tag:theconversation.com,2011:/es/topics/israel-palestine-4555/articlesIsrael-Palestine – The Conversation2024-03-04T13:35:14Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2232732024-03-04T13:35:14Z2024-03-04T13:35:14ZIsraeli peace activists are more anguished than ever − in a movement that has always been diverse and divided, with differing visions of ‘peace’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578455/original/file-20240227-18-cypqgm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1%2C1024%2C680&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A demonstration on Dec. 28, 2023, in Tel Aviv, organized by the peace group Standing Together, calls for a cease-fire. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-gather-to-stage-demonstration-calling-for-peace-and-news-photo/1883324720?adppopup=true">Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The months since Hamas’ attacks on Oct. 7, 2023, have been excruciating ones for Israeli peace activists. As the country rallies behind the war effort, critics <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/13/it-is-a-time-of-witch-hunts-in-israel-teacher-held-in-solitary-confinement-for-posting-concern-about-gaza-deaths">have been arrested</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/19/world/middleeast/israel-oct-7-left-wing-peace.html">and condemned</a> by opponents who say the attacks proved how misguided the peace movement is.</p>
<p>But in activists’ eyes, the horrific violence of Oct. 7 and Israel’s sweeping military response only prove its urgency. Vivian Silver, who spent a decade leading Women Wage Peace – a solidarity group of Israelis and Palestinians – was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/world/middleeast/peace-activists-killed-israel.html">one of several peace activists</a> <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/pictureshow/2023/11/17/1213523321/israel-gaza-peace-activist-vivian-silver-funeral-service">murdered that day</a>. “If we want a future here, we have to make the conflict a thing of the past,” her son Yonatan Zeigen <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2024-02-11/ty-article/.premium/my-mother-vivian-silver-is-gone-who-carries-her-flag/0000018d-9974-d92c-a9ed-fbfd75300000">wrote in an op-ed</a> after her death.</p>
<p>For some activists, in other words, Oct. 7 only underscored the urgency of their cause. Yet the peace movement has always been diverse and often fragmented. In reality, there are multiple movements, each with its own definition of peace. As <a href="https://kroc.nd.edu/faculty-and-staff/atalia-omer/">a scholar of religion, ethics and politics</a>, I have traced how divergent accounts of Israel’s founding connect to <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/W/bo15288847.html">different visions of justice</a>.</p>
<h2>The ‘peace camp’</h2>
<p>The Israeli demographics most associated with the “peace camp” are predominately <a href="https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/who-are-ashkenazi-jews/">Ashkenazi Jews</a>, meaning they are descended from communities in Central and Eastern Europe. They also tend to be secular, meaning they do not closely observe traditional Jewish religious law.</p>
<p>Even within this larger camp, however, there are divergent perceptions of justice, shaped by how people understand the root causes of the conflict. Did it truly start in 1917, when a British lord <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/text-of-the-balfour-declaration#google_vignette">promised a home for Jews</a>? In 1948, with Israel’s War of Independence – which Palestinians experienced as <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-nakba-at-75-palestinians-struggle-to-get-recognition-for-their-catastrophe-204782">the Nakba, their “catastrophe</a>”? Or is the most important date 1967, when Israel occupied the Golan Heights, east Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?</p>
<p>For the most part, this “peace camp” believes “Israel proper” consists of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-54116567">land within the “Green Line</a>,” set by the armistice agreements at the end of the 1948 war. The Green Line does not include the territories Israel has occupied since the end of the 1967 war, which most of the peace camp considers <a href="https://peacenow.org.il/en/about-us/who-are-we">a morally wrong occupation</a>.</p>
<p>More broadly, their vision is grounded in preserving Israel as a democracy with a Jewish majority. This necessitates the creation of a sovereign Palestinian nation-state in the occupied territories.</p>
<p>A prominent example of a secular group <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Beyond+the+Two+State+Solution%3A+A+Jewish+Political+Essay-p-9780745662947">accepting the Green Line as a peace premise</a> is <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/30246797?seq=3">the once-robust Peace Now movement</a>, created in 1978 by Israeli veterans. They argue, using human rights and international law, that a permanent occupation will threaten the character of Israel as a Jewish democracy. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578464/original/file-20240228-26-h0r0mi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Four adults and a child walk together, leading a march with city buildings in the background, in a black and white photo." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578464/original/file-20240228-26-h0r0mi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578464/original/file-20240228-26-h0r0mi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578464/original/file-20240228-26-h0r0mi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578464/original/file-20240228-26-h0r0mi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578464/original/file-20240228-26-h0r0mi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578464/original/file-20240228-26-h0r0mi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578464/original/file-20240228-26-h0r0mi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Members of the Peace Now movement arrive in Tel Aviv, finishing a 1983 march for peace that began at Israel’s northern border.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/moshe-ben-baruch-gives-the-peace-sign-to-applauding-members-news-photo/516513418?adppopup=true">Bettmann via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>… and its dissenters</h2>
<p>Ever since the early days of Zionism, however, other Jews have challenged the movement’s basic objective of creating a Jewish-majority state, given <a href="https://fathomjournal.org/the-bride-is-beautiful-but-she-is-married-to-another-man-the-tenacity-of-an-anti-zionist-fable/">the reality that other groups of people, in addition to Jews, already lived</a> in historic Palestine. For example, <a href="https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/brit-shalom-a-covenant-of-peace/">the group Brit Shalom</a>, established in 1926 by European Jewish intellectuals, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27917784?casa_token=a5y8GUrm5WIAAAAA%3AW1hlB5xoTqIhVXHUbp0eaVzhED1b8N5_M4_z3pYUN7Dv4FXzKJfiSNL9UBLM4Db07JqnB8YwESoc_zCyXJTIuboUoGpypsNHrv5metvIOk0oLcTC5mQ">envisioned a binational state</a> that would include equality for non-Jewish Palestinian communities. </p>
<p>In Brit Shalom’s view, a commitment to democratic principles contradicted ambitions for creating a majoritarian Jewish state, which they predicted would depend on driving out Palestinians and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2002.31.3.36">preventing their return</a>.</p>
<p>Other contemporary secular groups that are mostly made up of Jewish Israelis also oppose the Green Line as a basis for peace building. <a href="https://www.zochrot.org/articles/view/17/en?Our_Story">Zochrot, for example</a>, emphasizes <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-nakba-at-75-palestinians-struggle-to-get-recognition-for-their-catastrophe-204782">the Nakba</a> of 1948 as a root cause of the conflict. Therefore, they advocate for Palestinian refugees’ <a href="https://www.zochrot.org/sections/view/19/en?Return_Vision">right of return</a>, which is central to Palestinians’ own conceptions of justice.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578747/original/file-20240228-22-juzwz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A black and white photograph of a long line of people, including women and children, walking uphill as they hold bags of possessions." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578747/original/file-20240228-22-juzwz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578747/original/file-20240228-22-juzwz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578747/original/file-20240228-22-juzwz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578747/original/file-20240228-22-juzwz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578747/original/file-20240228-22-juzwz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578747/original/file-20240228-22-juzwz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578747/original/file-20240228-22-juzwz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The displacement of Palestinians during the 1948 war, often referred to as the Nakba, is central in shaping some activists’ ideas of justice.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Refugees_in_Galilee.jpg">Fred Csasznik/'Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem' via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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<p>Other critics of the mainstream peace movement have criticized it for ignoring <a href="https://doi.org/10.2979/jmiddeastwomstud.7.2.56">the social justice struggles of non-Ashkenazi Jewish Israelis</a>, such as Arab Jews or “Mizrahim” and Ethiopian Jews, or connecting those issues with Palestinians’ experience.</p>
<h2>Palestinian voices</h2>
<p>The continuous expansion of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/29/world/middleeast/israel-west-bank-settlements-expansion.html">Israeli settlements in the West Bank</a> has eroded the Green Line as the basis for peace. This <a href="https://jstreet.org/de-facto-annexation-the-israeli-rights-plan-for-permanent-occupation/">de facto annexation</a>, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/08/israel-palestine-west-bank-annexation-netanyahu-smotrich-far-right/">as many analysts call it</a>, makes it increasingly unlikely that “peace” could mean most Israelis living within the line and most Palestinians outside it.</p>
<p>Yet with the erosion of the Green Line, various organizations are reemphasizing a binational vision of a single state, or two states joined in a confederation. Compared with the “mainstream” peace camp, some of these groups have more Palestinian representation, coming mostly from Palestinian citizens of Israel.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.alandforall.org/english/?d=ltr">A Land for All: Two States One Homeland</a>, known as ALFA, was formed in 2012 and is co-led by Palestinian and Jewish Israelis. In <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rDKmPvsywEM">events after Oct. 7</a>, members <a href="https://www.alandforall.org/pain-and-opportunity/?d=ltr">grappled with their grief</a> by resolving to imagine a political future together.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578751/original/file-20240228-30-nubrrn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman in a white shirt kisses the forehead of another woman in a headscarf, whose eyes are closed, as they stand in front of a purple sign." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578751/original/file-20240228-30-nubrrn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578751/original/file-20240228-30-nubrrn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578751/original/file-20240228-30-nubrrn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578751/original/file-20240228-30-nubrrn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578751/original/file-20240228-30-nubrrn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578751/original/file-20240228-30-nubrrn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578751/original/file-20240228-30-nubrrn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Israeli activist Yael Admi embraces Arab Israeli activist Ghadir Hani following a speech during a Dec. 28, 2023, demonstration in Tel Aviv organized by the group Standing Together.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/israeli-activist-yael-admi-embraces-arab-israeli-activist-news-photo/1883322050?adppopup=true">Ahmad Gharabli/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>ALFA’s foundational assumption is that “<a href="https://www.alandforall.org/english/?d=ltr">both people belong in the whole land</a>.” While it believes that, realistically, Jewish settlers will remain in the territories occupied in 1967, it envisions them becoming Israeli residents of a future State of Palestine – one half of a larger confederation with the state of Israel.</p>
<p>Similarly, the organization <a href="https://www.standing-together.org/about-us">Standing Together</a> sent two representatives – one Jewish Israeli, one Palestinian Israeli – to the United States together to hold events with the message that “both Jewish people and Palestinians are going to stay on this land. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/17/world/middleeast/israel-palestinians-standing-together.html">No one is going anywhere</a>.”</p>
<p>Notably, the Palestinian members of groups seeking Palestinian-Israeli dialogues tend to be Israeli citizens from within the Green Line, with a few exceptions, such as <a href="https://cfpeace.org/">Combatants for Peace</a> – a group of Palestinians and Jews committed to nonviolence but made up of former fighters.</p>
<p>However, after decades of “peace process,” many Palestinians interpret coexistence initiatives as a form of <a href="https://www.972mag.com/what-is-normalization/">normalizing the occupation</a>.</p>
<h2>The Faithful Left</h2>
<p>The tension between Israel’s Jewish and democratic identities has been present since before the state’s founding. Under the current hard-line government, however, critics fear the state has been <a href="https://www.btselem.org/publications/fulltext/202101_this_is_apartheid">relinquishing the democratic part</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1215/26410478-9355297">in favor of Jewish supremacy</a>.</p>
<p>Religious politicians have been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-ministers-join-ultranationalist-conference-urging-gaza-resettlement-2024-01-29/">some of the most visible advocates</a> for measures that decrease the likelihood of a contiguous Palestinian sovereign state, such as by <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-settlements-hamas-gaza-war-netanyahu-smotrich-1d2306d55c24c8559b630d9f20db30e2">constructing new settlements</a>. Yet the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/israelpalestine/israels-winning-coalition">current right-wing coalition</a> has provided an impetus for more Israelis who are observant Jews to join peace efforts: <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/eyeing-their-communitys-rightward-shift-left-wing-religious-jews-form-new-movement/">the “Faithful Left</a>,” or Smol Emuni in Hebrew. </p>
<p>The movement was born when hundreds showed up to <a href="https://www.972mag.com/religious-jewish-left-israel/">a Jerusalem conference</a> in January 2023, discussing their discomfort with how Jewish tradition was being used politically, and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/under-shadow-of-war-conference-of-left-wing-religious-jews-grows-its-numbers/">a second conference</a> was held in February 2024. Because many of the Faithful Left are products of religious Zionist schools, their key advantage within the peace movement is the ability <a href="https://www.academicstudiespress.com/9798887193243/">to challenge</a> arguments for annexation or domination on religious grounds.</p>
<p>Older groups such as <a href="https://www.rhr.org.il/eng?lang=en">Rabbis for Human Rights</a>, whose members range from humanist to Orthodox, have also drawn on religious ideas for decades.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578756/original/file-20240228-9454-66bbn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man wearing blue, with a white beard and black hair, carries a large bundle through a dry grove of small trees." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578756/original/file-20240228-9454-66bbn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578756/original/file-20240228-9454-66bbn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578756/original/file-20240228-9454-66bbn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578756/original/file-20240228-9454-66bbn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578756/original/file-20240228-9454-66bbn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578756/original/file-20240228-9454-66bbn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578756/original/file-20240228-9454-66bbn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">U.S.-born Israeli Reform Rabbi Arik Ascherman, a member of Rabbis for Human Rights, helps Palestinians during the olive harvest outside Ramallah in November 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/born-israeli-reform-jewish-rabbi-arik-ascherman-a-member-of-news-photo/1777936330?adppopup=true">Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Some activists within the Faithful Left have also been a part of <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2022-12-04/ty-article/.premium/whos-an-anarchist/00000184-d9c3-dc05-adae-fff3834a0000">Bnei Avraham</a>, a group that <a href="https://www.mekomit.co.il/%D7%99%D7%A9-%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%93%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%9E%D7%94-%D7%A9%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%94-%D7%9C%D7%A0%D7%95-%D7%95%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F/">shows solidarity with Palestinians</a> by building relationships in the West Bank – specifically Hebron, where Palestinians routinely experience <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/09/west-bank-israel-settlers-violence/">violence and harassment</a>.</p>
<p>Secular anti-occupation groups such as <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2017-01-08/ty-article/.premium/masked-israelis-attack-activists-accompanying-palestinian-farmers/0000017f-ecd3-d3be-ad7f-fefb6cda0000">Ta'ayush</a> take this idea one step further by trying to provide in-person protection against violence. For example, Ta'ayush activists walk kids to school or accompany Palestinian shepherds as a buffer to prevent harassment.</p>
