tag:theconversation.com,2011:/es/topics/hong-kong-protests-73625/articlesHong Kong protests – The Conversation2024-03-20T19:55:20Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2261862024-03-20T19:55:20Z2024-03-20T19:55:20ZWhat Article 23 means for the future of Hong Kong and its once vibrant pro-democracy movement<p><em>Lawmakers in Hong Kong <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/19/hong-kong-article-23-security-law/">passed new security legislation</a> on March 19, 2024, handing authorities in the semi-autonomous city-state further power to clamp down on dissent.</em></p>
<p><em>The law, under <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/19/what-is-article-23-hong-kongs-new-draconian-national-security-law">Article 23</a>, has been decades in the making but was resisted for a long time by protesters who feared the legislation’s effect on civil liberties in Hong Kong, a special administrative region in China that has become increasingly under the thumb of Beijing.</em></p>
<p><em>To explain what the adoption of Article 23, which is set to be signed into law on March 23, 2024, means for the future of Hong Kong, The Conversation turned to Michael C. Davis, a <a href="https://jgu.edu.in/jgls/prof-michael-c-davis/">law professor</a> who taught constitutional law and human rights in Hong Kong for more than 30 years, most recently at the University of Hong Kong, and is the author of “<a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/freedom-undone/9781952636448">Freedom Undone: The Assault on Liberal Values in Hong Kong</a>.”</em></p>
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<h2>What is the background to Article 23?</h2>
<p>Article 23 has a lengthy backstory. It is an article in the <a href="https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/index/">Basic Law of Hong Kong</a> requiring the Hong Kong government to enact a local ordinance governing national security. The Basic Law itself is effectively the constitution of Hong Kong. Its promulgation by the central government was part of China’s obligation under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 – the treaty providing for Hong Kong’s return to China. Thirteen years later, in 1997, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-40426827">territory was transferred to Chinese rule</a> after more than a century under the British. </p>
<p>The Basic Law established a largely liberal constitutional order for post-handover Hong Kong. This included guarantees of the rule of law and basic freedoms, as well as a promise of ultimate universal suffrage. It was formally adopted by China’s National People’s Congress in 1990.</p>
<p>Basic Law Article 23 requires the Hong Kong government to “on its own” enact certain national security laws relating to treason, secession, sedition, subversion or theft of state secrets, and to regulate foreign organizations.</p>
<p>The Hong Kong government first put forward an Article 23 bill in 2003. But due to concerns over the implications for press and organizational freedoms, as well as expanded police powers, the proposed bill <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-68594448">met with widespread opposition</a>.</p>
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<img alt="A uniformed police officer puts his fingers in his ears in front of a sign that has the number 23 crossed out." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Noisy protests help defeat an earlier version of Article 23 in 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/police-officer-puts-his-fingers-in-his-ears-to-protect-news-photo/1258921548?adppopup=true">Peter Parks/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span>
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<p>A group of seven leading lawyers and two legal academics, including myself, challenged the proposed bill in a collection of pamphlets that highlighted its deficiencies under international human rights standards. Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3178339/july-1-2003-500000-take-hong-kongs-streets-protest-against">half a million protesters</a> took to the streets of Hong Kong. </p>
<p>In the face of such opposition and the consequent withdrawal of support by a leading pro-goverment party, the bill was withdrawn. </p>
<p>Rather than come forward with a replacement bill that would address human rights concerns, the government opted to let Article 23 languish for two decades.</p>
<p>Then, in 2020, Beijing <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/hong-kong-national-security-law-10-things-you-need-to-know/">imposed a national security law</a> that gave Hong Kong authorities greater power. It led to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/one-year-hong-kong-arrests-117-people-under-new-security-law-2021-06-30/">arrest and repression of opposition figures</a> in Hong Kong, silencing the once-vibrant democracy movement. </p>
<p>With no effective opposition left and the threat of arrest for anyone who speaks out, the pro-Beijing Hong Kong government decided now was the time to ram through a more extreme version of the bill.</p>
<p>The Hong Kong government, with Beijing’s encouragement, was able to open up a short consultation on the new Article 23 legislative proposal with little or no opposition expressed. </p>
<p>The process was facilitated by a “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/hong-kong-patriots-only-election-falls-flat-with-record-low-turnout-2023-12-11">patriots only” electoral system</a> imposed by Beijing in 2021 that has tightened Beijing’s grip over the Hong Kong legislature, leading to unanimous support for the bill.</p>
<h2>How will it affect civil liberties in Hong Kong?</h2>
<p>In tandem with the 2020 Beijing-imposed national security law, the new Article 23 legislation will have a dramatic effect on civil liberties.</p>
<p>The national security law – with its vague provisions on secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion – has already been used along with a colonial-era sedition law to arrest and silence dissent in Hong Kong. Many opposition figures <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/20/world/asia/hong-kong-democracy-leaders.html">are in prison or have fled into exile</a>. And those with dissenting views who remain have largely gone silent. </p>
<p>The draft bill expands on the national security law in key areas: the stealing of state secrets, insurrection, sabotage and external interference in Hong Kong.</p>
<p>It essentially embraces mainland China’s comprehensive national security regime, which has long focused on suppressing internal opposition, targeting numerous areas of local civil life, impacting organizational, press and academic freedoms.</p>
<p>Included in Article 23 is the adoption of the mainland’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/28/world/asia/china-state-secrets-law.html">broad definition of “state secrets</a>,” which can even include reporting or writing on social and economic development policies. </p>
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<p>The legislation expands the potential use of incarceration with both lengthy sentences upon conviction and longer holding of suspects before trial.</p>
<p>Article 23 also intensifies <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/30/hong-kong-article-23-new-national-security-laws-explained-what-do-they-mean">scrutiny of “foreign influence</a>” – making working with outsiders risky for Hong Kong citizens.</p>
<p>The draft legislation speaks disparagingly of activism under the guises of fighting for or monitoring human rights and is critical of “so-called” nongovernmental organizations.</p>
<p>All of this makes working with or supporting international human rights organizations perilous. </p>
<p>In short, in the space of two decades, Hong Kong’s liberal constitutional order has been transformed into a national security order with weak or no protections for basic freedoms.</p>
<h2>What is the wider context to Article 23?</h2>
<p>To understand this legislation, one must appreciate the Chinese Communist Party’s deep hostility to liberal values and institutions, such as the rule of law, civil liberties, independent courts, a free press and public accountability. Such liberal ideas are viewed as an existential threat to party rule. </p>
<p>This mindset has led to a dramatic expansion of the party’s <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/china-vows-to-safeguard-national-security-with-new-laws-at-conclave-/7520474.html">national security agenda</a> under current leader Xi Jinping. </p>
<p>Beijing has emphasized economic development in recent decades, staking its legitimacy on economic growth – betting that people will care more about their standard of living than about political freedoms. But as <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/15/china-needs-reforms-to-halt-significant-growth-declines-imf-chief.html">growth declines</a>, leaders’ concerns about security and dissent have grown, placing such security even above economic development.</p>
<p>This has led to the comprehensive national security concept now being imposed on Hong Kong. </p>
<p>With Beijing advancing an agenda that casts liberal, democratic ideas as a threat, a liberal Hong Kong on the country’s border became impossible for the Chinese Communist Party to ignore.</p>
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<img alt="A group of protesters shelter under umbrellas" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Protestors in Hong Kong use umbrellas as improvised shields in 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protestors-using-improvise-shield-to-push-toward-police-news-photo/1191713262?adppopup=true">Kwan Wong/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Widespread <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48607723">protests in Hong Kong in 2019</a> both exacerbated this concern and offered an opportunity for Beijing to address the perceived threat under the <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202112/1240540.shtml">claim that protesters were advancing a so-called “color revolution</a>.”</p>
<p>Having long nurtured its loyalist camp to rule Hong Kong, these loyal officials became the instrument of the crackdown.</p>
<h2>What does the lack of protest now say about the pro-democracy movement?</h2>
<p>It tells us that the mainland national security regime imposed on Hong Kong has effectively intimidated the society, especially those with opposition views, into silence. </p>
<p>Hong Kong’s pro-democratic camp had <a href="https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.5563">historically enjoyed majority support, at around 60%</a> of the voters in the direct elections that were allowed for half of the legislative seats.</p>
<p>The introduction of loyalists-only elections led to a dramatically reduced turnout.</p>
<p>This and emigration patterns tend to show that the majority of Hong Kong people do not support this new illiberal order.</p>
<p>Be that as it may, with most of their pro-democratic leaders either in jail or exile, they dare not speak out against the new national security regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226186/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael C. Davis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the space of two decades, Hong Kong’s liberal constitutional order has been transformed into a security regime that grants citizens few civil libertiesMichael C. Davis, Professor of Law and International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2211162024-02-28T19:14:56Z2024-02-28T19:14:56Z‘If we burn … then what?’ A new book asks why a decade of mass protest has done so little to change things<p>In 2010, in response to ongoing ill-treatment by police, a fruit vendor performed an act of self-immolation in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. This set off an uprising that led to the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/1/14/remembering-the-day-tunisias-president-ben-ali-fled">removal of dictator Ben Ali</a> and a process to rewrite the constitution in a democratic direction. </p>
<p>Inspired by this, huge demonstrations against police brutality erupted in Egypt, centred in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, the protesters calling for the removal of the country’s president, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/02/hosni-mubarak-legacy-of-mass-torture/">Hosni Mubarak</a>. </p>
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<p><em>If We Burn: The Mass Protest Decade and the Missing Revolution – Vincent Bevins (Hachette)</em></p>
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<p>These events catalysed what Vincent Bevins calls the “mass protest decade”. The years from 2010 to 2020 saw a record number of protests around the world seeking to transform societies in broadly progressive ways. Many groups were inspired by democratic ideals. </p>
<p>These protests were truly global. Those in Tunisia and Egypt became part of the wider uprising that came to be called the “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2021/jan/25/how-the-arab-spring-unfolded-a-visualisation">Arab Spring</a>”. </p>
<p>In 2013, the <em><a href="https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/brazilian-free-fare-movement-mpl-mobilizes-against-fare-hikes-2013">Movimento Passe Livre</a></em> (MPL) or “Free Fare Movement” led to mass protests in Brazil. Initially directed against rises in transport fares, they rapidly expanded to include an unwieldy and contradictory set of groups and grievances. </p>
<p>Many other protests sprang up, including Hong Kong’s pro-democracy protests in 2014, dubbed the “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/30/-sp-hong-kong-umbrella-revolution-pro-democracy-protests">umbrella movement</a>” in their first phase by the global press. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whatever-happened-to-the-arab-spring-10973">Whatever Happened to the 'Arab Spring'? </a>
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<h2>From bad to worse</h2>
<p>In his new book <a href="https://www.hachette.com.au/vincent-bevins/if-we-burn-the-mass-protest-decade-and-the-missing-revolution-as-good-as-journalism-gets">If We Burn: The Mass Protest Decade and the Missing Revolution</a>, Bevins starts by asking “how is it possible that so many mass protests apparently led to the opposite of what they asked for?” </p>
<p>The answer he provides is suggested in the book’s title, which <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=If5w78BrmT4">he expands</a> as: “If we burn … then what?” </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576967/original/file-20240221-24-3nryt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576967/original/file-20240221-24-3nryt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576967/original/file-20240221-24-3nryt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=921&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576967/original/file-20240221-24-3nryt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=921&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576967/original/file-20240221-24-3nryt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=921&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576967/original/file-20240221-24-3nryt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1157&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576967/original/file-20240221-24-3nryt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1157&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576967/original/file-20240221-24-3nryt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1157&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>Aiming to make sense of the significant role of mass protest across the decade, Bevins focuses on countries where the protest movements were so large that the existing government was either seriously destabilised or dislodged: Bahrain, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Hong Kong, South Korea, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine and Yemen. His book explores why movements failed to achieve their goals and why, in many cases, things got decidedly worse. </p>
<p>In Egypt, for example, the Mubarak regime ended up being replaced by the even worse <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypts-sisi-authoritarian-leader-with-penchant-bridges-2023-12-08/">El-Sisi dictatorship</a>. In Brazil, the leftist-led protests ended up undermining the progressive government led by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Dilma-Rousseff">Dilma Rousseff</a>, when groups on the right adopted similar tactics, media strategies, and anti-establishment and anti-corruption rhetoric. What ensued led to the impeachment of President Rousseff and the rise to power of far-right demagogue <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency_of_Jair_Bolsonaro">Jair Bolsonaro</a>.</p>
<p>For a significant part of the mass protest decade, Bevins was based in Sao Paulo as the Brazil correspondent for the Los Angeles Times. In If We Burn, he draws on his extensive experience as a journalist, as well as his academic background. He has travelled around the world and conducted over 200 interviews in 12 countries, which he has woven into an interesting narrative history. </p>
<p>His particular focus is on the activists who conceived and enacted the protest movements. Bevins covers their experiences at the time and, later in the book, what they came to understand about the events that unfolded, and their advice for future activists. He also engages with others, such as politicians and journalists, and draws on the work of social and political theorists. </p>
<p>The narrative is slanted towards his Brazilian home base. Bevins was there to witness the Free Fare Movement and the waves of mass protest it unleashed. Caught up in the action, he experienced, among other things, tear gassing. His colleague Giuliana Vallone was shot in the eye with a rubber bullet.</p>
<p>Vallone found her picture “flying through social networks”. Her image was used as a part of the Brazilian media’s reframing of the protests from broadly bad (leftist troublemakers) to broadly good (nationalists and patriots). </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578462/original/file-20240228-28-jrhegh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578462/original/file-20240228-28-jrhegh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578462/original/file-20240228-28-jrhegh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578462/original/file-20240228-28-jrhegh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578462/original/file-20240228-28-jrhegh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578462/original/file-20240228-28-jrhegh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578462/original/file-20240228-28-jrhegh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578462/original/file-20240228-28-jrhegh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Journalist Guiliana Vallone was hit in the eye with a rubber bullet during the Free Fare Movement protests in Brazil.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6QVLE8PQJ8">YouTube</a></span>
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<p>The effect of this reframing illustrates the power of dominant news media. As Bevins argues, media narratives shaped how the decades’ protests were viewed around the world, but they also shaped the configuration of the protests in real time, influencing who showed up, and why.</p>
<p>The reframing turbo-charged popular support for the mass protests across Brazil – but not in ways that aligned with the goals of the originators of the protests, which were taken over by an assortment of better organised right-wing groups, including proto-Bolsonaristas. </p>
<p>In a classic right-wing tactic, one group – the <em><a href="https://reason.com/2016/10/15/free-brazil/">Movimento Brasil Livre</a></em> (MBL) or “Free Brazil Movement” – even appropriated the originators’ name. “In Brazilian Portuguese,” Bevins notes,“‘MBL’ sounds nearly identical to ‘MPL’.” </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-bolsonaro-failed-to-overthrow-democracy-and-why-a-threat-remains-223498">Why Bolsonaro failed to overthrow democracy – and why a threat remains</a>
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<h2>International solidarity</h2>
<p>On June 13, 2013, while being tear gassed, the crowd in Sao Paulo chanted “love is over – Turkey is here”. They were referring to the ongoing repression of protesters in Turkey, whose <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/10/24/legacy-of-gezi-protests-in-turkey-pub-80142">occupation of Gezi Park</a>, next to Taksim Square in Istanbul, began as a protest against the park’s redevelopment, but became a focal point for wider discontentment with the regime of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.</p>
<p>Bevins posts the words on Twitter and is stunned to see them go viral. He receives a flood of images and messages in response. Signs pop up in Gezi Park over the following weeks reading “the whole world is Sao Paulo” and “Turkey and Brazil are one”. </p>
<p>The story exemplifies a new type of international solidarity. Facilitated by the speed of social networking sites, digitally mediated mass protests in significant public places, often squares, emulated the Tahrir Square “model”. </p>
<p>The global protests extended from Taksim Square and Gezi Park in Turkey, to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/sep/12/occupy-wall-street-10-years-on">Zuccotti Park and Occupy Wall St</a> in the United States, to the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-13551878">Plaza del Sol in Spain</a> and the <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/euro-maidan-revolution/">“Euromaidan” protests in Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>Bevins emphasises that these protests tended to share certain features: they were “digitally coordinated … horizontally structured … apparently leaderless … apparently spontaneous”. </p>
<p>He describes this phenomenon as a “repertoire of contention”. It involved a certain “recipe of tactics” that became largely taken for granted as the “natural way to respond to social injustice”. </p>
<h2>Repertoire of contention</h2>
<p>During the protest decade, this “repertoire of contention” was more successful than expected. It often put so many people on the streets that it gave protesters real political leverage. They were suddenly in a position where they could make demands and extract reforms from the political establishment. In some cases, they generated “revolutionary situations” where they might potentially take power themselves. </p>
<p>But this type of protest is, as Bevins observes, “very poorly equipped” to take advantage of the kinds of destabilisation or “revolutionary” situations that they create. In such situations, groups must either enter the ensuing power vacuum or use their leverage to negotiate with the establishment. The problem was that to do this effectively required the type of representation and organisation that had become almost impossible. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576969/original/file-20240221-28-vktr16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576969/original/file-20240221-28-vktr16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576969/original/file-20240221-28-vktr16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576969/original/file-20240221-28-vktr16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576969/original/file-20240221-28-vktr16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576969/original/file-20240221-28-vktr16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576969/original/file-20240221-28-vktr16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576969/original/file-20240221-28-vktr16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Vincent Bevins.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vincent_by_Best_Wishes.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>On one hand, Bevins says this was due to the “material conditions” existing before the popular explosions. In the North African dictatorships, for example, unions and alternative political parties had been severely weakened or suppressed. As such, the protests took the “horizontal” form characteristic of the decade.</p>
<p>But in countries with democracies, however imperfect – Brazil and Chile, for example – there were unions and alternative political parties. The horizontal nature of the protests there tended to be driven by an ideological commitment to “horizontalism”. </p>
<p>The ideal was a form of radical participatory democracy, emerging from left-libertarian and anarchist traditions, in which “everyone is equal”. Hierarchy is eschewed, as is any type of enduring formal structure of leaders or spokespeople. As the anthropologist and activist David Graeber wrote: “It is about creating and enacting horizontal networks instead of top-down structures like states, parties or corporations.”</p>
<p>Bevins reports that, at crucial moments, due to their lack of organisation and structure, key actors often replicated tactics they had learned beforehand. Their “repertoire” left them ill-prepared for both the challenges and opportunities that arose.</p>
<p>An unprecedented, technologically facilitated sense of solidarity and inspiration flowed around the world, but it happened so quickly that it led to the “cutting and pasting” of approaches into different national contexts. “Transfer of solidarity” became bound up with “transfer of tactics”. </p>
<p>This meant, in particular, that the “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alter-globalization">alter-globalisation</a>” movement, conceived in the democratic context of North America, had a disproportionate influence, creating a mismatch of tactics and circumstances. The hasty adoption of tactics meant most movements did not take the time to think through strategies that might be successful in their local context. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/louisa-lims-outstanding-portrait-of-a-dispossessed-defiant-hong-kong-is-the-activist-journalism-we-need-179091">Louisa Lim's 'outstanding' portrait of a dispossessed, defiant Hong Kong is the activist journalism we need</a>
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<h2>New strategies</h2>
<p>Bevins suggests that by taking this and other lessons on board, the deep desire for progressive change, both nationally and in the global system, might come closer to being realised in coming decades. The “mismatches” can be overcome with study and reflection on the events of the mass protest decade. More suitable “repertoires” might be arrived at. </p>
<p>The spontaneous horizontal protests, Bevins observes, “did a very good job of blowing holes in social structures and creating political vacuums”. But the power vacuums they created were filled by those who were ready. </p>
<p>In Egypt, that meant the military. The Gulf countries, especially the United Arab Emirates, were also involved in the El-Sisi coup, via their funding of the anti-Morsi <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23131953">Tamarod movement</a>. In Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council “literally marched in to fill in the gaps”. The Hong Kong movement was crushed by Beijing. In Brazil, Rousseff was “not removed, not immediately; but to the extent that she lost influence in June 2013, that power did not fall to the anti-authoritarian left, as the [Free Fare Movement] would have liked”.</p>
<p>Lasting progressive change, Bevins argues, requires better organisation and vehicles capable of handing down knowledge, strategy and tactics to the next generation of activists. He offers the example of Chile. </p>
<p>In Chile, the role of unions and political parties, as well as the activists engaging in institutional politics, proved more successful in producing progressive outcomes than digitally organised, horizontal, mass protests alone. </p>
<p>The powerful student unions played a strong role. The “autonomist” left-wing activist <a href="https://www.gob.cl/en/institutions/presidency/">Gabriel Boric</a>, who emerged through university politics, ended up becoming president in 2022. He was pivotal in the referendum process that sought to rewrite Chile’s Pinochet-era constitution. </p>
<p>Bevins proposes that the horizontalist left is so traumatised by the “sins of the Soviet Union” and “other revolutions” that many activists have given up “the things that work” – like organisation, structure and co-ordination. </p>
<p>“But if you refuse to use the tools that work”, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=If5w78BrmT4">he points out</a>, you are “ceding your power” to those who will. It is “like showing up to a football game without a coach, strategy, or even a clear idea of who’s on your team”. Being well organised does not guarantee success, but it is essential when you enter into conflict with other well organised forces. </p>
<p>Bevins describes the decade’s dominant form of protest as being ultimately “illegible”. A key part of the problem was that “the square” was, in most of these protests, not asking for one coherent thing, or set of things. Activists, years later, often had widely divergent views as to “what the movements were all about”. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Vincent Bevins speaking at the Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College, October 25, 2023.</span></figcaption>
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<strong>
Read more:
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<h2>American influence</h2>
<p>As the world’s dominant superpower, the United States is entwined, in complex ways, with the individual countries and the regional power-politics Bevins discusses. In 2011, for example, the US took the opportunity provided by unrest in Libya, and a brutal state crackdown in response, to invade and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/20/nato-libya-war-26000-missions">overthrow the Gaddafi regime in a NATO mission</a>. Hong Kong protesters came to believe they were “sacrificed” for the Trump administration’s ongoing “propaganda war against China”. </p>
<p>Bevins also argues that the American domination of the internet has contributed to unrealistic views about the nature of social institutions, power and social change. The techno-utopianism that has accompanied its rise, the US-centric culture and ideas that circulate on oligarch-owned social media platforms, and “online communities born in the alter-globalisation era”, such as <a href="https://indymedia.org/">Indymedia</a> and <a href="https://www.adbusters.org/about-us">Adbusters</a>, played an “outsize role” in the mass protest decade. </p>
<p>Protesters’ ideas about what was possible and how to proceed were shaped by their immersion in this media landscape. Reflecting in retrospect on the prominent use of material from The Hunger Games, V for Vendetta and Star Wars, a Hong Kong activist said: “I think it is … a little sad, and definitely very unfortunate, that we got so many of our ideas from pop culture.”</p>
<p>The simplistic faith of “liberal techno-optimists” that the internet and social media are intrinsically progressive has proved unfounded, as has the belief that “the internet would make the world more like the United States”. </p>
<p>No protest action or technology is intrinsically progressive. As Bevins points out, is has become clear in recent years that the protesters’ “repertoire” of tools and tactics can be used at least as effectively by right-wing demagogues and disinformation outfits. The shock of Trumpian politics was accompanied by a sobering realisation that “the internet was something that could be used by malevolent foreign powers to undermine the American project”. </p>
<p>Digital communication, Bevins observes, has facilitated “the existence of big protests that come together very quickly – so quickly, perhaps, that no one knows each other, people are trying to realize contradictory goals, and after the initial energy fades, nothing remains”. In a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yTRkIY6NQhA">recent interview</a>, he paraphrases one Free Fare Movement interviewee reflecting on how events unfolded in Brazil: “all we wanted to do for eight years was to cause a popular uprising; and then we did, and it was awful”. </p>
<p>Throughout If We Burn, Bevins shows that “movements that cannot speak for themselves will be spoken for”. As an Egyptian activist reflects: “we thought representation was elitism, but actually it is the essence of democracy”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221116/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Pollard does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Throughout If We Burn, Vincent Bevins shows that “movements that cannot speak for themselves will be spoken for”.Christopher Pollard, Tutor in Sociology and Philosophy, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1790912022-06-05T20:01:16Z2022-06-05T20:01:16ZLouisa Lim’s ‘outstanding’ portrait of a dispossessed, defiant Hong Kong is the activist journalism we need<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466228/original/file-20220531-12-cpssmd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kin Cheung AP Hong Kong July protesters flood the streets as they take part in an annual rally in Hong Kong</span> </figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.textpublishing.com.au/books/indelible-city-dispossession-and-defiance-in-hong-kong">Indelible City</a> is more than a book: it is a haunting testimonial to the intertwined vitality, tragedy and hope of Hong Kong. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Review: Indelible City: Dispossession and Defiance in Hong Kong by Louisa Lim (Text Publishing)</em></p>
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<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466229/original/file-20220531-16-61gc6e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466229/original/file-20220531-16-61gc6e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466229/original/file-20220531-16-61gc6e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466229/original/file-20220531-16-61gc6e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466229/original/file-20220531-16-61gc6e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466229/original/file-20220531-16-61gc6e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466229/original/file-20220531-16-61gc6e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466229/original/file-20220531-16-61gc6e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>Louisa Lim weaves together three powerful narratives to tell this city’s story. </p>
<p>It’s a macro-level history of Hong Kong and its relationship with its two colonial masters: the United Kingdom and China. A micro-level history of a not-so-mentally-stable street calligrapher, the King of Kowloon, whose art and bearing embody the dispossession and defiance that frame the macro-level history. And Lim shares her own personal narrative of growing up in Hong Kong and witnessing the transformation of the city in recent decades. </p>
<p>It should really come as no surprise that Hong Kong’s “return to the motherland” since 1997 has been an unmitigated disaster. Hong Kong is after all a culturally diverse, socially complex, rule-of-law-conscious, and politically engaged community: all traits for which China’s post-1989 leaders have had little patience.</p>
<p>What should in fact shock us is that this community, as deserving as any of a say in its own fate, has nevertheless been perpetually denied it. Lim’s history narrates how this could happen.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466237/original/file-20220531-14-42xcnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466237/original/file-20220531-14-42xcnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466237/original/file-20220531-14-42xcnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466237/original/file-20220531-14-42xcnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466237/original/file-20220531-14-42xcnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466237/original/file-20220531-14-42xcnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466237/original/file-20220531-14-42xcnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466237/original/file-20220531-14-42xcnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Hong Kong cityscape.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jerome Favre/AP</span></span>
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<h2>From British to Chinese colonisation</h2>
<p>Lim’s overview of the colonial era shows how British rule fostered the diverse, dynamic and mature society that we see today – but was structured around unforgivable exclusion and marginalisation. The latter, characteristic of the colonial experience, continued for Hong Kong in its process of supposed decolonisation. </p>
<p>Faced with the expiration of the 99-year lease on the New Territories in 1997, Great Britain pursued negotiations with China on the city’s future. </p>
<p>Lim brings us inside these negotiations and their often painful twists and turns, as the fate of millions was determined behind closed doors – with often quite inexplicable conclusions. Foremost among these was the diligent drafting of a supposedly legally binding agreement with China, a state that refuses to be bound by any law.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-fear-hong-kong-will-become-just-another-chinese-city-an-interview-with-martin-lee-grandfather-of-democracy-124635">'We fear Hong Kong will become just another Chinese city': an interview with Martin Lee, grandfather of democracy</a>
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<p>Tellingly, there was no seat at the negotiating table for a representative from Hong Kong. Lim shows how the concerns of excluded locals turned out to be prophetic. </p>
<p>One local official, excluded from the talks, expressed his worries that Hong Kong would not be genuinely autonomous, but rather controlled by Beijing; that Chinese officials charged with implementing policy would be unable to accept Hong Kong’s culture; and that future Chinese leaders might change their mind about promises made to Hong Kong. Few predictions of Hong Kong’s future could be more accurate.</p>
<p>The result of this deeply flawed process, as we can all see today, is a dynamic society muzzled under the so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-how-colonial-era-laws-are-being-used-to-shut-down-independent-journalism-174375">National Security Law</a>. Although marketed as a law, the National Security Law is effectively the end of all law in Hong Kong. It strips away legally protected rights and due process, giving the government free rein to imprison anyone it pleases indefinitely for speech crimes. </p>
<p>The fate of Hong Kong today is a stain on Britain’s legacy and a reminder of the fundamental duplicity of the Chinese Communist Party leadership. Yet most importantly, for the people of Hong Kong, none of whom have remained untouched by this debacle, it is a genuine tragedy: recolonisation masquerading as decolonisation.</p>
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<p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-activists-now-face-a-choice-stay-silent-or-flee-the-city-the-world-must-give-them-a-path-to-safety-141880">Hong Kong activists now face a choice: stay silent, or flee the city. The world must give them a path to safety</a>
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<h2>‘Guerrilla street calligrapher’ the King of Kowloon</h2>
