tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/russia-foreign-policy-20560/articlesRussia foreign policy – The Conversation2017-11-14T21:11:10Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/874282017-11-14T21:11:10Z2017-11-14T21:11:10ZNobody is going to bail out Venezuela<p><em>Leer <a href="http://theconversation.com/china-rusia-y-el-fmi-compiten-para-rescatar-financieramente-a-venezuela-86599">en español</a>.</em></p>
<p>Venezuela, the South American country convulsed by <a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-venezuelas-economic-collapse-80597">economic</a> and humanitarian catastrophe, has <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2017/11/14/news/economy/venezuela-debt-default-sp/index.html">defaulted</a> on some of its debt after missing an interest payment due in October. </p>
<p>Even as investors meet in Caracas to discuss restructuring <a href="http://americasquarterly.org/content/what-make-venezuelas-last-minute-debt-negotiations">US$60 billion in foreign debt</a>, the country is in urgent need of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/06/28/how-to-save-venezuela/venezuela-needs-international-assistance-to-recover">international financial assistance</a>. </p>
<p>Yet few nations are rushing in to aid the ailing country. Under the authoritarian regime of Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-region/venezuela-called-dictatorship-by-peru-condemned-by-new-bloc-idUSKBN1AO2NL">isolated</a> in Latin America, and the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-venezuela-sanctions/trump-slaps-sanctions-on-venezuela-maduro-sees-effort-to-force-default-idUSKCN1B5216">United States</a>, <a href="http://www.international.gc.ca/sanctions/countries-pays/venezuela.aspx?lang=eng&_ga=2.177192485.1698760013.1510071967-449799799.1508254687">Canada</a> and the <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-eu/eu-readies-sanctions-on-venezuela-approves-arms-embargo-idUSKBN1DD0UN?il=0">European Union</a> have all imposed sanctions against Venezuelan officials. Maduro has at times suggested he would not even accept <a href="https://www.wola.org/analysis/venezuela-humanitarian-crisis-aid/">humanitarian aid</a>. </p>
<p>Still, no indebted nation is totally alone in this world. As a financial analyst, I know there are always international players who see opportunity in the problems of others. And for Venezuela, my home country, all hope of a bailout rests with China, Russia and the International Monetary Fund. </p>
<p>Will they do anything to help?</p>
<h2>Venezuela’s debt: By the numbers</h2>
<p>Before exploring a possible Venezuela rescue, it is useful to understand how the country’s debt became such a burden. </p>
<p>In 1998, the year before the late Hugo Chávez came into power, Venezuela <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/how-venezuela-went-from-the-richest-economy-in-south-america-to-the-brink-of-financial-ruin-a7740616.html">was rich</a>. It produced roughly 60 barrels of oil per inhabitant per year. By late 2017, my projections – based on data compiled from Venezuela’s <a href="http://www.ine.gov.ve/evitalesjsp/evitales.html">National Statistics Institute</a> and BP’s <a href="https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2017/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2017-full-report.pdf">World Energy Report 2017</a> – show that production will have dropped to 20 barrels per capita. That’s a 66 percent drop in 20 years. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194617/original/file-20171114-26426-4er2ac.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194617/original/file-20171114-26426-4er2ac.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194617/original/file-20171114-26426-4er2ac.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194617/original/file-20171114-26426-4er2ac.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194617/original/file-20171114-26426-4er2ac.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194617/original/file-20171114-26426-4er2ac.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194617/original/file-20171114-26426-4er2ac.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194617/original/file-20171114-26426-4er2ac.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Oil output per capita in Venezuela has dropped significantly in the past several decades.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Henkel Garcia/BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017/National Statistics Institute</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Even as output steadily shrank, Chávez benefitted from relatively high oil prices, which allowed him to boost revenue from petroleum exports. And as oil sales rose, so did <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21720289-over-past-year-74-venezuelans-lost-average-87kg-weight-how">government expenditures</a>, as well as imports of food and other goods. </p>
<p>Eventually, excess spending took a toll on Venezuela’s <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/exportal.aspx?memberKey1=1050&date1key=2017-09-30&category=SDRNET">international reserves</a>. Rather than cut expenditures and imports, the Chávez regime <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/tags/series?t=venezuela">piled up foreign debt</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194626/original/file-20171114-26429-10u0f9q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194626/original/file-20171114-26429-10u0f9q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194626/original/file-20171114-26429-10u0f9q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194626/original/file-20171114-26429-10u0f9q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194626/original/file-20171114-26429-10u0f9q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194626/original/file-20171114-26429-10u0f9q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194626/original/file-20171114-26429-10u0f9q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194626/original/file-20171114-26429-10u0f9q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">As exports (US$ per capita) rose, so too did government spending and imports.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Banco Central de Venezuela, FRED (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), National Statistics Institute and Econométrica IE, C.A.</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>Then, in late 2014, international oil prices began to plunge. Today, <a href="http://especiales.prodavinci.com/deudaexterna/">estimates indicate that</a> Venezuela’s public sector debt tops $184.5 billion, including $60 billion in foreign debt, though the <a href="http://www.bcv.org.ve/c2/indicadores.asp">Venezuelan Central Bank</a> claims it’s much lower.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194627/original/file-20171114-26465-1ga8tcj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194627/original/file-20171114-26465-1ga8tcj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194627/original/file-20171114-26465-1ga8tcj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194627/original/file-20171114-26465-1ga8tcj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194627/original/file-20171114-26465-1ga8tcj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194627/original/file-20171114-26465-1ga8tcj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194627/original/file-20171114-26465-1ga8tcj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194627/original/file-20171114-26465-1ga8tcj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Venezuela’s foreign public debt, in US$ million, is at an all-time high.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Venezuelan Central Bank</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To service this debt, the government must pay $16 billion to $20 billion a year through at least 2022. Shouldering that huge expense has meant slashing imports, causing <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/06/01/venezuelas-hunger-crisis-is-for-real/?utm_term=.6b50fe00b919">food</a> and medicine shortages. As a result, almost <a href="http://rpp.pe/mundo/venezuela/venezuela-el-54-de-los-ninos-padece-desnutricion-noticia-1073023">54 percent of Venezuelan children are malnourished</a>. </p>
