tag:theconversation.com,2011:/es/topics/defense-31042/articlesDefense – The Conversation2024-01-22T14:55:11Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2215102024-01-22T14:55:11Z2024-01-22T14:55:11ZDrone-zapping laser weapons now effective (and cheap) reality<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570470/original/file-20240121-38659-1vateu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=20%2C3%2C589%2C363&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dragonfire laser system test firing.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">UK Ministry of Defence/wikipedia</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A single burst of light is precisely aimed at a tiny drone flying at breakneck speed far in the distance. Instants later, the deactivated drone crashes into the sea. Not a sound made, no human casualties, no messy explosions. A lethal, multimillion-dollar drone cleanly taken out by a shot that cost less than a good bottle of wine.</p>
<p>If you think this is a scene from a sci-fi movie, think again. Only a few days ago, a team of UK scientists and engineers successfully <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/advanced-future-military-laser-achieves-uk-first">demonstrated that this is viable technology</a> that could find its way on to the battlefield in the next five to ten years. </p>
<p>DragonFire, a £30 million technology programme launched in 2017 and involving the UK government agency Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, missiles manufacturer MBDA, aerospace company Leonardo UK and defence technology company QinetiQ, has passed its first field test by shooting down several drones off the coast of Scotland using laser beams. </p>
<p>Drones are unmanned and semi-automatic aircrafts capable of delivering deadly damage with pinpoint accuracy. They feature <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-drones-are-changing-the-conflict-both-on-the-frontline-and-beyond-211460">heavily on modern battlefields</a>, including the Ukrainian war and the commercial naval routes in the Red Sea.</p>
<p>Shooting them down is not easy and typically involves firing missiles that cost up to £1 million each. While usually effective, defensive systems of this kind are costly and carry a significant risk of causing collateral damage; if a missile misses its target, it will eventually land somewhere and still explode.</p>
<p>However, you don’t have to cause a spectacular explosion to deactivate a drone; interfering with its control and navigation systems is more than enough. This is a job that a laser beam can do. Lasers are nothing but particularly bright and directional beams of light – a particular kind of <a href="https://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/science/toolbox/emspectrum1.html">electromagnetic radiation</a>. A sufficiently powerful laser can interfere with any electronic device, causing it to malfunction. </p>
<p>Compared to standard missiles, a high-power laser system has a range of strategic advantages. It is surprisingly cheap to operate. Running DragonFire for ten seconds costs the equivalent of using a heater for an hour (less than £10 per shot). </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="DragonFire laser system." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570477/original/file-20240121-28-ilxzdp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570477/original/file-20240121-28-ilxzdp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570477/original/file-20240121-28-ilxzdp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570477/original/file-20240121-28-ilxzdp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570477/original/file-20240121-28-ilxzdp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570477/original/file-20240121-28-ilxzdp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570477/original/file-20240121-28-ilxzdp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">DragonFire laser system.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.mbda-systems.com/press-releases/dragonfire-proving-trials-underway">MDBA</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Lasers are also free from the risk of collateral damage. Even if a laser misses its target, it will keep on propagating upwards and eventually be absorbed and scattered in the atmosphere. A laser is a beam of light, so it only propagates in straight lines, regardless of gravity. Also, they usually cover a small area of the order of a few millimetres – they are akin to a surgical intervention.</p>
<p>Lasers are therefore the defensive weapon par excellence; they can only be used to stop incoming threats, not cause significant harm. Lasers are also far less susceptible to countermeasures. By its very nature of being a beam of light, lasers travel at the fastest possible speed: the speed of light. Once a laser beam is fired, there is nothing else in nature that can catch up with it and neutralise it.</p>
<p>Laser beams have been used on the battlefield for quite some time. They are <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214914719312231">mainly used for</a> tracking targets, remote sensing and precision aiming. However, this is the first time that this type of technology has proven effective in a disruptive application. </p>
<h2>Challenges remain</h2>
<p>The reason it has taken so long to develop this weapon is that to disable a drone, you need a laser beam with significant intensity.</p>
<p>However, if the laser beam is too powerful, it can strongly interact with the air in the atmosphere, <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4433/12/7/918">causing it to be absorbed or scattered</a>. One needs to strike the perfect balance of beam parameters, such as its <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/schwartz/files/lecture10-power.pdf">wavelength power</a> and shape, to make sure that it can propagate over long distances without significant degradation.</p>
<p>A laser beam will also be particularly sensitive to atmospheric conditions. The presence of fog, rain, or clouds <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4433/12/7/918">can significantly affect its performance</a>. </p>
<p>Due to the increasing threat posed by drones and subsonic missiles on a global scale, the UK defence ministry is now accelerating the development of this technology, with the expectation of having it fielded on war vessels in the next five to ten years. </p>
<p>Several technical and scientific issues still need to be addressed. For example, keeping the pointing of the laser stable on a moving platform (such as a cruiser in choppy waters) is not a simple task. It is like trying to hit the bullseye on a dartboard while standing on a balance board. However, this will only affect the accuracy of the weapon, without increasing the risk of collateral damage.</p>
<p>It will also be necessary to decouple the laser system performance from the weather conditions. Water droplets and air drafts can scatter or absorb the laser, reducing its effects. One would need to precisely factor in variable weather conditions in the preparation of the beam to be fired. While this is not an impossible task, it is technically difficult.</p>
<p>A structured training programme must also be established to ensure soldiers can efficiently operate such a high-tech system. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, these first tests demonstrate the viability and efficacy of this weapon, which promises to revolutionise modern warfare in the coming years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221510/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gianluca Sarri receives funding from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), InnovateUK, and Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL). </span></em></p>Operating the DragonFire laser system for ten seconds costs the equivalent of using a heater for an hour (less than £10 per shot).Gianluca Sarri, Professor at the School of Mathematics and Physics, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2210062024-01-12T18:57:11Z2024-01-12T18:57:11ZUS-UK airstrikes risk strengthening Houthi rebels’ position in Yemen and the region<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569063/original/file-20240112-29-67u6k4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C15%2C5276%2C3382&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Houthi supporters rally in Yemen following U.S.-U.K. airstrikes.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-handout-image-provided-by-the-uk-ministry-of-news-photo/1918198443?adppopup=true">Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The U.S.- and U.K.-led <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/11/us/politics/us-houthi-missile-strikes.html">strikes on the rebel Houthi group</a> in Yemen represent a dramatic new turn in the Middle East conflict – one that could have implications throughout the region.</p>
<p>The attacks of Jan. 11, 2024, hit around 60 targets at 16 sites, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthis-biden-retaliation-attacks-0804b93372cd5e874a0dd03513fe36a2">according to the U.S. Air Force’s Mideast command</a>, including in Yemen’s capital Sanaa, the main port of Hodeida and Saada, the birthplace of the Houthis in the country’s northwest.</p>
<p>The military action follows weeks of warning by the U.S. to the Houthis, ordering them to stop attacking commercial ships in the strategic strait of Bab el-Mandeb in the Red Sea. The Houthis – an armed militia backed by Iran that controls most of northern Yemen following a bitter <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen">near-decadelong civil war</a> – have also <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-houthi-attacks-affect-both-the-israel-hamas-conflict-and-yemens-own-civil-war-and-could-put-pressure-on-us-saudi-arabia-216852">launched missiles and drones toward Israel</a>. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.libarts.colostate.edu/people/mmahad/">expert on Yemeni politics</a>, I believe the U.S. attacks on the Houthis will have wide implications – not only for the Houthis and Yemen’s civil war, but also for the broader region where America maintains key allies. In short, the Houthis stand to gain politically from these U.S.-U.K. attacks as they support a narrative that the group has been cultivating: that they are freedom fighters fighting Western imperialism in the Muslim world.</p>
<h2>For Houthis, a new purpose</h2>
<p>The Israel-Gaza conflict has reinvigorated the Houthis – giving them a raison d'etre at a time when their status at home was diminishing.</p>
<p>By the time of the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data">Oct. 7 attack by Hamas militants</a> in Israel, the Houthis’ long conflict with Saudi Arabia, which backs the Yemeni <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-s-houthi-takeover">government ousted by the Houthis</a> at the start of Yemen’s civil war in 2014, had quieted after an April 2022 cease-fire drastically reduced fighting.</p>
<p>Houthi missile strikes on Saudi cities ceased, and there were hopes that a <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15258.doc.htm">truce could bring about a permanent end</a> to Yemen’s brutal conflict.</p>
<p>With fewer external threats, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/yemens-civilians-besieged-on-all-sides/">domestic troubles</a> that <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/1925121/extreme-poverty-threatens-yemenis-living-under-houthi-rule">surfaced in Houthi-controlled areas</a> – poverty, unpaid government salaries, crumbling infrastructure – led to growing disquiet over Houthi governance. Public support for the Houthis slowly eroded without an outside aggressor to blame; Houthi leaders could no longer justify the hardships in Yemen as a required sacrifice to resist foreign powers, namely Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/israels-military-campaign-in-gaza-is-among-the-most-destructive-in-history-experts-say">Israel’s attacks in Gaza</a> have provided renewed purpose for Houthis. <a href="https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/houthis-involvement-in-gaza-war-a-tactical-move/">Aligning with the Palestinian cause</a> has allowed Houthis to reassert their relevance and has reenergized their fighters and leadership.</p>
<p>By <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/14/yemens-houthis-say-they-fired-ballistic-missiles-towards-israel">firing missiles toward Israel</a>, the Houthis have portrayed themselves as the lone force in the Arab Peninsula standing up to Israel, unlike regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The militia is presenting to Yemenis and others in the region a different face than Arab governments that have, to date, been unwilling to take strong action against Israel.</p>
<p>In particular, Houthis are contrasting their worldview with that of Saudi Arabia, which prior to the October Hamas attack had been <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/saudi-israel-normalization-still-table">looking to normalize ties</a> with Israel.</p>
<p><iframe id="P6Wxe" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/P6Wxe/4/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Houthi’s PR machine</h2>
<p>The U.S. and U.K. strikes were, <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3644027/us-partners-forces-strike-houthi-military-targets-in-yemen/">the governments of both countries say</a>, in retaliation for persistent attacks by Houthis on international maritime vessels in the Red Sea and followed attempts at a diplomatic solution. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3643830/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-coalition-strikes-in-ho/">aim is to</a> “disrupt and degrade the Houthis’ capabilities,” according to U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A blurry picture shows an aircraft at night." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A U.K. military aircraft takes off en route to Yemen on Jan. 11, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-handout-image-provided-by-the-uk-ministry-of-news-photo/1918198443?adppopup=true">UK Ministry of Defence via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But regardless of the intent or the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/12/how-the-us-uk-bombing-of-yemen-might-help-the-houthis">damage caused to the Houthis militarily</a>, the Western strikes may play into the group’s narrative, reinforcing the claim that they are fighting oppressive foreign enemies attacking Yemen. And this will only bolster the Houthis’ image among supporters.</p>
<p>Already, the Houthis have managed to rally domestic public support in the part of Yemen they control behind their actions since October 2023. </p>
<p>Dramatic <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/how-houthi-rebel-attacks-in-the-red-sea-threaten-global-shipping">seaborne raids</a> and the taking hostage of ships’ crews have generated viral footage that taps into Northern Yemeni nationalism. Turning a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67632940">captured vessel into a public attraction</a> attracted more attention domestically. </p>
<p>Following the U.S.-U.K. strikes on Houthi targets, Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree has said the group would <a href="https://news.sky.com/video/yemen-houthi-general-says-attacks-will-not-pass-without-punishment-13046755">expand its attacks in the Red Sea</a>, saying any coalition attack on Yemen will prompt strikes on all shipping through the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects to the Arabian Sea at the southern end of the Red Sea.</p>
<h2>Weaponizing Palestinian sympathies</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, the Houthis have successfully managed to align the Palestinian cause with that of their own. Appeals through mosques in Yemen and cellphone text campaigns have raised donations for the Houthis by invoking Gaza’s plight. </p>
<p>The U.S.-U.K strikes may backfire for another reason, too: They evoke memories of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/30-years-after-our-endless-wars-in-the-middle-east-began-still-no-end-in-sight/">Western military interventions</a> in the Muslim and Arab world. </p>
<p>The Houthis will no doubt exploit this. </p>
<p>When U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin initially <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/19/us-announces-10-nation-force-to-counter-houthi-attacks-in-red-sea">announced the formation of a 10-country coalition</a> to counter Houthi attacks in the Red Sea on Dec. 18, 2023, there were concerns over the lack of regional representation. Among countries in the Middle East and Muslim world, only Bahrain – home to the <a href="https://cnreurafcent.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/NSA-Bahrain/">U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the U.S. 5th Fleet</a> – joined.</p>
<p>The absence of key regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Djibouti – where the U.S. has its only military base in Africa – raised <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/2023-12-17/ty-article-magazine/.premium/under-irans-auspices-houthis-turn-red-sea-to-an-independent-strategic-threat-zone/0000018c-7452-d48b-a5ec-745308440000">further doubts among observers</a> about the coalition’s ability to effectively counter the Houthis.</p>
<p>Muslim-majority countries were no doubt hesitant to support the coalition because of the sensitivity of the Palestinian cause, which by then the Houthis had successfully aligned themselves with.</p>
<p>But the lack of regional support leaves the U.S. and its coalition allies in a challenging position. Rather than being seen as protectors of maritime security, the U.S. – rather than the Houthis – are vulnerable to being framed in the region as the aggressor and escalating party. </p>
<p>This perception could damage U.S. credibility in the area and potentially serve as a recruitment tool for terrorist organizations like <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap">al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula</a> and similar groups.</p>
<p>The U.S.’s <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/history-us-support-israel-runs-deep-growing-chorus/story?id=104957109">military and diplomatic support for Israel</a> throughout the current conflict also plays into skepticism in the region over the true objectives of the anti-Houthi missile strikes.</p>
<h2>Reigniting civil war?</h2>
<p>The Houthis’ renewed vigor and Western strikes on the group also have implications for Yemen’s civil war itself.</p>
<p>Since <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/moment-truth-yemens-truce">the truce between</a> the two main protagonists in the conflict – Saudi Arabia and the Houthis – fighting between the Houthis and other groups in Yemen, such as the Southern Transitional Council, the Yemen Transitional Government and the National Resistance, has reached a deadlock. </p>
<p>Each group controls different parts of Yemen, and all seem to have accepted this deadlock. </p>
<p>But the U.S.-U.K. strikes put Houthi opponents in a difficult position. They will be hesitant to openly support Western intervention in Yemen or blame the Houthis for supporting Palestinans. There remains widespread sympathy for Gazans in Yemen – something that could give Houthis an opportunity to gain support in areas not under their control.</p>
<p>The Yemeni Transitional Government <a href="https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/25465/">issued a statement</a> following the U.S.-U.K. strikes that shows the predicament facing Houthi rivals. While blaming the Houthis’ “terrorist attacks” for “dragging the country into a military confrontation,” they also clearly reaffirmed support for Palestinians against “brutal Israeli aggression.”</p>
<p>While Houthi rivals will likely continue this balancing act, the Houthis face no such constraints – they can freely exploit the attacks to rally more support and gain a strategic advantage over their local rivals.</p>
<p>An emboldened Houthi group might also be less likely to accept the current status quo in Yemen and seize the moment to push for more control – potentially reigniting a civil war that had looked to be on the wane.</p>
<p>The Houthis thrive on foreign aggression to consolidate their power. Without this external conflict as a justification, the shortcomings of the Houthis’ political management become apparent, undermining their governance. During the civil war, Houthis were able to portray themselves as the defender of Yemen against Saudi influence. Now they can add U.S. and U.K. interference to the mix.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221006/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahad Darar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The raid follows warnings from Washington to cease attacks in the Red Sea − but it could serve to strengthen rebels and reignite civil war.Mahad Darar, Ph.D. Student of Political Science, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2093742023-07-10T17:26:03Z2023-07-10T17:26:03ZWhat’s on the agenda as Biden heads to NATO summit: 5 essential reads as Western alliance talks expansion, Ukraine<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536635/original/file-20230710-12553-71np5b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=32%2C16%2C5442%2C3812&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A flagging alliance? Far from it.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-photograph-taken-on-july-10-shows-the-turkish-nato-and-news-photo/1518683648?adppopup=true">Yves Herman/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Leaders of the nations comprising NATO will meet for a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/whats-table-nato-vilnius-summit-2023-07-07/">two-day summit</a> beginning on July 11, 2023.</p>
<p>The gathering in the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius, comes at a pivotal moment for the Western security alliance – it is <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/07/10/1186712386/biden-is-in-europe-to-focus-on-u-s-alliances-and-nato-expansion">seeking to expand membership</a> and confront challenges ranging from the ongoing <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/ukraine-invasion-2022-117045">war in Ukraine</a> to a <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/chinas-military-aggression-in-the-indo-pacific-region/">perceived growing military threat</a> from China.</p>
<p>No doubt NATO members will want to present a united front at the meeting. But on a number of key issues, not everyone is in agreement. Here are some of the issues likely to be discussed and debated during the leaders’ summit.</p>
<h2>1. A pathway to Ukraine membership?</h2>
<p>With war in Europe the obvious backdrop to the summit, much talk will be about Ukraine. NATO members have been aiding Kyiv individually, through the supply of arms and aid. And the military alliance has been assisting through nonlethal support, such as medical supplies and training. But, as noted by <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/gov/webber-mark.aspx">Mark Webber</a>, professor of international politics at the U.K.’s University of Birmingham, what many in Kyiv <a href="https://theconversation.com/nato-vilnius-summit-will-reflect-fresh-sense-of-purpose-over-ukraine-war-but-hard-questions-remain-over-membership-issues-208293">really want is full membership</a>: “The bigger prize for Ukraine, however, is NATO membership. That would bring the country within the collective defense provisions of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and, in effect, extend U.S. – and U.K. – nuclear guarantees to Ukrainian territory.”</p>
