tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/uganda-national-resistance-movement-nrm-46620/articlesUganda National Resistance Movement (NRM) – The Conversation2024-01-16T14:13:09Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2181712024-01-16T14:13:09Z2024-01-16T14:13:09ZUganda’s battle for the youth vote – how Museveni keeps Bobi Wine’s reach in check<p>Uganda is one of the youngest countries in the world, with an <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2020/02/25/uganda-jobs-strategy-for-inclusive-growth#:%7E:text=Uganda%20is%20one%20of%20the,working%20age%20population%20is%20rapid.">average age of 15.9 years</a>. Young people aged below 30 make up about <a href="https://www.issuelab.org/resources/4998/4998.pdf#page=1">77%</a> of the country’s population of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=UG">47 million</a> people.</p>
<p>Young people have legitimate and wide-ranging grievances, from unemployment to disenfranchisement. Opportunities remain limited, with <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2020/02/25/uganda-jobs-strategy-for-inclusive-growth">two-thirds of Ugandans</a> working for themselves or doing family-based agricultural work.</p>
<p>Yet, young people in Uganda haven’t coalesced as an electoral bloc. This is despite the emergence of a presidential candidate who champions youth issues. In the last presidential election in 2021, those aged between 18 and 30 made up <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/oped/commentary/what-young-voting-population-means-for-2021-elections-3206502">41%</a> of the total voter roll of 18 million. </p>
<p>Robert Kyagulanyi, the 41-year-old musician-turned-politician popularly known as Bobi Wine, leads the National Unity Platform. It is Uganda’s largest opposition party, known for its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/21/young-africa-new-wave-of-politicians-challenges-old-guard">youth appeal</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/bobi-wine-has-already-changed-the-ugandan-opposition-can-he-change-the-government-150231">Bobi Wine’s run at the presidency in the 2021 election</a> highlights the reality that capturing the youth vote in Uganda is complex. And that this broad category and the role it plays in Ugandan politics is poorly understood.</p>
<p>As it is, the term “youth” lacks a clear definition. Uganda’s government defines the youth as those aged between 18 and 30. However, in practice the “youth” category is much more amorphous. It tends to <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/13550">encompass</a> those who are no longer considered children, but haven’t yet realised the “social markers” that signify adulthood. These include financial independence, marriage and children.</p>
<p>The outcome of the 2021 elections defied expectations, given Uganda’s <a href="https://www.ubos.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/11_2022NLFS_2021_main_report.pdf#page=135">large and underemployed youth population</a> and the emergence of Bobi Wine. In a recent <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2023.2235661">paper</a>, we examined youth political mobilisation in this election. </p>
<p>Despite widespread “youth wave” optimism, we identified diverse, embedded strategies and tactics from the ruling party, the <a href="https://www.nrm.ug/manifesto-2021-2026">National Resistance Movement</a>, that obstructed Bobi Wine’s efforts to build a powerful national youth constituency. </p>
<p>The strategies were:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the structural capture of youth representation in Ugandan politics</p></li>
<li><p>diverse economic incentives for political loyalty in the form of loan schemes, grants and short-term employment </p></li>
<li><p>well-spun political narratives that draw on entrenched views of youth as beholden to their elders and the state. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>New wine, old bottles</h2>
<p>When Bobi Wine ran in the presidential election, he was aged 38. Commentators worldwide suggested his candidacy represented a <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2019/1003/A-rapper-s-quest-to-be-president">real</a> and <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/bobi_wine_threat_museveni/">unprecedented threat</a> to Yoweri Museveni’s longstanding rule. Museveni, 79, has been Uganda’s president since 1986.</p>
<p>Bobi Wine got <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/16/uganda-president-wins-decisive-election-as-bobi-wine-alleges">35%</a> of the vote. This is about the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/120/481/629/6406415?redirectedFrom=fulltext">same proportion of votes</a> that has accrued to the main opposition candidates in Uganda since multi-party elections resumed in 2006. </p>
<p>For a new entrant on the political scene, this was an impressive achievement – particularly in the light of political repression and patronage that make the <a href="https://time.com/5913625/bobi-wine-uganda-presidential-candidate/">playing field far from fair</a> in Uganda. </p>