<p>The erosion of the Green Line has challenged many peace groups’ visions for peace and justice, as diverse as those are. Even more fundamentally, it has reopened the question of what it means for Israel to be Jewish and democratic – a question at the heart of Israeli peace activists’ challenges today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223273/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Atalia Omer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Secular Jewish groups have historically made up the majority of solidarity and peace groups. But Palestinian citizens and observant Jews are also key.Atalia Omer, Professor of Religion, Conflict and Peace Studies, University of Notre DameLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2241342024-02-22T14:31:18Z2024-02-22T14:31:18ZSpeaker Lindsay Hoyle sparks chaos: five steps to understanding why MPs stormed out of parliament during Gaza vote<p>Chaos engulfed the House of Commons on Wednesday, February 21 when MPs representing the Conservatives and the Scottish National Party (SNP) stormed out of the chamber following a furious row over a debate on calling for a ceasefire in Gaza. The situation was complex but can be explained in five key moments.</p>
<p>The main piece of business in the House of Commons on the day in question was an opposition day debate tabled by the Scottish National Party (SNP) calling for a ceasefire in Gaza. Opposition day debates are an opportunity for opposition parties to put issues that they care about onto the parliamentary agenda. </p>
<p>There are 20 opposition days allocated per parliamentary year – 17 for the main opposition party (Labour) to set the agenda and three for the second opposition party (the SNP). </p>
<p>The drama unfolded on an SNP day and the chaos was triggered by the wording of the motion put forward for debate by the SNP. This contained the phrase “collective punishment of the Palestinian people” and did not include a call for a two-state solution, which Labour objected to.</p>
<h2>1. The SNP sets a trap</h2>
<p>To some degree the motion was a political trap set by the SNP for Labour. </p>
<p>In a November vote on the situation in Gaza, the Labour party suffered a <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/who-are-the-rebel-labour-mps-that-resigned-over-the-vote-for-a-gaza-ceasefire-13009351">major rebellion</a>, with 56 MPs voting with the SNP and against their own party to show their support for a ceasefire. Several shadow ministers resigned so they could vote this way. </p>
<p>Along with a desire to express support for a ceasefire, the SNP evidently saw an opportunity to split Labour once again with its opposition day motion. </p>
<h2>2. Labour tables its own amendment</h2>
<p>To avoid a split, Labour tabled its own amendment to the SNP’s motion. This called for a “humanitarian ceasefire” and included additional details, such as a call for a two-state solution. However it is unusual for opposition parties to seek to amend the motions of other opposition parties. </p>
<p>On such occasions where an opposition amendment is tabled, it is voted upon first, prior to the original (in this case SNP) motion. The spanner in the works here for Labour was that the government also tabled its own amendment to the SNP motion. </p>
<p>In this situation it comes down to the Speaker to decide which amendment is selected – and typically only one is selected. If the government tables an amendment to an opposition day motion, it will be called. The tabling of such an amendment from the government would have, in normal circumstances, torpedoed Labour’s plan. </p>
<h2>3. The speaker makes an unexpected decision</h2>
<p>However, something unexpected then came to pass. Lindsay Hoyle, the speaker, decided to permit both Labour and the government’s amendment to be called to allow for the widest possible debate. </p>
<p>Although not completely against House of Commons rules (<a href="https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/commons/standing-orders-public11/">standing orders</a>) allowing both amendments to proceed does go against convention. The speaker’s decision was taken against the advice of the clerk of the House of Commons (the most senior adviser to the speaker and the house).</p>
<p>Hoyle appears to have made the decision to select both amendments for a vote having spoken to Labour MPs about the fears for their safety. Many have said that they’ve faced threats of violence for failing to speak out in favour of a ceasefire. </p>
<p>Back in December, the constituency office of <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/mike-freer-minister-to-stand-down-as-mp-over-personal-safety-fears-after-death-threats-and-arson-attack-13061089">Conservative MP Mike Freer </a> was hit by an arson attack (fortunately no one was injured) and he has since announced he is standing down as an MP over personal safety fears. </p>
<p>These MPs had asked for the opportunity to express their support for a ceasefire in the chamber via the Labour amendment to make their position clear to the public. Party leader Keir Starmer, in tabling the Labour amendment, was attempting to give them the opportunity to do so.</p>
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<h2>4. MPs storm out of the chamber</h2>
<p>Despite Hoyle’s decision being made apparently with the best of intentions, it angered many MPs, especially as it broke both convention and the official advice of the clerk of the house. </p>
<p>A shouting match broke out between MPs on both sides of the house and between MPs and the speaker and his deputy. The government withdrew its amendment so it couldn’t be voted on and asked its MPs not to take part in any votes. SNP and Conservative MPs walked out of the House of Commons chamber in anger over what had happened. </p>
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<p>In withdrawing its amendment, the government prevented a sequence of votes from occurring. Had the government not withdrawn its amendment, there would have been three votes.</p>
<p>MPs would have voted first on Labour’s amendment (which would have likely been defeated due to the government’s majority), then on the SNP’s original opposition day motion (which would also have been likely defeated due to the government’s majority) and finally on the government’s amendment. The speaker’s plan was for everyone’s motions and amendments to be put to a vote – it just didn’t work out that way. </p>
<h2>5. Labour’s amendment passes</h2>
<p>Amid the chaos of the government withdrawing, a vote did eventually take place. Labour’s amendment to the SNP motion was taken and passed without objection. That meant that the SNP motion was duly amended and passed too (but not in the original form that the party wanted).</p>
<p>SNP MPs are justifiably angry. It was their opposition day debate (of which they only get three days per parliamentary year) and it has been completely overshadowed by screaming and shouting over parliamentary procedure.</p>
<h2>The result: an important issue overshadowed</h2>
<p>Despite the House of Commons passing a motion calling for a ceasefire in Gaza, MPs have not covered themselves in glory. The public will certainly be questioning what on earth was going on.</p>
<p>This anger, over what some MPs see as an abuse of procedure, has completely overshadowed the actual topic of the debate, the conflict in Israel and Gaza, as well as the humanitarian disaster. Although opposition day motions are not binding on the government, and this vote would not have led to a ceasefire, it is an issue which matters to MPs – and to the wider public. </p>
<p>Nor should we underestimate how angry MPs are at the speaker’s decision. He has apologised and said he made the wrong decision but many believe that he has overstepped his authority and have accused him of being biased towards Labour by backing both amendments. </p>
<p>At the time of writing, 60 MPs had signed an <a href="https://edm.parliament.uk/early-day-motion/61908">early day motion</a> (used by MPs to draw attention to a particular issue) stating that they have no confidence in Hoyle as speaker. They include SNP Westminster leader Stephen Flynn. Calmer heads may prevail over the coming days but the decision Hoyle made has undermined his position and authority.</p>
<p><em>This article has been corrected. It originally stated the Mike Freer is a Labour MP when he is in fact a Conservative MP.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224134/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Caygill has previously received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p>Instead of voting on a ceasefire, the House of Commons descended into furious arguments between MPs and the speaker.Thomas Caygill, Senior Lecturer in Politics, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2210172024-01-15T19:05:30Z2024-01-15T19:05:30ZSouth Africa has made its genocide case against Israel in court. Here’s what both sides said and what happens next<p>Following the October 7 attack by Hamas, Israeli forces have carried out sustained attacks on the Palestinian controlled territory, dividing the international community.</p>
<p>Last week, the South African government presented a case to the International Court of Justice. They argued the Israeli government’s attack on Gaza, and especially the actions of its forces within Gaza since early October, could amount to genocide. </p>
<p>Few cases that have gone before the court are as explosive and potentially significant as this one.</p>
<p>Here’s how the hearings unfolded and what happens now.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-enforcement-power-does-the-international-court-of-justice-have-in-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-220523">What enforcement power does the International Court of Justice have in South Africa's genocide case against Israel?</a>
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<h2>Defining genocide</h2>
<p>The crime of genocide is covered in the 1948 United Nations <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide</a>. </p>
<p>It is defined as acts committed with intent to destroy, either in part or in whole, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, including:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>killing members of the group</p></li>
<li><p>causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group</p></li>
<li><p>deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about a groups physical destruction, in whole or in part</p></li>
<li><p>imposing measures to prevent births</p></li>
<li><p>forcibly transferring children.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The Genocide Convention is designed to not only prosecute individuals and governments who committed genocide, but to prevent it from occurring.</p>
<p>Therefore, the Convention states that while genocidal acts are punishable, so too are attempts and incitement to commit genocide, regardless of whether they are successful or not.</p>
<h2>The South African case</h2>
<p>The South African government argued that Israeli forces had killed <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/14/israel-vows-not-to-stop-as-gaza-death-toll-nears-24000-on-day-100-of-war#:%7E:text=At%20least%2023%2C968%20people%20in,people%20were%20also%20taken%20captive.">23,210</a> Palestinians. Approximately 70% were believed to be women and children. </p>
<p>Crucially for the court, South Africa <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240111-ora-01-00-bi.pdf">argued</a> Israeli forces were often aware that the bombings would cause significant civilian casualties. It said many of the Palestinians were killed in Israeli declared safe zones, mosques, hospitals, schools and refugee camps. </p>
<p>Beyond the death toll, South Africa argued that there were 60,000 wounded and maimed Palestinians. The separation of families through arrest and displacement has caused large scale and likely enduring harm to civilians. South Africa highlighted the displacement of 85% of Palestinians, particularly the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-war-c8b4fc20e4fd2ef381d5edb7e9e8308c">October 13 evacuation</a> order which displaced over one million people in 24 hours.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-is-taking-israel-to-court-for-genocide-in-palestine-what-does-it-mean-for-the-war-in-gaza-220660">South Africa is taking Israel to court for genocide in Palestine. What does it mean for the war in Gaza?</a>
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<p>The South African government also alleged the Israeli attacks and the actions of its forces were preventing the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian people being met. It particularly emphasised the Israeli decision to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/16/israeli-authorities-cutting-water-leading-public-health-crisis-gaza">cut off water supply</a> to Gaza. The distribution of food, medicine and fuel were also hampered. Israeli <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/14/gaza-unlawful-israeli-hospital-strikes-worsen-health-crisis">attacks on hospitals</a> were also highlighted.</p>
<p>South Africa alleged the denial of adequate humanitarian assistance, especially medical supplies and care, amounts to the imposing of measures to prevent births. </p>
<p>Finally, South Africa focused on speeches by Israeli political leaders and soldiers advocating for the erasure of Gaza. This included Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s reference to the <a href="https://www.news.com.au/finance/work/leaders/oldtime-religion-netanyahu-invokes-scripture-as-hamas-fight-becomes-israels-holy-war/news-story/be3a19446c5e151e087e77b20ebdf145">biblical destruction</a> of enemies of ancient Israel and military commanders’ reference to Palestinians <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2023/10/358170/israel-defense-minister-calls-palestinians-human-animals-amid-israeli-aggression">as “human animals”</a> that need to be eliminated. These were used as evidence of incitement to genocide.</p>
<p>If the International Court of Justice doesn’t find that Israel is committing genocidal acts, South Africa has argued the Israeli forces have demonstrated an <em>intent</em> to commit genocide, and that there should be an interim order made to stop it.</p>
<h2>The Israeli response</h2>
<p>The Israeli government rejects all of the allegations by South Africa. Israel presented its <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240112-ora-01-00-bi.pdf">arguments</a> on January 12. </p>
<p>Israel’s overall argument is that the attacks on Gaza have been directed at Hamas soldiers. It says the civilian casualties have been an unfortunate consequence of carrying out military operations in an urban environment. Accordingly, the deaths, injuries and damage are not genocidal in nature, but instead, are incidental to military action. </p>
<p>Israel has presented evidence that it is delivering food, water, medical supplies and fuel to Gaza, demonstrating the opposite of genocidal intent. The Israeli Defence Force also runs a Civilian Harm Mitigation Unit. </p>
<p>These actions, according to Israel, are “concrete measures aimed specifically at recognising the rights of the Palestinian civilians in Gaza to exist”. </p>
<p>Finally, Israel has argued that the quotes South Africa have argued display incitement to commit genocide have been taken out of context. According to Israel, the court has no grounds to find that there are acts of genocide taking place, or that there is genocidal intent. </p>
<p>At this point, the court will not decide whether Israel has committed genocide or not. Determining that will likely take several years. Instead, the court will decide whether the allegations are at the least plausible, and if so, likely order that Israel and Palestine reach an interim ceasefire, and for Israeli forces to take all necessary steps to prevent genocide. </p>
<h2>How significant is it?</h2>
<p>If the court rules in favour of South Africa, a major world power – supported by the US and much of the Western world – will have been found to have committed what has, historically, been the most notorious of crimes. </p>
<p>That said, the prospect of any ruling by the International Court of Justice having a meaningful impact on the conflict in Gaza is remote. </p>
<p>The UN and its legal institutions are powered solely by a belief the international community is respectful of international institutions and international law. The problem is when a powerful country does not believe a ruling by a United Nations body applies to them, little can be done to enforce it. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/after-3-months-of-devastation-in-the-israel-hamas-war-is-anyone-winning-220644">After 3 months of devastation in the Israel-Hamas war, is anyone 'winning'?</a>
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<p>The case of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/1986/jun/28/usa.marktran">Nicaragua vs the United States</a> in 1986 shows this in stark detail. The US initially indicated it would respect the decision of the court, but when the court found against the US, the US simply ignored the decision. For Israel and for its most powerful supporters, a finding against it by the court would likely be something they dispute and ultimately ignore. </p>
<h2>Where does this leave Australia?</h2>
<p>There is, however, a possibility the ruling could influence smaller powers. </p>
<p>Small to middle powers that rely on international rules to further their interests may be moved to support the cause for a ceasefire more vocally. </p>
<p>The Australian government would find itself in a particularly awkward position. </p>
<p>After all, the Australian government <a href="https://www.themandarin.com.au/230764-australia-backs-icj-action-against-russia-for-ukraine-invasion/">supported Ukraine’s case </a> against Russia, also about genocide. </p>
<p>It has already made a public statement <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/nov/04/penny-wong-israel-must-listen-to-calls-for-restraint-from-its-friends-or-it-risks-gaza-conflict-spreading">calling for restraint</a> from Israel. </p>
<p>Australia would face a decision between unequivocal support for a country it sees as a partner, or support for a court it would otherwise see as a key arbiter in the international order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221017/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dean Aszkielowicz has received funding from the Army Research Scheme. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Taucher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The International Court of Justice has heard arguments from each side of an extraordinary genocide case. What was said, and what happens now?Paul Taucher, Lecturer in History, Murdoch UniversityDean Aszkielowicz, Senior Lecturer in History and Politics, Murdoch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2206602024-01-10T02:26:13Z2024-01-10T02:26:13ZSouth Africa is taking Israel to court for genocide in Palestine. What does it mean for the war in Gaza?<p>South Africa has taken Israel to the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192">International Court of Justice</a> (ICJ, also known as the World Court) in The Hague claiming genocide has been committed against Palestinians during the Gaza conflict. </p>