<p>Webber noted that accommodating Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s request for “expedited” membership of the alliance will be difficult. “No one in NATO is arguing in favor of granting membership while Ukraine remains at war. Beyond that, the allies are divided.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nato-vilnius-summit-will-reflect-fresh-sense-of-purpose-over-ukraine-war-but-hard-questions-remain-over-membership-issues-208293">Nato: Vilnius summit will reflect fresh sense of purpose over Ukraine war – but hard questions remain over membership issues</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>2. What about Sweden?</h2>
<p>The NATO leaders’ summit will be the first at which the members present will include Finland, which joined in April. Fellow Nordic state Sweden is hoping to be next, perhaps even officially becoming the group’s 32nd member at the Vilnius meetup. </p>
<p>Sweden’s ascension had been held up by NATO member Turkey. Turkey’s recently reelected leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, had previous blocked the bid due to what he saw as the Swedish government’s reluctance to crack down on Kurdish “terrorists” being “harbored” in Sweden. But on the eve of the Vilnius summit, it was announced that Erdoğan had agreed to forward Sweden’s bid to the Turkish parliament for ratification.</p>
<p><a href="https://ii.umich.edu/ii/people/all/r/rgsuny.html">Ronald Suny</a>, a historian at University of Michigan, noted that Erdoğan’s reluctance to allow Sweden and Finland entry represented domestic concerns – international pressure on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, fits his agenda of suppressing Kurdish rights in Turkey. But it also highlights an <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-turkey-isnt-on-board-with-finland-sweden-joining-nato-and-why-that-matters-183277">underlying problem the alliance is facing</a>:</p>
<p>“NATO is supposed to be an alliance of democratic countries. Yet several of its members – notably Turkey and Hungary – have moved steadily away from liberal democracy toward ethnonational populist authoritarianism,” Suny wrote. “Finland and Sweden, on the other hand, fulfill the parameters of NATO membership more clearly than several of the alliance’s current members. As the United States proclaims that the war in Ukraine is a struggle between democracy and autocracy, Turkey’s opposition to the Nordics who have protested its drift to illiberalism are testing the unity and the ideological coherence of NATO.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-turkey-isnt-on-board-with-finland-sweden-joining-nato-and-why-that-matters-183277">Why Turkey isn't on board with Finland, Sweden joining NATO – and why that matters</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>3. The benefit of being a NATO member</h2>
<p>But why would Finland, Sweden, Ukraine and any other country look to join NATO? John Deni at American University School of International Service explained that Article 5 of the alliance’s treaty <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-poland-demand-nato-act-in-event-of-russian-attack-an-expert-explains-article-4-and-5-commitments-following-missile-blast-194714">calls for collective action</a> should any member be attacked.</p>
<p>“Article 5 really is the heart and soul of the NATO alliance. It is the part of the treaty that says that if one member is attacked, then all of the other members will treat it as an attack on them all. In effect, it calls for a collective response once requested by any of the current 30 members of NATO and invoked by the entire alliance,” he wrote.</p>
<p>But that doesn’t necessarily mean that the U.S. would have to mount a military response should an ally be attacked. “Article 5 was written in such a way that it allows each ally to decide for itself the best course of action to take – there is no prescribed response once the article is invoked,” Deni added.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/could-poland-demand-nato-act-in-event-of-russian-attack-an-expert-explains-article-4-and-5-commitments-following-missile-blast-194714">Could Poland demand NATO act in event of Russian attack? An expert explains Article 4 and 5 commitments following missile blast</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>4. The end of the neutral option?</h2>
<p>As Finland’s and Sweden’s desire to join NATO shows, smaller nations traditionally seen as aspiring to neutrality are, in the words of University of Michigan’s Ronald Suny, “recalculating how they fit into this renewed division of the world.”</p>
<p>Suny noted that, with Finland’s entry into NATO and the now high chance of once-neutral Sweden joining it, <a href="https://theconversation.com/finland-nato-and-the-evolving-new-world-order-what-small-nations-know-203278">other states are questioning</a> “the efficacy of nonalignment in a polarized world.” </p>
<p>“In its place, we have the ‘NATOfication’ of Eastern Europe – something that Putin unwittingly accelerated and which leaves Putin’s Russia with less accommodating neighbors,” Suny wrote.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/finland-nato-and-the-evolving-new-world-order-what-small-nations-know-203278">Finland, NATO and the evolving new world order – what small nations know</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>5. A cluster bomb controversy</h2>
<p>A last-minute area of controversy emerged as NATO leaders prepared to gather in Vilnius: cluster bombs.</p>
<p>On July 7, 2023, the Biden administration announced that it would supply Ukraine with the controversial munition, which scatters bomblets across a wide area. The problem is not all NATO countries are in agreement with the U.S. move. Germany, the U.K. and Canada – which are among the 120-plus countries that have signed an international treaty banning the use of cluster bombs – have all already expressed their misgivings.</p>
<p>Robert Goldman, a laws of war expert at American University, explained that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/there-is-no-legal-reason-the-us-cant-supply-cluster-bombs-to-ukraine-but-that-doesnt-make-biden-decision-to-do-so-morally-right-207717">White House had previously shown hesitancy</a> over selling cluster bombs to Ukraine in part because of the “optics” and over concerns that “it may introducing a wedge between the U.S. and other NATO countries.”</p>
<p>Goldman explained that there is no law preventing the U.S. from providing cluster bombs to the Ukraine or any other country. “Nonetheless, providing Ukraine with cluster weapons could serve to destigmatize them and runs counter to international efforts to end their use. And that, in turn, could encourage – or excuse – their use by other states that may be less responsible,” he argued.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/there-is-no-legal-reason-the-us-cant-supply-cluster-bombs-to-ukraine-but-that-doesnt-justify-bidens-decision-to-do-so-207717">There is no legal reason the US can’t supply cluster bombs to Ukraine – but that doesn’t justify Biden's decision to do so</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This article was updated on July 10, 2023 in light of Turkey agreeing to forward Sweden’s NATO bid for ratification.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209374/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Leaders of the Western military alliance meet in Lithuania with the ongoing war in Ukraine as a backdrop.Matt Williams, Senior International EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1947142022-11-16T02:49:11Z2022-11-16T02:49:11ZCould Poland demand NATO act in event of Russian attack? An expert explains Article 4 and 5 commitments following missile blast<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495529/original/file-20221116-19-o0ccgm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=22%2C45%2C3735%2C2287&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Police officers gather at the site where offcials say a Russian-made missile fell.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/PolandRussiaUkraineWar/77c6e3fdba804d7cbf828dad1159e648/photo?Query=Poland&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=87316&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The risk of the conflict in Ukraine expanding further into Eastern Europe escalated on Nov. 15, 2022, with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-zelenskyy-kherson-9202c032cf3a5c22761ee71b52ff9d52">reports of a Russian-made missile straying</a> into neighboring Poland.</em></p>
<p><em>It was not immediately clear if the apparent strike – in which two people were killed – was intentional or accidental, or where the missile had originated. Later, the Polish president said that the projectile <a href="https://twitter.com/AFP/status/1592841693443035136">likely originated from Ukrainian air defense</a>. Nonetheless, concern that a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, could become further embroiled in the conflict led to questions over <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202%202/11/15/what-is-article-5-nato/">whether Poland may invoke Article 4 or Article 5</a> of the NATO treaty if attacked – something that could lead to military intervention by other member countries.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked John R. Deni, <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/deni.cfm">research professor at the U.S. Army War College, a lecturer at American University</a>, and author of “<a href="https://librarycatalog.ecu.edu/catalog/4809141">NATO and Article 5: The Transatlantic Alliance and the Twenty-First-Century Challenges of Collective Defense</a>,” to explain what invoking these articles would mean – and what would happen next.</em></p>
<h2>What is Article 5 of the NATO Treaty?</h2>
<p>Article 5 really is the heart and soul of the NATO alliance. It is the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm#:%7E:text=Article%205%20provides%20that%20if,to%20assist%20the%20Ally%20attacked.">part of the treaty</a> that says that if one member is attacked, then all of the other members will treat it as an attack on them all. In effect, it calls for a collective response once requested by any of the current 30 members of NATO and invoked by the entire alliance.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm">NATO treaty</a> was signed in April 1949 and Article 5 is central to it. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Western European countries sought a way to defend themselves in the event Germany again arose as a security challenge. By the late 1940s, concerns shifted toward the threat posed by the Soviet Union, which stationed large military forces across Eastern Europe, <a href="https://scalar.usc.edu/works/dissolution-of-czechoslovakia/1948-czechoslovak-coup-dtat">staged a coup in Czechoslovakia</a>, and <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_136188.htm#:%7E:text=Joseph%20Stalin%2C%20the%20Soviet%20leader,come%20to%20West%20Berlin's%20aid.">blockaded Berlin</a>.</p>
<p>Initially, the United States was skeptical of joining any kind of post-war alliance in Europe, but Soviet actions convinced American leaders to sign on as a way of maintaining Western Europe as free and open. </p>
<p>Article 5 doesn’t automatically get triggered once a NATO member is attacked; the country attacked needs to request that the alliance invoke it – in this case, that would mean Poland, should Polish officials conclude that Russian missiles were sent deliberately. </p>
<h2>What is the U.S. responsibility should it be triggered?</h2>
<p>In practice, invoking Article 5 would mean that the United States would be called upon to help defend any European ally, or Canada, if attacked.</p>
<p>But, there is an important caveat. Article 5 was <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm#:%7E:text=Article%205%20provides%20that%20if,to%20assist%20the%20Ally%20attacked.">written in such a way</a> that it allows each ally to decide for itself the best course of action to take – there is no prescribed response once the article is invoked.</p>
<p>In the case of U.S., the executive branch – that is, the president – would need to consider the views and responsibilities of the Congress. If the president were to decide on direct military action, then Congress would likely be involved in some capacity – and of course only <a href="https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/declarations-of-war.htm">Congress has the power to declare war</a>.</p>
<p>But Article 5 doesn’t necessarily require a military response. In fact, there is enough flexibility in the language of the treaty for a more nuanced response.</p>
<p>This is vital. Each member of NATO remains a sovereign state, and can’t be compelled into military action. Decision-making over the use of force remains at the national level; such choices are not simply handed over to a supranational organization.</p>
<p>That said, U.S. President Joe Biden – as with previous presidents – has been very clear about America’s willingness to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XHPokI1FsFE">defend “every inch</a>” of NATO territory.</p>
<p>As such, if there were a deliberate attack on a NATO ally, I’d expect a robust response by the U.S. and potentially a military one.</p>
<p>It would, of course, depend on what the attacked ally requested, and what the U.S. believes it can and should provide.</p>
<h2>In what instances has it been triggered in the past?</h2>
<p>Article 5 has only been triggered <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm">once in the seven decades</a> of NATO’s existence. That was on Sept. 12, 2001 – the day after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States.</p>
<p>The European allies came to the U.S.’s defense on that occasion. They did this by deploying patrol aircraft in U.S. airspace. Additionally, when the decision was made to invade Afghanistan, several NATO countries in which American troops are based – especially Germany – provided guards for U.S. military bases overseas so that American soldiers could deploy.</p>
<h2>Could this apparent missile strike on Poland trigger Article 5?</h2>
<p>That is tricky to assess at the moment, as not all the details are known – there are lots of variables at play.</p>
<p>It makes a massive difference whether this was a targeted attack on Polish military or civilian sites, or whether it was stray missiles. There is also the possibility that this was debris from a strike in Ukraine. We know that the missiles fell close to the Polish-Ukrainian border, in a village <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/explosion-kills-two-poland-near-ukraine-border-2022-11-15/">just a few miles away from the border</a>. The loss of any innocent lives is tragic in any case, but I think the number of deaths resulting from the strike will also be a factor in whether Poland requests invocation of Article 5.</p>
<p><iframe id="0QTpk" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/0QTpk/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>If it looks like an accident, that will definitely affect how and if the alliance responds. And even if it was deemed an intentional strike, the Poles may still decide not to request invocation of Article 5. This is when Article 4 of the NATO Treaty comes into play.</p>
<h2>What is Article 4?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49187.htm">Article 4</a> can be invoked by any NATO member that feels threatened. Under its terms, a member state can request a consultation of the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49763.htm">North Atlantic Council</a>, or NAC – the highest political decision-making body in the NATO alliance.</p>
<p>A NAC meeting in itself isn’t unusual. Every NATO summit is a NAC meeting at the level of heads of states. And a NAC meeting takes place every Wednesday at ambassadorial level in Brussels.</p>
<p>But what Article 4 does is open the way for a special meeting of the NAC to consult over the next steps that the alliance should take. This is still a big deal – just not as weighty as invoking Article 5.</p>
<p>Article 4 has been invoked several times over NATO’s lifetime. It was <a href="https://www.elojodigital.com/contenido/10978-syria-crisis-turkey-invokes-article-4-nato-charter">invoked by Turkey</a> amid concerns over cross-border terrorism as a result of the Syrian War. More recently, it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-invasion-why-eight-nato-members-triggered-article-4-of-the-north-atlantic-treaty-178054">invoked by eight NATO members</a> in Eastern Europe after the Feb. 24 Russian invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Poland is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-considering-nato-article-4-activation-says-spokesman-2022-11-15/">currently assessing whether to invoke Article 4</a>.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This article was updated on Nov. 16, 2022 to account for new statement from Polish president.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194714/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Deni does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Polish authorities are investigating what they initially believed to be a Russian-made missile blast close to the border with Ukraine. Later, the country’s president said it was likely to have been an accident.John Deni, Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1832772022-05-17T19:41:37Z2022-05-17T19:41:37ZWhy Turkey isn’t on board with Finland, Sweden joining NATO – and why that matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463686/original/file-20220517-25-ezc7ni.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=49%2C0%2C5472%2C3604&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Room for any more at NATO? Not according to Turkey's president.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/turkeys-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-attends-the-nato-news-photo/1233447431?adppopup=true">Kenzo Tribouillard/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After decades of neutrality, the two Nordic states that have to date remained out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have reacted to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/17/world/europe/sweden-finland-nato.html">declaring an intention to join</a> the American-led alliance. But there is a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-stockholm-sweden-finland-f7328801f699fbb2f28826c0f14d4ef6">major obstacle in their way</a>: Turkey.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/16/how-erdogans-anti-democratic-government-made-turkey-ripe-for-unrest/">increasingly autocratic and anti-democratic</a> president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has said he will not agree to the entry of these two countries. And as a member of NATO, <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm">Turkey’s approval is needed</a> for Finland and Sweden to join.</p>
<p>Erdogan is alone among NATO leaders in publicly stating that he is against the two countries’ joining the alliance.</p>
<h2>Harboring terrorists or grudges?</h2>
<p>The Turkish president’s opposition is based on his view that Finland and Sweden support “terrorists.” What Erdogan means is that both countries have given protection and residence to members of the <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/turkey_domestic_terrorism.html">Kurdistan Workers’ Party</a>, or PKK – the major armed group mounting resistance to Turkey’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/turkey">harsh treatment</a> of its millions of Kurdish citizens. The plight of the country’s Kurds, part of a large but stateless ethnic group in the region, has long been a bone of contention between Turkey and parts of the international community.</p>
<p>Despite the PKK’s being <a href="https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/">listed by the U.S.</a> <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L:2021:043:FULL&from=en">and EU</a> as a terrorist group, Finland and Sweden have been <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/sweden-finland-reject-turkeys-request-to-extradite-terrorists">reluctant to extradite</a> members of the group to Turkey over human rights concerns. Erdogan <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/16/sweden-announces-nato-membership-bid-one-day-after-finland#:%7E:text=In%20a%20news%20conference%20on,terrorist%20organisations%2C%E2%80%9D%20Erdogan%20said.">has responded</a> by calling Sweden a “hatchery” for terrorism and claiming neither country has “a clear, open attitude” toward terrorist organizations, adding: “How can we trust them?”</p>
<p>Erdoğan’s ire with Finland and Sweden has also been exacerbated by the country hosting followers of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/from-ally-to-scapegoat-fethullah-gulen-the-man-behind-the-myth/a-37055485">Turkish scholar and cleric Fethullah Gulen</a>. These followers are part of an educational and political movement with which Erdogan had been allied, but with which he broke as it grew more powerful. The Turkish president accuses the Gulenists of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61472021">staging a failed coup</a> against his government in 2016.</p>
<h2>All international politics is local</h2>
<p>As if that were not enough, the neutral <a href="https://buffalonews.com/news/national/govt-and-politics/explainer-why-is-turkey-wary-of-nordic-states-nato-bid/article_d0650bc8-7def-556e-bc3d-2d17643094fa.html">northern Europeans condemned Turkey’s 2019 incursion</a> into Syria. In that operation, the Turks targeted Rojava – a <a href="https://thekurdishproject.org/history-and-culture/kurdish-democracy/rojava-democracy/">socialist, feminist autonomous Kurdish enclave</a> near the Turkish border. Complicating the matter, the Syrians of Rojava were – despite their links to the PKK – allies of the American forces. The Kurds of Rojava played a crucial role beating back the Islamic State group in Syria but were later <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29702440">abandoned by the Trump administration</a>, which pulled U.S. troops back from the Turkish border, <a href="https://www.firstpost.com/world/turkey-remains-defiant-to-international-pressure-on-offensive-against-syrian-kurdish-forces-as-us-demands-ceasefire-7511331.html">allowing its NATO ally to launch a military operation</a> against the Kurds.</p>
<p>Foreign policy is almost always intimately tied to domestic concerns. In the case of Turkey’s government, a major fear is the threat to its grip on power posed by the Kurds – and international pressure over Turkey’s record of repressing the group.</p>
<p>Turkey’s Kurdish populations are <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/turkeys-local-elections-were-not-free-or-fair/">not allowed free elections</a> in the eastern Anatolian region, <a href="http://countrystudies.us/turkey/28.htm">where they are the majority</a>. Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/in-turkey-repression-of-the-kurdish-language-is-back-with-no-end-in-sight/">education and cultural institutions in the Kurdish language</a> face a de facto ban.</p>
