tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/maghreb-20871/articlesMaghreb – The Conversation2021-09-12T08:22:29Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1673132021-09-12T08:22:29Z2021-09-12T08:22:29ZWhy Algeria cut diplomatic ties with Morocco: and implications for the future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420075/original/file-20210908-25-1s4hkj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Moroccan foreign minister Nasser Bourita (R) welcomes his Israeli counterpart Yair Lapidis to Rabat, in August 2021.
The normalisation of relations between the two precipitated the breakup of Moroccan-Algerian diplomatic ties. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Alal Morchidi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The breakup of diplomatic relations between Algeria and Morocco <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/algeria-says-cutting-diplomatic-ties-with-morocco-2021-08-24/#:%7E:text=Speaking%20at%20a%20news%20conference,on%20the%20Western%20Sahara%20issue">in August</a> is the product of a long history of tension. The two nations have never had long periods of friendship, notwithstanding the many factors that bring them together. Indeed, they belong to the same <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/report-regional-integration-maghreb-2019-challenges-and-opportunities-private-sector-synthesis">Maghreb region</a>, share the same religion (Sunni Islam and Maleki rite) and identity, and speak a similar dialect. They also share a <a href="https://artsandculture.google.com/entity/algeria%E2%80%93morocco-border/g1229dss0?hl=en">1,550km common border</a>.</p>
<p>In fact, Algerian and Moroccan people are so close that it is difficult to distinguish them. But, historical, political and ideological dissimilarities since their respective independence weigh heavily in the relations between these “brotherly” countries. </p>
<p>How can one account for the tensions that have characterised their relations, which have now gone through a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1169bh2">second breakup in diplomatic relations</a>? The first, initiated by Morocco, was from 1976 to 1988.</p>
<p>I have researched relations between Algeria and Morocco for more than 40 years and published studies on the topic. Relations between the Algerian and Moroccan governments have seldom been cordial. This is due to the different nature of their anti-colonial struggle, their dissimilar political systems, and opposite ideological orientations. </p>
<p>In the last decade, Morocco exploited the lethargy of Algeria’s diplomacy and the paralysis of the political system to advance its interests, often to the detriment of Algeria. The reawakening of Algeria’s diplomacy and its decision to counter what it considers Morocco’s “hostile acts” resulted in the latest breakup.</p>
<p>Their tumultuous relationship has been an impediment to the integration of the region, which could bring sizeable benefits to both. Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia founded the <a href="https://maghrebarabe.org/fr/union-du-maghreb-arabe/">Arab Maghreb Union in 1989</a>. But since 1996, the union has become moribund due to repeated tensions in Moroccan-Algerian relations.</p>
<p>The divergences of recent years are potentially far more consequential. They could threaten the stability of the whole North Africa region.</p>
<h2>History of Algerian-Moroccan relations</h2>
<p>Algerian nationalists had relatively good relations with <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-relations-internationales-2011-2-page-77.htm.">King Mohammed V of Morocco</a> He died in 1961, one year before Algeria gained its sovereignty. Morocco became independent <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2020/11/326269/morocco-celebrates-64-years-of-independence-from-european-colonizers">in 1956</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Algerian-War">Algeria</a> in 1962. </p>
<p>King Mohammed’s son, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hassan-II">King Hassan II</a>, who succeeded him, made claims over Algerian territory. He invaded the country <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-21026-8_19">in 1963</a>. This resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Algeria’s ill-equipped fighters.</p>
<p>Although short, this war shaped the minds of the Algerian military-political establishment. There was an era of cooperation between 1969 and the mid-1970s. But the conflict in Western Sahara, invaded by Morocco under the so-called Green March <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/magazine-34667782">in 1975</a>, resulted in another era of tensions.</p>
<p>Indeed, in March 1976, Algeria’s recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, proclaimed by the Sahrawi nationalist movement, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Polisario-Front">Polisario Front</a>, saw Morocco break diplomatic relations with Algeria. Many other African countries recognised the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Relations were restored <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14123260">in May 1988</a>. </p>
<p>The renewal of relations was based <a href="https://www.tsa-algerie.com/rupture-des-relations-avec-le-maroc-le-texte-integral-de-la-declaration-de-lamamra/">on a number of agreements</a>. These were:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>a commitment to enduring relations of peace </p></li>
<li><p>good neighbourliness and cooperation</p></li>
<li><p>hastening the building of the Great Arab Maghreb</p></li>
<li><p>Algeria’s noninterference in Morocco’s domestic affairs </p></li>
<li><p>solving the Western Sahara conflict through a referendum on self-determination. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>From Algeria’s perspective, Morocco has reneged on all of them. </p>
<p>In the background, there has been a continuous buildup of Algerian-Moroccan tensions.</p>
<h2>Growing tensions</h2>
<p>In the 1990s, Algeria underwent a bigger crisis than it had ever known. The country was <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/remembering-algeria-1992-first-arab-spring-never-became-summer">devastated</a> by civil strife opposing the state, and armed Islamist groups. In 1994, in the midst of that crisis, Moroccan authorities <a href="https://en.yabiladi.com/articles/details/56799/attack-hotel-asni-marrakech-straw.html">falsely accused Algerian intelligence</a> of being behind the deadly terrorist attacks at the Asni hotel in Marrakech.</p>
<p>Morocco imposed visas on Algerians, including those holding another citizenship. Algeria retaliated in imposing visas and closed its land borders with Morocco. In late 1995, Morocco froze the institutions of the Arab Maghreb Union due to Algeria’s support for the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.</p>
<p>A shift in relations seemed to have occurred when <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14118854">Abdelaziz Bouteflika</a> became president of Algeria in April in 1999. He planned on meeting King Hassan II to iron out differences. But the king died in July that year. His successor <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1559304">Mohammed VI</a> showed no inclination for a resolution of Western Sahara under United Nations terms.</p>
<p>Amazingly, during his presidency, Bouteflika not only neglected the question of Western Sahara, he also instructed officials not to respond to any Moroccan hostile actions.</p>
<p>Following his <a href="https://theconversation.com/bouteflika-steps-aside-as-algerians-push-to-reclaim-and-own-their-history-114380">forcible removal in April 2019</a>, Algeria reiterated its support for the principle of self-determination. </p>
<p>For its part, Morocco had been lobbying the <a href="https://au.int/en">African Union</a>, Europe and the US for support for its claims of sovereignty over Western Sahara. Two events in the last 10 months escalated tensions. The first was an attack on Sahrawi demonstrators <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/world/middleeast/morocco-military-operation-western-sahara.html">in El-Guergarat</a>, the buffer zone in the south of Western Sahara, by Moroccan troops. Then there was <a href="https://www.undispatch.com/western-sahara-conflict-upended-by-a-trump-tweet/">a tweet from President Donald Trump</a> announcing US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in Western Sahara.</p>
<p>These constituted part of Algeria’s decision to break up diplomatic relations with Morocco. </p>
<p>Trump had traded Moroccan occupied Western Sahara in exchange for <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Joint-Declaration-US-Morrocco-Israel.pdf">Morocco normalising relations with Israel</a>. Other Arab states did the same thing in the framework of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a> brokered by Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner. </p>
<p>Before the Abraham Accords, Moroccan officials displayed relentless hostility toward Algeria to which the Algerian government did not respond. Trump’s tweet on <a href="https://twitter.com/ap/status/1337069459551506432?lang=en">10 December</a> seemed to galvanise Morocco’s hostile attitude toward Algeria. </p>
<p>Algeria perceived both decisions as a real threat to its national security. </p>
<p>Algiers’ threshold of tolerance against acts it considered hostile came <a href="https://fr.sputniknews.com/amp/international/202107191045896006-soutien-marocain-aux-separatistes-kabyles-le-debut-dune-dangereuse-escalade-entre-alger-et-rabat/">in mid-July</a> when Morocco’s ambassador to the UN distributed a note expressing support for a group fighting for the secession of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24042103">Kabyle coastal region of Algeria</a>. The group is listed as a terrorist group by Algeria. This resulted in Algeria recalling its ambassador in Morocco for “consultations” and <a href="http://www.mae.gov.dz/news_article/6594.aspx">asking Morocco to clarify</a> whether this was the ambassador’s sole decision or the government’s. It never received a response. </p>
<p>Another hostile act in the eyes of Algeria was a <a href="https://www.afrik.com/pegasus-plus-de-6000-algeriens-espionnes-par-le-maroc-dont-lamamra">vast spying scandal</a> revealed by a consortium of international newspapers and human rights organisations. They found that Morocco had targeted more than 6,000 Algerians, including many senior political and military officials.</p>
