tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/zanu-pf-46276/articlesZanu-PF – The Conversation2024-01-07T07:33:35Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2181792024-01-07T07:33:35Z2024-01-07T07:33:35ZYoung Africans could disrupt authoritarian states but they don’t – here’s why<p>Africa has the <a href="https://www.un.org/ohrlls/news/young-people%E2%80%99s-potential-key-africa%E2%80%99s-sustainable-development#:%7E:text=Africa%20has%20the%20youngest%20population,to%20realise%20their%20best%20potential.">world’s largest youth population</a>. By 2030, <a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/africas-future-youth-and-the-data-defining-their-lives/">75%</a> of the African population will be under the age of 35. The number of young Africans aged 15-24 is projected to reach <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2023/06/27/investing-in-youth-transforming-afe-africa">500 million</a> in 2080. </p>
<p>While population dynamics vary across the continent, most sub-Saharan countries have a <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/africas-median-age-about-19-median-age-its-leaders-about-63">median age below 19</a>. Niger is the youngest country in the world with a median age of 14.5, while South Africa, Seychelles, Tunisia and Algeria have median ages above 27. </p>
<p>These demographics are a potential <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/three-myths-about-youth-employment-in-africa-and-strategies-to-realize-the-demographic-dividend/">force for growth</a>. However, the potential of Africa’s demographic dividend has been overshadowed by concerns among governments and international donors about the relationship between large youth populations, unemployment rates and political instability. </p>
<p>Many countries with large youth populations and high rates of youth unemployment and under-employment <a href="https://ugapress.org/book/9780820348858/the-outcast-majority/">remain peaceful</a>. But the dominant policy narrative is that unemployed youth pose a threat to stability.</p>
<p>Further, the role of youth in popular protest – such as in <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7420-after-the-uprising-including-sudanese-youth">Sudan in 2019</a> – has created high expectations about their role in countering autocratic governments and contributing to democracy. </p>
<p>As political scientists and sociologists, we’re interested in understanding the interaction between youth and autocratic regimes – especially as elected autocracies <a href="https://alinstitute.org/images/Library/RetreatOfAfricanDemocracy.pdf#page=1">are taking hold</a> in Africa. </p>
<p>Electoral autocracies are regimes elected into power using authoritarian strategies. These include manipulation of elections and repression of the opposition, independent media and civil society.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research</a> focuses on the interactions between youth and regimes in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe. All are cases of electoral autocracies.</p>
<p>These regimes are aware of their large youth populations and are sometimes challenged by them. <a href="https://theconversation.com/bobi-wine-has-shaken-up-ugandan-politics-four-things-worth-knowing-about-him-153205">Uganda’s Bobi Wine</a>, a popular musician turned presidential candidate, is one example. </p>
<p>The four countries in our study have also been through civil wars, where the victorious armed groups have taken power and stayed in power since the end of the war. This has created a particular set of dynamics between the ageing rebel governments and the youth majorities.</p>
<p>In autocratic contexts like these ones, efforts to empower youth can easily be manipulated to serve the interests of the regime. Some young people may decide to play the game and take up opportunities offered by regime actors. Others might resist them. Some take up the opportunities, hoping it serves their own and not the regime’s interests. Still, this might reproduce forms of patronage. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/abiy-ahmed-gained-power-in-ethiopia-with-the-help-of-young-people-four-years-later-hes-silencing-them-195601">Abiy Ahmed gained power in Ethiopia with the help of young people – four years later he's silencing them</a>
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<p>All of this matters because the future of democracy is at stake, and using state-led opportunities might contribute to authoritarian renewal.</p>
<p>Our research teams in each country <a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">studied</a> the range of policies that governments put in place to “cater” for the youth. They included loans for young entrepreneurs, and setting up youth councils and youth quotas in political institutions. </p>
<p>We found that youth-targeted strategies – largely aimed at promoting employment and political participation – are part of the authoritarian rule book in all four countries we studied. Employment and entrepreneurship schemes were open to abuse through ruling party patronage networks and channelled to regime supporters.</p>
<h2>Not saving democracy</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research</a> found that young people in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe felt aggrieved about these opportunities being channelled to regime supporters. They also noted the lack of opportunities to have a meaningful voice. Institutions that were established to enable youth participation were co-opted and lacked independence from governments. </p>
<p>Some young people express their grievances through pro-democracy protests – like in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/violent-protests-break-out-mozambique-after-local-elections-2023-10-27/">Mozambique in October 2023</a>. But overall, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/221141/why-africas-youth-is-not-saving-democracy/">Africa’s youth are not saving democracy</a>. </p>
<p>Neither are they countering the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2022.2235656">deepening</a> trend of autocratisation on the continent, where incumbent governments have increasingly <a href="https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/60999">concentrated power</a> in the hands of the executive. Our research has confirmed this in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Uganda.</p>
<h2>Country case studies</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8797-the-risk-of-authoritarian-renewal-in-zimbabwe-understanding-zanu-pf-youth">Zimbabwe</a>, Zanu-PF has been in power since the country’s independence in 1980. The ruling party and many of its now ageing leaders use their history of having been part of the liberation war in the 1970s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600842472?casa_token=B53EF1Ev0XcAAAAA:7W-Izw-iDMuOCRc8RZiW8UcDpXn7kH5E-siDc2W1ux_L9w1WpyB-2mnTSMzmAXrLM5YmfFCx3Mlo4YA">to retain their hold on power</a>. </p>
<p>They do so by creating narratives around the country’s liberation history and patriotism, and accuse the “born-free” generation (those born after independence) of betraying the liberation war. This delegitimises any discontent young people may feel. Zanu-PF targets young people among its <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/14906">wider repertoire of strategies</a> to maintain power.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8798-poorly-designed-youth-employment-programmes-will-boost-the-insurgency-in-mozambique">Mozambique</a>, the ruling party Frelimo has won every election since 1992. The party has concentrated power and resources in the hands of the political elite. The youth continue to be under-represented and have serious challenges in accessing resources. This, in addition to other conflict dynamics, contributed to an insurgency in the northern region of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2020.1789271">Cabo Delgado from 2017</a>. It’s led by the radical religious group locally called Al-Shabaab, or sometimes “machababo” (the youth).</p>
<p>Youth-dominated protests in <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7829-neglect-control-and-co-optation-major-features-of-ethiopian-youth-policy-since-1991">Ethiopia</a> contributed to the 2018 fall of the ruling party that had been in power since 1991. They also led to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-change-happened-in-ethiopia-a-review-of-how-abiy-rose-to-power-110737">coming to power</a> of Abiy Ahmed that year. </p>
<p>Mobilisation among the youth has since <a href="https://theconversation.com/abiy-ahmed-gained-power-in-ethiopia-with-the-help-of-young-people-four-years-later-hes-silencing-them-195601">been silenced</a>. Only loyalists get access to job creation schemes. There has also been a militarising of youth-dominated ethnic movements. This was seen, for instance, with the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/322001/ethiopia-understanding-the-fano-and-the-fate-of-amhara/">Fano Amhara group</a> in the war in Tigray in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-tigray-war-parties-agree-pause-expert-insights-into-two-years-of-devastating-conflict-193636">2020-2022</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8801-moving-ugandas-national-development-planning-to-the-grassroots-whats-in-it-for-youth">Uganda</a> was a pioneer in institutionalising youth participation in decision-making. Youth engagement in political structures is considered to be a tool for government control. We found that young politicians felt that this flawed system of representation provided opportunities for mobilising both against and in favour of the current regime. Young candidates running for one of the youth quota seats in parliament, for instance, can’t easily evade ruling party patronage.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Young Africans are diverse. However, they have often been characterised as either <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2019-march-2020/african-youth-and-growth-violent-extremism">violent</a> or as <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2019/sc13968.doc.htm">changemakers and peace activists</a>. These characterisations represent opposite ends of a spectrum. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research project</a> engaged a diversity of young people positioned and constantly moving across different parts of the spectrum. This has enhanced our understanding of how they navigate and respond to the ways their regimes seek to handle the youth population.</p>
<p>In our view, research and policy initiatives towards young people in authoritarian states must acknowledge that well-intended youth interventions may reproduce authoritarian politics when they are channelled to party loyalists. </p>
<p>Interventions that aim to promote job creation and youth empowerment should monitor how youth participants are selected and funds disbursed to avoid interference from partisan actors.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218179/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lovise Aalen receives funding from the Research Council of Norway's Norglobal programme (grant # 288489). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marjoke Oosterom received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) </span></em></p>Africa’s youth are not countering the deepening of autocratisation across the continent.Lovise Aalen, Research Professor, Political Science, Chr. Michelsen InstituteMarjoke Oosterom, Research Fellow and Cluster Leader, Power and Popular Politics research cluster, Institute of Development StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116152023-08-22T13:19:50Z2023-08-22T13:19:50ZZimbabwe election: Can Nelson Chamisa win? He appeals to young voters but the odds are stacked against him<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543288/original/file-20230817-27-gcauag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nelson Chamisa, leader of Zimbabwe's main opposition Citizens Coalition for Change, addresses supporters at a rally.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Auntony / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/7/28/profile-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-nelson-chamisa">Nelson Chamisa</a>, the 45-year-old leader of Zimbabwe’s main opposition party, the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), is making a second bid to be Zimbabwe’s next president. </p>
<p>A lawyer and a pastor, Chamisa is the most formidable candidate against the ruling Zanu-PF led by President Emmerson Mnangagwa. The incumbent took over after the coup that ousted the country’s founding president Robert Mugabe in 2017. </p>
<p>Chamisa is over three decades younger than his (<a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/08/03/profile-emmerson-mnangagwa-zimbabwe-s-crocodile-president//">81-year-old</a>) opponent, and the youngest person running for president in this election. His youthfulness has been a major issue in this election, as it was in the last. </p>
<p>At least 62% of the population is <a href="https://zimbabwe.unfpa.org/en/topics/young-people-2">under 25</a>. They are <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-youth-speak-out-independence-day/2718352.html">“born-frees”</a> who feel the brunt of Zimbabwe’s failing economy. The actual unemployment rate is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-42116932">unclear</a>; some claim it is as high as <a href="https://worldhelp.net/zimbabwe-unemployment-as-high-as-80-amid-pandemic/">80%</a>. The government claims it is <a href="https://www.zimstat.co.zw/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/2021_Fourth_Quarter_QLFS_Report_8032022.pdf#page=13">18%</a>. What is true is that many of Zimbabwe’s youth eke a living in the informal sector, estimated to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-informal-sector-organisations-in-zimbabwe-shape-notions-of-citizenship-180455">90% of the economy</a>. </p>
<p>Many young graduates have settled for being street vendors or have taken the dangerous <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-precarious-road-zimbabweans-travel-to-seek-a-new-life-in-south-africa-58911">illegal track</a> across the crocodile infested Limpopo River to find work in neighbouring <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/zimbabwe-immigration/">South Africa</a>. Others with some financial means seek work overseas, even if it’s below their qualifications.</p>
<p>It is to this demographic that Chamisa is speaking directly. He promises the young a <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2023/08/gift-mugano-unpacking-the-ccc-manifesto-launched-by-nelson-chamisa/">total revamp of the economy</a>. His messaging often includes glossy pictures of high-rise buildings and modernised highway networks that stand in contrast to many dilapidated roads and buildings in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>As a political scientist who focuses on voting behaviour, migration and social media, I think Chamisa would have a more than fair chance to win in a truly free and fair election. He resonates with the country’s large disenchanted youth, mainly because of the poor state of the economy. However, campaigning in autocratic conditions is not ideal for the opposition. His and his party’s weakness are also serious hurdles.</p>
<h2>Youth appeal</h2>
<p>According to the independent African surveys network <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>, 67% of Zimbabweans are <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/zimbabwe_r8_diss1-zs-bh-11june21-v2_17june2021finalreleaseversion.pdf">unsatisfied with the direction the country is taking</a>. </p>
<p>In its recently released <a href="https://www.zimeye.net/2023/08/09/download-ccc-manifesto-a-new-great-zimbabwe-blueprint/">election manifesto</a>, the Citizens Coalition for Change promises to transform Zimbabwe into a US$100 billion economy over the next 10 years. The World Bank puts the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-heads-to-the-polls-amid-high-inflation-a-slumping-currency-and-a-cost-of-living-crisis-209841">battered economy</a> at just under <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/country/ZW">US$ 21 billion</a>. </p>
<p>Chamisa defines himself as a social democrat who believes in providing substantial welfare. His party’s manifesto promises universal healthcare and basic education. He also promises to open Zimbabwe to international trade and re-engagement, ending over 20 years of <a href="https://www.commonwealthroundtable.co.uk/commonwealth/africa/zimbabwe/opinion-zimbabwes-continued-isolation/">isolation</a>. The country was suspended from the Commonwealth and excluded from debt relief programmes due to ongoing human rights abuses. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe was once Africa’s breadbasket but can no longer <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/dec/15/we-could-have-lost-her-zimbabwes-children-go-hungry-as-crisis-deepens">feed</a> its small population of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ZW">just over 16 million</a> people.</p>
<p>Chamisa’s appeal to the youth vote has been received along partisan lines. For supporters of the ruling party, he is too young, too naïve, <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/chamisa-incompetent-western-puppet-faking-political-bravery/">too western-leaning</a>, and lacks liberation credentials. For his support base of mostly young urbanites, Chamisa’s youth is his <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-02-07-zimbabwes-voters-favour-nelson-chamisa-over-president-mnangagwa-survey-shows/">trump card</a>. They have turned the age mockery from Zanu-PF into a campaign slogan, “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxqs4l0RGaA">Ngapinde Hake Mukomana</a>” (let the young man enter the state house). </p>
<p>Chamisa is popular, as shown by huge attendance at his rallies. But will this be enough to help him win his first election as the founding leader of CCC? </p>
<h2>Voter apathy, funding and harassment</h2>
<p>Chamisa and his party face a number of hurdles. The first is getting the youth to vote. </p>
<p>Youth political participation in Zimbabwe has historically been very <a href="https://mg.co.za/thoughtleader/2023-08-12-zimbabwes-2023-elections-who-votes-and-why/">low</a>. Although the election body, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, is still to release a full voter’s roll, analysis by the Election Resource Center shows that <a href="https://twitter.com/ercafrica/status/1692100040196575545?s=20">while 85%</a> (6.6 million) of eligible voters are registered, only a third are under the age of 35. </p>
<p>In addition to voter apathy, Chamisa must contend with other hurdles within the opposition movement and the usual obstacles of running for office in electoral authoritarian state. </p>
<p>Chamisa <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2022-01-25-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-nelson-chamisa-forms-new-political-party/">founded</a> the CCC following his forced exit from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2021. The married father of three had been mentored by the opposition movement’s founder, the late <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/19/zimbabwes-opposition-leader-died-heres-what-you-need-to-know/">Morgan Tsvangirai</a>. But Tsvangirai’s death <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43066175">in 2018</a> ended Chamisa’s career in the party as divisions grew between him and the old guard. </p>
<p>The formation of the CCC helped him draw in a younger generation of politicians like <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/longform/2022/7/7/the-zimbabwean-political-leader-fighting-for-her-countrys-future">Fadzayi Mahere</a>. But it also opened up Chamisa to new problems. The CCC has <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/politics-zimbabwe-elections-economy-human-rights-violations/">little money</a> against Zanu-PF’s elections war chest.</p>
<p>Chamisa lost access to state funds and opposition institutions when he left the MDC. His departure also left him with few friends at home or abroad. </p>
<p>He argues that what some see as disorganisation and isolation is <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/theindependent/local-news/article/200013680/chamisa-its-time-for-clarity-not-ambiguity">strategic ambiguity</a>. He claims that his party keeps its cards closely guarded against infiltration and manipulation.</p>
<p>Chamisa has valid reasons to do so. The ruling party has successfully co-opted opposition leadership by offering patronage. The ruling party also uses courts to their advantage and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/45b09177-bfbe-41ea-9cbd-ea4c0218f447">violence against</a> opponents. </p>
<p>In 2007, in the months leading up to the election, Chamisa suffered a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna17646957">fractured skull</a>. In 2021, his party reported threats to his life when his envoy was attacked using a <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-assailants-attack-nelson-chamisa-vehicle-leader-safe/6277026.html">homemade bomb</a>. Members of his party have been beaten up, and others have even lost <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/local-news/article/200014816/ccc-member-stoned-to-death-in-harare-violence">their lives</a>. Job Sikhala, a senior member of the opposition, has been in jail for over a year on <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/zimbabwe-conviction-and-sentencing-of-opposition-leader/">unclear charges</a>. </p>
<h2>One man show</h2>
<p>Chamisa’s vagueness on policy adds to his challenges. On the social platform X, where he has more than a <a href="https://twitter.com/nelsonchamisa?s=20">million followers</a>, he regularly only shares <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/chamisas-followers-says-they-are-tired-of-bible-verses/">Bible verses</a> or ambiguous messages. This is a lost opportunity for a candidate counting on the youth vote.</p>
<p>His party structures are unclear and it has yet to release its constitution. The only formal position in the party is his position of president. Everyone else is known only as a change agent. </p>
<p>Chamisa has not announced a running mate. This feeds into rumours that he has weak leadership skills and prefers to centre power on himself. One might even wonder if he does not trust his supporters.</p>
<p>Still, those supporting him say they do not need to know his structures. Zimbabweans are hungry for change after four decades of Zanu-PF rule. Many who hoped for change after Mugabe’s ouster are dismayed by the continuing economic challenges and increasing militarisation of the Zimbabwean politics. For these voters, Chamisa is the change they hope to see.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211615/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chipo Dendere receives funding from the American Association of University Women (AAUW) and Wellesley College to support research. </span></em></p>Nelson Chamisa defines himself as a social democrat who believes in providing substantial welfare to support healthcare and basic education.Chipo Dendere, Assistant Professor, Africana Studies, Wellesley CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116332023-08-20T09:27:25Z2023-08-20T09:27:25ZZimbabwe’s president was security minister when genocidal rape was state policy in 1983-4. Now he seeks another term<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543031/original/file-20230816-17-eic0p6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's President Emmerson Mnangagwa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tafadzwa Ufumeli/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Trigger warning: this article contains accounts of sexual violence.</em></p>
<p>Zimbabwe will hold its elections on 23 August. The current president of Zimbabwe, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-mnangagwa-presidency-would-not-be-a-new-beginning-for-zimbabwe-87641">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, is running for re-election. This is despite his having oversight in the execution of the genocide of a minority group of Zimbabweans in the south-west region, as evidenced in my <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">newly published study</a>. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Hazel-Cameron-2">genocide scholar</a>, I have studied the nature, causes and consequences of genocide and mass atrocities, as well as the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41917771?seq=6">role of external institutional bystanders</a>. Since 2011, I have researched the crimes of the powerful of Zimbabwe. Much of this has involved an <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316020728_The_Matabeleland_Massacres_Britain%27s_wilful_blindness">analysis of official British and US government communications</a>. This has shed new light on what knowledge was available to the British and US governments about <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325887696_State-Organized_Starvation_A_Weapon_of_Extreme_Mass_Violence_in_Matabeleland_South_1984">atrocity crimes targeting the Ndebele</a> in the early post-independence years of Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">latest study</a> explores a military operation, known as Gukurahundi, between 1983 and 1984 in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands in Zimbabwe. Drawing on 36 in-depth interviews with survivors, my study provides new insights into <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7388214.stm">Operation Gukurahundi</a>. It identifies systematic patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence in the operation. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/british-policy-towards-zimbabwe-during-matabeleland-massacre-licence-to-kill-81574">British policy towards Zimbabwe during Matabeleland massacre: licence to kill</a>
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<p>The study concludes that these patterns indicate a state policy of systematic genocidal rape in 1983 and 1984. This policy was deployed with the intent to destroy, in part, a specific ethnic group: the minority Ndebele of Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>My study acknowledges the immense suffering of the victims of the genocide and their descendants. It also illustrates that genocide creates victims across generations. Time cannot eliminate the trauma inflicted or the need for justice. </p>
<h2>The genocide</h2>
<p>In January 1983, the Zanu-PF government of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27519044">Robert Mugabe</a>, in the newly
independent Zimbabwe, launched a massive security clampdown on the Ndebele. This was <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-policy-towards-zimbabwe-during-matabeleland-massacre-licence-to-kill-81574">both politically and ethnically motivated</a>. At the heart of the operation was a strategy of state-ordered terror. It was perpetrated by a 4,000-strong all-Shona Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwean National Army led by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-minister-idUSKCN24U0MK">Perrance Shiri</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-mnangagwa-presidency-would-not-be-a-new-beginning-for-zimbabwe-87641">Mnangagwa</a> had oversight over both the army’s Fifth Brigade and the Central Intelligence Organisation in his role as minister of internal security and chairman of Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/17/could-mnangagwa-be-zimbabwes-comeback-crocodile">Joint High Command</a>. He <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-27-op-ed-mnangagwa-and-the-gukurahundi-fact-and-fiction/">reported directly to Mugabe</a>. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa, however, has <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-24-00-gukurahundi-ghosts-haunt-mnangagwa/">denied accusations</a> he played an active role in Operation Gukurahundi.</p>
<p>The stated objective of the campaign was to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jocelyn-Alexander/publication/250225505_Dissident_Perspectives_on_Zimbabwe%27s_Post-Independence_War/links/566858c308ae193b5fa0379f/Dissident-Perspectives-on-Zimbabwes-Post-Independence-War.pdf">rid the country of “dissidents”</a>. However, the overwhelming majority of those targeted by security forces were non-combatant Ndebele civilians. The government viewed them as supporters, or potential supporters, of the political opposition.</p>
<p>In 1983, the Fifth Brigade moved from village to village in Matabeleland North and some areas of the Midlands. Their presence led to <a href="https://www.pearl-insights.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/The-Matabeleland-Massacres-Britains-wilful-blindness.pdf">extreme violence</a>. The operation shifted to Matabeleland South in February 1984, where state-led atrocities and violence
continued. This included the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325887696_State-Organized_Starvation_A_Weapon_of_Extreme_Mass_Violence_in_Matabeleland_South_1984">orchestrated starvation of the Ndebele</a>. </p>
<p>Estimates vary on the number of non-combatant civilians massacred during Operation Gukurahundi. One conservative estimate is <a href="https://apnews.com/article/df5722c221bf4c5ca894e5e481413ca3">between 10,000 and 20,000</a>. However, Dan Stannard, the director internal of Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation during Operation Gukurahundi, believed that between <a href="http://researchdata.uwe.ac.uk/104/240/roh-oh-sta-da1-appr.pdf">30,000 and 50,000</a> Ndebele may have been killed. </p>
<p>Although the peak of the violence occurred between 1983 and 1984, the operation didn’t end until December 1987 with the signing of a <a href="https://commonwealthoralhistories.org/explandict/unity-accord-of-1987/">national unity accord</a>. </p>
<h2>Rape and sexual violence</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">My research</a> reveals what has, until now, been omitted from criminological scrutiny: a state policy of rape and sexual violence that targeted the Ndebele people during Operation Gukurahundi. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</a> made a <a href="https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTR,40278fbb4.html">historic judgment</a> which established that rape and other forms of sexual violence could be acts of genocide as defined by the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf#page=1">United Nations Convention on Genocide Article II</a>. The tribunal recognised how rape and sexual violence functioned to destroy the minority Tutsi group of Rwanda in 1994.</p>
<p>I gathered data for my <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">study</a> from 36 in-depth interviews with male and female survivors in a representative sample of geographical locations across Matabeleland. While small in comparison to the sheer scale of the violence and the numbers who were victimised, this study nonetheless establishes reliable conclusions about the nature of events. </p>
<p>The patterns I identified include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>public spectacles of multiple perpetrator rape targeting children and adults</p></li>
<li><p>people forced to witness the rape of female and male family members</p></li>
<li><p>rape and sexual violence followed by mass killing</p></li>
<li><p>forced intrafamilial rape</p></li>
<li><p>forced bestiality</p></li>
<li><p>forced nudity.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These are acts that can be interpreted as “deliberately inflicting on the (Ndebele) group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”, a contravention of <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf#page=1">Article II (c) of the UN Genocide Convention</a>.</p>
<p>The systematic dehumanisation and degradation of the Ndebele through forced intrafamilial rape was a recurring pattern of state harm. It was pervasive in both Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South.</p>
