Zambian and South African inspired détente <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1975/03/25/archives/mr-vorsters-detente.html">exercise</a>. This inspired much competition for Zanu’s leadership: Mugabe arrived in Lusaka after ousting Ndabaningi Sithole, Zanu’s first leader. </p>
<p>Samora Machel, freshly in Mozambique’s top office, wondered if Mugabe’s quick rise was due to a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40201256.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A1d1f7a14b762adff6a6007321af29132">“coup in prison”</a>. Herbert Chitepo’s March 1975 <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3557400.pdf">assassination </a> (which got many of Zanu’s leaders arrested and its army kicked out of Zambia) was only one marker of the many fissures in the fractious party that by 1980 would rule Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>In late 1975 the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Vashandi_"><em>vashandi</em></a> group emerged within the Zimbabwean People’s Army. Based in Mozambique’s guerrilla camps, they tried to forge unity between Zimbabwe’s two main nationalist armies and push a left-wing agenda. They were profoundly unsure of Mugabe’s suitability for <a href="https://nehandaradio.com/2016/08/08/heroes-day-review-dzino-memories-freedom-fighter/">leadership</a>.</p>
<p>When Mugabe found his way to Mozambique also in late 1975, Machel put him under house arrest in Quelimane, far from the guerrilla camps. In January Grennan helped him to London to visit a hospitalised Sally. He made contacts around Europe and with a few <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03057078008708020">London-based Maoists</a>.</p>
<p>Soon after Mugabe’s return the young American congressman Stephen Solarz and the Deputy Head of the American embassy in Maputo, Johnnie Carson, wended their way to <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2014.956499">Quelimane</a>. Mugabe wowed them.</p>
<p>Solarz and Carson reported back that Mugabe was “an impressive, articulate and extremely confident individual” with a “philosophical approach to problems and … well reasoned arguments”. He claimed to control the “people’s army”. Yet by January 1977, he persuaded Samora Machel to imprison the young advocates of unity with Zapu. His many reasons included their initial refusal to support him at a late 1976 conference in Geneva organised by the British, helped immeasurably by Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of State. </p>
<p>At a hastily called congress in March 1977 to consecrate his ascension, Mugabe uttered his leitmotif: those appearing to attempt a change to the party’s leadership by “maliciously planting contradictions within our ranks” would be struck by the <a href="http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.nuzn197707">“the Zanu axe”</a>.</p>
<p>This was Mugabe’s strategy, embedded at an early stage: tell foreign emissaries what they wanted to hear, use young radicals (or older allies) until their usefulness subsided, and then get rid of them. All the while he would balance the other forces contending for power in the party amid a general climate of fear, distrust, and paranoia. </p>
<h2>Dealing with dissent</h2>
<p>It is not certain if Margaret Thatcher knew about this side of Mugabe when they met less than a month after his April 1980 inauguration. He seemed most worried about how Joshua Nkomo’s Zapu – which he had dumped from the erstwhile “Patriotic Front”, and the violence against which had put Zimbabwe’s election in some doubt – was making life difficult for the new rulers. He <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2016.1214116">warned</a> that he might have “to act against them soon”.</p>
<p>In as much as Zapu was linked with the South African ANC and Thatcher and her colleagues tended to think the ANC was controlled by the South African Communist Party, Zapu intelligence chief <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tribute-to-zimbabwean-liberation-hero-dumiso-dabengwa-117986">Dumiso Dabengwa’s</a> perspective might be more than conspiracy theory. Perhaps Thatcher’s wink and nudge was a green light for the anti-Soviet contingent to eliminate a regional threat. Gukurahundi <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2017.1309561">followed</a>. It was certainly the biggest blot on Mugabe’s career and created the biggest scar over Zimbabwe. The scar is still there, given the lack of any effort at reconcialitation, truth, or justice.</p>
<p>Four years later the ruling party’s first real congress since 1963 reviewed its history. Mugabe tore the Zipa/Vashandi group that had annoyed him eight years before to shreds. “Treacherous … counter-revolutionary … arms caching … dubbed us all <em>zvigananda</em> or bourgeois”. Thus it “became imperative for us to firmly act against them in defending the Party and the Revolution… We had all the trouble-makers detained”. </p>
<p>The great helmsman recounted the youthful dissenters’ arrest and repeated the axe phraseology. </p>
<p>But few saw these sides of Mugabe’s character soon enough; those who did were summarily shut up. </p>
<h2>The end</h2>
<p>After he’d been ousted, Mugabe could only look on in seeming despair over the ruination he had created. Sanctimonious as ever he wondered how his successor, current President Emmerson Mnangagwa, had become such an ogre. At his 95th birthday, February 21 2019, a few weeks after Mnangagwa’s troops had killed 17 demonstrators, raped as many women, and beaten hundreds more in the wake of his beleaguered finance minister’s methods to create <a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">“prosperity from austerity”</a>, Mugabe <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-156949.html">mused to his absent successor</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We condemn the violence on civilians by soldiers … You can’t do without seeing dead bodies? What kind of a person are you? You feed on death? </p>
</blockquote>
<p>He only had to look into his own history to see what kind of people he helped create.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121596/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Robert Mugabe’s years of playing one group off against the other to favour himself finally wore too thin in 2017.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of Johannesburg, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1081032019-09-06T05:39:36Z2019-09-06T05:39:36ZRobert Mugabe: as divisive in death as he was in life<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291235/original/file-20190906-175663-u64qs1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Robert Mugabe during his swearing-in ceremony in Harare, 2008. The former Zimbabwean president has died aged 95.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Robert Mugabe, the former president of Zimbabwe, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/09/06/377714687/robert-mugabe-veteran-president-of-zimbabwe-dead-at-95">has died</a>. Mugabe was 95, and had been struggling with ill health for some time. The country’s current President Emmerson Mnangagwa announced Mugabe’s death on Twitter on September 6:</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1169839308406054912"}"></div></p>
<p>The responses to Mnangagwa’s announcement were immediate and widely varied. Some hailed Mugabe as a liberation hero. Others dismissed him as a “monster”. This suggests that Mugabe will be as divisive a figure in death as he was in life.</p>
<p>The official mantra of the Zimbabwe government and its Zimbabwe African National Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) will emphasise his leadership of the struggle to overthrow <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ian-Smith">Ian Smith’s</a> racist settler regime in what was then Rhodesia. It will also extol his subsequent championing of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358530500082916">seizure of white-owned farms</a> and the return of land into African hands.</p>
<p>In contrast, critics will highlight how – after initially <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24hd4n.7?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">preaching racial reconciliation</a> after the liberation war in <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Rhodesian_Bush_War">December 1979 </a> – Mugabe threw away the promise of the early independence years. He did this in several ways, among them a <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">brutal clampdown</a> on political opposition in <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Matabeleland in the 1980s</a>, and Zanu-PF’s systematic <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-are-elections-really-rigged-mr-trump-consult-robert-mugabe-68440">rigging of elections</a> to keep he and his cronies in power. </p>
<p>They’ll also mention the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321704136_The_Curse_Of_Corruption_In_Zimbabwe">massive corruption</a> over which he presided, and the <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/publication/costs-and-causes-zimbabwes-crisis">economy’s disastrous downward plunge</a> during his presidency.</p>
<p>Inevitably, the focus will primarily be on his domestic record. Yet many of those who will sing his praises as a <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201709220815.html">hero of African nationalism</a> will be from elsewhere on the continent. So where should we place Mugabe among the pantheon of African nationalists who led their countries to independence?</p>
<h2>Slide into despotism</h2>
<p>Most African countries have been independent of colonial rule for <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2010/weighing-half-century-independence">half a century or more</a>.</p>
<p>The early African nationalist leaders were often regarded as gods at independence. Yet they very quickly came to be perceived as having feet of very heavy clay.</p>
<p>Nationalist leaders symbolised African freedom and liberation. But few were to prove genuinely tolerant of democracy and diversity. One party rule, nominally in the name of “the people”, became widespread. In some cases, it was linked to interesting experiments in one-party democracy, as seen in Tanzania under Julius Nyerere and Zambia under Kenneth Kaunda. </p>
<p>Even in these cases, intolerance and authoritarianism <a href="https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/doorenspleet/opd/">eventually encroached</a>.
Often, party rule was <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/159875?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">succeeded by military coups</a>.</p>
<p>In Zimbabwe’s case, Mugabe proved unable to shift the country, as he had wished, to one-partyism. However, this did not prevent Zanu-PF becoming increasingly intolerant over the years in response to both economic crisis and rising opposition. Successive elections were shamelessly perverted. </p>
<p>When, despite this, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-10-00-zim-2008-election-taken-by-a-gun-not-a-pen">Zanu-PF lost control of parliament</a> in 2008, it responded by rigging the presidential election in a campaign of unforgivable brutality. Under Mugabe, the potential for democracy was snuffed out by a brutal despotism.</p>
<h2>A wasted inheritance</h2>
<p>Whether the economic policies they pursued were ostensibly capitalist or socialist, the early African nationalist leaders presided over <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/78">rapid economic decline</a>, following an initial period of relative prosperity after independence. </p>
<p>In retrospect, it’s widely recognised that the challenges they faced were immense. Most post-colonial economies were underdeveloped and depended upon the export of a small number of agricultural or mineral commodities. From the 1970s, growth was crowded out by the International Monetary Fund demanding that mounting debts be surmounted through the pursuit of <a href="https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/glossary/structural-adjustment/">structural adjustment programmes</a>. This hindered spending on infrastructure as well as <a href="http://www.globalissues.org/article/3/structural-adjustment-a-major-cause-of-poverty">social services and education</a> and swelled political discontent.</p>
<p>In contrast, Mugabe inherited a viable, relatively broad-based economy that included substantial industrial and prosperous commercial agricultural sectors. Even though these were largely white controlled, there was far greater potential for development than in most other post-colonial African countries. </p>
<p>But, through massive corruption and mismanagement, his government threw that potential away. He also presided over a disastrous downward spiral of the economy, which saw both industry and <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/a-seized-zimbabwe-farm-is-returned-but-uncertainty-reigns-20180301">commercial agriculture collapse</a>. The economy has never recovered and remains in a state of acute and persistent crisis today.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-economy-is-collapsing-why-mnangagwa-doesnt-have-the-answers-104960">Zimbabwe's economy is collapsing: why Mnangagwa doesn't have the answers</a>
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<h2>Reputation</h2>
<p>On the political front, the rule of some leaders – like <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/milton-obotes-lasting-legacy-to-uganda/a-19191275">Milton Obote in Uganda</a> and <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/somalia-fall-of-siad-barre-civil-war/">Siad Barre in Somalia</a> – created so much conflict that coups and crises drove their countries into civil war. Zimbabwe under Mugabe was spared this fate – but perhaps only because the political opposition in Matabeleland in the 1980s was so brutalised after up to <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-policy-towards-zimbabwe-during-matabeleland-massacre-licence-to-kill-81574">30 000 people were killed</a>, that they shrank from more conflict. Peace, then, was merely the absence of outright war.</p>
<p>Some leaders, notably Ghana’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Kwame-Nkrumah">Kwame Nkrumah</a> and <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/former-tanzanian-president-julius-nyerere-dies">Julius Nyerere</a> in Tanzania, are still revered for their commitments to national independence and African unity. This is despite the fact that, domestically, their records were marked by failure. By 1966, when Nkrumah was <a href="https://www.eaumf.org/ejm-blog/2018/2/23/february-24-1966-dr-kwame-nkrumah-overthrown-as-president-of-the-republic-of-ghana">displaced by a military coup</a>, his one-party rule had become politically corrupt and repressive. </p>
<p>Despite this, Nyerere always retained his reputation for personal integrity and commitment to African development. Both Nkrumah’s and Nyerere’s ideas continue to inspire younger generations of political activists, while other post-independence leaders’ names are largely forgotten.</p>
<p>Will Mugabe be similarly feted by later generations? Will the enormous flaws of his rule be forgotten amid celebrations of his unique role in the liberation of southern Africa as a whole? </p>
<h2>A Greek tragedy</h2>
<p>The problem for pan-Africanist historians who rush to praise Mugabe is that they will need to repudiate the contrary view of the millions of Zimbabweans who have suffered under his rule or have fled the country to escape it. He contributed no political ideas that have lasted. He inherited the benefits as well as the costs of settler rule but reduced his country to penury. He destroyed the best of its institutional inheritance, notably an efficient civil service, which could have been put to good use for all.</p>
<p>The cynics would say that the reputation of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/patrice-emery-lumumba">Patrice Lumumba</a>, as an African revolutionary and fighter for Congolese unity has lasted because he was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jan/17/patrice-lumumba-50th-anniversary-assassination">assassinated in 1961</a>. In other words, he had the historical good fortune to die young, without the burden of having made major and grievous mistakes.</p>
<p>In contrast, there are many who would say that Mugabe simply lived too long, and his life was one of Greek tragedy: his early promise and virtue marked him out as popular hero, but he died a monster whom history will condemn.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108103/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation </span></em></p>Where should we place Mugabe among the pantheon of African nationalists who led their countries to independence?Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1227262019-09-05T09:02:06Z2019-09-05T09:02:06ZZimbabwe’s deepening crisis: time for second government of national unity?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290911/original/file-20190904-175686-v3skdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many Zimbabweans have turned to hawking to keep the wolf from the door as the economic crisis in the country deepens. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe is going through its worst socio-economic and political crisis in two decades. Crippling daily power outages of <a href="https://www.biznews.com/africa/2019/08/05/zimbabwe-tipping-point-economic-crisis">up to 18 hours</a> and erratic supply of clean water are just some of the most obvious signs. Meanwhile, an inflation rate of over 500% has put the prices of basic goods beyond the reach of most people.</p>