<p>Woven into this rich history is a parallel micro-history of the King of Kowloon: <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/04/hong-kong-chinese-calligraphy-democracy-indelible-city/629582/">Tsang Tsou-Choi</a>, a trash collector with some fairly obvious mental issues who made a name for himself as a guerrilla street calligrapher. Lim’s narrative of Tsang, his life, and his rise to the status of media icon makes for unforgettable reading. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466230/original/file-20220531-18-97oyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466230/original/file-20220531-18-97oyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466230/original/file-20220531-18-97oyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466230/original/file-20220531-18-97oyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466230/original/file-20220531-18-97oyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466230/original/file-20220531-18-97oyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466230/original/file-20220531-18-97oyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466230/original/file-20220531-18-97oyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">King of Kowloon street graffiti.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">longzijun/Flickr</span></span>
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<p>At some point in his life, Tsang came to the admittedly unlikely but symbolically telling conclusion that his family had once owned the Kowloon Penninsula and that this land had been taken from them illegally. Rather than seeking redress in the courts – long the preferred avenue for settling disputes in the city – Tsang opted to decorate the cityscape with calligraphic declarations of his family’s ownership of the penninsula and his own self-declared royal status. </p>
<p>Tsang’s choice here anticipated a broader shift from working within the system to resolve issues, to seeking new paths outside the system: a driving ethos of the protest movement of 2019. Here again, the streets of Hong Kong were covered in calligraphic declarations of dispossession and defiance, seeking redress (that would never arrive) beyond the stifling confines of the conventional.</p>
<h2>Neutrality a ‘corrupt compromise’</h2>
<p>The third narrative thread in the book is Lim’s own personal experiences, from growing up Eurasian in Hong Kong to observing the defining moments of the 2019 protests. </p>
<p>I particularly appreciated Lim’s frequently witty casual observations and offhand comments, which incorporate a touch of humour into the narrative: much needed, considering the gravity of its subject. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466877/original/file-20220603-17-buzix6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="short-haired woman smiling at the camera, wearing a purple blazer" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466877/original/file-20220603-17-buzix6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466877/original/file-20220603-17-buzix6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466877/original/file-20220603-17-buzix6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466877/original/file-20220603-17-buzix6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466877/original/file-20220603-17-buzix6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=670&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466877/original/file-20220603-17-buzix6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=670&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466877/original/file-20220603-17-buzix6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=670&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Louisa Lim’s book is an ‘outstanding example’ of activist journalism. Photo Laura Du Vé.</span>
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<p>In her reflections on the events of 2019, Lim narrates a number of moments at which she crossed over from an observer of political developments to become a participant. This poses a pressing question for our time: how does one balance the ideal of journalistic or academic neutrality with activist participation?</p>
<p>The answer to this question is, in my reading, extremely clear. As the horrifying nature of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-communist-party-claims-to-have-brought-prosperity-and-equality-to-china-heres-the-real-impact-of-its-rule-163350">Chinese Communist Party</a> rule over its colonies – from Hong Kong to <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-choosing-the-next-dalai-lama-will-be-a-religious-as-well-as-a-political-issue-162796">Tibet</a> to <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-who-are-the-uyghurs-and-why-is-the-chinese-government-detaining-them-111843">Xinjiang</a> – becomes increasingly apparent, the ideal of neutrality becomes a corrupt compromise with the fundamentally unjustifiable. </p>
<p>If academic or journalistic work on China in the age of the National Security Law, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-ominous-metaphors-of-chinas-uighur-concentration-camps-129665">concentration camps</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-chinas-denials-its-treatment-of-the-uyghurs-should-be-called-what-it-is-cultural-genocide-120654">genocide</a> is to have any meaning at all beyond its own vapid self-reproduction, it must embrace an activist ethos – of which Indelible City is an outstanding example. </p>
<p>Lim’s book concludes with details of a fascinating exchange with a curator and friend of the King of Kowloon, Joel Chung Yin-chai. Chung has ironically spent years carefully painting over the King’s calligraphy in public spaces, to preserve and protect these works from state-enforced erasure. </p>
<p>The King’s defiance thus lives on under a thin veneer of paint, unnoticed by tens of thousands of passersby every day, awaiting a moment when it can again see the light of day. This image is deeply evocative in the context of Hong Kong today.</p>
<p>Similarly, if we peer beneath the surface of the National Security Law’s unrelenting reign of terror, we can still see a politically engaged and dynamic civil society – as captured so memorably in Lim’s book. Hopefully awaiting the day when the thin, fragile and always fundamentally unsustainable veneer of repression can finally be chipped away, as history shows it always will be.</p>
<p>This will be the day when the people of Hong Kong will finally have a say in determining their own future, once and for all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179091/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevin Carrico does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Louisa Lim’s ‘haunting testimonial’ to Hong Kong reveals a politically engaged and dynamic civil society beneath the surface of an unrelenting reign of terror.Kevin Carrico, Senior Lecturer, Chinese Studies, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1742102022-03-30T14:18:19Z2022-03-30T14:18:19ZHow the controversial nationality and borders bill may help people from Chagos Islands and Hong Kong<p>The nationality and borders bill has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/audio/2022/feb/09/clause-9-and-the-erosion-of-citizenship-rights">widely condemned</a> as the continuation of a decade-long, Conservative-led immigration regime set on demonstrating that the UK is “tough on immigration”. It has been dubbed the “hostile environment” policy. </p>
<p>During its passage through the House of Lords, peers attempted to strip out some of the bill’s most contentious measures. But many of the proposed amendments have now been <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/borders-nationality-bill-refugees-msf-b2041671.html">rejected by</a> the House of Commons.</p>
<p>The bill is now in <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/ping-pong/">parliamentary ping-pong</a> – batted back to the Lords for its response to the Commons proposed changes. This is part of the process where the wording of the final bill is approved before it can be granted Royal Assent and become law.</p>
<h2>Clause 9 returns</h2>
<p>Some of the Lords amendments struck at the heart of bill, calling for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/feb/27/lords-criticise-plans-to-remove-uk-citizenship-without-warning">the removal</a> of the two most controversial issues: the extension of the deprivation powers of the Home Secretary so that they can <a href="https://theconversation.com/stripping-british-citizenship-the-governments-new-bill-explained-173547">remove citizenship</a> from people without notice – the so-called Clause 9 – and new prohibitions on those entering the UK without prior authorisation <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-nationality-and-borders-bill-qanda-how-will-it-affect-migration-across-the-english-channel-164808">to claim asylum</a>. </p>
<p>But when the amended bill was brought back to <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2022-03-22/debates/FA4FBF36-5168-4B9B-8C7E-09D2AAC33C39/NationalityAndBordersBill">the Commons</a> for consideration, these major amendments were overturned. Clause 9 and the criminalisation of those entering the UK as refugees without prior authorisation looks set to become law.</p>
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<p>These two issues have been incredibly divisive and have grabbed much of the attention around this controversial bill. But there are a set of other proposed changes that relate to Britain’s relationship with its former overseas citizens that have largely escaped notice.</p>
<h2>The Hong Kong visa</h2>
<p>The Hong Kong <a href="https://whodowethinkweare.org/what-can-the-hong-kong-bno-visa-tell-us-about-borders-and-belonging-in-britain-today">BN(O) visa</a> is the bespoke route introduced on January 31 2021 to facilitate the migration and settlement in the UK of those seeking to <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-political-turmoil-provokes-difficult-decisions-about-whether-to-leave-155994">leave Hong Kong</a> in the wake of China’s imposition of national security law. This route rests on the applicant being eligible for <a href="https://www.gov.uk/types-of-british-nationality/british-national-overseas">British Nationals (Overseas) status</a> – the status awarded to the people of Hong Kong when sovereignty was handed to China <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Handover_of_Hong_Kong">in 1997</a>.</p>
<p>The latest statistics show that in 2021, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-statistics-year-ending-december-2021/how-many-people-come-to-the-uk-each-year-including-visitors#british-national-overseas-bno-route">97,057 visas</a> were granted to people through this scheme. The original limits on this visa meant that those born after 1997 could only take advantage of this route as “dependants” of their BN(O) parents. This meant that in order to move to the UK through this route they would have to move with their parents. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/stripping-british-citizenship-the-governments-new-bill-explained-173547">Stripping British citizenship: the government's new bill explained</a>
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<p>But subsequent amendments to the bill mean those with a BN(O) parent will be eligible to apply for the scheme <a href="https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2022-02-24/hcws635">independently of their parents</a>. This is notable because previously many of the students and young people involved in political protests in Hong Kong fell out of the scope of the visa. </p>
<p>The routes available to them to enter the UK independently were limited to <a href="https://archive.discoversociety.org/2020/09/02/youth-mobility-scheme-panacea-or-unfolding-crisis-for-hong-kongese-without-british-national-overseas-status/">the youth mobility scheme</a> (a time-limited visa that explicitly prohibits a right to settlement) and applying for asylum. The amendment means that this is no longer necessary. This move has been welcomed by campaigners and the government <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2022-03-22/debates/FA4FBF36-5168-4B9B-8C7E-09D2AAC33C39/NationalityAndBordersBill">has confirmed</a> it will enact these changes by October. </p>
<h2>Children denied citizenship</h2>
<p>Citizens of the 14 remaining British overseas territories are eligible for British Overseas Territories Citizenship <a href="https://www.gov.uk/types-of-british-nationality/british-overseas-territories-citizen">(BOTC)</a>. This status was first introduced in 1981, when it did not permit the right to live and work in the UK. Its holders had to apply for visas to enter and settle. But because of changes introduced in 2002 through the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Overseas_Territories_Act_2002">British Overseas Territories Act</a>, those holding this status are now able to register for full British citizenship, which includes the right to live and work in the UK. </p>
<p>But this right to citizenship did not extend to the children of these citizens – specifically those born outside British territories to unmarried BOTC parents. In other words, they have been denied the right to the nationality of their British parent. This discrimination on the grounds of their parents’ marital status at the time of their birth exists to this day. It disproportionately impacts British people of colour. </p>
<p>Clause 1 of the bill addresses this. It commits the government to reforming the nationality legislation so children born abroad and outside of marriage to BOTC fathers can inherit the status of their parents, which would also entitle them to register as British citizens. This clause will make the world of difference to <a href="https://www.botccampaign.org/trentsstory">this group</a> of people. </p>
<h2>Chagos Islanders</h2>
<p>The case of the <a href="https://whodowethinkweare.org/what-can-we-learn-about-british-citizenship-from-the-chagos-islanders">Chagos Islanders</a> adds further complexity to this story of children denied the right to British nationality by descent. Between 1967 and 1972, the entire population of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chagos_Archipelago">Chagos Archipelago</a> was displaced to Mauritius and the Seychelles to make way for a joint UK-US military base on Diego Garcia.</p>
<p>The process included excising the archipelago from the control of Mauritius, at the time a British colony, to create the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). The BIOT remains one of Britain’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Overseas_Territories">14 remaining overseas territories</a>, along with Gibraltar and the Falklands. At this time, the Chagos Islanders are citizens in British nationality law. </p>
<p>But the descendants of forcibly displaced Chagos Islanders were denied this status – BOTC status was only available to those born on the islands and the first generation born off-island. It could not be passed on to future generations. Their case is unique because they were granted <a href="https://theconversation.com/chagos-islands-mauritiuss-latest-challenge-to-uk-shows-row-over-sovereignty-will-not-go-away-177381">no right of return</a> to British territories. </p>
<p>The amendment that would permit direct descendants of those from the Chagos Islands to inherit their parents’ status was <a href="https://members.parliament.uk/member/3960/contact">defeated in the Commons</a> in November 2021. However, a later version of this amendment was introduced by Labour’s <a href="https://members.parliament.uk/member/4234/contact">Baroness Lister</a> when the bill reached the House of Lords. The Lords voted in favour and while the government found this amendment “technically deficient”, it has made clear its commitment to offering <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nationality-and-borders-bill-chagossian-nationality-factsheet">a new route</a> to British nationality for these descendants.</p>
<p>These changes and amendments will make a huge difference for some of these communities. They are the provisions that seem to sweeten a deal that is otherwise set to introduce increasingly exclusionary measures aimed at controlling who can come to the UK and on what terms.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174210/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michaela Benson received funding from the British Academy MD19\190055 for her research into Britain's relationship with its overseas citizens. She is also a currently funded by the ESRC ES/V004530/1 for the project 'Rebordering Britain and Britons after Brexit'. </span></em></p>It has been a hugely controversial bill - but some of the proposals will actually help certain communities fighting for British citizenship.Michaela Benson, Professor in Public Sociology, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1743752022-01-10T14:58:10Z2022-01-10T14:58:10ZHong Kong: how colonial-era laws are being used to shut down independent journalism<p>Hong Kong has never been a democracy, but it was home to a vibrant media scene and enjoyed the free flow of information. No more. The National Security Law (NSL), unilaterally imposed by Beijing in 2020, cracked down on protest and effectively outlaws dissent. </p>
<p>This law chilled free speech and forced the closure of the city’s sole pro-democracy newspaper, Apple Daily, in June 2021. Then, three days before the end of 2021, the city’s largest independent online media outlet, Stand News, came to a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/29/speed-of-stand-news-shutdown-sends-chilling-signal-to-hong-kongs-media">sudden end too</a>.</p>
<p>Local national security police arrested seven former directors, columnists and editors of the outlet, which had never hidden its pro-democracy views, for alleged “conspiracy of publishing seditious publication”. Company materials were seized and its financial assets frozen. The current and former editor-in-chief were criminally charged, and the outlet shut down its website and social media accounts and erased all its online content. </p>
<p>Amid <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1940161208326598">growing self-censorship</a>, independent digital media outlets like Stand News offered a space for more critical reporting and opinion. Stand News regularly provided <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2022/01/05/timeline-hong-kongs-non-profit-outlet-stand-news-through-the-years/">in-depth coverage</a> of issues and individuals that were given short shrift or ignored in the mainstream media. The platform was funded mostly through monthly donations and crowdfunding. </p>
<p>Soon after <a href="https://theconversation.com/hongkongers-mourn-closure-of-apple-daily-and-fear-for-the-future-of-independent-journalism-163506">Apple Daily closed</a>, Stand News had taken preemptive action in response to <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/667617.html">what it called</a> “the arrival of the literary inquisition” in Hong Kong. The outlet announced the resignations of all but two of its directors, purged opinion articles from its website and suspended new donations. But this did not stop senior police figures from continuing to accuse the outlet of inciting public hatred against the force. </p>
<p>National security police have arrested more than 160 political dissidents and activists since the NSL <a href="https://www.chinafile.com/individuals-arrested-under-hong-kong-national-security-law-or-national-security-department">was implemented</a>. Apple Daily’s founder, Jimmy Lai, his former employees and related companies were charged under the NSL with colluding with foreign forces. </p>
<p>But high-profile arrests are just one part of the picture; the pressure on news organisations and journalists takes multiple forms. In the media, pro-Beijing voices have attacked <a href="https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/hong-kong-journalists-association-s-future-in-question/6247741.html">the Hong Kong Journalists Association</a> and <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/society/article/3154909/hong-kong-journalists-urge-government-drop-plans-fake-news">Foreign Correspondents’ Club</a>. The government has refused to <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/china/hong-kong-visa-economist-journalist-sue-wong-press-freedom-b1957078.html">renew work visas</a> for foreign correspondents, and foreign news organisations like the Wall Street Journal have received <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/hong-kong-china-wsj-threat-election-legco-democracy-freedom-protest-ccp-11638575014">threatening letters</a> from Hong Kong government officials.</p>
<h2>The return of sedition laws</h2>
<p>The government is now also using colonial laws to crack down on free speech and the free press. Hong Kong’s sedition laws were introduced in the early 20th century and can be overly broad and subjective. <a href="https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap200!en?INDEX_CS=N&xpid=ID_1438402821397_002">For example</a>, anyone who publishes or distributes content that “brings into hatred or excites disaffection against” the government or the administration of justice, or promotes enmity between different classes of people in Hong Kong, can be criminally prosecuted.</p>
<p>These colonial-era laws have been unused since the 1970s, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/hong-kongs-sedition-law-is-back">but returned</a> in autumn 2020 when the Hong Kong department of justice used them to charge activists who made public speeches against the government and unionists who published <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/22/five-arrested-in-hong-kong-for-sedition-over-childrens-book-about-sheep">children’s picture books</a> about the 2019 pro-democracy protests. </p>
<p>Now, they are being used to charge Apple Daily and Stand News journalists. And police <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2021/12/29/breaking-stand-news-closes-website-inaccessible-following-arrests-and-police-raid-chief-sec-slams-evil-elements/">recently told reporters</a> that opinion articles aren’t the only ones that can be regarded as seditious. Media interviews with exiled activists and features on clashes between protesters and riot police can also be considered seditious if the content is deemed by the government to be “fake news” or inciting hatred towards the government and endangering national security. </p>
<p>Newspaper editors and reporters now risk arrest if they have published articles critical of the government, if political authorities decide they are seditious. As the sedition laws predate the NSL, that potentially includes articles published before July 2020. Once they’re charged, journalists are likely to be denied bail and to face a long pre-trial detention.</p>
<p>Before the NSL, anyone charged with committing acts of sedition could expect to be granted bail unless the court suspected a high possibility they would reoffend or abscond. But under the NSL, this principle no longer applies. <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2021/12/15/stringent-national-security-bail-threshold-applicable-to-other-offences-hong-kongs-top-court-rules/">The latest ruling</a> by the chief justice in Hong Kong’s top court stated that as acts of sedition qualify as offences endangering national security, defendants will only be granted bail if they meet stringent requirements set by the NSL. </p>
<h2>Chilling effect</h2>
<p>The impact on Hong Kong’s media has been immediate. At least six other independent digital media outlets chose to shut down following the closure of Stand News, including <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/02/hong-kong-citizen-news-close-fears-staff-safety">Hong Kong Citizen News</a>. Its chief editor, a respected news industry veteran, said the move was taken to protect staff in an environment in which nobody can be sure where the red lines of sedition and national security are. The broadsheet Ming Pao Daily has started <a href="https://www.trendsmap.com/twitter/tweet/1478884481775939593">putting disclaimers</a> on all opinion pieces, stating the paper does not intend to incite hatred, contempt or disaffection against the government or any community. </p>
<p>Hong Kong was once known for its independent judiciary and the rule of law. Now its laws and courts are being weaponised by the government to crush press freedom and independent journalism. The government has also floated the possibility of a <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/fake-news-law-hong-kong-china-b1959398.html">fake news bill</a> this year. Unless the courts can uphold their integrity as a guardian of free speech, the city’s international standing will be further eroded.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174375/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The resurgence of sedition laws is having a devastating chilling effect on press freedom.Yan-ho Lai, Hong Kong Law Fellow, Center for Asian Law, Georgetown University, PhD Candidate in Law, SOAS, University of LondonYuen Chan, Senior Lecturer, School of Arts and Social Sciences, Department of Journalism, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1636652021-07-01T16:13:24Z2021-07-01T16:13:24ZChina’s Communist Party at 100: revolution forever<p>This month the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is celebrating its 100th anniversary. It has come a long way from its secret beginnings in July 1921, when 12 delegates from a small number of study groups of ardent young Marxists gathered in Shanghai for their first national congress. </p>
<p>These groups emerged from the anti-imperialist and nationalist protests of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/May-Fourth-Movement">May 4 1919</a> that had merged with a larger social and cultural movement. In an intensely international intellectual environment young students sought radical change and found inspiration in a range of new ideologies, from liberalism, humanitarianism and individualism to anarchism, feminism and socialism.</p>
<p>After the success of the Russian Revolution in 1917, Marxism gained significant traction. The Moscow-based Third Communist International offered support and sent a representative to the Shanghai meeting. The CCP thus emerged from a combination of the anti-imperialist and nationalist impulses of the May Fourth Movement with – as American scholar <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40201403">Maurice Meisner puts it</a>: “The chiliastic [millenarian] expectations of an imminent international revolutionary upheaval inspired by the writings of Lenin and Trotzky.”</p>
<p>How does one square this youthful rebelliousness with the situation today where the party has a membership of more than 90 million and is ruling over the world’s largest population. A party that has opened itself to private businesses, with the result that aspiration to membership is largely a career decision?</p>
<h2>Creating a revolutionary tradition</h2>
<p>At the beginning of 2021, the Ministry of Education launched an <a href="https://sieconnection.com/insight/2021/4/7/trends-in-chinese-education-white-paper-2021nbsp">educational campaign</a> with the aim of bolstering young people’s allegiance to the party. In an international environment where China is under intense pressure to justify its increasingly relentless authoritarian stance, this campaign is the expression of a deep anxiety about the preservation of the party’s revolutionary credentials and political legitimacy. </p>
<p>The preservation of “the red genes” lies at the heart of this campaign, as shown in this analysis by the China Media Project: <a href="https://chinamediaproject.org/2021/06/25/the-color-must-not-fade/">Our Colour Must not Fade</a>. Back in January 2021 the Ministry of Education issued <a href="http://edu.sc.gov.cn/scedu/jyt2021/2021/2/7/6b09aaea737e4facb68b067f3c102366.shtml">guidelines</a> on how to inculcate the revolutionary tradition into the minds of young children through the primary and secondary school curriculum. </p>
<p>This was followed by further instructions on how to teach children from a young age to “follow the party forever” using a series of tools from short video clips to class assemblies celebrating the “party spirit”, to patriotic education through red tourism. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Group picture of Mao Zedong and members of the CHinese COmmunist Party at Yan'an in 1942." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409341/original/file-20210701-23-38zub.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409341/original/file-20210701-23-38zub.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409341/original/file-20210701-23-38zub.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409341/original/file-20210701-23-38zub.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409341/original/file-20210701-23-38zub.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409341/original/file-20210701-23-38zub.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409341/original/file-20210701-23-38zub.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Mao Zedong and members of the Communist Party of China at Yan'an, the ‘birthplace of the revolution’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
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<p>The study of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-thought-explained-a-new-ideology-for-a-new-era.html">Xi Jinping’s New Era Thought</a> is seamlessly brought together with a party/state history that focuses on the establishment of the “New China”. In this narrative, “New China” begins with the glorious foundation of the People’s Republic in 1949. China’s development is tracked through the “Reform and Opening” policies launched in 1978 that “opened” China to the world after the end of the Mao era, to its reconstitution as the major global power that it is today.</p>
<p>Conveniently brushing over the disasters of the Mao era, such as the purges of “rightist” intellectuals, the famine of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, these new guidelines aim to make children from primary school age to “<a href="http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/gzdt_gzdt/s5987/202103/t20210330_523534.html">unswervingly obey the party</a>”. </p>
<p>Xi wants to go back to the revolutionary roots of his party without the social turmoil attached to it. The exact opposite of a revolution.</p>
<h2>The century of youth</h2>
<p>Party propagandists know why they focus on young people. It’s the youth that are uncompromising, daring and hungry for change. But it’s also the youth that tend to hold authorities to account – and therefore need to be brought in line. This part of the revolutionary tradition was shaped in the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/653116">Rectification Campaign of 1942</a> in Yan'an, a remote corner of the country, where the embattled communists had built their new base.</p>
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<img alt="Statue of Mao Zedong at the Memorial Hall of Chairman Mao in Beijing, China." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409332/original/file-20210701-21-1g05cir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409332/original/file-20210701-21-1g05cir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409332/original/file-20210701-21-1g05cir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409332/original/file-20210701-21-1g05cir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409332/original/file-20210701-21-1g05cir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409332/original/file-20210701-21-1g05cir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409332/original/file-20210701-21-1g05cir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Setting the tone: monument fo Mao Zedong in Beijing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">cowardlion via Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>In March of that year, <a href="https://u.osu.edu/mclc/2017/01/20/wang-shiwei-documentary/">Wang Shiwei</a>, a freethinking writer who would become one of the most tragic victims of this campaign, published his essay, Wild Lilies – the work that would bring him into trouble. Its opening lines told about Li Fen, a young student at Beijing University in 1926 where she joined the Communist Party. With great affection, sadness and admiration Wang describes Li’s courage and determination when she faced a martyr’s death upon being betrayed to the authorities by a member of her own family only two years later. </p>
<p>The purity of the youthful martyr stands in stark contrast to the hypocrisy of the elitist party leadership in Yan’an. In Wang’s mind, what was dismissed by some as youthful grumbling over minor injustices – such as unequal access to food and women – diminished and mocked the sacrifices made by young idealist revolutionaries such as Li. He wrote:</p>
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<p>The potential value of youth lies in its purity, sensitivity, fervour and love of life. When others haven’t felt the darkness, they sense it first, when others are reluctant to utter the unmentionable, they speak out courageously.</p>
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<p>Wang saw in youth – as embodied by Li – a heightened perceptiveness, a strong sense of justice and greater willingness to stand up for their ideals. The celebrated author Ding Ling’s <a href="https://www.marxists.org/chinese/reference-books/yanan1942/2-02.htm">exposition of gender inequalities</a>, criticising the party’s double standards when it came to women’s emancipation, was a more prominent example of the same. </p>
<p>The fates of both were in different ways signs of things to come and set the tone for the political campaigns and purges of the following decades. Wang spent the next years in confinement and was executed in 1947. Ding retracted and became a lauded author of social realism. </p>
<p>Wild Lilies highlighted the deep chasm between the idealism and the sacrifices made by women like Li and the betrayal of those values by the privileged leaders of the revolutionary society in Yan’an. What remained of the May Fourth rage was soon drowned in ideological struggles and Leninist party discipline. Ding lived, but her literary creativity was essentially stifled.</p>
<p>Mao would later use the power of the youth to turn against his own party, when he launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966 in a desperate attempt to reassert his position of power. The Cultural Revolution was the spectre that was evoked to justify the brutal crackdown when young students initiated the social protest movement of the early summer of 1989 leading to the tragedy of Tiananmen Square. Students have also been the main force behind the recent protests in Hong Kong. </p>
<p>The 100 years of the CCP’s history are full of ambiguities and contradictions, hope and joy, suffering and despair. There is a lot that is worth remembering. But the inculcation of a streamlined revolutionary tradition in an attempt to create new generations of blindly obedient followers is likely to backfire.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163665/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Janku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As it celebrates it’s 100th birthday, the Chinese ruling party’s latest programme of education aims to harness the power of youth in its own interests.Andrea Janku, Lecturer, Department of History, School of History, Religions & Philosophies, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1560702021-03-02T11:50:02Z2021-03-02T11:50:02ZHong Kong: ‘patriotism test’ for public officials shows China’s increasing assertiveness<p>Tensions are running high in Hong Kong after the pro-Beijing government charged <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/hong-kong-charges-47-pro-democracy-activists-over-unofficial-election-process-6xdnl3j7g">47 democracy activists and politicians</a> with sedition under the controversial new national security law. </p>
<p>The group is accused of running what has been described as an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/01/hong-kong-court-protests-democracy-activists-national-security-law">unofficial “primary” poll</a> in July last year in which more than 600,000 Honkongese voted to select candidates for a legislative election which was due to be held in September. The election was subsequently postponed by Carrie Lam, the territory’s pro-Beijing chief executive, who cited the coronavirus as the reason for delaying the vote.</p>
<p>The charges come just days after the Hong Kong government introduced <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/23/hong-kong-plans-to-make-politicians-swear-oath-of-loyalty-to-beijing">new oath requirements</a> for public officials – swearing loyalty not to their constituents but Beijing and the Communist Party. The oaths are part of a plan outlined on February 23 by Xia Baolong, the director of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, for major electoral reforms to ensure only “patriots” can stand for office. </p>
<p>This is designed to ensure that pro-Beijing officials will hold all the offices in the city’s executive, legislature and judiciary branches as well as statutory bodies. The move echoes words from Chinese President Xi Jinping earlier in the month when he said: “Hong Kong must always be governed by patriots”.</p>
<p>Pro-democrats accused the Hong Kong government of narrowing the scope for political participation, while the pro-establishment camp believed that the newly proposed requirements would work hand in hand with the National Security Law (NSL) to further eliminate “anti-China” elements from the city by providing it with a “patriotic” test. The NSL, imposed by Beijing in June 2020, has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-is-becoming-increasingly-assertive-security-law-in-hong-kong-is-just-the-latest-example-142313">widely criticised</a> both by pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong itself and by the international community as effectively outlawing opposition movements.</p>
<h2>Changing China</h2>
<p>The evolution of China’s posture towards the former British colony has largely tracked China’s development as a major global power. When the “<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-why-the-one-country-two-systems-model-is-on-its-last-legs-118960">one country, two systems</a>” principle was agreed in the 1980s as part of the legally binding <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8616/">handover agreement</a> between China and the UK, the city was given the assurance it could retain its own economic and administrative systems for 50 years with “a high degree of autonomy”. </p>
<p>At that stage, China was a rather marginal economic and geopolitical actor. But the rise of China to great power status, especially the country’s unprecedented economic growth, has inevitably caused a change in China’s perception of itself and others. </p>
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<p><em>You can hear more about the tough decisions facing people thinking of leaving Hong Kong in episode 4 of The Conversation Weekly podcast <a href="https://theconversation.com/leaving-hong-kong-after-chinas-clampdown-where-are-people-thinking-of-going-and-why-the-conversation-weekly-podcast-155927">Leaving Hong Kong after China’s clampdown: where are people thinking of going and why</a>. Listen and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts.</em></p>