<p>Algeria decided to break diplomatic relations with Morocco as of 24 August.</p>
<h2>Implications of the breakup</h2>
<p>The breakup may result in geopolitical realignments. But all will depend on whether Morocco will escalate tensions and use the Israeli card against Algeria, or whether it will seek to reduce tensions. </p>
<p>Algeria has already begun strengthening its control at the Algerian Moroccan border. It could create serious problems for Morocco if it decided to expel the tens of thousands of Moroccans (many of whom are illegal migrants) from Algeria. </p>
<p>There are wider implications too.</p>
<p>The breakup has marked the death knell of the Arab Maghreb Union, which was already dormant. The strained relations will either mean the regional grouping remains at a standstill or a new grouping might emerge.</p>
<p>And the rivalries between Algeria and Morocco can be expected to intensify at the African Union over <a href="https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/The-Admission-of-Israel-as-an-Observer-in-the-African-Union.aspx">Israel’s observer status at the AU</a>, and over Western Sahara. </p>
<p>In the economic realm, the Algerian energy minister announced in late August that the contract for the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline (GME), which goes through Morocco, will not be renewed after it <a href="https://www.algeriepatriotique.com/2021/08/26/lalgerie-ne-renouvellera-pas-le-contrat-du-gazoduc-traversant-le-maroc/">expires on 31 October 2021</a>. The decision has now <a href="https://www.olcnbvc4jz.com/renouvellement-du-gazoduc-maghreb-europe-lalgerie-a-tranche/">been confirmed</a>. The pipeline goes directly from northwest Algeria and then crosses Mediterranean.</p>
<p>Instead, Algeria will distribute natural gas to Spain and Portugal via the pipeline, MEDGAZ.</p>
<p>The term impact of this breakup is unpredictable. What’s certain, however, is that Algerian-Moroccan rivalry will intensify.</p>
<p><em>The views and opinions expressed in the article are the sole responsibility of the author and are not endorsed by Business Kedge School or those of the Brookings Doha Centre.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167313/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yahia H. Zoubir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the last decade, Morocco exploited the lethargy of Algeria’s diplomacy and the paralysis of the political system to advance its interests, often to the detriment of AlgeriaYahia H. Zoubir, Visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center and Senior Professor of International Studies and Director of Research in Geopolitics, Kedge Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1529052021-01-17T08:50:59Z2021-01-17T08:50:59ZNiger’s democratic transition is good news, but the threat of insurgency remains high<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377994/original/file-20210111-19-gud2rq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Following an inconclusive election in December 2020, Niger's Independent National Electoral Commission is set for a runoff in February. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Issouf Sanogo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Despite the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/niger/overview">twin problems</a> – poverty and insecurity – that have faced Niger in the past few decades, <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/africaga2016/documents/niger-he-mr-mahamadou-issoufou-president">President Mahamadou Issoufou</a> successfully completed his two-term tenure. In December 2020, the country held the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/01/07/nigerien-president-mahamadou-issoufou-set-to-exit-power//">first election</a> to transfer power from one civilian regime to another since independence from France in <a href="https://face2faceafrica.com/article/niger-gained-independence-from-france-on-this-day-in-1960-but-had-to-wait-much-longer-for-freedom">1960</a>. </p>
<p>The 27 December <a href="https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3633/">election</a> was inconclusive as no candidate got the constitutionally mandated 50% of the vote to emerge as president. A <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210102-niger-s-presidential-election-set-for-february-runoff">runoff</a> is now scheduled for 21 February. </p>
<p>When President Issoufou <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/22/niger-election-tandja-issoufou-chatelot">assumed power</a> in 2011 (a year after a coup d’etat which led to the removal of Mamadou Tandja), the country was overwhelmed by widespread poverty and insecurity. Persistent agitations came from the Tuareg ethnic groups, stemming from <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23266590?seq=1">perceived marginalisation and oppression</a>. Issoufou’s first step towards stabilising the country was to appoint Brigi Rafini, a Tuareg leader from Agadez, as <a href="https://www.news24.com/News24/nigers-new-leader-appoints-tuareg-as-pm-20110407">prime minister</a>.</p>
<p>Many rebel leaders were appeased with political positions, a gesture which helped stabilise the country and reduce <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">calls for secession</a>. Another boost to the country’s democracy was Issoufou’s decision not to seek a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201012-i-won-t-be-seeking-a-third-term-niger-s-president-issoufou-confirms">third term </a> but instead organise a free and fair election. </p>
<p>The increase in the number of African incumbent presidents extending or ignoring term limits has been described as <a href="https://theconversation.com/presidential-term-limits-slippery-slope-back-to-authoritarianism-in-africa-96796">reversing democracy</a>.</p>
<p>In addition to achieving relative political stability and entrenching democracy, Niger has grown its GDP during Issoufou’s tenure. GDP grew from <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/niger/gdp">$8.7 billion to $12.9 billion</a> between 2011 and 2019, and by <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/niger/overview#1">6.3%</a> in 2019. This was achieved through investment in agriculture, which represents about 40% of GDP, as well as the prevention of internal conflicts. </p>
<p>One of the key issues which plagued Niger was trafficking (weapons, humans and drugs). Although this still constitutes a menace, Niger has benefited financially from the European Union in its quest to reduce trafficking. It has been awarded over <a href="https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/refugees/community/2018/05/21/funders-must-recognize-refugees-have-assets-not-just-needs">$840 million</a> since 2011 to help curb the flow of migrants from Africa to Europe through the Sahara. This has helped the country combat trafficking through upgrading security infrastructure. </p>
<h2>Landlocked nation surrounded by problematic countries</h2>
<p>But despite the efforts of the Nigerien government to attain political stability, economic growth and security, conflict in neighbouring countries has hindered development. Islamist or terrorist groups operate in six of the seven countries that surround Niger (Algeria, Libya, Chad, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Mali). Benin is the exception.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17308138">Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb</a> – which was formed after the Algerian civil war in the late 1990s – operates along the northern border of Niger with Algeria. The war in Libya also polarised parts of the country’s north-eastern border where <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/178-how-islamic-state-rose-fell-and-could-rise-again-maghreb">Islamic State</a> operates. Boko Haram, formed in Nigeria, operates along Niger’s south-eastern border between Chad and Nigeria. The group claimed responsibility for the massacre of <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1080062">28 civilians</a> in the town of Toumour in December 2020. </p>
<p>Since 2018, the western parts of the country have also witnessed sporadic attacks orchestrated by <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/islamic-state-greater-sahara-isgs">Islamic State in the Greater Sahara</a>. This group is an affiliate of Islamic State which was formed in Mali but operates in Burkina Faso and along the border with Niger. As the results of the presidential election were being released, terrorists attacked two villages, killing over <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/02/at-least-70-killed-in-suspected-islamist-attacks-in-niger">100 people</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/">Data</a> from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project reveal that insurgent activities have increased in Niger in the past few years. A total of 167 conflict related events resulting in 506 fatalities were recorded in 2018. The numbers grew to 476 conflict related events resulting in 1046 fatalities in 2020. Most events happened around the borders of the country. <a href="https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2019/01/ACLED_Country-and-Time-Period-coverage_updDecember2020.pdf">These data</a> reveal the impact of insecurity on the stability of Niger.</p>
<h2>The elections and challenges ahead</h2>
<p>Although 30 candidates contested the presidential elections, there are believed to be two front runners. Mohamed Bazoum, the former head of Niger’s interior and foreign ministries, is one. The other is Mahamane Ousmane, Niger’s fourth president, who held office between 1993 and 1996 before being removed in a military coup. Since no candidate was able to garner 50% of the votes in the first round of elections (<a href="https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard">Bazoum got 39.33% and Ousmane got 17%</a>), runoff elections have been scheduled for February 2021.</p>
<p>The three key issues which have dominated the presidential campaigns are insecurity, poverty and corruption. Despite the progress recorded by the incumbent president in the past nine years, the World Bank states that poverty remains high: <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/niger/overview">41.4% </a> of the population lived in extreme poverty in 2019. </p>
