tag:theconversation.com,2011:/es/topics/international-relations-1577/articlesInternational relations – The Conversation2024-03-03T14:27:16Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2249152024-03-03T14:27:16Z2024-03-03T14:27:16ZBrian Mulroney’s tough stand against apartheid is one of his most important legacies<p>With his <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/brian-mulroney-passes-away-1.7130287">passing</a> announced on Feb. 29, Canadians have cause to reflect on the legacy of former prime minister Brian Mulroney. What will last when the great book of history is written is that Mulroney played a central role in the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa. </p>
<p>This contribution, along with Canada’s contributions to the First and Second World Wars and <a href="https://www.warmuseum.ca/learn/canada-and-peacekeeping-operations/">the creation of peacekeeping</a>, will stand among the great foreign policy contributions in Canadian history. </p>
<p>At the outset, we must acknowledge that apartheid — the system of racial separation and white domination of Blacks and others in South Africa — was <a href="https://theconversation.com/world-politics-explainer-the-end-of-apartheid-101602">brought down principally by South Africans themselves</a>. Their internal opposition to the regime, their mobilization of world opinion and action against it and their courage and moral clarity was a necessary condition for its end. </p>
<p>But the end of apartheid was accelerated by allies in the democratic West, and <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-brian-mulroney-south-africa-ramaphosa/">at the head of that group stood Mulroney</a>. Indeed, there is good reason why <a href="https://macleans.ca/news/world/macleans-archives-mandelas-three-city-visit-to-canada/">Nelson Mandela made his first foreign visit to Canada’s Parliament</a> after his release from prison in February of 1990. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2015/12/08/statement-prime-minister-canada-former-prime-minister-brian-mulroney">South Africa awarded Mulroney its highest honour for foreign citizens</a> in 2015 for his “exceptional contribution to South Africa’s liberation movement and his steadfast support for the release of Nelson Mandela.”</p>
<p>It is important that we recognize this accomplishment not only for its moral merits, but because it can teach us how Canadian foreign policy — for moral and instrumental ends — can be done effectively. There are three lessons to learn (or relearn). </p>
<h2>Lesson 1: Mulroney recognized apartheid as indefensible</h2>
<p>Mulroney’s opposition to apartheid was not driven by simple domestic politics and certainly not by diasporic concerns. Opposition to apartheid was widely held in Canada in the late 1980s and it was a live issue. But it was not one that obviously favoured Mulroney politically. So, why did he oppose it? </p>
<p>First, the issue was to him one of simple justice and morality. Like his early political mentor, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/1771019570">John Diefenbaker</a>, he thought the system was indefensible and immoral. It could not be redeemed by instrumental appeals to anti-Communism or whatever other realpolitik defences <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/brian-mulroney-legacy-south-africa-apartheid-1.7130982">U.S. President Ronald Reagan or U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher</a> advanced. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/brian-mulroney-champion-of-free-trade-brought-canada-closer-to-the-u-s-during-his-reign-as-prime-minister-224852">Brian Mulroney, champion of free trade, brought Canada closer to the U.S. during his reign as prime minister</a>
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<p>Second, he thought it was contrary to Canadian values, which have their roots in the founding of the country as a place dedicated to bringing different groups closer together, rather than farther apart. To maintain Canada’s credibility in the world as a <a href="https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/middle-power">middle power</a>, Canada had to act in a way that was consistent with a system of values, and not simple power. </p>
<h2>Lesson 2: Mulroney leveraged political and personal power</h2>
<p>Mulroney was a master of the multilateral system. By the late 1980s, accelerating and amplifying pressure on apartheid South Africa required ever stronger and <a href="https://www.history.com/news/end-apartheid-steps">tighter sanctions</a>. This required as many nations as possible to agree to as strong a sanction regime as possible. </p>
<p>I had the opportunity to directly ask Mulroney about his international leadership in the campaign against apartheid. As director of the <a href="https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/event/conversation-rt-hon-brian-mulroney">Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy</a>, I hosted a conversation with Mulroney in September 2022. When I asked him how he used international institutions, Mulroney said:</p>
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<p>People who say that nations only have interests, no friendships, is nonsense. … Everybody has interests but also friendships. And you can’t deal at the international level with any hostility. You gotta try and bring people (together). Canada is a middle power. We’re not a superpower. So we have to leverage our assets as best we can.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The author of this article, Peter Loewen, in conversation with Brian Mulroney on Sept. 22, 2022, at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy.</span></figcaption>
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<p>By 1987 and 1988, Mulroney had managed to secure the chairmanship of three international organizations covering the majority of the democratic world: The Commonwealth, the G7 and the Francophonie. In each of those organizations, he built personal ties with leaders, reinforced by a deep appreciation for their own domestic concerns and motivations. </p>
<p>When push came to shove on <a href="https://doi.org/10.3138/jcs.25.4.17">tightening sanction regimes,</a> he had both personal power and agenda-setting power. He could put apartheid on the agenda, and he could use the depth of relationships to push and pull leaders to his own position. We have not had a prime minister since who has combined institutional power and personal connection to such an effect. </p>
<h2>Lesson 3: Mulroney played a long game</h2>
<p>Mulroney played a long(ish) game. When South African President <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/11/world/south-africa-s-new-era-mandela-go-free-today-de-klerk-proclaims-ending-chapter.html">F.W. de Klerk announced in February 1990 the immediate release of Mandela from a prison</a> off the coast of Cape Town, he did not simultaneously agree to dismantle the laws enforcing apartheid. </p>
<p>Despite this, by Mulroney’s telling, he was under immediate and intense <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/07/14/thatcher-and-mulroney-clash-on-sanctions-against-s-africa/125f7806-a7f5-46aa-85ec-8f49f8c7f991/">pressure from Thatcher</a> to support the lifting of sanctions. Mulroney refused to do so until the system of racial separation in law was dismantled. </p>
<p>The broader context is important here. The Berlin Wall had fallen the year before and the world was experiencing a menacing uncertainty. Mulroney knew that the creation of a broader <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/664d7fa5-d575-45da-8129-095647c8abe7">rules-based order</a> with greater international security, more trade and more, not less, reconciliation depended deeply on defending democratic values. Those values had to be as deeply defended in South Africa as they were in a soon reunified Germany. They could not be abandoned as soon as attention moved elsewhere. </p>
<h2>Mulroney’s legacy</h2>
<p>We can arrive at different judgments of Mulroney’s legacy. To me, it is one marked by huge success and risky failures — but always an ambition to do big, consequential things. But in the final judgment, his confrontation of apartheid married moral clarity and effective politics. If only our politics had that same leadership again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224915/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Loewen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Brian Mulroney’s role in the campaign against apartheid in South Africa can teach us how Canadian foreign policy can be done effectively.Peter Loewen, Director, Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2228262024-02-21T12:29:46Z2024-02-21T12:29:46ZFree movement in west Africa: three countries leaving Ecowas could face migration hurdles<p>For Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, a recent decision to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947">withdraw</a> from the <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States</a> (Ecowas) has thrown up questions about how they will navigate regional mobility in future. </p>
<p>Ecowas covers a variety of sectors, but migration is a major one. The bloc’s protocols since 1979 have long been seen as a <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-97322-3_2">shining example</a> of free movement on the continent. They gave citizens the right to move between countries in the region without a visa, and a prospective right of residence and setting up businesses.</p>
<p>As multidisciplinary scholars we have previously researched <a href="https://www.arnold-bergstraesser.de/en/political-economy-west-african-migration-governance-wamig-2">migration governance in west Africa</a>, at the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2022.2084452">regional level</a>, and in particular contexts like <a href="https://ecdpm.org/work/what-does-regime-change-niger-mean-migration-cooperation-eu">Niger</a>. </p>
<p>We argue that Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have much to lose if their departure from Ecowas curtails mobility. But it is likely that informal mobility will continue anyway. </p>
<h2>Why free movement matters</h2>
<p>In September 2023, the three countries created a <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-have-a-new-defence-alliance-an-expert-view-of-its-chances-of-success-215863">mutual defence pact</a>, named <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sahel-coups-niger-tchiani-mali-burkina-faso-insecurity-e96627c700aa4fcf8d060dd9d2d16667">the Alliance of Sahel States</a>. This indicated their solidarity in dealing with insecurity. </p>
<p>Yet they also depend on neighbouring countries in the region, which puts these three countries in a difficult position.</p>
<p>The three countries that announced their withdrawal from Ecowas are connected in a web of mobility. Notably, Niger, seen as a key transit country for refugees and other migrants on their way to Europe, received <a href="https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/migration-and-society/3/1/arms030107.xml">major funds and support</a> from the European Union to prevent onward migration to Libya and beyond. </p>
<p>One central measure was <a href="https://www.refworld.org/legal/legislation/natlegbod/2015/fr/123771">Loi 2015-36</a>, a law which punished people transporting migrants with fines and prison sentences. The law was <a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/european-dominance-of-migration-policy-in-niger-31383/">mostly developed</a> by external actors and had detrimental effects on the <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/multilateral-damage.pdf">local economy</a>. It also made migration journeys across the Sahara desert even <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc4138add1-visit-niger-report-special-rapporteur-human-rights-migrants">more dangerous</a>. </p>
<p>In November 2023, the law, which <a href="https://www.arnold-bergstraesser.de/sites/default/files/medam_niger_jegen.pdf">arguably violated</a> the principles of free movement under Ecowas, was repealed by the Nigerien coup leaders. </p>
<p>Mali is another major transit country in the region, as well as a country of origin for regional migration. It has a complicated history of <a href="https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/72355">migration cooperation</a> with Europe. </p>
<p>Of less relevance to Europe, but more for regional dynamics, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-39814-8_11">Burkina Faso</a> is at the centre for <a href="https://www.mideq.org/en/migration-corridors/burkina-faso-cote-divoire/">regional migration</a>, often seasonal. Labour migration supports Côte d'Ivoire’s cocoa industry. After withdrawal from Ecowas, such labour migration may be difficult unless people resort more to informal migration. </p>
<p>As we have shown in our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2022.2084452">previous research</a>, informal mobility has always existed along with formal mobility governance. Official border crossing points are often not used, despite the legal requirement to do so. </p>
<p>Hence, leaving Ecowas may increase corruption and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/imig.12766">problems of harassment</a> at formal border crossings as well as <a href="https://mixedmigration.org/resource/human-rights-migrants-smuggling-mali-niger/">increased use of mobility facilitators</a>, or “passeurs”. These are people who negotiate passage through formal border crossings and organise journeys through other routes. </p>
<p>The legal gaps that the current situation creates could be very expensive for businesses and individuals. People may in the near future require visas. And for those who have migrated regionally, the right to stay in a country of residency may soon be under threat. </p>
<h2>An immediate exit</h2>
<p>Days after they <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947">announced</a> their withdrawal from <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/">Ecowas</a>, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger <a href="https://www.ewn.co.za/2024/02/08/burkina-mali-and-niger-reject-one-year-period-to-quit-ecowas">insisted</a> they were not bound by <a href="https://ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Revised-treaty-1.pdf#page=53">rules stipulating</a> a one year notice period before their final exit. </p>
<p>The announcement about leaving Ecowas outside the normal regulations was dramatic, but not unexpected. Military governments that took power in a series of coups in August 2020 and May 2021 in <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/mali-un-coup-dans-le-coup">Mali</a>, September 2022 in <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-burkina-faso-latest-coup/">Burkina Faso</a> and July 2023 in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/armed-troops-blockade-presidential-palace-in-niger-mohamed-bazoum">Niger</a> rule the three countries.</p>
<p>Ecowas has exerted political and economic pressure on the three countries to return to constitutional rule, through sanctions and the <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/policy-briefs/military-intervention-niger-imperatives-and-caveats">threat</a> of military intervention. </p>
<p>In Niger, for example, Ecowas <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-bazoum-coup-sanctions-ecowas-c7bdfd06559f1cfbfb856bea5b11a55f">closed</a> official border crossings, cut off more than <a href="https://punchng.com/niger-nigeria-cuts-power-supply-ecowas-vows-to-confront-junta/">70% </a> of electricity, and suspended financial transactions with other countries in the region. </p>
<p>International assets <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/31/nigers-planned-51-mln-bond-issuance-cancelled-due-to-sanctions">were frozen</a> and international aid halted. Even before the coup, <a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/thousands-children-niger-risk-severe-nutritional-crisis-border-closures-leave-trucks-stranded#:%7E:text=Furthermore%2C%20prior%20to%20the%20political,least%20one%20form%20of%20malnutrition.">3.3 million people</a> in Niger experienced acute food insecurity. </p>
<p>The Ecowas sanctions made daily life even worse and in all likelihood added to the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate">popularity</a> of the coup leaders. </p>
<p>Similar sanctions were applied in Mali. The population has suffered as a result and the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-arent-sanctions-preventing-coups-in-africa">effectiveness</a> of the sanctions is questionable. </p>
<p>Sanctions in Burkina Faso included <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-arent-sanctions-preventing-coups-in-africa">travel bans</a> against members of the military government.</p>
<h2>Potential ways ahead</h2>
<p>For Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, there are several considerations when it comes to regional mobility in their post-Ecowas era. These may include exploring the provisions of the <a href="https://www.uemoa.int/en">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a>; a return to bilateral agreements with individual neighbours; or relying on the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">African Union Protocol on Free Movement</a>. </p>
<p><strong>Monetary union:</strong> The three countries are still part of the <a href="https://www.uemoa.int/en">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a> (Waemu), a union around the common currency, the CFA franc.</p>
<p>The regional monetary union also has provisions for free movement of people and goods across its member countries. With this option, access to seaports, a major issue for all three landlocked countries, is ensured through other members of the monetary union, including, for example, Senegal. </p>
<p>On the downside is the fact that a major argument for leaving Ecowas was the perceived role of external influence over the regional bloc. The strong anti-imperialist discourse of the military governments does not bode well for the regional monetary union either. The union is the institutional framework for regional monetary policy over which France <a href="https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745341798/africas-last-colonial-currency/">continues</a> to exert significant influence. </p>
<p>Burkina Faso has already <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-may-quit-west-african-currency-union-not-mali-2024-01-31/">announced</a> its intention to leave the monetary union too. </p>
<p>The West Africa Economic and Monetary Union also excludes major trading partners like Nigeria – of major importance to landlocked <a href="https://www.inter-reseaux.org/en/publication/51-special-issue-nigeria/nigerias-role-in-nigers-food-security/">Niger</a> for food supplies. Trade and commerce between Nigeria and Niger provides a lifeline and is among the most intense areas of cross-border activity in west Africa. </p>
<p>For these reasons, the regional monetary union option seems an unlikely alternative.</p>
<p><strong>Bilateral agreements:</strong> Another option for the three countries could be a return to bilateral agreements with individual countries to facilitate free movement. This can be likened to what former Ecowas member <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00083968.2014.936696">Mauritania</a>, which left in <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2000/12/28/mauritania-pulls-out-ecowas">2000</a>, did. </p>
<p>However, at the moment, given the sanctions, this option is off the cards, and could take many years to work out. </p>
<p><strong>African Union protocol:</strong> At a continental level the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">African Union Protocol on Free Movement</a> may offer a distant way forward. So far only <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-sl-PROTOCOL_TO_THE_TREATY_ESTABLISHING_THE_AFRICAN_ECONOMIC_COMMUNITY_RELATING_TO_FREE_MOVEMENT_OF_PERSONS-1.pdf">32 countries</a> have signed it and four have ratified it, among them Mali and Niger (Burkina Faso is a signatory). </p>
<p>One way to move forward would be for countries to ramp up ratifications of this document, to ensure that cooperation on free movement can continue whatever happens to Ecowas. </p>
<p>Of course, other countries within Ecowas could also unilaterally open up for visa-free entry like <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/11/03/rwanda-announces-visa-free-travel-for-all-africans//">Rwanda</a> or Kenya have done, though the process has had its <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/01/09/kenya-backlash-over-new-visa-free-entry-policy-many-describe-as-hectic//">hiccups</a>. </p>
<p>Such visa arrangements are also unlikely to include the rights of residence and establishment guaranteed under the Ecowas framework.</p>
<p>Given the current political context, an institutionalised option seems unlikely in the near future. The most likely option would be that migration will simply continue – informally.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222826/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Franzisca Zanker received funding from the Mercator Stiftung for a research project "The Political Economy of West African Migration Governace" in 2019 which provided relevant background for this piece.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amanda Bisong is a policy officer at the ECDPM, Maastricht, The Netherlands.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leonie Jegen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have much to lose if they cannot migrate to and from neighbouring countries in Ecowas.Franzisca Zanker, Senior research fellow, Arnold Bergstraesser InstituteAmanda Bisong, PhD candidate, Vrije Universiteit AmsterdamLeonie Jegen, PhD Candidate, University of AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2234252024-02-13T03:13:44Z2024-02-13T03:13:44ZNew Zealand is reviving the ANZAC alliance – joining AUKUS is a logical next step<p>The National-led coalition government is off to a fast start internationally. In envisioning a more central role for the ANZAC alliance with Australia, and possible involvement in the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/aukus-explained-how-will-trilateral-pact-shape-indo-pacific-security">AUKUS</a> security pact, it is recalibrating New Zealand’s independent foreign policy.</p>
<p>At the inaugural Australia-New Zealand Foreign and Defence Ministerial (<a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/national/programmes/morningreport/audio/2018924310/australia-and-new-zealand-foreign-and-defence-ministers-in-inaugural-meeting">ANZMIN</a>) meeting in Melbourne earlier this year, the focus was on future-proofing the trans-Tasman alliance. </p>
<p>Detailed discussions took place on the defence and security aspects of the relationship. This included global strategic issues, the Indo-Pacific region, and the relevance of the partnership in the Pacific. </p>
<p>But the stage for this shift in New Zealand’s independent foreign policy had already been set by the Labour government in 2023. </p>
<p>In his foreword to the country’s first <a href="https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-11/national-security-strategy-aug2023.pdf">National Security Strategy</a> last year, then prime minister Chris Hipkins wrote that New Zealand “faces a fundamentally more challenging security outlook”. The strategy document called for a “national conversation on foreign policy”.</p>
<p>Christopher Luxon’s administration is taking the logical next step by increasing cooperation with Canberra. </p>
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<h2>In or out of AUKUS?</h2>
<p>New Zealand’s independent foreign policy emerged in the mid-1980s from the debris of the ANZUS alliance. It flourished in a historically rare era of muted great power rivalry and unprecedented economic globalisation. </p>
<p>It is abundantly clear that our holiday from history is over. </p>
<p>New Zealand’s independent foreign policy has to be redefined in response to present strategic circumstances rather than past interpretations, however well they may have served us. These historic positions, <a href="https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/helen-clark-and-don-brash-aukus-nz-must-not-abandon-our-independent-foreign-policy/LLYEOE4WH5AY5DTV3D323OXRUU/">recently put forward</a> by former National leader Don Brash and former prime minister Helen Clark, have run their course. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-defence-dilemma-facing-nzs-next-government-stay-independent-or-join-pillar-2-of-aukus-212090">The defence dilemma facing NZ's next government: stay independent or join 'pillar 2' of AUKUS?</a>
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<p>At the sharp end of this recalibration is AUKUS, the technology partnership involving Australia, the UK and the US. New Zealand has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/new-zealands-luxon-talk-defence-economy-australia-2023-12-19/">expressed an interest</a> in participating in “pillar two” of the agreement, involving non-nuclear technology sharing.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/joint-statement-australia-new-zealand-ministerial-consultations-anzmin-2024">joint statement</a> released after the ANZMIN consultations stated that AUKUS was discussed as “a positive contribution toward maintaining peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific”. </p>
<p>The Chinese embassy in Wellington has <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/508280/chinese-embassy-deplores-opposes-australia-nz-joint-statement">expressed “serious concerns”</a>. It called AUKUS:</p>
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<p>a stark manifestation of Cold War mentality [which] will undermine peace and stability, sow division and confrontation in the region, and thus runs against the common interests of regional countries pursuing peace, stability, and common security.</p>
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<p>Few neutral observers will be persuaded by Beijing’s characterisation.</p>
<h2>Labour on the fence</h2>
<p>AUKUS emerged in 2021, initiated in Canberra as a response to economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed on Australia by China in 2020. </p>
<p>New Zealand’s participation will invariably strengthen the ANZAC alliance. It is hard to see how non-involvement will not weaken that alliance. </p>
<p>This is something the Labour opposition will need to consider carefully. Having asked for a national foreign policy conversation while in government, it is now signalling disquiet over AUKUS membership.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aukus-pact-born-in-secrecy-will-have-huge-implications-for-australia-and-the-region-168065">The AUKUS pact, born in secrecy, will have huge implications for Australia and the region</a>
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<p>Labour’s Foreign Affairs Spokesperson <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/508926/aukus-a-military-pact-designed-to-contain-china-says-labour">David Parker said recently</a> that “we’re questioning [AUKUS’] utility and whether it is wise”. His associate spokesperson Phil Twyford told parliament AUKUS is an “offensive war-fighting alliance against China”.</p>
<p>It is unclear how this position is consistent with Labour’s progressively stronger support for the ANZAC alliance and AUKUS since 2021, and its earlier willingness to explore participating in pillar two.</p>
<h2>The future of independent foreign policy</h2>
<p>Truth be told, the Luxon administration’s interest in AUKUS is a consequence of China serving as the architect of its own strategic problems. </p>
<p>Before the Beijing Olympics in 2008, China enjoyed a generally positive relationship with a range of countries across Asia and the Pacific.</p>
<p>Since then, China’s relations with numerous regional states have deteriorated, in no small part due to actions initiated by Beijing in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/29/risk-of-miscalculation-rises-in-south-china-sea-as-beijing-ramps-up-aggressive-tactics">South China Sea</a> and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/japan-china-islands-dispute-islands-coast-guard-f75404c5a877abd823fd5fe1711f78b1">East China Sea</a>, its <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53062484">contested border with India</a>, and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/09/australia-china-decoupling-trade-sanctions-coronavirus-geopolitics/">sanctions on Australia</a> and <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2023/02/14/commentary/world-commentary/south-korea-missile-defense/">South Korea</a> for disagreements over Chinese foreign policy decisions.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-australia-signs-up-for-nuclear-subs-nz-faces-hard-decisions-over-the-aukus-alliance-201946">As Australia signs up for nuclear subs, NZ faces hard decisions over the AUKUS alliance</a>
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<p>New Zealand is committed to advancing its interests in a way that contributes to regional stability in what the ANZMIN joint statement described as “the most challenging strategic environment in decades”.</p>
<p>If New Zealand’s elected government determines that AUKUS is in the national interest, then it must seek the broadest consensus possible domestically. It also needs to unapologetically pursue that path internationally.</p>
<p>That is the essence of foreign minister Winston Peters’ response when asked whether Wellington’s interest in AUKUS would negatively affect relations with China:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>China is a country that practises something I have got a lot of time for – they practise their national interest […] and that’s what we’re doing.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>We are entering a new era for New Zealand’s independent foreign policy, one that includes a rebooted ANZAC alliance, with a possible AUKUS dimension.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223425/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Khoo has received research funding from the Australian National University, Columbia University, and the Asia New Zealand Foundation in Wellington. He is a Non-Resident Principal Research Fellow with the Institute of Indo-Pacific Affairs in Christchurch. </span></em></p>Global political unrest has highlighted the importance of a credible foreign policy. It may be time for the New Zealand government to consider the revitalisation of ANZAC and participation with AUKUS.Nicholas Khoo, Associate Professor of International Politics, University of OtagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216022024-01-23T04:33:03Z2024-01-23T04:33:03ZAustralia risks falling behind allies on research security. Will it take a spy scandal in our universities to catch up?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570797/original/file-20240123-15-9mk3k7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1000%2C0%2C3782%2C3296&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/a-building-with-trees-in-front-of-it-wkn_GKuDGg4">Jon Callow / Unsplash</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Late last year, a PhD student named Yuekang Li was <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-federal-court-decision-to-bar-chinese-student-expands-definition-of/">refused a study visa</a> to enter Canada. Why? Canada’s Federal Court was <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2023/2023fc1753/2023fc1753.html">concerned</a> he could be “targeted and coerced into providing information that would be detrimental to Canada”.</p>
<p>Li wasn’t the only one. Earlier this month, Iranian computer engineering student Reza Jahantigh was <a href="https://kitchener.citynews.ca/2024/01/09/iranian-student-denied-permit-to-study-in-canada-disputes-security-danger-label/">denied a visa</a> to study his PhD in Canada, because of his previous service in the Iranian military. Some observers have <a href="https://higheredstrategy.com/a-deeply-unhelpful-federal-court-ruling/">called the decisions “deeply unhelpful”</a>, and said they <a href="https://uwimprint.ca/article/federal-court-bans-chinese-student-from-studying-at-uw/">risked the prospects of future international students coming to Canada</a>.</p>
<p>Despite such criticisms, Canada is at the forefront of an international charge for stricter “<a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/services/defence/researchsecurity.html">research security</a>” – the idea of protecting certain university courses and research programs from espionage, foreign interference and technology theft. </p>
<p>While countries including the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are moving swiftly to make their research more secure, Australia lags behind. And our need for research security is only set to grow.</p>
<h2>Rules around the world</h2>
<p>In the US, applicants for federal funding must comply with strict guidelines on <a href="https://new.nsf.gov/research-security">disclosing both local and foreign partners</a>. Canada has <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-morning-update-ottawa-clamps-down-on-university-research-partnerships/">banned research collaborations with foreign entities</a> connected with Chinese, Russian or Iranian military or intelligence agencies. </p>
<p>The UK even <a href="https://www.ukri.org/manage-your-award/good-research-resource-hub/trusted-research-and-innovation/">funds specific university research into how they secure their work</a>. The Netherlands, a <a href="https://english.loketkennisveiligheid.nl/">world leader with its own brand of “knowledge security”</a>, has even proposed a controversial law to <a href="https://delta.tudelft.nl/en/article/knowledge-security-law-then-screen-everyone">security-screen every foreign researcher</a>, irrespective of their home country.</p>
<h2>What is Australia doing?</h2>
