tag:theconversation.com,2011:/es/topics/cabinet-papers-1994-95-47857/articlesCabinet papers 1994-95 – The Conversation2017-12-31T14:19:05Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/890132017-12-31T14:19:05Z2017-12-31T14:19:05ZKeating’s Working Nation plan for jobs was hijacked by bureaucracy: cabinet papers 1994-95<p>The White Paper called Working Nation became the Labor government’s major economic statement in Paul Keating’s second term. However, the policy was principally an after-the-fact attempt to clean up a mess in the labour market and be seen to be doing something even if a little belatedly.</p>
<p>Cabinet papers released today by the National Archives of Australia show the white paper began as a rational exercise but was soon overtaken by pressing contingencies and the desire to make the policy everything to everyone. While concerned ministers were anxious to reposition the government in the midst of an ongoing recession, the process of preparing the new White Paper became an exercise in opportunism and bureaucratic capture. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cabinet-papers-1994-95-how-the-republic-was-doomed-without-a-directly-elected-president-88394">Cabinet papers 1994-95: How the republic was doomed without a directly elected president</a>
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<h2>How Working Nation was formed</h2>
<p>On 15th December 1993 the Keating government released a significant draft policy entitled <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/cib/1994-95/95cib01.pdf">Restoring Full Employment</a> – a nostalgic resonance to the original war-time <a href="http://www.billmitchell.org/White_Paper_1945/index.html">Full Employment paper of 1945</a>. Australia’s unemployment rate at the time was a staggering 10% and while younger school leavers found it hard to find work or were actively discouraged, many older workers (especially males) were being thrown out of jobs, many never to work again. </p>
<p>Paradoxically, unemployment had not featured significantly in the 1993 election (which was fought on the GST), but Labor was now worried that if nothing was done about the deterioration in the labour market (and specifically job creation) then the government would not hold onto office in 1996.</p>
<p>In early February 1994, the Keating cabinet began work on a follow up government policy statement provisionally entitled: a White Paper on Employment and Industry. </p>
<p>The resulting Working Nation paper was one of five “Nation” statements favoured by the two Keatings (Paul the PM and Mike his head of department, not related). The cabinet papers show it began life with the worthy goal of “achieving sustainable high economic growth,” but soon became a “jobs and training compact” to reduce long-term unemployment. </p>
<h2>What Working Nation was designed to do</h2>
<p>Working Nation was meant to provide an employment strategy, stimulate regional development, introduce a new industry policy, and assist Australia “going global” in expanded trade opportunities. Ministers hoped the policy would lead the economic transformation of Australia. </p>
<p>It began life under ministers Kim Beazley (then head of the Department for Employment, Education and Training) and Peter Baldwin (Department of Social Security). The focus was on the job seekers who would be helped by individual case management, but with the insistence on “reciprocal obligation” - that those on income support had a responsibility to stay in education, be in training or doing other productive work.</p>
<p>But this obligation could easily be evaded through the misuse of medical certificates. Only women over 40 whose partners were unemployed were spared these expectations.</p>
<p>In its implementation by the federal bureaucracy, and the beleaguered Commonwealth Employment Service in particular, the policy descended into a treadmill of labour market programs. There was a saturation of jobs advertisements in the media – that even <a href="https://www.allenandunwin.com/browse/books/academic-professional/social-work/Social-Policy-Public-Policy-Meredith-Edwards-Cosmo-Howard-and-Robin-Miller-9781864489484">according to senior administrators</a> led to considerable “churning” of people through 12-18 month job compacts back onto the unemployment queues. </p>
<h2>Cost blow outs</h2>
<p>Cabinet deliberations at the time show two prominent political aspects of the policy. First, when money was up for grabs the policy intent expanded exponentially and ministers from tangential portfolios rushed to put their hands up for a share of the proceeds.</p>
<p>Second, fiscal circumstances were tight at the time, but costings for the multi-faceted White Paper went from estimates of A$200 to A$300 million for income support, to A$1 billion to A$1.4 billion a few days later. Then it became a maximum of A$1.7 billion. </p>
<p>When the program was announced in May 1994 it came in at an annual cost of A$2 billion, with claims of a total cost of A$6.5 billion before it was wound up in 1996.</p>
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<span class="caption">Ministers like Simon Crean were largely left out of the process of forming the policy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">National Archives of Australia</span></span>
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<p>The formulation process showed how a determined bunch of policy entrepreneurs, senior bureaucrats led by the head of Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and academic economists, were able to drive a policy response based on detailed research and theoretical propositions. Social Security bureaucrats were also able to exploit the opportunity to implement their own preferred policy adjustments, almost unrelated to the main thrust of the policy statements. At the same time these bureaucratic players largely marginalised ministers in the process. Indeed, the 1994 Employment Minister Simon Crean had to be briefed by officials on the content of the policy when Working Nation was released. </p>
<p>Moreover, these insider policy entrepreneurs carefully sidelined the government’s main economic adviser, the Treasury department, during the whole process. This perhaps reflects the deep suspicion of some of these actors to the ideological bent of the then Treasury officials. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cabinet-papers-1994-95-how-a-security-agreement-allayed-australian-anxiety-over-indonesia-89143">Cabinet papers 1994-95: How a security agreement allayed Australian anxiety over Indonesia</a>
