tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/world-trade-organization-24325/articlesWorld Trade Organization – The Conversation2024-03-04T22:59:07Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2249482024-03-04T22:59:07Z2024-03-04T22:59:07ZWTO conference ends in division and stalemate – does the global trade body have a viable future?<p>The 13th World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial conference in Abu Dhabi has failed to resolve any issues of significance, raising the inescapable question of whether the global trade body has a future.</p>
<p>The three-day meeting was due to end on February 29. But late into a fourth extra day, the 164 members were struggling to even agree on a declaration, let alone the big issues of agriculture, fisheries and border taxes on electronic commerce.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EJdw3ENDQTY">closing ceremony</a> was sombre, and the <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/W12R1.pdf&Open=True">ministerial declaration</a> bland, stripped of the substantive content <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/W12.pdf&Open=True">previously proposed</a>. Outstanding issues were kicked back to the WTO base in Geneva for further discussions, or for the next ministerial conference in 2026.</p>
<p>Briefing journalists in the closing hours, an EU spokesperson noted how hard it would be to pick up the pieces in Geneva after they failed to create momentum at the ministerial conference. She predicted:</p>
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<p>[Trade] will be more and more characterised by power relations than the rule of law, and that will be a problem notably for smaller countries and for developing countries.</p>
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<h2>Restricted access</h2>
<p>That imbalance is already evident, with power politics characterising the conference from the start. </p>
<p>There were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/activists-criticise-civil-society-restrictions-wto-meeting-uae-2024-02-28/">accusations of unprecedented restrictions</a> on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) registered to participate in the conference. These bodies are crucial to bringing the WTO’s impacts on farmers, fishers, workers and other communities into the negotiation arena.</p>
<p>A number of NGOs have <a href="https://www.twn.my/title2/wto.info/2024/ti240228.htm">submitted formal complaints</a> over their treatment by conference host the United Arab Emirates. They say they were isolated from delegations, banned from distributing papers, and people were arbitrarily detained for handing out press releases. </p>
<p>Critical negotiations were conducted through controversial “green rooms”. These were where the handpicked “double quad” members – the US, UK, European Union, Canada, China, India, South Africa and Brazil – tried to broker outcomes to present to the rest for “transparency”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/privilege-or-poisoned-chalice-as-deputy-chair-at-next-weeks-wto-meeting-nz-confronts-an-organisation-in-crisis-223849">Privilege or poisoned chalice? As deputy chair at next week’s WTO meeting, NZ confronts an organisation in crisis</a>
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<h2>Influence of power politics</h2>
<p>These powerful countries largely determined the outcomes (or lack of them). The US, historically the agenda-setter at WTO ministerial conferences, appeared largely disinterested in the proceedings, with trade representative Katherine Tai leaving early.</p>
<p>The final declaration says nothing about restoring a two-tier dispute body, which has been <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2023-08-30/supply-chains-latest-paralysis-at-wto-appellate-body-hurts-global-trade">paralysed since 2019</a> by the refusal of successive US Republican and Democratic administrations to appoint new judges to the WTO’s <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm">appellate body</a>.</p>
<p>The EU <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_24_933">failed to secure progress</a> on improvements to the appeal process. Likely Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump has <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/04/trump-floats-more-than-60percent-tariffs-on-chinese-imports.html">already announced</a> he would impose massive WTO-illegal tariffs on China if elected.</p>
<p>China, Japan, the US and EU – all big subsidisers of distant water fishing fleets – blocked an outcome aiming to protect global fish stocks, an issue already deferred from the last ministerial meeting.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/fisheries-deal-wto-insufficient-pacific-islands-fiji-says-2024-02-29/">six Pacific Island</a> WTO members lobbied tirelessly for a freeze and eventual reduction in subsidies. But the text was diluted to the point that no deal was better than a bad deal.</p>
<p>The EU, UK, Switzerland and other pharmaceutical producers had already blocked consensus on lifting patents for <a href="https://www.business-standard.com/india-news/india-seeks-5-yr-patent-waiver-for-covid-diagnostics-therapeutics-from-wto-123120600256_1.html">COVID-19 therapeutics</a> and diagnostics, sought by 65 developing countries. A deal brokered in 2021 on COVID vaccines is so complex no country has used it.</p>
<h2>Domestic and global agendas</h2>
<p>India’s equally uncompromising positions also reflected domestic priorities. The 2013 Bali ministerial conference promised developing countries a permanent solution to prevent legal challenges to India’s subsidised stockpiling of food for anti-hunger programmes. </p>
<p>A permanent solution was a red line for India, which faces an election next month and mass protests from farmers concerned at losing subsidies. </p>
<p>Agricultural exporters, including New Zealand, tabled counter-demands to broaden the agriculture negotiations. The public stockpiling issue remains a stalemate, without any real prospect of a breakthrough.</p>
<p><a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/29.pdf&Open=True">India</a> and South Africa formally objected to the adoption of an <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/17R1.pdf">unmandated plurilateral</a> agreement on <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invfac_public_e/invfac_e.htm">investment facilitation</a>. </p>
<p>The concerns were less with the agreement itself and more with the precedent it would create for sub-groups of members to bypass the WTO’s rule book. This would allow powerful states to advance their favoured issues while developing country priorities languish.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-developing-countries-must-unite-to-protect-the-wtos-dispute-settlement-system-224102">Why developing countries must unite to protect the WTO's dispute settlement system</a>
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<h2>Crisis and transformation</h2>
<p>The face-saver for the conference was the temporary extension of a highly contested <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/W26.pdf&Open=True">moratorium</a> on the right to levy customs duties at the border on transmissions of digitised content.</p>
<p>Securing that extension (or preferably a permanent ban on e-commerce customs duties) on behalf of Big Tech was the main US goal for the conference. Developing countries opposed its renewal, so they could impose tariffs both for revenue and to support their own digital industrialisation.</p>
<p>The moratorium will now expire in March 2026, so the battle will resume at the next ministerial conference scheduled to be held in Cameroon that year. </p>
<p>But there is every likelihood the current paralysis at the WTO will continue, and the power politics will intensify. As the previously quoted EU spokesperson also mused:</p>
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<p>Perhaps the WTO needed a good crisis, and perhaps this will lead to a realisation that we cannot continue like this.</p>
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<p>Ideally, that would result in a fundamentally different international institution – one that provides real solutions to the 21st century challenges on which the WTO is unable to deliver.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224948/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Kelsey attended the WTO ministerial as a representative of the Pacific Network on Globalisation (PANG), and as an invited Guest of the Chair. She advises a number of developing country governments on these issues. She is not paid by, and this is not written on behalf of, any of them. </span></em></p>The recent World Trade Organization conference in Abu Dhabi has again failed to resolve any of the big issues on the table. Power relations rather than rule-based negotiation will fill the void.Jane Kelsey, Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata RauLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2238492024-02-21T19:12:26Z2024-02-21T19:12:26ZPrivilege or poisoned chalice? As deputy chair at next week’s WTO meeting, NZ confronts an organisation in crisis<p>New Zealand Trade Minister Todd McClay will be one of three deputy chairs (alongside ministers from Panama and Cameroon) at the <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc13_e/mc13_e.htm">13th ministerial conference</a> of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Abu Dhabi next week.</p>
<p>Whether this proves to be an honour or a poison chalice for McClay will depend on who defines “success” and how.</p>
<p>The bar for the conference – known as MC13 – will be set very low. It may be judged simply by whether the ministers reach an agreed declaration, and what fallout there might be, given the power politics at play.</p>
<p>Nearly half the WTO ministerial conferences since its creation in 1995 have not produced a substantive outcome document. But despite the low expectations, the stakes are very high.</p>
<h2>A body in crisis</h2>
<p>The WTO faces an ongoing existential crisis, with all three of its core functions in various states of collapse.</p>
<p>The dispute and enforcement mechanism has been paralysed since late 2019, because both US Republican and Democrat administrations have vetoed new appointments to the WTO’s <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm">Appellate Body</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm">Doha Development Round</a> of multilateral trade negotiations, launched in 2001, has never concluded. Instead, smaller groups of mainly developed countries, including New Zealand, are conducting unmandated plurilateral negotiations.</p>
<p>These centre on topics such as electronic commerce and how all kinds of services are regulated domestically. These are priorities for developed countries, but leave the different priorities of developing countries behind.</p>
<p>And the notification mechanism to monitor compliance with trade agreements is breached more often than honoured, as developing countries struggle to cope with their obligations. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/world-trade-organization-steps-back-from-the-brink-of-irrelevance-but-its-not-fixed-yet-185373">World Trade Organization steps back from the brink of irrelevance – but it's not fixed yet</a>
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<h2>Deferred decisions</h2>
<p>The previous ministerial conference in Geneva in 2022 was proclaimed a “success” because it produced a partial agreement on unsustainable fisheries subsidies. </p>
<p>But the hard question of restricting harmful subsidies paid to large international fishing fleets was deferred to this year’s meeting and remains unresolved.</p>
<p>Solving the impasse over the Appellate Body was given until 2024, which the US now insists means the end of the year. Whichever party wins the presidential election, the US will continue its veto. Donald Trump <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BnqV3nso9KY">may go further</a> if he returns to the White House and revive threats to quit the WTO entirely.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/governments-spend-us-22-billion-a-year-helping-the-fishing-industry-empty-our-oceans-this-injustice-must-end-222511">Governments spend US$22 billion a year helping the fishing industry empty our oceans. This injustice must end</a>
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<p>Several member countries that want to protect their <a href="https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2022-11-10/who-killed-the-vaccine-waiver">pharmaceutical industries</a> continue to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/feb/14/wto-fails-to-reach-agreement-on-providing-global-access-to-covid-treatments">block a proposal</a> by South Africa and India to <a href="https://medicineslawandpolicy.org/2023/10/new-reports-offer-evidence-for-extending-the-wto-decision-on-trips-to-covid-19-therapeutics-and-diagnostics-why-delay-further/">waive patent rights</a> for coronavirus therapeutics and tests.</p>
<p>These patent rights are guaranteed under the Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (<a href="https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm">TRIPS</a>) and there is still no agreement on a “TRIPS waiver”. Its opponents want the issue declared dead.</p>
<p>Also dating back to 2001 is a permanent resolution on the public stockpiling of food grains, which India insists is essential for food security. This is something the <a href="https://www.cairnsgroup.org/Pages/Introduction.aspx">Cairns Group</a> of agricultural exporters, including New Zealand, vehemently opposes as distorting free trade.</p>
<p>With an election pending, and <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/business/economy/india-susceptible-to-trade-disputes-without-permanent-solution-for-food-security-9160098/">protests from Indian farmers</a> demanding the country withdraw from the WTO, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government continues to demand an outcome.</p>
<h2>‘Reform by doing’</h2>
<p>Agreement on these big issues seems a long way off, just days out from the Abu Dhabi conference. And a prolonged WTO General Council meeting last week failed to resolve almost anything.</p>
<p>Big power politics is driving the process, and not just by the US and EU. China is exerting enormous pressure on developing country governments to endorse an unmandated agreement on “investment facilitation”. </p>
<p>This would create rules to streamline foreign investment, but would be <a href="https://www.twn.my/title2/briefing_papers/MC12/briefings/Joint-statement%20initiative%20on%20IF%20WTOMC12BP%2020%20Nov%202021%20Mohamadieh.pdf">onerous for developing countries</a> to implement. It needs consensus to become a WTO agreement.</p>
<p>South Africa and India have resolutely challenged the systemic consequences of these plurilateral negotiations as undermining the multilateral system and sidelining developing countries’ priorities.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/intellectual-property-waiver-for-covid-vaccines-should-be-expanded-to-include-treatments-and-tests-194918">Intellectual property waiver for COVID vaccines should be expanded to include treatments and tests</a>
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<p>They were stridently attacked for this by China at last week’s General Council, <a href="https://www.twn.my/title2/wto.info/2024/ti240212.htm">as well as by</a> WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. </p>
<p>But the plurilateral approach continues an agenda dubbed “reform by doing” by Okonjo-Iweala, a former managing director of the World Bank who holds dual Nigerian and US citizenship. </p>
<p>Essentially, it means bypassing the WTO’s <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm">constitutional rules</a> and formal bodies to redesign the WTO along the lines demanded by its powerful members and approved by the director-general. </p>
<p>Claims of bias were reinforced by the WTO’s (now deleted) pro-patent Valentine’s Day tweet this year, just days after the TRIPS waiver talks had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/feb/14/wto-fails-to-reach-agreement-on-providing-global-access-to-covid-treatments">broken down</a>: “Your love is like a patent, so rare and true / A work of art that only I can view / And just like some IP rights, it can never expire / Our love is like a never-ending fire.” </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-zealand-is-overdue-for-an-open-and-honest-debate-about-21st-century-trade-relations-160922">New Zealand is overdue for an open and honest debate about 21st-century trade relations</a>
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<h2>Exclusionary and manipulative</h2>
<p>Developing countries have heavily criticised Okonjo-Iweala for what they see as the <a href="https://www.twn.my/title2/wto.info/2022/ti220625.htm">exclusionary and manipulative practices</a> used to secure an outcome at MC12. She reportedly <a href="https://www.twn.my/title2/wto.info/2022/ti220703.htm">pushed back</a> against such complaints.</p>
<p>MC13 is shaping up to repeat these patterns, with negotiations on crucial issues scheduled simultaneously for small rooms that can accommodate only a subset of members, whom the director-general will choose.</p>
<p>New Zealand can use its privileged position as deputy chair to ensure the conference is conducted ethically, according to the WTO’s mandate: multilateral, member-driven, rules-based, non-discriminatory, transparent, with meaningful participation in consensus-based decisions.</p>
<p>If not, it will share the responsibility for enabling power politics to further destabilise the WTO.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223849/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Kelsey is attending the WTO ministerial as a representative of the Pacific Network on Globalisation (PANG), and as an invited Guest of the Chair. She advises a number of developing country governments on these issues. She is not paid by, and this is not written on behalf of, any of them. </span></em></p>Power politics and lack of progress on vital issues mean there are low expectations for the World Trade Organization’s ministerial conference in Abu Dhabi next week.Jane Kelsey, Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata RauLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2225112024-02-02T11:04:44Z2024-02-02T11:04:44ZGovernments spend US$22 billion a year helping the fishing industry empty our oceans. This injustice must end<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572830/original/file-20240201-27-sdoziy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=2%2C0%2C1370%2C770&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.pexels.com/photo/drone-view-of-fishing-trawler-on-sea-5829126/">Pok Rie/Pexel</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Overfishing has dire consequences for ocean health and for the millions of people who depend on fish for food and wellbeing. Globally, catch has been steadily <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms10244">declining</a> since the 1990s. It’s a trend that’s likely to continue if we fail to act now.</p>
<p>Nearly all governments, including Australia’s, subsidise their fishing industries. Financial support comes in many forms, from taxpayer-funded fuel to reduced boat-building costs. These subsidies are harmful because they encourage overfishing. Some of the most environmentally damaging and least efficient fishing activities, such as <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0308597X09001663">bottom trawling</a> and <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/full/10.1126/sciadv.aat2504">distant water fishing</a>, would become unprofitable and cease without government <a href="https://archives.nereusprogram.org/ask-an-expert-why-is-the-global-fishing-industry-given-35-billion-in-subsidies-each-year/">subsidies</a>. </p>
<p>Scientists worldwide are rallying for stringent regulations to eliminate harmful fisheries subsidies, which totalled a whopping <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X19303677">US$22 billion</a> in 2018. Safeguarding the ocean will strengthen food security and allow more equitable distribution of marine resources.</p>
<p>Trade ministers from around the world are set to convene later this month in Abu Dhabi at a key meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In an <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s44183-024-00042-0">open letter</a> published today, we are among 36 marine experts calling on the WTO to adopt ambitious regulations promoting fisheries sustainability and equity, and to eliminate harmful fisheries subsidies.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putting-an-end-to-billions-in-fishing-subsidies-could-improve-fish-stocks-and-ocean-health-163470">Putting an end to billions in fishing subsidies could improve fish stocks and ocean health</a>
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<h2>A long-awaited agreement</h2>
<p>International pressure from scientists helped to broker an earlier agreement on fishing subsidies, which is yet to be ratified. </p>
<p>In October 2021, 300 experts published an <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abm1680">article in Nature</a> calling for an end to harmful subsidies in the fishing sector. </p>
<p>After decades of fruitless negotiations, the WTO finally reached an <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/rulesneg_e/fish_e/fish_factsheet_e.pdf">agreement on fisheries subsidies</a> in June 2022. </p>
<p>Once ratified by two-thirds of WTO members, this agreement will partially address the United Nations <a href="https://indicators.report/targets/14-6/">Sustainable Development Goal Target 14.6</a> to eliminate harmful subsidies.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572831/original/file-20240201-17-tiyvdp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a suit brings down the gavel after agreement was reached on fisheries subsidies at the WTO meeting in 2022." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572831/original/file-20240201-17-tiyvdp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572831/original/file-20240201-17-tiyvdp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572831/original/file-20240201-17-tiyvdp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572831/original/file-20240201-17-tiyvdp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572831/original/file-20240201-17-tiyvdp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572831/original/file-20240201-17-tiyvdp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572831/original/file-20240201-17-tiyvdp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The gavel goes down after members reached an agreement on fisheries subsidies, Geneva, 17 June 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc12_e/photos_e.htm">WTO/Jay Louvion</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
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<p>Unfortunately, while this agreement is historic, it is narrow. It only prohibits member governments from financing illegal fishing activities and the exploitation of already overfished stocks. But it’s obvious illegal fishing should be banned and the focus on overfished stocks is too little, too late. </p>
<p>Experts argue the agreement fails to specifically address harmful subsidies across global fisheries and as such only affects a <a href="https://oceana.org/blog/the-wto-agreement-saves-face-but-does-it-save-fish/">trivial component</a> of subsidy-driven exploitation. The subsidies that reduce operating costs and increase fishing capacity, allowing vessels to travel further and remain at sea longer, remain in place. </p>
<h2>Fisheries subsidies affect more than just fish</h2>
<p>Scientists have been <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-021-00451-1">sounding the alarm</a> for decades. Many published studies document the <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0020239">destabilising effects</a> of fisheries subsidies on ecosystems. In addition to impacting biodiversity and ecosystems, subsidies also increase the <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0921800921001154">CO₂ emissions</a> that contribute to climate change.</p>
<p>More recently, studies have also applied a social perspective to this issue. Seafood lifts millions of people out of hunger, malnutrition and poverty. Yet more people will lose a secure <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/534317a">source of food and nutrients</a> if fish stocks continue to decline due to industrial overfishing. </p>
<p>Research shedding light on the concept of “<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X20302529">equity</a>” shows subsidies don’t just harm the ocean, they also affect human <a href="https://www.worldwildlife.org/stories/5-ways-harmful-fisheries-subsidies-impact-coastal-communities">communities</a>. These communities are largely in developing countries which are rarely the source of harmful fisheries subsidies. Rather, their waters are exploited by <a href="https://oceana.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/18/OceanaDWF_FinalReport.pdf">foreign vessels</a> supported by wealthy governments’ fisheries subsidies.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572832/original/file-20240201-25-bknp4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Person wearing gloves, bending down to handle drying squid on a fish net" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572832/original/file-20240201-25-bknp4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572832/original/file-20240201-25-bknp4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572832/original/file-20240201-25-bknp4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572832/original/file-20240201-25-bknp4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572832/original/file-20240201-25-bknp4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572832/original/file-20240201-25-bknp4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572832/original/file-20240201-25-bknp4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Fisheries contribute to livelihoods and food security of millions of people.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.pexels.com/photo/person-drying-squid-on-fishnet-13243896/">Jimmy Liao/Pexel</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>Fisheries subsidies foster unfair competition not only among countries but also between industrial and community led fishing fleets. In the <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s44183-023-00031-9">Indian Ocean</a>, the level of subsidies provided to industrial fisheries corresponds to the amount of seafood exported to international markets, largely supplying rich and food-secure countries. This shows governments are deliberately empowering their industrial fleets to fish for seafood largely exported and consumed elsewhere, instead of sustaining fisheries providing food for locals. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fisheries-subsidies-fuel-ocean-depletion-and-hurt-coastal-communities-142260">Fisheries subsidies fuel ocean depletion and hurt coastal communities</a>
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<h2>The good, the bad and the ugly</h2>
<p>While most nations contribute to harmful subsidies, <a href="https://oceana.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/18/994812/Oceana_Summary6-22.pdf">ten nations</a> are responsible for 70% of this unsustainable financing. Chief among them are China, Japan and the European Union, reflecting the significant size of their distant water fishing fleets that typically access the resources of less-developed nations.</p>
<p>In contrast, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X19303677?via%3Dihub">Australia</a> contributes only 0.1% of global harmful subsidies. Only 6% of Australia’s annual US$400 million in fisheries subsidies is considered harmful. While Australia should give attention to its ongoing annual taxpayer contribution of US$25 million to the fishing sector, it is well placed to demonstrate global leadership on how fishing can deliver sustainable and equitable outcomes without harmful subsidies.</p>
<h2>An essential opportunity</h2>
<p>A <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc13_e/mc13_e.htm">second wave</a> of negotiations on fisheries subsidies is expected during the WTO Ministerial Conference this February in Abu Dhabi. This conference represents an invaluable opportunity to better protect the ocean. </p>
<p>In anticipation of this meeting, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s44183-024-00042-0">we are urging nations</a> to adopt more ambitious regulations that eliminate harmful subsidies, prioritising fisheries sustainability and ocean equity. </p>
<p>Harmful fisheries subsidies are not only unsustainable but profoundly unfair. Based on the extensive body of evidence, the WTO should agree to eliminate harmful subsidies once and for all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222511/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vania Andreoli received funding for her PhD research from the Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship and The Jock Clough Marine Foundation through the Oceans Institute Robson and Robertson Award. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Zeller supervises Vania Andreoli’s PhD, so his lab has indirectly received funding for this doctoral research from the Australian Government and the Jock Clough Marine Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jessica Meeuwig supervises Vania Andreoli's PhD so her lab has indirectly received funding for this doctoral research from the Australian Government and the Jock Clough Marine Foundation. </span></em></p>Governments all over the world are propping up overfishing. Now scientists have penned an open letter calling on trade ministers to implement stricter regulations against harmful fisheries subsidies.Vania Andreoli, PhD Candidate, The University of Western AustraliaDirk Zeller, Professor & Director, Sea Around Us - Indian Ocean, The University of Western AustraliaJessica Meeuwig, Wen Family Chair in Conservation, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2127502023-09-05T12:31:51Z2023-09-05T12:31:51ZThe US broke global trade rules to try to fix climate change – to finish the job, it has to fix the trade system<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546039/original/file-20230902-29-t9j2d6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5136%2C3421&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. President Joe Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act on Aug. 16, 2022, including electric vehicle subsidies with 'buy American' rules.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-smiles-as-he-test-drives-an-electric-news-photo/1236627019">Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, President Joe Biden’s landmark climate law, is now expected to prompt <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/goldman-sees-biden-clean-energy-181052871.html">a trillion dollars in government spending</a> to fight climate change and trillions more in private investment. But the law and Biden’s broader “buy American” agenda include measures <a href="https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/ira-ev-tax-credits/">that discriminate against imports</a>.</p>
<p>One year in, these policies, such as the law’s <a href="https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/ira-ev-tax-credits/">electric vehicle subsidies</a>, appear to be succeeding at growing domestic clean energy industries – consider the <a href="https://www.energy.gov/investments-american-made-energy">US$100 billion in newly announced battery supply chain investments</a>. But we believe the law also clearly violates international trade rules.</p>
<p>The problem is not the crime but the cover-up. Today’s trade rules are ill-suited for the climate crisis. However, simply tearing them down could hinder economic growth and climate progress alike. </p>
<p>If U.S. leaders instead take responsibility for forging an improved international trade system – rather than denying the violations of trade rules or pointing fingers at similar transgressions by trade partners – they could help put the global economy in a better position to weather increasing climate-related trade tensions.</p>
<h2>Building, then violating WTO rules</h2>
<p>The United States has shaped international trade rules more than any other country.</p>
<p>In the 1940s, <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c13863/c13863.pdf">the U.S. proposed</a> rules that were eventually largely adopted as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, or GATT, a series of multinational agreements to reduce trade barriers. The <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c13863/c13863.pdf">most ambitious</a> of the GATT agreements was the U.S.-instigated Uruguay Round of the 1990s, which created the World Trade Organization.</p>
<p>Some WTO rules are vague, but others are crystal clear, including <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf">an unambiguous prohibition</a> of subsidies contingent on the use of domestic products instead of imports. Certain provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act do exactly that, such as the <a href="https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/ira-ev-tax-credits/">electric vehicle subsidies</a> that require a large percentage of parts to be produced in North America.</p>
<p>The choice facing U.S. policymakers was between accepting the Inflation Reduction Act, including its rule-breaking, protectionist elements, or missing the small window to pass federal climate legislation.</p>
<p>Sen. Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.) explicitly refused to provide the 50th vote needed to pass the law if it wasn’t to his liking, and among his asks was <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-19/manchin-nearly-killed-ev-credit-with-take-it-or-leave-it-threat">domestic sourcing requirements</a>. More broadly, any meaningful climate legislation that does not support the local economies of fossil fuel-heavy regions may be dead on arrival in the U.S. Senate.</p>
<p>Without the Inflation Reduction Act, however, the U.S. had <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126%2Fscience.adg3781">next to no chance of meeting its climate commitments</a>, which would have dampened climate policy momentum across the world.</p>
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<p>U.S. leaders might have been justified in begging for forgiveness after passing the legislation rather than asking for permission to violate trade rules. Instead, Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), who chairs the powerful Senate Finance Committee, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/12/09/trade-rules-democrats-inflation-tax-00073138">said his team reviewed</a> the international trade laws very carefully and found no violations.</p>
<p>Instead of an apology, U.S. leaders have said, “You’re welcome,” <a href="https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/01/24/brian-deese-john-podesta-and-jake-sullivan-on-the-inflation-reduction-act">arguing</a> that the subsidies will benefit other countries by accelerating the deployment of clean energy technologies and <a href="https://rhg.com/research/emerging-climate-technology-ira/">lowering costs</a>.</p>
<p>While there is strong evidence to support this argument, it falls flat from a country that <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-which-countries-are-historically-responsible-for-climate-change/">has failed to fulfill</a> its obligations to take federal action on climate change for decades and just violated trade laws it has <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm">held others accountable to</a> for so long. <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d27c3b26-275e-45c0-95fd-af64169e500d">India’s power minister accused the West of hypocrisy</a>, saying the Inflation Reduction Act’s protectionism will inhibit the energy transitions in developing economies.</p>