<p>One of the people I interviewed, Bukhosi, who was 19 in 1984 and living in Matabeleland South, <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">shared the cruelty</a> of knowing that the Fifth Brigade might force him to attempt to have sex with his relatives. They would threaten to shoot him if he refused. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>There were times we were afraid even to be in the company of our sister, even to go to the shop. Because I know when these guys come and see us together, they say ‘sleep with your sister’. Then you are afraid to go with your mother because something terrible would happen, they will say ‘do this to your mother’. You are afraid even to be with your brother at home, because they … these guys (Fifth Brigade), when they find the two of you. It is terrible … So we were all separated ….</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Such <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm">rituals of degradation</a> are found wherever a policy of genocidal rape is adopted. They cause shame and humiliation. They leave communities and individual families destroyed, their bonds crushed through the annihilation of social norms. </p>
<p>Forty years later, the intergenerational impacts of Operation Gukurahundi on the Ndebele group are profound. My interviewees widely reported mental health issues. Children born of survivors are angry and struggle to understand their family’s brutal history when questions about these painful experiences are met with silence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Mnangagwa
with Senior Royal Prince William in November 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kingston Royal</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I also identified patterns of reproductive violence targeting males and females. These included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>killing the foetuses of pregnant women</p></li>
<li><p>internment in concentration camps for sexual servitude (rape camps)</p></li>
<li><p>forced pregnancies </p></li>
<li><p>genital mutilation. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Fifth Brigade officers targeted the wombs of pregnant women with knives, bayonets or through stamping.</p>
<p>These acts can be interpreted as “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the (Ndebele) group”, a contravention of <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf#page=1">Article II (d) of the Genocide Convention</a>. </p>
<p>Every participant in my study reported the presence of a military rank structure – and complicity of senior officers in mass rapes and sexual violence. There was no evidence of sexual predation by army personnel for personal satisfaction. </p>
<p>Another study participant, Phindile, was 37 and lived in Matabeleland South in 1984. There were 21 homesteads in her village. She told me there were three commanders in her area. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Those were the ones who were giving the instructions. Rape was done (by) daylight and darkness but most were done in the evening. The commanders would be there eating. The chief commander would be sitting at a distance and giving instructions on what to do. They used to do the raping according to their rank.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>My <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">research</a> establishes that the policy of rape and other forms of sexual violence was systematic and predicated on the government’s intent to destroy the Ndebele in part. The policy reflects the ideology and strategic goals of those in high office. The fundamental human rights of many survivors remain affected <a href="https://www.zimlive.com/gukurahundi-the-election-dilemma-for-undocumented-victims/">to this day</a>. </p>
<h2>Swept under the carpet</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">Prosecution for genocide</a> extends to those who plan, instigate, order, commit or aid and abet in its <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/genocide">planning, preparation or execution</a>.</p>
<p>In the early 1990s, reports of state-organised rape, the detention of women in rape camps, enforced pregnancy and other sexual atrocities trickled out of Bosnia and Croatia. Securing indictments became an <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/abs/war-crimes-brutality-genocide-terror-and-the-struggle-for-justice-by-aryeh-neier-new-york-times-books-1998-pp-xiv-274-index-25-can35-between-vengeance-and-forgiveness-facing-history-after-genocide-and-mass-violence-by-martha-minow-boston-beacon-press-1998-pp-xiii-202-index-23/47336631C6CF464C84E5226AB62AD274">international political priority</a>. </p>
<p>Similar <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/uk/revealed-british-diplomats-pressured-bbcs-jeremy-paxman-understand-true-perspective-massacres-zimbabwe-61535">reports had trickled out</a> of Zimbabwe a decade earlier but were <a href="https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10023/16176/Cameron_2017_TIHR_BritainsWilfulBlindness_AAM.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">swept under the carpet</a>. </p>
<p>Intelligence on genocidal rape and other atrocities was <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316020728_The_Matabeleland_Massacres_Britain%27s_wilful_blindness">minimised by British representatives</a> in Zimbabwe. This was clearly politically influenced, as expressed in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316020728_The_Matabeleland_Massacres_Britain%27s_wilful_blindness">numerous diplomatic cables</a> between Harare and London.</p>
<p>The crimes of genocide committed by the Third Reich in Nazi Germany, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia or the Hutu government of Rwanda were subjected to investigation, prosecution and judgment in international courts. </p>
<p>Yet, 40 years after the mass atrocities of Operation Gukurahundi, there has been no official investigation, prosecution or judgment. The most senior surviving person accused of overseeing the genocide and other crimes against humanity, the incumbent president of Zimbabwe, enjoys impunity. He is endorsed and flattered – for example, he was <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202304190012.html#:%7E:text=Emmerson%20Mnangagwa%2C%20President%20of%20Zimbabwe%20.&text=President%20Emmerson%20Mnangagwa%20has%20been,ceremonial%20home%20of%20Britain's%20monarchy.">invited</a> to the May 2023 coronation of King Charles III of the UK.</p>
<p>Rather than being subjected to a process of international justice before a court with the jurisdiction to try the mass crimes of Gukurahundi, Mnangagwa will stand for re-election on 23 August. The survivors will continue their <a href="https://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/memory-and-erasure">search for justice and accountability</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211633/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hazel Cameron received funding for this research project from Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland, the British Academy and a Principal’s Special Award, University of St Andrews. </span></em></p>President Emmerson Mnangagwa has not faced official investigation or prosecution over his role in Operation Gukurahundi – 40 years on.Hazel Cameron, Honorary Senior Research Fellow, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2028582023-04-20T15:06:01Z2023-04-20T15:06:01ZZimbabwe’s ruling party vilifies the opposition as American puppets. But the party itself had strong ties to the US<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521045/original/file-20230414-16-97marz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's President Emmerson Mnangagwa addressing a rally in Bulawayo recently. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Auntony/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF), which has governed Zimbabwe since independence in 1980, is well known for denouncing the United States’ role as a superpower that polices the world. </p>
<p>In a 2007 address at the United Nations, then Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-zimbabwe-mugabe/mugabe-slams-bush-hypocrisy-on-human-rights-idUSN2627903020070926">assailed</a> his American counterpart, George W. Bush. Mugabe charged:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>his hands drip with innocent blood of many nationalities. He kills in Iraq. He kills in Afghanistan. And this is supposed to be our master on human rights? </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Confrontation with the US, a recurrent feature of Zimbabwe’s political history since <a href="https://roape.net/2020/01/17/one-who-preferred-death-to-imperialism/">the 1960s</a>, surged after Washington adopted a bipartisan <a href="https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/07/11/2019/post-mugabe-zimbabwe-retreats-western-outreach-embraces-africa">sanctions package</a> in 2001. The European Union also imposed sanctions. </p>
<p>US officials have <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1158">repeatedly stated</a> that the sanctions target specific individuals or entities that have abused human rights or undermined democracy. <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200924-zimbabwe-leader-tells-un-that-sanctions-hurt-development">Zanu-PF has responded</a> by pointing to UN reporting which notes that the sanctions have weakened the country’s economy and impeded national development.</p>
<p>I am a historian of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. My <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Pan-Africanism-Versus-Partnership-Decolonisation-Rhodesian-ebook/dp/B0BSKNHMYH/ref=sr_1_2?qid=1681393772&refinements=p_n_publication_date%3A1250228011&s=books&sr=1-2">forthcoming book</a> focuses on its formative stages in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This was when Mugabe first became active in politics and the US got more involved in the politics of what was then Rhodesia, a British colony. In my view, the 21st century hostility obscures a nuanced historical relationship between the US and Zanu-PF.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/winky-d-is-being-targeted-by-police-in-zimbabwe-why-the-music-stars-voice-is-so-important-202246">Winky D is being targeted by police in Zimbabwe – why the music star's voice is so important</a>
</strong>
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</p>
<hr>
<p>At first, the fledgling liberation movement valued American support. Zanu-PF <a href="https://www.africabib.org/rec.php?RID=18593742X">broke away</a> from the Soviet-aligned Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu) in August 1963. Zanu-PF was originally known as Zanu, but adopted the “PF” suffix <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/zanu-pf-wins-first-free-elections-zimbabwe">ahead of elections in 1980</a>.</p>
<p>This context is relevant now because Zanu-PF efforts to consolidate both domestic and pan-African support selectively overlook more compatible aspects of its historical relations with the US.</p>
<h2>Zanu-PF’s anti-American bluster</h2>
<p>Zanu-PF has exploited sanctions to its advantage.</p>
<p>Emmerson Mnangagwa, previously Mugabe’s deputy, <a href="https://www.sardc.net/en/southern-african-news-features/sadc-mobilizes-anti-sanctions-day-25-october/">came to power</a> in a factional coup in late 2017. He has successfully mobilised pan-African support against sanctions.</p>
<p>Since 2019, the Southern African Development Community and the African Union have observed 25 October as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/10/26/zimbabwe-regime-sanctions-zanupf">“Anti-Sanctions Day”</a> in solidarity with the Zanu-PF leadership.</p>
<p>Zanu-PF’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/10/25/thousands-in-zimbabwe-denounce-evil-western-sanctions">anti-American rhetoric</a> is not only deployed to win friends abroad. It is also a prominent campaign tactic at home. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/president-mnangagwa-claimed-zimbabwe-was-open-for-business-whats-gone-wrong-154085">President Mnangagwa claimed Zimbabwe was open for business. What's gone wrong</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>With general elections expected <a href="https://www.eisa.org/calendar2023.php">in July</a> or August, Zanu-PF is following the strategy again. It’s discrediting its leading opponent, Nelson Chamisa of the Citizens Coalition for Change, as a <a href="https://twitter.com/TafadzwaMugwadi/status/1631150059122221056">“US pawn”</a>. </p>
<p>His predecessor, Morgan Tsvangirai, faced <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-election/mugabe-belittles-opponents-as-frog-and-puppet-idUSL2321227420080223">similar treatment</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man points ahead with his right index finger in front of banners bearing the acronym 'CCC'." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nelson Chamisa, leader of the opposition Citizens Coalition for Change party.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Auntony / AFP via Getty Images)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Zimbabwe’s partisan state media routinely employ such terms as <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/us-president-exposes-puppets-in-zim/">“puppets”, “pawns” and “lackeys”</a> to describe Chamisa and his party. These jibes are intended to convince Zimbabwean voters that Chamisa would prioritise foreign interests.</p>
<p>The rhetoric conceals ZANU-PF’s own American ties.</p>
<h2>Zanu-PF’s American connections</h2>
<p>Historically, relations between the US and Zanu-PF have fluctuated. Mugabe formed a <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/a-walk-down-memory-lane-with-andrew-young/">close bond</a> with Andrew Young, the US ambassador to the UN during <a href="https://theconversation.com/jimmy-carters-african-legacy-peacemaker-negotiator-and-defender-of-rights-200744">Jimmy Carter’s presidency</a>. Carter’s government was the <a href="https://diplomacy.state.gov/encyclopedia/u-s-embassy-harare-zimbabwe/">first to open an embassy</a> in independent Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>Solid relations continued during the early years of the Reagan administration. Harare was one of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/12/20/us-slashes-aid-to-zimbabwe-by-almost-half/e67886cf-9f52-4fde-beee-83ba1b40c3e0/">top three African recipients</a> of US aid in the early 1980s. </p>
<p>US vice-president <a href="https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/11/18/Vice-President-George-Bush-arrived-today-for-talks-with/7630406443600/">George H.W. Bush travelled to Harare</a> in 1982. In 1997, first lady Hillary Clinton made a <a href="https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1997/03/1997-03-11-first-lady-travels-in-africa-later-this-month.html">goodwill visit</a> to Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>Ties were even deeper in the early 1960s when the US government encouraged the party’s very establishment. Historian <a href="https://www.kent.edu/history/profile/timothy-scarnecchia">Timothy Scarnecchia</a>, who has mined records in the US national archives, has <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781580463638/the-urban-roots-of-democracy-and-political-violence-in-zimbabwe/">documented the ties</a> that Zanu forged with American officials 60 years ago. </p>
<hr>
<p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/repression-and-dialogue-in-zimbabwe-twin-strategies-that-arent-working-122139">Repression and dialogue in Zimbabwe: twin strategies that aren't working</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The organisation’s core leadership in temporary exile in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (then Tanganyika), regularly consulted with US embassy officials in that country. Its leading representatives, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137543462_5">including Mugabe</a>, lobbied the US government for funding. (There is no evidence that the new party received any directly.) </p>
<p>Zanu’s first president, <a href="https://www.sithole.org/biography.php">Ndabaningi Sithole</a>, received theological education in the US in the late 1950s. Archival records show that on the eve of Zanu’s formation he met with State Department officials in Washington DC who connected him to private American funders. In another archived account of a meeting with the US ambassador in Tanganyika (now Tanzania) in July 1963, Leopold Takawira, subsequently Zanu’s first vice-president, relayed that Sithole regarded the US as his second home.</p>
<p>Herbert Chitepo, who became Zanu’s national chair, visited the US in July 1963 and also met with American diplomats. According to a record of their conversation in the US national archives, Chitepo expressed his desire to accept US funding and defied</p>
<blockquote>
<p>anyone to call him an American stooge.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The 11 July 1963 issue of Zimbabwe Today, a periodical produced by Zapu in Tanzania, declared that following Sithole’s return from the US,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the American dollar and its ugly imperialist head is clearly visible in the actions of Mr. Sithole. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Zanu-PF’s assaults on Chamisa and his party’s supposed American connections is a repackaging of the very attacks Mnangagwa’s party faced from Zapu when it was formed 60 years ago. </p>
<h2>Double standards</h2>
<p>Although it has not been well documented, the US provided critical support during Zanu’s founding in 1963. It also helped the party consolidate its authority following independence in 1980. Since the US government imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe in 2001, these ties have been overshadowed. </p>
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<p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-zimbabwe-finally-ditch-a-history-of-violence-and-media-repression-99859">Can Zimbabwe finally ditch a history of violence and media repression?</a>
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<p>As elections approach in Zimbabwe, the role of the US looms large. Zanu-PF overlooks historical aspects of its own relations with the US as it seeks to undermine its domestic opposition and appeal to continental allies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202858/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brooks Marmon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zanu-PF’s anti-American rhetoric is not only deployed to win friends abroad. As elections approach, it is also a prominent campaign tactic at home.Brooks Marmon, Post-doctoral Scholar, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, The Ohio State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1884072022-08-09T10:15:56Z2022-08-09T10:15:56ZWashington wants to address anti-west sentiment in Africa: Blinken is doing his bit<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478121/original/file-20220808-26-tldg8o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US state secretary Antony Blinken seeks closer ties with Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alex Wong/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to three African countries this week is another sign of the Joe Biden administration’s US-Africa policy of reengaging with the continent. </p>
<p>This was first unveiled in visits to Nigeria, Kenya and Senegal <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/africa-reacts-secretary-blinkens-africa-tour">at the end of 2021</a>.</p>
<p>This time he is visiting South Africa, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).</p>
<p>These are welcome visits following the previous administration’s disengagement with Africa and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-referred-haiti-african-countries-shithole-nations-n836946">less than flattering comments</a> about African countries. </p>
<p>Blinken’s first trip to Africa in 2021 outlined the US’s need to build a 21st century partnership with the continent. This is key to maintaining the US’s strategic geo-political and economic influence in Africa against the backdrop of increased competition between advanced and emerging countries in an increasingly complex world.</p>
<p>The Biden administration’s re-engagement policy is also informed by other considerations, such as <a href="https://blogs.afdb.org/fr/afdb-championing-inclusive-growth-across-africa/post/the-expansion-of-chinese-influence-in-africa-opportunities-and-risks-9612">China’s rising influence</a>.</p>
<p>Some media reports have suggested that Blinken’s trip is aimed at countering China and Russia’s footprint in Africa. In particular, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-and-africa-building-a-21st-century-partnership/">recent visit</a>. </p>
<p>But it is difficult to claim that Blinken’s visit is singularly informed by the Russia - Ukraine conflict. After all, Blinken’s first visit took place before the Russian invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Blinken is <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/04/27/how-biden-can-build-u.s.-africa-relations-back-better-pub-84399">launching the US strategy for sub-Saharan Africa</a>. This is anchored on engaging Africa in promoting an open and stable international system in security, exchange and trade. </p>
<p>This will also tackle the effects of climate change, food security, global pandemics and shape technological and economic futures. </p>
<p>In a speech given at the University of Pretoria in South Africa, Blinken reiterated – as he did in Nigeria in November 2021 – that he wanted to treat African countries as <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/south-africa-speech-blinken-details-us-policy-africa-88101187">equal</a> partners. </p>
<h2>Pressing issues</h2>
<p>In Pretoria, Blinken <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/south-africa-speech-blinken-details-us-policy-africa-88101187">focused on four priorities</a> that he believed the US and Africa could tackle together. </p>
<p>The first was “to foster openness”. This would require the free flow of ideas and information, respect for international law, territorial integrity and national sovereignty. And US support for Africa’s quest to choose its own path and not just be instruments of the progress of other nations.</p>
<p>Blinken <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SgyKkL6wCjs">said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The United States will not dictate Africa’s choices, neither should anyone else. The right to make those choices belongs to Africans. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The idea of an equal partnership could be pursued through areas of common interest: global health, the climate crisis, inclusive economic growth, democracy and peace and security.</p>
<p>Blinken said that the US strategy was founded on sub-Saharan Africa’s capacity as a geopolitical force. For him the equal partnership is informed by Africa’s diversity, agency and focuses on</p>
<blockquote>
<p>what we will do with African nations and peoples, not for African nations and peoples. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The second priority was partnering with Africa to fulfil the promise of democracy. He referenced <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SgyKkL6wCjs">Afro-barometer surveys</a> that show Africans are largely against authoritarianism. </p>
<p>And he acknowledged that delivering on democracy dividends – and the threat to democracy – were not just an African problem, but a global challenge. This included the US where the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/United-States-Capitol-attack-of-2021">insurrection at the Capitol</a> revealed fissures in US democracy.</p>
<p>However, the US would work with Africa to promote more inclusive and resilient processes and communities, citizen participation and the peaceful transition of power. These would be subjects of an <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/07/20/biden-to-host-african-leaders-for-december-summit-white-house//">African leaders summit in December 2022</a>. </p>
<p>The third priority is working with Africa to recover from the economic devastation wrought by the Covid-19 pandemic. And laying the foundation for economic opportunities for people. The US position is rooted in the understanding that helping Africa recover is also in the US and the world’s interest.</p>
<p>Blinken spelt out the ways in which the US will “be there for African countries”. These included rallying rich countries and key institutions to support debt relief, supporting the <a href="https://au.int/en/documents/20210715/african-union-green-recovery-action-plan-2021-2027">African Union’s Green Recovery Action Plan</a>, climate finance, humanitarian and food relief, investment in agriculture, vaccine self-sufficiency and sharing vaccine technology.</p>
<p>The US is also supporting African-led initiatives such as the<a href="https://au.int/en/cfta"> African Continental Free Trade Area</a> and the <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview">African Union Agenda 2063</a>. The US also pledged to raise over US$200 billion dollars to invest in infrastructure. </p>
<p>Other areas includes intellectual exchanges such as the Young African Leaders Initiative. </p>
<p>The fourth priority area is leading with Africa on clean energy transition, reducing emissions and restoring ecosystems. It would help save the planet, adapt to the effects of climate change and provide power for economic growth. </p>
<p>He reiterated the US will invest in expanded energy access and meet developmental targets towards a just energy transition; helping communities to choose “conservation over deforestation”.</p>
<p>Blinken rounded off by reiterating that these priorities were first championed by Africa and Africans, and have now become the world’s priorities as well. </p>
<h2>Engaging Africa as equal partners</h2>
<p>Whatever equal partnership means in this case, even if it is spelt mostly in terms of American rather than a (South) African Strategies for partnership, it looks as though the key take-away was a carefully considered business agreement couched as friendship. </p>
<p>In the past, the US’s partnerships with Africa have been informed and characterised by power relations in which the US dictated the terms. </p>
<p>It remains to be seen the extent to which the four areas of cooperation (not too dissimilar to the five points presented in West Africa 2021) will reflect the notion of equal partnership with African countries on the ground.</p>
<p>In our view the significant rise in Beijing’s influence on the continent is a factor in the US redefinition and resetting its relations with Africa. </p>
<p>But Washington still has a long way to go. It must overcome <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/russias-soft-power-sources-in-africa/">growing anti-west sentiment</a> on the continent given the development alternative that China offers.</p>
<p>For instance, while China (and Russia for that matter) does not make upholding democracy and human rights a condition for engaging with African states, the US bases its partnership on advancing these values. This and other factors such as neo-colonialism fuel anti-West sentiment against the US. </p>
<p>It’s re-engagement approach should therefore consider African perspectives on how the issues of diversity, democracy and human rights can be pursued. </p>
<p>Overall, Blinken’s stated commitment to “equal” partnership with Africa, if truly implemented, has the potential to deconstruct these perceptions and the sentiments they produce. The starting point would be to focus on and invest in young people on the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188407/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Washington must overcome growing anti-west sentiment on the continent given the development alternative that China offers.Christopher Isike, Director, African Centre for the Study of the United States, University of PretoriaTinashe Nyamunda, Associate Professor, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1856482022-07-03T08:10:30Z2022-07-03T08:10:30ZBook on Zimbabwe strongman Robert Mugabe’s legacy has many flaws<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470799/original/file-20220624-17-oop0y4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe died in 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Development studies professor David Moore’s new <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/mugabes-legacy/">book</a>, Mugabe’s Legacy: Coups, Conspiracies and the Conceits of Power in Zimbabwe, attempts to understand the legacy of <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Robert_Mugabe">Robert Mugabe</a>, who led Zimbabwe from 1980 to 2017, when he lost power in a military coup. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/david-b-moore-285501">Moore</a> maintains that Mugabe’s legacy revolves around what he terms “the three Cs”: coups, conspiracies and conceits of political power. He shows that “the three Cs” have their origins in the perilous politics of the independence struggle, in which Mugabe was a key participant.</p>
<p>The book consists of a prologue and 10 chapters. The first chapter seeks “to erect a conceptual structure on which the Zimbabwe ‘facts’ will sit”. Chapters two to five set out “the making of Mugabe and his legacy” in the liberation struggle years. Chapters six to nine trace the independence time trajectory of Mugabe’s political career through to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-military-coup-is-afoot-in-zimbabwe-whats-next-for-the-embattled-nation-87528">2017 coup</a>. Chapter ten examines Zimbabwean politics after Mugabe’s fall from power and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49604152">death in 2019</a>.</p>
<p>The scholars <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9781003026280/personality-cult-politics-mugabe-zimbabwe-ezra-chitando">Ezra Chitando</a>; <a href="https://www.ohioswallow.com/book/Robert+Mugabe">Sue Onslow and Martin Plaut</a>; <a href="https://www.press.umich.edu/11424894/mugabe">Stephen Chan</a>; and <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2">Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Pedzisai Ruhanya</a>, among others, have debated the legacies of Mugabe’s 37-year rule. </p>
<p>Moore largely ignores the contributions of these important contending studies about Mugabe’s legacies. This is subnormal academic practice. Consequently, the precise ways in which his book surpasses or buttresses competing works about Mugabe’s legacy are indistinct.</p>
<p>Bar an interview with the veteran nationalist politician Edgar Tekere (who had a mammoth lifelong axe to grind with Mugabe) in 2004, Moore did not interview anybody else in Zanu-PF who knew Mugabe well, or worked closely with him for an extended period. For that reason, the book is bereft of exceptionally revealing findings about Mugabe’s leadership, legacy and the politics of Zanu-PF. Moore’s main sources are unremarkable diplomatic cables in Western archives and material already in the public domain such as newspaper articles, NGO reports and published books. They do not make for a groundbreaking book.</p>
<h2>Missing the point</h2>
<p>We live in an age where the decolonisation of the knowledge agenda has, rightly, come to the fore in the academy. In light of this, I expected arguments about Mugabe’s leadership developed by black Zimbabwean scholars based in Zimbabwe to be central to Moore’s analysis. In place of debates about Mugabe by black Zimbabwean scholars, he has the thought of 20th century Italian Marxist intellectual-politician <a href="https://globalsocialtheory.org/thinkers/gramsci-antonio/">Antonio Gramsci</a> as his book’s central point of reference. </p>