<p>In Australia, research security is a contentious topic. We don’t recognise the term, we don’t really talk about it, and it doesn’t appear in parliamentary press releases. But there are real threats to our universities. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/NationalSecurityRisks/Report">parliamentary inquiry in 2022</a> heard stories of coercion, suppression and foreign interference on almost every Australian campus. Two years on, <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/NationalSecurityRisks/Government_Response">almost none of the inquiry’s recommendations have been completely adopted</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/teaching-chinese-politics-in-australia-polarised-views-leave-academics-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-157886">Teaching Chinese politics in Australia: polarised views leave academics between a rock and a hard place</a>
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<p>Last year, my colleagues and I found <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:af6347b">Australia has more than 3,000 research agreements with China</a>, some of which might pose significant security risks. Only a few months ago, the Five Eyes – <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/five-eyes-intelligence-chiefs-warn-chinas-theft-intellectual-property-2023-10-18/">composed of the intelligence agencies of the US, UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia</a> – called China an “unprecedented threat” to innovative research around the world. </p>
<p>We should be worried. Under the AUKUS agreement, Australia is about to receive some of the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-12-19/defence-staff-studying-nuclear-science-aukus-program/100710264">most closely guarded military secrets in the world</a> courtesy of the US – nuclear-powered submarines. </p>
<p>After that, we will be <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/aukus-pillar-two-advancing-capabilities-united-states-united-kingdom-and-australia">sharing breakthroughs in military technologies</a> such as robotics, hypersonic missiles and quantum computers. The government has even <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2023-11-29/additional-university-places-grow-australias-aukus-workforce">allocated thousands of new university positions to support AUKUS</a>. </p>
<h2>Some action, but not enough</h2>
<p>But what Australia hasn’t done is take a really good look at what needs to be done to keep those secrets safe.</p>
<p>We aren’t completely defenceless. ASIO has published a booklet called <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/system/files/2023-05/Protect%20Your%20Research%2C%20Collaborate%20with%20Care%20-%20Booklet.pdf">Collaborate with Care</a>, which gives researchers tips on how to ensure their research isn’t compromised. And one of Australia’s biggest funding bodies, the Australian Research Council, recently published its <a href="https://www.arc.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-12/ARC%20Countering%20Foreign%20Interference%20Framework.pdf">Countering Foreign Interference Framework</a>. </p>
<p>But the steps outlined in those publications are all voluntary, and pale in comparison with our international allies. So, what will it take for Australia to reconsider its position on research security?</p>
<h2>Does Australia need a scandal?</h2>
<p>Put simply, Australia seems to need a proper research security scandal in one of its universities.</p>
<p>The US has a long history of research security scandals. One of the worst was the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/china/education-or-espionage-chinese-student-takes-his-homework-home-china-n893881">alleged theft of “military grade meta-materials”</a> by Chinese entrepreneur and one-time graduate student Ruopeng Liu from Duke University in 2009. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-thousand-talents-plan-is-part-of-chinas-long-quest-to-become-the-global-scientific-leader-145100">The Thousand Talents Plan is part of China's long quest to become the global scientific leader</a>
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<p>In 2018, Hao Zhang – a professor at China’s Tianjin University – was arrested (and later convicted) for <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-citizen-convicted-economic-espionage-theft-trade-secrets-and-conspiracy">stealing semiconductor technology from US businesses</a>. And in 2021, Harvard professor Charles Lieber – once considered a frontrunner for the Nobel Prize in Chemistry – was <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-04-27/harvard-professor-sentenced-for-lying-about-china/102273486">convicted of fraud</a> for lying about payments he received to be a “strategic scientist” for foreign universities.</p>
<p>Canada too has had its scandals. In 2021, doctors Xiangguo Qiu and Keding Cheng were <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/winnipeg-lab-security-experts-1.6059097">fired by Canada’s National Microbiology Lab and lost their security clearances</a> for allegedly sharing virus samples with the Wuhan Institute of Virology. And in 2023, Norwegian officials arrested a Russian intelligence agent named Mikhail Mikushin, who had <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/tylerroush/2023/12/14/man-accused-of-being-spy-admits-hes-russian-after-years-posing-as-academic-in-norway-canada/?sh=5ee2cf5c7c96">posed for years as a Canadian university academic</a>.</p>
<h2>Close calls</h2>
<p>In Australia, we’ve come close. Just two years ago, the ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess told the Five Eyes his agency had <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-10-18/five-eyes-spy-summit-asio-cia-fbi-san-francisco/102984976">expelled a visiting professor</a> who had been given “money and a shopping list of intelligence requirements” by Chinese intelligence. Then, last year, ASIO warned that foreign intelligence agents have been told to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/apr/20/foreign-spies-are-aggressively-seeking-disloyal-insiders-with-access-to-australias-secrets-asio-warns">“aggressively seek” and steal AUKUS secrets</a> from Australia.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-quest-for-techno-military-supremacy-91840">China's quest for techno-military supremacy</a>
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<p>So perhaps we should act now, before we get a scandal to spur us into action. </p>
<p>We could be having open, honest and frank discussions between universities and our intelligence services. We could be crafting a robust research security policy hand-in-hand between academia and government. We could be looking at what works around the world, analysing it, critiquing it, and seeing if it works here. </p>
<p>Otherwise, Australia stands to lose the very secrets we have just been entrusted to keep.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221602/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendan Walker-Munro does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia’s allies are serious about the risk of research espionage - and one way or another, we need to catch up.Brendan Walker-Munro, Senior Research Fellow, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2152322023-10-08T07:05:41Z2023-10-08T07:05:41ZA ‘no’ win will make it harder for government to tackle Indigenous disadvantage: Albanese<p>The government’s efforts to tackle Indigenous disadvantage will not be as effective if Saturday’s referendum fails, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has said.</p>
<p>Albanese has also reconfirmed that if there is a “no” vote he will not seek to legislate a Voice. </p>
<p>The government would respect the outcome, he said on Sunday. “If Australians vote "no”, I don’t believe that it would be appropriate to then go and say, oh, well you’ve had your say, but we’re going to legislate anyway".</p>
<p>As the campaign enters its final days, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-10-08/voice-polls-show-support-lower-than-republic-vote/102942468">the ABC’s “poll of the polls”</a> had “yes” at an average of 41.2%, and “no” on 58.8%. To pass, the referendum needs a national majority and to win in a majority of states. </p>
<p>Albanese told a rally in Queanbeyan he would be visiting Broken Hill, Port Lincoln, Mutitjulu, Uluru and Melbourne, Hobart, Perth, Adelaide and Sydney in the final stretch. </p>
<p>Asked on the ABC whether he’d walk away from the Voice altogether if there was a no vote, he was unequivocal, saying “correct.”</p>
<p>“What you do when we’re talking about the Voice is listening. And Indigenous Australians have said they want a Voice that’s enshrined [in the Constitution]. </p>
<p>"What they don’t want to do is what they’ve done time and time again, which is to be a part of establishing representative organisations only to see, for opportunistic reasons, a government to come in and just abolish it.”</p>
<p>The federal opposition is committed to legislating local and regional Voices.</p>
<p>Albanese said the government was already undertaking measures to combat Indigenous disadvantage but, in the event of a “no” vote, “it won’t be as effective as having a body, a Voice to be listened to”. </p>
<p>“But we’ll continue to do things like, we’re replacing the remote jobs program with a program for employment that actually creates real jobs with real wages. We’ll continue to invest in justice reinvestment, looking at programs like Bourke that work effectively. We’ll continue to invest in community health. </p>
<p>"But what a Voice will do is provide for an opportunity for us to replicate the success stories. There are success stories out there. Success stories where Indigenous kids are going to school, where health programs are being improved.” </p>
<p>Albanese said the referendum was being watched internationally. If it was carried, “it will be seen that Australia has come to terms with our history, that we’re a mature nation”.</p>
<p>The debate was about “whether we’re a country that looks for hope and optimism and for the future, or whether we shrink in on ourselves”.</p>
<p>But if the referendum went down, “we will go out there and explain the position”.</p>
<p>Deputy opposition leader Sussan Ley told Sky: “Whatever the result is on Saturday it will be bad, divisive and unhappy for Australians the next day. So we do need to bring the country together.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215232/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The PM also reconfirmed that if there is a no vote he will not seek to legislate a VoiceMichelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2128152023-10-03T19:35:52Z2023-10-03T19:35:52ZBook review: African thinkers analyse some of the big issues of our time - race, belonging and identity<p>The subjects of race, identity and belonging are often fraught with contention and uneasiness. Who are you? Who belongs? Who is native, or indigenous to a place? These perennial questions arise around the world.</p>
<p>They are the subject of the book <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/9783031387968">The Paradox(es) of Diasporic Identity, Race and Belonging</a>, edited by <a href="https://scholar.google.co.jp/citations?user=EEyB8sMAAAAJ&hl=en">Benjamin Maiangwa</a>, a political scientist at Lakehead University in Canada. </p>
<p>The contributors are academics, mostly early career scholars and doctoral candidates in African and North American universities. They study genocide, peace and conflict, gender, decolonial practices, identity, race and war. </p>
<p>Unavoidably, questions that defy convenient answers pervade the reflections and analyses in the book. </p>
<p>In my own work as <a href="https://www.mtroyal.ca/ProgramsCourses/FacultiesSchoolsCentres/Arts/Departments/EnglishLanguagesCultures/FacultyStaff/Ademola-Adesola.htm">a scholar</a> of African literature with an interest in the subjects of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10402659.2017.1344526">conflict</a>, childhood and identity, I underscore the relevance of these questions. </p>
<p>The Paradox(es) of Diasporic Identity, Race and Belonging assembles voices that urge us to think more critically about how the politics of race and identity hampers healthy interrelations among people.</p>
<p>In a world increasingly divided by supremacist ideologies, the insights in this collection of essays are highly relevant. </p>
<h2>What the book’s about</h2>
<p>The contributors to the book use a variety of forms of writing. Some of the essays are autobiograpical; some are literary criticism; others scholarly analyses. They re-examine familiar but controversial concepts. </p>
<p>Among them are ideas about naming, indigeneity, land, citizenship, identitarian disparity, diasporic (un)being, immigration and migration, and the political economy of (un)belonging. These are topical ideas that predominate in discourses on nationalism, ethnicity and nation states. Their engagement in this collection helps us to further appreciate how unfixed and complex they are; they are never amenable to any easy analysis. </p>
<p>The volume is structured into three parts: Identity, Coloniality, and Home; Diaspora, Race, and Immigration; and Belonging: Cross-Cutting Issues. Each section has an introduction, a conversation among four of the contributors, an epilogue and an afterword.</p>
<p>This layout attests to the careful editing of the whole. There is an organic flow of engagement with ideas from one chapter to the next. Yet no chapter’s unique argument is overshadowed by another’s. </p>
<h2>Critical probing and analysis</h2>
<p>The chapters inspired by personal experiences do as much critical probing as those framed by hardcore analyses. </p>
<p>The contributions don’t sound jointly rehearsed, but represent a form of dialogue. Readers will find a kaleidoscope of interrelated but distinct compelling arguments on matters of race, identity and belonging, and the violent and paradoxical patterns they take in the <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520204355/on-the-postcolony">postcolony</a>. This is a notion that is concerned with a particular historical course involving societies that have latterly experienced colonialism, as theorised by the Cameroonian historian and political theorist <a href="https://wiser.wits.ac.za/people/achille-mbembe">Achille Mbembe</a>. </p>
<p>As is customary in volumes of this kind, the opening chapter comes from the editor. He welcomes readers with questions that invite them to ruminate on place and identity construction and the way it determines relations. </p>
<p>Such questions, which reverberate throughout the volume, are “What is home? What creates the feeling of belonging or (dis)connection to a place/space or other people? Is home a place, a feeling, other people, or an idea? Is it a destination or a spiritual entity or experience? Who am I in this political space?” </p>
<p>For the reader who has taken their identity for granted thus far, such questions can be jarring and unnerving. They can also provoke deep thoughts. </p>
<h2>The construction of race</h2>
<p>The chapter underlines the fact that identity is constructed and is fluid. It stresses racial signifiers – indigenous, native, white, black – as markers which mask, confuse, distress and misrepresent. </p>
<p>In some people they produce false triumphalism and superiority and in others they activate demeaning nervousness. As the chapter maintains, cultural essentialism, the product of these markers, distorts cultural facts. It also abjures a cultivation of interest in history and critical mindedness. And it is this matter of invented racial/cultural identity that the conversation in chapter 12 of the book foregrounds. </p>
<p>In that conversation, such constructs as “Black”, “African”, “White” and “immigrant” ricochet from one discussant to another. The conversation makes it clear that there is a kind of under-appreciation of the violence that minoritised people within national boundaries and diasporic spaces experience when designated in certain senses. </p>
<h2>Interconnected humanity</h2>
<p>With its other chapters, the volume broadens the frontiers of research in the intersecting areas of race, ethnicity, peace, home(lessness), gender and other forms of identity and diasporic formations. It calls for a spiritual reawakening of our identities. </p>
<p>This volume is a force in the promotion and celebration of the dignity of human differences. One can hear again and again the refrain in Maya Angelou’s timeless poem, Human Family:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://allpoetry.com/Human-Family">We are more alike, my friends,/than we are unalike</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The humanistic ring in this book results from a conviction that the human or spiritual identity trumps all other ones, including institutionalised discriminatory ways of being and exclusionary policies and regulations, all of which enable the questioning of other people’s humanity. </p>
<p>The contributors’ insistence is on interconnected human relations and, to borrow from the Canadian novelist and essayist, Dionne Brand, on life – </p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Map-Door-No-Return-Belonging/dp/0385258925">It is life you must insist on</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Scholars, students and general readers interested in migration studies, peace and conflict studies, political science, literary studies, African studies, international relations, gender studies, sociology and history will find this work an enlightening resource.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212815/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ademola Adesola does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The book makes invaluable contributions to subjects of race, identity and belonging and how they shape human interrelations.Ademola Adesola, Assistant Professor, Mount Royal UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2134562023-10-01T19:16:37Z2023-10-01T19:16:37ZCloser relations between Australia and India have the potential to benefit both nations<p>The structure of Andrew Charlton’s <a href="https://www.blackincbooks.com.au/books/australia-s-pivot-india">Australia’s Pivot to India</a> is built on three promises: the promise of India; the promise of the Australia-India relationship; and the promise of the Indian diaspora becoming a powerful mainstream force in Australian politics. </p>
<p>At a time when the Indian diaspora is attracting attention globally, this book – launched on Wednesday by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese – will be read, and read widely. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Review: Australia’s Pivot to India – Andrew Charlton (Black Inc.)</em></p>
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<p>Unfortunately, the successes of the diaspora have been temporarily overshadowed by the Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/justin-trudeaus-india-accusation-complicates-western-efforts-to-rein-in-china-213922">accusation</a> that Indian government agents were involved in the assassination of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Vancouver. Nijjar was an advocate for a separate Khalistan Sikh state and the government of India believed he was involved in terrorist activities. India has categorically denied Trudeau’s charge.</p>
<p>Written for a discerning but popular audience, Australia’s Pivot to India is an elegant volume that treads ground familiar to those who have followed the bilateral relationship. The book serves as a primer and a political manifesto embedded in Charlton’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Worldview">weltanschauung</a>. It is written with finesse and fluency, but hurriedly: there is at least one sentence borrowed from my writings, used without attribution. </p>
<p>Charlton, the federal member for Parramatta and a rising star of the Australian Labor Party, is a believer. He is persuaded by India’s contemporary success and advocates the need for even greater intimacy between New Delhi and Canberra. For him, India’s rise is almost inevitable. As he puts it: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>For all its twists and turns, India’s journey has brought it to a point of extraordinary promise. Just as the twentieth century was said to be the American Century, and the nineteenth century was the Age of Empire, we may well end the twenty-first century with India on top. </p>
<p>India is already the largest nation in the world by population. And it’s growing so quickly that by 2070 its population should rival that of China, the United States and the European Union combined. India also has the fastest economic growth of any major nation. It has the second-largest armed forces and the fastest growing military capability in the world. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Will this book, and the earlier Peter Varghese report <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade-and-investment/india-economic-strategy/ies/index.html">An India Economic Strategy to 2035</a>, do for India what the <a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/series/china-update/china-next-twenty-years-reform-and-development">Ross Garnaut report</a> and Kevin Rudd’s writings did for China three decades ago? </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/india-has-landed-on-the-moon-heres-what-the-political-and-economic-gains-are-212313">India has landed on the Moon: here's what the political and economic gains are</a>
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<h2>Amrit Kaal</h2>
<p>Charlton’s book is dedicated to the people of Parramatta and the Indian diaspora across Australia. But his India-focused political vision speaks beyond the Little India of his Parramatta electorate.</p>
<p>For his electorate and the Indian audience of his book, Charlton is preaching to the converted. Indians, including its diaspora across the world, believe in India’s rise probably more strongly than the most generous outsider. </p>
<p>While the Chinese were content to emerge after just 150 years of Western humiliation, many Indians believe Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of <a href="https://www.investindia.gov.in/team-india-blogs/new-india-amrit-kaal">Amrit Kaal</a> – literally the “age of immortality” – will see the return of the “Golden Age” of India after nearly 2000 years of suppression. Amrit Kaal refers to the period between 75 years and 100 years of India’s independence (2022-2047): a period in which it is projected that India will transition to become a developed country.</p>
<p>While Charlton focuses on India’s staggering demographics and its growth story, more recent news has also celebrated the country’s rise. As the Economist <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/09/07/the-g20-summit-will-be-a-resounding-success-for-india">recently suggested</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>In 2008 China used the Beijing Olympic games as a “coming-out party” to show itself off to the world. For India, the Presidency of the G20 has served much the same purpose.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2023/09/09-10/">G-20 Summit in September</a> demonstrated India’s convening power and its ability to generate a consensus at what is arguably the most important forum engaged with the globe’s most consequential problems. The summit, and 200-odd meetings held all over India this year, brought the diversity, colour and genius of the Indian people onto the world stage with a new confidence.</p>
<h2>Civilisational strength</h2>
<p>Soft power is too vulgar, too belittling a term, to describe arguably the most resilient source of India’s power: a civilisational strength often suppressed by a lack of self-confidence. This has changed, and changed in such a way that India is being perceived as a key destination for dialogue and debate over the most contentious of issues. </p>
<p>Despite the seductive force of realpolitik, India seems to be able to retain its core values and its space, as well as its conscience. The theme of India’s G-20 presidency – <em>Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam</em>: a Sanskrit term meaning one earth, one family, one future – signalled this. The theme was fleshed out in the <a href="https://www.g20.org/content/dam/gtwenty/gtwenty_new/document/G20-New-Delhi-Leaders-Declaration.pdf">G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We meet at a defining moment in history where the decisions we make now will determine the future of our people and our planet. It is with the philosophy of living in harmony with our surrounding ecosystem that we commit to concrete actions to address global challenges.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Simultaneously, India has become the voice for an alternative technological vision. Just ahead of the summit, <a href="https://datatopics.worldbank.org/g20fidata/">World Bank G20 Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion</a> released a document that endorsed the transformative impact in India of <a href="https://www.ibm.com/topics/api">Application Programming Interfaces</a> (APIs), which allow different computer programs to communicate with each other. </p>
<p>It pointed out that a comprehensive data coordination system, known as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JAM_Yojana">JAM trinity</a>, has increased rates of participation in the Indian financial system from 25% in 2008 to over 80% of adults in last six years, and that it could do for much for the world. </p>
<p>The government established an electronic identification system, known as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aadhaar">Aadhaar</a>, which provides a unique identification number, based on biometrics, to everyone resident in India. Its electronic financial inclusion program, the <a href="https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/major_initiatives/pradhan-mantri-jan-dhan-yojana/">Jan Dhan Yojana</a>, lets every citizen open a bank account, which provides access to a debit card, accident insurance cover, an overdraft facility and transfer of all direct benefits from the government. All transactions can be done through a mobile phone. </p>
<p>This technology is part of what has come to be known as the <a href="https://indiastack.org/">India Stack</a> – open-access software that can be provided to all those interested in the Global South. </p>
<p>India’s insistence on the African Union’s inclusion in the now G-21 was also rooted in this “alternative” vision of not losing your heart, even while being dictated by your head.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/au-and-g20-membership-will-give-africa-more-say-on-global-issues-if-it-speaks-with-one-voice-213737">AU and G20: membership will give Africa more say on global issues – if it speaks with one voice</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Mutual understanding</h2>
<p>All of these developments complement the argument Charlton develops in Australia’s Pivot to India and will surely find place in the next edition of the book. The bulk of his book is concerned with examining the past, present and future of the bilateral relationship.</p>
<p>Charlton does well to look beyond the clichés of the “3Cs”: Commonwealth, cuisine and cricket. He considers multiple sectors where there are enormous opportunities for the relationship to grow. The “3Cs” lead to the “4Ds”: democracy, defence, <em>dosti</em> (friendship) and the diaspora. </p>
<p>Business, politics, media, education and culture are also identified by Charlton as potential areas of development. As he incisively points out: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Australia’s pivot to India should aspire to build a distinctive relationship that goes beyond transactional engagement and circumstantial alignment […] the essence of the partnership is to deepen the relationship with mutual investment in common endeavours across every sphere of our interactions. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The aim should be “to increase mutual understanding, build relationships and breed familiarity”. With their “expertise and energy”, the almost one-million-strong diaspora can play a key role in cementing the relationship and is therefore a “vital part of Australia’s pivot to India”.</p>
<p>In fleshing out areas of cooperation, Charlton illustrates the huge potential of the Australia-India partnership. As I have written in the foreword of historian Meg Gurry’s book on the <a href="https://www.mup.com.au/books/australia-and-india-mapping-the-journey-electronic-book-text">bilateral relationship</a> (the only full-length study on the relationship, which Charlton cites extensively): </p>
<blockquote>
<p>After six decades characterised by misperception, lack of trust, neglect, missed opportunities and even hostility, a new chapter in India’s relations with Australia has begun.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Consider this: in 1955, Robert Menzies decided Australia should not take part in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Bandung-Conference">Bandung Afro-Asian</a> conference, which had been organised by India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma (Myanmar) and Ceylon (Sri Lanka). In doing so, Menzies – who would later confess that Occidentals did not understand India – alienated Indians, offended Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and left Australia unsure about its Asian identity for decades.</p>
<p>In 2011, when I became the inaugural director of the <a href="https://aii.unimelb.edu.au/">Australia India Institute</a> (whose seminal role in building the bilateral relationship Charlton almost completely ignores), I made a giant leap of faith. I had not visited Australia before and had little knowledge of the country. My friends warned me I was literally going “Down Under”, soon to become irrelevant and marginal to all policy issues in India. My teenage daughters were told they risked being bashed up in school and college. My extended family was astounded.</p>
<p>But today I have no doubt it was one of the best decisions of my life. With not one unpleasant experience in the country, as a family we have found Australians open, friendly, fair, accepting and generous, and the country a model of good governance.</p>
<p>In September 2014, when Liberal prime minister Tony Abbott visited India – <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-03/first-meeting-for-tony-abbott-and-india27s-new-leader-narendra/5716150">the first</a> stand-alone state visit to be hosted by the Modi government – he brought a sordid chapter of bilateral relations to a close. When asked why Australia had agreed to export uranium to India, which is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Abbott was unequivocal: “We trust you!” </p>
<p>No better declaration could have been made to reflect the new Australian belief in the promise and potential of this relationship, for it was the deficit of understanding and faith that severely undermined the relationship in the past. </p>
<p>In a reciprocal gesture, in November of that year, Mr Modi became the first Indian prime minister to visit Australia <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/indian-prime-minister-narendra-modi-draws-thousands-to-sydney-olympic-park-20141117-11oe5f.html">in 28 years</a>, adding new ballast to the relationship. Since then, the bilateral relationship has grown in strength, and across the board.</p>
<p>Today there are few countries in the Indo-Pacific which share so much in common, in both values and interests, than India and Australia. From water management and clean energy, to trauma research, skills and higher education, counter-terrorism, maritime and cybersecurity, there is a world of opportunities that awaits the two countries if they work in close coordination with each other.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213456/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amitabh Mattoo was the inaugural director of the Australia India Institute.</span></em></p>Today there are few countries in the Indo-Pacific which share so much in common, in both values and interests, than India and Australia. Andrew Charlton’s new book examines the possibilities.Amitabh Mattoo, Honorary Professor of International Relations, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2085902023-09-22T12:28:07Z2023-09-22T12:28:07ZAsian women are still a minority in diplomatic positions: this is how we can fix this<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534261/original/file-20230627-7336-wfx2kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C44%2C4992%2C3682&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women in diplomacy.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.freepik.com/free-vector/illustration-international-diverse-people_3207233.htm#query=women%20across%20country&position=7&from_view=search&track=ais">Freepik</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://investinginwomen.asia/knowledge/global-gender-gap-report-2022/">2022 Global Gender Gap Report</a> showed Asian countries have managed to narrow the gender gap in economic, education and health sectors. But when it comes to political participation, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0192512120935517">the gap persists</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_1">Studies</a> have shown in most Asian countries, women are still marginalised in the field of international relations. They are underrepresented in <a href="https://www.sfpa.sk/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/ulicna-intempl-final-kopie-kopie.pdf">ambassadorial positions</a> and their low involvement <a href="https://dcollection.ewha.ac.kr/public_resource/pdf/000000201749_20230919130428.pdf">during negotiation processes</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://ieomsociety.org/proceedings/2022malaysia/495.pdf">Studies</a> about representation of women in modern diplomacy also assert that in general, Asian women continue to be the minority in this field, with very low percentage.</p>
<p>Despite <a href="https://www.sfpa.sk/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/ulicna-intempl-final-kopie-kopie.pdf">some progress</a> and <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_11">efforts</a> to achieve gender parity, Asian women are still <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_11">in constant conflict</a> with cultural dynamics that hamper their advancement in foreign affairs.</p>
<p>Here’s how we fix it. </p>
<h2>Women are not represented</h2>