<h2>The real concern: Rising protectionism</h2>
<p>The Inflation Reduction Act contains a fundamental contradiction. Its promise to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions relies on the rapid diffusion of technologies, knowledge and finance across borders. Yet, its domestic subsidies may accelerate the adoption of trade barriers that inhibit these same cross-border flows, thus slowing progress on climate change.</p>
<p>Moreover, the investments it catalyzes will immediately benefit the U.S. economy, while the shared benefits of technological progress and emissions reductions will unfold over many decades for other countries. In the intervening years, other countries may respond with <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-us-eu-trade-tensions-rise-conflicting-carbon-tariffs-could-undermine-climate-efforts-198072">protectionist policies of their own</a>.</p>
<p>Indeed, the real concern might not be the opening salvo, but the shootout of growing protectionism that ensues. For all its drawbacks, the growth in international trade since World War II has led to immense economic progress in much of the world, <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions">including the United States</a>. The WTO and its predecessors have been instrumental in reducing harmful tariffs and providing a consistent set of trade rules to which countries are supposed to adhere. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Biden and von der Lyden talk in the Oval Office. They're leaning foward toward each other in their chairs and smiling." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546040/original/file-20230902-21-4omogb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546040/original/file-20230902-21-4omogb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546040/original/file-20230902-21-4omogb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546040/original/file-20230902-21-4omogb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546040/original/file-20230902-21-4omogb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546040/original/file-20230902-21-4omogb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546040/original/file-20230902-21-4omogb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Combating climate change was on the agenda when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited the White House in March 2023. The European Union has proposed its own rules to support its domestic clean energy industries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-meets-with-president-of-european-news-photo/1472620847">Alex Wong/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>The Biden administration is attempting to assuage these concerns by <a href="https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/will-united-states-new-critical-minerals-agreements-shape-electric-vehicle">forging agreements</a> that make more foreign producers eligible for Inflation Reduction Act subsidies. But, in our view, bespoke agreements with a handful of countries aren’t enough. A new vision is needed for international trade rules that support low trade barriers and “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/04/20/remarks-on-a-modern-american-industrial-strategy-by-nec-director-brian-deese/">green industrial policies</a>” alike.</p>
<h2>An opportunity to modernize international trade</h2>
<p>Global trade rules have not been updated in a generation. They are sorely in need of reform.</p>
<p>The usefulness of the WTO is contingent on most parties agreeing that its rules are worth following. Without a new working consensus and backing from the largest powers with effective vetoes, the organization will become irrelevant.</p>
<p>The first step to fixing the situation is to stop denying the problem or digging deeper holes, such as the United States’ ill-advised <a href="https://www.iisd.org/articles/united-states-must-propose-solutions-end-wto-dispute-settlement-crisis">blocking of appointments</a> to the WTO’s dispute settlement Appellate Body since 2017 to protest what it sees as overreach by the body.</p>
<p>More proactively, the U.S. can reestablish its commitment to trade rules by instigating a process to develop equitable reforms.</p>
<p>That could begin with a global summit to discuss the changes necessary to reflect new realities. High-level leadership from the United States would add considerable heft to the <a href="https://remakingtradeproject.org/">ongoing efforts to reform global trade rules</a>.</p>
<p>Any fundamental rewrite of WTO rules will be a long and painstaking process. Instead, it may be sufficient to add a few clauses to existing agreements – like <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art20_e.pdf">GATT Articles 20</a> and <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art21_e.pdf">21, which deal with exceptions to the trade rules</a> – that clearly and transparently recognize that governments will need to nurture emerging domestic industries to cut emissions fast, ensure energy security and support vulnerable economies. </p>
<p>New rules <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5ca0ec9b809d8e4c67c27b3a/t/646b98583cf55d296031fcb3/1684772952775/T20_PB_TF4_434.pdf">could limit and define</a> the appropriate use of green subsidies, carbon border tariffs, export and import controls and supply chain coordination. For example, the U.S. and other developed countries could agree to limit subsidies’ domestic sourcing requirements to only emerging, innovative clean technologies that require public support to commercialize. Building on this, all countries could work toward an explicit list of clean energy, transport and industrial technologies needed by all that can be traded with reduced or minimal tariffs. </p>
<p>Of course, these trade tools would have to be managed carefully to avoid proliferating and exacerbating tensions.</p>
<p>In the meantime, since U.S. leaders are already acting as if these rules exist, they’ll have to accept that other countries’ leaders may act similarly — a new <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_imperative">Kantian Golden Rule</a> for trade. </p>
<p>It may turn out that the United States did the world a favor by throwing off the shackles of outdated trade rules. That will depend on whether U.S. leaders take advantage of the opportunity to reframe the discussion around the country’s recent legislation as steps toward a modernized international trade regime that better aligns with the world’s climate goals.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212750/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Joe Biden’s ‘buy American’ effort with EVs likely violated World Trade Organization rules that the US helped create. The US has an opportunity now to update the system – if it’s willing to take it.Noah Kaufman, Research Scholar in Climate Economics, Columbia UniversityChris Bataille, Adjunct Research Fellow in Energy and Climate Policy, Columbia UniversityGautam Jain, Senior Research Scholar in Financing the Energy Transition, Columbia UniversitySagatom Saha, Research Scholar in Energy Policy, Columbia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2038982023-04-17T20:03:47Z2023-04-17T20:03:47ZAustralia’s barley solution with China shows diplomacy does work<p>The agreement between Australia and China to resolve a dispute over Chinese tariffs on Australian barley without World Trade Organization (WTO) adjudication is evidence of a distinct improvement in relations. </p>
<p>It raises confidence Australia can maintain a constructive relationship with China even as US-China relations continue to deteriorate. </p>
<p>China imposed an 80.5% import tariff on Australian barley in May 2020, on the grounds Australian barley was sold in the Chinese market at a price lower than its price in Australia (known as “dumping”) and was subsidised, harming China’s barley growers. </p>
<p>China’s Ministry of Commerce began an anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigation into barley in November 2018. At the time it was perceived as retaliation for more than a dozen anti-dumping actions taken by Australia <a href="https://theconversation.com/barley-is-not-a-random-choice-heres-the-real-reason-china-is-taking-on-australia-over-dumping-107271">against Chinese imports</a> over a decade.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/barley-is-not-a-random-choice-heres-the-real-reason-china-is-taking-on-australia-over-dumping-107271">Barley is not a random choice – here's the real reason China is taking on Australia over dumping</a>
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<p>But the timing of the tariff decision, just weeks after Australia called for an international investigation into the origin of COVID-19, meant it was perceived as part of a broader campaign of Chinese economic coercion that included actions against Australian coal, beef, lobster and wine. </p>
<p>In December 2020, Australia lodged its claim against the barley tariffs <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds598_e.htm">with the WTO</a>. The breakdown in the official relationship at the time made it impossible for the dispute to be resolved via consultation. </p>
<p>Last week (on April 11) both parties requested the WTO suspend proceedings. This follows nearly a year of efforts to repair the relationship following the election of the Albanese government.</p>
<p>The agreement came in the same week that Australia <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media-release/australia-china-senior-officials-talks">hosted China’s deputy foreign minister</a>, Ma Zhaoxu, the highest-level Chinese official to visit Canberra in more than six years. </p>
<p>Official visits by China’s Foreign Minister, Qin Gang (who met Australia’s Foreign Minister Penny Wong in March on the sidelines of a G20 meeting in New Delhi) and senior officials from other ministries like agriculture and education, are expected to follow.</p>
<h2>What the barley agreement means</h2>
<p>Digging into <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/step-forward-resolve-barley-dispute-china">the details</a> of the barley deal, China has agreed to conduct an expedited review of barley tariffs in the next three or four months. </p>
<p>China’s Ministry of Commerce <a href="http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zfxxgk/article/gkml/202304/20230403404024.shtml">initiated a review</a>
on April 14, based on an application lodged by the China Alcoholic Drinks Association. The review is needed for the ministry to find a reasonable ground to remove the duties. The standard time frame for such a review is 12 months.</p>
<p>For Australia, this offers a quicker path to get barley back in the Chinese market than proceeding with <a href="https://theconversation.com/taking-china-to-the-world-trade-organisation-plants-a-seed-it-wont-be-a-quick-or-easy-win-152173">the WTO case</a>. </p>
<p>While a decision from the WTO panel hearing the dispute was expected in just days, a finding that Australia wasn’t dumping barley on China could have meant another year before the tariffs were terminated. This is because China would retain the option of appealing the decision. Even if it then lost the appeal, it could still have dragged out removing the tariffs.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/taking-china-to-the-world-trade-organisation-plants-a-seed-it-wont-be-a-quick-or-easy-win-152173">Taking China to the World Trade Organisation plants a seed. It won't be a quick or easy win</a>
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<p>The approach sets a useful template for how Australia might similarly get China to remove the tariffs (of 116% to 218%) imposed on Australian wine <a href="https://www.agriculture.gov.au/abares/research-topics/trade/australian-wine-in-china">in March 2021</a>. </p>
<p>Australia initiated WTO proceeding in June 2021, with the WTO panel established four months later. It is expected to issue its decision by mid-2023. But continuing with the process will also take much longer for the tariffs to be removed. </p>
<p>This approach can also potentially be a template for the parties to suspend WTO dispute proceedings brought by <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds603_e.htm">China against Australia</a> for its anti-dumping and anti-subsidy tariffs on selected Chinese imports.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/it-might-look-like-china-is-winning-the-trade-war-but-its-import-bans-are-a-diplomacy-fail-154558">It might look like China is winning the trade war, but its import bans are a diplomacy fail</a>
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<h2>Knocking on the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s door</h2>
<p>For China, a more strategic goal behind the agreement might be alleviating Australia’s resistance to China joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). </p>
<p>The trade pact involves 11 Pacific-rim nations and now Britain, whose request to join was approved by the other signatories in March.</p>
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<p>China lodged its application to join after the UK, in September 2021. It too needs consensus approval from all CPTPP parties, and Australia has made its position crystal clear: China must end its trade sanctions and show a capability and willingness to live up to the CPTPP’s high standards. </p>
<p>Resolving the barley dispute is a starting point. It will also demonstrate that a rules-based global trading system can influence China’s behaviour. That’s not unexpected, because no country has <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_outlook23_e.pdf">a bigger stake</a> in global trade. Last year China’s goods trade reached $US6.3 trillion, nearly $US900 billion more than the US. </p>
<p>For Australia, beginning a discussion about China joining the CPTPP may speed up regaining market access for its exports, and be an opportunity to secure China’s commitment to a rules-based agreement that exceeds WTO minimums. </p>
<h2>From cautious optimism to reasonable confidence</h2>
<p>The anticipated resolution of the barley dispute is not an isolated achievement. It demonstrates the effectiveness of the Albanese government’s diplomatic approach to China. </p>
<p>This has involved incrementally rebuilding economic cooperation while managing disagreements on values and security issues through calm and professional engagement. Amid geopolitical tensions with the US, China is also looking to stabilise its external environment. </p>
<p>Economic cooperation remains a standout area of common interest. Add in political willingness and diplomatic wisdom, and an assessment of cautious optimism can be replaced by one of reasonable confidence in the upward trajectory of the bilateral relationship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203898/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Abandoning its WTO case is a quicker path to getting Australian barley back into China. It could also be a template for resolving tariff disputes over other products, including Australian wine.Weihuan Zhou, Associate Professor, Co-Director of China International Business and Economic Law (CIBEL) Centre, Faculty of Law and Justice, UNSW Sydney, UNSW SydneyJames Laurenceson, Director and Professor, Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI), University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1949182022-11-21T19:03:46Z2022-11-21T19:03:46ZIntellectual property waiver for COVID vaccines should be expanded to include treatments and tests<p>Global inequities in access to COVID vaccines have turned out to be a “catastrophic moral failure”, just as the World Health Organization warned they would in <a href="https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-148th-session-of-the-executive-board">January 2021</a>. Yet it took 20 months of negotiations for members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to agree to a limited relaxation of patent rules for COVID vaccines – a move <a href="https://www.msf.org/lack-real-ip-waiver-covid-19-tools-disappointing-failure-people">decried by civil society organisations</a> as too little, too late.</p>
<p>Treatments and diagnostic tests are also very important in managing the pandemic, and like vaccines, are very unequally distributed globally. Unfortunately, negotiations to expand the WTO decision on COVID vaccine patents to include treatments and tests are in a sorry state. There is little chance of a decision by the December deadline WTO members set for themselves. </p>
<p>In the meantime, deaths and hospitalisation from COVID continue to place pressure on health-care systems.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-should-rich-countries-do-with-spare-masks-and-gloves-its-the-opposite-of-what-the-who-recommends-191265">What should rich countries do with spare masks and gloves? It's the opposite of what the WHO recommends</a>
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<h2>Inequities in access</h2>
<p>By the end of 2021, more than a year after the first COVID vaccines went into arms, more than 76% of people in high- and upper-middle-income countries had received a dose, compared with <a href="https://globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12992-022-00801-z">8.5% in low-income countries</a>. Even now, with almost 13 billion doses administered around the world, less than <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations">25% of people in low-income countries</a> have received a dose.</p>
<p>By September 2022, more than 330 COVID tests per 100,000 people were being performed daily in high-income countries, in comparison to <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/external-evaluation-of-the-access-to-covid-19-tools-accelerator-(act-a)">5.4 per 100,000 in low-income nations</a>. And of the three billion tests used globally by March 2022, only <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(22)00378-4/fulltext">0.4% were administered in low-income countries</a>.</p>
<p>Treatments are even more inequitably distributed. Most low-income countries are unable to access the new oral antivirals such as Paxlovid (made by Pfizer) and Lagevrio (Merck Sharpe & Dohme). These companies charge around <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/price-covid-treatments-pfizer-merck-gsk-align-with-patient-benefits-report-2022-02-03/">US$530 and US$700</a> (A$800 and A$1,050) respectively for a five-day course of treatment in high-income markets such as the United States. </p>
<p>Pfizer has agreed to deals with UNICEF and the Global Fund to provide <a href="https://www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-detail/pfizer-supply-global-fund-6-million-paxlovidtm-treatment">10 million courses of Paxlovid</a> to lower-income countries at lower prices. But this represents a very small proportion of the treatments Pfizer is making.</p>
<p>Both Pfizer and Merck Sharpe & Dohme have established licensing agreements with the <a href="https://medicinespatentpool.org/progress-achievements/licences">Medicines Patent Pool</a>, enabling generic manufacturers to make their antiviral treatments for poorer countries in future. But they have restricted the number of countries that will be able to purchase the generic drugs to mainly low- and lower-income countries (<a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/pfizer-merck-pills-renew-concerns-on-covid-treatment-equity">106 and 95 respectively</a>). </p>
<p>This leaves many upper-middle income countries (such as Thailand, China and Mexico) in a difficult situation. They are unable to pay the high prices for the originator drugs but are excluded from accessing the lower-priced generics.</p>
<p>It’s clear more needs to be done to ensure all countries can access the tools they need to manage the pandemic.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-were-on-a-global-panel-looking-at-the-staggering-costs-of-covid-17-7m-deaths-and-counting-here-are-11-ways-to-stop-history-repeating-itself-190658">We were on a global panel looking at the staggering costs of COVID – 17.7m deaths and counting. Here are 11 ways to stop history repeating itself</a>
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<h2>Negotiations at the WTO</h2>
<p>India and South Africa first put a proposal to the WTO in <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/W669.pdf&Open=True">October 2020</a> to temporarily relax certain intellectual property rules in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights for COVID medical products during the pandemic.</p>
<p>The proposed waiver would have enabled companies around the world to freely produce COVID health products and technologies – vaccines, treatments, tests, and personal protective equipment (such as face masks) – without fear of litigation over possible infringements of intellectual property rights. </p>
<p>These intellectual property rights included not only patents, but copyright, trademarks and trade secrets or know-how. Specifically, know-how is often essential for manufacturing vaccines and some treatments. However, under existing rules, there are limited pathways to <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3872796">compulsorily licence know-how</a> and other confidential information.</p>
<p>The proposal eventually gained the support of more than 100 of the WTO’s 164 member countries and was sponsored by more than 60. But it faced strong opposition from wealthy countries that house multinational pharmaceutical companies, particularly the <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/healthcare/biotech/pharmaceuticals/msf-urges-rich-nations-to-accept-trips-waiver/articleshow/89757281.cms">European Union, United Kingdom and Switzerland</a>.</p>
<p>On June 17 2022, WTO members belatedly agreed on a <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN22/30.pdf&Open=True">narrow, limited waiver</a>, applying only to patents, and only to COVID vaccines in the first instance. In the end it waives only a single rule, making it easier for vaccines made using its provisions to be exported from the country of manufacture to a <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4150090">second developing country</a>. </p>
<p>While the decision applied only to vaccines, it included a clause committing the parties to decide whether to expand the waiver to include COVID treatments and tests within six months.</p>
<p>That six-month period ends on December 17. Unfortunately, the same dynamics that slowed and watered down the initial proposal threaten to prevent a timely decision this time too. The <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/health-consumers/news/discussions-for-waiver-on-covid-19-diagnostics-and-therapeutics-at-standstill/">EU, Switzerland, Japan and the UK</a> are particularly reluctant to allow negotiations to move forward.</p>
<p>As with the original waiver debate, many countries lack the know-how to commence domestic vaccine manufacturing, particularly for <a href="https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2020.02097">novel vaccine platforms</a>. Lack of know-how was an even greater barrier to widespread COVID vaccine manufacturing than patents. </p>
<p>Many more countries have the capacity to produce treatments, but therapeutic patents are <a href="https://www.wipo.int/publications/en/details.jsp?id=4589">more prevalent</a> than COVID vaccine patents. So, expanding the waiver to include COVID therapeutics could help countries quickly scale up domestic manufacturing of essential treatments.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/wealthy-nations-starved-the-developing-world-of-vaccines-omicron-shows-the-cost-of-this-greed-172763">Wealthy nations starved the developing world of vaccines. Omicron shows the cost of this greed</a>
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<h2>Help where it’s needed</h2>
<p>Low and middle-income countries have been impacted disproportionately by the pandemic so far, suffering <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/05-05-2022-14.9-million-excess-deaths-were-associated-with-the-covid-19-pandemic-in-2020-and-2021">85%</a> of the estimated 14.9 million excess deaths in 2020 and 2021. </p>
<p>Globally, progress in reducing extreme poverty was set back three to four years during 2020–21. But low-income countries lost <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/936001635880885713/poverty-median-incomes-and-inequality-in-2021-a-diverging-recovery">eight to nine years of progress</a>.</p>
<p>Expanding the WTO decision on COVID vaccines to include treatments and tests could be vital to reduce the health burden on poorer countries from COVID and enable them to recover from the pandemic. The Australian government should get behind this initiative and encourage other countries to do the same.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194918/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Deborah Gleeson has received funding in the past from the Australian Research Council. She has received funding from various national and international non-government organisations to attend speaking engagements related to trade agreements and health. She has represented the Public Health Association of Australia on matters related to trade agreements and public health</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dianne Nicol has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Medical Research Futures Fund, the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) and the Federal Department of Health. She is chair of the NHMRC Embryo Research Licensing Committee and co-lead of the Regulatory and Ethics Work Stream of the Global Alliance for Genomics and Health</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Scheibner has received funding from Health Translation SA, as well as the Swiss National Science Foundation through the Personalized Health and Related Technologies project.</span></em></p>Time is running out to expand an agreement to relax patent rules on COVID vaccines. Members of the World Trade Organization should broaden its scope to treatments and tests.Deborah Gleeson, Associate Professor in Public Health, La Trobe UniversityDianne Nicol, Emeritus Professor of Law, University of TasmaniaJames Scheibner, Lecturer in Law, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1855672022-07-18T15:08:50Z2022-07-18T15:08:50ZWe have a deal. Can we now talk about some not-so-harmful fisheries subsidies?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472975/original/file-20220707-22-wx1ev1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C59%2C4992%2C3263&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The World Trade Organization reached an agreement on fisheries subsidies, prohibiting member countries from funding illegal fishing and fishing of overexploited stocks at the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva on June 17. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Fabrice Coffrini/Pool Photo/Keystone via AP)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/we-have-a-deal--can-we-now-talk-about-some-not-so-harmful-fisheries-subsidies" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>The World Trade Organization reached an <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN22/W22.pdf&Open=True">agreement on fisheries subsidies</a> on June 17, prohibiting member countries from funding illegal fishing and fishing of overexploited stocks. </p>
<p>After decades of failed negotiations, this new agreement is a massive step toward achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 14 — <a href="https://www.globalgoals.org/goals/14-life-below-water/">Life Below Water</a>. While this new agreement fails to address the “harmful” subsidies that fund overfishing, the <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spno_e/spno28_e.htm">WTO is committed to continuing its negotiation</a> to restrict these programs.</p>
<p>This idea of “harmful” subsidies, however, overlooks the diverse conditions of fisheries worldwide. It ignores the important role government interventions play in the economic security and <a href="https://pubs.iied.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/migrate/16647IIED.pdf">livelihood of coastal communities</a>. </p>
<p>Using oversimplified terms, like harmful, to define subsidies can have real-life consequences. Ignoring the nuances of fisheries under the guise of “illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing,” for example, has already led to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/faf.12462">the criminalization of small-scale fishers</a>.</p>
<p>As a fisheries economist involved in the 2011 WTO negotiations, and who has followed this issue since then, I believe we need to have more nuanced discussions about the role of fisheries subsidies — even the nominally harmful ones — to avoid further marginalization of small-scale fishers.</p>
<h2>‘Harmful’ subsidies are not always harmful</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2019.103695">Harmful subsidies</a> are government programs that reduce the operating costs of fishing, and leads to excessive fishing and overexploitation. </p>
<p>The notion of “harm” is focused primarily on overfishing. However, this description ignores how subsidies can be used as key policy tools that address fisheries-related social issues.</p>
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<img alt="A worker stands near a large trawl with fish on the deck of a ship" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473967/original/file-20220713-9428-g1of2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473967/original/file-20220713-9428-g1of2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473967/original/file-20220713-9428-g1of2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473967/original/file-20220713-9428-g1of2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473967/original/file-20220713-9428-g1of2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473967/original/file-20220713-9428-g1of2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473967/original/file-20220713-9428-g1of2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Harmful fishing subsidies focus on one potential environmental outcome — overfishing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
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<p>Such subsidies include providing <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0277-5395(00)00090-X">public employment insurance</a> that considers the seasonal nature of fishing, government-backed loans for independent harvesters when <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103982">private loans are not enough</a>, <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/fisheries-oceans/news/2022/02/government-of-canada-invests-118-million-in-indigenous-fisheries-opportunities-in-bc.html">infrastructure support in underserved communities</a> and <a href="https://repositorio.cepal.org/handle/11362/45984">emergency relief funds</a>. </p>
<p>Because these programs are cost-reducing and have potential environmental impacts, they are considered harmful. But this is an inaccurate descriptor because these kinds of subsidies don’t impose a choice between addressing social or environmental concerns. </p>
<p>The link between subsidies and overexploitation can be <a href="https://doi.org/10.1787/bd9b0dc3-en">mitigated by better fisheries management programs</a>, such as caps on fishing effort or limits on catch.</p>
<h2>Addressing neoliberalism’s legacy</h2>
<p>Leading up to the recent rounds of WTO negotiations, harmful subsidies were argued to be a source of inequity for two reasons. </p>
<p>First, industrialized nations were found <a href="https://oceana.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/18/OceanaDWF_FinalReport.pdf">to spend more than others on subsidies</a>. Second, the majority of the public funds allotted to fishing sectors were <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2020.539214">captured by industrial fleets</a> instead of small-scale fishers. </p>
<p>It’s true that some subsidy programs represent <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/icesjms/fsaa142">wasteful, unjustified and potentially corrupt transfers</a> of public funds to private corporations. In such cases, it is essential that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.10.001">governments eliminate such practices</a>. </p>
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<p>But this does not mean that restricting governments’ ability to intervene will lead to a fair playing field. On the contrary, governments should help small-scale fisheries be more commercially competitive through programs that reduce licence fees or support catch quota acquisitions and those that provide essential infrastructure and services. </p>
<p>Developing coastal nations — particularly <a href="https://www.un.org/ohrlls/content/about-small-island-developing-states">small island developing states</a> — have been locked in decade-long fights over transboundary fish stocks. Their goals <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104781">include developing domestic fleets</a> that are capable of capturing their fair share of resources. </p>
<p>Given the <a href="https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/publications/FfD-SIDS-UNDP-OHRLLS-Discussion-Paper.pdf">lack of private capital</a> in these countries, they are unlikely to achieve these aspirations without public financial support. </p>
<p>Simply put, public interventions like subsidies are necessary to remedy the disproportionate market power and access that industrial fleets have accrued under <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.03.025">decades of neoliberal policies</a>. </p>
<h2>Need a more nuanced conversation</h2>
<p>Addressing social injustice within communities starts with recognizing their diverse histories, future goals, local management practices, governance structures and the sociocultural and economic roles of fishing in certain contexts. </p>
<p>The new WTO agreement improves global transparency by expanding subsidy notification obligations. Member states will be required to submit any information about new subsidies programs to the WTO, where the committee will assess them to ensure member states are complying with the new agreement. In order for the new agreement to be meaningful, this new notification mechanism must be publicly accessible.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The new WTO agreement creates a framework for global transparency through fisheries subsidies programs including an enhanced notification scheme and a new Committee on Fisheries Subsidies.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Future attempts to restrict how sovereign nations support their domestic fisheries and coastal communities must proceed with caution. We must be aware of the limits in a top-down, international approach, and avoid unnecessarily constraining governments’ capacity. </p>
<p>We must ensure that the actions to control overfishing must not lead to further marginalization of small-scale fishers. </p>
<p>Now that the mandate for the WTO agreement on fisheries subsidies is embedded within the UN Sustainable Development Agenda, future negotiations must protect and enhance ocean equity. This starts with more nuanced conversations about so-called harmful subsidies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185567/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wilf Swartz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is a need for nuanced discussions around the role of fisheries subsidies — even those that may be nominally harmful — to avoid further inequity and marginalization of small-scale fishers.Wilf Swartz, Associate Professor, Marine Affairs Program, Dalhousie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1853732022-06-21T19:56:34Z2022-06-21T19:56:34ZWorld Trade Organization steps back from the brink of irrelevance – but it’s not fixed yet<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469885/original/file-20220620-18-wsmzgw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5000%2C2544&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">India's minister of commerce Piyush Goyal and WTO director-general Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala celebrate the end of the WTO's 12th Ministerial Conference.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fabrice Coffrini/Pool/Keystone via AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After decades of conflict that has neutered its work, the World Trade Organization looks to be back in business. </p>