<p>Hopes that the end of President Robert Mugabe’s ruinous rule in November 2017 would help put the country on a new path of peace and prosperity have long <a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">dissipated</a>. Efforts by his successor President Emmerson Mnangagwa to <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwe-is-open-for-business-says-mnangagwa-12913367">attract foreign investors</a>, who are critical in reviving Zimbabwe’s ailing economy, have also largely failed.</p>
<p>The situation has not been helped by the rejection of the 2018 presidential election results by the main opposition party. The Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A) claims the governing Zanu-PF stole the elections even though the results were <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Regional-observers-Zimbabwe-election-free-and-fair/4552902-4692254-e75fje/index.html">endorsed</a> as free and fair by the African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC). Only the European Union observers were somewhat circumspect <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/eu-observers-say-zimbabwe-election-fell-short-on-fairness-20181010">in their assessment</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">Fantasy that Mnangagwa would fix Zimbabwe now fully exposed</a>
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<p>The opposition alliance has been calling for Mnangagwa’s government to relinquish power, and a <a href="https://www.openparly.co.zw/chamisa-calls-for-national-trasitional-authority/">national transitional authority</a> appointed to run the country for at least two years, or until the 2023 general elections.</p>
<p>How individuals who will sit on the national transitional authority will be chosen and by whom, is not clear. But the party and <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2019/03/01/towards-the-national-transitional-authority/">some academics</a> believe such a transitional authority would normalise Zimbabwe’s highly polarised political situation and help it revive its relations with the West.</p>
<p>The opposition may have a point on re-engagement with the West. This is key to helping end the investment drought that started in earnest <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.908.3003&rep=rep1&type=pdf">between 2000 and 2003</a> under sanctions imposed by Western countries for human rights violations linked to Zanu-PF’s violent land reform seizures and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jun/03/zimbabwe.andrewmeldrum">election rigging</a>.</p>
<p>But the transitional authority idea is doomed to fail because of lack of buy-in by Zanu-PF. So, it’s time to consider a more viable alternative path to peace for Zimbabwe.</p>
<h2>Clamping down</h2>
<p>For now, the government has dismissed talk of a transitional authority as unconstitutional. Instead, in May it launched its own platform, called the <a href="https://www.panafricanvisions.com/2019/zimbabwe-mnangagwa-launches-the-political-actors-dialogue-to-address-long-term-economic-challenges/">Political Actors Dialogue</a>. The forum comprises 17 small political parties that participated in the 2018 elections. </p>
<p>The main opposition party is boycotting the process on grounds that Mnangagwa is an illegitimate president. Recently, it attempted to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwi-gdPunLfkAhXfSBUIHdWZCeIQFjAEegQIBBAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworld-africa-49366224&usg=AOvVaw0fkr2f1y4BV0-4W2SlJHGY">embark on public protests</a> in the hope of bringing the government to its knees. The protests fell flat after being blocked by the courts and the police.</p>
<p>It boggles the mind why the MDC-A, led by Nelson Chamisa, insists on marches when previous attempts were crushed with brute force. These led to deaths in <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=21&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwingbiQ87TkAhVsZhUIHWexAsIQFjAUegQICBAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.news24.com%2FAfrica%2FZimbabwe%2Fzimbabwean-generals-deny-troops-shot-and-killed-6-protesters-20181113&usg=AOvVaw02nyk1uLwat64nJso2EImF">August 2018</a> and <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwicyIfl87TkAhV9SBUIHXzrAC4QFjAAegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fmg.co.za%2Farticle%2F2019-01-30-zim-army-responsible-for-murders-rapes-report&usg=AOvVaw1fiTJ2kraC9xNiMyQ4TBM6">January 2019</a>. </p>
<p>The Zanu-PF regime has always clamped down heavily on perceived threats to its rule since 1980. Why then does the MDC-A continue to endanger people’s lives through this deadly route as a way of resolving Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political crises?</p>
<p>I firmly believe that the opposition needs to change tack and focus on entering into dialogue with the government. </p>
<h2>Dialogue and unity government</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s ongoing crisis requires the two leading political protagonists - Mnangagwa and Chamisa - to enter into serious dialogue. Both leaders need to soften their hard-line stances towards each other and put the people of Zimbabwe first.</p>
<p>There’s a precedent for this. Ten years ago, then South African President Thabo Mbeki managed to bring then President Mugabe and Movement for Democratic Change opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai to the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiMheeVnrfkAhVXShUIHeBIDw04ChAWMAB6BAgAEAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.france24.com%2Fen%2F20080721-mbeki-harare-mediate-talks-zimbabwe-political-crisis&usg=AOvVaw2pLPeTVwBEVrH2TSAcW5e3">negotiation table</a>. </p>
<p>The talks culminated in the formation of the government of national unity that ran Zimbabwe from February 2009 to July 2013, with Mugabe as the President and Tsvangirai as the Prime Minister. The unity government was fairly successful and managed to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiv9PjanrfkAhUUTBUIHQR0D0cQFjAJegQIABAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theindependent.co.zw%2F2013%2F07%2F11%2Freflecting-on-positive-zimbabwe-gnu-moments%2F&usg=AOvVaw25plQQHFWt-5PTjI9_Fi6J">stabilise the economy</a>.</p>
<p>Two decades of suffering have shown that it is not the threat of protests or sanctions from the West that can move Zanu-PF to change, but neighbouring countries under the aegis of <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwia1fucj7HkAhWnRhUIHcY8Dvc4ChAWMAB6BAgAEAI&url=https%3A%2F%2Flibrary.fes.de%2Fpdf-files%2Fbueros%2Fmosambik%2F07874.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2PSzn2eTrgI53Cnw2yrI2t">SADC</a>. South Africa is pivotal in this regard as the region’s strongest economic and military power. </p>
<p>It’s time to experiment with a second government of national unity for Zimbabwe. But for this to happen, SADC and South Africa must have the appetite to intervene in Zimbabwe. This is currently lacking. </p>
<h2>Dialogue in Zimbabwe’s history</h2>
<p>Historically, dialogue has moved Zimbabwe forward as a nation during its darkest hours. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>A year before independence in 1980, battle-hardened guerrilla commanders agreed to talk to the then Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, to end Zimbabwe’s liberation war even though they were convinced that they were winning. </p></li>
<li><p>In 1987 Joshua Nkomo, who was the leader of the main opposition party, the Zimbabwean African People’s Union, agreed to talk to his political nemesis, then Prime Minister Mugabe. Yet before this, he had been hounded out of the country by Mugabe in the mid-80s, and <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">thousands of his supporters killed</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>More recently in 2009, Morgan Tsvangirai agreed to enter into a unity government with Mugabe, despite winning the first round of the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-10-00-zim-2008-election-taken-by-a-gun-not-a-pen">2008 elections</a>. The unity government briefly resuscitated and stabilised Zimbabwe’s fragile economy. Hyperinflation was tamed, basic commodities became available again and people regained purchasing power.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Given the MDC-A’s positive contribution during its brief stint in the 2009-2013 unity government, the party should be expending its energies on dialogue. The main opposition party can enter into a second government of national unity, but continue building and strengthening its own support.</p>
<p>In the same vein, Zanu-PF also needs to realise that without the involvement of the MDC-A, its attempts to revive the economy and end the strife in the country, on its own terms, are destined to fail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122726/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tapiwa Chagonda has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>It’s time for a new approach as it becomes increasingly clear that protests won’t topple the Zanu-PF government.Tapiwa Chagonda, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1221392019-08-21T09:42:34Z2019-08-21T09:42:34ZRepression and dialogue in Zimbabwe: twin strategies that aren’t working<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288885/original/file-20190821-170927-slrpli.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's crisis is deepening on all fronts.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">globalnewsart.com/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the November 2017 coup that toppled Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and the elections in 2018, the regime of President Emmerson Mnangagwa has forged two forms of rule. These have been based on coercion on the one hand, and on the other dialogue.</p>
<p>Following the 2018 general elections and <a href="http://solidaritypeacetrust.org/1800/Zimbabwe-the-2018-elections-and-their-aftermath/">the violence that marked its aftermath</a>, the Mnangagwa regime once again resorted to coercion in the face of the protests in January 2019. The protests were in response to the deepening <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-08-06-zimbabwe-hikes-fuel-prices-by-26-percent/">economic crisis in the country</a>, and part of the opposition strategy to contest the legitimacy of the government. </p>
<p>The response of the state to the protests was swift and brutal. Seventeen people were killed and 954 jailed nationwide. In May the state turned its attention to civic leaders, arresting seven for “subverting” a constitutional government. The repressive state response was felt once again on 16 and 19 August, when the main opposition Movement for Democratic Chance (MDC) and civic activists were once again prevented from marching against the <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/police-soldiers-deploy-in-zimbabwe's-bulawayo-as-opposition-challenges-protest-ban/">rapid deterioration of Zimbabwe’s economy</a>. </p>
<p>These coercive acts represent a continuation of the violence and brutality of the Mugabe era.</p>
<p>At the same time Mnangagwa has pursued his objective of global re-engagement and selective national dialogue. This is in line with the narrative that has characterised the post-coup regime.</p>
<p>In tracking the dialogue strategy of the Mnangagwa government, it is apparent that it was no accident that key elements of it were set in motion in the same period as the agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a new staff monitored programme. </p>
<p>The purported objective is to move the Zimbabwe Government towards an economic stabilisation programme. This would result in a more balanced budget, in a context in which excessive printing of money, rampant issuing of treasury bills and high inflation, were the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2019/05/31/Zimbabwe-Staff-Monitored-Program-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-46952">hallmarks of Mugabe’s economic policies</a>. </p>
<p>The dialogue initiatives also took place in the context of renewed discussions on re-engagement with the European Union (EU) in June this year.</p>
<p>But, Mnangagwa’s strategy of coercion and dialogue has hit a series of hurdles. These include the continued opposition by the MDC. Another is the on-going scepticism of the international players about the regime’s so-called reformist narrative.</p>
<h2>Dialogues</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa has launched four dialogue initiatives. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Political Actors: This involves about 17 political parties that participated in the 2018 elections. They all have negligible electoral support and are not represented in parliament. The purported intent is to build a national political consensus. The main opposition party, the MDC, boycotted the dialogue, dismissing it as a public relations exercise controlled by the ruling Zanu-PF. </p></li>
<li><p>The Presidential Advisory Council: This was established in January to provide ideas and suggestions on key reforms and measures needed to improve the investment and business climate for economic recovery. This body is largely composed of Mnangagwa allies. </p></li>
<li><p>The Matabeleland collective: This is aimed at building consensus and an effective social movement in Matabeleland to influence national and regional policy in support of healing, peace and reconciliation in this region. But it has come in for some criticisms. One is that it has been drawn into Mnangagwa’s attempt to control the narrative around the <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2019/06/04/gukurahundi-zimbabwe-mnangagwa/">Gukurahundi massacres</a>. These claimed an estimated 20 000 victims in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions in the early 1980’s. Another criticism is that it has exacerbated the divisions within an already weakened civic movement by regionalising what should be viewed as the national issue of the Gukurahundi state violence. </p></li>
<li><p>The Tripartite National Forum. This was launched in June, 20 years after it was <a href="http://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/building-from-the-rubble">first suggested by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions</a>. The functions of this body set out in an <a href="https://www.greengazette.co.za/documents/national-gazette-42554-of-28-june-2019-vol-648_20190628-GGN-42554">Act of Parliament</a>, include the requirement to consult and negotiate over social and economic issues and submit recommendations to Cabinet; negotiate a social contract; and generate and promote a shared national socio-economic vision.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The establishment of the forum could provide a good platform for debate and consensus. But there are dangers. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions warned of the long history of the lack of “broad based consultation on past development programmes”. It <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/tnf-launched-20-years-later-amid-visible-tensions">insists that</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>reforms must never be deemed as tantamount to erosion of workers’ rights.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The strategy</h2>
<p>In assessing the central objectives of the various strands of Mnangagwa’s dialogue strategy, three factors stand out.</p>
<p>The first is that the Political Actors Dialogue, the Presidential Advisory Council and the Matabeleland Collective were developed to control the pace and narrative around the process of partnership with those players considered “reliable”. Major opposition and civic forces that continued to question the legitimacy of the Mnangagwa boycotted these processes.</p>
<p>Secondly, the formal establishment of the long awaited Tripartite National Forum may serve the purpose of locking the MDC’s major political ally, the Zimbabwe Council of Trade Unions, into a legally constructed economic consensus. The major parameters of this will likely be determined by the macro-economic stabalisation framework of the IMF programme.</p>
<p>When brought together, all these processes place increased pressure on the political opposition to move towards an acceptance of the legitimacy of the Mnangagwa regime, and into a new political consensus dominated by the ruling Zanu-PF’s political and military forces, thus earning them the seal of approval by major international forces.</p>
<p>The MDC has responded with a combined strategy of denying Mnangagwa legitimacy, protests as well as calls for continued global and regional pressure. The MDC believes that the continued decline of the economy will eventually end the dominance of the Mnangagwa regime. </p>