<p>As of 2023, the global share of women serving as cabinet ministers globally is just 22.8%, according to the <a href="https://www.ipu.org/resources/publications/infographics/2023-03/women-in-politics-2023">the Inter-Parliamentary Union</a>. Asian countries (Central and Southern Asia) rank the second lowest of the world regions or at <a href="https://www.ipu.org/news/press-releases/2023-03/women-in-power-in-2023-new-data-shows-progress-wide-regional-gaps">10.1%</a>.</p>
<p>Most of the women (84%) in the cabinet ministers in Asia are assigned in ministries or institutions related to women’s issues, gender equality and children. Meanwhile, the number of women serving in traditionally <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/history-of-education-quarterly/article/abs/lady-astors-campaign-for-nursery-schools-in-britain-19301939-attempting-to-valorize-cultural-capital-in-a-maledominated-political-field/C7F81D3D2296C8AC47F4208908401E5D">male-dominated fields</a>, such as defence, energy and transportation, remains small – less than 12%. </p>
<p>Globally, out of 193 countries, the portion of women who serve in ministerial positions at the ministries of foreign affairs is only around 20%.</p>
<p>In Asia, the proportion of women as ambassadors and permanent representatives in United Nations (UN) organisations is just <a href="https://www.agda.ac.ae/docs/default-source/2023/women-diplomacy.pdf?sfvrsn=6189673b_3">12%</a>, far less than the global average of 20.54%. The Maldives has the greatest ratio of female ambassadors among Asian countries – at 50%, while Cambodia with 25% share is the lowest in Asia.</p>
<p>Right now, only <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-58682-3_2">17 Asian nations</a> that currently have ever had female foreign ministers. In Southeast Asia, it is only Philippines, Timor Leste, Myanmar and Indonesia.</p>
<p>During President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo term, Indonesian female ambassadors made up <a href="https://theconversation.com/data-bicara-keterwakilan-perempuan-indonesia-sebagai-duta-besar-kurang-dari-6-strategi-pengarusutamaan-gender-perlu-diperkuat-197033">13.46%</a> from the <a href="https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/page/29/kedutaan_konsulat">total 95 embassies and three permanent missions</a>, that is higher than the previous administration which stood at 9.55%.</p>
<h2>The challenges</h2>
<p>There are three challenges behind the low representation of women in Asian foreign affairs. </p>
<p><strong>First</strong>, the dearth of representation of women in international affairs is inextricably linked to <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/16/here-s-why-closing-foreign-policy-gender-gap-matters-pub-68325">the notion</a> in most Asian nations that males still dominate this field. Historically, diplomacy has been a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article/13/3/521/2625550">male-dominated domain</a> with <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_7">very few provisions</a> for women.</p>
<p><strong>Second</strong>, in <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/00219096231176738">most Asian countries</a>, there are still <a href="https://download.e-bookshelf.de/download/0010/5370/59/L-G-0010537059-0024446644.pdf">unequal cultural and structural power relations</a> inside internal organisations. <a href="https://www.diplomacy.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/IC-and-Diplomacy-FINAL_Part16.pdf">Patriarchal views and gender preconceptions</a> about the function of female ambassadors still exist.</p>
<p><strong>Third</strong>, female diplomats are also affected more disproportionately because they <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-gender/article/abs/work-and-family-balance-in-top-diplomacy-the-case-of-the-czech-republic/CA79AA24B75D006C2D0A601966A65F32">carry double burden</a> in balancing work and personal life.</p>
<p>While they hold public positions, most of them still carry domestic responsibilities. It is still more difficult for women, compared to men, to deal with frequent job rotations, long working hours and placements abroad.</p>
<h2>Promoting gender-responsive policies</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.nyu.edu/washington-dc/dc-dialogues/women-in-and-of-the-world/broad-influence--how-women-are-changing-the-way-america.html">Research</a> has shown that if women achieved critical mass –somewhere between 20-30% – within an organisation they can <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-a-critical-mass-of-women-can-change-an-institution">wield power and influence</a> in public life and the workforce. </p>
<p>But it is not enough to only ensure women receive fair representation in organisations. After achieving critical mass, the next step is to include a gender perspective in foreign policy approaches, formulation and implementation.</p>
<p>In recent years, several governments in Asia <a href="https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/Brief-Feminist-foreign-policies-en_0.pdf">have recognised</a> the needs of <a href="https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article/16/2/143/5781199">gender mainstreaming</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26760832">feminist foreign policy</a>.</p>
<p>Indonesia, for example, has issued <a href="https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Details/163046/permenlu-no-21-tahun-2020">a ministerial regulation</a> that facilitates gender-related concerns in ministries, including facilities for female employees.</p>
<p>Other Asian countries are also beginning to implement gender-responsive foreign policy. Several Asian countries have developed <a href="https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2020/10/women-peace-and-security-in-asia-pacific-20-years-on-progress-achieved-and-lessons-learned">National Action Plans</a> on women, peace and security. These include Indonesia (2014), the Philippines (2010 and 2017), South Korea (2014) and Timor Leste (2016). </p>
<p>Sending more female ambassadors to regional and global forums is another way for achieving gender balance and equality.</p>
<p>Efforts have been started but much more is needed. All stakeholders must keep echoing the necessity of gender equality in the work place through better and wider <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10357718.2021.1893653?journalCode=caji20">attempts to normalise gender equality</a> in foreign policy institutions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208590/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Para penulis tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi di luar afiliasi akademis yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Although there have progress to achieve gender equality, women are still under-represented in diplomacy in Asia.Athiqah Nur Alami, Researcher at Research Center for Politics, Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional (BRIN)Ganewati Wuryandari, Professor, Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional (BRIN)Mario Surya Ramadhan, Researcher, Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional (BRIN)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2140462023-09-21T11:28:57Z2023-09-21T11:28:57ZKing Charles makes state visit to France – a year into his reign, here’s what’s changed under the new British monarch<p>King Charles’s three-day <a href="https://www.royal.uk/news-and-activity/2023-09-06/the-king-and-queen-will-undertake-a-state-visit-to-france">state visit to France</a>, a year into his reign, has marked the return of the British monarchy’s international dimension. The trip, along with his first state visit earlier in the year to Germany, are the first among what is hoped will be many trips. </p>
<p>After a state <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33234200">visit to Germany</a> and a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34929516">visit to Malta in 2015</a>, Elizabeth II stopped travelling overseas. This limited a key function of the monarchy, which is to represent the UK abroad as part of an overall package of soft power.</p>
<p>Other members of the royal family, including the then Prince Charles, conducted official visits overseas. But these fell short of the scale and spectacle of being a full state visit, which often includes great ceremony such as a full state banquet and an address to the host nation’s parliament.</p>
<p>The state visit to France also signals a shift towards a sharper monarchy. It was organised on government advice, probably to send a clear message that although the UK has left the EU, it still sees itself as part of Europe – a point that has become all the more important since Russia invaded Ukraine. These are precisely the sort of broad messages which command widespread support in the UK and that the monarchy is well placed to project.</p>
<p>That said, the king must also tread carefully. The monarchy can send such signals only if it maintains political impartiality – and perception is as important as the reality of any given situation. </p>
<p>When the <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/eu-commission-president-ursula-von-der-leyen-to-meet-king-while-in-uk-for-brexit-talks-12821356">King met Ursula von der Leyen</a>, the president of the European Commission, it was a typical meeting between the king and a world leader. However, the meeting took place at a crucial moment in Brexit talks, leading some Brexit-supporting politicians to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/feb/28/king-charles-hosting-ursula-von-der-leyen-not-unusual-insists-james-cleverly-brexit-eu">complain</a> that the king was being drawn into politics.</p>
<p>The difficulty is that, given his past as Prince of Wales, Charles perhaps has to work harder than his mother did to prove his impartiality. His year on the throne has seen him hone his skills in this respect. The new sharpness of the new monarchy has been displayed on the domestic front but always with caution. </p>
<p>It was announced at the end of 2022, for example, that the King had made a personal <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-63846028">donation of fridges to food banks</a>, a move taken as a statement that the monarchy is mindful of underlying political conditions while not actively getting engaged in the political fray.</p>
<p>He has also shown a greater emphasis on diversity when selecting engagements. This triggered one of the most eye-catching photographs of the first year of the king’s reign, the king and queen walking down Brick Lane, a notable road in an ethnically diverse area of London.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1623385791844982788"}"></div></p>
<p>It also appears that other members of the royal family have been given a freer rein. For example, Prince William joined his staff for <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/royal-family/prince-william-poland-tour-restaurant-b2307215.html">dinner at an LGBTQ+-friendly restaurant in Warsaw</a> during an official visit to Poland. This was seen to be in response to <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/es/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/eur370022005en.pdf">anti-LBGTQ+ politics</a> in the country.</p>
<h2>Treading carefully</h2>
<p>Challenges lie ahead on the international front, too. For many of the 14 Commonwealth realms, such as Australia, Canada, Jamaica and Belize, which share the king as their head of state, the new reign is an opportunity to reevaluate their relationship with the Crown. </p>
<p>Especially in the Caribbean, this is wrapped up in the issue of addressing slavery and the worst excesses of the British Empire. Here, the king’s room for manoeuvre is limited. </p>
<p>He has endorsed a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-65200570">study of the monarchy’s relationship with slavery</a>, and told the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/06/king-charles-signals-first-explicit-support-for-research-into-monarchys-slavery-ties?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other">Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting last year</a>: “I cannot describe the depths of my personal sorrow at the suffering of so many, as I continue to deepen my own understanding of slavery’s enduring impact.”</p>
<p>Yet calls for reparations are not for the king to decide. They are a matter for the British government, which has to balance its response to any demand with domestic political opinion.</p>
<p>Ultimately, it is domestic opinion which will determine the success of the king’s reign. Even in the darkest days of the monarchy, republicanism never attracted support beyond 20%. </p>
<p>But after a long period of stability, the longer-term trend is <a href="https://theconversation.com/king-charles-inherits-crown-with-support-for-monarchy-at-record-low-but-future-not-set-in-stone-190448">gradual decline</a>. This is most marked among younger adults, whose experiences of monarchy has been the departure of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/meghan-and-harrys-oprah-interview-why-royal-confessionals-threaten-the-monarchy-156601">Duke and Duchess of Sussex to America</a>, together with allegations of racism – and of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/prince-andrew-a-legal-expert-explains-the-settlement-with-virginia-giuffre-177255">allegations of sexual abuse against Prince Andrew</a>.</p>
<p>Fundamentally, the biggest challenge for the king is following his mother. Especially during the last 25 years of her reign, Elizabeth II transcended the role of monarch, becoming a sort of world figure. </p>
<p>Books were published with titles such as “Queen of the World”. The former prime minister Boris Johnson called her “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h_89HU_H7wo">Elizabeth the Great</a>”. The largest gathering of world leaders in history attended her funeral. How can Charles follow that?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214046/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Craig Prescott does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A trip abroad marks the return of the British monarchy’s international angle after Charles mother stopped travelling.Craig Prescott, Lecturer in Law, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2120842023-08-28T12:04:06Z2023-08-28T12:04:06ZThe US and China may be ending an agreement on science and technology cooperation − a policy expert explains what this means for research<p>A decades-old science and technology <a href="https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/agreement-between-the-united-states-and-china-cooperation-science-and-technology">cooperative agreement</a> between the United States and China expires on Aug. 27, 2023. On the surface, an expiring diplomatic agreement may not seem significant. But unless it’s renewed, the quiet end to a cooperative era may have consequences for scientific research and technological innovation.</p>
<p>The possible lapse comes after U.S. Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wis., <a href="https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/media/letters/letter-secretary-blinken-science-and-technology-agreement">led a congressional group warning</a> the U.S. State Department in July 2023 to beware of cooperation with China. This group recommended to let the agreement expire without renewal, claiming China has gained a military advantage through its scientific and technological ties with the U.S. </p>
<p>The State Department has dragged its feet on renewing the agreement, only requesting an extension at the last moment to “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-says-it-seeks-six-month-extension-science-agreement-with-china-2023-08-23/">amend and strengthen</a>” the agreement. </p>
<p>The U.S. is an active international research collaborator, and since 2011 China has been its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11024-015-9273-6">top scientific partner</a>, displacing the United Kingdom, which had been the U.S.’s most frequent collaborator for decades. China’s domestic research and development spending is closing in on parity with that of the United States. Its scholastic output is growing <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-022-04291-z">in both number and quality</a>. According to recent studies, China’s science is becoming <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-020-03579-2">increasingly creative</a>, breaking new ground. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://glenn.osu.edu/caroline-s-wagner">policy analyst and public affairs professor</a>, I research international collaboration in science and technology and its implications for public policy. Relations between countries are often enhanced by negotiating and signing agreements, and this agreement is no different. The U.S.’s science and technology <a href="https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/agreement-between-the-united-states-and-china-cooperation-science-and-technology">agreement with China</a> successfully built joint research projects and shared research centers between the two nations.</p>
<p>U.S. scientists can typically work with foreign counterparts without a political agreement. Most aren’t even aware of diplomatic agreements, which are signed long after researchers have worked together. But this is not the case with China, where the 1979 agreement became a prerequisite for and the initiator of cooperation.</p>
<h2>A 40-year diplomatic investment</h2>
<p>The U.S.-China science and technology agreement was part of a historic opening of relations between the two countries, following decades of antagonism and estrangement. U.S. President Richard Nixon set in motion the process of <a href="https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/nixon-foreignpolicy">normalizing relations</a> with China in the early 1970s. President Jimmy Carter <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/china-policy">continued to seek an improved relationship</a> with China.</p>
<p>China had announced reforms, modernizations and a global opening after an intense period of isolation from the time of the Cultural Revolution from the late 1950s until the early 1970s. Among its “<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Four-Modernizations">four modernizations</a>” was science and technology, in addition to agriculture, defense and industry. </p>
<p>While China is historically known for inventing <a href="https://www.brown.edu/Departments/Joukowsky_Institute/courses/13things/7687.html">gunpowder</a>, <a href="https://www.worldhistory.org/article/1120/paper-in-ancient-china/">paper</a> and the <a href="https://www.smith.edu/hsc/museum/ancient_inventions/compass2.html">compass</a>, China was not a scientific power in the 1970s. American and Chinese diplomats viewed science as a low-conflict activity, comparable to cultural exchange. They figured starting with a nonthreatening scientific agreement could pave the way for later discussions on more politically sensitive issues. </p>
<p>On July 28, 1979, Carter and Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping signed an “<a href="https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/oes/science/science_agreements/st_umbrella.html">umbrella agreement</a>” that contained a general statement of intent to cooperate in science and technology, with specifics to be worked out later.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544632/original/file-20230824-27-8yin5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two men, Jimmy Carter and Deng Xiao Ping, smile and shake hands while standing on a lawn." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544632/original/file-20230824-27-8yin5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544632/original/file-20230824-27-8yin5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544632/original/file-20230824-27-8yin5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544632/original/file-20230824-27-8yin5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544632/original/file-20230824-27-8yin5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544632/original/file-20230824-27-8yin5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544632/original/file-20230824-27-8yin5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Jimmy Carter with Deng Xiaoping in January 1979.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/jimmy-carter-with-chinese-leader-deng-xiao-ping-at-the-news-photo/581773063?adppopup=true">Chuck Fishman/Archive Photos via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>In the years that followed, China’s <a href="https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33534.html">economy flourished</a>, as did its scientific output. As China’s economy expanded, so did its investment in domestic research and development. This all boosted China’s ability to collaborate in science – aiding their own economy. </p>
<p>Early collaboration under the 1979 umbrella agreement was mostly symbolic and based upon information exchange, but substantive collaborations grew over time. </p>
<p>A major early achievement came when the two countries published research showing mothers could ingest folic acid to prevent birth defects <a href="https://embryo.asu.edu/pages/china-us-study-prevention-neural-tube-defects-using-folic-acid-1999">like spina bifida</a> in developing embryos. Other successful partnerships developed <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.12.053">renewable energy</a>, rapid diagnostic tests <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-019-6776-3">for the SARS virus</a> and a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1900556116">solar-driven method for producing hydrogen fuel</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544642/original/file-20230824-17-8zbxik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man with glasses and a lab coat looks into a microscope." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544642/original/file-20230824-17-8zbxik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544642/original/file-20230824-17-8zbxik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544642/original/file-20230824-17-8zbxik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544642/original/file-20230824-17-8zbxik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544642/original/file-20230824-17-8zbxik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544642/original/file-20230824-17-8zbxik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544642/original/file-20230824-17-8zbxik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Research collaborations between the U.S. and China have led to a variety of innovations, including tests for the SARS virus.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/dec-2-2020-a-staff-member-observes-the-microscopic-features-news-photo/1229971264?adppopup=true">Xinhua News Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Joint projects then began to emerge independent of <a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Trends%20in%20US-China%20Science%20and%20Technology%20Cooperation.pdf">government agreements or aid</a>. Researchers linked up around common interests – this is how nation-to-nation scientific collaboration thrives. </p>
<p>Many of these projects were initiated by Chinese Americans or Chinese nationals <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scz056">working in the United States</a> who cooperated with researchers back home. In the earliest days of the COVID-19 pandemic, these strong ties led to rapid, increased <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236307">Chinese-U.S. cooperation</a> in response to the crisis. </p>
<h2>Time of conflict</h2>
<p>Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, scientific collaboration between the two countries <a href="https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2202.00453">increased dramatically</a> – joint research projects expanded, visiting students in science and engineering skyrocketed in number and collaborative publications received more recognition. </p>
<p>As China’s economy and technological success grew, however, U.S. government agencies and Congress began to <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/RL32496.pdf">scrutinize the agreement</a> and its output. Chinese know-how began to build military strength and, with China’s military and political influence growing, they worried about intellectual property theft, trade secret violations and national security vulnerabilities coming from connections with the U.S.</p>
<p>Recent U.S. legislation, <a href="https://issues.org/competing-with-china-chips-science-zhou/">such as the CHIPS and Science Act</a>, is a direct response to China’s stunning expansion. Through the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346">CHIPS and Science Act</a>, the U.S. <a href="https://ejournals.bc.edu/index.php/ihe/article/view/16093">will boost its semiconductor industry</a>, seen as the platform for building future industries, while seeking to limit China’s access to <a href="https://issues.org/competing-with-china-chips-science-zhou/">advances in AI and electronics</a>. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/mFfB3zzdMNo?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The CHIPS and Science Act aims to bolster domestic semiconductor production.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>A victim of success?</h2>
<p>Some politicians believe this bilateral science and technology agreement, negotiated in the 1970s as the least contentious form of cooperation – and one renewed many times – may now threaten the United States’ dominance in science and technology. As political and military tensions grow, both countries are wary of renewal of the agreement, even as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scad022">China has signed</a> similar agreements with over 100 nations. </p>
<p>The United States is stuck in a world that no longer exists – one where it dominates <a href="https://issues.org/global-science-technology-policy-guile-wagner/">science and technology</a>. China now <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/china-rises-first-place-most-cited-papers">leads the world in research publications recognized as high quality work</a>, and <a href="https://issues.org/wadhwa-engineers-education/">it produces many more engineers than the U.S</a>. By all measures, China’s <a href="https://sciencebusiness.net/news/international-news/puzzle-stumps-statisticians-how-much-does-china-actually-spend-rd">research spending is soaring</a>.</p>
<p>Even if the recent extension results in a renegotiated agreement, the U.S. has signaled to China a reluctance to cooperate. Since 2018, joint publications have <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/the-u-s-is-turning-away-from-its-biggest-scientific-partner-at-a-precarious-time-9fb9adaa">dropped in number</a>. Chinese researchers are <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/news/faculty-issues/research/2023/07/05/study-chinese-scientists-increasingly-leaving-us">less willing</a> to come to the U.S. Meanwhile, Chinese researchers who are in the U.S. are increasingly <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/news/faculty-issues/research/2023/07/05/study-chinese-scientists-increasingly-leaving-us">likely to return home</a> taking valuable knowledge with them.</p>
<p>The U.S. risks being cut off from top know-how as China forges ahead. Perhaps looking at science as a globally shared resource could help both parties craft a truly “win-win” agreement.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212084/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Caroline Wagner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China’s success in science and technology propelled it to the forefront of many fields. Now, the US wants to pull back from years of intense cooperation.Caroline Wagner, Professor of Public Affairs, The Ohio State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2095392023-07-11T15:32:11Z2023-07-11T15:32:11ZSweden is joining Nato: what that means for the alliance and the war in Ukraine<p>In a surprise move, Turkey <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/10/nato-sweden-pm-to-meet-with-turkeys-erdogan-in-last-ditch-bid-to-seal-membership">has ended</a> its <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/03/the-turkish-veto-why-erdogan-is-blocking-finland-and-swedens-path-to-nato/">veto</a> on Sweden joining Nato, thereby removing all the barriers to its membership of the military alliance. </p>
<p>Hungary quickly followed suit and, as a result of the two countries’ support, a consensus was able to be reached at the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/216570.htm">2023 Nato summit</a> in Vilnius, Lithuania. Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan agreeing to support Sweden’s bid to join will be touted as one of the key achievements of the summit.</p>
<p>Sweden submitted its formal application for membership in May 2022 alongside Finland, which was <a href="https://theconversation.com/finland-joins-nato-in-a-major-blow-to-putin-which-doubles-the-length-of-the-alliances-border-with-russia-203217">admitted</a> into the alliance in April 2023. </p>
<p>Sweden, though not a formal member, has had a very close relationship with Nato for almost 30 years, since joining the alliance’s Partnership for Peace programme in 1994. It has contributed to Nato missions. And as a member of the European Union and contributor to the bloc’s <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/common-security-and-defence-policy_en">common security and defence policy</a>, it has also worked closely with the vast majority of European Nato allies. </p>
<p>In pursuing Nato membership, both Sweden and Finland have dramatically shifted their traditional policy of military non-alignment. A critical driver of this move was, clearly, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It is also more evidence that Russian president Vladimir Putin has failed to achieve two of his own strategic objectives: weakening solidarity in the alliance and preventing further Nato enlargement towards Russia’s borders.</p>
<p>Finland and Sweden’s accession is of significant operational importance to how Nato defends allied territory against Russian aggression. Integrating these two nations on its north flank (the Atlantic and European Arctic) will help to solidify plans for <a href="https://www.economist.com/international/2023/07/02/nato-is-drafting-new-plans-to-defend-europe">defending</a> its Ukraine-adjacent centre (from the Baltic Sea to the Alps). This will ensure that Russia has to contend with powerful and interoperable military forces across its entire western border.</p>
<h2>Why Turkey lifted its veto</h2>
<p>For a few years now, Turkey’s relationship with Nato has been nuanced and strained. Turkey’s objections to Sweden’s accession were ostensibly connected to its concerns over Sweden’s policy towards the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. </p>
<p>Turkey has accused Sweden of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66160319">hosting Kurdish militants</a>. Nato has acknowledged this as a legitimate security concern and Sweden has made concessions as part of its journey towards Nato. </p>
<p>The main material driver of the agreement, however, may always have been a carrot being dangled by the US. American president Joe Biden now appears to be <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/cd8e7cc1-30c8-4b53-a605-8524d5815156">moving forward with</a> plans to transfer F-16 fighter jets to Turkey – a deal that appears to have been unlocked by Erdoğan’s changed stance on Sweden. But it is often the case that a host of surrounding deals and suggestions of deals can help facilitate movement at Nato. Everyone, including Turkey, now seems able to sell the developments as a win to their constituents back home. </p>
<h2>The ‘Nordic round’</h2>
<p>Sweden’s accession means all Nordic nations are now part of Nato. As well as being significant in operational and military terms, this enlargement has major political, strategic and defence planning implications. Although Finland and Sweden have been <a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1466256/finland-sweden-and-nato-from-virtual-to-formal-allies/">“virtual allies”</a> for years, their formal accession means some changes in practice. </p>
<p>Strategically, the two are now free to work seamlessly with the rest of the Nato allies to plan for collective defence. Integrating strategic plans is extremely valuable, particularly considering Finland’s massive border with Russia and Sweden’s possession of critical terrain like the Baltic Sea island of Gotland. This will increase strategic interoperability and coordination.</p>
<p>Nato allies also open their defence planning books to one another in unprecedented ways. Finland and Sweden will now undergo bilateral (with Nato’s international secretariat) and multilateral (with all allies) examinations as part of the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49202.htm">Nato defence planning process</a>. They will also contribute to the strategic decisions that undergird that process.</p>
<p>Their defence investments will also be scrutinised (and they will scrutinise the spending of other allies). Initial analysis suggests that while Finland and Sweden have lagged behind their Nordic neighbours’ increases in <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm">defence investment since 2014</a>. Finland’s investment in defence <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm">leapt significantly</a> leading up to and following its accession to Nato. While we may not know for months if the same is true of Sweden, we may expect similar increases on its part. Alliance norms and peer pressure are powerful.</p>