<p>Moore invokes Gramsci <em>ad infinitum</em>, without ever properly contextualising his ideas or making clear their illuminating pertinence in debates about Mugabe’s legacy. Nor does Moore use his study of Mugabe’s legacy to extend and refine Gramscian theories. My comprehension of Mugabe, his legacy and Zanu-PF was not enhanced in any novel way after all that Gramsci. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470798/original/file-20220624-22-lqecj8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470798/original/file-20220624-22-lqecj8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=882&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470798/original/file-20220624-22-lqecj8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=882&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470798/original/file-20220624-22-lqecj8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=882&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470798/original/file-20220624-22-lqecj8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1108&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470798/original/file-20220624-22-lqecj8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1108&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470798/original/file-20220624-22-lqecj8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1108&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
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<p>Discussion of real and imagined coups is an important theme in Moore’s book. This is presented as a key component of Mugabe’s legacy. But, Moore does not engage relevant coup and military rule literature in order to enhance our understanding of Zimbabwe’s 2017 coup, and for the coup to advance broader studies about the nature and effects of coups, such as work by <a href="https://yalebooks.co.uk/page/detail/?k=9780300040432">Samuel Decalo</a>, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/african-government-politics-and-policy/when-soldiers-rebel-ethnic-armies-and-political-instability-africa?format=HB&isbn=9781108422475">Kristen Harkness</a>, <a href="https://www.press.jhu.edu/books/title/10989/seizing-power">Naunihal Singh</a>, <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-213418">Barbara Geddes</a> and <a href="https://www.ohioswallow.com/book/In+Idi+Amin%E2%80%99s+Shadow">Alicia Decker</a>, among others.</p>
<p>Moore states that he finds coup literature “boring” because it consists of “conservative tracts on the primordial-like prebendal and neo-patrimonial coupishness of Africans” (page 164). Serious coup scholars will bristle at his characterisation of their work as “conservative”, and defined by a propensity to regard Africans as innately prone to coup making because of personalised patronage-based politics. </p>
<p>Moore cursorily engages the African studies scholar <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1973.tb01413.x">Ali Mazrui’s 1973 article</a>, called Lumpen Proletariat and Lumpen Militariat: African Soldiers as New Political Class, about the consequences of coups, to underline why he finds coup literature “boring” and unhelpful.</p>
<p>The problem with this is that Mazrui’s article is dated and was hardly authoritative even in 1973. Moore depicts a crude caricature of a diverse, sophisticated, instructive and evolving coup and military rule literature.</p>
<h2>Portrayal of women</h2>
<p>Feminist scholarship has done much to challenge patriarchal erasure and trivialisation of women in political science. Moore’s book does precisely what feminist scholars have critiqued for decades now. It is laden with unquestioned patriarchal notions and gendered trivialisations that impoverish the study of politics.</p>
<p>Moore writes as if nothing can be gained analytically by treating women (Zimbabwe’s former <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Grace_Mugabe">first lady Grace Mugabe</a>, specifically) seriously. By this I mean methodically tracing, listening to and understanding women’s actual political incentives and experiences. </p>
<p>Moore employs sexist tropes when discussing Grace Mugabe’s role in politics and the 2017 coup. For example, he describes her as “the volatile former secretary”, “the woman who whipped her son’s girlfriend” and “incendiary Grace”. Yet there is no mention of the equally notable emotional volatility of the powerful political men – Mugabe, <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Constantino_Chiwenga">Constantino Chiwenga</a>, <a href="http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/Dzinashe%20Machingura.pdf">Dzinashe Machingura</a>, <a href="https://www.colonialrelic.com/biographies/joshua-nkomo/">Joshua Nkomo</a>, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/samora-machel">Samora Machel</a> and <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Josiah_Tongogara">Josiah Tongogara</a> – who he discusses in his book.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Moore did not unearth any treasures in his research of Mugabe’s legacy. He has not even drawn a map that might lead us to an enhanced understanding of the making of Mugabe and his legacy, the politics of Zanu-PF, and coups and their corollaries.</p>
<p><em>Blessing Miles Tendi is the author of <a href="http://www.milestendi.com/books">The Army and Politics in Zimbabwe - Mujuru, the liberation fighter and kingmaker</a></em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185648/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Blessing-Miles Tendi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Moore did not unearth any treasures in his research of Mugabe’s legacy. He has not even drawn a map that might lead us to them.Blessing-Miles Tendi, Associate Professor in the Politics of Africa, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1838512022-06-01T15:04:27Z2022-06-01T15:04:27ZZimbabwe’s 2023 elections: how to judge candidates’ social protection promises<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465668/original/file-20220527-17-v9r9jp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Traders examine bales of tobacco, which is among Zimbabwe's key exports, at a March 2022 auction in Harare.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe is heading for general polls <a href="https://www.eisa.org/calendar-comprehensive.php">in 2023</a> amid an ongoing macroeconomic crisis. In the decade starting from 2001, the state-led economy started to show <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-inflation-idUSL1992587420070919">signs of strain</a>. Unemployment <a href="https://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp197654.pdf?iframe">reached 85%</a>. Inflation, which was a staggering <a href="https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/Hanke_zimbabwe_091708.pdf">79,000,000%</a> in 2008, came down but has been rising in the <a href="https://take-profit.org/en/statistics/inflation-rate/zimbabwe/">past two years</a>. It is still <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/zimbabwe/inflation-cpi">among the highest in the world</a>.</p>
<p>The economic crisis has heightened the vulnerability of households and the need for social protection to prevent hunger among poor households, complement the risk mitigation mechanisms of informal workers, and improve access to social services such as education, health and water.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-informal-sector-organisations-in-zimbabwe-shape-notions-of-citizenship-180455">How informal sector organisations in Zimbabwe shape notions of citizenship</a>
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<p>It is highly unlikely that the formal economy will turn the tide soon to create formal employment, which is vital for the stability of household income, and reduce the need to support food insecure households. </p>
<p>In the last presidential election in 2018, several presidential candidates promised to provide social protection for citizens.</p>
<p>The ruling party, <a href="https://webcms.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/495/country_documents-2020/Zimbabwe/ZANU_PF_2018_MANIFESTO_ENGLISH_%20(39.51).pdf">Zanu-PF promised</a> to create safety nets and enhance access to health and education services. Safety nets are also called <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29115">social assistance</a> and typically include cash and food transfers, public works, subsidies and fee waivers for education and health.</p>
<p>The Zanu-PF government’s safety net package includes cash transfers to <a href="https://social-assistance.africa.undp.org/data">52,049 households</a>, public monthly maintenance allowances in form of food and or cash to <a href="https://social-assistance.africa.undp.org/data">6,688 households</a> and paltry tuition grants and examination fee subsidies <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/outcry-over-paltry-beam-allocations/">for underprivileged students</a>. </p>
<p>The main opposition party, MDC-Alliance (now <a href="https://www.facebook.com/CitizensCoalition4Change">Citizens Coalition for Change</a>), promised to bolster social protection and <a href="https://t792ae.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MDC-ALLIANCE-SMART-MANIFESTO.pdf">reform the National Social Security Authority</a>. The terms <a href="https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_604882/lang--en/index.html">“social protection” and “social security”</a> are used interchangeably, and typically include social assistance and social insurance measures.</p>
<p>Little-known opposition parties also made promises. For instance, the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/People%E2%80%99s_Rainbow_Coalition">People’s Rainbow Coalition</a> promised to <a href="https://www.slideshare.net/povonews/peoples-rainbow-coalition-2018-election-manifesto-idea">provide social security</a>, and the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/APAZimbabwe">Alliance for the People’s Agenda</a> undertook to <a href="https://t792ae.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/APA-Manifesto-2018.pdf">deliver social packages</a> such as support for education and health care.</p>
<p>As Zimbabwe heads for 2023 presidential elections, due to be held on <a href="http://www.news.cn/english/africa/2021-11/11/c_1310303313.html">23 April 2023</a>, new or recycled promises will be made to voters. </p>
<p>Voters must judge candidates by the soundness of their promises to improve the reach of cash and food transfers to poor households, extend social insurance coverage to informal workers, and facilitate access to education, health and water for all citizens.</p>
<h2>What’s in place</h2>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.undp.org/africa/publications/state-social-assistance-africa-report">researched</a> <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/social-protection-operational-tool-humanitarian-development-and-peace-nexus-linkages">social protection</a> <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2516602620936028">in Zimbabwe and beyond</a> for the past decade. There are a few key social protection measures to consider. Among them are social insurance, such as pension, sickness, maternity and unemployment benefits. These depend on contributions from formal economy workers and their employers. </p>
<p>The coverage of the Harmonised Social Cash Transfers programme is <a href="https://social-assistance.africa.undp.org/data">limited to 52,049 households</a>. So, it covers only 6% of the food insecure households. But over four million Zimbabweans, out of a population of <a href="https://populationstat.com/zimbabwe/">15 million</a>, <a href="https://www.unicef.org/zimbabwe/press-releases/zimbabwe-rated-one-worlds-top-global-food-crises-new-united-nations-report">are food insecure</a>.</p>
<p>The flagship social assistance programme gives households between US$20-50 bimonthly, depending on household size.</p>
<p>Since inception in 2011, the programme has covered <a href="https://socialprotection.org/discover/programmes/harmonised-social-cash-transfer-hsct">less than 20 districts</a>. There are 59 districts in Zimbabwe and all have food insecure households. </p>
<p>Then there’s <a href="https://www.nssa.org.zw/news-blogs/talking-social-security/schemes-for-social-protection/">social insurance</a> which covers pensions and worker compensation. But this doesn’t cover the risks faced by most workers as it only applies to formal employment. Only 15% of Zimbabweans are employed in the formal economy while 85% work in the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2020-09-16-outlook-for-informal-economy-in-zimbabwe-is-dire-after-harsh-covid-19-response/">informal economy</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/insights-from-zimbabwe-on-how-to-link-formal-and-informal-economies-182353">Insights from Zimbabwe on how to link formal and informal economies</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Many informal workers create their own risk mitigation mechanisms such as <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0020872815611196">burial societies</a> or subscribe to funeral insurance policies to cover funeral expenses, which can be as high as their <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11150-020-09498-8">yearly income</a>. </p>
<p>Another cost that could be covered by social protection is school fees. According to the Zimbabwe National Vulnerability Assessment Committee <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/zimbabwe/zimbabwe-vulnerability-assessment-committee-zimvac-2020-rural-livelihoods-assessment">2020 report</a>, 50.3% of children of school-going age were sent away from school in the first term of 2020 because they could not pay fees. </p>
<p>The report also notes that 75% of all rural residents who are chronically ill miss their medication because they cannot afford it. </p>
<p>In the short-term, social protection must focus on fee waivers to improve access to education and health care services for all citizens. In the medium term, all these critical social services must be brought within acceptable travelling distances.</p>
<h2>Lessons from elsewhere</h2>
<p>A number of countries in Southern African Development Community region have national social cash transfers for all vulnerable people of a certain demographic group. For instance, in Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa, older people receive an <a href="https://social-assistance.africa.undp.org/data">old age grant</a>.</p>
<p>Some governments in Africa complement the risk mitigation mechanisms of informal workers. For instance, the Rwandan government adds a matching contribution plus life and funeral insurance policies on the contributions that informal workers make <a href="https://ejoheza.gov.rw/ltss-registration-ui/landing.xhtml;jsessionid=BFC430CED41625AEB78C47507D381B8C">towards their pension</a>.</p>
<p>In Ghana, the government contributes 5% to the new national pension scheme, which <a href="https://www.ssnit.org.gh/faq/the-new-pension-scheme/#:%7E:text=The%20new%20National%20Pension%20Scheme,benefits%20as%20and%20when%20due.&text=The%20New%20Pension%20Scheme%20was,implementation%20started%20in%20January%202010">includes informal workers</a>.</p>
<p>Free access to education has had positive impact on enrolment in <a href="https://world-education-blog.org/2016/01/27/can-africa-afford-free-education/#:%7E:text=Among%20the%2053%20countries%20with,of%20Tanzania%20and%20Uganda%20show">Kenya, Malawi and Uganda</a>. There are fee waivers for health care in countries such as <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29115">Eswatini and Burundi</a>.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>It’s important to address two issues when it comes to social protection in Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>The first is the lingering view that social protection creates a dependency syndrome – not only in Zimbabwe, but Africa-wide. This <a href="https://academic.oup.com/wbro/article/33/2/259/5127165">myth has been busted</a> by scientific evidence showing that cash transfers do not lead to fewer people seeking jobs.</p>
<p>The second is whether the state can afford to finance the extension of social protection to all food insecure households. </p>
<p>In a constrained macroeconomic environment such as Zimbabwe’s, funding social protection among other competing needs is about budget priorities more than it is an issue of sourcing new revenue.</p>
<p>Where there is high unemployment and food insecurity, it is socially and legally justified for the poor to depend on social assistance as it is their right, for which the government must be held accountable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183851/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gift Dafuleya does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Zimbabwe heads for 2023 presidential elections, there are key things voters should watch out for in the social protection promises made by candidates.Gift Dafuleya, Lecturer in Economics, University of VendaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1796832022-03-23T11:21:13Z2022-03-23T11:21:13ZZimbabwe by-elections are attracting huge crowds, but don’t read too much into them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453646/original/file-20220322-302-js9i5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's opposition Citizens Coalition for Change supporters attend an election campaign rally in Harare, in February. Zimbabwe, 20 February.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabweans are set to cast their votes in key parliamentary and local government by-elections on 26 March 2022. The by-elections have the potential to set the tone for next year’s national elections. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe’s national assembly has <a href="https://parlzim.gov.zw/members/">270 parliamentarians</a> of which 210 are elected. The 60 additional parliamentarians are brought into the house through a quota system reserved for women. </p>
<p>The 28 parliamentary and 105 local government council seats that are up for grabs in these by-elections were left vacant due to recalls and deaths of representatives. The empty seats constitute 13.3% of Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2773/">210 elective parliamentary seats</a>. The council positions represent <a href="https://genderlinks.org.za/news/zimbabwe-local-govt-quota-takes-shape-ahead-of-2023-elections/">5.4% of the 1,958 local government seats</a>. </p>
<p>Parliament is currently overly dominated by members of the governing Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF). The election of new parliamentarians will bring new voices. </p>
<p>The polls were initially due to take place in December 2020 but were <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/chiwenga-suspends-by-elections-indefinitely/">postponed</a> because of the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<p>The by-elections have attracted huge national and regional focus. They will give communities that have gone without representation for almost two years a chance to choose their candidates. They also provide an opportunity for the youthful and charismatic Nelson Chamisa to showcase the party he recently rebranded after breaking away from the leading opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). This followed a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-lack-of-a-succession-plan-has-left-morgan-tsvangirais-party-in-disarray-91714">bitter leadership struggle</a> after the death of its founder Morgan Tsvangirai in February 2018. </p>
<p>Chamisa <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2022-01-25-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-nelson-chamisa-forms-new-political-party/">raised the political stakes</a> by leaving the original party and rebranding his political grouping to the “Citizens Coalition for Change” at the end of January 2022.</p>
<h2>Hopes for the opposition</h2>
<p>Twenty of the 28 parliamentary seats being contested – 71.4% – <a href="https://zimfact.org/factsheet-who-previously-held-seats-to-be-filled-on-march-26/">became vacant</a> after the controversial recall of the representatives by a faction of the Movement for Democratic Change party led by Douglas Mwonzora between May and October 2020.</p>
<p>The significance of these by-elections is also evident from the way the two main parties, ZANU-PF and Citizens Coalition for Change, have invested huge human and financial resources in organising campaign rallies across the country. </p>
<p>Rallies have attracted huge crowds and ignited political excitement in the country. They have also fuelled speculation that the 2023 national elections, due in less than a year, will be a tight political contest between the two main parties. Some even say Citizens for Coalition for Change poses an <a href="https://thisisafrica.me/politics-and-society/bsr-what-happens-when-zanu-pf-faces-an-existential-threat/">existential threat to ZANU-PF</a>. </p>
<p>The by-elections <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-02-28-zimbabwes-new-political-party-citizens-coalition-for-change-sparks-fear-and-violence-from-zanu-pf/">have even been described</a> as a dress rehearsal for the 2023 elections which some think could be a watershed poll.</p>
<p>There are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58270973">wide expectations</a> that Zimbabwe’s opposition will be able to build on its earlier successes and capitalise on the deteriorating political and economic conditions in the country to break ZANU-PF’s authoritarian control since 1980. </p>
<p>There are, nevertheless, some caveats.</p>
<h2>Need for circumspection</h2>
<p>It’s important not to exaggerate the impact of the poll.</p>
<p>First, it is unlikely that the huge public turnout at the rallies is going to translate into a huge voter turnout. That’s partly because by-elections in Zimbabwe have always had a low voter turnout. For example, the 2018 general election showed a very low turnout. In some areas, <a href="https://www.zesn.org.zw/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ZESN-Cowdray-Park-By-election-Report.pdf">not even a quarter of the registered voters</a> showed up.</p>
<p>Second, political violence <a href="https://www.ijr.org.za/portfolio-items/elections-in-zimbabwe-a-recipe-for-tension-or-a-remedy-for-reconciliation/">has spoiled Zimbabwe’s elections</a> since 1980, and even more so <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/06/04/elephant-room/reforming-zimbabwes-security-sector-ahead-elections">since 2000</a>. This is likely to dissuade some voters from turning up.</p>
<p>Most recently, there have been clashes between ZANU-PF and Citizens Coalition for Change supporters in the mining town of Kwekwe on 27 February 2022. One <a href="https://www.ijr.org.za/portfolio-items/elections-in-zimbabwe-a-recipe-for-tension-or-a-remedy-for-reconciliation/">person was killed and ten injured</a>. </p>
<p>Since then, media and human rights watchdog reports have <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/rights-groups-bemoan-escalating-political-violence/">noted</a> that some supporters and leaders of Citizens Coalition for Change have been violently attacked by ZANU-PF and state security agencies. This has included including candidates for the by-elections.</p>
<p>The violence could deter voters on election day.</p>
<p>Third, evidence from recent surveys suggest that Zimbabweans have become more politically disengaged since the 2018 elections. An example is <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Summary%20of%20results/summary_of_results-zimbabwe-afrobarometer_round_8-21jul21.pdf">one done in June by the independent pan-African network Afrobarometer</a>. Instead, they’re turning their focus on economic survival in the deteriorating economy. </p>
<p>The International Republican Institute’s survey on public perceptions of local government <a href="https://www.iri.org/news/iri-zimbabwe-poll-in-bulawayo-and-mashonaland-east-shows-concerns-over-corruption-and-the-economy-approval-of-basic-services/">of October 2021</a> also shows an increase in citizen apathy towards political parties and community leaders. This is especially so for local government councillors and members of parliament, due to loss of trust in representative leadership. The growing trust deficit is strongly linked to increased corruption and irresponsible leadership among parliamentary and local officials. </p>
<p>Fourth, a growing number of Zimbabweans are losing confidence in elections as a mechanism for bringing leadership change at both national and local levels. This is mainly because of <a href="https://kubatana.net/2018/06/04/electoral-irregularities-point-2018-electoral-fraud/">strong allegations of electoral fraud</a> and the <a href="https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/coup-constitution-and-the-count-zimbabwes-disputed-elections/">growing list of disputed election results since 2000</a>.</p>
<p>The disillusionment is fuelling voter apathy. Most citizens feel that it is pointless to vote because it won’t change anything.</p>
<p>Fifth, attendance at political rallies cannot be taken as an indicator of likely voter turnout. Most people who attend rallies <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/27/politics/2016-election-crowd-size/index.html">don’t necessarily turn out to vote</a>. </p>
<p>Evidence from past elections indicates that crowd size is frequently not a good indicator of success on election day. Attendance of rallies is often motivated by <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/inside-shadowy-world-political-crowds-for-hire-3754652">different factors</a>. These include a range of incentives on offer, such as free music entertainment, alcohol, food, t-shirts and other items of clothing. All are absent on election day.</p>
<p>And most people who have been attending campaign rallies, especially in urban areas, are young. But a significant proportion of Zimbabwean youth – most of whom are unemployed and frustrated with the current political and economic status quo – are still not registered as voters. Analysis conducted by Pachedu (a group of data experts that has been analysing the Zimbabwe Voters Roll since 2018) showed that in 2018, 39% of Zimbabweans aged between 18 and 34 <a href="https://twitter.com/PacheduZW/status/1475526009017544709?t=_gzhe_EpIYvsKgWdIZm43A&s=08">were not registered and nearly 50% eligible young voters didn’t vote</a>. </p>
<p>The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission recently pointed out that <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2022/01/zec-revises-figure-on-registered-voters/">only 2,971 new voters</a> registered countrywide in 2021, and that <a href="https://www.zimlive.com/2022/02/23/zec-registered-50000-new-voters-between-february-1-and-february-20/">just under 50 000</a> people registered during the Commission’s registration blitz conducted in January and February 2022.</p>
<p>For all these challenges, the upcoming poll cannot be dismissed. Coming a few months before the country goes for the 2023 national elections, the elections create an opportunity for electoral stakeholders, including political parties, the electoral management body, security sector agencies, civil society and citizens, to review opportunities and challenges ahead of the milestone elections. </p>
<p>The elections are coming at a time when the country, which has been experiencing political and economic crisis for the last two decades, is going through its <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2021/12/17/notable-risks-for-zim-economy-in-2022/">worst crisis since 2007-2008</a>, with unemployment and poverty soaring and political divisions worsening. </p>
<p>A peaceful and credible election is needed to restore political and economic normalcy in the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179683/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Muzondidya is also an independent political and development analyst.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Munyaradzi Mushonga does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most citizens feel that it is pointless to vote because it won’t change anything.James Muzondidya, Part-time Lecturer, African History and Politics, University of ZimbabweMunyaradzi Mushonga, Senior Lecturer and Programme Director for Africa Studies in the Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1760682022-02-01T14:21:11Z2022-02-01T14:21:11ZSouth Africa is in a state of drift: the danger is that the ANC turns the way of Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443502/original/file-20220131-125257-1x63ckg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Cyril Ramaphosa (left) with his Zimbabwean counterpart, President Emmerson Mnangagwa, in Harare in 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dirco/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The dismal <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/dynamics-of-the-zimbabwe-crisis-in-the-21st-century/">fate of Zimbabwe</a> under the stewardship of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (<a href="https://www.zanupf.org.zw/">Zanu-PF</a>) government has long stood out as a warning to South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (<a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/">ANC</a>). Yet rarely has South Africa been in more danger of launching into a trajectory of Zimbabwe-like decline than now. </p>
<p>The South Africa media is thoroughly consumed with the political crisis within the ANC: the <a href="https://theconversation.com/factionalism-and-corruption-could-kill-the-anc-unless-it-kills-both-first-116924">rampant factionalism</a>, the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_south-africas-president-says-anc-cleaning-corruption/6209485.html">massive corruption</a>, the ‘capture’ of the state by the practice of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321223498_The_African_National_Congress_ANC_and_the_Cadre_Deployment_Policy_in_the_Postapartheid_South_Africa_A_Product_of_Democratic_Centralisation_or_a_Recipe_for_a_Constitutional_Crisis">‘cadre deployment’</a>, and the resulting <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-voters-are-disillusioned-but-they-havent-found-an-alternative-to-the-anc-171239">decline in the party’s poll ratings</a>.</p>
<p>There are genuine fears (or hopes) that the party will lose its electoral majority at the next general election <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2022-01-03-the-anc-renewal-boat-has-sailed-so-who-will-rise-and-take-up-the-political-baton-in-the-2024-elections/">in 2024</a>.</p>
<p>From this follows the most fundamental question of all: if the ANC lost its majority at the next election, as Zanu-PF did in the parliamentary and presidential elections of <a href="https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=929b38cb-3d7e-86c4-70da-e9ed343cc38d&groupId=252038">2008</a>, would it democratically concede power?</p>
<p>Or, alternatively, would it thwart the popular will by systematically undermining any post-election coalition government, as Zanu-PF did when it entered a coalition with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/zanu-pf-draft-constitution-angers-mdc-20120824">in 2009</a>? It refused to give up presidential power, and clung on to all the key levers of state power. It subsequently rigged the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/000203971304800305">2013 general election</a>.</p>
<p>What prompts such thinking is the apparent dilemma confronted by President Cyril Ramaphosa, who is also the ANC president. He positioned himself as the candidate who would <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-sets-out-a-bold-vision-for-south-africa-but-can-he-pull-it-off-109784">reform the ANC</a>. He also pledged to clean up the <a href="https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">mess of corruption left behind by the Zuma presidency</a>, and set South Africa back on <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2018-state-nation-address-16-feb-2018-0000">the path of growth</a>. </p>