<p>As part of its 2018 election campaign, the MDC made it clear it would accept no other result than a victory for itself and Chamisa. That message has persisted and is a central part of the de-legitimation discourse of the opposition and many civic organisations. The MDC has regularly <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/sikhala-mnangagwa-faces-overthrow-through-citizen-mass-protests/">threatened protests since 2018</a>.</p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>The MDCs strategies have not resulted in any significant progress. The hope that the economic crisis and attempts at mass protests to force Zanu-PF into a dialogue are, for the moment, likely to be met with growing repression. Moreover, the deepening economic crisis is likely to further thwart attempts to mobilise on a mass basis.</p>
<p>The EU, for its part, is still keen on finding a more substantive basis for increased re-engagement with Mnangagwa and will keep the door open. Regarding the US, given the toxic politics of the Trump administration at a global level, and the ongoing <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/trump-administration-condemns-latest-govt-abductions-and-torture-of-opposition-in-zimbabwe/">strictures of the US on the Zimbabwe government</a>, there has been a closing of ranks <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/sadc-declares-anti-sanctions-day/">around a fellow liberation movement</a> in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/sadc-declares-anti-sanctions-day/">recent appointment</a> as Chair of the SADC Troika on Politics, Peace and Security in Tanzania will only further cement this solidarity.</p>
<p>There is clearly a strong need for a national dialogue between the major political players in Zimbabwean politics. But there is little sign that this will proceed. Moreover, the current position of regional players means that there is unlikely to be any sustained regional pressure for such talks in the near future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122139/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Raftopoulos is affiliated with a Zimbabwean NGO Ukuthula Trust. </span></em></p>The Mnangagwa regime’s coercive acts are a continuation of the violence and brutality of the Mugabe era, while he seeks global re-engagement and selective national dialogue.Brian Raftopoulos, Research Fellow, International Studies Group, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1179862019-05-30T11:07:31Z2019-05-30T11:07:31ZA tribute to Zimbabwean liberation hero Dumiso Dabengwa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278494/original/file-20190607-52748-jxtqi0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A fitting way to pay tribute to Zimbabwean liberation war hero <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/sacp-sacp-expresses-its-heartfelt-condolences-to-the-dabengwa-family-the-people-of-zimbabwe-and-southern-africa-for-the-great-loss-encountered-2019-05-24">Dumiso “DD” Dabengwa</a>, who has died aged 79, is to depict a snapshot history of the late 1970s and the 1980s that shows the stresses of his job during and just after Zimbabwe’s war of liberation.</p>
<p>As the head of intelligence for <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Zimbabwe-Peoples-Revolutionary-Army/dp/1436361559">Zimbabwe African People’s Revolutionary Army</a>, the armed wing of Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu), he faced two enemies in the late seventies: the Rhodesian forces and those of Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwean African National Union (Zanu), the nationalist party that split off from <a href="https://www.academia.edu/38948000/The_split_of_ZAPU_2_">Zapu in 1963</a> and would eventually lead Zimbabwe. In the 1980s South Africa and the United Kingdom joined those antagonists. </p>
<p>Only psychologists could discern how Dabengwa maintained his legendary composure. He kept his head while everyone was losing theirs: a necessary trait for an intelligence supremo. </p>
<p>This tribute is inspired by a picture – probably taken in 1981 at the New Sarum airfield outside what was Salisbury – that’s making social media rounds following Dabengwa’s death. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1131547396960399361"}"></div></p>
<p>Dabengwa is shown standing with Rex Nhongo, commander of the newly integrated Zimbabwean military forces. The two young soldiers symbolise the unity to be forged out of Rhodesia’s and the two nationalist parties’ security forces as they entered Zimbabwe’s democratic dispensation. </p>
<p>That task’s difficulty is shown by the possibility that the two were on their way to Entumbane to calm the battles raging between the two nationalist armies, in which over 300 soldiers <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/obituaries/dumiso-dabengwa-dead.html">were killed</a>. But they would fail in these efforts and would land on different sides of Zimbabwe’s post liberation story. Dabengwa would be jailed by his erstwhile comrades. Nhongo would retire early, rich and still a power-broker in his party – until his fiery death in mid-<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331776137_Political_Accidents_in_Zimbabwe">2011</a>.</p>
<h2>Internecine violence</h2>
<p>About five years before 1981, an effort <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589001.2012.639655">emerged</a> to create a united “people’s army” out of Zanu’s guerrilla forces, Zanla and Zipra.</p>
<p>Nhongo had once been a Zipra soldier, but left during Zapu’s devastating internecine disputes in the early 1970s. With Zanla’s commander in Zambia’s jails suspected of <a href="https://allnewsnetwork.wordpress.com/2011/03/12/who-killed-josiah-tongogara-and-herbert-chitepo/">murdering the national chairman of Zanu, Herbert Chitepo</a>, Nhongo was by 1976 at the head of Zanla. Thus he became the commander of the Zimbabwe People’s Army (Zipa), supposedly an attempt to unite the two nationalist armies. </p>
<p>But his heart was not in it. He ordered his soldiers on engaging the Rhodesian forces to <a href="https://academic.oup.com/hwj/article/57/1/79/675840">kill Zipra fighters first</a>. There were battles between the two armies in training camps. What should Dabengwa have done?</p>
<p>Zipra withdrew a good number of troops, but adhered to the agreement to unite the armies. As it happened, before too long Robert Mugabe (on his way to the top) and Nhongo sidelined the group that really believed in the unity project. Dabengwa told one of us (Moore) many years later that Zipa was too militaristic, ignoring democratic processes. He took a wait and see approach.</p>
<p>With the adherents to unity gone, Zanu’s anti-Zapu sentiments opened further. The party’s <a href="http://www.archives.gov.zw/">1978 political education</a> tract claimed that Zipra forces planned to let Zanla smash Rhodesia’s “racist state machinery” single-handedly. Once victory was achieved, Zipra would “crash (sic) Zanla and seize political power…” </p>
<h2>Gukurahundi</h2>
<p>These and <a href="https://cul.worldcat.org/title/march-11-movement-in-zapu-revolution-within-the-revolution/oclc/13564369">other Zanu-related imbroglios</a> made life very difficult for Dabengwa, a man entrusted with Zapu’s intelligence. </p>
<p>Yet with “freedom” – hastened by <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2017.1275108">Soviet assistance to ZPRA</a> – Zimbabwe became even more central to Cold War and South African intrigue. As Zimbabwean political scientist Miles Tendi <a href="https://www.zimlive.com/2019/05/27/dumiso-dabengwa-a-military-czar-without-peer-in-making-of-the-zimbabwean-state/">attests</a>, Dabengwa and Josiah Tongogara, then the top Zanla general, played a key role with the “Patriotic Front” (another effort at unity between the two main liberation parties) at the late 1979 <a href="https://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/5847/5/1979_Lancaster_House_Agreement.pdf">Lancaster House negotiations </a> that led to Zimbabwe’s new dispensation. </p>
<p>Dabengwa himself said in a <a href="http://www.cite.org.zw/videos/interview-with-dumiso-dabengwa/">mid-2018 interview</a> that he and Tongogara thought they could push the unity idea beyond an agreement to maintain unity at diplomatic negotiations, but remaining separate for all other purposes. They wanted <em>political</em> unity. They carried out research among the soldiers, who indicated agreement. Yet Tongogara’s <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-152947.html">suspicious death</a> as he drove to a Mozambican camp only days later killed that dream: <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Gukurahundi</a> mass killings and atrocities in Matabeleland were only steps away. </p>
<p>Dabengwa’s interview leaves little doubt about Gukurahundi’s roots:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>At independence the British had already made a decision with Mugabe to carry out this genocide. (They) had already decided to ensure that that no one of the Ndebele nation would be allowed to be leader in this country. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Conspiracy and persecution</h2>
<p>On 9 May 1980, just weeks after Zimbabwe’s 17 April freedom celebrations, Mugabe visited British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. He <a href="http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/help-with-your-research/research-%20guides/prime-ministers-office-records/">complained that</a> “some” in Zapu did “not accept the new situation”. They wanted to continue the fight and the government might have to act against them soon.</p>
<p><a href="http://researchdata.uwe.ac.uk/104/240/roh-oh-sta-da1-appr.pdf">Danny Stannard</a>, Rhodesia’s Special Branch director, stayed on during the new era. With then Minister of State Security Emmerson Mnangagwa, he organised the transition of Zimbabwe’s security services – precisely to keep the region Communist-free, Stannard told one of us in 2014. He thought Mnangagwa was the perfect man for that job. Stannard held Dabengwa in venomous disregard and was dead certain that in February 1982 his Soviet allies were rolling to the Entumbane barracks. </p>
<p>In March the Zapu cabinet ministers, Dabengwa, deputy armed forces commander Lookout Masuku, and four other Zapu officials were arrested and charged with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1983/03/25/world/a-fateful-trial-witty-ex-guerrilla-v-zimbabwe.html">treason</a>. Arms caches had been “discovered” on Zapu properties. </p>
<p>In December 1982 a Whitehall officer wondered if the British should reconsider support for a régime seemingly hell-bent on eliminating Zapu and its potential supporters. No, he wrote, “if we refuse military sales and aid” Mugabe might approach the USSR – albeit reluctantly. Other reasons to keep Mugabe on side included selling arms and jet fighters, as well as paving the road to Namibian and South African <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/07075332.2017.1309561">settlements</a>. </p>
<p>Treason charges for all but Dabengwa were dismissed in early April 1983. But, as he and the others walked out of court they were jailed again under the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1983/03/25/world/a-fateful-trial-witty-ex-guerrilla-v-zimbabwe.html">Emergency Powers Act</a>. </p>
<h2>Peacemaking</h2>
<p>By this time, the Fifth Brigade had been in Matabeleland for several months: Gukurahundi was underway with its terror, mass starvation, and murder. When they were released in 1986 Zapu had to stop the carnage, agreeing to be absorbed into Zanu (PF). Dabengwa’s reluctant agreement was essential; it took his authority, and that of Zapu leader <a href="https://pindula.co.zw/Joshua_Nkomo">Joshua Nkomo</a>, to persuade the Zipra ex-combatants and the Zapu youth to merge.</p>
<p>The Cold War was on its last legs. Zanu (PF) had won its war for a one-party state. During the 1990s, with Nkomo as vice-president in the revised Zanu (PF) government, Dabengwa took on posts ranging from Home Affairs minister to managing the long-gestating but never funded <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2011/01/06/matabeleland-zambezi-water-project-urgent/">Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project</a>. </p>
<p>He left government in 2000. In 2008 he abandoned the Zanu (PF) politburo and revived Zapu. </p>
<p>There cannot be a man deserving more to rest in peace than Dabengwa.</p>
<p><em>David Galbraith, a retired Professor of English at University of Toronto and who spent the early 1980s in Matabeleland, contributed to this article</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117986/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Only psychologists could discern how Dumiso Dabengwa maintained his legendary composure, a necessary trait for an intelligence supremo.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies and Visiting Fellow, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge, University of JohannesburgNqobile Zulu, Lecturer in Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1078402018-12-05T12:09:51Z2018-12-05T12:09:51ZLiberation hero Mugabe evokes polarised emotions among Zimbabweans<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/247966/original/file-20181129-170250-1fqyfc2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The end of Robert Mugabe’s rule was greeted with momentous national celebration. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Robert Mugabe’s name is <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/robert-mugabe">synonymous</a> with both Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle and its post-colonial politics. His role and that of his Zanu-PF party have been central to the country’s dynamics since the early 1960s – and could well set the tone for the foreseeable future. </p>
<p>For much of his political life Mugabe has often been viewed, in the words of one of his biographers <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=vQY4DgAAQBAJ&pg=PT23&lpg=PT23&dq=Martin+Meredith,+Mugabe+%22secretive+and+solitary%22&source=bl&ots=DmCK97xurM&sig=PymYcd-DCAyFl-2WFRS18fAIbao&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwijmNmroPneAhWQsKQKHZANDhAQ6AEwAnoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=Martin%20Meredith%2C%20Mugabe%20%22secretive%20and%20solitary%22&f=false">Martin Meredith</a>, as “secretive and solitary”, an “aloof and austere figure”.</p>
<p>However he is described, there’s no doubt that Mugabe’s political legacy is highly contested. To understand how this happened, it’s necessary to examine his personal history; his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/11/17/its-been-one-year-since-zimbabwe-toppled-mugabe-why-isnt-it-a-democracy-yet/?utm_term=.11c978401892">political demise</a> in 2017; and Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/19/zimbabwe-needs-aid-to-prevent-further-crisis-warns-ruling-party">deepening political and economic crisis</a> more than a year after Mugabe’s ouster.</p>
<p>For the faction that has succeeded Mugabe, led by President Emmerson Mnangagawa, moving beyond the highly problematic legacy that they helped to create remains a daunting task.</p>
<h2>Early life</h2>
<p>Robert Mugabe was born 94 years ago at Kutama Mission in Zvimba District, west of what was then called Salisbury, the capital of then <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Southern-Rhodesia">Southern Rhodesia</a> (today’s Zimbabwe). He received a <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/africa/robert-mugabe">Jesuit education</a> and was by many accounts an exceptional student.</p>
<p>In 1945 Mugabe left Kutama Mission with a teaching diploma. He won a scholarship to South Africa’s Fort Hare University in 1949. There he met other emerging nationalists and was <a href="http://www.channelafrica.co.za/sabc/home/channelafrica/news/details?id=7aa25498-9448-4324-89c2-e4f62a324e17&title=The%20rise%20and%20fall%20of%20Mugabe">introduced to Marxist ideas</a>. </p>
<p>Armed with a BA degree in history and English Literature, Mugabe returned to Southern Rhodesia in 1952. He soon moved to the Northern Rhodesia (today’s Zambia) in 1955 to take up a teaching post. In 1958 he moved again, to a teacher training college in Ghana. There, a year after Ghana’s independence in 1957, he experienced the thrill and sense of possibility of a newly independent African state. It was a seminal political moment for him.</p>
<h2>Making of a revolutionary</h2>
<p>Mugabe returned home in 1960 on extended leave to introduce his new wife <a href="https://www.zambianobserver.com/the-forgotten-story-of-sally-mugabe-the-beloved-mother-of-zimbabwe-robert-mugabes-first-wife-and-true-love-the-woman-whose-death-changed-president-mugabe-forever/">Sally Hayfron</a> to his family. Instead of returning to Ghana, he became entangled in nationalist politics. This included the turmoil that the two major nationalist parties, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/30035743?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu) and Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu)</a>, split. </p>
<p>In 1963 he was arrested, along with many other nationalists. He was <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2011/10/dtente-the-release-of-nationalist/">released</a> after 11 years. </p>