<p>Since the runoff elections will be between two popular figures in the country, intense political calculations are expected.</p>
<p>One key issue which is likely to be prominent in the build up to the runoff election is the ability of the candidates to sustain the balance of power. This has been essential in keeping Niger relatively stable since 2011.</p>
<p>While the prospect of a peaceful democratic transition in Niger is welcome in the country and across the region, the eventual winner faces an uphill task to surmount the twin problems of insecurity and poverty.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152905/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Although Niger’s quest for entrenching democracy is a good development, poverty and insecurity are obstacles.Olayinka Ajala, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1381252020-05-08T10:45:39Z2020-05-08T10:45:39ZThe poetic power of Idir, the artist who took Algerian music to the world<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/333394/original/file-20200507-49565-1boomon.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Salvatore di Nolfiepa/EFE/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/iconic-algerian-singer-berber-idol-idir-dies-70-200503141909813.html">death</a> of Algerian icon <a href="https://idir-officiel.fr">Idir</a> has brought an important chapter of Algerian music to a close. Through his brilliant career, Idir modernised and promoted the richness of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Kabyle-people">Kabyle</a> melodies and poetry, popularised North African culture, and advocated for unity and tolerance both in Algeria and in France.</p>
<p>Looking at Idir’s life in music is looking into Algeria’s relationship with its history and identity, but also questioning what it means to be exiled in a new country, France, and to be a citizen of the world.</p>
<p>Hamid Cheriet, better known as Idir, was born in 1949 and grew up during the Algerian <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/11/a-chronology-of-the-algerian-war-of-independence/305277/">War of Independence</a> in Aït Yenni, a small village bordering the Djurdjura mountain range of Kabylia. It is within this setting that Idir developed a deep understanding of the rich oral traditions of his own Kabyle culture, a branch of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Berber">Amazigh (Berber)</a> culture. </p>
<p>Through his mother and grandmother’s roles as hosts of vigils within their local community, where local poetry and tales were recited, Idir came to learn the power of words from a young age. </p>
<p>Initially he did not pursue a career in music. But his life took a turn in 1973 when he was called on at a moment’s notice to replace the Kabyle singer Nouara at Radio Algiers. It led to his recording <em>Rsed A Yidess</em> (May Sleep Come) and <em>A Vava Inouva</em> (My Dad). <em>A Vava Inouva</em> would soon become his most iconic work as well as one of the first North African songs to gain international recognition. </p>
<p>In 1976, after completing his military service and moving to Paris, at the request of the French label Pathe-Marconi, he produced his <a href="https://bit.ly/2A8q9si">first album</a>, named after his hit <em>A Vava Inouva</em>. This marked the beginning of a long and fruitful career in music.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/333421/original/file-20200507-49573-peb1xw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/333421/original/file-20200507-49573-peb1xw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/333421/original/file-20200507-49573-peb1xw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/333421/original/file-20200507-49573-peb1xw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/333421/original/file-20200507-49573-peb1xw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/333421/original/file-20200507-49573-peb1xw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/333421/original/file-20200507-49573-peb1xw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/333421/original/file-20200507-49573-peb1xw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Idir and his daughter Tanina Cheriet perform in Paris in 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Wolff/Patrick/WireImage</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Ambassador of Kabylia</h2>
<p>Shortly after gaining independence from the French, the new Algerian government began a steady-paced process of <a href="http://countrystudies.us/algeria/53.htm">arabisation</a> throughout the country. This involved promoting Arabic as the national language. This denied much of the country’s rich linguistic and cultural diversity. This was particularly true among the Amazigh factions of the population, who accounted for a third of the total. </p>
<p>These repressive government policies resulted in mass political <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1362938042000325813">protest</a> throughout Kabylia in 1980, a period known as the <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/berber-spring">Berber Spring</a>, later followed by the <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/black-spring">Black Spring</a> in 2001. These two periods of social unrest were violently repressed by the Algerian government. </p>
<p>It is these repressive policies that Idir, a fierce defendant of his Kabyle heritage, dedicated much of his life to fighting. He did this through his unapologetically Kabyle music and his role as an advocate for Kabyle culture. </p>
<p>Some artists, such as the late <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Lounes-Matoub">Matoub Lounes</a> – another great figure of Kabyle music – were outwardly critical of the government in their lyrical content. Idir’s lyrics bore their power in their poetic depictions of Kabyle social life and culture. </p>
<p>The songs <em>A Vava Inouva</em> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UFOU-MIHqz0"><em>Zwit Rwit</em></a> (Shake It Move It), both on his <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jDY30v6wSzQ">debut album</a> and the cornerstones of his career, are good examples of this. The first is a melancholic ballad, portraying the atmosphere of the vigils which he attended in his childhood. The second is an exhilarating dancing piece that conveys the upbeat mood of a wedding.</p>
<p>This album, followed by <em>Ayarrach Negh</em> (For Our Children) in 1979, bears the musical mark of Idir’s sound. It is a savant blend of traditional instruments: the shepherd flute which he learned to play as a child, the bendir (a frame drum), the tambourine, and darbuka (a goblet-shaped drum) accompanied by the guitar, bass, and drums. </p>
<p>Filled with a feeling of melancholia and nostalgia as an exile in France, his songs convey his deep yearning for home and touch upon universal themes. It is in their universal essence, bearing collective memories and histories, that his songs retain their power.</p>
<h2>Multicoloured and multicultural</h2>
<p>After a decade-long break from show business, Idir returned to centre stage in 1991 with a compilation release, followed by the release of his third album two years later. In 1993’s <em>Les chasseurs de Lumières</em> (Light Hunters) Idir addresses his favourite themes: exile, liberty and love. It came at a time of serious political <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Algeria/Civil-war-the-Islamists-versus-the-army">upheaval</a> with Algeria experiencing a violent and bloody civil war between the military government and Islamist groups. </p>
<p>Though Idir remained true to his specifically Kabyle heritage, he maintained a strong sense of Algerian pride through which he sought fraternity, democracy, and secularism, in those times of trouble and uncertainty. As such, he appeared in a collaboration with the renowned <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/09/10/khaled-and-the-myth-of-rai/">Raï singer Cheb Khaled</a>, in 1995, for a concert in Paris promoting peace, liberty, and tolerance, amongst a Berber and Algerian Arabic speaking audience.</p>
<p>A long-time advocate for unity, Idir continued to promote peace and a sense of togetherness with the release of his album <em>Identités</em> (Identities) in 1999. This included collaborations with a wide variety of artists from different backgrounds: French, North African, Malian, and Ugandan. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/uyuP-jwXaSQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A Vava Inouva in concert in Algiers in 2018.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In an attempt to bridge the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea, <em>Identités</em> also featured a moving duo with Franco-Spanish musician and producer Manu Chao called <em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UCWVZyjz0Cw">A Tulawin (Une Algérienne Debout)</a></em> (A Standing Algerian), a powerful message of hope for a country ravaged by civil war. The album also linked Kabylia with Celtic folk music, in which he <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rt0J7P4yDZU">performed</a> with Scottish singer Karen Matheson and the Breton guitarist Gilles Servat, in innovative collaborations. </p>
<p>The album encapsulated a vision of a multicultural and multicoloured France, one which he would later reassert in his 2007 album <em>La France des Couleurs</em> (France of Colours).</p>
<p>In his two last albums, <em>Adrar Inu</em> (My Mountain) and <em>Ici et Ailleurs</em> (Here and There), released in 2013 and 2017, Idir offered a more intimate picture of his music, going back to the source of his inspiration, his natal Kabylia, with reinterpretations of some of the classics of the French popular music repertoire, such as <em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XTtnlpEiTnE">La Boheme</a></em> (Bohemia) with the late Charles Aznavour. In 2018, for the first time in 38 years, Idir appeared on stage in Algiers for a concert celebrating the Berber New Year. Two years later he proudly talked in interviews of the current peaceful protests in Algeria.</p>