<p>Its highest decision-making body – a conference of ministers from the organisation’s 164 member nations – has just met for the first time since 2017. </p>
<p>None of what the ministerial conference (<a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc12_e/mc12_e.htm">dubbed MC12</a> due to being the 12th such meeting) agreed on was particularly groundbreaking. But the fact there was agreement at all – on areas such as agriculture, fishing, intellectual property, e-commerce and food insecurity – was itself a milestone.</p>
<p>The question is what happens now, with considerable challenges ahead for the WTO and its role in promoting and protecting a global rules-based trading system.</p>
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<h2>Fighting for relevance</h2>
<p>The WTO’s job is to be the forum for <a href="https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/multilateral">multilateral</a> rule-making, to observe the implementation of these trade rules, and to settle disputes among members. </p>
<p>In most situations, decisions must be made by consensus. This means a single detractor can scuttle initiatives supported by the rest of the WTO’s membership.</p>
<p>This has proved particularly problematic for the WTO’s rule-making function, which has largely been comatose for two decades, since negotiations on reducing trade barriers ground to a standstill at the ill-fated Doha Round launched in 2001. </p>
<p>Particularly damaging to the WTO has been the hostility of the US. Past administrations, especially the Trump administration, stymied the WTO’s dispute-settlement function by blocking the appointment and reappointment of judges to its appeal court (<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3399300">known as the Appellate Body</a>). By 2019, there were not enough judges to hear appeals, leaving disputes in limbo.</p>
<p>The WTO has also been criticised for having few to no answers to the world’s most pressing issues: how to craft modern trade rules that support climate action and sustainability. </p>
<p>The rise of <a href="https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/wp19-15.pdf">economic nationalism</a> and unilateralism has increased trade friction making the WTO look increasingly irrelevant. </p>
<h2>Reaching agreement</h2>
<p>Given this, the <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/mc12_17jun22_e.htm">ministerial conference</a> held in Geneva last week delivered welcome agreements on several sometimes long and strongly contested areas.</p>
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<img alt="The closing session of World Trade Organization's 'Ministerial Conference 12' in Geneva, June 17 2022." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469952/original/file-20220621-11-2i0sfz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469952/original/file-20220621-11-2i0sfz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469952/original/file-20220621-11-2i0sfz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469952/original/file-20220621-11-2i0sfz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469952/original/file-20220621-11-2i0sfz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469952/original/file-20220621-11-2i0sfz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469952/original/file-20220621-11-2i0sfz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The closing session of World Trade Organization’s ‘Ministerial Conference 12’ in Geneva, June 17 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fabrice Coffrini/Pool/Keystone/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It agreed on <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN22/W22.pdf&Open=True">limiting government subsidies</a> for <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/05/ending-harmful-fisheries-subsidies-would-positively-impact-ocean-health-and-coastal-communities/">harmful fishing</a> operations in an attempt to slow the depletion of rapidly declining fish stocks. This agreement will aid in curbing food insecurity and increase the sustainability of certain fish species. </p>
<p>Importantly, it is the first WTO treaty with environmental protection and sustainability as its objective. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-still-need-a-vaccine-patent-waiver-but-not-the-one-on-offer-at-the-world-trade-organization-meeting-181235">We still need a vaccine patent waiver, but not the one on offer at the World Trade Organization meeting</a>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putting-an-end-to-billions-in-fishing-subsidies-could-improve-fish-stocks-and-ocean-health-163470">Putting an end to billions in fishing subsidies could improve fish stocks and ocean health</a>
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<p>It agreed to <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN22/W15R2.pdf&Open=True">relax intellectual property rules</a> for COVID-19 vaccines. </p>
<p>Countries such as South Africa have been pushing for a waiver from provisions in the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights so they can produce cheaper generic versions of vaccines. The impact should be limited, given <a href="https://www.who.int/campaigns/vaccine-equity">vaccine supply is now enough to meet demand</a>, but the concession may serve as a blueprint for the future.</p>
<p>It agreed to extend the moratorium on customs duties on “<a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN22/W23.pdf&Open=True">electronic transmissions</a>” first agreed to in 1988.</p>
<p>It agreed to co-operate to resolve issues to do with <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN22/W17R1.pdf&Open=True">food insecurity</a>. With Russia’s war on Ukraine driving up food prices, some countries have <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN22/W18.pdf">restricted certain food exports</a> or are <a href="https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-s-food-subsidies-plan-needs-to-improve-coverage-plug-leakages-122030600092_1.html">subsidising the price of food</a> from domestic farmers.</p>
<p>It also agreed on reforming the WTO dispute settlement process, committing members – including the US – to “<a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN22/W16R1.pdf&Open=True">conduct discussions</a>” to arrive at a “fully and well-functioning dispute settlement system accessible to all Members by 2024”. </p>
<p>Such soft language is a far cry from reinstating the Appellate Body. It was likely the only way to bring the US on board.</p>
<h2>But fundamental differences remain</h2>
<p>The ministerial conference is only the first step. It will be difficult – and take time – for WTO members to reach a compromise on many important issues. </p>
<p>Compromise is needed between the policy space governments demand for themselves and effective international trade rules. </p>
<p>For example, the US and its allies have been <a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/january/joint-statement-trilateral-meeting-trade-ministers-japan-united-states-and-european-union">pushing for tightening the rules</a> on China’s state-owned enterprises and industrial subsidies. China has showed strong resistance to any new rules it views as being against its interests. </p>
<p>Another issue is <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_support_measures_e.htm">support measures</a> adopted during the pandemic. Some governments understandably adopted policies to support domestic businesses in a time of crisis. But some of these measures are arguably against the WTO’s rules to eliminate trade distortions. </p>
<p>These points are symbolic of the larger disagreements between WTO members, with economic nationalism and unilateralism presenting a fundamental challenge to the organisation’s reason for being.</p>
<p>Examples abound. There are the US <a href="https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-china-trade-war-tariffs-date-chart">tariffs</a> on steel and aluminium on national security grounds. China’s trade <a href="https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Journal+of+World+Trade/56.5/TRAD2022003">sanctions against Australia</a> on products such as wine, coal, lobster, barley and beef. China’s <a href="https://www.china-briefing.com/news/chinas-anti-foreign-sanctions-law-how-businesses-should-prepare/">Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law</a> and the European Union’s <a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-05-26/ACI-is-sign-of-European-departure-from-the-multilateral-trading-system-1alQWJqNdbG/index.html">Anti-Coercion Instrument</a> allow these governments to retaliate against any foreign actions they deem to be unfair. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-have-canada-and-australia-taken-such-a-different-approach-to-china-168236">Why have Canada and Australia taken such a different approach to China?</a>
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<p>A common feature of these instruments or actions is governments taking the law into their own hands, ignoring the WTO’s rule book and its dispute resolution mechanisms.</p>
<p>To overcome these existential challenges, the multilateral trading system will need strong and sustained commitment from member governments.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185373/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Meeting for the first time since 2017, the WTO’s highest decision-making body managed to agree on some things – including its first treaty with environmental protection as the objective.Markus Wagner, Associate Professor of Law and Director of the UOW Transnational Law and Policy Centre, University of WollongongWeihuan Zhou, Associate Professor, Co-Director of China International Business and Economic Law (CIBEL) Centre, Faculty of Law and Justice, UNSW Sydney, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1812352022-06-05T12:22:00Z2022-06-05T12:22:00ZWe still need a vaccine patent waiver, but not the one on offer at the World Trade Organization meeting<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466910/original/file-20220603-17-5nwz4k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=382%2C238%2C4930%2C3241&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Global Justice campaigners in London stand by fake coffins to highlight global COVID-19 deaths. If pharma companies waived intellectual property rights, it would be easier for low- and middle-income countries to access COVID-19 vaccines.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Alastair Grant)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In mid-June, the <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc12_e/mc12_e.htm">World Trade Organization (WTO) will meet</a> to finish negotiations to waive certain sections of the agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). However, it is not the TRIPS waiver originally proposed 18 months ago by member states South Africa and India, which would have allowed countries to produce lower-cost generic vaccines and other COVID-19 medical tools without the risk of legal trade challenges.</p>
<p>The opposition to the waiver from a few WTO member states — home to the pharma companies holding monopoly patent rights over the vaccines — has resulted in “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(22)00328-2">vaccine apartheid</a>” (rich countries buying up all the early supplies) and “<a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/economy/pfizer-pandemic-profiteering/">vaccine profiteering</a>” (companies making multi-billion-dollar profits and fighting every effort to allow generic competition). </p>
<p>Vaccine supply is no longer the main issue. Pharma companies still holding the vaccine patents can now produce enough for everyone — though not necessarily at affordable prices — and have described the <a href="https://healthpolicy-watch.news/with-covid-vaccine-supply-outstripping-vaccination-rates-pharma-giants-question-pursuit-of-ip-waiver/">idea of a TRIPS waiver now as “insane” and “unproductive</a>.” </p>
<p>But for the scores of WTO member states and thousands of global health researchers still supporting the waiver <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-drug-and-vaccine-patents-are-putting-profit-before-people-149270">(myself included)</a>, getting the WTO to approve one at its upcoming June ministerial meeting remains important. Just not the waiver that’s on the negotiating table. </p>
<h2>Worse than no waiver</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/trip_06may22_e.htm">The current version</a> is the outcome of discussions involving the two original proposing members, the United States and the European Union. It is restricted to vaccines — a U.S. request — ignoring, for now at least, therapeutics, diagnostics and other essential COVID-19-related health products. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Hands holding a syringe and vial of vaccine" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466905/original/file-20220603-15469-2mn4y6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466905/original/file-20220603-15469-2mn4y6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466905/original/file-20220603-15469-2mn4y6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466905/original/file-20220603-15469-2mn4y6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466905/original/file-20220603-15469-2mn4y6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466905/original/file-20220603-15469-2mn4y6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466905/original/file-20220603-15469-2mn4y6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The waiver under negotiation puts a time limit on the waived obligations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Michel Euler)</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>It requires generic manufacturers to identify all related patents, which is impossible given vaccines’ complex “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-021-04873-6">patent thickets</a>” (overlapping patent rights), and something not required under present TRIPS rules. It puts a time limit on the waived obligations, as though pandemics are calendar-savvy. </p>
<p>While it removes barriers to generic companies exporting to developing countries that lack their own manufacturing capacity, it excludes countries that supplied more than 10 per cent of global vaccine exports in 2021, namely, China. </p>
<p>A shadow of its original intent, the new waiver is <a href="https://twn.my/title2/wto.info/2022/ti220514.htm">endorsed only by the EU, with support from the WTO director-general</a>. </p>
<h2>Why the new waiver proposal should be opposed</h2>
<p>If enacted as currently drafted, the new waiver sets a precedent that will restrict the ability of countries with the capacity to mass produce therapeutics, diagnostics and even personal protective equipment. This would apply to the still-with-us COVID-19 pandemic and for any new zoonotic outbreaks that are <a href="https://theconversation.com/future-infectious-diseases-recent-history-shows-we-can-never-again-be-complacent-about-pathogens-177746">almost certainly on the near horizon</a>. </p>
<p>Without a meaningful waiver, new variant-ready vaccines <a href="https://medicalxpress.com/news/2022-04-pfizer-eyes-covid-vaccine-variants.html">expected later this year</a> are likely to be gobbled up once more by high-paying rich countries, with the poorer ones left with older less-effective versions. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Vials of vaccine with purple caps shot from above" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466908/original/file-20220603-9439-4opry1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466908/original/file-20220603-9439-4opry1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466908/original/file-20220603-9439-4opry1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466908/original/file-20220603-9439-4opry1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466908/original/file-20220603-9439-4opry1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466908/original/file-20220603-9439-4opry1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466908/original/file-20220603-9439-4opry1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pharma companies holding patents can now produce enough vaccine for everyone, though not necessarily at affordable prices.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Achmad Ibrahim)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The same scenario applies to therapeutics such as <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-22/covid-antiviral-pills-seen-surging-after-slow-initial-uptake">Pfizer’s antiviral drug, Paxlovid</a>. Most of its current supply will go to wealthy countries that can afford the high prices Pfizer charges. Pfizer will allow licences for generic versions to be produced for distribution to 95 developing countries, but not until 2023. </p>
<p>Moderna, the other mRNA vaccine leader, is busy <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/3/16/modernas-profits-show-why-big-pharma-cant-meet-our-health-needs">registering patents for its vaccine in South Africa</a> as that country, with WTO support, is close to copying Moderna’s recipe, the know-how for which it plans to share publicly. Moderna’s new patents could <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/moderna-patent-application-raises-fears-africa-covid-vaccine-hub-2022-02-17/">jeopardize this effort</a>. The company meanwhile has plans to create its own mRNA plant in Kenya to supply the African continent <a href="https://socialeurope.eu/control-the-vampire-companies">on its own profitable terms</a>. </p>
<p>On May 25, Pfizer announced that it would eventually provide all “<a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/05/pfizer-launches-an-accord-for-a-healthier-world-a-call-for-action-to-improve-health-equity-globally/?utm_source=sfmc&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2778051_Am22-AgendaDaily-26May2022&utm_term=&emailType=Agenda%20Week">current and future patent-protected medicines on a not-for-profit basis” to 45 lower-income countries</a>, beginning with five countries in Africa. </p>
<p>The company’s decision is welcome, but questions remain. Will Pfizer forego lucrative sales of its current and future drugs to rich countries in order to supply (eventually) the 1.2 billion people living in the world’s poorest nations? Or will these countries have to wait until the paying world’s 6.7 billion people have had their supply needs met? </p>
<h2>Current property rights not fit for global health purpose</h2>
<p>The bottom line: for-profit companies should not be setting public health policy during global health emergencies. Individual corporate decisions to supply life-saving health innovations at cost in otherwise unprofitable markets is not a sustainable or ethical solution. </p>
<p>Bluntly stated: companies’ intellectual property rights should not be allowed to trump people’s health rights. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A crowd outdoors with people holding blue signs reading 'Support patent waivers on COVID-19 vaccines'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466911/original/file-20220603-11-mv11bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466911/original/file-20220603-11-mv11bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466911/original/file-20220603-11-mv11bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466911/original/file-20220603-11-mv11bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466911/original/file-20220603-11-mv11bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466911/original/file-20220603-11-mv11bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466911/original/file-20220603-11-mv11bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Activists support patent waivers on COVID-19 vaccines in front of the European Union office during an EU summit in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 12, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Investment into new health products means taking risks, and it warrants some reward. However, much of the groundwork in pharmaceutical research is publicly funded. </p>
<p>This was certainly the case with COVID-19 vaccines, and one of the reasons why many organizations argued that these discoveries <a href="https://peoplesvaccine.org/">should be considered “people’s vaccines” and treated as public goods</a>. Governments need to place <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/governing-health-innovation-for-the-common-good">conditions on the financial support they give to health research</a> to ensure that the results are more equitably shared. </p>
<p>In the case of public health emergencies, such as pandemics, this should include requirements that companies forego their monopoly property rights, accept negotiated royalties for their efforts and share their knowledge. </p>
<p>President Joe Biden’s administration recently took a step in this direction. It <a href="https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2022/05/12/nih-licenses-covid-19-research-tools-early-stage-technologies-who-program.html">licensed 11 COVID-19 inventions</a> that arose from in-house research at the National Institutes of Health, including early-stage development of the stabilized spike protein that forms the base of mRNA vaccines. </p>
<p>Described as “<a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/pretty-big-deal-u-s-makes-covid-19-technologies-available-use-developing-countries">a pretty big deal</a>” by an advocate of shared intellectual property, the licenses will be administered by the non-profit <a href="https://medicinespatentpool.org/">Medicines Patent Pool</a> that negotiates low royalty costs for generic manufacturers, so inventors will still get some reward. </p>
<p>But this early-stage knowledge-sharing is insufficient to enable full development of medical innovations, which requires drug companies holding patents on the finished, commercialized vaccines and COVID-19-related technologies to waive these rights and to share their technical know-how. </p>
<h2>Canada and the June WTO meeting</h2>
<p>As with the rest of the world, Canada’s attention is moving away from COVID-19 to <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/canada-inflation-april-1.6457520">inflation fears</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine-faqs-about-the-conflict-that-has-shocked-the-world-177963">Russia’s war against Ukraine</a>. With surprisingly little media coverage, the government began holding <a href="https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/FAAE/StudyActivity?studyActivityId=11504514">parliamentary committee hearings on vaccine equity</a> this past spring. Still, it remains uncommitted on the waiver, as it has since the original waiver was proposed. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A globe and a syringe against a blue background" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466903/original/file-20220603-26-bpuy54.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=748%2C30%2C3341%2C2501&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466903/original/file-20220603-26-bpuy54.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466903/original/file-20220603-26-bpuy54.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466903/original/file-20220603-26-bpuy54.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466903/original/file-20220603-26-bpuy54.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466903/original/file-20220603-26-bpuy54.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466903/original/file-20220603-26-bpuy54.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Companies’ intellectual property rights should not be allowed to trump people’s health rights.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
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<p>Health and civil society groups, meanwhile, remain committed to urging the government to make the right ethical and health protective decision. They are calling on Canada to <a href="https://policyalternatives.ca/newsroom/updates/canada-should-reject-compromise-proposal-trips-waiver-its-present-form-civil">use the June WTO meeting to bring the deeply flawed new waiver proposal closer to the original one</a>. </p>
<p>There is still a need for a decent TRIPS waiver to ensure that intellectual property rights do not get in the way of rapid and equitable access to medicines or any other essential health innovations. That must be one of the key lessons we take from our COVID-19 experience.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181235/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ronald Labonte receives funding from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, and is a member of the Steering Council of the People's Health Movement, which advocates for global health equity.</span></em></p>Waiving patent rights on COVID-19 vaccines and drugs is still crucial to ensure access globally, but the waiver on the table at the June World Trade Organization meeting doesn’t do the job.Ronald Labonte, Professor and Distinguished Research Chair, Globalization and Health Equity, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1796422022-03-21T02:02:10Z2022-03-21T02:02:10ZWhy a leaked WTO ‘solution’ for a COVID patent waiver is unworkable and won’t make enough difference for developing countries<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453165/original/file-20220320-36080-1bqusvq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=34%2C103%2C5742%2C3629&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Aaron Chown/PA Images via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There was a brief moment of euphoria last week, when it seemed that COVID-19 vaccines, medicines and supplies might be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/drugmakers-condemn-plan-covid-vaccine-patent-waiver-2022-03-16/">liberated</a> from the World Trade Organization’s intellectual property rights straitjacket and a patent waiver would make them available and affordable to the unvaccinated in the global south.</p>
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<p>But on closer scrutiny, Big Pharma and their parent states have won again. </p>
<p>The leaked “<a href="http://freepdfhosting.com/4d79fc6c70.pdf">solution</a>” agreed by the informal “quad” (US, EU, India and South Africa) is insufficient, problematic and unworkable. There are too many limitations to make any significant difference and it is a far cry from the original proposal from India and South Africa that would have effectively addressed the barriers. </p>
<p>While the WTO makes decisions by consensus, it is unclear how far this deeply flawed text can, or will, be reopened when members debate it next week. Given its fraught history, it is unlikely they will agree to remedy its defects.</p>
<p>Let us recall some stark and distressing facts. Into the third year of this pandemic, <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations">only 14%</a> of people in low-income countries have been vaccinated even once. Wealthy countries like New Zealand are 90% vaccinated and on our third shots. Indeed, by the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5144cd19-2c67-46d0-a37d-a869006bfbdb">end of last year</a>, more boosters had been given in high-income countries than total doses in low-income ones.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-big-barriers-to-global-vaccination-patent-rights-national-self-interest-and-the-wealth-gap-153443">The big barriers to global vaccination: patent rights, national self-interest and the wealth gap</a>
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<p>A second stark and disturbing fact: in November last year the <a href="https://www.oxfam.org.nz/news-media/pfizer-biontech-and-moderna-making-us1000-profit-every-second/">People’s Vaccine Alliance</a> reported that Pfizer, BioNTech and Moderna, the companies behind two of the most successful COVID-19 vaccines, were together making US$65,000 (NZ$92,000) every minute. </p>
<p>They had received more than US$8 billion in public funding to develop the lucrative COVID-19 vaccines. Pfizer and BioNTech had delivered less than 1% of their total vaccine supplies to low-income countries, while Moderna has delivered just 0.2%.</p>
<h2>Pharma’s profits and property rights before right to life</h2>
<p>An important guarantor of pharmaceutical companies’ profits is a little-known trade agreement, the Agreement on Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights (<a href="https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/31bis_trips_01_e.htm">TRIPS</a>). </p>
<p>During negotiations to form the WTO during the early 1990s, the US had demanded strong protections for its corporations’ intellectual property rights as the price for agreeing to discuss genuine trade issues such as subsidised agriculture. The WTO’s members, aside from the least developed countries, have to implement these rules in their domestic laws.</p>
<p>The significance of the TRIPS was exposed in the late 1990s when pharmaceutical giants <a href="https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620381/bn-access-to-medicines-south-africa-010201-en.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">threatened legal action</a> against South Africa and Brazil for producing generic versions of patented HIV-AIDS anti-retroviral medicines. </p>
<p>A global name-and-shame campaign led them to back down and saw a <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm">Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health</a> adopted at the WTO ministerial conference in 2001. That <a href="https://unu.edu/publications/articles/south-south-cooperation-intellectual-property-and-aids-medicines.html#info">compromise</a> was a forerunner of the COVID-19 scenario. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/wealthy-nations-starved-the-developing-world-of-vaccines-omicron-shows-the-cost-of-this-greed-172763">Wealthy nations starved the developing world of vaccines. Omicron shows the cost of this greed</a>
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<p>To date, only <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3778945">one country</a>, Rwanda (which belongs to the group of least developed countries), has been able to jump the <a href="https://www1.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/hiv-aids/the-trips-agreement-and-access-to-arvs/5.pdf">hurdles</a> and import pharmaceuticals under the amendment to TRIPS.</p>
<h2>Tentative deal limited to vaccines only</h2>
<p>Two decades later, in October 2020, South Africa and India led moves for a TRIPS waiver for COVID-19 vaccines, medicines, test kits and other supplies. Despite another global campaign, which included <a href="https://thespinoff.co.nz/society/29-01-2021/open-letter-ardern-vaccine">New Zealand</a> public health advocates, unions, churches and development agencies, the European Union, Switzerland and UK blocked the waiver every step of the way. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/may/statement-ambassador-katherine-tai-covid-19-trips-waiver">Biden administration</a> shifted its position in May 2021 to support negotiations for a waiver, but limited it to vaccines. That announcement brought a fence-sitting <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-backs-moves-improve-global-access-covid-vaccines">New Zealand on board</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-support-for-waiving-covid-19-vaccine-patent-rights-puts-pressure-on-drugmakers-but-what-would-a-waiver-actually-look-like-160582">US support for waiving COVID-19 vaccine patent rights puts pressure on drugmakers – but what would a waiver actually look like?</a>
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<p>The proposal remained stuck for 18 months. Some richer countries demanded completely unrelated trade-offs to advance their commercial objectives, while the hard core refused to budge. Last December, the talks moved to a new phase where the “quad” of key WTO members tried to broker a deal.</p>
<p>When that tentative deal was announced last week and the <a href="http://freepdfhosting.com/4d79fc6c70.pdf">text was leaked</a>, the euphoria quickly subsided. </p>
<p>The text applies only to patents on vaccines, and only for COVID-19, which means a similarly fraught process would be required for future pandemics. WTO members will decide in six months whether to extend it to medicines, diagnostics and therapeutics, as South Africa and India had proposed. Realistically, that won’t happen.</p>
<h2>Odds continue to be stacked against poorer countries</h2>
<p>Beyond these limitations, there is no guarantee that governments can access the “recipe” for all currently patented vaccines, let alone second-generation vaccines still applying for patents, or the technology needed to produce them.</p>
<p>There are many legal uncertainties. A WTO member state can authorise “use of patented subject matter” that is otherwise protected under TRIPS Article 28.1 “to the extent necessary to address the COVID-19 pandemic”. </p>
<p>When does COVID-19 cease being a pandemic, who decides, and what happens when COVID-19 is just endemic? Which uses of patented subject matter will be considered “necessary” (a restrictive concept in trade law) and which go too far? The text still allows those matters to be taken to a dispute.</p>
<p>The odds are stacked further against poorer countries. Eligibility is limited to WTO developing countries that exported less than 10% of the world’s vaccines in 2021. That means China and non-WTO countries are excluded, as are countries like Brazil that recently surrendered their developing country status. </p>
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<p>Coverage of least developed countries is unclear. And the complex and burdensome notification and compliance requirements are likely to be as unworkable as the previous TRIPS waiver.</p>
<p>Four things remain to be seen. First, will the deal actually be gavelled through without debate and amendment in another travesty of the WTO’s consensus process?</p>
<p>Second, what trade-offs will richer countries demand in return for their support?</p>
<p>Third, will this be the end of moves to set aside TRIPS rules, even temporarily, to secure genuine access to life-saving COVID medicines, vaccines and medical supplies for the majority of the world’s people in the developing world once the immediate COVID-19 crisis has subsided?</p>