<p>Mugabe and his colleague <a href="https://pindula.co.zw/Edgar_Tekere">Edgar Tekere</a> escaped to Mozambique in 1974 to join the liberation war against the regime of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ian-Smith">Prime Minister Ian Smith</a>, conducted from bases in that country. There have been different accounts of Mugabe’s rise to the top of the leadership in Mozambique. As liberation war veteran <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/a-real-zimbabwean-war-veteran-speaks-97206">Wilfred Mhanda tells it</a>, their support for Mugabe was premised on his commitment to building unity between the rival nationalist movements. </p>
<p>But he reneged on this, instead pursuing the supremacy of his own party Zanu.</p>
<p>Following the Lancaster House settlement and the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40395186?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">1980 elections</a>, Mugabe’s Zanu emerged as the dominant party. He set out his policy of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24hd4n.7?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">reconciliation with the white population</a>. This allowed the existing property and economic relations from the Rhodesian period to continue, while the politics of state control was transferred to Zanu. </p>
<p>This period witnessed the consolidation of Mugabe’s control of both his party and the state. The massive violence committed against the competing party of liberation, <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Zimbabwe_African_People's_Union">Zapu</a>, through the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Gukurahundi massacres</a>, signalled Zanu’s violent intolerance of opposition. </p>
<p>However, the 1980s were also evidence of Mugabe’s commitment to social policies such as health and education. Mugabe’s government greatly expanded the state expenditure in these areas in the <a href="http://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/zimbabwe.-the-political-economy-of-transition-1980-1986">first decade of independence</a>. </p>
<p>The hostilities between Zapu, led by Joshua Nkomo, and Mugabe’s Zanu officially ended with the signing of a <a href="https://pindula.co.zw/Unity_Accord">Unity Accord</a> by the two leaders on December 22, 1987. Zapu was effectively swallowed by Zanu PF. The ruling party had used the acronym since the end of the brief Patriotic Front coalition (1976-79) between the two liberation parties, on the eve of the 1980 elections. </p>
<h2>Things go south</h2>
<p>During the 1990s, opposition to Mugabe <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/300366769_The_Movement_for_Democratic_Change_MDC_and_the_Changing_Geo-Political_Landscape_in_Zimbabwe">grew</a> in size and influence. Faced with the real possibility of political defeat – and dissent from the war veterans – Mugabe drew on <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/zimbabwe/ZimLand0302-02.htm">longstanding land grievances</a> to reconfigure the politics of the state and Zanu-PF. </p>
<p>His <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358530500082916">Fast Track Resettlement</a> programme radically reconstructed the land relations from the settler colonial period. There is a continuing debate about the effects of the land redistribution exercise. It resulted in the violent allocation of land to a combination of large numbers of small farmers and the ruling party elite, and its long term impact on the country’s economy remains problematic.</p>
<p>The process also created a massive rupture between <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/111691/P202.pdf">human and redistributive rights </a>. By legitimising the Fast Track programme, Zanu-PF emphasised economic redistribution and settling the colonial legacy around the land question. </p>
<p>But in doing so, the ruling party opportunistically labelled the fight for human and democratic political rights – which had long been central to the anti-colonial struggle – as a foreign <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/sunday-times/20180218/282342565314857">“regime change agenda”</a> pushed by the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and civic movements. </p>
<p>The politics of the land reform process unleashed many questions around citizenship, belonging, and assertions of identity. Mugabe’s often valid critique of imperialist duplicity was accompanied by an unacceptable authoritarian intolerance of dissent within Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>The armed forces were <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-mugabe-why-the-role-of-zimbabwes-army-cant-be-trusted-87872">central to his stay in power</a>. The push in his final years to have his wife Grace succeed him heralded a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/mugabe-announces-appointment-of-controversial-wife-grace-to-a-key-post-20170915">longer term reign for a Mugabe dynasty</a>. To further his wife’s ambitions, Mugabe first moved against Vice President Joyce Mujuru, the favoured contender to succeed him, in <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/clues-to-successor-as-mugabe-names-vice-president/a-18122886">2014</a>.</p>
<p>Next, the Mugabes, with the support of a faction of Zanu-PF known as the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics-g40-factbox/factbox-key-figures-in-zimbabwe-first-lady-grace-mugabes-g40-faction-idUSKBN1DF1DX">G40 group</a>, took on another potential successor, Vice President Mnangagwa. He was dismissed from his state and party positions in <a href="https://www.chronicle.co.zw/mnangagwa-fired-disloyal-disrespectful-deceitful2/">early November 2017</a>.</p>
<p>This set off a dramatic series of events. In mid- November 2017, following military chief Constantine Chiwenga’s warning of <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/counter-revolutionaries-want-to-destroy-zanu-pf-army-chief-tells-mugabe-20171113">“counter-revolutionaries”</a> in the ruling party, the armed forces <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-military-coup-is-afoot-in-zimbabwe-whats-next-for-the-embattled-nation-87528">effectively took power</a> away from the executive. </p>
<p>This was followed by the initiation of an impeachment process against Mugabe. But, on the day the process began, in November 2017, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">he resigned</a>. </p>
<h2>End of an era</h2>
<p>For many Zimbabweans Mugabe remains a contested figure. For those who lived through the humiliations of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/720978?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">settler colonialism</a>, his strident critique of its legacies still ring true. But others will find it impossible to accept his exclusivist assertions of <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-129803.html">national belonging</a> and authoritarian intolerance of dissent.</p>
<p>When combined with the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249599119_Zimbabwe_Now_The_Political_Economy_of_Crisis_and_Coercion">deep economic crisis</a> over which he presided, it is little surprise that the end of Mugabe’s rule was greeted with such momentous national celebration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107840/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Raftopoulos is a Research Fellow in the International Studies Group at the University of the Free State, and Research Director of Solidarity Peace Trust a Human Right Organisation working on Zimbabwe . </span></em></p>For many Zimbabweans Robert Mugabe will remain a contested figure.Brian Raftopoulos, Research Fellow, International Studies Group, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1010472018-08-04T12:31:57Z2018-08-04T12:31:57ZTwo narratives are being spun about Zimbabwe’s poll. Which one will win the day?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230639/original/file-20180803-41357-qy8nh5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A triumphant Zanu-PF supporter celebrates the Emmerson Mnangagwa's victory in the presidential race.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It is said that two things are inevitable in life: death and taxes. To these a third might be added – election victories for former southern African liberation parties. This is especially true in Zimbabwe, whose governing Zanu-PF party is steeped in the politics of entitlement. One with a <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-zimbabwe-finally-ditch-a-history-of-violence-and-media-repression-99859">brutal history</a> whenever it is confronted by dissent and opposition.</p>
<p>It came as no great surprise, therefore, that it secured a resounding victory in the recent <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/997207/Zimbabwe-election-results-2018-Mnangagwa-Chamisa-who-won">parliamentary elections</a>, followed by a narrower but still decisive win for Emmerson Mnangagwa over Nelson Chamisa in the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-45053412">presidential poll</a>. But – 50.8% to 44.3% – was suspiciously convenient, just nudging Mnangagwa past the point required to avoid a <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2018-08-03-zanu-pfs-emmerson-mnangagwa-wins-zimbabwean-election/">run-off contest</a>. This was akin to the contrived result of 2008, which denied Morgan Tsvangirai the presidency by pushing him <a href="https://eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008results5.htm">below 50%</a>. </p>
<p>The standard features of Zimbabwean elections were all evident again. A slavish state media acting as praise singers for Zanu-PF, rather than as a forum for diverse opinions, the open allegiance of the security forces, and the misuse of the state apparatus for <a href="https://www.biznews.com/briefs/2018/05/03/life-mugabe-zim-opposition-credible-election">party purposes</a>. </p>
<p>What was missing this time was a full-blown campaign of state intimidation and violence to ensure that voters ‘did the right thing’. The post-Robert Mugabe administration is astute enough to understand that such tactics would drive a coach and horses through its key policy objectives. These are to secure global rehabilitation, gain access to International Monetary Fund and World Bank support, and to entice investors and business back to the country.</p>
<p>Thus, the balancing act was to retain power while still doing enough to convince the global community that Zimbabwe was on an upward curve. The kind of approach used in previous elections could only be deployed in extreme circumstances. It posed a fundamental threat to the wider national interest, and shows how the <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/economic-analysis/zimbabwe-dire-need-economic-reform-nation-must-act-quickly-post-mugabe-say-imf/">precarious economic situation</a> has compelled a political reappraisal within Zanu-PF about strategy and tactics.</p>
<p>There has been no Damascene conversion here. Mnangagwa was an architect of previous election campaigns rooted in intimidation and he has been implicated in the atrocities of the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Gukurahundi</a>. </p>
<p>His was merely a pragmatic recognition that less crude tactics were necessary due to the country’s untenable economic situation. </p>
<p>Will this strategy work? It is currently too early to say. What’s clear though is that two narratives have already begun to emerge. Mnangagwa’s is that there <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/03/africa/zimbabwe-election-mnangagwa-chamisa-intl/index.html">needs to be</a> national unity, that he’s a centrist and pragmatist and needs the West’s support to get the country back on its feet. For his part, Chamisa has already begun to write his script: <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/03/africa/zimbabwe-election-mnangagwa-chamisa-intl/index.html">the election was rigged</a> and Zimbabweans were robbed of a fair election. </p>
<h2>Election observers</h2>
<p>While the Southern African Development Community and African Union monitors have <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/sadc-au-comesa-endorse-zim-elections-16352866">approved the elections</a>, those endorsements must be placed in their proper historical context. Both bodies have a long history of endorsing Zimbabwean elections in the face of the most egregious vote rigging and violence. And both have a structural bias towards protecting the interests of incumbents. </p>
<p>There is a strong ‘leaders club’ mentality in both organisations. And a ‘liberation club’ mentality remains exceptionally strong within the SADC. These organisations still lack a thorough democratic character and remain unable to translate the noble aspirations of their charters into a consistent defence of democratic principles on the ground. </p>
<p>For its part, the European Union was less generous. The EU was allowed to monitor a Zimbabwean election for the first time <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/eu-observe-zimbabwe-polls-first-time-16-years-182429480.html?guccounter=1">in 16 years</a> and it highlighted structural inequalities in the electoral process, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-08-01-history-is-repeating-itself-in-zimbabwe/">concluding that </a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>a truly level playing field was not achieved which negatively impacted on the democratic character of the electoral environment. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>One must also place explanations for any Zimbabwean election in the wider context of a dominant party state which is highly authoritarian. Zanu-PF has embedded itself in power over almost four decades. It has entrenched itself in the state and its behaviour has shown that any result defying ‘the revolution’ - that is its own defeat - is unacceptable and will be resisted with the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1">full might of the state</a> </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwe police outside the Bronte Hotel during the opposition MDC- Alliance leader Nelson Chamisa’s press conference in Harare.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In short, everything can change in Zimbabwe except the rule of the dominant party. That is the limit of its ‘reform process’. This inevitably affects the wider population, it grinds a people down, exhausts them and compels them to make their own often resigned and unhappy accommodation with a status quo which seems immovable. This is particularly so as people struggle daily to make ends meet.</p>
<p>People have learned what a serious challenge to Zanu-PF power actally entails, and naturally flinch from inviting such retribution on themselves. In short, there is an awareness that behind Mnangagwa’s conciliatory discourse is a steely <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/02/mnangagwas-zanu-pf-on-track-to-pull-off-narrow-win-in-zimbabwe-election">determination never to yield power</a>.</p>
<h2>How should the West respond?</h2>
<p>Western support is needed to unlock the doors to the main global financial institutions whose support Zimbabwe desperately needs to pull it from the economic abyss. </p>
<p>Two contrasting narratives are being spun, each seeking to shape the Zimbabwean reality for a Western audience. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s pitch is that Zimbabwe is moving on after the disasters of the Mugabe era. While the election may be acknowledged as imperfect, it’s a good start and a clear advance on previous polls. In the coming days and weeks he will suggest that, with strong external support and by fully welcoming Zimbabwe back into the family of nations, further progress is likely. </p>
<p>The opposition MDC-Alliance and Chamisa, by contrast, has already begun to advance a narrative that this is simply more of the same – <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/news-africa/1988993/nelson-chamisa-claims-zecs-results-are-unverified-and-fake/">rigged elections</a> falling lamentably short of democratic standards. Their argument is that behind the smokescreen of soothing rhetoric is the same implacable determination by Zanu-PF to remain in power at any cost, as shown by the deadly shooting of <a href="https://www.news.com.au/world/africa/army-opens-fire-on-opposition-protests-in-zimbabwe-capital-during-wait-for-election-results/news-story/197e63b58f92e98d15f25aee087a7dd9">unarmed protesters</a>. </p>
<p>In short, Mnangagwa is a wolf in sheep’s clothing and Western states should hold him at arm’s length and deny him the legitimacy he craves. Saying this, of course, will open the MDC-Alliance to the familiar Zanu-PF charge that it is ‘treasonous’ and is collaborating with foreign powers and ‘imperialist forces’. </p>
<p>Which of these proves to be the more compelling narrative will turn on whether Western states insist on full respect for the democratic process, and on certain democratic benchmarks as being non-negotiable; or whether they will view Mnangagwa and Zanu-PF as the only game in town and deal with them, albeit reluctantly. </p>