<h2>The path ahead for NATO</h2>
<p>Finland and Sweden are neutral countries not beholden to the strategic compromises that the United States and NATO are forced to make to hold the alliance together. Both countries have to date been free to take a moral position on Turkey’s position on Kurdish rights and have officially protested the repressions of dissidents, academics, journalists and minority groups.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, NATO countries have equivocated before their fellow member, agreeing to label the <a href="https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/">PKK a terrorist organization</a>.</p>
<p>So where does this all leave Finland and Sweden’s application for NATO membership?</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm">rules for entry into the strategic alliance</a> require unanimity of the current NATO members.</p>
<p>As such, Turkey can effectively veto the entry of Finland and Sweden.</p>
<p>The standoff highlights an underlying problem the alliance is facing. NATO is supposed to be an alliance of democratic countries. Yet several of its members – <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/05/strongmen-die-but-authoritarianism-is-forever/">notably Turkey and Hungary</a> – have moved steadily away from liberal democracy toward ethnonational populist authoritarianism.</p>
<p>Finland and Sweden, on the other hand, fulfill the parameters of NATO membership more clearly than several of the alliance’s current members. As the United States proclaims that the war in Ukraine is a struggle between democracy and autocracy, Turkey’s opposition to the Nordics who have protested its drift to illiberalism are testing the unity and the ideological coherence of NATO.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183277/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ronald Suny does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan is against allowing two Nordic countries to join NATO over what he deems their support of ‘terrorists.’ His opposition will test the alliance’s unity.Ronald Suny, Professor of History and Political Science, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1574652021-04-06T12:28:47Z2021-04-06T12:28:47ZThe US is worried about its critical minerals supply chains – essential for electric vehicles, wind power and the nation’s defense<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393342/original/file-20210404-13-12hqo30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=166%2C0%2C1461%2C939&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Wind turbines and fighter jets both rely on imported critical minerals.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/478441/f-35a-lightning-ii/">U.S. Air Force; Dennis Schroeder/NREL</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When U.S. companies build military weapons systems, electric vehicle batteries, satellites and wind turbines, they rely heavily on a few dozen “critical minerals” – many of which are mined and refined <a href="https://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/mcs2021">almost entirely by other countries</a>. Building a single F-35A fighter jet, for example, requires at least <a href="https://www.airforcemag.com/article/rare-earth-uncertainty/">920 pounds</a> of rare earth elements that come primarily from China. </p>
<p>That level of dependence on imports <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/02/24/executive-order-on-americas-supply-chains/">worries the U.S. government</a>.</p>
<p>Natural disasters, civil unrest, trade disputes and company failures can all disrupt a mineral supply chain and the many products that depend on it – making many critical minerals a national security priority. </p>
<p>The U.S. has increased its strategic planning and investment in reliable supply chains in recent years, particularly as China has moved to <a href="https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-tightens-control-over-management-of-rare-earths/">increase control over critical mineral exports</a>, but the U.S.’s own mining and recycling of these minerals is still small. This is due in part to how environmentally destructive and polluting many mining and processing operations can be, but also because policy measures are only recently being explored and funded. The U.S. now has a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/02/24/executive-order-on-americas-supply-chains/">review underway</a> of critical mineral supply chains, and the Department of Energy recently <a href="https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-announces-30-million-research-secure-domestic-supply-chain-critical-elements-and">pledged up to US$30 million</a>, on top of funding included in the December pandemic aid package and a <a href="https://www.energy.gov/articles/department-energy-announces-122-million-regional-initiative-produce-rare-earth-elements-and">2020 support package for mining</a>.</p>
<p>The question <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=KttlJdQAAAAJ&hl=en">policy</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=DAwwVkwAAAAJ&hl=en">experts</a> like ourselves are exploring is how best to provide sustainable and secure critical mineral supply chains in a way that limits environmental damage and promotes good governance. </p>
<h2>The list: 35 critical minerals</h2>
<p>Critical minerals earn their name from their vital role in products Americans rely on every day.</p>
<p>Over the last 60 years, the U.S. has doubled the number of these minerals it is 100% reliant on other countries to provide. Of the 35 critical minerals identified by the U.S. in 2018, 28 are <a href="https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2021/mcs2021.pdf">at least 50% imported</a>.</p>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/05/18/2018-10667/final-list-of-critical-minerals-2018">critical minerals list</a> has changed since it was first created by the U.S. Geological Survey in 1973. Many of the same minerals are there, including <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-are-rare-earths-crucial-elements-in-modern-technology-4-questions-answered-101364">rare earth elements</a> and lithium, but their relative importance in 1973 was for petroleum refining and making glass, among other goods.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Photo of bauxite with a pink hue" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392922/original/file-20210331-25-sju2jn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392922/original/file-20210331-25-sju2jn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392922/original/file-20210331-25-sju2jn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392922/original/file-20210331-25-sju2jn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392922/original/file-20210331-25-sju2jn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392922/original/file-20210331-25-sju2jn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392922/original/file-20210331-25-sju2jn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bauxite is a source of aluminum and gallium, which is used in LEDs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/bauxite-and-alumina-statistics-and-information?qt-science_support_page_related_con=0#qt-science_support_page_related_con">Scott Haworth/USGS</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The list today reflects the essential role that renewable energy, electric vehicles and advanced defense technologies have in the U.S. economy – and the specialized alloys, magnets and catalysts that enable them. These include batteries and electric motors, but also missile guidance systems, communications and <a href="https://www.airforcemag.com/article/rare-elements-of-security/">even satellites</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Piles of rare earth elements, clockwise from top center: praseodymium, cerium, lanthanum, neodymium, samarium and gadolinium" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391003/original/file-20210322-23-1y0389.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1%2C8%2C1176%2C756&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391003/original/file-20210322-23-1y0389.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391003/original/file-20210322-23-1y0389.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391003/original/file-20210322-23-1y0389.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391003/original/file-20210322-23-1y0389.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391003/original/file-20210322-23-1y0389.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391003/original/file-20210322-23-1y0389.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Examples of rare earth elements, which are used in batteries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.usgs.gov/media/images/rare-earth-oxides">Peggy Greb/USDA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Because of this, the Department of Defense has been one of the strongest supporters for more resilient supply chains. In the last few years it has been proactive about <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2488672/dod-announces-rare-earth-element-award-to-strengthen-domestic-industrial-base/">strengthening domestic production</a>, especially for rare earth elements. That includes <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2418542/dod-announces-rare-earth-element-awards-to-strengthen-domestic-industrial-base/">new contracts</a> with rare earth mining and production operations in <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2418542/dod-announces-rare-earth-element-awards-to-strengthen-domestic-industrial-base/">California, Nebraska</a> and <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2488672/dod-announces-rare-earth-element-award-to-strengthen-domestic-industrial-base/">Texas</a>. The <a href="https://www.dla.mil/HQ/Acquisition/StrategicMaterials/About/OurOffices/">Defense Logistics Agency</a> also has emergency stockpiles of 42 commodities with a market value of US$1.1 billion at six different locations across the U.S.</p>
<p>Now, with President Joe Biden’s <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-plan/">infrastructure plan</a> promising an expansion of electric vehicles and renewable energy, “green” legislation becoming more likely and <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/02/02/963014373/how-fast-will-biden-need-to-move-on-climate-really-really-fast">climate change becoming a priority</a>, critical mineral supply chains are again in the spotlight.</p>
<p><iframe id="caYW9" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/caYW9/6/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Getting serious about supply chains</h2>
<p>The amounts of lithium, cobalt, graphene, indium and other critical minerals needed for low-carbon technologies alone are expected to increase anywhere from <a href="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/367/6473/30">100% to 1,000% by 2050</a>.</p>
<p>These estimates are concerning on their own, but when combined with military needs, industrial needs and the decline of U.S. mining, it paints a troubling picture for U.S. supply shortages.</p>
<p>Countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo, which made headlines in the past due to mineral sales that <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-responsible-sourcing-of-drc-minerals-has-major-weak-spots-115245">financed armed conflict</a>, are not particularly appealing partners for U.S. companies. The DRC is responsible for producing <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-cobalt-mining-drc-needs-urgent-attention">more than 70%</a> of the world’s cobalt, used in almost all rechargeable lithium ion batteries that power everything from cellphones and laptops to electric vehicles, and China has invested heavily in the region.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392919/original/file-20210331-17-tqr4qs.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of countries with bar charts showing percentage of minerals supplied in 2017." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392919/original/file-20210331-17-tqr4qs.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392919/original/file-20210331-17-tqr4qs.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392919/original/file-20210331-17-tqr4qs.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392919/original/file-20210331-17-tqr4qs.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392919/original/file-20210331-17-tqr4qs.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392919/original/file-20210331-17-tqr4qs.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392919/original/file-20210331-17-tqr4qs.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The largest sources of critical minerals used in the United States.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45810.html">Congressional Research Service</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The ability of the United States to drive demand – but hesitation to get involved with “risky” nations or commit to domestic production – means the U.S. is reliant on countries that are more willing to accept those risks. China <a href="https://about.bnef.com/blog/china-dominates-the-lithium-ion-battery-supply-chain-but-europe-is-on-the-rise/">now controls</a> 80% of the world’s lithium-ion battery material refining, 77% of the world’s battery cell capacity and 60% of the world’s battery component manufacturing.</p>
<h2>How to strengthen critical supply chains</h2>
<p>The U.S. can take several steps to avoid being left behind by shortages and to ensure a successful energy transition.</p>
<p>During the Trump administration, the U.S. launched a <a href="https://www.usgs.gov/news/trump-administration-announces-strategy-strengthen-americas-economy-defense#:%7E:text=In%202017%2C%20President%20Donald%20Trump,to%20critical%20mineral%20supply%20disruptions.">federal strategy to ensure reliable supplies of critical minerals</a>, but that strategy was based in part on scaling back reviews of the projects’ environmental impact, and it didn’t have many actionable steps. The administration also started the Energy Resource Governance Initiative, focused on working with partner countries on improving the governance of mineral supply chains. </p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>The U.S. has lots of room to improve its support for critical mineral markets and trade agreements. Biden’s <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/24/fact-sheet-securing-americas-critical-supply-chains/">100-day review</a> of the critical mineral supply chains is a good start.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.minesnewsroom.com/news/sustainable-supply-minerals-and-metals-key-low-carbon-energy-future">Expanding recycling and reuse</a> of critical minerals can also increase sustainability and make minerals more available for U.S. use. One way to encourage recycling programs is to shift responsibility from waste managers to major producers like Apple and Samsung.</p>
<p>International agreements can also be written in ways that <a href="http://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaz6003">require responsible mining</a>. U.S. companies, similarly, can do more to ensure that they aren’t purchasing from unsustainable sources or supporting practices that encourage the abuse and exploitation of developing economies.</p>
<p>The U.S. can also expand its exploration for critical minerals. Rio Tinto recently announced plans for a new plant to <a href="https://riotintokennecott.com/coppercurrents/rio-tinto-to-build-new-tellurium-plant-at-kennecott-mine/">recover tellurium</a>, a critical mineral used in solar panels, from its copper refining operations in Utah. <a href="https://qz.com/1975325/electric-cars-are-fueling-the-uss-lithium-mining-boom/#:%7E:text=But%20the%20US%20has%2010,public%20land%20in%20California%20alone.">Lithium mining</a> in the California desert has also started to attract investors, as have rare earth projects in <a href="https://www.mining.com/rare-earths-processing-facility-opens-in-colorado/">Colorado</a> and Nevada. </p>
<p>Discussions of clean energy technologies should also include industrial policy, such as how mines are permitted, funding for processing plants and advanced manufacturing research. How the U.S. shapes the path for critical minerals will have important consequences for everything from the environment to national security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157465/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Right now, the nation is almost entirely dependent on other countries for minerals that are used in everything from wind turbines to strike fighters and satellites.Jordan Lee Calderon, Payne Institute Program Manager, Colorado School of MinesMorgan Bazilian, Professor of Public Policy and Director, Payne Institute, Colorado School of MinesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1417642020-07-02T12:27:42Z2020-07-02T12:27:42ZWhy ‘I was just being sarcastic’ can be such a convenient excuse<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345103/original/file-20200701-159785-mvvnbw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=69%2C96%2C3503%2C2281&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Oh come on, you could tell it was sarcasm ... right?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Election-2020-Canvassing/542b128d592b4c64a00191f13f1362a2/15/0">AP Photo/Sue Ogrocki</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After President Donald Trump <a href="https://apnews.com/476068bd60e9048303b736e9d7fc6572">said</a> during a rally in June 2021 that increased testing was responsible for the surging number of infections, the condemnation of the <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-nw-cb-trump-tulsa-rally-fact-check-20200621-ufzitovasrgcpkj3aybed3stfe-story.html">inaccurate claim</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/21/coronavirus-live-updates-us/">was swift</a>. </p>
<p>Six days later, during a Fox News town hall, Sean Hannity asked Trump about those remarks on increased testing. </p>
<p>“Sometimes I jokingly say, or sarcastically say, if we didn’t do tests we would look great,” he replied. </p>
<p>This seems to be a pattern. Two months earlier, the president had mused about the beneficial effects of injecting disinfectants into the body to combat COVID-19. After many health officials expressed their dismay, Trump <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephaniesarkis/2020/04/24/trump-now-claims-sarcasm-on-disinfectant-and-injections-comments/">repeatedly claimed that he was just being sarcastic</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1253755048934375426"}"></div></p>
<p>That same month, after he misspelled “Nobel Prize” in a tweet – writing it out as “Noble Prize” – <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-twitter-nobel-prize-biden-deepfake-coronavirus-a9485251.html">he deleted the tweet</a> before falling back on on a familiar excuse: sarcasm.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1254544354603143168"}"></div></p>
<p>What is it about sarcasm that makes it such a convenient excuse for people who are trying to distance themselves from what they’ve said?</p>
<p>As I describe in <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/irony-and-sarcasm">my book</a> on irony and sarcasm, most cognitive scientists and other language researchers think of sarcasm as a form of verbal irony. Both ways of speaking involve saying the opposite of what you mean. But the goals of irony and sarcasm are actually different.</p>
<p>For example, if someone slowly intones “What beautiful weather!” on a cold and rainy day, it’s clear they’re speaking ironically about a disappointing state of affairs. In general, irony is used to provide commentary on unexpected and negative outcomes. </p>
<p>Sarcasm, on the other hand, is most frequently used to disparage the actions of other people. If someone tells you that you’re a real genius after you forgot to meet them for an important appointment, they clearly don’t mean that you’re mentally gifted. Simply put, irony is commentary, but sarcasm is criticism.</p>
<p>That seems straightforward enough. But in actual practice, the line between irony and sarcasm is blurry and confusing. Many people assert they are being sarcastic when they are in fact being ironic, as in the previous example of the weather.</p>
<p>The enlargement of the domain of sarcasm – at irony’s expense – is a linguistic shift that has been going on for some time. In fact, linguist Geoffrey Nunberg <a href="https://books.google.com/books?newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&id=oEliAAAAMAAJ&dq=the+way+we+talk+now+nunberg&focus=searchwithinvolume&q=irony%27s+moving+out">called attention to this phenomenon 20 years ago</a>. So it’s hard to fault the president for conflating the two.</p>
<p>Another element that makes sarcasm tricky to grasp has to do with saying the opposite of what is meant. The recipient of such a statement isn’t supposed to take it literally.</p>
<p>For this reason, when we use verbal irony or sarcasm, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005120109296">we might employ cues to signal our nonliteral intent</a>. We may, for example, speak in a tone of voice that’s slower, lower and louder than how we speak normally. Our pitch may swoop up or down. Ironic statements are also frequently accompanied by facial displays, such as a smirk or the rolling of the eyes.</p>
<p>And that’s why, when being sarcastic over text or email, we’ll <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-sarcasm-so-difficult-to-detect-in-texts-and-emails-91892">use emojis to relay nonliteral intent</a>. Of course, even then, there’s no guarantee that the recipient will interpret the message correctly.</p>
<p>President Trump does, at times, clearly make use of sarcasm. For example, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tz_LqxeDEEk">at a December 2019 rally in Hershey, Pennsylvania</a>, he said, referring to the House’s imminent decision to initiate impeachment proceedings, that the Democrats “also understand poll numbers, but I’m sure that had nothing to do with it.” He signals sarcasm by using absolute words like “sure” and “nothing” and by gesturing broadly with both hands. He also pauses to give his audience a moment to interpret his remark as the opposite of what he has said – that, in fact, “my high poll numbers have everything to do with impeachment.” The remark is sarcastic because there’s a clear target: the Democrats in Congress.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/tz_LqxeDEEk?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Trump gets sarcastic during his Dec. 10, 2019 rally in Hershey, Pennsylvania.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But at both the Tulsa rally and his April press conference, the president’s controversial remarks didn’t have such accompanying verbal and nonverbal cues. He wasn’t being critical of anyone; he was simply asserting that testing leads to more infections, or asking what appeared to be sincere questions about the use of disinfectants to combat the virus. Chances are he literally meant what he said. </p>
<p>[<em>Science, politics, religion or just plain interesting articles:</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-checkoutweekly">Check out The Conversation’s weekly newsletters</a>.]</p>