<p>Idir produced only a handful of studio albums. Nevertheless his contribution to the world of music and culture was immense. He will be remembered for promoting his Kabyle heritage to the world, thus contributing to its sustainability against cultural erasure, for seeking a peaceful, democratic, secular, and united Algeria, and for his vision of tolerance and integration in France. All artfully – and subtly – done through his music.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/138125/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hugo Hadji does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Looking at his brilliant career is looking into Algeria’s relationship with its history and identity, but also questioning what it means to be exiled.Hugo Hadji, Doctoral Researcher in ethnomusicology, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/935102018-05-16T20:40:05Z2018-05-16T20:40:05Z‘I understood you!’: May 1958, the return of De Gaulle and the fall of France’s Fourth Republic<p>A decade before the student uprising of May 1968, one of the months in French history was May 1958: After years in the political wilderness, General De Gaulle returned to power and established the Fifth Republic. Yet despite the monumental changes that that month brought, many in France today remain ignorant of the facts, or simplify or exaggerate them. When students or passers-by are asked what they know of the events of May 1958, it’s not uncommon to hear that De Gaulle launched a coup d’état, that he rose to power with the backing of the army, or that he was so enthusiastically welcomed that his only choice was to bury the Fourth Republic.</p>
<p>Speaking in front of a large crowd in Algiers on June 4, 1958, a few days after his return to power, De Gaulle exclaimed a brief phrase: “Je vous ai compris!” – “I understood you”. He follows with:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I know what happened here. I see what you wanted to do. I see that the road you have opened in Algeria is that of renewal and fraternity… ”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In France, De Gaulle’s key line, “I understood you!”, is better known to the general public, yet still not clearly understood. In this article we are not going to analyse the question of whether De Gaulle pulled off a “democratic” coup d’état in 1958, nor if it was a “coup de force”, or anything else, but to try to see more clearly the complex and difficult events of that year.</p>
<iframe allowfullscreen="" width="100%" height="259" frameborder="0" marginheight="0" marginwidth="0" scrolling="no" src="https://player.ina.fr/player/embed/I00012428/1/1b0bd203fbcd702f9bc9b10ac3d0fc21/460/259/1"></iframe>
<h2>French Algeria rises…</h2>
<p>Prior to the events of May 1958 and his famous speech in June, De Gaulle has been out of power since 1946. France’s politically unstable <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/France/The-Fourth-Republic#ref465519">Fourth Republic</a> – afterwards nicknamed the <em>le mal aimé</em>, or “the unloved one” – had undergoes a major crisis with the Algerian War, squandering lives and resources in a conflict that it could not solve. Politicians were deeply divided on the path forward, and there was a vacuum of power since the fall of the government led by Prime Minister <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F%C3%A9lix_Gaillard">Félix Gaillard</a> on April 15, 1958.</p>
<p>Police demonstrations in Algeria soon began to call for the return of De Gaulle to power. On May 8, French president René Coty turned to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pierre_Pflimlin">Pierre Pflimlin</a>, known for being in favour of a negotiation with the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). For the military and the “Europeans” of Algeria, it was out of the question for them to allow a “traitor” negotiate with “terrorists”. On May 13, the day after the constitution of the Pflimlin government, a protest in Algiers degenerated into a riot, and the main government building was occupied by protesters. A Committee of Public Safety (CSP) was formed under the presidency of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacques_Massu">General Jacques Massu</a>, influenced by the Gaullist Leon Delbecque. The representatives, frightened, finally decided to trust Pflimlin’s government. The new chief executive then granted civilian and military powers to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raoul_Salan">General Raoul Salan</a>, who joined General Massu.</p>
<h2>… and the Fourth Republic collapses</h2>
<p>Everything advanced rapidly. The new government was unable to regain control, the CSP called upon De Gaulle to come out of his silence and take power, the state of emergency was voted by the French National Assembly and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Guy-Mollet">Guy Mollet</a>, leader of the Socialist Party, asked General de Gaulle what his intentions were. De Gaulle then gave a press conference on May 19, where he insists on his desire to respect democracy and the French Republic. On the May 24 the military’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Resurrection">“Operation Resurrection”</a> began: Paratroopers from Algiers seize Ajaccio, and then all of Corsica in a few hours. Then the rumour rose: paratroopers were about to land in mainland France. In Paris, there was panic. Gradually, elected representatives of various political parties rallied to the idea of a government led by De Gaulle.</p>
<p>While the “Operation Resurrection” was intended to continue, the May 28 announcement of the establishment of “a Republican government capable of ensuring the unity and independence of the country”, led by De Gaulle, puts an end to it. The elected representatives, whether they are sincerely rallied to the General or they fear a coup d’état, vote largely in favour of this government on June 1. Two days later, the National Assembly granted the government the power to draft a new constitution. On September 28, it was proposed and approved by 80% of voters. The Fourth Republic ceased to exist.</p>
<h2>“I understand you!"… or not</h2>
<p>Yet if the Fourth Republic fell without being really defended by the political class or France’s citizens, nothing presupposed the return of General de Gaulle. As French journalist and historian <a href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul-Marie_de_La_Gorce">Paul-Marie de la Gorce</a> wrote:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>"We must have the humility to say this: nothing was sure, nothing was played. What began in 1958 could appear, with the passage of time, as obvious: in the view of the historian, however, nothing is more inaccurate. It was not gained that de Gaulle would come back to power, and when it was done, there was no guarantee that he would stay there for a long time, or that he could achieve his goals.” (Translation by the author, “La naissance de la Ve République”, p.27).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Having crossed the political desert and overcome many obstacles, De Gaulle arrived in Algiers on June 4, 1958. He tries to reassure everyone (military, colonists, Algerians) by pronouncing his famous but incomprehensible “I understood you!” Incomprehensible because no one is able to really explain today what he meant. Some thought that he supported French Algeria, others that he recognised the equality of the rights between all, or even the independence of the country. Finally, de Gaulle accepts – by pragmatism – to allow the independence of Algeria. He then suffers a series of crises: the barricades of Algiers, the putsch of the generals in April 1961 and several <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Bastien-Thiry#Assassination_attempt">assassination attempts</a> by the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organisation_arm%C3%A9e_secr%C3%A8te">Organisation armée secrète</a> (OAS) in the 1960s.</p>
<p>In the end, nobody at that time understood what De Gaulle wanted to say, and the misunderstanding seems to persist today. The history of May 1958 is rich qualitatively, but poor in terms of quantity. And the narrative of De Gaulle’s story still remains unfinished.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93510/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bryan Muller ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>In May 1958 General de Gaulle returned to power and established the Fifth Republic. Yet despite the monumental changes of that time, many in France today still don’t understand what really happened.Bryan Muller, Doctorant contractuel chargé d'enseignement en Histoire contemporaine, Université de LorraineLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/740962017-03-13T07:31:02Z2017-03-13T07:31:02ZTunisia, Morocco and Egypt: a new global hub for social impact start-ups<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160355/original/image-20170310-19278-6sz25u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">from www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/12/05/au-maroc-une-start-up-vend-le-frigo-du-desert-sans-electricite_5043753_3212.html">Refrigerators in the Moroccan desert</a>; a <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/12/05/au-maroc-une-start-up-vend-le-frigo-du-desert-sans-electricite_5043753_3212.html">bracelet to prevent heart attacks</a> in Tunisia; a <a href="http://africa-me.com/bassita-helps-fund-social-change-clickfunding/">source funding system for charities</a> in Egypt. Mission-driven start-ups are blossoming in these three North African countries, which are now at the forefront of social entrepreneurship.</p>
<p>Morocco now boasts more than <a href="http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/startups-au-maroc-une-industrie-en-pleine-%C3%A9volution">250 start-ups</a>. With around 100 seed-stage startups, Tunisia is ranked seventh in the world as the best place to launch start-ups by <a href="http://africanmanager.com/16_tunis-la-tunisie-au-top-10-des-meilleures-conditions-pour-les-startups-dans-le-monde">SeedStars World</a>. Egypt broke records with <a href="http://mobile.planete-plus-intelligente.lemonde.fr/business/les-startups-nouveau-remede-anti-chomage-en-egypte-_a-56-3161.html">the creation of thousands of start-ups in 2012 and 2013</a>, according to the Egyptian bureau of statistics.</p>
<p>How can we explain the meteoric rise of social-oriented start-ups in countries where economic indicators remain weak?</p>