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<p>Hong Kong is one of the key examples of that change of perception. After handover in 1997, Hong Kong became a <a href="https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/1-530-5745?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true">Special Administrative Region</a> (SAR) but is – on every level – part of China. The former British colony still fulfils its function as a conduit between China and the world, but even this has gradually become symbolic as China now has several other important financial hubs, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3091526/shanghais-quest-be-global-financial-centre-gains-impetus-hong">principally Shanghai</a>. </p>
<p>China’s economy has <a href="https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33534.html#:%7E:text=From%202008%20to%202010%2C%20China's,to%206.8%25%20in%202017">grown rapidly over the past two decades</a>, while, on the other hand, the outside world – particularly the US and Europe – was pushed into recession by the 2008 financial crisis and had barely recovered when COVID-19 hit.</p>
<p>China’s changing global power has radically changed the context which the Hong Kong issue sits. Beijing has clearly found it difficult, if not possible, to maintain the same attitude towards the former UK territory as it had at handover in 1997, especially in the face of rising political instability in the city and the deterioration of US-China relations during the presidency of Donald Trump.</p>
<h2>Jurisdictional loopholes</h2>
<p>The new US president, Joe Biden, made human rights in Hong Kong and elsewhere a focus of his <a href="https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-beijing-hong-kong-asia-china-df5d5e94d0862df0987f59b166cc4705">first phone call</a> with Xi Jinping at the beginning of February. Biden pressed Xi on Hong Kong, Taiwan and China’s treatment of its Uighur Muslim minority. The Chinese state broadcaster CCTV said Xi had pushed back on these concerns on China’s internal affairs, saying: “The US should respect China’s core interests and act with caution.”</p>
<p>The deterioration of relations between Washington and Beijing has been evident for some time, for example in 2019 when the US Congress passed <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/3289">Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act</a>, which established that the US would review its stance on Hong Kong annually with regard to China’s upholding of the 1997 Handover Agreement. China responded by <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-50626796">cancelling the US navy’s Hong Kong visit</a> in 2019.</p>
<p>Another important indication of China’s more assertive stance towards Hong Kong is that, 23 years after handover, the <a href="https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202009/29/P2020092900336.htm">Central Military Dock</a> was officially placed under the control of the People’s Liberation Army Navy on September 29 2020. The dock was part of a Sino-UK agreement made in 1994 on the arrangements for the future use of military sites in the former British colony. </p>
<p>It is evident that Beijing’s failure to uncouple Hong Kong from its colonial past created “jurisdictional loopholes” – the establishment of the national security law and the new oath requirement shows Beijing taking legal and legislative action to fully “decolonise” Hong Kong. </p>
<p>Hong Kong can still enjoy a certain degree of autonomy under the “one country, two systems” principle while remaining a Special Administrative Zone of China. But Beijing is expected to make more “loyalty” demands like the recent oath requirements to ensure that the notion of “one country” is a prerequisite for viability of Hong Kong’s “two systems” – at least, until the agreement ceases to have legal force in 2047.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156070/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New laws demand that all public officials swear loyalty to China and the Communist Party.Boyang Su, PhD Researcher, Lau China Institute, King's College LondonSophie Wushuang Yi, PhD Researcher in the Lau China Institute, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1559942021-02-26T11:20:19Z2021-02-26T11:20:19ZHong Kong: political turmoil provokes difficult decisions about whether to leave<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/386638/original/file-20210226-13-1gh3bbk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=73%2C73%2C5337%2C3501&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Thousands of people protested in Hong Kong in July 2019 against a proposed extradition law. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/hong-kong-hk-july-21-2019-1456955633">omonphotography via Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This is a transcript of Episode 4 of The Conversation Weekly: <a href="https://theconversation.com/leaving-hong-kong-after-chinas-clampdown-where-are-people-thinking-of-going-and-why-the-conversation-weekly-podcast-155927">Leaving Hong Kong after China’s clampdown: where are people thinking of going and why?</a>. In this week’s episode, three experts explain why more people are thinking of leaving Hong Kong – and the choices they face about where to go. And we hear about new research that has found a new way to speed up the search for that elusive enigma: dark matter.</em> </p>
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<p><em>NOTE: Transcripts may contain errors. Please check the corresponding audio before quoting in print.</em></p>
<p>Dan Merino: Hello and welcome to <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a>. </p>
<p>Gemma Ware: In this episode, three experts explain why people are leaving Hong Kong, where they’re going and why. </p>
<p>Sui-Ting Kong: They can’t find that Hong Kong any more, that’s why they are seeking for a better life.</p>
<p>Dan: And we’ll hear from a physicist who is using technology from the world of quantum computing, to help speed up the search for dark matter, of all things. </p>
<p>Benjamin Brubaker: There’s this invisible cosmic wave all around us and it’s just oscillating up and down. </p>
<p>Gemma: From The Conversation, I’m Gemma Ware in London. </p>
<p>Dan: And I’m Dan Merino in San Francisco. You’re listening to <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a>, the world explained by experts. </p>
<p>Gemma: First up today, Dan, we’ve got a story about Hong Kong, and the people who are having to make really tough decisions about whether to stay or whether to leave. </p>
<p>Dan: And people fighting for democracy anywhere in the world really have to consider that I’m sure. “Should I stay? Or do I have to get out, get somewhere safer it’s getting too dangerous?”</p>
<p>Gemma: And the situation in Hong Kong has been getting really dangerous for people who’ve been protesting over the past few years.</p>
<p>Gemma: The <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/umbrella-movement-72282">umbrella movement</a> that began in 2014 got its name from the colourful umbrellas that the pro-democracy protesters were holding up, initially to protect themselves against pepper spray from the police but then eventually water cannons too.</p>
<p>Gemma: Then in 2019, China proposed a new extradition law that would have allowed Hong Kong residents to be extradited to the mainland. This triggered huge protests which lasted for months, characterised by severe police violence and large scale destruction in the city. </p>
<p>Gemma: Then in mid-2020, the Chinese government passed a new national security law for Hong Kong. </p>
<p>Dan: So this new law was in addition to the old extradition law?</p>
<p>Gemma: Yeah, that’s right and actually the extradition law was eventually withdrawn after all the protests. And then subsequently the Chinese Communist Party introduced this new national security law which was passed in the middle of 2020, and essentially it criminalises anyone who disagrees with the government in Hong Kong and any acts of subversion among other things. And experts, some of whom have actually written for The Conversation about this, say that the passing of the law spelled the death knell for this <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-end-of-one-country-two-systems-poses-fresh-challenges-for-joe-biden-150213">“one country two systems”</a> framework that Hong Kong is known for. </p>
<p>Dan: Fundamentally, it all comes down to this weird situation where the UK handed control of Hong Kong back to China. It’s this complicated question of who’s actually in charge.</p>
<p>Gemma: Yeah, and that 1997 handover by the British back to China really focused on the rule of law and <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-how-chinas-new-national-security-law-subverts-the-territorys-cherished-rule-of-law-139683">upholding the rule of law</a>. And Hong Kong’s Basic Law was specifically meant to guarantee Hong Kong’s judicial independence from China. But this national security law kind of threw that all out of the window. And people were always worried about what would happen in the future, and it seems that they were right to be worried and right to be concerned about what China would do. </p>
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<p>Gemma: So much of the world was incensed by China’s decision to pass this national security law, and as part of its own response, the British government actually opened up a new visa route to Hong Kong at the end of January. A few other countries, such as Australia and Canada are also seeing more interest in people to come to those countries too. So to find out more about this, I’ve spoken to three experts about how the political turmoil in Hong Kong is influencing people’s decisions about whether to leave or whether to stay, and if they do decide to leave, where to go.</p>
<p>Sui-Ting: I’m Sui-Ting Kong, assistant professor in the Department of Sociology of Durham University. </p>
<p>Gemma: Sui-Ting told me the recent wave of arrests in Hong Kong has frightened a lot of those involved in the recent protests.</p>
<p>Sui Ting: Even those who are less prominent, they are now, you know, under the threat of prosecution. And that definitely caused, you know, fear, among people. They just do not know whether I have already crossed a red line. </p>
<p>Gemma: But not all people are thinking of leaving for the same reasons. </p>
<p>Sui-Ting: There is a group of people, they really think that they disagree with the protest, that happened in 2019 and they do really feel that the Hong Kong they used to love, which is stable, harmonious and a place for making money and business, is long gong. </p>
<p>Gemma: Sui-Ting is working on a couple of research projects about how political participation – or lack of it - influences people’s everyday lives. One of these projects, led by the <a href="https://www.hksyu.edu/counpsy/index_staff_LAUBobo.htm">researcher Bobo Lau</a> in Hong Kong, is also researching the tensions that politics can create between different generations of the same family. As part of it, they’ve been interviewing parents and their children.</p>
<p>Sui Ting: And in our interviews, for example, a lot of parents, they actually talk about moving back to China. Because they believe that they fled China in the past in order to seek stability and harmony.</p>
<p>Gemma: As Sui-Ting and her colleagues have begun analysing their interviews, migration has emerged as a prominent theme.</p>
<p>Sui-Ting: We have actually seen three different ways that they describe the decision to migrate.</p>
<p>Gemma: The first way to describe leaving is just that – migration.</p>
<p>Sui-Ting: Migration is a term in Cantonese, we call it <em>yímín</em> (移民), which is a fairly neutral term.</p>
<p>This particular term is used by those who are considered to be what they call “light yellow”. It means that when they are participating in the protest movement, they are not those who are considered to be valiant or frontline protesters. They are supportive of the movement and they also feel very disappointed over the course of last year that things are not changing towards a better direction.</p>
<p>And quite often, if they’ve got children, one of the major concerns is that they want the children to grow up in a place which is free for them to express themselves, as well as having an education system that allows their children to have critical thinking, including being critical of China.</p>
<p>Gemma: She says this group of people are searching for something safer, a life with more freedom. </p>
<p>Sui-Ting: And that is also how they perceive Hong Kong is and should be but they can’t find that Hong Kong anymore, given the current situation, and that’s why they are seeking elsewhere for a better life.</p>
<p>Gemma: A second group, those who were more involved in the protests, describe their decision to leave as a type of flight.</p>
<p>Sui-Ting: The other term is called <em>zǒunàn</em> (走難), that basically means that fleeing from disaster or fleeing from something very undesirable and unpleasant. And they find it really difficult to reconcile the idea of moving away from Hong Kong while they have invested so much energy, sacrificed so much in the movement, to make Hong Kong a better place for themselves. And one of the interviewee, who is a young adult, just graduated from the university involved in our project, she even said that, “I can’t, I can’t believe myself even ponder, you know, the idea of moving away while Hong Kong is crumbling.”</p>
<p>And that kind of sense of indebtedness and sense of guilt for leaving Hong Kong just doesn’t allow them to think about leaving Hong Kong for a better life. And one of the many ways of living with it is that it is not really my choice. I must go because it is just too bad in this place. This particular description of the migration decision would then actually affect the way they re-engage with the Hong Kong politics after they move out of Hong Kong. </p>
<p>Gemma: The final way people describe leaving is much more brutal. </p>
<p>Sui-Ting: The third category is called <em>liúwáng</em> (流亡). It literally means exile.</p>
<p>Gemma: She said her team hasn’t actually interviewed anyone who is going into exile or taking political refuge, but that this a distinct way some people talk about leaving Hong Kong.</p>
<p>Sui-Ting: And this particular category, for those who can be seen or even claim to be in this category, they need to have certain political capital. They have to be fairly involved in the movement to the extent that they are eligible to take political refuge. We have already seen very high profile, prominent cases who actually, took that route, exile. For example, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-53393030">Nathan Law who is now in the UK</a> - he will be arrested if he goes back. Then, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pWm_3_saGvI">Ted Hui, Hui Chi-fung</a>, he actually left with the whole family and and ended up in the UK. </p>
<p>And this particular phenomenon doesn’t just happen by just fleeing to the UK, but also fleeing to Taiwan. And we’ve got a very clear case about the Hong Kong 12 who actually fled Hong Kong, tried to go to Taiwan, and got caught by the Chinese government. </p>
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<p>Gemma: I wanted to find out more about the routes for Hong Kongers to come to both of those places – the UK and Taiwan. First, let’s focus on the UK. At the end of January this year, the British government opened up a new visa route for millions of Hong Kongers. </p>
<p>To find out more the route I called up an immigration expert. </p>
<p>Peter William Walsh: My name is Peter William Walsh. I’m a researcher at the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford. </p>
<p>Gemma: Peter explained that the British National Overseas – or BNO – status is essentially a hangover from the British Empire. </p>
<p>Peter: It was actually created in advance of the 1997 handover of Hong Kong to China, to allow Hong Kong residents to “retain a connection” is how the government described it with the UK.</p>
<p>Gemma: Back then it didn’t mean a huge amount – people with BNO status couldn’t actually move freely to the UK to study or work.</p>
<p>Peter: And now that’s all changed. It is no longer symbolic. Now it brings some definite rights and privileges that weren’t afforded to Hong Kong holders of this status before.</p>
<p>Gemma: The new route opened up on January 31. </p>
<p>Peter: So in principle, it will allow up to 5.4 million Hong Kong residents to come to the UK to work, to live, to study, and become British citizens. There are 2.9 million BNO status holders estimated by the UK government, but it’s also their close family members, their spouses, their children, their grandchildren who are eligible.</p>
<p>Gemma: The application costs £250. </p>
<p>Peter: That’s relatively cheap for a British visa. At the moment a standard work visa costs over a £1,000.</p>
<p>Gemma: If they’re successful, the visa last for five years, at which point they can apply to become a British citizen. But there are a number of other associated costs.</p>
<p>Peter: The immigration health surcharge, that’s currently over £600 pounds for each year of the visa and that has to be paid upfront. So that brings the cost to one individual to move to about £3,000.</p>
<p>Gemma: The UK government doesn’t really have any firm idea of how many people are going to apply for it.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-china-crackdown-is-likely-to-boost-migration-to-uk-152766">Hong Kong: China crackdown is likely to boost migration to UK</a>
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<p>Peter: The government has <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia/2020/70/pdfs/ukia_20200070_en.pdf">provided some projections</a>, but as they admit, they are quote highly uncertain. The lowest estimate is that 9,000 people will move to the UK in the first five years of the policy. The highest estimate is that over a million will come. </p>
<p>So it’s perhaps more sensible to take the government’s middle estimates. And so that puts it at between 250,000 and 320,000, so between 50,000 and 60,000 a year over the first five years. </p>
<p>Gemma: Another estimate, based on a <a href="https://www.hongkongers.org.uk/policy-study-coming-for-hope">survey by a group called Hong Kongers in Britain</a>, which recruited people via social media, suggested 200,000 people would come on average per year over the first three years. </p>
<p>Peter: But again, highly uncertain, and I think we should treat all these figures with a large measure of caution. </p>
<p>Gemma: This week, as the British government launched a new phone app that BNO status holders can use to apply for the visa, it <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hong-kong-bnovisa-uk-government-launch-digital-process?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=govuk-notifications&utm_source=b0f670f7-a75b-440d-83f9-d55bdab1aece&utm_content=daily">said that thousands of people had already applied</a> in the first few weeks. </p>
<p>But the full figures won’t be clear for a few months until the government next publishes its immigration data. The new route came just a month after the UK left the European Union’s single market due to Brexit, bringing to an end decades of free movement for EU and UK citizens. In its place, the UK government has introduced a new points-based immigration system. </p>
<p>Peter: We’ll have to see where that balance is and where the BNO visa fits in. It could in fact contribute to higher overall immigration numbers, which would go against one of the government’s main aims of its points based system. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-uk-immigration-system-is-broken-coronavirus-and-brexit-will-make-it-even-worse-144148">The UK immigration system is broken – coronavirus and Brexit will make it even worse</a>
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<p>Gemma: For its part, the Chinese government is furious about the new BNO visa route. A few days before it opened, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/29/britain-launches-visa-scheme-for-hong-kong-citizens">China announced</a> it would no longer recognise the BNO passport as an official travel document. Then in February, the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b88ec4f2-6977-4fbd-9d88-52ec6d7f629b">UK government warned</a> that China was no longer recognising dual nationality, which could make it difficult to provide consular assistance to British citizens who also hold a local passport. </p>
<p>I asked Sui-Ting Kong how the new BNO visa route was influencing conversations about migration in Hong Kong. She said it had big implications on family life. </p>
<p>Sui-Ting: If you want to be eligible for BNO, you have to be born before 1997. And that means that those who are born after 1997, they can actually move to the UK under this particular new BNO pathway only when they are dependants of BNO-holding parents. </p>
<p>Gemma: This can lead to tensions between parents who have BNO status, but don’t want to move, and their children who do. </p>
<p>Sui-Ting: And that creates a lot of discussion about whether the Hong Kong is actually the place that they can live in as a family and create a lot of generational splits.</p>
<p>What happened is that a lot of parents, they actually have developed their business or their career in Hong Kong. It’s not as easy for them to just move because they feel like, “I’ve got a decent salary here.” They might not actually speak English well, and they’ve got their families and a lot of friends here. And moving at at the age of forties, fifties it’s just not something that they want to do. However, their children actually might see that, “You can actually provide me the opportunity to leave this place and seek a better life elsewhere, however you do not choose to do so.” It becomes a source of conflict. </p>
<p>Gemma: The UK isn’t the only option for young people who want to leave Hong Kong, and Taiwan is becoming an increasingly attractive choice. Figures released by Taiwan’s Immigration Agency in early February <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-03/hong-kongers-move-to-taiwan-in-record-numbers-amid-turmoil">showed 10,800 Hong Kongers</a> got local Taiwanese residence permits in 2020, a record number – and double the previous year. </p>
<p>In March 2020, in response to the higher number of people migrating, Taiwan actually altered its immigration law to restrict the naturalisation of Hong Kong citizens. And yet a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/08/hong-kong-exile-taiwan-first-choice/">survey conducted a few months later</a> found that Taiwan was still Hong Kongers’ first migration destination above Canada, Australia, the UK and US. </p>
<p>To find out more, I spoke to a researcher in Taiwan who studies migration from Hong Kong. </p>
<p>Tsungyi Michelle Huang: I am Tsungyi Michelle Huang, professor at the Geography Department of National Taiwan University. </p>
<p>Gemma: Michelle explains that she got interested in the issue when she moved for a few years to teach at Chinese University in Hong Kong. When she met new people and revealed that she was from Taiwan, their attitude would often shift.</p>
<p>Michelle: From cold and detached, that kind of metropolitan cool, to warm and friendly. So these Hong Kongers I met usually describe their personal relationship with Taiwan in very affectionate terms. And it is very usual to hear them say, “Oh, you’re from Taiwan. I love Taiwan so much.”</p>
<p>Gemma: But it didn’t used to be that way, and she says there has been a shift in attitudes.</p>
<p>Michelle: Before 2000, Taiwan was not considered an attractive place by the Hong Kong community.</p>
<p>At that time Taiwan is some kind of back yard for Hong Kong, like they come to visit but still it’s a little bit like economic back water. It’s like rural area. So definitely not their top choice for migration. But this so-called Taiwan fever emerged after 2005. This is a trend reflected in the statistics of Hong Kongers visiting Taiwan.</p>
<p>Gemma: Part of Michelle’s research includes interviews with women from Hong Kong <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Positioning-Taiwan-in-a-Global-Context-Being-and-Becoming/Chang-Lin/p/book/9780367077129">who have migrated to Taiwan to marry</a>. </p>
<p>Michelle: These interviewees are women between 35 to 45 and have been living in Taiwan for between five to 12 years. </p>
<p>Gemma: These women suggest the attraction of Taiwan can be summed in the term “small happiness”, or the search for small pleasures – a more balanced way of life. </p>
<p>Michelle: They love Taiwan’s space, the natural environment and slow pace of life. The charm of Taiwanese small happiness can be found both in it’s casual lifestyle and the low barriers and costs for new businesses. </p>
<p>Gemma: Taiwan has grown in attraction in recent years because of the political turbulence in Hong Kong.</p>
<p>Michelle: And today’s Hong Kong, they would describe this as a place where tear gas and political violence seems to become the new normalcy in the city, together with the city’s high population density, the world’s most expensive housing market and this speedy and demanding work life.</p>
<p>Gemma: It’s relatively easy for people from Hong Kong to move to Taiwan, including by investing a certain amount of money to start up a business, or moving for work or to study. And many people see the move as a temporary one.</p>
<p>Michelle: Migrating to Taiwan is close and cheap compared with migrating to USA, Australia or Canada, for example. So, many of them have this idea that if things don’t work as planned, they can just go back to Hong Kong.</p>
<p>Gemma: OK, so they can try it out, come to live in Taiwain for a few years. </p>
<p>Michelle: Right, right, exactly, to see if they like it. So it’s quite flexible for them. And also, if you move to Taiwan, you don’t have to speak a foreign language.</p>
<p>Gemma: For the women Michelle has interviewed, politics wasn’t the main reason they migrated to Taiwan, they came to marry. But some of them spoke about their disappointment with the changes that have been going back on in Hong Kong. She gives the example of one woman, who said she felt sad for Hong Kongers.</p>
<p>Michelle: She said, “Hong Kong people are getting more and more angry because of the political situation. They cannot find a channel to vent their anger.”</p>
<p>Gemma: And some of them have a strong political stance - an anti-China one. </p>
<p>Michelle: Many of them say that once they become citizens of Taiwan, the first thing they do is to vote and they think this is very important for them. And many of them are supportive of the DPP. </p>
<p>Gemma: That’s the Democratic Progressive Party, Taiwan’s ruling party, which takes a strong line against China. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/taiwan-what-election-victory-for-tsai-ing-wen-means-for-the-islands-future-129802">Taiwan: what election victory for Tsai Ing-wen means for the island's future</a>
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<p>Michelle: And many of them have strong anti-China sentiments and believe that today’s Hong Kong, tomorrow’s Taiwan. They think Taiwan is the last place that can stand firm against China. </p>
<p>Gemma: I asked Michelle how people in Taiwan have reacted to the increase in migration from Hong Kong. </p>
<p>Michelle: The Taiwenese are basically sympathetic and accepting of Hong Kongers because over these years time, Taiwanese society has also developed this anti-China sentiment. So Taiwan and Hong Kong formed some kind of imagined political alliance, share this anti-China sentiment.</p>
<p>Gemma: But she says that some questions are now being raised in Taiwan about the new migration. </p>
<p>Michelle: After this Hong Kong version of the national security law, public opinion organisations <a href="https://www.tpof.org/%E5%9C%96%E8%A1%A8%E5%88%86%E6%9E%90/">conducted a survey</a>. One of the questions was, “Should Taiwan protect and welcome Hong Kongers to come to Taiwan?” with 41.5% agreeing and 50.5% disagreeing. </p>
<p>Gemma: It’s younger people, under the age of 34, who are the most sympathetic. But the poll showed that more than half of those over 40 don’t think Taiwan should be protecting Hong Kongers. </p>
<p>Michelle: One interesting view is that, Taiwanese are worried whether many of the Hong Kongers who have immigrated to Taiwan are actually mainlanders, because of this distrust of Chinese. </p>
<p>Gemma: When I asked Michelle how she saw this relationship evolving in the future, she said it’s still early days. Hong Kong’s umbrella movement and the protests against the extradition bill have led to what she says is a “common destiny” between Taiwan and Hong Kong. But China’s imposition of the national security law has stoked new fears.</p>
<p>Michelle: Paradoxically, the strengthening of China’s rule over Hong Kong has also increased Taiwan’s society’s suspicion of Hong Kong’s new immigrants. So one of my interviewees told me that her parents-in-law never really trust her because she’s from Hong Kong. And they think that, you know, Hong Kong now is part of mainland China. And on top of that, doubts about Hong Kongers coming to Taiwan for property speculation and social welfare use will probably be more prevalent in Taiwan in the future</p>
<p>Gemma: Both Michelle and Sui-Ting Kong will be watching what impact any increase in people choosing to leave Hong Kong might have – including on those existing communities of Hong Kongers in the UK and Taiwan. What’s clear is that those Hong Kongers who do make the decision to go, whether to Taiwan, the UK or elsewhere, will continue to follow the political situation in Hong Kong very closely. </p>
<p>Dan: Those are some really big decisions a lot of people need to be making. </p>
<p>Gemma: Yeah absolutely, and it’s also going to be interesting to see how their relationship with Hong Kong develops in the future. You can read more analysis on what’s happening in Hong Kong, and an <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-china-crackdown-is-likely-to-boost-migration-to-uk-152766">article about the BNO visa route</a> by Peter William Walsh on TheConversation.com, or by following the links in the show notes. </p>
<p>Dan: For our next segment, we’re leaving behind the trials and tribulations of the laws of mankind and venturing off into the laws of physics, specifically, the hunt for dark matter. </p>
<p>Gemma: That sounds intriguing Dan but I have to admit I don’t know what you’ve just said means. </p>
<p>Dan: Well, nobody knows what dark matter is. This is the question. It’s totally undetectable, and the only way astronomers and physicists know it exists is because you can see how it affects things in the universe, but not the thing itself. So to understand more, fist about what dark matter may or may not be, but more importantly about how we’re getting a step closer to actually finding it, I spoke to Benjamin Brubaker. </p>
<p>Benjamin: I’m a physicist, my career has straddled particle physics and quantum physics. Currently I’m a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Colorado at Boulder. And the work that we recently published is actually from my time in graduate school at Yale, where I was doing particle physics research in dark matter.</p>
<p>Dan: Dark matter. It’s a fun word to say. It doesn’t really mean anything to me. Why are we even looking? How do we know dark matter exists, if we don’t know that it exists? </p>
<p>Benjamin: So dark matter is obviously kind of a buzzword and it’s this name we give to this invisible substance, which fills our galaxy. It’s actually all around us, and we just don’t experience it on day-to-day level. We basically, we know nothing about what it’s made of, but we have a lot of converging lines of evidence that it exists and that it’s there. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-search-for-dark-matter-gets-a-speed-boost-from-quantum-technology-153604">The search for dark matter gets a speed boost from quantum technology</a>
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<p>And the simplest evidence is from the motions of the stars. So gravity causes the stars in our galaxy to orbit the galactic centre, basically the same way that the planets in our solar system orbit the sun.</p>
<p>But when astrophysicists study these orbits, they find the stars are just moving way too fast. And so that suggests there’s something else out there that we don’t know about that’s pulling on the stars gravitationally. </p>
<p>And then you can look at other evidence. So for example, you can study this light from the early universe and there’s these patterns in the light. When you look at these patterns, they also tell us that there’s some extra matter out there. That’s a totally different kind of measurement. And most importantly, they tell us that this extra matter can’t be made of atoms, like all the other matter we’re familiar with. So this really tells us there’s something missing from our description of reality. And it’s a big, big missing piece, that actually dark matter, we know that it makes up more than 80% of the matter in the universe. </p>
<p>Dan: Do we have any idea what we’re talking about here or we just randomly searching, you know, you put up a big net metaphorically speaking and are hoping to find something? </p>
<p>Benjamin: Yes, that’s a great question. So there’s a bunch of different theories that all postulate all these different kinds of particles and we have no idea if any of them are correct. We have no idea which one is correct, and all of them might be wrong. So one of the types of particles that dark matter might be it’s called an axion. </p>
<p>Axions are these sort of unusual particles that behave more like waves than particles, actually. There’s a ton of them and they’re just, they’re collective behaviour is like waves. And this is a little bit similar to how, when you wade into the ocean, you experience the motion of the water as waves, even though at the microscopic level, the water is really made of a bunch of individual molecules.</p>
<p>And so if dark matter is made of axions, there’s this invisible cosmic wave all around us and it’s just oscillating up and down. And it’s actually doing that at a really, really specific frequency. We have no idea what this frequency is.</p>
<p>Dan: OK. My radio goes from like 88.1 all the way up to like 107 point whatever. I mean, that’s not that big of a range. I can click through it in a few minutes. I assume this is a much bigger problem to solve for you guys.</p>
<p>Benjamin: Yeah, the axion wave frequency really could be anywhere from 300 hertz to 300 billion hertz. So that’s a factor of a billion, is a huge, huge, huge number.</p>
<p>Dan: How long would this have taken to scan from 300 hertz to 300 billion hertz?</p>
<p>Benjamin: We actually did a calculation for a smaller fraction of that range because the technology changes a fair amount over that range, but even for this smaller fraction, it could take more than 10,000 years. We might get lucky of course, but you know, shouldn’t count on winning the lottery </p>
<p>Dan: 10,000 years for not even the whole range…</p>
<p>So Ben, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03226-7">your new paper</a> was talking about how you guys used something from quantum computing technology to essentially speed up the search for dark matter. What does that mean? And then what is the outcome? </p>
<p>Benjamin: Yeah, so by searching for dark matter, I mean we know this stuff called dark matter’s out there. We have no idea what it is. So we’re just trying to look through all these different possible hypotheses and take some time to rule out each one. So we’re looking for this specific type of dark matter called axion and we incorporated some technology that we borrowed from quantum computing research that allowed us to sort of manipulate the laws of quantum mechanics to our advantage and double the rate at which we’re able to search for this specific type of dark matter particle.</p>
<p>So what our axion detector is doing is actually, it’s measuring these particular kinds of electromagnetic oscillations called quadratures. </p>
<p>Dan: How’d you guys do it? </p>
<p>Benjamin: So the detector that we’re looking for is sort of optimised to look for these kind of cosmic waves and it’s called Haystac and that’s an acronym.</p>
<p>Dan: The haloscope at Yale sensitive to axion CDM. It’s the detector, essentially.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383393/original/file-20210209-13-he5g0y.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large copper cylinder connected to a gold-plated assembly of tubes and wires hanging from the ceiling of a lab." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383393/original/file-20210209-13-he5g0y.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383393/original/file-20210209-13-he5g0y.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383393/original/file-20210209-13-he5g0y.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383393/original/file-20210209-13-he5g0y.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383393/original/file-20210209-13-he5g0y.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383393/original/file-20210209-13-he5g0y.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383393/original/file-20210209-13-he5g0y.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Haystac detector is searching for the axion, one of the hypothetical particles that could make up dark matter.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kelly Backes</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
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<p>Benjamin: So the philosophy of Haystac, really, since the project started in 2012 has been, we’re just going to try to reduce that noise as much as possible. So we’ve been drilling down on the noise down, down, down. And in 2017, we eventually got to this point where the noise is limited by this fundamental minimum noise level that comes from a law of quantum physics called the uncertainty principle.</p>
<p>What it does is it adds noise to those measurements. So when you ask, is the electromagnetic field oscillating in this way, or is it oscillating in this other way, both of those questions you’ll get like, yeah, a little bit. But that a little bit is just the noise and there’s no way to totally eliminate this noise. But what it is possible to do, and this is what we did in our new paper, is we can control that noise.</p>
<p>So you can kind of shuffle it around. You can say, “Hey, uncertainty principle, I know we have to add noise to both of these quadratures, but why don’t you put most of it in this quadrature? And we’re going to look at this other quadrature.” And that actually is a net benefit, if you do that. And this way of manipulating noise is called quantum squeezing. </p>
<p>Dan: OK. So you might like, for example, to go back to our radio metaphor, turn up the lows in the static, but you might be able to hear the highs a little better and pick out your song or whatever. </p>
<p>Benjamin: Yeah, the quadratures aren’t really different frequencies, but, but sure that that’s a, that’s a pretty reasonable analogy.</p>
<p>Dan: So you used quantum computing technology. Where did this come into play? </p>
<p>Benjamin: So quantum computing is this sort of new technological revolution in applied science. And one of those ways is to use superconducting circuits at really low temperatures.</p>
<p>Dan: Superconducting materials have no electrical resistance, meaning electrons can flow freely through them as fast as they please and it allows it to transfer information super fast and be super sensitive to any little signals it might pick up. </p>
<p>Benjamin: And superconducting circuits work at particular frequencies. And those frequencies happen to be pretty similar to where we’re looking with Haystac.