<p>But for all the talk, Ramaphosa has made little progress. He appears to be totally paralysed by an inability to resolve the battle between factions within the ANC. He apparently lacks the authority to control his Cabinet. And <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/columnists/adriaanbasson/adriaan-basson-analysis-paralysis-why-hasnt-ramaphosa-fired-sisulu-20220123">the will to do so</a>.</p>
<p>So long as this continues, the country remains in a state of drift. The <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/Presentation%20QLFS%20Q2_2021.pdf">level of unemployment</a> is shocking, the <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-06/Report-03-10-062015.pdf#page=69">extent of poverty</a> among the black population is appalling, and the prospects for meaningful and appropriate economic growth <a href="https://www.resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/publications/statements/monetary-policy-statements/2022/statement-of-the-monetary-policy-committee/Monetary%20Policy%20Committee%20Statement%20January%202022.pdf">are minimal</a>. No wonder so many fear that South Africa is embarked upon a <a href="https://www.biznews.com/good-hope-project/2020/03/09/brains-wired-sa-zimbabwe-wrong-neurologist">Zimbabwean-style decline</a> into a basket-case economy run by a liberation movement autocracy.</p>
<h2>Three key features of liberation movements</h2>
<p>Highlighting three key features of liberation movement rule – such as that by Zanu-PF and the ANC – help us to understand the present crisis in South Africa.</p>
<p>First, liberation movements are characterised by simultaneous <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781847011343/liberation-movements-in-power/">democratic and authoritarian impulses</a>. Their claim to having liberated their countries from colonial oppression has much merit. This is true if they are reluctant to share this with other forces which participated in the struggle for freedom.</p>
<p>Furthermore, their present claim to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-insists-its-still-a-political-vanguard-this-is-what-ails-democracy-in-south-africa-141938">representative of ‘the people’ </a> ensures that they cannot completely ignore the needs of their supporters. </p>
<p>On the other hand, they have a long history of authoritarianism. </p>
<p>Although they tolerated internal dissent during the freedom struggle, they also quelled it at times <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/DC/slapr93.3/slapr93.3.pdf">with brutal violence</a>. After the arrival of democracy, they have systematically suppressed rivals or allies with a legitimate claim to having contributed to the struggle for liberation. </p>
<p>The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, led by Zimbabwean liberation struggle hero Joshua Nkomo, was bruised and beaten until it agreed to merge itself into Zanu-PF <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-liberators-turn-into-oppressors-a-study-of-southern-african-states-57213">in 1987</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/united-democratic-front-udf">United Democratic Front</a>, the effective internal wing of the ANC during the latter years of apartheid, dissolved itself following heavy pressure to do so by the ANC <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/united-democratic-front-udf-dissolved">in 1991</a>.</p>
<p>Both Zanu-PF and the ANC tolerate opposition parties. But they systematically seek to delegitimise them by characterising them as ‘counter-revolutionary or <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-05-13-chasing-butterflies-and-bogeymen-mantashe-beats-regime-change-drum/">agents of foreign powers</a>.</p>
<p>Second, the liberation movements have become the vehicles for <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-corruption-in-south-africa-isnt-simply-about-zuma-and-the-guptas-113056">rapid class-formation</a>. Although they won political power, they inherited only limited economic power, as the commanding heights of their economies remain in private hands. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, by gaining control over the state, Zanu-PF and the ANC secured control over the state owned enterprises. In South Africa, these accounted for around 15% of GDP <a href="https://repository.hsrc.ac.za/handle/20.500.11910/6219">in the early 1990s</a>. </p>
<p>Initially, their principal focus was on removing old-guard public servants, whose loyalty to a democratic government could not be assumed, and replacing them with party loyalists who could be trusted. </p>
<p>This resulted in the merging of party and state, weakening the independence of bodies of accountability established under their respective constitutions. </p>
<p>And, justified on the basis of pursuing the revolution, efforts were made in both countries to ‘capture’ the commanding heights of the economy. This was achieved fully <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781847011343/liberation-movements-in-power/">in Zimbabwe</a>, but only partially in South Africa. The process was easily perverted into lining the pockets of an <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781847011343/liberation-movements-in-power/">increasingly predatory party-state bourgeoisie</a>. This, as Zanu-PF’s and the ANC’s control of the public service, including the parastatals, enabled them to allocate high paid jobs, tenders and procurement contracts to cronies.</p>
<p>Third, there is a constant tension between liberation movements’ commitment to the liberal constitutionalism by which they acceded to power and their aspirations to monopoly domination of society. </p>
<p>The liberation movements regard themselves as the historic embodiments of the aspirations of ‘the people’. Their logic is that those who are not for them are against them. Constitutional restraints on the exercise of power by the state are weakened or ignored. Above all, other political parties or organs of civil society which make claims to represent the popular will are dismissed as counter-revolutionary. The popular will cannot be shared.</p>
<p>These (and other) liberation movement dynamics lead inexorably to democratic and economic decline. If liberation movements are the historic embodiments of freedom, then restraints on their power must constitute unfreedom. Similarly, extension of liberation movement control over the economy must by definition constitute the furtherance of the revolution. </p>
<p>Yet such thinking allows little scope for private participation in the economy – unless it is closely aligned with the interests of the ruling party. It allows even less for popular participation in the political arena – unless it takes place under the umbrella of those who rule.</p>
<h2>Leaving the political stage</h2>
<p>These dynamics explain why Ramaphosa’s reform agenda has fallen foul of a political paralysis gripping the ANC and the wider arena of politics in South Africa. </p>
<p>The ANC retains its determination to rule yet lacks the capacity to do so effectively. The only way out of the dilemma is its defeat in an election. </p>
<p>However, as the 2008 Zimbabwean example has shown, defeat of a liberation movement in an election does not guarantee its removal from power, so long as it retains the support of the military, police and security services. </p>
<p>Perhaps South Africa could prove different. The military <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-mulls-future-of-its-military-to-make-it-fit-for-purpose-146423">has been run down</a>, and the police and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/zumas-abuse-of-south-africas-spy-agency-underscores-need-for-strong-civilian-oversight-154439">security services</a> are themselves <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-06-battle-lines-have-been-drawn-between-saps-factions-and-we-are-the-casualties/">heavily factionalised</a>. However, this assumes that there is an opposition party or coalition capable of displacing the ANC electorally. And that this would be backed up by a level of popular and civil society support which would be ready and willing to combat any attempt to steal an election.</p>
<p>The liberation movements have fulfilled their historic task. Compelling them to leave the political stage is a daunting but necessary agenda.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176068/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>The ANC retains its determination to rule yet lacks the capacity to do so effectively. The only way out of the dilemma is its defeat in an election.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1438472020-08-04T15:24:33Z2020-08-04T15:24:33ZHow artists have preserved the memory of Zimbabwe’s 1980s massacres<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350897/original/file-20200803-14-1vcb9b8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A scene from a play about the Gukurahundi genocide, 1983 The Dark Years, performed in Harare in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">JEKESAI NJIKIZANA/AFP/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>“Let people vent,” lamented performing artist and television personality <a href="http://almasiartsalliance.org/category/kudzai-sevenzo/">Kudzai Sevenzo</a> in a <a href="https://twitter.com/KudzaiSevenzo/status/1288407558097641472?s=20">tweet</a> as Zimbabweans on social media reacted to the death of <a href="https://apnews.com/7afe3ad83057f11f793dd54228e8e8d9">Perence Shiri</a>. Shiri was the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/profile/zenzele-ndebele">Zenzele Ndebele</a>, an investigative journalist, also spoke out in a <a href="https://twitter.com/zenzele/status/1289075563236413441?s=20">tweet</a>: “Shiri gets to be buried like a hero. We never got a chance to mourn our relatives who were killed by the 5th Brigade.”</p>
<p><a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/zimbabwe/who-is-perrance-shiri-black-jesus-dead-29-july-2020/">Shiri</a> was a military man who commandeered a praetorian army that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/19/mugabe-zimbabwe-gukurahundi-massacre-matabeleland">killed</a> over 20,000 civilians in the provinces of Matabeleland and the Midlands between 1983 and 1987. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2b5iVGCDs0">Gukurahundi</a> saw his North Korean-trained unit, the <a href="https://gijn.org/2018/12/03/digging-up-zimbabwes-gukurahundi-massacre-dossier/">Fifth Brigade</a>, descend on provinces inhabited by the Ndebele people to quell dissent. <a href="https://bit.ly/2Po03WA"><em>Gukurahundi</em></a> is a Shona term referring to the early summer rains that remove chaff and dirt from the fields.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1289075563236413441"}"></div></p>
<p>The death of Shiri on 29 July 2020 has kindled flames of debate that the ruling party has tried to shut down for many years. </p>
<p>I argue, in a <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021989415615646">paper</a> on Gukurahundi, that writers and artists have left behind a richly textured memory on what writer <a href="https://www.novuyotshuma.com/">Novuyo Rosa Tshuma</a> has called the country’s “<a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2018/12/06/old-faces-new-masks-zimbabwe-one-year-after-the-coup/">original sin</a>”.</p>
<h2>Enforced ‘collective amnesia’</h2>
<p>In the aftermath of Gukurahundi, <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-gabriel-mugabe-a-man-whose-list-of-failures-is-legion-121596">former president</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-gabriel-mugabe-a-man-whose-list-of-failures-is-legion-121596">Robert Mugabe</a> enforced collective forgetting of this period in Zimbabwe’s history. He referred to it simply as a “<a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/mugabes-moments-of-madness">moment of madness</a>” and suggested that discussing the events would undermine attempts to nurture national unity. </p>
<p>His successor, <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-mnangagwa-usher-in-a-new-democracy-the-view-from-zimbabwe-88023">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, Minister of State Security at the time of the Gukurahundi <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml">genocide</a>, has also implored Zimbabweans to “let bygones be bygones”. At his 2017 <a href="https://bit.ly/2PqhhSY">inauguration</a> he said that the past cannot be changed, but “there is a lot we can do in the present and the future to give our nation a different positive direction”.</p>
<p>However, as l contend in another <a href="https://journals.assaf.org.za/index.php/tvl/article/view/1548">paper</a>, silence on Gukurahundi has not led to any national cohesion. Instead, it has been a part of what’s responsible for the culture of state violence and impunity in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980. </p>
<h2>Writing against forgetting</h2>
<p>Yet, a rich body of literary and visual artworks has emerged thematising the genocide. There have been books in indigenous languages such as <em><a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Uyangisinda_lumhlaba.html?id=U80JAQAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">Uyangisinda Lumhlaba</a></em> (This world is unbearable) in Ndebele by Ezekiel Hleza and <em><a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Mhandu_dzorusununguko.html?id=jBAkAQAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">Mhandu Dzorusununguko</a></em> (Enemies of independence) in Shona by Edward Masundire. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1126&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1126&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1126&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Farrar, Straus and Giroux</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There has been an even bigger corpus of texts written in English. Among them is the late Yvonne Vera’s 2002 novel <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781466806061"><em>The Stone Virgins</em></a>. It details the horrors faced by villagers from a ruthless army. In <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/zimbabwe-running-with-mother-robert-mugabe"><em>Running with Mother</em></a>, a 2012 novel by Christopher Mlalazi, a child narrator, Rudo, recounts the arrival of the Fifth Brigade in her village.</p>
<p>Peter Godwin’s largely autobiographical <a href="https://www.orwellfoundation.com/book-title/mukiwa-a-white-boy-in-africa/"><em>Mukiwa: A White Boy in Africa</em></a>
in 1996 gives a picture of Gukurahundi from the eyes of a young white journalist. And <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/08/books/review/house-of-stone-novuyo-rosa-tshuma.html"><em>House of Stone</em></a>, the 2018 novel by Novuyo Rosa Tshuma, tells the story of an orphaned young man trying to explore his past. He’ll find out that his father is Black Jesus (a name by which Shiri was known). Tshuma’s descriptions of the genocide are detailed, graphic and ghastly. </p>
<p>Literary creativity has made it possible to remember, commemorate and document experiences that otherwise would have been forgotten or dispersed through wilful omission. In doing so, literary texts create narratives of Zimbabwe’s history and national identity. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">W. W. Norton & Company</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>“To write is to banish silence,” writes Vera in her 1995 <a href="https://ocul-yor.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/01OCUL_YOR/q36jf8/alma991010694059705164">doctoral thesis</a> on colonialism and narratives of resistance. “As a writer, you don’t want to suppress history, you want to be one of the people liberating stories.” </p>
<p>She explains that “to write is to engage possibilities for triumphant and repeated exits, inversion and recuperation of identity”. In this line of thinking, writing can offer victims of Gukurahundi a voice which the state continues to deny them. </p>
<h2>Art of torture</h2>
<p>Visual artworks have also engaged with Gukurahundi, such as in the exhibition <em>Sibathontisele</em> by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/04/zimbabwe-artist-arrest-mugabe-censorship">Owen Maseko</a>, which has stood for years as a material text-under-erasure in Zimbabwe. <em>Sibathontisele</em> is a Ndebele word meaning “we drip it on them”. It refers to an infamous torture technique used by the Fifth Brigade in which they dripped hot and melted plastic on victims.</p>
<p>Unlike literary texts, which have remained unbanned and uncensored, Maseko’s 2010 exhibition was banned by state security a day after its opening at the <a href="http://www.nationalgallerybyo.com/">National Arts Gallery</a> in Bulawayo and the artist was arrested. Visual art, it appears, is deemed more subversive than written texts. In spite of such restrictions, Maseko’s exhibition has been hosted outside Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>The artist explains in this <a href="http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/artcul/osisa_trials_tribulatn_of_artist_110630.pdf">article</a> that art, justice and human rights are intricately interrelated. Visual art plays a role in bringing to the surface narratives on Gukurahundi, which have been buried for almost three decades.</p>
<h2>The rich memory</h2>
<p>Writers and visual artists are able to create alternative spaces for marginalised and forgotten stories. And Zimbabwe’s artists have created a rich memory and archive that counters the culture of forgetting and criminalising open discussion of Gukurahundi. </p>
<p>Through their works, histories are revisited so that they can be better understood and can be accorded their rightful recognition. They have opened new spaces of discussion and have gestured towards the importance of remembering and learning from the past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143847/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gibson Ncube does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Artists are filling the state’s silence by revisiting history so that it can be discussed.Gibson Ncube, Associate Professor, University of ZimbabweLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1421952020-07-26T09:52:15Z2020-07-26T09:52:15ZEternal mothers, whores or witches: being a woman in politics in Zimbabwe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349183/original/file-20200723-29-8mzr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Grace Mugabe at the funeral of former president Robert Mugabe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">JEKESAI NJIKIZANA/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The political arena in Zimbabwe is a de facto male space in which women play very peripheral and insignificant roles. <a href="https://www.theindigopress.com/these-bones-will-rise-again">Author</a> and scholar Panashe Chigumadzi sums the situation up in an op-ed <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/opinion/zimbabwe-elections-mugabe-fear-women.html">article</a>, writing that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Politics in Zimbabwe remains a man’s game, and virility is a measure of one’s ability to rule over others. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is not the place of women to rule, especially over men. Women who dare to aspire to rule are considered to be wild and unruly.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30307333">Grace Mugabe</a>, the former first lady of Zimbabwe, is one such woman, I <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10130950.2020.1749523">argue</a> in a paper on the tropes used to describe women in politics in the southern African country. </p>
<p>Grace rattled political cages in 2019 in her bid to replace her ageing <a href="https://theconversation.com/mugabe-is-dead-but-old-men-still-run-southern-africa-123611">husband</a>, both as leader of the ruling <a href="https://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/events/zanu-pf-history-1963-2017">ZANU-PF</a> party and also possibly as president of the country. </p>
<p>But instead of focusing on the merits and demerits of her political interests, the recurring comment was that she was a sex-starved <em>hure</em> (a Shona word for “whore”). This sexist slandering has not been used to describe just Grace Mugabe. It has been used systematically to <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/06/mudslinging-sexism-scath-female-politicians/">denigrate women</a> who aspire for any political positions.</p>
<h2>From ‘gold-digger’ to mother figure</h2>
<p>Grace became a public figure in 1996 when she married Robert Mugabe after the death of his first wife. She had previously been his personal assistant. At the time of the marriage, she was defamed for having an affair while his first wife, Sally, was terminally ill. </p>
<p>Moreover, Grace was labelled a gold-digger because she had married a rich and powerful man who was 40 years her senior. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1146&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1146&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1146&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sally Mugabe (1931-1992), former first lady.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>She was often compared to Sally, the latter characterised as womanly, motherly and homely. Sally was a saint, according to public opinion, partly because she had assumed a more ornamental role as first lady. </p>
<p>However with time, Grace was embraced as the proverbial mother of the nation and the endearing appellation of <em>Amai</em> (mother) was bestowed on her.</p>
<p>In 2014, she took her first steps in politics when she was elected president of the women’s league of the ruling Zanu-PF party. She was fronted as the face of the Generation 40 faction within the ruling party. Generation 40 was a group of young party members who felt there was need for a change of power from the old guard that had waged the liberation war. Grace began a series of rallies across the country. The rallying call at these events was the Shona phrase <em>Munhu wese kuna Amai</em> (Everyone, side with Mother). </p>
<p>She used the rallies to <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/11/g40-plots-anti-mnangagwa-demo/">attack</a> not just members of the opposition but more importantly members of the competing faction which was headed by current president <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-mnangagwa-usher-in-a-new-democracy-the-view-from-zimbabwe-88023">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>. Her outbreaks were far from diplomatic, they were blunt, <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/zimbabwe/mugabes-launch-scathing-attack-on-vp-mnangagwa-20170911">scathing and contemptuous</a>.</p>
<h2>From mother figure to ‘whore’</h2>
<p>It was around the time of the countrywide interface rallies that the name <em>Amai</em> was gradually replaced by the tag of <em>hure</em>. Academic and writer Rudo Mudiwa in the <a href="https://www.africasacountry.com/2017/11/on-grace-mugabe-coups-phalluses-and-what-is-being-defended">article</a> <em>On Grace Mugabe: coups, phalluses, and what is being defended</em>, explains how Grace came to be called <em>hure</em> and shows how the name was linked to the November 2017 “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/15/zimbabwe-when-a-coup-is-not-a-coup/">coup that was not a coup</a>”:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Grace, already branded a harlot, was considered a threat to the nation-state on the basis that she was improperly influencing Mugabe, weaponising their pillow talk to sway a senile old man. Her speeches, nakedly ambitious, only seemed to confirm that it was she who was in power in Harare. The phallus had been deposed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <em>hure</em> label was used because Grace had subverted the image of the domesticated first lady who was not interested in politics. In Mudiwa’s argument, the soft coup that overthrew Mugabe was actually a defence of patriarchy and a counter attack against the anxieties that Grace was causing men in politics. The military intervention could thus be read as the protection of male dominance which had been challenged by a woman who had left behind her decorative role as a silent, domesticated and thus respectable woman.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349181/original/file-20200723-15-ztomms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349181/original/file-20200723-15-ztomms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349181/original/file-20200723-15-ztomms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349181/original/file-20200723-15-ztomms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349181/original/file-20200723-15-ztomms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349181/original/file-20200723-15-ztomms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349181/original/file-20200723-15-ztomms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349181/original/file-20200723-15-ztomms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Grace Mugabe addresses a religious gathering and rally in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">JEKESAI NJIKIZANA/AFP via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What this tells us</h2>
<p>Grace Mugabe’s short stint in politics has shown that women are far from being afforded a place in Zimbabwean politics. </p>
<p>Sexist and misogynistic slurs such as <em>hure</em> point to how women continue to be sexualised and objectified. The treatment of women in politics is no different from how women in general are regarded in the country, because their competencies are often disregarded or unnoticed. Emphasis is placed rather on their bodies and sexualities.</p>
<p>In the few instances that women are accorded a space in politics, they are used as pawns in factional battles within political parties, as Grace was. </p>
<p>When she attacked other women politicians like former vice president <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-35708891/joice-mujuru-mugabe-s-new-rival-in-zimbabwe-my-hands-are-clean">Joice Mujuru</a>, she was not considered dangerous. However, when her verbal attacks targeted men like Mnangagwa she was deemed to be treading treacherously. When the coup that toppled Mugabe was in progress, the men in the Generation 40 faction clandestinely left the country, leaving Grace alone to deal with the military.</p>
<h2>The future of women in Zimbabwean politics</h2>
<p>As long as safe and conducive spaces are not created for women in Zimbabwe, they will continue to be sidelined from positions of political power and authority. As Zimbabwe continues to aspire towards democracy and democratic ideals, despite the odds, more needs to be done to level the political playing field.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/mugabe-is-dead-but-old-men-still-run-southern-africa-123611">Mugabe is dead, but old men still run southern Africa</a>
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<p>Women who do choose to venture into the field of politics will need to do so fully aware of the multifarious challenges that lie in wait. They will need to be strategic in their actions and how they navigate a space that is slanted heavily against them.</p>
<p>For as long patriarchal societies, such as Zimbabwe, do not recognise the vast potential women have as knowledgeable politicians and skilled decision-makers, an equitable society cannot be realised.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/142195/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gibson Ncube does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sexist slandering has been used not just to describe Grace Mugabe, but to denigrate any women who aspire to political positions.Gibson Ncube, Associate Professor, University of ZimbabweLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1236112019-09-17T12:32:18Z2019-09-17T12:32:18ZMugabe is dead, but old men still run southern Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292643/original/file-20190916-19030-ryoxe2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa at the funeral of his predecessor, Robert Mugabe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The death of Robert Gabriel Mugabe (95) saw another of the first-generation leaders of newly independent southern African states leave the world stage. </p>
<p>Southern Africa was the last region on the continent to obtain majority rule. The independence of Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1990) and democracy in South Africa (1994) ended white settler minority regimes. They were <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24487678?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">replaced in power by liberation movements</a>. The Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu, later Zanu-PF), the South West African People’s Organisation (Swapo) and the African National Congress (ANC) have been in government since then. </p>
<p>Mugabe’s death invites a look at the succession – or lack of – in these three countries.</p>
<p>Despite the cultivation of heroic narratives and patriotic history, the first-generation freedom fighters who took over the state offices are not immortal. <a href="https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/gerontocratic">Mugabe’s</a> male-dominated leadership structures based on liberation struggle credentials remain entrenched.</p>
<p>In all three countries a second struggle generation is gradually entering the higher echelons of party and state. But the “born free” – people who were born after liberation – as well as women have hardly made significant inroads into the meritocratic, male-dominated core structures of power. </p>
<p>The question is how much longer the “old men syndrome” will remain alive and kicking in the three countries, despite growing frustration among the politically powerless.</p>
<h2>Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>Celebrated by many as an <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/obituary-zimbabwes-robert-mugabe-a-revolutionary-20190906">icon of the anti-colonial struggle</a>, Mugabe was nevertheless an autocratic ruler who overstayed his time in office. The military finally replaced him with his longtime confidante Emmerson Mnangagwa in <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2017/11/16/understanding-the-military-takeover-in-zimbabwe/">a soft coup</a> in November 2017.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/06/zimbabwe-robert-mugabe-vice-president-emmerson-mnangagwa-grace-mugabe">sidelining</a> was initiated by Mugabe’s younger wife Grace (born in 1965, she was 40 years his junior) to hijack the succession of her husband. She led a group of Zanu-PF members, dubbed the <a href="https://www.zimbabwebriefing.org/single-post/2018/07/13/Thinking-after-Zimbabwe%E2%80%99s-ConCoup-Now-Then-and-Then-Again">G40</a> (for Generation 40). The name referred to a constitutional clause that everyone above the age of 40 qualified as a presidential candidate. But, the military and security apparatus and its leadership was still firmly rooted in the struggle generation and opted for <a href="https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/11/21/what-is-behind-the-military-coup-in-zimbabwe/">“Team Lacoste”</a> named after “the Crocodile”, which is Mnangagwa’s nickname. </p>
<p>This ended the political careers of the G40. So far, the “elders” remain in charge and in firm control.</p>
<p>Morgan Tsvangirai (born 1952) founded the <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/zimbabwe-went-wrong-mdc/">Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai</a> in 1999. The opposition party has been denied electoral victory several times <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/14/obituaries/morgan-tsvangirai-zimbabwe-dead.html">since 2002</a>. </p>
<p>After Tsvangirai’s death earlier this year the much younger Nelson Chamisa (born in 1978) won the internal party <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/mdc-t-endorses-nelson-chamisa-as-morgan-tsvangirais-successor-13558886">power struggle</a>. He challenged Mnangagwa in the elections in July last year. </p>