<p>According to the data company <a href="http://www.journaldunet.com/web-tech/start-up/1158880-start-up-quels-sont-les-secteurs-dans-lesquels-les-investissements-ont-explose-en-2015">Mattermark</a>, while for several years North African start-ups mainly flourished in sectors like e-marketing and online dating, since 2012, they have begun appearing in areas such as banking, health, lending, <a href="https://theconversation.com/now-that-bitcoins-are-worth-more-than-their-weight-in-gold-is-it-time-for-central-banks-to-make-their-own-73984">currencies</a> and e-commerce. </p>
<h2>New businesses and collaborative economics</h2>
<p>This trend towards collaborative economics makes sense in emerging markets where the start-up business is a little under ten years old.</p>
<p>Since these countries began to attract the interest of foreign investors, several generic accelerator programmes have popped up, such as <a href="http://www.flat6labs.com/">Flat6labs</a> in Tunisia, and <a href="http://www.usinenouvelle.com/article/maroc-innov-invest-le-fonds-d-amorcage-pour-les-startups-n-attend-plus-que-le-feu-vert-de-la-banque-mondiale.N432572">Innov Invest</a> and <a href="https://paris.numa.co/blog/numa-sinstalle-au-maroc-avec-numa-casablanca/">Numa</a> in Morocco.</p>
<p>Foreign backing helps finance such businesses, which are seen as unstable and insecure, and consequently receive little or no funding from traditional local banks which bridle at the prospect of a slow return on investment. It should be noted that these countries have retained a <a href="https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00593994/document">European-style investment model</a> mainly based around banking institutions. For young entrepreneurs, foreign backing may be the only available funding source.</p>
<p>Besides the “investment gap” left by the banking sector in countries that refuse to finance start-ups, foreign investors have also noticed the significant opportunities for positive social impact.</p>
<p>According to the <a href="http://www.ins.tn/fr/publication/recensement-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral-de-la-population-et-de-lhabitat-2014-vol4">Tunisian National Institute of Statistics (NIS)</a> and the <a href="https://books.google.fr/books?id=_DzLCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA12&lpg=PA12&dq=insea+maroc+statistiques+jeunesse&source=bl&ots=OBSmAiqf4F&sig=-M8yzqwwCt9IX4FcMizuQ7b9gu8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjX-5HZxabSAhULM8AKHcEsDYgQ6AEIOTAE#v=onepage&q=insea%20maroc%20statistiques%20jeunesse&f=false">Moroccan National Institute of Statistics and Applied Economics</a>, these companies are made up of people whose mean age ranges from 25 to 32. Young people, especially qualified young people, are terrified by rampant unemployment rates in the region. <a href="http://www.ins.tn/fr/publication/note-sur-lenqu%C3%AAte-nationale-de-l%E2%80%99emploi-t4-2016">According to the NIS</a>, there were 267,700 out-of-work graduates in Tunisia in the third quarter of 2016, amounting to 31.9% of the total number of unemployed people.</p>
<p>These young unemployed people are for the most part talented, ambitious, unfazed by change and interested in new technologies – skills sets that represent real value for investors speculating on the new economy.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160206/original/image-20170309-21018-h9n7f6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160206/original/image-20170309-21018-h9n7f6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160206/original/image-20170309-21018-h9n7f6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160206/original/image-20170309-21018-h9n7f6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160206/original/image-20170309-21018-h9n7f6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160206/original/image-20170309-21018-h9n7f6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160206/original/image-20170309-21018-h9n7f6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Political and social movements in Egypt and Tunisia had a strong influence on the people behind innovative projects.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/01/Manifestation_UGTT_anti_RCD_II.JPG/1024px-Manifestation_UGTT_anti_RCD_II.JPG?uselang=fr%20%22">Habib M’henni/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions were not necessarily responsible for the rise of these start-ups, they helped <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21714335-arab-entrepreneurs-could-help-many-regions-problems-too-many">drive their proliferation</a>. The new generation has realized that it can play by a new set of rules. The Arab Spring freed up young people and taught them that change is not impossible and they are capable of controlling their own destinies.</p>
<h2>An emphasis on social projects</h2>
<p>My research on start-ups and young entrepreneurs has revealed one striking common attribute: whether Tunisian, Moroccan or Egyptian, they are overwhelmingly socially oriented. Knowing their countries’ economic difficulties, they are driven to fight unemployment, not just by launching their own businesses, but also by improving the lives of their fellow citizens.</p>
<p>A great number of these start-uppers are creating transport and health projects with the aim of compensating <a href="http://www.liberation.fr/futurs/2014/06/29/la-tunisie-en-mode-start-up_1053388">for insufficient government investment</a>.</p>
<p>For example, Tunisian start-up <a href="http://bethree.co.nf/">BeThree</a>, the brainchild of three students from the Esprit engineering school, has succeeded in developing a smart bracelet that detects abrupt changes in cardiac rhythm and arterial blood pressure in order to prevent heart attacks. </p>
<p>A few months ago, this start-up was in talks with <a href="https://www.wonkalab.com/">Wonka Lab</a>, a Los Angeles-based start-up accelerator. “Wonka Lab offered to help us develop our product for the American market,” one of the entrepreneurs <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/03/15/des-start-up-made-in-tunisia-qui-innovent_4883189_3212.html#6lRKTqEcrAWIYF0f.99">told</a> French newspaper Le Monde.</p>
<p>Casablanca start-up <a href="http://carmine.ma/condition_generales.html">Carmine</a> facilitates car sharing, a solution for young professionals who cannot afford to buy their own vehicle. As it is still in operation, with an increasing number of available stations, the business is thinking about expanding its mission to include other Moroccan cities.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160207/original/image-20170309-21050-1awttme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160207/original/image-20170309-21050-1awttme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160207/original/image-20170309-21050-1awttme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160207/original/image-20170309-21050-1awttme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160207/original/image-20170309-21050-1awttme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160207/original/image-20170309-21050-1awttme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160207/original/image-20170309-21050-1awttme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Start-Up MENA gathers together innovative project creators in the region.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/123943225@N07/14586994893">Start Up Mena/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are also start-ups in the crowd-sourcing sector, such as Egyptian company <em>Bassita</em> (“simple” in Arabic), which <a href="http://africa-me.com/bassita-helps-fund-social-change-clickfunding/">found an innovative way to raise money</a> to provide access to clean drinking water for more than a thousand households. In 2014, this same model was used to raise the funds needed to buy a thousand pairs of glasses for embroiderers in one of the poorest regions; in 2015, it allowed thirty children who had never seen the ocean to spend a day by the Red Sea.</p>
<p><a href="http://lavieeco.com/news/economie/cinq-start-up-qui-feront-le-maroc-de-demain-32370.html">Moroccan start-up</a> Safa, also created by students, at the Mohammadia engineering school, developed a clay-and-wood water filter. They decided to employ housewives to build the filters and gave them a share in the profits.</p>
<p>Regardless of country or industry, today’s start-ups are vulnerable because of their heavy dependence on private investment during the seed phase, which can discourage backers.</p>
<p>Start-ups will have a significant role to play in the economic future of these countries. They now have to attract the attention of policy makers in order to obtain better regulatory and fiscal conditions for their development.</p>
<p><em>Translated from the French by Alice Heathwood for <a href="http://www.fastforword.fr/en/">Fast for Word</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74096/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zouhour Ben Hamadi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Thanks to foreign backing, social impact start-ups led by young entrepreneurs are flourishing in North Africa.Zouhour Ben Hamadi, Enseignant chercheur en finance comptabilité contrôle de gestion, EM NormandieLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/670712016-10-18T14:33:30Z2016-10-18T14:33:30ZThe ICC’s Al-Mahdi ruling protects cultural heritage, but didn’t go far enough<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141959/original/image-20161017-4735-vbd8m3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A burnt ancient manuscript at the Ahmed Baba Centre for Documentation and Research, in Timbuktu. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Benoit Tessier/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the first of its kind, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has delivered an important <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=pr1242">judgment</a> on the destruction of World Heritage.</p>