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<p>While a jobs training package sounded a simple response to a pressing problem, the Working Nation policy created more headaches for a government with umbilical links to the trade union movement. There was contention over a “training wage,” whether it should be greater than the Newstart allowance and how it related to the minimum wage. There was also debate on whether workers could jobshare (which was not endorsed by cabinet) and how increased income support impacted on housing and rental relief measures. </p>
<p>Working Nation was a classic case of just how complex and interrelated such well-intentioned policy statements can become when they cut across other areas of established policy. </p>
<p>Even before it was wound up, there were concerns, noted by cabinet, that the program was not achieving its objectives and that those on the Job Compacts program remained without work when their program entitlements expired. </p>
<p>Even after economic growth in Australia improved, the unemployment rate remained stubbornly stuck at 8.5% before the 1996 election, - an election at which Labor suffered a heavy defeat. Working Nation led to the Commonwealth Employment Service being disestablished and replaced by the now familiar network of private or community job-seeker agencies delivering services under competitive contracts. </p>
<p>While Working Nation was a major economic and social policy statement of the government, it was an inadequate response (too late and too slow) to the imperatives of the 1991-92 recession. And in the process of producing the White Paper, strategically placed insiders grabbed the opportunity to flex their own policy muscles inserting their preferred options into the statement. </p>
<p>Once released, Working Nation had a short-lead in time for implementation (eight weeks) placing huge burdens on a centralised bureaucracy, not generally equipped to respond so receptively to such demands. Working Nation highlighted not only the policy-making inadequacies of the federal government but also the tardy delivery capacity of large unwieldy bureaucratic organisations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89013/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Wanna does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Cabinet papers released today by the National Archives show Working Nation began as a rational exercise but was soon overtaken by a desire to make the policy everything to everyone.John Wanna, Sir John Bunting Chair of Public Administration, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/894902017-12-31T14:19:01Z2017-12-31T14:19:01ZCabinet papers 1994-95: Keating’s climate policy grapples sound eerily familiar<p>A highly publicised international deal on climate change is two years old. Australia’s federal government, under pressure from environmentalists and with a new prime minister at the helm, signs up and <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-to-ratify-the-paris-climate-deal-under-a-large-trump-shaped-shadow-68586">quickly ratifies it</a>. However, its emissions reductions actions don’t work, and the government faces a dilemma: strengthen the measures (including perhaps carbon pricing), or keep cooking up voluntary measures, spiced with a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-federal-climate-policy-review-a-recipe-for-business-as-usual-89372">dash of creative accounting</a>.</p>
<p>While the paragraph above might just as well describe the present day, it also sums up the situation in 1994, when Paul Keating’s government was wrestling with Australia’s climate policy. The period is better remembered for <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/133332774">angry timber industry workers blockading Parliament</a>, but there were also important battles over carbon pricing and Australia’s international negotiating position.</p>
<p>Cabinet papers from 1994 and 1995, <a href="http://naa.gov.au/collection/explore/cabinet/by-year/index.aspx">released today</a> by the National Archives of Australia, show how Keating’s cabinet fought an internal civil war over how to respond to climate change, while working hard to protect Australia’s fossil fuel exports.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-30-years-since-scientists-first-warned-of-climate-threats-to-australia-88314">It's 30 years since scientists first warned of climate threats to Australia</a>
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<h2>International pressure building</h2>
<p>Two years previously, in 1992, Australia’s environment minister Ros Kelly had <a href="https://theconversation.com/twenty-five-years-of-australian-climate-pledges-trumped-78651">enthusiastically signed up</a> to the new <a href="https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf">United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)</a> at the Rio Earth Summit. Australia’s willingness to support targets and timetables for emissions reductions (something the United States ultimately vetoed) gave it credibility. </p>
<p>Australia used this credibility to propound a “fossil fuel clause,” which made the now-familiar argument that:</p>
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<p>…economies that are highly dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export, and/or consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products and/or the use of fossil fuels … have serious difficulties in switching to alternatives.</p>
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<p>The cabinet papers released today reveal that defending this clause was a major preoccupation of the government of the day.</p>
<p>In early 1994 Ros Kelly’s political career was brought low by the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/close-keating-ally-resigns-in-grants-scandal-1426241.html">“sports rorts” affair</a>. She was briefly replaced by Graham Richardson, and then the highly respected John Faulkner.</p>
<p>By this time, all climate eyes were on the first UNFCCC summit, to be held in Berlin in March-April 1995. As an August 1994 cabinet memo noted: </p>