<p>As the president has repeatedly demonstrated, a claim of intended sarcasm can be used to walk back a remark that has been criticized or otherwise fallen flat. Thanks to our slippery understanding of the term, along with the way sarcasm can be easily missed, it can function like a “Get Out of Jail Free” card: The speaker can take a conversational mulligan and try to make things right.</p>
<p>We’ve all said things that we later regretted and appealed to “just kidding” or “I was being sarcastic.” However, if we habitually reach for such excuses to absolve ourselves of linguistic sins, it becomes, like the little boy who cried wolf, less and less effective.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141764/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger J. Kreuz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Because sarcasm is often difficult to discern and improperly used, it can operate as a linguistic mulligan. But deploy the excuse too much, and you might raise some eyebrows.Roger J. Kreuz, Associate Dean and Professor of Psychology, University of MemphisLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1296172020-02-04T13:32:58Z2020-02-04T13:32:58ZThe Iraq War has cost the US nearly $2 trillion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310550/original/file-20200116-181598-1vq9ftr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C49%2C5406%2C2916&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Packed and ready to leave? Perhaps not quite yet.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-handout-picture-released-by-the-us-army-shows-u-s-army-news-photo/1191159403?adppopup=true">Capt. Robyn Haake/US Army/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Editor’s note: The <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/">Costs of Wars project</a> was started in 2011 to assess the long-term consequences of the post-9/11 wars. Project co-director <a href="https://www.bu.edu/polisci/people/faculty/crawford/">Neta C. Crawford</a>, professor and chair of political science at Boston University, explains the major implications of the Iraq War for the federal budget.</em></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312721/original/file-20200130-41476-3w82x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312721/original/file-20200130-41476-3w82x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312721/original/file-20200130-41476-3w82x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=256&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312721/original/file-20200130-41476-3w82x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=256&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312721/original/file-20200130-41476-3w82x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=256&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312721/original/file-20200130-41476-3w82x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=322&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312721/original/file-20200130-41476-3w82x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=322&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312721/original/file-20200130-41476-3w82x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=322&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Even if the U.S. administration <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/01/06/pentagon-says-no-decision-iraq-withdrawal-after-qasem-soleimani-backlash/2827126001/">decided to leave</a> — or <a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/01/05/iraq-parliament-calls-for-expulsion-military/UrIXb0TChbusBl08SV1CkI/story.html">was evicted from</a> — Iraq immediately, the bill of war to the U.S. to date would be an estimated US$1,922 billion in current dollars.</p>
<p>This figure includes not only funding appropriated to the Pentagon explicitly for the war, but spending on Iraq by the State Department, the care of Iraq War veterans and interest on debt incurred to fund 16 years of U.S. military involvement in the country.</p>
<p>Since 2003, the Department of Defense has received about $838 billion in “emergency” and “overseas contingency operation” <a href="https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/fy2020_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf">funding</a> for operations in Iraq through fiscal year 2019. This includes, from 2014 on, money dedicated to the <a href="https://www.inherentresolve.mil/">fight against the Islamic State group</a>, also known as ISIS or IS, in a region including both Iraq and Syria.</p>
<p>The Pentagon “base” budget — money needed to keep the department running on an ongoing basis — has also ballooned while the U.S. has been at war. War-related <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2018-10/54219-oco_spending.pdf">increases to the base budget</a> include heightened security at bases, enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, increased military pay, and the healthcare costs of soldiers. I estimate nearly $800 billion in such increases since 9/11, with Iraq’s share about $382 billion.</p>
<p>Add to this approximately $59 billion spent by the State Department and USAID on <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2013/sigir-learning-from-iraq.pdf">Iraq</a> and <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2019/Aug/09/2002169448/-1/-1/1/Q3FY2019_LEADIG_OIR_REPORT.PDF">Syria</a> for democracy promotion, reconstruction, training, and removing unexploded bombs.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, about 4.1 million post-9/11 war veterans are receiving <a href="https://www.va.gov/budget/docs/summary/fy2020VAbudgetVolumeIImedicalProgramsAndInformationTechnology.pdf">medical care</a> and <a href="https://www.va.gov/budget/docs/summary/fy2020VAbudgetvolumeIIIbenefitsBurialProgramsAndDeptmentalAdministration.pdf">disability and other compensation</a>. Roughly half the spending for those veterans is Iraq related, with the total nearing $199 billion.</p>
<p>And since there have been no Iraq War taxes and very few <a href="https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/research/indepth/ebonds/res_e_bonds_eepatriotbond.htm">war bonds</a> issued to finance the post-9/11 wars, we should add another $444 billion in <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2020/Peltier%202020%20-%20The%20Cost%20of%20Debt-financed%20War.pdf">interest</a> on borrowing to pay for Pentagon and State Department spending. </p>
<p>Department of Defense spending on Iraq has tailed off in the past decade <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2018/Crawford_Costs%20of%20War%20Estimates%20Through%20FY2019.pdf">after peaking at around $140 billion</a> in 2008. </p>
<p>In December 2019, Congress <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/national-defense-authorization-act-fiscal-year-2020">appropriated</a> about <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/21/trump-signs-738-billion-defense-bill.html">$70 billion for the post-9/11 wars</a> as part of the $738 billion National Defense Authorization Act.</p>
<p>The Pentagon originally <a href="https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/fy2020_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf">requested</a> less than $10 billion of that amount for Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Syria.</p>
<p>But that budget may already be blown. Earlier this month, the US sent <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/u-s-sending-thousands-more-troops-mideast-after-baghdad-attack-n1110081">more troops</a> into a war zone that was supposed to be winding down.</p>
<p>[ <em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129617/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Neta C. Crawford receives funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. </span></em></p>The Pentagon has spent more than $800 billion on military operations in Iraq. But that doesn’t include money needed to care for veterans, rebuild the country or pay interest on war debt.Neta C. Crawford, Professor of Political Science and Department Chair, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1276832019-12-02T03:27:23Z2019-12-02T03:27:23ZWhy does the US pay so much for the defense of its allies? 5 questions answered<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/303625/original/file-20191126-84217-e85kx9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The U.S. pays billions to maintain military bases in Japan and South Korea.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/us-army-soldier-mission-660813538?src=e92a681d-fc60-470c-b79c-0c16298b084b-1-3">BOATFOTO/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the start of Donald Trump’s run for the U.S. presidency in 2015, he has been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/world/europe/donald-trumps-remarks-rattle-nato-allies-and-stoke-debate-on-cost-sharing.html">critical of the amount of money U.S. allies contribute to their own defense</a>. </p>
<p>Now, the Trump administration is demanding that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-usa/trump-asked-tokyo-for-8-billion-to-keep-u-s-troops-in-japan-foreign-policy-idUSKBN1XQ06F">Japan</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/14/politics/trump-south-korea-troops-price-hike/index.html">South Korea</a> pay more for hosting U.S. troops stationed in those countries. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-military/us-considers-pulling-up-to-4000-troops-from-south-korea-chosun-ilbo-idUSKBN1XU2V4">media also reported</a> that U.S. military leadership in South Korea discussed the possibility of withdrawing up to 4,000 troops from South Korea if it does not increase its contributions. The Pentagon has since denied having such plans.</p>
<p>We have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213484055">each studied</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X12442306?journalCode=afsa">overseas deployments</a> of U.S. military personnel for nearly a decade and have recently come together to research the costs and benefits of such deployments. </p>
<h2>1. What’s in it for the US?</h2>
<p>The U.S. currently has approximately 174,000 active-duty personnel deployed to overseas locations in approximately 140 countries. The Department of Defense Comptroller’s Office estimates <a href="https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/">the total cost</a> of overseas bases and deployments at US$24.4 billion in fiscal year 2020. These figures generally exclude the costs of ongoing combat operations. </p>
<p>When <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2111499?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">stronger countries provide security</a> for weaker countries, <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801477157/hierarchy-in-international-relations/">they receive</a> non-material benefits in return. </p>
<p>For example, the weaker country may sacrifice control over their foreign policy and give the major power access to territory or airspace it otherwise would not have. Deployments in Japan and Korea gave the U.S. influence in Southeast and East Asian regional matters during the Cold War.</p>
<p>Additionally, U.S. military personnel have served as the forefront of U.S. public diplomacy over the past 70 years through their routine jobs and day-to-day interactions with locals. The U.S. has been particularly effective at building “soft power,” meaning that people in other countries support the U.S. because of the affinity they feel toward Americans and American culture.</p>
<p><iframe id="ZZoxF" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/ZZoxF/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>2. How long has the US had bases in Japan and South Korea?</h2>
<p>Since the end of <a href="https://www.usfj.mil/About-USFJ/">World War II</a> in 1945 and the <a href="https://www.usfk.mil/About/">Korean War</a> in 1953, the U.S. has maintained several military bases and tens of thousands of military personnel within both countries. </p>
<p>After Japan regained its sovereignty in 1951, the United States and Japan signed a treaty calling for mutual defense and an agreement that allowed for the U.S. to operate and maintain military bases in Japan. Either country has the option, with one year’s notice, to end the treaty. </p>
<p>Currently, there are <a href="https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp">approximately 55,000</a> U.S. troops in Japan.</p>
<p>South Korea has hosted U.S. forces since the Korean War, when the <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/82">United Nations Security Council authorized</a> member nations to repel North Korea’s invasion of South Korea. After the 1953 armistice, the forces remained to provide continued security to South Korea and to deter hostilities from North Korea. </p>
<p>There are currently approximately <a href="https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp">26,500 U.S. troops</a> in South Korea.</p>
<p><iframe id="4Ebwy" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/4Ebwy/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>3. How much do Japan and South Korea normally contribute?</h2>
<p>The United States has negotiated agreements with both Japan and South Korea that lay out the details of the cost-sharing arrangements with each country. </p>
<p>The specific amounts contributed, as well as the activities that each state covers, vary by country and over time. However, the contributions of U.S. allies typically are substantial. </p>
<p>For example, in 2019, <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/19-405-Korea-SMA.pdf">the U.S. and South Korea negotiated</a> an agreement calling for South Korea to contribute approximately $893 million. </p>
<p>Japan’s current agreement doesn’t provide a clear statement on total contributions. However, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/q-a-how-much-do-u-s-military-bases-in-japan-and-korea-cost-1461822624">Japan’s current support</a> amounts to approximately $1.7 billion. </p>
<p>By comparison, the <a href="https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/">Department of Defense currently estimates</a> the total cost of maintaining the U.S. presence in South Korea and Japan at $4.5 billion and $5.7 billion, respectively. </p>
<p>Accordingly, both countries’ contributions amount to a substantial percentage of these total price tags. </p>
<p>Importantly, these figures provide only a rough picture of the financial relationship between the host country and the U.S. related to defense. For example, the figures for Japan <a href="https://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/The-Looming-Cost-Sharing-Storm_Bosack.-formatted.pdf">do not reflect other transfers</a>, like Japanese purchases of U.S. weapons systems, <a href="https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-trump-allies-20160930-snap-story.html">free rent and tax waivers</a>, and other expenditures taken on by the Japanese government. </p>
<p><iframe id="1cvZb" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/1cvZb/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>4. How do people in other countries view the presence of U.S. military?</h2>
<p>In 2018, <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3326211">we conducted a survey</a> in 14 countries, including Japan and South Korea, with approximately 1,000 respondents in each. These countries <a href="https://minerva.defense.gov/Owl-In-the-Olive-Tree/Owl_View/Article/1797784/understanding-how-populations-perceive-us-troop-deployments/">have traditionally hosted large U.S. military deployments</a>. </p>
<p>We found that people in the host country generally feel positively or have neutral attitudes toward the U.S. personnel stationed in their country. People who have had direct contact with members of the U.S. military, or whose families and friends have interacted with the military, are more likely to report favorable views of U.S. personnel. </p>
<p>In addition, between 10% and 25% report receiving financial benefits from the U.S. military presence. This can include having U.S. servicemembers patronize their businesses or being employed by the U.S. military. </p>
<p>Our personal interviews with people in troop-hosting countries confirm these findings. For example, when we asked a member of the local Parish Council in the village of Lakenheath, England, how locals interact with the U.S. military, he told us, “When they see that [U.S. military personnel] are just as human as you are, people like [the U.S. military] more.” </p>
<p><iframe id="mNE83" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/mNE83/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Opinions are not uniform. There are certainly ethical, social, environmental and economic considerations to hosting large U.S. deployments, and these costs have led to dissatisfaction and opposition in multiple countries. </p>
<p>The U.S. presence has led to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-okinawa-henoko/outnumbered-and-elderly-okinawa-protesters-oppose-u-s-military-runway-idUSKCN1RF0KC">protest movements on the Japanese island of Okinawa</a>, around <a href="https://www.stripes.com/news/europe/protesters-to-rally-outside-ramstein-against-alleged-drone-operations-1.587695">the Ramstein Air Base in Germany</a>, and in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/10/19/seoul-students-scale-wall-us-embassy-protest-american-troop-presence-south-korea/">South Korea</a>. </p>
<p>The more the U.S. demands host nations pay for the U.S. presence, the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-japans-okinawa-voters-deliver-a-resounding-no-to-new-us-military-base/2019/02/24/95283a46-3858-11e9-b786-d6abcbcd212a_story.html">less support</a> local politicians may have to maintain the arrangement.</p>
<h2>5. Are Trump’s demands reasonable?</h2>
<p>The discussion of whether U.S. allies contribute enough to their own defense is <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1927082">as old as many of the deployments themselves</a>. </p>
<p>However, there are two components that make the Trump demands novel. </p>
<p>First, negotiations with South Korea previously occurred every four to five years. The Trump administration changed this last year to <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2019/11/15/esper-says-south-korea-which-paid-90-percent-of-costs-for-camp-humphreys-needs-to-increase-burden-sharing-to-keep-us-troops-in-south-korea/">every year for South Korea</a>. These negotiations are complicated and could make annual negotiations both time-consuming and turbulent. </p>
<p>Second, reports suggest that Trump’s new demands are not based on any clear U.S. military need. This leads us to the question of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/14/politics/trump-south-korea-troops-price-hike/index.html">how Trump arrived at the new sum being sought from South Korea</a>.</p>
<p>Polling shows that while Americans are <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/10/majorities-of-u-s-veterans-public-say-the-wars-in-iraq-and-afghanistan-were-not-worth-fighting/">increasingly skeptical</a> of the U.S. intervention into Afghanistan and Iraq, <a href="https://digital.thechicagocouncil.org/lcc/rejecting-retreat">Americans do support</a> the United States’ current engagement in the world and its commitments to allies.</p>
<p>[ <em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127683/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Parts of this article are based on work supported by, or in part by, the Minerva Research Initiative, the U.S. Army Research Laboratory, and the U.S. Army Research Office under grant number W911NF-18-1-0087. The opinions and interpretations are those of the authors and not the U.S. Army or Department of Defense.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span> </span></em></p>The Trump administration is demanding that Japan and South Korea pay more for hosting U.S. troops.Michael E. Flynn, Associate Professor of Political Science, Kansas State UniversityCarla Martinez Machain, Associate Professor of Political Science, Kansas State UniversityMichael A. Allen, Associate Professor of Political Science, Boise State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1175722019-07-25T17:47:00Z2019-07-25T17:47:00ZA World War II battle holds key lessons for modern warfare<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276386/original/file-20190524-187172-1ffg2x5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C798%2C737&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of the 1st Marine Division land on Guadalcanal on Aug. 7, 1942.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:GuadLandingsLunga.jpg">U.S. Marine Corps</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Between Aug. 7, 1942, and Feb. 9, 1943, U.S. forces sought to capture – and then defend – the Pacific island of Guadalcanal from the Japanese military. What started as an amphibious landing quickly turned into a series of massive air and naval battles. The campaign marked a major turning point in the Pacific theater of World War II. It also revealed important lessons about the nature of warfare itself – ones that are particularly relevant when <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf">planning for conflict</a> in the 21st century.</p>
<p>Specifically, the Guadalcanal campaign shows how the old saying “the best defense is a good offense” can be turned upside-down – with a strong defense becoming an effective offensive weapon. The Japanese sought to find weaknesses, but kept running up against American power on land, on the sea and in the air. </p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=7sjhifoAAAAJ&hl=en">As scholars</a> and military professionals, we see Guadalcanal as teaching enduring lessons about the importance of integrating planning, training and technology to generate options that confound an adversary. We are not alone. The Chinese Navy’s official magazine recently published an article <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-chinas-navy-studying-battle-guadalcanal-50107">analyzing the Guadalcanal campaign for lessons useful in future wars</a>. </p>
<p><iframe id="bS1TG" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/bS1TG/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Defense as offensive strategy</h2>
<p>In early August 1942, the United States landed Marines and other troops on Guadalcanal, taking much of the island and capturing its airfields. Initially, it was an offense-as-defense strategy, part of a larger effort to capture the Solomon Islands, so Japan couldn’t use them as a base for attacking Allied naval forces in the Pacific. </p>
<p>Japanese resistance took a heavy toll, especially on the U.S. Navy, which lost 29 ships and thousands of sailors. But the Japanese efforts did more lasting damage to its own military, expending pilots, aircraft and ships Japan simply could not replace fast enough to sustain the war. The U.S., by contrast, had a vast population and enormous industrial potential, and was able to replace its losses and even reinforce its positions. </p>