So there’s this sort of natural technological compatibility there. And so what we did specifically is we used these particular kinds of superconducting circuits that are capable of squeezing quantum noise, and we adapted these into our detector and that allows us to speed up the search for the axion.</p>
<p>Dan: And that will speed this search up by how much?</p>
<p>Benjamin: So in our particular case, in Haystac, we’re able to double the search rate, and there’s no limit on how good that could be, in principle. Of course, it’s harder to make it better. It gets progressively harder and harder. But one of the exciting things is that this quantum technology is proceeding in leaps and bounds. It’s really going ahead quite fast. And we think it’s pretty feasible that within a couple of years or something, you could turn this doubling into a factor of ten in the search rate.</p>
<p>Dan: That’s a huge deal. What’s the bigger meaning behind this? What do you foresee the search for dark matter looking like? </p>
<p>Benjamin: That’s a very important point. So, you know, my estimate before was more than 10,000 years. So if you’re thinking about doubling the search rate, you might be sitting there thinking, “Well, gee, I still don’t want to wait 5,000 years.” Obviously that’s helped a lot.</p>
<p>So one of these ways that is less quantum, more boring is just to have a bunch of these detectors working together in sync in this kind of clockwork way, that’s scales a lot better than just having a bunch of independent copies of your detector. </p>
<p>The stuff that I’m really excited about is the application of quantum technology. I think what we’ve done is kind of opened a door to, “Look, there is a way to use quantum technology to speed up this search.”</p>
<p>There’s other kinds of quantum techniques that could come into play here. We’re working on a paper right now that I’m really excited about, which is a complimentary technique to squeezing, it evolves noiseless amplification of the signal. And we think we could get a factor of 20 out of that. Though, that will require a good deal of technological development.</p>
<p>I should say, these are all pretty long-term things. What’s exciting to me here is that quantum technology, you know, these quantum computing stuff with superconducting circuits is proceeding extremely rapidly. There’s really impressive developments. </p>
<p>In many instances, it’s sort of like you’ve invented the world’s best hammer and people are like, well, nails are going to be ready you know? We’re working on it, but it’s going to be a while. So having some, near-term applications for this stuff is really exciting. </p>
<p>Dan: Well, it’s cool to hear that you guys’ paper has been able to put this stuff to use and speed up the search. So Ben, thank you so much for taking the time to explain your cool finding with us and best of luck on the hunt for axions.</p>
<p>Benjamin: Yeah. Thank you as well. </p>
<p>Dan: You can read more about the search for dark matter and see some really cool photos of the Haystac detector itself in <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-search-for-dark-matter-gets-a-speed-boost-from-quantum-technology-153604">an article Ben wrote for The Conversation</a>. Find the link in the show notes.</p>
<p>Gemma: To finish off this episode we’ve got a few recommendations sent in via voicemail from our colleague Luthfi Dzulfikar, associate editor at The Conversation in Indonesia. </p>
<p>Luthfi Dzulfikar: Hi, my name is Luthfi Dzulfikar, an editor at The Conversation based in Jakarta.</p>
<p>Indonesia’s President, Joko Widodo, recently made a public statement urging Indonesians to do a better job in criticising his government. This was immediately met with outrage across the country, many highlighting the president’s hypocrisy of how criticism towards the government has fallen on deaf ears, time and time again.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://theconversation.com/tutup-telinga-dan-mengancam-penjara-5-hal-ini-menunjukkan-pemerintahan-jokowi-tidak-mau-menerima-kritik-dari-warga-155467">our report, we talked with academics from Universitas Airlangga and Universitas Brawijaya</a>, on a number of crucial moments that the government ignored public demand. For instance, the government went forward with numerous regional elections in the midst of skyrocketing COVID-19 cases, signed into law a massive labour bill that curtailed worker’s rights even after waves of protests, passed legislation that weakened the country’s anti-corruption agency in the middle of the largest student demonstration in two decades, and last but not least, repeatedly abusing the country’s notorious internet law to threaten and imprison its critics.</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://theconversation.com/bagaimana-orang-lajang-di-indonesia-mencari-kebahagiaan-di-internet-namun-tidak-menemukannya-154838">second story comes from Karel Karsten Himawan</a>, psychology researcher at Universitas Pelita Harapan. Dr Himawan’s recent study, which involved over 500 people across the country, found that a lot of single Indonesians are going online in an attempt to find social connection and happiness, but fail to do so – contrary to a number of international research. Their online dating activities and “superficial” friendships made through social media have fallen short in fulfilling the social needs of single people and have done little to lessen their feelings of loneliness.</p>
<p>The study suggests that for Indonesian singles, surrounding ourselves with a tight-knit group of friends is a better way of boosting happiness. That’s it from the team in Jakarta, stay safe everyone.</p>
<p>Gemma: Luthfi Dzulfikar there from The Conversation in Indonesia. </p>
<p>Dan: OK then, that’s it for this episode of The Conversation Weekly. Thank you to all of the academics we’ve spoken to in this episode. And thanks to The Conversation editors Jonathan Este, Justin Bergman and Luthfi Dzulfikar. </p>
<p>Gemma: You can find links to all the expert analysis we’ve mentioned in this week’s episode in the show notes. Or head to TheConversation.com, where you can sign up to get a free daily email by clicking “Get newsletter” at the top of the homepage. </p>
<p>Gemma: This episode is co-produced by Mend Mariwany and me, with sound design by Eloise Stevens. </p>
<p>Dan: Our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. Final thanks also to Alice Mason, Stephen Khan and Imriel Morgan. </p>
<p>Gemma: And one final thing, if you like this podcast, please tell your friends about us and go please give us a <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/the-conversation-weekly/id1550643487">review on Apple Podcasts</a> – it really does help.</p>
<p>Gemma: Until next week. Thanks for listening.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155994/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A transcript of episode 4 of The Conversation Weekly podcast. Including a story on how scientists are speeding up the hunt for dark matter.Gemma Ware, Head of AudioDaniel Merino, Associate Breaking News Editor and Co-Host of The Conversation Weekly PodcastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1540032021-02-15T13:12:38Z2021-02-15T13:12:38ZHow the U.S. can move beyond mass protests in the aftermath of Donald Trump<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383811/original/file-20210211-13-bfx4iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C26%2C6000%2C3925&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of President Donald Trump are confronted by U.S. Capitol Police officers outside the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Manuel Balce Ceneta)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Does the world seem in turmoil? COVID-19 has certainly caused great upheaval, but it’s not alone in confusing our sense of what life should be like. Over the past five years, the world has experienced a constant stream of mass protests.</p>
<p>If you live in the United States and Canada, you’ve been a witness to the Black Lives Matter protests, which <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/12/31/2020-the-year-black-lives-matter-shook-the-world">started here</a> and spread to other countries, and the often <a href="https://www.vox.com/2020/9/14/21432330/counterprotests-black-lives-matter-violent">violent counter-demonstrations</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-guns-rally-idUSKBN1ZJ15B">pro-gun</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/mar/24/washington-march-for-our-lives-gun-violence">anti-gun</a> rallies in <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/7331295/pro-gun-rally-parliament-hill/">both countries</a>, and both <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/truck-convoy-red-deer-ottawa-arnprior-1.5023646">pro-pipeline</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/12/world/canada/gas-pipeline-protests.html">anti-pipeline</a> demonstrations, the latter of which included <a href="https://torontosun.com/news/national/pipeline-protests-timeline-of-how-we-got-here">Indigenous protests</a>.</p>
<p>There have also been demonstrations against violence against women, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/09/world/americas/mexico-women-strike-protest.html">particularly in Mexico</a>, loosely tied to the #MeToo movement, which started <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208-htmlstory.html">in the U.S.</a> but became <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/08/metoo-around-the-world/">international in scope</a>.</p>
<p>The final days of Donald Trump’s presidency saw the storming of the Capitol building, considered the shrine to American democracy, by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/us/capitol-rioters.html">xenophobes, militia members and QAnon supporters along with other core Trump supporters</a>. They were there to support their president in his bid to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election, and Trump’s second impeachment trial featured <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-impeachment-trial-trump/2021/02/10/17863674-6bbe-11eb-9f80-3d7646ce1bc0_story.html">previously unseen footage</a> of lawmakers running for their lives from the mob.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-did-donald-trump-do-better-than-expected-in-the-u-s-election-149779">Why did Donald Trump do better than expected in the U.S. election?</a>
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<p>This was perhaps a fitting end to a tumultuous half decade in the American republic, a time when forces demanding change and forces insisting upon a return to an idealized, largely fictional past struggled for control. But the U.S. has not been alone in the battle over the future direction of society. </p>
<h2>Worldwide protests</h2>
<p>Citizens in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/13/hong-kong-protests-arrests-as-thousands-sing-protest-anthem-on-anniversary-of-clashes">Hong Kong</a> have been fighting for their democracy. Protests have broken out <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50486646">in Iran</a> on several occasions since 2017, directed at the country’s stagnant economy and at the Iranian leadership. </p>
<p>Chile too was rocked by violent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/21/world/americas/why-chile-protests.html">protests over economic inequality</a> in 2019 and more recently <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/police-shooting-sets-off-fiery-protests-southern-chile-75728112">over police brutality</a>. Economic protests in Zimbabwe <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/zimbabwe-mugabe-loses-power-what-could-happen-next-2017-11">brought down</a> President Robert Mugabe in 2017, but continued corruption and economic hardship led to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/world/africa/zimbabwe-coronavirus-protest.html">more demonstrations</a> in 2020. </p>
<p>Venezuela has seen repeated mass protests <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/timeline-how-the-crisis-in-venezuela-unfolded/">against the Nicolas Maduro government</a> over political corruption and a rapidly deteriorating economy. Indian farmers are carrying on a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/27/world/asia/india-farmer-protest.html">large-scale campaign</a> to bring relief from Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s agricultural reforms, which the farmers feel will lead to the destruction of family farms. Protests have been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55778334">escalating in Russia</a> since 2020 over political corruption.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indias-farmers-are-right-to-protest-against-agricultural-reforms-152726">India's farmers are right to protest against agricultural reforms</a>
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<p>This is just a sampling of multiple mass protests in recent years. Understanding why they occur will help to explain the frequency. There are some common elements in most mass movements.</p>
<h2>For and against change</h2>
<p>Some movements are about change and some are against change. All start with people who feel something they urgently need is being denied by authorities. If that denial persists, eventually frustration leads to protest. </p>
<p>Protests that are sustained by strong frustrations, or even desperation, will endure, grow and eventually usually lead to violence, either by the demonstrators or their opponents. </p>
<p>At that point, authorities have to decide whether to crush the protest movement or provide concessions. At the moment, the Chinese government is imposing a law that essentially sends anyone who opposes or criticizes the Chinese-controlled government of Hong Kong <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/world/asia/china-hong-kong-arrests.html">to mainland China for trial</a> on what would be loosely termed charges of sedition or treason. </p>
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<img alt="Men in masks carrying signs outside a courthouse." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383836/original/file-20210211-20-18hl6he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383836/original/file-20210211-20-18hl6he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383836/original/file-20210211-20-18hl6he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383836/original/file-20210211-20-18hl6he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383836/original/file-20210211-20-18hl6he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383836/original/file-20210211-20-18hl6he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383836/original/file-20210211-20-18hl6he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Various groups of pro-democracy activists arrive at a court in Hong Kong in February 2021 charged with joining an unauthorized assembly in June 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Kin Cheung)</span></span>
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<p>The pandemic has made large public protests dangerous, and the number of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/hos.%20ngkong-security-emigration/">people fleeing Hong Kong</a> suggests the Chinese government has won, as governments usually do.</p>
<p>Social media often fuels today’s mass protests. Citizens can now connect with others who are equally frustrated about political and economic issues and inequities, and can organize demonstrations. The first real cross-country protest by Indigenous people in Canada, the Idle No More movement, was largely <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/11/canada-indigenous-people-demand-better-deal">organized on Facebook</a>.</p>
<p>Not surprisingly, dictatorships, and even some democratic governments, often <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/06/myanmar-generals-shut-down-internet-as-thousands-protest-coup.html">shut down the internet</a> and cell phone service during mass protests.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Will millions continue <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/venezuela-emergency.html">to flee Venezuela</a> because the government has successfully used <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/25/venezuela-arrests-killings-anti-government-protests">brutal repression</a> to control demonstrators while the economy implodes? </p>
<p>Will Vladimir Putin’s widespread <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/membership/2021/feb/08/covering-the-russia-protest-police-usually-let-western-reporters-go">use of force</a> in Russia curb protests against corruption and abuse of power? </p>
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<img alt="Detained protesters walk are escorted by police" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383810/original/file-20210211-21-1dav4gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383810/original/file-20210211-21-1dav4gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383810/original/file-20210211-21-1dav4gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383810/original/file-20210211-21-1dav4gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383810/original/file-20210211-21-1dav4gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383810/original/file-20210211-21-1dav4gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383810/original/file-20210211-21-1dav4gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Detained protesters walk are escorted by police on Jan. 31, 2021, during a protest against the jailing of opposition leader Alexei Navalny in St. Petersburg, Russia. Governments usually win when it comes to resolving mass protests.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Dmitri Lovetsky)</span></span>
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<p>Will the Modi government in India turn to <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/02/india-government-must-stop-crushing-farmers-protests-and-demonizing-dissenters/">increased use of force</a> if farm protesters become frustrated with the lack of action on their grievances and turn to violence?</p>
<p>And what about the U.S. now that Trump is out of power?</p>
<p>I’ve previously identified groups who were core Trump supporters, such as evangelical Christians; industrial workers who have lost their jobs because of globalization and those whose livelihood depends on those workers; xenophobes; and white supremacists.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-hard-core-trump-supporters-ignore-his-lies-144650">Why hard-core Trump supporters ignore his lies</a>
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<p>These are among the people who came to Washington on Jan. 6 to demand Congress refuse to recognize the outcome of the election. All claim they feel ignored by government. But their view of what America should be was leveraged by the president, who gave frustration a voice. While <a href="https://www.fox10tv.com/news/us_world_news/trump-takes-no-responsibility-for-capitol-attack/article_8839962f-5081-5be5-a2d4-6ac5f0864a4d.html">not all</a> took part in the insurrection, many did, having been given permission by the president to do so. Here we have a variation on usual protests — authority encouraged rather than opposed protest.</p>
<h2>Biden’s attempts to ease tensions</h2>
<p>President Joe Biden <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/joe-biden-policies.html">is making efforts</a> to address some economic grievances. He’s supporting a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/10/stimulus-update-biden-white-house-builds-business-coalition-to-support-plan.html">massive aid</a> package for Americans, and his Buy American policies will sit well with those who are angry over the flight of manufacturing from the U.S. He’s also proposed subsidies for certain industries that could create jobs, taxing products made overseas by American companies and boosting wealth taxes.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383895/original/file-20210211-15-1vyd52s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Biden wears a mask while sitting in the Oval Office." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383895/original/file-20210211-15-1vyd52s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383895/original/file-20210211-15-1vyd52s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383895/original/file-20210211-15-1vyd52s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383895/original/file-20210211-15-1vyd52s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383895/original/file-20210211-15-1vyd52s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383895/original/file-20210211-15-1vyd52s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383895/original/file-20210211-15-1vyd52s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Biden speaks during a meeting with lawmakers on investments in infrastructure in the Oval Office of the White House on Feb. 11, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Evan Vucci)</span></span>
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<p>Evangelical Christians will be harder to pacify. Though he’s a devout Catholic, Biden’s liberal <a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/evangelical-christians-take-measure-of-biden-after-finding-unlikely-ally-in-trump-01607279720">views on abortion</a> likely mean evangelicals will stick with the Republican Party.</p>
<p>Some xenophobes will be placated by America First policies, but many will be angered by Biden’s <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/11/house-democrats-biden-immigration-plan-468720">easing of restrictions</a> on immigration from Latin American countries. </p>
<p>By <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/capitol-arrests-far-right-militia-1.5879722">prosecuting identifiable attackers</a> in the Capitol insurrection, the government is doing the right thing to prevent a similar violent protest. </p>
<p>Militias and other right-wing extremists seem to be <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/where-protesters-go-armed-militias-vigilantes-likely-follow-little-stop-n1238769">a feature of American life</a>. They have largely remained in the shadows until Donald Trump gave them legitimacy. With the current prosecutions, and undoubtedly increased surveillance, they will once again be pushed into the background. </p>
<p>If the Biden administration can show that it’s taking action to address widespread hardships — particularly those of African Americans, who have endured generations of systemic racism and inequality — the U.S. should be able to move forward from this period of sustained mass protest. It remains to be seen whether that’s possible in other regions of the world, where the same governments remain ensconced — for now.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154003/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ron Stagg does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If the new U.S. administration can show that it’s taking action to address widespread grievances, it should be able to move forward from this period of sustained mass protest.Ron Stagg, Professor of History, Toronto Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1552232021-02-12T14:22:39Z2021-02-12T14:22:39ZMyanmar: memes and mantras of a new generation of democracy protesters<p>What do the internet memes <a href="https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/doge">Doge</a> and <a href="https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/cheems">Cheems</a>, the Hollywood film franchise The Hunger Games, and a sachet of instant tea have in common? They are all part of a rich lexicon of protest now being deployed by young activists contesting Myanmar’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmar-coup-how-the-military-has-held-onto-power-for-60-years-154526">military coup</a>. </p>
<p>The country has been in turmoil since the military seized control on February 1, imprisoning state councillor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and leading NLD party officials, who won another landslide victory in November’s elections.</p>
<p>But, as a new generation of protesters <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-protest-idUSKBN2A702Y">take to the streets</a> of the country’s towns and cities in growing numbers, they are drawing on a range of internet memes, slogans, cartoons, and cultural symbols to make themselves heard and mobilise support within the country and across the region.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/08/three-finger-salute-hunger-games-symbol-adopted-by-myanmars-protesters">three-finger salute</a>, initially appropriated from the hugely popular The Hunger Games trilogy by young democracy activists protesting the 2014 military coup in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2020/8/19/in-pictures-thai-students-hunger-games-protests-spread/">neighbouring Thailand</a>, is their shared signal of defiance, enumerating the need for equality, freedom, and solidarity as they find themselves engaged in a similarly dystopian struggle with an unscrupulous tyrant.</p>
<iframe src="https://player.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/episodes/myanmars-collective-fury?theme=default&cover=1&latest=1" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="110px" allow="autoplay"></iframe>
<p>They deploy cartoon characters including <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/08/three-finger-salute-hunger-games-symbol-adopted-by-myanmars-protesters">Pepe the Frog</a> and the internet memes <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/08/three-finger-salute-hunger-games-symbol-adopted-by-myanmars-protesters">Doge and Cheems</a> to ridicule senior general Min Aung Hlaing and other junta leaders. Their placards are in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-55982001">English as much as Burmese</a>, and they now set the protest songs employed by previous generations of the country’s pro-democracy activists to <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210209-worse-than-my-ex-myanmar-s-very-online-youth-take-on-the-junta">western rap and hip-hop</a> soundtracks.</p>
<p>Myanmar’s young protesters epitomise a culture of transnational activism now favoured by a generation of technically savvy and increasingly cosmopolitan young people intent on resisting the imposition of authoritarian agendas. </p>
<h2>Sharing a taste for (milk) tea</h2>
<p>As the authorities suspend the internet and <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2021/2/6/22269831/myanmar-orders-block-twitter-facebook-instagram-military-coup">block social media platforms</a> such as Facebook, many are resorting to VPN access to get their message out on Instagram, TikTok and Discord through an avalanche of rapidly mutating hashtags. Likeminded netizens in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Thailand are working in support through the <a href="https://time.com/5904114/milk-tea-alliance/">Milk Tea Alliance</a>, a movement pushing for democratic change across south-east Asia and beyond.</p>
<p>This diffuse, largely online, democratic solidarity movement unites young people confronting riot police in downtown Yangon and Mandalay with <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3118468/thailands-king-works-bolster-his-image-protests-set">Thai youth in Bangkok</a> campaigning for reform of the monarchy, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-security-timeline-idUSKBN29B0B7">pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong</a> contesting Beijing’s National Security Law, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/10/milk-tea-alliance-anti-china/616658/">and young Taiwanese nationalists</a> countering the increased presence of Chinese trolls and bots from the internet cafes of Taipei. </p>
<p>Thai artist Sina Wittayawiroj’s <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/Milk_Tea_Alliance/comments/legj53/the_new_milk_tea_alliance_sina_wittayawiroj/">illustration</a> of a set of fists defiantly holding aloft steaming cups of milk tea – fast becoming the unofficial logo of the alliance – has now been joined by one bearing the Myanmar flag. Images of <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3120526/asias-milkteaalliance-has-new-target-brewing-generals-behind">Royal Myanmar “Teamix” sachets</a>, featuring its distinctive milky brew much like Thailand’s orange-hued and Taiwan’s boba tea, are being enthusiastically disseminated on social media and emblazoned on street placards.</p>
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<img alt="Graphic posters depicting arms aloft with cups of milky tea, symbolising dissent across south-east Asia." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383973/original/file-20210212-21-nts69x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383973/original/file-20210212-21-nts69x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383973/original/file-20210212-21-nts69x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383973/original/file-20210212-21-nts69x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383973/original/file-20210212-21-nts69x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383973/original/file-20210212-21-nts69x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383973/original/file-20210212-21-nts69x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">‘Solidari-tea’: poster for the Milk Tea Alliance, an protest meme spreading across south-east Asia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Image courtesy of Sina Wittayawiroj</span></span>
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<p>Like other members of the alliance, <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/myanmar-anti-coup-protesters-rally-at-chinese-embassy-14171132">they are quick to blame China</a> (where tea is of course traditionally served without milk) as they accuse Beijing of lending the Myanmar military logistic support as well as working to undermine democratic rights and freedoms elsewhere in the region.</p>
<p>Solidarity is being expressed by the alliance in other ways. Some young activists in Myanmar are wearing hard hats like the “flashmobs” in Hong Kong, and others have created impromptu “<a href="https://twitter.com/JohnLiuNN/status/1359394538356264965">Lennon Walls</a>” on bridges and underpasses redolent of those created by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/lennon-walls-herald-a-sticky-note-revolution-in-hong-kong-129740">Umbrella Movement</a> there. These, in turn, were inspired by anti-communist street propaganda in Europe’s former Eastern bloc shortly after the assassination of the Beatles front man. </p>
<p>Young members of Thailand’s Progressive Movement and anti-establishment organisation Ratsadon (The People) have <a href="https://www.thaipbsworld.com/thai-politicians-and-activists-join-myanmar-people-at-embassy-to-protest-against-the-coup-in-myanmar/">organised solidarity protests</a> banging pots and pans as anti-coup demonstrators are doing nightly in Myanmar to drive out evil spirits which have torn down their fledgling democracy.</p>
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<p>One young aerobics instructor in the the Myanmar capital Naypyidaw happened to <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3120255/myanmar-aerobics-instructor-dances-indonesian-protest-anthem">record a video</a> of her regular workout session in front of the Burmese government buildings as armoured personnel carriers moved into the shot. This has subsequently been set to an Indonesian protest anthem which has gone viral.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-55930799">Art</a> and <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-02-05/myanmar-coup-youth-movement-democracy-rebel-riot-band">music</a> are being expertly employed to articulate messages of protest and solidarity that bridge cultural and linguistic divides and unite political interests.</p>
<h2>The past is a foreign country</h2>
<p>Not for the first time, young people – particularly educated young people – are playing a decisive role in Myanmar’s growing civil disobedience movement. Student protests in 1920, 1936, 1962, 1974, 1988, 2007 and 2015 have been part of the long struggle for independence and democracy. They ignited the momentous democratic uprising in 1988, and the so-called “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/saffron-revolution-good-monk-myth/541116/">Saffron Revolution</a>” in 2007, when the country’s monks joined them on the streets in a defiant show of moral support.</p>
<p>For the most part, these popular uprisings were violently crushed. It is <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/burma-inside-the-saffron-revolution-5329400.html">estimated</a> that hundreds if not thousands died in the 1988 uprisings alone. How is this latest expression of dissent likely to be any different? Already we hear of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/feb/09/myanmar-protesters-curfew-junta-demonstrators-army">police brutality</a> and with the protests gathering momentum it is likely the authorities will respond with increasing force. </p>
<p>Indeed, the stage is set for just such a confrontation as the commitment of young people – largely innocent of history but with a brief taste of freedom – encounter the dark forces of authoritarian rule that have yet again undermined a democratic future for their beleaguered country.</p>
<p>And yet there is hope that this generation of young activists might succeed where others have failed. They are politically and technically literate. They inhabit a wider world than young pro-democracy activists in Myanmar have done in the past. They have access to new places and spaces of protest thanks to the technological benefits of globalisation. They are actively forging new networks of solidarity and resistance beyond their country and communities. They are, in short, on the right side of history.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155223/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Dolan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Hunger Games salute, teabags and Pepe the Frog are being adopted by young pro-democracy activists across south-east Asia.Richard Dolan, Post-doctoral researcher, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1527552021-01-08T01:14:33Z2021-01-08T01:14:33ZWith mass arrests, running for office in Hong Kong is now not only futile, it can be criminal<p>Nearly overshadowed by the chaos in the US this week was a dramatic escalation of the crackdown on pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong. </p>
<p>Authorities <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-01-06/over-50-hong-kong-activists-arrested-for-breaching-security-law/13035878">arrested more than 50 pro-democracy figures</a> in early morning raids under the territory’s six-month-old national security law. The opposition lawmakers, activists and lawyers were accused of subversion for holding primaries for pro-democracy candidates for Hong Kong elections.</p>
<p>The Beijing-drafted law has previously been used to target <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-activists-now-face-a-choice-stay-silent-or-flee-the-city-the-world-must-give-them-a-path-to-safety-141880">protesters</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/killing-the-chicken-to-scare-the-monkey-what-jimmy-lais-arrest-means-for-hong-kongs-independent-media-144206">independent media</a> in Hong Kong, but this week’s mass arrests marked a sobering turning point for the city.</p>
<p>They make political participation in Hong Kong not just futile but dangerous, and are likely to render the Legislative Council a rubber stamp along the lines of the National People’s Congress in Beijing, which has never challenged an initiative of China’s ruling party.</p>
<p>Britain’s foreign secretary, Dominic Raab, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/china-accused-of-deliberately-misleading-the-world-over-hong-kong-20210107-p56s9a.html">responded with outrage</a>, saying China</p>
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<p>deliberately misled the world about the true purpose of the national security law, which is being used to crush dissent and opposing political views.</p>
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<h2>Opposition politics now considered ‘subversion’</h2>
<p>Those arrested were all linked to informal primaries convened by pro-democracy parties last year ahead of Legislative Council elections, which were ultimately postponed.</p>
<p>At the time, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/14/hong-kong-primaries-china-declares-pro-democracy-polls-illegal">Beijing labelled the primaries “illegal”</a> and Hong Kong authorities said they would investigate whether the opposition’s plan to win a legislative majority that could veto government initiatives violated the national security law. The law provides for penalties up to life imprisonment.</p>
<p>It is unsurprising Beijing views grassroots political organisation with suspicion. Its authoritarian political system precludes any challenge to the Communist Party’s rule.</p>
<p>In Hong Kong, only half of the legislature’s seats are elected by universal suffrage; the others are reserved for members of trades and industries. But it has still been possible for opposition figures to win election and exercise their rights to vote and, where numbers permit, veto actions.</p>
<p>The fact the Hong Kong authorities now classify such acts as “subversion of state power” confirms the national security law has <a href="https://ssrn.com/abstract=3749674">redrawn Hong Kong’s constitutional landscape</a>. Its enforcement is playing out according to the most pessimistic forecasts.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-fear-hong-kong-will-become-just-another-chinese-city-an-interview-with-martin-lee-grandfather-of-democracy-124635">'We fear Hong Kong will become just another Chinese city': an interview with Martin Lee, grandfather of democracy</a>
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<h2>Steady erosion of rights</h2>
<p>While Hongkongers nominally enjoy a wide range of rights under the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49633862">Basic Law</a>, the outline of which was negotiated with Britain before the handover in 1997, some have come under severe pressure following the passage of the security law. These include freedom of speech, assembly and now electoral rights.</p>
<p>A key point of contention has been the progression to full democracy <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29454385">promised in the Basic Law</a> but repeatedly withheld by Beijing. Chinese authorities have persistently misinterpreted the idea of Hong Kong self-government as a challenge to central authority and territorial integrity.</p>
<p>After the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/30/-sp-hong-kong-umbrella-revolution-pro-democracy-protests">2014 Umbrella Movement</a>, the Hong Kong government told young democracy advocates to take their cause off the streets and into politics. But after many did so with remarkable success, that door has now been slammed shut.</p>
<p>In addition to aggressively prosecuting pro-democracy protesters, the Beijing and Hong Kong governments have orchestrated the disqualification of many pro-democracy candidates and elected officials in recent years. This <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/asia/critics-round-on-hong-kong-s-expulsion-of-pro-democracy-mps-20201112-p56dv3">culminated</a> in the arbitrary removal last November of four sitting legislators, which triggered the resignation of the 15 remaining opposition members.</p>
<p>Around two-thirds of those arrested this week were former legislators or current district councillors. Other prominent opposition figures and members of civil society groups were also targeted. Police also <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2021/01/06/breaking-over-50-hong-kong-democrats-arrested-under-security-law-over-2020-legislative-primaries/">reportedly</a> seized documents from media and polling organisations.</p>
<p>Benny Tai, a longtime opposition figure who was among those arrested, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3116729/national-security-law-hong-kong-opposition-lawmakers">said</a>:</p>
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<p>Hong Kong has entered a cold winter, the wind is strong and cold.</p>
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<h2>Why the world hasn’t done more</h2>
<p>With rights and freedoms diminishing under Beijing’s vast national security apparatus, the outlook for Hong Kong is indeed bleak.</p>
<p>Hong Kong’s judiciary has been a bulwark against executive overreach, but it has been criticised by all sides for its decisions in political cases. </p>