<p>In that event, like the Zimbabwean population, they too will have been worn down by the attritional politics of Zanu-PF.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101047/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Hamill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Winners and losers are both trying to win the West’s support for their view.James Hamill, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1006792018-07-27T16:17:05Z2018-07-27T16:17:05ZZimbabwe poll explained: ballot papers galore, and loads of new politicians<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229580/original/file-20180727-106517-sf0fv6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">MDC-Alliance supporters at a campaign rally addressed by the party leader Nelson Chamisa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Zimbabeans go to the polls they will be voting in what’s been dubbed <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwes-harmonised-elections-too-close-to-call-15411721">“harmonised” elections</a>.</p>
<p>When I see the word “harmony” used in the context of Zimbabwean politics, I shudder a bit. Instead of turning my gaze to the complicated combination of votes to be cast in this election, the term takes my mind back to the Zimbabwe African National Union’s (Zanu) guerrilla camps based in Mozambique in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057070.2017.1273537?src=recsys">mid-1977</a>. </p>
<p>Zanu had been through some tough years. In early 1975, the Lusaka-based national chairman Herbert Chitepo and his Volkswagen Beetle were <a href="http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/product_info.php?products_id=21858">blown to bits</a> – just after a rebellion had been quelled. Robert Mugabe used the word “harmony” chillingly at the historic Chimoio central committee meeting as he took a large and nearly final step towards consolidating his rule over the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/rMgI4U3XnXMEkDA33t4X/full">fractious party and its army</a>.</p>
<p>Mugabe was referring to the 1974 rebellion and another perceived one in 1976 when he uttered these chilling words, to be printed and published in Zimbabwe News, Zanu’s globally circulated magazine. He <a href="http://psimg.jstor.org/fsi/img/pdf/t0/10.5555/al.sff.document.nuzn197707_final.pdf">warned</a> that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the Zanu axe must continue to fall upon the necks of rebels when we find it no longer possible to persuade them into the harmony that binds us all.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Well, we can forget these menacing words now, when those striving to change the country’s leadership can do so via the ballot box (as long as the slips deposited in it are counted correctly) and a vigorously debated campaign (given no intimidation and open violence). </p>
<p>But the process is complicated. Voters much chose the next president from 23 candidates. They must also choose MPS from over 1 600 candidates for 210 parliamentary seats. Then they will have to chose from thousands more contenders for municipal councillors’ <a href="http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/rau_mayor_ele_zim_legisl_131029.pdf">posts</a>. There are also 60 senators – each of the 10 provinces have six each, half of whom are women. But the voters don’t have to choose them: they are on party lists and will fit in according to proportional representation. </p>
<p>All make for a huge number of ballot papers, and a large contingent of new politicians. </p>
<h2>What is a ‘harmonised’ election?</h2>
<p>From 1980 to 2008 Zimbabwean voters experienced a plethora of electoral forms, but not a lot of real choice. There was a prime minister and his ceremonial president surrounded by MPs. Until 1987, 20 of the parliament’s 100 seats were reserved for whites.</p>
<p>After 1987 things became close to one-partyism. Robert Mugabe assumed far-reaching powers and soon had no limits to his terms. This was after the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Gukurahundi massacre</a> of thousands of Matabeleland-and Midland-based Zimbabweans in which current President Emmerson Mnangagwa played a key <a href="https://www.sithatha.com/books">role</a>. It also followed Joshua Nkomo’s <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/content/chapter-two-brief-history-context-zapu-guerrillas">Zapu-PF</a>, the long-time opposition party overwhelmed by Zanu’s violence, being swallowed into Zanu. </p>
<p>By 1990 the presidential race took place every six years and parliament’s twice per decade, including a Senate reinstated after 2005.</p>
<p>The system changed again in 2008 – a game changer year in many respects. Since then, Zimbabwe’s voters have made many electoral choices with one visit to the polling station every five years. They have deposited their choices for presidents, the 210 MPs as well as local councillors in their separate boxes. </p>
<p>The presidential choices in the first round of the 2008 election resulted in less than the 50%+1 majority needed for either Mugabe (at about 43%) or Morgan Tsvangirai (at around 48%) to claim victory. Thus a run-off was <a href="http://concernedafricascholars.org/docs/acasbulletin80.pdf">required</a>. </p>
<p>The vengeance wreaked by Mugabe’s henchmen was so bad – at least 170 MDC, and some Zanu-PF voters who split their presidential and assembly votes, were killed and hundreds more <a href="http://www.hrforumzim.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/200812MPVR.pdf">abducted or beaten</a> – that Tsvangirai withdrew. This led the Southern African Development Community to push for a <a href="http://weaverpresszimbabwe.com/index.php/store/history-and-%20politics/the-hard-road-to-reform-detail">government of national unity</a>. </p>
<p>Violence like this wasn’t repeated in 2013, although that election was <a href="https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/view/717/715">suspect in many ways</a>.</p>
<h2>New goalposts</h2>
<p>Now we have another contest, with new goalposts. No more <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/16/robert-mugabe-zimbabwe-disgraceful-coup-must-be-undone">Mugabe</a>. No more <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-morgan-tsvangirai-heroic-herald-of-an-epoch-foretold-91845">Tsvangirai</a>. At last count Nelson Chamisa and Mnangagwa were only separated by <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-poll-the-bar-for-success-is-low-the-stakes-are-high-and-its-a-close-race-100100">three percentage points</a>. </p>
<p>The other 21 runners – some more or less planted by Zanu-PF to confuse things while others are angry splinters from the main <a href="https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/24888-full-list-of-all-the-133-political-parties-that-are-going-to-contest-in-zimbabwes-2018-elections.html">contenders</a> – do not amount to much, unless they help keep the winner’s margin down under 50%. </p>
<p>A runoff? Such a nuisance and so scary. Maybe a wee fudge of counting would make a respectable win for the incumbent amid lots of horsetrading to cool the ardour of the increasingly fiery aspirant.</p>
<p>Aside from the big race, the over 1 600 candidates for MPs (including less than 250 women) were chosen at some fairly shambolic primaries. Some constituencies, such as Bulawayo’s Pelandaba Mpopoma, host 17 candidates including two from the MDC-Alliance (which does not include Thokozani Khuphe’s MDC-T) and Strike Mkandla - who has experienced many bruising moments in his political <a href="https://www.amazon.com/My-Life-Struggle-Liberation-Zimbabwe/dp/1496983238">history</a> - for Zapu. </p>
<p>If the election will be judged by the hundreds of international observers as credible and the parties accept the verdict, then harmony won peaceably – not by a falling axe – would have won. </p>
<p>That would be no small victory in itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100679/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zimbabweans face a complicated array of choices at the polls.David B. Moore, Fellow, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge; Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/998592018-07-16T14:15:04Z2018-07-16T14:15:04ZCan Zimbabwe finally ditch a history of violence and media repression?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227563/original/file-20180713-27045-2alah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zanu-PF supporters at a peace rally in Harare.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe’s governing Zanu-PF is earnestly courting international legitimacy as the country approaches its first post-independence elections <a href="https://www.apnews.com/baee38cf5cd24282be5d7c332848a8b2">without Robert Mugabe</a>. </p>
<p>The party frequently uses clichés like “fresh start”, “new dispensation”, and “open for business” to signal its willingness to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/24/africa/zimbabwe-president-emmerson-mnangagwa-davos-intl/index.html">engage with the West</a>. The talk has been matched by some action.</p>
<p>The government has repudiated most of its <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/govt-amends-indigenisation-law/">indigenisation legislation</a>, and recently <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/62f28a38-5d0a-11e8-9334-2218e7146b04">applied to re-join</a> The Commonwealth. Additionally, <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimbabwe-invites-46-countries-to-observe-2018-polls/">46 countries and 15 regional bodies</a> have been invited to observe the elections. This includes many Western nations that had been excluded in recent years.</p>
<p>Their assessments will probably not be decided by technical factors. It seems unlikely that ongoing debates over <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/06/zec-under-fire-over-undelivered-voters-roll/">the voter’s roll</a> or the prominence of ex-military personnel in the <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/02/soldiers-make-15-zec-staff/">Zimbabwe Electoral Commission</a> will have much impact on the final judgements passed by the monitoring missions.</p>
<p>It’s more likely that the credibility of the elections will be shaped by issues such as political violence and media freedom. In both spheres, the legacy of colonialism and the liberation struggle weigh heavily. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-71015.html">breakaway party</a> from the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu) in 1963, the Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu) emerged in a very fragile position. It endured violence against its members and was denied access to a free media. In later years, the party perpetrated and perpetuated the same tactics under which it was conceived – both as a liberation movement and in government.</p>
<p>There are a number of examples of how Zanu-PF drew on colonial-era repressive tactics in its post-independence quest for political primacy. These include the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/01/31/gukurahundi-is-mugabe-s-baby">Gukurahundi violence</a> under the Mugabe led government in the 1980s against areas predominantly supporting Zapu, the government’s 2005 <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/zimbabwe/zimbabwe-operation-murambatsvina-overview-and-summary">Operation Murambatsvina</a> which targeted properties belonging mostly to urban opposition supporters, and the 2008 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1">election run-off violence</a> after Mugabe lost the first round of voting.</p>
<p>As Zimbabweans head to the polls on July 30, this history looms large over the electorate and those responsible for overseeing its successful execution.</p>
<h2>History of political violence</h2>
<p>In July 1960, unprecedented protests in Zimbabwe’s two largest cities ushered in a new era of political violence in the British colony. A year later violence erupted within the liberation movement itself. In June 1961, the first significant attempt to form a breakaway nationalist movement in Zimbabwe was thwarted. Members of the <a href="https://zimhistassociation.wordpress.com/2018/03/27/the-first-split-in-zimbabwes-anti-colonial-struggle-continues-to-cast-shadows-over-contemporary-politics/">Zimbabwe National Party</a> (ZNP) were physically prevented from launching the party at their own press conference by <a href="http://www.sundaynews.co.zw/events-leading-to-banning-of-ndp/">National Democratic Party</a> (NDP) sympathisers.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The ill-fated efforts of the ZNP would have been prominent in the minds of Zanu founders when it was formed two years later. </p>
<p>Zapu, which replaced the NDP after it was banned, went to great lengths to beat Zanu into submission. The houses of Mugabe and Ndabaningi Sithole, the top leaders in Zanu, <a href="http://cba1415.web.unc.edu/files/2014/07/zapu.pdf">were stoned</a> after the new party was launched.</p>
<p>As other African nations became independent and Zimbabwe remained under minority rule, frustration mounted. This led to a determination to achieve majority rule by any means. A <a href="https://www.pambazuka.org/arts/roots-political-violence-go-deep-zimbabwe">culture of political violence</a> became institutionalised.</p>
<h2>Media Repression</h2>
<p>Assaults on the media were particularly prominent under white minority rule following the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/40-years-on-from-udi-zimbabwe-is-still-paying-the-price-1-1101979">Censors </a> redacted broad swathes of news stories, littering papers with blank pages.</p>
<p>This overt censorship was but a new manifestation of a repressive media heritage. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/wmss/online/blcas/welensky.html">Political papers</a> of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/07/world/sir-roy-welensky-84-premier-of-african-federation-is-dead.html">Roy Welensky</a>, the second Prime Minister of the Federation to which Southern Rhodesia belonged from 1953 - 1963, reveal the invidious nature of attempts to control the press. His government covertly worked with journalists and editors to produce articles critical of the white opposition in newspapers that were nominally independent. He also consulted with the white publishers of newspapers geared toward a black audience about ways to promote his government.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://pdfproc.lib.msu.edu/?file=/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Journal%20of%20the%20University%20of%20Zimbabwe/vol23n2/juz023002004.pdf"><em>Central African Examiner</em></a>, a news magazine that was theoretically independent and had links with <em>The Economist</em>, changed editors in the middle of the 1958 elections. The new editor, David Cole, was Welensky’s public relations adviser. </p>
<p>In 1961 the government considered blocking the sale of the colony’s newspaper titles catering to a predominantly black audience to the Thomson Newspaper Group. The concern was that it would be difficult to influence the editorial policy of papers with foreign ownership. Meanwhile, newspapers geared toward a predominantly white audience and owned by the South African based Argus Press were not seen as posing a threat.</p>
<p>The sale went ahead. But in August 1964 both the African Daily News (which had a pro-Zapu bias) and Zanu <a href="http://pdfproc.lib.msu.edu/?file=/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Journal%20of%20the%20University%20of%20Zimbabwe/vol6n2/juz006002015.pdf">were banned</a>. </p>
<p>Zanu learnt the importance of media control in its early years. Once in power it exerted its own influence. Forty years after Zanu and the <em>African Daily News</em> were proscribed, Zanu-PF replicated the tactics when it <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2004/jan/22/pressandpublishing.Zimbabwenews">banned a newspaper, also known as the Daily News</a> amid a media clampdown.</p>
<h2>Eyes on Mnangagwa</h2>
<p>While President Emmerson Mnangagwa has backtracked from Mugabe’s more confrontational rhetoric, his political career is nearly as long as his predecessor’s. His political upbringing was profoundly shaped by the repressive measures the nationalists endured and took up in the 1960s to dismantle the unjust system that governed them.</p>
<p>Zanu-PF’s assaults on the media and penchant for violence are reflective of similar tactics that were used against the party during the colonial era. And they have been critical to its ability to <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/06/10/violence-dominates-zim-political-history/">obtain and retain power</a> for 37 years. </p>
<p>Will Zimbabwe be able to turn the corner and move toward a more equitable election campaign in which the historic trajectory of media repression and political violence is fundamentally altered? If the answer is yes, Mnangagwa will have made a significant stride in truly ushering in a “<a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/the-first-100-days-of-the-new-dispensation/">new dispensation</a>”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99859/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brooks Marmon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The credibility of Zimbabwe’s elections will depend on issues like political violence and media freedom.Brooks Marmon, PhD Student, Centre of African Studies, The University of EdinburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/881712017-11-29T13:26:13Z2017-11-29T13:26:13ZWhy signs for transitional justice in Zimbabwe don’t look promising<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196713/original/file-20171128-7474-14sr3fl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=112%2C241%2C5639%2C3354&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the first reports appeared of military tanks approaching Zimbabwe’s capital, Harare, questions started flooding my mind: would this mean a transition in power? And would it be a transition of the kind regarded as “model” transitions – transition from dictatorship to democracy? </p>