<p>Realizing the Japanese had committed to retaking Guadalcanal no matter the cost, the U.S. <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2015/10/how-the-u-s-army-remains-the-master-of-landpower/">strategy</a> shifted to defense-as-offense, or what is called a “<a href="https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/cost-imposing-strategies-a-brief-primer">cost imposition</a>” campaign. It’s most often seen as a business strategy, but can be <a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1737468/thinking-differently-about-the-business-of-war/">applied to military efforts</a> too. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276392/original/file-20190524-187189-1en1f0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276392/original/file-20190524-187189-1en1f0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276392/original/file-20190524-187189-1en1f0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276392/original/file-20190524-187189-1en1f0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276392/original/file-20190524-187189-1en1f0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276392/original/file-20190524-187189-1en1f0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=582&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276392/original/file-20190524-187189-1en1f0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=582&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276392/original/file-20190524-187189-1en1f0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=582&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. military construction and repair crews were able to keep Henderson Field on Guadalcanal open, and even expand it during the course of the multi-month battle.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Henderson_Field_-_Guadalcanal_-_11_April_1943.jpg">U.S. Navy</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In general, cost imposition involves making it very expensive – in personnel, equipment and time – for an adversary to achieve a particular goal. This presents the enemy with a <a href="https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/cost-imposing-strategies-a-brief-primer">serious dilemma</a>: Giving up means certain defeat, of course, but continuing to compete decreases the likelihood of winning.</p>
<p>At Guadalcanal, the Japanese fell prey to the “<a href="https://www.behavioraleconomics.com/resources/mini-encyclopedia-of-be/sunk-cost-fallacy/">sunk costs fallacy</a>,” deciding that because they had <a href="https://www.behavioraleconomics.com/resources/mini-encyclopedia-of-be/sunk-cost-fallacy/">spent so much already</a>, they should just keep going. They found their battleships matched not only against the U.S. warships and planes, but also bulldozers, as U.S. Marines repaired key airfields in between barrages of shelling from Japanese ships offshore. </p>
<p>While the Japanese Navy expended round after round of ammunition, American planes were still able to take off and land, conducting repeated raids that sank or damaged the Japanese warships.</p>
<h2>Drone swarms, advance bases and cyber defense</h2>
<p>Today, the United States faces a complex mix of threats. Global powers like Russia and China use politics and economics as well as military strength to achieve their goals. Terrorists and hackers spread fear, uncertainty and <a href="https://theconversation.com/weaponized-information-seeks-a-new-target-in-cyberspace-users-minds-100069">social discord</a> within the U.S. All of that puts the U.S. at risk of ending up on the wrong side of cost-imposition efforts from adversaries big and small. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.naval-technology.com/features/future-aircraft-carriers-us-china/">Expensive aircraft carriers</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-went-wrong-with-the-f-35-lockheed-martins-joint-strike-fighter-60905">advanced aircraft</a> can be threatened by much cheaper missiles wielded by extremists. Hackers can threaten military bases and weapons – as well as civilian infrastructure like power plants.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/qW77hVqux10?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A U.S. Navy system to launch a swarm of small drones is tested.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In our view, the U.S. military therefore needs a new approach to defense strategy. First, the country needs <a href="https://www.military.com/defensetech/2018/07/23/marines-test-new-drone-swarms-single-operator-can-control.html">entirely new classes</a> of <a href="https://mwi.usma.edu/era-drone-swarm-coming-need-ready/">cheap, disposable drones</a> that engage targets on land, at sea and in the air. For example, <a href="https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2018/07/20/the-corps-wants-15-suicide-drones-swarming-from-the-hands-of-one-front-line-marine/">low-cost drone swarms</a> could help U.S. Marine forces threaten enemy naval and ground assets, while <a href="https://news.usni.org/2018/06/04/marines-forward-deploy-portable-drone-killing-system">counter-drone systems</a> protect U.S. forces. Like Guadalcanal’s bulldozers, they would offer a cheap way to keep the enemy under threat.</p>
<p>Second, Guadalcanal also highlights the importance of being able to rapidly build and defend advance bases. Into the future, the U.S. Marine Corps will need to be able to construct and repair airfields. They’ll also need to be able to use those locations as airplane, drone and missile bases to attack enemy forces. </p>
<p>In addition, those bases can block the enemy from <a href="https://mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Cuomo.pdf">using key terrain</a>, and give the U.S. <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2015/04/distributed-maritime-operations-an-emerging-paradigm/">multiple options</a> if a strike is needed. Those factors again raise the cost of conflict and competition for a potential adversary. </p>
<h2>Education matters, too</h2>
<p>A further lesson from the Guadalcanal campaign is that it’s vital to integrate new technology into training, so Marines and sailors know how to use new capabilities. In early August 1942, the U.S. Navy suffered one of its <a href="https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/first-battle-of-savo-island-the-u-s-navys-worst-defeat/">worst-ever defeats</a> in the Battle of Savo Island. American and allied forces lost four cruisers, while the Japanese Navy suffered little damage. </p>
<p>The U.S. had a significant technological advantage, but didn’t use it: radar. Few ship captains and crews understood how radar worked, much less how to use it in battle. One captain, Howard Bode of the USS Chicago, <a href="http://www.aferguson.net/magindexes/default.asp?mag=mhq&author=Denis%20Warner">ordered his ship’s radar turned off</a>, for fear it would reveal his position. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276393/original/file-20190524-187189-zy6mpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276393/original/file-20190524-187189-zy6mpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276393/original/file-20190524-187189-zy6mpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276393/original/file-20190524-187189-zy6mpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276393/original/file-20190524-187189-zy6mpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276393/original/file-20190524-187189-zy6mpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276393/original/file-20190524-187189-zy6mpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276393/original/file-20190524-187189-zy6mpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Crew of the USS Chicago repair damage from a Japanese torpedo during the Battle of Savo Island.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/c/chicago-ii.html">U.S. Navy</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Later on, in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands in October 1942, the U.S. ships again did not use their radars. The Japanese used their searchlights to spot American aircraft at night, controlling the battle in the darkness and sinking one U.S. aircraft carrier and severely damaging another.</p>
<p>The lesson remains important in the 21st century: Failing to experiment with new capabilities, whether radar in the 1940s or cyber operations and drone swarms today, diminishes battle readiness. That’s why the Marine Corps University created <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/welcome-to-fight-club-wargaming-the-future/">war-gaming fight clubs</a> and <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/diverging-from-the-arbitrary-the-gray-scholars-and-innovation-in-the-u-s-marine-corps/">training programs</a> that let students imagine future conflicts and experiment with how to respond. </p>
<p>Battles can be won before the first shot is fired, if future leaders prepare in classrooms and training for what they might face and how they might find advantages when conflict comes – whether online, in space or elsewhere.</p>
<p>[ <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=thanksforreading">Thanks for reading! We can send you The Conversation’s stories every day in an informative email. Sign up today.</a></em> ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117572/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Jensen receives funding from the Carnegie Corporation and the Koch Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Bowers serves on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps. The views in this article are his own and the co-author’s.</span></em></p>A defender that can hold out while inflicting greater losses on its attacker can wear down an adversary – reducing the threat of additional attacks.Benjamin Jensen, Associate Professor of International Relations, Marine Corps University; Scholar-in-Residence, American University School of International ServiceWilliam Bowers, Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps; President, Marine Corps UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1131082019-03-14T10:38:02Z2019-03-14T10:38:02ZWho are the private contractors fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan? An inside look at this invisible military force<p>The debate on privatizing the war in Afghanistan is heating up yet again, with Democratic lawmakers pledging to end so-called “<a href="https://taskandpurpose.com/dem-lawmakers-forever-war">forever wars</a>.” The public is slowly recognizing the war’s <a href="https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2019-01-29/death-disappearance-inside-world-of-privatised-war">hidden costs</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-10/blackwater-mercenary-prince-has-a-new-1-trillion-chinese-boss">global scale</a>. </p>
<p>In 2016, 1 in 4 U.S. armed personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan <a href="https://taskandpurpose.com/heres-many-us-troops-private-contractors-sent-afghanistan">was a private contractor</a>. This means that the war is already being outsourced, yet scholars, the media and the general public know almost nothing about it. </p>
<p>Because contractors operate in the shadows, without effective public oversight, they allow policymakers to have their cake and eat it too – by appearing to withdraw, while keeping proxy forces in theater. Who are the contractors who actually execute American policy? Are they equipped to succeed in this important task? What risks is the U.S. asking them to take?</p>
<p>The simple truth is that there is little reliable data about this industry. Without this data, scholars cannot ask even the most basic questions of whether using contractors works better than the alternative, namely military personal or local forces – or, indeed, whether it works at all. </p>
<p>We are researchers who study the privatization of security and its implications. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X18811375">In our study</a>, published on Dec. 5 in Armed Forces & Society, we shed light on some of the aspects of this largely invisible workforce for the first time.</p>
<h2>Gaps in the data</h2>
<p>It’s hard to get data about private military contractors, mainly because of the proprietary business secrets. Despite the fact that those companies act as proxies of the state, they are not legally obligated to share information with the public on their actions, organization or labor force. </p>
<p>Given how centrally private military companies feature in American foreign <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/11/privatizing-the-u-s-effort-in-afghanistan-seemed-a-bad-idea-now-its-even-worse/">policy debates lately</a>, Americans may assume that their policymakers are working from a detailed understanding of the contractor workforce. After all, the point is to weigh the contractors’ merits against uniformed service members, about whom the public have <a href="https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/data_reqs.jsp">excellent information</a>. </p>
<p>But this does not appear to be the case. There isn’t a detailed account of the private military industry’s practices, workforce, misconducts or contracts. Noticing this gap, in 2008, Congress instructed the Department of Defense <a href="https://www.congress.gov/110/plaws/publ181/PLAW-110publ181.pdf">to start collecting data</a> on private security personnel. </p>
<p>However, this data is limited, as <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf">security contractors</a> comprise just 10 to 20 percent of DOD contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq. The rest provide mission essential functions, such as engineering, communication and transportation and many others. Those roles take place in conflict areas and place those contractors at similar risk level as the soldiers. </p>
<p>Since it is impossible to say anything directly about the total population of American and British contractors who have served in Iraq, we sought out a sample for which records do exist – namely, those who died and whose deaths were recorded in obituaries. They are the corporate war dead. They are not a representative sample, since some occupations and some personalities are more likely to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/us/navy-seal-william-ryan-owens-dead-yemen.html">risk death</a> in combat than others, but in a setting without any reliable information they offer us a glimpse to this industry’s workforce.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262747/original/file-20190307-82669-i1ws8g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262747/original/file-20190307-82669-i1ws8g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262747/original/file-20190307-82669-i1ws8g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262747/original/file-20190307-82669-i1ws8g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262747/original/file-20190307-82669-i1ws8g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262747/original/file-20190307-82669-i1ws8g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262747/original/file-20190307-82669-i1ws8g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262747/original/file-20190307-82669-i1ws8g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Two U.S. private security contractors investigate the site where a military armored bus was damaged by a roadside bomb on the highway near Baghdad International Airport in Baghdad, Iraq in 2004.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/IRAQ-BLACKWATER/dd3f18835309424cbd07f2dcaa2414c8/5/0">AP Photo/Hadi Mizban</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Basic demographics</h2>
<p>We collected open source data from <a href="http://icasualties.org/">iCasualties</a>, a site that collects basic data on soldiers and contractors casualties. Using this data we gathered demographic information from obituaries and news articles, on 238 contractors who perished in Iraq between 2006 and 2016. </p>
<p>We learned that the contractors in our sample are predominantly white man in their 40s who choose contracting as a second career. Most are veterans with significant military experience. </p>
<p><iframe id="MCPVS" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/MCPVS/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Among those contractors who were previously deployed as service members, many are former officers and about half of them are Special Forces veterans. They are more likely to have a college degree than their active duty counterparts, but less likely than their fellow veterans in the general population.</p>
<p>They come from parts of the U.S. or United Kingdom with higher unemployment rates and fewer job opportunities – not the areas with the strongest traditions for military service. </p>
<h2>How contractors died</h2>
<p>What was it like to be a contractor in Iraq? From our sample of the corporate war dead, most of their deployments were short, between a week to a month. Many contractors treated it as a temporary job, taking a few tours. </p>
<p>Most of those in our sample worked in security, an especially dangerous job. Indeed, these contractors were more likely to be killed by enemy action than the American service members they worked alongside.</p>
<p><iframe id="sdzpz" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/sdzpz/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Of course, all of the members of our sample died. Contractors faced mortal peril in different places than service members. Many more of them died in Baghdad or on the roads than did at work or on a base. </p>
<p>This makes sense, considering that contractors that often lacked a protective umbrella of support from other units. If encountering unexpected threats, their support was less organized and effective. They were also routinely tasked with different types of missions: less combat work, and more logistics, maintenance or security type work. These types of missions – for example, driving the supply trucks to and from a base – are less protected and have routines that can be detected by insurgents.</p>
<h2>Enriching the debate</h2>
<p>To make informed decisions about whether and how to privatize future military commitments, the public needs at least a general understanding of the people tasked with projecting American force abroad.</p>
<p>The corporate war dead of future conflicts will almost certainly include Americans who previously served their country honorably in uniform. Their lives should be viewed as no more expendable as contractors than as soldiers, sailors, airmen or Marines. </p>
<p>Our contribution to the ongoing debate on contractors is important, but modest. Our sample represents less than a quarter of the private military contractors’ total population. The public still knows almost nothing about military contractors or the organizations they are affiliated with. </p>
<p>Contractors’ variation in experience, training and capabilities is broad and not well understood. Most contractors are not Westerners, but rather <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf">third country nationals</a>, recruits from Iraq and Afghanistan. Many others are veterans from other countries, such as Peru, Colombia, Fiji and Uganda. Some bring less institutional experience, as the industry recruits former <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2017/04/child-soldiers-reloaded-privatisation-war-170424204852514.html">child soldiers</a> from Sierra Leone and ex-guerrilla fighters from the FARC. </p>
<p>Some very big questions still lack any answer at all. Are contractors better or worse than service members in achieving a country’s political ends abroad? Is the U.S. using them effectively, making the most of what they do offer and mitigating those areas where they fall short? What are the unintended consequences of reliance on contractors in terms of human rights, legal complication, mismanagement and accountability?</p>
<p>Private military and security companies do not have real incentive to share these data, but the public interest is clear: The public needs it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113108/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new study looks at obituaries of private military contractors killed at war. The majority are white men with significant military experience.Ori Swed, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work, Texas Tech UniversityThomas Crosbie, Assistant Professor of Military Operations and Military Studies, Royal Danish Defence CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1048272018-11-29T11:37:28Z2018-11-29T11:37:28ZSwamped by cyberthreats, citizens need government protection<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/246574/original/file-20181120-161638-1tga52b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The public needs help from officials who can protect and serve.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/miniature-police-squad-protecting-laptop-computer-217515769">kirill_makarov/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most people can’t keep up with the latest in technology, which puts them at risk as cybercriminals <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/seniors">exploit human and technical weaknesses</a>. </p>
<p>For example, <a href="https://abc7chicago.com/realestate/wired-away-couple-loses-life-savings-during-home-purchase/2630496/">William and Nancy Skog</a> hoped to retire to a beautiful new home. Then a fraudster fooled them into transferring US$307,000 to his bank account. Their entire life savings disappeared in the blink of an eye. </p>
<p><a href="https://fermanaghherald.com/2018/11/police-in-new-warning-as-scammers-target-elderly/">This is not an isolated incident</a> – <a href="https://www.ubs.com/magazines/wma/insights/en/life-events/2018/cyber-scams-should-know.html">it happens all the time</a> <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/money/spend-save/scams-2018-fraud-robots-ransomware-rip-off-bank-accounts-identity-a8131236.html">across the globe</a>, and <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/15069/number-of-internet-scams-in-the-us/">attacks are increasing</a>. Older computer users are <a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/more-millennials-reported-losing-money-to-scams-in-2017-than-senior-citizens-2018-03-02">particularly vulnerable</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/initiatives/global-commission-internet-governance">Public officials around the world</a> – and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf">in the U.S.</a> – are beginning to understand that their cybersecurity efforts need to <a href="https://www.nascio.org/Portals/0/Publications/Webinars/NASCIO%20Cyber%20Webinar%202018%20August%2021.pdf">do more than defend businesses</a> and government agencies. <a href="https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/white-house-issues-national-cyber/">Citizens’ personal cybersecurity</a> is a <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/09/20/donald-trumps-new-cybersecurity-plan-allows-more-offensive-operations/1370946002/">key element of national security</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/02/government-responsibility-to-citizens-anne-marie-slaughter/">Governments have long addressed physical security</a> through public safety services, like police and fire departments, as well as public health programs for water purification, sewage treatment and inoculation against infectious diseases. Similar efforts could – and, in our view, should – <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/cybersecurity-everyone-s-problem-across-society-us-security-chief-1.3465066">help citizens cope with cyberthreats</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.karenrenaud.com">We</a> <a href="http://www.misprofessor.us/">are</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=u6VeU9UAAAAJ&hl=en">cybersecurity</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=xEkLk5YAAAAJ&hl=en">behavioral</a> researchers working with <a href="https://www.its.ms.gov/About/Pages/ExeDirBio.aspx">Craig Orgeron</a>, who heads the state of Mississippi’s Department of Information Technology Services, contemplating how government could support its citizens when it comes to cybercrime. A <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2018/03/17/more-fraudsters-scamming-senior-citizens-through-technology-and-its-costing-them-millions/428406002/">new endeavor</a> demonstrates what is possible. New York City’s government has launched a campaign to help <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/29/nyc-secure-new-york-cybersecurity-app-de-blasio/">residents to defend themselves</a> against hacking, online fraud and other cybersecurity threats. </p>