<p>Its jurisdiction over national security matters is also constrained: judges are vetted by the executive government and can only apply, not interpret, the law. Cases can also be transferred to mainland courts.</p>
<p>The retiring chief justice recently <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2021/01/05/retiring-top-judge-pleas-to-maintain-hong-kongs-judicial-independence/">pleaded</a> for Hong Kong’s judicial independence to be respected, but the government’s <a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3100499/carrie-lams-stance-separation-powers-hong-kong-self-contradictory">fallacious</a> insistence that Hong Kong, like China, has no separation of powers is one of several causes for concern as the baton passes to a new top judge.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-activists-now-face-a-choice-stay-silent-or-flee-the-city-the-world-must-give-them-a-path-to-safety-141880">Hong Kong activists now face a choice: stay silent, or flee the city. The world must give them a path to safety</a>
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<p>Beijing has learned the lessons of the Tiananmen Square crackdown and sensibly opted to bring Hong Kong to heel by <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/lawfare-waged-by-the-hong-kong-government-is-crushing-the-hopes-of-democrats/">gradually escalating the authoritarian use of the law</a>, rather than a military crackdown.</p>
<p>This makes the likelihood of international intervention — always a dim prospect — practically negligible.</p>
<p>Western democracies have <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/china-accused-of-deliberately-misleading-the-world-over-hong-kong-20210107-p56s9a.html">criticised</a> the erosion of Hong Kong’s democratic principles and rule of law, and Hongkongers can expect <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-china-crackdown-is-likely-to-boost-migration-to-uk-152766">easier pathways to residency</a> in some of those countries, but China’s economic power will deter most governments from doing more.</p>
<p>This should not mask the fact that true political repression is taking place in Hong Kong. Key opposition figures have been <a href="https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/215/123/223/1522804643621.html">vilified</a> by pro-establishment media and harassed by law enforcement, leading many to flee overseas. Some have had their assets subsequently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/07/exiled-hong-kong-legislator-calls-for-inquiry-after-hsbc-freezes-bank-account">frozen</a> by a vindictive government.</p>
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<p>The Chinese government’s approach to Hong Kong is consistent with its more assertive approach internationally — it is <a href="https://theconversation.com/behind-chinas-newly-aggressive-diplomacy-wolf-warriors-ready-to-fight-back-139028">aggressively pursuing its own interests</a> without apparent regard for the reputational cost.</p>
<p>Once the international community understands how China plays the game, governments can formulate diplomatic and economic policies to deter bad conduct and protect their own national interests, along with the interests of others who fall within China’s sphere of influence.</p>
<p>However, such is China’s determination to crush dissent and opposition that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/31/china-hong-kong-security-law-american-citizen-exiles">anyone, anywhere in the world</a> who advocates for such policies can be charged under Hong Kong’s national security law.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/heavy-hand-of-china-is-prompting-fears-for-hong-kongs-future-as-a-major-business-hub-150107">Heavy hand of China is prompting fears for Hong Kong's future as a major business hub</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152755/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendan Clift receives funding from an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship.</span></em></p>Britain accused China of deliberately misleading the world after the arrest of 50 pro-democracy figures under Hong Kong’s new national security law.Brendan Clift, Teaching Fellow and PhD candidate, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1487512020-11-08T09:11:55Z2020-11-08T09:11:55ZUnderstanding violent protest in South Africa and the difficult choice facing leaders<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/365540/original/file-20201026-19-uiops5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A police van lies in flames after white farmers went on a rampage in Senekal, South Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tracy Lee Stark/The Citizen.</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Protests and social mobilisation are the lifeblood of democracy. They enable the discontent of citizens to be communicated to political elites between elections, and when intra-institutional processes have lost their efficacy. But <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/aug/24/protest-movement-failings-i-dont-believe-in-it-anymore">most protests never lead to sustainable change</a>. They peter out because of one or other reformist measure. Or they lose support because they tend to take on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190513-it-only-takes-35-of-people-to-change-the-world">violent overtones</a>.</p>
<p>Most protesters and leaders engage in peaceful mobilisation. But there are always some leaders and activists who are intent on violence. This is because protests and social movements always involve heterogeneous communities with multiple expressions, political factions and leaders. </p>
<p>Some of these expressions and political factions believe in violent direct action and behave accordingly in the protests. Add to this the opportunism of criminals who use the protests as a cover to conduct criminal activity, and it is not hard to imagine why protests can turn violent.</p>
<p>Much of this is reflected in the contemporary protests and social mobilisation around the world. All of the movements - <a href="https://www.adl.org/education/educator-resources/lesson-plans/black-lives-matter-from-hashtag-to-movement">#BlackLivesMatter</a>, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49317695">Hong Kong Democracy Movement</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/03/who-are-the-gilets-jaunes-and-what-do-they-want">Gilets Jaunes</a> in France, <a href="https://theconversation.com/feesmustfall-the-poster-child-for-new-forms-of-struggle-in-south-africa-68773">#FeesMustFall</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/16/the-real-meaning-of-rhodes-must-fall">#RhodesMustFall</a> in South Africa - were in the main peaceful. But they nevertheless manifested in violent direct action on occasion.</p>
<p>Protest leaders often expressed disquiet and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6VLtWdilSKI">dissociated themselves from the violence</a>. But on many occasions, they also excused the violence, suggesting that it could not be compared to that experienced by protesters at the hands of police or by the victims of oppression and exploitation. This may be true in most cases. But it evades the strategic issue that violence can often undermine and erode the legitimacy of protests. It creates the opportunity for police and security forces to repress the social action itself.</p>
<p>Protest leaders also often blame the violence on criminals or on aggressive police action. Again much of this is true. Criminals use protests to conduct criminal activity including, among others, looting and theft when the opportunity arises. Moreover, aggressive policing and repressive actions by security services can often turn the tide of peaceful protests and prompt violent acts by some protesters. </p>
<p>But these explanations do not account for all forms of violence in protests.</p>
<h2>Why peaceful protests turn violent</h2>
<p>Perhaps the foremost scholar on social movements and political violence is political scientist <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=utI_trMAAAAJ&hl=en">Donatella Della Porta</a>. She holds that violence in protests is a product of two distinct developments: aggressive police action and <a href="https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/cas_sites/sociology/pdf/EventfulProtest.pdf">political factionalisation</a>, in which distinct political groups try to dominate the leadership of social movements. The explanation of aggressive policing is uncontested by most progressive intellectuals. They often refer to it to explain the violence. But they often ignore the second explanation because it involves a collective self-reflection and a political confrontation with movement participants. </p>
<p>There is no doubt that in many of these movements, there are individual activists and political groupings who explicitly hold the view that <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2015-08-31-in-defence-of-black-violence/">violent action is legitimate</a>. They use the circumstances to actively drive such behaviour, as I explain in detail in Chapter 9 of my 2018 book, <em><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Rebels-Rage-FeesMustFall-Adam-Habib-ebook/dp/B07P626QB4">Rebels and Rage</a></em>. </p>
<p>These proactive commitments from factions within these protest movements suggest that violence is as much internally driven from within the social movements as it is a response to the repressive actions of the police and security services.</p>
<p>This then necessitates a reflection on the strategic efficacy of violence as a means of sustainably achieving social justice outcomes. Of course, this reflection must be contextually grounded. It must be understood in the context of the democratic societies within which the protests occur. After all it is the democratic character of these societies, flawed as they may be, which establishes the parameters of legitimate political action and the consequences for the violations thereof.</p>
<h2>Rage versus violence</h2>
<p>Social mobilisation requires rage but not violence. When the two get confused, the cause of social justice itself may be delegitimised or defeated. Rage is important because it can inspire people, galvanise them, and as a result enable collective action against injustice. It also need not always lead to violence. Neither does it need to lead to emotionally driven acts of impulsiveness.</p>
<p>If there is a lesson to be learnt from the life of the late statesman <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/content/page/biography">Nelson Mandela</a>, it is that effective leadership of a social or political struggle requires an understanding of the political lay of the land. It also requires an assessment of the prevailing distribution of power among social forces, an acute grasp of the leverage available to political actors opposed to the social justice cause, and a plan for how to overcome these without compromising on the ultimate social outcome.</p>
<p>Much of the case of young activists for adopting violence as a strategic option is predicated on the presence of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/structural-violence">structural violence</a>. This refers to the prevailing economic and political conditions which produce not only deep social marginalisation within and across nations, but also the implicit racism that is codified in institutions and daily practices. </p>
<p>If there is such structural violence present, it is held, is there no legitimacy to acts of physical violence that are targeted to address the marginalisation and oppression? </p>
<h2>Social pact in a democracy</h2>
<p>The answer to this lies in the social pact that undergirds democratic society. Citizens <a href="https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190679545.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190679545-e-13">cede the authority of legitimate violence to the state</a> in exchange for security and rights. The alternative to this is that all bear the right to legitimate violence, thereby making society vulnerable to the rule of the strongest and the most forceful. The real victims of such an environment are the poorest and weakest in society.</p>
<p>Yet what does one do if political factions or individuals resort to violence in a peaceful protest? This after all is one of the major challenges that confront leaders of protests. Most of them are committed to peaceful social mobilisation, but are confronted with individuals or political factions who violate the peaceful character of the mobilisation – either proactively or as a response to aggressive police action. </p>
<p>The protest leaders have to then engage in a rearguard battle in which they have to explain why there is violence accompanying the protest, even though they have expressed a commitment to peaceful social mobilisation. Inevitably the leaders come off as unconvincing or duplicitous or as making excuses for the violence.</p>
<p>Of course those who are committed to violent direct action are aware of this reluctance by protest leaders to identify them. They realise that most protest leaders will not identify the perpetrators of violence because they would not want to be seen as abetting the authorities. </p>
<p>The perpetrators of violence can then behave in a manner that explicitly defies the collective underlying principles of the protest without having to fear any sanction. Essentially the political norms disable the incentive structure for political factions to abide by the strategic principle of peaceful social action.</p>
<p>The only way out of this dilemma is to change the rules. Leaders must either explicitly exclude political factions or individuals who are committed to violent social action. Or they must make explicitly clear that they will identify those who violate the principle of nonviolence that serves as the guiding philosophy of the protest. </p>
<p>Of course the political factions or individuals are unlikely to meekly accept this state of affairs. But leaders are going to have to explicitly manage this political challenge by openly debating the issue with movement participants, explaining why this is necessary for the success of the protest itself. Otherwise, such leaders will forever remain hostage to factions and small unaccountable political groups who serve as parasites on the progressive social cause.</p>
<p>This then is the challenge for protest leaders. </p>
<h2>Exercising leadership</h2>
<p>Political leadership sometimes requires difficult choices. Such difficult choices are not simply required from those leading institutions and governments. It is sometimes also demanded of leaders of social movements. This is particularly true when individual acts of violence can compromise the outcomes of the protest itself.</p>
<p>Protest leaders have a choice: either they allow acts of violence and, therefore, play to a political script not of their own making, or they act in a manner that keeps the social mobilisation on a path that they have explicitly chosen. This is especially important because the alternative path will not only erode the broader legitimacy of the cause. It will also provoke reactions that could undermine the protest and the sustainability of the social justice outcome. </p>
<p>This choice of enabling or containing political violence is, therefore, the central strategic challenge confronting the political leadership of contemporary protests both in South Africa and around the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148751/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Habib does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are individual activists and political groupings who believe violent action is legitimate and use the circumstances to actively drive such behaviour.Adam Habib, Vice-Chancellor and Principal, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1473992020-10-07T12:27:29Z2020-10-07T12:27:29ZOxford is protecting students from China’s national security law – other universities must follow suit<p>Students at the University of Oxford will now submit some of their work <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/education/2020/sep/28/oxford-moves-to-protect-students-from-chinas-hong-kong-security-law">on China anonymously</a>. This, among other measures, is an important protection against China’s new national security law in Hong Kong, which makes it risky for anyone that appears to be criticising the Chinese government. Other universities must follow suit with measures that allow freedom of expression for both students and academics studying China. </p>
<p>Introduced on June 30 this year, China’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-53256034">new national security law</a> criminalises what it considers to be secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign or external forces. The details of this law were not released until after it was passed, with terminology so vague that it has many activists and academics scared of punishment for voicing any critique of the Chinese government. </p>
<p>The singing of songs, repeating of slogans and even the reading of newspapers have been framed by the law as separatist and undermining of the power of Hong Kong’s government, as well as Beijing’s influence over it. They could therefore be deemed acts of secession and subversion. </p>
<p>Quite what “collusion with foreign or external forces” means for people around the world who want to express solidarity with Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement remains to be seen. But these laws have an extraterritorial reach, which means they apply to everyone, everywhere. </p>
<p>For me, as a UK national that might not be so worrying. But, for academics and students from Hong Kong or mainland China, this makes what they say or write particularly risky. This threatens academic integrity and universities, as places where debate and freedom of expression are crucial, have a duty to protect these scholars. The identity and purpose of universities as spaces of free thinking depends on it. </p>
<h2>Taking its toll</h2>
<p>As someone who researches Hong Kong, I’ve campaigned with colleagues including <a href="https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScLrwdgVY_M4yAQqz3Co5xghHv2kSkyNarH35JZWwEJ8TN6yQ/viewform?gxids=7628">members of the British Association of Chinese Studies</a> for a greater show of support from our universities on this issue. At best, we’ve found universities to be hesitant and, at worst, reluctant to take a stand against the new national security law. One aspect of an increased internationalisation of higher education is that it brings market pressures, with degree programmes as commodities and students as consumers. </p>
<p>One Hong Kong scholar based in the UK told me they felt like UK universities were kowtowing to Chinese money “at the expense of freedom of expression”: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The most disappointing part being that we aren’t even talking about freedom of discussion or debate, but simply the more fundamental issue of expressing one’s views.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Financial decisions should not compromise academic enquiry. While funding can be an enabler to the generation of knowledge, a threat of its withdrawal should not act as inhibitor, editor or censor to the formulation of ideas. Unfortunately, the national security law is already taking a toll on Hong Kong academics in the UK. Colleagues have told me the new law has made them fearful and hopeless, as well as concerned about censorship. One said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I have actually noticed self-censorship on my part as well, since the national security law has come into force. I now tend to be extra careful when I present my work if I know there will be Chinese researchers in the audience.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A growing issue on campus is the fear that supporters of the Chinese government will report their peers. Battles have taken place between groups of pro-Beijing and pro-Hong Kong students in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-influence-on-campus-chills-free-speech-in-australia-new-zealand/2019/08/09/3dad3a3c-b9f9-11e9-8e83-4e6687e99814_story.html">Australia, New Zealand</a> and <a href="https://truenorthfareast.com/news/china-influence-canada-universities-cssa">Canada</a>. These clashes illustrate attempts to shut down debate, which in turn threatens free speech. </p>
<p>In the UK, similar incidents have taken place. The <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/motion-backing-hong-kong-blocked-after-campaign-by-chinese-students-at-warwick-fsdfphr26">student’s union at the University of Warwick</a>, for example, saw a motion to support the democratic and human rights of Hong Kongers voted down by unprecedented numbers of Chinese students voting in support of Beijing. The example serves as a warning of the mobilisation of nationalist sentiment in the name of student activism. </p>
<p>A major concern for critics of the Chinese government is getting filmed and the footage being shared with Chinese authorities. Hence, Oxford’s new protection measures include a ban on recording classes or sharing the material from them with anyone outside the group, as well as making tutorials one-to-one, instead of groups, and work by students anonymous. </p>
<h2>Standing with HK</h2>
<p>I’ve <a href="https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S096262982030322X">written about</a> the long tradition of scholar-activism in my field of social and political geography, which involves engaging critically with those we work with and teach, and not just observing idly from the sidelines. Meaningful solidarity requires moving beyond symbolic gestures and actively challenging systems of oppression. </p>
<p>For my part, while the ongoing coronavirus pandemic has rendered much travel impossible, it is the deterioration of Hong Kong’s political situation that put an end to my annual undergraduate field trip to the city, and the cancellation of my latest research visit. Without a prospect of return and with the monstrous reach of the national security law, I shall continue to stand in solidarity with Hong Kong from a distance. </p>
<p>I am grateful for Oxford’s academic leadership in this regard, though if we are to make use of our privileged positions to defend academic freedom more resolutely, we need to call out injustice when we see it and we need others to follow. With the start of the academic year already upon us, this needs to happen fast.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147399/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Joseph Richardson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The identity and purpose of universities as spaces of free thinking depends on it.Michael Joseph Richardson, Lecturer of Human Geography, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1442062020-08-11T06:19:27Z2020-08-11T06:19:27Z‘Killing the chicken to scare the monkey’: what Jimmy Lai’s arrest means for Hong Kong’s independent media<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352131/original/file-20200811-24-14zd26g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kin Cheung/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The arrest this week of pro-democracy media tycoon Jimmy Lai in Hong Kong reveals the repressive reality of the city’s new made-in-China <a href="http://www.ecns.cn/news/politics/2020-07-01/detail-ifzxrvxc0874078.shtml">national security law</a>. </p>
<p>It also sends a sharp signal to the remaining independent media in the territory: watch your step, or you could be next.</p>
<p>Lai, his two sons and four top executives of the Next Digital media group were all <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3096679/hong-kong-national-security-law-media-mogul-jimmy-lai">arrested</a> under the new law. On the same day, police <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3096679/hong-kong-national-security-law-media-mogul-jimmy-lai">raided</a> the offices of Next’s flagship publication, Apple Daily, deploying over 200 officers to search the premises for almost nine hours.</p>
<p>China <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-activists-now-face-a-choice-stay-silent-or-flee-the-city-the-world-must-give-them-a-path-to-safety-141880">imposed the national security law</a> in June, bypassing the local legislature and breaching the principle of non-interference in the city’s governance. </p>
<p>The new law established a comprehensive PRC-style national security regime <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/06/15/beijings-security-law-for-hong-kong-wont-be-compatible-with-citys-common-law-system-says-justice-sec/">overriding</a> aspects of Hong Kong’s common law legal system.</p>
<p>The national security law is designed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-activists-now-face-a-choice-stay-silent-or-flee-the-city-the-world-must-give-them-a-path-to-safety-141880">make dissent all but impossible</a> in Hong Kong, including in the city’s once-freewheeling but gradually diminished independent media.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352132/original/file-20200811-15-1mawji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352132/original/file-20200811-15-1mawji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352132/original/file-20200811-15-1mawji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352132/original/file-20200811-15-1mawji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352132/original/file-20200811-15-1mawji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352132/original/file-20200811-15-1mawji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352132/original/file-20200811-15-1mawji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jimmy Lai had been an outspoken critic of the government — and knew his arrest was likely.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">VERNON YUEN/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What the new law means for journalists</h2>
<p>Lai and the others were arrested under <a href="https://twitter.com/hkpoliceforce/status/1292633610676105222">article 29</a> of the new law, which criminalises collusion with a foreign country or external elements to endanger national security. </p>
<p>Banned acts include collaborating with a foreign entity to impose sanctions on Hong Kong or China, seriously disrupting the making of laws or policies, or provoking hatred of the government among Hong Kong residents.</p>
<p>Although Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement is a grassroots, homegrown affair, Beijing has sought to portray it as the result of foreign meddling. Hong Kong’s last two leaders, <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/01/24/hong-kongs-carrie-lam-repeats-claim-foreign-elements-behind-protests-admits-no-conclusive-evidence/">Carrie Lam</a> and <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1679392/cy-leung-reiterates-claim-external-forces-influencing-occupy-provides">CY Leung</a>, both alleged foreign forces were behind the protests that took place during their terms.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-activists-now-face-a-choice-stay-silent-or-flee-the-city-the-world-must-give-them-a-path-to-safety-141880">Hong Kong activists now face a choice: stay silent, or flee the city. The world must give them a path to safety</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Beijing has already signalled that collusion will be <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/07/02/spreading-rumours-of-police-killing-protesters-at-prince-edward-mtr-may-breach-hong-kong-security-law-beijing-official/">broadly interpreted</a> under the law. </p>
<p>Police have not disclosed the specifics of Lai’s offences, but his <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2019/07/10/hong-kong-media-tycoon-jimmy-lai-meets-us-no-2-mike-pence-sec-state-pompeo-discuss-extradition-bill/">July meeting</a> with US Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is likely to be under the microscope, as is an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/opinion/hong-kong-china-national-security-law.html">opinion piece</a> he wrote for The New York Times in May.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1292898570337746953"}"></div></p>
<p>Lai’s status as an influential media owner and prominent pro-democracy activist has positioned him in Beijing’s crosshairs. He has been the target of <a href="http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0820/c90000-9607736.html">extraordinary vitriol</a> from mainland state media and was arrested by Hong Kong police in February and April on charges of participating in an illegal assembly.</p>
<p>Lai’s case is undoubtedly intended to serve as a warning — "<a href="http://www.standardmandarin.com/idiom/literally-killing-the-chicken-to-scare-the-monkey-idiom-to-punish-an-individual-as-an-example-to-oth">killing the chicken to scare the monkey</a>,“ to borrow a Chinese saying — and an inducement for the city’s journalists to self-censor, lest they fall foul of the new law. </p>
<p>For instance, an editorial calling for Hong Kong’s <a href="https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/index.html">constitutionally guaranteed</a> autonomy to be preserved could be interpreted by a zealous prosecutor as inciting secession under articles 20 and 21 of the law.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352135/original/file-20200811-21-82ttke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352135/original/file-20200811-21-82ttke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352135/original/file-20200811-21-82ttke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352135/original/file-20200811-21-82ttke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352135/original/file-20200811-21-82ttke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352135/original/file-20200811-21-82ttke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352135/original/file-20200811-21-82ttke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hong Kong’s protests have dwindled since the new security law came into place this year.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Vincent Yu/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>An uncertain future for independent media</h2>
<p>Although self-censorship has long been a concern, Hong Kong has traditionally enjoyed a vibrant free press. In 2002, <a href="https://rsf.org/en/ranking">Reporters Without Borders</a> ranked it 18th in its inaugural World Press Freedom Index. </p>
<p>However, by 2020, the city had plunged to 80th. (China, meanwhile, ranked 177th of 180 countries.) The application of the national security law in Hong Kong will no doubt see the territory’s ranking tumble even further.</p>
<p>Apple Daily’s days appear to be numbered. Similar fates could befall other outspoken independent media, like the crowd-funded <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/">Hong Kong Free Press</a>, which launched in 2015 amid rising concerns over declining press freedoms in the city. This was around the same time the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/">South China Morning Post</a>, Hong Kong’s venerable English-language daily, was acquired by the mainland conglomerate <a href="https://www.alibabagroup.com/en/global/home">Alibaba</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-is-taking-a-risk-by-getting-tough-on-hong-kong-now-the-us-must-decide-how-to-respond-139294">China is taking a risk by getting tough on Hong Kong. Now, the US must decide how to respond</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Over the years, much of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16525992">Hong Kong’s media</a> has been bought up by China-owned or -affiliated entities, some of which are ultimately controlled Beijing’s Liaison Office in Hong Kong. More than half of Hong Kong’s media owners are now members of political bodies on the mainland.</p>
<p>The public broadcaster <a href="https://www.rthk.hk/">Radio Television Hong Kong</a> has remained editorially independent, but it is <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/05/29/hong-kong-public-broadcaster-to-be-reviewed-by-govt-amid-wide-public-concerns/">under review</a> again, having recently fallen foul of the local regulator for criticising the police handling of pro-democracy protests in a manner that was</p>
<blockquote>
<p>irresponsible, and could be regarded as a hate speech with the effect of inciting hatred against the police.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>International media still operate in Hong Kong relatively unrestrained, but visa refusals for foreign journalists suggest this is changing. </p>
<p>In recent years, Financial Times editor Victor Mallet’s <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2168219/financial-times-journalist-victor-mallet-about-leave-hong">visa renewal was denied</a> after he chaired a discussion with a pro-independence politician, and New York Times reporter Chris Buckley’s <a href="https://cpj.org/2020/07/hong-kong-denies-work-permit-to-new-york-times-correspondent-chris-buckley/">Hong Kong work permit was denied</a>, without any specific reason, months after he was also kicked out of China.</p>
<p>The Times has moved some of its former China- and Hong Kong-based reporters to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/business/media/new-york-times-hong-kong.html">South Korea and Taiwan</a> in response. However, foreign journalists who engage in critical reporting on China and Hong Kong could be in breach of the national security law regardless of where they are based, as the law applies extraterritorially and to non-Chinese citizens as well as nationals.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352139/original/file-20200811-15-1wttchm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352139/original/file-20200811-15-1wttchm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352139/original/file-20200811-15-1wttchm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352139/original/file-20200811-15-1wttchm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352139/original/file-20200811-15-1wttchm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352139/original/file-20200811-15-1wttchm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352139/original/file-20200811-15-1wttchm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Blank Post-it sticky notes have been posted around Hong Kong to protest the breadth of the new national security law.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">TYRONE SIU/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Speaking for the party’s will</h2>
<p>China’s constitution purports to preserve freedom of expression. It has never met the promise of its terms. In 2016, President Xi Jinping <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2016/02/191569/">told</a> the country’s press, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>all news media run by the party must work to speak for the party’s will and its propositions and protect the party’s authority and unity.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The guarantees of free speech and a free press under Hong Kong’s <a href="https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/index.html">Basic Law</a> are now on the same trajectory. </p>
<p>It is unlikely the media in Hong Kong will be nationalised to the extent it is on the mainland. Instead, Beijing is deploying a combination of acquisition, co-optation and intimidation to obtain its compliant silence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144206/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendan Clift receives funding from an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship.</span></em></p>Over the years, much of Hong Kong’s media has been bought up by China-owned or -affiliated entities. Now, the few remaining independent journalists face a new threat: the city’s national security law.Brendan Clift, Teaching Fellow and PhD candidate, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1418802020-07-03T03:15:41Z2020-07-03T03:15:41ZHong Kong activists now face a choice: stay silent, or flee the city. The world must give them a path to safety<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345417/original/file-20200703-33935-15mmuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=289%2C140%2C5595%2C4007&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sipa USA Willie Siau / SOPA Images/Sipa U</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In recent days, the prime ministers of the UK and Australia <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-07-02/australia-considering-offering-safe-haven-to-hong-kong-residents/12415482">each declared</a> they are working toward providing safe haven visas for Hong Kong residents. In the US, lawmakers passed a bill that would <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/07/02/politics/china-sanctions-hong-kong/index.html">impose sanctions</a> on businesses and individuals that support China’s efforts to restrict Hong Kong’s autonomy.</p>
<p>The prospect of a shift from rhetoric to action reveals just how dire the situation in China’s world city has become.</p>
<p>July 1 is usually associated with Hong Kong’s annual pro-democracy march. This year, it saw <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/07/01/hong-kong-security-law-180-arrests-tear-gas-pepper-balls-and-water-cannon-as-protesters-ignore-police-ban/">around 370 arrests</a> as protesters clashed with police under the shadow of a brand new national security law. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-fear-hong-kong-will-become-just-another-chinese-city-an-interview-with-martin-lee-grandfather-of-democracy-124635">'We fear Hong Kong will become just another Chinese city': an interview with Martin Lee, grandfather of democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Hong Kong police have been cracking down hard on demonstrators for over a year – with Beijing’s blessing – and most of this week’s arrests were possible simply because police had banned the gathering. </p>
<p>But ten arrests were made under the national security law for conduct including the possession of <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/07/02/every-person-on-the-planet-affected-hong-kong-security-law-more-draconian-than-feared-say-analysts/">banners advocating Hong Kong independence</a>.</p>
<p>Already, <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/06/30/breaking-joshua-wongs-pro-democracy-group-demosisto-disbands-hours-after-hong-kong-security-law-passed/">a pro-democracy political party has disbanded</a> and <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/06/30/hong-kong-pro-independence-activist-jumps-bail-flees-ahead-of-national-security-law/">activists are fleeing the city</a>.</p>
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<h2>What’s in the national security law and how it could be applied</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.ecns.cn/news/politics/2020-07-01/detail-ifzxrvxc0874078.shtml">The national security law</a> had been unveiled just hours earlier, its details kept secret until <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/06/30/breaking-hong-kong-security-law-revealed-violators-may-face-life-imprisonment/">this week</a>. It was imposed on Hong Kong in unprecedented circumstances when Chief Executive Carrie Lam, Beijing’s appointed leader in the city, bypassed the local legislature and <a href="https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/english/gazette/volume.php?year=2020&vol=24&no=44&extra=1&type=2">promulgated</a> it directly.</p>
<p>The law creates four main offences: secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces to endanger national security. </p>
<p>Hong Kong law already contains some offences of this sort, including treason, a disused colonial relic, and terrorism, tightly defined by statute. The new national security offences are different beasts – procedurally unique and alarmingly broad.</p>
<p>Secession, for example, includes the acts of inciting, assisting, supporting, planning, organising or participating in the separation or change of status of any part of China, not necessarily by force. This is calculated to prevent even the discussion of independence or self-determination for Hong Kong. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345423/original/file-20200703-33939-14rjy61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345423/original/file-20200703-33939-14rjy61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345423/original/file-20200703-33939-14rjy61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345423/original/file-20200703-33939-14rjy61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345423/original/file-20200703-33939-14rjy61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345423/original/file-20200703-33939-14rjy61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345423/original/file-20200703-33939-14rjy61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">More than 300 people were detained at a protest this week and ten were arrested under the new law.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">e: Sipa USA Willie Siau/SOPA Images/Sipa U</span></span>