<p>A charge of genocide before the court in the midst of a heated armed conflict is exceptional. </p>
<p>Likewise, the significance of South Africa’s claim against Israel has immense cultural, diplomatic, historical, and political significance. Israel has rejected South Africa’s claim and vowed to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67866342">contest the case</a> against it.</p>
<p>International court cases such as these typically run for many years before a final judgement is reached, however South Africa has also requested <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192/press-releases">provisional measures</a> – a form of international injunction – and preliminary hearings will take place in The Hague on January 11 and 12. </p>
<p>A decision on South Africa’s provisional measures request will most likely be made by the end of January with the potential to have a profound impact on Israel’s military campaign in Gaza.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/after-3-months-of-devastation-in-the-israel-hamas-war-is-anyone-winning-220644">After 3 months of devastation in the Israel-Hamas war, is anyone 'winning'?</a>
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<h2>Which laws are in question?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">1948 Convention</a> on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) was adopted following the 1940s holocaust by the Nazi regime, which resulted in the deaths of six million Jewish people. </p>
<p>The Genocide Convention was one of the most significant responses by the then fledgling United Nations to the holocaust. It was intended to clearly define genocide, prevent future genocides, and make nation states accountable for genocide. </p>
<p>There are a total of 153 parties to the Genocide Convention, including Israel and South Africa, and it is widely seen as one of the pillars of the United Nations human rights system. </p>
<p>States are accountable for genocide before the International Court of Justice, while individuals can be charged with the crime of genocide and placed on trial at the International Criminal Court.</p>
<p>Genocide is <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-prevention-and-punishment-crime-genocide">defined in the Convention</a> as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” and extends to:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>killing members of the group, or causing serious bodily harm to members of the group</p></li>
<li><p>deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction </p></li>
<li><p>imposing measures to prevent births.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What is South Africa’s case about?</h2>
<p>South Africa’s case against Israel under the Genocide Convention was commenced on December 29 2023 following lodgement of an <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20231228-app-01-00-en.pdf">84 page application</a> instituting the proceedings. </p>
<p>South Africa has brought the case by relying on the principle that as a party to the Genocide Convention, it has an obligation to enforce legal rights owed to all people that genocide not be allowed. The claim could have been commenced by any other party to the convention, however, South Africa has been <a href="https://www.dirco.gov.za/south-africa-calls-for-the-international-community-to-hold-israel-accountable-for-breaches-of-international-law/">raising concerns</a> about genocide in Gaza since October 30.</p>
<p>The claim gives an historical context to Israel’s conduct in Palestine, recounts the Hamas terrorist attacks on October 7, and details Israel’s subsequent Gaza military operations. </p>
<p>Particular attention is given to the actions and conduct of Israeli political and military leaders, especially their statements as to how Israel intended to respond to the Hamas attacks, and the extent and scale of Israel’s military operations and military objectives in Gaza. </p>
<p>South Africa then details Israel’s actual military conduct during the Gaza campaign and the consequences for Palestinian civilians. This conduct is linked directly back to acts of genocide as defined in the Genocide Convention.</p>
<p>South Africa’s court case takes two forms: a claim that Israel has committed genocide against Palestinians in Gaza, and the urgent request for provisional measures (international legal speak for expediting the process). </p>
<p>South Africa has requested that the court order that Israel’s political and military leaders, and Israel’s military, immediately cease any activities that amount to an ongoing campaign of genocide against the Palestinian people. </p>
<p>South Africa will need to prove, both in law and in facts, that the case is admissible, that the World Court has jurisdiction to hear this claim, and that the application is urgent, requiring orders to prevent irreparable harm. </p>
<p>Importantly at this stage, South Africa does not need to conclusively prove genocide has taken place. That comes at the later phase, called the Merits phase. South Africa does, however, need to demonstrate that Palestinians face irreparable harm and that, on the facts, Israel’s conduct could be considered to be acts of genocide.</p>
<p>Israel will no doubt robustly resist any assertion genocide is occurring and argue its political and military leaders are acting consistently with international law in response to the threat posed by Hamas. Particular attention will probably be given to Israel’s right of self-defence following the October 7 attacks.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-foreign-policy-under-ramaphosa-has-seen-diplomatic-tools-being-used-to-provide-leadership-as-global-power-relations-shift-218966">South Africa's foreign policy under Ramaphosa has seen diplomatic tools being used to provide leadership as global power relations shift</a>
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<h2>How do cases like these work?</h2>
<p>The International Court of Justice has been thrust into the middle of the Israel-Hamas conflict. </p>
<p>However, it is not being asked to play the role of the United Nations Security Council and settle that dispute. The court’s role, as a United Nations organ is purely to apply the Genocide Convention and international law. </p>
<p>It will, nevertheless, be acutely aware of the significance of its role, especially in the face of claims of an ongoing genocide. This has been reflected in how it has moved quickly to hear South Africa’s case. </p>
<p>There are two potential outcomes from South Africa’s provisional measures request. </p>
<p>The court may decline to order provisional measures. It may, for example, find it lacks jurisdiction and that South Africa’s case is inadmissible on technical legal grounds, or the facts do not support the claims made. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hamas-use-of-sexual-violence-is-an-all-too-common-part-of-modern-war-but-not-in-all-conflicts-219301">Hamas' use of sexual violence is an all-too-common part of modern war − but not in all conflicts</a>
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<p>Or the court may uphold South Africa’s request and order provisional measures. Any provisional measures ruling against Israel would require a radical modification of Israel’s military operations in Gaza. </p>
<p>The court cannot, however, enforce its decisions. In 2022, for example, Russia ignored an International Court of Justice <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/16/un-international-court-of-justice-orders-russia-to-halt-invasion-of-ukraine">provisional measures order</a> following its invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>No matter what the court orders, Israel will retain its right of <a href="https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2023/12/7-10-the-question-of-israels-right-to-self-defense-under-international-law/">self-defence</a> against Hamas.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220660/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Donald Rothwell receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>Today, hearings will begin in the International Court of Justice, where South Africa is accusing Israel of genocide in Palestine. How will the proceedings work, and what does it mean for the war?Donald Rothwell, Professor of International Law, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2199582023-12-18T03:20:04Z2023-12-18T03:20:04ZIsrael-Hamas war: a ceasefire is now in sight. Will Israel’s prime minister agree?<p>The mistaken killing of <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-12-16/israel-kills-hostages-mistakenly-in-gaza/103237282">three Israeli hostages</a> by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) at the weekend has substantially increased pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept a ceasefire in the war against Hamas.</p>
<p>The Biden administration is exerting maximum pressure to convince the Israeli government that the downsides of its prosecution of the war, particularly the shockingly high Palestinian civilian death toll, now outweigh the potential gains.</p>
<p>During a visit to Israel earlier this month, Secretary of State Antony Blinken told Netanyahu and his cabinet they would have to <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/12/14/israels-current-large-scale-operation-is-the-last-one-in-gaza">end the offensive</a> by the new year. </p>
<p>National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan visited Israel on the weekend to deliver the same message, emphasising that the US wanted to <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/israel-hamas-war-live-updates-rcna130070">see results</a> on its demands to Israel to avoid civilian casualties in Gaza.</p>
<p>Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin is currently on a trip to the Middle East, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/israel-hamas-war-live-updates-rcna130070">including a stopover</a> in Israel to discuss the “eventual cessation of high-intensity ground operations and air strikes”. </p>
<p>Earlier in the month, Austin <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4339335-lloyd-austin-israel-risks-defeat-if-civilians-not-protected/#:%7E:text=Defense-,Israel%20risks%20'strategic%20defeat'%20if%20civilians%20aren',t%20protected%2C%20Pentagon%20chief%20says&text=Secretary%20of%20Defense%20Lloyd%20Austin,group%20Hamas%20in%20the%20region.">warned</a> that Israel’s killing of Palestinian civilians risked driving them into the arms of the enemy – replacing “a tactical victory with a strategic defeat”.</p>
<p>Finally President Joe Biden, who won enormous kudos in Israel for his visit in the immediate aftermath of the Hamas attacks on October 7, has <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/12/politics/biden-israel-losing-support-netanyahu/index.html#:%7E:text=Rifts%20between%20the%20United%20States,plans%20for%20post%2Dwar%20Gaza.">publicly warned</a> that Israel’s “indiscriminate bombing” of Gaza is losing it international support.</p>
<p>The US, if not Israel (which regards the UN as biased against it) will be concerned at the UN General Assembly vote on December 12 demanding a ceasefire. Though the resolution is non-enforceable, the large majority – 153 of the 190 members – was a clear indication of growing international opposition to the war. </p>
<p>The majority in favour of a similar resolution in October was 120. The US stood out as the only UN Security Council member to vote against the December resolution.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-us-israel-relationship-is-in-period-of-transition-as-biden-says-israel-is-losing-support-219571">Gaza war: US-Israel relationship is in period of transition as Biden says Israel is losing support</a>
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<h2>Israeli forces credibility reduced</h2>
<p>To underline these messages, a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/13/politics/intelligence-assessment-dumb-bombs-israel-gaza/index.html">leaked US intelligence assessment</a> has claimed 40-45% of the 29,000 air-to-surface ground munitions Israel has used in Gaza have been “dumb” (unguided) bombs. This disclosure effectively undercuts the Israel Defense Force’s claim that its strikes have been only at <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/israel-hamas-engage-in-fierce-battles-in-gaza-s-biggest-cities-/7389468.html">proven Hamas targets</a>.</p>
<p>Details of the accidental killing of the three hostages, as they have emerged at the weekend, further reduce the credibility of the Israeli forces’ claims to be operating with full regard to international humanitarian law. The three were holding <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/middle-east/israeli-army-says-it-mistakenly-shot-and-killed-three-hostages-20231216-p5erwi.html">a white cloth</a>, had their hands in the air and were calling to the soldiers in Hebrew.</p>
<p>An Israeli Defense Force official has said the case was “against our rules of engagement” and an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67738111">investigation was happening</a> at the “highest level”.</p>
<p>The tragedy has given renewed impetus to the campaign by families of the more than 100 remaining hostages and their numerous supporters. They want the government to prioritise negotiations for the release of the captives over the war against Hamas. <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/video/hundreds-protest-in-tel-aviv-after-idf-mistakenly-kills-3-hostages-200358981517">Demonstrations took place</a> in Tel Aviv after news of the three hostages’ deaths.</p>
<hr>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-brief-history-of-the-us-israel-special-relationship-shows-how-connections-have-shifted-since-long-before-the-1948-founding-of-the-jewish-state-215781">A brief history of the US-Israel 'special relationship' shows how connections have shifted since long before the 1948 founding of the Jewish state</a>
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<p>So far Netanyahu and his Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant, are holding firm that the operation to destroy Hamas must continue. Gallant has said that only <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/gaza-war-puts-pressure-on-hamas-to-free-more-hostages-gallant-tells-families/#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CWhen%20the%20military%20operations%20advance,%2C%E2%80%9D%20Gallant%20told%20the%20families.">intense military pressure</a> on Hamas will create conditions for release of more hostages.</p>
<h2>Netanyahu likely to continue the conflict</h2>
<p>Netanyahu has a number of reasons for continuing the war. </p>
<p>In the inevitable postwar inquiry into the security lapses that led to the horrific Hamas attack on October 7, major blame is certain be laid on him. That inquiry won’t be held while the war proceeds. </p>
<p>But Netanyahu will be aware that his only chance of avoiding the sort of withering criticism that would force him from office is to make good on his pledge to totally eliminate Hamas, and to find and recover the remaining hostages. That will take much more time than Biden seems willing to allow him.</p>
<p>Unfortunately for Netanyahu, he cannot yet claim victory on the basis of decapitating the Hamas leadership. The movement’s political ruler in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, and its military leader, Mohammed Deif, are still at large. They’re probably somewhere in the vast tunnel network beneath Gaza. If Israel were to capture or kill these two, Netanyahu would be able to claim substantial vindication.</p>
<p>The Biden administration’s pressure is of less concern to Netanyahu. He is practised at staring down US presidents, particularly Democratic ones. In <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1157889/">2009</a> he defied President Barack Obama’s call for a freeze on settlement building in the West Bank.</p>
<p>In 2015 he even <a href="https://time.com/3678657/obama-netanyahu-washington/">breached protocol</a> by accepting a Republican invitation to visit Washington to address a joint sitting of Congress without calling on Obama.</p>
<p>Within Israel, Netanyahu is helped by the fact that Israelis have only a partial picture of the human toll their country’s campaign is having on Palestinian civilians. </p>
<p>The ABC Global Affairs Editor, John Lyons, who was based in Jerusalem for many years and understands Hebrew, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-12-10/israel-gaza-media-watching-a-sanitised-war/103206528">reported</a> after a recent visit to Israel:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] most Israelis do not see pictures (on their televisions) of injured Palestinian women and children or the destruction of Gaza into kilometre after kilometre of rubble […] Israelis are watching a sanitised war […] They are bewildered at why the world is increasingly uncomfortable at the high civilian casualty rate.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Resumption of hostage negotiations</h2>
<p>That said, Netanyahu has bowed to the hostages lobby by reversing a decision that the head of Mossad, David Barnea, should cease negotiations in Qatar for more hostage releases. Barnea met Qatar’s prime minister in Europe <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/benjamin-netanyahu-hints-at-new-hostage-negotiations-with-hamas/cfjriz264">last week</a>. No details were available at time of writing. </p>
<p>But Hamas continues to <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/17/israel-faces-new-calls-for-truce-after-killing-of-hostages-raises-alarm-about-its-conduct-in-gaza.html">make demands</a> that Israel would find hard to accept: no further hostage releases until the war ends; and insistence that a deal would involve release of large numbers of Palestinian prisoners, including high-profile militants.</p>
<p>In the background, a worry for both Israel and the US is that support for Hamas has risen substantially in the West Bank since the war started. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/under-pressure-netanyahu-agrees-to-a-ceasefire-and-hostage-deal-with-hamas-are-his-days-now-numbered-218348">Under pressure, Netanyahu agrees to a ceasefire and hostage deal with Hamas. Are his days now numbered?</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/961">Polling</a> between November 22 and December 2 by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research indicated that backing for Hamas had risen from 12% in September to 44% at the beginning of December. This is shown also in the number of green Hamas flags in evidence when Palestinian prisoners were freed during the pauses in fighting in late November.</p>