<p>To ensure its citizens’ basic well-being, Venezuela must be able to import, on average, $1,000 a year per inhabitant – or roughly $33 billion a year. My data show it’s currently bringing in about half that. </p>
<h2>No Chinese largess</h2>
<p>As an oil producer, Venezuela’s desperation rouses geopolitical interests. </p>
<p>Venezuela owes <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-and-china-are-propping-up-maduros-regime-in-venezuela-2017-9">$28.1 billion to China and $9.1 billion to Russia</a>, its main creditors. In recent years, both countries have been eager to prop up the Maduro regime, with little concern for its authoritarian tendencies. </p>
<p>China, at least publicly, has remained decidedly mum on <a href="http://www.el-nacional.com/noticias/mundo/afp-venezuela-mas-lejos-una-salida-crisis-tras-comicios_208008">Venezuela’s political crisis</a>. According to a spokesperson from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October, Beijing “believe[s] that the government of this country is able to appropriately handle its domestic affairs within the law, maintaining stability and prosperity.” </p>
<p>So far, though, Chinese financial institutions have not further opened their coffers. They have, however, granted <a href="http://www.petroguia.com/pub/article/pdvsa-ahorra-6725-millones-en-2016-y-2017-al-postergar-despachos-china-por-dos-a%C3%B1os">Venezuela a grace period of at least 18 months to pay off the debt</a> it owes them. This modest concession gives the government a bit of breathing room.</p>
<p>China has also allowed Venezuela to use shipments of crude <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/26/china-latin-america-resources-concern">to pay off some of its debt</a>, revealing China’s main interest in Venezuela: its oil.</p>
<p>But, in my view, Venezuela shouldn’t count on Beijing for significant additional financial help. For China to issue new loans, insiders have told me, Maduro’s government would have to show clear signs of fiscal discipline. Nothing indicates it is <a href="http://especiales.prodavinci.com/deudaexterna/">capable of that</a>. </p>
<p>I believe a more likely next step is that Venezuela will bring in much-needed cash by selling off existing <a href="https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Venezuelas-Oil-Fire-Sale-To-Benefit-Russia-China.html">stakes in oil companies and resource-extraction ventures it co-owns with China</a>.</p>
<h2>Putin to the rescue?</h2>
<p>Russia has been somewhat more generous with Venezuela, and its geopolitical interests here are clear. </p>
<p>The Kremlin benefits from having <a href="https://news.vice.com/story/russia-is-using-cheap-oil-to-undermine-the-u-s-around-the-world">a trustworthy ally on this side of the world</a> – especially one that is avowedly anti-U.S. and ranked as the <a href="https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/data/browser/#/?pa=00000000000000000000000000000000002&c=ruvvvvvfvtvnvv1vrvvvvfvvvvvvfvvvou20evvvvvvvvvvvvuvo&ct=0&tl_id=5-A&vs=INTL.57-1-AFG-TBPD.A&vo=0&v=H&start=2014&end=2016">11th-largest oil producer worldwide</a>. </p>
<p>Plus, Russia already has many oil interests in the country, including <a href="http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7167:pdvsa-inauguro-base-operacional-perforosven-en-la-faja-petrolifera-del-orinoco-hugo-chavez&catid=10:noticias&Itemid=5&lang=es">joint exploration projects with Petróleos de Venezuela</a>, the state-owned oil company. </p>
<p>Indeed, Russia and its state-funded oil venture, Rosneft, have already helped the country <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/29/business/energy-environment/russia-venezula-oil-rosneft.html?_r=0">avoid default at least twice</a>, providing Caracas with $10 billion in financial assistance. In an Oct. 29 New York Times article, oil expert <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/29/business/energy-environment/russia-venezula-oil-rosneft.html?_r=0">Francisco Monaldi said</a> Russia is “the only country that can toss Venezuela a lifeline.” </p>
<p>In my opinion, even its public declarations defending Venezuela’s politics are <a href="http://www.eluniversal.com/noticias/politica/rusia-considera-inaceptables-sanciones-contra-venezuela_675578">more incisive</a> than China’s. Russia’s Foreign Ministry has called international sanctions against Venezuela “unacceptable.”</p>
<p>Still, thus far, Russia has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/08/business/energy-environment/russia-venezuela-debt.html">agreed only to restructure its bilateral debt with Venezuela</a>. While the terms weren’t disclosed, I don’t believe anything like a real bailout is on offer.</p>
<h2>Last resource</h2>
<p>This could lead Venezuela to its last resort: the <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm">International Monetary Fund</a>. In my opinion, this global lender would be the most appropriate source of a bailout. </p>
<p>Neither China nor Russia is willing or able to offer the huge sum Venezuela needs to stay afloat, at least $30 billion. Nor is any country likely to match the super-low 2 percent interest rate that the <a href="http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/20/33/Stand-By-Arrangement">IMF offers to emerging economies in crisis</a>. </p>
<p>Bondholders typically look askance at this type of financial assistance. Countries receiving support from the IMF and other multilateral lenders are generally “<a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ricardo-hausmann-and-miguel-angel-santos-pillory-the-maduro-government-for-defaulting-on-30-million-citizens--but-not-on-wall-street">advised to renegotiate foreign debt</a>,” which can leave investors with empty pockets.</p>
<p>And today, Venezuela has no official relationship with the organization. The Chávez administration <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wVs5TB0xEPU">loved to disparage the IMF</a>, saying it should “close down” or “vanish.” </p>
<p>Even so, there are signs that the IMF is <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3908e5c0-b19b-11e7-a398-73d59db9e399">sketching out a possible rescue plan</a> for the country. Bank officials have <a href="https://es.panampost.com/sabrina-martin/2017/10/25/rescate-economico-para-venezuela/">expressed concern</a> with both Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis and the possible spinoff effects of its economic collapse on other Latin American economies. </p>
<p>Since the multilateral organization is unlikely to bail out the current regime – which has previously <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Maduro-rechaza-que-la-derecha-negocie-a-Venezuela-con-el-FMI-20151015-0065.html">rebuked its possible intervention</a> – the IMF probably hopes to work with some future transition government that’s more democratic and open to international aid. If so, help may be a long time coming.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87428/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henkel García is the director of Econométrica IE, C.A., a Venezuelan economic analysis firm.</span></em></p>China, Russia and the International Monetary Fund are among those contemplating a Venezuela bailout. But help for this debt-stricken nation seems far from assured.Henkel Garcia U, Finance Instructor, Professional Studies Extension Programme, Universidad Católica Andrés BelloLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/648422016-09-27T06:43:11Z2016-09-27T06:43:11ZWhat’s holding Russia back from ratifying the Paris climate agreement?<p>Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has announced that <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-37469603">his country will ratify the Paris climate agreement</a> in October, a significant boost in the campaign to have the agreement become legally binding by the end of the year.</p>
<p>India will join the 61 other countries that have formally signed up to limit future global temperature rise to a maximum of 2°C. But one important player is still missing. Russia, the world’s <a href="http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/news_docs/jrc-2015-trends-in-global-co2-emissions-2015-report-98184.pdf">fifth-largest greenhouse gas emitter</a> is unlikely to ratify by the end of the year. </p>