<h2>Improving cyber immunity</h2>
<p><a href="https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/29/nyc-secure-new-york-cybersecurity-app-de-blasio/">New York City</a> offers its citizens a free smartphone app called “<a href="https://secure.nyc/">NYC Secure</a>.” Any U.S. resident can download it, no matter where they live. It scans the person’s smartphone for a range of threats, and offers advice on how to fix any problems it finds. The app has some key strengths.</p>
<p>Most importantly, it targets citizens individually, delivering advice from a trustworthy authority directly to their pockets. This does not require people to search for information online and then figure out which web source to trust. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241130/original/file-20181017-41129-amobzh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241130/original/file-20181017-41129-amobzh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241130/original/file-20181017-41129-amobzh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1067&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241130/original/file-20181017-41129-amobzh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1067&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241130/original/file-20181017-41129-amobzh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1067&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241130/original/file-20181017-41129-amobzh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1340&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241130/original/file-20181017-41129-amobzh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1340&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241130/original/file-20181017-41129-amobzh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1340&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A new app gives a warning about smartphone security threats.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Screenshot of 'NYC Secure' app by The Conversation</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The app essentially empowers citizens. Many hackers succeed because they <a href="https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-emerging-threats-how-do-zero-day-vulnerabilities-work-30sectech.html">exploit previously unknown vulnerabilities</a>. Operating system providers and anti-malware software vendors make updates available to remove these, but the average citizen might not be aware of the need to install it. The app could bridge this gap, ensuring that far fewer devices can be successfully attacked. </p>
<p>As the app gains popularity, it could easily be extended to warn users as and when a new attack emerges. For instance, the widespread <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/dec/30/wannacry-petya-notpetya-ransomware">WannaCry attack of May 2017</a> compromised only computers that did not have a particular update installed. The app could easily warn people to install updates, tell them exactly how to check their devices for infection and even give directions for cleanup.</p>
<h2>Attracting attention</h2>
<p>The city’s campaign to protect its residents’ cybersecurity will bolster New Yorkers’ awareness of a wide range of online dangers. That could encourage them to take other protective actions. For example, many people use public Wi-Fi, which can easily allow attackers to <a href="https://www.techadvisor.co.uk/feature/security/why-you-need-vpn-for-surfing-on-public-wi-fi-3670765/">eavesdrop on communications</a>. An app that warned users about the dangers of Wi-Fi networks could help people choose whether to connect or not, and know that some activities – like bank transactions – should be conducted only on secure Wi-Fi networks.</p>
<p>In terms of privacy, too, people need help. <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-health-apps-are-like-the-wild-west-with-apple-just-riding-into-town-103512">Health care apps</a>, mostly provided by private companies, are not particularly respectful of their users’ extremely sensitive data. The <a href="https://secure.nyc/">“NYC Secure” app</a>, by contrast, diligently preserves its users’ privacy. The app embodies government’s goal to serve the citizenry without need for profit, which builds trust with users, making people more likely to use it. </p>
<p>It is impossible to wipe out all cyber threats – just as it is to eradicate all infectious diseases. Of course, even apps designed specifically to support and empower citizens may be targeted by hackers. The New York model is one other cities and states could emulate and extend: Give advice and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2018.06.006">provide tools to help citizens to repel cyber attacks</a>. Governments could promote the “NYC Secure” app itself or provide something similar for their own citizens, especially if it provides regularly updated advice tailored specifically to address current and emerging threats. We believe governments have the responsibility to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2018.06.006">help their citizens protect themselves</a> – both in the physical world and online.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104827/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Governments can help citizens protect their own cybersecurity by providing practical advice and meaningful support.Karen Renaud, Professor of Cybersecurity, Abertay UniversityMerrill Warkentin, James J. Rouse Endowed Professor of Information Systems, Mississippi State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1049982018-10-19T10:35:00Z2018-10-19T10:35:00ZArms sales to Saudi Arabia give Trump all the leverage he needs in Khashoggi affair<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241346/original/file-20181018-67185-11iae4z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">American-made F-15 warplanes fly over Riyadh.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Mideast-Yemen-Saudi/392582a9aa2042288bb64ca504b4c4bf/1/0">AP Photo/Hassan Ammar</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Among Donald Trump’s many unusual characteristics as president is his frankness. </p>
<p>Last week, after the disappearance and apparent torture and murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi, Trump <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/10/13/jamal-khashoggi-trump-saudi-arms-deal/1630693002/">argued that “we would be punishing ourselves”</a> by canceling arms sales to Saudi Arabia over a human rights concern. Few world leaders, or former U.S. presidents, would have been so bold as to publicly admit that a Saudi journalist’s life is not worth the loss of arms sales.</p>
<p>And it’s true that the armaments relationship between these two countries is long-established and lucrative for U.S. companies, as <a href="https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/people.cfm?authorID=571">my own research</a> on the global defense industry shows. </p>
<p>However, the president has it wrong when he argues the U.S. would be “foolish” to use these sales as leverage with the Saudis, claiming they could just get their tanks and fighter jets from other countries. In fact it’s one of the best bargaining chips he has with the kingdom. </p>
<h2>An arms-buying behemoth</h2>
<p>Saudi Arabia is indeed a major weapons buyer. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/yb_18_summary_en_0.pdf">Saudi Arabia spent</a> US$69.4 billion on military expenditures in 2017, according to the <a href="https://www.sipri.org">Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</a>, the world’s leading research organization on conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Only the U.S. and China spent more. </p>
<p>But since it doesn’t have an arms industry – like the U.S. and China – Saudi Arabia must import most of that from other countries. That’s why, over the past decade, Saudi Arabia <a href="http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist.php">has imported</a> more armaments than every country but India. </p>
<p>And U.S. companies such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon have benefited most from all that spending, making up the <a href="http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php">55 percent</a> of its weapons imports from 2008 to 2017. </p>
<p><iframe id="4zlVK" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/4zlVK/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>That has made Saudi Arabia the top buyer of American arms, with 11.8 percent of all sales over that period. In fact, U.S. defense contractors have made almost $90 billion <a href="https://www.stripes.com/news/us/top-defense-contractors-keeping-quiet-amid-saudi-arabia-uproar-1.552011">selling</a> arms to Saudi Arabia since 1950. </p>
<p><iframe id="O2y5E" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/O2y5E/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>In recent years, fighter planes like the F-15 and their spare parts have become particularly <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/10/15/657588534/fact-check-how-much-does-saudi-arabia-spend-on-arms-deals-with-the-u-s">important</a> to the weapons trade with Saudi Arabia because it needs them to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia/571465/">conduct</a> its bombing campaigns in Yemen.</p>
<p>For example, a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/us-saudi-arabia-strike-30-billion-arms-deal/2011/12/29/gIQAjZmhOP_blog.html?utm_term=.b2ce778d0994">2011 contract</a> awarded $30 billion to U.S. defense contractors to produce 84 F-15 jets and other weaponry for the Saudi military. Boeing stands to earn $24 billion of this total, which the company <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2011/12/29/world/meast/u-s--saudi-fighter-sale/index.html">claimed</a> will support over 50,000 U.S. jobs.</p>
<h2>A bargain over human rights</h2>
<p>As president, Trump clearly hopes that the money continues to pour in and helps him with his “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-38698654/donald-trump-america-first-america-first">America First</a>” campaign, intended to create jobs for Americans.</p>
<p>It’s no surprise, then, that he made <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/trump-arrives-saudi-arabia-foreign-trip-170520063253596.html">his first foreign trip</a> as president to Saudi Arabia in May 2017. During the trip, he reportedly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/14/us/politics/trump-saudi-arabia-arms-deal.html">struck a bargain</a> with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman: Trump wouldn’t lecture his kingdom on human rights, and Saudi Arabia would buy more American weapons. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, Trump’s claim to have secured $110 billion in arms sales has not materialized. Although the Saudis signed numerous letters of intent and interest, some of which had been <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/06/05/the-110-billion-arms-deal-to-saudi-arabia-is-fake-news/">approved</a> by the Obama administration, no new <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/10/10/after-khashoggi-us-arms-sales-to-the-saudis-are-essential-leverage/">contracts</a> have resulted, due mainly to lower oil prices and the Saudis’ costly war in Yemen.</p>
<p>So in the Khashoggi affair, it appears that Trump is eager to keep to his end of the bargain. He has avoided criticizing the Saudi government over its alleged role in Khashoggi’s disappearance to curry favor with the monarchy over arms sales. Even in the face of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/world/europe/turkey-saudi-khashoggi-dismember.html">Turkish reports</a> that Saudi agents tortured Khashoggi and dismembered his body and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/world/middleeast/pompeo-khashoggi-murder.html">U.S. intelligence supporting</a> those allegations, Trump has preferred to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/10/15/657522089/rogue-killers-may-have-murdered-saudi-journalist-trump-suggests">blame “rogue killers”</a> for any crime.</p>
<p>In defending this course of action, Trump <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/411271-trump-defends-110-billion-us-arms-sale-to-saudi-arabia">claimed</a> that “if they don’t buy [weapons] from us, they’re going to buy it from Russia or they’re going to buy it from China or they’re going to buy it from other countries.” </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241339/original/file-20181018-67185-15tbj5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241339/original/file-20181018-67185-15tbj5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=355&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241339/original/file-20181018-67185-15tbj5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=355&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241339/original/file-20181018-67185-15tbj5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=355&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241339/original/file-20181018-67185-15tbj5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241339/original/file-20181018-67185-15tbj5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241339/original/file-20181018-67185-15tbj5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Smoke billows from a 2015 Saudi-led airstrike in Sanaa, Yemen.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Mideast-Saudi-Nation-at-War/502c555d233e4a73a1cbf2b38eab7ffa/58/0">AP Photo/Hani Mohammed</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>US leverage</h2>
<p>While it’s true that Russia and China are <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/yb_18_summary_en_0.pdf">indeed major exporters</a> of armaments, the claim that U.S. weapons can easily be replaced by other suppliers is not – at least not in the short term. </p>
<p>First, once a country is “locked in” to a specific kind of weapons system, such as planes, tanks or naval vessels, the cost to <a href="http://doi.org/10.1257/jep.8.4.65">switch</a> to a different supplier can be huge. Military personnel must be retrained on new equipment, spare parts need to be replaced, and operational changes may be necessary. </p>
<p>After being so reliant on U.S. weapons systems for decades, the <a href="http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a498941.pdf">transition costs</a> to buy from another country could be prohibitive even for oil-rich Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>The second problem with Trump’s argument is that armaments from Russia, China or elsewhere are simply <a href="https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1344">not as sophisticated as</a> U.S. weapons, which is why they are usually cheaper – though the quality gap is quickly decreasing. To maintain its military superiority in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has opted to purchase virtually all of its weapons from American and European companies. </p>
<p>That is why the U.S. has significant leverage in this aspect of the relationship. Any <a href="http://fortune.com/2018/10/14/saudis-threaten-retaliation-jamal-khashoggi/">Saudi threat</a> to retaliate against a ban on U.S. arms sales by buying weapons from countries that have not raised concerns about the Khashoggi disappearance would not be credible. And is probably why, despite worries in the White House, such a threat has not yet been made.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241340/original/file-20181018-67179-3z8696.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241340/original/file-20181018-67179-3z8696.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241340/original/file-20181018-67179-3z8696.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241340/original/file-20181018-67179-3z8696.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241340/original/file-20181018-67179-3z8696.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241340/original/file-20181018-67179-3z8696.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241340/original/file-20181018-67179-3z8696.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In many ways, Saudi Arabia is locked in to buying U.S. weapons such as missiles for F-15 fighters.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Watchf-Associated-Press-International-News-Saud-/04d1b04997dd4cbd98aee655486b42fc/20/0">AP Photo/Scott Applewhite</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Selling ideals for short-term gains</h2>
<p>Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has developed a global reputation as a <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/365846-susan-rice-giving-up-uss-moral-authority-makes-a-mockery-of-america">moral authority</a> championing human rights. </p>
<p>Yes, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/19/opinions/trump-trip-abroad-human-rights-tasini-opinion/index.html">there have been many times when realpolitik</a> took priority.</p>
<p>But despite these moments, the U.S. managed also to maintain its authority by advocating respect for human rights as a global norm during the Cold War, and within many repressive regimes ever since.</p>
<p>With Khashoggi, Trump is choosing to give up that mantle completely by showing his priority is purely economic, regardless of the impact on the United States’ global <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/10/01/trumps-international-ratings-remain-low-especially-among-key-allies/">reputation</a>. Such a bald-faced strategy, in my view, sells American values short and weakens U.S. global credibility.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104998/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Terrence Guay has received research funding from the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. </span></em></p>Trump claimed that ‘we would be punishing ourselves’ by using US arms sales to Saudi Arabia as a bargaining chip over the disappearance of Khashoggi. A look at the arms trade shows why he’s wrong.Terrence Guay, Clinical Professor of International Business, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1020152018-08-24T10:39:16Z2018-08-24T10:39:16ZMichael Cohen’s guilty plea? ‘Nothing to see here’<p>On the afternoon of Aug. 21, when news of Paul Manafort’s conviction and Michael Cohen’s plea deal emerged within hours of one another, the social media channels of Donald Trump’s most vociferous supporters went dark.</p>
<p>The statements of Cohen, Trump’s longtime personal attorney, seemed damaging. </p>
<p>Cohen pleaded guilty to federal charges of campaign finance violations and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/22/politics/michael-cohen-transcript-plea/index.html">swore</a>, under oath, that he acted to prevent “information that would be harmful to the candidate and to the campaign” from reaching the public for the “principal purpose of influencing the election.” In confessing to the federal crimes Cohen also implicated his client, Trump, by saying he committed these crimes at the behest of “a candidate for federal office.” </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/us/politics/trump-manafort-cohen-mueller.html">As a New York Times analysis put it</a>, Cohen’s statement in court “carried echoes of President Richard M. Nixon, who was named an ‘unindicted co-conspirator’ in the special prosecutor’s investigation of Watergate.”</p>
<p>Because of the seriousness of Cohen’s plea, the question wasn’t if Trump and his surrogates would respond, but when.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"267626951097868289"}"></div></p>
<p>Trump and his team <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/us/politics/trump-manafort-cohen-mueller.html">reportedly</a> “spent hours working on a statement” to attempt to clear Trump’s name and reject the “unindicted co-conspirator” label. By the following morning, a messaging strategy seemed to coalesce.</p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=KgYzj5gAAAAJ&hl=en">As a professor of rhetoric and argumentation</a> who is finishing a book about Trump’s presidential campaign, I paid close attention to what Trump’s camp decided to say in his defense.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Z4C-maGgYk0C&pg=PA22&lpg=PA22&dq=apologia+rhetoric&source=bl&ots=5ys5eYUu7N&sig=RQnzxDw-SgHC8mu1mro1QHnA6Zo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwizrpuet4HdAhUFUKwKHcSRBlo4ChDoATADegQIBxAB#v=onepage&q=apologia%20rhetoric&f=false">Apologia”</a> – an Ancient Greek <a href="http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/lsj/#eid=13459&context=lsj&action=from-search">term</a> for the speech of self-defense – can assume a few well-known forms. They include: denial (“I didn’t do it”), differentiation (“It wasn’t what you think, it was something else”), bolstering (“Important people approve of what I did, so you should, too”) and transcendence (“Let’s focus on what is really important here – the big picture”).</p>
<p>Trump’s apologia has been primarily based upon denial and differentiation. He wants to persuade Americans that he did nothing wrong and that <a href="http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/398606-trump-what-youre-seeing-in-the-news-is-not-whats-happening-inbox-x">things are not what they appear to be</a>.</p>
<p>To buttress this, his defenders relied upon what rhetoric scholars call “<a href="https://owl.purdue.edu/owl/general_writing/the_writing_process/stasis_theory/index.html">points of stasis</a>,” which are questions that debaters since <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00335637209383109?journalCode=rqjs20">Aristotle</a> have used to develop their most persuasive appeals. </p>
<p>Points of stasis deal with four questions: What happened? How should we understand it? How should we value it? What should we do about it?</p>
<p>In coming up with answers to these questions, debaters will attempt to frame what happened, influence how we should understand it, dictate how we should value it and outline what should be done about it. </p>
<p>When paired with apologia, points of stasis can be used to try to wiggle out of difficult situations. They can help an audience understand new information from the perspective of your side and mitigate damaging charges. </p>