<p>Bobi Wine’s <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/12/uganda-stop-killings-and-human-rights-violations-ahead-of-election-day/">violent arrest</a> in November 2020 gained international attention, as did the government’s aggressive response to protests calling for his release. These resulted in the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/21/uganda-elections-marred-violence">death of at least 54 National Unity Platform supporters</a>. Security forces perpetrated <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/21/uganda-elections-marred-violence">widespread violence and human rights abuses</a> in the run-up to the election.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/black-november-remembering-ugandas-massacre-of-the-opposition-three-years-on-217847">Black November: remembering Uganda's massacre of the opposition three years on</a>
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<p>On the eve of the election, the government ordered a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/kampala-elections-coronavirus-pandemic-uganda-united-states-65942284f4e73dbf120ace23775baae4">five-day internet shutdown</a>. There were also <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/special-reports/elections/nrm-dishes-out-money-to-locals-ahead-of-polls-3248892">reports</a> of the ruling party dishing out money to potential voters, with instructions to vote for Museveni. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2023.2235661">Our research</a> reviewed Ugandan history since its independence from the British in 1962. We found that the possibility of a national youth constituency had been a concern of Uganda’s post-colonial governments. Regimes have long sought to integrate the youth into their political project, while keeping them fragmented and regionally embedded to prevent broader political mobilisation. </p>
<p>Contemporary tactics used by the ruling party to co-opt the youth converge with these historically rooted methods of regime consolidation. </p>
<h2>Splitting the youth</h2>
<p>The National Resistance Movement has an elaborate set of measures in place –from state level to the villages – to prevent youth discontent from becoming a national political threat. </p>
<p>First, the youth are organised into a “special interest group” <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41653703">reinforced through quota systems</a>. These are closely allied with the ruling party’s leadership. Political structures, such as youth MPs and representatives, absorb youth representation under regime authority and entrench regional divisions. </p>
<p>Second, the ruling party uses patronage networks and tactics to mobilise young voters. It offers economic rewards for allegiance and generous material compensation for “party-switching” – which is when supporters defect from the opposition to the National Resistance Movement, often quite publicly. Ahead of the 2021 election, Museveni <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/62550-inside-museveni-s-war-on-the-ghetto">gave state appointments to popular musicians with wide youth appeal</a> who had been working closely with Bobi Wine’s party. </p>
<p>The ruling party also offers young people <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/opposition-cries-foul-as-museveni-gives-shs741m-in-cash-donations-1484578">economic incentives</a> during campaigns. These include short-term employment, loans and cash handouts. Youth are often recruited as election workers, special police constables and crime preventers. In these short-term positions, tens of thousands of youth survey their communities and share local intelligence with the authorities, acting as the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2016.1272283">state’s eyes and ears</a> at a village level. Among young, economically precarious men, this is seen as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2023.2235661">an opportunity</a>, even though they become engaged in supporting the re-election of a regime they may oppose. </p>
<p>Third, during the last election, campaign observers were optimistic about the power of social media to amplify Bobi Wine’s message and increase support. But social media is also a tool the National Resistance Movement uses adeptly. Beyond internet shutdowns and disinformation campaigns, we found that Museveni and the National Resistance Movement used social media channels to promote powerful narratives that linked social order and prosperity to a culture of gerontocracy. This refers to a system of governance in which older people dominate.</p>
<h2>What hope for Bobi Wine?</h2>
<p>Well-developed structures, practices and narratives that fragment national youth mobilisation have been seen in recent Ugandan history. In northern Uganda, for example, young people have lived through a recent history of <a href="https://theconversation.com/managing-life-after-war-how-young-people-in-uganda-are-coping-108351">devastating conflict</a> and still struggle with its legacies. </p>
<p>This, combined with long-standing regional and ethnic tensions throughout the country, means that his opponents often describe Bobi Wine first as a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/120/481/629/6406415?login=true">political agitator</a> who could tear the country apart, not as the youth’s best chance for <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2023.2235661">political liberation and progress</a>. </p>