<p>Ever since it became clear that Emmerson Mnangagwa would be inaugurated as the <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-11-24-mnangagwa-sworn-in-as-zimbabwe-president/">next president</a>, there are fears that the country wouldn’t go through a genuine transition, that one dictator might simply replace another <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13313370">as was the case in Egypt</a>.</p>
<p>Transitional justice is a term coined by the scholar <a href="https://www.questia.com/library/62448130/transitional-justice">Ruti Teitel</a> in 1990. She defined it as a form of justice that could address the legacy of human rights violations and violence during a society’s transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. Transitional justice refers to the ways in which countries emerging from periods of conflict and repression address large scale human rights violations so numerous and serious that the normal justice system is unable to provide an adequate response.</p>
<p>Transitional justice has become a vital part of modern peace building efforts alongside disarmament, security sector reform and elections. The United Nations <a href="https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf">views it as the full range of processes</a> associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses with a view to ensuring accountability, serving justice and achieving reconciliation. </p>
<p>It encompasses issues such as whether the perpetrators of serious human rights violations under a previous regime should be prosecuted or pardoned. It also involves looking at reparations, institutional reform, public recognition of violations and whether and how investigations should be initiated to uncover the truth about past violations. </p>
<p>It’s still unclear whether Zimbabwe will manage an effective transition to participatory democracy and freedom. But the current signs are not encouraging. </p>
<h2>Transitional justice in Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>After three decades of state <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20161116-Zimbabwe-Early-Warning-Report.pdf">sponsored violence</a>, there is an acute need to break the culture of impunity that has become entrenched in Zimbabwe. The steady erosion of human and political rights has further led to a lack of faith in the rule of law. </p>
<p>Early excitement about prospects of transitional justice in Zimbabwe has already been dampened by the agreement struck between the military and the outgoing president. The deal entails exempting Robert Mugabe <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics-mugabe/mugabe-granted-immunity-assured-of-safety-in-zimbabwe-sources-idUSKBN1DN0UX">from prosecution</a> for crimes committed during his 37 years in office. The immunity deal reportedly covers numerous members of Mugabe’s extended family, including his stepson and nephews. It may also include senior ruling party officials detained by the military as well as those who are currently overseas.</p>
<p>This immunity agreement creates grave doubts about the legitimacy of the foundation on which the new Zimbabwe will be built.</p>
<p>It’s clear that the agreement violates international law. Under Mugabe’s rule opposition supporters suffered harassment, intimidation, forced removal and <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/2170138/Zimbabwe-Death-toll-rises-in-Robert-Mugabes-reign-of-terror-before-election.html">death</a>. <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/11636475">Crimes against humanity</a> were also committed. There are also strong allegations that Mugabe ordered his opponents to be tortured. International law holds that to be guilty of torture, it isn’t necessary that a person should have directly participated in torture. Ordering torture is sufficient to warrant conviction.</p>
<p>There are other reasons to doubt whether Zimbabwe’s new leadership is interested in pursuing transitional justice. For example, would they be prepared to look back at post-independence crimes such as the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Gukurahundi massacre</a> in Matabeleland that claimed the lives of 20 000 people? Given Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-27-op-ed-mnangagwa-and-the-gukurahundi-fact-and-fiction/#.Wh1qlVWWbIU">prominent role</a> in this massacre it’s highly unlikely that official attempts will be undertaken to uncover the truth of this massacre.</p>
<p>Measured against the <a href="https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Am_Law_Econ_Rev-2013-Inman-aler_ahs023(1).pdf">South African transition</a>, it is already clear that the “transition in Zimbabwe” is imperfect. This is because it lacks democratic legitimacy. Unlike the wave of transitions from socialism to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s the Zimbabwean transition, at this stage, does not look as if it has the potential to truly liberate Zimbabwean citizens and to convey them into a state in which human rights are supreme.</p>
<h2>Free passage for Mugabe</h2>
<p>Former Zimbabwe finance minister and opposition party member Tendai Biti said in a recent interview with South Africa’s Sunday Times that there was no point in prosecuting Mugabe. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>we cannot let the past continue to hold the future, and Mugabe is in the past… He must be given the right of free passage… </p>
</blockquote>
<p>But Mugabe does not deserve a “right of free passage”. To award him this right would be to make a mockery of the principles of international law, transitional justice and the ongoing suffering of millions of Zimbabweans. </p>
<p>Biti emphasised the importance of economic growth and transformation. As a former finance minister he should know that financial prosperity cannot be separated from social cohesion and respect for the rule of law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88171/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mia Swart does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s still unclear whether Zimbabwe will manage an effective transition to participatory democracy and freedom. And the current signs are not encouraging.Mia Swart, Professor of International Law, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/877122017-11-21T14:04:31Z2017-11-21T14:04:31ZZimbabwe beware: the military is looking after its own interests, not democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195615/original/file-20171121-6031-14lazje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe National Army commander Constantino Chiwenga, second from left, addressing the media.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>November 2017 will go down in the history of Zimbabwe as the beginning of the end of Robert Mugabe’s <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/14/tanks-seen-heading-towards-zimbabwe-capital-harare/">37 year tyranny</a>. A tumultuous week finally culminated in <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">his resignation</a> on November 21st. One cannot understate the widespread jubilation at the demise of Mugabe and his desire to create a dynasty for himself <a href="https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/world-news/660122/Zimbabwe-news-Robert-Mugabe-Grace-Zanu-PF-Twitter-latest-situation-coup-Emmerson-Mnangagwa">through his wife Grace</a>. </p>
<p>But the optimism is misplaced because it doesn’t deal directly with the dearth of democracy in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>First, contrary to popular sentiment that the coup was meant to usher in a new era of political <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42035981">liberalisation and democracy</a>, the takeover is actually meant to deal with a succession crisis in Zanu-PF. The military made this clear when it said that it was dealing with <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/zimbabwe-military-statement-seizing-power-171115061457199.html">criminals around Mugabe</a>. And the party’s secretary for legal affairs Patrick Chinamasa indicated that removing Mugabe from the party’s Central Committee was an <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/politics/dont-need-opposition-zanupf-business-chinamasa/">internal party matter</a>. </p>
<p>Secondly, I would argue that the military resorted to a “smart coup” only after its preferred candidate to succeed Mugabe, Emmerson Mnangagwa, was fired from the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/07/vp-mnangagwa-fired">party and government</a>. </p>
<p>The way in which the military has gone about executing its plan upends any conventional understanding of what <a href="http://www.jonathanmpowell.com/uploads/2/9/9/2/2992308/powell_and_thyne_2011jpr_-_global_instances_of_coups_from_1950_to_2010.pdf">constitutes a coup d'etat</a>. It’s a “smart coup” in the sense that the military combined the frustrations of a restive population, internal party structures and international sympathy to remove a sitting president. It thereby gained legitimacy for an otherwise partisan and unconstitutional political act – toppling an elected government. </p>
<p>This begs the question: Is the military now intervening for the collective good or for its own interests?</p>
<h2>Why the military intervened</h2>
<p>It is baffling to imagine how the military has suddenly become the champion of democracy and regime change in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>It’s clear that what motivated the military commanders was a fear of losing their jobs and influence after their preferred successor was purged. They launched a preemptive strike against Mugabe to safeguard their own selfish interests as a military class and the future of their careers. </p>
<p>Given the symbiotic relationship between the Zimbabwean military and the <a href="https://rusi.org/system/files/Zimbabwe_SSR_Report.pdf">ruling Zanu-PF party</a>, it was inevitable that the top commanders would be embroiled in the party’s succession crisis. After all, the military has been the key lever behind the power of both Mugabe and his ruling Zanu-PF since 1980. </p>
<p>In the past they have acted as part of the Zanu-PF machinery, openly <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/06/09/bullets-each-you/state-sponsored-violence-zimbabwes-march-29-elections">campaigning for Mugabe</a> alongside other security agencies.</p>
<p>And they have played a key role in neutralising political opponents. Back in the 1980s the military was responsible for the massacre of thousands of civilians and Zapu supporters in <a href="https://archive.org/stream/BreakingTheSilenceBuildingTruePeace/MatabelelandReport_djvu.txt.">Matebeleland</a>. More than two decades later in 2008 they were responsible for the torture, death and disappearance of 200 opposition activists and the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/2170138/Zimbabwe-Death-toll-rises-in-Robert-Mugabes-reign-of-terror-before-election.html">maiming of hundreds more</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, <a href="http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DRC%20S%202001%20357.pdf">the UN</a> has implicated Mnangagwa and the generals in the illegal plundering of resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They have also been fingered in the disappearance of diamond revenues from Zimbabwe’s Marange <a>diamond fields</a>. </p>
<p>On top of this the military and Zanu-PF share a special relationship that has its roots in the liberation struggle. The Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu) was the political wing of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (Zanla) during the liberation war. They therefore have vested interests in the survival of the party.</p>
<p>After independence, the relationship remained intact as the military became the <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-86814.html">guarantors of the revolution</a>. Some of the same surviving commanders of Zanla are still senior high ranking officials. The commanders are also bona fide members of the ruling party and <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/112460/JUL09SSRZIMBABWE.pdf">guarantors of Zanu-PF power</a>. </p>
<p>The same securocrats are also members of the Zimbabwe National Liberation <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/Zimbabwe_National_Liberation_War_Veterans_Association">War Veterans Association</a>. This quasi paramilitary group is an auxiliary association of the ruling party and has fiercely opposed Mugabe’s attempt to create a dynasty.</p>
<h2>Military must step aside</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe goes to the polls next July to choose a new president and parliament. The elections – if conducted in a credible way – will provide the next government with the legitimacy it needs to take the country out of its political and <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-financial-system-is-living-on-borrowed-time-and-borrowed-money-86159">economic crises</a>.</p>
<p>Now that Mugabe <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">has resigned</a> the hope is that the military will allow a genuinely democratic transition to take place. All political players, including opposition parties, would need to be incorporated into a broad-based transitional authority pending credible elections. </p>
<p>But for the elections to be credible, the transitional authority would need urgently to reform the electoral system. This would ensure Zimbabweans can freely and fairly choose their leaders. Without this, peace and prosperity will continue to elude Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>In the long run, the military would do well to get out of politics instead of continuing to view itself as <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/14/chiwenga-warns-mugabe-zanu-pf">“stockholders”</a> in the country’s political affairs because of its liberation struggle credentials.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87712/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Enock C. Mudzamiri has in the past received funding from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, American Political Science Association and the National Endowment for the Humanities</span></em></p>Contrary to popular sentiment that the coup in Zimbabwe would usher in a new era of democracy, the military intervention is much more about a succession crisis in the ruling Zanu-PF.Enock C. Mudzamiri, DLitt et DPhil Student in Politics, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/876892017-11-19T09:15:50Z2017-11-19T09:15:50ZMugabe and Dos Santos: Africa’s old men seem, finally, to be fading away<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195298/original/file-20171119-11467-i9mm17.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mugabe tried to impose his wife on his party as his chosen successor.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Philimon Bulawayo/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Soon after Zimbabwe’s army confined President Robert Mugabe to his <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/mugabe-latest-leader-over-years-to-be-placed-under-house-arrest-20171115">palatial Harare home</a> this week – allegedly for his safety – it was announced in Luanda that Angola’s new President, João Lourenço, had relieved Isabel dos Santos of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/15/angolan-president-sacks-predecessors-daughter-as-state-oil-chief">her position</a> as head of the state-run oil company Sonangol. </p>
<p>While there may not be any direct connection between these two events, they suggest some intriguing comparisons. In both countries ruling families seem to have failed to secure themselves in power. </p>
<p>When Mugabe, as leader of the <a href="http://www.zanupf.org.zw/">Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF)</a>, became ruler of Zimbabwe at independence in <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/11/15/as-he-turns-93-years-old-today-who-is-robert-mugabe/">April 1980</a>, José Eduardo dos Santos was already <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13036738">President of Angola</a>. He had succeeded to that position after the death of Agostinho Neto in <a href="https://afrolegends.com/2011/08/04/agostinho-neto-doctor-poet-president-and-father-of-angolan-independence/">September 1979</a>. </p>