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<p>Collusion includes making requests of or receiving instructions from foreign countries, institutions or organisations to disrupt laws or policies in or impose sanctions against Hong Kong or China. </p>
<p>This is aimed at barring Hong Kongers from lobbying foreign governments or making representations at the United Nations, which many <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-wong/hong-kong-activist-joshua-wong-seeks-u-s-support-for-protests-idUSKBN1VZ0LQ">protesters have done</a> in the past year.</p>
<p>The law contains severe penalties: for serious cases, between ten years and life imprisonment. It also overrides other Hong Kong laws. The presumption in favour of bail, for instance, will not apply in national security cases, facilitating indefinite detention of accused persons.</p>
<p>Defendants can be tried in Hong Kong courts, but in a major departure from the city’s long-cherished judicial independence, the chief executive will personally appoint the judges for national security cases. </p>
<p>The chief executive also decides if a trial involves state secrets – a concept <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/168000/asa170371996en.pdf">defined very broadly</a> in China. In these cases, open justice is abandoned and trials will take place behind closed doors with no jury.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345436/original/file-20200703-33956-gi4678.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345436/original/file-20200703-33956-gi4678.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345436/original/file-20200703-33956-gi4678.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345436/original/file-20200703-33956-gi4678.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345436/original/file-20200703-33956-gi4678.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345436/original/file-20200703-33956-gi4678.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345436/original/file-20200703-33956-gi4678.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A black Hong Kong flag burning last month during an anti-government demonstration.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Viola Kam/SOPA Images/Sipa USA</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>While Hong Kong courts can apply the new national security law, the power to interpret it lies with Beijing alone. And in the most serious cases, mainland Chinese courts can assume jurisdiction. </p>
<p>This raises the prospect of political prisoners being swallowed up by China’s legal system, which features no presumption of innocence and nominal human rights guarantees. China also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/mar/29/death-penalty-countries-world">leads the world in executions</a>.</p>
<p>Much of the national security law’s content contradicts fundamental principles of Hong Kong’s common law legal system and the terms of its mini-constitution, the <a href="https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/index.html">Basic Law</a>. </p>
<p>Even the territory’s justice minister – another unelected political appointee – has admitted <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/06/15/beijings-security-law-for-hong-kong-wont-be-compatible-with-citys-common-law-system-says-justice-sec/">the systems are incompatible</a>.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-does-british-offer-of-citizenship-to-hongkongers-violate-thatchers-deal-with-china-139413">Hong Kong: does British offer of citizenship to Hongkongers violate Thatcher's deal with China?</a>
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<h2>Why it is deliberately vague</h2>
<p>In the typical style of mainland Chinese laws, the national security law is drafted in vague and general terms. This is designed to give maximum flexibility to law enforcement and prosecutors, while provoking maximum fear and compliance among the population.</p>
<p>The government has said <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/07/02/every-person-on-the-planet-affected-hong-kong-security-law-more-draconian-than-feared-say-analysts/">calls for independence</a> for Hong Kong, Tibet, Xinjiang and even Taiwan are now illegal, as is the popular protest slogan “<a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/07/02/breaking-slogan-criminalised-as-govt-claims-liberate-hong-kong-revolution-of-our-times-is-pro-independence-secessionist/">liberate Hong Kong; revolution of our times</a>”. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345419/original/file-20200703-33913-kn99d9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345419/original/file-20200703-33913-kn99d9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345419/original/file-20200703-33913-kn99d9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345419/original/file-20200703-33913-kn99d9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345419/original/file-20200703-33913-kn99d9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345419/original/file-20200703-33913-kn99d9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345419/original/file-20200703-33913-kn99d9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Posting Hong Kong independence stickers can now lead to severe punishments.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sipa USA Willie Siau / SOPA Images/Sipa U</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A Beijing spokesman has said the charge of collusion to “provoke hatred” against the Hong Kong government could be used against <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/07/02/spreading-rumours-of-police-killing-protesters-at-prince-edward-mtr-may-breach-hong-kong-security-law-beijing-official/">people who spread rumours</a> that police beat protesters to death in a notorious subway station clash last year, echoing the infamous mainland Chinese law against “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-12/picking-quarrels-and-provoking-troubles-the-crime-sweeping-china">picking quarrels and provoking trouble</a>”.</p>
<p>The law does not appear to be retroactive, but fears that it could be interpreted that way have caused a flurry of online activity as <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com.au/hk-activists-disband-delete-social-posts-china-pass-security-law-2020-6">people have deleted social media accounts and posts</a> associating them with past protests.</p>
<p>This is unsurprising given the Hong Kong government’s record of <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2018/10/12/breaking-hong-kong-bans-democrat-lau-siu-lai-standing-kowloon-west-election/">trawling through old social media posts</a> for reasons to bar non-establishment candidates from standing at elections.</p>
<h2>Dissent in any form becomes extremely hazardous</h2>
<p>Despite the promise of autonomy for Hong Kong, enshrined in a pre-handover treaty with the UK that China <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-anniversary-china/china-says-sino-british-joint-declaration-on-hong-kong-no-longer-has-meaning-idUSKBN19L1J1">claims is now irrelevant</a>, the national security law has escalated the project to “<a href="https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124913011">harmonise</a>” the upstart region by coercive means, rather than addressing the root causes of dissatisfaction.</p>
<p>Under the auspices of the new law, the Chinese government will openly establish a security agency, with agents unaccountable under local law, in Hong Kong for the first time. It has also authorised itself in the new law to extend its tendrils further into civil society, with mandates to manage the media, the internet, NGOs and school curricula.</p>
<p>Under the weight of this authoritarian agenda, dissent in any form becomes an extremely hazardous prospect. It is no doubt Beijing’s intention that it will one day be impossible – or better yet, something Hong Kongers would not even contemplate. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-is-taking-a-risk-by-getting-tough-on-hong-kong-now-the-us-must-decide-how-to-respond-139294">China is taking a risk by getting tough on Hong Kong. Now, the US must decide how to respond</a>
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<p>The aim of silencing all opposing voices – including those overseas – is clear from the purported <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/07/02/every-person-on-the-planet-affected-hong-kong-security-law-more-draconian-than-feared-say-analysts/">extraterritorial operation</a> of the law.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/07/01/china-must-reconsider-hong-kong-security-law-27-countries-tell-united-nations/">international community has condemned</a> Beijing’s actions, but its members have a responsibility to follow words with actions. The least that democratic countries like the US, UK, Australia and others can do is offer a realistic path to safety for the civic-minded Hong Kongers who have stood up to the world’s premier authoritarian power at grave personal risk.</p>
<p>Some 23 years after China achieved its long-held ambition of regaining Hong Kong, it has failed to win hearts and minds and has brought out the big stick. Its promises may have been hollow, but its threats are not.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141880/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendan Clift receives funding from an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship.</span></em></p>Much is still unknown about how the new national security law will be used in Hong Kong – a deliberate strategy by China. Beijing’s intention, though, is clear: make dissent all but impossible.Brendan Clift, Teaching Fellow and PhD candidate, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1396422020-06-04T12:27:13Z2020-06-04T12:27:13ZWhy Hong Kong’s untold history of protecting refugee rights matters now in its struggle with China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339614/original/file-20200603-130907-13k3scv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5000%2C3308&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters in Hong Kong during demonstrations against China's draft bill to impose national security laws on the semi-autonomous territory. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protesters-gesture-the-five-demands-sign-during-news-photo/1214941174?adppopup=true">Ivan Abreu/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>New <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/world/asia/china-hong-kong-crackdown.html">national security measures</a> proposed by China would significantly undermine the rule of law in Hong Kong, limiting freedom of speech, restricting the right to due process and curtailing other basic civil liberties. The stakes are high for the Hong Kong people, who’ve been fiercely defending their <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/27/world/asia/why-are-hong-kong-protesters.html">autonomy from the Chinese government</a> for years. </p>
<p>The greater respect for human rights and the rule of law that distinguishes this former British colony from mainland China stems, in part, from a little known chapter of Hong Kong’s history.</p>
<p>Between 1975 and 1997, almost 200,000 <a href="http://vietnameseboatpeople.hk/">Vietnamese sought refuge in Hong Kong</a>, fleeing from their communist government. The majority were eventually resettled in the United States, Canada and Australia, but <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Chinese-Vietnamese-Diaspora-Revisiting-the-boat-people/Chan/p/book/9780415704816">tens of thousands were stuck in Hong Kong camps</a>, often for years, waiting for their asylum claims to be processed. </p>
<p>Some Vietnamese activists in the camps accused Hong Kong of violating their human rights. In making their case in court, they actually helped define the terms of Hong Kong’s current struggle with China. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339605/original/file-20200603-130955-17y3k95.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339605/original/file-20200603-130955-17y3k95.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339605/original/file-20200603-130955-17y3k95.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339605/original/file-20200603-130955-17y3k95.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339605/original/file-20200603-130955-17y3k95.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339605/original/file-20200603-130955-17y3k95.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339605/original/file-20200603-130955-17y3k95.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Street demonstrations against China’s new security law in Hong Kong, May 24, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/after-firing-teargas-towards-demonstrators-police-charge-to-news-photo/1216521574?adppopup=true">Tommy Walker/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>‘Please help the boat people!’</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520343665/in-camps">“Have you ever lived under a communist regime?”</a> a Vietnamese man asked <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/">United Nations</a> officials in July 1989, when huge numbers of Vietnamese were arriving in Hong Kong. </p>
<p>“Look at the T.A.M.” he added, referring to the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/china-1989-tiananmen-square-protests-demonstration-massacre">Tiananmen Square Massacre</a>. </p>
<p>Weeks before, on June 4, 1989, Chinese soldiers had killed student protesters en masse at Tiananmen Square. For the man, who had just arrived in Hong Kong, citing this grim example to UN human rights officials in an effort to get refugee status must have seemed strategic. </p>
<p>Aware that Hong Kong people would be observing the crackdown in communist China, the Vietnamese might have imagined the government there would understand why he had fled a communist country. </p>
<p>Even as Hong Kong received an influx of Vietnamese people in the late 1980s, Great Britain was actually negotiating the return of the territory it <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-anniversary-history/chronology-timeline-of-156-years-of-british-rule-in-hong-kong-idUSSP27479920070627">had acquired in the 1840s</a> back to China. Hong Kong people worried they would lose their economic and political freedoms in that transition. </p>
<p>Their concern about life under communist rule did not, however, translate into much sympathy for the Vietnamese arrivals. Many Hong Kong people <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24491756?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">resented that Vietnamese had been welcome as refugees</a> simply because they fled communism, when unauthorized Chinese border crossers were promptly returned back to China. </p>
<p>In 1988 Hong Kong changed its asylum determination process, requiring Vietnamese claimants to prove that they had faced targeted political persecution back home. This is what led to the lengthy detentions of thousands – and, consequently, to allegations of human rights violations.</p>
<p>As negotiations around the 1997 handover progressed, Vietnamese activists in the camps led <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2017/01/01/hkfp-history-brief-history-hong-kongs-notorious-whitehead-refugee-detention-centre/">dozens of protests</a>, hunger strikes and <a href="https://calisphere.org/item/ark:/13030/hb4f59n8hh/">demonstrations</a>. In tense standoffs within the camps, Vietnamese shouted, “Protest against forced repatriation! Protest against the violation of human rights! The people of Hong Kong, please help the boat people!” </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339611/original/file-20200603-130917-1ig5ywd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339611/original/file-20200603-130917-1ig5ywd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339611/original/file-20200603-130917-1ig5ywd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339611/original/file-20200603-130917-1ig5ywd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339611/original/file-20200603-130917-1ig5ywd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339611/original/file-20200603-130917-1ig5ywd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339611/original/file-20200603-130917-1ig5ywd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339611/original/file-20200603-130917-1ig5ywd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Vietnamese who were refused entry into Macau arrived at Hong Kong’s Government Pier in Sheung Wan, June 1978.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/vietnamese-refugees-who-were-refused-entry-into-macau-news-photo/1092905308?adppopup=true">Yau Tin-kwai/South China Morning Post via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Habeas corpus</h2>
<p>As I recount in my new book, “<a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520343665/in-camps">In Camps: Vietnamese Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Repatriates</a>,” <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2002/apr/27/guardianobituaries">legal advocates for the Vietnamese</a> brought dozens of lawsuits before Hong Kong’s courts in the 1990s, pointing out the flaws in the asylum process. </p>
<p>Finally, in 1995, Hong Kong-based lawyers devised a new strategy to free clients who were still in limbo. They began filing <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/habeas_corpus">habeas corpus petitions</a>, invoking a bedrock principle in western law that protects individuals from indefinite detention or being detained without knowing the charges. </p>
<p>In one habeas motion, Hong Kong human rights lawyers representing three Vietnamese families who had been detained for more than four years said this was an “extraordinary” amount of time, and argued that the Hong Kong government must release their clients. </p>
<p>Pointing to the rapidly approaching handover to China, the lawyers told the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/">South China Morning Post</a> that the case had implications for “the future of civil liberties for everyone in Hong Kong after 1997.”</p>
<p>If Hong Kong leaders wanted guarantees that its people <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3017318/explainer-what-sino-british-joint-declaration-and-what-does">would maintain their civil and economic liberties</a> under Chinese rule, the lawyers suggested, the fact that Hong Kong itself was holding people “in administrative custody indefinitely” could set a dangerous precedent.</p>
<p>“Habeas corpus is not available in China,” a senior lecturer at <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nihal_Jayawickrama">Hong Kong University</a> elaborated in Hong Kong’s English-language media. “With regard to what’s happening across the border, it’s something we should guard very jealously.”</p>
<p>In March 1996, the high court for the colonies <a href="https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5b2898022c94e06b9e19edb9">ruled in favor</a> of the Vietnamese. It ordered the Hong Kong government to release over 200 Vietnamese. </p>
<p>“It’s a victory for people in Hong Kong as much as the people detained,” lead attorney Rob Brook said of the decision. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339619/original/file-20200603-130912-1j7pxvb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339619/original/file-20200603-130912-1j7pxvb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339619/original/file-20200603-130912-1j7pxvb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339619/original/file-20200603-130912-1j7pxvb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339619/original/file-20200603-130912-1j7pxvb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339619/original/file-20200603-130912-1j7pxvb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339619/original/file-20200603-130912-1j7pxvb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339619/original/file-20200603-130912-1j7pxvb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Vietnamese protest at a Hong Kong detention camp, 1990.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://calisphere.org/clip/500x500/cca6b9cd35c4a913bc323e40ab6c5408">Online Archive of California/UC Irvine, Southeast Asian Archive</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Protecting the marginalized helps everyone</h2>
<p>Coming down so close to the July 1, 1997, handover of Hong Kong to China, the Vietnamese victory inadvertently solidified the rule of law in Hong Kong, leaving habeas corpus protections stronger than they had been before. </p>
<p>Today, habeas corpus and other legal rights are at the heart of Hong Kong’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-protests-against-extradition-bill-spurred-by-fears-about-long-arm-of-china-118539">ongoing protests</a> against <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/world/asia/hong-kong-protest-future-china.html">Chinese efforts to assert greater control over the territory</a>. Among the pro-democracy activists <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/world/asia/hong-kong-arrests.html">arrested this year</a> was Margaret Ng, a Hong Kong politician who more than 20 years ago <a href="https://www.scmp.com/article/195274/our-freedoms-must-be-writ-large">wrote eloquently</a> about the relationship between the rights of Vietnamese asylum seekers and Hong Kong’s civil liberties. </p>
<p>The case of the Vietnamese asylum-seekers is relevant, too, beyond Hong Kong’s current struggle with China. It demonstrates how fighting for the rights of a vulnerable minority in any country creates protections and civil liberties enjoyed by all. </p>
<p>[<em>Like what you’ve read? Want more?</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=likethis">Sign up for The Conversation’s daily newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/139642/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jana Lipman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The cherished legal rights that Beijing seeks to suppress in Hong Kong were established, in part, by Vietnamese asylum-seekers who fought for their freedom in court in the 1980s.Jana Lipman, Associate Professor of History, Tulane UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1396052020-06-01T10:24:31Z2020-06-01T10:24:31ZWhy the US dollar remains crucial for Hong Kong’s economic prosperity<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/338537/original/file-20200529-96741-wrscw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/ckxoFlEtlUc">Dan Freeman on Unsplash</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Increasing economic tensions between the US and China continue to threaten Hong Kong’s economy. China’s proposed <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-how-chinas-new-national-security-law-subverts-the-territorys-cherished-rule-of-law-139683">national security law</a> will see greater controls over areas such as secessionist activities, terrorism and foreign interference. Similarly, the announcement by the US secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, that Hong Kong <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/27/politics/hong-kong-pompeo-certification/index.html">should no longer be viewed as independent from China</a> could undermine Hong Kong’s longstanding role as an intermediary between China and the rest of the world. </p>
<p>But one important pillar of Hong Kong’s economy remains unchanged and outside of Chinese government control – its currency, which is pegged to the US dollar via a currency board. This could have significant benefits for the city as it tries to deal with pressing socioeconomic challenges. But this also requires more public spending from the special administrative region’s government. </p>
<p>Since its introduction, the currency peg has withstood a variety of challenges – from the UK handover of Hong Kong back to China, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b4b6c382-c408-11e9-a8e9-296ca66511c9">to attacks from speculators</a>. But it has often resulted in the Hong Kong government adopting an overly conservative approach to spending. Although the peg gives Hong Kong a considerable financial buffer, successive governments have tended towards fiscal conservatism. Public spending has rarely exceeded <a href="https://www.budget.gov.hk/2019/eng/pdf/e_appendices_b.pdf">20% of GDP since the 1997</a> handover. </p>
<h2>Bad timing and poor management</h2>
<p>Hong Kong is struggling to deal with sluggish economic growth and myriad socioeconomic challenges, not least increasing levels of poverty <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-protesters-dont-identify-as-chinese-amid-anger-at-inequality-survey-suggests-122293">and a high level of inequality</a>. The city was poised to benefit from legislation passed by the US senate which could force <a href="https://www.thewirechina.com/2020/05/24/bears-on-the-potomac/">Chinese companies to delist</a> from the US stock exchange. This would make Hong Kong the natural route for Chinese companies seeking to access overseas funds – something the city’s financial markets <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X08003379">have long provided</a>. But the new national security law and Pompeo’s comments will make Hong Kong less attractive. </p>
<p>Many of the challenges now facing Hong Kong have their roots in decades of <a href="https://hkupress.hku.hk/pro/1696.php">mismanaged prosperity</a>. Yet they do not necessarily threaten the US dollar peg. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/338539/original/file-20200529-96717-1jnwyqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/338539/original/file-20200529-96717-1jnwyqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338539/original/file-20200529-96717-1jnwyqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338539/original/file-20200529-96717-1jnwyqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338539/original/file-20200529-96717-1jnwyqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338539/original/file-20200529-96717-1jnwyqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338539/original/file-20200529-96717-1jnwyqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Ongoing protests in Hong Kong have hurt business.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/hong-kong-june-16-2019-kongs-1473462398">Tee Jz / Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>In theory, the dollar peg gives the US the ultimate sanction on Hong Kong. In practice, it is more complicated, not least because the global demand for dollar assets <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/exorbitant-privilege-9780199642472?q=Eichengreen&lang=en&cc=ie">helps subsidise US living standards</a>. Nevertheless, were the US to strictly apply export controls or remove special tariffs, it would make Hong Kong’s task of sustaining a net inflow of foreign exchange more difficult.</p>
<h2>A pragmatic choice</h2>
<p>Hong Kong’s currency board was introduced in 1983 following concerns over capital flight <a href="https://hkupress.hku.hk/pro/298.php">and the volatility of Hong Kong’s then free-floating currency</a> as UK-China negotiations over Hong Kong’s handover progressed. The currency board requires Hong Kong to hold enough liquid assets in the form of US dollar reserves to cover the amount of Hong Kong dollars that are in circulation. </p>
<p>The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), which acts as a de facto central bank, ensures the US dollar trades in a narrow band between HK$7.75-7.85. So the HKMA will buy up Hong Kong dollars to strengthen the currency when it falls to the lower margin of this band and it will sell them when it gets too strong. </p>
<p>Replacing the US dollar with the Chinese RMB is currently not feasible due to restrictions on the RMB’s deliverability as a currency. This makes the RMB unsuitable as a liquid reserve asset. Meanwhile, China’s state enterprises and the offshore market for RMB continue to benefit from Hong Kong’s deep and liquid financial markets as a source of offshore US <a href="https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1603u.htm">dollar funding</a>. </p>
<h2>Hong Kong’s future prosperity</h2>
<p>Hong Kong’s future prosperity depends on good relationships between China and the US. But this is hindered by a historical reluctance by business interests and senior officials in the city to contemplate <a href="https://hkupress.hku.hk/pro/316.php">even moderate political reform</a>. Such reforms are now unavoidable, however. </p>
<p>A deterioration in Hong Kong’s business <a href="https://www.hkeconomy.gov.hk/en/pdf/box-20q1-1-2.pdf">sentiment can be traced to early 2019</a> and public concerns over democracy. Addressing public concerns should also benefit Beijing. China’s economic growth has seen its business interests in the city increase but also become more fragmented. This has made it more difficult to read the public mood. As issuer of the global reserve currency, the US also has a responsibility to ensure that liquidity shortage is not used as a political stick to punish Hong Kong. </p>
<p>Ultimately, neither the security law nor changes in the US stance towards Hong Kong will help the squeeze on living standards faced by many of Hong Kong’s residents. Conversely, maintaining the currency peg gives the Hong Kong government ample fiscal scope to deal with these. </p>
<p>Its own economic research indicates the economic impacts of external events on Hong Kong’s economic growth tend to be large but not long lasting. Data from <a href="https://www.hkeconomy.gov.hk/en/pdf/box-20q1-1-1.pdf">Hong Kong’s government</a> show that the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis saw Hong Kong’s economy contract by 8.3% in the third quarter of 1998 while the global financial crisis resulted in a 7.8% contraction in the first quarter of 2009. In both instances, Hong Kong’s economy returned to growth following four to five quarters of contraction. </p>
<p>Recent indications that the US is set <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-debt-and-deficit-projections-hit-records/">to run budget deficits so great</a> they will exceed wartime records could provide Hong Kong’s fiscally conservative government with the political justification for increasing much needed public spending.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/139605/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Damian Tobin receives funding from the ESRC. </span></em></p>Hong Kong’s currency is pegged to the US dollar, which offers an opportunity to increase public spending and placate protestors.Damian Tobin, Lecturer in Management, Cork University Business School, University College CorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1396832020-05-29T15:55:35Z2020-05-29T15:55:35ZHong Kong: how China’s new national security law subverts the territory’s cherished rule of law<p>Tensions are running high in Hong Kong at a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/china-parliament-approves-hong-kong-national-security-bill-200528073103358.html">decision by China’s ruling body</a>, the National People’s Congress (NPC), authorising its standing committee to draft a national security law for Hong Kong. The decision, drafted in secret, is likely to become law by August. </p>
<p>It should never have come to this. Article 18 of Hong Kong’s <a href="https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basiclaw_full_text_en.pdf">Basic Law</a> – the territory’s de facto mini-constitution that came into effect after the British handover in 1997 – specifically limited Beijing from applying national laws to the territory, except in matters of defence and foreign affairs. The <a href="https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/hknationalsecuritydecisionfinal/">NPC decision</a> changes all that. It not only authorises the standing committee to draft such a law, it allows the law to be inserted into Hong Kong’s Basic Law by promulgation. </p>
<p>This completely by-passes the Legislative Council, the law-making body of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government, and creates new national security crimes. It talks, for example, of “unflinchingly” preventing, stopping and punishing any conduct that seriously endangers national security, such as separatism, subversion of state power, or organising and carrying out terrorist activities. Any activities by foreign and overseas forces that interfere “in any fashion” in the affairs of Hong Kong, and any overseas forces that use Hong Kong to carry out “separatist, subversive, infiltrative or destructive activities”, will be punished. </p>
<p>Articles 3 and 4 of the decision also specifically reiterate the HKSAR’s obligation to enact its own national security law. Hong Kongers thus face the dubious prospect of having not one but two national security laws.</p>
<h2>Unilateral decision</h2>
<p>The US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, claimed the NPC’s decision means Hong Kong is <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/27/politics/hong-kong-pompeo-certification/index.html">no longer politically autonomous</a> from mainland China. The US will <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/business/hong-kong-special-status-explained.html">could now revoke</a> the special status it accords Hong Kong, and which gives it favourable trading terms. This, married with further US sanctions, is a threat to China’s economy. Worse still, it would be fatal to Hong Kong’s standing as one of the world’s major financial centres.</p>
<p>Under a 1984 <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8616/">Joint Sino-British Declaration</a>, Britain retains a watching brief, sanctioned by an international treaty lodged with the UN. Once upon a time, such treaties meant something. Despite this, apart from a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/23/chris-patten-chinas-security-laws-a-betrayal-of-hong-kong-people">few stalwart voices</a>, the UK’s initial response was muted, despite the fact that Hong Kong was a British colony until 1997. However, on May 28, the NPC decision finally prompted the British government to offer 300,000 Hong Kongers sanctuary in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/28/uk-will-extend-visas-for-300000-hong-kong-residents-says-raab">form of the right to live in the UK</a>. </p>
<p>With China becoming a political hegemon as well as an economic powerhouse, its leaders feel able to unilaterally <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-anniversary-china/china-says-sino-british-joint-declaration-on-hong-kong-no-longer-has-meaning-idUSKBN19L1J1">declare the joint declaration obsolete</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/12/hong-kong-chief-implies-china-is-responsible-for-barring-british-activist">bar British critics</a> from entering Hong Kong, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/29/hong-kong-crisis-china-support-police-warns-us-interfere-trump">denounce</a> all foreign criticism as foreign interference.</p>
<h2>Chipped away</h2>
<p>It would be a mistake to see the NPC’s decision as just another aspect of the US-China trade war. It comes after a series of protracted and increasingly unsuccessful attempts by the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) to capture the hearts and minds of Hong Kong people. There was a short window, just after the 1997 handover, when optimism was high and this goal might have been feasible. </p>
<p>But the years since 1997 have been marked by sniping attacks on Hong Kong’s legal system, chipping away at what Hong Kongers see as the territory’s core value: <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/lost-in-china/FDCB2555DA4658381EB6DFAAAE8FE00E">the rule of law</a>. Its independent judges have been <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1529167/full-text-practice-one-country-two-systems-policy-hong-kong-special">termed</a> “administrators” who must toe the party line. Retiring judges <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-crime/article/2077521/experts-line-throw-book-hong-kongs-foreign-judges">have spoken</a> of the impending demise of the rule of law. </p>
<p>Since 1997, the Chinese government’s response to popular protest has been single-minded and blunt repression. Invariably, such conflagrations leave only two escape routes: submission or retraction. </p>
<p>This is what happened in 2003, when HKSAR government first proposed a national security law, as it was obliged to do under Article 23 of the Basic Law. This aimed to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition or subversion against the Chinese government.</p>
<p>The broad, sweeping nature of its provisions, which included the prohibition of foreign political organisations or bodies from conducting political activities within the region, <a href="http://www.lse.ac.uk/fang-test/TaiwanProgramme/Journal/JournalContents/TCP5Jones.pdf">caused a storm of protest</a> – on July 1 2003, over 500,000 people demonstrated against the proposal. After a standoff, it was eventually withdrawn.</p>
<p>The NPC latest decision reveals that while the 2003 bill was gone, it was not forgotten. Frustrated with the inability of the HKSAR government to pass such legislation, China secretly planned its own law. In the meantime, it nibbled away at some of Hong Kong’s other legal defences. </p>
<p>In 2019, the HKSAR government was pressured by Beijing to introduce a new extradition law. Overnight, Hong Kong, once seen as a city of law, became a city of street battles. The massed ranks of para-military police, equipped with tear gas, pepper spray, water cannons and rubber bullets, <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-police-legitimacy-draining-away-amid-spiral-of-rage-and-retaliation-127127">openly fought</a> protesters on the streets. </p>
<p>There was violence from both <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-49949548">protesters</a> and the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-50370715">police</a>, but while numerous by-standers and protesters felt the full force of the HKSAR’s legal and para-military capability, demands for an independent inquiry into police conduct have been <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/21/hong-kongs-carrie-lam-rejects-independent-inquiry-into-police-tactics.html">rejected by</a> Carrie Lam, Hong Kong’s chief executive. My own phone buzzed with messages from former students caught up in events: one messaged that the friend standing beside her had just been hit in the stomach with a rubber bullet. My former student was acting as a frontline medic and, though clearly identified as such, was forced “run for her life” from the police. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-police-legitimacy-draining-away-amid-spiral-of-rage-and-retaliation-127127">Hong Kong: police legitimacy draining away amid spiral of rage and retaliation</a>
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<p>Beijing deemed her and others like her “subversives”, “secessionists”, and “terrorists”. This word has now been added to the lexicon of crimes by the NPC’s new decision, reflecting China’s recent predilection for <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/03/28/hong-kongs-terrorism-alert-credible-serious-threat-bid-smear-protest-movement/">defining its opponents</a> as “terrorists”. </p>
<h2>Ignoring the international order</h2>
<p>The NPC decision states that China will oppose “foreign interference” in Hong Kong and will punish foreign forces which use Hong Kong to carry out “separatist, subversive, infiltrative or destructive activities”. In their own struggle for power before 1949 this is exactly how Chinese communists used Hong Kong. Ever since then they have worried that their enemies would also use the territory as a “base for subversion” to overthrow the communist regime. It is perhaps no wonder, then, that given the <a href="https://theconversation.com/i-was-in-china-doing-research-when-i-saw-my-uighur-friends-disappear-127166">domestic and international challenges</a> to President Xi Jinping’s authoritarian regime, China sees the Hong Kong protests through a lens of paranoia about the rest of the world.</p>