<p>Following a special climate event at the 2016 United Nations General Assembly, Alexander Bedtritsky, special adviser on climate to Vladimir Putin, <a href="http://tass.ru/obschestvo/3639933">confirmed that</a> “Russia will not artificially speed up the ratification process”. </p>
<p>Russian representatives have said they need more time to evaluate the effects of the Paris agreement on the Russian economy, which is <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-a-global-energy-powerhouse-thats-much-more-than-a-petro-state-57766">heavily dependent on fossil fuels</a>. The government wants to <a href="http://kommersant.ru/Doc/2951538">draft a low-carbon development strategy</a> before deciding to ratify.</p>
<p>So far, the plan is to work out an analysis of the socio-economic effects of the <a href="http://kommersant.ru/Doc/2951538">ratification by mid-December</a>, and to later draft a strategy for low-carbon development. No certain deadline for ratification, which is due to take place by passing a corresponding legal act within Russia, has been set. </p>
<h2>The great climate debate</h2>
<p>Why is Russia dragging its feet? One reason is the fact that opinions on the merits of the Paris agreement are split within the country. Most senior officials and federal ministries support the treaty and informally speak in favor of quicker ratification. But opposition comes mainly from large private businesses, predominantly from the coal and steel sectors.</p>
<p>The companies, whose extracting and processing facilities are largely located in <a href="http://kommersant.ru/doc/3037549">Siberia</a>, claim that quick ratification, and the introduction of any kind of carbon price within Russia will cause serious socio-economic damage. This will affect vulnerable groups employed in the coal industry the most, they say. </p>
<p>These companies have secured support among powerful business lobby groups, <a href="http://kommersant.ru/doc/3042039">think-tanks and research institutes</a>. Together, these groups run anti-Paris agreement campaigns, including one on the “<a href="http://www.right4coal.ru">right to coal</a>”, in some of Russia’s resource-rich regions. Meanwhile, authors of <a href="http://kommersant.ru/doc/3042039">privately sponsored research papers</a> argue that the Russian economy will suffer severe losses after the agreement enters into force.</p>
<p>Most oil and gas majors, however, are keeping quiet, neither objecting nor openly supporting the new climate treaty. Representatives of the Russian gas giant Gazprom often talk about importance of <a href="http://www.gazprom.com/nature/kioto/%20or%20http://kommersant.ru/doc/2984626">switching to natural gas</a> to bring down greenhouse gas emissions, but rarely speak openly about the importance of the Paris agreement.</p>
<p>There are a number of pro-climate stakeholders, however. These include officials from federal ministries, think tanks and NGOs, as well as certain businesses, all of whom argue vocally for ratification. </p>
<p>Shortly before the Paris climate summit in December 2015, a number of Russian companies launched the <a href="http://climatepartners.ru/">Russian Partnership for Climate Protection</a>, including high-tech state-owned enterprise Rusnano, state-owned hydro-energy company Rushydro, state-owned banks Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank, private bank Alfabank, and a group of aluminium companies, Rusal. </p>
<p>Oleg Deripaska, the owner of Rusal and one of Russia’s richest oligarchs, has been quoted in the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/34c3a69e-9d02-11e5-b45d-4812f209f861">international media</a> calling for a global price on carbon.</p>
<p>According to a <a href="https://b8f65cb373b1b7b15feb-c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/001/132/original/CDP_Carbon_Price_report_2016.pdf?1474453251">recent report</a>, three Russian companies have already embedded a carbon price into their business strategy.</p>
<h2>Bad economic climate</h2>
<p>There are other significant barriers to climate progress. The perception prevails that Russia can’t allow itself an ambitious domestic climate policy for economic reasons – namely, the lack of funding for emission reduction and energy efficiency measures. </p>
<p>Speaking at a recent joint China-Russia group meeting on climate change, a high-level official with the Ministry of Economic Development said that the core activities in carbon regulation in Russia should be concentrated around energy efficiency. This requires an <a href="http://kommersant.ru/doc/3096251">annual investment</a> of no less than €6 billion. </p>
<p>Energy efficiency was high on the Russian agenda from 2009-2011. But following the imposition of <a href="https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions_en">international sanctions</a> over the conflict in Ukraine, the issue has been dropped. Regional subsidies for emission reduction and energy efficiency measures are being cut to zero for the <a href="http://kommersant.ru/doc/2636114">third year in a row</a>.</p>
<p>Another problem is the lack of access to international financing sources – here, once again, following international sanctions, a number of international donors and development institutions have <a href="http://kommersant.ru/doc/3069138">cut support</a> for emission reduction projects in Russia.</p>
<h2>Global posturing</h2>
<p>In spite of domestic controversies, Russia continues to speak in favor of the new global climate treaty on the world stage, trying to show its openness to climate efforts. </p>
<p>Some experts, including <a href="http://kommersant.ru/doc/2577921">economist George Safonov</a>, argue that by showing its readiness to fight climate and environmental challenges, Russia is both trying to set itself up as an important global player, and also improve its relations with the West on “neutral ground”. </p>
<p>Russia is also trying to develop climate and environmental cooperation with Brazil, India, China and South Africa, proposing to set up a <a href="http://kommersant.ru/doc/2961113">platform for green technologies</a>.</p>
<p>Will these international efforts be enough if Russia doesn’t step up and ratify with the other big emitters? <a href="http://kommersant.ru/doc/3096251">Experts have said</a> that if the Paris agreement enters into force without Russia’s signature, the country will lose its right to vote and take decisions in new climate working groups.</p>
<p>This would be a shame. However slow Russia’s ratification schedule is, it remains crucial to keep the world’s fifth-largest emitter on board for future climate negotiations. This means continuing to give it a seat at the table.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64842/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Angelina Davydova teaches at the St.Petersburg State University at a joint MA Program (together with the Free University of Berlin) "Global Communication and International Journalism", which receives government funding from both countries. She is also a director of an NGO "German-Russian Office of Environmental Information" and works on a contract-basis for other NGOs ("German-Russian Exchange', "Bellona", "n-ost") and the German Development Agency (GIZ). </span></em></p>Russia is dragging its feet on climate action - and risks being left out in the cold.Angelina Davydova, Senior Lecturer, St Petersburg State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/526572015-12-30T19:50:34Z2015-12-30T19:50:34ZWas 2015 such a terrible year? And what will 2016 look like?<p>Well Santa has come and gone, at least for the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/11518702/Mapped-What-the-worlds-religious-landscape-will-look-like-in-2050.html">largest proportion </a>of the world’s population. And, as we reach the end of the year, it is inevitably time to review recent trends and the prospects for 2016.</p>
<h2>By many standards, 2015 has been a terrible year</h2>