<p>The expansion of Nato to include Sweden is a major step for all these reasons. But while anyone watching the Vilnius summit will naturally now be asking whether the shift changes the situation for Ukraine’s membership aspirations, an answer is unlikely to be on the near horizon. Any final decision on Ukraine being offered a <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37356.htm">membership action plan</a> for the time being is a bridge too far, especially in the current context of an ongoing war with an outcome that, as yet, is unpredictable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209539/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon J Smith receives funding from the British Academy for research on UK Civilian-Military relations and received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council for research on the Drivers of Military Strategic Reform.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jordan Becker receives funding from the European Research Council. He is affiliated with the United States Government as an active duty US Army Officer and Academy Professor at the United States Military Academy. This article reflects the authors' views alone and should not be construed as reflecting any official US Government policy.</span></em></p>All Nordic states are now members of the military alliance, bolstering key border regions with Russia.Simon J Smith, Associate Professor of Security and International Relations, Staffordshire UniversityJordan Becker, Director, SOSH Research Lab Assistant Professor of International Affairs, United States Military Academy West PointLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2047582023-05-31T20:07:25Z2023-05-31T20:07:25ZThe Harvard of anti-terrorism: how Israel’s military-industrial complex feeds the global arms trade<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528780/original/file-20230529-17-hbx826.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=50%2C8%2C5531%2C3715&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An Israeli soldier, seen through a shattered window of an Israeli army vehicle, near the Gaza border in southern Israel, August, 2010.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tsafrir Abayov/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In <a href="https://scribepublications.com.au/books-authors/books/the-palestine-laboratory-9781922310408">The Palestine Laboratory: How Israel Exports the Technology of Occupation Around the World</a>, Antony Loewenstein details how Israel’s military-industrial complex has grown from a minor industry into a dominant economic and social force at home and abroad. </p>
<p>He traces how, since 1967, the Occupied Territories and their people have furnished Israel with a living laboratory for their application and development of border security and surveillance systems, phone-hacking spyware, tracking and targeting technologies, as well as more traditional weapons systems. Tried and tested in the field, these systems are then packaged and sold for export. </p>
<p>In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the wave of anxiety they engendered, demand for Israeli hardware and know-how exploded. Israel is now one of the world’s <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/267131/market-share-of-the-leadings-exporters-of-conventional-weapons/">top-ten weapons dealing nations</a>. Its defence enterprises market everything from small arms to killer drones, from spyware to surface-to-air missiles. If it flies, watches, listens or goes bang, Israeli companies make and will sell it to (just about) anybody. </p>
<p>The Israeli economy, one critic noted, has “abandoned oranges for hand grenades”. Perhaps. But, as Loewenstein notes, everybody wants hand grenades nowadays. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Review: The Palestine Laboratory: How Israel Exports the Technology of Occupation Around the World – Antony Loewenstein (Scribe)</em></p>
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<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528765/original/file-20230529-9039-43a10a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528765/original/file-20230529-9039-43a10a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528765/original/file-20230529-9039-43a10a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528765/original/file-20230529-9039-43a10a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528765/original/file-20230529-9039-43a10a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528765/original/file-20230529-9039-43a10a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1154&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528765/original/file-20230529-9039-43a10a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1154&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528765/original/file-20230529-9039-43a10a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1154&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption"></span>
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<p>Loewenstein’s analysis of Israeli arms dealing offers a sobering roll-call of the past half-century’s standout despots and pariah nations, ranging from apartheid-era South Africa to Saudi Arabia’s bonesaw authoritarians. Their clients have included, among others, Suharto-era Indonesia, Ceausescu’s Romania, Pinochet’s Chile, the Shah’s Iran, the Duvaliers’ – <em>père</em> et <em>fils</em> – Haiti, Stroessner’s Paraguay, and Rios Montt’s genocidal tyranny in Guatemala, where Israeli-made Galil rifles were used to massacre indigenous communities. </p>
<p>Through its commercial relationships and the diplomacy into which they so often shade, Israel has consistently pursued international acceptance of, or acquiescence to, its occupation of pre-1967 Palestinian territories. Israel will trade with any state whose backing will help stifle criticism or stave off sanctions, as well as just about anybody else who can pay. As a result, not only has Israel surrendered its once-prized status as “a light unto nations”, its export policies have ensured that millions labouring under autocratic rule remain locked in darkness. </p>
<p>Despite the massive investments of manpower, materiel and infrastructure, Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and the containment of Gaza, has been a boon to the state, not a financial burden. The high operational tempo of its military means that those marketing Israeli defence materiel can point to the performance of their technologies in Gaza, Jenin, and across the Occupied Territories, as well as in Lebanon and Syria. </p>
<p>Do you need to know what your enemies are planning? Listen to these recordings of their conversations and messages sourced via the latest spyware. Do you want to see where your enemies are and interdict them before they can do you any harm? See how this drone locates, tracks and then detonates the car in which the militant commander is travelling. Looking for a surgical strike option? Watch this missile demolish the tower block where enemy intelligence has occupied offices, leaving the surrounding real estate mostly intact. </p>
<h2>Export industry</h2>
<p>The September 11 attacks on New York and Washington turbocharged Israel’s defence sector. Spooked by the fear of hostile foreigners and enemies within, governments from around the world queued up to learn from “the Harvard of anti-terrorism” and buy its technology. </p>
<p>As of 2021, Israeli arms sales had increased by more than 55% over the preceding two years, to a total of <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-arms-sales-hit-new-record-of-11-3-billion-in-2021/">US$11.3 billion</a>. Its more recent clients include India, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Azerbaijan. In each of these countries, Israeli arms have exacerbated existing conflicts. Indeed, Israel rarely meets a client with whom it will not do business. Its government has approved every defence deal brought to it since 2007. </p>
<p>Despite this, the US National Security Agency (NSA) has continued to transfer data-mining and analytical software to the Israelis, who have increasingly passed it on to private companies. Using its operations in the occupied territories as incubator, accelerator and test bed, and drawing on the expertise of Unit 8200 – the Israeli Defense Force’s equivalent of the NSA – the Israeli state has facilitated and funded numerous private start-ups. </p>
<p>Yet the appearance of a thriving defence private sector is illusory, as the government oversees ownership and directs the operations of the key players in the market. NSO, the surveillance company responsible for the phone-hacking spyware Pegasus, is under the “almost complete control” of Israel’s Ministry of Defense, which “controls ownership and rights and has a veto on shareholders, owners and operators. The tech, patent and IP is also controlled.” </p>
<p>All foreign sales are overseen by the Ministry of Defense. A dedicated department of the Director of Security of the Defense Establishment is tasked to ensure that classified information about the defence industry is not inadvertently revealed through any of these deals. Israel thus retains its best and sharpest innovations for its own use.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529206/original/file-20230530-21-ofog7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529206/original/file-20230530-21-ofog7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529206/original/file-20230530-21-ofog7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529206/original/file-20230530-21-ofog7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529206/original/file-20230530-21-ofog7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529206/original/file-20230530-21-ofog7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529206/original/file-20230530-21-ofog7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529206/original/file-20230530-21-ofog7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A bomb hits the building housing international media, including The Associated Press, in Gaza City, May 15, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mahmud Hams /Pool Photo via AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-nakba-75-years-after-losing-their-home-the-palestinians-are-still-experiencing-the-catastrophe-205413">The Nakba: 75 years after losing their home, the Palestinians are still experiencing the 'catastrophe'</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Commercial sales</h2>
<p>The commercial sale of technologies ordinarily reserved for state purposes, and their subsequent misuse, often by states themselves, has disturbed senior intelligence officials in the <a href="https://privacyinternational.org/learn/five-eyes">“five eyes” intelligence community</a> and strained ties with Tel Aviv. </p>
<p>The first major customer for NSO’s Pegasus spyware, in 2011, was the Mexican government, which at the time was locked in a bloody struggle against drug cartels. The capacity to listen in to the narco-traffickers’ conversations and read their text exchanges gave Mexican authorities a crucial if temporary edge. Pegasus, they later claimed, had played a key role in the 2016 arrest of the head of the Sinaloa drug cartel, “El Chapo”. </p>
<p>However, it wasn’t long before state officials made the information garnered by Pegasus, and the technology itself, available to the cartels. While the drug traffickers targeted their rivals and their critics in the media, leading to a massive upsurge in the killing of reporters, the government used the technology to spy on critics of its other policies, notably proponents of a sugar tax on the country’s soft-drinks industry, giving the lie to its assurance that it would be used solely to track perpetrators of major crimes. </p>
<p>Jeremy Fleming, former director of Britain’s intelligence, security and cyber agency Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), described NSO’s practices as “beyond the pale” and argued that “countries or companies that promulgate [technology] in an unconstrained way like that are damaging and should not be tolerated”.</p>
<p>How are the Israelis able to behave like this? Why doesn’t the United States rein them in? </p>
<p>Loewenstein argues that after the US failed to protect it from Iraqi Scud missiles during the first Gulf War, Israel exercised greater autonomy in the production, deployment and trade in its military technology. It is not an entirely convincing argument. It overlooks the fact that the Scuds that landed on Tel Aviv and Haifa in January 1991 were targeted as much at the Arab and Muslim-majority members of the international coalition that the US had assembled against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as they were at the Israelis. </p>
<p>The missile attacks were intended to provoke a response from Israel, which was not a member of the US-led coalition, in the belief this would bring about the withdrawal of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey and others, and so precipitate the collapse of the anti-Iraqi alliance. </p>
<p>Israel has acted with greater independence from the US because, over the past 20 years, it has become less economically dependent. Until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Israel was perennially the largest recipient of US aid, which in 1981 was roughly equivalent to 10% of Israel’s economy. As its economy grew, the size and significance of the US subvention diminished. By 2020, the US’s $4 billion of financial assistance amounted to only 1% of the economy, thus freeing Israel to act, at home and abroad, with less regard for the political interests or moral sensitivities of the US.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528779/original/file-20230529-17-zfc66b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528779/original/file-20230529-17-zfc66b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528779/original/file-20230529-17-zfc66b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528779/original/file-20230529-17-zfc66b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528779/original/file-20230529-17-zfc66b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528779/original/file-20230529-17-zfc66b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528779/original/file-20230529-17-zfc66b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Antony Loewenstein.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alison Martin/Scribe Publishing</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/on-its-75th-birthday-israel-still-cant-agree-on-what-it-means-to-be-a-jewish-state-and-a-democracy-204770">On its 75th birthday, Israel still can't agree on what it means to be a Jewish state and a democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The border industrial complex</h2>
<p>Before we retreat behind the smug assumption that the unethical sell only to the unprincipled, Loewenstein reminds us that in 2021 the major destination for Israeli arms exports was Europe. </p>
<p>As the immediate threat of terrorism has faded since the defeat of Islamic State, Israeli defence technology has played a central role in helping the European Union and its constituent states to monitor and hold back the flow of refugees making their way to the European mainland. </p>
<p>The EU’s border agency, Frontex, uses unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – Israeli Heron and Hermes drones – to monitor movements on its maritime and land borders. Tested over the occupied territories, the Heron can remain in the air for up to 24 hours. Its equipment includes high-resolution and thermal-imaging cameras, artificial intelligence to detect moving targets, and mobile telephone location technology. </p>
<p>While these drones can locate and track migrants on land or the water, in daylight or darkness, providing the Frontex control centre in Warsaw with a visual live feed, they cannot rescue anybody. If the Frontex operator sees an armed vessel or a suspicious-looking boat, he can alert a patrol boat to intercept and investigate. If all he sees is a leaky boat full of refugees, there may not be quite as much hurry. As one analyst noted, the technology gives Frontex “the option to let refugees drown”. </p>
<p>Frontex’s budget grew from €6 million in 2006 to <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2021/04/27/eu-plans-to-boost-power-of-border-agency-frontex-raise-eyebrows">€460 million in 2020</a>. The EU is now pledged to spend <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4106">€34.9 billion on border and migration management between 2021 and 2027</a>, transforming it from “a coordination mechanism to a fully fledged multinational security force”. </p>
<p>Israel supplies this “border industrial complex” with, among other things, digital barriers, steel fences, observation towers, ground sensors, thermal imaging, virtual border-guard interview machines, and lie-detector machines powered by AI. </p>
<p>The size of the Frontex budget, and the inhuman equipment it furnishes, lays bare just how badly the multicultural project in Europe is struggling. The backlash against immigration has long been a feature of European Union politics, energised by the global financial crisis, and lethally sharpened after the influx of Syrian refugees in 2015. Ethno-nationalists, Brexiteers and other tinpot populists have ridden to power by stoking public fears of the outsider and championing an increasingly narrow vision of national identity and its approved expression. </p>
<p>Benjamin Netanyahu’s Israel, Loewenstein argues, has been at the forefront in articulating and embedding the policies and practices of this new ethno-nationalism. For a long time, Israel and its policies in the Occupied Territories looked like an outlier. The then US President Barack Obama, in one of his many spats with Netanyahu, argued that the arc of history was bending away from colonialism and racism, and that the Israelis would have to come to a settlement with the Palestinians, as in the 21st century it was no longer sustainable to occupy another land and oppress its people. </p>
<p>Netanyahu disagreed, arguing, as <a href="https://peterbeinart.substack.com/p/benjamin-netanyahu-father-of-our">Peter Beinart</a> put it, that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the future belonged not to liberalism as Obama defined it – tolerance, equal rights and the rule of law – but to authoritarian capitalism: governments that combined aggressive nationalism with economic and technological might. The future, Netanyahu implied, would produce leaders who resembled not Obama, but him.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528776/original/file-20230529-22-hhwic5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528776/original/file-20230529-22-hhwic5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528776/original/file-20230529-22-hhwic5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528776/original/file-20230529-22-hhwic5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528776/original/file-20230529-22-hhwic5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528776/original/file-20230529-22-hhwic5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528776/original/file-20230529-22-hhwic5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528776/original/file-20230529-22-hhwic5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Oval Office of the White House, Washington DC, November 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Andrew Harnik/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As the retreat from liberalism plays out across the world, in the US, India, Hong Kong, Hungary, Poland and multiple African states, Netanyahu looks less like a has-been and more like a portent, the “rough beast, its hour come round at last / Slouch[ing] towards Bethlehem”.</p>
<p>In The Palestine Laboratory, Loewenstein does not merely indict Israel for its failure to live up to the promise of its founding principles and its leading role in the supply, sustainment and normalisation of a border-industrial complex. He also condemns Europe, the US, Australia and the West for their politicisation of fear of the outsider, their receptiveness to divisive demagoguery, and their moral complicity in the immiseration of millions who live under occupation and oppression, and the millions more who roam the Earth in search of safe harbour. Israel may have lost its way, but once-civilised nations seem to be following it into the darkness.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204758/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevin Foster does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Tried and tested in the field, Israeli weapons and surveillance technology are being packaged and sold for export.Kevin Foster, Associate Professor, School of Languages, Literatures, Cultures and Linguistics, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2055902023-05-15T11:47:04Z2023-05-15T11:47:04ZThe Diplomat: Netflix show suggests the US-UK special relationship needs some TLC<p>Netflix’s new political drama, The Diplomat, is focused on the trials and tribulations of Kate Wyler (Keri Russell), a new American ambassador to Britain. It begins with a deadly attack on a British aircraft carrier and then follows the twists and turns of a joint US and UK attempt to find the culprits.</p>
<p>Ambassador Wyler is an experienced diplomat frustrated by the unwanted interventions of her high profile husband (Rufus Sewell). Wyler is a capable crisis manager irritated by the ceremonial demands of the role but earmarked for great things by the White House (she has been identified as a future vice president).</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/lV6sJlBbhPs?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The trailer for Netflix’s The Diplomat.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is entertaining stuff and clearly owes much to its highly successful predecessor in dissecting US politics, The West Wing (1999).</p>
<p>The Diplomat also tells the familiar story of the much celebrated “special relationship” between the US and UK. It engagingly critiques, laments and celebrates contemporary US-UK relations.</p>
<p>The show suggests that if the special relationship is to survive into a world turned topsy turvy by Brexit (explicitly named), Trump (hinted at) and war in Europe (repeatedly referred to) it demands a little TLC.</p>
<h2>The history of the special relationship</h2>
<p>The idea of the “<a href="https://uk.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/special-relationship-anniversary-1946-2016/">special relationship</a>” was popularised by Winston Churchill in a speech he gave at Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946 that bequeathed two evocative phrases. </p>
<p>One was “<a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Iron-Curtain#:%7E:text=Iron%20Curtain%2C%20the%20political%2C%20military,West%20and%20other%20noncommunist%20areas.">Iron Curtain</a>”, deployed to describe the hardening of tensions between east and west. The other, a rallying cry intended to consolidate the Anglo-American bond forged in war, was that “special relationship”.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525864/original/file-20230512-15-4sjmk9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Black and white portrait of Churchill" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525864/original/file-20230512-15-4sjmk9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525864/original/file-20230512-15-4sjmk9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=757&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525864/original/file-20230512-15-4sjmk9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=757&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525864/original/file-20230512-15-4sjmk9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=757&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525864/original/file-20230512-15-4sjmk9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525864/original/file-20230512-15-4sjmk9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525864/original/file-20230512-15-4sjmk9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Churchill was the child of an Anglo-American love match.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sir_Winston_Churchill.jpg">Library and Archives Canada</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For various reasons, Churchill’s phrase quickly entered the lexicon of diplomatic discourse. One reason was its author, a skilful orator whose words always drew press attention. But another was that Churchill had described something – the idea of a special connection between the US and UK – that had long been the subject of sustained cultural attention. </p>
<p>Take, for instance, how the Anglo-American alliance <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s42738-020-00053-y">had been depicted</a> in films like <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KZSdSntd4ZI">A Yank in the RAF</a> (1941), <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rbjVrazpjzU">The Way to the Stars</a> (1945) and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jfpcsk_rUa8">I Live at Grosvenor Square</a> (1945).</p>
<p>All these films celebrated special Anglo-American connections often – like Churchill – with a nod towards shared language, values and history. And crucially, given a key feature of The Diplomat, many also did so via a specific narrative ploy: a transatlantic love tryst.</p>
<p>It is a revealing metaphor and in it the gendered assumptions shaping the 1940s US-UK alliance are powerfully exposed. This was a relationship, these films suggest, sustained by love and romance just as much as by trade or treaties – an idea that Churchill, himself the product of <a href="https://winstonchurchill.org/the-life-of-churchill/child/lord-and-lady-randolph-churchill/">an Anglo-American love match</a>, understood very well.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/iA3WLXRuC9E?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Love Actually’s ‘special relationship’ scene.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While this was a ploy with a deep history (traceable to the writings of 19th century <a href="https://www.neh.gov/humanities/2011/julyaugust/feature/henry-james-and-the-american-idea">authors such as Henry James</a>), it was in wartime and, later, post-war popular culture that it secured new visibility. </p>
<p>By the 1990s the trope was a staple, with transatlantic romances featuring in everything from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-t3Xv70vkY8">A Matter of Life and Death</a> (1946), to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-SNJR4eJ36o">D-Day: Sixth of June</a> (1956), to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFC_5n08a-0">The War Lover</a> (1962), <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jWnUizew7io">Yanks</a> (1979) and the popular television series about the second world war American presence in Britain, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ClwW0n05av4">We’ll Meet Again</a> (1982).</p>
<p>Still more recently, it has featured in a host of transatlantic rom coms, from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4RI0QvaGoiI">Notting Hill</a> (1996) to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H9Z3_ifFheQ">Love Actually</a> (2003) and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wk9caHO3pW0">The Holiday</a> (2006).</p>
<h2>Unrequited love?</h2>
<p>In its love triangle between the US ambassador, her husband and the British foreign secretary (David Gyasi), The Diplomat deploys this same metaphor in order to critique the special relationship.</p>
<p>The drama underscores that close ties remain between the nations. It’s apparent in their intelligence sharing, the speed with which the US president offers his support to the British prime minister, the easy familiarity between the two nation’s principal players and – most obviously – in the burgeoning romance between the US ambassador and the British foreign secretary.</p>
<p>But there is also a clear sense that the two nations have become estranged. </p>
<p>Does London really have Washington’s full support? Does Brexit Britain retain its strategic significance to the US? And of course, sublimating it all, is the most important question of all: is the foreign secretary’s love for the ambassador unrequited? Does she feel for him what he feels for her? </p>
<p>If she does, then perhaps this is the very sort of TLC that might restore and rejuvenate the special relationship. After all, to thrive and prosper, any good relationship needs a little romance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205590/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Edwards has previously received funding from the ESRC and the US-UK Fulbright Commission. Sam is a Trustee of The American Library (Norwich) and Sulgrave Manor.</span></em></p>The Diplomat suggests that if the ‘special relationship’ is to survive into a world turned topsy turvy by Brexit, Trump and war in Europe, it demands a little TLC.Sam Edwards, Reader in Modern Political History, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2051492023-05-11T11:36:26Z2023-05-11T11:36:26ZEurovision 2023: why the stage itself is the silent star of the contest<p>This week, Liverpool stages one of the <a href="https://eurovision.tv/mediacentre/release/183-million-viewers">world’s largest live televised events</a>, the Eurovision Song Contest. I grew up watching it as an annual family get-together. </p>
<p>Now, as a lecturer in theatre and scenography – the study and practice of how set, sound, light and costume work together in an event – I have come to appreciate the immense logistical effort this entertainment behemoth requires. </p>
<p>More fascinatingly though, it is an extraordinary example of media and performance history, providing a yearly snapshot of pan-European <a href="https://theconversation.com/eurovision-even-before-the-singing-starts-the-contest-is-a-fascinating-reflection-of-international-rules-and-politics-204934">national identities and politics</a>.</p>
<p>While the contest’s rules state that <a href="https://eurovision.tv/about/rules">it is a non-political event</a>, it undeniably puts international relations on display. But while looking at different countries’ acts and voting patterns offers interesting insights, there is a silent star of the event that often goes unnoticed – the stage.</p>
<h2>Staging a nation</h2>
<p>Since the contest’s inception in 1956, there has been no serious discussion about the way Eurovision is an exercise in staging nation, nationality and nationalism in the literal sense – namely how these ideas inform the scenography.</p>
<p>2023 marks the first time Eurovision will be hosted in the runner-up’s country due to war, with the UK hosting on behalf of Ukraine. </p>
<p>The host’s stage set-up must be everything and nothing at the same time. It needs to provide a flexible, adaptable canvas for the wide-ranging individual acts of up to 44 countries. At the same time, it must offer a memorable and distinct experience to measure up to previous iterations of the competition. </p>
<p>The stage also needs to embody that year’s chosen theme, while meeting the extensive requirements of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), which organises the event, in order to allow the competition to run efficiently.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/kDPBB09eiXs?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Inside Liverpool Arena as the Eurovision 2023 build got underway.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>2023’s theme is “united by music”. After the UK’s difficult departure from the EU, it now faces the challenge of staging itself as part of a united European community. Meanwhile, it also needs to give space to Ukraine to do the same. </p>
<p>The Liverpool stage’s designer, Julio Himede, has repeatedly offered the <a href="https://recessed.space/00097-Julio-Himede-Eurovision">image of a hug</a> – of open arms welcoming Ukraine and the world – as central to the stage’s spatial configuration.</p>
<p>The early days of Eurovision were a much smaller affair than nowadays. When the UK first hosted in 1960 at the Royal Festival Hall in London, it seated just 2,500 people. That’s less than a quarter of this year’s 11,000 at the Liverpool arena.</p>
<p>And if you have been watching the semi-finals, you’ll already have a good sense of the sheer scale of this year’s stage. At 450m², it is almost as big as a basketball court. With an integrated lighting design through video-capable floor and ceiling tiling and huge LED screens, the only apt descriptor is “spectacular”.</p>
<p>For Eurovision, the concepts, symbols and metaphors underpinning the design have to work in tandem with the creative vision of each delegation, as well as the 45 second turnover between acts in the live show.</p>
<p>The design concept also has to be one that acknowledges the particular situation of this year’s contest and simultaneously unites the identities of Ukraine and the UK. </p>
<p>Ultimately, the image of the hug that underpins the sweeping curve of the main stage space aims to offer a more universal theme, rather than one which is culturally specific. Viewers will notice the “open arms” of the stage are echoed in the arrangement of the “green room”, where the national delegations are located during the show.</p>
<p>In this sense, Eurovision is a prime example of a “soft power” approach to international relations, which works by persuasion or influence, rather than the “hard power” of economic sanctions or military intervention. </p>
<h2>The UK after Brexit</h2>
<p>This year, it will be fascinating to see how much space the UK will give to Ukraine, not only last year’s winner but a nation in need of international recognition and support. And to what extent the UK will use this event, post-Brexit, to stage itself as a welcoming part of Europe.</p>
<p>The UK does have a history of highly successful <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/stage/theatreblog/2012/jul/31/olympic-opening-ceremony-agitprop-theatre">agit-prop</a> events, which have engaged audiences emotionally to shape public opinion. Think back to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/stage/theatreblog/2012/jul/31/olympic-opening-ceremony-agitprop-theatre">2012 London Olympics opening ceremony</a>, which strove to inspire <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13642529.2014.909674">a sense of national identity</a>. </p>