<p>Thanks mainly to rural area results, Zanu-PF recorded a landslide victory in the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimelections2018-full-details-of-parliament-results-16378869">parliamentary elections</a>. Mnangagwa also secured a (disputed) and much more narrow first term in office as elected head of state. </p>
<p>This is partly due to a continued stricter social control in rural areas. Political interaction and activities in villages can be much more easily monitored than in urban areas. But it also suggests that traditional values – such as respect for elders – remain alive. This gives the generation in power a comparative advantage over younger competitors. </p>
<p>Similar generational constellations also benefited the governing parties in Namibia and South Africa.</p>
<h2>Namibia</h2>
<p>Namibia has had three state presidents <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290429183_From_Nujoma_to_Geingob_25_years_of_presidential_democracy">since independence in 1990</a>. Sam Nujoma, co-founder of Swapo in 1960, was its president until 2007 and the country’s first head of state for three terms until 2005. In May he celebrated his 90th birthday in seemingly good health. Though he remains influential, he has been less visible lately.</p>
<p>In a heavy-handed inner-party battle he ensured that his crown prince Hifikepunye Pohamba (born 1936) followed for <a href="https://brill.com/view/title/33326">two terms</a>. Pohamba was succeeded by Namibia’s first Prime Minister Hage Geingob (born 1941).</p>
<p>After a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2002-09-01-geingob-out-in-the-cold-before-demotion">clash with Nujoma</a>, Geingob left Namibia to <a href="http://ahibo.com/ticad/en/LP2_8GlobalCoalition_E.pdf">head the Global Coalition for Africa</a> in Washington. Returning to Namibia’s parliament, he made a comeback under Pohamba. Reappointed as Prime Minister <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-12-07-namibias-geingobs-comeback-paves-way-for-swapo-moderates">in 2012</a>, he became state president in 2015 and party leader in 2017.</p>
<p>Geingob is tipped to be reelected as head of state for another five-year term in the next presidential and parliamentary elections <a href="https://www.nbc.na/news/namibias-general-elections-be-held-27-november.20811">in November</a>. His current Vice President <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=axBhO1aqECg">Nangolo Mbumba</a> is the same age. In the Swapo electoral college on 7 September he secured another top ranking on the party’s candidate list for the National Assembly and will remain in the inner circle of <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/82885/read/Geingobs-loyalists-win-big-at-the-pot">“Team Hage”</a>.</p>
<p>Five years ago the delegates, in a surprise move, ousted some of the old party cadres. But the elders remained <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/116/463/284/2760214">dominant in cabinet</a>. This time the expected further <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/82880/read/Swapo-concludes-electoral-college">generational shift did not happen</a>.</p>
<p>Party president Geingob could also fill ten secure seats on the electoral list and brought some of those seniors back, who <a href="https://www.nbc.na/news/president-geingob-throws-old-guard-party-list-lifeline.23864">did not make the cut</a>. As the head of state <a href="http://www.tfd.org.tw/export/sites/tfd/files/publication/journal/155-173-How-Democratic-Is-Namibias-Democracy.pdf">he can appoint</a> another eight non-voting members to parliament. This will allow him to retain several more of the trusted old cadres.</p>
<p>Despite this, Namibia’s second struggle generation (those who went into exile in the mid-1970s) is gradually taking over. </p>
<h2>South Africa</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/nelson-rolihlahla-mandela">Nelson Mandela,(1918-2013)</a> served only one term as state president. His successors <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki">Thabo Mbeki</a> and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma">Jacob Zuma</a> (both born 1942) were recalled by the ANC and did not survive the full two terms in office. </p>
<p>Zuma was succeeded by <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cyril-matamela-ramaphosa">Cyril Ramaphosa</a>. Born in 1952, he is ten years younger than his predecessor.</p>
<p>Inter-generational tensions have begun to show in South Africa. In the latest national elections young South Africans, or “born frees”, showed their disdain for the ANC’s old guard and agenda by staying away from the polls as a <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1614389/south-africa-election-young-voters-stay-away-from-polls/">form of protest</a>. </p>
<p>This younger generation has shown its frustration with the limits to liberation. Many <a href="https://theconversation.com/study-shows-young-south-africans-have-no-faith-in-democracy-and-politicians-118404">dismiss formal politics</a>. Their preference is to engage in social movements or other parties.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/study-shows-young-south-africans-have-no-faith-in-democracy-and-politicians-118404">Study shows young South Africans have no faith in democracy and politicians</a>
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<p>One such choice is to support Julius Malema (born 1981) and his Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) which was <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/economic-freedom-fighters-eff">founded in 2013</a> and appeals to a smaller pan-African segment of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-eff-excellent-politics-of-props-and-imagination-59918">younger generation</a>. But the party’s election results remained behind its expectations and kept it in a distant third place, garnering <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/App/dashboard.html">only 10,80% in the latest polls</a>.</p>
<h2>The future</h2>
<p>For obvious reasons, the first-generation freedom fighters, who took over the state offices after liberation, continue to place a high value on seniority in age. </p>
<p>Younger generations of leaders and women make only limited inroads into the structures of power, and the “born free” are not represented. </p>
<p>Rather, the second struggle generation is moving upward to take over, maintaining a system which leaves little room for renewal beyond the confines of individual credentials within the ranks of the former liberation movements.</p>
<p>The continued cultivation of a heroic narrative and patriotic history includes the internalised conception that freedom fighters never retire. Theirs is a lifelong struggle. <em>“A luta continua”</em> remains alive as long as they are. </p>
<p>But this is a backward looking perspective, nurtured by a romanticised past. It blocks new ideas and visions by younger generations contributing to governance, which would create ownership and make them feel represented. It prevents rather than creating a common future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123611/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber has been a member of Swapo since 1974. </span></em></p>It remains to be seen how much longer the ‘old men syndrome’ will persist in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, despite growing frustration among the politically powerless.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1215962019-09-06T09:08:13Z2019-09-06T09:08:13ZRobert Gabriel Mugabe: a man whose list of failures is legion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287334/original/file-20190808-144862-11u42pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Robert Mugabe, former President of Zimbabwe, addressing media in Harare, in July 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One wishes one could say “rest in peace”. One can only say, “may there be more peace for Zimbabwe’s people, now that <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/robert-mugabe">Robert Gabriel Mugabe</a> has retired permanently”. Zimbabwe’s former president <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life-108103">has died</a>, aged 95.</p>
<p>His failures are legion. They might start with the 1980s Gukurahundi massacres in Matabeleland and the Midlands, with perhaps <a href="https://www.sithatha.com/books">20 000 people killed</a>. Next, too much welfare spending <a href="http://weaverpresszimbabwe.com/reviews/59-becoming-zimbabwe?start=10">in the 1980s</a>. Then crudely implemented <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289336044_The_Economic_Structural_Adjustment_Programme_The_Case_of_Zimbabwe_1990-1995">structural adjustment programmes</a> in the 1990s, laying the ground for angry war veterans and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a strong labour union and civil society based opposition party.</p>
<p>In 1997 Mugabe handed out unbudgeted pensions to the war-vets and promised to really start the “fast track land reform” that got going <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287199114_The_impact_of_land_reform_in_Zimbabwe_on_the_conservation_of_cheetahs_and_other_large_carnivores">in 2000</a>, when the MDC threatened to defeat Zanu (PF) at the polls. That abrogation of property rights started the slide in the Zimbabwean dollar’s value.</p>
<p>From 1998 to 2003 Zimbabwe’s participation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s second war cost US$1 million a day, creating a military cabal used to getting money fast. Speedy money printing presses led to <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/file%20uploads%20/hany_besada_zimbabwe_picking_up_the_piecesbook4you.pdf">unfathomable hyperinflation</a> and the end of Zimbabwe’s sovereign currency, still the albatross around the country’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48757080">neck</a>. </p>
<p>In 2008, the MDC’s electoral victory was reversed with a presidential run-off when at least 170 opposition supporters were murdered. Hundreds more were beaten and <a href="http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/elec/rau_critique_zec_elec_report_090612.pdf">chased from their homes</a>. Even Mugabe’s regional support base could not stand for that, so he was forced to accept a <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2013/07/15/review-the-hard-road-to-reform-the-politics-of-zimbabwes-global-political-agreement-reviewed-by-timothy-scarnecchia/">transitional inclusive government</a> with the MDC.</p>
<p>Over the next decade, Mugabe was unable to stop his party’s increasing faction fighting. His years of playing one group off against the other to favour himself <a href="https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f05aec20-6d98-425a-8d82-56688ea93246/download_file?file_format=pdf&safe_filename=State%2Bintelligence%2Band%2Bthe%2Bpolitics%2Bof%2BZimbabwe%2527s%2Bpresidential%2Bsuccession.pdf&type_of_work=Journal+article">finally wore too thin</a>. When in early November 2017, at his wife Grace’s instigation, he fired his long-time lapdog Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa, the generals with whom he’d colluded for decades turned on him. A <em>coup petit</em> ensued and returned Mnangagwa from exile, soon to be elevated to the presidency and heavily indebted to his comrades.</p>
<p>Where did Mugabe gain his proclivity for factionalism? And how did he learn to speak the language all wanted to hear – only to make them realise they had been deluded in the end? </p>
<h2>The beginning</h2>
<p>Mugabe and many other Zimbabwean nationalists were jailed in 1964. Ian Smith was preparing for the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, and the first nationalist party had split into Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union and Ndabaningi Sithole’s Zanu. Mugabe had been Nkomo’s Publicity Secretary. </p>
<p>As far back as 1962, Mugabe was registering on the global scales: Salisbury’s resident British diplomat <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/de/book/9781137543448#aboutAuthors">thought Mugabe was</a> “a sinister figure” heading up a youthful “Zimbabwean Liberation Army … the more extreme wing of Zapu”. </p>
<p>But almost as soon as Mugabe was imprisoned, a man in her majesty’s employ travelled down from his advisory post in newly free Zambia to visit the prisoner. Dennis Grennan returned to Lusaka having <a href="http://archive.kubatana.net/html/archive/opin/080120dm.asp?sector=OPIN&year=2008&range_start=571">promised</a> to look after Mugabe’s wife Sarah, known as “Sally”. Grennan and people like Julius Nyerere’s British friend and assistant <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3518465.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A4d7659d7e9f1b2a3dd3124c9a249a47c">Joan Wicken</a> played an important role in Mugabe’s rise. </p>
<p>The Zimbabwean nationalists emerged from Salisbury’s prisons late in 1974, as Portugal’s coup led to Angola and Mozambique emerging from colonialism into the Soviet orbit. The fifties generation of Zimbabwean nationalists were to participate in the Zambian and South African inspired détente <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1975/03/25/archives/mr-vorsters-detente.html">exercise</a>. This inspired much competition for Zanu’s leadership: Mugabe arrived in Lusaka after ousting Ndabaningi Sithole, Zanu’s first leader. </p>
<p>Samora Machel, freshly in Mozambique’s top office, wondered if Mugabe’s quick rise was due to a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40201256.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A1d1f7a14b762adff6a6007321af29132">“coup in prison”</a>. Herbert Chitepo’s March 1975 <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3557400.pdf">assassination </a> (which got many of Zanu’s leaders arrested and its army kicked out of Zambia) was only one marker of the many fissures in the fractious party that by 1980 would rule Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>In late 1975 the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Vashandi_"><em>vashandi</em></a> group emerged within the Zimbabwean People’s Army. Based in Mozambique’s guerrilla camps, they tried to forge unity between Zimbabwe’s two main nationalist armies and push a left-wing agenda. They were profoundly unsure of Mugabe’s suitability for <a href="https://nehandaradio.com/2016/08/08/heroes-day-review-dzino-memories-freedom-fighter/">leadership</a>.</p>
<p>When Mugabe found his way to Mozambique also in late 1975, Machel put him under house arrest in Quelimane, far from the guerrilla camps. In January Grennan helped him to London to visit a hospitalised Sally. He made contacts around Europe and with a few <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03057078008708020">London-based Maoists</a>.</p>
<p>Soon after Mugabe’s return the young American congressman Stephen Solarz and the Deputy Head of the American embassy in Maputo, Johnnie Carson, wended their way to <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2014.956499">Quelimane</a>. Mugabe wowed them.</p>
<p>Solarz and Carson reported back that Mugabe was “an impressive, articulate and extremely confident individual” with a “philosophical approach to problems and … well reasoned arguments”. He claimed to control the “people’s army”. Yet by January 1977, he persuaded Samora Machel to imprison the young advocates of unity with Zapu. His many reasons included their initial refusal to support him at a late 1976 conference in Geneva organised by the British, helped immeasurably by Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of State. </p>
<p>At a hastily called congress in March 1977 to consecrate his ascension, Mugabe uttered his leitmotif: those appearing to attempt a change to the party’s leadership by “maliciously planting contradictions within our ranks” would be struck by the <a href="http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.nuzn197707">“the Zanu axe”</a>.</p>
<p>This was Mugabe’s strategy, embedded at an early stage: tell foreign emissaries what they wanted to hear, use young radicals (or older allies) until their usefulness subsided, and then get rid of them. All the while he would balance the other forces contending for power in the party amid a general climate of fear, distrust, and paranoia. </p>
<h2>Dealing with dissent</h2>
<p>It is not certain if Margaret Thatcher knew about this side of Mugabe when they met less than a month after his April 1980 inauguration. He seemed most worried about how Joshua Nkomo’s Zapu – which he had dumped from the erstwhile “Patriotic Front”, and the violence against which had put Zimbabwe’s election in some doubt – was making life difficult for the new rulers. He <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2016.1214116">warned</a> that he might have “to act against them soon”.</p>
<p>In as much as Zapu was linked with the South African ANC and Thatcher and her colleagues tended to think the ANC was controlled by the South African Communist Party, Zapu intelligence chief <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tribute-to-zimbabwean-liberation-hero-dumiso-dabengwa-117986">Dumiso Dabengwa’s</a> perspective might be more than conspiracy theory. Perhaps Thatcher’s wink and nudge was a green light for the anti-Soviet contingent to eliminate a regional threat. Gukurahundi <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2017.1309561">followed</a>. It was certainly the biggest blot on Mugabe’s career and created the biggest scar over Zimbabwe. The scar is still there, given the lack of any effort at reconcialitation, truth, or justice.</p>
<p>Four years later the ruling party’s first real congress since 1963 reviewed its history. Mugabe tore the Zipa/Vashandi group that had annoyed him eight years before to shreds. “Treacherous … counter-revolutionary … arms caching … dubbed us all <em>zvigananda</em> or bourgeois”. Thus it “became imperative for us to firmly act against them in defending the Party and the Revolution… We had all the trouble-makers detained”. </p>
<p>The great helmsman recounted the youthful dissenters’ arrest and repeated the axe phraseology. </p>
<p>But few saw these sides of Mugabe’s character soon enough; those who did were summarily shut up. </p>
<h2>The end</h2>
<p>After he’d been ousted, Mugabe could only look on in seeming despair over the ruination he had created. Sanctimonious as ever he wondered how his successor, current President Emmerson Mnangagwa, had become such an ogre. At his 95th birthday, February 21 2019, a few weeks after Mnangagwa’s troops had killed 17 demonstrators, raped as many women, and beaten hundreds more in the wake of his beleaguered finance minister’s methods to create <a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">“prosperity from austerity”</a>, Mugabe <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-156949.html">mused to his absent successor</a>:</p>
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<p>We condemn the violence on civilians by soldiers … You can’t do without seeing dead bodies? What kind of a person are you? You feed on death? </p>
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<p>He only had to look into his own history to see what kind of people he helped create.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121596/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Robert Mugabe’s years of playing one group off against the other to favour himself finally wore too thin in 2017.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of Johannesburg, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1081032019-09-06T05:39:36Z2019-09-06T05:39:36ZRobert Mugabe: as divisive in death as he was in life<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291235/original/file-20190906-175663-u64qs1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Robert Mugabe during his swearing-in ceremony in Harare, 2008. The former Zimbabwean president has died aged 95.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Robert Mugabe, the former president of Zimbabwe, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/09/06/377714687/robert-mugabe-veteran-president-of-zimbabwe-dead-at-95">has died</a>. Mugabe was 95, and had been struggling with ill health for some time. The country’s current President Emmerson Mnangagwa announced Mugabe’s death on Twitter on September 6:</p>
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<p>The responses to Mnangagwa’s announcement were immediate and widely varied. Some hailed Mugabe as a liberation hero. Others dismissed him as a “monster”. This suggests that Mugabe will be as divisive a figure in death as he was in life.</p>
<p>The official mantra of the Zimbabwe government and its Zimbabwe African National Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) will emphasise his leadership of the struggle to overthrow <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ian-Smith">Ian Smith’s</a> racist settler regime in what was then Rhodesia. It will also extol his subsequent championing of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358530500082916">seizure of white-owned farms</a> and the return of land into African hands.</p>
<p>In contrast, critics will highlight how – after initially <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24hd4n.7?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">preaching racial reconciliation</a> after the liberation war in <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Rhodesian_Bush_War">December 1979 </a> – Mugabe threw away the promise of the early independence years. He did this in several ways, among them a <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">brutal clampdown</a> on political opposition in <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Matabeleland in the 1980s</a>, and Zanu-PF’s systematic <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-are-elections-really-rigged-mr-trump-consult-robert-mugabe-68440">rigging of elections</a> to keep he and his cronies in power. </p>
<p>They’ll also mention the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321704136_The_Curse_Of_Corruption_In_Zimbabwe">massive corruption</a> over which he presided, and the <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/publication/costs-and-causes-zimbabwes-crisis">economy’s disastrous downward plunge</a> during his presidency.</p>
<p>Inevitably, the focus will primarily be on his domestic record. Yet many of those who will sing his praises as a <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201709220815.html">hero of African nationalism</a> will be from elsewhere on the continent. So where should we place Mugabe among the pantheon of African nationalists who led their countries to independence?</p>
<h2>Slide into despotism</h2>
<p>Most African countries have been independent of colonial rule for <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2010/weighing-half-century-independence">half a century or more</a>.</p>
<p>The early African nationalist leaders were often regarded as gods at independence. Yet they very quickly came to be perceived as having feet of very heavy clay.</p>
<p>Nationalist leaders symbolised African freedom and liberation. But few were to prove genuinely tolerant of democracy and diversity. One party rule, nominally in the name of “the people”, became widespread. In some cases, it was linked to interesting experiments in one-party democracy, as seen in Tanzania under Julius Nyerere and Zambia under Kenneth Kaunda. </p>
<p>Even in these cases, intolerance and authoritarianism <a href="https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/doorenspleet/opd/">eventually encroached</a>.
Often, party rule was <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/159875?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">succeeded by military coups</a>.</p>
<p>In Zimbabwe’s case, Mugabe proved unable to shift the country, as he had wished, to one-partyism. However, this did not prevent Zanu-PF becoming increasingly intolerant over the years in response to both economic crisis and rising opposition. Successive elections were shamelessly perverted. </p>
<p>When, despite this, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-10-00-zim-2008-election-taken-by-a-gun-not-a-pen">Zanu-PF lost control of parliament</a> in 2008, it responded by rigging the presidential election in a campaign of unforgivable brutality. Under Mugabe, the potential for democracy was snuffed out by a brutal despotism.</p>
<h2>A wasted inheritance</h2>
<p>Whether the economic policies they pursued were ostensibly capitalist or socialist, the early African nationalist leaders presided over <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/78">rapid economic decline</a>, following an initial period of relative prosperity after independence. </p>
<p>In retrospect, it’s widely recognised that the challenges they faced were immense. Most post-colonial economies were underdeveloped and depended upon the export of a small number of agricultural or mineral commodities. From the 1970s, growth was crowded out by the International Monetary Fund demanding that mounting debts be surmounted through the pursuit of <a href="https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/glossary/structural-adjustment/">structural adjustment programmes</a>. This hindered spending on infrastructure as well as <a href="http://www.globalissues.org/article/3/structural-adjustment-a-major-cause-of-poverty">social services and education</a> and swelled political discontent.</p>
<p>In contrast, Mugabe inherited a viable, relatively broad-based economy that included substantial industrial and prosperous commercial agricultural sectors. Even though these were largely white controlled, there was far greater potential for development than in most other post-colonial African countries. </p>
<p>But, through massive corruption and mismanagement, his government threw that potential away. He also presided over a disastrous downward spiral of the economy, which saw both industry and <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/a-seized-zimbabwe-farm-is-returned-but-uncertainty-reigns-20180301">commercial agriculture collapse</a>. The economy has never recovered and remains in a state of acute and persistent crisis today.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-economy-is-collapsing-why-mnangagwa-doesnt-have-the-answers-104960">Zimbabwe's economy is collapsing: why Mnangagwa doesn't have the answers</a>
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<h2>Reputation</h2>
<p>On the political front, the rule of some leaders – like <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/milton-obotes-lasting-legacy-to-uganda/a-19191275">Milton Obote in Uganda</a> and <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/somalia-fall-of-siad-barre-civil-war/">Siad Barre in Somalia</a> – created so much conflict that coups and crises drove their countries into civil war. Zimbabwe under Mugabe was spared this fate – but perhaps only because the political opposition in Matabeleland in the 1980s was so brutalised after up to <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-policy-towards-zimbabwe-during-matabeleland-massacre-licence-to-kill-81574">30 000 people were killed</a>, that they shrank from more conflict. Peace, then, was merely the absence of outright war.</p>
<p>Some leaders, notably Ghana’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Kwame-Nkrumah">Kwame Nkrumah</a> and <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/former-tanzanian-president-julius-nyerere-dies">Julius Nyerere</a> in Tanzania, are still revered for their commitments to national independence and African unity. This is despite the fact that, domestically, their records were marked by failure. By 1966, when Nkrumah was <a href="https://www.eaumf.org/ejm-blog/2018/2/23/february-24-1966-dr-kwame-nkrumah-overthrown-as-president-of-the-republic-of-ghana">displaced by a military coup</a>, his one-party rule had become politically corrupt and repressive. </p>
<p>Despite this, Nyerere always retained his reputation for personal integrity and commitment to African development. Both Nkrumah’s and Nyerere’s ideas continue to inspire younger generations of political activists, while other post-independence leaders’ names are largely forgotten.</p>
<p>Will Mugabe be similarly feted by later generations? Will the enormous flaws of his rule be forgotten amid celebrations of his unique role in the liberation of southern Africa as a whole? </p>
<h2>A Greek tragedy</h2>
<p>The problem for pan-Africanist historians who rush to praise Mugabe is that they will need to repudiate the contrary view of the millions of Zimbabweans who have suffered under his rule or have fled the country to escape it. He contributed no political ideas that have lasted. He inherited the benefits as well as the costs of settler rule but reduced his country to penury. He destroyed the best of its institutional inheritance, notably an efficient civil service, which could have been put to good use for all.</p>
<p>The cynics would say that the reputation of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/patrice-emery-lumumba">Patrice Lumumba</a>, as an African revolutionary and fighter for Congolese unity has lasted because he was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jan/17/patrice-lumumba-50th-anniversary-assassination">assassinated in 1961</a>. In other words, he had the historical good fortune to die young, without the burden of having made major and grievous mistakes.</p>
<p>In contrast, there are many who would say that Mugabe simply lived too long, and his life was one of Greek tragedy: his early promise and virtue marked him out as popular hero, but he died a monster whom history will condemn.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108103/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation </span></em></p>Where should we place Mugabe among the pantheon of African nationalists who led their countries to independence?Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1227262019-09-05T09:02:06Z2019-09-05T09:02:06ZZimbabwe’s deepening crisis: time for second government of national unity?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290911/original/file-20190904-175686-v3skdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many Zimbabweans have turned to hawking to keep the wolf from the door as the economic crisis in the country deepens. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe is going through its worst socio-economic and political crisis in two decades. Crippling daily power outages of <a href="https://www.biznews.com/africa/2019/08/05/zimbabwe-tipping-point-economic-crisis">up to 18 hours</a> and erratic supply of clean water are just some of the most obvious signs. Meanwhile, an inflation rate of over 500% has put the prices of basic goods beyond the reach of most people.</p>
<p>Hopes that the end of President Robert Mugabe’s ruinous rule in November 2017 would help put the country on a new path of peace and prosperity have long <a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">dissipated</a>. Efforts by his successor President Emmerson Mnangagwa to <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwe-is-open-for-business-says-mnangagwa-12913367">attract foreign investors</a>, who are critical in reviving Zimbabwe’s ailing economy, have also largely failed.</p>
<p>The situation has not been helped by the rejection of the 2018 presidential election results by the main opposition party. The Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A) claims the governing Zanu-PF stole the elections even though the results were <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Regional-observers-Zimbabwe-election-free-and-fair/4552902-4692254-e75fje/index.html">endorsed</a> as free and fair by the African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC). Only the European Union observers were somewhat circumspect <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/eu-observers-say-zimbabwe-election-fell-short-on-fairness-20181010">in their assessment</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">Fantasy that Mnangagwa would fix Zimbabwe now fully exposed</a>