<p>The war in Syria and Iraq worsened as the number of war casualties <a href="http://sn4hr.org/blog/category/victims/death-toll/">grew</a> and its consequences spread. First, to Europe’s shores, with horrendous attacks on Paris at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-kind-of-toughness-we-need-now-36037">beginning</a> and near the <a href="https://theconversation.com/paris-the-war-with-is-enters-a-new-stage-50709">end</a> of the year. And then it spread to America with the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/12030160/California-shooting-Multiple-victims-reported-in-San-Bernardino-live.html">attack</a> in San Bernardino.</p>
<p>The flow of refugees fleeing from the Middle East, Afghanistan and Eritrea became a tidal wave as the number of internally displaced persons and refugees reached an all-time <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/558193896.html">high</a>. Some European governments, like <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/08/germany-on-course-to-accept-one-million-refugees-in-2015">Germany</a>, found their soul when it came to accepting these refugees. Others lost <a href="http://wpo.st/nW5y0">theirs</a> – if they ever had one. </p>
<p>Back in the US, some used their presidential campaign as an opportunity to tap the kind of nativist impulse that periodically <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-it-time-america-finally-took-a-chance-on-syrias-refugees-47452">overwhelms the country</a> when its national security is threatened. Many Republicans supported <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/12/10/poll-finds-republican-support-for-donald-trumps-ban-on-muslims-coming-to-u-s/?_r=0">banning Muslims</a> from entering the United States. Others favored registering those already domiciled.</p>
<p>As all this was happening, the world’s governments <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/26/world/middleeast/us-foreign-arms-deals-increased-nearly-10-billion-in-2014.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share">sold more arms</a> than ever. And US-Chinese relations became increasingly <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/16/world/asia/us-navy-commander-implies-china-has-eroded-safety-of-south-china-sea.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share">tense</a> over the revelation that China was building islands in the South China Sea. </p>
<h2>But there have been some bright spots</h2>
<p>We should remember that wasn’t all bad news. America’s <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-cuba-reach-agreement-to-establish-formal-diplomatic-relations-1435702347">rapprochement</a> with Cuba has potentially eradicated one of the few remaining vestiges of the Cold War. And while the jury is still out, the <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/press-release/2015-07-14/P5-Plus-1-Nations-and-Iran-Reach-Historic-Nuclear-Deal">P5+1 agreement</a> with Iran offers the prospect that the West will avert a damaging conventional war. </p>
<p>More importantly, the number of people living in extreme poverty declined again, <a href="http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml">falling to 14% in 2015</a>, from nearly 50% a generation ago. And the international community reached an <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/13/paris-climate-deal-cop-diplomacy-developing-united-nations">environmental agreement</a> in Paris. While critics may rightly contend that it is inadequate, in the words of <a href="http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/l/laotzu137141.html">Lao Tzu</a>, “the journey of a thousand miles begins with one step.” </p>
<p>Finally, if the Nigerian president is to be believed, Boko Haram has been “<a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35173618">defeated</a>,” at least technically. If true, and that is a big “if,” it offers some inspiration for all those governments dealing with radicalism and terrorism.</p>
<h2>What of last year’s predictions?</h2>
<p>At this time last year, I offered my <a href="https://theconversation.com/around-the-world-in-2015-the-big-stories-predicted-35842">predictions</a> for 2015. </p>
<p>I suggested that the US would increase its ground force combat military presence in Iraq and Syria. That proved <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/world/middleeast/us-increases-special-operations-forces-fighting-isis-in-iraq.html">true</a>. I also predicted that the war would come to Europe and that Europe would join the war – although France and Britain have stuck to an air war so far, and not ground troops as I suggested. I predicted that American relations with Russia would worsen, which they <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/76136">have</a>; and that the number of migrants and refugees fleeing to Europe would grow – as they did, with more than a <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911">million</a> arriving. I also predicted that the major powers would reach a deal with Iran. Finally, I suggested that the dollar would strengthen against other major currencies. It <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/business/dollars-surge-against-other-currencies-weighs-down-united-states-economy.html?&moduleDetail=section-news-5&action=click&contentCollection=Business%20Day&region=Footer&module=MoreInSection&version=WhatsNext&contentID=WhatsNext&pgtype=article">did</a>.</p>
<p>But before I get too impressed with myself, I should note that my long shots proved to be – well, long shots. Benjamin Netanyahu is still in power and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has remained in a quagmire. North Korea is as isolated and threatening as ever. And, with the exception of Cuba, the jury is still out on improved US relations with Latin America – although the election of new right wing governments in <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/11/mauricio-macri-elected-argentinas-next-president">Argentina</a> and <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/venezuela-opposition-win-and-dethrone-nicolas-maduro-after-17-years-of-socialist-rule-a6762946.html">Venezuela</a> suggests that may materialize.</p>
<p>And I missed so many other major stories.</p>
<p>So what of 2016? Here are five possible story lines.</p>
<h2>A muddled, fragile agreement, of sorts, is reached in Syria – one that excludes the Islamic State</h2>
<p>It is the turn of the year and still the season of goodwill, So let’s start off with an optimistic, if some would say unrealistic, prediction. An agreement will be reached. It is presaged by a growth in violence as all parties push to secure more territory before it takes effect. And it may vaguely mention power transition. But it promises that some day there will be an election, which Bashar Al-Assad will win because – sadly – he has more domestic <a href="http://www.globalresearch.ca/bashar-al-assad-has-more-popular-support-than-the-western-backed-opposition-poll/5495643">support</a> that his critics are willing to acknowledge. Any ceasefire is repeatedly broken. Long shot? ISIS will informally, de facto, respect the deal because it faces defeat if it continues its efforts to expand.</p>
<h2>The US will accept some Syrian refugees – but deport many more Hispanic immigrants</h2>
<p>President Obama has made it clear that he will accept more Syrians – even in what are pathetically small numbers – despite proposed <a href="http://thehill.com/homenews/house/260782-house-defies-obama-approves-bill-halting-syrian-refugees">congressional legislation</a> that seeks to do the opposite. </p>
<p>One nice thing about being in your last year in office is that you can often ignore <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/poll-majority-americans-oppose-accepting-syrian-refugees-n465816">public opinion</a>, as the president wants to do in admitting these refugees. But administration officials from the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency have made it just as clear that they intend to <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/25/us/politics/us-plans-raids-in-new-year-to-fight-surge-in-border-crossings.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share">round up and deport</a> many more undocumented families, hoping to discourage a renewed surge in illegal border crossings. </p>