<p>International law clearly protects cultural heritage from attack, including during <a href="http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13637&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html">armed conflict</a>. But such crimes are seldom prosecuted and tend to be viewed as secondary to crimes against people. The ICC has partly changed this in the case against Ahmad Al Faqi Al-Mahdi, a local leader in Timbuktu who was appointed as head of the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi">morality police</a> when power changed hands in the city. The case exclusively concerned attacks against <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi">cultural heritage</a>. </p>
<p>This is the first ICC case to examine attacks against cultural heritage. It is also the first to consider the actions of terrorist movements linked to Al-Qaeda. Its findings are likely to affect how the international community responds to attacks on cultural heritage – for example, <a href="http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/23">the destruction of Palmyra in Syria</a> by Islamic State.</p>
<p>The judgment sends the message that the international community will not tolerate destruction of cultural heritage sites. That is to be welcomed. But in our view the judgment did not go far enough. This is because it also sends the message that the court values the culture that binds a community together less than the toll on human lives. While understandable, we suggest that the court’s reasoning is shortsighted and that it missed a valuable opportunity.</p>
<p>We would argue that protecting cultural heritage sites is equally important and connected to the protection of civilian populations. After all, as the ICC recognised in its judgment, the heritage site was a large part of the social glue that made the individuals living in Timbuktu a community. </p>
<p>Without culture, people are but an assembly of organisms in the same species. Culture makes us a people, a civilisation.</p>
<h2>Cultural heritage in times of war</h2>
<p>The rise of the so-called Islamic State (Isis) in recent years has seen a spike in attacks on and destruction of globally significant sites of cultural heritage. Some of these have included <a href="http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/23">Palmyra</a> and <a href="http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/21">Aleppo</a> in Syria, the <a href="https://gatesofnineveh.wordpress.com/2014/07/24/and-now-its-gone-shrine-of-jonah-destroyed-by-isis/">Shrine of Jonah</a> in Iraq and <a href="http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/119">Timbuktu</a> in Mali, which date back centuries and were internationally recognised as protected sites. </p>
<p>Increasingly, such sites are targeted precisely because of their religious and cultural significance and their value to the international community.</p>
<p>The ancient city of Timbuktu holds a special place in Islamic and world history. It played an essential role in the spread of Islam in Africa during the religion’s early period. Its mosques also made it a commercial, spiritual and cultural centre in the <a href="http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/gold/hd_gold.htm">trans-Saharan trading route</a>.</p>
<p>Following the collapse of government in Mali in <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/africa/mali-coup-france-calls-for-elections.html?_r=0">2012</a>, terror groups occupied the power vacuum. These groups include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mujwa.htm">MUJWA</a>, an offshoot of Maghred Al-Qaeda;</p></li>
<li><p><a href="http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/national-movement-liberation-azawad-mnla">MNLA</a>, Tuareg nationalists; </p></li>
<li><p><a href="http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/ansar-dine">Ansar Dine</a>, Muslim fundamentalists who ordered the destruction of Timbuktu escalating the activities of the morality police led by Al-Mahdi; and </p></li>
<li><p>Al-Qaeda in the <a href="https://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqim.html">Islamic Maghreb</a>, a franchise of Al-Qaeda that runs separately from the Saudi Al Qaeda. It was responsible for the 9/11 attacks in the US. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Al-Mahdi was an educated and respected member of the local community in Timbuktu. From April 2012 he was the head of the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi">Hesbah</a>, the morality brigade responsible for enforcing the religious and political edicts of the two terrorist groups, Asnar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The two groups had gained control of Timbuktu. These organisations decided that the mausoleums to the saints and the mosques in Timbuktu were to be destroyed.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141958/original/image-20161017-4752-1xjcphj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141958/original/image-20161017-4752-1xjcphj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141958/original/image-20161017-4752-1xjcphj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141958/original/image-20161017-4752-1xjcphj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141958/original/image-20161017-4752-1xjcphj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141958/original/image-20161017-4752-1xjcphj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141958/original/image-20161017-4752-1xjcphj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi on trial at the ICC for destroying historic mausoleums in Timbuktu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Patrick Post/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Al-Mahdi initially advised against their destruction, recognising that the sites were an important part of the community’s religious and cultural life.</p>
<p>But the ICC found that in organising and providing the means for the destruction and participating in the destruction of five sites, Al-Mahdi was criminally responsible for total or partial destruction of 10 of the most significant sites in Timbuktu. These included several parts of the World Heritage Site.</p>
<h2>Heritage versus human lives</h2>
<p>The ICC sentenced Al-Mahdi to nine years imprisonment, which was within the range of nine to 11 years agreed by the prosecution and defence. The sentence recognised the gravity of the crime, the significance of the cultural heritage destroyed and the religious motivation for its destruction. </p>
<p>But the judges also highlighted that the destruction of “property” – no matter how culturally significant – is less grave than crimes committed against individuals. In other words, cultural heritage has been relegated to a subset of property offences. </p>
<p>In doing so, the ICC suggests that destroying a cultural heritage site that has stood for centuries, and is an important part of a group’s social glue, is about as bad as destroying a modern hospital. While both buildings play important roles, one is much harder to replace than the other. The ICC does not seem to have taken that fully into account.</p>
<p>This will have repercussions for the future protection of cultural heritage in armed conflict. </p>
<p>The judgment also ignored the connection between acts against cultural heritage and violence against the civilian population, which are often both justified by the same discriminatory religious ideals. This therefore weakens its potential to send a strong signal that intentional destruction of cultural heritage will not be tolerated.</p>
<p>The international community has always been reluctant to acknowledge this reality and turn it into law. There are other historical examples. </p>
<p>During World War II, and in many conflicts since, this realisation was always in the mind of the major war criminals, as witnessed in the <a href="http://www.rapeofeuropa.com/">Nazi policy</a> of destroying Jewish art; the <a href="http://www.icty.org/en/press/full-contents-dubrovnik-indictment-made-public">bombing of Dubrovnik</a> during the Yugoslav wars; and the destruction of the <a href="http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/208">Buddhas of Bamiyan</a>.</p>
<p>The ICC had the chance to change the world’s approach to these acts. But it fell short.</p>
<h2>Identifying victims of cultural loss</h2>
<p>Al-Mahdi accepted responsibility and demonstrated remorse for his actions. He pleaded guilty at an early stage and cooperated with the prosecution. Other possible defendants may have taken note of the court’s recognition of this in his sentence. </p>
<p>His guilty plea certainly saved valuable time and resources. And the case has been the most efficient and speedy <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi">ICC trial to date</a>. This is an important win for an institution that has struggled to deliver timely justice and faces serious challenges to its credibility due to the collapse of key trials.</p>
<p>The conviction also opens the door for the ICC to consider suitable reparations to victims for the destruction of the sites. This will be the first time an international court has had to consider how one compensates for the loss of the irreplaceable.</p>
<p>Eight victims participated in the trial process. But the court will have to explore who the victims of destruction of cultural heritage are: individuals, local communities, the state of Mali or the international community? </p>
<p>The ICC prosecutor, and the court itself, recognised that at some level all are victims. Indeed, while the suffering of the local community in Timbuktu is deepest of all, we are all affected by the loss of the treasures that bind us as humankind. </p>
<p>If only the ICC could fully see that.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67071/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lucas Lixinski is affiliated with the Association of Critical Heritage Studies.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Williams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The ICC sentence against Al-Mahdi for destroying ancient artifacts at Timbuktu sends the right message that the international community will not tolerate the destruction of heritage sites.Lucas Lixinski, Senior lecturer, UNSW SydneySarah Williams, Associate professor, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/516152015-12-08T14:54:20Z2015-12-08T14:54:20ZIs Algeria really spring cleaning its ‘deep state’?<p>The trial was fast and efficient: after only four hours, Algeria’s notorious former counter-terrorism chief Abdelkader Ait-Ouarabi, better known as General Hassan, was unceremoniously <a href="http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/le-general-hassan-condamne-a-5-ans-de-prison-27-11-2015-308589_109.php">sentenced</a> to five years in prison. </p>