<p>Against this backdrop, if Bobi Wine contests in 2026, he is likely to struggle again. He may attract global media attention, but Museveni and the National Resistance Movement are familiar with his brand of <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/120/481/629/6406415?login=trueopposition">“defiance-based” opposition politics</a>. </p>
<p>As commentators increasingly note, the big question remains whether Bobi Wine and the National Unity Platform, without experience in government and in the absence of strong links to powerful military and state players, can realistically achieve a political <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/120/481/629/6406415?login=trueopposition">transition</a> in Uganda. </p>
<p>The overall picture is one in which the elite have long seen the youth as an important resource and potential threat – and as such fear and value them. While Uganda’s young people have real and legitimate grievances, they lack modes of political and social organisation – by long-standing design.</p>
<p><em>Arthur Owor, the director for research and operations at the Centre for African Research, is a co-author of this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218171/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rebecca Tapscott receives funding from the ESRC-funded Centre for Public Authority and International Development (CPAID) and the Gerda Henkel Foundation's Special Programme for Security, Society and the State.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anna Macdonald receives funding from the ESRC-funded Centre for Public Authority and International Development (CPAID). </span></em></p>Bobi Wine’s run at the presidency in 2021 had appeared to present an unprecedented threat to Yoweri Museveni’s longstanding rule.Rebecca Tapscott, Lecturer, University of YorkAnna Macdonald, Associate Professor, Global Development, University of East AngliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1531072021-01-12T16:05:54Z2021-01-12T16:05:54ZSocial media seized the narrative in Uganda’s election. Why this was good for democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378234/original/file-20210112-23-ioio6h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=265%2C68%2C757%2C533&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ugandan musician-turned-politician Robert Kyagulanyi addresses the media after his car was shot at by police in eastern Uganda during his campaign.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Sumy Sadurni/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For months, Ugandans have witnessed a <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/uganda-wraps-up-violent-and-chaotic-election-campaign-3251436">vicious presidential election campaign</a> without precedent. While the incumbent, Yoweri Museveni, has enjoyed free rein on the campaign trail, his youthful main opponent Robert Kyagulanyi and his supporters have faced numerous obstacles – and <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/58126/uganda-elections-bobi-wine-puts-yoweri-museveni-on-icc-notice/">physical assault</a>. The result is a pervasive <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1081662">sense of political crisis</a> in the run-up to the January 14 vote. </p>
<p>But in this crisis is the potential for release. Ordinary Ugandans are pouring their social and political grievances onto social media platforms, spawning <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/uganda-protest-over-new-social-media-tax-turns-violent">debates</a> around accountability and governance. They have taken to recording events they find newsworthy and posting them directly to ordinary people’s WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter accounts. In the process, they are sidestepping traditional channels – mainly radio, television and newspapers – along with their bureaucratic and hierachical procedures of news gathering. </p>
<p>The traditional media landscape has been dominated by Vision Group, in which the state owns the majority stake. The group owns the biggest circulating newspaper,<em>The New Vision</em>, a number of local regional newspapers and TV stations. Uganda Broadcasting Corporation, a statutory agency, has the widest TV and radio reach over the country, broadcasting in English and the major local languages as well as Kiswahili. The other main players are private media houses with TV and radio outlets and newspapers. But all are kept on a short leash through legislation and commercial imperatives in a market where the government is the <a href="https://acme-ug.org/tag/media-landscape-in-uganda/">chief source of advertising</a>.</p>
<p>The migration to social media has been driven by two key factors. The first is the wave of excitement in favour of Kyagulanyi, better known by his stage name Bobi Wine, and his bid for the presidency. The recent riots and their spread across the country only provide a glimpse into the popular interest in him. Traffic on social media is an indication of his appeal. </p>