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<p>…international pressure is mounting to strengthen the Convention’s emission reduction commitments,</p>
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<p>…Australia’s measures will fall short of reaching greenhouse gas emission targets and that Australia’s greenhouse performance is likely to compare unfavourably with that of most other OECD countries.</p>
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<p>This was a reference to the 1992 <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AUMPLawJl/1997/48.pdf">National Greenhouse Response Strategy</a>, which was already being shown to be toothless, with state governments approving new coal-fired
power stations and renewable energy ignored. Environmentalists wanted more mandatory action; business wanted to keep everything voluntary. After a roundtable hosted by Keating in June, cabinet debated climate change in August.</p>
<p>The political calculations involved are evident in the official record, which states: </p>
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<p>[Australia’s] ability to influence international negotiations away from unqualified, binding uniform emissions commitments towards approaches that better reflect Australia’s interests will be inhibited by a relatively poor domestic greenhouse response.</p>
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<p>And what are Australia’s national interests? It won’t surprise you to learn that the government worried that:</p>
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<p>…action by the international community could have a major impact on Australia’s energy sector and on the economy in general, by changing the nature and pattern of domestic energy use and/or by changing the world market for energy for Australian exporters.</p>
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<p>Cabinet pondered finding international allies – such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland and New Zealand – for the get-out-of-jail idea of “burden sharing”, which would allow countries to finesse their climate commitments by funding emissions reductions elsewhere.</p>
<p>Cabinet also canvassed the possibility of adopting either a proactive or reactive stance, or even withdrawing from the UN climate negotiations altogether. That last option – one that in essence would be adopted by John Howard, at least after George Bush opened up that space in 2001 by withdrawing from Kyoto – was seen as too risky. While the UNFCCC didn’t contain provisions for banning imports from recalcitrant countries, nevertheless:</p>
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<p>As a major exporter of energy and energy intensive products, Australia would need to be involved in the negotiations to guard against the possibility of this occurring.</p>
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<h2>Carbon tax?</h2>
<p>Faulkner had already flagged that he would bring a proposal to December 1994’s cabinet meeting, possibly including a small carbon tax – something the Greens, Democrats and Australian Conservation Foundation were <a href="https://theconversation.com/tax-or-trade-the-war-on-carbon-pricing-has-been-raging-for-decades-46008">all pushing for</a>.</p>
<p>His opponents were ready, with a two-pronged approach. First, they produced economic modelling (with, it later emerged, <a href="http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/26286/investigation_1998_01.pdf">significant help from fossil fuel companies</a>), which warned that “to stabilise emissions at 1988 levels by 2000, taxes per tonne of CO₂ would need to be around US$192 for Australia and US$24 for the OECD.</p>
<p>So far, so frightening. But given that decisions reached at the Berlin summit might have consequences for Australia’s prized coal exports, some sort of
response was necessary. Fortunately, the Department of Primary Industry and Energy had prepared a document, called Response to Greenhouse Challenge "in consultation with key industry organisations” such as the Business Council of Australia. This had provided a “basis for discussions with industry and incorporates the key principles that industry wants included in the scheme”.</p>
<p>The carbon tax decision was deferred, and ultimately after a series of meetings in February 1995, Faulkner was forced to concede defeat. A purely voluntary scheme – the “Greenhouse Challenge” – was agreed, with industry signing on to what was essentially a reboot of the demonstrably ineffective National Greenhouse Response Strategy.</p>
<p>The Berlin meeting did lead to a call for <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09644019508414218">binding emissions cuts for developed countries</a>, and
Australia signed on, albeit grudgingly. By the end of the year, the same industry-funded modelling was used to produce a <a href="https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/2351285">glossy report</a> which argued that Australia deserved special consideration because of the makeup of its economy. Australian diplomats would use this argument as a basis of their lobbying all the way through to the 1997 Kyoto climate summit.</p>
<p>In one of history’s ironies, on the same day that this report was released – December 1, 1995 – Keating’s cabinet discussed “the development of a more comprehensive effort in greenhouse science”, noting that: </p>
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<p>Climate change is capable of impacting severely on coastal infrastructure, living marine resources and coastal ecosystems such as reefs. The Australian
regional oceans strongly influence global climate, and Australia is vulnerable to oceanic changes affecting rainfall and possibly the incidence of tropical cyclones.</p>
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<p>A look at <a href="https://theconversation.com/2017-the-year-in-extreme-weather-88765">2017’s weather</a> tells you they may have been onto something there.</p>
<p><em><strong>Read more</strong>: <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-ten-years-since-rudds-great-moral-challenge-and-we-have-failed-it-75534">It’s ten years since Kevin Rudd’s ‘great moral challenge’, and we have failed it</a></em></p>
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<h2>The ominous parallels</h2>