<p>The NPC decision does not prohibit sedition, treason, theft of state secrets, or ties with foreign political organisations. But it would be naive to think that the new law will ignore such activities. The NPC’s decision also states that bodies such as the Ministry of State Security will be allowed to operate in Hong Kong – which could mean spying on schools, universities, the media and monitoring people’s personal social media accounts for any sign of dissent. </p>
<p>The possibility that the new national security crimes may violate the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx">International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</a> can no longer be relied upon to check China’s intentions. As its dismissal of the Joint Sino-British Declaration suggests, China feels able to disregard laws it sees as against its interests. On Hong Kong as elsewhere, Beijing is prepared to challenge the rules-based international order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/139683/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carol Anne Goodwin Jones is affiliated with Hong Kong Watch; Hong Kong Scholars Association;</span></em></p>The decision of China’s ruling council to impose a national security law on Hong Kong goes against the territory’s own mini-constitution.Carol Anne Goodwin Jones, Reader, Birmingham Law School, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1392942020-05-25T05:28:26Z2020-05-25T05:28:26ZChina is taking a risk by getting tough on Hong Kong. Now, the US must decide how to respond<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337251/original/file-20200525-124832-116e08i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sipa USA Ivan Abreu / SOPA Images/Sipa US</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Beijing’s <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-05/22/c_139078396.htm">recent announcement</a> it would authorise the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress – China’s rubber-stamp parliament – to draft a national security law for Hong Kong caught most off guard. </p>
<p>The move <a href="https://www.9news.com.au/world/hong-kong-protest-police-fire-tear-gas-amid-security-law-demonstration/1b7d68c7-ec56-460f-aca1-8615f31e6dd3">sparked renewed protests</a> over the weekend, caused a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/21/investing/global-stocks/index.html">landslide</a> on the local stock market and elicited the expected <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/23/global-outrage-erupts-over-chinas-draconian-security-law-for-hong-kong">global outrage</a>. </p>
<p>Beijing’s decision to bypass the Hong Kong’s legislature and directly impose a national security law is widely seen as a <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/05/22/why-is-the-uk-so-silent-as-beijing-trashes-the-hong-kong-handover-agreement/">violation of the joint treaty</a> signed between China and the UK when Hong Kong was handed over in 1997. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-fear-hong-kong-will-become-just-another-chinese-city-an-interview-with-martin-lee-grandfather-of-democracy-124635">'We fear Hong Kong will become just another Chinese city': an interview with Martin Lee, grandfather of democracy</a>
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<p>It could jeopardise the rule of law and civil liberties currently enjoyed in the city, and ultimately, be the <a href="https://www.state.gov/prc-proposal-to-impose-national-security-legislation-on-hong-kong/">death knell</a> for the “one country, two systems” framework that Beijing has touted to integrate Hong Kong into the mainland and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-anniversary-president/taiwan-leader-rejects-chinas-one-country-two-systems-offer-idUSKBN1WP0A4">compel Taiwan</a> to move towards unification.</p>
<p>Now that Beijing has made its play, it’s up to the US and its allies to decide how to respond. And the situation could have more serious geopolitical consequences if neither side backs down.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1264663479312691202"}"></div></p>
<h2>What would the draft national security law do?</h2>
<p>The Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution that came into effect in 1997, <a href="https://time.com/5841283/hong-kong-national-security-law-china/">calls for the local government to enact a national security law</a>. But legislation to do this has been <a href="https://time.com/5606212/hong-kong-history-mass-demonstrations-protest/">suspended since 2003</a> when a half million people took to the streets in protest.</p>
<p>The law, if formally adopted this week, would prohibit treason, secession, sedition, subversion and the theft of state secrets. And it would legitimise the presence of China’s state security apparatus in the city. </p>
<p>The timing of the move by the Chinese government appears to be opportunistic. It comes as the year-long pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong have waned due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Western countries, the traditional supporters of Hong Kong’s push for freedom, have been distracted by their own responses to the pandemic.</p>
<p>For Beijing, the move kills two birds with one stone. In the short term, it should help quell – through intimidation – the civil unrest that has been raging in the city for over a year. </p>
<p>More profoundly, in the longer term, it could be the decisive blow for rule of law in Hong Kong – and the city’s autonomy.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337276/original/file-20200525-55437-xkjr31.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337276/original/file-20200525-55437-xkjr31.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337276/original/file-20200525-55437-xkjr31.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337276/original/file-20200525-55437-xkjr31.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337276/original/file-20200525-55437-xkjr31.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337276/original/file-20200525-55437-xkjr31.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337276/original/file-20200525-55437-xkjr31.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Masked protesters again clashed with police in Hong Kong on Sunday.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jerome Favre/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The costs for China could be massive</h2>
<p>What should be noted here is the significance of Beijing’s top-down, unilateral approach. This is, indeed, an audacious move considering the potential costs down the road. </p>
<p>The announcement will certainly fuel a new wave of protests in Hong Kong, this time with much higher stakes. Though some in the pro-democracy movement have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/22/world/asia/hong-kong-china-protest.html">expressed feelings of hopelessness</a> recently, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/24/world/asia/hong-kong-protest-coronavirus-china.html">thousands still took to the streets</a> on Sunday, leading to clashes with police. </p>
<p>China risks a severe backlash in the international arena. The UK, Canada and Australia have issued a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-from-the-uk-australia-and-canada-on-hong-kong">joint statement</a> saying they were “deeply concerned” about the proposed legislation. </p>
<p>The United States has reacted more forcefully by “<a href="https://www.state.gov/prc-proposal-to-impose-national-security-legislation-on-hong-kong/">condemning</a>” the move and urging “Beijing to reconsider its disastrous proposal”. President Donald Trump has threatened to respond “<a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-22/china-to-propose-national-security-legislation-for-hong-kong/12274202">very strongly</a>” if Beijing follows through with the new law.</p>
<p>One option for the US is to invoke the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/3289">Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act</a>, which was passed by Congress last year amid the continuing Hong Kong protests.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1263496184087412738"}"></div></p>
<p>This, however, would represent the “nuclear option” for the US. Under the act, the US could revoke Hong Kong’s preferential trading status if the city’s autonomous status within China is compromised. This means the same tariffs and export controls the US now imposes on China <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/22/world/asia/trump-pompeo-china-hong-kong.html">would extend to Hong Kong</a>, putting at risk <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-hongkong-trade-explainer/explainer-how-ending-hong-kongs-special-status-could-affect-us-companies-idUSKBN22Y22Z">some US$67 billion in annual trade</a>. </p>
<p>There is growing support in the US to apply sanctions to mainland Chinese officials behind the proposed security law.</p>
<p>The aim of this kind of response would be to hurt China by hurting Hong Kong. This comes at a time when Beijing needs Hong Kong, an international finance hub, to attract foreign investment as it deals with the ongoing trade war with the US and its post-pandemic economic recovery.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/behind-chinas-newly-aggressive-diplomacy-wolf-warriors-ready-to-fight-back-139028">Behind China's newly aggressive diplomacy: 'wolf warriors' ready to fight back</a>
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<p>Beijing’s credibility could be severely damaged if it fails to honour its treaty obligations with regards to Hong Kong. This runs contrary to the image Beijing has been painstakingly building in recent years of a responsible great power and an emerging leader of the world.</p>
<p>Given the potential costs, it is all the more extraordinary that Beijing is taking this approach. What, then, could have driven such a move?</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337279/original/file-20200525-55451-1vr156x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337279/original/file-20200525-55451-1vr156x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337279/original/file-20200525-55451-1vr156x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337279/original/file-20200525-55451-1vr156x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337279/original/file-20200525-55451-1vr156x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337279/original/file-20200525-55451-1vr156x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337279/original/file-20200525-55451-1vr156x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters have increasingly appealed to western powers to support their bid for greater freedoms.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sipa USA Ivan Abreu / SOPA Images/Sipa US</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Beijing signals readiness for new cold war</h2>
<p>For Beijing, this is a public acknowledgement of its inability to resolve the political unrest in Hong Kong without resorting to violence, and that the ongoing protests could ultimately undermine its own national security. </p>
<p>It is a sign that Beijing has lost patience with the “one country, two systems” approach to slowly incorporate Hong Kong into the fold and provide a road map for Taiwan’s eventual unification with the mainland. </p>
<p>As Taiwan has drifted further away from Beijing’s overtures in recent years, the Chinese government has felt less obliged to keep up the “one-country, two systems” window dressing in Hong Kong. </p>
<p>The strategy is no longer to win hearts and minds, but to impose fear.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1264466922675945472"}"></div></p>
<p>Beijing is counting on Washington and its allies to come to the realisation that hurting Hong Kong would not be in their own economic interests and eventually back away from their threats to take action. </p>
<p>If anything, this is a dual crisis in the making. It is a constitutional crisis for Hong Kong that could irrevocably redefine the nature of its autonomy and rule of law in the city moving forward. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-china-relations-were-already-heated-then-coronavirus-threw-fuel-on-the-flames-137886">US-China relations were already heated. Then coronavirus threw fuel on the flames</a>
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<p>It also has the potential to become a diplomatic crisis. There’s a chance Beijing may have miscalculated the situation and the US and its allies will retaliate with economic or other punishments. </p>
<p>The Chinese leadership is unlikely to back down and be seen as giving in to external pressures. </p>
<p>This puts China even more firmly on a collision course with the US and suggests the Chinese leadership is as determined as ever to fight a new cold war with its western adversaries. </p>
<p>And Hong Kong is in the middle, poised to become, as pro-democracy activist Joshua Wong, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/3026395/german-minister-welcomes-release-hong-kong-activist-joshua-wong">put it</a>, “the new Berlin”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/139294/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hui Feng does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>US President Donald Trump says he’ll respond ‘very strongly’ if China follows through with its draft national security law in Hong Kong. Beijing, though, is prepared for a potential new cold war.Hui Feng, ARC Future Fellow and Senior Research Fellow, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1322252020-03-18T14:53:17Z2020-03-18T14:53:17ZCan we talk? Bridging campus divides over Hong Kong<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319899/original/file-20200311-116270-8rigzv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C188%2C5472%2C3202&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pro-China counter-protesters, wearing red, shout down a man in a black shirt during a rally for Hong Kong in Vancouver in August 2019. The University of British Columbia is taking measures to enhance respectful dialogue over Hong Kong divisions.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Darryl Dyck</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/5433842/canada-china-detentions-trade-extradition/">Canada-China relations are bleak</a>, to put it mildly. The diplomatic tensions have extended to Chinese communities in Vancouver, but is there hope on the horizon? </p>
<p><a href="https://sppga.ubc.ca/news/hong-kong-contextualized-exploring-conflict-through-students-lens/">Our research</a> shows promising solutions are already emerging. </p>
<p>Global power dynamics <a href="https://www.brinknews.com/the-global-power-balance-shifts-toward-asia/">are said to be shifting</a> towards the east. </p>
<p>But domestically, the People’s Republic of China, or PRC, has been confronting mass <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/wo%20%20%20%20rld-asia-china-49317695">civil unrest</a> in Hong Kong while facing <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html">international scrutiny</a> for the government’s “re-education” centres for Muslims in Xinjiang province.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-ominous-metaphors-of-chinas-uighur-concentration-camps-129665">The ominous metaphors of China's Uighur concentration camps</a>
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<p>Meanwhile, Canadian media <a href="https://www.asiapacific.ca/canada-asia-agenda/canadas-print-media-fair-china">has been criticized</a> for propagating Western-centric rhetoric, often misleading the public and unfairly polarizing contentious issues. </p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3043258/how-hong-kong-protests-affected-overseas-chinese-asia-and-beyond">news outlets have reported</a> a rise in <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/5806296/anti-immigration-billboard/">anti-immigrant sentiment</a> in the wake of escalating bilateral tensions. These concerns have been heightened in the face of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-the-latest-disease-to-fuel-mistrust-fear-and-racism-130853">Coronavirus: The latest disease to fuel mistrust, fear and racism</a>
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<p>These challenges continue to <a href="https://sppga.ubc.ca/news/hong-kong-contextualized-exploring-conflict-through-students-lens/">affect people</a> living in Canada, including students at the University of British Columbia.</p>
<p>Divisive politics and polarized ideologies <a href="https://sppga.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/01/HongKongSeries_Article3_Polarization_CassandraJeffery_Final_Revised.pdf">are fuelling</a> an atmosphere of reproachful disengagement and stereotyping within the diverse ethnic Chinese communities on this particular campus and <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/5824569/hong-kong-protests-chinese-canadian-community/">in the region</a>. </p>
<p>Similar <a href="https://www.guelphtoday.com/local-news/support-for-hong-kong-on-u-of-g-cannon-sparks-campus-conflict-4-photos-1883951">news reports</a> coming out of Canadian universities suggest this issue is not isolated to UBC’s campus. </p>
<h2>Student voices: The Hong Kong conflict</h2>
<p>To understand this issue more completely, we interviewed UBC students and alumni. As researchers, we engaged with students from Hong Kong, Taiwan and mainland China. <a href="https://sppga.ubc.ca/news/hong-kong-contextualized-exploring-conflict-through-students-lens/">Our findings</a> highlight the diverse range of perspectives within the diasporic community on UBC’s campus, and draws attention to a student-led initiative facilitating dialogue in times of political tension and increasing polarization. </p>
<p>“I love my country, but I don’t agree with being extremely patriotic,” said Jessica, a UBC alumnus. “[Chinese students are] disagreeing with Hong Kong students, but that doesn’t mean they’re any more Chinese for it.” </p>
<p>Jessica <a href="https://sppga.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/01/HongKongSeries_Article2_Identity_CassandraJeffery_Final-1.pdf">explained</a> how the conflict has affected her life here in Canada. Originally from mainland China, she moved to Vancouver close to 10 years ago to study at UBC. She’s always held liberal views, and yet, regardless of her beliefs and opinions, she feels targeted in Canadian society as an ethnically Chinese individual while scrutinized by some Chinese nationals for holding more liberal views. </p>
<p>“Someone basically told me, if you don’t come, you’re not Chinese,” said Jessica, referring to a pro-China protest held on UBC’s campus during the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/49862757">2014 umbrella movement</a>. </p>
<p>Zhang Wei, a graduate student at UBC, <a href="https://sppga.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/01/HongKongSeries_Article2_Identity_CassandraJeffery_Final-1.pdf">can relate</a>; he said his identity as a Chinese citizen makes his pro-democracy ideology problematic within his social circle.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Talking about Hong Kong is complex for me because I genuinely support the pro-democracy movement. I don’t agree with the way the Chinese government has been abusing human rights, especially in the last six years since [Chinese President] Xi Jingping took power.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Peter, an undergraduate student and Hong Kong native, added: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“We can have different aspects to our identity, but I don’t think we should tie ourselves to government ideology. Is it Hong Kong rejecting China, or is it Hong Kong rejecting the government and the PRC style of policy and rhetoric?” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Meanwhile, Hong Kong native and undergraduate student <a href="https://sppga.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/01/HongKongSeries_Article3_Polarization_CassandraJeffery_Final_Revised.pdf">Danielle said</a> it’s not about political disagreement, it’s about a complete lack of rights.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“It’s so frustrating, I am standing up for a basic fundamental right, but people think I am somehow destroying the society. Yes, I am radical in a way. I stand up for what I believe in, for my rights in society, but that doesn’t mean I hate mainlanders. I recognize where their thoughts and values come from. It’s really hard because it’s not about the facts and the communication, it’s the value system and the structural system that has defined our identities from a very young age.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Calvin, another undergraduate student at UBC, believes rejecting China and rejecting the government are one and the same, <a href="https://sppga.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/01/HongKongSeries_Article3_Polarization_CassandraJeffery_Final_Revised.pdf">suggesting</a> the Hong Kong government has failed to educate its constituents on the history and cultural values of China:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“There’s definitely a lot of tension between mainlanders and Hong Kongers. Most people just take what the western media says about protests, which is mostly negative towards China. China isn’t as bad as its portrayed. I’ve lived most of my life in China, and I don’t feel like my free speech has been challenged.” </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Hua Dialogue: Tackling difficult conversations</h2>
<p>The Hong Kong protests illustrate how such a divisive movement abroad can sow tensions among communities here in Canada. Easing those tensions isn’t easy. However, <a href="https://equity.ubc.ca/resources/resources-for-respectful-debate/">learning how</a> to effectively engage in difficult conversations might be a good place to start. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319898/original/file-20200311-116255-1n3nhe1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3500%2C2232&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319898/original/file-20200311-116255-1n3nhe1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319898/original/file-20200311-116255-1n3nhe1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319898/original/file-20200311-116255-1n3nhe1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319898/original/file-20200311-116255-1n3nhe1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319898/original/file-20200311-116255-1n3nhe1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319898/original/file-20200311-116255-1n3nhe1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this Jan. 1, 2020, photo, Hong Kong people participate in their annual pro-democracy march to insist their five demands be matched by the government in Hong Kong.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Vincent Yu)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The student-led <a href="https://www.facebook.com/ubcdialogue/">Hua Dialogue</a> at UBC provides a platform for people from different communities to exchange ideas, increase awareness and discuss contentious issues. Moderators <a href="https://sppga.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/01/HongKongSeries_Article4_Dialogue_Final_revised.pdf">facilitate dialogue</a> by indirectly discussing controversial subject matter through a neutral lens. One of their most <a href="https://sppga.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/01/HongKongSeries_Article4_Dialogue_Final_revised.pdf">recent conversations</a> debated the role of media as an influential tool in polarizing opinions. </p>
<p>“Hua Dialogue is a way to challenge stereotypes,” <a href="https://sppga.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/01/HongKongSeries_Article4_Dialogue_Final_revised.pdf">a member</a> of the Hua Executive team said in an interview. “You start to understand where people are coming from and what their viewpoints mean to them.” </p>
<p>Improving the China-Canada diplomatic relationship is fraught with hurdles, but it’s not impossible. At a minimum, we must understand the root cause of the problem from multiple vantage points if there is any chance of repair, both within Canadian communities and internationally.</p>
<p>It is a process that begins by learning how to question our biases and assumptions, while learning how to be comfortable with disagreement and ambiguity; a goal the Hua Dialogue team <a href="https://sppga.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/01/HongKongSeries_Article4_Dialogue_Final_revised.pdf">aims to achieve</a> in every meeting and with every disagreement. </p>
<p>“It was heartbreaking to see growing segregation within Chinese communities, so we wanted to contribute to a space that provides room for growth for people from all types of backgrounds,” <a href="https://sppga.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/01/HongKongSeries_Article4_Dialogue_Final_revised.pdf">added another member</a> of the Hua Executive team. </p>
<p>“Learning about individual experiences, and how they might influence an individual’s thoughts and values, is essential to understanding ourselves and processing our own experiences.” </p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article is based on a larger research project conducted and published by the University of British Columbia through the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs in Vancouver, Canada. Names used in this article have been changed to protect the identity of student interviewees. To review the research project in its entirety, <a href="https://sppga.ubc.ca/news/hong-kong-contextualized-exploring-conflict-through-students-lens/">click here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132225/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Improving the China-Canada diplomatic relationship is fraught with hurdles, but it’s not impossible. At minimum, we must understand the root cause of the problem from multiple vantage points.Timothy Cheek, Louis Cha Chair in Chinese Research and Professor of History, SPPGA, UBC, University of British ColumbiaCassandra Jeffery, Graduate Student, University of British ColumbiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1297402020-01-17T21:44:37Z2020-01-17T21:44:37Z‘Lennon Walls’ herald a sticky-note revolution in Hong Kong<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309498/original/file-20200110-97165-l8lmj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1599%2C1168&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hong Kong's first Lennon Wall appeared in 2014.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lennon_Wall_stair_view_20141101.jpg">Wpcpey/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Months of anti-government protests in Hong Kong have physically reshaped the city. As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=XzywWaQAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=sra">scholar of urban landscapes</a>, I have been interested in how the citizens and activists made use of the urban environment during the movement, including walls of Post-it sticky notes and other creative displays. </p>
<p>These spaces, which locals call “Lennon Walls,” have sprung up on buildings, walkways, sky bridges, underpasses and storefronts and carry messages like “Hong Kongers love freedom,” “garbage government” and “We demand real universal suffrage.” </p>
<p>The <a href="http://lonelyplanet.com/czech-republic/prague/atdtractions/john-lennon-wall/a/poi-sig/401339/358835">original Lennon Wall</a> was in central Prague, west of the Vltava River and south of the iconic Charles Bridge. Since the 1960s, the wall had been a location for romantic poems and anti-government messages. After Beatles legend John Lennon’s murder in 1980, someone painted a portrait of Lennon and some of his song lyrics on the wall. In time, messages evoking Lennon’s common themes of peace, love and democracy covered the space. It became a location for <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/pragues-famous-john-lennon-wall-it-over-or-just-reborn-180953415/">community-generated protest art that endures</a> – yet is ever-changing – today.</p>
<p>In Hong Kong, the first Lennon Wall appeared during the 2014 Umbrella Movement protests – named for their participants’ use of umbrellas to shield themselves from police pepper spray. This wall of an outdoor staircase in the city’s Admiralty district, near the Central Government Complex, was covered by handwritten sticky notes supporting the protest. The colorful mosaic became one of the most memorable sights of the movement.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309508/original/file-20200110-97178-a2vhry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309508/original/file-20200110-97178-a2vhry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309508/original/file-20200110-97178-a2vhry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309508/original/file-20200110-97178-a2vhry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309508/original/file-20200110-97178-a2vhry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309508/original/file-20200110-97178-a2vhry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309508/original/file-20200110-97178-a2vhry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309508/original/file-20200110-97178-a2vhry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In Hong Kong, pedestrian tunnels and other public walls have become Lennon Walls, spaces of protest and political engagement.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jeff Hou</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Freeing expression</h2>
<p>In 2019, as anti-government protests spread throughout Hong Kong, <a href="https://newslab.pts.org.tw/news/73">more than 100 Lennon Walls</a>, covered in sticky notes and other creative displays, appeared around the city. Like the rivers of protesters flowing through Hong Kong’s urban canyons, these sticky notes have covered all sorts of surfaces, including storefronts and freeway pillars. </p>
<p>The Lennon Walls in Hong Kong have transformed nondescript walkways, sky bridges and tunnels into spaces of gathering and exchange where ordinary people would pause, read, write, and engage others in conversations. The simple and highly adaptable technique has allowed multitudes of citizens, visitors and tourists to participate in the movement and the political debate. </p>
<p>The messages on the walls are not exclusively in support of the protest movement – one note read “Hong Kong belongs to China,” a view decidedly opposed to many of the protesters. But the community has apparently developed a tacit agreement that people won’t take down or cover over messages they disagree with. The walls themselves have become an exercise in democracy.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/07/10/dozens-police-riot-gear-remove-flyers-officers-personal-info-tai-po-lennon-wall-message-board/">Hong Kong’s authorities have removed</a> some of these walls over objections from protesters. However, new notes, posters and other displays reappear in a matter of hours. It’s another way the movement is expressing its motto, “<a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/hong-kong-protest-latest-bruce-lee-riot-police-water-a9045311.html">Be water</a>,” signifying that the protesters’ actions should be adaptable, tactical, fast and spontaneous – the way water flows through cracks in a structure.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309510/original/file-20200110-97165-x5pog9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309510/original/file-20200110-97165-x5pog9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309510/original/file-20200110-97165-x5pog9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309510/original/file-20200110-97165-x5pog9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309510/original/file-20200110-97165-x5pog9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309510/original/file-20200110-97165-x5pog9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=537&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309510/original/file-20200110-97165-x5pog9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=537&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309510/original/file-20200110-97165-x5pog9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=537&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Passersby transform a wall of a New York City subway tunnel with sticky notes carrying all sorts of messages.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jeff Hou</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Around the world</h2>
<p>As Hong Kong took inspiration from Prague, other cities have followed Hong Kong’s lead. </p>
<p>In November 2016, after Donald Trump’s surprise presidential win, New York City residents used sticky notes to transform a pedestrian tunnel beneath 14th Street into a space of therapy and mourning. Passersby would stop, read, take pictures, add to the collection and <a href="https://niemanstoryboard.org/stories/new-yorks-subway-therapist-and-his-collage-of-a-citys-hopes-and-fears/">come away with a sense of shared emotion</a>.</p>
<p>This spontaneous and collective form of public communication has brought new life to the historical idea of public space as a place for expression, dialogue and assembly, a concept dating back to the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/agora">Greek agora</a>. Recent examples included New York City’s <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/surprise-police-raid-clears-out-zuccotti-park/">Zuccotti Park during the Occupy Wall Street protest</a>, and the <a href="https://elpais.com/tag/movimiento_15m/a/">Puerta del Sol square in Madrid</a> during the 15M Movement where tens of thousands of people gathered to protest against the government’s austerity policy.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309511/original/file-20200110-97130-cyulx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309511/original/file-20200110-97130-cyulx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309511/original/file-20200110-97130-cyulx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309511/original/file-20200110-97130-cyulx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309511/original/file-20200110-97130-cyulx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309511/original/file-20200110-97130-cyulx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309511/original/file-20200110-97130-cyulx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309511/original/file-20200110-97130-cyulx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A spontaneous Lennon Wall appeared on a decorative pillar in the the popular Ximenting district of Taipei, Taiwan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jeff Hou</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Around the world, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lennon_Wall_(Hong_Kong)#Influence_around_the_world">Lennon Walls</a> have sprung up to show solidarity with the Hong Kong protesters. In New York City, supporters set up <a href="https://www.thevillager.com/2019/08/lennon-walls-imagine-a-new-hong-kong/">temporary, portable Lennon Walls in public parks</a>; there were similar efforts in Seattle and San Francisco.</p>
<p>In Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, supporters created spontaneous Lennon Walls in the tourist-frequented Ximenting area, and inside a pedestrian underpass near National Taiwan University. In Tokyo, supporters at the busy Shibuya crossing intersection became <a href="https://www.thestandnews.com/politics/%E6%9D%B1%E4%BA%AC%E6%B8%8B%E8%B0%B7%E7%8F%BE-%E9%80%A3%E5%84%82%E7%89%86-%E7%B4%99%E7%89%8C-%E4%BA%BA%E8%BA%AB%E4%BB%A3%E7%89%86%E9%81%BF%E5%85%8D%E6%89%93%E6%93%BE%E6%97%A5%E6%9C%AC%E4%BA%BA/?fbclid=IwAR15mDL_cig5sUhLHbP7_1Yq2aVFfQG3oKu0peomOdgbZ097WmGkC3BXthQ">human Lennon Walls</a>, inviting passersby to post messages of support on protesters’ clothes.</p>
<p>By occupying public walls, or at least publicly accessible ones, these Lennon Walls show how ordinary people are reclaiming urban spaces and voices in a political process. Even if sticky notes can’t themselves fuel a revolution, they serve as reminders that people have the collective ability to reinvigorate democracy, wherever they are.</p>
<p>[ <em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129740/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeff Hou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>First seen in Prague in 1980, a form of public protest and free expression has spread throughout Hong Kong and around the world.Jeff Hou, Professor of Landscape Architecture, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1287452019-12-30T08:48:55Z2019-12-30T08:48:55ZProtest has helped define the first two decades of the 21st century – here’s what’s next<p>The first two decades of the 21st century saw the return of mass movements to streets around the world. Partly a product of <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/2641-the-extreme-centre">sinking confidence in mainstream politics</a>, mass mobilisation has had a huge impact on both official politics and wider society, and protest has become the form of political expression to which millions of people turn. </p>
<p>2019 has ended with protests on a global scale, most notably in Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, Hong Kong and across India, which has recently flared up against Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s <a href="https://scroll.in/latest/947363/citizenship-act-protests-at-least-three-dead-thousands-detained-as-demonstrations-engulf-country">Citizenship Amendment Act</a>. In some cases protests are <a href="https://theconversation.com/chile-protests-escalate-as-widespread-dissatisfaction-shakes-foundations-of-countrys-economic-success-story-125628">explicitly against neoliberal reforms</a>, or against legal changes that threaten civil liberties. In others they are <a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/2196673-students-join-massive-global-strike-against-climate-change/">against inaction over the climate crisis</a>, now driven by a generation of young people new to politics in dozens of countries.</p>
<p>As we end a turbulent two decades of protest – the subject of much of my own teaching and ongoing research – what will be the shape of protest in the 2020s? </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/school-climate-strikes-what-next-for-the-latest-generation-of-activists-111594">School climate strikes: what next for the latest generation of activists?</a>
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</em>
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<hr>
<h2>What’s changed in the 21st century</h2>
<p>Following moments of open class warfare in the late 1960s and early 1970s, battles against the political and economic order became fragmented, trade unions were attacked, the legacy of the anti-colonial struggles was eroded and the <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/M/bo3644914.html">history of the period was recast by the establishment</a> to undermine its potency. In the post-Cold War era, a new phase of protest finally began to overcome these defeats. </p>
<p>This revival of protest exploded onto the political scene most visibly in Seattle outside the <a href="https://www.counterfire.org/articles/analysis/20748-unfinished-business-the-battle-of-seattle-twenty-years-on">World Trade Organization summit in 1999</a>. If 1968 was one of the high points of radical struggle in the 20th century, protest in the early 2000s once again began to reflect a general critique of the capitalist system, with solidarity forged across different sections of society. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307655/original/file-20191218-11904-1vvqk9v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307655/original/file-20191218-11904-1vvqk9v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307655/original/file-20191218-11904-1vvqk9v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307655/original/file-20191218-11904-1vvqk9v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307655/original/file-20191218-11904-1vvqk9v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307655/original/file-20191218-11904-1vvqk9v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307655/original/file-20191218-11904-1vvqk9v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protests against the WTO shook Seattle in 1999.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/seattlemunicipalarchives/37326739756/in/photolist-YSrihy-LyuU2F-xvukLi-PbKuvW-FSuUhP-y6KcKK-AHcHwy-5G9AfL-3JGcyT-BUVVh5-zNX4VY-yT3xC7-zxxgLg-zNXj97-zML7ps-5G9Apq-6P6S4e-3JLvdy-zQ4Sck-iZPYs-zMKUXj-zxrvWy-zQ4LdX-3JLvFJ-zxtzWw-zNXwYA-zNXyqU-yT25yu-yTbMfa-yTcVnv-yTbd8Z-zQ678z-zxurAw-zQZ3P2-yTctH4-yTcHBM-zQYZYc-yTcfFH-zQ556k-yTc5AT-zxt97L-zQ6dik-zMLW6u-zNXKTd-yT2ZDh-zQZ2wT-zNX8ew-yTbUpF-zxtLxG-zQ3DGc">Seattle Municipal Archives</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The birth of the anti-globalisation movement in Seattle was followed by extraordinary mobilisations outside gatherings of the global economic elite. Alternative spaces were also created for the <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/170-a-movement-of-movements">global justice movement</a> to connect, most notably the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0263276404047421">World Social Forums</a> (WSFs), starting with Porto Alegre, Brazil in 2001. It was here that questions over what position the anti-globalisation movement should take over the Iraq War, for example, were discussed and debated. Though the WSFs provided an important rallying point for a time, they <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436590902867003">ultimately evaded politics</a>.</p>