<p>The polling even showed that support for Hamas in Gaza over the same period had risen from 38% to 42%.</p>
<p>Netanyahu may get lucky if his forces find Sinwar and Deif. In the meantime, a decision on continuation of the war rests with him.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219958/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Parmeter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The mistaken killing of three Israeli hostages by the Israeli Defense Forces at the weekend has substantially increased pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept a ceasefire.Ian Parmeter, Research Scholar, Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2194542023-12-14T13:11:40Z2023-12-14T13:11:40ZIs Hamas the same as ISIS, the Islamic State group? No − and yes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565012/original/file-20231211-25-msxpy5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=42%2C0%2C4644%2C3070&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Palestinian militant rides on the back of a motorcycle near a crossing between Israel and the northern Gaza Strip on Oct. 7, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinians-at-the-erez-crossing-also-known-as-the-beit-news-photo/1713407740">Ahmed Zakot/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the aftermath of Hamas’ bloody raid into Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, many Israelis and people around the world equated the newly ultraviolent and audacious Palestinian militant organization with the world’s deadliest terrorist group, ISIS – the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria.</p>
<p>Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for example, linked the two groups directly on Oct. 25, 2023, stating: “<a href="https://twitter.com/SkyNews/status/1717233019876966485">Hamas is ISIS and ISIS is Hamas</a>.” President Joe Biden and <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4254371-lloyd-austin-hamas-israel-atrocities-isis/">Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin</a> made similar comparisons. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Hamas killing families “<a href="https://www.newsnationnow.com/world/war-in-israel/idf-isis-flag-hamas-massacre/">brings to mind the worst of ISIS</a>.”</p>
<p>There are plenty of reasons for Israel to want the world to think Hamas is ISIS – including the hope of marshaling the sort of overseas support that led to the 2014 creation of the 86-member <a href="https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-political-affairs/bureau-of-counterterrorism/the-global-coalition-to-defeat-isis/">Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS</a>. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-really-defeated-the-islamic-state-obama-or-trump-148066">fighting between 2014 and 2019</a>, the coalition reclaimed all the territory the Islamic State group had seized in Iraq and Syria.</p>
<p>And it is true that the Oct. 7 attack displayed tactics that are remarkably similar to those of the Islamic State group. But as <a href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">a scholar</a> of ISIS specifically, and Middle Eastern militants in general, I am inclined to agree with those who say the comparison between the two terrorist groups overlooks their underlying differences. The similarities are on the surface, in methods and tactics – but their goals and ideologies remain vastly different.</p>
<h2>Fundamental differences</h2>
<p>As <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/11/21/hamas-isis-are-not-the-same-00128107">various news articles</a> have <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/25/hamas-isis-islamic-state-israel-terrorism-analogy/">pointed out</a>, the Islamic State is a Sunni group <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-11-22/the-weak-points-of-israels-thesis-why-hamas-is-not-the-same-as-isis.html">militantly opposed to the Shia branch of Islam</a> and calls Shiites “<a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-11-22/the-weak-points-of-israels-thesis-why-hamas-is-not-the-same-as-isis.html">rafida</a>,” which means “rejecter of Allah.” While it is true that <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/11/1218145466/israel-hamas-war-shia-sunni-iran-backed-militants">most Palestinians in Gaza are Sunni</a>, Shia-led <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-needed-a-new-way-to-get-money-from-iran-it-turned-to-crypto-739619aa">Iran is Hamas’ primary benefactor</a>.</p>
<p>And Hamas and ISIS have even met in battle. Bloody <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/islamic-state-affiliates-press-hamas/">clashes between ISIS and Hamas</a> in 2015 resulted from efforts by <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-uncovered/isis-supporters-throw-down-gauntlet-hamas-gaza-n385006">Islamic State supporters to establish ISIS affiliates in the Hamas-dominated Gaza Strip</a> and the neighboring Sinai Peninsula.</p>
<p>In January 2018, leaders of the Islamic State group in the Sinai declared war on the “Hamas tyrants” via a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/world/middleeast/isis-hamas-sinai.html">lengthy online video</a> that included the execution of a Hamas member.</p>
<p>The two groups’ differences also include their divergent goals. The Islamic State group aims to create a global theocracy based on the principles of fundamentalist Sunni Islam, <a href="https://www.institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/isis-rejection-nation-state">with no national or territorial borders</a>.</p>
<p>Hamas, by contrast, is narrowly focused on <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/8/what-is-the-group-hamas-a-simple-guide-tothe-palestinian-group">constructing a Palestinian national state</a> by “<a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/3416">armed resistance to the occupation</a>” of the Palestinian territories by Israel.</p>
<p>So it’s pretty clear that Hamas is not ISIS. But it’s not that simple either.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Smoke trails in the sky over an urban scene show where rockets have been fired." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hamas fired rockets into Israel as part of the Oct. 7, 2023, attack.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IsraelPalestinians/006937a3e5424b1cad4cd35b853349c5/photo">AP Photo/Hatem Moussa</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Interconnections and exchanges</h2>
<p>Despite their differences, there are several similarities, including the fact that both groups are on the <a href="https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/">U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations</a>. The two organizations have on occasion also shared common strategic, if not necessarily ideological, goals. And, as became obvious on Oct. 7, their tactics have become similar, though in service of different objectives.</p>
<p>My long study of Islamic State fighting tactics, including <a href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/iraqi_kurdistan/field_iraqi_kurdistan.html">field research</a> in Iraq, leads me to believe Hamas has recently undergone a radical ISIS-inspired transformation that has not yet gotten widespread public attention. Prior to its Oct. 7 blitz, Hamas’ actions were limited to lobbing imprecise rockets and digging tunnels into Israel to kidnap or kill small numbers of Israelis.</p>
<p>But as University of Miami professor and expert in the study of jihadism Nathan S. French has noted in El Pais, “Hamas operatives – like other Islamist and jihadist groups – <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-11-22/the-weak-points-of-israels-thesis-why-hamas-is-not-the-same-as-isis.html">borrow, steal and appropriate tactics and strategies</a> from other similar political, guerrilla, or militant movements.” And it seems that Hamas has borrowed tactics from ISIS.</p>
<p>It’s likely that Hamas learned from the hundreds of Palestinians who <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/isis/2015-11-19/ty-article/isis-in-israel-and-the-palestinian-territories/0000017f-e2cc-d568-ad7f-f3efca2d0000?lts=1699816485685">joined both the core ISIS caliphate</a> in Syria and Iraq and the ISIS affiliate in the Sinai. </p>
<p>And despite their differences, Hamas officials have in the past <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-and-islamic-state-growing-cooperation-sinai">met directly with leaders of the Islamic State in the Sinai</a>. Those meetings were likely linked to <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/islamic-state-affiliates-press-hamas/">collaboration between the two groups</a> for specific actions that benefited their respective goals, such as weapons smuggling, undermining Egyptian government influence in the Sinai and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/elite-hamas-fighters-defecting-to-islamic-state/">transporting injured Islamic State fighters to Gaza</a> for medical treatment. </p>
<p>In October 2023, an article in the U.K. newspaper The Times cited an intelligence official who said, “<a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/what-are-the-connections-between-hamas-and-isis-0db9rnlg3">It’s clear that the two movements have worked together</a> close enough over the past few years to copy each other’s methods, learn tactics and train on weapons they have procured together.”</p>
<h2>Tactical similarities</h2>
<p>In many ways, Hamas’ Oct. 7 surprise attack <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/fact-why-toyota-yes-toyota-dominates-today%E2%80%99s-battlefields-158581">resembled ISIS attacks</a>, such as a June 2014 blitz in which Islamic State group fighters burst out of secret desert bases to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27778112">conquer much of northern Iraq</a>, including the country’s second-largest city, Mosul.</p>
<p>Both groups’ attacks took their opponents by complete surprise, indicating a high degree of secrecy and advanced preparation. And both assaults utilized “technicals” – pickup trucks with machine guns mounted in their cargo beds and carrying squads of fighters. Both attacking forces <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/ctc-publishes-new-report-islamic-state-drones/">used commercial drones</a> to provide air support for their troop movements. And both organizations deployed <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/hamas-fighters-bodies-israel-toll-gaza-ground-invasion-rcna119640">suicide-attack fighters</a> known as “inghimasi,” Arabic for “plungers into battle.” </p>
<p>On Oct. 7, Hamas fighters reportedly left <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-shows-foreign-press-raw-hamas-bodycam-videos-of-murder-torture-decapitation/">black ISIS war banners</a> at the scene of several attacks. There were also videos posted online that appeared to show Hamas fighters <a href="https://talk.tv/news/38068/hamas-video-fighters-singing-isis-songs-october-7">singing popular ISIS war songs as they stormed into Israel</a>.</p>
<h2>Made for the media</h2>
<p>An additional notable similarity is that Hamas released ISIS-style videos of the horrific atrocities it inflicted on Israelis. The Islamic State group’s media approach involved disseminating videos of <a href="https://www.vox.com/videos/2015/7/6/8886461/isis-videos-burning">mutilation, rape, amputation, slavery, suicide warfare, torture and mass murder</a>.</p>
<p>On and after Oct. 7, Hamas fighters similarly uploaded videos and images of their <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/18/israel/palestine-videos-hamas-led-attacks-verified">executions of cowering Israeli civilians</a> and other atrocities to a Telegram channel. These visuals made their way to X – formerly known as Twitter – and TikTok and other platforms. </p>
<p>Israel Defense Forces spokesman Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari has specifically said those videos are part of why Israel has been <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-shows-foreign-press-raw-hamas-bodycam-videos-of-murder-torture-decapitation/">equating Hamas with the Islamic State group</a>.</p>
<p>The Times of Israel came to a similar conclusion, noting: “<a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/hamas-and-islamic-state-two-faces-of-jihadi-terror-same-contempt-for-human-life/ar-AA1ifNoR">Looking at images of the Hamas assault</a>, it is fair to assume that Hamas learned a lesson from the ISIS terror playbook.”</p>
<h2>Rape as a weapon</h2>
<p>Another tactic new to Hamas, but not to ISIS, was the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/17/world/israel-investigates-sexual-violence-hamas/index.html">alleged rape and mutilation of girls and women</a>. Hamas has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sexual-assault-hamas-oct-7-attack-rape-bb06b950bb6794affb8d468cd283bc51">denied the allegations</a>. Islamic State religious scholars have previously <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1711590">sanctioned violence against women</a> and told fighters to rape non-Muslim women “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/08/middleeast/isis-rape-theology-soldiers-rape-women-to-make-them-muslim/index.html">to make them Muslim</a>.”</p>
<p>Similarly, Israel Defense Forces officials have said the Hamas religious leaders gave their fighters ISIS-like religious texts based on extremist interpretations of traditional Islamic jurisprudence telling them <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/10/israel-womens-groups-warn-of-failure-to-keep-evidence-of-sexual-violence-in-hamas-attacks">captives were “the spoils of war</a>.”</p>
<p>All these developments indicate that ISIS has had an influence on Hamas, even if their goals remain quite different – or in direct opposition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219454/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Glyn Williams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of the Islamic State group says Hamas has undergone a radical ISIS-inspired transformation that has not yet gotten widespread public attention.Brian Glyn Williams, Professor of Islamic History, UMass DartmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2195712023-12-13T16:07:07Z2023-12-13T16:07:07ZGaza war: US-Israel relationship is in period of transition as Biden says Israel is losing support<p>With US president Joe Biden under increasing pressure to alter his policy towards Israel, it is significant that he has said publicly that <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-67699255">Israel is starting to lose</a> international support for its offensive over “indiscriminate” bombing of Gaza.</p>
<p>His comments were made at a fundraising event on December 12, and may well be part of attempts by the US to put more pressure on Israel to rein in its intensive bombing campaign and to do more to avoid deaths of civilians. Biden did add that there was “no question about the need to take on Hamas”.</p>
<p>The US has a long history as an ally of Israel. It was the first country to recognise Israel <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-us-policy-israeli-palestinian-conflict">as a sovereign nation</a>, in 1948, and has long seen it as a strategic partner. It has also made significant efforts to negotiate a peace settlement between the Palestinians and Israel. However, Biden had <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-us-policy-israeli-palestinian-conflict">a cool relationship</a> with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu even before the offensive.</p>
<p>Biden’s remarks followed a UN general assembly <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/12/middleeast/ceasefire-vote-gaza-israel-un-intl/index.html">vote</a>, also on December 12, for a ceasefire in Gaza, with 153 nations in favour and the US one of a handful against. The US has been blocking a vote on a ceasefire at the more influential UN Security Council.</p>
<p>The nation’s attitude towards the conflict is split along both party and generational lines, according to a <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/most-americans-disapprove-biden-handling-israel-hamas-war-poll-2023-12-10/">recent CBS/YouGov poll</a>. This is part of a picture that suggests the long-term relationship between the US and Israel, and attitudes to it, are in a period of transition.</p>
<h2>Attitudes to US policy</h2>
<p>In the poll of more than 2,000 Americans, just 39% of those questioned approved of Biden’s attempts to broker peace in the Middle East, down slightly from October.</p>
<p>But there’s a distinct split along party lines, with 63% of Democrats approving of Biden’s policy in Israel and Gaza, while just 22% Republicans believe that Biden’s approach is right. Around 55% of those who identify themselves as liberals also support Biden, while just 23% of conservatives think that Biden has acted correctly. </p>
<p>Young people are more likely to back Biden’s handling of the conflict than older people. Responders under the age of 30 were divided, with 50% approving – the highest approval rating of any age group. Among older adults, 32% of those between the age of 30 and 44 approved of Biden’s handling of the conflict – the lower support of any age group.</p>
<p>Around 41% thought that the US was giving Israel just enough support, and 31% felt it was too much. Only 28% felt that Israel should have been shown more support by the US. Around 48% of Republicans thought that the US had not been strong enough in its support.</p>
<p>Biden’s backing for Israel is also getting held up in Congress. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/dec/06/republicans-ukraine-funding">In early December</a>, the Senate blocked a major funding bill aimed at supporting both Ukraine and Israel. The 49-to-51 vote was a result of every Republican voting against providing US$111bn (£88.6bn) of support, US$60bn of which was destined for Ukraine, unless Biden included stricter US border and immigration regulations.</p>
<p>Left-wing Vermont senator Bernie Sanders voted with the Republicans. Sanders is an independent, but he often votes with the Democrats. Sanders <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/dec/06/republicans-ukraine-funding">said</a> in a letter to Congress, that he felt that such support would be irresponsible. He felt that any further military aid had to be conditional on Israel ensuring the protection of civilians.</p>
<p>“I think what the Congress has got to do is make it clear to Netanyahu that we’re not going to simply give him a blank check to kill women and children in Palestine,” <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bernie-sanders-face-the-nation-transcript-12-10-2023/">he told</a> CBS’s Face the Nation in an interview on December 10.</p>