<p>As I pointed out in <a href="https://theconversation.com/cabinet-papers-1992-93-australia-reluctant-while-world-moves-towards-first-climate-treaty-70535">last year’s cabinet records article</a>, “when it comes to climate policy, there are no real secrets worthy of the name. We have always known that the Australian state quickly retreated from its already hedged promise to take action, and told us all along that this was because we had a lot of coal”.</p>
<p>Reading these documents is a bit like yelling at a person in a horror movie not to open the door behind which the killer lurks. You know it is futile, but you just can’t help yourself. The December 1994 cabinet minutes contain sentences like this:</p>
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<p>Greenhouse is expected to generate future commercial opportunities for Australia with increased export of renewable energy technology e.g. photovoltaic, wind and mini-hydro technology, especially in the Asia-Pacific Region [to] support renewables.</p>
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<p>At yet, several governments later, we’re stuck having the same debates while standing by and letting other countries embrace those exact opportunities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89490/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marc Hudson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Paul Keating’s government, faced with the prospect of international action on climate change, took steps to preserve the coal industry - a tactic that has been rebooted many times since.Marc Hudson, PhD Candidate, Sustainable Consumption Institute, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/883952017-12-31T14:18:24Z2017-12-31T14:18:24ZCabinet papers 1994-95: The Keating government begins to craft its legacy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199625/original/file-20171218-17889-1mh1c3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Keating drove a policy agenda that had been rallied after the 1993 victory.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/NAA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>If Labor was surprised by its re-election <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_federal_election,_1993">in March 1993</a> – the “sweetest victory of them all”, as Paul Keating claimed – there was, for months before the 1996 election was called, much less confidence in government ranks that it could hang on.</p>
<p>They were right. A 6.17% first-preference swing <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_federal_election,_1996">against Labor</a> in 1996 confirmed the momentum John Howard’s Coalition leadership had built over the previous year. The political mood was shifting decisively.</p>
<p>Howard pitched to the values of the “battlers”, <a href="https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/2357256">affirming</a> “the Australia I believe in”. In contrast, Don Watson, Keating’s speechwriter, <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/06/10/1022982811918.html">recalls that</a> the “big picture” reforms of Keating’s prime ministership “never found a place for the people” in testing those values. </p>
<p>Political scientists Paul Strangio, Paul t’Hart and James Walter <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=wecvDwAAQBAJ">add that</a>, after 1993, Keating became ever-more dominant in “a small clique of very senior colleagues”. He drove a policy agenda that had been rallied after the 1993 victory.</p>
<p>There were big ambitions, like Working Nation, and big symbols, like the republic. These initiatives were part of a push through 1994 and 1995, as revealed in the cabinet papers released today by the National Archives of Australia, to ensure a legacy for the program Labor had crafted since 1983.</p>
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<p><em><strong>Further reading: <a href="https://theconversation.com/cabinet-papers-1994-95-how-the-republic-was-doomed-without-a-directly-elected-president-88394">Cabinet papers 1994-95: How the republic was doomed without a directly elected president</a></strong></em></p>
<p><em><strong>Further reading: <a href="https://theconversation.com/keatings-working-nation-plan-for-jobs-was-hijacked-by-bureaucracy-cabinet-papers-1994-95-89013">Keating’s Working Nation plan for jobs was hijacked by bureaucracy: cabinet papers 1994-95</a></strong></em></p>
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<p>In that process, the term “benchmarking” figured repeatedly in the cabinet submissions ministers debated. It was time to take stock of what had been achieved, in terms of reform, expectations of it, and principles that could not be undone by their successors. </p>
<h2>Changing attitudes to social policy</h2>
<p>The measures of such impact included a vital element of attitudinal change. </p>
<p>In social policy, ministers were assured that the past ten years marked a decisive shift for people with disabilities from a welfare approach to a “human-rights-based focus”, measured in labour market access. Cabinet called for regular reports to track how effectively this support continued to move from the margins of specialised programs to mainstream provision.</p>
<p>Other measures included a standard pension rate of 25% of male total average weekly earnings, a target of 100 residential care places per 1,000 population aged over 70 by 2001, and a child support system that fostered “a change in the community ethos” with regard to the obligations of separated parents. </p>
<p>In May 1994, cabinet endorsed tackling the more “legally complex or controversial issues” identified in the 1992 <a href="http://www.voced.edu.au/content/ngv%3A18075">Half Way to Equal report</a> on women’s rights. Among them was a commitment to target potential pregnancy “as a ground of prohibited discrimination”.</p>
<p>As Labor’s 1994 national conference adopted a commitment to a 35% quota of safe seats for women candidates by 2002, these issues achieved a clearer place in public debate.</p>
<p>Reforms in public and community housing were aimed at increasing the co-ordination of federal and state governments in delivering stock to meet diverse needs. The beneficiaries of such attention, it was argued, would include people with psychological illness. The minister concerned, Brian Howe, pushed for the principle that rent in such housing should not exceed 30% of income.</p>