<p>This was the country’s first prosecution of a high-ranking secret service officer since the 2011 Arab uprisings, and just the most recent visible sign of a concerted effort to remake the Algerian state – and to finally make good on some still unfulfilled presidential promises.</p>
<p>Elected for the first time in 1999 after a devastating <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/2010/11/2010118122224407570.html">civil war</a>, for many Algerians, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika is still the herald of national reconciliation. He is also the one who famously <a href="http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/52764/uho_algeria_profile.pdf">declared</a> that he would not allow his power to be restricted by the military. </p>
<p>And yet, his first two terms were marked by a de facto alliance with the head of military intelligence, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-34268565">General Mohamed Mediene</a> (also known as “General Toufik”), in which Mediene wielded the real influence. The balance has only begun to shift in the last few years, as a number of key figures in the military and secret service were progressively retired and replaced. </p>
<p>The process has culminated in the discharge of two powerful figures in Algeria’s infamous “<a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/algeria-military-court-intelligence-oficial-151124040909790.html">parallel state</a>”. First, Hassan was arrested in August, and while grounds for the official charges of “disobeying military orders” and “destroying documents” were not made public, the Algerian press came up with several hypotheses, among them an unauthorised <a href="http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2015/11/26/general-hassan-proces-toufik_n_8652350.html?utm_hp_ref=algeria">undercover action</a> across the border with Mali. He also ran the special unit, <a href="http://www.impact24.info/le-scorat-change-de-commandement/">Scorat</a>, which dealt quite controversially with the terrorist <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31645967">attack on the In Amenas oil plant</a> in January 2013. </p>
<p>And in September it was the turn of General Mediene himself, who after 25 years was removed from office and forced to retire. Many feared that such an abrupt dismissal would unleash violent retaliation, but for the moment, there seem to have been no visible consequences.</p>
<h2>Blurred boundaries</h2>
<p>Some observers see these replacements and trials as part of an effort to promote <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/10/changing-guard-algiers-151006101714778.html">stronger civilian control</a> of the country’s institutions. But to many <a href="http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/22347/the-changing-nature-of-the-algerian-political-syst">other analysts</a>, the weakening of the military doesn’t necessarily mean Algeria is getting any more pluralistic. Instead, it might also point to the growing power of Bouteflika’s clan over the rest of the country. </p>
<p>The clan is backed by an increasingly influential new business class, and by yet another military wing, this one led by General <a href="http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/22839/de-dramatizing-algerian-politics">Gaid Salah</a>. That means the “new civilian trend” narrative cannot work as long as Algerian civil society, fragmented by decades of repression, violence, and clientelism, remains too weak to truly counterweight the country’s power elite.</p>
<p>This might also explain why many key figures in the country have reacted to the recent power shift with a mix of surprise and concern. </p>
<p>Longstanding political opponents of Bouteflika still <a href="http://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/une-epuration-politique-pour-crimes-de-non-allegeance-233941">prefer the army to its “civilian” alternative</a>, taking the side of General Hassan. Even the secretary of the workers’ party, Louisa Hanoune, has claimed that the imprisonment of General Hassan would “weaken the military and <a href="http://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/louisa-hanoune-une-grave-scission-au-sommet-de-letat-231979">affect the credibility of the state</a> with foreign allies”.</p>
<p>For an example of just how contorted the effort to “clean up” the state really is, look at the re-emergence of former head of the armed <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/01/algeria-banned-islamists-apply-1.html">Islamic Salvation Front</a>, Madani Mezrag. Whereas General Hassan, Mezrag’s opponent during the civil war, is now imprisoned, Mezrag is now not only tolerated but even <a href="http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2014/06/08/islamistes-pouvoir-opposition-algerie_n_5469416.html">recognised by the government</a>, and often appears in the <a href="http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2015/10/15/madani-mezrag_n_8300080.html">national media</a>. This and similar cases have the press <a href="http://www.algerie1.com/actualite/le-general-hassan-en-attente-dune-autre-juridiction-pour-etre-juge/">questioning the secret services’ ability and intention</a> to curb the influence of terrorists old and new.</p>
<h2>Managing the crisis</h2>
<p>On the surface, it may seem like the Algerian state is playing the same old game, using the spectre of Islamism <a href="http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21988/a-dangerous-dualism_the-myth-of-two-algerias">to justify authoritarian rule</a>. On the other hand, for the last 15 years Algeria has tried hard – and sometimes successfully – to mediate between opposing forces inside and around the country. </p>
<p>Given the general instability across North Africa and the Sahel, declaring open war on all violent Islamist groups might well trigger violent retaliation, such as the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/26/in-amenas-murders-coroner-finds-algerian-gas-plant-had-security-flaws">In Amenas gas field attacks</a>, which were supposedly payback for Algerian support to France in Mali. </p>
<p>In addition, while most Algerians are deeply disturbed by the advent of new armed Islamist groups, they do not necessarily approve of alliances with Western powers, understandably fearing their destabilising influence in the region. Algerian officials are all too aware of that distrust, and they usually downplay the importance of anti-terrorist alliances with the EU and the US.</p>
<p>There are enormous challenges ahead. Algeria must find a way to better cope with the pressure caused by migrants, who are coming mainly from Mali. A recent <a href="http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2015/11/25/incendie-de-ouargla-letat-decide-de-nouvelles-mesures-de-prises-en-charges-des-migrants-africains_n_8645264.html">fire in the refugee camp in Ourgla</a> resulted in 18 deaths. Then there’s the urgent need to reform the economy and save the country from a dire economic crisis, given that it still relies <a href="http://www.gmfus.org/publications/algeria-three-years-after-arab-spring">almost exclusively on oil revenues</a>. And a new financial bill just approved by parliament despite <a href="http://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/scenes-de-revolte-a-lassemblee-237477">fierce opposition</a>, allows for the privatisation of several state companies, which could be profoundly destabilising without a parallel social welfare strategy. </p>
<p>Since Bouteflika’s poor health keeps him from appearing in public more than once a year, the assorted possible post-Bouteflika scenarios are naturally being discussed. The president’s brother Saïd, who some say is now the real decision-maker, could either <a href="http://www.impact24.info/said-bouteflika-se-prepare-a-succeder-a-son-frere/">step forward personally</a> or continue to promote the clan’s interest behind the scenes. </p>
<p>If a real transition begins, bowing to the pressure from the country’s younger and more educated generations, Algeria could consolidate its role as a crucial mediator in a truly unstable part of the world. The way its government evolves over the next few months will have a major impact on the stability of the whole region – and on the world beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51615/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Viola Sarnelli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The “deep state” has been a problem in Algeria for decades, but at last it’s being turfed out. Or is it?Viola Sarnelli, Researcher - Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/481842015-09-28T04:43:07Z2015-09-28T04:43:07ZHow the US is expanding its fight against extremism in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/96239/original/image-20150925-17736-v3t4pv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The opening ceremony of an exercise organized by the US military in Ndjamena, Chad earlier this year to take on Boko Haram.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Emmanuel Braun </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>From the perspective of a US national security specialist, we live in a dark and gloomy world. Numerous worldwide threats exist across almost every part of the planet including China, Iran, North Korea and Russia. This typically puts Africa at the bottom of the pecking order.</p>
<p>But America is taking more notice of the African continent due to the expansion of extremist organisations operating in Africa like al-Qaeda, al-Shabbab, Ansar al-Sharia, al-Murabitun, Boko Haram, Islamic State (IS) and others.</p>
<h2>The four main threats</h2>
<p>Islamic extremist organisations operating inside Libya, Nigeria, northwest Africa and Somalia pose the largest substantial threats to the African people and their international partners like the US.</p>
<p>The situation in Libya, also referred to as “Somalia on the Med”, has spiralled out of <a href="http://fpif.org/four-years-after-gaddafi-libya-is-a-failed-state/">control</a> since Muammar Gaddafi was ousted in 2011. Fighters from Ansar al-Sharia, IS and others control territory and operate and train with impunity. The US strategy here is to contain the situation by supporting its allies like Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia.</p>