<p>And will the New Zealand and Australian governments be complicit in this happening?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179642/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Kelsey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Only 14% of people in poorer countries have received one vaccine dose, but a leaked WTO ‘solution’ to waive patents fails to ensure developing countries can access life-saving vaccines and medicines.Jane Kelsey, Professor of Law, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata RauLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1791852022-03-17T12:11:32Z2022-03-17T12:11:32ZRussia’s no longer a ‘most-favored nation’: 5 questions about the coveted trading status answered<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452534/original/file-20220316-8547-ihvpwe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=323%2C287%2C5667%2C3700&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian-made goods will likely cost more in Western liquor stores if most-favored-nation status is removed. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaUkraineWarTradeExplainer/78ca0661c64a4282ac0dac94e1b79c34/photo?Query=Russia%20trade&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1617&currentItemNo=17">AP Photo/Gene J. Puskar</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The U.S., the European Union, Japan and Canada are further severing Russia from global markets by <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/11/biden-will-push-to-end-russias-most-favored-nation-trade-status.html">removing a coveted trading designation</a> over its war in Ukraine. Known as most-favored-nation status, it generally entitles a country to the best possible trading terms, which comes with many economic benefits. The <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_22_1776">EU agreed to drop the designation</a> on March 15, 2022, and Congress <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-07/u-s-senate-to-vote-on-russian-crude-oil-ban-send-to-house">did the same on April 7</a>. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Y58-EhUAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Charles Hankla</a>, a political scientist who studies trade at Georgia State University, explains what most-favored-nation status is, why countries want it and the consequences of Russia losing it.</em></p>
<h2>1. What is most-favored-nation status?</h2>
<p>Designating a country as a “most-favored nation,” which the U.S. also calls permanent normal trading relations, lies at the heart of the global trading system.</p>
<p>In fact, most-favored-nation status is mentioned in the very <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm">first article</a> of the first treaty that established the multilateral trading system in 1947. Even today, the most critical commitment made by all 164 members of the World Trade Organization is to extend most-favored-nation status to all others in the club.</p>
<p>When a country awards this designation to a trading partner, it promises to apply only its lowest trade barriers – tariffs, quotas and the like – to that partner. If the awarding country then decides to lower barriers to one trading partner, it must lower them to all deemed a most-favored nation. </p>
<p>This embodies the principle of <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm">non-discrimination</a> within the WTO: Every member of the multilateral trading organization must treat all the others alike.</p>
<h2>2. How is it removed?</h2>
<p>Russia is still a member of the WTO, which <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/russia_e.htm">it joined in 2012</a>. So how can its most-favored-nation status be taken away? </p>
<p>WTO rules <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm">provide a number of ways</a> that members <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm">can impose special trading barriers</a> on other members, but the one that’s relevant here is the so-called security exception. Article 21 of the 1994 treaty that gave rise to the WTO <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art21_e.pdf">allows a member state to waive most-favored-nation status</a> when “necessary for the protection of its essential security interests,” especially “in time of war or other emergency in international relations.”</p>
<p>President Donald Trump <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/500528-reforming-national-security-tariffs">used this exception</a> as part of his justification for his trade war with China, also a WTO member.</p>
<p>With the war in Ukraine, the security provision <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/remove-russia-trade-privilege-what-need-know/">provides the primary legal justification</a> for sanctions against Russia that might seem to violate the rules of the multilateral trading system. </p>
<p>Russia does have the right to appeal these sanctions, but the WTO body that adjudicates disagreements <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/gc_09dec19_e.htm">has essentially been defunct</a> – as the result of a Trump-imposed nomination boycott – since 2020.</p>
<p>And in one of those ironies that occasionally arise in international relations, Russia <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/wtos-first-ruling-national-security-what-does-it-mean-united-states">used the security exemption</a> in 2019 to justify sanctions it imposed on Ukraine – and its right to do so was affirmed by a WTO adjudication panel. It seems unlikely that the WTO would rule against the U.S. or its allies over sanctions undertaken during a much hotter war than existed three years ago.</p>
<p>While the temporary suspension of most-favored-nation status can be taken immediately by individual countries, the tougher penalty of expelling Russia from the World Trade Organization – floated by <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/596993-expel-russia-from-the-wto">some commentators</a> – would be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/ousting-russia-wto-imf-would-mark-end-an-era-2022-03-09/">much more complicated</a>. It would require two-thirds of member states to open debate on the issue and three-quarters to vote for expulsion, something that seems unlikely in an organization traditionally built on consensus.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A worker in a yellow fluorescent coat stands next to large pipes that carry gas from Russia to Germany" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452554/original/file-20220316-8117-dpnwnv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452554/original/file-20220316-8117-dpnwnv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452554/original/file-20220316-8117-dpnwnv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452554/original/file-20220316-8117-dpnwnv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452554/original/file-20220316-8117-dpnwnv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452554/original/file-20220316-8117-dpnwnv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452554/original/file-20220316-8117-dpnwnv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Nord Stream 2, a gas pipeline running from Russia to Germany, is on pause because of the war in Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/UkraineTensionsEnergySecurity/883677f11671410ba8c931c2a6e4a261/photo?Query=Russia%20gas%20Europe&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=535&currentItemNo=8">AP Photo/Michael Sohn</a></span>
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<h2>3. What impact will this have on Russia?</h2>
<p>While taking away most-favored-nation status won’t have much immediate effect – beyond symbolism – this change could lead to more severe sanctions in the future. </p>
<p>Although the U.S. doesn’t trade a lot with Russia – with <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/russia-and-eurasia/russia">imports of just US$22.3 billion</a> in 2019, and that was mostly the oil, gas and coal that <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/08/fact-sheet-united-states-bans-imports-of-russian-oil-liquefied-natural-gas-and-coal/">has now been banned</a> – the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries">EU is Russia’s largest single trading partner</a>. Moreover, the <a href="https://www.g7germany.de/resource/blob/997532/2014234/39e142fa878dce9e420ef4d29c17969d/2022-03-11-g7-leader-eng-data.pdf?download=1">G-7 countries</a> – the U.S., U.K., Japan, France, Germany, Canada and Italy – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/11/business/economy/russia-trade-status-us.html">alone account for half</a> of all Russian exports.</p>
<p>Of course, there’s a flip side to this since trade interdependence works both ways: As the damage on Russia goes up, the country imposing the sanctions feels more pain as well. This is especially true given <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/12/energy/us-gas-prices-russia-oil/index.html">Europe’s oil and gas dependence on Russia</a>, which means its energy costs could surge if the EU imposes more sanctions on Russia’s energy sector. More than that, Ukraine’s and Russia’s status as major producers of food grains has the <a href="https://www.wfp.org/stories/ukraine-war-more-countries-will-feel-burn-food-and-energy-price-rises-fuel-hunger-warns-wfp">World Food Program</a> sounding the alarm that the war and resulting sanctions could increase hunger in many developing countries.</p>
<p>The bottom line is this: Withdrawal of most-favored-nation status, by bypassing international trade law, opens the door to much more severe sanctions. Whether these are imposed depends on how much individual nations – especially in Europe – will be willing to sacrifice to punish Russia.</p>
<h2>4. Can Russia find other countries to buy its goods?</h2>
<p>The Russian government seems to believe that even if it’s subjected to crippling trade sanctions from the U.S. and Europe, it will be able to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/13/russia-counts-on-sanctions-help-from-china-us-warns-beijing">survive economically</a> thanks to its special relationship with China. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/13/us/politics/russia-china-ukraine.html">Intelligence reports</a> have alleged that Russian President Vladimir Putin informed his counterpart in China in advance of his broad plans toward Ukraine. It seems likely that Putin understood that sanctions were a possible consequence of the invasion, though he probably did not anticipate their severity. Whatever the case, Putin likely wanted to ensure that China would help cushion the blow. </p>
<p>There is no question that China’s support could be critical to bolstering a Russian economy reeling from <a href="https://www.foxbusiness.com/money/russia-debts-ruble-sanctions">crippling sanctions</a>. China is now the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/13/us/politics/russia-china-ukraine.html">world’s second-largest economy</a>, a major trading power and a source of deep-pocketed <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-aiib-and-the-one-belt-one-road/">financial resources</a>. Despite its massive geographic size and formidable if diminished military, Russia is a much weaker economic power, with an <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/insights/worlds-top-economies/">economy smaller</a> than that of Italy, Canada or South Korea. </p>
<p>With China’s support, Russia should be able to find a buyer for some of its exports, including natural gas and oil, and it will have access to a well-capitalized financial system. </p>
<p>But the matter isn’t so straightforward for Moscow. As economist and columnist <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/07/opinion/china-russia-sanctions-economy.html">Paul Krugman has argued</a>, Russia depends on the United States and its allies for many critical imports, including high-tech goods. And a dependence on China as financier and purchaser represents its own security challenges to Putin, who undoubtedly wants to avoid becoming a client of Beijing. </p>
<p>China, for all its economic weight, will not be able to shield Russia from the economic consequences of this devastating war. </p>
<h2>5. Are there any other long-term consequences of this?</h2>
<p>There are potential long-term implications of withholding most-favored-nation status from Russia. </p>
<p>First, there is the risk that heavier trade barriers will backfire by driving Russia more deeply into the Chinese sphere of influence. Indeed, American observers were already beginning to worry about Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s increasingly cozy relationship <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-obama-driving-russia-china-together-10735">well before the invasion</a>.</p>
<p>Second, while trade sanctions are a common tool to punish countries breaking international rules and norms, their use against a major power like Russia is quite unusual. Indeed, the guiding principle of the multilateral trading system is <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm">nondiscrimination</a> in trade. There is, then, the danger that this intrusion of geopolitics into trade could threaten the coherence of a trading system already <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/17/opinion/wto-trade-biden.html">buffeted by crises</a>.</p>
<p>When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and the Eastern Bloc was integrated into the trading system, <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_End_of_History_and_the_Last_Man/NdFpQwKfX2IC?hl=en&gbpv=0">many saw it</a> as the final step in a long effort to create a liberal world order. Economic interdependence, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/425131">it was thought</a>, would discourage future wars and promote peace.</p>
<p>With the war in Ukraine, that assumption has been called into question, and along with it the unity of the global trading order. </p>
<p>All of this leaves the U.S. and other liberal powers on the horns of a dilemma. Trade and financial sanctions are the primary tools available – short of war – to punish Russia for invading Ukraine. But if sanctions are so severe that they prompt Moscow and Beijing to forge an ever closer relationship, that risks further splintering the already fragile world trading system. </p>
<p>By no means does that mean the West shouldn’t punish Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. But it’s important to be aware of the potential consequences that could poison the well of global trade for years to come.</p>
<p>[<em>More than 150,000 readers get one of The Conversation’s informative newsletters.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140K">Join the list today</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179185/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Hankla does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US, Japan and other wealthy G-7 nations plan to remove Russia’s status as a most-favored nation. A trade expert explains what that term means and what might happen next.Charles Hankla, Associate Professor of Political Science, Georgia State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1736292022-01-06T13:18:14Z2022-01-06T13:18:14ZThe ‘China shock’ of trade in the 2000s reverberates in US politics and economics – and warns of the dangers for fossil fuel workers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437867/original/file-20211215-23-1hirha3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=95%2C53%2C3760%2C2383&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Containers are seen stacked at a port in Qingdao in China's eastern Shandong province on Jan. 14, 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/containers-are-seen-stacked-at-a-port-in-qingdao-in-chinas-news-photo/1193594687?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In December 1978, the Chinese leader <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Deng-Xiaoping">Deng Xiaoping</a> introduced economic reforms that dramatically altered China’s economy by strengthening trade and cultural ties with the West.</p>
<p>Beginning in the 1990s, these reforms set China on a trajectory to become what it is today: a nation with a <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/the-big-story/the-2021-economic-scorecard-how-china-stacks-up-with-the-us-and-its-allies/">dynamic</a> and substantially market-driven economy that is also the world’s <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.aau9413">second-largest</a>. </p>
<p>U.S. residents have enjoyed lower-priced goods exported from China since then, but many communities that produced goods that competed with Chinese manufacturing exports suffered <a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.6.2121">job losses and economic downturns</a>.</p>
<p>This negative effect on U.S. manufacturing jobs from Chinese exports is often called the “China Shock.” <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/on-the-persistence-of-the-china-shock/">A recent study</a> has found that even though this shock leveled off around 2010, its harmful aftereffects continued for many years beyond, particularly in certain industries such as <a href="https://chinashock.info/">furniture, games and toys, and children’s toy bicycles or cars</a>.</p>
<p>I am an <a href="https://www.rit.edu/directory/aabgsh-amit-batabyal">economics professor</a> who has <a href="https://people.rit.edu/aabgsh/">conducted research</a> on China, and understanding when these trade effects ended allows me and other researchers to examine what long-term demographic aftershocks are occurring in U.S. communities and how best to deal with them. These policy prescriptions can be applied to other industries that are experiencing a rapid shift in employment because of macreconomic trends. </p>
<h2>How China gained so much so quickly</h2>
<p>As a part of its increased openness to the world, China joined the <a href="https://www.wto.org/index.htm">World Trade Organization</a> – the international body that sets global trade rules – in 2001. Believing that increasing economic liberalization would lead to <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/298527/the-china-fantasy-by-james-mann/">political liberalization</a> in China, the U.S. began to engage in robust trade with the country. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.pearson.com/us/higher-education/program/Krugman-International-Trade-Theory-and-Policy-RENTAL-EDITION-11th-Edition/PGM1838560.html">International trade theory</a> teaches that free trade between nations makes them better off than not trading at all. And <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/on-the-persistence-of-the-china-shock/">recent research</a> underscores that the economic gains to the U.S. from trade in general have been positive but small, adding about <a href="https://www.nber.org/digest/apr18/how-large-are-us-economys-gains-trade">2% to 8%</a> of <a href="https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product">gross domestic product</a>. </p>
<p>Yet trade with China has given rise to a <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2021/11/02/1050999300/how-american-leaders-failed-to-help-workers-survive-the-china-shock">significant economic shock</a> involving job losses and declines in human welfare in <a href="https://chinashock.info/">several U.S. regions</a>, especially in the Deep South and in some Midwestern states. </p>
<p>The source of this shock is China’s <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20131687">comparative advantage</a> in manufacturing, specifically in goods that are labor-intensive. <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/comparativeadvantage.asp">Comparative advantage</a> is a nation’s ability to produce a good or service at a lower <a href="https://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/College/opportunitycost.html">cost</a> than its trading partners. China has an <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/twec.12619">abundant supply</a> of labor relative to capital and natural resources.</p>
<p>As China began to liberalize its foreign trade, there was a dramatic surge in manufacturing exports and an accompanying economic shock to the U.S. economy. That’s because U.S.-produced goods could not compete with the inexpensive Chinese goods that were flooding the market.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/EF/EF00/20210928/114084/HHRG-117-EF00-20210928-SD002.pdf">U.S. economy lost 1.5 million manufacturing jobs</a> between 1980 and 2000, and <a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/EF/EF00/20210928/114084/HHRG-117-EF00-20210928-SD002.pdf">5 million more</a> between 2000 and 2017. </p>
<p>This fall in manufacturing employment was <a href="https://news.mit.edu/2021/david-autor-china-shock-persists-1206">not accompanied</a> with the same number of job gains in other sectors of the U.S. economy. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437869/original/file-20211215-6487-15iiv9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Workers build desks." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437869/original/file-20211215-6487-15iiv9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437869/original/file-20211215-6487-15iiv9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437869/original/file-20211215-6487-15iiv9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437869/original/file-20211215-6487-15iiv9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437869/original/file-20211215-6487-15iiv9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437869/original/file-20211215-6487-15iiv9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437869/original/file-20211215-6487-15iiv9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Workers produce desks for export to the U.S. at a factory in Nantong in China’s eastern Jiangsu province on Sept. 4, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/workers-produce-desks-for-export-to-the-us-france-germany-news-photo/1165927293?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The impact endures</h2>
<p>Today, even with the China manufacturing surge ending, its effects in the U.S. have endured.</p>
<p>A decade after the conclusion of the China trade shock in 2010, the U.S. still has a large number of local economies in which studies show social structures, including the institution of marriage, are fraying because <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aeri.20180010">workers have lost their jobs</a> and don’t have <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/article/uwpjhriss/v_3a51_3ay_3a2016_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a1-29.htm">stable salaries they can live on</a>.</p>
<p>This lack of wages has subsequently resulted in declines in the demand for local goods and services and in <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20150578">housing values and property tax revenues</a>. There has also been <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.103.6.2121">an increase</a> in the number of people on government assistance such as Medicaid.</p>
<h2>How to help communities still suffering</h2>
<p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2358751">Economists generally support</a> “people-based” over “place-based” policies. <a href="https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/1403_719_lla080702.pdf">People-based policies</a> focus on distressed people, with a frequent focus on retraining, while place-based policies concentrate on investing in communities where workers live, such as revitalizing downtowns. Investment in the communities hit hard by Chinese imports have tended to focus on people-based policies because economists <a href="https://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/abhijit-v-banerjee/good-economics-for-hard-times/9781541762879/">generally believe that investing in workers can help them move from distressed places with little job opportunity</a> to new places with better job markets, schools and other amenities.</p>
<p>The best-known people-based U.S. government program that assists workers displaced by trade competition is the <a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/tradeact">Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers</a>. It helps workers with job training, relocation assistance, subsidized health insurance and extended unemployment benefits. </p>
<p>Yet, relative to the magnitude of the job losses, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/26/opinion/sunday/duflo-banerjee-economic-incentives.html">program is small</a>, providing too little relief to most workers who lost their jobs because of import competition in the 1990s and 2000s. </p>
<p>The Nobel laureates <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2019/11/12/displaced-workers-need-more-than-what-economists-are-suggesting/">Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo have pointed out</a> that the TAA program needs to be expanded significantly. Although the House of Representatives is <a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/house-leaders-advance-bold-plan-revitalize-trade-adjustment-assistance/?agreed=1&agreed=1">taking steps</a> to reauthorize and expand the TAA program, it is still too early to tell what the final legislation will look like. </p>
<h2>Revisiting place-based policies</h2>
<p>Even though economists favor people-based policies, the evidence shows that those laid off as a result of import competition from China frequently <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/adammillsap/2016/12/21/people-are-giving-up-instead-of-moving-to-opportunity-and-thats-not-good/?sh=8b18dd4c562f">don’t move</a> because of unaffordable housing, child care costs and the uncertainties associated with finding a new job. </p>
<p>And left-behind places never completely die. Instead, in <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/03/manufacturing-marriage-family/518280/">such places</a> fewer people marry and have children. More children live in poverty, alcohol and drug abuse go up and young men are less likely to graduate from college.</p>
<p>Therefore, a rethinking of economic policy is likely now needed in the U.S. to focus on two key points: the need to provide adequate assistance to workers in mass layoff events and to recognize that this assistance, quite frequently, will need to be place-based.</p>
<h2>Two lessons for the future</h2>
<p>Like the China trade shock, the <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=44115">decline of the coal industry</a> in the U.S. beginning in 1980 and the <a href="https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great-recession-of-200709">Great Recession</a>, from 2007 to 2009, were also mass layoff events.</p>
<p>Although local economies exposed to the <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w29401">Great Recession recovered</a> their pre-recession employment rates quickly, the decline of coal and the China trade shock both <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/23/opinion/climate-coal-china-us.html">gave rise to</a> long-lasting job losses, reduced incomes, and slow population declines. </p>
<p>Policymakers could apply the lessons learned from this trade shock to respond effectively to the next likely mass layoff event.</p>
<p>As economies transition out of fossil fuels, we will continue to see <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/the-employment-impact-of-a-green-fiscal-push/">job losses</a> in the coal mining and oil industries. </p>
<p>Although the increased use of renewable energy is likely to <a href="https://www.edf.org/energy/clean-energy-jobs">generate new jobs</a>, there is no guarantee that they will be anywhere near where the localized job losses are occurring. Hence, the prospect of large-scale, localized job losses remains. And new policies are needed to enhance employment growth in regions hurt by prolonged joblessness. </p>
<p>The evidence in the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12358">U.S. and Europe</a> shows that political support for populist nationalists tends to be greater in regions that have suffered large, trade-led job losses. </p>
<p>If policies that promote job growth in distressed regions are not implemented, we may see more populist nationalists in power in the U.S.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173629/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amitrajeet A. Batabyal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Large-scale job losses in the US due to trade with China will lead to enduring demographic and political aftershocks without the implementation of policies that promote widespread job growth.Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, Arthur J. Gosnell Professor of Economics, Rochester Institute of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1724842021-11-24T19:04:13Z2021-11-24T19:04:13ZDivided and paralysed, can the WTO negotiate a pandemic recovery plan that is fair for all?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433584/original/file-20211123-18938-1o0d2vw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C0%2C3742%2C2815&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hard on the heels of the political deal-making by major powers and corporate lobbyists at the COP26 climate conference, similar manoeuvres are shaping the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 12th Ministerial Conference (<a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc12_e/mc12_e.htm">MC12</a>), scheduled to begin on November 30 in Geneva. </p>
<p>The decision to hold an in-person negotiating conference of ministers from 164 countries in the midst of a pandemic, and as Europe undergoes another surge, is controversial. </p>
<p>Aside from concerns about safety, there are serious questions about the legitimacy of decisions that will be made under these conditions, including the expected absence of a number of trade ministers, mainly from developing countries.</p>
<p>Ministers with no commercial flights operating from their countries may be unable to travel. Those who can attend face onerous and expensive transit and quarantine arrangements. The size of delegations has been severely limited to facilitate social distancing and reduce processing queues. </p>
<p>At present, only certain vaccines, mainly those used in richer countries, will secure a pass for automatic entry into meeting venues. Ministers and officials who used non-EU-approved vaccines will be subject to periodic testing.</p>
<p>There is also a clampdown on dissent. Swiss authorities have refused authorisation – sought by one of their own parliamentarians – for five protesters to hold placards calling for action on COVID-19 in front of the WTO building. Non-government organisations, an important resource for many developing country delegations, have been <a href="https://ourworldisnotforsale.net/2021_R_postpone_MC12">denied space</a> at the main venue.</p>
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<h2>WTO in crisis</h2>
<p>All this is bad enough for a “member-driven organisation” that makes decisions by consensus. But this conference is shaping up as the most important in the WTO’s 26 years. It is widely agreed the organisation faces an existential crisis. Every one of its core functions – negotiations, dispute settlement, notifications – has broken down.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm">Doha “development” round</a> of negotiations, launched in 2001, promised poorer countries a rebalancing of global trade rules that were designed by and for powerful countries and their corporations. But the Doha round has been moribund for over a decade. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/old-wine-in-new-bottles-why-the-nz-uk-free-trade-agreement-fails-to-confront-the-challenges-of-a-post-covid-world-170621">Old wine in new bottles – why the NZ-UK free trade agreement fails to confront the challenges of a post-COVID world</a>
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<p>At the last ministerial conference four years ago, self-selected groups of members, led by rich countries including New Zealand and Australia, announced they were launching alternative “plurilateral” processes to bypass the WTO’s consensus-based multilateral process – without any mandate to do so. They plan to legitimise those processes at the MC12.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the WTO’s dispute settlement system, considered the jewel in its crown, is paralysed. The US <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-committed-wto-wants-it-succeed-trade-rep-tai-says-2021-10-14/">refuses to approve</a> new appointments to the WTO’s Appellate Body until other members agree to its demands for reform. The last judge’s appointment expired in November 2020.</p>
<p>The more powerful WTO members have a raft of other demands. These include severely reducing the number of “developing” countries entitled to special and differential treatment, changes to the mechanism to monitor compliance, and other institutional arrangements.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433586/original/file-20211123-13-1wboldi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433586/original/file-20211123-13-1wboldi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433586/original/file-20211123-13-1wboldi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433586/original/file-20211123-13-1wboldi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433586/original/file-20211123-13-1wboldi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433586/original/file-20211123-13-1wboldi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433586/original/file-20211123-13-1wboldi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A Washington protest against the visiting German chancellor’s opposition to an emergency WTO waiver for vaccine patents.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span>
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<h2>The pandemic factor</h2>
<p>These fractures have become fissures in recent years and COVID-19 has brought matters to a head. </p>
<p>Sixty-four developing countries have proposed a temporary waiver of rules in the WTO’s Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights (<a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm">TRIPS</a>) that guarantee Big Pharma’s rights over COVID-related vaccines and technologies. The waiver is essential to supply affordable generic versions to the 98% of people in low-income countries who are not yet fully vaccinated.</p>
<p>A recent <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/pfizer-biontech-and-moderna-making-1000-profit-every-second-while-worlds-poorest">Oxfam report</a> estimated Pfizer and Moderna are expected to take in a combined US$93 billion next year on sales of the vaccines they developed with significant public subsidies. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-zealand-is-overdue-for-an-open-and-honest-debate-about-21st-century-trade-relations-160922">New Zealand is overdue for an open and honest debate about 21st-century trade relations</a>
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<p>The EU, UK and Switzerland are leading the opposition, supported by their pharmaceutical industries. New Zealand supports a limited version of the waiver, but its ambassador to the WTO, David Walker, is leading a parallel initiative that undermines it. </p>
<p>Walker was tasked by the director-general, not the WTO members, with facilitating a COVID-19 recovery plan. The “Walker process” has been <a href="https://twn.my/title2/wto.info/2021/ti211122.htm">heavily criticised</a> for marginalising the priorities of the least-developed and developing countries. There is a real potential for this to negatively affect New Zealand’s reputation with those nations at the WTO. </p>
<p>The proposed Declaration and Action Plan, prepared on Walker’s “<a href="https://www.bilaterals.org/?wto-response-to-the-pandemic">own responsibility</a>”, have not been developed through the WTO’s normal process of negotiations. Extraordinarily, the text was not tabled in the General Council meeting on November 22. This meant members could not discuss (or reject) it, although it has since been leaked. </p>
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<h2>Hope for a better regime</h2>
<p>Critics object that Walker’s proposal is heavily skewed towards the interests of richer countries and that it uses COVID-19 as a back door to promote more liberalisation, reflecting the agenda for WTO reform being advanced by the “Ottawa Group” of countries, including New Zealand and Australia. Walker has ruled out including the waiver or other changes to WTO intellectual property rules. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-big-barriers-to-global-vaccination-patent-rights-national-self-interest-and-the-wealth-gap-153443">The big barriers to global vaccination: patent rights, national self-interest and the wealth gap</a>