<p>For example, Trump’s lawyer, Rudy Giuliani, attempted to explain what happened when he <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/michael-cohen-president-trumps-longtime-personal-attorney-reaches/story?id=57310974">released a statement</a> denying that Trump was implicated at all in the Cohen matter. “There is no allegation of any wrongdoing against the President in the government’s charges against Mr. Cohen,” it read, framing the events in a way that vindicated Trump from any wrongdoing. </p>
<p>But, you might wonder, if Trump wasn’t specifically implicated in Cohen’s guilty plea, then how should we understand what happened? Didn’t hush money still get paid to help the campaign?</p>
<p>To shape how observers might make sense of this, lawyer Alan Dershowitz, the author of the book “<a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=TYBaDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Alan+Dershowitz+impeachment&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjmtPuRq4HdAhVSDq0KHQGWB4IQ6AEIKDAA#v=onepage&q=Alan%20Dershowitz%20impeachment&f=false">The Case Against Impeaching Trump</a>,” appeared on <a href="http://dailycaller.com/2018/08/21/alan-dershowitz-cnn-scenario-trump/">CNN</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NwStH3G6-N0">“Tucker Carlson Tonight”</a> and <a href="http://video.foxnews.com/v/5825323703001/?#sp=show-clips">“Fox and Friends”</a> to argue that everyone commits campaign finance violations – and that campaign finance rules are incomprehensible anyway.</p>
<p>In other words, viewers should realize that this is something really common in politics – an easy mistake to make that shouldn’t be thought of as a big deal.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2018/08/22/dershowitz_candidate_entitled_to_pay_hush_money_committed_no_election_crime.html">According to Dershowitz</a>, campaign finance violations are trivial infractions like jaywalking. And if hush money were paid, while it’s not exactly noble behavior, it isn’t a crime. Little value, he seems to be saying, should attributed to the crimes – if they were committed at all. </p>
<p>Furthermore, there’s not much that can even be done about it, they say. A sitting president cannot be indicted (and therefore audiences and courts do not get to judge). And <a href="http://thehill.com/homenews/media/402991-dershowitz-defends-trump-says-every-campaign-violates-campaign-finance-law">even if it were crime</a>, it isn’t a “high crime,” so it isn’t an impeachable offense.</p>
<p>To recap the points of stasis:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>What happened?</strong> There’s no allegation of wrongdoing by the president in the government’s charges.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>How should we understand Cohen’s guilty plea?</strong> It’s a mere campaign finance violation, which everyone commits.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>What sort of stock should we put into this crime?</strong> It’s like jaywalking. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>What if Trump paid hush money?</strong> Not great, but not illegal.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>What can be done about it?</strong> Nothing. The president can’t be indicted.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>In the days since Cohen’s plea deal, these points of stasis have been repeated to shore up Trump’s denial of wrongdoing and differentiate campaign finance violations from “high crimes and misdemeanors,” the phrase in the Constitution that describes impeachable offenses. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1032044202811641857"}"></div></p>
<p>Of course, this isn’t playing out in a courtroom or in the Athenian Agora. Instead, it’s playing out in the court of public opinion. Impeachment is a political process, and it seems to hinge on whether enough voters get fully behind the effort. </p>
<p>In this sense, one bolstering strategy may resound the most. Trump’s base is so firmly in his camp, some of his backers in the media <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2018/08/22/storm-clouds-gather-for-gop-as-midterms-approach-but-forecast-isn-t-clear.html">have argued</a>, that this news won’t hurt Trump’s political standing. </p>
<p>It doesn’t really matter if he is an unindicted co-conspirator, they say – because his supporters won’t care. </p>
<p>Trump may have enough support for now to stay afloat. How long he can tread water is unclear.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102015/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Mercieca does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Trump’s surrogates have deployed tried and true rhetorical techniques to defend the president.Jennifer Mercieca, Associate Professor of Communication, Texas A&M UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/912882018-02-07T00:03:26Z2018-02-07T00:03:26ZHow bombardier beetles survive being eaten – and other amazing animal defence mechanisms<p>In Disney’s film version of Pinnochio, the boy-puppet rescues his creator Geppetto by lighting a fire inside Monstro the whale, who has swallowed them both. The fire causes the whale to sneeze, freeing Pinnochio and Geppetto from their gastric prison.</p>
<p>Before you dismiss this getaway as incredible fantasy, consider that new research shows that a kind of fire in the belly can actually be an effective strategy for escaping predators in the real world. In fact, the animal kingdom is full of amazing examples of unusual defence mechanisms that help small creatures avoid a nasty fate.</p>
<p>In a new paper <a href="http://rsbl.royalsocietypublishing.org/lookup/doi/10.1098/rsbl.2017.0647">in Biology Letters</a>, scientists at Kobe University in Japan describe how bombardier beetles can survive being eaten by a toad by releasing a hot chemical spray that makes the hungry amphibian vomit.</p>
<p>Bombardier beetles are so-named because, when threatened, they emit a boiling, irritating substance from their backsides <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/422599.stm">with remarkable accuracy</a>, to deter potential predators. They produce the caustic mixture by <a href="https://www.wired.com/2014/05/absurd-creature-of-the-week-bombardier-beetle/">combining hydrogen peroxide, hydroquinones and chemical catalysts</a> in a specially reinforced chamber at the base of their abdomen, which shields the beetle’s own organs from the resulting explosive reaction.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/iPlcA3VGXtc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p><a href="http://rsbl.royalsocietypublishing.org/lookup/doi/10.1098/rsbl.2017.0647">The Japanese researchers</a> fed two different species of bombardier beetles to captive toads. They were then able to confirm that the beetles used their weapon inside the toads by listening carefully for the explosive pop that accompanies each discharge. </p>
<p>Toads are ambush predators, quite used to swallowing first and asking questions later. When they start to feel a dose of diner’s remorse, they can literally turn <a href="https://indianapublicmedia.org/amomentofscience/how-to-heave-your-guts/">their stomachs inside out and scrape out the contents</a>, rather than suffering meekly from indigestion. Many of the toads in this experiment did just that, disgorging the beetles up to 107 minutes after ingestion. Remarkably, the ejected beetles all survived.</p>
<p>In a further experiment, the researchers poked beetles with forceps to deplete their spray reserves. Compared to those with full tanks of fuel, the exhausted beetles were much less likely to be ejected. This showed that it really was their chemical arsenals that saved them, rather than just their taste or behaviour in the gut.</p>
<figure> <img src="https://media.giphy.com/media/26DN4S3rQgsgvzEY0/giphy.gif"><figcaption>“I guess I’ll die another day.” Sugiura & Sato, Kobe University</figcaption></figure>
<p>The bombardier beetle is of course not the only animal escape artist. The diverse getaway tactics of animals are a testament to the fascinating creativity of evolution. Subject to millions of years of abuse and exploitation by predators, natural selection has shaped an array of ingenious strategies for cheating death in the face of would-be devourers.</p>
<h2>Animal Houdinis</h2>
<p>Some examples are probably familiar to most people. For instance, many lizards drop their tails to distract a predator or <a href="https://academic.oup.com/bioscience/article/59/8/728/256547">escape from its venom</a>. But others are more exotic. Sea cucumbers don’t have tails so they <a href="http://echinoblog.blogspot.ca/2012/01/sea-cucumber-evisceration-defense.html">eject and regenerate their internal organs instead</a>. Loud sounds (<a href="http://thatslifesci.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/2016-12-26-How-Pistol-Shrimp-Kill-With-Bubbles-AStrauss/">such as the “gunshots” of snapping shrimp</a>) and bright colours (as on <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/ebook.php?isbn=9780520952461">banded wing grasshoppers</a>) are also effective means of <a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5742/afd010a4e1b889d1097f28f6f5741f10d33e.pdf">startling predators</a>. Mantid insects unite movement, sound and colour in an elaborate display that can stop an attack or at least give them a chance to escape.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/G6QBRbLrOSw?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Some animals fight back, such as the frogs that can <a href="http://rsbl.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/4/4/355">erect sharp bony splinters</a> from their claws that <a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn13991-horror-frog-breaks-own-bones-to-produce-claws/">pierce their own skin</a>, like X-Men’s Wolverine. Other animals, including <a href="https://doi.org/10.1098%252Frspb.2001.1708">the mimic octopus</a>, prefer to pretend to be being dangerous, <a href="https://www.nature.com/scitable/blog/accumulating-glitches/the_mimic_octopus_master_of">adopting the appearance of more deadly prey</a> when threatened.</p>
<p>The stunning variety of defensive mechanisms would be impressive even if we only counted variations of chemical warfare, similar to the bombardier beetle’s steam treatment. There are the defensive toxins in <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/fish/group/pufferfish/">pufferfish</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20150422-the-worlds-most-poisonous-animal">poison arrow frogs</a>, the nauseating <a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg12717282-900-science-the-seven-deadly-smells-of-a-skunk/">odours of skunks</a>, the charmingly named but actually revolting <a href="http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20150623-millipedes-use-chemical-weapons">repugnatorial glands of some millipedes</a>, and the <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/vomit-bird-throws-defense-predators-eurasian-roller-nestlings-emit-foul-smelling-fluid-protection-article-1.1037423">projectile vomiting</a> and <a href="https://wildfowl.wwt.org.uk/index.php/wildfowl/article/view/562">faecal egg decorating</a> of some birds.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205061/original/file-20180206-14107-1lzimnd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205061/original/file-20180206-14107-1lzimnd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205061/original/file-20180206-14107-1lzimnd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205061/original/file-20180206-14107-1lzimnd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205061/original/file-20180206-14107-1lzimnd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205061/original/file-20180206-14107-1lzimnd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205061/original/file-20180206-14107-1lzimnd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">I wouldn’t eat me if I were you.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/strawberry-poison-dart-frog-dendrobates-pumilio-110478725?src=wsqFvxedepyW5_6CPNI-NQ-1-3">Maiquez/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Why should nature have created such an impressive array of defensive tactics? One possible explanation can be summarised as the <a href="http://evosophos.com/life-dinner-principle/">life-dinner principle</a>, articulated by biologists <a href="http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/205/1161/489">Richard Dawkins and John Krebs in the late 1970s</a>. The argument is that predator and prey often face asymmetrical selection pressures, meaning that the stakes are different for the two competitors. If a predator fails to capture its target, it loses dinner, but if the prey fails to escape, it loses its life. Because the stakes are greater for prey, we shouldn’t be surprised they have developed so many impressive defences.</p>
<p>Understanding nature’s tremendous capacity to adapt should make us be careful. Humans interact with other organisms all the time, and usually we’re the predators. When we try to take action against other creatures to stop them spreading disease or eating crops, we should be mindful that evolutionary innovation can produce remarkable adaptations. For example, our widespread use of <a href="https://www.myjoyonline.com/lifestyle/2018/february-3rd/high-levels-of-antibiotic-resistance-found-worldwide-who.php">antibiotics</a> and <a href="https://guardian.ng/features/malaria-cases-rise-as-insecticide-resistance-spreads/">pesticides</a> has spurred the evolution of organisms that are resistant to these methods.</p>
<p>Only by having a healthy respect for the relentless power of evolution can we hope to generate sustainable solutions to these kinds of problems. If we grow complacent and inattentive, we may some day soon find ourselves facing newly evasive diseases and pests, sputtering to breathe and dyspeptic amid all the fire and smoke in our bellies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91288/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luc Bussiere does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Meet the brawny bug with a concoction so caustic it’ll make a toad vomit.Luc Bussiere, Lecturer in Biological Sciences, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/760702017-06-01T01:57:24Z2017-06-01T01:57:24ZPrivate defense companies are here to stay – what does that mean for national security?<p>Share prices of many military and intelligence contractors have risen sharply since President Donald Trump’s election. </p>
<p>Investors are betting that an increase in defense spending will provide a windfall for these firms. For instance, <a href="http://www.generaldynamics.com/our-business/combat-systems/land-systems">General Dynamics</a>, a large contractor that develops combat vehicles and weapons systems for the U.S. military, saw its stock price jump by more than <a href="https://www.google.com/finance?q=NYSE%3AGD&ei=ZcMtWYm4JIO0jAHxy6egDg">30 percent in the months after the election</a>. Likewise, Kratos Defense and Security Services, a smaller firm that builds <a href="http://www.kratosusd.com/capabilities/unmanned-tactical-systems">drones</a> for the U.S. Air Force, saw its shares soar <a href="https://www.google.com/finance?q=Kratos&ei=ZcMtWYm4JIO0jAHxy6egDg">more than 75 percent</a> between November 2016 and May 2017. </p>
<p>This trend may be short-lived. Congress still must decide whether <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/us/politics/trump-budget-winners-losers.html?_r=0">Trump’s proposed 10 percent increase in defense spending</a> is practical given current budget constraints.</p>
<p>What is certain is that for-profit military and intelligence firms will remain an integral part of U.S. national defense. My <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2017.1243912">research</a> focuses on the changing nature of the private defense industry. Military contracting <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67440">is still big business</a>, although media coverage of private military firms has diminished since the withdrawal of the U.S. from Iraq in 2011. Today, contractors’ work ranges from assisting in drone missions to analyzing signals intelligence to <a href="http://www.jobs.net/jobs/dyncorp/en-us/job/Afghanistan/Advisor-Embedded-Police/J3J6Y7686BZTPSFRY48/">training police forces</a> in fragile countries like Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Like it or not, government agencies responsible for national security are dependent on private defense firms. These companies are primarily responsible to shareholders rather than the American people. How can they be held accountable to the nation’s interests?</p>
<h1>New frontiers</h1>
<p>In recent years, private military companies have adapted to changing demands from U.S. defense agencies. During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military relied heavily on contractors to support counterinsurgency operations. However, high-profile incidents of alleged human rights abuses by the company CACI at <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/us-appeals-court-reinstates-abu-ghraib-prison-abuse-case-against-caci/2016/10/21/e53c43a6-97b5-11e6-bc79-af1cd3d2984b_story.html?utm_term=.6e0a02269e7a">Abu Ghraib Prison</a> in Iraq and Blackwater at <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/blackwater-verdict.html">Nisour Square</a>, Iraq brought to light the difficulty the American military faces monitoring private defense companies. </p>
<p>At the same time, Americans have since become averse to nation-building campaigns in <a href="https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/americans-support-limited-military-action-syria-against-isis">failing states</a>. So, private defense firms have shifted away from supporting “boots on the ground.” Instead, they are increasingly assisting military and intelligence agencies with counterterrorism and cybersecurity.</p>
<p>While the American people generally want to avoid deploying troops to conflict zones, they still demand protection from terrorism. The Pentagon, CIA and other defense agencies receive assistance in these areas from private companies with expertise in drone warfare, special forces operations and analysis of electronic surveillance of potential terrorist threats. These traditionally were duties of <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/19/5/1055/505530/We-Can-t-Spy-If-We-Can-t-Buy-The-Privatization-of">public employees</a>.</p>
<p>Cybersecurity is another area in which private military companies see <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/09/29/raytheon-wins-1-billion-cybersecurity-contract-to-battle-attacks-on-u-s-agencies/?utm_term=.f3154e7c2d4d">increasing demand</a>. Information gleaned from hacking government agencies, world leaders and political campaigns can be used by rogue states like Russia and nonstate actors like WikiLeaks to harm American interests.</p>
<p>Governments and multinational corporations realize that protecting classified information and intellectual property is of paramount importance. They are willing to pay top dollar to private defense firms to keep their secrets safe.</p>
<h2>Serving the public interest?</h2>
<p>Most defense analysts now acknowledge that the question is not whether to privatize, but <a href="http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/DAED_a_00100?journalCode=daed#.WRJ6HxiZO1s">where to draw the line</a>. If the U.S. government is going to work extensively with contractors, it requires a more <a href="https://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cwc/20110929213815/http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/">robust oversight system</a>. Government agencies and courts also need assurances they can hold defense firms accountable if they break the law overseas. </p>
<p>During the Iraq War, this was a point of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2010.480906">serious contention</a>. It was unclear what legal jurisdiction applied to employees of private defense firms. The uncertain legal status of contractors caused significant tension between the U.S. and the government of Iraq and hampered <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/01/world/middleeast/01contractors.html?mtrref=undefined&gwh=04E8524B4347957ED094B882F7D70C09&gwt=pay">American counterinsurgency efforts</a>. </p>
<p>Here are three ways Congress could increase accountability for private defense firms as the industry becomes more enmeshed in national security.</p>
<p>First, Congress could create an independent regulatory agency to report on contractors’ performance. While major firms in the industry insist they can <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-public-policy/article/effectiveness-of-selfregulation-by-the-private-military-and-security-industry/4E7881E8C544004B3F6A8FB5310DD1EE">regulate themselves</a>, an independent oversight agency could more adequately assess how defense contractors perform. </p>
<p>Second, as things stand now, the U.S. government often overlooks bad behavior and renews contracts with companies that have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/opinion/will-anyone-pay-for-abu-ghraib.html?_r=0">less than stellar records</a>. Instead, the government could more severely penalize firms that do not fulfill the terms of their agreements.</p>
<p>Third, government employees often transition from public service into lucrative positions at <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pentagon-nominees-ties-to-private-firms-embody-revolving-door-culture-of-washington/2017/01/19/3524e8f4-dcf9-11e6-918c-99ede3c8cafa_story.html?utm_term=.3650925cd8bf">billion-dollar defense corporations</a>. Stricter rules to limit this “revolving door” would make government employees more willing to penalize firms.</p>
<p>Private defense contractors will likely be a major part of U.S. national defense for the foreseeable future. Diligent oversight and regulation of companies in this rapidly evolving industry, I believe, are necessary to ensure that these firms advance the public good of American security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76070/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Mahoney does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For-profit corporations are deeply embedded in US national security infrastructure – and they’re not going anywhere.Charles Mahoney, Professor of Political Science, California State University, Long BeachLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/744942017-03-16T02:25:49Z2017-03-16T02:25:49ZNorth Korea and the dangers of Trump’s diplomacy-free Asia strategy<p>North Korea’s missile launches last week are an early warning that the Trump administration’s Asia strategy could end up triggering the world’s next major war.</p>
<p>Spurred by the launches, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is touring Japan, South Korea and China this week. But Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile activities are not Trump’s priority in Asia.</p>
<p>For Trump and “inner circle” advisers like <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/23/stephen-bannons-nationalist-call-to-arms-annotated/">Steve Bannon</a>, the <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2017-01-18-americas-international-role-trump-wickett-final2.pdf">top concern</a> is economic. Trump and his team see U.S. trade deficits, concentrated in Asia, as <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/12/trump-trade-deficit/509912/">draining America’s wealth</a> and threatening its <a href="http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-03-05/wsj-op-ed-peter-navarro-writes-deficits-could-put-us-national-security-jeopardy">national</a> <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/03/07/business/economy-business/top-trump-adviser-outlines-aggressive-trade-policy-sees-deficit-threat-national-security/#.WMWXnfnys2w">security</a>. Trump claims he is out to redefine U.S. economic ties to Asia’s major economies.</p>