<h2>Progress on Indigenous Australians</h2>
<p>For Indigenous Australians, ministers agreed that “priority be given to social benchmarks” for housing and also health and community support, employment and education. Together they would hold agencies accountable for the delivery of services, rather than simply describing the conditions to those receiving them.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199626/original/file-20171218-17842-1k37iik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199626/original/file-20171218-17842-1k37iik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199626/original/file-20171218-17842-1k37iik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=934&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199626/original/file-20171218-17842-1k37iik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=934&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199626/original/file-20171218-17842-1k37iik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=934&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199626/original/file-20171218-17842-1k37iik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1173&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199626/original/file-20171218-17842-1k37iik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1173&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199626/original/file-20171218-17842-1k37iik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1173&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The Aboriginal flag and the Torres Strait Islander flag were granted ‘Flag of Australia’ status in 1995.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/NAA</span></span>
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<p>The minister, Robert Tickner, urged that consultation with Indigenous clients must take into account that their “reluctance … to provide information” reflected “a more complex, historical issue”. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission’s work as a national representative body was seen as integral to overcoming this challenge.</p>
<p>The new National Native Title Tribunal brought sharp focus to these concerns. Keating urged that this body must have sufficient authority to counter the “implacable” opposition of interests and governments such as that in Western Australia. </p>
<p>Cabinet also moved to establish an Indigenous land acquisition program. The May 1995 launch of a National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families, followed by the official gazettal of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander flags, further consolidated a network of recognition it would not be easy to unravel.</p>
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<p><em><strong>Further reading: <a href="https://theconversation.com/cabinet-papers-1992-93-keating-government-fights-for-indigenous-rights-on-multiple-fronts-70059">Cabinet papers 1992-93: Keating government fights for Indigenous rights on multiple fronts</a></strong></em></p>
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<h2>Labour market reform</h2>
<p>Indigenous affairs had some of the elements of “compassion” and “justice” Keating spoke of returning to politics. This pushed the boundaries of prevailing values. </p>
<p>Yet, with promising economic forecasts in early 1994, ministers were also keen to ensure there was no backsliding in the stricter discipline of microeconomic reform. </p>
<p>Having recently bedded-down principles of enterprise bargaining, cabinet was advised in March 1994 that the still-fragile foundations of a “productivity culture” were too vulnerable to “unrealistic” expectations developing in workplaces across Australia to risk any further iterations of the Prices and Incomes Accord. </p>
<p>A cabinet submission claimed that “it may be necessary to push the limits of what is acceptable” to the unions, and instead “establish benchmark criteria to assist employers in responding to claims”. </p>
<hr>
<p><em><strong>Further reading: <a href="https://theconversation.com/cabinet-papers-1992-93-the-rise-and-fall-of-enterprise-bargaining-agreements-70139">Cabinet papers 1992-93: the rise and fall of enterprise bargaining agreements</a></strong></em></p>
<hr>
<p>While sticking to this message, ministers still worried that the people seemed not to be travelling with them. In mid-1994 they decided to appoint an independent consultant to probe the question of why reported poverty levels had not declined, “despite all the measures taken over the last decade”.</p>
<p>Cabinet’s Social Policy Committee regarded the evidence informing such analysis as a “statistical artefact”. The Department of Social Security ventured that the long-term impact of labour market deregulation might help explain such sentiments. Finance countered that an already overgenerous social welfare system acted as “a disincentive to efforts to improve private incomes”. </p>
<p>As economic signals wavered through 1994 and 1995 – despite Keating’s assurance with the 1995 budget that “this is as good as it gets” – the challenge of inclusion grew. </p>
<p>There were some benchmarks, clearly, that were up for debate within a cabinet still pushing Australian economic as well as social transformation.</p>
<h2>Climate change becomes a more pressing concern</h2>
<p>There were also some benchmarks that were troubling on a larger scale. </p>
<p>Over 1994 and 1995, the government was briefed on the extent to which global commitments were already proving insufficient to stabilise atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… at a level that would prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>And even within the concessions Australia had won in those formula as an “emissions-intensive economy”, it was “only likely to achieve 46–53%” of its target by 2000.</p>
<p>Enhanced support for “greenhouse science” was identified as one option Australia might pursue in preserving its international reputation on these issues. More was required if we were to hold our standing in relation to vulnerable island states of the South Pacific. And more was required at home.</p>