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<p>As the MC12 heads for a showdown on all these and other issues, the strategies being pursued by the New Zealand and Australian governments to keep the WTO on life support are counterproductive. </p>
<p>Even if those attending the conference manage to reach agreement on some final declaration – which eluded them at the last ministerial conference in 2017 – the refusal of its more powerful members to address the organisation’s systemic failings ensures it will continue its spiralling decline. </p>
<p>Longtime critics of the WTO hope this may finally open the door to re-envisioning a new, more equitable international trading regime that can address the challenges of the 21st century highlighted by the pandemic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172484/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Kelsey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With the World Trade Organization’s 12th Ministerial Conference – arguably its most important ever – happening next week, attempts to keep it ‘on life support’ may be counterproductive.Jane Kelsey, Professor of Law, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata RauLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1682362021-09-21T13:06:49Z2021-09-21T13:06:49ZWhy have Canada and Australia taken such a different approach to China?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422281/original/file-20210921-13-7kl3ae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C159%2C4423%2C2619&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Prime Minister Justin Trudeau meets Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing in December 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Sean Kilpatrick </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over the past two years, China has punished Canada and Australia for actions that the Chinese deem objectionable — and in response, both countries <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-53980706">have faced unjust detentions</a> <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/8169098/two-michaels-1000-days-imprisonment-china/">of their citizens</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/it-might-look-like-china-is-winning-the-trade-war-but-its-import-bans-are-a-diplomacy-fail-154558">sudden, harsh</a> trade barriers. </p>
<p>Yet these two members of the <a href="https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-five-eyes-the-intelligence-alliance-of-the-anglosphere/">Five Eyes intelligence alliance</a> — which also includes the United Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand — have responded differently. That’s evident in the recent launch of the Australia/U.K./U.S. security pact called AUKUS, from which Canada is <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-canadian-government-surprised-by-new-indo-pacific-security-pact/">conspicuously absent</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Joe Biden stands at a podium with Boris Johnson and Scott Morrison on screens beside him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422155/original/file-20210920-27-17bwgsu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=351%2C0%2C4175%2C1766&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422155/original/file-20210920-27-17bwgsu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422155/original/file-20210920-27-17bwgsu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422155/original/file-20210920-27-17bwgsu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422155/original/file-20210920-27-17bwgsu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422155/original/file-20210920-27-17bwgsu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422155/original/file-20210920-27-17bwgsu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. President Joe Biden, joined virtually by Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, right on screen, and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, speaks about the Australia/U.K./U.S. security pact the White House. Canada is conspicuously absent from the deal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Andrew Harnik)</span></span>
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<p>The agreement includes provisions to start consultations to help Australia acquire a fleet of nuclear-propelled submarines.</p>
<p>Why was Canada not included, and why has Australia taken such a different path in response to similar situations? Are there areas where their approaches to China can converge?</p>
<h2>Strong-arm Chinese tactics</h2>
<p>China arrested citizens of both countries after <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-australia-china-idUSKCN26H00T">Australia called for an investigation into the origins of COVID-19</a> and Canada arrested Huawei executive <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/us-doj-resumes-talks-plea-deal-with-huaweis-meng-wanzhou-globe-mail-2021-09-18/">Meng Wanzhou over a U.S. extradition request related to fraud charges</a>.</p>
<p>Canadians <a href="https://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/on-the-two-michaels-1000th-day-of-captivity-hundreds-march-in-ottawa">Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig</a> and Australian <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/13/i-pray-for-her-australian-broadcaster-cheng-lei-no-closer-to-release-a-year-after-being-detained-in-china">Cheng Lei</a> are widely viewed as victims of <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-has-a-new-way-to-exert-political-pressure-weaponising-its-courts-against-foreigners-141195">“hostage diplomacy.</a>” Spavor and Kovrig were finally released after Wanzhou reached a deal with the U.S. Justice Department that allowed her to return to China in exchange for acknowledging some wrongdoing in a criminal case.</p>
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<img alt="A man and woman embrace in front of a plane." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423226/original/file-20210926-21-1e8tafj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423226/original/file-20210926-21-1e8tafj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423226/original/file-20210926-21-1e8tafj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423226/original/file-20210926-21-1e8tafj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423226/original/file-20210926-21-1e8tafj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423226/original/file-20210926-21-1e8tafj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423226/original/file-20210926-21-1e8tafj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Michael Kovrig embraces his wife Vina Nadjibulla after arriving at Pearson International Airport in Toronto after more than 1,000 days in captivity in China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Frank Gunn</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>In the Australian capital of Canberra, the Chinese embassy issued a confrontational <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/fourteen-points-on-australias-icy-times-with-china/">14-point ultimatum</a> demanding policy changes from Australia. It also sharply <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/pause-in-china-cold-war-could-be-the-time-to-parley-20210813-p58if2">rebuked the country</a> over comments on the Chinese judicial proceedings against Spavor and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/10/china/china-robert-schellenberg-lost-appeal-intl-hnk/index.html">Robert Schellenberg</a>, a Canadian citizen convicted of drug smuggling and facing a death sentence. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1425325936291946507"}"></div></p>
<p>China has imposed a range of punitive tariffs on targeted Australian and Canadian sectors. In June of this year, China referred Australia to the World Trade Organization (WTO) <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/jun/24/australia-vows-to-vigorously-defend-itself-against-china-wto-complaint">over tariffs</a> on steel products. Canada took China to the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3142635/canada-escalates-wto-case-against-chinas-blocks-its-canola">WTO on canola</a>, and Beijing has since sought to <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-canola-canada-1.6084860">block the investigation</a> of Canada’s claims. These actions have implications for all <a href="https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/middle-power">middle power countries</a> and their relationships with China. </p>
<h2>Now a superpower</h2>
<p>Simply put, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12895">China’s “reform and open” era</a> has ended. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-domestic-and-international-consequences-of-xis-political-philosophy/">It’s now a great power</a> on the global stage, actively promoting its economic and political system as a legitimate alternative to a U.S.-led, rules-based international order. That includes the largest and most rapid expansion of maritime and aerospace power <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/19/op-ed-will-chinas-president-xis-big-bet-pay-off.html">in generations</a>. </p>
<p>Highly sensitive decisions are looming for Canada and Australia, including the judicial outcome on the Meng extradition case and the Australian Defence Department’s review of the Chinese company Landbridge’s 99-year lease of the strategic <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09-18/darwin-port-deal-complicates-top-end-military-expansion-experts/100470644">Darwin Port</a>. </p>
<p>Hostile responses from China can be expected if decisions don’t favour Chinese interests. Indeed, China has taken aim at middle powers like Australia and Canada to force their submission and set an example for others — or “<a href="https://correspondent.afp.com/kill-chicken-scare-monkey">kill the chicken to scare the monkeys</a>,” as the old Chinese idiom goes. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-china-is-remaking-the-world-in-its-vision-155377">How China is remaking the world in its vision</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Beijing has <a href="https://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/mccuaig-johnston-there-are-no-good-options-for-canadas-china-policy-but-we-should-not-choose-the-worst-one">conveyed to Canada that it is not a middle power</a>, but a small power that has to stop leaning on the U.S. </p>
<p>The Chinese Communist Party perceives Australia and Canada as both “essential targets” due to their close alliance with the U.S. and “soft targets” because of their economic dependence on China.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-behind-chinas-bullying-of-australia-it-sees-a-soft-target-and-an-essential-one-151273">What's behind China's bullying of Australia? It sees a soft target — and an essential one</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<hr>
<p>Beijing therefore can unleash its wrath on Ottawa and Canberra without great risk to itself, setting an example for others not to cross it in any way. Even so, Canada and Australia provide China with various and much needed natural resources, so none of the parties involved want to risk losing those valuable economic ties.</p>
<h2>Quiet diplomacy versus a firm stand</h2>
<p>Managing middle power relationships with China is clearly difficult, and Canada and Australia have responded differently. </p>
<p>Canada has tried using quiet diplomacy, but for many months, Beijing did <a href="https://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/mccuaig-johnston-there-are-no-good-options-for-canadas-china-policy-but-we-should-not-choose-the-worst-one">not even answer phone calls</a> from Ottawa.</p>
<p>Canada hasn’t demonstrated to China that there are consequences for its actions against Canadian citizens and trade because it has a longstanding policy not to retaliate against an action in one area with sanctions in another. Canadian officials fear that reprisals could spiral out of control. </p>
<p>Furthermore, Canada has avoided taking actions that might anger China, and so still <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/parliament-passes-tory-motion-to-demand-government-decision-on-huawei-5g-1.5194860">has not announced its decision on Huawei</a> or on the listing of China’s CGTN television network, which <a href="https://safeguarddefenders.com/en/blog/canadian-tv-regulator-fails-investigate-chinese-tv-despite-systematic-violations">has been broadcasting</a> forced confessions by people detained in China on Canadian cable channels carrying the network. </p>
<p>Canada has also been circumspect in supporting its fellow democracy, Taiwan, which faces <a href="https://afsa.org/countering-chinas-intimidation-taiwan">military intimidation from China</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422027/original/file-20210920-48840-1wd95o2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3140%2C1944&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Scott Morrison and Justin Trudeau shake hands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422027/original/file-20210920-48840-1wd95o2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3140%2C1944&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422027/original/file-20210920-48840-1wd95o2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422027/original/file-20210920-48840-1wd95o2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422027/original/file-20210920-48840-1wd95o2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422027/original/file-20210920-48840-1wd95o2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422027/original/file-20210920-48840-1wd95o2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422027/original/file-20210920-48840-1wd95o2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Prime Minister Justin Trudeau speaks with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison during a bilateral meeting at the APEC Summit in Papua New Guinea in 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Australia, on the other hand, has taken a firm stand in <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/huawei-no-way-why-australia-banned-the-world-s-biggest-telecoms-firm-20210503-p57oc9.html">excluding Huawei</a> from access to its 5G expansion program on national security grounds, introducing legislation requiring the registration of agents acting for <a href="https://theconversation.com/agents-of-foreign-influence-with-china-its-a-blurry-line-between-corporate-and-state-interests-112403">“foreign principals”</a> and updating its <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/strengthening-australias-sanctions-laws">sanctions laws</a>. </p>
<h2>Caught by surprise?</h2>
<p>With the launch of the AUKUS security pact, Australia is working with two of Canada’s closest allies in response to growing concerns of an <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/18/aukus-australia-united-states-submarines-china-really-means/">escalating threat</a> and aimed at discouraging any future Chinese bid for regional dominance. At this stage, Canada is absent from the new agreement and the deal appears to have caught Ottawa by surprise. </p>
<p>This is despite the fact that Australia and Canada have similar perspectives in several areas. Both Australia’s <a href="https://www.news.com.au/finance/economy/josh-frydenberg-reveals-australias-china-plus-strategy-to-counter-economic-coercion/news-story/f3bdd5eb7019d17ca2a8f644c38c9ce1">Treasurer Josh Frydenberg</a> and <a href="https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-1/CACN/meeting-5/evidence">Dominic Barton</a>, Canada’s ambassador to China, have argued that companies relying heavily on Chinese markets and supply chains should diversify to other markets. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/work-with-us-to-engage-china-20210812-p58i3n">Australian prime minister has called for</a> an annual economic dialogue between the trade and finance ministers of the U.S. and Australia, seeking protections against coercive economic and trade practices as part of maintaining regional security. </p>
<p>Canada would also benefit from such discussions with allies as a response to China’s overtly coercive <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-07-07/australia-china-trade-tensions-official-economic-punishment/100273964">trade punishments</a>, just as the Canada-led <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/arbitrary_detention-detention_arbitraire.aspx?lang=eng">Declaration on Arbitrary Detention</a> responded to China’s hostage diplomacy. </p>
<h2>Submarine capacity</h2>
<p>Canada has been developing an <a href="https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/canada-looks-beyond-china-and-quietly-draws-up-new-indo-pacific-strategy">Indo-Pacific strategy</a> that’s expected to have both technology and security dimensions. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422159/original/file-20210920-13-1h9vwc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A submarine returns to port." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422159/original/file-20210920-13-1h9vwc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422159/original/file-20210920-13-1h9vwc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422159/original/file-20210920-13-1h9vwc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422159/original/file-20210920-13-1h9vwc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422159/original/file-20210920-13-1h9vwc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422159/original/file-20210920-13-1h9vwc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422159/original/file-20210920-13-1h9vwc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">HMCS Windsor, one of Canada’s Victoria-class long range patrol submarines, returns to port in Halifax on June 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Andrew Vaughan</span></span>
</figcaption>
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<p><a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-canada-cannot-claim-arctic-sovereignty-unless-we-find-the-political/">There have long been arguments</a> that Canada should acquire modern submarine capacity to better defend its three coasts, including the Arctic, where China has <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1174816.shtml">signalled plans</a> to build military infrastructure. Clearly, Canada would benefit by participating in this aspect of AUKUS.</p>
<p>But AUKUS is about much more than advanced submarines — it includes strategic intelligence-sharing, co-operation on cyber security, quantum computing, artificial intelligence (AI) and undersea technologies.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/undersea-internet-cables-connect-pacific-islands-to-the-world-but-geopolitical-tension-is-tugging-at-the-wires-167968">Undersea internet cables connect Pacific islands to the world. But geopolitical tension is tugging at the wires</a>
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</p>
<hr>
<p>These are all Canadian technology strengths. </p>
<p>Canada’s re-elected Liberal government must develop a more robust strategy for dealing with China. Canada’s current passive responses clearly do not deter China’s aggression. </p>
<p>The government should use its new mandate to discuss with members of AUKUS how Canada can work with its allies on advanced technologies and, as a Pacific nation, how it can contribute to security in the Indo-Pacific region. That should include seriously considering joining the new security pact.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168236/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Margaret McCuaig-Johnston is a Senior Fellow with the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa as well as a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Science, Society and Policy of the University of Ottawa. She is also
affiliated with the Canadian International Council (National Capital Region) as a Board member. CIC encourages discussion of foreign policy issues in Canada. She is a Member of the Advisory Board of the Canada China Forum which is a forum for young professional Canadians engaged on China-related issues designed to increase Canada's capabilities related to China. For 37 years she was a Canadian public servant, 13 as an Assistant Deputy Minister.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Garrick does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Canada is conspicuously absent from the new security pact signed between the U.S., the U.K. and Australia on China. Is it time for Canada to take a page from the Australian playbook on managing China?Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaJohn Garrick, University Fellow in Law, Charles Darwin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1634702021-07-12T15:12:36Z2021-07-12T15:12:36ZPutting an end to billions in fishing subsidies could improve fish stocks and ocean health<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410230/original/file-20210707-25-mjklhr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=49%2C49%2C5357%2C3579&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Industrial fishing trawlers stocking up on unsustainable quantities of fish.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Global fish catches are fluctuating near the <a href="https://doi.org/10.4060/ca9229en">highest levels ever reported, while the fraction of fish stocks that are sustainable has never been lower</a>. Nevertheless, governments spent <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2019.103695">US$22 billion of public money on harmful fisheries subsidies in 2018</a>.</p>
<p>These harmful subsidies fund the construction of new fishing vessels or reduce the cost of fuel, for example. They <a href="https://theconversation.com/fisheries-subsidies-fuel-ocean-depletion-and-hurt-coastal-communities-142260">increase fishing capacity by reducing costs, which heightens the risk of overfishing</a>. In short, they limit our ability to sustainably manage our fisheries.</p>
<p>Their scale and impact means that international reform of fishing subsidies is now a necessity, and may be the <a href="https://oceana.org/press-center/press-releases/new-oceana-supported-research-maps-wealthy-nations%E2%80%99-harmful-fisheries">single greatest global action we can take to ensure an abundant ocean</a>. Later this month, the <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/rulesneg_e/fish_e/fish_e.htm">World Trade Organization (WTO) will continue its negotiations on fisheries subsidies</a>. These negotiations began in 2001, and are intended to incorporate the <a href="https://www.undp.org/sustainable-development-goals">United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals</a>. </p>
<p>As a fisheries researcher I believe establishing international rules on fisheries subsidies would be a significant step towards rebuilding an abundant ocean. It would reduce inequity in international fish trade — and help stop overfishing.</p>
<h2>Why do harmful fisheries subsidies exist?</h2>
<p>Historically, subsidies were seen as good things that let governments implement new policies. Each subsidy was introduced for a specific reason, whether to benefit a subset of individuals or society as a whole. </p>
<p>Three broad arguments support subsidies: to address <a href="https://pubs.iied.org/16655iied">social equity issues</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0030605303000413">conservation concerns</a>, and to incentivize economic growth.</p>
<p>Subsidies to support economic growth were once important for ensuring food security, and powered the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aar3279">post-war expansion of fisheries</a> and the recent <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2010.10.014">industrialization of developing nations’ fisheries</a>.</p>
<p>However, fears of food shortages in many nations have largely receded, and <a href="https://doi.org/10.4060/ca9229en">90 per cent of global fish stocks are either fully exploited or overfished</a>, meaning they have been fished to the maximum — or beyond. As such, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2019.103699">economic growth arguments no longer exist</a>, at least not for developed nations.</p>
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<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369797/original/file-20201117-13-180ibt9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369797/original/file-20201117-13-180ibt9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369797/original/file-20201117-13-180ibt9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369797/original/file-20201117-13-180ibt9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369797/original/file-20201117-13-180ibt9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369797/original/file-20201117-13-180ibt9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369797/original/file-20201117-13-180ibt9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption"></span>
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<p><strong><em>This story is part of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/oceans-21-96784">Oceans 21</a></em></strong>
<br><em>Our series on the global ocean opened with <a href="https://oceans21.netlify.app/">five in-depth profiles</a>. Look out for new articles on the state of our oceans in the lead up to the UN’s next climate conference, COP26. The series is brought to you by The Conversation’s international network.</em></p>
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<p>Some conservation-focused subsidies may still be beneficial. For example, subsidies may be used to restore depleted stocks by releasing cultured fish or to finance the adoption of more benign fishing methods. </p>
<p>But research has provided a greater understanding of the overall impact and effectiveness of fisheries subsidies. Most are now considered to be harmful, and the majority exist for political reasons: to lower fishing costs and delay the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-010-9090-9">inevitable economic and social impacts of overfishing</a>.</p>
<h2>How do fisheries subsidies relate to other SDGs?</h2>
<p>Concerns over fisheries subsidies are not new. In 1776, Adam Smith wrote about <a href="https://era.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1455">British herring fishing subsidies that were provided proportionally to the length of vessels</a>. Their intention was to promote exports. Instead they led to larger vessels, raised local food prices and decimated Scottish small-scale fisheries.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Small-scale fishermen catching fish" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410239/original/file-20210707-13-pdkqjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410239/original/file-20210707-13-pdkqjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410239/original/file-20210707-13-pdkqjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410239/original/file-20210707-13-pdkqjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410239/original/file-20210707-13-pdkqjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410239/original/file-20210707-13-pdkqjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410239/original/file-20210707-13-pdkqjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Small-scale fisheries in Bangladesh.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Worldfish, 2001/flickr)</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Little has changed in 250 years. The <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2020.539214">largest vessels still receive the greatest share of the spoils</a>. Many of these vessels originate from rich countries but fish in the waters of poorer countries, transferring the risk of overfishing to those that can least afford it. Our latest study estimates that <a href="https://oceana.org/sites/default/files/994812/Oceana_Summary6-22.pdf">a third of the subsidies provided by the largest fishing nations go towards fishing in other countries’ waters</a>.</p>
<p>The UN SDGs were set up to address many of these global issues and achieve a more sustainable future. But fisheries subsidies makes the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2017.05.030">SDGs on ocean sustainability, poverty and hunger</a>, difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. </p>
<p>Harmful fisheries subsidies damage fish stocks, <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2017.05.013">undermine the economic viability of small-scale producers</a> and jeopardize the livelihoods and food security of coastal communities. It is vital that the WTO negotiations succeed.</p>
<h2>What’s the state of play of the WTO negotiations?</h2>
<p>The negotiations began in 2001, with vague aims of “<a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm">clarifying and improving</a>” existing rules on subsidies. However, no meaningful progress was made — except on <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15693-9">defining fisheries subsidies</a> — until efforts were reinvigorated in 2015, when the SDGs specifically targeted the elimination of harmful subsidies, through the conclusion of the WTO negotiations.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Director General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala with an ice sculpture of fish titled Stop Funding Overfishing" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410237/original/file-20210707-25-wvkdv4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410237/original/file-20210707-25-wvkdv4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410237/original/file-20210707-25-wvkdv4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410237/original/file-20210707-25-wvkdv4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410237/original/file-20210707-25-wvkdv4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=672&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410237/original/file-20210707-25-wvkdv4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=672&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410237/original/file-20210707-25-wvkdv4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=672&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, an economist and former government minister in Nigeria, was appointed as WTO director-general in February 2021. She said she would ‘unblock’ languishing talks on curbing harmful fisheries subsidies.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(WTO/Bryan Lehmann/flickr)</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Six years later, <a href="https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/environment-sustainability/wto-director-general-ngozi-okonjo-iweala-calls-for-deal-to-curb-fishing-subsidies">encouraged by the new WTO Director General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala</a>, an agreement is within reach. On May 11, 2021, <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/TN/RL/W276.pdf&Open=True">a draft agreement</a> was made public — the first since 2007. However, the text remains negotiable and must be agreed to by all 164 ministers at talks on July 15.</p>
<h2>What are the key points of draft text and upcoming talks?</h2>
<p>The draft essentially proposes three categories of prohibited subsidies, those that support illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing (Article 3.1); affect overfished stocks (Article 4.1); or lead to overcapacity and overfishing (Article 5.1).</p>
<p>This may sound simple. But the diverse political, economic, cultural and practical complexities pose real challenges. How are harmful practices determined, and who determines them?</p>
<p>The article addressing IUU lacks impact. IUU activities are secretive and obscure. Removing subsidies to known IUU fishers would eliminate only a small portion of the total and <a href="http://www.subsidyexplorer.org/">will likely have no impact on sustainability</a>.</p>
<p>The article dealing with overfished stocks may have a greater impact, but debates continue over who decides if a stock is overfished. The status of surprisingly few stocks is known — in the central Mediterranean, for example, <a href="https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/status-of-marine-fish-stocks-4/assessment">less than two per cent of landings come from assessed stocks</a>. Stock assessments are technically demanding and costly.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/eAPdLpjGJ_g?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing threatens the sustainable management of marine resources, and represents about 20 per cent of annual catches. (UN Food and Agriculture Organization)</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The article covering overcapacity and overfishing could truly end harmful fisheries subsidies. It is, however, the least developed. In its current state it includes a promising list of subsidy types to be prohibited. </p>
<p>But it also includes a loophole that allows subsidies if measures are in place to keep stocks sustainable. It is unclear what measures would qualify or where the burden of proof would lie. This loophole could remove the teeth from the only rule that might bite!</p>
<h2>What are the possible outcomes?</h2>
<p>The WTO talks require a precarious balance between appeasing the diverse interests of members and ensuring rules are effective and practical. I am cautiously optimistic an agreement will be reached, particularly for the articles on IUU and overfished stocks. I remain concerned, however, that loopholes will render the article on overcapacity and overfishing ineffective. We require all three articles to achieve sustainable fisheries globally.</p>
<p>While we do not want to see the inclusion of blanket loopholes, any agreement will contain special treatment for developing nations.</p>
<p>This issue is sensitive and complex. I believe that long-term sustainability is only achievable if all nations have autonomy over their resources. Currently many developing nations <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0118351">enter unfavourable agreements</a> where rich nations catch fish that host nations are unable to. Subsidies may be necessary for some nations to develop their fisheries. </p>
<p>However, such exemptions must not be perpetual or extended to include industrial fisheries. And as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104507">even small subsidies can be harmful</a>, developing nations must <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.10.001">fund fleet development in ways that don’t undermine sustainability</a>.</p>
<p>The reality of history, however, suggests that no final outcome will be achieved in July. Further talks will be required to finalize Article 5, and therefore the agreement itself. </p>
<h2>Is any agreement better than no agreement?</h2>
<p>Any agreement is a positive outcome if it reduces the global provision of harmful fisheries subsidies. Even a watered-down agreement provides a platform for more progressive future rules. Research shows that reducing fishing capacity inline with resource availability could lead to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/icesjms/fsw016">more fish, support more jobs and lift millions of people from hunger</a>.</p>
<p>Yet adherence to new rules must be monitored and enforced, particularly as subsidies are highly complex and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/icesjms/fsaa142">their reporting often vague or green-washed</a>. Future battles will revolve around issues of transparent reporting and the measured effectiveness of the agreement.</p>