<p>In 2023, the UK sees itself in the middle of global instability and national tension over <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/mar/16/hostile-authoritarian-uk-downgraded-in-civic-freedoms-index">mounting authoritarianism</a> and <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/society/articles-reports/2023/02/07/yougov-cost-living-segmentation">widening social divisions</a>. Once again, it has the chance to use an international stage to put forward an idealised narrative.</p>
<p>In any such example, the stage underpins the entire event. It is essential to the atmosphere for the live audience and fundamental to its appearance on television. </p>
<p>There is no doubt that Eurovision 2023 is a staging extravaganza and will test the UK’s capability to shake off its <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/britain-is-the-sick-man-of-europe-again/">“sick man of Europe”</a> image. It is a stage which offers the UK the opportunity to adjust its global image in line with the contest’s welcoming theme. </p>
<p>It will be interesting to see whether the image of open arms for the world is sincere or cynical.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205149/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lara Maleen Kipp does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>2023 sees the UK host the Eurovision Song Contest on behalf of Ukraine. But what role does the stage itself have to play in the musical spectacle?Lara Maleen Kipp, Lecturer in Theatre and Scenography, Aberystwyth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2012842023-03-08T13:39:43Z2023-03-08T13:39:43ZRussia wants military aid from China – here’s why this deal could help China, too<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514043/original/file-20230307-20-3dnypx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, left, met with his then-Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, in March 2022 in Huangshan. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1239620057/photo/china-russia-diplomacy.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=5Z6aXWvegWI5ZWwsZEqeQZJxJ2pdowVG0a_rmitPrtg=">STR/CCTV/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/02/24/china-weapons-russia-ukraine-war-00084425">China is considering</a> sending weapons, ammunition and drones to Russia, according to information the Biden administration declassified at the end of February 2023. </p>
<p>China’s military aid would directly <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-government-antony-blinken-china-6ad43aa87f086acce31a1de63c6caf15">support Russia’s war</a> in Ukraine.</p>
<p>This public disclosure, emerging less than a month after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/spy-balloon-drama-elevates-public-attention-pressure-for-the-us-to-confront-china-199484">U.S. navy shot down a Chinese balloon</a> that allegedly was being used for spying purposes, further heightened existing tensions between the U.S. and China. </p>
<p>It also comes as Russia is facing <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/putins-war-costs-shifting-burden-population">mounting costs in its war on Ukraine</a> – both financial and in human lives. </p>
<p>These setbacks have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343311411959">pushed Russia to seek help</a> where the government can find it.</p>
<p>Russia has tried to secure weapons and other military support from allies such as <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/09/12/russia-weapons-resupply-problems/">North Korea</a> and neighboring <a href="https://theconversation.com/3-reasons-belarus-is-helping-russia-wage-war-against-ukraine-177984">country Belarus</a>. Russia has also turned to neutral countries <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/11/29/russia-turns-to-india-for-help-as-western-sanctions-bite-reuters-a79539">like India</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-march-imports-russian-oil-may-hit-record-shiptracking-data-2023-03-02/">China to whom it can sell</a> its oil and gas and bring in more money.</p>
<p>China has not publicly announced a decision <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3306439/dod-official-says-us-not-yet-seeing-china-giving-lethal-aid-to-russia/">to give military aid</a> to Russia. </p>
<p>I am a <a href="http://ma-allen.com/">scholar</a> of <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=bSApaj4AAAAJ&hl=en">international relations</a> whose work focuses on the <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Wire-Military-Deployments-BRIDGING-ebook/dp/B0BPPT4CJD/">increasing competition between the U.S. and China</a>. Based on my research, I’m certain Russia would <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/13/us/politics/russia-china-ukraine.html">welcome</a> any assistance China would offer. China’s decision about whether to get involved in the Ukraine war will be carefully calculated, factoring in potential long-term benefits, risks and the influence of Western powers.</p>
<p>But I think that China’s choice in supporting Russia or not chiefly comes down to two considerations: how the Ukraine conflict will affect China’s overall growth in world politics, and its <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/12/china-takeover-taiwan-xi-tsai-ing-wen/671895/">interest in invading Taiwan</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514035/original/file-20230307-2056-a8loq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People are shown sitting around a long table that has a Russian and Chinese flag on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514035/original/file-20230307-2056-a8loq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514035/original/file-20230307-2056-a8loq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514035/original/file-20230307-2056-a8loq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514035/original/file-20230307-2056-a8loq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514035/original/file-20230307-2056-a8loq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514035/original/file-20230307-2056-a8loq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514035/original/file-20230307-2056-a8loq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russia’s Sergei Lavrov sits across the table from China’s Qin Gang in March 2023 while in New Delhi for a meeting of foreign ministers from the world’s largest industrialized and developing nations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1247609685/photo/russias-foreign-minister-lavrov-in-india.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=TGc6d8rvDhOfMzvPjP8tmSYIhdLG5kcS4zQ-DqN41oE=">Russian Foreign Ministry Press/Handout/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>China’s official stance</h2>
<p>Massive military aid to a struggling army is not cheap. The U.S. spent <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts">over US$75 billion</a> on aid to Ukraine in 2022. But despite the costs of war, China is considering supplying Russia military hardware for a few reasons. </p>
<p>Economically, China’s interests in Russia include money, energy and trade opportunities.</p>
<p>During the Cold War, the U.S. <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/driving-a-wedge-between-china-and-russia-wont-work/">successfully drove a wedge between the two countries</a>. However, after the Cold War, Russia and China grew closer <a href="https://chinapower.csis.org/history-china-russia-relations/">and became economically interconnected</a>.</p>
<p>Since Russia first launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, China has appeared to maintain a <a href="https://qz.com/2141404/chinese-scholars-warn-of-cost-of-pro-russia-neutrality">“pro-Russia” neutrality</a>. That is, China is officially neutral and not contributing to the conflict, but its government officials are <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2023/ukraine-at-one-year-has-china-supported-russia/">still echoing Russia’s war narrative and propaganda,</a> while ignoring what Ukraine is telling the world.</p>
<p>China has <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/23/china/china-position-political-settlement-ukraine-intl-hnk/index.html">criticized Western interference</a> in the war. It has <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/06/china-russia-war-taiwan-ukraine-peace-plan-xi-putin">also proposed a peace plan</a> for the conflict – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64762219">which does not</a> actually call for Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukraine. </p>
<p>So far, China has stopped short of sending military aid to Russia. Reversing course would be a substantive departure from China’s previous policy of official neutrality. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514034/original/file-20230307-18-4x3z0m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two men in suits walk in front of a formal display of military personnel, all wearing blue and yellow outfits and carrying rifles." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514034/original/file-20230307-18-4x3z0m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514034/original/file-20230307-18-4x3z0m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514034/original/file-20230307-18-4x3z0m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514034/original/file-20230307-18-4x3z0m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514034/original/file-20230307-18-4x3z0m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514034/original/file-20230307-18-4x3z0m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514034/original/file-20230307-18-4x3z0m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin reviews a military guard with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing in 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/969631120/photo/topshot-china-russia-diplomacy.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=LlE__0P7kFwYp-YcSqWkqvtBYRrgpqLM-KBI3zLTZXM=">Greg Baker/Pool/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A common adversary</h2>
<p>Russian success in Ukraine would align with China’s goals of reshaping <a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2022/10/10/china-wants-to-change-or-break-a-world-order-set-by-others">global politics and power</a>, and could help facilitate China’s own rise as an economic and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-59600475">military leader</a>.</p>
<p>In February 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Winter Olympics in Beijing. <a href="http://www.en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770">They issued a joint document</a> calling for reshaping global politics. The lengthy statement details shared values and a vision for a world without the United States as a major leader, and where China and Russia gain more control and influence.</p>
<p>China’s and Russia’s foreign ministers met on March 2, 2023, and China’s government <a href="http://sa.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202303/t20230305_11035968.htm">released a statement</a> that reiterated this point, saying that the two countries “have maintained sound and steady development, setting a new paradigm for a new type of major-country relationship.” </p>
<p><a href="https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html">Political scientists</a> and <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf">human rights scholars</a> do not consider <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/russia/nations-transit/2020">Russia</a> or <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2021">China</a> to be democracies or politically free. But both countries have lauded their own traditions of democracy and say they stand opposed to a world where the U.S. asserts its version of democracy and human rights as the only option. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514037/original/file-20230307-24-mkrk8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A helicopter is seen over a blue ocean, with land in the distance." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514037/original/file-20230307-24-mkrk8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514037/original/file-20230307-24-mkrk8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514037/original/file-20230307-24-mkrk8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514037/original/file-20230307-24-mkrk8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514037/original/file-20230307-24-mkrk8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514037/original/file-20230307-24-mkrk8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514037/original/file-20230307-24-mkrk8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chinese military helicopters fly nearby Taiwan in August 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1242294930/photo/topshot-china-taiwan-us-diplomacy-military.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=0ILxpTjtCeRrwkn_tu-JGC130g2ejEtQ6gUINZsjcWk=">Hector Retamal/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The Taiwan factor</h2>
<p>Another reason China may want Russia to succeed in Ukraine is that a Russian victory would give <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/russia-and-china-unveil-a-pact-against-america-and-the-west">China more external support</a> in any plans to overtake Taiwan or other territories. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-59900139">Taiwan is an island</a> off the coast of China that claims independence, but China maintains it is simply a breakaway province that it wants to regain control over. </p>
<p>If Russia had <a href="https://qz.com/2154947/why-russia-wants-to-win-its-war-against-ukraine-by-may-9">won the Ukraine war</a> as quickly as it initially planned, this might have <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/18/us-russia-china-war-nato-quadrilateral-security-dialogue/">paved the way for China to attempt a similar invasion</a> of Taiwan. But there was no quick victory.</p>
<p>Yet a prolonged Russia-Ukraine war may present a new kind of opportunity for China in Taiwan by diverting U.S. money, military resources and attention away from the island. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/07/1161570798/china-accuses-u-s-of-containment-warns-of-potential-conflict">Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang argued</a> on March 7, 2023, that because the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-reports-21-chinese-air-force-planes-entered-its-air-defence-zone-2023-03-02/">U.S. sells weapons to Taiwan</a>, this justifies China selling weapons to Russia. </p>
<p>Some critics have noted that U.S. aid to Ukraine makes it harder for the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/02/22/taiwan-weapons-china-gallagher/">U.S. to justify defending Taiwan</a> if China attempts to overtake it.</p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/reality-check/reality-check-10-china-will-not-invade-taiwan/">China invading Taiwan appears unlikely</a> in the short term – and some experts say such a move <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/10/taiwan-invasion-by-china-would-fail-but-at-huge-us-cost-analysts-war-game-finds">would be disastrous for China</a> – both the U.S. and China have a vested interest in the fate of Taiwan and the surrounding region.</p>
<p>The U.S. and China have made recent moves to establish more military presence in the South China Sea region. China has increased its <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/2/taiwan-china-12">display of military force</a> surrounding Taiwan. The United States recently announced it would <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-and-the-philippines-military-agreement-sends-a-warning-to-china-4-key-things-to-know-199159">deploy troops and military equipment in the Philippines</a>, a strategic military base that is close to Taiwan.</p>
<h2>Western pressure</h2>
<p>In the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-politics-antony-blinken-xi-jinping-4501b49359d73b6efbac87b2af54f189">past few months</a>, the Biden administration and other Western powers have warned China that it should not get involved in the Ukraine conflict. </p>
<p>In March 2023, German Chancellor <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/german-chancellor-scholz-warns-of-consequences-if-china-sends-arms-to-russia">Olaf Scholz publicly warned China</a> that there would be consequences if it gets involved. </p>
<p>Given that China has not yet officially stepped forward to support Russia, <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2023/ukraine-at-one-year-has-china-supported-russia/">these efforts appear successful</a>.</p>
<p>However, research has shown that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123412000506">countries intervene in conflicts when they think</a> their interests may be affected and when <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12036">they can make a difference</a>. This could be a factor that pushes China to become more involved in Russia’s battle.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201284/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael A. Allen has previously received funding from the Minerva Research Initiative, the Department of Defense, and the Army Research Office. These organizations funded part of the work mentioned here. The views expressed here are the author's only and do not represent the views of any outside funder.</span></em></p>China and Russia’s relationship is complex. But China’s decision to support Russia’s war on Ukraine could ultimately come down to China’s own political interests.Michael A. Allen, Professor of Political Science, Boise State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1994942023-02-28T19:06:28Z2023-02-28T19:06:28ZSanctions rarely work, but are they still the least worst option?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510465/original/file-20230216-18-tw5fso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=23%2C0%2C7922%2C5253&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A carnival float depicting Vladimir Putin, Mainz, Germany, February 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michael Probst/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>How do we encourage states – or more specifically the people who run them – to behave well, or at least not badly? </p>
<p>The “we” in this context is the fabled “international community”, which usually amounts to little more than the United States and a few trusty allies. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Review: Backfire: How Sanctions Reshape the World Against US Interests – Agathe Demarais (Columbia University Press).</em></p>
<hr>
<p>As Agathe Demarais makes clear in her excellent, insightful and rather sobering book <a href="http://cup.columbia.edu/book/backfire/9780231199902">Backfire: How Sanctions Reshape the World Against US Interests</a>, American policymakers have been prepared to act unilaterally when it suits their perceived national interests, which turns out to be most of the time. </p>
<p>Despite Washington’s continuing enthusiasm for sanctions, however, the results of American policies have often been counterproductive. Not only has the unilateral and arbitrary use of sanctions undermined the international standing of the US, it has had material consequences.</p>
<p>In retrospect, such an outcome seems inevitable. As Demarais points out, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>typically effective sanctions are in place for the short term, have a narrow goal, target a democracy that has significant ties with the United States, and are backed by American allies. This is the exact opposite of most US sanctions programs.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Could do better?</h2>
<p>The apparent failure of American foreign policy in general and sanctions in particular is of more than academic interest. </p>
<p>Unbelievably, Europe is hosting an old fashioned inter-state war of a sort that many of us thought was a thing of the past. If Europe, with all its contemporary advantages and blood-soaked past, can’t learn the lessons of history, where can? </p>
<p>Of the many questions Putin’s invasion of Ukraine poses, the most immediate is how he might be forced or persuaded to stop. One thing is already painfully apparent: the logic of deterrence and the theories about the balance of power that underpin them look <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/eroding-balance-terror">threadbare and inadequate</a>.</p>
<p>Clearly, Putin was not deterred by NATO or the prospect of American opposition. Even if he made a “rational” calculation that neither the US nor NATO had the stomach for direct conflict with Russia, it is evident that all the West’s expensive military hardware was not enough to deter someone bent on righting perceived historical wrongs. </p>
<p>Xi Jinping may be equally impervious to the assumed strategic calculus.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510478/original/file-20230216-24-qw965b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510478/original/file-20230216-24-qw965b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510478/original/file-20230216-24-qw965b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510478/original/file-20230216-24-qw965b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510478/original/file-20230216-24-qw965b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510478/original/file-20230216-24-qw965b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510478/original/file-20230216-24-qw965b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510478/original/file-20230216-24-qw965b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The logic of deterrence did not prevent Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mikhail Metzel/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-russian-economy-is-defying-and-withstanding-western-sanctions-194119">How the Russian economy is defying and withstanding western sanctions</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This is why – in theory, at least – sanctions are so attractive. Sanctions are intended to “inflict economic, financial, and social pain on a country to make it change its behaviour”. In theory, when successfully applied, they can bring about the non-violent resolution of conflicts, stop human rights violations, or any other actions that outrage the sanctioning countries. </p>
<p>In practice, successes – such as the UN mandated sanctions against Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya in the 1990s – are thin on the ground. In reality, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Libya was an exception. In most cases, sanctions do not work. In some instances, they may even backfire and hurt US interests.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>According to Demarais, Gaddafi was not the only one feeling the effects of American policy during the 1990s. Over half the world’s population was subject to US sanctions. Instruments don’t get much blunter. Little wonder so many came to resent the ubiquitous influence of American power, even if that power was invariably incapable of achieving the desired results. More recent efforts have generally not been more successful.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510477/original/file-20230216-141-qw965b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510477/original/file-20230216-141-qw965b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510477/original/file-20230216-141-qw965b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=861&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510477/original/file-20230216-141-qw965b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=861&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510477/original/file-20230216-141-qw965b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=861&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510477/original/file-20230216-141-qw965b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1082&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510477/original/file-20230216-141-qw965b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1082&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510477/original/file-20230216-141-qw965b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1082&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
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</figure>
<p>Demarais examines a number of the more prominent attempts to use sanctions to influence “rogue” states. One of the distinguishing features of American policy is the use of so-called secondary sanctions, such as threatening to deny access to the US financial system and the use of the dollar if countries or companies contravene American interests. </p>
<p>For example, the French energy company Total abandoned major investments in Iran rather than risk being sanctioned by the US. Not only did this episode poison US relations with France and the European Union, but it actually reinforced the influence of the hardliners in Iran.</p>
<p>The net effect of the unilateral deployment of sanctions, especially under the erratic leadership of Donald Trump, has been to reinforce the perception that the US is an increasingly unreliable partner that cares little about the collateral damage its policies inflict on even its closest allies. Little wonder that the Europeans in particular, and central bankers more generally, have been working to limit their exposure to the US dollar. </p>
<p>Most importantly, in the context of Europe’s current travails, Russia has “effectively disarmed the threat of US sanctions, leaving Washington with little leverage in negotiations with Moscow”. To its credit, a group of 10 EU states has recognised <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/22/eu-states-urge-crackdown-on-russia-over-sanctions-evading-arms-ploy">the limitations of the existing sanctions regime</a>, and is attempting to to target vital, difficult to replace, western components in the supply chains that produce Russian weaponry. It will be an important test of both the efficacy of sanctions and European solidarity.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/all-told-australian-sanctions-will-have-almost-zero-consequences-for-russia-177913">All told, Australian sanctions will have almost zero consequences for Russia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The China challenge</h2>
<p>Even without policy activism on the part of other countries, the reality is that American economic primacy – the very thing that makes it a potentially powerful actor – has been eroding, not least because of the rise of China.</p>
<p>The re-emergence of China as a great power has become the single biggest challenge to American preeminence. Not only is China rapidly becoming a strategic “peer competitor”, it will soon overtake the US as the world’s largest economy. It has already “grown far too big for America to sanction Beijing with its usual toolkit”. </p>
<p>This underlying material reality has forced American policymakers to think of other ways to try to contain Chinese power – not that they would actually describe it that way.</p>
<p>It’s worth emphasising just what a profound change this represents in American policy. Less than 20 years ago, the <a href="https://www.oup.com.au/books/others/9780195390650-playing-our-game">conventional wisdom</a> was that China’s integration into a global capitalist economy, predicated on American normative preferences and practices, would socialise Chinese elites into “good” behaviour. It took a while for American policymakers to recognise that China’s version of state capitalism was not only different and unlikely to change, but that it was beginning to challenge US dominance in key areas of the global economy.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510493/original/file-20230216-29-wt2636.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510493/original/file-20230216-29-wt2636.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510493/original/file-20230216-29-wt2636.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510493/original/file-20230216-29-wt2636.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510493/original/file-20230216-29-wt2636.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510493/original/file-20230216-29-wt2636.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510493/original/file-20230216-29-wt2636.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510493/original/file-20230216-29-wt2636.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Xi Jinping delivers a speech in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, January 20, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Li Xueren/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The eventual US response has been very different from the older form of sanctions applied to lesser powers. “Decoupling” has entered the lexicon of political economy as shorthand for policies designed to restrict China’s access to American technology. </p>
<p>Although there are key manufacturing hubs in Taiwan and South Korea, the US remains the dominant player in global microchip production, providing crucial software and equipment for downstream companies. Consequently, export controls limiting access to innovative technology are the key element in the US’s updated toolkit. </p>
<p>As Demarais points out, given that semiconductors are currently China’s largest single import item, this is a potentially serious problem – at least in the short-term. </p>
<p>According to The Economist, the recently inaugurated <a href="https://www.economist.com/united-states/2023/02/08/the-history-and-limits-of-americas-favourite-new-economic-weapon">Foreign Direct Product Rule</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>attempts to weaponise the ubiquity of American technology. It lets the government claim jurisdiction over almost every chip factory in the world. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the longer term, however, the consequences of decoupling look uncertain. On the one hand, China is rapidly moving to expand its domestic capacity for microchip production. Its rapid economic transformation over the last 20 or 30 years suggests that this ambition is likely to be realised. Demarais claims that China’s investment plans in this sector are 50 times greater than those of the American government. </p>
<p>The consequences for American firms are potentially dire: not only do US-based companies have some $700 billion invested in the People’s Republic, but they may lose access to a crucial market. As a result, Demarais argues that “decoupling is both a bad idea and poor policy”. More specifically she claims that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the danger that decoupling poses stems from the loss in revenues that not being able to serve the Chinese market and losing contracts in other countries would entail. With profits severely curtailed, US technology firms would probably struggle to remain ahead of the global game for semiconductor innovation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Even more fundamentally, perhaps, the division of the world into disconnected rival camps with different operating systems may force other countries to make invidious choices between competing great powers at a time of heightened strategic tension. </p>
<p>Many countries have been scarred by America’s unilateral use of sanctions. Indeed, the collateral damage inflicted by the Trump era, in particular, means it is not obvious that even Western allies such as the EU will automatically side with the US against China in a contest for economic supremacy.</p>
<h2>What’s the alternative?</h2>
<p>The key message from this book is that sanctions are a bad idea in principle and not very effective in practice. </p>
<p>Perhaps so, but it’s worth asking what other options are available to policymakers, short of direct coercion and military might. After all, Putin’s current war of choice demonstrates that deterrence is not the force many of its advocates hoped or expected. This makes the expenditure on mountains of munitions harder to justify. If nothing else, sanctions are cheaper to apply and don’t risk cataclysmic conflicts when they fail.</p>
<p>It’s also worth remembering that sanctions do work sometimes. Coalitions of like-minded states operating together are likely to be more successful than the unilateral actions, especially when applied to poorer, less powerful states. Finely tuned sanctions that target individuals rather than entire populations are also potentially attractive, if relatively easy to evade. </p>
<p>Part of the problem here, of course, has been the willingness of people and even other governments to facilitate the avoidance schemes of bad actors. Britain’s role in assisting Russia’s kleptocracy to manage its wealth is perhaps the most <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250281937/butlertotheworld">egregious case in point</a>.</p>
<p>The good news, such as it is, may be that “the days of unilateral US sanctions are numbered”. American unilateralism has generally been ineffective and self-serving, and has inflicted massive collateral damage on allies and the long-suffering populations of targeted states. </p>
<p>But if we are to persist with sanctions as a tool of international diplomacy – which perhaps we should, given the potentially limited and violent alternatives – we need to remember the other vital lesson from this important book: sanctioned states have to believe there is a reward for good behaviour. As Demarais concludes, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>lack of trust undermines the effectiveness of sanctions, which are not meant to be used as sticks to punish rogue countries, but as carrots to reward those foes that change their ways. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Whether this logic will prove attractive to Putin is a moot point, given the existential stakes in that active conflict. But sanctions still might work against the likes of Iran and perhaps even North Korea. Persuasion still looks better than coercion.</p>
<p>In an ideal world some UN-sponsored mechanism to coordinate international efforts and sanction bad actors might be optimal. Unfortunately, we do not inhabit such a world. Perhaps the best we can hope for is that like-minded states will cooperate for the greater good. </p>