<p>The second driver has been the fact that Uganda has a very youthful voting age population. The country has the <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/the-world-s-10-youngest-countries-are-all-in-africa">second youngest population on the continent</a>. According to the <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/uganda-population">World Population Review</a>, just 2% of Ugandans are 65 or older. </p>
<p>These young Ugandans have turned to their favourite tool and pastime: social media. The easy access to information on smartphones has emboldened them to speak out without fear. </p>
<p>In addition, journalists and prominent people in politics have set up Facebook pages and YouTube channels. They have taken to posting realtime events and activities of the politicians and their families. These clips range from hard news to human interest stories as well as outright propaganda and lies which are quickly debunked by the adversary.</p>
<p>The government tried to curb the use of social media, such as enacting a law on the misuse and abuse of technology. But it does not have the capacity to track all offenders, let alone to prove its case in court. Also, its attempts to limit access by levying social media tax have largely been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/feb/27/millions-of-ugandans-quit-internet-after-introduction-of-social-media-tax-free-speech">sidestepped</a> by the widespread use of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computer-science/virtual-private-network">virtual private networks</a>. </p>
<p>Never has a contest in Uganda’s political history been so furiously played out in the media space as the 2021 national elections. This trend is now irreversible. This may be the one gain for Ugandan democracy from the bruising poll. And it’s a gain unlikely to be dented by Uganda’s unprecedented <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-election-social-media/uganda-orders-all-social-media-to-be-blocked-letter-idUSKBN29H1E7">ban</a> on all social media platforms and messaging apps 48 hours before the presidential vote. </p>
<h2>History</h2>
<p>During Amin’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Idi-Amin">era</a> in the 1970s balanced reporting was unheard of. The government newspaper, Voice of Uganda, carried leading headlines daily featuring Amin throughout its lifetime and the government radio and TV stations were Amin’s mouthpieces. It was suicidal to carry dissenting voices.</p>
<p>When the National Resistance Movement came to power in 1986 through an armed insurrection, it set up its own media presence. This media extolled the new leadership and the movement through which it captured power. “When we captured power” became the ubiquitous preamble of many government officials’ speeches. It was embraced positively in TV and radio documentary scripts and newspaper articles. </p>
<p>The image of a new regime riding on the wrongs of past leaders to capture power by armed insurrection in the interests of the people is <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5UoqwEREY5A">now a distant memory</a>. Fast forward to 2021 and six election cycles later, Ugandans in general and journalists in particular are feeling the full force of that power. </p>
<p>Journalists covering the current campaign have endured <a href="https://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00076398.html">police assault</a>, access restrictions and regulatory sanctions such as having to register to be accredited. There is <a href="https://www.hrnjuganda.org/hrnj-uganda-alert-two-arrested-over-brutal-assault-of-three-journalists-four-others-remain-at-large-2/">ample evidence of brutality</a>. </p>
<p>COVID-19 restrictions have also been <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/un-high-commissioner-for-human-rights-condemns-abuses-in-uganda/">used as a smokescreen</a> to control the media and the movement of journalists. </p>
<p>Restrictions have been placed on media access for opposition candidates. Such candidates have reported incidents of being denied access to upcountry broadcast outlets by government authorities and owners fearing repercussions. Opposition candidates also <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BiYISQYySbQ">lament restrictions to the mainstream radio and television such as UBC’s network</a>.</p>
<p>Amid all these hurdles, Museveni has continued to appear daily on media outlets. His daily schedule includes live TV appearances commissioning government development projects such as roads, hospitals, markets, bridges and dams. </p>
<h2>Social media</h2>
<p>There are also downsides to the spike in social media use. One is that conspiracy theories abound on the various platforms. But, despite the challenges posed by the unprofessionalism of some citizen journalism on social media, the public has woken up to the power of breaking news and whistleblowing that speaks directly to power. </p>
<p>There have been some notable instances where social media has come into its own in holding those in authority accountable. One example was the effective use of live streaming of the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N2UloXXNzZA">deadly political riots</a> in which at least 45 were killed in November 2020. This proved to be the only source of direct information after security services cut the flow of information by seizing journalists on the scene and prevailing on media houses <a href="https://ipi.media/journalist-critically-injured-in-uganda-riots/">not to broadcast</a> the violent scenes. </p>