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<p>The opposition alliance has been calling for Mnangagwa’s government to relinquish power, and a <a href="https://www.openparly.co.zw/chamisa-calls-for-national-trasitional-authority/">national transitional authority</a> appointed to run the country for at least two years, or until the 2023 general elections.</p>
<p>How individuals who will sit on the national transitional authority will be chosen and by whom, is not clear. But the party and <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2019/03/01/towards-the-national-transitional-authority/">some academics</a> believe such a transitional authority would normalise Zimbabwe’s highly polarised political situation and help it revive its relations with the West.</p>
<p>The opposition may have a point on re-engagement with the West. This is key to helping end the investment drought that started in earnest <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.908.3003&rep=rep1&type=pdf">between 2000 and 2003</a> under sanctions imposed by Western countries for human rights violations linked to Zanu-PF’s violent land reform seizures and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jun/03/zimbabwe.andrewmeldrum">election rigging</a>.</p>
<p>But the transitional authority idea is doomed to fail because of lack of buy-in by Zanu-PF. So, it’s time to consider a more viable alternative path to peace for Zimbabwe.</p>
<h2>Clamping down</h2>
<p>For now, the government has dismissed talk of a transitional authority as unconstitutional. Instead, in May it launched its own platform, called the <a href="https://www.panafricanvisions.com/2019/zimbabwe-mnangagwa-launches-the-political-actors-dialogue-to-address-long-term-economic-challenges/">Political Actors Dialogue</a>. The forum comprises 17 small political parties that participated in the 2018 elections. </p>
<p>The main opposition party is boycotting the process on grounds that Mnangagwa is an illegitimate president. Recently, it attempted to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwi-gdPunLfkAhXfSBUIHdWZCeIQFjAEegQIBBAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworld-africa-49366224&usg=AOvVaw0fkr2f1y4BV0-4W2SlJHGY">embark on public protests</a> in the hope of bringing the government to its knees. The protests fell flat after being blocked by the courts and the police.</p>
<p>It boggles the mind why the MDC-A, led by Nelson Chamisa, insists on marches when previous attempts were crushed with brute force. These led to deaths in <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=21&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwingbiQ87TkAhVsZhUIHWexAsIQFjAUegQICBAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.news24.com%2FAfrica%2FZimbabwe%2Fzimbabwean-generals-deny-troops-shot-and-killed-6-protesters-20181113&usg=AOvVaw02nyk1uLwat64nJso2EImF">August 2018</a> and <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwicyIfl87TkAhV9SBUIHXzrAC4QFjAAegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fmg.co.za%2Farticle%2F2019-01-30-zim-army-responsible-for-murders-rapes-report&usg=AOvVaw1fiTJ2kraC9xNiMyQ4TBM6">January 2019</a>. </p>
<p>The Zanu-PF regime has always clamped down heavily on perceived threats to its rule since 1980. Why then does the MDC-A continue to endanger people’s lives through this deadly route as a way of resolving Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political crises?</p>
<p>I firmly believe that the opposition needs to change tack and focus on entering into dialogue with the government. </p>
<h2>Dialogue and unity government</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s ongoing crisis requires the two leading political protagonists - Mnangagwa and Chamisa - to enter into serious dialogue. Both leaders need to soften their hard-line stances towards each other and put the people of Zimbabwe first.</p>
<p>There’s a precedent for this. Ten years ago, then South African President Thabo Mbeki managed to bring then President Mugabe and Movement for Democratic Change opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai to the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiMheeVnrfkAhVXShUIHeBIDw04ChAWMAB6BAgAEAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.france24.com%2Fen%2F20080721-mbeki-harare-mediate-talks-zimbabwe-political-crisis&usg=AOvVaw2pLPeTVwBEVrH2TSAcW5e3">negotiation table</a>. </p>
<p>The talks culminated in the formation of the government of national unity that ran Zimbabwe from February 2009 to July 2013, with Mugabe as the President and Tsvangirai as the Prime Minister. The unity government was fairly successful and managed to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiv9PjanrfkAhUUTBUIHQR0D0cQFjAJegQIABAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theindependent.co.zw%2F2013%2F07%2F11%2Freflecting-on-positive-zimbabwe-gnu-moments%2F&usg=AOvVaw25plQQHFWt-5PTjI9_Fi6J">stabilise the economy</a>.</p>
<p>Two decades of suffering have shown that it is not the threat of protests or sanctions from the West that can move Zanu-PF to change, but neighbouring countries under the aegis of <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwia1fucj7HkAhWnRhUIHcY8Dvc4ChAWMAB6BAgAEAI&url=https%3A%2F%2Flibrary.fes.de%2Fpdf-files%2Fbueros%2Fmosambik%2F07874.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2PSzn2eTrgI53Cnw2yrI2t">SADC</a>. South Africa is pivotal in this regard as the region’s strongest economic and military power. </p>
<p>It’s time to experiment with a second government of national unity for Zimbabwe. But for this to happen, SADC and South Africa must have the appetite to intervene in Zimbabwe. This is currently lacking. </p>
<h2>Dialogue in Zimbabwe’s history</h2>
<p>Historically, dialogue has moved Zimbabwe forward as a nation during its darkest hours. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>A year before independence in 1980, battle-hardened guerrilla commanders agreed to talk to the then Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, to end Zimbabwe’s liberation war even though they were convinced that they were winning. </p></li>
<li><p>In 1987 Joshua Nkomo, who was the leader of the main opposition party, the Zimbabwean African People’s Union, agreed to talk to his political nemesis, then Prime Minister Mugabe. Yet before this, he had been hounded out of the country by Mugabe in the mid-80s, and <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">thousands of his supporters killed</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>More recently in 2009, Morgan Tsvangirai agreed to enter into a unity government with Mugabe, despite winning the first round of the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-10-00-zim-2008-election-taken-by-a-gun-not-a-pen">2008 elections</a>. The unity government briefly resuscitated and stabilised Zimbabwe’s fragile economy. Hyperinflation was tamed, basic commodities became available again and people regained purchasing power.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Given the MDC-A’s positive contribution during its brief stint in the 2009-2013 unity government, the party should be expending its energies on dialogue. The main opposition party can enter into a second government of national unity, but continue building and strengthening its own support.</p>
<p>In the same vein, Zanu-PF also needs to realise that without the involvement of the MDC-A, its attempts to revive the economy and end the strife in the country, on its own terms, are destined to fail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122726/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tapiwa Chagonda has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>It’s time for a new approach as it becomes increasingly clear that protests won’t topple the Zanu-PF government.Tapiwa Chagonda, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1179862019-05-30T11:07:31Z2019-05-30T11:07:31ZA tribute to Zimbabwean liberation hero Dumiso Dabengwa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278494/original/file-20190607-52748-jxtqi0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A fitting way to pay tribute to Zimbabwean liberation war hero <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/sacp-sacp-expresses-its-heartfelt-condolences-to-the-dabengwa-family-the-people-of-zimbabwe-and-southern-africa-for-the-great-loss-encountered-2019-05-24">Dumiso “DD” Dabengwa</a>, who has died aged 79, is to depict a snapshot history of the late 1970s and the 1980s that shows the stresses of his job during and just after Zimbabwe’s war of liberation.</p>
<p>As the head of intelligence for <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Zimbabwe-Peoples-Revolutionary-Army/dp/1436361559">Zimbabwe African People’s Revolutionary Army</a>, the armed wing of Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu), he faced two enemies in the late seventies: the Rhodesian forces and those of Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwean African National Union (Zanu), the nationalist party that split off from <a href="https://www.academia.edu/38948000/The_split_of_ZAPU_2_">Zapu in 1963</a> and would eventually lead Zimbabwe. In the 1980s South Africa and the United Kingdom joined those antagonists. </p>
<p>Only psychologists could discern how Dabengwa maintained his legendary composure. He kept his head while everyone was losing theirs: a necessary trait for an intelligence supremo. </p>
<p>This tribute is inspired by a picture – probably taken in 1981 at the New Sarum airfield outside what was Salisbury – that’s making social media rounds following Dabengwa’s death. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1131547396960399361"}"></div></p>
<p>Dabengwa is shown standing with Rex Nhongo, commander of the newly integrated Zimbabwean military forces. The two young soldiers symbolise the unity to be forged out of Rhodesia’s and the two nationalist parties’ security forces as they entered Zimbabwe’s democratic dispensation. </p>
<p>That task’s difficulty is shown by the possibility that the two were on their way to Entumbane to calm the battles raging between the two nationalist armies, in which over 300 soldiers <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/obituaries/dumiso-dabengwa-dead.html">were killed</a>. But they would fail in these efforts and would land on different sides of Zimbabwe’s post liberation story. Dabengwa would be jailed by his erstwhile comrades. Nhongo would retire early, rich and still a power-broker in his party – until his fiery death in mid-<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331776137_Political_Accidents_in_Zimbabwe">2011</a>.</p>
<h2>Internecine violence</h2>
<p>About five years before 1981, an effort <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589001.2012.639655">emerged</a> to create a united “people’s army” out of Zanu’s guerrilla forces, Zanla and Zipra.</p>
<p>Nhongo had once been a Zipra soldier, but left during Zapu’s devastating internecine disputes in the early 1970s. With Zanla’s commander in Zambia’s jails suspected of <a href="https://allnewsnetwork.wordpress.com/2011/03/12/who-killed-josiah-tongogara-and-herbert-chitepo/">murdering the national chairman of Zanu, Herbert Chitepo</a>, Nhongo was by 1976 at the head of Zanla. Thus he became the commander of the Zimbabwe People’s Army (Zipa), supposedly an attempt to unite the two nationalist armies. </p>
<p>But his heart was not in it. He ordered his soldiers on engaging the Rhodesian forces to <a href="https://academic.oup.com/hwj/article/57/1/79/675840">kill Zipra fighters first</a>. There were battles between the two armies in training camps. What should Dabengwa have done?</p>
<p>Zipra withdrew a good number of troops, but adhered to the agreement to unite the armies. As it happened, before too long Robert Mugabe (on his way to the top) and Nhongo sidelined the group that really believed in the unity project. Dabengwa told one of us (Moore) many years later that Zipa was too militaristic, ignoring democratic processes. He took a wait and see approach.</p>
<p>With the adherents to unity gone, Zanu’s anti-Zapu sentiments opened further. The party’s <a href="http://www.archives.gov.zw/">1978 political education</a> tract claimed that Zipra forces planned to let Zanla smash Rhodesia’s “racist state machinery” single-handedly. Once victory was achieved, Zipra would “crash (sic) Zanla and seize political power…” </p>
<h2>Gukurahundi</h2>
<p>These and <a href="https://cul.worldcat.org/title/march-11-movement-in-zapu-revolution-within-the-revolution/oclc/13564369">other Zanu-related imbroglios</a> made life very difficult for Dabengwa, a man entrusted with Zapu’s intelligence. </p>
<p>Yet with “freedom” – hastened by <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2017.1275108">Soviet assistance to ZPRA</a> – Zimbabwe became even more central to Cold War and South African intrigue. As Zimbabwean political scientist Miles Tendi <a href="https://www.zimlive.com/2019/05/27/dumiso-dabengwa-a-military-czar-without-peer-in-making-of-the-zimbabwean-state/">attests</a>, Dabengwa and Josiah Tongogara, then the top Zanla general, played a key role with the “Patriotic Front” (another effort at unity between the two main liberation parties) at the late 1979 <a href="https://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/5847/5/1979_Lancaster_House_Agreement.pdf">Lancaster House negotiations </a> that led to Zimbabwe’s new dispensation. </p>
<p>Dabengwa himself said in a <a href="http://www.cite.org.zw/videos/interview-with-dumiso-dabengwa/">mid-2018 interview</a> that he and Tongogara thought they could push the unity idea beyond an agreement to maintain unity at diplomatic negotiations, but remaining separate for all other purposes. They wanted <em>political</em> unity. They carried out research among the soldiers, who indicated agreement. Yet Tongogara’s <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-152947.html">suspicious death</a> as he drove to a Mozambican camp only days later killed that dream: <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Gukurahundi</a> mass killings and atrocities in Matabeleland were only steps away. </p>
<p>Dabengwa’s interview leaves little doubt about Gukurahundi’s roots:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>At independence the British had already made a decision with Mugabe to carry out this genocide. (They) had already decided to ensure that that no one of the Ndebele nation would be allowed to be leader in this country. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Conspiracy and persecution</h2>
<p>On 9 May 1980, just weeks after Zimbabwe’s 17 April freedom celebrations, Mugabe visited British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. He <a href="http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/help-with-your-research/research-%20guides/prime-ministers-office-records/">complained that</a> “some” in Zapu did “not accept the new situation”. They wanted to continue the fight and the government might have to act against them soon.</p>
<p><a href="http://researchdata.uwe.ac.uk/104/240/roh-oh-sta-da1-appr.pdf">Danny Stannard</a>, Rhodesia’s Special Branch director, stayed on during the new era. With then Minister of State Security Emmerson Mnangagwa, he organised the transition of Zimbabwe’s security services – precisely to keep the region Communist-free, Stannard told one of us in 2014. He thought Mnangagwa was the perfect man for that job. Stannard held Dabengwa in venomous disregard and was dead certain that in February 1982 his Soviet allies were rolling to the Entumbane barracks. </p>
<p>In March the Zapu cabinet ministers, Dabengwa, deputy armed forces commander Lookout Masuku, and four other Zapu officials were arrested and charged with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1983/03/25/world/a-fateful-trial-witty-ex-guerrilla-v-zimbabwe.html">treason</a>. Arms caches had been “discovered” on Zapu properties. </p>
<p>In December 1982 a Whitehall officer wondered if the British should reconsider support for a régime seemingly hell-bent on eliminating Zapu and its potential supporters. No, he wrote, “if we refuse military sales and aid” Mugabe might approach the USSR – albeit reluctantly. Other reasons to keep Mugabe on side included selling arms and jet fighters, as well as paving the road to Namibian and South African <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/07075332.2017.1309561">settlements</a>. </p>
<p>Treason charges for all but Dabengwa were dismissed in early April 1983. But, as he and the others walked out of court they were jailed again under the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1983/03/25/world/a-fateful-trial-witty-ex-guerrilla-v-zimbabwe.html">Emergency Powers Act</a>. </p>
<h2>Peacemaking</h2>
<p>By this time, the Fifth Brigade had been in Matabeleland for several months: Gukurahundi was underway with its terror, mass starvation, and murder. When they were released in 1986 Zapu had to stop the carnage, agreeing to be absorbed into Zanu (PF). Dabengwa’s reluctant agreement was essential; it took his authority, and that of Zapu leader <a href="https://pindula.co.zw/Joshua_Nkomo">Joshua Nkomo</a>, to persuade the Zipra ex-combatants and the Zapu youth to merge.</p>
<p>The Cold War was on its last legs. Zanu (PF) had won its war for a one-party state. During the 1990s, with Nkomo as vice-president in the revised Zanu (PF) government, Dabengwa took on posts ranging from Home Affairs minister to managing the long-gestating but never funded <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2011/01/06/matabeleland-zambezi-water-project-urgent/">Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project</a>. </p>
<p>He left government in 2000. In 2008 he abandoned the Zanu (PF) politburo and revived Zapu. </p>
<p>There cannot be a man deserving more to rest in peace than Dabengwa.</p>
<p><em>David Galbraith, a retired Professor of English at University of Toronto and who spent the early 1980s in Matabeleland, contributed to this article</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117986/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Only psychologists could discern how Dumiso Dabengwa maintained his legendary composure, a necessary trait for an intelligence supremo.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies and Visiting Fellow, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge, University of JohannesburgNqobile Zulu, Lecturer in Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1129672019-03-11T14:18:25Z2019-03-11T14:18:25ZZimbabwe’s MDC faces a leadership contest. But can it be peaceful?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262465/original/file-20190306-100793-m9f32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of MDC's Nelson Chamisa believe he could win Zimbabwe's 2023 elections.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance, Zimbabwe’s largest opposition party, has announced that it will hold its elective congress in May 2019. The announcement has stirred interest – inside and outside the party. This is because there could be an intriguing contest for the presidency of the party between the incumbent <a href="https://informationcradle.com/africa/nelson-chamisa/">Nelson Chamisa</a> and the secretary-general <a href="https://pindula.co.zw/Douglas_Mwonzora">Douglas Mwonzora</a>. The two have a history of rivalry.</p>
<p>Mwonzora is Chamisa’s political nemesis. In 2014 Mwonzora unexpectedly won a contest for the position of secretary-general even though Chamisa, as organising secretary, was in a position to influence party structures in his favour and had been nominated by 11 out of 12 provinces. One theory is that the MDC’s former leader Morgan Tsvangirai, who died of cancer in <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/zimbabwean-opposition-leader-tsvangirai-dies">February 2018</a>, engineered Mwonzora’s victory by influencing the voting patterns of congress delegates. The reason given for this is that he wanted to curtail Chamisa’s political ambitions because of his perceived role in the MDC’s surprising poor showing in the 2013 national elections.</p>
<p>After his defeat, Chamisa was relegated to an ordinary party member, until Tsvangirai brought him back into the MDC’s executive. The speculation is that Tsvangirai did this because he sensed that Chamisa was still popular within the party’s structures, especially among younger members. </p>
<p>A Mwonzora victory is worrying for some of Chamisa’s most fervent supporters. This is because they believe Chamisa is the future of the party. He’s only 41 years old. Also, they believe he gave Zanu-Pf candidate Emmerson Mnangagwa a run for his money in the 2018 presidential elections. Chamisa’s camp believes he’s better placed to defeat Mnangagwa in the 2023 elections because of his <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/2018zimelections-who-is-nelson-chamisa-16237399">widespread national appeal</a>. </p>
<p>Mwonzora too has his fair share of supporters. He’s also widely respected within the MDC because of his easy going temperament. </p>
<p>What this all adds up to is that a victory by either candidate could split the party for the umpteenth time. Even a contest carries risks because the MDC has a chequered history in which violence has been used regularly against opposing factions. If the two do contest the party presidency in May – and Mwonzora in the past few days has <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/i-will-be-tougher-for-zanu-pf-says-mwonzora/">hinted that he might</a> – their supporters’ tactics could heighten the danger of violence and intimidation. This could further divide or damage the party and set Zimbabwean democracy back after decades of authoritarian rule. </p>
<h2>Troubled past</h2>
<p>Tsvangirai’s MDC had a “T” at the end – which stood for Tsvangirai himself. This was to distinguish his MDC from the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/MDC-Welshman_Ncube">Welshman Ncube MDC</a> which had cut ties with Tsvangirai. Ncube was the founding secretary-general of the MDC. </p>
<p>Just before he died Tsvangirai had agreed to bring back former “rebels” who had been founding members of the party. This included Welshman Ncube, Tendai Biti and Job Sikhala. For his part, Chamisa agreed to accommodate and rope in his former “comrades-in-arms” into his election campaign. </p>
<p>The coalition under their umbrella became known as <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zim-chamisa-forced-to-register-mdc-alliance-as-a-political-party-amid-squabbles-20180616">the MDC-Alliance party</a> just before Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections. The reason for the name change was that former MDC member Thokozani Khupe was arguing in the courts that her formation was the bona fide MDC-T. </p>
<p>A succession puzzle was created in the MDC-Alliance when Tsvangirai, as president and before his death, appointed Chamisa as head of policy and research and then as one of three deputy presidents of the party. This muddying of the waters appears to have been deliberate. It meant that Tsvangirai could easily play his deputies against each other if he felt threatened by any one of them. </p>
<p>But having three vice-presidents – Chamisa, Elias Mudzuri and Thokozani Khupe – didn’t do the party any favours. After Tsvangirai’s death a bloody battle for succession ensued, and led to another split in the party.</p>
<h2>The contest hots up</h2>
<p>The MDC’s May congress has inevitably sucked in the ruling Zanu-PF. The two have been at loggerheads since 1999 when the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad8338.html">original MDC was formed</a>. A succession of bruising electoral contests, including the highly disputed 2008 elections which the MDC-T was <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-are-elections-really-rigged-mr-trump-consult-robert-mugabe-68440">widely believed to have won</a>, galvanised the ruling Zanu-PF party into resolving to weaken, if not destroy, the MDC brand. </p>
<p>It’s against this backdrop that Zanu-PF is being accused of having a role in the unfolding MDC-Alliance drama ahead of the impending congress. </p>
<p>Some top MDC-Alliance leaders in Chamisa’s camp have been claiming that the governing Zanu-PF has set aside between US$ 4 million to US$6 million to pay MDC delegates to vote for Mwonzora <a href="https://nehandaradio.com/2019/03/03/zanu-pf-pouring-millions-to-influence-mdc-congress/">at the party congress</a>. Biti, who is currently the party’s vice-chairperson, has said he will reject any candidates sponsored by Zanu-PF.</p>
<h2>Best case scenario</h2>
<p>As party leader Chamisa has the opportunity to foster peace, tolerance and democracy. He should make sure that the lead up to the congress is violence- free and that party members who are in good standing can contest any post without being intimidated.</p>
<p>He needs to be wary of political sycophants within his party who want to turn him into a demigod, as was the case during Mugabe’s long reign as the leader of Zanu-PF. Chamisa has already shown that he has nothing to fear from a fair contest.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112967/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tapiwa Chagonda has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>Nelson Chamisa has the opportunity to foster peace, tolerance and democracy within Zimbabwe’s main opposition party.Tapiwa Chagonda, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1129732019-03-10T09:20:04Z2019-03-10T09:20:04ZResponses to Zimbabwe highlight gulf between the region and the west<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262191/original/file-20190305-48423-1k7l4u1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa's regime has yet to show it differs from that of Robert Mugabe. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The post-Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe continues to struggle to establish its legitimacy. While this is the case the terms of its future international re-engagement will continue to occupy the Zanu-PF government.</p>
<p>The government’s problems are compounded by the international outcry over its brutal response to the protests against <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/huge-zim-fuel-price-hike-foreigners-to-pay-in-forex-20190113">massive fuel price hikes</a> in January. At least 16 people died and hundreds were wounded from ‘gunshots, dog bites, <a href="http://kubatana.net/2019/02/03/crimes-humanity-alert-zimbabwe-brink-violations-intensify/">assaults and torture"</a>. </p>
<p>The events of January once again underscored the fault lines in Zimbabwe’s foreign relations. One the one hand the Southern African Development Community came out in support of a member state in the face of clear evidence of state brutality against its citizens. It even went so far as to condemn the continuing <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/sadc-backs-zim-against-onslaught/">“illegal sanctions”</a> against Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>In contrast, the UK, EU and the US all condemned the human rights abuses of the Zimbabwean state. They called for a return to the commitment to political and economic reforms. And they renewed their calls for as inclusive, credible national dialogue to map <a href="http://www.newsdzezimbabwe.co.uk/2019/02/us-slams-ed-govt-over-violence.html">the way forward</a>.</p>
<p>These responses once again show how polarised regional and western government policies are on the Zimbabwe crisis. This has had another consequence – the sidelining of efforts to reach a consensus on economic and political reforms. There have been at least three efforts at some sort of reconciliation over the past decade. The first was during the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Global-Political-Agreement">Global Political Agreement (2009-2013)</a>, again in the aftermath of the November 2017 coup, and then again in the run up to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-zimbabwes-first-elections-after-the-mugabe-ouster-are-so-significant-100505">2018 elections</a>.</p>
<p>Another consequence of the fallout from January is that Mnangagwa’s government has reached out further to its authoritarian economic and political partners in <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-15/with-president-mnangagwa-in-russia-zimbabwe-descends-into-chaos">Eurasia</a>. The problem with this is that <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414016666859">linkages with other autocratic regimes</a> provide some protection against forces pushing for democratic change. In addition, these relationships tend to consolidate those in the military and business sectors who see any prospect of serious economic and political reform as a threat.</p>
<h2>Responses</h2>
<p>A <a href="https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/statement-sadc-chairperson-his-excellency-dr-hage-g-geingob-president-republic-namibia-political-and-socio-economic-situation-zi/">statement</a> issued by the current head of the Southern African Development Community repeated the official position of the Zimbabwe government. It criticised “some internal players, in particular NGOs, supported by external players (who have) continued to destabilise the country.”</p>
<p>Early signs of this position were clear in South African President Cyril Ramaphosa’s speech at the International Labour Organisation in January. He claimed that sanctions against the country were <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/ramaphosa-says-lift-zimbabwe-sanction-20190122">no longer necessary</a> because the government had “embarked on democracy”.</p>
<p>Once again the regional body has conflated genuine concerns over imperial interventions in the developing world with the fight for democratic and human rights by national forces. Like Zanu PF – both under former President Robert Mugabe and Mnangagwa – Southern African Development Community has affirmed its support for a selective anti-imperialist narrative by an authoritarian nationalist regime that conflates the fight for democratic rights with outside intervention.</p>
<p>The response from the EU couldn’t have been more different. A <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2019-0116&language=EN">resolution</a> of the European Parliament in mid-February strongly condemned the violence and excessive force used in January. It reminded the government of Zimbabwe that long term support for it is dependent on “comprehensive reforms rather than mere promises”. </p>
<p>The resolution also called on the European Parliament to: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>(review restrictive measures against) individuals and entities in Zimbabwe, including those measures currently suspended, in the light of accountability for <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2019-0116&language=EN">recent state violence</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This position in effect put on hold any new restrictive measures against the Zanu-PF government. It also left open the option for renewed dialogue.</p>
<h2>Going forward</h2>
<p>The debate on sanctions on Zimbabwe has been lost in the region and on the continent. And this solidarity with the Mnangagwa regime is likely to persist for the foreseeable future. </p>
<p>Change, if any, might come from the EU and US. It’s possible that they could change their positions again if the Mnangagwa government made another attempt at minimalist reforms. </p>
<p>The current US policy in Africa is targeted against what it considers to be the “rapidly expanding” financial and political <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/">influence of China and Russia</a> on the continent. Trump is also looking to make the US the major player in the new battle for metal resources in Africa. This new struggle for technology metals is taking place in countries such as Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/business/how-president-trump-is-using-britain-to-fight-his-trade-war-against-china-in-africa-a4078031.html">Tanzania and Sierra Leone</a>. </p>