<p>Whatever this goal’s merits, from my experience at the National Security Council, on the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff and as a visiting scholar at Peking University, I believe it is dangerously flawed as a basis for U.S. Asia strategy. Asia today is more economically interdependent than any other part of the world. It also has serious security challenges. Besides competitive posturing on the Korean peninsula, these challenges include escalating disputes in the East and South China seas. </p>
<p>Yet there is no mechanism bringing America and its Asian allies together with China to manage these problems through multilateral diplomacy. </p>
<p>This raises risks that regional security challenges will turn into armed conflicts. The devastation that such conflicts would wreak on global welfare makes it imperative that Washington and major regional players create an effective security framework. I’m concerned that Trump’s strategy ignores this imperative. </p>
<h2>Trump and Asia’s diplomacy deficit</h2>
<p>Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs highlight the dangers flowing from Asia’s lack of a regional security mechanism. North Korea is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/world/asia/north-korea-claims-its-nuclear-arsenal-is-just-a-deterrent.html">chronically concerned</a> that its security is at <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missile-statement-idUSKCN0XN1XE">risk</a>. Consequently, it <a href="http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/north-koreas-nuclear-weapons-future-strategy-and-doctrine">takes steps</a> to develop <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/09/north-korea-is-practicing-for-nuclear-war/">nuclear and missile capabilities</a> that, from Pyongyang’s vantage, might keep America and its allies at bay. But Pyongyang’s quest for deterrence also <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/09/north-korea-is-practicing-for-nuclear-war/">raises risks</a> that conventional conflict in Korea escalates to nuclear war. </p>
<p>In my assessment, Trump does not view conflict prevention in Korea as an urgent focus. Trumpian rhetoric emphasizes “radical <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/trump-radical-islam/508331/">Islam</a>” and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/us/politics/stephen-bannon-cpac-speech.html?_r=0">illegal immigration</a> as immediate threats to Americans. Through this prism, war in Asia seems less directly dangerous. North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear-armed missiles could even be a useful lever to advance Trump’s real regional goals.</p>
<p>North Korean nuclear and missile tests give Trump openings to “reassure” <a href="http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201702120027.html">Japan</a> and <a href="http://www.vox.com/world/2016/11/10/13585524/donald-trump-phone-call-south-korea-park-geun-hye">South</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/world/asia/trump-north-korea-south.html?_r=0">Korea</a>, in more fulsome terms than his campaign rhetoric suggested, of U.S. commitment to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-03-07/abe-gets-trump-backing-as-north-korea-warns-of-nuclear-disaster">their</a> <a href="https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/world/asia/korea-missile-defense-china-trump.html?smid=tw-nytimesworld&smtyp=cur&referer=https://t.co/e7YDIlyz89">security</a>. He has already done so directly and through <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/02/james-mattis-arrives-in-south-korea-japan-to-soothe-fears-over-trumps-foreign-policy.html">Defense</a> <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/04/national/politics-diplomacy/inada-says-hopes-mattis-visit-strengthens-regional-security-ties-south-korea/">Secretary</a> <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/04/national/politics-diplomacy/inada-says-hopes-mattis-visit-strengthens-regional-security-ties-south-korea/#.WMiPCfnys2x">James Mattis</a>. Last week, Trump deployed the first Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) units to South Korea, which can purportedly intercept North Korean warheads.</p>
<p>It appears Trump is playing on these moves to seek more <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/cdae8542-ed22-11e6-930f-061b01e23655">Japanese</a> and <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2017-01-17/hyundai-highlights-us-spending-plan-before-trump-takes-oath">Korean</a> investment in the United States. He also wants understandings on <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-02-10/trump-vows-level-playing-field-for-u-s-japan-china-currency">currency</a> <a href="http://english.donga.com/Home/3/all/26/834470/1">valuation</a> and more balanced <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/052cf600-e95b-11e6-893c-082c54a7f539">bilateral</a> <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/south-korea-feeling-pressure-to-appease-trump-on-trade/3707669.html">trade</a>. </p>
<p>With China – a major economic partner, but not an ally – Trump aims to leverage U.S. military power and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/9892b7ae-d2f9-11e6-9341-7393bb2e1b51">other</a> <a href="http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-02-13/trump-unveil-passive-aggressive-currency-war-china">coercive</a> <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-eyes-new-tactic-to-press-china-1487034167">levers</a> to wrest <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/01/25/trade-trumps-national-security-in-trumps-worldview-thats-really-bad-news-for-china/?utm_term=.8f52d3af97f6">trade</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/technology/zte-china-fine.html?_r=0">and</a> <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-02-10/trump-vows-level-playing-field-for-u-s-japan-china-currency">monetary</a> concessions. </p>
<p>To this end, Trump seeks to increase pressure on China by expanding America’s regional military posture. Pyongyang’s weapons tests create openings to do so. Already, Beijing worries that THAAD deployments to Asia could ultimately threaten <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-thaad-deployment-south-korea-means-china">China’s</a> <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-03-06/explaining-thaad-and-why-it-so-bothers-china-quicktake-q-a">defensive</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/07/why-china-is-so-mad-about-thaad-a-missile-defense-system-aimed-at-deterring-north-korea/?utm_term=.71b4ff6002f8">and</a> <a href="https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/03/11/world/asia/us-south-korea-thaad-antimissile-system-china.html">deterrent</a> <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/thaad-and-chinas-nuclear-second-strike-capability/">capabilities</a>.</p>
<p>But Trump’s strategy offers no solution to security problems associated with North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. </p>
<h2>Solving the North Korea problem</h2>
<p>As previous U.S. administrations have learned, there is no preventive military option against Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile capabilities. Attacking them will trigger Seoul’s destruction by North Korean conventional artillery. </p>
<p>Saying the problem is China’s to solve won’t work, either. </p>
<p>Beijing is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/world/asia/china-north-korea-relations-kim-jong-un.html">increasingly displeased</a> with North Korea’s nuclear and missile displays. But there are 30,000 U.S. soldiers in South Korea today. In such a setting, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A8_NFOEfgBU">Beijing</a> will not accept U.S.-allied South Korea’s effective extension to China’s border. This could enable deployment of tens of thousands of U.S. troops to that border. Thus, Beijing will never press Pyongyang in ways that bring North Korea to the verge of collapse, no matter how much Washington wants it to.</p>
<p>If Trump wanted to solve the Korea problem, he would pursue what China <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1444204.shtml">proposed</a> last week: dual track diplomacy aimed at “denuclearizing the peninsula on the one hand and establishing a peace mechanism on the other.” Initially, this would entail “suspension for suspension.” Pyongyang would halt its weapons tests; Washington and Seoul would stop joint military exercises. </p>
<p>Parties could then negotiate more comprehensively. America and its allies would seek a Korea without nuclear weapons. For Pyongyang and Beijing, denuclearization would be joined with a regional <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1444204.shtml">“peace mechanism”</a> and a U.S.-North Korean peace treaty. </p>
<p>But the dual track would commit America to a cooperative approach to Asian security. And that would not help Trump pursue his economic goals. In a stable Asia, how would Trump leverage military power to extract economic concessions from allies or from China?</p>
<p>Barring major changes in Trump’s Asia strategy, North Korea will likely keep developing its strategic deterrent. This will continue <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/09/north-korea-is-practicing-for-nuclear-war/">raising risks</a> that conventional conflict on the Korean peninsula escalates rapidly to nuclear war. </p>
<p>China is reacting deliberately to what it sees as provocative U.S. policies. President Xi <a href="http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Xi-eyes-US-visit-as-Beijing-mends-fences">wants</a> a summit with Trump before July’s G20 summit. Chinese officials and analysts also say Xi wants to keep Sino-U.S. relations on a relatively even keel through this fall’s 19th Party Congress. The Congress will approve Xi’s second term as China’s top leader. Xi wants to be seen as a steady steward of Chinese interests in a global order still significantly influenced by Washington. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, China may not mind if Trump renegotiates America’s economic relationships in Asia – especially to the extent this happens at the expense of U.S. allies. But if Trump keeps building what China sees as a more robust and ultimately offensive regional military posture, Beijing will respond. </p>
<p>China will leverage its own economic and political ties to U.S. allies in Asia to constrain and undermine Trump’s strategy. Recently impeached South Korean President Park Geun-hye will probably be replaced by a progressive figure espousing engagement with Pyongyang and more multilateral regional security approaches. This could position Beijing to contain and ultimately reverse U.S. THAAD deployments. </p>
<p>Overall, Trump’s Asia strategy is unlikely to boost Sino-U.S. cooperation on regional security. Instead, it will almost certainly intensify Sino-U.S. security competition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74494/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Flynt L. Leverett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Tensions in Asia may soon boil over. If U.S. leaders fail to seek pathways to peace, the consequences may be grim, warns former National Security Council member.Flynt L. Leverett, Professor of International Affairs and Asian Studies, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/644742016-09-09T04:35:23Z2016-09-09T04:35:23ZDefeating terrorism through design: Think souks, not office buildings<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136954/original/image-20160907-25266-ltqg2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Embodiment of defiance... or foolhardy design?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/86502566@N03/16267367576">Paul Silva</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>To fight terrorist networks, <a href="https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/designing-our-way-to-a-better-world">we need to understand them and learn from them</a>. Obviously that doesn’t mean training to become terrorists ourselves. But we can learn from the way many terrorist organizations operate – via highly networked, decentralized connections. This kind of setup has a lot in common with the networked way in which many of us will live and work in the decades ahead.</p>
<p>Since the wake-up call of 9/11, terrorism has come to characterize many of the <a href="http://knopfdoubleday.com/book/234879/the-terror-years/9780385352079/">military conflicts in the 21st century</a>. Today’s terrorist networks demonstrate a highly resilient way of organizing diverse and often distantly located people toward a common goal. This system of organization helps explain why, <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/are-we-any-safer/492761/">as journalist Steven Brill argues</a>, we are not much safer now than we were before 9/11, even after spending US$1 trillion on homeland security. As <a href="http://www.nebraskapress.unl.edu/product/War-of-the-Flea,676555.aspx">studies of guerrilla warfare</a> have shown, centralized, hierarchical, top-down systems, like our current Department of Defense, have a hard time defeating a decentralized, nonhierarchical, networked ones, like the Islamic State group.</p>
<p>Centralized, hierarchical systems may appear stronger, with more power and efficiency on their side. But networked, nonhierarchical ones have much greater capacity to take a hit and to keep functioning, as the sizable literature on <a href="http://www.resalliance.org/publications">ecosystem resilience</a> has repeatedly shown. Networked systems even have an “antifragile” quality, as <a href="http://www.randomhousebooks.com/books/176227/">scholar Nassim Nicholas Taleb has argued</a>, with an ability to bounce back even stronger after a shock. All of which suggests we need to fight terrorist networks in networked ways of our own.</p>
<p>I am an architect and urban designer by training and so I leave it to policymakers and defense strategists to contemplate what this means militarily. I want to focus on what I know: the target side of the equation. How can we reduce the targets of terrorism, getting rid of concentrations of people of a particular type to reduce the likelihood of a devastating strike? How can we rethink our cities and our buildings so that instead of trying to fortify our architectural bull’s-eyes, we eliminate them with a denser weave of diverse activities across a metropolitan area? </p>
<h2>Designing away targets, not fortifying them</h2>
<p>The idea of doing away with the targets of large concentrations of people doing the same type of activity may seem like a restraint of Americans’ freedom, a violation of the First Amendment right to “peaceably assemble” in whatever kind of conglomeration we choose. But it’s really a call for us to assemble in new ways, aided by digital technology, so we can do so with peace of mind. </p>
<p>In some ways, the 9/11 terrorists were sending us an unintended message: Concentrating the military command in the Pentagon, or financial and governmental organizations in the World Trade Center towers, makes them – and all of us commuting to workplaces like this every day – more vulnerable.</p>
<p>Taleb captures this idea in the title of one of his book chapters: “The Souk and the Office Building.” The modern office building may seem efficient by gathering so many people in an organization together. Such structures, though, remain vulnerable to what Taleb calls “fat tails,” in which <a href="http://www.randomhousebooks.com/books/176227/">distant events have inordinate effects</a> on their operation – think of a power failure that can incapacitate an entire corporate headquarters.</p>
<p>Office towers also have what I describe as a <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Designing-To-Avoid-Disaster-The-Nature-of-Fracture-Critical-Design/Fisher/p/book/9780415527361">fracture-critical nature</a>; they’re subject to catastrophic failure when hit by an unanticipated force like a commandeered airplane.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136965/original/image-20160907-25231-btolu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136965/original/image-20160907-25231-btolu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136965/original/image-20160907-25231-btolu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136965/original/image-20160907-25231-btolu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136965/original/image-20160907-25231-btolu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136965/original/image-20160907-25231-btolu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136965/original/image-20160907-25231-btolu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136965/original/image-20160907-25231-btolu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A souk, with many access points and a diffuse layout.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/bhaktiamsterdam/7426935774">Bhakti Dharma</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Taleb contrasts the familiar U.S. urban landscape with the Arab bazaar or souk. Comprising a network of small shops along covered streets, without any center or clear boundaries, there are multiple ways in and out. Souks might seem more vulnerable to attack, given their accessibility. Such complex webs of human activity, however, are also highly resilient – not just economically because of their diversity of small businesses, but also militarily because of their distributed nature.</p>
<p>In the heavily damaged souk in Aleppo, Syria, one businessman still <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-sight/wp/2016/03/29/witness-the-stunning-devastation-inside-aleppos-destroyed-souks/">opens his shop to serve coffee</a> to patrolling soldiers, an act of resistance as well as a sign of resilience. Can you imagine an accounting department on a bombed-out skyscraper’s 43rd floor, for instance, opening for business after an attack? </p>
<p>It’s significant that an Arab urban form, the souk, may serve as one of the best defenses against a type of attack emanating from the Arab world. Unlike most shopping malls that stand like isolated targets in the midst of parking lots, souks typically cover existing streets and turn them into pedestrian precincts, as Milan, Italy, did long ago with <a href="http://www.ingalleria.com/en">its Galleria</a> and as Las Vegas did more recently with <a href="http://vegasexperience.com/">Fremont Street</a>. The mall and the city become an integral whole. </p>
<h2>We’re already living with digital souks</h2>
<p>Souks may seem far removed from modern life, just as office buildings seem to epitomize it. But that’s begun to change with the rise of a sharing, collaborative or on-demand economy. Many people now work anywhere that has a high-bandwidth internet connection. We shop anytime for goods and services that are delivered to our doors. We meet anyplace some good food or coffee allows us to linger.</p>
<p>We have, in other words, already created a kind of digital version of the souk, with service platforms providing people access to experiences as diverse as those encountered by the customers in Arab markets. <a href="http://books.wwnorton.com/books/Platform-Revolution/">Such platform companies have great resilience</a> because of their accessible, distributed character and their ability to compete successfully against gatekeeper organizations. Look at how quickly Uber has overtaken taxi companies and Airbnb traditional hoteliers by leveraging excess capacity to meet people’s needs at a lower cost. These companies also exist everywhere and nowhere, not concentrated in an office building or a hotel, but spread across a city or region, in individual apartments and cars. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136935/original/image-20160907-25257-ro85jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136935/original/image-20160907-25257-ro85jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136935/original/image-20160907-25257-ro85jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136935/original/image-20160907-25257-ro85jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136935/original/image-20160907-25257-ro85jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136935/original/image-20160907-25257-ro85jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136935/original/image-20160907-25257-ro85jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136935/original/image-20160907-25257-ro85jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hey! Here’s where we keep our top brass!</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/la-citta-vita/6040339754">La Citta Vita</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Our greatest weakness comes from the old thinking that still pervades not just our military, but also our public policies and development assumptions. We continue to zone our cities as if the sharing economy didn’t exist, build our roads as if driverless cars won’t happen, and pursue economic development strategies as if the platform revolution doesn’t matter. And, despite the message that terrorists have sent us, we continue to maintain and construct targets for their attacks: The Pentagon remains a bull’s-eye from the air, as do the office towers recently built around the World Trade Center site. Such buildings may embody defiance and feel like proof of our resilience; really they only show how little we’ve learned from our enemies. A physically strengthened or more highly defended target is still a target.</p>
<p>The fight against terrorism requires that we start thinking in new ways about how to live and work in a 21st-century economy. Just as we need to acknowledge and embrace the distributed, on-demand nature of how many people will create and exchange goods and services in the near future, we also need to start imagining a more distributed and diverse built environment in line with that economy and in defense against those who might want to attack us.</p>
<p>America began as a nation of small shopkeepers and small communities scattered across the land. While the movement of people chasing economic opportunities to metropolitan areas seems unstoppable, we need to inhabit our cities and suburbs in much more networked ways. While this will take at least a generation to accomplish, we can already see it in trends like the home office, flextime, and walkable mixed-use neighborhoods. These should become the norm, even as we reduce, as much as possible, the number of big, symbolic structures that only tempt terrorists – foreign or domestic. We need to think souks, not office buildings.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64474/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Fisher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Are terrorist attacks also an implicit design critique of our urban landscape? An architect and urban designer suggests we can fight terrorism by not building obvious targets.Thomas Fisher, Professor of Architecture, Director of the Metropolitan Design Center, and Dayton Hudson Chair in Urban Design, University of MinnesotaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.