<p>Obama may want to go down in history as a president who was gracious in <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/obama-syrian-refugees/417222/">accepting</a> the Syrians. But his treatment of Latin Americans will certainly add to his reputation as the great deporter, having done so to nearly two million people in total and more people in <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows.html">2014</a> than any president in American history. The only good news for Democrats is that the presidential candidates will be able to separate themselves from his policy by heavily criticizing him for his actions.</p>
<h2>The Arctic will become the new frontier</h2>
<p>The pressure to drill for oil in the Arctic may have lessened as prices have fallen. But global climate change means there is no prospect of the refreezing of huge swathes of the Arctic any time soon. So the Arctic is becoming <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-arctic-melts-the-us-needs-to-pay-attention-35578">an increasingly important waterway</a> and its abundant natural resources are all the more accessible. The Russians realize this. So they are militarizing their presence in the Arctic. And they are constructing a new generation of <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-is-the-us-facing-an-icebreaker-gap/">super-nuclear icebreakers</a> to ensure they have access to the Arctic’s waters. </p>
<p>In contrast, the US is woefully <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-arctic-melts-the-us-needs-to-pay-attention-35578">underprepared</a> to engage in the region. It does have an embryonic policy. But as President Obama’s visit to the Arctic’s fringes made clear, it is primarily an <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/opinion/mr-obamas-urgent-arctic-message.html">economic and environmental</a> one. Not a military, one. America, for example, has no comparable icebreakers to those being developed by the Russians.</p>
<p>The remaining member states of the Arctic Council are worried by Russia’s behavior – and <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/why-is-the-plan-near-alaska/">China is lurking</a> as it recognizes the significance of these emergent seas lanes to its global trade. It would be nice to think a grand agreement could be reached on how to reconcile every side’s interests. But <a href="https://theconversation.com/under-the-sea-russia-china-and-american-control-of-the-waterways-50442">evidence about disputes</a> stretching from the South China Sea to the Black Sea suggests that is unlikely. </p>
<p>Watch for maps of the Arctic Circle on your TV screens soon.</p>
<h2>Closer to home – Donald Trump will not be the Republican candidate</h2>
<p>There is a long history of loud populists who know how to tap into the minority of voters in democracies who resort to nativism when they feel economic insecurity and who feel free to express racist impulses. They look for a powerful leader. Broderick Crawford depicted such a persona beautifully in the movie of Robert Penn Warren’s <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0041113/">All the King’s Men</a>. </p>
<p>But a recent <a href="http://www.quinnipiac.edu/news-and-events/quinnipiac-university-poll/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=2311">poll</a> suggests that half of American voters say they would be embarrassed to have Donald Trump as president. It reveals that he has the highest unfavorability rating of any candidate among prospective voters, and that other candidates are closing the gap on his lead among Republicans.</p>
<p>Trump may yet win in Iowa. But Iowa’s Republicans have proved very bad at picking presidential nominees. Their last two picks were Rich Santorum and, before that, Mike Huckabee.</p>
<p>Indeed, the American system is built to withstand the kind of buffeting caused by Trump’s kind of candidacy. And as the Republican field narrows, and Americans actually begin to focus on the presidential election, many senior <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/opinion/no-donald-trump-wont-win.html">analysts</a> believe that Trump’s star will wane. Indeed, despite his astonishing self-promotion and evident triumphalism, if held today, Trump would <a href="http://www.alternet.org/election-2016/bernie-would-do-better-hillary-2016-race-against-trump-national-poll-finds">lose an election </a>to either Hillary Clinton or Bernie Sanders handily. Many Republican voters, if only because of their loathing of Hillary Clinton, want to back a winner. </p>
<p>I am not imprudent enough to suggest who the Republican candidate will be. In may be a centrist such as Jeb Bush or Marco Rubio or, as the Democrats would prefer, a more radical Republican such as Ted Cruz. But I suspect that Trump’s momentum will abruptly halt as the long primary process unfolds.</p>
<h2>But yes, Hillary will be the Democratic candidate – and will be elected president</h2>
<p>There it is. I said it. There is nothing like putting your reputation on the line in print. Despite her immense baggage and no shortage of possible trip wires between now and election day, I believe Clinton will be the first female president. America’s shifting demographics favor her, given the continued Republican missteps in alienating America’s growing minority electorate. And if elected, her foreign policy will be a little more robust and muscular than Barack Obama’s – signaling a return to forthright American leadership, rather than a <a href="http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2015-1e95/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-october-november-2015-3ec2/57-5-11-reich-and-dombrowski-d455">strategy of sponsorship</a>. This will mean a greater military engagement in the Middle East; more negotiations with the Russians and the Chinese on a variety of issues; and more money spent on America’s diplomatic services, a key component of what Clinton has referred to as “<a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/3/hillary-clinton-smart-show-respect-even-enemies/">smart power</a>.” She will use husband Bill as foreign emissary, generating the kind of goodwill that Barack Obama enjoyed in Europe and Africa in the early days of his presidency.</p>
<p>Then again, I left Britain in the early 1980s believing that Margaret Thatcher would only last a year or two as Britain’s prime minister. She was Britain’s longest serving prime minister of the twentieth century. So you can be forgiven for dismissing that prediction.</p>
<p>I conclude on a more joyful note. May 2016 bring us all health, prosperity and love – and the time to enjoy them all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52657/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Well Santa has come and gone, at least for the largest proportion of the world’s population. And, as we reach the end of the year, it is inevitably time to review recent trends and the prospects for 2016…Simon Reich, Professor in The Division of Global Affairs and The Department of Political Science, Rutgers University - NewarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/490342015-10-14T05:29:18Z2015-10-14T05:29:18ZWhat are Russia’s grand designs in Central Asia?<p>While international attention has focused on Russian military operations in Ukraine and Syria, Moscow has also been <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-russia-dostum-seeks-military-help/27293696.html">involved</a> in a flurry of diplomatic and security initiatives to address the growing instability in northern Afghanistan. </p>
<p>But its moves to bolster regional security are more than just a response to local security concerns. Russia has a broader strategy that could leave it as the dominant security actor across much of Eurasia.</p>
<p>Even before the shock of the <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/afghanistan-city-of-kunduz-largely-under-taliban-control-1443447706">Taliban occupation of Kunduz</a> in late September, Russian officials were concerned about the fragile security situation in northern Afghanistan, including the rise of Islamic State in northern Afghanistan and its potential spread to Central Asia and thence to Russia’s large Muslim community. As if to emphasise the domestic threat, on October 12 Russian police announced that they had <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/12/isis-trained-russians-foiled-moscow-terror-attack">uncovered a terrorist plot in Moscow</a> apparently involving a group of Central Asian militants.</p>