<p>What is important is that the WTO is able to reach consensus and we can take an important step — no matter how small — towards rebuilding fish stocks for the communities that rely on them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163470/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Skerritt receives funding from Oceana, The Pew Charitable Trusts, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, for work regarding global fisheries subsidies.</span></em></p>The WTO is set to wrap up negotiations on harmful fisheries subsidies This could help rebuild the oceans’ fish stocks, and support the communities that rely on them.Daniel Skerritt, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Fisheries Economics Research Unit, University of British ColumbiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1625862021-06-11T16:40:46Z2021-06-11T16:40:46ZWhat’s the G-7? An international economist explains<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405979/original/file-20210611-19-d8b8xi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=32%2C11%2C1913%2C1265&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Two members of the G-7 exchange an elbow bump.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/BritainG7/0cc9d55b5d4447a890ac835b822b6909/photo?Query=g7&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=4310&currentItemNo=38">Phil Noble, Pool via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/g7.asp">The Group of 7</a> is an informal group of seven powerful democracies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The presidents of the European Commission and European Council also attend G-7 meetings because several of Europe’s largest countries are also members. </p>
<p>Membership, which is decided internally, hasn’t changed much since the group’s founding in 1975. At the time, it included only six countries, all of which still belong. Canada joined a year later. Russia joined as an eighth member in 1998, temporarily changing the group’s moniker to the G-8, but Russia <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2014/03/24/politics/obama-europe-trip/index.html">was ousted after it annexed</a> Crimea in 2014. </p>
<p>Together, these seven wealthy nations form the foundation of the modern global economy and the cooperative rules-based system on which it is built. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Leaders of the seven current nations in the G7 as well as of the European Commission and European Council stand and pose for a picture in Cornwall, England" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405948/original/file-20210611-23-x7771g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=92%2C133%2C5487%2C3563&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405948/original/file-20210611-23-x7771g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405948/original/file-20210611-23-x7771g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405948/original/file-20210611-23-x7771g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405948/original/file-20210611-23-x7771g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405948/original/file-20210611-23-x7771g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405948/original/file-20210611-23-x7771g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">G-7 heads of state and the presidents of the European Commission and European Council pose for pictures.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/G7Biden/a2e82343e3bc44018543dba7e5dcce45/photo?Query=g7&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=4310&currentItemNo=10">AP Photo/Patrick Semansky</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why the G-7 matters</h2>
<p>The G-7 countries <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2021/06/09/who-gets-to-be-in-the-g7">make up about 40% of the world economy</a>, down from nearly 70% a few decades ago. </p>
<p>Despite the decline, the economic might of G-7 nations remains undeniable, not least due to their collective position as countries at the forefront of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-18/germany-breaks-korea-s-six-year-streak-as-most-innovative-nation">technological innovation and industrial know-how</a>. Moreover, G-7 economies are inextricably interwoven with global supply chains, which means that a policy change or economic shock in one G-7 country will, for better or worse, have ripple effects across the globe.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the G-7 may be the best hope for quick, decisive and meaningful policy action on pressing global problems.</p>
<p>While the G-7 doesn’t have the institutional clout of the United Nations, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/america-and-the-world-still-need-the-wto-to-keep-trade-and-the-global-economy-humming-113440">World Trade Organization</a> or NATO, it also doesn’t have their institutional red tape or bureaucracy. </p>
<p>And although the G-7 is a subset of the <a href="https://www.g20.org">ascendant G20</a> – which also includes rising economic powerhouses China, India and Brazil – the G-7 has another advantage: it’s much easier to achieve consensus in an intimate group of similar nations than it is to find common ground among diverse nations with very different economic and political priorities.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Leaders of the U.S., U.K., France, West Germany, Japan and Italy pose for a picture during a meeting of the then-G-6 in 1975." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405787/original/file-20210610-24-1l0bytd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=36%2C54%2C2973%2C1962&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405787/original/file-20210610-24-1l0bytd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405787/original/file-20210610-24-1l0bytd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405787/original/file-20210610-24-1l0bytd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405787/original/file-20210610-24-1l0bytd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405787/original/file-20210610-24-1l0bytd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405787/original/file-20210610-24-1l0bytd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Back in 1975, when what is now known as the G-7 was formed, only six nations belonged.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/G7SummitWhatsTheG7/7ad2d9593abf4d86801d34184ab4b5ed/photo?Query=g7%201975&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo/Patrick Semansky</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What the G-7 does</h2>
<p>The world is facing profound challenges, from the devastation of the <a href="https://covid19.who.int">COVID-19 pandemic</a> and <a href="https://climate.nasa.gov/effects/">climate change</a> to <a href="https://theconversation.com/autocracies-that-look-like-democracies-are-a-threat-across-the-globe-110957">authoritarianism</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/search?q=attacks+on+democracy">attacks on democracy</a>.</p>
<p>None of these issues colors neatly within the lines of national borders. Countries need to cooperate to find solutions that do not simply kick the can to their neighbors.</p>
<p>An example of meaningful action by the G-7 is its June 5, 2021, announcement of an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/what-now-g7-tax-deal-multinationals-2021-06-07/">agreement on global minimum corporate tax rates</a>, which marked a watershed moment in international taxation. If successful, the agreement could mean the end of <a href="https://theconversation.com/g7-deal-uk-is-badly-conflicted-between-offshore-tax-havens-and-bidens-global-tax-drive-162190">tax havens</a> and a dramatic shift in how companies record their profits around the world.</p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. publishes short, accessible explanations of newsworthy subjects by academics in their areas of expertise.</em></p>
<p>[<em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162586/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emily J. Blanchard does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The G-7 nations, which include the US and UK, form the foundation of the modern global economy.Emily J. Blanchard, Associate Professor of Economics, Dartmouth CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1624242021-06-10T05:19:07Z2021-06-10T05:19:07ZMorrison’s dilemma: Australia needs a dual strategy for its trade relationship with China<p>En route to this year’s <a href="https://www.g7uk.org/">G7+ Summit</a> in the UK, Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison delivered a speech in Perth on “<a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/address-perth-usasia-centre-perth-wa">A world order that favours freedom</a>”.</p>
<p>He spoke of “Australia’s preparedness to withstand economic coercion in recent times”. As “the most practical way to address economic coercion”, he called for reform of the World Trade Organization, particularly “the restoration of the global trading body’s binding dispute settlement system”.</p>
<p>It wasn’t hard to work out what – and who – he was talking about: China.</p>
<p>But Morrison faces a conundrum in his pitch to reform the WTO to resolve <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/apr/29/fuel-on-the-fire-war-of-words-between-australia-and-china-stokes-tension">trade disputes with China</a>, which has blocked or restricted <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3806162">Australian exports</a> of beef, wheat, lobster, timber and coal, and imposed high tariffs on barley and wine. </p>
<p>But it isn’t China that has undermined the role of the WTO as the global mechanism for settling trade disputes peacefully through agreed rules and procedures. </p>
<p>The blame for that rests with the United States, which under the Trump administration effectively rendered <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3399300">the organisation’s appeals process</a> inoperable. </p>
<p>By emphasising China’s economic coercion and using it to appeal to the US and others to reform the World Trade Organization, the Morrison government is playing a risky game. It may be squandering an opportunity to engage more constructively with China on common interests.</p>
<h2>Trade disputes with China</h2>
<p>As diplomatic relations between China and Australia deteriorated over the past 18 months – fuelled by things such as Australia leading the call for an independent investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 virus – China’s trade restrictions on Australian imports escalated. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-australia-china-relationship-is-unravelling-faster-than-we-could-have-imagined-145836">Why the Australia-China relationship is unravelling faster than we could have imagined</a>
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<p>By December 2020 Australia was ready to make its very first complaint against China <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds598_e.htm">to the WTO</a> – over China’s five-year 80.5% tariff on Australian barley. The Morrison government is now <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/02/australia-china-wine-trade-dispute-canberra-considers-involving-wto.html">contemplating a second WTO complaint</a> over China’s tariffs of as high as 200% on Australian wine.</p>
<h2>Appellate Court in limbo</h2>
<p>The WTO established a panel to review the barley tariff in May. </p>
<p>Even if Australia does win its case, it faces the <a href="https://theconversation.com/taking-china-to-the-world-trade-organisation-plants-a-seed-it-wont-be-a-quick-or-easy-win-152173">uncertainty</a> of how long China takes in acting on the WTO ruling. </p>
<p>But before that is the problem of the WTO making a final ruling. </p>
<p>Like other court systems the WTO has an appeals mechanism, known as the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body is meant to have seven members, and requires a quorum of three judges to hear an appeal. Members are appointed to four-year terms. Appointments require all of the WTO’s 164 member nations to agree.</p>
<p>The US, however, has blocked every appointment and reappointment over the past four years or so. Now the Appellate Body has no members. So no dispute taken to the WTO can be resolved if one of the disputing parties appeals. </p>
<p>If Australia does win its case against China, and China appeals, the <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3399300">dispute will remain in limbo</a> until the Appellate Body can hear that appeal.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/taking-china-to-the-world-trade-organisation-plants-a-seed-it-wont-be-a-quick-or-easy-win-152173">Taking China to the World Trade Organisation plants a seed. It won't be a quick or easy win</a>
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<h2>Shared trade interests</h2>
<p>On this issue, Australia and China have a shared position. In 2018, for example, they <a href="http://grupopuntadeleste.com/es/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/WTGC197-Dec-14-2018.pdf">joined forces</a> with other countries to push for the appointment of Appellate Body members. </p>
<p>They also have common interests on some other reform issues in trade that Morrison mentioned in his speech, such as the digital economy and environmental sustainability. Reducing pollution from <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/envir_17nov20_e.htm">trade in plastics</a> is an example.</p>
<p>Morrison’s speech, however, tended to highlight the differences rather than shared interests in the international trading system.</p>
<p>“We are facing heightened competition in the Indo-Pacific region,” he said. “We know that because we live here. The task is to manage that competition. Competition does not have to lead to conflict. Nor does competition justify coercion.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-a-biden-presidency-means-for-world-trade-and-allies-like-australia-149735">What a Biden presidency means for world trade and allies like Australia</a>
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<h2>Need for a dual strategy</h2>
<p>Morrison’s speech did acknowledge the need for “all nations to participate in the global system”. Australia, he said, “stands ready to engage in dialogue with all countries on shared challenges, including China when they are ready to do so with us”.</p>
<p>But Australia’s national interest demands more than just standing ready. The government needs to do the proverbial walking and chewing gum at the same time. </p>
<p>Though its primary motivation for WTO reform may be Australia’s trade disputes with China, it cannot ignore the need to promote that reform through engaging and collaborating with China, now the world’s biggest economy and Australia’s <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/trade-investment-glance-2020.pdf">most important trading partner</a> by far. </p>
<p>This won’t be easy. There are some big differences that separate China from Australia and its allies. The Chinese government is far more involved in its economy than the market-based ethos that drove the establishment of the World Trade Organization in the first place.</p>
<p>Negotiating these differences peacefully will require delicate conversations over the boundaries of trade law and policy. That will be impossible in an environment of mutual distrust. </p>
<p>Any WTO reform will <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/article/3133534/chinas-wto-reform-aspirations-take-centre-stage-globalisation-seminar">need China on board</a>. </p>
<p>Finding common ground on reinstating a reformed WTO Appellate Body could be a starting point for tempering this lack of trust. It could pave the way for the two nations to de-escalate and move closer to resolving their disputes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162424/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Markus Wagner is the Executive Vice-President of the Society of International Economic Law. He writes in his personal capacity. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Weihuan Zhou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia’s Prime Minister wants reform of the World Trade Organization to rein in China’s ‘economic coercion’. But it also needs to constructively engage with China on that reform.Weihuan Zhou, Associate Professor, Director of Research and member of Herbert Smith Freehills CIBEL Centre, Faculty of Law and Justice, UNSW Sydney, UNSW SydneyMarkus Wagner, Associate Professor of Law and Director of the UOW Transnational Law and Policy Centre, University of WollongongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1606852021-05-11T21:22:54Z2021-05-11T21:22:54ZCanada is virtue signalling while waffling on global access to COVID-19 vaccines<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400122/original/file-20210511-13-1tuqssl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=237%2C26%2C3233%2C2365&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Anita Anand, Canada's minister of public services and procurement, opens a box with some of the first 500,000 of the two million AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine doses that Canada secured last March through a deal with the Serum Institute of India. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Carlos Osorio - POOL</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Based on public statements, it’s easy to come to the conclusion that Canada is working to improve global access to COVID-19 vaccines.</p>
<p>This quote comes from an <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/15/international-community-must-guarantee-equal-global-access-covid-19-vaccine/">opinion piece</a> in the <em>Washington Post</em> on July 15, 2020; the lead author, none other than Prime Minister Justin Trudeau:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“…we must urgently ensure that vaccines will be distributed according to a set of transparent, equitable and scientifically sound principles. Where you live should not determine whether you live, and global solidarity is central to saving lives and protecting the economy.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The person being quoted here in early May of this year is <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-trudeau-wont-state-position-on-covid-19-vaccine-patent-waiver-as/">Mary Ng</a>, the International Trade Minister in Trudeau’s cabinet:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The work we have been doing and the leadership we have been providing is very much about removing all barriers to vaccine access, whether it be production or supply chain or export restrictions…We’re trying to remove all barriers to access to vaccines.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But despite what Trudeau and Ng said, Canada is not doing all that it can to improve access. Far from it.</p>
<h2>Virtue signalling with little action</h2>
<p>Canada has <a href="https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/canada-has-reserved-more-vaccine-doses-per-person-than-anywhere-1.1533041">signed contracts for enough vaccine doses</a> to inoculate every woman, man and child in Canada four times. Canada is <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/7777450/biden-covid-vaccine-canada-help/">accepting vaccine donations</a> from the United States and also <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/covax-first-shipment-canada-1.5979777">purchasing vaccines from COVAX</a> (COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access — a mechanism mainly designed to ensure that low- and middle-income countries can access vaccines). </p>
<p>Over one-third of Canadians have <a href="https://health-infobase.canada.ca/covid-19/vaccination-coverage/">received at least one dose of vaccine</a> as of May 7, compared to <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-africas-vaccination-rollout-off-to-slow-start/a-57242006">vaccination rates of under two per cent in Africa</a>. Back in January, Canada <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-canada-rejects-who-request-for-immediate-vaccine-donations-to-lower/">refused to donate any vaccines</a> and that position has not changed since.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400123/original/file-20210511-13-1wx018t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A person in a reflective vest and a face mask examining a crate with a COVAX label" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400123/original/file-20210511-13-1wx018t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400123/original/file-20210511-13-1wx018t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400123/original/file-20210511-13-1wx018t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400123/original/file-20210511-13-1wx018t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400123/original/file-20210511-13-1wx018t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400123/original/file-20210511-13-1wx018t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400123/original/file-20210511-13-1wx018t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A shipment of COVID-19 vaccines distributed by the COVAX Facility arrives in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, last February.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/ Diomande Ble Blonde)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This pattern of virtue signalling about access to medicines and then doing nothing has a long tradition in Canada.</p>
<p>Back in the late 1990s, the South African government was trying to improve access to drug treatment for the staggering <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ije/article/31/1/37/655915">22 per cent of the population that was HIV positive</a>. At that time, triple therapy — the three-drug cocktail used to treat HIV — <a href="https://www.msf.org/untangling-web-antiretroviral-price-reductions-14th-edition">cost over US $10,000 per person per year</a>, effectively putting it out of reach of the vast majority of South Africans. </p>
<p>South Africa wanted to encourage the use of low-cost generic drugs. The response from 39 drug companies, backed by the United States, was to take South Africa to court. Canada’s position? We <a href="http://jmcti.org/2000round/build-in-agenda/service/S_CSS_W_046.pdf">supported access but we also supported the intellectual property rights of the drug companies</a>.</p>
<h2>C-TAP, COVAX and the WTO TRIPS waiver</h2>
<p>Fast forward to the present and COVID-19. In May 2020, the World Health Organization launched the <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/29-05-2020-international-community-rallies-to-support-open-research-and-science-to-fight-covid-19">COVID-19 Technology Access Pool</a>, or C-TAP, an initiative to accelerate and broaden global access to COVID-19 vaccines under development at the time, as well as treatments and diagnostics. </p>
<p>C-TAP has the <a href="https://www.who.int/initiatives/covid-19-technology-access-pool/endorsements-of-the-solidarity-call-to-action">endorsement of 40 countries</a>. But not Canada. No pharmaceutical company has contributed to C-TAP. <a href="https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/05/28/who-voluntary-pool-patents-pfizer/">Pfizer CEO Albert Bourla said</a>: “At this point in time, I think it’s nonsense, and… it’s also dangerous.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A policeman standing on a skip with crates of vaccine." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400125/original/file-20210511-23-x2rlm8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400125/original/file-20210511-23-x2rlm8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400125/original/file-20210511-23-x2rlm8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400125/original/file-20210511-23-x2rlm8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400125/original/file-20210511-23-x2rlm8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400125/original/file-20210511-23-x2rlm8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400125/original/file-20210511-23-x2rlm8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Malawian policeman guards AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccines after the shipment arrived in March at the Kamuzu International Airport in Lilongwe, Malawi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Thoko Chikondi, File)</span></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>COVAX is designed to give poor countries enough vaccine for 20 per cent of their population, but it is <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/covax-facility-seeks-an-additional-2b-for-covid-19-vaccines-99671">$2 billion short</a> of even achieving that modest objective.</p>
<p>In the face of the failure of C-TAP and in order to supplement what COVAX could do, back in October 2020 India and South Africa asked the World Trade Organization to <a href="https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-arguments-against-sharing-covid-19-intellectual-property-dont-add-up-51620056595">suspend the protection of intellectual property</a>.</p>
<p>The request included patent rights, technical know-how and undisclosed data for COVID-19 products for the duration of the pandemic. This is known as the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) waiver. The objective was to free up unused worldwide capacity to increase the production of vaccines and other products necessary for the prevention and treatment of COVID-19.</p>
<p>As many <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-suspending-covid-19-vaccine-patents-is-morally-correct-but-wont-move/">commentators have pointed out</a>, if the waiver is approved by the WTO (and approval requires consensus among all its 159 members), nothing will change overnight. It will take many months and possibly even longer to ramp up vaccine production. </p>
<p>But that increased capacity is going to be needed. It is increasingly looking like we might require <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/why-annual-covid-19-boosters-may-become-the-norm">yearly booster shots for COVID-19</a> as variants multiply. That’s almost six billion doses of vaccine a year for people 15 years and older, <a href="https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-arguments-against-sharing-covid-19-intellectual-property-dont-add-up-51620056595">almost double the current capacity to produce vaccines</a>. </p>
<p>Moreover, when drug companies think that the pandemic is over, they are going to raise prices dramatically. Pfizer currently charges US$19.50 per dose, but chief financial officer Frank D’Amelio said that <a href="https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/pfizer-eyes-higher-covid-19-vaccine-prices-after-pandemic-exec-analyst">Pfizer’s normal price for vaccines is $150 to $175</a>.</p>
<h2>Canada’s position on intellectual property</h2>
<p>To the amazement of just about everyone, the Biden administration just announced that the U.S. is going to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/05/politics/vaccine-patent-waivers/index.html">support the waiver</a> for COVID-19 vaccines.</p>
<p>Canada? Just like the South Africa situation, we neither support nor oppose the waiver. The Canadian government will take part in talks at the WTO about the waiver, but won’t say which side it will be taking. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A motorcade of police cars and a truck." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400126/original/file-20210511-23-1cxa0na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400126/original/file-20210511-23-1cxa0na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400126/original/file-20210511-23-1cxa0na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400126/original/file-20210511-23-1cxa0na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400126/original/file-20210511-23-1cxa0na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400126/original/file-20210511-23-1cxa0na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400126/original/file-20210511-23-1cxa0na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A police escort follows the shipment carrying just under 300,000 doses of the single-shot Johnson & Johnson COVID-19 vaccine, which is developed by the Janssen Pharmaceutical Companies, at Pearson International Airport in Toronto on April 28.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Nathan Denette</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Canada’s position for months has been that it was “<a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-trudeau-wont-state-position-on-covid-19-vaccine-patent-waiver-as/">merely asking questions about the patent waiver proposal, rather than opposing it</a>.” But in a <a href="https://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/2021-03-05-phrma-letter.pdf">letter to the U.S. government</a> back in March from the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Canada was listed as one of the countries standing with the U.S. in opposing the waiver.</p>
<p>Canada is <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-canada-to-take-part-in-talks-over-vaccine-patent-waivers-but-wont/">currently negotiating with drug companies over vaccine delivery schedules</a> and is still in a battle with them about changes to <a href="http://innovativemedicines.ca/pmprb-regulations-delayed/">how prices for patented drug will be determined</a>. </p>
<p>Innovative Medicines Canada (IMC), the lobby group for the multinational companies, not surprisingly has come out strongly against the waiver. <a href="http://innovativemedicines.ca/innovative-medicines-canada-cautions-covid-19-trips-ip-waiver/">In a statement</a> a few days after the U.S. announced its position, IMC said the “proposed waiver of TRIPS IP protections would be a disappointing step that will create greater uncertainty and unpredictability in the production, quality, and availability of COVID-19 vaccines worldwide.” </p>
<p>How much is fear of further angering the pharmaceutical industry playing into Canada’s position on the waiver?</p>
<p>When it comes to standing up for access to medicines versus standing up for intellectual property rights, for Canada, plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose; the more things change, the more they stay the same.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160685/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>In 2017-2020, Joel Lexchin received payments for being on a panel at the American Diabetes Association, for talks at the Toronto Reference Library, for writing a brief in an action for side effects of a drug for Michael F. Smith, Lawyer and a second brief on the role of promotion in generating prescriptions for Goodmans LLP and from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research for presenting at a workshop on conflict-of-interest in clinical practice guidelines. He is currently a member of research groups that are receiving money from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research and the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council. He is a member of the Foundation Board of Health Action International and the Board of Canadian Doctors for Medicare. He receives royalties from University of Toronto Press and James Lorimer & Co. Ltd. for books he has written. </span></em></p>Despite some public virtue signalling, the Canadian government is not doing all it can to improve global access to COVID-19 vaccines. Canada has yet to announce its position on the WTO patent waiver.Joel Lexchin, Professor Emeritus of Health Policy and Management, York University, Emergency Physician at University Health Network, Associate Professor of Family and Community Medicine, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1605822021-05-10T12:34:00Z2021-05-10T12:34:00ZUS support for waiving COVID-19 vaccine patent rights puts pressure on drugmakers – but what would a waiver actually look like?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399578/original/file-20210509-15-imdzwl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C5%2C3810%2C2527&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A COVID-19 surge has pushed hospitals in India beyond their capacity. A stadium in New Delhi was being used as a makeshift ward on May 2, 2021.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/medical-worker-in-ppe-observes-patients-who-have-been-news-photo/1315876823">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The U.S. and Europe are debating waiving patent rights for COVID-19 vaccines, a move that could allow more companies to produce the vaccine around the world. But it’s not as simple as it might sound.</p>
<p>When the <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/trip_11mar21_e.htm">U.S. announced</a> on May 5, 2021, that it supported the idea of a temporary waiver, the statement was vague. Some <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/eu-summit-vaccine-waiver/eu-sceptical-on-vaccine-waiver-but-ready-to-discuss-proposal-idUSL8N2MV07S">European countries</a> still oppose even a narrow waiver. </p>
<p>Any agreement will take weeks of negotiation among the World Trade Organization’s 164 members, and then months more for production to begin.</p>
<p>That long timeline won’t solve the immediate problem. Many poor countries have vaccinated <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/coronavirus-data-explorer">less than 1%</a> of their populations, while <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/coronavirus-data-explorer">44% of the vaccine doses</a> have gone to Europe and North America, where wealthy countries secured <a href="https://apnews.com/article/europe-coronavirus-vaccine-coronavirus-pandemic-technology-business-dd8e893679769166e170144644eced75">large vaccine contracts</a>. At the same time, the disease is spreading quickly in South Asia, and new variants are raising the risks around the world.</p>
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<p>The idea of temporarily waiving World Trade Organization rules on intellectual property rights for the COVID-19 vaccines was <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/W669.pdf&Open=True">first proposed</a> by South Africa and India in late 2020. The original proposal was broad, covering patents, copyrights, trade secrets and industrial designs related to the “prevention, containment or treatment of COVID-19.”</p>
<p>The U.S. is suggesting a much narrower approach, but exactly what that would look like isn’t yet clear.</p>
<p>Some European countries with vaccine industries, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-split-vaccine-waiver-idea-unlikely-take-clear-stance-2021-05-07/">including Germany</a>, argue that waiving intellectual property rights would pose a <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-support-for-patent-waiver-unlikely-to-cost-covid-19-vaccine-makers-in-short-term-11620414260">danger to future vaccine innovation</a> and is unnecessary. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-split-vaccine-waiver-idea-unlikely-take-clear-stance-2021-05-07/">Others pointed out</a> that most countries in need lack the facilities, technology and skilled technicians to produce the vaccines even if patent rights were waived, and said the bigger problem was countries like the U.S. and Britain preventing their vaccines and ingredients from being exported to the rest of the world.</p>
<p>Critics are correct that, by itself, a temporary waiver is not sufficient to address the gap in production. They are correct that vaccine ingredients and other supplies remain a major blockage.</p>