<p>Dos Santos had to deal with <a href="http://www.africansunmedia.co.za/Sun-e-Shop/Product-Details/tabid/78/ProductID/429/Default.aspx">external intervention</a> and over two decades of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/angolan-civil-war-1975-2002-brief-history">civil war </a>, during which he ruled dictatorially. Mugabe, despite a facade of constitutionalism and regular elections, also became increasingly dictatorial. He abandoned adherence to the rule of law and his country’s <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-10-02-hopes-dim-for-zimbabwes-economy/">economy collapsed</a>. Angola became notorious for the scale of the corruption linked especially to its <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-luandas-residents-are-asking-where-did-all-the-oil-riches-go-49772">oil riches</a>. Zimbabwe went from bread-basket to basket-case. With the great majority of the people of both countries living in dire poverty, Dos Santos flew to Europe when he needed medical attention, while Mugabe <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/10/robert-mugabe-ruling-zimbabwe-from-hospital-bed-says-opposition">went to Singapore</a>. </p>
<p>Though Dos Santos was probably as reluctant as Mugabe to give up power, he decided to quit as president of the country and try to retain influence through the ruling party and members of his family. Mugabe tried to impose his wife on his party as his <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/mugabe-announces-appointment-of-controversial-wife-grace-to-a-key-post-20170915">chosen successor</a> and then to cling on to his positions even when the army took effective control of his country.</p>
<p>Given recent developments in Luanda and Harare, it would seem that neither of these two old men have succeeded in securing their family dynasties.</p>
<h2>Dos Santos’s succession plan</h2>
<p>By 2016, suffering health problems that took him to Spain <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/angolan-president-back-home-after-treatment-in-spain">for treatment</a>, Dos Santos announced that he would step down as president of Angola and he <a href="https://theconversation.com/election-unlikely-to-herald-the-change-angolans-have-been-clamouring-for-82851">approved</a> his Minister of Defence, João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço as his successor. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, president of Angola.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Fernando Villar</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Following the victory of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the general election held in August this year, Lourenço took over as <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/09/26/new-angolan-president-joao-lourenco-sworn-in">president</a> in September. But Dos Santos remained president of the MPLA, and clearly expected Lourenço to look after his interests and that of his family, who had become enormously wealthy. </p>
<p>From the action Lourenço has now taken against Dos Santos’ billionaire daughter Isabel, it would seem that he’s becoming his own man. It appears he wishes to distance himself from the Dos Santos family, which for many Angolans is associated with corruption on a vast scale. </p>
<p>The London-educated Isabel has proved herself to be a very capable businesswoman, and though the Angolan economy has been suffering because of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-prices/oils-bull-run-hides-a-deep-disconnect-crude-traders-warn-idUSKBN0NR1Q320150506">low oil-prices</a>, on top of <a href="https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/elections_in_angola_time_to_tackle_corruption">massive corruption</a>, it’s unlikely she was sacked to bring in a better chief executive to run the country’s most important state owned company. There is talk in Luanda that Isabel’s brother, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-02-00-angola-whos-who-in-the-palace">José Filomeno dos Santos</a>, will be relieved of his position as head of the country’s large <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-24/angolan-wealth-fund-plans-shift-away-from-external-managers">Sovereign Wealth Fund</a> and that his father, the former president of the country, will be replaced as president of the ruling party, though that may have to wait until a party congress is held.</p>
<h2>Mugabe’s succession plan</h2>
<p>In Zimbabwe Mugabe has sought to arrange that his wife will <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/fall-from-grace-mugabes-wife-was-his-weakness-20171116">succeed him</a>. But <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/gucci-grace-from-benoni-robert-mugabes-biggest-mistake-12024383">Gucci Grace</a> and Robert made the mistake of trying to ensure this by <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/07/vp-mnangagwa-fired">firing</a> Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa. </p>
<p>Though at the time of writing, the 93-year-old Mugabe remains president both of the country and of the ruling Zanu-PF party, it’s widely expected that he will soon be relieved of both positions, probably by Mnangagwa, with the assistance of the army.</p>
<h2>Changes for the better?</h2>
<p>New leadership in Angola and Zimbabwe will have an impact on the region as a whole. </p>
<p>Given Mnangagwa’s record as a long serving member of government in Zimbabwe, and his <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">involvement</a> in the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">mass killing of Ndebele</a> in the early 1980s, it is hardly likely that he will emerge as a champion of democracy. </p>
<p>In Angola, Lourenço is still finding his feet as head of government. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=788&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=788&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=788&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=990&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=990&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=990&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fired Zimbabwean Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is therefore unrealistic to hope that either country will soon move from decades of repressive rule and lack of transparency to greater constitutionalism and closer adherence to the rule of law. </p>
<p>But if we are witnessing the end of an era in which dictators stayed <a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-old-mens-club-out-of-touch-with-continents-suave-burgeoning-youth-48618">in power for decades</a> and tried to secure their continuing influence through their families, and if we are seeing the diminishing importance of liberation movements turned political party, this must be good not only for Angola and Zimbabwe but for the southern African region as a whole. </p>
<p>It should also hold lessons for those who rule in neighbouring countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87689/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Saunders does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Are we witnessing the end of an era in which dictators stayed in power for decades? If so this must be good not only for Angola and Zimbabwe but for southern Africa as a whole.Chris Saunders, Emeritus Professor, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/876462017-11-16T16:25:34Z2017-11-16T16:25:34ZMnangagwa and the military may mean more bad news for Zimbabwe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195045/original/file-20171116-15428-u8p65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The military has taken control of the national broadcaster, troops are in the streets and the president is being held in a secure environment. All military leave is cancelled and a senior general has addressed the nation. Yet the Zimbabwean military continues with the pretence that this is <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-15-zimbabwe-army-in-control-of-state-institutions-but-insists-not-a-coup/#.Wg2PqE27LL8">not a coup d’etat</a>. </p>
<p>The obvious response to this is: if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck then the chances are it’s a duck. And the sole reason the Zimbabwean military is not acknowledging this as a coup d’etat is to avoid triggering the country’s automatic suspension from the <a href="https://au.int/">African Union</a> and the Southern African Development Community <a href="http://www.sadc.int/">(SADC)</a>. Both bodies frown on coups.</p>
<p>A perfect storm formed ahead of these events and made military action predictable. The country had once again entered a steep economic decline (not that its “recovery” had been anything of note). A clear and reckless bid for power was being made by the so-called <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/03/18/what-does-g40-want/">Generation 40 (G40) faction</a> around Grace Mugabe in direct opposition to the Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa, the standard bearer for the so-called <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">Lacoste faction</a>. </p>
<p>This culminated in <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/12164/Mugabe_drops_the_crocodile">Mnangagwa’s dismissal</a> by President Mugabe: a clear indication that Grace Mugabe was now calling the shots. It also served as a follow up to the 2015 Grace-engineered dismissal of another Vice President and rival, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30400178">Joice Mujuru</a>. </p>
<p>The coup means that Mugabe’s long and disastrous presidency is finally over. The only questions that remain are the precise details and mechanics of the deal which secures his departure.</p>
<h2>Why the coup</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa is a long time Zanu-PF stalwart and is clearly closely integrated with the military high command and the intelligence services. Both institutions are concerned that the succession is being arranged for a faction led by people with no liberation credentials but who have been skilled in manipulating Mugabe himself and in making him do their bidding. The G40 now appear to have overreached, perhaps believing that their proximity to the “old man” made them invincible.</p>
<p>This coup’s explicit purpose is twofold. First, it’s trying to definitively kill off Grace Mugabe’s ambitions to become president and to set in place a ruling dynasty akin to the Kims in North Korea. Second, it’s a bid to clear Mnangagwa’s path to power, first in Zanu-PF and then within the state itself (over the last three decades these have been virtually one and the same thing). </p>
<p>What we do not yet know is what counter force, if any, the G40 can bring to bear against the military. The calculation of the military hierarchy appears to be that Grace and company are paper tigers who will have few cards to play against such force majeure and who lack the popular appeal to bring angry and disillusioned masses out onto the streets.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Could this be the end of President Robert Mugabe’s 37 year reign?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The coup has formally stripped away the façade that Zimbabwe is a constitutional state. This is clearly a militarised party-state where the military is a pivotal actor in the ruling party’s internal politics. It is not simply a neutral state agency subordinate to the civilian leadership. And the idea that this military intervention is an aberration – a departure from the constitutional norm – is misplaced. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe is a de facto military dictatorship. It serves as a guarantor of Zanu-PF rule rather than as a custodian of the constitution. It has helped Zanu-PF rig elections. And it was central to the state terror which was unleashed against the population to reverse Mugabe and Zanu-PF’s <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/2170138/Zimbabwe-Death-toll-rises-in-Robert-Mugabes-reign-of-terror-before-election.html">electoral defeat in 2008</a>. The military has always been a key political actor. The only difference this time is that its intervention is designed to control events within Zanu-PF rather than to crush opposition to it.</p>
<p>But, a highly politicised military is a major impediment to the re-establishment of a democratic order in Zimbabwe. It has nothing to gain, politically or financially, from democratic rule given the lucrative networks of embezzlement and plunder it’s put in place over decades. Most recently it seized and siphoned off of the country’s diamond wealth for military officers and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/12/zimbabwe-diamonds-mugabe-marange-fields">party hierarchy</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and former Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This intervention is designed to secure the presidency for Mnangagwa. So it is hard to avert our eyes from the elephant –- or in this case the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">Crocodile</a> –- in the room. Mnangagwa is the Mugabe henchman who helped enable the misrule and tyranny of the last 37 years. He was one of the principal architects of the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false"><em>Gukurahundi</em></a> -– the genocidal attack on the Ndebele – in the early to mid-1980s which left at least 20 000 people dead.</p>
<p>He has also been instrumental in rigging elections and crushing all opposition to Zanu-PF rule, including the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-15-after-mugabe-what-next?utm_source=Mail+%26+Guardian&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily+newsletter&utm_term=https%3A%2F%2Fmg.co.za%2Farticle%2F2017-11-15-after-mugabe-what-next">atrocities of 2008</a>. </p>
<p>Expecting such a person to now make a deathbed conversion to the democracy, constitutional government and good governance he has spent an entire career liquidating is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/15/mugabe-gone-zimbabweans-decide-future-mnangagwa">dangerous nonsense</a>.</p>
<h2>Dilemmas to come</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa will soon have to confront a series of dilemmas. How can he put in place an administration which has the appearance of a national unity government, can secure international approval and the financial assistance required to help rebuild a shattered economy – but avoid ceding any meaningful power or control? Can this circle be squared? </p>
<p>The best hope for Zimbabweans is that the international community uses its leverage wisely and sets stringent conditions for such assistance: free elections closely monitored by an array of international organisations, the establishment of a new electoral commission, free access to the state media and the right of parties to campaign freely. </p>
<p>There should also be a role here for South Africa to restore its badly tarnished image as a champion of democracy in Africa. It has followed a malign path over the last two decades, facilitating Zanu-PF authoritarianism in the name of a threadbare and increasingly degenerate “liberation solidarity”.</p>
<p>Such a combination of pressures will severely restrict Mnangagwa’s room for manoeuvre. Anything short of that will deliver an outcome which is essentially Mugabeism without Mugabe.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87646/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Hamill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The coup in Zimbabwe means Mugabe’s long and disastrous presidency is finally over. The questions that remain are the precise details and mechanics of the deal which secures his departure.James Hamill, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/875282017-11-15T10:20:54Z2017-11-15T10:20:54ZA military coup is afoot in Zimbabwe. What’s next for the embattled nation?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194773/original/file-20171115-19836-oyw8n1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Robert Mugabe and his wife Grace have become increasingly divisive figures in Zimbabwe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nobody is safe from the rages of Zimbabwe’s First Lady, “<a href="https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2014/09/21/grace-mugabes-doctorate-uz-remains-mum/">Dr</a>. Amai” Grace Mugabe. There was the young <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/special-features/zimbabwe/grace-mugabe-split-my-head-open-claims-joburg-woman-10788605">South African model</a> Grace lashed with extension cords. 93-year-old President Robert Mugabe’s longtime and usually trusted ally <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/12164/Mugabe_drops_the_crocodile">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, was next in the firing line: he was sacked because his supporters allegedly <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/an-ordinary-man-after-all-mugabe-fires-right-hand-man-mnangagwa-20171106">booed</a> her at a rally. </p>
<p>The consequences of her vengeance may have <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2017/11/14/live-updates-situation-zimbabwe/">led to a coup</a> headed by Zimbabwe’s army chief General Constantino Chiwenga, who is commonly perceived to be Mnangagwa’s protégé. But <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/who-is-emmerson-mnangagwa/4115612.html">ex-freedom fighter Mnangagwa</a> has his own presidential aspirations.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa has been exiled from the party in which he has served since he was a teenager. But he is not just skulking in the political wilderness. On arrival in South Africa he issued a statement calling those who wanted him out <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/full-statement-im-not-going-anywhere-zanu-pf-is-not-your-personal-property-mnangagwa-tells-mugabe-20171108">“minnows”</a>. He promised to control his party “very soon” and urged his supporters to register to vote in the national elections next July.</p>