<p>The global anti-war movement led to <a href="https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/the-world-says-no-to-war">the biggest co-ordinated demonstrations</a> in the history of protest on <a href="https://wearemany.com/">February 15 2003</a>, in which millions of people demonstrated in over 800 cities, creating a crisis of democracy around the US and UK-led intervention in Iraq. </p>
<p>In the years leading up to and following the banking crisis of 2008, food riots and anti-austerity protests escalated around the world. In parts of the Middle East and North Africa, protests achieved insurrectionary proportions, with the overthrow of one dictator after another. After the <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438711000937">Arab Spring was thwarted by counter-revolution</a>, the Occupy movement and then Black Lives Matter gained global attention. While the public, urban square became a central focus for protest, social media became an important – but by <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/05/in-person-protests-stronger-online-activism-a-walking-life/578905/">no means exclusive</a> – organising tool.</p>
<p>To varying degrees, these movements sharply raised the question of political transformation but didn’t find new ways of institutionalising popular power. The result was that in a number of situations, protest movements fell back on widely distrusted parliamentary processes to try and pursue their political aims. The results of this parliamentary turn have not been impressive. </p>
<h2>Crisis of representation</h2>
<p>On the one hand, the first two decades of the 21st century have seen <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2017.1333414">soaring inequality</a>, accompanied by debt and the neglect of working people. On the other, there have been poor results from purely parliamentary attempts to challenge it. There is, in other words, a deep crisis of representation. </p>
<p>The inability of modern capitalism to deliver more than survival for many has combined with a general critique of neoliberal capitalism to create a situation in which wider and wider sections of society are being drawn into protest. More than a million people have poured <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/lebanons-october-revolution-must-go-on/">onto the streets of Lebanon</a> since mid-October and protests continue despite a violent crackdown by security forces.</p>
<p>At the same time, people are less and less willing to accept unrepresentative politicians – and this is likely to continue in the future. From <a href="https://theconversation.com/tripoli-the-lebanese-city-of-contrasts-thats-now-the-bride-of-an-ongoing-uprising-126223">Lebanon</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/violent-crackdown-against-iraq-protests-exposes-fallacy-of-the-countrys-democracy-124830">Iraq</a> to Chile and <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/hong-kong-protests-73625">Hong Kong</a>, mass mobilisations continue despite resignations and concessions. </p>
<p>In Britain, the Labour Party’s defeat in the recent general election is attributed largely to its <a href="https://jacobinmag.com/2019/12/labour-party-uk-brexit-jeremy-corbyn-general-election">failure to accept the 2016 referendum result</a> over EU membership. Decades of loyalty to the Labour Party for many and a socialist leader in Jeremy Corbyn calling for an end to austerity couldn’t cut through to enough of the millions who voted for Brexit. </p>
<p>In France, a general strike in December 2019 over President Emmanuel Macron’s proposed pension reforms <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A5c1lBiUjXA">has revealed the extent of opposition</a> that people feel towards his government. This comes barely a year after the start of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/gilets-jaunes-one-year-on-how-the-yellow-vest-movement-has-changed-french-citizens-lives-127178">Yellow Vest movement</a>, in which people have protested against fuel price hikes and the precariousness of their lives.</p>
<p>The tendency towards street protest will be encouraged too by the climate crisis, whose effects mean that the most heavily exploited, including along race and gender lines, have the most to lose. When the protests in Lebanon broke out, they were taking place <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/10/18/lebanons-protests-wildfires-tell-same-grim-story/">alongside rampant wildfires</a>. </p>
<h2>Thinking strategically</h2>
<p>As protesters gain experience, they consciously bring to the fore questions of leadership and organisation. In Lebanon and Iraq there has already been a conscious effort to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/607d3030-fcca-11e9-98fd-4d6c20050229">overcome traditional sectarian divides</a>. Debates are also raging in protest movements from Algeria to Chile about how to fuse economic and political demands in a more strategic manner. The goal is to make political and economic demands inseparable, such that it’s impossible for a government to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2012.738419">make political concessions without making economic ones too</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-future-of-protest-is-high-tech-just-look-at-the-catalan-independence-movement-125776">The future of protest is high tech – just look at the Catalan independence movement</a>
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<p>As the 2020s begin, it’s clear we’re living in an unprecedented moment: a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-needed-to-tackle-the-climate-emergency-and-who-is-responsible-127642">climate emergency</a> and ecological breakdown, a brewing <a href="https://theconversation.com/buckle-up-for-turbulence-why-a-global-debt-crisis-looks-very-hard-to-avoid-127260">global financial crisis</a>, deepening inequality, trade wars, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-iran-conflict-escalates-again-raising-the-threat-of-another-war-in-the-middle-east-118995">growing threats of more imperialist wars</a> and militarisation. </p>
<p>There has also been a resurgence of the far right in many countries, emboldened most visibly by parties and politicians in the US, Brazil, India and many <a href="https://theconversation.com/far-right-groups-may-be-diverse-but-heres-what-they-all-have-in-common-101919">parts of Europe</a>. This resurgence, however, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/13/between-five-rocks-and-sardines-protest-groups-take-to-streets-in-italy-matteo-salvini">has not gone unchallenged</a>. </p>
<p>The convergence of crisis on these multiple fronts will reach breaking point, creating conditions that will become intolerable for most people. This will galvanise more protest and more polarisation. As governments respond with reforms, such measures on their own will be unlikely to meet the combination of political and economic demands. The question of how to create new vehicles of representation to assert popular control over the economy will keep emerging. The fortunes of popular protest may well depend on whether the collective leadership of the movements can provide answers to it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128745/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Feyzi Ismail does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What shape will global protests take in the 2020s?Feyzi Ismail, Senior Teaching Fellow, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1281372019-12-04T19:36:20Z2019-12-04T19:36:20ZHong Kong: when the citizen-birds rebel<p>While the current protests in Hong Kong bear some similarities with other popular uprisings around the world – in Lebanon, Algeria, Bolivia, Chile or even <a href="https://theconversation.com/gilets-jaunes-one-year-on-how-yellow-vest-movement-has-changed-french-citizens-lives-127178">France</a> – observers have noted specific characteristics that set apart those in Hong Kong. </p>
<p>The unrest in Hong Kong began in March 2019 after the city’s governor, Carrie Lam, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/10/world/asia/hong-kong-extradition-bill.html">introduced a bill</a> that would allow citizens to be extradited to the People’s Republic of China, of which Hong Kong is part under special administrative status with a high degree of autonomy. The controversial bill was withdrawn <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/04/hong-kong-lam-to-withdraw-extradition-bill-say-reports">in September</a>, yet the movement continued, with protesters demanding the right to directly elect their government. This was a promise made by the United Kingdom after the 1997 handover of its formal colony, but since has been indefinitely delayed by China. </p>
<p>Hong Kong citizens are concerned about their increasingly uncertain future and in response have invented <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-democracy-protesters-care-about-their-own-future-not-the-mainlands-32769">new forms of solidarity</a>. Small groups of hyper-connected youth and students have been joined by other segments of the population such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-protests-city-workers-expats-and-unions-join-clamour-making-it-ever-harder-for-china-to-ignore-121138">union workers or even expatriates</a>.</p>
<p>Less noticed by observers are the explicit references to nature in two of the movement’s mottoes, “Be Water” or “Blossom everywhere”. Both inscribe the Hong Kong protests into a specifically Chinese cultural space.</p>
<h2>A fluid conception of collective action</h2>
<p>A number of media have highlighted the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/hong-kong-protest-latest-bruce-lee-riot-police-water-a9045311.html">connection between the motto “Be water” and the memory of Bruce Lee</a>, the hero of the Hong Kong movie industry who made kung-fu globally famous. In the 2000 documentary <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UfpgwrvbFbk&vl=fr"><em>A Warrior’s Journey</em></a>, Lee quotes a line he wrote for the 1970s TV film <em>Longstreet</em>: “Be formless, shapeless, like water”. This motto is inspired by an ancient principle of tai chi chuan: to control one’s inner energy, it must be perceived as <a href="http://www.watertradition.net/taichi.html">water circulating throughout the body</a>.</p>
<p>By encouraging protesters to spread rapidly when police arrive, the Hong Kong movement has adopted a fluid conception of collective action that is deeply inscribed in the Chinese tradition.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">“Be water, my friend”, Bruce Lee.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The second motto, “Blossom everywhere”, is an unexpected echo of one of the slogans of the Maoist period. In 1956 Mao Zedong launched the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Hundred-Flowers-Campaign">“Hundred Flowers Campaign”</a>, which encouraged Chinese citizens to openly express their opinions about the new communist regime: “Let hundred flowers blossom! Let hundred schools dispute!” (<em>Bǎihuā qífàng, bǎijiā zhēngmíng</em>). The campaign was an unexpected success – so much so that it was severely repressed the following year by Mao himself.</p>
<p>When the Hong Kong protesters subvert a Maoist slogan to protest against a regime that claims to be fulfilling Mao’s dream of a unified and developed China, they are borrowing from a tradition that belongs to the <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781349132058">long history of China</a>.</p>
<h2>Nature as a source for criticism</h2>
<p>At first glance, these two mottoes may seem contradictory. “Be water” refers to an element that is invisible and yet permanent, evoking the durability of the movement. On the other hand, “Blossom everywhere” refers to beings that are highly visible yet ephemeral, conveying the vulnerability of the protests. Rather than contradictory statements mixing the orders of nature and culture, these mottoes are performative statements through which Hong Kong citizens learn to perceive their collective environment in new ways.</p>
<p>The explicit reference to nature by protesters, who are highly aware of the current environmental crisis, bears an analogy with the thinking of alternative movements in France, who advise their members to <a href="https://www.terrestres.org/2018/10/11/le-point-de-vue-est-dans-le-corps/">“think like a jaguar”</a> or like a forest. But instead of borrowing animist concepts from Amazonia, Hong Kong protesters follow their own Chinese traditions.</p>
<p>In an <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/Assets/PubMaterials/978-1-4780-0698-5_601.pdf">upcoming book</a> presenting ethnographic research conducted in southern China in the last 12 years, I show that Hong Kong citizens have identified themselves with birds since 1997, the year when the former British colony returned to Chinese sovereignty and when the first cases of the influenza virus H5N1 emerged among humans and birds.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/303493/original/file-20191125-74580-17tcssv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/303493/original/file-20191125-74580-17tcssv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/303493/original/file-20191125-74580-17tcssv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/303493/original/file-20191125-74580-17tcssv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/303493/original/file-20191125-74580-17tcssv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/303493/original/file-20191125-74580-17tcssv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/303493/original/file-20191125-74580-17tcssv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/303493/original/file-20191125-74580-17tcssv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Bird market in Hong Kong.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Frédéric Keck</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>Such an identification was highly ambivalent, since it could focus either on domestic chickens, which were <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/12/30/hong-kong-destroys-its-chickens/54980a16-6112-4665-8622-4501a2510216/">slaughtered by the millions</a> in an attempt to blunt the spread of the disease, or on wild birds, suspected to carry viruses, although they were rarely infected because they carry the virus asymptotically.</p>
<h2>Bird-citizens</h2>
<p>The Hong Kong citizens I met during my research often compared themselves with birds to convey their contradictory feelings of living in tiny apartments like chickens trapped in the cages, and yet being able to escape like migratory birds by flying with planes all over the world. Such an ambivalent identification is clearly visible in the film made in 2008 by Johnnie To , <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oZ6gqV6RnWA"><em>Sparrow</em></a>.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Trailer from the movie <em>Sparrow</em>, 2008.</span></figcaption>
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<p>In 1997 the Hong Kong government ordered the slaughter of all poultry living on its territory – 1.5 million chickens, roosters, ducks, geese and quails – and citizens perceived the killing as a violent demonstration of China’s new sovereignty over the city.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://correspondent.afp.com/kill-chicken-scare-monke">traditional Chinese saying</a> goes : “Kill the rooster to scare the monkey” (<em>shā jī xià hóu</em>). Hong Kong citizens considered that chickens and other birds were the sacrificial victims of a political spectacle offered by the Chinese sovereign to its new subjects, warning them that they could be next on the list.</p>
<p>Such a sacrificial interpretation of what seems like a radical yet legitimate public health measure resonates with the current motivations of the most engaged Hong Kong demonstrators, who say that they are ready to die to denounce China’s power, as a previous generation of students did in Beijing in 1989.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The 1989 repression at the Tiananmen Square (INA).</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Symbols, sacrifice and active images</h2>
<p>This is where the symbols used by the protest movement in Hong Kong distinguish it from others around the world. In 1989, the students in Beijing built a “Goddess of Democracy” (<em>zìyóu nǚshén</em>), based on the US Statue of Liberty. They placed it in front of the People’s Assembly and the Forbidden City. Such gesture implied an opposition of Chinese and Western symbols. The act prompted the Chinese government, led by Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng, to justify the repression of the protest movement and to erase it from the memories of the Chinese population.</p>
<p>But the Hong Kong citizens mobilise active images rather than cultural symbols – that is, images through which they act like natural elements to divert the forces of the police. In the same way, when they wanted to criticise the precautionary measures taken by the Hong Kong government against bird flu, they identified not with the chickens that were massively slaughtered but with migratory birds that fly across borders. Rather than becoming sacrificial victims of the Chinese government, they see themselves as sentinels of the global environmental crisis.</p>
<p>Analogical thinking has dominated the Chinese tradition. It was centred around the sacrificial operation through which the <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/ten-thousand-things">“ten thousand beings”</a> composing the world are made to hold together. Yet as anthropologist Philippe Descola <a href="https://www.college-de-france.fr/media/philippe-descola/UPL35678_descola_cours0203.pdf">has shown</a>, it is also compatible with some forms of animism, which contest and subvert the polarities of analogism.</p>
<p>Following this hypothesis, I suggest that the Hong Kong citizens have reinserted animism within analogism. Similarly, some alternative movements in France, such as the successful struggle against the construction of the <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/debats/2019/06/02/alessandro-pignocchi-la-zad-a-defendre_1731180">Notre-Dame des Landes airport</a>, reinserted animism within naturalism.</p>
<p>When they identify with water, flowers or birds, Hong Kong citizens contest from inside the sacrificial power of Chinese sovereignty. While anthropology is neither a predictive science nor a universalist model, we can bet that their movement has a future, and that it concerns every human being.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=121&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=121&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=121&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=152&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=152&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=152&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Created in 2007 to help accelerate and share scientific knowledge on key societal issues, the Axa Research Fund has been supporting nearly 600 projects around the world conducted by researchers from 54 countries. To learn more, visit the site of the <a href="https://www.axa-research.org/en/">Axa Research Fund</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128137/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frédéric Keck received funding from the Axa Research Fund.</span></em></p>Hong Kong protesters deeply identify with nature, a reference to the current environmental crisis but also a fluid conception of collective action that is inscribed in ancient Chinese tradition.Frédéric Keck, Directeur du laboratoire d'anthropologie sociale, Collège de FranceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1257102019-11-21T04:31:20Z2019-11-21T04:31:20ZNZ remains unscathed by US-China trade war, but that’s no reason for complacency<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302602/original/file-20191120-542-1ut20an.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=20%2C342%2C6689%2C4124&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">While tariffs have a direct impact on exporters in the US and China, third-party countries like New Zealand are more affected by non-tariff barriers.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Aleksandar Plavevski</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Despite <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/10/14/the-end-of-global-supply-chains-as-we-know-them/">disruptions to global value chains</a>, the <a href="https://fortune.com/2019/10/14/us-china-trade-war-truce-vague-details-phase-one-us-china-trade-agreement/">18-month trade tensions</a> between the US and China appear to have left New Zealand exporters unscathed so far. </p>
<p>As our analysis of <a href="https://www.stats.govt.nz/">StatsNZ</a>’s <a href="https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/overseas-merchandise-trade-august-2019">merchandise trade data</a> shows, New Zealand has managed an overall growth of 4.7% in merchandise exports over the year ending in August. New Zealand exports to top trading partner China grew by 19.6% (slightly less than 21.1% during the previous year).</p>
<p>There was also strong growth in exports to Thailand (18.7%, compared to negative growth in 2017/2018) and to the Philippines (15.5% compared to 7.2%). </p>
<p>It is not all good news, though. Exports to New Zealand’s second most important trading partner Australia dropped to -0.1% (from 5.8% in 2017/2018). More worryingly, there was a sharp drop from 43.9% to 4.4% for Hong Kong, 39.4% to -10.1% for Singapore, 23.4% to -18% for the United Arab Emirates, and many other countries. Export growths to almost all of New Zealand’s second-tier trading partners have fallen. </p>
<p>Should New Zealand exporters be worried about these shifts in exports? There are several ways we can drill deeper into the impacts of the trade war between the world’s two largest economies.</p>
<h2>Politics in the way of trade</h2>
<p>First, exporters may be concerned over <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/19/business/economy/trade-war-economic-concerns.html">politically motivated policies</a> that would have an adverse effect on goods from New Zealand. While the impact of tariffs is immediate for US and Chinese exporters, the most worrying aspects for exporters from third-party countries like New Zealand are <a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3033323/proposed-us-china-trade-and-brexit-deals-have-spurred-investor">non-tariff barriers that can be politically motivated</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-get-ready-as-the-us-china-trade-war-spills-over-to-other-countries-114361">How to get ready as the US-China trade war spills over to other countries</a>
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<p>For more than 70 years, the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (<a href="https://www.wto.org/">WTO</a>) (previously GATT) provided a process for countries to resolve trade grievances. But the US-China trade war has sidelined these global principles and <a href="http://digamoo.free.fr/tradewarcepr19.pdf#page=22">replaced them with tit-for-tat exchanges of tariffs and political power wrestling</a> between the two big powers. As politics gets in the way of trade flows, companies are encountering an <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022199618304604">increasing level of political control or intervention</a> (e.g. stricter checks at customs, stricter processes for issuing or renewing licences for importing, and stricter scrutiny over inbound or outbound foreign direct investment). </p>
<p>While many non-tariff trade barriers are not caused by the trade war, they are <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/07/nabe-economists-lower-outlook-see-rising-risk-of-recession.html">amplifying fear and worry about protectionist measures</a>, with <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3033354/chinas-car-industry-slowdown-continue-2020-tariff-impact">negative sentiment among customers and suppliers</a> (especially from the US and China). New Zealand exporters need to calm their customers and reassure them that the current political stand-off between the two giants does not affect New Zealand’s commitments to their markets. </p>
<h2>Patriotic consumer response</h2>
<p>Second, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2019-10-08/unwinnable-trade-war">consumer boycotts</a> can become contagious during international political conflicts. A disagreement with political powers of a country can be interpreted as an attack on the identity of people in in-group cultures. </p>
<p>Some companies, such as the Danish company Arla, were boycotted in Middle Eastern markets because they were associated, through country of origin, with the Danish cartoonists behind the <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0024630108001155">Muhammad cartoons</a>, which offended Muslims. When it comes to China, <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/balancing-act-china-nationalist-consumer-boycotts">consumer boycotts can be accelerated and politically directed</a> because of the size of the market and political structure of the country. Consumers often collectively and emotionally <a href="https://fortune.com/2019/06/26/china-consumers-boycot-us-brands/">follow the guidance of political forces</a>. </p>
<p>China is an <a href="https://www.scmp.com/sport/basketball/article/3032993/nba-china-crisis-lebron-james-uneducated-daryl-morey-stance-and">extra sensitive market</a> because of its <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/economy/articles/2019-10-11/trading-silence-for-access-the-cost-of-doing-business-in-china">relatively closed society</a> (with internet and other censorship), <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3033172/us-fears-over-economic-damage-further-tariffs-china">rising nationalism</a> and strong <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/08858621211251460/full/html">collectivist and in-group culture</a>. The current Hong Kong crisis could easily embroil any foreign company that has either intentionally or unintentionally supported the youth and democratic movements. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/university-under-siege-a-dangerous-new-phase-for-the-hong-kong-protests-127228">University under siege: a dangerous new phase for the Hong Kong protests</a>
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<p>The most recent example is the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/houston-we-have-a-china-problem-11570487719">boycott of the Houston Rockets and National Basketball Association</a> by Chinese official media and sponsors because the Rockets’ general manager Daryl Morey tweeted a message supporting the Hong Kong movement. Cathay Pacific was also targeted, and its CEO resigned following <a href="https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=12259334">pressure by Beijing</a> over participation by some of its employees in protests. </p>
<h2>Rising costs of exports</h2>
<p>Third, <a href="https://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/international_trade/">exporting costs rise</a> as a result of political disruptions in global trade. A trade war creates uncertainty among managers about the global business environment. <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3031052/chinese-americans-urged-fight-back-dispel-growing-cloud">Information is largely asymmetrical</a>, complex and dynamic. Firms have to spend <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/trump-trade-war-tariffs-china-manufacturing-deal-intellectual-property-1465751">more resources to communicate</a>, coordinate and adjust to the threat from political disruptions. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.spglobal.com/en/research-insights/articles/global-growth-is-down-but-not-out">Sluggish export demand</a>, negative customer sentiment, decreasing export prices and volatile foreign exchange rates can all contribute to the costs of exporting. </p>
<p>Overall, the current trade war or the evident (or potential) <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3032768/chinas-exports-suffer-biggest-drop-february-us-trade-war">political decoupling between the US and China</a> has made global business and export environments especially sensitive. </p>
<p>Companies in New Zealand should watch closely how the trade tensions develop and avoid politically provocative marketing, communication and public relations while finding ways to address rising export costs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125710/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>So far, New Zealand exporters have not been affected by the trade war between the US and China, but the Hong Kong crisis could easily embroil any foreign company.Hongzhi Gao, Associate professor, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of WellingtonIvy Guo, Research Assistant, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of WellingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1272922019-11-19T14:05:23Z2019-11-19T14:05:23ZIs there hope for a Hong Kong revolution?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302257/original/file-20191118-66953-ss5fu8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3087%2C2080&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hong Kong protesters shelter behind a thin barrier – and umbrellas – as police fire tear gas and encircle a group of demonstrators.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Hong-Kong-Protests/b49d0d929bad4345b182403dff51aedc/2/0">AP Photo/Vincent Yu</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hong Kong may seem like an unlikely place for a revolution. In this relatively affluent and privileged city, young people might be expected to be more concerned with making money than with protesting in the streets. Yet day after day, demonstrators in Hong Kong <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/hong-kong-protesters-make-last-stand-as-police-close-in-on-besieged-university/2019/11/18/7f614012-09c8-11ea-8054-289aef6e38a3_story.html">risk injury and death</a> confronting security forces backed by the massive power of the Chinese government.</p>
<p><a href="https://yp.scmp.com/hongkongprotests5demands">Among their demands</a> are democratic elections for the city’s Legislative Council and chief executive. Their desire for fundamental change has mounted, and they increasingly <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/i-will-die-with-the-city-a-young-womans-chilling-message-from-hong-kongs-front-lines/2019/10/24/9f51a35e-f0b3-11e9-bb7e-d2026ee0c199_story.html">see their own lives as lacking meaning</a> unless circumstances change.</p>
<p>Historians have long argued that revolutions are built not on deep misery but on rising expectations. Since the 18th century, societies, clubs and associations of intellectuals have been seedbeds of radical change in countries throughout the world. They provided <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jsh/article/52/3/545/5159508">leadership for the French Revolution</a> in 1789, the <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/1848-the-revolution-of-the-intellectuals-9780197261118?cc=us&lang=en&">European revolutions of 1848</a> and the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Russian-Revolution-of-1905">Russian Revolution of 1905</a>.</p>
<p>The situation in Hong Kong is revolutionary, too, although the history of past revolutions may not provide much hope of immediate change.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302260/original/file-20191118-66957-rxk169.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302260/original/file-20191118-66957-rxk169.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302260/original/file-20191118-66957-rxk169.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302260/original/file-20191118-66957-rxk169.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302260/original/file-20191118-66957-rxk169.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302260/original/file-20191118-66957-rxk169.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302260/original/file-20191118-66957-rxk169.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302260/original/file-20191118-66957-rxk169.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A view of the Hungarian Revolution before the Soviet tanks rolled in.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1956_Gabor_B._Racz_Hungarian_Revolution.jpg">Gabor B. Racz/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A look at Hungary</h2>
<p>The most compelling parallel to Hong Kong may be the <a href="https://time.com/3878232/the-hungarian-revolution-of-1956-photos-from-the-streets-of-budapest/">Hungarian Revolution of 1956</a>, which attempted to <a href="http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/hungarianrevolution.htm">wrest power</a> from a communist regime. It, too, <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5379586.stm">began with a student uprising</a> in favor of democratic elections.</p>
<p>Within a few days, the communist government resigned and a reformist administration was formed under <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Imre-Nagy">Imre Nagy</a>, who allowed noncommunists to enter political office. This went too far for communist leaders in the Soviet Union. The USSR invaded Hungary, <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/soviets-put-brutal-end-to-hungarian-revolution">overthrew Nagy’s regime</a> and secretly put him to death. </p>
<p>As with the Hong Kong protests today, the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20191118164342/https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/107186.htm">United States gave little official support</a> to the Hungarian Revolution and was unwilling to offer material assistance. Keeping peace in Europe was of vital importance to U.S. policy in 1956, just as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/03/world/asia/hong-kong-protesters-call-for-us-help-china-sees-a-conspiracy.html">good relations with China</a> are now central.</p>
<p>The Hungarian example may provide little solace to the Hong Kong protesters – except, perhaps, if they consider its long-term consequences. </p>
<p>In October 1989, with Soviet influence in Eastern Europe collapsing, the democratic Republic of Hungary was declared on the 33rd anniversary of the 1956 revolution. Those who died during that revolution are now <a href="https://year1989.pl/y89/hungary/history/8697,Hungary.html">remembered as martyrs</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302263/original/file-20191118-66971-1ivvpxg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302263/original/file-20191118-66971-1ivvpxg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302263/original/file-20191118-66971-1ivvpxg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302263/original/file-20191118-66971-1ivvpxg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302263/original/file-20191118-66971-1ivvpxg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302263/original/file-20191118-66971-1ivvpxg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302263/original/file-20191118-66971-1ivvpxg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302263/original/file-20191118-66971-1ivvpxg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A contemporary print depicting the battle at the Ta-ping gate at Nanking, part of China’s Revolution of 1911.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:An_episode_in_the_revolutionary_war_in_China,_1911_-_the_battle_at_the_Ta-ping_gate_at_Nanking._Wellcome_L0040002.jpg">T. Miyano, Wellcome Library/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>In China’s own history</h2>
<p>Chinese history supplies a more heartening example of a successful student-led uprising: the <a href="https://alphahistory.com/chineserevolution/xinhai-1911-revolution/">Revolution of 1911</a>. It was fomented by young men returning from study abroad, who formed political societies to “<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Revive-Han-Association">revive</a>” their country, often disguised as literary discussion groups.</p>
<p>The 1911 Revolution mobilized networks of intellectuals and students throughout China, but it also drew on other social groups: military officers, merchants, coal miners and farmers. The revolution erupted in many parts of China simultaneously and <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2011/10/08/from-sun-to-mao-to-now">had various outcomes</a>, from utter failure, to the massacre of ethnic Manchus to declarations of Mongol and Tibetan independence. A provisional government emerged by the end of the year in Nanjing.</p>
<p>The Hong Kong protests, however, are too limited in geographical scope and social support to repeat the success of the 1911 revolutionaries.</p>
<p>The subsequent Chinese revolution in 1949, like the 1917 Russian Revolution, <a href="https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/uk.hightide/distinguishingfeatures.htm">followed Leninist theory</a> and was spearheaded by professional party insiders, not by intellectuals. The communists regarded mass protests as potentially counter-revolutionary and as threats to the new order.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302267/original/file-20191118-66917-1gtjnot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302267/original/file-20191118-66917-1gtjnot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302267/original/file-20191118-66917-1gtjnot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302267/original/file-20191118-66917-1gtjnot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302267/original/file-20191118-66917-1gtjnot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302267/original/file-20191118-66917-1gtjnot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302267/original/file-20191118-66917-1gtjnot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302267/original/file-20191118-66917-1gtjnot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">On June 5, 1989, a Chinese man stood alone to block a line of tanks in Tiananmen Square.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/China-70-Years-Mao-to-McDonalds/5ef78baeea4d4a9a9ef519dd3e0cc524/104/0">AP Photo/Jeff Widener</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>The young protestors in Hong Kong seek to avoid the fate of the student demonstrators of <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/china/tiananmen-square">Tiananmen Square in spring 1989</a>. Three decades ago, hundreds, perhaps thousands, of protesters were massacred after the communist government invoked martial law. The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tiananmen-idUSKCN1T3001">pro-democracy agenda of the Tiananmen protesters</a> was vague, and they relied on reformers within the party apparatus, who finally betrayed them.</p>
<p>The Hong Kong crowds are focused on specific changes and lack illusions about the party. They will go down fighting desperately, not <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/tank-man-the-picture-that-almost-wasnt/">standing with faint hope in front of tanks</a>. That may give pause to the forces of repression. As the Communist Party of China and any student of history knows, martyrs are the fuel of future revolutions.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Monod does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Revolutions are built not on deep misery but on rising expectations. History may not provide much hope of immediate change in Hong Kong – but protesters may have a longer view.Paul Monod, Professor of History, MiddleburyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.