<p>Major decisions were being taken that were “contrary to the terms of the 1992 National Greenhouse Response Strategy”. As ministers were told, Western Australia’s new Collie Power Station would “provide electricity at a higher cost than gas-powered alternatives”. The “extension of the electricity grid to outback areas of NSW ignored the potential for lower cost solar energy”. </p>
<p>Decisions to defer minimum energy standards for appliances showed “little more than lip service” to the fundamental issues of climate change. What was the point of such benchmarks if nothing was done to observe them?</p>
<p>If the 1996 vote reflected an electorate wearied of “big picture” reform, it was clear that the Keating government itself was seeking indicators that could affirm and entrench its achievements. Not all were easily found. </p>
<p>But, in retrospect, several do still stand up as enduring principles, and/or as markers around which a good deal of political conflict was to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88395/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Brown does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After 1993, Paul Keating became ever-more dominant in cabinet policy discussions to ensure a legacy for the Labor government.Nicholas Brown, Professor in History, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/883942017-12-31T14:18:21Z2017-12-31T14:18:21ZCabinet papers 1994-95: How the republic was doomed without a directly elected president<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199805/original/file-20171218-27568-dk3t9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Queen Elizabeth signs the visitors' book at Parliament House, while Prime Minister Paul Keating and Parliament House officials look on in February 1992.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">National Archives of Australia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Not long after defeat in the 1999 referendum, Malcolm Turnbull, a leading republican who had chaired the Republic Advisory Committee (RAC) appointed by Paul Keating, was licking his wounds.</p>
<p>“We must not let the desperate desire not to be ‘elitist’ lead us into imagining that the voters always get it right,” he reflected. “They don’t. Sometimes nations vote for the wrong people or the wrong propositions … There is nothing disrespectful in questioning the judgement of 55% of the Australian population.”</p>
<p>Like many republicans, Turnbull laid much blame at John Howard’s feet. But cabinet papers released today by the National Archives of Australia suggest a very different story: the republic was doomed from the moment the Keating government rejected the idea of a directly elected president.</p>
<hr>
<p><em><strong>Further reading: <a href="https://theconversation.com/cabinet-papers-1994-95-the-keating-government-begins-to-craft-its-legacy-88395">Cabinet papers 1994-95: The Keating government begins to craft its legacy</a></strong></em></p>
<hr>
<p>The submission, considered by cabinet’s Republic Committee on March 22, 1995 (and by cabinet on June 6, 1995) warned:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Public opinion polls … suggest that any mechanism for appointing a head of state short of direct election will be controversial.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The document, unusually couched in the first person with Keating as narrator, is haunted by the ghosts of 1975. The risk of direct election, it explained, was:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… that the head of state might be tempted to assume, or presume to take moral authority from, a popular national mandate … and exercise the powers of that office in a manner which could bring the office into competition with the government of the day.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Here, in a nutshell, was the problem republicans faced. They wanted to present Australia’s constitutional arrangements as deficient enough to justify reform, yet they refused to countenance change that might lead to any but cosmetic changes. A bunch of politicians wanted to prevent an outbreak of politics.</p>
<p>Direct election of a president, we are told:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… would in time fundamentally change the character of Australian Government and could well move our parliamentary democracy towards an executive presidency, where power is no longer diffuse and representative and where substantial national power is vested unalterably in one person for a set period. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>“This matter,” the submission went on to explain, “needs to be handled sensitively so that public understanding increases as the debate continues”.</p>
<p>In other words, it was the public’s ignorance that led it to support direct election. If only citizens better understood their political system, they would realise that selection by a joint sitting of parliament, with a two-thirds majority required to endorse a prime ministerial nomination, would make it impossible for a partisan figure to become president. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Prime Minister Paul Keating makes a parliamentary statement on the republic in 1995.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The paradox was that election by politicians was supposedly needed to avoid a politicians’ republic. Years passed, but no-one ever found a way to work through this conundrum of the republicans’ making. In the meantime, Keating faced another problem: even if parliamentary selection was accepted, what should the powers of that president be?</p>
<p>The governor-general had many roles and powers, some of which the Constitution defined. Some were exercised by convention on ministerial advice, and some were in a third, murky and controversial category known as reserve powers. The submission dismissed complete codification of the reserve powers as politically impossible:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>An acrimonious debate on this issue would have the potential to derail the whole republic initiative. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>It then went on to consider other ways of dealing with the problem. Eventually, the full cabinet would opt in June 1995 for a formula to be included in the constitution asserting that the president would “exercise his or her functions in accordance with the constitutional conventions which related to the exercise of the powers and performance of the functions of the governor-general”. </p>