<p>Insecurity in Afghanistan may pose a potential security threat for Moscow, but it is being seized upon as a major geopolitical opportunity. Against a backdrop of failed Western policies across much of Russia’s southern flank, Moscow is moving quickly to fill a security vacuum in the region. It is strengthening existing alliances to consolidate its hold over former Soviet republics in Central Asia and reshaping the security dynamics of the region around its own favoured security groupings – the <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/csto.htm">Collective Security Treaty Organisation</a> (CSTO) and the <a href="http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/">Shanghai Cooperation Organisation</a> (SCO).</p>
<p>The first step has been a series of meeting with Central Asian leaders, all on the front line in case of renewed Afghan insecurity. A meeting between Russian president Vladimir Putin and Emomali Rakhmon, the president of Tajikistan, led to promises of <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/07/us-russia-tajikistan-defence-idUSKCN0S10TT20151007">more attack helicopters</a> to bolster the existing Russian military based in the country, which has become the hub of a <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan-far-outpost-of-great-powers/27141036.html">well-developed defence system</a> against cross-border infiltration.</p>
<h2>Crisis and opportunity</h2>
<p>Putin also took time out of his birthday celebrations in Sochi to meet Almazbek Atambayev, the president of Kyrgyzstan, a country that has become the linchpin of Russia’s security strategy in the region. Until 2014 Kyrgyzstan hosted a US airbase, but as I <a href="https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10871/18208/Lewis%20Russia%20and%20Kyrgyzstan%202015.pdf?sequence=1">explored in a recent paper</a>, Russia has been remarkably successful in ousting the Americans and turning Kyrgyzstan into a dependable ally in the region.</p>
<p>If Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are relatively relaxed about an enhanced Russian military presence, the Uzbek president, Islam Karimov, is instinctively allergic to talk of renewed Russian influence and <a href="http://www.academia.edu/4058733/Uzbekistan_s_challenging_withdrawal_from_the_CSTO">pulled out of the Russian-led CSTO in 2012</a>. </p>
<p>Now the northern Afghan crisis offers an opportunity to bring Uzbekistan back into Moscow’s embrace. A delegation from the Russian MOD, led by deputy minister Anatoly Antonov, has recently <a href="http://www.uzmetronom.com/2015/10/07/tovarishhi_po_oruzhiju.html">paid the country its first high-level visit since 2007</a>.</p>
<p>There was no coverage of the Russian visit in Uzbekistan’s heavily censored press. Instead, the <a href="http://www.ng.ru/cis/2015-10-08/1_ashabad.html">newpapers led on a summit</a> with neighbouring Turkmen president, Gurmanguly Berdymukhamedov. The two presidents both have serious security concerns about Afghanistan, but both want to manage them without Russian assistance. Both states have appalling human rights records, limiting the potential for Western aid, and it may be hard to refuse Russian offers of help if unrest grows along their borders with Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>Friends reunited</h2>
<p>Afghan officials have also been in Moscow, seeking assistance. Vice-president and Uzbek warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostum, has sought to revive old ties during a recent visit, also paying a side visit to the influential Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-russia-dostum-seeks-military-help/27293696.html">to share experiences of “fighting terrorism”</a>. If the Afghan situation worsens significantly, Dostum offers the potential for Moscow to build up a further band of loyal forces in the north of Afghanistan, in an effective re-run of its Taliban-era support for the Northern Alliance.</p>
<p>Other Afghan government officials attended a conference of SCO members and observers on Afghanistan in Moscow. The chief of Russia’s general staff, first deputy defence minister, Valery Gerasimov, took time out to give a speech that highlighted the failure of US policy in the Middle East, leaving little doubt that Moscow now sees Afghanistan through the same geopolitical prism as it frames Syria. Russian intelligence officials regularly claim that IS is part of a <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/75486">broader US plot to destabilise Central Asia and Russia</a> from the south.</p>
<p>Still, there is no appetite for Russia to get involved in Afghanistan in the way it has in Syria. There are still bitter memories of the humiliating Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. But an anti-IS stance in the region provides Russia with the opportunity to consolidate its presence in Central Asia and become the centre of new alliances in the region – with SCO partners such as China, and with Iran – and to sponsor anti-Taliban and anti-IS forces in northern Afghanistan.</p>
<p>More intriguingly, some Russian officials see Moscow’s new strategic initiatives in Syria and Afghanistan as a chance to carve out a significant role in a wider region. State Duma speaker, Sergei Naryshkin, has been talking of a “<a href="http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en">Greater Eurasia</a>”, linking Russia not only to former Soviet republics, but more widely to a range of allies in Syria, Iran, India and China. </p>
<p>This may be just another of Russia’s historical spatial fantasies for now, but in a rapidly changing international environment, Moscow will try to use its dominance in Central Asia as a first step towards shaping a new regional security order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49034/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Lewis has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council project 'Rising Powers and Conflict Management in Central Asia'.</span></em></p>A renewed security focus on Afghanistan is part of Vladimir Putin’s plan to re-energise Russia’s vision of a ‘Greater Eurasia’.David Lewis, Senior Lecturer, Politics, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/484562015-10-01T15:22:06Z2015-10-01T15:22:06ZJust how dangerous are the skies over Syria?<p><em>This article was updated on October 8 to reflect the latest developments.</em></p>
<p>All eyes are on the skies above Syria which have become the potential flashpoint for conflict between Russia and the West after Russian aircraft conducting airstrikes against anti-Assad rebels reportedly violated Turkish airspace, raising the possibility of NATO getting drawn into a rapidly escalating crisis.</p>
<p>NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/08/nato-ready-to-deploy-forces-to-defend-turkey-against-any-threats">issued a warning to Russia</a> that it was taking the situation seriously and had already responded by increasing its capacity and readiness to deploy forces – including in Turkey.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>NATO is ready and able to defend all allies, including Turkey against any threats … In Syria, we have seen a troubling escalation of Russian military activities. We will assess the latest developments and their implications for the security of the alliance. This is particularly relevant in view of the recent violations of NATO’s airspace by Russian aircraft.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Stoltenberg’s warning came as the British foreign secretary, Michael Fallon, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34472739">announced the deployment of troops to Baltic countries</a> to shore up NATO’s eastern defences in the face of Russian military incursions in Ukraine. </p>
<p>Russia’s decision to conduct airstrikes in Syria <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-putin-ended-up-gambling-on-airstrikes-in-syria-and-what-might-come-next-48414">follows a summer of fruitless and inconsequential diplomacy</a> and raises important questions about who is bombing who and what these campaigns aim to achieve.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/9JOvD8yW1bQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Reuters report on video of Russian airstrikes.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>So who’s flying what?</h2>