<p>The White House announced this week that it has extended sanctions against Zimbabwe for <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2019-03-05-trump-extends-us-sanctions-against-zimbabwe-by-a-year/">another year</a>. Nevertheless, at some stage the politics of US strategic interests in Africa could lead to a more accommodating relationship with an authoritarian regime such as the Mnangagwa administration. This has happened on many occasions in its foreign policy interventions.</p>
<p>The EU is in a “wait and see” mode. It will need evidence of some notable movement by the Zimbabwean state on the political and economic reform front before it pushes the re-engagement process forward. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s regime has yet to show that it is any different from Mugabe’s. Given the continuing factional battles in the ruling party – and its inability to imagine itself out of power – it is difficult to view the current government as anything other than a continuation of the authoritarian Zanu-PF’s legacy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112973/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span> He/ is affiliated with Solidarity Peace Trust.. </span></em></p>The debate on sanctions on Zimbabwe has been lost in the southern African region and on the continent.Brian Raftopoulos, Research Fellow, International Studies Group, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1105782019-01-27T10:40:28Z2019-01-27T10:40:28ZSouth African diplomacy on Zimbabwe can remain quiet – but it must get tough<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255709/original/file-20190127-108358-1bp97vx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's President Cyril Rampahosa, right, must get tough on his Zimbabwean counterpart Emmerson Mnangagwa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GovernmentZA/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Cries of moral outrage have greeted the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-needs-to-be-done-to-stop-zimbabwes-violent-meltdown-110193">brutal crackdown</a> by the Zimbabwean security forces on nationwide protests sparked by a sudden, massive, government-ordained <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/01/13/anger-as-mnangagwa-raises-fuel-prices-in-zimbabwe">hike in the price of fuel</a>. Naturally enough, the demand is that “something must be done” to stop the brutality. Twelve people have <a href="https://worldjusticenews.com/news/2019/01/20/twelve-dead-as-zimbabwe-crackdown-continues/">already died</a>, hundreds have been injured and there have been <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimbabwe-crackdown-children-shackled-and-caged-in-security-round-up/?PageSpeed=noscript">mass round ups</a>. </p>
<p>In South Africa, demands that President Cyril Ramaphosa’s government should take <a href="https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/why-south-africa-must-intervene-in-zimbabwe-20190124">firm action</a> are fuelled by two factors. The presence of a large Zimbabwean <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/millions-of-zimbabweans-living-in-sa-must-help-resolve-conflict-back-home-anc-20190122">migrant community</a> within the country is one. The second is a widespread sense that Pretoria’s policy towards its errant neighbour has always been one of light wrist-tapping rather than a vigorous twisting of arms. </p>
<p>Inter-liberation movement solidarity is widely said to have strangled serious South African criticisms of Zimbabwean governments. This “quiet diplomacy” has been <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-11-15-south-africas-quiet-diplomacy-towards-zimbabwe-must-end-maimane/">regularly dismissed</a> as a strategy of doing nothing. If South Africa got serious, say the critics, President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s regime would have to comply with its demands. Democracy in Zimbabwe could be given a real chance. </p>
<p>Many South Africans are concerned by the position Ramaphosa has taken towards the present crisis. South Africa is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics-safrica/south-africa-turned-down-zimbabwe-request-for-12-billion-loan-in-december-idUSKCN1PF0IG">reported</a> to have turned down a request from Zimbabwe for a loan of US$1.2 billion to ease its desperate foreign currency shortage. Yet Ramaphosa was vocal at the recent meeting of global leaders at the World Economic Forum in Davos in calling for <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/ramaphosa-says-lift-zimbabwe-sanction-20190122">an end to sanctions</a>. He argued that these were damaging Zimbabwe’s prospects of economic recovery. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s call for an end to sanctions clearly reflects his government’s view that it cannot afford a collapse of the Zimbabwean economy. Zimbabwe remains a <a href="http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/early-days-but-some-sa-firms-responding-to-zimbabwes-open-for-business-pledge-2018-03-23">site</a> for South African investment and a <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/exports/zimbabwe">significant market</a> for South African goods. This is despite the huge difficulties South African firms have in getting profits out of Zimbabwe .</p>
<p>Meanwhile, best estimates suggest that South Africa already hosts up to <a href="https://africacheck.org/reports/how-many-zimbabweans-live-in-south-africa-the-numbers-are-unreliable/">two million Zimbabweans</a>, though the exact number isn’t known. Any further decline of an already shattered Zimbabwean economy could send many more Zimbabwean migrants across the border, adding to the already <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate">huge pool of unemployed</a> in South Africa. </p>
<p>There are thus very real reasons for the South African position, even if the motivation is self-interested. Yet would it help the cause of Zimbabwean democracy and human rights if the European Union and US were to now bring “sanctions” to an end? </p>
<p>In reality, the answer is extraordinarily complicated.</p>
<h2>The thorny subject of sanctions</h2>
<p>Successive Zimbabwean governments have long been dismissive of efforts from outside the country to effect political change. President Robert Mugabe <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2008-07-16-mugabe-lashes-out-at-uk-as-inflation-soars">routinely insisted </a>that sanctions and other policies designed to isolate Zimbabwe were intended to bring about “regime change”. </p>
<p>These interventions included the round of sanctions first <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/feb/18/zimbabwe">imposed by the European Union in 2002</a> and <a href="https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ99/PLAW-107publ99.pdf">the passage</a> by the US government of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act in 2001. The act encouraged the president to implement travel bans and financial restrictions against people conducting political violence.</p>
<p>The Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has equally consistently claimed that the collapse of the Zimbabwean economy is a result of the imposition of sanctions. Recently Mnangagwa <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/remove-illegal-sanctions-against-zimbabwe-mnangagwa-pleads-with-the-west-20180929">claimed</a> that the sanctions, which are still in place, are “illegal”.</p>
<p>Setting aside the Zimbabwe government’s reaction – which is to be expected – do sanctions work, which ones work and what conditions are necessary to make them work? </p>
<p>There is enormous controversy, politically and academically, around the issues. Furthermore, what impact do sanctions have, how do you measure this, and does impact measure up to the objectives notionally to be achieved? </p>
<p>In the Zimbabwean case, the US and EU insist that the measures they have taken are “targeted sanctions”. These are designed to hurt individuals identified as members of the repressive ZANU-PF regime rather than the ordinary people of Zimbabwe. For instance, the US Zimbabwe law led <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-reforms-first-then-removal-of-zimbabwe-sanctions/4572810.html">to the imposition of travel bans</a> and financial restrictions on members of the ZANU-PF regime. </p>
<p>Yet reliable data on how effective such measures have been is lacking. Critics would argue that the present crackdown on protests demonstrates their manifest failure. There may well be a case for arguing that the imposition of targeted sanctions by both the US and EU are designed to demonstrate to domestic audiences that “they are doing something” as much as to bring about improved governance. </p>
<p>Yet does this mean they should be abandoned?</p>
<h2>The case for keeping up the pressure</h2>
<p>Immediate cancellation of such sanctions would clearly send out an extraordinarily dispiriting message to Zimbabweans who are on the receiving end of regime violence. </p>
<p>There is also a message here for the Ramaphosa government, and for other member governments of the southern African region.</p>
<p>By all means keep the borders with Zimbabwe open, the traffic flowing, and economic exchanges continuing. At the same time, there’s an urgent need to get serious with the Mnangagwa government. The time for diplomatic niceties is long past. South Africa needs to make life as uncomfortable as possible for members of the regime by adopting practical and measurable strategies: stop their travel to and through South Africa, freeze their bank accounts, stop them sending their children to private schools and South Africa’s top universities. </p>
<p>It may well be that if South Africa is to effect change for the better in Zimbabwe its diplomacy must remain “quiet”. If so, it must also be tough.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110578/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall has received funding from the National Research Foundation.. </span></em></p>South Africa needs to make life as uncomfortable as possible for members of Zimbabwe’s government.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1101972019-01-22T09:09:00Z2019-01-22T09:09:00ZFantasy that Mnangagwa would fix Zimbabwe now fully exposed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254899/original/file-20190122-100261-p4boy9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe President Emmerson Mnangagwa with Russian President Vladimir Putin.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Sergei Chirikov</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As of January 18, more than 12 people had died, no less than 78 had suffered gunshot injuries, and at least 240 had been beaten and tortured by the Zimbabwean state. More than 466 had been arbitrarily arrested and detained, while hundreds are displaced or in safe houses in and <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-01-19-revolt-and-repression-in-zimbabwe">outside the country</a>. </p>
<p>Added to that is the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/zimbabwe-shuts-down-all-internet-connectivity-again-18869497">shutdown</a> of the internet and social media. All this points to a vicious authoritarian state showing its true face, this time in response to a stay-away protesting a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zimbabwes-president-hikes-fuel-prices-to-tackle-shortages-20190113">massive petrol price rise</a>. </p>
<p>The latest events are happening in the context of years of economic crisis, and the government’s months-long legitimacy crisis.</p>
<p>The last few days have wiped out any trust people might have had in the ability of the <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/703839/pdf">November 2017 coup</a> that toppled former President Robert Mugabe to bring democratic and socio-economic rights to Zimbabwe’s long-suffering people.</p>
<p>Yet one wonders: is this a vicious repressive state or the accumulative effect of institutions that decayed under the doddering Mugabe; now disintegrated, dead and disinterred thanks to <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/economic-turmoil-is-unavoidable-in-mnangagwas-zimbabwe">diminishing dollars</a>?</p>
<p>Will Zimbabwe’s future be even worse than its terrible past? Can its neighbours bang some heads together to create a “transitional authority” of some sort, as Zimbabwean scholar and activist Professor Brian Raftopoulos <a href="https://player.fm/series/the-karima-brown-show-2342437/unpacking-the-violence-and-killings-in-zimbabwe-as-it-enters-its-3rd-day-of-protest">suggests</a>?</p>
<p>That’s needed, clearly. But it would not be advisable to raise one’s hopes.</p>
<h2>Mugabe’s legacy</h2>
<p>A veteran of many struggles against Mugabe once said that the old tyrant’s main problem was his inability to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304869932_Robert_Mugabe_An_Intellectual_Manque_and_His_Moments_of_Meaning">abide people smarter than him</a>. So he surrounded himself with sycophants, and the odd idiot savant. </p>
<p>As another astute Zimbabwean observer put it to me, Mugabe was good at playing the country’s many opposing groups against one another. He would grant one the hope of ascendance, then pull it away in favour of another grasping gang. It created a precarious balance. Now one of the groups has the levers of state in hand, the awkward equilibrium is no more – and the winners are split in all directions too.</p>
<p>With Mugabe gone, the victors – <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">Mnangagwa’s faction of the ruling Zanu-PF</a> – have no idea how to police themselves, let alone an economy, their subjects and the opposition. Harvard professor and emeritus president of the World Peace Foundation, Robert Rotberg, has politely called their plans’ <a href="https://theconversation.com/bold-steps-mnangagwa-should-be-taking-instead-of-fiddling-with-the-petrol-price-109890">“barmy”</a>. </p>
<p>My guess is that the men and women in charge are following some of the advice of their <a href="https://nehandaradio.com/2018/09/15/who-is-professor-mthuli-ncube/">financial guru</a> Professor Mthuli Ncube. He’s one of those mathematical geniuses whose ideology of short term pain producing fantastical gain needs either a lesson or two <a href="https://news.pindula.co.zw/2019/01/15/chief-justice-luke-malaba-condemns-mthuli-ncube-austerity-measures-says-they-threaten-the-rule-of-law/?_ga=2.38229859.1398503167.1548007307-1613363783.1531465861">in politics</a> or an iron fist. He has the latter.</p>
<p>It’s likely that those charged with implementing “austerity for prosperity” so zealously are fighting among themselves while their soldiers loot and kill on their own, as well as their officers’, will. </p>
<p>As the spoils’ scarcity worsens and power’s centre cannot hold – all in the shadows cast by the near dead – stories of <a href="https://news.pindula.co.zw/2019/01/21/breaking-ed-impeachment-plotters-tried-to-kill-me-mayor-justice-wadyajena/">post-coup coups</a> and impeachments pop up. Police spokesperson Charity Charamba even believes the soldiers looting and torturing are people who have stolen their uniforms, so any “retired, deserted, and AWOL” soldiers must</p>
<blockquote>
<p>immediately hand over uniforms either to the police or the <a href="https://www.sundaynews.co.zw/government-warns-rioters-1-fare-buses-introduced/">Zimbabwe Defence Forces"</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>A good excuse to round up suspected mutineers? </p>
<h2>Chilling warning</h2>
<p>President Emmerson Mnangagwa announced the gargantuan increase in fuel prices and then took his begging bowl to the oligarchic remnants of the Soviet ruins. His next stop was due to <a href="https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2019/01/19/Big-Saturday-Read-Davos%E2%80%99-shame-as-Zimbabwe-burns">be Davos</a> where he hoped to charm those with money by repeating his “open for business” mantra. But a <a href="https://www.techzim.co.zw/2019/01/president-mnangagwa-not-going-to-davos-hes-coming-home-to-deal-with-crisis">60,000 strong petition</a> helped keep him away. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa has <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zim-president-mnangagwa-returns-amid-economic-crisis-crackdown-20190122">returned from his travels</a> with power retained, although now more tainted than before. He’s likely to be at his crudest. Presidential spokesperson George Charamba promises that so far there has been only seen a “foretaste of things to come”, and that Zanu-PF would <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/mdc-and-allies-will-be-held-accountable/">“revisit”</a> the sections of the constitution protecting rights of association and expression, “which we now know are prone to abuse by so-called proponents <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2019/01/20/world/africa/20reuters-zimbabwe-politics.html">of democracy”</a>.</p>
<p>As this week began, an eerie calm settled. But many civil society and political opposition activist members are still in hiding, lest the fate of teachers’ union president Obert Masaraure, abducted in the early hours of 18 January, tortured, and dumped at Harare’s Central Police Station, befall them. </p>
<p>The Zimbabwe Human <a href="http://www.hrforumzim.org/news/zimshutdown-violations-updates/">Rights NGO Forum</a> also chronicles the torture of Rashid Mahiya’s mother and his pastor. He is the chairperson of Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition and Executive Director of Heal Zimbabwe Trust, and is accused of “masterminding” last week’s protests. </p>
<p>Movement for Democratic Change member and former Minister of Education Senator David Coltart has accused the military and those it has hired of <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-01-20-blocked-internet-in-zimbabwe-hides-government-crimes-against-humanity/">crimes against humanity</a>. In personal communication from Bulawayo he writes that last week’s debacle was a “deliberate campaign to punish the working class people” in his city. </p>
<h2>A dream deferred</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/a-false-new-dawn-for-zimbabwe-what-i-got-right-and-wrong-about-the-mood-100971">The nightmare of August 1 last year</a> – when the military brutally clamped down on opposition supporters protesting against the announcement that Mnangagwa had won the presidential election, killing at least six – started to dash the post-Mugabe leader’s dream of legitimacy.</p>
<p>Economic revival might have done the trick: now there’s no chance of that. Last week’s events have exposed the fantasy in full finality. The only Zimbabweans still in the trance are its supposed leaders. </p>
<p>Their neighbours seem caught in it too. They had better wake up before the maelstrom mauls them in the morning.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110197/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Zimbabwean government’s brutal response to protests has dashed hopes for democracy under President Mnangagwa.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1101932019-01-21T13:42:02Z2019-01-21T13:42:02ZWhat needs to be done to stop Zimbabwe’s violent meltdown<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254725/original/file-20190121-100285-374wg5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters block a major road leading into centre of Zimbabwe' capital Harare. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe is sliding into a violent meltdown and it’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/20/zimbabwe-warns-brutal-crackdown-foretaste-of-things-to-come">expected</a> to worsen, unless there are some serious interventions. </p>
<p>Days of mass <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46862194">protests</a> have been characterised by violence, looting and heavy-handedness by the police and army. It has led to the deaths and injury of many people, largely in Harare and Bulawayo’s high-density areas. <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/latest-zimbabwe-groups-say-at-least-12-killed-in-unrest-20190119">According</a> to the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, at least 12 people have been killed and thousands injured. </p>
<p>In addition to placing many urban areas under military siege, the government has also <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46917259?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/crr7mlg0rpvt/zimbabwe&link_location=live-reporting-story">shut down</a> social media platforms such as WhatsApp, Twitter and Facebook. These are viewed as the avenue through which the opposition and other civil society bodies have been communicating messages of “anarchy”. The internet has been shut down twice on separate occasions. </p>
<p>The deadly violence was triggered by President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s announcement of <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zimbabwes-president-hikes-fuel-prices-to-tackle-shortages-20190113">steep fuel price hikes</a> on Saturday 9 January. Made in the dead of night, the announcement proved to be the straw that broke the camel’s back for a largely peaceful, if not somewhat passive, populace that has borne the brunt of two decades of economic meltdown. Mnangagwa’s regime increased the prices of fuel by a staggering 150%, making Zimbabwe’s fuel the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46878267">most expensive</a> in the world. </p>
<p>The sharp fuel hike prompted the country’s largest trade union body, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, and other civil society bodies such as the Crisis Coalition, to call for a three day mass stay away from work.</p>
<p>The reaction was hardly surprising. Conditions have become fertile for a massive militant mass revolt. Shortages of a lot of goods have become the order of the day. Long fuel queues, and incessant electricity and water cuts have not helped the situation for poverty-weary Zimbabweans. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa, and those he can rally behind him in the ruling Zanu-PF, need urgently to take steps towards forming a government of national unity, as has been done before in the country. This will require the opposition Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-Alliance) to get its act together by behaving maturely. Another urgent step that’s needed is that the country’s chaotic currency situation needs immediate resolution.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/bold-steps-mnangagwa-should-be-taking-instead-of-fiddling-with-the-petrol-price-109890">Bold steps Mnangagwa should be taking instead of fiddling with the petrol price</a>
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<h2>Currency crunch</h2>
<p>Prior to the deadly protests, Zimbabweans endured a tumultuous few months economically as the country’s cash crunch worsened. </p>
<p>Just before Professor Mthuli Ncube was appointed Minister of Finance in September 2018, he <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/09/20/u-turn-on-bond-notes-gets-thumbs-up">said</a> he wanted to phase out the country’s quasi-currency, the bond note, nicknamed <a href="https://citizen.co.za/business/2024640/zim-bollar-a-guide-to-zimbabwes-black-market/">“bollars”</a> by the market. The rationale behind scrapping the bond note was that it was promoting the black market, as individuals were using this quasi-currency to mop up scarce US dollars. </p>
<p>Ncube also argued that Zimbabwe needed to come up with its own proper currency, which could be recognised as legal tender. </p>
<p>The bond note was introduced in the second half of 2016 in a bid to ease the cash squeeze the country was facing as a consequence of using a multiple currency regime which was anchored by the US dollar. But a lack of investment in Zimbabwe, combined with few exports, meant that the US dollar was not readily available on the market. </p>
<p>The bond note was meant to fill the cash gap on the market. Instead, it spawned a flourishing black market last witnessed during Zimbabwe’s dark days of hyperinflation in 2008. Dealers, including top government officials, used the quasi-currency to mop up scarce US dollars on the market. </p>
<p>The Zimbabwean government has consistently argued that the bond note is equivalent to the US dollar. But the market has suggested otherwise. Most retailers have a three-tier pricing system – US$, bond notes or Ecocash, the country’s PayPal like service that is making transactions possible. The reason for providing these options is the shortage of US dollars and the bond notes. Those that are available are largely in the hands of currency speculators. </p>
<p>The bond note’s death knell, which was sounded by Ncube, has sparked panic and led to a devaluation of the quasi-currency. This in turn led to retailers increasing their prices of goods and services for people using bond notes.</p>
<p>The knock-on effect is that doctors, teachers and other civil servants are demanding that they be paid in dollars – not bond notes.</p>
<p>Shortages of foreign currency has also led to companies like <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2019/01/11/delta-on-the-brink/">Delta</a>, the country’s largest brewer, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/zimbabwe-delta/zimbabwes-delta-beverages-to-accept-cash-only-amid-currency-crunch-idUSL8N1Z23G7">failing</a> to import adequate raw materials for alcohol and soft drinks.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe’s largest cooking oil producer, Olivine, has also <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2019-01-14-panic-buying-and-a-stayaway-as-zimbabwe-fuel-price-bites/">closed shop</a>, citing a lack of foreign currency to import raw materials for their products. </p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>To stem the tide of the current crisis, before it totally overwhelms Mnangagwa and the ruling Zanu-PF, the president needs to immediately cease the brutal onslaught on civilians. In addition, Mnangagwa and his officials have to get off their high horse and facilitate talks that can lead to a government of national unity with the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-Alliance).</p>
<p>This has proved to be successful before. A government of national unity was formed in the wake of the violent elections in 2008 that plunged the country into chaos. The 2009-2013 <a href="https://jppgnet.com/journals/jppg/Vol_2_No_2_June_2014/9.pdf">government of national unity</a> helped to stabilise the Zimbabwean economy and brought the country back from the brink. </p>
<p>The MDC-Alliance also has to stop fomenting acts of violence that have become the party’s hallmark since its leader Morgan Tsvangirai’s <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/zimbabwe-opposition-leader-morgan-tsvangirai-dies-of-cancer-1.4535490">death</a> in February 2018. </p>
<p>Lastly, Zimbabwe needs to introduce its own currency so the cancerous black market that’s been wreaking havoc on the economy can be eliminated.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110193/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tapiwa Chagonda has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation.</span></em></p>To stem the tide of the current crisis before it totally overwhelms President Mnangagwa and the ruling Zanu-PF, he needs to immediately cease the brutal onslaught on civilians.Tapiwa Chagonda, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1098902019-01-15T15:10:32Z2019-01-15T15:10:32ZBold steps Mnangagwa should be taking instead of fiddling with the petrol price<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253840/original/file-20190115-152986-1z00z45.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe erupted in violent protest after the government doubled the price of petrol. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When economically challenged rulers try to run nations, especially fragile ones, they can easily make mistakes. </p>
<p>In the past few weeks demonstrators have taken to the streets of Khartoum and Omdurman to protest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s removal of subsidies that have long kept <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/sudan-official-death-toll-protests-rises-24-190113065645372.html">bread and fuel affordable</a>. </p>
<p>Now it’s Zimbabwe’s turn. Just before flying off to Russia last weekend, President Emmerson Mnangagwa <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zimbabwes-president-hikes-fuel-prices-to-tackle-shortages-20190113">doubled the price of petrol</a>. Doing so brought already impoverished urban Zimbabweans out onto the streets of the capital Harare as well as Bulawayo and a dozen other cities and towns. Protesters blocked roads with tyres, trees and rocks, stopped bus transport, attacked the police, threw canisters of tear gas back at security forces and <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/deaths-in-zimbabwe-fuel-protests-says-security-minister-20190115">generally ran amok</a>. </p>
<p>At least five people <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/military-deploys-in-zimbabwe-fuel-hike-protests-5-killed/2019/01/15/d44875f6-18aa-11e9-b8e6-567190c2fd08_story.html?utm_term=.2af9f13b1349">were reported</a> to have been killed. Flights into Harare <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2019-01-14-fastjet-cancels-flights-as-zimbabwe-unrest-continues-countrywide/">were cancelled</a> and the government <a href="https://www.techzim.co.zw/2019/01/econet-and-telone-shut-down-the-internet-completely-now-its-darkeness/amp/?__twitter_impression=true">closed down the internet</a>. </p>
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<p>Mnangagwa’s excuse for raising prices so abruptly is not clear. Possibly he thinks that more costly petrol will bring more cash into national coffers that are mostly bare. Or perhaps he believes that more petrol will pour into the country via the pipeline from Beira in Mozambique if it is more valuable. Both ideas are barmy. </p>
<p>Before flying off to Russia, Mnangagwa said that the fuel price rise was intended to reduce shortages of fuel that, he indicated, were caused by rises in the use of fuel and what he called <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/anger-as-mnangagwa-raises-gas-prices-in-zimbabwe-20190113-2">“rampant” illegal trading</a> – accusations that make no sense whatsoever. Making petrol purchasing more expensive for poor Zimbabweans – the majority of the nation’s people – simply adds to their hardship and further slows an already crippled economy.</p>
<p>Instead Mnangagwa should do everything his government can to reduce the shortage of real (rather than fake) cash that is crippling the local economy, reducing local production and corporate and consumer cash flows, and driving an already weakened economy <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/01/12/zimbabwe-plans-new-currency-as-dollar-shortage-bites-finance-minister">further into recession</a>.</p>
<p>He should also be focused on taking a number of other bold steps to try and reverse the collapse of the country’s economy. Among them are bringing state looting to a halt.</p>
<h2>The cash crisis</h2>
<p>The US dollar is the official currency of commerce. But because Zimbabwe’s economy has essentially ground to a halt, it has few means of bringing new dollars into the country. That, and the steady money laundering of real dollars by high-level officials of the ruling Zanu-PF party, has drained the country of <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/10/looting-of-state-resources-to-blame-for-economic-crisis/">currency</a>. </p>
<p>The government has printed $1 bond notes — known as <a href="https://businesstimes.co.zw/dollars-vs-zollars-zim-puts-accounting-standards-to-test/">zollars</a> – for Zimbabweans to use instead of real dollars. They are supposed to be exchangeable at par, but in 2019 they are worth as little as a third of a paper dollar. Many merchants refuse to accept zollars at all.</p>