<p>But it is also clear that vaccine makers are not voluntarily licensing their vaccines at the scale needed to expand production enough to stop the pandemic.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An employee in full protective gear works on assembling vaccine doses." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399579/original/file-20210509-13-1hfzvy5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399579/original/file-20210509-13-1hfzvy5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399579/original/file-20210509-13-1hfzvy5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399579/original/file-20210509-13-1hfzvy5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399579/original/file-20210509-13-1hfzvy5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399579/original/file-20210509-13-1hfzvy5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399579/original/file-20210509-13-1hfzvy5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">India’s Serum Institute is one of a few companies outside North America and Europe licensed to produce patented COVID-19 vaccines.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-employee-in-protective-gear-works-on-an-assembly-line-news-photo/1230726607">Punit Paranjpe/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>The <a href="https://www.unicef.org/supply/covid-19-vaccine-market-dashboard">UNICEF COVID Dashboard</a> shows that Moderna and Pfizer/BioNTech, which both use new mRNA technology in their vaccines, have licensed to few other companies. Moderna had <a href="https://investors.modernatx.com/news-releases/news-release-details/statement-moderna-intellectual-property-matters-during-covid-19">voluntarily agreed not to enforce its patents</a> but has not shared trade secrets or know-how. Johnson & Johnson and AstraZeneca have primarily licensed to companies with which they carried out national clinical trials, and these may be limited just to production for export for existing developed country contracts or purely domestic supply. Refusals to license to experienced drug manufacturers such a <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-canadian-firm-seeks-mandatory-licence-to-produce-covid-19-vaccines-for/">Biolyse in Canada</a> or <a href="https://kfgo.com/2021/04/28/exclusive-teva-pharm-unlikely-to-reach-deals-to-co-produce-vaccines-ceo/">Teva in Israel</a> present a serious problem.</p>
<p><a href="https://udayton.edu/directory/law/shabalala_dalindyebo.php">I have worked on legal issues related to access to medicines</a> since 2004 and have been involved in these debates at the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization. I believe that U.S. support of the waiver proposal can lead to an effective outcome if minimum criteria are met: The vaccine makers will have to give up some control, and the countries must ensure those companies are appropriately compensated.</p>
<p>The waiver could build on the existing system for compulsory licensing of patents and extend that to trade secrets and knowledge. The <a href="https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/84/5/news10506/en/">negotiations around access to HIV/AIDS medicines</a> in the 1990s ended up with a similar framework.</p>
<h2>How to make compulsory licenses work for vaccines</h2>
<p>When a country approves a patent, it gives the patent holder a monopoly for a limited term, usually 20 years, for new and highly inventive ideas. The key phrase is “limited time.” This makes sure that once a patent runs out, others can make the product. Generic drugs are an example.</p>
<p>For emergencies, the patent system has safety valves that allow governments to intervene before that limited time is up. Based on public needs – including health emergencies – a government can allow others to make the product, usually with a reasonable royalty, or fee, paid to the patent owner. This is known as a compulsory license.</p>
<p>Today, any country that has issued a patent to a COVID-19 vaccine maker can use that patent simply by issuing a compulsory license to enable production by its own companies.</p>
<p>The problem is that many countries don’t have vaccine production facilities within their borders – they need to rely on imports. But under Article 31 of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, or TRIPS, compulsory licenses can’t be used to produce vaccines for exporting to other countries. That means countries like China and the Philippines that have thriving pharmaceutical industries can’t use compulsory licenses to send vaccines to Africa, for example.</p>
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<img alt="A person wearing a mask and gloves holds up a small vial." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399580/original/file-20210509-17-xtrg2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399580/original/file-20210509-17-xtrg2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399580/original/file-20210509-17-xtrg2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399580/original/file-20210509-17-xtrg2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399580/original/file-20210509-17-xtrg2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399580/original/file-20210509-17-xtrg2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399580/original/file-20210509-17-xtrg2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A medical worker in Algeria holds a vial of Russia’s Sputnik V vaccine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/medical-worker-holds-a-vial-of-russias-sputnik-v-vaccine-news-photo/1230865914">Ryad Kramdi/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>There have been several attempts to solve this problem, including a change to the TRIPS Agreement approved in 2005. But <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripsfacsheet_e.htm">only one country – Rwanda – has used that system</a> to access drugs, and it was deemed <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=Q:/IP/C/57.pdf&Open=True">too difficult to use</a>. Rwanda was able to import 7 million doses from Canada, but it took almost two years, and the Canadian generic producer declared the system <a href="https://www.biospace.com/article/releases/apotex-corp-receives-final-tender-approval-from-rwanda-for-vital-aids-drug-/">economically unsustainable for a private company</a>.</p>
<p>The technologies in COVID-19 vaccines, especially those based on mRNA vaccines, are complex and involve multiple patents, trade secrets and know-how. The TRIPS Agreement <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04d_e.htm">requires countries to provide protection</a> for trade secrets. Some countries’ laws, such as the U.S. Defense Production Act, allow for requiring such technology transfer, but many countries don’t want to violate the agreement. </p>
<p>To successfully expand vaccine production, countries need a relatively seamless system. The waiver must <a href="https://dalishabalala.wordpress.com/2021/04/15/a-compulsory-license-option-for-the-covid19-trips-waiver-proposal/">lift the TRIPS limitations on exports</a> and allow countries to require sharing of trade secrets and know-how. This would let a country like the Philippines issue a blanket license for COVID-19 technologies, allow its companies to produce vaccines developed elsewhere and export those vaccines to countries that lack their own manufacturing capacity.</p>
<p>Lifting those restrictions could help ensure that the world is not still in the same position in 2022. And that is what the proposal is truly aimed at.</p>
<h2>How soon could the world see results?</h2>
<p>Both the threat of the waiver and its actual implementation could accomplish several things.</p>
<p>First, they increase the incentive for companies to voluntarily license their vaccines and transfer knowledge to trusted partners in other countries. Provided there is pressure to do so, they could allow production for export to additional countries.</p>
<p>Second, they increase the leverage developing country companies and governments have in negotiations with vaccine makers for licenses, like the production <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/03/politics/biden-merck-johnson--johnson-dpa/index.html">agreement between Merck and Johnson & Johnson brokered by the Biden administration</a>.</p>
<p>Finally, if implemented, the waiver would ensure that pharmaceutical companies are compensated for their work in developing vaccines while ensuring that they cannot prevent wider production.</p>
<p>This is an international emergency that requires “extraordinary measures,” as <a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/may/statement-ambassador-katherine-tai-covid-19-trips-waiver">U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai noted</a>. These measures do not need to be taken at the cost of either innovation or access.</p>
<p><em>This article updates a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-get-covid-19-vaccines-to-poor-countries-and-still-keep-patent-benefits-for-drugmakers-158384">version</a> published April 14, 2021.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160582/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dalindyebo Shabalala is affiliated with the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) as a Board Member. He has previously worked at the South Centre, an intergovernmental organization of developing countries on Access to Medicines projects funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, SIDA, and GIZ among others</span></em></p>The process will take months, if it’s even approved. But just the threat of waiving intellectual property rights could spur faster action.Dalindyebo Shabalala, Associate Professor, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1604432021-05-07T04:05:42Z2021-05-07T04:05:42ZUS support for waiving COVID vaccine IP is a huge step<p>Yesterday, the US Biden administration <a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/may/statement-ambassador-katherine-tai-covid-19-trips-waiver">declared</a> its support for waiving intellectual property rights, including patents, for COVID-19 vaccines.</p>
<p>This decision represents a huge breakthrough in discussions at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that have been deadlocked for more than six months.</p>
<p>Shortly afterwards, New Zealand’s trade minister Damien O'Connor <a href="https://twitter.com/DamienOConnorMP/status/1390041572679372800">announced his country’s support on Twitter</a>, quickly followed by <a href="https://www.thestar.com/politics/federal/2021/05/06/canada-supports-review-of-patent-protections-for-covid-19-vaccines.html">Canada’s expression of support for the proposal</a>.</p>
<p>Other nations that have so far resisted pressure to support the waiver are likely to fall like dominoes in the wake of the US in coming days.</p>
<p>Today, Australia’s trade minister <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-05-07/dan-tehan-says-australia-will-support-patent-waiver-for-vaccines/13333684">Dan Tehan said</a> the waiver “will be an important part of trying to get a resolution in the World Trade Organisation”, but it remains unclear whether Australia has unequivocally thrown its support behind the proposal. </p>
<p>Waiving intellectual property rights is a necessary first step to scaling up the global supply of COVID-19 vaccines and correcting worsening inequities in access to these desperately needed products. </p>
<p>A decision by Australia to support the waiver would indicate we value human lives more than pharmaceutical industry profits, and are committed to bringing the pandemic to an end globally.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/over-700-health-experts-are-calling-for-urgent-action-to-expand-global-production-of-covid-vaccines-159701">Over 700 health experts are calling for urgent action to expand global production of COVID vaccines</a>
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<h2>Why do we need to waive intellectual property rights?</h2>
<p>The exclusive rights to manufacture COVID-19 vaccines are currently held by a small number of companies that control the global supply. This is despite the <a href="https://www.msf.org/governments-must-demand-all-coronavirus-covid-19-vaccine-deals-are-made-public">huge amounts of public funding</a> funnelled into their development.</p>
<p>Some of these companies have entered into licensing arrangements with other manufacturers to increase production, such as AstraZeneca’s contracts allowing CSL in Australia and the Serum Institute of India to make its vaccine.</p>
<p>But most have not. And no pharmaceutical company has taken steps to share its intellectual property, know-how, and technology through the <a href="https://www.who.int/initiatives/covid-19-technology-access-pool">COVID-19 Technology Access Pool</a>, a platform set up by the World Health Organisation (WHO) for this purpose almost a year ago.</p>
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<p>The exclusive rights held by these companies are governed by the WTO’s <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_03_e.htm">Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights</a>, commonly known as “TRIPS”. WTO members are required by TRIPS to provide patent terms of at least 20 years, along with other types of intellectual property protection, such as protection of trade secrets.</p>
<p>Suspending patents and other intellectual property rights relevant to pharmaceuticals will remove legal barriers, allowing vaccine developers to enter the market more quickly without worrying about the prospect of litigation over potential infringements of intellectual property rights. </p>
<p>It will also mean vaccines manufactured in one country can be exported to others without having to navigate a legal maze.</p>
<h2>What’s been happening at the WTO?</h2>
<p>India and South Africa first put a <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/W669.pdf&Open=True">proposal</a> to the WTO in October 2020 for a waiver of certain intellectual property provisions in TRIPS for COVID-19 medical products for the duration of the pandemic. As envisaged by its sponsors, the waiver would apply to vaccines along with other medical products to fight the pandemic such as treatments, diagnostic tests and medical equipment.</p>
<p>Over the ensuing six months, <a href="https://www.twn.my/title2/health.info/2021/hi210306.htm">more than 100</a> of the WTO’s 164 members moved to support the TRIPS waiver proposal. </p>
<p>But several countries have prevented negotiations from moving forward, including the US, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, Brazil, Norway and Australia. If Australia now adds its wholehearted support to the US proposal for a waiver for vaccines, this could help shift the dynamics at the WTO further towards a resolution.</p>
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<p>Meanwhile, the pandemic has been accelerating and inequities in vaccine access have been worsening. The director-general of the WHO, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-56698854">noted in April</a> that one in four people in rich countries had been given a vaccine dose, but only one in around 500 in low-income countries had received a dose. </p>
<p>It has become increasingly clear that unless governments take urgent action, the global supply of vaccines won’t be adequate to meet demand for a long time to come. COVAX, the global program for equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, has so far <a href="https://www.unicef.org/supply/covid-19-vaccine-market-dashboard">been able to deliver only 54 million</a> of the two billion vaccine doses it planned to distribute by the end of 2021.</p>
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<h2>Why is the US about-face so significant?</h2>
<p>Historically, the US has been the world’s staunchest advocate for intellectual property rights. It has demanded its trading partners <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/jlme.12014">provide high levels of protection for IP</a> in exchange for access to US markets, and has <a href="https://www.keionline.org/35215">named and shamed countries</a> it sees as providing insufficient IP protection, singling them out for trade sanctions.</p>
<p>The change in the US position signals how clearly the success of every country in fighting the pandemic depends on vaccinating the whole world. The risk of variants emerging in areas of uncontrolled transmission means no country can gain control of the situation just by vaccinating its own population.</p>
<p>The US move will give confidence to other countries to support the waiver and will isolate any countries that continue to oppose it.</p>
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<figcaption>Source: Médecins Sans Frontières</figcaption></figure>
<h2>Does the US support for the waiver go far enough?</h2>
<p>The US has agreed to support a waiver only for vaccines. This is short-sighted. COVID-19 treatments could become a more important part of the medical toolkit for fighting the pandemic further down the track — as treatments called “antiretrovirals” have proved <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/art-lives-saved">crucial to reigning in the spread of HIV</a>. And many countries are lacking sufficient diagnostic tests, which are critical for getting outbreaks under control.</p>
<p>The waiver also isn’t enough on its own: it’s necessary but not sufficient. Governments will need to incentivise pharmaceutical companies — or if they continue to drag their feet, force them — to share their knowledge of manufacturing processes and their technology through initiatives like the WHO Technology Access Pool.</p>
<p>And governments will need to invest in building production capacity in low- and middle-income countries and find solutions to problems like shortages of raw ingredients, rather than relying on the market to solve these structural problems.</p>
<h2>What needs to happen next?</h2>
<p>Given the consensus-based decision-making process at the WTO, the TRIPS waiver will still need to win the support of the remaining countries standing in the way.</p>
<p>Gaining the EU’s support will probably be the most difficult battle. The EU, where a large proportion of the world’s pharmaceutical companies are headquartered, has so far emphasised donations of vaccines as the way out of the pandemic. But European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has at least <a href="https://twitter.com/vonderleyen/status/1390215441625321472">signalled</a> the EU’s willingness to discuss the US proposal.</p>
<p>Once consensus is reached, it will be important for the negotiations to be transparent, with draft texts shared publicly, as the benefits that flow from the waiver will rely on the detail of its wording.</p>
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<p>Negotiations will also need to progress at speed. There have been millions of deaths from COVID-19 since the proposal was first tabled six months ago. The world can’t afford another long wait.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160443/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Deborah Gleeson has received funding in the past from the Australian Research Council. She has received funding from various national and international non-government organisations to attend speaking engagements related to trade agreements and health. She has represented the Public Health Association of Australia on matters related to trade agreements and public health.</span></em></p>The change in the US position signals how clearly the success of every country in fighting the pandemic depends on vaccinating the whole world.Deborah Gleeson, Associate Professor in Public Health, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1594672021-04-25T16:50:26Z2021-04-25T16:50:26ZIntellectual property and Covid-19: how can we accelerate vaccination globally?<p>The gap between the number of vaccines administered in rich countries and in the developing world “is growing every single day, and becoming more grotesque every day”, declared Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), on March 22. The latter statement referred to the fact that only 0.1% of the doses of vaccines distributed in the world had been received by the 29 poorest countries, which represent <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/health/20210322-covid-19-who-slams-grotesque-growing-global-vaccine-inequity">9% of the global population</a>.</p>
<h2>An ambitious scaling-up plan</h2>
<p>However, as early as April 2020, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the European Commission and France together with WHO supported the implementation of COVAX (Covid-19 Vaccines Global Access), an international solidarity mechanism. Led by GAVI (the Vaccine Alliance) and CEPI (Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations), in partnership with UNICEF and PAHO (Pan-American Health Organization), COVAX’s mission is to purchase vaccines for equitable distribution in <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/18-12-2020-covax-announces-additional-deals-to-access-promising-covid-19-vaccine-candidates-plans-global-rollout-starting-q1-2021">98 participating high-income countries and 92 low- and middle-income countries</a>.</p>
<p>At the end of February, the first 504,000 and 600,000 doses were delivered to Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana respectively. At the beginning of April, more than 38 million doses had already been received by 100 countries, 61 of which benefiting from a subsidy <a href="https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/covax-reaches-over-100-economies-42-days-after-first-international-delivery">financed by a dedicated fund</a>. In the coming months, the expected scale-up of COVAX is ambitious, with a stated objective of 337 million doses to 145 countries by the end of June, and at least 2 billion doses by the end of 2021, including 1.3 billion at no cost to low-income countries, where up to <a href="https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/covid/covax/COVAX-Interim-Distribution-Forecast.pdf">27% of the population could be vaccinated</a>.</p>
<p>Even if this objective is met, it will not be sufficient to bring the pandemic under control. To achieve this, a much higher percentage of the population must be immunised. Recent modelling has estimated that if a vaccine prevents transmission of the virus in 90% of cases, then nearly 67% of the population needs to be vaccinated to achieve – at least temporarily – herd immunity, and <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-00396-2">return to “normal” life</a>. Such a threshold, applied to a world population of <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/">7.7 billion people</a>, leads to a production target of between 5.2 billion doses in the most favourable situation of a single-dose vaccine, and twice as much, or 10.4 billion doses, if two shots are needed.</p>
<h2>No one is safe until everyone is safe</h2>
<p>In addition to producing new vaccines at an unprecedented scale, it is necessary to vaccinate everywhere in the world, in the shortest possible time, before <a href="https://theconversation.com/new-covid-variants-have-changed-the-game-and-vaccines-will-not-be-enough-we-need-global-maximum-suppression-157870">new variants compromise the initial results</a>. This imperative is reiterated by <a href="https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/patient-zero-understanding-how-new-coronavirus-variants-emerge">GAVI</a> and <a href="https://cepi.net/news_cepi/global-leaders-support-cepi-plan-to-tackle-risk-of-future-pandemics/">CEPI</a>, the co-leads of COVAX, as well as by <a href="https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/we-need-speed-and-simplicity-remove-barriers-acquisition-manufacture-and">UNICEF</a> and <a href="https://www.paho.org/en/news/17-3-2021-deliveries-covid-19-vaccines-procured-through-covax-accelerate">PAHO</a>, in charge of procurement and logistics. In the words of Jeremy Farrar, director of the <a href="https://wellcome.org/news/why-we-need-share-vaccine-doses-now-and-why-covax-right-way-do-it">Wellcome Trust</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“If left to spread unchecked in large parts of the world, the virus risks mutating to an extent where our vaccines and treatments no longer work – leaving us all exposed.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The distribution of vaccines is complicated by early commercial agreements concluded by governments with the industry, when no product was yet approved, in some cases for more doses than needed. For example, by mid-November 2020, pre-orders from Australia, Canada and Japan together exceeded <a href="https://www.bmj.com/content/371/bmj.m4750">1 billion doses</a>. In total, high-income countries alone are estimated to have pre-ordered <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(21)00306-8/fulltext">4.2 billion doses for 2021</a>.</p>
<p>The COVAX mechanism offers a partial solution, by encouraging high-income countries to donate surplus doses for reallocation to developing countries. But redistribution only makes it possible to share volumes which are limited by installed production capacities. The firms that signed a supply agreement with COVAX control capacities estimated at 8 billion doses for 2021, of which 2 billion relate to an mRNA vaccine that entails supply chain and storage challenges, particularly in the developing world. The manufacturing issues encountered recently by <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/38fecae5-86d0-49a5-8a33-3bf4a64e57bb">BioNTech-Pfizer</a>, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/316b77c1-e640-4d53-8dec-547b1b5651d8">Gamaleya</a>, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b5ba2702-3bad-4f10-9d80-00eb3d48d802">Johnson & Johnson</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8e2e994e-9750-4de1-9cbc-31becd2ae0a8">Oxford-AstraZeneca</a> have pointed to the difficulty of increasing production to capacity.</p>
<p>Future supply issues and resulting delays are likely to jeopardise the reallocation mechanism by incentivizing governments of developed countries to enforce priority clauses included in pre-order contracts.</p>
<h2>Temporary patent waiver versus bilateral manufacturing agreements</h2>
<p>Efforts are already underway to increase production capacity. Suppliers of approved vaccines invest in new manufacturing facilities. Other firms are developing candidate vaccines that could soon be added to the current supply.</p>
<p>A more controversial move was initiated in October 2020 by South Africa and India, which filed a request with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) for a temporary waiver of intellectual property rights relating to Covid-19, <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/W669.pdf&Open=True">particularly patents</a>. Supported by some 100 countries, the request aims to accelerate the production of vaccines, as well as treatments and diagnostics, for the <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-00727-3">developing world</a>.</p>
<p>This initiative has met with opposition from the pharmaceutical industry, and many developed countries, for whom it would be sufficient to rely on bilateral agreements – between a vaccine producer and a firm holding production capacity – to increase supply, without questioning patents.</p>
<p>A patent waiver and the status quo are both vulnerable to policy-induced delays resulting from unilateral actions by governments. If patents are suspended, the flow of ingredients needed for vaccine production is likely to be hindered by export control mechanisms <a href="http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/244291614991534306/pdf/The-Covid-19-Vaccine-Production-Club-Will-Value-Chains-Temper-Nationalism.pdf">recently reinforced in a number of countries</a>. If, on the other hand, patents are maintained, the use of compulsory licences – which allow a third party to manufacture the patented product without the consent of the patent holder – could become more widespread among developing countries, as occurred in the 2000s for the production of <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001154">HIV antiretroviral drugs</a>.</p>
<p>In both cases, a patent waiver and compulsory licensing provide little incentive for companies to engage in the transfer of know-how which is essential for vaccine production, and is <a href="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/369/6506/912">not described by intellectual property rights</a>.</p>
<h2>The Medicines Patent Pool of the WHO C-TAP mechanism as a third way</h2>
<p>A third approach, that we support, would be for vaccine producers to engage in licence agreements with the MPP (Medicines Patent Pool), a United Nations-backed public health organization integrated in the Covid-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-00759-9">initiative of WHO</a>.</p>
<p>The mission of the MPP, whose mandate has been extended to Covid-19 as of March 2020, is to improve access to essential medicines in low- and middle-income countries. It solicits voluntary licenses – and thus does not question the patent system – from the pharmaceutical industry before acting as a one-stop shop for disseminating (combinations of) these licenses to producers of generics or biosimilars.</p>
<p>The resulting lower transaction costs, and the elimination of multiple margins by the pooling approach, entail lower prices in the final market than if the licences were transacted separately in multiple bilateral agreements. At the same time, incentives to invest in research and to transfer technical know-how to technology users can be preserved when patent holders, without taking in their production capacity, <a href="https://ferdi.fr/dl/df-ZXSnmDsG1rJHejemQ5nRYaoL/ferdi-b216-covid-19-should-intellectual-property-rights-be-challenged.pdf">receive royalties from the MPP</a>. Licences can cover only a few critical ingredients, or relate to narrowly defined operations, in order to eliminate bottlenecks and increase production capacity without transferring unduly the <a href="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/369/6506/912">proprietary knowledge of patent holders</a>.</p>
<p>Industry contributions to the MPP solution, within the WHO-initiated C-TAP mechanism, minimises risks of vaccine nationalism and of compulsory licensing initiatives, without suspending intellectual property rights. It has the advantage of using a well-established platform in order to immediately accelerate access to vaccines worldwide.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159467/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Etienne Billette de Villemeur is also associated with UQAM, Canada and works with the "Chaires Universitaires Toussaint Louverture", in Haiti.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bruno Versaevel is a consultant to companies in the biopharmaceutical field. He is also a researcher at GATE (UMR #5824 CNRS).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vianney Dequiedt is affiliated with FERDI, a not-for-profit foundation specialized in international development policy.</span></em></p>Licensing agreements between pharmaceutical companies and the Medicines Patent Pool, in cooperation with the WHO, could accelerate access to doses for the poorest countries.Etienne Billette de Villemeur, Professor, Université de LilleBruno Versaevel, Professor of industrial economics, EM Lyon Business SchoolVianney Dequiedt, Professor of Economics, Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1583842021-04-14T19:20:16Z2021-04-14T19:20:16ZHow to get COVID-19 vaccines to poor countries – and still keep patent benefits for drugmakers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395076/original/file-20210414-13-heql0s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=535%2C23%2C4640%2C3150&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hospital staff in Lagos, Nigeria, administer the AstraZeneca vaccine.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/VirusOutbreakNigeriaAfricaVaccines/f37e2b62ec484fc1970d3dbcbb49c3b3/photo">AP Photo/Sunday Alamba</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The world has a COVID-19 vaccine access problem: Almost half of all doses administered so far have been in Europe and North America, while many poorer countries have vaccinated <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/coronavirus-data-explorer">less than than 1%</a> of their populations.</p>
<p>With new coronavirus variants raising the health risk, South Africa and India have proposed that the World Trade Organization <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/trip_11mar21_e.htm">temporarily waive intellectual property rights</a> for COVID-19 vaccines to help ramp up production.</p>
<p>The U.S., Britain and the European Union <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-health-coronavirus-wto-idUKKBN28020X">rejected the idea</a>, arguing that intellectual property rights – which give vaccine creators the power to prevent other companies from reproducing their products – are necessary to ensure innovation and waiving them would not result in increased production. They are now <a href="https://www.rollcall.com/2021/04/05/fellow-democrats-pressure-biden-to-weaken-vaccine-patents/">under pressure</a> to change their minds.</p>
<p>So, are there only two paths here? Patents remain inviolate, or patents are disregarded?</p>
<p><a href="https://udayton.edu/directory/law/shabalala_dalindyebo.php">I have worked on legal issues related to access to medicines</a> since 2004 and have been involved in these debates at the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization, working with civil society groups and developing countries. I believe there is a middle way: compulsory licensing.</p>
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<h2>Governments can already get around patents</h2>
<p>When a country approves a patent, it gives the patent holder a monopoly for a limited term, usually 20 years, for new and highly inventive ideas.</p>
<p>The promise of having a monopoly gives the patent holder more incentive to take on the risk of research and development and get a product to market. The company can charge a high price for a limited time to recoup that investment.</p>
<p>The key phrase is “limited time.” This makes sure that once a patent runs out, others can make the product. Generic drugs are an example. Competition typically lowers prices and ensures greater access for those who want or need the product.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Employees in protective coveralls work on a machine filling vials with vaccine." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395083/original/file-20210414-23-1yqeiyc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395083/original/file-20210414-23-1yqeiyc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395083/original/file-20210414-23-1yqeiyc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395083/original/file-20210414-23-1yqeiyc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395083/original/file-20210414-23-1yqeiyc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395083/original/file-20210414-23-1yqeiyc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395083/original/file-20210414-23-1yqeiyc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">AstraZeneca issued a license to the Serum Institute of India to produce its COVID-19 vaccine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/VirusOutbreakIndia/d7d89250c6ed43d19370970f200a0d3a/photo">AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For emergencies, the patent system has a series of safety valves that allow governments to intervene before that limited time is up. The most important safety valve for COVID-19 vaccine production is the compulsory license. Based on public needs – including health emergencies – a government can allow others to make the product, usually with a reasonable royalty, or fee, paid to the patent owner.</p>
<p>Today, any country that has issued a patent to a COVID-19 vaccine maker can use that patent simply by issuing a compulsory license to enable production by its own companies.</p>
<p>So, why doesn’t this solve the COVID-19 vaccine access problem?</p>
<h2>Vaccine patents end at the border</h2>
<p>The same issue arose in the context of <a href="https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/84/5/news10506/en/">access to HIV medications</a> during the late 1990s.</p>