<p>Admittedly, such an outcome looks unlikely and partial at best. And yet if the “international community” cannot act against the most flagrant acts of aggression and violations of international humanitarian norms, what hope is there for cooperation over even more existentially threatening issues like climate change? A rhetorical question to which I fear we all know the answer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199494/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Beeson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new book argues that sanctions are a bad idea in principle, not very effective in practice, and often have unintended consequences.Mark Beeson, Adjunct professor, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1983162023-02-10T09:09:16Z2023-02-10T09:09:16ZHenry Kissinger: history will judge the former US secretary of state’s southern African interventions to be a failure<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507529/original/file-20230201-22-xvmqx2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Henry Kissinger, who sexed up the art of diplomacy in the eight years between 1969 and 1977, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67574495">has died</a> at the age of 100.</p>
<p>In the obituaries that have been written, some laud Kissinger’s role in the shaping of East-West relations while he was in office as US Secretary of State. And many in their commentary on the decades beyond call him a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24916333#metadata_info_tab_contents">“statesman”</a>. </p>
<p>Radical critics have pointed to Kissinger’s ruthless methods – like <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB437/">encouraging the coup</a> in Chile in September, 1973 – and called for him to be <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/community/bookreviews/hitchens.htm">put on trial for “war crimes”</a>.</p>
<p>Traditionally, diplomacy was staid – a near-hidden enterprise for grey-suited men who (mostly by intuition) understood the grave matters of war and peace. Kissinger turned it into a site of celebrity, the jet-set and expert opinion. The world watched where he went.</p>
<p>Kissinger’s diplomatic achievements were quite astonishing – the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/rapprochement-china">recognition of China</a> (1971/72) by the US was simply breathtaking. But domestically more important was America’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/vietnam-war-how-us-involvement-has-influenced-foreign-policy-decisions-over-50-years-194951">withdrawal from Vietnam</a> (1973) and the Nixon administration <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45181235#metadata_info_tab_contents">policy of détente</a> (easing of hostility) with the Soviet Union, which led to a series of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Strategic-Arms-Limitation-Talks">strategic arms limitation talks</a>.</p>
<p>These helped to secure Kissinger’s global brand. But his track record in the global south – especially in Africa – is dismal. </p>
<p>Not a little of Kissinger’s fame – or infamy, depending on the particular issue at hand – was facilitated by <a href="https://adst.org/2016/03/on-the-road-again-kissingers-shuttle-diplomacy/">“shuttle diplomacy”</a>, a tactic first used in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Yom-Kippur-War">Yom Kippur War of 1973</a>. In an effort to mediate between the warring Egypt and Israel, Kissinger very publicly jetted between the two countries. </p>
<p>A year later, a form of shuttle diplomacy was necessary in southern Africa as it became plain that Kissinger had misread the region’s place in world affairs and its politics.</p>
<p>This was evident from a 1969 leaked policy document which had set out America’s approach to regional affairs. The policy recommended that the US “tilt” towards the region’s white-ruled and colonial regimes to protect US economic (and strategic) interests. </p>
<p>As the grand narrative of Kissinger’s life story is written, his southern African interventions must be judged a failure as he neither ended colonialism nor minority rule in the region. </p>
<h2>White minority rule</h2>
<p>Famously, Kissinger’s <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwj1y9zXlPT8AhXSMcAKHfREAEkQFnoECCgQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Farchive.org%2Fdetails%2Fworldrestored00kiss&usg=AOvVaw1bBVPkUufYxYxQco7LwSFE">doctoral thesis</a> at Harvard was on the diplomacy of the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815). He argued that “legitimacy” in international affairs rested on establishing a balance between powerful states rather than promoting justice. </p>
<p>But 19th century Europe was no guide to managing 20th century southern Africa, when the legitimacy of states was seized with liberation rather than the niceties of big power diplomacy.</p>
<p>In April 1974, a coup in Lisbon had signalled an <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000011345">end to Portuguese colonialism in Africa</a>. This exposed the vulnerability of white rule in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South African controlled South West Africa (now Namibia). Although hidden at the time, it is nowadays clear that the events in Lisbon helped to prime the fire that was to come to South Africa.</p>
<p>With the stability of the “white South” under threat, US policy required rethinking.</p>
<p>It was Cuba’s intervention <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-30-years-since-cuito-cuanavale-how-the-battle-redefined-southern-africa-78134">in Angola</a> that helped Kissinger reframe Washington’s approach to the region in Cold War terms. South Africa and the United States supported the rebel Unita movement to fight the government of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Popular-Movement-for-the-Liberation-of-Angola">MPLA</a>) which was allied to Soviet Union. </p>
<p>It required drawing the apartheid regime closer while, simultaneously, urging change in Zimbabwe and Namibia.</p>
<p>The shuttle started with a speech in Lusaka, Zambia, which put pressure on white-ruled Rhodesia to accept the idea of “majority rule”. More gently, Kissinger asked South Africa to announce a timetable to achieve “self-determination” in Namibia. Kissinger then travelled to Tanzania to make a similar address.</p>
<p>A series of high-profile meetings followed with apartheid’s then prime minister, John Vorster. These took place in Germany and Switzerland. The record of these encounters make interesting reading. Over dinner on 23 June 1976, the ice was broken over a racist joke which established a bonhomie between a dozen white men who deliberated on the future of a sub-continent of black people for two hours.</p>
<p>The apartheid regime had catapulted directly into Kissinger’s star-studded orbit.</p>
<p>An <a href="https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553485.pdf">official record</a> of the talks suggests the South African delegation appear dazed. Were they overwhelmed by the occasion, or were they reeling from the events the previous week in <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-epochal-1976-uprisings-shouldnt-be-reduced-to-a-symbolic-ritual-185073">Soweto</a>, when apartheid police killed unarmed school children protesting against the imposition of the Afrikaans language as a medium of instruction? </p>
<p>For their part, the American side seemed keen to learn – at an early moment in the proceedings, Kissinger declared that he was “trying to understand”; at another, he was being “analytical”.</p>
<p>True to diplomatic form, apartheid was not discussed even though some attention was given to South West Africa. The discussion remained focused on Rhodesia.</p>
<p>Eventually a strategy was agreed: Vorster would get the recalcitrant Rhodesians to agree on majority rule; Kissinger would get the Zambians and the Tanzanians to support the deal; movement on the Namibian issue would be slower.</p>
<p>The high moment of the entire exercise was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1976/09/18/archives/new-jersey-pages-kissingers-meeting-with-vorster-opens-on-a-hopeful.html">Kissinger’s September 1976 visit</a> to Pretoria. By happenstance, Rhodesia’s prime minister, Ian Smith, was scheduled to be in town to watch a rugby match.</p>
<p>The New York Times <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1976/09/21/archives/johannesburg-news-and-notes-vorster-is-hopeful-over-rhodesia.html">reported</a> that Kissinger was received with a small guard of honour – of black soldiers – at the Waterkloof Air Base when his plane landed. And Kissinger and his entourage – including the all-important press – set up camp in Pretoria’s Burgerspark Hotel.</p>
<p>For four days an increasingly isolated and internationally condemned South Africa basked in the spotlight of world attention – undoubtedly, it was the high point of apartheid’s diplomacy. </p>
<p>The drama of the weekend turned less on whether Kissinger met black leaders who were critical of apartheid – the activist editor <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/percy-tseliso-peter-qoboza-1938">Percy Qoboza</a> was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1976/09/21/archives/johannesburg-news-and-notes-vorster-is-hopeful-over-rhodesia.html">the only one</a> – than on whether Kissinger, as an envoy of the US, could meet directly with Smith, whose regime was not internationally recognised.</p>
<p>In the event the two men met for four hours on the Sunday morning, and a deal was sealed. A tearful Smith, then prime minister, announced that Rhodesia would accept the principle of majority rule. </p>
<p>But the follow up processes were fumbled. The illegal regime limped on for another four years.</p>
<p>Kissinger had two further visits to South Africa. One was in September 1982 when he delivered the <a href="https://www.africaportal.org/publications/saiia-international-affairs-bulletin-vol-6-no-3-1982/">keynote address</a> at a conference organised by the South African Institute of International Affairs. The second was when (with others) he <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/15/world/kissinger-fails-with-zulus.html">unsuccessfully tried</a> to solve the crisis over Inkatha Freedom Party leader <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mangosuthu-G-Buthelezi">Mangosuthu Buthelezi</a>’s rejection of South Africa’s interim constitution in April 1994. </p>
<p>Kissinger’s interest in southern Africa in the mid-1970s was predicated on the idea that balance would return if the interests of the strong were restored. He failed to understand that the struggle for justice was changing the world – and diplomacy itself. </p>
<p><em>Article was updated to reflect Henry Kissinger’s death.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198316/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Vale does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>He failed to understand that the struggle for justice and freedom in southern Africa was changing the world - and diplomacy itself.Peter Vale, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria, and Visiting Professor of International Relations, Federal University of Santa Maria, Brazil, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1957652022-12-07T14:39:47Z2022-12-07T14:39:47ZOuter space talks are a welcome addition to the US-Africa Leaders Summit - what’s on the table<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499274/original/file-20221206-15-xvsgjj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">NASA's Artemis I mission is the first integrated test of the agency's deep space exploration systems.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Joel Kowsky/NASA via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Joe Biden is hosting the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/07/20/statement-by-president-biden-on-the-u-s-africa-leaders-summit/">Second US-Africa Leaders Summit</a> in mid-December 2022. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.state.gov/africasummit/">focus</a> will be on eight areas: economic engagement; peace, security and good governance; democracy and human rights; regional and global health security (including recovery from COVID-19 and pandemic preparedness); food security; climate change; diaspora ties; and education and youth leadership.</p>
<p>Of the 55 African heads of governments, <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202211220001.html">49</a> have been invited to the summit. Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Sudan are currently on suspension from the Africa Union due to coups d’etats, hence they were not invited. </p>
<p>Western Sahara (officially called Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic), though a member of the African Union, is not recognised by the US, so it was not invited. The US has no ambassador exchange with Eritrea, hence its exclusion.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/21/statement-press-secretary-announcing-us-africa-leaders-summit">first edition of this summit</a> was held in 2014, during President Barack Obama’s second term in office. The calling of this second summit may suggest that Africa is important to the current US administration. </p>
<p>It has no clear-cut theme, but a side-event on outer space is a welcome development. </p>
<p>For Africa, space is one of the flagship programmes of Agenda 2063, while for the US, space is a critical domain as a degradation or denial of access to its satellite infrastructure would impact heavily on its national security, economy and public livelihood.</p>
<p>It is therefore important to align the priorities and interests of the US and Africa in order for the planned meeting to be fruitful.</p>
<h2>Expectations from the US-Africa Space Forum</h2>
<p>The Space Forum has <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202211220001.html">three main themes</a> for discussion: climate crisis; promoting responsible behaviour; and strengthening cooperation on science and commercial space activities. </p>
<p>These themes are in line with the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/united-states-space-priorities-framework-_-december-1-2021.pdf">US space policy priorities</a> document released about a year ago.</p>
<p>As stated in the document, the two priorities of the US in space are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>maintaining a robust and responsible US space enterprise</p></li>
<li><p>preserving space for current and future space generations. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The US wants to maintain its leadership in space, develop space capabilities to respond to climate change, and boost its commercial space sector. </p>
<p>It’s also important to the US to defend its national security interests and secure access to space for its future generations. </p>
<p>It does not appear that Africa is contributing to the agenda of the planned Space Forum. Nevertheless, Africa’s approach and contributions need to be hinged on the African <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/37433-doc-african_space_policy_isbn_electronic_.pdf">Space Policy</a> and <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/37434-doc-au_space_strategy_isbn-electronic.pdf">Strategy</a>.</p>
<p>Africa’s overarching goal is to meet the developmental needs of the continent while still being a responsible and peaceful user of space. Its core priorities include socioeconomic development; access to space-derived data, products and services; development of the local space industry; corporate governance and management; continental space coordination; and beneficial partnerships. </p>
<h2>Aligning interests</h2>
<p>The agendas of the US and Africa for space are not divergent; they are only internally focused. Efforts are therefore needed to align their respective policies and actions for mutual benefit.</p>
<p>For example, climate change affects Africa’s social, economic and environmental needs. So it’s not just a priority of the Biden administration. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://cop27.eg/#/">27th Conference of Parties</a> (COP27) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, highlighted that most of the gaps in observation and data are in developing countries. </p>
<p>With the help of space and satellite technology, these gaps can be filled. Hence satellites form the core of the <a href="https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cop27_auv_RSO.pdf">Global Climate Observing System</a>. </p>
<p>Space technology also offers tools for climate mitigation and adaptation. Knowledge and technology sharing are therefore necessary to fill the gaps in developing countries.</p>
<p>Secondly, Africa has committed to being a “responsible and peaceful user of outer space”. This means that African countries commit to not taking actions that will affect the ability of other countries to operate in space. </p>
<p>Hence, global efforts at promoting <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/354/39/PDF/N2035439.pdf?OpenElement">responsible behaviour</a> in space and <a href="https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2018/aac_1052018crp/aac_1052018crp_20_0_html/AC105_2018_CRP20E.pdf">space sustainability</a> should be embraced.</p>
<p>Discussions on African countries signing up to the US-led <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/index.html">Artemis Accords</a> are likely to come up at the forum. The accords are a set of principles for participating in the US-led space exploration programme called Artemis. </p>
<p>African countries need to approach the framework with a clear understanding of the <a href="https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/epdf/10.1089/space.2020.0043">costs and benefits</a>. The African Space Strategy also highlights space missions, technologies, operations and applications, that should guide them in their decision-making.</p>
<p>Regarding the third theme, supporting Africa’s commercial space industry is in the interest of both the US and Africa. The US needs to view African countries as allies and therefore remove barriers to knowledge sharing, trade and exports. Investment in Africa’s commercial space sector should be discussed at the summit.</p>
<p>Furthermore, efforts should be made to strengthen linkages and networks across universities and research institutions. This should be discussed at the forums on education, youth and diaspora engagement.</p>
<h2>Beyond the Space Forum</h2>
<p>There are several potential areas for US-Africa space partnership, particularly in the focus areas of the African space programme: Earth observation; satellite communication; satellite navigation; and astronomy. </p>
<p>The US-Africa Space Forum could be made a permanent platform for exchanges, policy alignments and trade facilitation. This effort will enhance overarching US-Africa relations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195765/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Etim Offiong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As US-Africa leaders meet, it should be clear that aligning respective goals, priorities and actions is in the interests of the US and of African countries.Etim Offiong, Scientific Officer, Obafemi Awolowo UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1919472022-10-06T03:29:46Z2022-10-06T03:29:46ZWhy increasing support for Ukraine is critical to Australia’s security as a ‘middle power’<p>Support for Ukraine is normally described in ideological or moral terms as a duty to <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/06/14/supporting-democracy-after-invasion-of-ukraine-pub-87290">support democracies</a> in the face of resurgent totalitarianism.</p>
<p>This is an important consideration. But since Russia’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/30/putin-announces-russian-annexation-of-four-ukrainian-regions">declared annexation</a> of Ukraine’s sovereign land last week, there’s now a hard-headed security rationale for supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia.</p>
<p>Russia’s brutal invasion and claimed annexation is a clear breach of an international law rule that is critical to the security of smaller and middle powers like Australia.</p>
<p>This security imperative requires more, not less, support for Ukraine for the duration of this war. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-west-owes-ukraine-much-more-than-just-arms-and-admiration-179383">The West owes Ukraine much more than just arms and admiration</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<h2>International law and wars of territorial acquisition</h2>
<p>Why should we care about international law? The short answer is that certain rules in the international legal order are effective, even in the absence of centralised enforcement. </p>
<p>Prior to the second world war, international law formally recognised territorial acquisition through war. This was, after all, the age of empires, a time when powerful and wealthy European countries acquired their colonies through war.</p>
<p>But, after the horrors of WWII, the international community built an international order that banned territorial acquisition through war. <a href="https://legal.un.org/repertory/art2.shtml">Article 2</a> of the United Nations Charter states that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This norm has exerted a strong “compliance pull”, which means there have been very few instances of the <a href="http://theinternationalistsbook.com/">use of war to annex territory</a>. Since 1945, powerful countries simply do not invade and annex other countries anymore. As problematic as the United States’ wars have been since then, they have never involved a war of territorial acquisition against a sovereign state.</p>
<p>Article 2 is therefore a critical norm for the security of less powerful countries, such as Australia.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putin-announces-annexation-of-four-regions-but-his-hold-on-them-may-be-flimsy-191641">Ukraine war: Putin announces annexation of four regions, but his hold on them may be flimsy</a>
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</em>
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<h2>Russia’s invasion</h2>
<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the most brazen attack on this rule since 1945. Last week, Russia <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/russia-has-annexed-more-of-ukraine-what-does-that-mean-and-what-happens-now-20220930-p5bm8o.html">formally annexed</a> swathes of eastern and southern Ukraine, after invading Ukraine over seven months ago.</p>
<p>Russian President Vladimir Putin has justified this action on the basis that Ukraine is not a “real country” and that its government is the puppet of neo-Nazis and the West. This justification echoes wars of imperial aggression from the 19th century and reflects Putin and his supporters’ <a href="https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/gbp/the-post-soviet-as-post-colonial-9781802209433.html">neo-imperial mindset</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1577436249966579712"}"></div></p>
<p>Russia’s war of conquest is therefore more than a Cold War-esque showdown between Russia and the United States.</p>
<p>It threatens to destroy the key rule found in Article 2 of the UN Charter against the acquisition of territory through war. It therefore threatens to bring us back to the 19th century world where strong countries do what they want and the weak suffer what they must.</p>
<h2>The security ramifications</h2>
<p>The war in Ukraine, therefore, has clear security ramifications for smaller or middle powers.</p>
<p>If Russia is successful in taking land by force, other powerful countries in the world will be more likely to follow suit.</p>
<p>This has clear implications for Australia’s security position. As China grows more powerful in Asia and our ally the United States weakens, Australia will rely increasingly on Article 2’s strong international law norm against warlike acquisition of territory for its territorial integrity.</p>
<p>Australia’s support for Ukraine so far has been <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/our-support-for-ukraine-is-pitifully-small-here-s-why-we-must-do-more-20221004-p5bn1j.html">limited</a>. And Russia’s claimed annexations was met with a <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/our-support-for-ukraine-is-pitifully-small-here-s-why-we-must-do-more-20221004-p5bn1j.html">muted response</a> from the Australian government. This is a mistake. </p>
<h2>How we talk about the war</h2>
<p>This also has implications for how we talk about the war in Ukraine to countries in the global south.</p>
<p>Discussing the war as one between democracy and totalitarianism might make sense in the West, but is problematic for many countries in the global south that are suspicious of American democracy promotion efforts. This in part has explained the <a href="https://www.vox.com/23156512/russia-ukraine-war-global-south-nonaligned-movement">tacit support or neutrality</a> of many of these countries towards Russia.</p>
<p>But if we talk about this war as potentially reopening the door to wars of territorial acquisition today, we are far more likely to persuade these countries of the need to condemn Russia and support Ukraine in its fight to uphold a foundational norm in international law.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-this-the-beginning-of-the-end-for-vladimir-putin-191058">Is this the beginning of the end for Vladimir Putin?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>With its assertions of sovereignty over Ukrainian land through force, Russia’s actions in Ukraine are about more than a new Cold War. </p>
<p>They now pose a fundamental threat to the stability of the international system and the national security of small and middle powers around the world.</p>
<p>Putin’s annexation of Ukraine’s sovereign territory has therefore significantly raised the stakes in this war – for much of the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191947/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Partlett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There’s now a hard-headed security rationale for further supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia.William Partlett, Associate Professor, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1893322022-09-01T14:36:25Z2022-09-01T14:36:25ZWolf Warrior II: what the blockbuster movie tells us about China’s views on Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482037/original/file-20220831-14-55nu1g.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Action flick Wolf Warrior II is one of China's most commercially successful films ever.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Publicity still courtesy Wolf Warrior II/The H Collective/Well Go USA Entertainment</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Chinese film <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt7131870/">Wolf Warrior II</a> (2017) has been a runaway success – even though it contains controversial expressions of Chinese nationalism and racist stereotypes of Africans. It is one of the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/robcain/2017/08/27/chinas-wolf-warrior-2-becomes-2nd-film-in-history-to-reach-800m-in-a-single-territory/?sh=1c0150483460">most commercially successful Chinese movies</a>, having grossed over US$800 million at the Chinese box office. Only Star Wars: The Force Awakens has performed better at the box office in a single territory. </p>
<p>The film tells the story of an exiled elite Chinese soldier who travels to an unnamed African country on a personal matter. He gets caught in the middle of a civil war between government troops and mercenaries. The hero rescues African and Chinese civilians and defeats the mercenaries.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10304312.2022.2110567?journalCode=ccon20">recent analysis</a>, we argue that the movie does more than reproduce clichés from Hollywood action cinema. It is also an expression of how China sees its global status today, a status developed across its post-revolutionary and post-socialist periods from the mid 1970s. </p>
<p>Our study of the film identifies the historical precedents and ideological shifts within the nationalist discourse of “China in Africa”. We also provide contemporary contexts for the power dynamics between China and African nations.</p>
<h2>A new discourse on China and Africa</h2>
<p>The tide of westernisation sweeping China since the 1980s weakened its focus on African countries once considered allies. Media coverage of Africa dwindled in China. State media outlets such as Xinhua News Agency and the People’s Daily diminished their focus on Africa and the commercial ones found the continent “<a href="https://asq.africa.ufl.edu/files/v16a10_Li.pdf">not attractive enough to make a huge investment</a>”.</p>
<p>At the same time, the influx of western and Hollywood films filled the gap in the public perception of Africa. African countries, once portrayed as beacons of modernity, began to be shown as having poor, lagging economies. This is evident in the scenes of slums and the plots of war and plague in the fictional Africa in Wolf Warrior II. </p>
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<p>Since 2010, China’s Africa engagement has entered a new phase. It is centred on the <a href="https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance-landscape.pdf">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, which promotes infrastructure development in more than 150 countries in the world. The historical narrative of friendship between China and Africa has reappeared in mainstream national media in China. It’s getting renewed attention due to economic incentives in the form of the <a href="https://issafrica.org/chapter-1-introduction-focac-and-africa">Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</a>, a platform established by the Chinese government to strengthen its multilateral economic relations with African countries.</p>
<p>The caricatured representations of Africa in Wolf Warrior II comprise a patchwork of memories from different historical periods. From the 1950s to the 1970s, Africa was commonly represented in China as a close “third world” brother. The 1980s to the 2000s presented Africa as a poor stranger. Finally, in the 2010s Africa is a business partner of the Belt and Road Initiative. </p>
<h2>China in Africa</h2>
<p>These different narratives can sometimes overlap. The movie brings together a montage of elements like Somali pirates, Ebola, impoverished townships in South Africa, and the Libyan Civil War. This creates a pan-African stereotype that serves mainly to support China’s nationalistic imagination of the rise of the country as a global leader. </p>
<p>Similarly, elements of China-Africa relations from different historical periods are used to create a benevolent role for China in Africa. The film depicts friendship and aid, poverty-stricken Africa, and the leadership of China in the global south. Such depictions of a “generous” China cloud the unequal power relations embedded in the Belt and Road Initiative relationship. </p>
<p>In Wolf Warrior II, China is a beacon of hope, development and peace in Africa. A lead female character, for example, discovers the cure for a fatal disease. A Chinese owned factory provides jobs and asylum during scenes of conflict. In the film, the Chinese government exercises diplomatic generosity by accepting an official request for military assistance from the local government to fight the rebels.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482027/original/file-20220831-22-pzawkk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A movie poster showing a collage of action and explosions, a Chinese man holds a gun at the centre of the image." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482027/original/file-20220831-22-pzawkk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482027/original/file-20220831-22-pzawkk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=843&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482027/original/file-20220831-22-pzawkk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=843&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482027/original/file-20220831-22-pzawkk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=843&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482027/original/file-20220831-22-pzawkk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1059&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482027/original/file-20220831-22-pzawkk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1059&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482027/original/file-20220831-22-pzawkk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1059&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wolf Warrior II/The H Collective/Well Go USA Entertainment</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>This benevolence is presented in contrast to absentee American and bloodthirsty European mercenaries. As academics have <a href="https://u.osu.edu/mclc/online-series/liu-rofel/">observed</a>, Wolf Warrior II appears to present “a new master race that has arrived to displace the whites as the new saviour of an ‘Africa’ ravaged by civil war, political chaos, starvation, and deadly disease”. As the representative of this “master race”, the lead character, Feng, becomes a messianic figure. Speaking about incarcerated Chinese and African workers, he claims, “I was born for them.” The film closes with Feng holding up the Chinese flag, leading survivors of conflict on a truck to a UN sanctuary.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>It has been five years since the release of Wolf Warrior II. Yet the nationalism and racism seen in the film have not faded within China. Indeed they have grown stronger, especially on social media in China. </p>
<p>Against this backdrop, the “China in Africa” shown in Wolf Warrior II seems to fall back once again on the Third World Alliance of the Maoist era. But the regional inequality between China and African countries goes well beyond Cold War-era relations. </p>