<p>However, the conventions would not be regarded as “rules of law”, nor would the provision prevent “further development of these conventions”. </p>
<p>The attention that the reserve powers received underlines how powerfully 1975 preyed on the mind of Keating, who had been a young, recently appointed minister in the Whitlam government at the time of the dismissal. He pointed to the risk that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… without codification, every half century or century the nation could suffer a wilful or misguided head of state who exercises political judgement against the interests of one of the parties or without due regard to historical conventions.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The priority was to avoid another Kerr. Indeed, he is even mentioned by name, as one whom few thought “benign to begin with – and he did not have to run the gauntlet of parliamentary approval, but he did suffer subsequent admonition by a large section of the country”.</p>
<p>Future presidents, unlike Kerr, would be constrained through their manner of selection by a super-majority of the House of Representatives and Senate sitting as one. The president would need to have the confidence of both parties, and so was likely to be non-partisan and of high calibre. However, if they proved “misguided or aberrant”, they could be removed via a two-thirds majority of a joint sitting convened by a simple majority vote of either chamber.</p>
<p>The psychology of this minimalist position is epitomised in how the submission dealt with the issue of what to call the republic. </p>
<p>It opted for keeping “Commonwealth of Australia” – not, it seems, because there was anything valuable or resonant in this title, but because it “would reflect the (minor) extent of the changes sought to the Australian system of government and would avoid the need for numerous consequential changes to the Constitution and other areas of official life”. An example of this would be the national anthem’s reference to “this Commonwealth”.</p>
<p>Leaving aside the absurdity of the last point, to argue for a change while also telling people that little would change was a balancing act beyond the republicans’ powers. At a time of populist revolt – the Hanson outbreak occurred in 1996 – it became even easier to cultivate hostility to “elites” out of touch with ordinary Australians.</p>
<p>I voted “yes” in 1999. I would vote “no” today if offered a reheated minimalist republic. </p>
<p>The arguments in the cabinet submission suggest a failure of imagination and, more seriously, of trust. They grossly exaggerate the fragility of Australian parliamentary government, which is sufficiently entrenched to avoid the spectre of a well-designed scheme for direct election leading to a US-style executive presidency.</p>
<figure>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Australian Republican Movement chairman Malcolm Turnbull speaks after the referendum was lost in 1999.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The late historian John Hirst, the Australian Republican Movement’s Victorian convener in the 1990s and an RAC member appointed by Keating, <a href="https://independentaustralia.net/australia/australia-display/consulting-not-leading-an-enemy-of-the-australian-republic,3811">warned</a> a Canberra ARM audience in 2011 that parliamentary selection would never win public support. The ARM therefore should support direct election.</p>
<p>Hirst also warned against a consultative two-step process that invited voters to consider the principle of a republic, followed by a further vote for a specific model. </p>
<p>The first of these votes would permit a potent “no” campaign around such tried and true themes as change is dangerous, republics are bad, we already have an Australian head of state, politicians cannot be trusted, and voters should not issue a blank cheque. </p>
<p>The recent same-sex marriage survey provides Hirst’s warning with ample vindication. Opponents of a republic would be no more likely to campaign directly for the monarchy and against a republic than opponents of same-sex marriage campaigned explicitly against homosexuality. Red herrings would be the order of the day.</p>
<p>But in contrast to same-sex marriage, if the principle of a republic were to be defeated in a popular vote, like Sleeping Beauty it would have a restful century or so while it waited for a reviving kiss from a handsome prince.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88394/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Bongiorno does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The arguments about a potential Australian republic in cabinet submissions suggest a failure of imagination and, more seriously, of trust.Frank Bongiorno, Professor of History, ANU College of Arts and Social Sciences, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/891432017-12-31T14:18:18Z2017-12-31T14:18:18ZCabinet papers 1994-95: How a security agreement allayed Australian anxiety over Indonesia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200080/original/file-20171220-4968-1y8p6qe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C1940%2C3292%2C2059&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Keating is known as one of the most Indonesia-friendly Australian prime ministers.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/NAA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Despite its short lifespan, the signing of the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security in 1995 marked a particular milestone in the history of the two countries’ relationship.</p>
<p>From the Indonesian perspective, the agreement was considered somewhat effective in building common interests to promote regional security and stability. Indonesia perceived the agreement <a href="https://www.library.ohio.edu/indopubs/1995/12/15/0013.html">as complementary</a> to the 15 years of Australia-Indonesia military co-operation that had already taken place. </p>
<p>To some extent, the agreement also enriched Indonesia’s existing <a href="https://yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10315/1421/YCI0080.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">bilateral military co-operation</a> with selected countries in the region.</p>