<p>Just like with HIV drugs then, the capacity to manufacture vaccines today is unevenly distributed. The real issue isn’t whether a country like Botswana can issue a compulsory license allowing its domestic companies to manufacture the vaccines – many countries don’t have that kind of production facility and, in many cases, the drugs aren’t even patented there.</p>
<p>The real issue is whether India or China or the Philippines – countries with thriving pharmaceutical industries and where drugs are much more likely to be patented – can issue a compulsory license that would allow their companies to export to Botswana.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two people in lab coats hold a box showing the label" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395091/original/file-20210414-16-1t8mv8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395091/original/file-20210414-16-1t8mv8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395091/original/file-20210414-16-1t8mv8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395091/original/file-20210414-16-1t8mv8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395091/original/file-20210414-16-1t8mv8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395091/original/file-20210414-16-1t8mv8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395091/original/file-20210414-16-1t8mv8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Technicians in Nairobi, Kenya, hold a carton of AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine manufactured in India.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/VirusOutbreakAfricaVaccinesKenya/338446ad563d4555b0efcd24d69016f6/photo">AP Photo/Ben Curtis</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Why isn’t this happening under the existing rules?</p>
<p>Article 31 of the WTO’s <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm">Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property</a>, or TRIPS, limits compulsory licenses primarily to domestic production and use. It does not allow a country to issue a compulsory license to a company outside its territory. Countries also cannot issue compulsory licenses to companies within their territories to produce products primarily for export.</p>
<p>There have been several attempts to solve this problem, including a change to the TRIPS Agreement approved in 2005. But <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripsfacsheet_e.htm">only one country – Rwanda – has used that system</a> to access drugs. After an almost two-year process, Rwanda was able to import 7 million doses from Canada. However, the Canadian generic producer, Apotex, declared that the system was <a href="https://www.biospace.com/article/releases/apotex-corp-receives-final-tender-approval-from-rwanda-for-vital-aids-drug-/">economically unsustainable for a private company</a>. During a 2010 review of the system, <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=Q:/IP/C/57.pdf&Open=True">many developing countries noted how difficult</a> it was to use, with several generic producers giving up in the middle of the process.</p>
<p>The process requires an agreement between the two countries issuing compulsory licenses. It also comes with a series of legal requirements, including producing only the amount ordered by the importing country; using entirely different packaging, coloring or shapes to distinguish the drug from regular production; and following special processes in the importing country to prevent the product from being diverted elsewhere. A different compulsory license and production line would be needed for each additional country.</p>
<p>For COVID-19, there is also another problem: The technologies in COVID-19 vaccines are complex and involve multiple patents, trade secrets and know-how. A compulsory licensing system would need to address not just patents but all related intellectual property.</p>
<h2>What to do about it</h2>
<p>An international consortium called <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-best-hope-for-fairly-distributing-covid-19-vaccines-globally-is-at-risk-of-failing-heres-how-to-save-it-158779">COVAX</a> is trying to expand COVID-19 vaccine deliveries to low-income countries through agreements with vaccine producers, but <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/08-04-2021-covax-reaches-over-100-economies-42-days-after-first-international-delivery">it is struggling</a> to reach its <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/08-04-2021-covax-reaches-over-100-economies-42-days-after-first-international-delivery">goal of providing 2 billion doses</a> by the end of 2021.</p>
<p>To successfully expand vaccine production, countries need a relatively seamless system that allows a country like India to grant a single, blanket license allowing its companies to produce vaccines developed by U.S. or European companies for export to all countries that lack their own manufacturing capacity.</p>
<p>This is ideally what a properly functioning system of global compulsory licensing would enable, in my view. Compulsory licensing is not a violation of patent or intellectual property. The rights holder still gets compensated, and access is assured when it is most needed.</p>
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<p>The proposed WTO waiver of intellectual property rights seeks to address this need, but it may be broader than necessary. A better solution as I see it would be to smooth the way for using compulsory licensing across all relevant intellectual property needed to expand vaccine manufacturing.</p>
<p>Removing the TRIPS limitations on production for export would allow a country like India, at the request of a qualifying country, to issue blanket compulsory licenses covering all COVID-19 vaccine technologies, set the compensation prices and allow the vaccines to be exported to multiple countries simultaneously. </p>
<p>The company would make the vaccine in its existing facilities and would be allowed to stockpile for future orders. Additional requests from other countries could be fulfilled from the same production line on the same basis, ensuring a sustainable business model. The patent owner – Moderna, for example – may lose control over the market, but it maintains its right to be compensated, as is normal for any compulsory license. </p>
<p>This is part of the bargain Moderna and Pfizer made when they received patent protection. </p>
<p>The result could be a fast increase in vaccine manufacturing that reaches countries that have been left out. Without global vaccinations, it’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-021-00728-2">hard to see an end</a> to this pandemic. This emergency is exactly what the patent system is designed for, if it’s allowed to operate properly for the patent holder and for the public.</p>
<p>[<em>More than 104,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158384/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dalindyebo Shabalala is affiliated with the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) as a Board Member. He has previously worked at the South Centre, an intergovernmental organization of developing countries on Access to Medicines projects funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, SIDA, and GIZ among others.</span></em></p>India and South Africa are pressing the World Trade Organization to waive patent rights to help ramp up vaccine production. There’s a better solution.Dalindyebo Shabalala, Associate Professor, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1569712021-03-22T18:51:43Z2021-03-22T18:51:43ZMore talk, no action: Australia’s approach to trade rules restraining vaccine production<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390555/original/file-20210319-14-n8tm2e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3600%2C2401&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A pharmacist prepares to vaccinate health-care workers at the Klerksdorp Hospital, South Africa, on February 18 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shiraaz Mohamed/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Papua New Guinea’s COVID-19 outbreak is a portent of the “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-55709428">catastrophic moral failure</a>” the head of the World Health Organization warned of in January due to poor countries being pushed to the back of the vaccine queue. </p>
<p>Australia has gifted 8,000 doses to PNG, and vowed to help the nation of almost 9 million secure <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-03-17/covid-papua-new-guinea-vaccination-australia-scott-morrison/13255158">1 million more</a>. Earlier this month Australia agreed to work with the US, India and Japan <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/mar/13/australia-commits-100m-to-covid-vaccine-deal-at-quad-meeting">to provide 1 billion vaccines</a> to poorer countries in the Asia-Pacific. It is also supporting <a href="https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/covax">COVAX</a>, the global program aiming to buy and distribute 2 billion COVID-19 vaccine doses to developing nations by the end of 2021.</p>
<p>But all this could be negated through Australia’s potential spoiling role (with a handful of other countries) against a proposal supported by 118 countries to ramp up vaccine production by relaxing the trade rules governing intellectual property.</p>
<h2>Inequities in access to COVID-19 vaccines</h2>
<p>The inequities in access to vaccines are stark. By November, wealthy nations accounting for just <a href="https://www.bmj.com/content/371/bmj.m4750">14% of the global population</a> had locked in premarket agreements to buy 51% of the first 7.48 billion doses of candidate COVID-19 vaccines. </p>
<p>That number should be enough to vaccinate almost half the global population – 3.76 billion of 7.8 billion people. But Canada, Australia, Britain, Japan, the European Union and the US have all bought up more than their fair share. Canada has reserved about 4.5 courses per person; Australia and the UK close to 2.5.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390763/original/file-20210322-13-l49s7r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Pre-market commitments for COVID-19 vaccines, per capita (in courses)" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390763/original/file-20210322-13-l49s7r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390763/original/file-20210322-13-l49s7r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390763/original/file-20210322-13-l49s7r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390763/original/file-20210322-13-l49s7r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390763/original/file-20210322-13-l49s7r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390763/original/file-20210322-13-l49s7r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390763/original/file-20210322-13-l49s7r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.ignitetheidea.org/covid-reservedvaccines">Anthony D. So/British Medical Journal</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>This means most middle-income countries won’t achieve widespread vaccination coverage until late 2022, according to <a href="https://www.eiu.com/n/85-poor-countries-will-not-have-access-to-coronavirus-vaccines/">The Economist’s Intelligence Unit</a>. For poorer economies, including some of Australia’s closest neighbours, it won’t be “before 2023, if at all”.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390515/original/file-20210318-15-1m5hohi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The Economist Intelligence Unit infographic showing vaccine access by country." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390515/original/file-20210318-15-1m5hohi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390515/original/file-20210318-15-1m5hohi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390515/original/file-20210318-15-1m5hohi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390515/original/file-20210318-15-1m5hohi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390515/original/file-20210318-15-1m5hohi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390515/original/file-20210318-15-1m5hohi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390515/original/file-20210318-15-1m5hohi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.eiu.com/n/85-poor-countries-will-not-have-access-to-coronavirus-vaccines/">The Economist Intelligence Unit</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<h2>Suspending intellectual property rules</h2>
<p>Addressing vaccine inequities, the director-general of the World Health Organization, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus has said, requires pulling “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/mar/05/vaccination-covid-vaccines-rich-nations">out all the stops</a>”.</p>
<p>One of those stops is the international agreement protecting intellectual property rights – the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, commonly called the <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm">TRIPS agreement</a>. All members of the World Trade Organization are bound by the agreement. </p>
<p>In October 2020, South Africa and India <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/W669.pdf&Open=True">proposed waiving</a> certain provisions of TRIPS that give the owners of the intellectual property exclusive rights over the manufacture and sale of COVID vaccines. The waiver would only apply to COVID-19 medical products and only for the duration of the pandemic. This would allow others to make COVID-19 vaccines without the vaccine developers’ permission.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390543/original/file-20210319-15-1levqhz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390543/original/file-20210319-15-1levqhz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390543/original/file-20210319-15-1levqhz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390543/original/file-20210319-15-1levqhz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390543/original/file-20210319-15-1levqhz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390543/original/file-20210319-15-1levqhz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390543/original/file-20210319-15-1levqhz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390543/original/file-20210319-15-1levqhz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Medecins Sans Frontieres members deploy a banner in front of the headquarters of the World Trade Organization in Geneva on March 4 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Martial Trezzini/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The TRIPS waiver is supported by <a href="https://www.twn.my/title2/health.info/2021/hi210306.htm">118</a> of the WTO’s 164 members – more than two-thirds of its membership. </p>
<h2>The counter-proposal supported by Australia</h2>
<p>Australia, however, has joined with Canada, Chile, Colombia, New Zealand, Norway and Turkey in supporting a <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/GC/230.pdf&Open=True">counter-proposal</a> that argues provisions already in the TRIPS agreement are good enough.</p>
<p>TRIPS does allow for compulsory licensing, enabling the use of a patent without the consent of the owner, in a public health emergency. But the compulsory licensing process is time-consuming and only applies to patents, not the other types of intellectual property important for making vaccines.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A vaccination centre in Mumbai, India, on March 10 2021." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390567/original/file-20210319-13-hf9fph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390567/original/file-20210319-13-hf9fph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390567/original/file-20210319-13-hf9fph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390567/original/file-20210319-13-hf9fph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390567/original/file-20210319-13-hf9fph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390567/original/file-20210319-13-hf9fph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390567/original/file-20210319-13-hf9fph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A vaccination centre in Mumbai, India, on March 10 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rajanish Kakade/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The counter-proposal put its faith in encouraging more talk between vaccine developers and manufacturers, enabling them to make voluntary licensing agreements and identify ways to increase production.</p>
<p>But there’s little reason to think this would achieve more than what is already happening. For example, AstraZeneca has licensed the <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/healthcare/biotech/pharmaceuticals/astrazeneca-serum-institute-of-india-sign-licensing-deal-for-1-billion-doses-of-oxford-vaccine/articleshow/76202016.cms?from=mdr">Serum Institute of India</a> to make its vaccine both for India and other countries. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/yes-export-bans-on-vaccines-are-a-problem-but-why-is-the-supply-of-vaccines-so-limited-in-the-first-place-156569">Yes, export bans on vaccines are a problem, but why is the supply of vaccines so limited in the first place?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Voluntary licences are problematic because they are ad hoc and confidential. The lack of transparency has seen <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/astrazeneca-vaccine-cost-higher-in-poorer-countries-coronavirus/">pricing discrepancies</a> such as Bangladesh and South Africa reportedly paying more for their AstraZeneca doses than European nations. </p>
<p>Voluntary licences can also place tight restrictions on where the resulting products can be sold. For example, when US pharmaceutical company Gilead Sciences negotiated licences with makers in India, Pakistan and Egypt to produce a cheaper version of Remdesivir (a candidate for COVID-19 treatment in the early stages of the pandemic) the licence conditions <a href="https://www.citizen.org/news/remdesivir-should-be-in-the-public-domain-gileads-licensing-deal-picks-winners-and-losers/">excluded many middle-income countries</a> from buying the cheaper version. </p>
<p>Australia’s support for this counter-proposal is therefore a distraction at best. It can’t bring about the fundamental change the TRIPS waiver could generate. Nor is it likely to lead to the world being vaccinated sooner.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156971/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Deborah Gleeson has received funding in the past from the Australian Research Council. She has received funding from various national and international non-government organisations to attend speaking engagements related to trade agreements and health. She has represented the Public Health Association of Australia on matters related to trade agreements and public health.</span></em></p>Australia has joined a handful of countries resisting a push to relax intellectual property rules related to COVID vaccines.Deborah Gleeson, Associate professor, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1505682020-11-20T16:59:09Z2020-11-20T16:59:09ZG20: led by Russia and China, world’s ‘emerging powers’ look to push unified agenda<p>One thing the coronavirus pandemic has meant for world leaders is that it has simplified their international calendars somewhat. Take the week ending November 22: Russia hosted the <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/11/19/russia-highlights-of-the-xii-brics-summit/">BRICS summit</a> on Tuesday November 17, Malaysia held the <a href="https://www.apec.org/">Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</a> meeting on Friday November 20 and the weekend of November 21 and 22 was booked in for the <a href="https://g20.org/en/Pages/home.aspx">G20 summit in Riyadh</a>, Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>Rather than having to board flights and live out of suitcases, leaders had to attend via video link. So COVID-19 has at least cut down on jetlag and carbon emissions.</p>
<p>For leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, the virtual BRICS summit, hosted by Vladimir Putin in Moscow, was an opportunity to rehearse their priorities in the run up to the G20. As you might expect, the summit’s priority was the cross-country efforts responding to COVID-19 and how to ensure a swift economic recovery. Also on the agenda were how to coordinate and enhance cooperation in trade, energy, and counter-terrorism. </p>
<h2>Covid vaccine: a global race</h2>
<p>Leaders at the BRICS summit will have been well aware that the big story of the G20 will be the coronavirus pandemic and efforts around the world to develop effective vaccines. While the recent vaccine breakthroughs in the US and Europe will be of great interest, BRICS countries – notably Russia, India and China – want more of a focus on their own efforts and achievements. </p>
<p>Having assured his BRICS colleagues that Russia’s vaccines “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/summits-india-coronavirus-pandemic-vladimir-putin-china-63b174580063da09912890ffd167eca6">work effectively and safely</a>”, Putin called for the alliance to join forces for the mass production and use of Sputnik V, which he said had shown in early tests to be 92% effective. </p>
<p>The notion of cooperation through the bloc was enthusiastically taken up. India’s prime minister Narendra Modi said that India’s vaccine production capacities will be important “for the interests of humanity”, and Chinese president Xi Jinping said his country would “actively consider” providing its vaccines to the other BRICS countries. There is already a degree of cooperation: both Brazil and India are conducting trials for Sputnik V. </p>
<h2>Multilateralism</h2>
<p>Multilateralism was also high on the agenda. Media reports, from <a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-11-17/Chinese-President-Xi-Jinping-attends-BRICS-summit-via-video-link-VuN5bKHeO4/index.html">Chinese</a> and <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/12th-brics-summit-2020-live-updates-pm-modi-russia-putin/liveblog/79260787.cms">Indian</a> news outlets particularly, reported that BRICS leaders stressed the importance of a multilateral approach to combat what was described as growing nationalism and economic protectionism in the west. </p>
<p>The forum signed the <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1207147.shtml">BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy</a> to facilitate cooperation in a wide range of areas: economics and trade, anti-terrorism, science, technology and innovation – even the prevention of a space arms race. The bloc has an <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/countries/groups/brics">enormous economic influence</a> with its population of 3.6 billion people (42% of the world total) and 23% of world’s GDP and BRICS countries are now a force in the global trading system, able to exert a strong influence in the World Trade Organization (WTO).</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/370531/original/file-20201120-13-1k32toi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="IMF graphic showing the population, GDP and land area occupied by BRICS countries." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/370531/original/file-20201120-13-1k32toi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/370531/original/file-20201120-13-1k32toi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/370531/original/file-20201120-13-1k32toi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/370531/original/file-20201120-13-1k32toi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/370531/original/file-20201120-13-1k32toi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=698&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/370531/original/file-20201120-13-1k32toi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=698&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/370531/original/file-20201120-13-1k32toi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=698&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The growing economic and political clout of the BRICS bloc.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">IMF</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>New priorities</h2>
<p>India takes over the chair of BRICS in 2021 and Modi set out his priorities <a href="https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/pm-modi-raises-terrorism-at-brics-summit-says-important-to-name-and-blame-responsible-nations-1741638-2020-11-17">in his speech</a>. He identified terrorism as the world’s biggest problem and stressed the importance of multilateral cooperation in countering this. But, he added, “today the multilateral system is going through a crisis”.</p>
<p>He signalled the need for reform of several major global institutions including the UN Security Council, as well as the WHO, World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). </p>
<p>Putin, in turn, <a href="http://en.special.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/64430">stressed the importance</a> of BRICS countries working together in areas such as science and innovation, as well as continuing to develop cultural ties and a common strategy to combat terrorism, drug trafficking and cyber crime. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-11/17/c_139523124.htm">Xi warned</a> that the pandemic would increase the clamour for “de-globalisation”, “economic decoupling” and “parallel systems”. This, he said, would “end up hurting one’s own interests and the common interests of all”, adding: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We need to uphold the multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core and reject abuse of the ‘national security’ concept for protectionist purposes.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The summit provided another chance for Modi and Xi to meet (virtually) face to face amid the two countries’ <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/08/china-india-border-soldiers-pangong-lake">border tensions in the Ladakh region</a>. Both countries have strengthened their ties with Russia in the summit, although their military standoff will continue to cast a shadow over the bloc. </p>
<h2>From BRICS to G20</h2>
<p>So the five BRICS leaders had a chance to develop a common script to take to the G20 in Riyadh at the weekend. Covering two-thirds of the world’s population and representing <a href="https://www.statista.com/topics/4037/g20-summit/">75% of global GDP</a>, the G20 group has traditionally been dominated by western powers whose economic might gave them the heft to set the global political economy. </p>
<p>But there are signs this is not as solid as it was. Disastrous coronavirus responses from the US and UK have undermined their leadership status on this, the world’s most pressing issue in 2020. This in turn provides an opportunity for emerging powers from BRICS to stand in the front row. The political turmoil surrounding the result of the US election has also muddied the waters and it will be interesting to see what the US president, Donald Trump, says and does during the summit.</p>
<p>If BRICS summit was a rehearsal of the emerging powers’ advocacy of their positioning for the new world order, the G20 summit provides a formal occasion for them to exercise their voice more widely.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150568/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Xuebing Cao does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hosted by Russia, the summit gave the BRICS group a chance to harmonise their approach before the G20 meeting in Riyadh.Xuebing Cao, Senior Lecturer in Human Resource Management, Keele UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1497352020-11-16T01:06:50Z2020-11-16T01:06:50ZWhat a Biden presidency means for world trade and allies like Australia<p>Back in March, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again">Joe Biden lamented</a> “the international system that the United States so carefully constructed is coming apart at the seams”.</p>
<p>“As president,” he declared, “I will take immediate steps to renew US democracy and alliances, protect the United States’ economic future, and once more have America lead the world.”</p>
<p>Among the closest allies of the US, none arguably has more at stake in Biden making good on his promises than Australia. </p>
<p>The international system Australia wants repaired is one defined by rules and consensus. As a middle-ranking power, it has long recognised its national interests are best protected by international agreements and the rule of law, rather than one in which might makes right. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-australia-china-relationship-is-unravelling-faster-than-we-could-have-imagined-145836">Why the Australia-China relationship is unravelling faster than we could have imagined</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<p>At the heart of Australia’s desired international trade system are multilateral trade deals, rather than bilateral deals which tend to favour the stronger nation, and a strong international authority – namely the World Trade Organisation – to negotiate rules and adjudicate disputes. </p>
<p>Donald Trump’s presidency undermined both. His “America First”
polices were grounded in grievances about other nations playing the US for “suckers”. He obstructed the WTO, turned his back on multilateral deals and started trade wars. </p>
<p>A Biden presidency promises a return to multilateralism. But it remains to be seen how it approaches the WTO.</p>
<h2>Trump’s war on multilateralism</h2>
<p>As president, Trump rapidly undid decades of mutilateral trade negotiations.</p>
<p>In his first week in office he withdrew the US <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-the-trans-pacific-partnership-survive-after-trump-71821">from the Trans-Pacific Partnership</a>, the multilateral trade deal intended to strengthen economic ties between Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru, Vietnam and the US. (The agreement was modified and signed without the US as the <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/cptpp/Pages/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership">Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership</a>.)</p>
<p>Trump’s trade war with China was also an exercise in power over principle. Both the escalating tariffs and the truce struck in January, known as the “<a href="https://www.fas.usda.gov/topics/china-phase-one-agreement">Phase One Agreement</a>”, repudiated established free-trade principles.</p>
<p>Along with commitments to reduce “structural barriers”, China is required to buy an extra US$200 billion in specified American goods and services over two years in return for the US cutting tariffs on $US110 billion in Chinese imports. </p>
<p>This worries Australian exporters.</p>
<p>The US shopping list for China includes more American seafood, grain, wine, fruit, meat and energy – all markets in which Australia is a significant exporter to China. As former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/us-china-trade-deal-threatens-australian-exporters-20200116-p53s2a.html">asked at the time</a> the deal was signed:</p>
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<p>How can the US pursue another $US32 billion of American beef, wheat, cotton and seafood – all listed in the agreement – without Australian exporters becoming collateral damage?</p>
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<p>The deal, as the Minerals Council of Australia rightly noted, undermined “the principles of free trade which have underpinned Australia’s bipartisan approach to trade policy for many decades”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/are-trumps-tariffs-legal-under-the-wto-it-seems-not-and-they-are-overturning-70-years-of-global-leadership-121425">Are Trump's tariffs legal under the WTO? It seems not, and they are overturning 70 years of global leadership</a>
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<h2>Blocking the World Trade Organisation</h2>
<p>The Trump administration has also continued the slow <a href="https://theconversation.com/key-trade-rules-will-become-unenforceable-from-midnight-australia-should-be-worried-126768">strangulation of the World Trade Organisation</a>, on the grounds it doesn’t serve American interests.</p>
<p>The US has blocked every recent appointment and reappointment to the WTO’s Appellate Body, which hears appeals to WTO adjudications. Appointments require the agreement of all of the WTO’s 164 member nations, and the Appellate Body requires three judges to hear appeals. US obstruction reduced the number of judges to <a href="https://theconversation.com/key-trade-rules-will-become-unenforceable-from-midnight-australia-should-be-worried-126768">just one by December 2019</a>, meaning it simply cannot function.</p>
<p>It’s important to note that US antagonism to the WTO predated Trump. The Obama administration also blocked <a href="https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2016/09/the-obama-administrations-attack-on-appellate-body-independence-shows-the-need-for-reforms-.html">appointments</a> it considered would not sufficiently represent US preferences. But the Trump administration certainly upped the obstructionism.</p>
<p>Indeed, just days before the 2020 election it blocked the appointment of former Nigerian finance minister Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala to head the World Trade Organisation. A highly regarded development economist with a 25-year career at the World Bank, Okonjo-Iweala is widely considered to be an outstanding candidate to lead the WTO. The United States stood alone in objecting to her appointment.</p>
<h2>What will change under Biden?</h2>
<p>Dropping opposition to Okonjo-Iweala and other appointments so the WTO’s processes can function would be an important symbolic and practical first step for Biden. It would reassure Australia and others that global rules still matter.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/arrogance-destroyed-the-world-trade-organisation-what-replaces-it-will-be-even-worse-125321">Arrogance destroyed the World Trade Organisation. What replaces it will be even worse</a>
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<p>How quickly, and on what terms, Biden returns the US to multilateralism remains to be seen. </p>
<p>He has acknowledged the importance of deals like the Trans-Pacific Partnership to ensure an increasingly powerful China “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/presidential-candidates-trans-pacific-partnership">doesn’t write the rules of the road for the world</a>”. But he has also pledged to not enter any more international agreements “until we have made major investments in our workers and infrastructure”.</p>
<p>For Australia – and other US allies – it is important that the US return to the multilateral negotiating table sooner rather than later. For global stability, long-term interests need to override the temptation of short-term expediency. </p>
<p>For “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again">America to lead again</a>” there’s a long and difficult diplomatic road ahead. The international trade system and the WTO are not perfect, but a world without rules would be far worse.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149735/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Professor Lisa Toohey is a holder of the 2020 Fulbright Professional Scholarship in Australian-American Alliance Studies, funded by the Fulbright Foundation and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. </span></em></p>A Biden presidency promises a return to multilateral trade agreements. But it remains to be seen how it approaches the World Trade Organisation.Lisa Toohey, Professor of Law, University of NewcastleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.