<p>But Jake Sullivan, the White House’s national security advisor, had already <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-israel-military-assistance-senate-929bc5841a8697f244d2d41f3171b0ed">told senators</a> in a private meeting that the White House would not be seeking conditions on aid for Israel.</p>
<p>Maryland’s Democratic senator Chris Van Hollen <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-israel-military-assistance-senate-929bc5841a8697f244d2d41f3171b0ed">told the Associated Press</a> that the meeting addressed Democratic party concerns about the humanitarian situation in Gaza.</p>
<p>In a column for the Washington Post, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/12/06/van-hollen-israel-war-gaza-hamas-conditions-aid/">Van Hollen wrote</a> that although the Israelis were conducting a “just” war, the US has “an obligation to the American people to ensure our support is consistent with our interests and values — and in line with U.S. and international humanitarian law”.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-we-should-consider-a-transitional-administration-for-gaza-219476">Why we should consider a transitional administration for Gaza</a>
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<p>Biden has been supportive of Israel since the crisis began on October 7. Early on he <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/10/07/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-terrorist-attacks-in-israel/">said</a>: “My administration’s support for Israel’s security is rock solid and unwavering.”</p>
<h2>Netanyahu and his positioning</h2>
<p>It appeared to be business as usual when the US vetoed the UN Security Council’s resolution that called for an immediate ceasefire on December 8. Robert Wood, the US deputy ambassador to the UN, <a href="https://usun.usmission.gov/explanation-of-vote-on-a-united-arab-emirates-drafted-un-security-council-resolution-on-the-situation-in-the-middle-east/">told</a> the council that that any ceasefire would allow Hamas to continue to rule in Gaza.</p>
<p>But there have also been calls from within the US for a reassessment of its relationship with Israel, and criticism of Israel’s military tactics. </p>
<p>The Washington Post columnist Thomas Friedman <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/05/opinion/biden-middle-east-deal.html">has said</a> that Netanyahu’s attempts to promote ties between Israel and European far-right parties should cause alarm for the Biden administration, for example.</p>
<p>Despite the opposition, the conflict is currently unlikely to have a considerable effect on the 2024 presidential election. In the <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/691181212/CBS-News-poll">CBS/YouGov poll</a>, just 4% of those polled said that the conflict was the most important problem facing the country. Of greater concern were inflation (27%) and immigration (20%). But that doesn’t mean it will fade from the headlines.</p>
<p>If Israel’s aggressive policy of violence towards Gaza continues, it will undoubtedly lead to a louder call for a ceasefire from more people in the US and abroad. The Israel-US partnership is still a strong one and remains important to the US’s Middle East objectives, but Biden knows there are those in his party who want him to continue to call out Israel’s excessive force and he may well want to put more distance between his government and that of Netanyahu.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219571/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dafydd Townley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Around 50% of those under 30 supported Biden’s policy on Israel, a higher number than other age groups.Dafydd Townley, Teaching Fellow in International Security, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2189662023-12-12T09:12:23Z2023-12-12T09:12:23ZSouth Africa’s foreign policy under Ramaphosa has seen diplomatic tools being used to provide leadership as global power relations shift<p>Leadership plays a critical role in diplomacy. What quality of leadership does South Africa need if it’s to secure its international interests?</p>
<p>This is a question my colleagues and I have had the opportunity to reflect on in researching and writing about foreign policy since the late 1980s.</p>
<p>Presidents <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/nelson-rolihlahla-mandela">Nelson Mandela</a> and <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/former-president-thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki">Thabo Mbeki</a> displayed <a href="https://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/85/Strategic%20Review/Vol36(2)/04-le-pere-pp-31-56.zp39575.pdf">assertive African and global south leadership</a>. Their successor, Jacob Zuma, did much to reverse the country’s international moral standing. </p>
<p>In our view, the current president, <a href="https://www.dpme.gov.za/about/Pages/President-Cyril-Ramaphosa.aspx">Cyril Ramaphosa</a>, is restoring the country’s standing and role as a global moral leader. He has done so in an environment in which seismic changes are taking place in the balance of power between the world’s largest nations.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s messages, and tone of delivery, suggest an assertive southern leader who understands how the world works. He’s not afraid to challenge the dominant narrative and is prepared to put global south demands on the table.</p>
<p>In his speech on Africa Day on 25 May 2023, Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-africa-day-celebrations#:%7E:text=There%20can%20be%20no%20better,are%20optimistic%20about%20our%20future.">said</a>:</p>
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<p>We are … witnessing Africa being dragged into conflicts far beyond our own borders. Some countries, including our own, are being threatened with penalties for pursuing an independent foreign policy and for adopting a position of non-alignment. South Africa has not been and will not be drawn into a contest between global powers. We will maintain our position on the peaceful resolution of conflict wherever those conflicts occur.</p>
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<p>In a similar assertive tone, at a Financing for Development Summit in New York in September 2023, he <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/reform-international-financial-architecture-president-ramaphosa">said</a>:</p>
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<p>… at a time when solidarity was needed most, agreed international commitments were not honoured. Principles such as common but differentiated responsibilities are not being respected. Four decades since the right to development was established by the United Nations as a human right, the failure to act on commitments to support development is deepening the divide between the global north and south.</p>
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<p>These statements reflect Ramaphosa’s shrewd reading of a fundamental shift in the global balance of forces. Over the past year it is this that has informed his assertiveness in foreign policy matters. As a result, we argue, he has used the tools of diplomacy to lead Africa and the global south to shape the architecture of a new world order currently being forged.</p>
<h2>Facing a complex world</h2>
<p>However, Ramaphosa and his administration’s ability to advance South Africa‘s interests globally has became much more complex because of rising geopolitical tensions. </p>
<p>In particular, Russia’s invasion of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/tag/russia-ukraine-war">Ukraine in February 2022</a> brought into sharp relief the longstanding tense relationship between Russia seeking recognition as a recovering superpower and the west’s pursuit of containment. </p>
<p>The conflagration has serious consequences for the world at large, including Africa, already struggling with food and energy insecurities. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-and-russia-president-cyril-ramaphosas-foreign-policy-explained-198430">South Africa and Russia: President Cyril Ramaphosa's foreign policy explained</a>
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<p>Under these conditions, Pretoria struggled to formulate a clear position. It initially condemned the Russian intervention in Ukraine. It later took a <a href="https://www.dirco.gov.za/south-african-government-calls-for-a-peaceful-resolution-of-the-escalating-conflict-between-the-russian-federation-and-ukraine/">more neutral position</a> – “<a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2023/the-state-of-non-alignment-in-south-africas-foreign-policy/">non-alignment</a>”. </p>
<p>Yet it became clear that Ramaphosa was reading a fundamental shift in the global balance of forces. One of his responses was to <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/statement-president-cyril-ramaphosa-78th-session-united-nations-general-assembly-united-nations%2C-new-york">call for reform of the UN Security Council</a>. </p>
<p>He also led an eclectic assembly of African leaders on a “<a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-russia-ukraine-peace-mission-what-can-it-achieve-206201">peace mission</a>” to Ukraine and Russia. It was initially scorned by pro-western commentators. The benefits of the initiative for Africa are becoming apparent, particularly in <a href="https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/peace-african-style-6936/">enhancing food security</a>.</p>
<p>But the turning point in Ramaphosa’s increasingly assertive foreign policy conduct came with the hosting of the <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/">15th Brics Summit</a> in South Africa in August. His government succeeded in hosting, chairing and steering the group to new levels of cooperation. Ramaphosa’s congenial personality played no small role in the successes.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/address-president-cyril-ramaphosa-outcomes-15th-brics-summit%2C-union-buildings%2C-tshwane">Achievements</a> include facilitating new trade relations between Africa and Brics, strengthening the <a href="https://www.ndb.int/">New Development Bank</a>, and forging an agreement to <a href="https://theconversation.com/brics-expansion-six-more-nations-are-set-to-join-what-theyre-buying-into-212200">expand membership</a> to make Brics more inclusive.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-foreign-policy-new-paper-sets-the-scene-but-falls-short-on-specifics-188253">South Africa's foreign policy: new paper sets the scene, but falls short on specifics</a>
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<p>These breakthroughs are not to be underestimated. Reshaping the global order opens the space for an emboldened global south to co-determine the future.</p>
<p>His seeming over-dependence on consultation, seen by many as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosas-famous-negotiating-skills-have-failed-him-heres-why-130393">liability</a>, stands him in good stead. Because he is comfortable with exercising soft power, he speaks boldly at international meetings. It has also given him the ability to position South Africa prominently, and on the right side of history, on the tragedy in Gaza, <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/opening-remarks-president-cyril-ramaphosa-extraordinary-joint-meeting-brics-leaders-and-leaders-invited-brics-members-situation-middle-east">seeking peace, not war</a>. </p>
<h2>Criticism and scepticism</h2>
<p>Some foreign policy practitioners and scholars are sceptical of Ramaphosa as a foreign policy leader. An entire volume of the respectable <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/south-african-foreign-policy-review-volume-4">South African Foreign Policy Review</a> is dedicated to this theme – the decline of South Africa’s global moral standing. </p>
<p>Many commentators, including some from the <a href="https://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/">Brenthurst Foundation</a> think-tank, view South African foreign policy through domestic lenses, coloured by their aversion to the African National Congress which Ramaphosa leads and which runs the country. </p>
<p>From this perspective they are quick to denounce South African foreign policy decision-makers as <a href="https://bridgebooks.co.za/products/good-bad-ugly">lacking awareness of the objective of international relations and diplomacy</a>. The minister of foreign affairs, <a href="https://www.dirco.gov.za/dr-grace-naledi-mandisa-pandor/">Naledi Pandor</a>, in particular, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-11-07-pandor-calls-for-immediate-ceasefire-in-gaza-and-an-end-to-israels-collective-punishment-on-all-palestinians/">has attracted scorn</a>. In her case, it could be as a result of her <a href="https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/minister-naledi-pandor-ongoing-israeli-palestinian-conflict-07-nov-2023">outspoken position</a> on the Israel-Palestine conflict.</p>
<p>To understand the tough judgments made of the government’s foreign policy it’s useful to look at them against the backdrop of domestic politics. Domestic politics and foreign affairs are interwoven. What happens at home affects a country’s global standing. </p>
<p>In African foreign policy analytical circles, there is a <a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/African_Foreign_Policies_Power_and_Process">belief</a> that a weak president embraces international crises as it redirects the attention from failures at home.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa is indeed embattled on the home front. He was meant to put a stop to <a href="https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">years of abuse</a> and <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">high corruption</a> under his predecessor, Jacob Zuma, and <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2021-08-12-political-platitudes-unpacking-ramaphosas-real-battle-in-aftermath-of-zondo-commission-testimony/">repair the damage</a> he caused. </p>
<p>Euphoria and unreserved support for a “reformist” president turned into <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/7/22/ex-president-mbeki-rebukes-ramaphosa-predicts-sas-arab-spring">disappointment and cynicism</a> as his efforts at “house cleaning” got bogged down <a href="https://witspress.co.za/page/detail/State-Capture-in-South-Africa/?k=9781776148318">in the intricacies of power play</a> in the ANC.</p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/aziz-pahad-the-unassuming-south-african-diplomat-who-skilfully-mediated-crises-in-africa-and-beyond-214648">Aziz Pahad: the unassuming South African diplomat who skilfully mediated crises in Africa, and beyond</a>
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<p>Nevertheless, we would argue that if Ramaphosa survives the forces of disruption at home as his ruling party <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-12-07-anc-veteran-of-60-years-mavuso-msimang-painfully-severs-ties-tenders-devastating-resignation/">decomposes</a>, he will surely be counted among those who read global events, understood that there was a need for a stronger voice from the global south, and acted to make it happen.</p>
<p>He should also be remembered for breathing new life into the <a href="https://au.int/en/about/vision">vision of the African Union</a>: an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218966/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthoni van Nieuwkerk is affiliated with Umlambo Foundation.</span></em></p>President Cyril Ramaphosa’s messages, and tone of delivery, suggest an assertive leader representing the interests of the global south.Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, Professor of International and Diplomacy Studies, Thabo Mbeki African School of Public and International Affairs, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2180972023-12-12T09:10:47Z2023-12-12T09:10:47ZWhat’s east Africa’s position on the Israel-Hamas war? An expert unpacks the reactions of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda<p>The reactions of some east African countries to the ongoing conflict in Gaza have been less dramatic than South Africa’s. South Africa’s parliament has passed a resolution calling for the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/safrican-lawmakers-vote-suspend-diplomatic-ties-with-israel-shut-embassy-2023-11-21/">closure</a> of its embassy in Tel Aviv. Algeria and South Africa have been the most supportive of the Palestinians. Thus far only South Africa and Chad have withdrawn their representatives from Tel Aviv.</p>
<p>In contrast, the reactions from east African capitals have been less dramatic. At the outset of the current conflict in Gaza, Kenya’s President William Ruto <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2023-10-08-kenya-stands-with-israel-ruto-says-amidst-war-with-palestine/">expressed solidarity</a> with Israel and condemned</p>
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<p>terrorism and attacks on innocent civilians in the country.</p>
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<p><a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/museveni-reacts-as-hamas-attack-on-israel-spirals-4393308">Uganda</a> and <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/tanzania-calls-for-peace-as-israel-palestine-war-intensifies-4394110">Tanzania</a> condemned all forms of violence and called for</p>
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<p>restraint to stem further loss of human life.</p>
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<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Michael+Bishku+research&hl=en&as_sdt=0&as_vis=1&oi=scholart">scholar</a> of Middle Eastern and African history, I have researched the relationship between Israel and African countries including those in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312006990_Israel's_Relations_with_the_East_African_States_of_Kenya_Uganda_and_Tanzania_-_From_Independence_to_the_Present">east Africa</a>. </p>
<p>It is my conclusion that the reactions of the east African states to the conflict in the Middle East are shaped by two things: the perceived national threat of terrorism by Islamist factions and, for those states with democratic institutions, domestic public opinion.</p>