<p>The second main threat comes from Somalia and al-Shabaab. Despite a robust African Union mission supported by a host of African and international countries, the group continues to execute lethal attacks within Somalia’s borders, as well in countries like Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. </p>
<p>The US strategy is to support partner operations by helping to plan and co-ordinate operations and to support maritime security efforts in the region. For instance, the US <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/mideast-africa/2015/08/06/kenya-gets-us-funds-counter-terror-war/31209675/">donated</a> US$92.4 million to the Kenyan Defence Forces in August for soldier training and new equipment acquisitions.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/96201/original/image-20150925-17725-3t5cyy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/96201/original/image-20150925-17725-3t5cyy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/96201/original/image-20150925-17725-3t5cyy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/96201/original/image-20150925-17725-3t5cyy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/96201/original/image-20150925-17725-3t5cyy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=561&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/96201/original/image-20150925-17725-3t5cyy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=561&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/96201/original/image-20150925-17725-3t5cyy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=561&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Centre for Intelligence and National Security, University of Oklahoma. Research supported by Defense Intelligence Agency, Grant # HHM402-14-1-0007 (PI: Regens)./Dr. James L. Regens, Regents Professor and Director</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The third main threat comes from Northwest Africa and al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). The strategy is to support France. AQIM is France’s number one overseas problem, and they understand this is not a short term fight. In May, the US gave France <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2015/05/01/us-invests-35-million-fight-against-boko-haram">US$35 million</a> to support their operations in Chad, Niger and Mali, but also to help combat the threat posed by Boko Haram in Nigeria.</p>
<p>Boko Haram recently pledged its <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31862992">allegiance</a> to IS, meaning its aim is now to establish a caliphate in West Africa rather than just Northern Nigeria. </p>
<p>The US strategy is to help Nigeria and neighbouring countries get back into the fight. Under a new joint US Department of State and US Department of Defense initiative, the Global Security Contingency <a href="http://www.state.gov/t/pm/sa/gscf/">Fund</a>, the US will contribute US$40 million to the governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. This money is to train and equip their military and civilian forces and to lay the <a href="https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2015/07/27/global-security-contingency-fund-helps-african-partners-take-fight-boko-haram#sthash.lr3oMMe9.4m8rjwG0.dpuf">groundwork</a> for increased cross-border co-operation against Boko Haram.</p>
<p>A last threat, but not at the same level as the other four, is the Lord’s Resistance Army <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/lra.htm">(LRA)</a>. Led by Joseph Kony, the LRA is believed to still be carrying out small-scale attacks around the border region of the Central African Republic, DRC, South Sudan and Uganda. </p>
<p>The US first deployed 100 special forces in 2011 to support the search for LRA commanders. The US strategy is to continue <a href="http://www.army.mil/article/141909/903rd_CCBN_Soldiers_support_Operation_Observant_Compass/">supporting</a> its African partners, particularly Uganda, through a Special Operations Command Africa-led operation.</p>
<h2>Barriers to success</h2>
<p>Africa’s gigantic size makes the operations difficult. </p>
<p>In war, the military needs overhead imagery to provide crucial intelligence. If satellites are not available, drones are the other option. But due to the location of the airports the US military <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/01/mapped-the-u-s-militarys-presence-in-africa/">uses</a> and the sheer distance between areas, flying a drone from one location to another at 80-90 knots can hypothetically mean only 30 minutes to one hour of actual intelligence out of 16 hours flying time. </p>
<p>Troops are too far from each other in Somalia, making communication and movement difficult. In March, the US helped combat the air support problem by donating two Cessna 208B aircraft as a token of appreciation for Uganda’s counterterrorism and security efforts.</p>
<p>From an ideological viewpoint, it is hard to fight extremist threats because of their effective narrative. They are fighting under an ideology they <a href="http://www.clarionproject.org/understanding-islamism/islamic-extremism#">claim is powered by God</a>. This is difficult to counter. Negative socioeconomic factors only exacerbate the situation.</p>
<p>All of these operations equate to money. Until 2014 when transitions were made in Afghanistan and Iraq to an “advise and assist” role, most of this money was not going to the US military’s African Command but to <a href="http://www.centcom.mil/">Central Command</a> responsible for America’s security interests in 20 nations, stretching through the Arabian Gulf region into Central Asia. </p>
<p>Even when money is available and military training of partner nations is going well, what is the US to do if the newly trained and equipped African defence force is used elsewhere, say to squash internal uprisings?</p>
<h2>The good news?</h2>
<p>The good news is that the new US defence <a href="http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/FY16-Budget">budget</a> of US$534 billion is the largest ever. AFRICOM is to get 2% more after a 6.5% cut the year before. The US is expanding African operations. This includes new US military facilities in countries like Niger.</p>
<p>It was announced in <a href="http://warisboring.com/articles/u-s-military-setting-up-shop-in-niger/">August</a> that jet fuel is now available at Zinger Airport in Niger enabling American planes to make pit stops. This is in addition to the new US drone base in Niamey and another refurbished airstrip in the fringe of the Sahara Desert, all closely located to Boko Haram’s operating territory.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/96200/original/image-20150925-17708-1a2sr9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/96200/original/image-20150925-17708-1a2sr9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/96200/original/image-20150925-17708-1a2sr9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/96200/original/image-20150925-17708-1a2sr9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/96200/original/image-20150925-17708-1a2sr9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/96200/original/image-20150925-17708-1a2sr9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/96200/original/image-20150925-17708-1a2sr9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">CentreCentre for Intelligence and National Security, University of Oklahoma. Research supported by Defense Intelligence Agency, Grant # HHM402-14-1-0007 (PI: Regens)./Dr. James L. Regens, Regents Professor and Director</span></span>
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<p>Expect more US-Nigerian military cooperation with Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, a US Army War College <a href="http://africanspotlight.com/2014/12/31/buhari-ranked-among-famous-u-s-army-war-college-alumni/">alumnus</a>, in command. Washington refused to sell US-made Cobra fighter-helicopters to Nigeria during President Goodluck Jonathan’s presidency due to concerns over the protection of <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.638992">civilians</a> when conducting military operations. </p>
<p>Strides are already being made on certain fronts. In 2008, the LRA had approximately 800 troops. <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/congress-activists-josephy-kony-lords-resistance-army-lra/2913060.html">Today</a> it has about 190 to 200. US Special Forces are even using Ugandan music and a famous song, Come Home, <a href="http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/lord-s-resistance-army-update-23-april-2015">to encourage defections</a>. </p>
<p>The FBI <a href="http://www.eagle.co.ug/2015/09/15/fbi-agents-in-uganda-for-ongwen-investigations.html">recently</a> sent officers to Uganda to assist with investigations in relation to the International Criminal Court trial of ex-LRA Commander Dominic Ongwen. Of the five indicted LRA commanders only two Ongwen and Joseph Kony are still alive. The latter is still on the run.</p>
<p>This new multifront and multidimensional battle is different from the 1990s when Osama bin Laden was based in Sudan. America is doing what it can to assist and will be doing more. There is increased overall multilateral support, but there can always be more. Africa itself can always do more. Without security there is no <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/21541015">“Africa Rising”</a>.</p>
<p>There are three “Ds” of America’s security strategy: diplomacy, development and defence. We cannot downplay the importance of the military and defence, but diplomacy is terribly underfunded. America’s military <a href="http://africamilitarismwatch.org/2015/02/obama-proposes-largest-dod-budget-ever-2016/">has more members</a> in its 158 military bands than diplomats in the State Department in the US and abroad. In the long term, you can’t shoot your way out of this one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/48184/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Firsing does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Apart from numerous worldwide threats including from China, Iran, North Korea and Russia, the US is taking more notice of Africa due to the expansion of extremist organisations on the continent.Scott Firsing, Research Fellow, International Relations, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.