<p>Indonesia once assumed that the agreement was also meant to build confidence and ease <a href="https://www.library.ohio.edu/indopubs/1995/12/15/0013.html">Australia’s anxiety</a> over regional security. Australian federal cabinet papers from 1994 and 1995, released today by the National Archives of Australia, support this presumption.</p>
<hr>
<p><em><strong>Further reading: <a href="https://theconversation.com/cabinet-papers-1994-95-the-keating-government-begins-to-craft-its-legacy-88395">Cabinet papers 1994-95: The Keating government begins to craft its legacy</a></strong></em></p>
<hr>
<h2>A gesture from down under</h2>
<p>Cabinet submissions show Prime Minister Paul Keating first raised the idea of a security agreement in June 1994 with Indonesian President Soeharto. Discussions on the draft were relatively efficient: the text was agreed one month before the treaty was signed in December 1995.</p>
<p>Keating is remembered as one of the most Indonesia-friendly Australian prime ministers. He has frequently argued that relations with Indonesia should be an Australian foreign <a href="https://www.library.ohio.edu/indopubs/1996/02/05/0006.html">policy priority</a>.</p>
<p>Keating’s cabinet submission strengthens his image <a href="https://jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jsp/article/download/10848/pdf">as an Indonesian “diplomat”</a> while prime minister. Unlike previous administrations, members of the Keating government visited Indonesia four times per year. This showed his strong personal interest in building a sustainable relationship with one of Australia’s nearest neighbours. </p>
<p>The agreement with Australia was Indonesia’s first bilateral security agreement. It emphasised the friendly relations between the two countries in the early-to-mid-1990s. This contrasts with the late 1990s, when enmity dominated relations amid the East Timor dispute.</p>
<p>There were some concerns in Indonesia over the agreement, including questioning <a href="https://www.library.ohio.edu/indopubs/1995/12/15/0013.html">its impact</a> on the wider southeast Asian region. However, these were not as strong as protests in Australia, where some claimed the agreement showed Keating <a href="https://www.library.ohio.edu/indopubs/1996/01/05/0000.html">supported Soeharto’s dictatorship</a>.</p>
<h2>Easing Australia’s anxiety</h2>
<p>The cabinet records not only reinforce Keating’s strategic interest in Indonesia, they also reflect Australia’s anxiety on certain issues.</p>
<p>From a regional perspective, the treaty reassured others of Indonesia’s commitment to building common security interests. From the Keating government’s point of view, the process of securing stability in the region should begin on its doorstep. So Indonesia has a dual purpose for Australia: a near neighbour, and an entry point for securing regional security.</p>
<p>The cabinet records also disclose that the agreement was seen as a means to ease Australian anxiety on uncertain strategic change in southeast Asia. This aligns with the region undergoing a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2644754?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">post-Cold-War security transformation</a> in the 1990s, particularly in the relationship between ASEAN and Indochinese countries (such as Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia).</p>
<p>Keating’s submission also supports his statement that Australia’s success in Asia would <a href="http://www.keating.org.au/shop/item/australia-asia-and-the-new-regionalism---17-january-1996">determine its success elsewhere</a>. For him, the security agreement with Indonesia would help enrich Australia’s existing arrangements in the region.</p>
<p>The cabinet records confirm Australia’s anxiety on what would happen once Soeharto left office. The treaty itself was therefore seen as a way to bind Indonesia’s commitment to co-operate with Australia. </p>
<p>Keating argued that the treaty might not necessarily prevent Australia from any possible disputes with Indonesia. But it could help Australia to handle what – and who – followed Soeharto as president. This expectation was far from true, given Indonesia’s decision to terminate the treaty in 1999 due to Australia’s intervention in East Timor. </p>
<p>The period in Indonesia following Soeharto’s resignation in 1998 was unpredictable. The assumption that the security agreement would be helpful indicates that Australia did indeed have strong fears of Indonesia’s upcoming <em>reformasi</em>. </p>
<p>However, Indonesia’s succession was a domestic issue. It would not have threatened Australia’s strategic security in any way – but for the Howard government intervening in East Timor. </p>
<h2>Repairing the mutual trust</h2>
<p>The Labor government’s defeat in 1996 and the conclusion of the security agreement in 1999 were once misunderstood as the end of the Australia-Indonesian friendship. Indeed, it wasn’t until 2006 that the two countries developed the <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/pages/agreement-between-the-republic-of-indonesia-and-australia-on-the-framework-for-security-cooperation.aspx">Lombok Treaty</a> to revive security co-operation. </p>
<p>The cabinet records show that Keating’s legacy has proven relevant: Australia’s defence relationship with Indonesia is its most important in the region. It has built a strong base to extend the scope of co-operation between the two countries to economics, counter-terrorism, and law enforcement. </p>
<p>The commitment from the two countries to build a mutual understanding also remained strong. Suspicion has <a href="https://theconversation.com/spying-scandal-another-challenge-to-the-australia-indonesia-relationship-19909">sometimes arisen</a>, but the two countries are aware that conflict would do more harm than good.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89143/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hangga Fathana does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It was Paul Keating himself who first raised the idea of a security agreement between Indonesia and Australia in June 1994 to Indonesian President Soeharto.Hangga Fathana, Lecturer in International Relations, Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII) YogyakartaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.