<p>In my view these three countries are unlikely to change their stance unless the current conflict escalates. On the one hand they will continue to limit their actions to voting in the United Nations for resolutions in support of the Palestinians. On the other they will continue to solicit technical assistance – especially in agriculture and security – from Israel.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>Relations between African countries and Israel have been tested before. For example, in 1973, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20455585">25 independent African states</a> cut diplomatic relations with Israel after its occupation of Egyptian territory. These included east African states, such as Kenya, which had enjoyed particularly <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/a-history-of-africa-israel-relations/a-43395892">close relations</a> with Israel since its independence from Britain in 1963.</p>
<p>East African countries colonised by Britain <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/09/israeli-penetration-east-africa-objectives-risks-160929102604246.html">sought</a> technical assistance after independence. This was particularly true in agriculture. They viewed Israel as complementary or an alternative to having to seek assistance from the big powers.</p>
<p>When African states cut off the diplomatic ties with Israel in 1973, Kenya was reluctant but had to act in solidarity with other independent African nations. It kept its cooperation with Israel even before the formal ties were restored in 1988. It facilitated Israel’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Entebbe-raid">1974 rescue operation</a> at Uganda’s Entebbe airport. The operation was meant to rescue passengers of a French jet airliner that was hijacked on its way from Israel to France, and flown to Entebbe. </p>
<p>Tanzania, on the other hand, sought a more neutral course after independence. It found the socialist character of the Israeli Labour governments appealing but Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories following the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Six-Day-War">1967 Six-Day War</a> complicated relations. </p>
<p>Tanzania was one of the last African states to <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1481841?ln=en">renew</a> relations with Israel in 1994. That was a year after the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oslo-Accords">Oslo Accords</a> between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Tanzania was also the <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200605-palestine-julius-nyerere-and-international-solidarity/">first African country</a> to recognise the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in 1973 and to host a representative office in its capital. </p>
<p>Uganda has had the most tempestuous relationship with Israel. Under the erratic <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Idi-Amin">Idi Amin</a> the country broke off relations with Israel and embraced Libya. Israel and Uganda have had good relations under President Yoweri Museveni. Israeli companies <a href="https://embassies.gov.il/nairobi/bilateral-relations/Pages/Israel-and-Uganda.aspx">currently operate</a> in Uganda’s construction, infrastructure, agriculture and water management, communications and technology sectors.</p>
<p>Uganda joined most other African countries in <a href="https://truman.huji.ac.il/publications/uganda-and-israel-history-complex-relationship">renewing</a> relations with Israel just after the end of the Cold War.</p>
<p>Uganda, along with Kenya, has militarily intervened in Somalia as part of an African Union mission. </p>
<p>The ebbs and flows of these relationships have to be seen against the backdrop of the hard work Israel has put in to building <a href="https://jewishstudies.washington.edu/israel-hebrew/benjamin-netanyahu-resetting-israel-africa-relations/">diplomatic relations</a> with a range of other African countries too. By 2023 it had ties with 46 of the <a href="https://au.int/">55 African Union member states</a>.</p>
<h2>National security threat</h2>
<p>Kenya has been affected by instability in neighbouring Somalia and has been the victim of terror attacks. </p>
<p>In 1998, al Qaeda attacks <a href="https://press.un.org/en/1998/19980813.sc6559.html">targeted</a> the US embassy in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The Nairobi attack <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/kenya-victims-of-1998-us-embassy-bombing-demand-compensation-/7215264.html">resulted</a> in over 200 deaths and thousands of people were injured. Since then, Israel <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/23/nairobi-attack-israel-advising-kenyan-forces">has taken the lead</a> among foreign countries in aiding and advising Kenyan security.</p>
<p>Kenya has suffered attacks since then by al-Shabaab – across its <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-reasons-why-militants-are-targeting-kenyas-lamu-county-176519">border</a> as well as in <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/kenya/">Nairobi</a> in 2019. </p>
<p>Tanzania’s security situation has been different. Unlike Kenya, Tanzania has not militarily intervened in Somalia as part of an African Union mission (Amisom). The mission has been operating since 2007 to provide security in that country in the Horn of Africa.</p>
<p>Uganda has its own set of security problems. A terrorist bombing in Uganda’s capital Kampala in 2010 was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/7/13/al-shabab-claims-uganda-bombings">attributed</a> to al-Shabaab. But a bigger threat to Uganda’s security has come from Islamist rebels known as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/tracking-the-drcs-allied-democratic-forces-and-its-links-to-isis-116439">Allied Democratic Forces</a> based in the Democratic Republic of Congo. </p>
<h2>Domestic institutions and public opinion</h2>
<p>There is one other factor that explains east Africa’s relations with Israel: the religious composition of populations in the region. </p>
<p>Israel is <a href="https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/truth-many-evangelical-christians-support-israel-rcna121481">popular</a> with many devout Christians in east Africa, as is the case throughout the continent. If given the opportunity, these Christians would make a pilgrimage to the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.23.1.09">Holy Land</a>. This factor obviously affects <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/israel-in-africa-9781786995056/">public opinion</a>. </p>
<p>Conversely, Muslims in east Africa have a greater concern for the situation of the Palestinians. All three countries – Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania – have populations adhering to these two religions. </p>
<p>Given the democratic characters of Kenya and Tanzania, where there have been peaceful transfers of power, public opinion has more of an impact. This explains Ruto’s <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/president-ruto-changes-tune-on-israel-hamas-conflict-4431560">change of tone</a> after the initial statement strongly critical of Hamas.</p>
<p>Tanzania has remained consistent in condemning all forms of violence. That country calls for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as do the other east African states. </p>
<p>Public pressure is less important in Uganda, where Museveni is quite autocratic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218097/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael B. Bishku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>East Africa’s reaction to the war in Gaza appears shaped by history, affinity to the policies of the west and the threat of terrorism.Michael B. Bishku, Professor of Middle Eastern and African History, Augusta UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2179702023-11-22T14:37:55Z2023-11-22T14:37:55ZGood Jew, Bad Jew: new book explores why the west views brutality against Ukrainians and Palestinians differently<p><em>In a recently published book Steven Friedman, who has written extensively on the political and social aspects of apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa, explores the racist underpinnings of the west’s responses to Israel’s war in Gaza. This is an extract from the book, <a href="https://www.witspress.co.za/page/detail/Good-Jew-Bad-Jew/?K=9781776148486">Good Jew, Bad Jew</a>.</em></p>
<p>Ugandan academic <a href="https://anthropology.columbia.edu/content/mahmood-mamdani">Mahmood Mamdani</a> sees a link between the violence of the coloniser and the slaughter of Jews and Slavs by the Nazis. The racial theories of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Houston-Stewart-Chamberlain">Houston Stewart Chamberlain</a> and others who claimed the Aryan race was superior meant that Jews and Slavs, who were both regarded as not Aryan, could be placed beyond the pale of civilisation and were thus candidates for the “laws of nature”, not of war. </p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Good-Muslim-Bad-America-Terror/dp/0385515375">Mamdani</a>, in World War II, the Nazis “observed the laws of war against the Western powers but not against Russia”, and not against Jewish civilians and resistance fighters. British, American and French prisoners of war were treated according to the rules of the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.32_GC-III-EN.pdf">Third Geneva Convention</a>, but Russians were not.</p>
<p>A bizarre feature of this distinction between the “civilised” and those ripe for the slaughter was that the Nazis’ Jewish prisoners of war serving in the Western armies were not slaughtered. But Russian soldiers were. This does not mean that Jewish and non-Jewish prisoners were treated entirely equally. Jewish prisoners were usually separated from others and there is some evidence that <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3685079">they were treated more harshly</a>. </p>
<p>But the vast majority survived the war and there is no evidence that any were killed because they were Jewish. Scholars have made various attempts to explain this. But perhaps the most plausible explanation is one that none of them offers – that serving in a Western European or American army meant that Jews, in the eyes of their Nazi captors, had attained at least a sufficient degree of “Europeanness” to save them from death. Serving in the Russian military conferred no such “honorary Aryan” status because Soviet Russia was considered a mortal enemy of the Aryan race – a “non-Western” presence in Europe.</p>
<p><a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/gassing-operations">Nazi extermination camps</a>, where gas chambers were used as instruments of slaughter, were all situated in occupied Poland, not in Germany. There were concentration camps in Germany, but these were forced labour camps, not death camps. An obvious explanation for this seemingly odd fact is that the Nazis worried that Germans might learn what was happening in death camps, and might not share their government’s view that wholesale slaughter was acceptable. </p>
<p>This was similar to the tactics of the architects of apartheid in South Africa. They ensured that brutality directed at black people was usually imposed in areas away from the gaze of white people. But it seems unlikely that this explanation would hold. Apartheid showed that human rights abuses do not need to be moved to another country to hide them from the sight of the dominant group. </p>
<p>Rather, it seems likely that the reason was that which Mamdani’s analysis suggests: by siting the camps to the east of Germany, the Nazis were, in effect, removing them from Western Europe where such barbarism was not considered acceptable. The east of Europe became, in a sense, a colony inhabited by people who were not considered Aryan and therefore not fully European. They were thus subject only to the “laws of nature”.</p>
<h2>Anti-semitism, racism and genocide</h2>
<p>Nazi anti-Jewish bigotry was originally labelled racism while bigotry against people who were not white Europeans was not. The context of the situation of the camps helps to explain that. Bigotry was acceptable only if it was directed at people who were not European. Mamdani cites <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/en/book/show/335802">A History of Bombing</a>, by the Swedish author Sven Lindqvist. He <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Good-Muslim-Bad-America-Terror/dp/0385515375">observes</a> that the Nazi genocide was</p>
<blockquote>
<p>born at the meeting point of two traditions that marked modern Western civilization: ‘the anti-Semitic tradition and the tradition of genocide of colonised peoples’.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The first was (mainly) the prejudice of the right. The second produced the less obvious but still real prejudices which justified colonisation and continue to underpin mainstream European attitudes. Mamdani <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Good-Muslim-Bad-America-Terror/dp/0385515375">notes</a>,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The fate of the Jewish people was that they were to be exterminated as a whole. In that, they were unique – but only in Europe.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This point, he adds, was not lost on intellectuals from colonised countries, such as the Martinican thinker Aimé Césaire, who <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfkrm">wrote that</a> the European bourgeoisie could not forgive Hitler for</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the fact that he applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then had been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the ‘coolies’ of India, and the ‘niggers’ of Africa.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This, of course, explains why a Europe that was justifiably appalled at the Nazi genocide had no great qualms about the wholesale slaughter of <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/the-colonial-legacy-and-transitional-justice-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">Congolese</a> or about the <a href="https://theconversation.com/namibian-traditional-leaders-haul-germany-before-us-court-in-genocide-test-case-71222">Herero genocide</a>. </p>
<p>It might be argued that the reason was not bigotry but distance. Events in Africa were simply not noticed in Europe because they happened far away, and few people were aware of them. But Mamdani’s view that race prejudice was at work is supported by the fact that these attitudes persist today, when communications technologies ensure that the Western mainstream knows what is wrought on people in far-off places. A clear example is the attitudes prompted by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/calling-the-war-in-ukraine-a-tragedy-shelters-its-perpetrators-from-blame-and-responsibility-212080">Russian invasion of Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>As numerous critiques have shown, European politicians and journalists <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/3/1/covering-ukraine-a-mean-streak-of-racist-exceptionalism">drew repeated attention</a> to the fact that the Ukrainians were white Europeans or “people like us” – and therefore “civilised” – in contrast to Iraqis, Yemenis, Syrians, Afghanis, Africans and, until not that long ago, Jews. </p>
<p>While this could be dismissed as the view of a bigoted few, the fact that Europe and the United States acted with a level of anger never directed at the Israeli state’s bombing of Palestinians, Saudi bombing of Yemen or Russian bombing of Muslim Chechnya and Syria suggests that Mamdani’s hypothesis explains this reaction too. That the United States led the charge, despite its own incursions into Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries, could be explained as plain hypocrisy but could also fit in with Mamdani’s thesis. The Russians had broken the rules of “civilised war” by treating white European Ukrainians in a manner that should be reserved for colonised subjects. Had they restricted themselves, like the West, to visiting misery only on people who were not European, such as the Syrians whom they had earlier bombed, they would have acted well within “civilised” bounds.</p>
<h2>Racial experiments</h2>
<p>But it seems not always possible to restrict barbarism to the colonies. Mamdani <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/106769/good-muslim-bad-muslim-by-mahmood-mamdani/">shows</a> how European behaviour in Namibia set the stage for the Nazi genocide in Europe. It was in Namibia in the first years of the 20th century that Eugen Fischer, a German geneticist, conducted “racial experiments” on Herero people who were, as Jews would later be, interned in concentration camps. Fischer claimed to have shown that people born of mixed Herero and German parentage were</p>
<blockquote>
<p>physically and mentally inferior to their German parents.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Adolf Hitler <a href="https://dnalc.cshl.edu/view/15745-Eugen-Fischer-about-1938.html">read</a> Fischer’s book that made this claim, and later appointed him rector of the university of Berlin. One of Fischer’s students was <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Josef-Mengele">Josef Mengele</a>, who conducted experiments in Auschwitz on Jewish human beings and who also selected victims for the gas chambers.</p>
<p>Nazism was, seen through this lens, what Franz Fanon <a href="https://grattoncourses.files.wordpress.com/2019/12/frantz-fanon-richard-philcox-jean-paul-sartre-homi-k.-bhabha-the-wretched-of-the-earth-grove-press-2011.pdf">suggested it was</a>: a form of colonial rule extended into Europe. It took the “anti-Semitic tradition” to its logical conclusion by relegating Jews to the status of Africans whose slaughter Chamberlain celebrated in his letters to the German Kaiser hailing the murder of Hereros. </p>
<p>We can see current attempts to align Jews with white supremacy and ethnic nationalism as attempts to escape this history and to position “good”, Zionist, Jews as the white Europeans that Nazism insisted they were not. This gives added significance to the fact that the first American writings claiming a “new anti-Semitism” devoted much effort to blaming black people for anti-Semitism, thus signalling that Jews shared the prejudices of the white European mainstream and so should never have been treated as the Congolese and Hereros had been.</p>
<h2>Zionism and violence against Palestinians</h2>
<p>The current alliance between the Israeli state and other ethnic nationalists is a further example of the attempt to become European. Viewed in this way, today’s right-wing Zionism is not, as it is sometimes portrayed, a departure from the movement’s supposed humanist past. There is a direct line from Herzl, whose Zionism was inspired by the music of a virulent anti-Semite, to the Israeli state and its supporters who find sustenance in the prejudices of <a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-and-the-rise-of-white-identity-in-politics-67037">Donald Trump</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/viktor-orbans-use-and-misuse-of-religion-serves-as-a-warning-to-western-democracies-146277">Viktor Orban</a>.</p>