<p>How the role of social media will affect the outcome of the poll remains an open question. Demographics will play a large role. Museveni still has a hold on rural and elderly voters while Kyagulanyi seems to pull the urban youth. </p>
<p>Above all, much depends on whether it’s a free and fair poll. Here, Kyagulanyi can only hope that the electoral commission ensures a level playing field.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153107/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Geoffrey Ssenoga does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Never has a political contest in Uganda’s history been so furiously played out in the media space as the 2021 national elections.Geoffrey Ssenoga, Lecturer of Mass Communications, Uganda Christian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/879642017-11-22T15:23:32Z2017-11-22T15:23:32ZAfter Mugabe, all eyes are on Museveni: how long can he cling to power?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195852/original/file-20171122-6020-102njsc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni speaks during a presidential campaign rally in the capital Kampala in 2016. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/James Akena</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On 21 November, Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe resigned as president under intense pressure from the military, his own party, and mass protests. The news <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-42072673">was celebrated on the streets of Harare</a> and also by pro-democracy activists across the continent. </p>
<p>But in Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni – who has been in power for almost 30 years – clings on, plotting to change the constitution so that he can stand in the 2021 elections. So how long can he stay in power?</p>
<p>When multi-party electoral politics were restored in Uganda in 2005, what Museveni was handed in return was the <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Ten-years-later--Revisiting-term-limits-drama-of-2005---part-I/688334-2782690-l5jmi9/index.html">removal of presidential term-limits</a>. This allowed the president, in power since 1986, to repeatedly stand for re-election.</p>
<p>However, the constitution still placed a limit: presidential candidates could not be over 75 years of age. Time flies, and now that restriction stands in Museveni’s way: he will be 76 by the time of the next polls in 2021.</p>
<p>Following a pattern that is emerging across authoritarian states, the president has not proposed the constitutional change himself. Instead, a <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Magyezi-tables-controversial-age-limit-bill/688334-4122946-ubt6w7z/index.html">private member’s bill</a> has been brought to parliament by a sitting member of his National Resistance Movement (NRM). But – as with his selection as the <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/PeoplePower/MP-Anite--Loyal-cadre-or-opportunistic-politician-/689844-2207914-aubc0o/index.html">NRM’s sole candidate</a> for the 2016 elections - there seems no doubt that Museveni is behind the plan.</p>
<p>Despite this attempted sleight of hand, the president is not having everything his own way. There were <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-Parliament-minister-25-MPs-suspended-Kibuule/688334-4114446-36kfhpz/index.html">chaotic scenes in parliament</a> when the bill was introduced; <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Besigye-murder-Uganda-age-limit/2558-4148084-rlfucg/index.html">popular protests have been violently suppressed</a>, but <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Age-limit--Butembe-residents-stone-MP-Lufafa-s-vehicle/688334-4173300-y70wplz/index.html">keep recurring</a>. Several <a href="https://ugandaradionetwork.com/story/rugunda-warns-religious-leaders-on-age-limit-remarks">bishops have also denounced</a> the move. </p>
<p>Most significantly, <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/NRM-leaders-Buzaaya-vote-amendment-age-limit/688334-4140464-2rjrdjz/index.html">many within the NRM have opposed the change</a>, even in parts of the country that have generally been loyal to Museveni. </p>
<p>Museveni is a wily politician, with a well-used toolbox for maintaining power, and has responded by providing <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/PeoplePower/Shs29m-facilitation-break-coalition-removing-age-limit/689844-4160078-ce22xg/index.html">29 million Uganda shillings (a little over US$7,000) to each sitting member of parliament</a> to facilitate a “consultation” with their constituents. Yet some who received the handout have nonetheless <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-support-age-limit-bill-Mpigi-NRM-MP/688334-4176130-9yexxbz/index.html">put on the red headband</a> that has come to be the mark of resistance.</p>
<h2>Museveni’s hypocrisy</h2>