<p>At the beginning of the war, the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) was able to use its overwhelming air superiority to bomb rebel positions but developments have affected the Syrian military’s air status and have made the Russian intervention much more important for the Assad regime. </p>
<p>Firstly, parts of the war have moved into major urban areas where air superiority is of less tactical use, though the use of barrel bombs from Syrian helicopters still regularly make the news. Secondly, many Syrian airbases, for both fighter planes and helicopters <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-captures-major-air-base-in-syria-from-government-1408895103">have been captured and destroyed,</a> which has had a major impact on the ability of Assad forces to hold territory.</p>
<p>Prior to the capture or destruction of air bases in Syria, the <a href="https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2015/01/16/the-syrian-arab-air-force-beware-of-its-wings/">SyAAF was flying MiG-21s, MiG-23BNs, Su-22s and a few Su-24s</a>, all fighter and bomber aircraft that are used by most other Arab countries not under the patronage of United States defence assistance.</p>
<figure>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Russian video of airstrikes released September 30.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The United States and its allies in the region <a href="http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve">began to target IS positions in Syria</a> in August 2014, following a similar pattern used in Iraq. <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/12/who-has-contributed-what-in-the-coalition-against-the-islamic-state/">With the United States over Syria</a> are six other countries: Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates – and the United Kingdom. Other countries, such as Turkey and France, are also targeting IS from outside the official coalition and others such as The Netherlands and Australia have limited their operations to Iraq.</p>
<p>The US-led coalition has refrained from directly targeting Syrian pro-government forces while primarily defending Kurdish positions and attacking supply lines. In addition to traditional air forces, the <a href="http://dronewars.net/2014/11/07/drones-in-iraq-and-syria-what-we-know-and-what-we-dont/">US, UK and many others are using drones</a> over Syria as have the Iranians, and more recently – according to some reports – <a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/03/18/is-isis-building-a-drone-army.html">IS itself</a>.</p>
<p>With the US-led intervention, it could be taken that as well as the Kurdish forces, moderate rebel forces, such as the Free Syrian Army, also had air support while the SyAAF continued to experience a decline in numbers and operational opportunities.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-34411477">Russian air force</a> has third-class fighter aircraft such as SU-24 over Syria and their operational role will be to destroy supply lines, target headquarters and harass back lines all in an effort to help the pro-government forces to hold and take new territory. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/14/russia-sends-artillery-and-tanks-to-syria-as-part-of-continued-military-buildup">Russia has also sent in specialist forces to defend air bases</a>.</p>
<h2>Strange bedfellows</h2>
<p>With so many actors in Syria, such as the Iranians, Turks, US-led coalition and now the Russians, there is the question of communication. In December 2014, Iraqi Shia forces released information which suggested that the US and Iran <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/04/world/middleeast/a-us-concession-to-reality-in-the-battle-against-islamic-state.html?_r=1">were talking to one another</a> about how to organise and respond to IS threats to Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. The Iranians were eager to let the world know that the US had to speak to them to coordinate forces on the ground while the US was less keen to jeopardise the assistance given to it by its Arab allies.</p>
<p>For Iran, the Russian intervention is a very welcome sight not only because of a long-term alliance since the Islamic Republic was founded. Iran is <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.678423">widely reported</a> to have been preparing a ground offensive with Hezbollah troops so Russian air support would greatly assist in this.</p>
<p>If it is indeed already coordinating with the Iranians in Iraq, it makes sense for the US and Russia to <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/sep/29/obama-pentagon-channel-communication-russia-syria">enhance their defence communication</a> in Syria. Having agreed that they would establish a communication channel with Moscow, the US Central Command <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/09/30/russian-parliament-troops-abroad/73072884/">expressed shock</a> at the lack of communication by the Russians prior to its first airstrike – they were given an hour’s warning. But communication between the US and Russia <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nato-and-russia-are-playing-a-cold-war-game-of-hotlines-and-spooks-41639">had already improved</a> during the Ukraine conflict. The effort to go a step further over Syria makes sense – but perhaps not for the reasons that many would expect: friendly fire.</p>
<h2>Accidents may happen</h2>
<p>But the Russian incursions into Turkish airspace, which Russia has said were accidental but which NATO is treating as potentially hostile, has raised the stakes considerably. Turkey was already smarting at the fact that, despite a visit to Moscow in September by the president, Recep Erdogan, it was given no indication of Russia’s intentions to start an air campaign just across its border with Syria.</p>
<p>An angry Erdogan invoked <a href="http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm">Article 5 of the NATO</a> Treaty, saying that any “<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/07/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKCN0S01DS20151007">attack on Turkey means an attack on NATO</a>”. The Russian ambassador was repeatedly summoned to explain what it has interpreted as hostile activity, including not only the incursions but also an incident in which Russian anti-aircraft batteries operating in Syria reportedly locked on to Turkish aircraft on patrol along the Syrian border.</p>
<p>Meanwhile the Pentagon is <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/07/politics/u-s-diverts-aircraft-to-avoid-russian-fighter/index.html">reported to have diverted two US warplanes</a> over Syria so as to avoid coming too close to Russian jets operating there. The US and Russia are negotiating over a “mutual flight safety rules and practices” but as yet no firm agreement has been signed and US pilots have orders to change their flight path if there is a Russian plane within 20 nautical miles.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/48456/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David J Galbreath receives funding from Economic and Social Research Council as well as the Arts and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p>Despite a fierce exchange of rhetoric over Russia’s airstrikes in Syria, it makes sense for Moscow and Washington to coordinate their military intervention.David J Galbreath, Professor of International Security, Director of Centre for War and Technology, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/477872015-09-18T16:58:57Z2015-09-18T16:58:57ZWhat’s behind Russia’s military build-up in Syria?<p>Evidence is emerging of a <a href="http://ruslanleviev.livejournal.com/38649.html">significant intensification</a> of Russia’s military support for the Assad government. While the exact scale and purpose of Russia’s latest deployments remain obscure, the available evidence suggests that the Russians are preparing an airbase near the city of <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/17/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-exclusive-idUSKCN0RH15S20150917?utm_source=Facebook">Latakia</a> for possible airstrikes in support of the Syrian army, complete with several hundred Russian troops protecting it. </p>