<p>Much the same impulse surely drives British Jews who today unite with those who had once excluded them from their clubs and, more recently, stereotyped them in novels. These stereotypes are used to denounce left-wingers whom the right has <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Specter-Haunting-Europe-Myth-Judeo-Bolshevism/dp/0674047680">always associated with Jewishness</a>.</p>
<p>Mamdani uses the term “conscripts of Western power” to describe those who were once oppressed by the West but are <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Good-Muslim-Bad-America-Terror/dp/0385515375">now allied to it</a>. But today’s “good Jews” are not conscripts; they are volunteers.</p>
<p>His argument also sheds new light on the visits of right-wing anti-Semites to the Yad Vashem memorial to Nazi victims, a practice aptly described by the Israeli journalist Noa Landau as <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2022-02-28/ty-article-opinion/.premium/the-writing-has-been-on-the-wall-for-yad-vashems-schnorrer-culture/0000017f-dc3a-d3ff-a7ff-fdbab8fd0000">“Shoah-washing”</a>. The Israeli anti-Zionist activist Orly Noy <a href="https://www.972mag.com/holocaust-antisemitism-israel-tool/">notes</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If Zionism previously justified its crimes against the Palestinian people in the name of the Holocaust, today it uses the Holocaust as a tool to justify antisemitism itself in exchange for political profit. More than that: it allows an antisemite to define what antisemitism is. This is the bitter truth we face today – for the official State of Israel, the concept of the Holocaust and antisemitism are purely political means, and as such can be manipulated, distorted, and deceived, just like any other political tool.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Nazi crimes are used by the Israeli state to justify violence against Palestinians. But viewed through Mamdani’s distinction, and the core role that Nazi mass murder plays in Zionism’s justifications, the Israeli state’s use of the Nazi genocide may also be seen as a continuing attempt to remind ethnic nationalists that by forming an ethnic nationalist state, Jews should be treated as the Nazis would not treat them – as fellow Europeans, rather than as “darker people” who are deserving targets of racism.</p>
<p>Noy’s reference to allowing anti-Semites to define anti-Semitism may also shed light on why today’s anti-Semites are happy to accept the invitation to mourn a Nazi slaughter that they usually excuse. An obvious explanation is that their admiration for the Israeli state makes a little hypocrisy necessary. </p>
<p>If their favourite ethnic nationalist state wants heads of government who feel that the Nazi genocide has received an unfair bad press to shed a ritualised tear for its victims, that is a small price to pay. But they may also be signalling that the establishment of an ethnic nationalist state, which itself colonises the “darker races”, entitles “good Jews” to the European status that the Nazis had denied them. This, of course, does not mean that “bad Jews” – those who are not fervent ethnic nationalists – deserve the same consideration.</p>
<p>The distinction between European and colonial wars may also shed more light on why “good Jews”, those who support the Israeli state, are so firmly supported by Western centrists and liberals. If Jews are, as the opponents of Nazi racism insisted, European, then the Israeli state can be seen as another colonial enterprise, which, in the view of some of its opponents, <a href="https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/1652565">is exactly what it is</a>. And so its response to Palestinians is, in the eyes of its European allies, governed by the “laws of nature”, not by the “laws of war”. To brutalise Ukrainians is to violate the “laws of war” and is unacceptable to Europe and its heirs. To brutalise Palestinians is to follow the “laws of nature”. The Israeli state may do as it pleases to Palestinians without violating the code of those to whom “Europeanness” or “whiteness” is a valued identity – many of whom are liberals or centrists.</p>
<p>The distinction between European and colonial wars, then, throws important light on the new way in which Jews are viewed both by white supremacists and by mainstream Europe.</p>
<p><em><a href="https://www.witspress.co.za/page/detail/Good-Jew-Bad-Jew/?K=9781776148486">Good Jew, Bad Jew: Racism, anti-Semitism and the assault on meaning</a> is published by Wits University Press</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217970/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The European bourgeoisie could not forgive Hitler because he applied in Europe colonialist procedures previously reserved for the supposedly inferior Arabs, Indians, and Africans.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2176472023-11-21T13:23:22Z2023-11-21T13:23:22ZWhat would it take for a cease-fire to happen in Gaza?<p>Calls for a cease-fire and other limits on military operations and violence were made by <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/news/cease-fire-israel-palestine">governments</a>, <a href="https://www.ijvcanada.org/ijv-calls-for-a-ceasefire-and-systemic-change-in-palestine-israel/">advocacy</a> <a href="https://www.fcnl.org/updates/2023-10/quaker-lobby-calls-urgent-de-escalation-violence-israel-and-gaza">groups</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/10/11/democratic-divisions-ceasefire-comments-israel-war/">political leaders</a> around the world almost immediately after the Oct. 7, 2023, massacre of 1,200 Israeli civilians by Hamas. Israel immediately declared war on Hamas and began shelling and then invaded Gaza, leading to more than 11,000 <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2023/gaza-rising-death-toll-civilians/">civilian deaths</a> and massive destruction. </p>
<p>Global <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/nov/15/poll-us-israel-support-hamas-war">calls for cease-fires</a> have continued to be made by hundreds of <a href="https://pressley.house.gov/2023/11/15/pressley-joins-colleagues-in-calling-on-biden-admin-to-establish-a-ceasefire-protect-children-in-the-gaza-strip/">disparate organizations</a> and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinian-war-march-washington-830cb77476af80ffde431165ee01533d">tens of thousands of demonstrators</a>. </p>
<p>The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council have issued <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1142847">calls for fighting to stop</a>, to ensure “<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/11/1143632">the immediate, continuous, sufficient and unhindered provision</a> of essential goods and services to civilians throughout the Gaza Strip” and to ensure “immediate, full, sustained, safe and unhindered humanitarian access” for the U.N. and other agencies. </p>
<p>To date, there has been no cease-fire, though in early November, Israel agreed to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-gaza-humanitarian-pauses-b8fc613ffd8b9351c0dc37b90b6e10dd">stop attacks for four hours a day</a> to allow refugees to flee and aid to be distributed. And other <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/qatar-seeking-israel-hamas-deal-to-free-50-hostages-and-3-day-truce-sources-say/articleshow/105238187.cms">efforts to establish a cease-fire agreement</a> are reportedly underway.</p>
<p>Those demanding a cease-fire are driven by humanitarian compassion and principles, primarily the need to protect civilians caught up in a terrible war. But as a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=jMEGeTUAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">scholar of mediation</a> who also works as an international mediator, I know that cease-fires are technically complicated military and political undertakings that always entail risk and require <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/thematic-areas/ceasefires-security-arrangements">specialist expertise</a>.</p>
<h2>The basic requirements</h2>
<p>In addition to providing mediation training to senior international diplomats, I have done <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viac065">comparative research</a> on what constitutes a strong cease-fire. I also have practical experience: In 2005 and 2006 I was a member of the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2006/05/02/5377336/african-union-extends-mediation-talks-on-darfur">African Union mediation team for ending violent conflict in Darfur</a>, responsible for drafting the peace agreement’s cease-fire provisions. To this end, I facilitated tense negotiations between Sudanese military officers and Darfur rebels.</p>
<p>On the basis of my research and experience, it is clear that a strong cease-fire agreement must always have clear and viable rules and timelines, including about the use and control of weapons, the movements of fighters and the activities of humanitarian agencies.</p>
<p>The leadership and rank and file of the opposing forces must understand precisely what their responsibilities are in a cease-fire. They must know exactly what activities are prohibited and what activities are permitted. </p>
<p>Moreover, the rules and procedures must be tailored to the particular political, military and geographic circumstances of each conflict. The details of a humanitarian cease-fire agreement for Gaza would look completely different from, say, the cease-fire agreement for Darfur. And it needs political will from the opposing parties, which varies from case to case and can change over time.</p>
<h2>A cease-fire for Gaza</h2>
<p>The relevant circumstances of Gaza include these facts:</p>
<ul>
<li>Israel has <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/how-do-hamas-and-hezbollah-compare-with-israel-militarily/a-67166698">much more powerful military capabilities</a> than Hamas.</li>
<li>The fighting in Gaza is taking place in a densely populated area.</li>
<li>Hamas fighters are <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/11/18/israel-gaza-war-planning-hamas-direction/">physically close to and perhaps even immersed in the civilian population</a> of Gaza.</li>
<li>The U.N. and numerous other organizations have said it is <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/11/1143632">essential for Hamas to release the Israeli hostages</a> it holds.</li>
<li>The people of Gaza have critical humanitarian needs for food, water, shelter and safety, as well as hospital and medical support.</li>
</ul>
<p>The Israeli government and Hamas would have to negotiate mutually acceptable ways of addressing these challenges.</p>
<p>It would also be important to consult the <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/">U.N. and other humanitarian agencies</a> to determine what they need in order to provide humanitarian support and protect children, injured people and other vulnerable groups.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560192/original/file-20231117-21-wvkehj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People help a dust-covered man into the back of a truck." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560192/original/file-20231117-21-wvkehj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560192/original/file-20231117-21-wvkehj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560192/original/file-20231117-21-wvkehj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560192/original/file-20231117-21-wvkehj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560192/original/file-20231117-21-wvkehj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560192/original/file-20231117-21-wvkehj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560192/original/file-20231117-21-wvkehj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Palestinians search through rubble to find survivors in Gaza on Nov. 17, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-search-through-buildings-destroyed-during-israeli-news-photo/1798268440">Ahmad Hasaballah/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The role of trust – and mistrust</h2>
<p>Opposing groups who are in violent conflicts inevitably hate and mistrust each other. It is therefore helpful for cease-fire negotiations to be supported by a mediator who is sufficiently trusted by the parties. The mediator can facilitate these negotiations through indirect dialogue – referred to as “<a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/shuttle-diplomacy">shuttle diplomacy</a>” – when the parties are unwilling or unable to meet face-to-face.</p>
<p>In the Gaza crisis, <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/qatar-seeking-israel-hamas-deal-to-free-50-hostages-and-3-day-truce-sources-say/articleshow/105238187.cms">Qatar</a>, supported by the United States, is playing the mediator role. Qatari mediators are attempting to negotiate a deal between Hamas and Israel that could include the release of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatar-says-challenges-israel-hamas-hostage-deal-are-just-logistical-2023-11-19/">roughly 50 civilian hostages from Gaza in exchange for a three-day cease-fire</a>.</p>
<p>There are two other ways cease-fires can be strengthened in order to mitigate the hatred and mistrust between the parties. The first is by deploying cease-fire monitors – independent observers on the field of battle – who investigate alleged cease-fire violations. Their presence can help to deter violations.</p>
<p>The second way is by setting up communication channels between the mediator and representatives of the warring parties to resolve disputes and address violations that inevitably arise. The goal is to prevent small-scale violations from escalating into large-scale violations that could herald a return to hostilities.</p>
<h2>Political will is important</h2>
<p>Israel and Hamas can overcome the technical difficulties of a Gaza cease-fire if they have the political will to do so. It is relevant that Israel and Hamas have <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/11/4/23945628/israel-hamas-war-gaza-ceasefire-history-explained">previously negotiated cease-fires</a> and truces in Gaza. And <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-strikes-gaza-palestinians-fire-rockets-truce-bid-lingers-2023-05-13/">in 2023 a truce</a> between Israel and the Gaza-based Islamic Jihad militant group was brokered by Egyptian mediators after cross-border attacks. A cease-fire brokered by the U.S. in November 2012 lasted 18 months. But none of the cease-fires was likely to hold in the long term because they were not linked to a political resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict.</p>
<p>In responding to the Gaza crisis, some world leaders have appeared <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/08/us/politics/israel-gaza-ceasefire-pause.html">confused about</a> the distinction between a truce, a humanitarian pause, a cease-fire and a cessation of hostilities. <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/thematic-areas/ceasefires-security-arrangements">In general</a>, there is no international consensus on the meaning of these terms. In Gaza, as in every case, the cease-fire objectives, rules and procedures matter more than the labels that are used.</p>
<p>The current focus of international calls for a cease-fire is on humanitarian relief as a short-term objective. But the humanitarian situation, and the need to protect civilians in Gaza, will remain critical in the medium to long term.</p>
<p>The question of a permanent cease-fire and long-term security arrangement will have to be part of any negotiations to finally resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If the vision of a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/two-state-solution">two-state solution</a> is realized, the challenge will be to ensure that both Israel and an independent Palestinian state can enjoy sovereignty and adequate self-defense without threatening each other.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217647/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laurie Nathan is affiliated with the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. </span></em></p>Calls for a cease-fire in Gaza are driven by humanitarian compassion and principles. But cease-fires are also technically complicated military and political ventures.Laurie Nathan, Professor of the Practice of Mediation, University of Notre DameLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2171572023-11-07T14:30:39Z2023-11-07T14:30:39ZIsrael-Hamas war: there is an important difference between a humanitarian pause and a ceasefire<p>The British Labour Party leader, Keir Starmer, has come under fire from members of his own party for <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/gaza-lucy-powell-israel-hamas-burnley-b2442285.html">refusing to call for a ceasefire in the Hamas-Israel war</a>, instead pushing for a humanitarian pause in the conflict. As a result, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/labour-keir-starmer-gaza-israel-ceasefire-b2442358.html">50 Labour councillors</a> have quit the party. The controversy raises the question of the <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/11/humanitarian-pauses-and-ceasefires-what-are-differences">difference between a humanitarian pause and a ceasefire</a>. </p>
<p>The conflict began in the early morning of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-did-hamas-attack-and-why-now-what-does-it-hope-to-gain-215248">October 7 2023</a> when armed Hamas fighters launched a surprise attack against Israel, killing at least 1,400 Israelis and taking more than 200 civilians hostage. </p>
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<p>Israel responded to this attack by launching an assault on Gaza beginning with a relentless aerial bombardment and continuing now with a ground offensive. According to the Gaza health ministry, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/06/world/middleeast/gaza-death-toll-israel-hamas-war.html">at least 10,000 people</a> – mainly civilians – have been killed in Gaza in the month since the conflict began, including 4,100 children. </p>
<p>A further 25,000 people have been injured and hundreds of thousands have been displaced within the Gaza Strip, unable to leave because of the blockade imposed by Israel.</p>
<p>Israel’s massive bombing campaign has unsurprisingly led to a disastrous humanitarian situation. The UN secretary general, Antonio Guterres, has described the situation in Gaza as a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231021-un-chief-urges-ceasefire-to-end-gaza-s-godawful-nightmare">“godawful nightmare”</a>. </p>
<p>This has led the UN and other countries to pressure Israel for a “pause” in the fighting to at least provide temporary humanitarian relief to the people of Gaza.</p>