<p>Rather, Wolf Warrior II dramatises emerging political and economic relations within the global south that are likely to generate new variations of the “China in Africa” narrative. These answer to a much more complicated political and economic role for China in the post-pandemic era that foresees a new divided world order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189332/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China is seen as Africa’s saviour and friend in the film - which is still full of racist stereotypes.Yu Xiang, Assistant Professor, Shanghai UniversityJinpu Wang, Doctoral Researcher, Department of Sociology, Syracuse UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1878352022-08-05T12:13:18Z2022-08-05T12:13:18ZWhy are nuclear weapons so hard to get rid of? Because they’re tied up in nuclear countries’ sense of right and wrong<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477238/original/file-20220802-19-qrajme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1%2C4%2C1020%2C674&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaks during the 2022 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the United Nations on Aug. 1, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/secretary-of-state-antony-blinken-speaks-during-the-2022-news-photo/1242248550?adppopup=true">Angela Weiss/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Every five years, the nearly 200 member states of the <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/">Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons</a> meet to review their progress – or lack thereof. After being postponed because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the monthlong conference <a href="https://www.un.org/en/conferences/npt2020">is now meeting in New York</a> and opened with a stark warning.</p>
<p>The world is “just one misunderstanding, one miscalculation away from nuclear annihilation,” <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/01/world/europe/nuclear-war-un-guterres.html">United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said Aug. 1, 2022</a>, citing growing conflicts and weakening “guardrails” against escalation.</p>
<p>The treaty has three core missions: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to states that do not have them, ensuring civil nuclear energy programs do not turn into weapons programs, and facilitating nuclear disarmament. The last review conference, <a href="https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/">held in 2015</a>, was widely regarded as a nonproliferation success but a <a href="https://cpr.unu.edu/publications/articles/why-the-2015-npt-review-conference-fell-apart.html">disarmament failure</a>, with the five members that possess nuclear weapons failing to make progress toward eliminating their nuclear arsenals, as promised in <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/peace_security-paix_securite/action_plan-2010-plan_d_action.aspx?lang=eng">previous conferences</a>.</p>
<p>At the heart of this dispute are states’ <a href="https://doi.org/10.3402/egp.v2i2.1916">motivations for keeping nuclear weapons</a> – often perceived as rooted in hard-nosed security strategy, by which morality is irrelevant or even self-defeating.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.polisci.txst.edu/people/faculty-bios/doyle.html">a nuclear ethicist</a>, though, I see these explanations as incomplete. To understand <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538164136/Nuclear-Ethics-in-the-Twenty-First-Century-Survival-Order-and-Justice">leaders’ motives</a> – and therefore effectively negotiate the elimination of nuclear weapons – other scholars and I argue we must acknowledge that policymakers express underlying moral concerns as strategic concerns. History shows that such moral concerns often form the foundations of nuclear strategy, even if they’re deeply buried. </p>
<h2>National values</h2>
<p>It is easier for many people to see how the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/treaty-nuclear-weapons-prohibition">nuclear abolitionist argument</a> is fundamentally based in morality. The fear of <a href="https://theconversation.com/nuclear-war-could-be-devastating-for-the-us-even-if-no-one-shoots-back-131809">nuclear winter</a> – or even a less severe “nuclear autumn” – is rooted in the immorality of killing millions of innocent people and devastating the environment in long-lasting ways.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A black and white photo shows a man standing in a sea of rubble, with the ruins of one building in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477239/original/file-20220802-10020-gr7br8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477239/original/file-20220802-10020-gr7br8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477239/original/file-20220802-10020-gr7br8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477239/original/file-20220802-10020-gr7br8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477239/original/file-20220802-10020-gr7br8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477239/original/file-20220802-10020-gr7br8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477239/original/file-20220802-10020-gr7br8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Hiroshima, Japan, after the atomic bomb was dropped in August 1945.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/world-war-ii-after-the-explosion-of-the-atom-bomb-in-august-news-photo/566461861?adppopup=true">Universal History Archive/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>By contrast, a realistic and strategic approach to the value of nuclear weapons has dominated <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538164136/Nuclear-Ethics-in-the-Twenty-First-Century-Survival-Order-and-Justice">security discourse</a> since the early Cold War era. This approach argues that the primary purpose of nuclear weapons is to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491573">deter adversaries</a> from attacking vital national security interests. If an attack does occur, then nuclear weapons can be used to <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=21511">punish aggression</a> in a proportional way and caution other adversaries, restoring nuclear deterrence. </p>
<p>Even so, according to <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty/joseph-nye">political scientist Joseph Nye</a>, the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs under President Bill Clinton, a strategist <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Nuclear-Ethics/Joseph-S-Nye/9780029230916">may pose as a moral skeptic</a> but “tends to smuggle his preferred values into foreign policy, often in the form of narrow nationalism.”</p>
<p>Nationalism asserts the moral priority of one’s own nation over others. Communities’ deep-held beliefs are intimately woven into <a href="https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/michael-walzer/just-and-unjust-wars/9780465052707/">ideas about nationhood, security and prestige</a>.</p>
<p>In the United States, for example, the moral underpinnings of American identity are deeply rooted in the idea of being “<a href="https://www.neh.gov/article/how-america-became-city-upon-hill">a city on a hill</a>”: an example the rest of the world is watching. Americans are anxious about losing their way, and many feel that their country was once a <a href="https://www.mic.com/articles/5505/is-america-the-greatest-force-for-good-in-the-world">force for good</a> in the world, but no longer. Thus, national survival is embraced as a moral value, and deterring or defending against aggression has strategic, political and moral overtones.</p>
<p>Regardless of whether someone thinks these concerns are justified, it is important to recognize that, in their defenders’ view, they go beyond strategy or sheer survival. They reflect societies’ foundational ideas about what is wrong and right – their sense of morality.</p>
<h2>Early motives</h2>
<p>So how are these moral concerns applied to the questions of nuclear weapons and their role in security strategy?</p>
<p>It is worth remembering what motivated President Franklin D. Roosevelt to authorize the <a href="https://www.routledge.com/A-Perpetual-Menace-Nuclear-Weapons-and-International-Order/Walker/p/book/9780415421065">development of the atomic bomb</a>: the genocidal evil of Nazi German aggression in World War II and the knowledge that Adolf Hitler had begun an atomic bomb program. </p>
<p>And when Nazi Germany had been defeated, the U.S. justifications for <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250070050/hiroshimanagasaki">using atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki</a> centered on two kinds of moral concerns. The most frequently invoked was utilitarian: <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1995/07/was-it-right/376364/">preventing a greater number of deaths</a> in a land invasion of Japan. The second, not expressed as explicitly, viewed the atomic bombing as a kind of moral <a href="https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/atomic-bombings-ian-w-toll">punishment</a> for the Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor and the brutal treatment of Allied prisoners of war.</p>
<p>In short, the motivations for the original atomic bomb program and its uses could not be described in solely “hard-nosed” strategic terms. As political philosopher <a href="https://www.ias.edu/scholars/walzer">Michael Walzer</a> <a href="https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/michael-walzer/just-and-unjust-wars/9780465052707/">has argued</a>, both morality and strategy are about justification: Both tell us what we should do or should not do, based on some set of values. And strategy is often used for decision-makers’ moral aims, such as their goal to defeat a genocidal regime.</p>
<h2>Morally excusable?</h2>
<p>Along with other scholars, I have argued that moral concerns also motivated the central role of <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.1081/E-EPAP3-120052995/defense-military-policy-nuclear-war-deterrence-policy-thomas-doyle">nuclear deterrence policy</a> during the Cold War. American policymakers portrayed Soviet communism, like Nazism, as a politics of brute force that had no regard for law or morals. Once the Soviet Union and China had acquired nuclear weapons, American analysts came to believe that communism represented <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674005426">an existential threat</a> not only to U.S. security, but to liberal democracy in general.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A black and white photograph shows newspaper headlines about Russia's atomic weapon testing." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477240/original/file-20220802-12171-qiicwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477240/original/file-20220802-12171-qiicwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=817&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477240/original/file-20220802-12171-qiicwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=817&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477240/original/file-20220802-12171-qiicwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=817&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477240/original/file-20220802-12171-qiicwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1027&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477240/original/file-20220802-12171-qiicwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1027&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477240/original/file-20220802-12171-qiicwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1027&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A selection of U.S. newspaper headlines about President Truman’s announcement that Soviet Union had conducted its first nuclear weapon test, in 1949.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/selection-of-us-newspaper-headlines-on-president-trumans-news-photo/85274999?adppopup=true">Keystone/Hulton Archive via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p><a href="https://www.ias.edu/scholars/walzer">Walzer described</a> such situations as “supreme emergency conditions,” in which ordinary moral prohibitions against mass destruction are suspended to ensure what political leaders see as <a href="https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/michael-walzer/just-and-unjust-wars/9780465052707/">the highest value: national survival</a>. </p>
<p>This is self-preservation – but people often think about that, too, as a moral concern. Social norms against suicide, for example, imply that people have a moral duty to preserve their lives except under certain conditions, reflecting a belief that human life has intrinsic moral value.</p>
<p>Walzer did not claim that using nuclear weapons, or even threatening their use, was morally justified. However, he suggested they might be necessary for national security, and therefore become morally excusable in supreme emergency situations. His argument has been <a href="http://cup.columbia.edu/book/conspiring-with-the-enemy/9780231182454">very influential</a> in government and academic circles.</p>
<p>Many critics claim that it is always <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/morality-prudence-and-nuclear-weapons/B9969D41EC15E37CA7F506CDD2A578C9">immoral to use nuclear weapons</a>, since they cannot discriminate between soldiers and innocent civilians, including children, the elderly and the infirm. Moreover, the use of nuclear weapons cannot but bring social and environmental catastrophe, the kind that our <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/21/books/review/review-the-road-by-cormac-mccarthy.html">darkest dystopian novels</a> and films depict. And if it is immoral to use nuclear weapons, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/05568649109506350">it is immoral to threaten to use them</a>.</p>
<p>But it is unsurprising that the leaders of the nuclear-weapon states are ultimately committed to the survival of their countries and peoples, even if others must pay an ultimate price. To fully appreciate nuclear motivations, we must understand the role of this kind of moral concern in their decision-making.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187835/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas E. Doyle II does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Policymakers often think of their decisions about nuclear weapons as moral, a nuclear ethicist explains – which is key to understanding their motives.Thomas E. Doyle II, Associate Professor of Political Science, Texas State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1877112022-07-26T14:41:48Z2022-07-26T14:41:48ZWhy Russia is on a charm offensive in Africa. The reasons aren’t pretty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476058/original/file-20220726-26-ddxqbt.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov are intent on growing Russia's African influence</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kremlin/Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/why-russia-is-on-a-charm-offensive-in-africa-the-reasons-arent-pretty-187711&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>Russia is the <a href="https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/feature/russias-ongoing-charm-offensive-in-africa-78348">source</a> of less than 1% of the foreign direct investment into Africa. Substantively, then, Russia brings little to the continent. But the fact that Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is making a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/lavrov-tours-africa-amid-diplomatic-isolation/a-60745880">high-profile trip</a> to Africa in the throes of Russia’s war on Ukraine reveals how much Russia needs Africa. </p>
<p>A priority for Lavrov’s trip to Egypt, the Republic of the Congo, Uganda and Ethiopia is to show that Russia is not isolated internationally, despite expansive western sanctions. The objective is to portray Russia as an unencumbered Great Power that maintains allies around the globe with whom it can conduct business as usual. </p>
<p>Russia is also vying to <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/russias-authoritarianism-looms-over-international-order-africa-34914">normalise an international order</a> where might makes right. And democracy and respect for human rights are optional. </p>
<p>Lavrov’s Africa trip is significant, accordingly, for Russia’s geostrategic posturing. Russian messaging recasts Russia’s imperialistic land grab in Ukraine as a broader East-West ideological struggle. To the extent that Moscow succeeds in this framing, few African countries will criticise it. </p>
<p>This, in part, explains why 25 of Africa’s 54 states <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-countries-showed-disunity-in-un-votes-on-russia-south-africas-role-was-pivotal-180799">abstained or did not vote</a> to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine during the UN General Assembly resolution ES-11/1 in March. This ambivalent response was in stark contrast to the overwhelming condemnation of Russia’s aggression from every other region of the world. </p>
<p>Lavrov can also be expected to portray the <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-grain-export-deal-promises-major-benefits-for-poor-countries-if-it-holds-187595">recent Ukrainian-Russian deal</a> to unblock more than 20 million metric tonnes of Ukrainian grain for export as a humanitarian gesture by Moscow. This, even though it was Russia’s invasion and blockade of Ukrainian ports that has prevented the grain from reaching international markets. Russia’s bombing of the Ukrainian port of Odessa the day after the agreement was signed suggests that Moscow will continue to try to weaponise the food crisis. All while blaming the west. </p>
<p>Egypt and Ethiopia – key countries on Lavrov’s itinerary – have been particularly hard hit by this disruption in food supply. The Russian blockade has caused <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/commodity-prices-surge-due-war-ukraine">global grain</a> prices to double this year, creating intense political and social strains throughout Africa.</p>
<h2>What African hosts gain</h2>
<p>Focusing on ideological themes helps obscure how modest Russia’s official economic and diplomatic investments in Africa are. </p>
<p>This begs the question of what African leaders gain from hosting Lavrov at a time when Russia is under severe criticism for its unprovoked aggression and the destabilisation of global food, fuel, and fertiliser markets. The short answer is political support. </p>
<p>Russia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russia-is-growing-its-strategic-influence-in-africa-110930">expanding influence</a> in Africa in recent years is mostly a result of Moscow’s use of unofficial means — deploying mercenaries, disinformation campaigns, arms for resources deals, and trafficking of precious metals. These low-cost, high impact tools are typically employed in support of isolated African leaders with dubious legitimacy. Russian backing of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/7/russian-troops-deploy-to-malis-timbuktu-after-french-exit">beleaguered leaders</a> in Central African Republic (CAR), Mali and Sudan has been vital to keeping these actors in power. </p>
<p>Russia’s asymmetric approach to gaining influence in Africa is also notable in that these “partnerships” are with the individual leaders Moscow is propping up – and not with the broader public. It’s about <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2022/03/21/how-russia-is-pursuing-state-capture-in-africa-ukraine-wagner-group/">elite co-option</a> more than traditional bilateral cooperation. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-fresh-warning-that-africa-needs-to-be-vigilant-against-russias-destabilising-influence-178785">Ukraine war: fresh warning that Africa needs to be vigilant against Russia's destabilising influence</a>
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<p>Understanding these motivations brings Lavrov’s trip and itinerary into sharper focus. </p>
<p>Egypt’s President Abdel al Sisi is a key ally in Russia’s efforts to install a proxy government in Libya. This would enable Russia to establish an enduring naval presence in the southern Mediterranean and tap Libyan oil reserves. Sisi has also been a <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/growing-relations-between-egypt-and-russia-strategic-alliance-or-marriage-of-convenience/">Russian partner</a> in attempting to derail the democratic transitions in Sudan and Tunisia. </p>
<p>Russia, moreover, is <a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-russia-will-affect-arms-sales-to-africa-the-risks-and-opportunities-180038">a major arms supplier for Egypt</a>. A <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/russia-s-rosatom-starts-construction-of-egypt-s-first-nuclear-plant-01658424307">$25 billion Russian-financed loan</a> for Russian atomic energy company Rosatom, to construct the Dabaa nuclear power plant in Cairo, makes little economic sense. But it does provide a potential windfall for cronies of Sisi and Putin. And it is a means for Russia to gain further leverage over Sisi.</p>
<p>Lavrov’s trip to Uganda provides political cover for the increasingly <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-ugandan-state-outsources-the-use-of-violence-to-stay-in-power-180447">repressive and erratic regime</a> of President Yoweri Museveni as it attempts to orchestrate a <a href="https://theconversation.com/musevenis-first-son-muhoozi-clear-signals-of-a-succession-plan-in-uganda-181863">hereditary succession</a> to Museveni’s son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba. </p>
<p>Russia’s driving interest in Uganda is to pull another historically western-leaning African country into Moscow’s orbit. For Museveni, drawing closer to Russia sends a none-too-subtle message that he will move further towards Moscow if the west is too critical of his deteriorating human rights and democratisation record.</p>
<p>Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed is also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/feb/08/ethiopia-human-rights-abuses-possible-war-crimes-tigray">fending off fierce international criticism</a> for Ethiopia’s alleged human rights abuses in Tigray and subsequent obstacles hampering the humanitarian response in the region. Russia’s <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-violence-india-humanitarian-assistance-ethiopia-f93a9a6bc7c0845a37cf7e3e3757e1e7">thwarting</a> of UN Security Council resolutions drawing attention to the Tigray conflict and humanitarian crisis have been well appreciated in Addis. </p>
<p>Ethiopia has long maintained an independent foreign policy. But Addis Ababa is set to host the next Russia-Africa summit meeting later this year. The event would provide a high-profile platform to reinforce Moscow’s message that it remains welcome on the global stage. </p>
<p>While in Addis Ababa, Lavrov can be expected to highlight Russia’s close ties with the African Union. Fear of annoying Russia led the regional body to repeatedly put off a virtual meeting with Ukrainian president Volodymr Zelensky. When the meeting was finally (and quietly) held in July, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61864049">only four African heads of state tuned in</a>. </p>
<p>The Republic of the Congo’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Denis-Sassou-Nguesso">President Denis Sassou-Nguesso</a> has led the Central African country for all but five years since he first came to power in 1979. The country <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo">is ranked 169 out of 180 countries</a> on Transparency International’s annual corruption perception index. It has been on Moscow’s radar for <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/petrochemicals/060722-refinery-news-roundup-progress-reported-on-some-projects-in-africa">expanding control</a> of hydrocarbon exports from the Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo and CAR through Pointe Noire. This would further enhance Russia’s influence over global energy markets. </p>
<h2>Benefits to ordinary Africans?</h2>
<p>Lavrov’s visit demonstrates that there are African leaders who find political value in retaining ties with Russia, regardless of Moscow’s tarnished international reputation. </p>
<p>Notably, most of the countries on his African tour maintain significant relations with the west. Hosting a high-profile visit from Lavrov is not intended to scuttle these ties. Rather, it is an attempt to gain more leverage vis-à-vis the west.</p>
<p>But this is a dangerous game for these African leaders. Russia has <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/countries/compare/russia/spain?sc=XE15">an economy the size of Spain’s</a>, does not provide significant investment or trade to the continent (other than grains and arms), and <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/countries/compare/russia/spain?sc=XE15">is increasingly disconnected</a> from the international financial system. </p>
<p>Moreover, foreign direct investment is <a href="https://www.atlantis-press.com/article/125965842.pdf">strongly correlated</a> with upholding the rule of law. By signalling that they are open to Russia’s lawless international order, these African leaders risk damaging their prospects for greater western investment. </p>
<p>Nine of the top 10 countries investing in Africa, comprising 90% of foreign direct investment, are part of the western financial system. It may take years for African countries to recover from the reputational damage of embracing the Russian worldview that rule of law is arbitrary. </p>
<p>Lavrov’s trip to Africa is not an isolated event. It is part of an ongoing dance. Moscow is trying to gain influence on the continent without investing in it. This strategy can only gain traction if certain African leaders see Russia as a means to validate their hold on power, despite objectionable human rights and democratic norms. </p>
<p>The advantages to Moscow and these African leaders are clear. For ordinary African citizens, not so much.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187711/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph Siegle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia is trying to normalise an international order where might makes right. And democracy and respect for human rights are optional.Joseph Siegle, Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, University of MarylandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1860252022-07-25T14:05:22Z2022-07-25T14:05:22ZA brief history of Esperanto, the 135-year-old language of peace hated by Hitler and Stalin alike<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471701/original/file-20220629-18-3oqon1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=15%2C61%2C5136%2C3167&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An Esperanto teacher instructs a class in a room with a painting of the language's creator on the wall.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/esperanto-teacher-iwona-zalewska-instructs-a-class-of-news-photo/667892248">Janek Skarzynski/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the late 1800s, the city of Białystok – <a href="https://yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Bia%C5%82ystok">which was once Polish, then Prussian, then Russian, and is today again part of Poland</a> – was a hub of diversity, with <a href="https://culture.pl/en/article/bialystok-the-original-babel-of-the-eastern-european-borderlands">large numbers of Poles, Germans, Russians</a> and <a href="https://www.yivo.org/cimages/basic_facts_about_yiddish_2014.pdf">Yiddish</a>-speaking <a href="https://theconversation.com/uncovering-ancient-ashkenaz-the-birthplace-of-yiddish-speakers-58355">Ashkanazi Jews</a>. Each group spoke a <a href="https://culture.pl/en/article/poland-didnt-always-speak-polish-the-lost-linguistic-diversity-of-europe">different language</a> and viewed members of the other communities with suspicion. </p>
<p>For years, <a href="https://culture.pl/en/article/9-things-you-need-to-know-about-esperanto-its-creator">L.L. Zamenhof</a> – a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/books/review/bridge-of-words-esperanto-esther-schor.html">Jewish man</a> from Białystok who had trained as a doctor in Moscow – had <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/15/us/dream-of-a-common-language.html">dreamed</a> of a way for diverse groups of people to communicate easily and peacefully.</p>
<p>On <a href="https://time.com/4417809/esperanto-history-invention/">July 26, 1887</a>, he published what is now referred to as “<a href="https://www.genekeyes.com/Dr_Esperanto.html">Unua Libro</a>,” or “First Book,” which introduced and described <a href="https://culture.pl/en/podcast/SFTEW-06-ESPERO">Esperanto</a>, a language he had spent years <a href="https://99percentinvisible.org/episode/episode-16-a-designed-language-download-embed/">designing</a> in hopes of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2003/jul/12/weekend.davidnewnham">promoting peace among the people of the world</a>. </p>
<p>Esperanto’s <a href="https://libro.ee/file.php?id=1269">vocabulary</a> is mostly drawn from English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Latin, Polish, Russian and Yiddish, as <a href="https://www.babbel.com/en/magazine/the-most-multilingual-people-throughout-history">these were the languages that Zamenhof was most familiar with</a>. Grammatically, Esperanto was primarily <a href="https://bulteno.esperanto-usa.org/a/2022/01/informado/">influenced</a> by <a href="https://culture.pl/en/article/how-much-polish-is-there-in-esperanto">European</a> languages, but <a href="https://www.jbe-platform.com/content/journals/10.1075/lplp.34.1.04par">interestingly</a>, some of Esperanto’s innovations bear a striking resemblance to features found in some <a href="https://blogs.bl.uk/european/2017/07/esperanto-as-an-asian-language.html">Asian languages</a>, such as <a href="http://claudepiron.free.fr/articlesenanglais/europeanorasiatic.htm#isolating">Chinese</a>.</p>
<p>Now, 135 years later, Europe is again riven by violence and tension, most notably by the war between Russia and Ukraine, which is <a href="https://theconversation.com/long-before-shots-were-fired-a-linguistic-power-struggle-was-playing-out-in-ukraine-178247">at least partially driven</a> by <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-ukrainian-a-language-or-a-dialect-that-depends-on-whom-you-ask-and-how-the-war-ends-180849">a political debate about language differences</a>. Unfortunately, <a href="https://theconversation.com/conflicts-over-language-stretch-far-beyond-russia-and-ukraine-183280">conflicts over language are common</a> around the world.</p>
<p>The promise of peace through a shared language has not yet caught on widely, but there are perhaps as many as <a href="https://www.babbel.com/en/magazine/how-many-people-speak-esperanto-and-where-is-it-spoken#:%7E:text=It's%20hard%20to%20know%20exactly,speakers%20in%20the%20world%20today.">2 million Esperanto speakers worldwide</a>. And it’s still spreading, if slowly.</p>
<figure>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Families gather from around the world to speak Esperanto.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A language for all</h2>
<p>Having grown up in the multicultural but distrusting environment of <a href="https://centrumzamenhofa.pl/en/p,111,clz">Białystok</a>, Zamenhof dedicated his life to <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2015/5/29/8672371/learn-esperanto-language-duolingo-app-origin-history">constructing</a> a language that <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/files/57184/57184-h/57184-h.htm">he hoped could help foster harmony between groups</a>. The goal <a href="https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/627963/esperanto-universal-language-experiment">wasn’t to replace anyone’s first language</a>. Rather, Esperanto would serve as <a href="https://freakonomics.com/podcast/why-learn-esperanto-special-feature/">a universal second language</a> that would help promote international understanding – and hopefully peace.</p>
<p>Esperanto is <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130310081949/http://esperanto-usa.org/?q=node%2F77">easy to learn</a>. Nouns do not have <a href="https://blog.duolingo.com/what-is-grammatical-gender/">grammatical gender</a>, so you never have to wonder whether a table is masculine or feminine. There are no <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/highly-irregular-why-tough-through-and-dough-dont-rhyme-and-other-oddities-of-the-english-language/oclc/1286858982">irregular</a> verbs, so you don’t have to memorize <a href="https://www.bescherelle.com/livre/bescherelle-la-conjugaison-pour-tous-9782401052352/">complex conjugation tables</a>. Also, the spelling is entirely <a href="https://www.dictionary.com/e/phonetic-spelling/">phonetic</a>, so you’ll never be confused by silent letters or letters that make different sounds in different contexts.</p>
<p>In “Unua Libro,” Zamenhof outlined Esperanto’s <a href="https://babel.ucsc.edu/%7Ehank/105/Esperanto16.pdf">16 basic rules</a> and provided a dictionary. This book was translated into more than a dozen languages, and at the beginning of each edition, <a href="http://www.esperantic.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/LLZ-Bio-En.pdf">Zamenhof permanently renounced all personal rights to his creation</a> and declared Esperanto to be “the property of society.”</p>
<p>Soon, Esperanto <a href="https://uea.org/landoj/tutmonde">spread</a> to <a href="https://www.jei.or.jp">Asia</a>, <a href="https://ttt.esperanto-usa.org/eusa/en">North</a> and <a href="https://esperanto.org.br/info/">South</a> America, the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8159082.stm">Middle East</a> and <a href="https://www.esperanto-afriko.org">Africa</a>. Starting in 1905, Esperanto speakers from around the world began gathering once a year to participate in the <a href="https://esperanto2022.ca/en/world-esperanto-congress/">World Esperanto Congress</a> to celebrate – and use – the language.</p>
<p>Between 1907 and his death in 1917, Zamenhof received <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/nomination/archive/show_people.php?id=10372">14 nominations</a> for the Nobel Peace Prize, though he never won the award. </p>