<p>Bond notes now trade on the black market at 3.2 per dollar, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-14/no-currency-just-a-currency-crisis-zimbabwe-s-woes-deepen">according</a> to the Harare-based ZimBollar Research Institute.</p>
<p>The stress has also spread to financial markets, with locals piling into equities to hedge against price increases. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa may be <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-15/with-president-mnangagwa-in-russia-zimbabwe-descends-into-chaos">attempting to obtain loans</a> from Russia and from shady Central Asian countries <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/04/kazakhstan-at-twenty-five-stable-but-tense-pub-62642">like Kazakhstan</a>. But what the president should be doing is prosecuting and imprisoning his corrupt cronies. That could limit the flight of dollars from Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>He also needs to trim the bloated civil service of excessive patronage appointments. Most of all, if he dared, he should be cutting military expenditures. Zimbabwe has no imaginable need for its large and well equipped a security establishment.</p>
<p>Such bold measures could return confidence to the country’s corporate and agri-business sectors. If coupled with reduced military and other expenditures, and bolstered by funds no longer being transferred overseas, Zimbabwe’s long repressed economy could take off from a very low base.</p>
<h2>Poor leadership</h2>
<p>Raising petrol prices in a land where but a few months ago supplies of petrol were short and motorists <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-10-27/zimbabwe-suffering-worst-economic-crisis-in-a-decade/10433028">queued for hours and days</a> outside stations is neither politically nor economically wise. The newly aroused protesters will not readily melt away. Putting such a hefty extra charge on an essential commodity, and doing so just when Zimbabwe’s parlous economy was beginning to show signs of stability, shows few leadership skills and little common sense.</p>
<p>Inflation has soared since the national election in July, almost reaching the <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=sudan+70%25+inflation&rlz=1C1NHXL_enZA711ZA711&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiwn7u4oO_fAhVMUBUIHVJzAKEQsAR6BAgEEAE&biw=1283&bih=638">Sudanese level of 70% a year</a>. Foreign capital and domestically reinvested capital is avoiding the country. </p>
<p>On top of this, exporters are struggling under draconian Reserve Bank regulations. Only Chinese purchases of ferrochrome, other metals and tobacco, keep the economy ticking over, albeit in an increasingly dilatory manner.</p>
<p>A further drain on confidence and economic rational thinking is the Reserve Bank’s allocation of whatever hard currency there is to politically prominent backers of the president. That is how arbitrage during President Robert Mugabe’s benighted era helped to enrich his entourage while sinking the Zimbabwean economy and impoverishing its peoples.</p>
<h2>Work that needs to be done</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa’s regime has much more work to do to stimulate sustainable economic growth. He will need to restore the rule of law, badly eroded in Mugabe’s time, put some true meaning into his <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2018-11-20-socialites-laying-low-as-zimbabwes-government-cracks-down-on-big-spenders/">“back to honest business”</a> promise, and widely open up the economy. That would mean eliminating most Reserve Bank restrictions on the free flow of currency and allowing the entire Zimbabwean economy once again to float.</p>
<p>Most of all, Mnangagwa needs to rush home from Russia and Asia and rescind or greatly reduce the price of petrol. After so many years of repression and hardship, Zimbabweans are out of patience.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109890/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Rotberg does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s decision to double the price of petrol shows very poor judgement and bad leadership.Robert Rotberg, Founding Director of Program on Intrastate Conflict, Harvard Kennedy SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1070972018-12-17T12:10:59Z2018-12-17T12:10:59ZZimbabwe minus Mugabe: two books on his fall and Mnangagwa’s rise<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250014/original/file-20181211-76956-5ex5kg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's former president Robert Mugabe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Penguin Books has released two books by Zimbabwean journalists in time to celebrate the first anniversary of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14113249">coup</a> that finally put Robert Mugabe’s ruinous reign to an end. These are Ray Ndlovu’s <em>In the Jaws of the Crocodile: Emmerson Mnangagwa’s Rise to Power in Zimbabwe</em> and <em>The Graceless Fall of Robert Mugabe: The End of a Dictator’s Reign</em> by Geoffrey Nyarota.</p>
<p>The books, about the end of Mugabe’s nearly four decades of ruling Zimbabwe, arrive at a time when journalists have to constantly rush to beat tweets and Facebook posts. This haste can work against their claim to be offering something closer to truth’s complexities than can be rendered in 280 characters.</p>
<p>At the time of the coup the international community, the long-suffering urban unemployed and rural peasants, and the business players itching to embrace the graces of a régime “open for business”, hoped that a long-delayed nirvana was just over the horizon. </p>
<p>That vista remains distant: if there was a rainbow – President Emmerson Mnangagwa promised Zimbabwean whites their place back in Zanu-PF’s good books – the pot of gold keeps receding. The long lines of fuel-starved vehicles indicated more about the first birthday of Zimbabwe’s “Second Republic” than Zanu-PF’s comparatively muted celebrations. </p>
<p>‘Queuing after the coup’ seemed an alliteration appropriate to this review of the two books, neither of which does justice to the enormity both of events in Zimbabwe as well as the sheer scale of what’s required to rebuild the country. </p>
<h2>The coup</h2>
<p>‘Romancing the <a href="https://www.commonsensemedia.org/movie-reviews/romancing-the-stone">coup’</a> could also characterise such tales. Ndlovu’s chronicle of Mnangagwa’s adventures bears the hallmarks of a roller-coaster thriller. <em>In the Jaws</em> excurses excitedly through “The Crocodile’s” firing from the vice-presidency, forced exile and escape, his Pretoria-based saviour, corrupt police (contrasted with brave soldier-saints), and his triumphant return to the treasures surely to follow his presidential inauguration. </p>
<p>Nyarota’s more sober historical take characterises former First Lady Grace Mugabe as someone whose treasure map bore little relation to the route she and her fellow plotters in “Generation-40” – the faction conniving to rid their party and country of “Lacoste” (a play on Mnangagwa’s nickname) group – took when they persuaded then President Mugabe to fire his longtime lackey.</p>
<p>Could military commander Constantino Chiwenga save the day and grab the treasure? Now a Vice-President, many credit Chiwenga with organising the “militarily assisted transition” allowing Mnangagwa to cross the river. <em>In The Jaws</em> celebrates the bromance between Chiwenga and Mnangagwa. But circumspection regarding such claims is cautioned. </p>
<p>The real gold lies under Zimbabwe’s putrid piles of economic ruin. Thus hopes are pinned on Mthuli Ncube, Zimbabwe’s new finance minister. These hopes are tied tightly to Zanu-PF’s factional fights for pieces of a Zimbabwean pie as ethereal as the electronic “money” used in the absence of real currency.</p>
<p>Ncube’s fantastical neo-liberal solutions are eerily reminiscent of the economic structural adjustment policies that during the 1990s’ precipitated Zimbabwe’s nosedive. Even the International Monetary Fund had to restrain Ncube’s exuberant <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2018-11-23-zimbabwe-announces--austerity-measures-to-spur-stalling-growth/">“Austerity for Prosperity”</a> <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/11/23/imf-pressures-ncube-on-reforms-sequence/">plans</a>. Matched with the ruling party’s scrambles and the poor’s impatience, roiling ensues.</p>
<p>Keynesians and neo-liberals alike have little to which they can look forward, although the Confederation of Zimbabwean Industry proclaims that industrial capacity rose <a href="https://www.sundaymail.co.zw/industry-optimistic-of-growth">by 5% in early 2018</a>. Yet just after mid-year, the little electoral legitimacy on which the global citadels of finance and investment banked slid away. The military killed at least six demonstrators while, as many say, its intelligence corps took over counting the election’s votes.</p>
<p>Neither of the two books portend much of the coup’s consequences. They improve on an unhappy catalogue of books on Zimbabwean politics. But the bar is low. The best that can be said of them is that they are good in parts. </p>
<h2>Map still missing</h2>
<p>Nyarota’s enthusiasm for the new régime is muted, but he’s very happy to see the back of Mugabe and his unruly wife. </p>
<p><em>Graceless</em> is more about their drawn-out fall than the coup per se. The elder Nyarota’s world-weary schadenfreude contrasts vividly with Ndlovu’s youthful exuberance. Nyarota’s historical depth, if meandering, gives necessary context to last year’s events. His insight into the near-coups in the 1970s that Ndlovu misses completely – when not misconstruing history – are valuable indeed. </p>
<p><em>Graceless</em> has no interviews: Mugabe’s minders refused Nyarota’s requests. Yet Ndlovu’s one-on-ones are mostly with the victors. </p>
<p>Of course, purported “Generation-40” leader and former cabinet minister Jonathan Moyo’s unstoppable stream of tweets and interviews from wherever resides his physical self, features prominently. But since they are accessible to anyone with internet they need deconstruction, not replication. </p>
<p>One would expect journalists to criticise Moyo’s nefarious role in his information portfolio (and many others). The elder and the younger don’t disappoint. Unsurprisingly, when the born-again constitutionalist Moyo was interviewed recently he judged Ndlovu’s work as a hagiography for <a href="https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2018/11/10/Big-Saturday-Read-One-year-after-the-Coup---A-Conversation-with-Professor-Jonathan-Moyo">Mnangagwa</a>. Unfortunately, Nyarota’s unpacking of Moyo’s past looks too much like Wikipedia to satisfy. </p>
<p>Moyo’s criticism of <em>In the Jaws</em> goes too far. But both books suggest more questions than answers. Even given publishers’ and the media rushes to keep up with insubstantial and fake news circulating via billions of clicks, this is not enough. Zimbabwe’s treasures haven’t been dug up yet, and these journalists-cum-authors haven’t drawn the map.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107097/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two new books about Zimbabwe deal with the coup in November 2017. But the country’s treasures haven’t been dug up yet.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1078402018-12-05T12:09:51Z2018-12-05T12:09:51ZLiberation hero Mugabe evokes polarised emotions among Zimbabweans<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/247966/original/file-20181129-170250-1fqyfc2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The end of Robert Mugabe’s rule was greeted with momentous national celebration. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Robert Mugabe’s name is <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/robert-mugabe">synonymous</a> with both Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle and its post-colonial politics. His role and that of his Zanu-PF party have been central to the country’s dynamics since the early 1960s – and could well set the tone for the foreseeable future. </p>
<p>For much of his political life Mugabe has often been viewed, in the words of one of his biographers <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=vQY4DgAAQBAJ&pg=PT23&lpg=PT23&dq=Martin+Meredith,+Mugabe+%22secretive+and+solitary%22&source=bl&ots=DmCK97xurM&sig=PymYcd-DCAyFl-2WFRS18fAIbao&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwijmNmroPneAhWQsKQKHZANDhAQ6AEwAnoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=Martin%20Meredith%2C%20Mugabe%20%22secretive%20and%20solitary%22&f=false">Martin Meredith</a>, as “secretive and solitary”, an “aloof and austere figure”.</p>
<p>However he is described, there’s no doubt that Mugabe’s political legacy is highly contested. To understand how this happened, it’s necessary to examine his personal history; his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/11/17/its-been-one-year-since-zimbabwe-toppled-mugabe-why-isnt-it-a-democracy-yet/?utm_term=.11c978401892">political demise</a> in 2017; and Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/19/zimbabwe-needs-aid-to-prevent-further-crisis-warns-ruling-party">deepening political and economic crisis</a> more than a year after Mugabe’s ouster.</p>
<p>For the faction that has succeeded Mugabe, led by President Emmerson Mnangagawa, moving beyond the highly problematic legacy that they helped to create remains a daunting task.</p>
<h2>Early life</h2>
<p>Robert Mugabe was born 94 years ago at Kutama Mission in Zvimba District, west of what was then called Salisbury, the capital of then <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Southern-Rhodesia">Southern Rhodesia</a> (today’s Zimbabwe). He received a <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/africa/robert-mugabe">Jesuit education</a> and was by many accounts an exceptional student.</p>
<p>In 1945 Mugabe left Kutama Mission with a teaching diploma. He won a scholarship to South Africa’s Fort Hare University in 1949. There he met other emerging nationalists and was <a href="http://www.channelafrica.co.za/sabc/home/channelafrica/news/details?id=7aa25498-9448-4324-89c2-e4f62a324e17&title=The%20rise%20and%20fall%20of%20Mugabe">introduced to Marxist ideas</a>. </p>
<p>Armed with a BA degree in history and English Literature, Mugabe returned to Southern Rhodesia in 1952. He soon moved to the Northern Rhodesia (today’s Zambia) in 1955 to take up a teaching post. In 1958 he moved again, to a teacher training college in Ghana. There, a year after Ghana’s independence in 1957, he experienced the thrill and sense of possibility of a newly independent African state. It was a seminal political moment for him.</p>
<h2>Making of a revolutionary</h2>
<p>Mugabe returned home in 1960 on extended leave to introduce his new wife <a href="https://www.zambianobserver.com/the-forgotten-story-of-sally-mugabe-the-beloved-mother-of-zimbabwe-robert-mugabes-first-wife-and-true-love-the-woman-whose-death-changed-president-mugabe-forever/">Sally Hayfron</a> to his family. Instead of returning to Ghana, he became entangled in nationalist politics. This included the turmoil that the two major nationalist parties, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/30035743?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu) and Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu)</a>, split. </p>
<p>In 1963 he was arrested, along with many other nationalists. He was <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2011/10/dtente-the-release-of-nationalist/">released</a> after 11 years. </p>
<p>Mugabe and his colleague <a href="https://pindula.co.zw/Edgar_Tekere">Edgar Tekere</a> escaped to Mozambique in 1974 to join the liberation war against the regime of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ian-Smith">Prime Minister Ian Smith</a>, conducted from bases in that country. There have been different accounts of Mugabe’s rise to the top of the leadership in Mozambique. As liberation war veteran <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/a-real-zimbabwean-war-veteran-speaks-97206">Wilfred Mhanda tells it</a>, their support for Mugabe was premised on his commitment to building unity between the rival nationalist movements. </p>
<p>But he reneged on this, instead pursuing the supremacy of his own party Zanu.</p>
<p>Following the Lancaster House settlement and the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40395186?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">1980 elections</a>, Mugabe’s Zanu emerged as the dominant party. He set out his policy of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24hd4n.7?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">reconciliation with the white population</a>. This allowed the existing property and economic relations from the Rhodesian period to continue, while the politics of state control was transferred to Zanu. </p>
<p>This period witnessed the consolidation of Mugabe’s control of both his party and the state. The massive violence committed against the competing party of liberation, <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Zimbabwe_African_People's_Union">Zapu</a>, through the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Gukurahundi massacres</a>, signalled Zanu’s violent intolerance of opposition. </p>
<p>However, the 1980s were also evidence of Mugabe’s commitment to social policies such as health and education. Mugabe’s government greatly expanded the state expenditure in these areas in the <a href="http://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/zimbabwe.-the-political-economy-of-transition-1980-1986">first decade of independence</a>. </p>
<p>The hostilities between Zapu, led by Joshua Nkomo, and Mugabe’s Zanu officially ended with the signing of a <a href="https://pindula.co.zw/Unity_Accord">Unity Accord</a> by the two leaders on December 22, 1987. Zapu was effectively swallowed by Zanu PF. The ruling party had used the acronym since the end of the brief Patriotic Front coalition (1976-79) between the two liberation parties, on the eve of the 1980 elections. </p>
<h2>Things go south</h2>
<p>During the 1990s, opposition to Mugabe <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/300366769_The_Movement_for_Democratic_Change_MDC_and_the_Changing_Geo-Political_Landscape_in_Zimbabwe">grew</a> in size and influence. Faced with the real possibility of political defeat – and dissent from the war veterans – Mugabe drew on <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/zimbabwe/ZimLand0302-02.htm">longstanding land grievances</a> to reconfigure the politics of the state and Zanu-PF. </p>
<p>His <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358530500082916">Fast Track Resettlement</a> programme radically reconstructed the land relations from the settler colonial period. There is a continuing debate about the effects of the land redistribution exercise. It resulted in the violent allocation of land to a combination of large numbers of small farmers and the ruling party elite, and its long term impact on the country’s economy remains problematic.</p>
<p>The process also created a massive rupture between <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/111691/P202.pdf">human and redistributive rights </a>. By legitimising the Fast Track programme, Zanu-PF emphasised economic redistribution and settling the colonial legacy around the land question. </p>
<p>But in doing so, the ruling party opportunistically labelled the fight for human and democratic political rights – which had long been central to the anti-colonial struggle – as a foreign <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/sunday-times/20180218/282342565314857">“regime change agenda”</a> pushed by the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and civic movements. </p>
<p>The politics of the land reform process unleashed many questions around citizenship, belonging, and assertions of identity. Mugabe’s often valid critique of imperialist duplicity was accompanied by an unacceptable authoritarian intolerance of dissent within Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>The armed forces were <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-mugabe-why-the-role-of-zimbabwes-army-cant-be-trusted-87872">central to his stay in power</a>. The push in his final years to have his wife Grace succeed him heralded a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/mugabe-announces-appointment-of-controversial-wife-grace-to-a-key-post-20170915">longer term reign for a Mugabe dynasty</a>. To further his wife’s ambitions, Mugabe first moved against Vice President Joyce Mujuru, the favoured contender to succeed him, in <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/clues-to-successor-as-mugabe-names-vice-president/a-18122886">2014</a>.</p>
<p>Next, the Mugabes, with the support of a faction of Zanu-PF known as the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics-g40-factbox/factbox-key-figures-in-zimbabwe-first-lady-grace-mugabes-g40-faction-idUSKBN1DF1DX">G40 group</a>, took on another potential successor, Vice President Mnangagwa. He was dismissed from his state and party positions in <a href="https://www.chronicle.co.zw/mnangagwa-fired-disloyal-disrespectful-deceitful2/">early November 2017</a>.</p>
<p>This set off a dramatic series of events. In mid- November 2017, following military chief Constantine Chiwenga’s warning of <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/counter-revolutionaries-want-to-destroy-zanu-pf-army-chief-tells-mugabe-20171113">“counter-revolutionaries”</a> in the ruling party, the armed forces <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-military-coup-is-afoot-in-zimbabwe-whats-next-for-the-embattled-nation-87528">effectively took power</a> away from the executive. </p>
<p>This was followed by the initiation of an impeachment process against Mugabe. But, on the day the process began, in November 2017, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">he resigned</a>. </p>
<h2>End of an era</h2>
<p>For many Zimbabweans Mugabe remains a contested figure. For those who lived through the humiliations of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/720978?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">settler colonialism</a>, his strident critique of its legacies still ring true. But others will find it impossible to accept his exclusivist assertions of <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-129803.html">national belonging</a> and authoritarian intolerance of dissent.</p>
<p>When combined with the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249599119_Zimbabwe_Now_The_Political_Economy_of_Crisis_and_Coercion">deep economic crisis</a> over which he presided, it is little surprise that the end of Mugabe’s rule was greeted with such momentous national celebration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107840/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Raftopoulos is a Research Fellow in the International Studies Group at the University of the Free State, and Research Director of Solidarity Peace Trust a Human Right Organisation working on Zimbabwe . </span></em></p>For many Zimbabweans Robert Mugabe will remain a contested figure.Brian Raftopoulos, Research Fellow, International Studies Group, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1048662018-10-17T11:43:05Z2018-10-17T11:43:05ZMnangagwa’s been wooing Zimbabwe’s white sports heroes. Here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240597/original/file-20181015-165897-1pg283n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwean Olympic gold medallist swimmer, Kirsty Coventry, with President Emmerson Mnangagwa after taking the oath of office.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Aaron Ufumeli/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sport in general, and particularly gifted sports people, have been known to rouse feelings of national unity. In the process, they instil a sense of patriotism and pride in their countries. Good examples include <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41824586">George Weah</a>, the soccer legend from Liberia now the president of his country and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-19844270">Imran Khan</a>, the cricketing star from Pakistan, now its prime minister. Notable sports figures have managed, to some extent, to unify their troubled nations. In the process they have shown how powerful a force sport can be. </p>
<p>This salient observation has not escaped Zimbabwe’s newly elected president, <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=Emmerson+Mnangagwa">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>. In a bid to restore and paper over the badly damaged relations between the governing Zanu-PF party and the country’s white community both inside and outside Zimbabwe, Mnangagwa has <a href="https://www.sport24.co.za/OtherSport/WaterSport/olympic-swimmer-coventry-named-zimbabwes-sport-minister-20180907">appointed</a> the former swimming sensation, <a href="https://www.kirstycoventry.com/">Kirsty Coventry</a> as Minister of Youth, Sport, Arts and Recreation. </p>
<p>The 35-year-old is a seven time <a href="https://afrotourism.com/travelogue/city-icon-kirsty-coventry-harare/">Olympic medallist</a>. She is the only African to break the 1:00 min barrier in the womens 100m backstroke. She also has the highest number of individual Olympic medals of all female swimmers in history.</p>
<p>But Coventry’s appointment is not where Mnangagwa ended. He also reached out to
the flamboyant footballer, Bruce Grobbelaar, the former goalkeeper for the Zimbabwean national football team as well as British football club Liverpool whose nickname is “Jungleman”. In an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2018/oct/01/bruce-grobbelaar-interview-donald-mcrae">interview</a> he described Mnangagwa’s call which started with the president saying: “Hello, Jungleman, how are you?”</p>
<p>By wooing Coventry and Grobbelaar, Mnangagwa is clearly hoping to achieve a number of outcomes. The first is that he is hoping to repair the damaged relations between Zanu-PF and Zimbabwe’s white community. As a long shot, he might also be hoping that this will help normalise relations with the West which could, in turn, unblock much needed foreign direct investment. </p>
<p>Working with the hugely popular Coventry and equally liked Grobbelaar could also lure the young urban electorate back to Zanu-PF. They left the party in droves for the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) when it was <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zimbabwe-opposition-leader-says-winning-election-resoundingly-20180731">launched</a> in 1999. </p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>When Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980 the country’s <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/demography/population/zimbabwe?year=1980">population</a> stood at just over 7 million people. The white population was around 230 000. This began to decline steadily white Zimbabweans began to emigrate to countries such as South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. The exodus increased significantly after 2000, when the Zanu-PF government began embarking on violent land grabs that resulted in Zimbabwe’s economy going into meltdown.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20140901192722/http://www.zimstat.co.zw/dmdocuments/Census/CensusResults2012/National_Report.pdf">last census in 2012</a>, put the number of white Zimbabweans at 28 000. This community has been very active and is still, to a limited extent, influential, in sectors such as agriculture, mining and manufacturing. Whites have also traditionally been active in sports such as cricket, rugby and swimming.</p>
<p>Zanu-PF’s fractured relationship with the white community dates back to Robert Mugabe’s rule. He presided over the breakdown in relations when he began implementing a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/zimbabwe/ZimLand0302-02.htm">violent land reform programme</a> which ended up benefiting Zanu-PF members and chiefs. </p>
<p>But relations hadn’t always been bad between the party and white Zimbabweans. At the advent of independence, Mugabe famously <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/mugabe-on-reconciliation">pleaded</a> with the white community:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Stay with us, please remain in this country and constitute a nation based on national unity.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And in 1980 Mugabe retained white Zimbabweans such as <a href="http://www.themukiwa.com/rhodesianwar/Ken_Flower.htm">Ken Flower</a>. Flower had been in charge of Rhodesian prime minister Ian Smith’s intelligence services which had been accused of masterminding the assassination of some of Zimbabwe’s leading nationalists such as Herbert Chitepo and Jason Ziyapapa Moyo. </p>
<p>Mugabe also appointed white ministers such as <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2007/12/save-lives-and-talk-to-mugabe-denis-norman/">Dennis Norman</a> (agriculture) and advocate <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/08/21/requiem-for-advocate-chris-andersen">Chris Andersen</a> (mines) to his first cabinet. </p>
<p>But this rosy relationship <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3557390">turned sour</a> in 1999 when the white community rejected a draft national constitution that included a clause on redistributing the country’s most fertile land – the bulk of which was in the hands of around 4 000 White farmers – without compensation.</p>
<p>This set the scene for violent land seizures. This, in turn, resulted in <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sc9396.doc.htm">sanctions</a> being imposed on Zimbabwe by a number of Western nations. These only served to harden Mugabe’s resolve towards the white farmers. In a presidential election rally in 2002, he <a href="http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3df4aaf46.pdf">thundered</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Our party must continue to strike fear in the heart of the white man, our real enemy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the intervening years Zimbabwe’s political and economic landscapes have continued to deteriorate as the country became a pariah state and a basket case. This was largely because of the punishing ramifications of the sanctions and the corruption and ineptitude of the Mugabe regime.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe’s economic crisis reached its peak in 2008 when hyperinflation reached a stupendous 231 million percent, officially, even though leading inflation experts such as Steve Hanke <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/zimbabwe-inflation/hyperinflation-threat-returns-to-zimbabwe-idUSL8N1N22JU">estimate</a> that the country’s inflation rate far exceeded the official figure.</p>
<h2>Picking up the pieces</h2>
<p>For his part, Mnangagwa has always cultivated good relations with white Zimbabweans. This goes back to the 1980s when he had cordial working relationships with people like Flower who were in intelligence. </p>
<p>In later years, Mnangagwa has been <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/news/national/145285">linked</a> to a number of white business people in some of his business ventures. </p>
<p>In mending the relations with the white community by roping in Coventry and Grobbelaar, Mnangagwa might just have pulled off a masterstroke. He must be hoping it will eventually help extricate Zimbabwe from its economic quagmire.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104866/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tapiwa Chagonda has in the past received funding from the South African National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>In mending the relations with Zimbabwe’s white community by roping in Kirsty Coventry and Bruce Grobbelaar, President Mnangagwa might just have pulled off a masterstroke.Tapiwa Chagonda, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.