<p>Much of the critical comment on these developments, both within Uganda and internationally, has focused on Museveni’s hypocrisy. As a young radical in the 1980s, he publicly scorned African rulers who clung to power. Now, after 30 years in office, he is clearly clinging pretty hard himself. </p>
<p>The resignation of Mugabe further shines a spotlight on Museveni’s intransigence. Yet in other ways, Museveni has been very consistent. His first public political role was as an organiser of nominations in Milton Obote’s one-party state, nearly 50 years ago, and he has always understood that elections can do useful political work for authoritarians. </p>
<p>Like many of his generation, he saw political parties as divisive. So when he seized power in 1986, Museveni banned political party activity and introduced elections without parties. In this system, all candidates stood on ‘individual merit’, and voters chose those they thought most able to bring development. </p>
<p>Though multi-party politics has returned, the legacy of that system continues today in weak party organisations and the focus on the individual quality of candidates. For Museveni, elections perform a number of different roles. They demonstrate the power of the state – often in a very violent way, as police break-up opposition rallies. </p>
<p>But they also provide a useful vent for tensions, and for communication. Campaigning forces politicians – from the president down – to engage with the public. That engagement <a href="http://acfimuganda.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Discussion-Paper-on-Political-Economy-of-Elections-in-Uganda.pdf">tends to take the form of patronage</a>: voters are given immediate gifts – of money or goods. Or they are promised specific rewards – roads, electricity, scholarships. Sometimes, they get at least some of the things they are promised. </p>
<p>That has encouraged accountability of a sort – but it is problematic and locally-focussed, revolving around what candidates deliver to their constituents. As a result, voters turn out to cast their ballots in significant numbers, and Museveni faces neither insurrection nor insurgency. </p>
<p>This is a common phenomenon in contemporary Africa, where the widespread reintroduction of multi-party elections has not always made changes of government more frequent.</p>
<p>But this strategy of political management leaves Museveni with a problem. His dislike of parties, and his brand of patronage politics, have combined to prevent the emergence of any viable successor within the NRM. In fact, Museveni has gone out of his way to undermine MPs from his own party. More than once he has turned on them, <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Museveni-MPs-youth-Constitution-jobs-women/688334-4135306-qe7h4az/index.html">urging voters to blame MPs, rather than the government itself, for the multiple woes of everyday life</a>.</p>
<p>The weakness of the NRM as an organisation matters because Museveni does not trust anyone else enough to step aside of his own volition. The ruling party also does not have the structures that would allow the emergence of a successful challenger. Twice in the last 16 years, rivals have sought to challenge Museveni from within the NRM. <a href="http://www.elections.co.ug/new-vision/election/1000093/besigye-kifefe-kizza">Kizza Besigye</a> and <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Mbabazi-declares-2016-bid-at-dawn/688334-2753236-fy2aatz/index.html">Amama Mbabazi</a> both found that position in the NRM means little. That includes the apparently powerful position of secretary-general which Mbabazi held for many years. Each was effectively forced out of the NRM, and then defeated by Museveni in flawed elections.</p>
<p>So Uganda is stuck with a president who is good at playing the electoral game and a ruling party which has no way of producing a successor. Museveni may well manage to push the change through. The NRM has an overwhelming parliamentary majority and in the end most MPs will be too reliant on the president’s patronage to defy him. </p>
<p>But the president – and those around him – will surely know that the constitutional change can only defer the problem, and make it more intractable. Indeed, the Ugandan press has not lost the opportunity to editorialise on <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/Editorial/Leaders-should-plan-life-presidency/689360-4191358-7ygkmd/index.html">events in Zimbabwe in ways that indirectly question Museveni’s future</a>. As Robert Mugabe found out to his cost, elections without choice have their uses: but they cannot ensure stable succession.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87964/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Justin Willis receives funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council, grant ref ES.L002345.1: 'The impact of elections in sub-Saharan Africa'. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabrielle Lynch and Nic Cheeseman do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As a young radical in the 1980s, Museveni publicly scorned African rulers who clung to power. Now, after 30 years in office, he is clearly clinging pretty hard himself.Justin Willis, Professor of History, Durham UniversityGabrielle Lynch, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of WarwickNic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.