<p>This is in addition to a Russian navy refuelling facility already in operation <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18616191">in the port of Tartus</a>, and substantial supplies of weapons and military advisers for the Syrian regime which the Soviet Union and Russia have been supplying Syria for decades.</p>
<p>Such is the concern in the West at Vladimir Putin’s motives for this military build-up in Russia’s war-torn client state that the reports prompted the US to <a href="http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/09/07/428122/Greece-US-Russia-Syria-Daeash">put pressure on the Greek</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-34184947">Bulgarian</a> governments to close their airspace to Russian planes bound for Syria.</p>
<p>But what are Putin’s motives? For a start, the Russian president clearly wants to confirm his country’s status as a global power with its own sphere of influence which is able to act independently of the US and is not dependent on the approval of Washington. This interpretation is supported by the logic of a breakdown in Russia’s relations with the West over the Ukraine crisis, which led some observers to call a <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/04/welcome-to-cold-war-ii/">return of the Cold War</a>.</p>
<p>But, equally, it is also clear that Moscow is extremely worried about the rise of radical Islamic terrorism. Remember, not long ago Russia fought two bloody wars in Chechnya, mostly against radical Islamists. Its territory is home to some 17m Muslims, many living in its poorest regions in the North Caucasus, where an Islamic insurgency continues and which bubbles up with periodic bursts of violence. Moscow is also aware of the risk of insurgency from predominantly Muslim Central Asia – which it counts as part of its sphere of influence – from where several million have migrated to work in Russia. A history of insurgency and poor economic conditions make those regions vulnerable to Islamic State influence.</p>
<p>Putin, <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50291">recently confirmed</a> that one the biggest security threats to the former Soviet states that are members of the Moscow-centric Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is a potential expansion of IS in the Middle East, Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU). Putin specifically singled out ideological indoctrination and military training of nationals in FSU countries by IS and said their return home would be a major threat to security.</p>
<p>His concerns are well founded – there are <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/1700-russians-fighting-isis-says-head-russian-secret-service-308206">an estimated 1,700 volunteers</a> from Russia alone fighting with IS, mostly from the North Caucasus and Central Asia. A recent high-profile defection was the <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan-police-commander-islamic-state-treason/27051207.html">head of the Tajik special forces</a>, Gulmuro Halimov, who was reported in June 2015 to have joined IS. </p>
<p>Putin would also be mindful that the more Russia can become an indispensable player in Syria’s civil war – and a potential broker of peace there – the more leverage it could give Russia with the West over other issues, especially over Ukraine and the economic sanctions imposed on Russia. However improbable this might sound, increasing his foothold in Syria could be a way for Putin to mend his relations with the West by building a joint anti-IS coalition.</p>
<p>This seems unlikely for now as removal of Assad is a non-negotiable condition for the West – as opposed to Russia, which sees maintenance of the current regime, at least for the present, as the only way to defeat extremist insurgency in Syria. But if the West is serious about defeating IS and the Assad regime survives with the Russian and Iranian help, then at some point it might have to consider joining forces with Russia against IS.</p>
<h2>Towards an ‘Alawite Israel’?</h2>
<p>To properly understand Russia’s involvement in Syria it’s necessary to consider a fundamental difference in Russia’s perception of causes of the Syrian debacle. The West saw the uprising against Assad as an expression of popular will within the framework of the inevitable progress of democracy, while Russia saw the conflict in more complex terms. For a start, Russia recognised the nature of the Syrian society with its ethnic and religious diversity, a strong army and a close-knit ruling group. Coupled with a complex regional rivalries between the Gulf states, Turkey and Iran – Assad’s most staunch supporter – the swift demise of the Syrian regime was always unlikely.</p>
<p>More importantly, the Kremlin has <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/syrian-conflict-according-putin-291372">consistently prioritised stability over revolutionary</a> change and sovereign rights over humanitarian intervention. In fact, from the Russian point of view, the Western interventionist agenda of democratisation, which ignored local conditions, has made the situation in the Middle East worse – from Iraq to Libya and Syria.</p>
<p>It seems unlikely that Moscow can hope for an outright victory in Syria’s civil war, so some kind of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/15/west-ignored-russian-offer-in-2012-to-have-syrias-assad-step-aside">political compromise</a> with the moderate opposition is in the offing. This, however, is at best a long shot given the hostility to Assad in the West and the intensity of the conflict in Syria.</p>
<p>Instead, the immediate priority seems to be to ensure a survival of the Syrian state and military institutions in the areas it can control, what one Russian observer called an <a href="http://www.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/Alavitskii-Izrail-17674">“Alawite Israel”</a> – a strip of land from the Mediterranean coast to Damascus, able to at least contain IS with some external support.</p>
<h2>Situation normal: at loggerheads</h2>
<p>How can the West respond to Russia’s latest initiatives? One option would more economic sanctions against Russia in order to dissuade it from supporting Assad. The West could also increase in its military presence, for example by creating a no-fly zones in Syria. Increasing military support for the opposition is another option, in the unlikely hope that it could topple Assad before IS does.</p>
<p>This would be mirroring Russia’s <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/09/11-russia-america-same-mistakes-syria-baev-shapiro?utm_campaign=Brookings+Brief&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=22021030&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-9hKD3Nn-VCmVttltLX3_VVHbn6NgXP1S9VezLL1eoJFA42vLmmMRjWDJso8DEgFNeOIh4LH8k4kblCHVrkuHAQqsH2Pw&_hsmi=22021030">logic of escalation</a> aimed at forcing the other side to change its attitudes by creating new facts on the ground. The likely outcome would be a doubling of support for Assad from Iran and Russia and perpetuating of the civil war. Finally, it could accept Russia’s view that it is unrealistic to get rid of IS and Assad at the same time, and choose the <a href="http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=61218">least bad option</a>.</p>
<p>The last option seems unlikely for now, given the fundamental disagreements about the causes of the conflict as well as about its likely solution. Is there any cause for optimism then? Perhaps the only consolation is that there are no chemical weapons left in Syria. Those were removed under a joint US-Russia plan in 2013. </p>
<p>This – sadly – remains the only concrete and positive outcome of Russia’s cooperation with the West in the Middle East.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/47787/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Titov does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The West has condemned Moscow’s ongoing support for Bashar al-Assad. But perhaps it is the least-worst option.Alexander Titov, Lecturer in Modern European History, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.