<p>As if to back Mnangagwa, on November 13 General Chiwenga announced that he and his officers could not allow the “counter-revolutionary infiltrators”, implied to be behind Grace Mugabe, to <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/13/zimbabwe-army-chief-warns-mugabes-party-military-may-intervene/">continue their purges</a>. </p>
<h2>Factions and purges</h2>
<p>Chiwenga <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41992351">declared</a> that the armed forces must ensure all party members attend the extraordinary Zanu-PF congress next month with “equal opportunity to exercise their democratic rights”. He flashed back through Zanu-PF’s history of factionalism, reminding his listeners that although the military “will not hesitate to step in” it has never “usurped power”. Chiwenga promised to defuse all the differences “amicably and in the ruling party’s closet”. </p>
<p>Although this airbrushed more than it <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2014.956499">revealed</a> about the party’s rough patches when leadership vacuums appeared, the statement appeared more as a cautionary note than a clarion call to arms. It’s not often a coup is announced before it starts; but once in motion direction – and history – can change. Grace Mugabe may have unleashed a perfect storm and her own undoing.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Soldiers stand next to a tank on a road in Harare.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>All the “shenanigans” that have inspired the generals to consider a coup have set the stage for an extraordinary Zanu-PF congress this December instead of in the expected 2019: that is, <em>before</em> rather than <em>after</em> the July 2018 national elections.</p>
<p>This suggests some people were in a hurry to settle the succession issues for the president, who is now showing every one of his 93 years. Maybe Robert Mugabe won’t rule until he is <a href="http://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/product.php?productid=2114&freedownload=1">100-years-old</a>. If not, and <a href="https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/mugabes-zimbabwe-has-an-angry-population-and-a-potentially-violentfuture/article36934238/">members of his family</a> or party wanted to keep their dynasties alive, they had to work quickly lest some similarly inclined contenders are in their way.</p>
<p>These contenders include Mnangagwa and a slew of his <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">“Lacoste” faction</a> consisting of war veterans and the odd financial liberal. The best-known of these is Patrick Chinamasa. This former finance minister tried to convince the world’s bankers he could pull Zimbabwe <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-financial-system-is-living-on-borrowed-time-and-borrowed-money-86159">out of the fire</a>. He was demoted to control cyberspace and then fired. Perhaps he may make a comeback in the wake of the semi-coup.</p>
<p>The pro-Grace faction includes the members of <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/03/18/what-does-g40-want/">Generation 40, or “G-40”</a>. Many are well over 40. But in Robert Mugabe’s shadow they appear young, as does the 52-year-old First Lady. Without a base in the liberation-war cohort, they resorted to working with the Mugabe couple: sometimes their ideology appears radical, espousing indigenous economics and more land to the tillers. </p>
<p>If the history of their best-known member – the current Minister of Higher Education <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Jonathan_Moyo">Jonathan Moyo</a> – is indicative, however, they are pragmatic; or less politely put, opportunist. </p>
<p>But with Grace Mugabe sans Robert, they would have to muster inordinate amounts of patience and manipulation to steer the sinking ship to the shores of stable statehood and incorporate yet <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Search-Elusive-Zimbabwean-Dream-Autobiography/dp/0994707924">younger generations</a> who cut their political teeth as Robert Mugabe’s rule faltered. </p>
<h2>Perfidious ‘saviours’</h2>
<p>Yet the possible plan for the upcoming congress – to create a third vice-president – appears not to move far beyond the cold hands of the old. <a href="https://www.news24.com/Tags/People/phelekezela_mphoko">Phelekezela Mphoko</a> would be pushed to third vice-president status. Grace would be the second vice-president. </p>
<p>The current defence minister, <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/11/10/mnangagwas-great-escape-details/">Sydney Sekeramayi</a> would be first vice-president and so, next in line for the presidential palace. He is a quiet but no less tarnished member of the Zanu-PF old guard; especially when one remembers the massacre of thousands of Ndebele people during the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false"><em>Gukurahundi</em></a>. </p>
<p>When performing the calculus necessary to rectify Zimbabwe’s graceless imbalances, remember that Mnangagwa was perhaps the key architect of the nearly genocidal <em>Gukurahundi</em>, now chronicled in archival detail in historian Stuart Doran’s <a href="https://www.sithatha.com/books">Kingdom, Power, Glory: Mugabe, Zanu, and the Quest for Supremacy</a>. Among the scores implicated therein are the British, condemned by Hazel Cameron, another meticulous archivist, as exercising <a href="https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/news/archive/2017/zimbabwe-cameron/">“wilful blindness”</a> during what Robert Mugabe has dismissed as a “moment of madness”.</p>
<p>Perhaps it’s no surprise, then, that many are suspicious of Mnangagwa’s <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2017/11/08/zimbabwe-the-uks-misguided-role-in-the-rise-and-fall-of-mnangagwa/">relationship</a> with the UK. Many suspect he has been swimming with perfidious Albion for a very, very long time.</p>
<p>Those waters, in the shadow of Mugabe’s heritage, will take a few more generations of hard political work to clear. It hardly seems propitious that a coup, and the same generation that has ruled since 1980, starts it off.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87528/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The protracted political crisis in Zimbabwe has worsened since President Mugabe fired vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa. Now the military has entered the fray, raising fears a coup is imminent.David B. Moore, Fellow, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge; Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/815742017-09-17T10:44:01Z2017-09-17T10:44:01ZBritish policy towards Zimbabwe during Matabeleland massacre: licence to kill<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/183734/original/file-20170829-10409-jl5ttt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe's clampdown on dissent in Matabeleland claimed up to 20 000 lives. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Aaron Ufumeli/ Pool</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In January 1983 Robert Mugabe’s government launched a massive security clampdown in Matabeleland. It was led by a North Korean-trained, almost exclusively chiShona-speaking army unit known as the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Sabelo_Ndlovu-Gatsheni/publication/237426294_The_post-colonial_state_and_Matebeleland_Regional_perceptions_of_civil-military_relations_1980-2002/links/573ddabf08aea45ee842d9ad.pdf">Fifth Brigade</a>. They committed thousands of atrocities, including murders, gang rapes and <a href="http://davidcoltart.com/wp-content/uploads/2006/10/breakingthesilence.pdf">mass torture</a>. </p>
<p>Mugabe’s government called the operation <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false"><em>Gukurahundi</em></a>. This is chiShona for “the rain that washes away the chaff (from the last harvest), before the spring rains”. </p>
<p>It is estimated that between <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07075332.2017.1309561?scroll=top&needAccess=true">10 000 and 20 000</a> unarmed civilians died at the hands of Fifth Brigade.</p>
<p>An <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07075332.2017.1309561?scroll=top&needAccess=true">analysis</a> by the author of official British and US government communications relevant to the Matabeleland Massacres has shed new light on the British Government’s wilful blindness to Operation Gukurahundi, including its diplomatic and military team on the ground in Zimbabwe during the atrocities. The information was obtained via <a href="https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-freedom-of-information/what-is-the-foi-act/">Freedom of Information Act </a> requests to various British government ministries and offices and to the US Department of State. </p>
<p>The unique dataset provides minutes of meetings and other relevant communications between the British High Commission in Harare, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s office, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Defence in London, as well as the US Department of State and the US Embassy in Harare. </p>
<h2>The brutalities</h2>
<p>The attacks’ ramifications continue to be felt by survivors and their families. The children born of rape at the hands of the Fifth Brigade face ongoing discrimination and generally find themselves in hopeless situations.</p>
<p>The catalogue of brutalities committed by the Fifth Brigade include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>One man learned that his child was abducted from school by the Fifth Brigade and forced to catch poisonous black scorpions with his bare hands. He was stung and died before being buried in a shallow grave (interview with survivor TH, 2017). His only “crime” was to be Ndebele. </p></li>
<li><p>Entire families were herded into grass-roofed huts, which were then set alight (interview with survivor AN, 2017).</p></li>
<li><p>In Mkhonyeni a pregnant woman “was bayoneted open to kill the baby”. Also, “pregnant girls were bayoneted to death by 5th Brigade in Tsholotsho”, <a href="http://davidcoltart.com/wp-content/uploads/2006/10/breakingthesilence.pdf">killing the unborn babies</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>Young Ndebele men between the ages of 16-40 were particularly vulnerable. They were frequently targeted and killed or forced to perform demeaning <a href="http://davidcoltart.com/wp-content/uploads/2006/10/breakingthesilence.pdf">public sex acts</a>. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Unique dataset</h2>
<p>The data provides a unique insight into the British government’s role in Gukurahundi. It also establishes what information was available to the British government about the persistent and relentless atrocities; what the British diplomatic approach was in response to this knowledge; and what the British government’s rationale was for such policies. </p>
<p>The data evidences, for example, that the British Foreign and Commonwealth offices were aware that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>there was much talk – and evidence – of widespread brutality by the Fifth Brigade towards [Ndeble] villagers. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In a cable forwarded to the US embassy in Maputo and Dar es Salaam, then-US Secretary of State <a href="https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/shultz-george-pratt">George Shultz</a> stated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>what we are addressing is not simply a bad policy choice by the GOZ [Government of Zimbabwe] to deal with a difficult security situation in a section of their country. What is involved is the very fundamental issue of relations between the two parties, between the Ndebele and the Shona.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The West German ambassador to Zimbabwe, <a href="http://www.ohr.int/?ohr_archive=ambassador-dr-richard-ellerkmann-curriculum-vitae">Richard Ellerkmann</a>, thought it “ominous” that “Mugabe, in his latest speech in Manicaland, had used the Shona equivalent of ‘wipe out’ with reference to the Ndebele people, not just ZAPU people, if they didn’t stop supporting the dissidents”.</p>
<p>However, “most poignant for Ellerkmann was the remark of a German Jewish refugee in Bulawayo who said the situation reminded him of how the Nazis treated Jews in the 1930s”. (Cable American Embassy, Harare to Secretary of State Washington DC, 11 Mar. 1983). </p>
<p>There could be no doubt in the minds of the British that Gukurahundi was Zimbabwean government policy. On 7 March 1983 Roland “Tiny” Rowland, a British businessman and chief executive of the Lonrho conglomerate with heavy economic commitments in Zimbabwe, met Mugabe. The documents indicate he subsequently reported to the American ambassador in Harare that he was convinced Mugabe was:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>fully aware of what is happening in Matabeleland and it is Government policy. Mnangagwa (Zimbabwean Minister of State Security) is fully aware and he was in the meeting when they discussed the situation in detail. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The author’s analysis provides clear evidence that the British diplomatic and military teams in Harare during Gukurahundi were consistent in their efforts to minimise the magnitude of Fifth Brigade’s atrocities.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185858/original/file-20170913-23100-xerxnu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185858/original/file-20170913-23100-xerxnu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185858/original/file-20170913-23100-xerxnu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185858/original/file-20170913-23100-xerxnu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185858/original/file-20170913-23100-xerxnu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185858/original/file-20170913-23100-xerxnu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185858/original/file-20170913-23100-xerxnu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The remains of a victim of the massacre.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Anonymous/Supplied by author</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is indisputable that this is the general theme of the available cables that were forwarded from the British High Commission in Harare to London during the period analysed. </p>
<p>The analysis also clearly proves that, even when in receipt of solid intelligence, the UK government’s response was to wilfully turn a “blind eye” to the victims of these gross abuses. Instead, the British government’s approach appears to be have been influenced solely by consideration for the white people who were in the affected regions but were not affected by the violence. </p>
<h2>Rationale for realpolitik</h2>
<p>The rationale for such naked realpolitik is multi-layered. It is expressed clearly in numerous communications between Harare and London. One cables notes that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Zimbabwe is important to us primarily because of major British and western economic and strategic interests in southern Africa, and Zimbabwe’s pivotal position there. Other important interests are investment (£800 million) and trade (£120 million exports in 1982), Lancaster House prestige, and the need to avoid a mass white exodus. Zimbabwe offers scope to influence the outcome of the agonising South Africa problem; and is a bulwark against Soviet inroads… Zimbabwe’s scale facilitates effective external influence on the outcome of the Zimbabwe experiment, despite occasional Zimbabwean perversity.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>One can but assume that “occasional Zimbabwean perversity” refers to Gukurahundi.</p>
<h2>Accountability</h2>
<p>In a more general sense it is quite clear that, apart from the immediate perpetrators, external bystanders also have to be held accountable at least to some extent for the unbridled atrocities that took place in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>With the end of Mugabe’s long reign drawing ever closer, it is imperative that the international community help develop strategies to help Zimbabweans address the prevailing impunity and lack of accountability for the crimes of Gukurahundi. That is critical for the establishment of truth, justice, and accountability for the victims, survivors and their families.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81574/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hazel Cameron receives funding from the University of St Andrews (a research grant)</span></em></p>The effects of President Mugabe’s post-independence security clampdown that led to the murder of between 10 000 and 20 000 Zimbabweans, known as the Matabeleland massacre, continue to be felt.Hazel Cameron, Lecturer of International Relations, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.