<p>Continuing Zamenhof’s work, the <a href="https://uea.org/info/en/kio_estas_uea">Universal Esperanto Association</a>, an organization that seeks to encourage relations among people through the use of Esperanto, has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/nomination/archive/show_people.php?id=11715">more than 100 times</a> in recognition of its “<a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/nomination/archive/show.php?id=17262">contribution to world peace by permitting people in different countries to enter direct relations without linguistic barriers</a>.” So far, it has never won the award.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/wjHV1dNDGG4?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">What is Esperanto, anyway, and what is it useful for?</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Struggles and successes</h2>
<p>After World War I, the <a href="https://www.ungeneva.org/en/league-of-nations">League of Nations</a> – the predecessor to the United Nations – was founded <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tul0iUZ5F50">in hopes of preventing future conflict</a>. Shortly thereafter, the <a href="http://en.umz.ac.ir/index.aspx?siteid=122&&siteid=122&pageid=13816&newsview=30091">Iranian delegate</a> to the League of Nations proposed that Esperanto be adopted as the language of international relations. </p>
<p>However, this proposal was <a href="https://www.loc.gov/resource/gdcwdl.wdl_11591/?r=0.317,0.346,0.547,0.274,0">vetoed</a> by the French delegate, who feared that the French language would lose its <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/25/world/diplomatically-french-is-a-faded-rose-in-an-english-garden.html">position of prestige</a> in diplomacy. In 1922, the French government went a step further and banned the teaching of Esperanto at all French universities for supposedly being a <a href="https://www.gastearsivi.com/en/gazete/evening_star/1922-07-16/25">tool to spread communistic propaganda</a>.</p>
<p>Ironically, life behind the <a href="https://www.nationalchurchillmuseum.org/sinews-of-peace-iron-curtain-speech.html">Iron Curtain</a> wasn’t much easier for Esperanto speakers. In the Soviet Union, Esperantists were alleged to be part of an “<a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/dangerous-language-esperanto-and-the-decline-of-stalinism/oclc/980600750">international espionage organization</a>.” Many <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/danera-lingvo-studo-pri-la-persekutoj-kontra-esperanto/oclc/1050004987?referer=di&ht=edition">were persecuted and later perished</a> during Stalin’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Great-Purge">Great Purge</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/modern-hebrew-the-past-and-future-of-a-revitalized-language/oclc/869265531">According to Hitler</a>, Esperanto was evidence of a <a href="https://www.yiddishbookcenter.org/language-literature-culture/pakn-treger/esperanto-jewish-story">Jewish</a> plot to take over the world. During the Third Reich, <a href="https://blogs.bl.uk/european/2016/12/the-dangerous-language.html">the Gestapo received specific orders to search for the descendants of Zamenhof</a>. All three of his <a href="https://blogs.bl.uk/european/2017/01/lidia-zamenhof-a-cosmopolitan-woman-and-victim-of-the-holocaust.html">children</a> died in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/quantifying-the-holocaust-measuring-murder-rates-during-the-nazi-genocide-108984">Holocaust</a> – <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/dangerous-language-esperanto-under-hitler-and-stalin/oclc/1159041131&referer=brief_results">as did many Esperanto speakers</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2015/06/13/413968033/esperanto-is-not-dead-can-the-universal-language-make-a-comeback">Despite</a> such events, in 1954 the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, better known as <a href="https://www.unesco.org/en/vision">UNESCO</a>, passed a <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000114586">resolution</a> recognizing – and entering into a relationship with – the Universal Esperanto Association, <a href="https://esperantoporun.org/en/us-and-the-un/">which opened the door for the Esperanto movement to be represented at UNESCO events pertaining to language</a>.</p>
<p>In 1985, UNESCO passed a resolution encouraging countries to add Esperanto to their school curricula. For <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2158870">years</a>, <a href="https://bulteno.esperanto-usa.org/a/2021/06/pinjino/">China</a> has offered Esperanto as a foreign language option at several of its universities, one of which houses an <a href="http://e-muzeo.uzz.edu.cn/en/">Esperanto museum</a>. There is now a program in <a href="https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/interlinguistics">interlinguistics</a> offered at <a href="http://international.amu.edu.pl/about_amu/">Adam Mickiewicz University</a> in Poland <a href="http://interl.home.amu.edu.pl/interlingvistiko/studoj.html">that’s taught in Esperanto</a>.</p>
<p>More recently, UNESCO declared 2017 as <a href="https://diplomatmagazine.eu/2018/01/22/unesco-declared-2017-year-ludovic-zamenhof/">the year of Zamenhof</a>, and since that time, its flagship journal – <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/notice?id=8d23f742-d3df-4b38-a253-245920cdbad9">The UNESCO Courier</a> – has had an <a href="https://uea.org/revuoj/unesko_kuriero">Esperanto-language edition</a> published quarterly.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="InstagramEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.instagram.com/p/CdfZmkQuTjS","accessToken":"127105130696839|b4b75090c9688d81dfd245afe6052f20"}"></div></p>
<figure><figcaption><span class="caption">In May 2022, there was an Esperanto group at the Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station in Antarctica.</span></figcaption></figure>
<h2>Give peace a chance</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/dec/06/saluton-the-surprise-return-of-esperanto">Today</a>, Esperanto is spoken by <a href="https://www.meetup.com/topics/esperanto/">pockets of enthusiasts</a> all around the world – including on <a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/CdfZmkQuTjS/">Antarctica</a>. There is now a wide array of free Esperanto resources <a href="https://www.ctpublic.org/arts-and-culture/2015-06-10/esperanto-in-the-internet-age">online</a>, including <a href="https://www.duolingo.com/course/eo/en/Learn-Esperanto">Duolingo</a>, <a href="https://lernu.net">lernu!</a>, the <a href="https://vortaro.net">Complete Illustrated Dictionary of Esperanto</a>, the <a href="https://bertilow.com/pmeg/index.html">Complete Manual of Esperanto Grammar</a> and <a href="https://translate.google.com">Google Translate</a>.</p>
<p>Esperanto also has its own edition of <a href="https://eo.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vikipedio:%C4%88efpa%C4%9Do">Wikipedia</a>, and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Wikipedias">at present</a>, there are more Wikipedia entries written in Esperanto than articles in Danish, Greek or Welsh.</p>
<figure>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Its founder, and many speakers, see Esperanto as a means toward achieving a more peaceful world.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Esperanto, the word “Esperanto” means “one who hopes.” Some may <a href="https://www.economist.com/prospero/2013/09/26/johnson-simple-logical-and-doomed">argue</a> that it is <a href="https://paw.princeton.edu/article/language-idealists">idealistic</a> to believe that Esperanto could <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/10/31/a-language-to-unite-humankind">unite humanity</a>, especially in the midst of <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraines-foreign-legion-may-be-new-but-the-idea-isnt-185082">another major war</a>. </p>
<p>But even the most violent wars don’t end without <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/21/only-diplomacy-can-end-ukraine-war-volodymyr-zelenskiy">peace talks</a> – which <a href="https://doi.org/10.52034/lanstts.v15i.428">often require translators</a> to interpret the languages of the opposing parties. Zamenhof wondered – and I do too – whether violence itself might be less common if a <a href="https://sites.law.wustl.edu/WashULaw/harris-lexlata/esperanto-the-neutral-global-language/">neutral language</a> could help people <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/bridge-of-words-esperanto-and-the-dream-of-a-universal-language/oclc/898529359">bridge their divides</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186025/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Holzer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Created in Europe during a time of intercultural struggle and strife, Esperanto was meant as a communication tool to spread peace among the people of the world. Its speakers are still at it.Joshua Holzer, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Westminster CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1799272022-07-15T12:18:33Z2022-07-15T12:18:33ZYoung people in the Middle East struggle to see a promising future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474159/original/file-20220714-35540-d5rtyi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2835%2C1888&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mahdi Shaban, a Palestinian living in Gaza, paid for his master's degree with earnings from digging graves.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/mahdi-shaban-who-completed-his-masters-degree-with-earnings-news-photo/1241050988">Mustafa Hassona/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Middle East’s population is growing <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?contextual=default&locations=ZQ">almost twice as fast</a> as the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?contextual=default">world overall</a>, and <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?locations=ZQ">one-third of its people</a> are under the age of 15.</p>
<p>As Joe Biden takes his first trip to the region as president, he plans to focus on the <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/07/13/biden-visit-saudi-arabia-mbs-israel-palestinians">prospects for peaceful international relations</a>. A key factor often overlooked is the Middle East’s lack of opportunities for young people.</p>
<p>As a scholar who has spent almost 20 years studying <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=GaXIwTYAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">conflict, migration and youth in the Middle East</a>, I believe their frustration could ultimately lead to an international crisis way beyond the borders of the region. </p>
<h2>A rapidly changing situation</h2>
<p>The region encompassing the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena">Middle East and North Africa</a> is diverse economically, geographically, historically, politically and socially, and often fraught with tension. <a href="https://theforum.erf.org.eg/2021/04/24/learning-long-term-consequences-armed-conflict/">Most of the major</a> armed conflicts in the last decade have occurred there – apart, obviously, from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p><a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/conflict-trends-middle-east-1989-2019">Since the pro-democracy protests and uprisings of the Arab Spring</a> in 2010, the region has experienced some sort of <a href="https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2021/06">significant conflict</a> in eight of its 21 countries: Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. </p>
<p>In addition, the region’s population is <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=ZQ">growing at a much faster rate</a> than the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?contextual=default&locations=ZQ">global average</a> – and has been since the World Bank began keeping records in 1961. Its people now number <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ZQ">over 450 million</a>, up from 300 million in 2001.</p>
<h2>Widespread youth unemployment</h2>
<p>The region’s young workers – those from ages 15 to 24 – already struggle with the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=ZQ">highest unemployment rates</a> in the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/269640/youth-unemployment-rate-in-selected-world-regions/">world</a>, averaging 25%. <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=ZQ&most_recent_value_desc=true">Thirteen</a> countries in the region have a youth unemployment rate of at least 20%, with the rate above 50% in Libya, above 40% in Jordan and Palestine, and above 30% in Algeria and Tunisia. </p>
<p>And <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?locations=ZQ">more young workers</a> are on the way.</p>
<p>The World Bank estimates that to provide employment for those currently out of a job and those who will soon be seeking work, Middle Eastern and North African nations need to <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2018/11/13/fixing-the-education-crisis-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa">create more than 300 million new jobs</a> by 2050. This number is almost <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t01.htm">twice</a> as many jobs as are currently in the U.S.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man makes a coffee at a machine in the back of a small vehicle, while another man waits." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Karrar Alaa, a 20-something Iraqi, could not find work, so he started his own small traveling coffee business in Basra.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/iraqi-karrar-alaa-aged-26-sells-coffee-by-his-travelling-news-photo/977556546">Haidar Mohammed Ali/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Economic struggles</h2>
<p>The struggle of high youth unemployment in the region is not a new challenge. Local and international governments and organizations have <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/youth-employment-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-revisiting-and-reframing-the-challenge/">tried for years</a> to create more opportunities for young people, but with little success.</p>
<p>In many Middle Eastern nations, regulations and laws about hiring and firing workers <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2012/061312.htm?id=186569">discourage employers from creating new jobs</a> when times are good, for fear they’ll have to keep those people employed when times get worse again. Other rules <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2012/061312.htm?id=186569">discriminate against young women</a> seeking work. Education and training programs <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2012/061312.htm?id=186569">don’t always line up</a> with the jobs that are available. </p>
<p>In many countries, the government is the one of the largest employers. In Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, government jobs are <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/54/vc061312">almost one-third</a> of all employment. In Egypt, government work accounts for 70% of nonagricultural jobs. In most countries, government jobs pay about 20% less than private industry, but in the Middle East, government jobs pay about 30% more on average. This means people will often just wait for a public sector job instead of taking available private sector jobs. </p>
<p>Even those young people who manage to get jobs say they often are <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/youth-employment-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-revisiting-and-reframing-the-challenge/">searching for several years</a> before landing work. During this time, they rely on financial support from their families. This causes them to experience what has been called “<a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1087433">prolonged adolescence</a>,” in which they are unable to develop financial and social independence, such as moving out and getting married, until their 20s or even their 30s.</p>
<h2>Other compounding challenges</h2>
<p>The region faces other obstacles that make it even harder for governments to tackle youth unemployment.</p>
<p>In addition to <a href="https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2021/06">internal conflict</a>, the International Monetary Fund reports that several of the region’s countries – including Egypt, Iraq and Tunisia – are facing a <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/Issues/2022/04/25/regional-economic-outlook-april-2022-middle-east-central-asia">slow economic recovery from the pandemic</a>, inflation in the costs of basic commodities such as energy and food, and financial and debt obligations needed to stabilize the economy.</p>
<p>Several countries across the region – including Algeria, Libya, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen – have <a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/finding-the-balance-population-and-water-scarcity-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/">less water than their populations need</a>.</p>
<p>There are other <a href="https://www.unep.org/resources/publication/environmental-challenges-middle-east-and-north-africa-region-paper">environmental concerns</a>, such as pollution, agriculture land scarcity and <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/49d6211b-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/49d6211b-en">poor public infrastructure</a>, which hinder sustainable economic growth. </p>
<p>The crisis in Ukraine threatens food supplies. More than one-third of Egyptians’ diets are based on wheat, but <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/blog/russia-ukraine-crisis-poses-serious-food-security-threat-egypt">85% of Egypt’s wheat</a> comes from Russia and Ukraine. Supplies have been reduced, and <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/blog/russia-ukraine-crisis-poses-serious-food-security-threat-egypt">prices are expected to rise</a> on bread and other wheat-based staple foods.</p>
<p>All these problems have contributed to varying degrees of lack of public confidence in the economies in the region. For instance, <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/">in a nationally representative survey</a>, 78% of Iraqis describe the economic situation in their country to be either bad or very bad. In Yemen, that proportion is 68%.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-crisis-poses-a-serious-threat-to-egypt-the-worlds-largest-wheat-importer-179242">Russia-Ukraine crisis poses a serious threat to Egypt – the world’s largest wheat importer</a>
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<h2>Potential effects</h2>
<p>Often the way to <a href="https://www.pesnetwork.eu/2019/09/05/lmb3-educational-attainment/">improve young people’s prospects</a> is education. But in several Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia, university-educated young people have a <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2012/061312.htm">higher unemployment rate</a> than their less-educated peers because most of the available opportunities are for low-skill jobs.</p>
<p>Rather than bringing <a href="https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2016/data-on-display/education-matters.htm">higher earnings</a>, education for Middle Eastern young people <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/2019/09/youth-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/">can deliver frustration</a>.</p>
<p>It’s no surprise, then, that vast numbers of young people – <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/covid-19-survey/#data_sets">at least one-fourth</a> of young Egyptians, Iraqis and Yemenis, and more than <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/2022/04/what-lebanese-citizens-think-about-migration/">60% of Lebanese youth</a> – are looking to emigrate, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/09/libya-new-evidence-shows-refugees-and-migrants-trapped-in-horrific-cycle-of-abuses/">often to Europe</a>.</p>
<p>All these forces at work in the Middle East – economic pressures, political conflict and water shortages – have the potential to spread international tension, refugees seeking safety and opportunity, or even disease. The challenges facing Middle Eastern nations are all made more difficult by the lack of faith their young people have in the prospect of a fulfilling future at home.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179927/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georges Naufal is a research fellow at the IZA Institute of Labor Economics and Economic Research Forum.
</span></em></p>Political and economic forces across the Middle East and North Africa combine to mean well-educated young people spend years looking for work, which delays their independence and adulthood.Georges Naufal, Associate Research Scientist, Public Policy Research Institute, Texas A&M UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1750302022-05-01T15:04:46Z2022-05-01T15:04:46ZCritical race theory and feminism are not taking over our universities<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460392/original/file-20220428-4047-ybhlo5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=98%2C116%2C5892%2C3835&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">United States Rep. Robert Johnson, D-Natchez, centre, and other members of the House express their objections to the banning of teaching of Critical Race Theory in Mississippi in March. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Rogelio V. Solis)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Editor’s note: This story is part of series that also includes live interviews with some of Canada’s top social sciences and humanities academics. Click <a href="https://www.meetview.ca/sshrc20220503/">here</a> to register for this free event, on May 3 at 2 p.m. EDT, co-sponsored by The Conversation and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.</em></p>
<p>Conservative observers everywhere are complaining about a <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/us/critical-race-theory-database-colleges-universities">supposed surge</a> in feminist and critical race theories being taught in colleges and universities. </p>
<p>In Hungary, the government went even further <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2018/10/17/hungary-officially-ends-gender-studies-programs">and banned gender studies master’s degrees</a> country-wide. Their reasoning: to avoid the spread of ideas about the social construction of gender. </p>
<p>In the United States, Republican lawmakers have embarked <a href="https://www.edweek.org/policy-politics/map-where-critical-race-theory-is-under-attack/2021/06">on a war</a> against critical race theory at lower levels of education, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/apr/02/mississippi-anti-critical-race-theory-law-whitewashing-history">fearing it will indoctrinate their kids</a> even before they get to higher education institutions.</p>
<p>Many believe universities are spending too much money to <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/us/critical-race-theory-database-colleges-universities">“infuse”</a> feminist and critical race approaches, which risk messing up curriculum and fostering division. Is this actually true? Are feminist and critical race studies taking over our classrooms and universities? </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Protesters seen holding placards." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447059/original/file-20220217-27-88r8o8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4006%2C2446&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447059/original/file-20220217-27-88r8o8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447059/original/file-20220217-27-88r8o8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447059/original/file-20220217-27-88r8o8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447059/original/file-20220217-27-88r8o8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447059/original/file-20220217-27-88r8o8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447059/original/file-20220217-27-88r8o8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People protest against the teaching of critical race theory outside the New Mexico Public Education Department in Albuquerque.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Cedar Attanasio)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>My personal experience, as well as my research, points to the contrary. When I was a graduate student in international relations (IR) from 2011 to 2020, gender approaches were barely addressed, or were compartmentalized to one single week of the year. Since then, I have attended or taught 10 international relations courses at three Canadian universities in both French and English. In all courses, I noticed a trend of marginalization of non-western and non-masculine approaches to world politics. </p>
<p>To test and explore the inconsistency between this growing public fear of these theories invading our classrooms with my own recent experience, I analyzed the contents of 50 introductory syllabi for international relations courses in North America and Europe. </p>
<p>What <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekab009">I found confirmed a pattern related to my personal experience:</a> race and gender studies are silenced or marginalized in western introduction to international relations courses.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1491728695677145092"}"></div></p>
<h2>Pink for a week</h2>
<p>Over half of international relations instructors in western countries simply do not address gender, feminism or women. Only three per cent of mandatory and optional readings assigned by instructors address gender or feminist aspects of the world.</p>
<p>For example, one syllabus devoted four weeks to globalization, without addressing <a href="https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/care-economy/lang--en/index.htm">care work</a> or the <a href="https://pmpress.org/index.php?l=product_detail&p=1086">international sexual division of labour</a>. Another syllabus had seven weeks on various regional and world wars, without mentioning <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298880170030801">feminist definitions of security</a>, <a href="https://books.google.com.co/books/about/Gender_War_and_Militarism.html?id=om3yy1JoS34C&redir_esc=y">gendered impacts of militarization</a>, how <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Masculinity-and-New-War-The-gendered-dynamics-of-contemporary-armed-conflict/Duriesmith/p/book/9780367221492">masculinity influences war</a>, <a href="https://wappp.hks.harvard.edu/publications/mothers-monsters-whores-womens-violence-global-politics">gendered violence</a> or the impact of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2016.1192242">gender in peacebuilding</a>. </p>
<p>Of the 23 syllabi that do mention gender, 78 per cent of them (18 of 23) adopt the one-week-only philosophy. This compartmentalization condenses gender research to one meagre week, the sacrosanct “women’s week.” In students’ minds, this reduces gender to an easily dismissed sectoral framework. In short, you are either interested in war or you are interested in gender — you cannot be both.</p>
<h2>Race and colonialism barely mentioned</h2>
<p>International relations has also been criticized for being “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/03/why-is-mainstream-international-relations-ir-blind-to-racism-colonialism/">blind to racism</a>.” The ethnocentricity of the field of international relations has been called out <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12171">again</a> and <a href="https://www.routledge.com/International-Relations-from-the-Global-South-Worlds-of-Difference/Tickner-Smith/p/book/9781138799103">again</a>, and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1153416">again</a> and <a href="https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/364801/mod_resource/content/1/waever_1998.pdf">again</a>. </p>
<p>My research confirms that race studies are rarely mentioned — in only seven syllabi (14 per cent). As for postcolonial studies, they are only mentioned in 17 syllabi (34 per cent). In comparison, liberalism appears in 38 syllabi (76 per cent). </p>
<p>The lists of historical events we present to our students are also dominated by the western world. For example, the Cold War is listed as an important event in 25 syllabi, but de/colonization processes are only listed in three syllabi and slavery in only one course plan.</p>
<p>Siphamandla Zondi, professor of international relations at the University of Johannesburg, notes that describing the field as <em>international</em> is a “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2018.1418202">masquerade</a>.” International relations courses pretend to be about everyone, but in fact they are predominantly about western countries and their white citizens (even ignoring racialized or Indigenous populations).</p>
<p>Indeed, scholars from the Global South are marginalized in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekz006">reading lists</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viz062">textbooks</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829819872817">research</a>, including in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1332/251510818X15272520831157">international feminist journals</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="22 flags representing mostly western countries fly in front of a blue sky." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447072/original/file-20220217-27-1pgq1ke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447072/original/file-20220217-27-1pgq1ke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447072/original/file-20220217-27-1pgq1ke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447072/original/file-20220217-27-1pgq1ke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447072/original/file-20220217-27-1pgq1ke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447072/original/file-20220217-27-1pgq1ke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447072/original/file-20220217-27-1pgq1ke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Too often, international relations courses only focus on western countries and their white citizens.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A more complex — less masculine and western — story</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://twitter.com/asherblackdeer/status/1438549432044302336">lack of inclusion</a> of women and Global South authors in reference lists is not <em>only</em> a problem of representation. It also means that masculine and western point of views are perpetuated in our teaching. </p>
<p>For example, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-II/Forces-and-resources-of-the-European-combatants-1939">story of the Second World War</a> usually includes the Axis and the Allies, the evolution of armaments, the details of German imperialism in Europe and the military support of the United States and Canada.</p>
<p>A more complex — less masculine and western — story would add that this <a href="https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/gender-home-front">war changed the face of western societies</a>, as women replaced men combatants on the job market and did not want to leave it upon their return. It would also mention proxy wars and Global South men and women fighting alongside Europeans in foreign battles.</p>
<p>A western tale of international development might start in 1947, with U.S. President <a href="https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/education/lesson-plans/conflicting-views-point-iv">Harry Truman speaking for the first time</a> of “underdeveloped” countries. It would speak of the establishment of western aid organizations like the World Bank. </p>
<p>A more <a href="https://ecosociete.org/livres/perdre-le-sud">international account</a> would throw the net wider and might start with the appropriation of Global South wealth and knowledge by European colonizers, the destruction of living conditions of Indigenous peoples and the brutalization of African populations contributing to the ongoing enriching of capitalists in Britain and the United States. It would tie the concept of development with North/South inequalities, not only with western aid in the Global South.</p>
<h2>Change ahead is slow</h2>
<p>One hopeful marker of change can be seen in academic conferences and publications. Between 2000 and 2010, presentations addressing gender at the annual International Studies Association (ISA) conference have increased by <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Feminism-and-International-Relations-Conversations-about-the-Past-Present/Tickner-Sjoberg/p/book/9780415584609">400 per cent</a>. </p>
<p>It seems, however, that conference organizers also fall into similar traps as international relations course instructors. They marginalize presenters into the feminist box: on more than 320 feminist, gender and queer papers at the ISA conference in 2021, only 71 were placed in mainstream “non-gender” panels. </p>
<p>My perception is that gender scholars are slotted to go to a gender-specific panel on security but not the more front-and-centre panel on security.</p>
<p>Teaching (or not teaching) race or gender approaches influence how we present the world to scholars-to-be and to the leaders of tomorrow. This, in turn, will affect which policies and research will be prioritized.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, one thing is certain: these concepts are not yet mainstreamed in western classrooms. And they are certainly not taking over universities.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maïka Sondarjee receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p>An analysis of international relations syllabi shows race and gender studies are barely mentioned.Maïka Sondarjee, Professeure adjointe, International Development and Global Studies, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.