<p>A number of resolutions calling for a ceasefire or some form of truce have been raised in the UN security council, but on each occasion <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-israel-hamas-war-benefits-russia-but-so-would-playing-peacemaker-216113">they have been vetoed</a> by one or more of the permanent members. A <a href="https://apnews.com/article/un-resolution-vote-israel-hamas-gaza-truce-7eec00b0e28ef2036636b166b48ca030">non-binding resolution</a> passed the UN general assembly on October 27, but this has been ignored by the Israeli government.</p>
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<h2>A humanitarian pause</h2>
<p>Gaza has no access to basic humanitarian aid due to the siege and blockade that Israel has inflicted on the strip. Even before the beginning of the war, Gaza had been subject to a <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-has-been-blockaded-for-16-years-heres-what-a-complete-siege-and-invasion-could-mean-for-vital-supplies-215359">16-year blockade</a> after Hamas took political control of the strip in June 2007. </p>
<p>After the October 7 Hamas attack, the Israeli defence minister Yoav Gallant ordered a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/program/newsfeed/2023/10/9/israeli-defence-minister-orders-complete-siege-on-gaza">“complete siege”</a> on Gaza, which included cutting off supplies of electricity, food, water and gas. These shortages have put the country’s health system at risk – hospitals are now being run on power from electric generators and with severe shortages of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/06/world/middleeast/gaza-hospitals-israel-war.html">vital medical supplies</a>.</p>
<p>According to the UN, a <a href="https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/dms/Documents/AccessMechanisms.pdf">humanitarian pause</a> is defined as “a temporary cessation of hostilities purely for humanitarian purposes”. It is carried out for a certain period of time and in a specific geographic location. </p>
<p>The pause allows civilians trapped in conflict areas to safely flee, access assistance or receive medical treatment. It also enables the passage of essential supplies such as food, fuel and medicines.</p>
<p>In the context of Gaza, a pause could, for example, enable civilians to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/11/01/middleeast/rafah-border-crossing-egypt-foreign-nationals-gaza-intl-hnk/index.html">flee the enclave through the Rafah crossing</a> into Egypt. The crossing has been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-border-authority-says-rafah-crossing-open-only-listed-egyptians-foreigners-2023-11-06/#">opened for limited periods</a> to allow some evacuees to leave and some supplies to enter. But not enough.</p>
<p>There is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-chief-surprised-by-escalation-israels-bombardment-calls-humanitarian-2023-10-28/">an increasing international consensus</a>, including from countries supporting Israel such as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/02/us/politics/biden-israel-gaza-fighting-pause.html">the US</a>, that at least a humanitarian pause is needed.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, some argue that using a humanitarian pause to provide a temporary halt in the bombing of Gaza is not enough. In a report calling for a general ceasefire, <a href="https://views-voices.oxfam.org.uk/2023/11/why-humanitarian-pause-or-corridors-not-the-answer-in-gaza/">Oxfam said</a> its experience is that such pauses can even put civilians at a greater risk, as there is usually less clarity involved about safe zones and the duration of pauses. </p>
<p>“Rumours and misinformation spreads that this road or that ‘safe zone’ has been declared a demilitarised area, but that is often not true, leaving people walking into a warzone believing it is safe,” the report said. At the beginning of the war, routes that were thought to have been designated safe passages for evacuation from Gaza <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/14/gaza-civilians-afraid-to-leave-home-after-bombing-of-safe-routes">were bombed</a>.</p>
<p>As a result, the only true humanitarian solution that appears ideal is a complete ceasefire.</p>
<h2>A ceasefire: roadmap for an end to hostilities</h2>
<p>A <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/ceasefire">ceasefire</a> is a political process rather than simply a humanitarian one. It urges parties to come together to find a political solution to the conflict. </p>
<p>It is meant to a be a longer-term process than a “pause” and should apply to the entire geographical area of the conflict. In this case, it would mean the whole of Gaza strip but also all others affected by the conflict such as <a href="https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-civilians-killed-hamas-03a050045c6bf3f87e12086b63b40a1c">the south of Lebanon</a> where Israeli troops are battling with Hezbollah.</p>
<p>In the context of Gaza, a ceasefire would mean a complete stop of fighting on all sides, and the eventual release or exchange of hostages. It would not only mean the end of the bombardment of Gaza, but would also obligate Hamas to stop its attacks on Israel. </p>
<p>It is important to note that, like a pause, a ceasefire is <a href="https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/cease-fire/#">not a permanent peace agreement</a>. That said, the aim would be to create the conditions for a permanent settlement.</p>
<p>Reaching a ceasefire would likely require the involvement of a third party mediator, such as the US, Qatar or Iran. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinian-cease-fire-hamas-caac81bc36fe9be67ac2f7c27000c74b">previous Hamas-Israel war in 2021</a>, both parties eventually managed to reach a ceasefire after 11 days of destruction which left more than 200 people dead. In that conflict, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/26/egypts-role-gaza-more-than-mediator">Egypt</a> played a major role as a mediator. </p>
<p>Since the latest conflict began on October 7, the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has resisted all calls for a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/3/blinken-discusses-humanitarian-pauses-as-israel-encircles-gaza-city">humanitarian pause</a> and a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/10/30/israel-hamas-war-live-palestinian-death-toll-gaza-rises-above-8000">ceasefire</a>.</p>
<p>But the US and other allies of Israel continue to press Netanyahu for at least a pause in Israel’s assault. He insists that while “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-open-little-pauses-gaza-fighting-netanyahu-says-2023-11-07/#:%7E:text=Asked%20if%20he%20was%20open,we've%20had%20them%20before.">little pauses</a>” might be arranged to allow for the exit of hostages or to facilitate the entry of humanitarian aid, a longer halt in hostilities is not possible until all hostages taken by Hamas are released. And so the killing continues</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217157/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Malak Benslama-Dabdoub does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>At present the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has ruled out a ceasefire but may allow ‘little pauses’.Malak Benslama-Dabdoub, Lecturer in law, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2169222023-11-06T13:06:16Z2023-11-06T13:06:16ZGaza conflict: if the cycle of violence is to end we must not prioritise one side’s suffering over the other<p>Shortly after the Hamas massacre in Israel on October 7, people I know and respect were posting Palestinian solidarity notices on their social media feeds. I am supportive of the rights of the Palestinian people and am greatly disturbed by their treatment under Israel’s military occupation. But I found this response troubling. </p>
<p>Why is it appropriate to respond to <a href="https://forward.com/fast-forward/566249/israeli-officials-and-civilian-responders-describe-evidence-of-rape-and-other-atrocities-in-hamas-attack/">rape</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-forensic-teams-describe-signs-torture-abuse-2023-10-15/">torture and murder (including decapitation)</a>, as a moment to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/08/israel-hamas-war-security-police-jewish/">celebrate</a> Palestinian resistance? </p>
<p>This response has only increased with time and the rising <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1142687">Palestinian death toll</a> because of Israel’s bombing campaign.</p>
<p>I’ve noticed a discourse in some quarters that repeatedly privileges the victimhood and suffering of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/31/nyregion/israel-gaza-kidnapped-poster-fight.html">one group at the expense of the other</a> – in this case the Palestinian civilian casualties of Israel’s assault on Gaza over the Israeli civilians massacred on October 7. There are also those who tend to prioritise the suffering of Israelis in this terrible conflict. </p>
<p>And here’s the problem: it comes down to a <a href="https://publicseminar.org/author/ilan-zvi-baron/">zero-sum debate</a> about the righteousness of being the greater victim and dismisses the rights, pain and suffering of the other.</p>
<p>This seems to stem from an impoverished way of understanding political responsibility. </p>
<p>In political thought, responsibility is often understood as a <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/290293">synonym for being “answerable” for something</a>, which assumes that we can be <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy/article/abs/collective-responsibility/26700BC2E1DCCFAA959950C4BE8E6DE8">held to account for our actions</a>. <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/4381">Political</a> or <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/S/bo3634549.html">collective</a> responsibility explores the question of being responsible for things that we have not done but arise because of our membership in a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/burdens-of-political-responsibility/burdens-of-political-responsibility/1514F5586A37CCAC5894DE7C011D6D4D">specific group</a>. </p>
<p>Whatever definition we take, when we hold any individual or group responsible, we are attributing to them a form of moral agency. A problem in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that responsibility is used to dehumanise the other.</p>
<h2>‘Us versus them’</h2>
<p>Too much rhetoric about this conflict is a simplistic contrast between right and wrong in its “us versus them” formulation. It is not hard to find fault on both sides. There is nothing inherently wrong with holding both the Israeli government and Palestinian militants such as Hamas liable for their actions.</p>
<p>But when it comes to Israel-Palestine, it is sadly common to hear that <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/27/business/adl-open-letter-colleges-spj/index.html">Israel is to blame</a> for the actions of Palestinian terrorists. Such claims stretch the idea of responsibility to the extent that it becomes largely meaningless.</p>
<p>It is undeniable that Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, is responsible for creating the conditions for Palestinians to want to resist. His policies – and the ideology of the ultra-nationalist right that he has worked with over his many years in office – involved supporting Hamas. </p>
<p>This took the form of <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/netanyahu-israel-gaza-hamas-1.7010035">significant financial payments</a> to Hamas in Gaza alongside a wider strategy of undermining the peace process by supporting the expansion of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-palestinian-territory-israel-has-turned-into-a-firing-zone-meet-the-cave-dwelling-people-of-masafer-yatta-191356">Jewish settlements in the West Bank</a>, who all too often get away with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/30/world/middleeast/west-bank-settlers-palestinians-violence.html?searchResultPosition=1">the murder of Palestinians</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-palestinian-territory-israel-has-turned-into-a-firing-zone-meet-the-cave-dwelling-people-of-masafer-yatta-191356">The Palestinian territory Israel has turned into a firing zone: meet the cave-dwelling people of Masafer Yatta</a>
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<p>However, he is not responsible for the actions taken by Hamas.
It is possible to <a href="https://file.hukum.uns.ac.id/data/PDIH%20File/e-book/the%20question%20of%20german%20guilt.pdf">contribute to an outcome without being responsible for it</a>. Hamas needs to be held to account and we must not forget what they did on October 7.</p>
<p>Hamas violated multiple international humanitarian laws in its October 7 attack, which included murdering more than 1,400 Israelis, wounding another 5,000, and taking <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/israel-hostages-hamas-explained.html">over 200 hostages</a>. They are responsible for that, and for the high number of <a href="https://twitter.com/IsraelinUSA/status/1719333607108378833?s=20">missile launches</a> against Israel. We should not buy into the “look what you made me do” excuse that attempts to justify Hamas’ terrorism as a legitimate response to the treatment of Palestinians by multiple Israeli governments over the years.</p>
<p>Israel has the right to self-defence. But the brutality of the October 7 attack does not mean that we can excuse the form of Israel’s <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-11-2-2023-6a398d4aeba979aef24960efc31eb772">military response</a> or <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/01/gaza-israeli-attacks-blockade-devastating-people-disabilities#">blockade</a> of Gaza which is in violation of the international law pertaining to collective punishment, among other aspects of the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.33_GC-IV-EN.pdf">Geneva conventions</a>. </p>
<p>We need to hold the appropriate agents responsible for their own actions and choices, including Netayanhu and his government, and Hamas. </p>
<h2>Antisemitism and Islamophobia on the rise</h2>
<p>There are a lot of different ways to be held responsible, but blanket condemnations that feed into a zero-sum ways of thinking are dangerous.</p>
<p>The dangers are evident in <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/global-antisemitic-incidents-wake-hamas-war-israel">rising antisemitism</a> including <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/10/31/paris-prosecutor-opens-investigation-after-stars-of-david-found-tagged-on-buildings_6216629_7.html">spray painting Stars of David on buildings</a> in Paris which has <a href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/video/nazi-soldiers-rousting-office-workers-nazi-soldier-news-footage/509271021">echoes of Nazi era Germany</a>. </p>
<p>When we hold Jews in the diaspora <a href="https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-obligation-in-exile.html">responsible for Israeli policy,</a>, we are not engaging in any sensible notion of individual or political responsibility. Holding Jews to account for what Israel does is a variant of antisemitism. </p>
<p>By the same token, blaming all Palestinians – or Muslims – for the actions of Hamas is equally disturbing. Worryingly, both antisemitism and Islamophobia seem to be <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/26/israel-palestine-hostilities-affect-rights-europe">on the rise</a>.</p>
<p>Much of the public discourse and protest against Israel’s military response has sought to minimise Hamas’ violence on October 7. At times it seems that the horror of Hamas’s massacre of Israeli civilians is diminished once Palestinian suffering is taken into account. That’s disturbing. </p>
<p>One side’s tragedy does not undermine the reality of the other’s. One group’s responsibility does not mitigate the other’s moral agency. Responsibility is a mechanism that makes us moral agents. Let’s not use it to dehumanise each other.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216922/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>I have received funding in the past from the British Council for Research on the Levant, as well as a scholarship from the Rothschild Foundation Hanadiv (Europe).</span></em></p>Blaming an entire nation for the actions of some of its people is unfair, unproductive and will perpetuate the hatred and suffering.Ilan Zvi Baron, Professor of International Political Theory, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2168502023-11-02T17:23:29Z2023-11-02T17:23:29ZIsrael-Hamas war: Lebanese peace plan reflects country’s lack of appetite for more conflict<p>As the Lebanese prime minister, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/profile/najib-mikati/">Najib Mikati</a>, outlined a three-step peace plan for the conflict in Gaza on October 31, he made a statement which may seem ordinary to a western audience: “We will consider the right of Israel and the right of the Palestinians.”</p>
<p>But his words had the potential to spark outrage in a country that has yet to recognise Israel, let alone entertain the idea of peace talks.</p>
<p>Speaking to <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/10/31/lebanons-prime-minister-najib-mikati-has-a-peace-plan-for-gaza">The Economist</a>, Mikati outlined his initiative. His plan calls for a five-day ceasefire followed by a permanent cessation of hostilities. </p>
<p>Then, an international conference should convene to finally resolve the issue by implementing the ever-elusive <a href="https://theconversation.com/oslo-accords-30-years-on-the-dream-of-a-two-state-solution-seems-further-away-than-ever-213003">two-state solution</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/oslo-accords-30-years-on-the-dream-of-a-two-state-solution-seems-further-away-than-ever-213003">Oslo accords: 30 years on, the dream of a two-state solution seems further away than ever</a>
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<p>There is no doubt that Mikati’s plan expresses the more moderate wishes of the majority in the Middle East. Most people not directly involved in the conflict want to see an immediate end to what is widely seen as a disproportionate and collective punishment of Gaza. They also want an increase in international diplomatic efforts to tackle the underlying issues. </p>
<p>It’s clear that many in the Arab world don’t consider the attacks on October 7 as isolated incidents. And that some responsibility should be shared by Israel and the west, who they consider to have failed to seriously pursue the two-state solution, at the expense of Palestinian dignity and political expression.</p>
<p>Yet Mikati’s plan itself is hardly original. It echoes the <a href="https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=a5dab26d-a2fe-dc66-8910-a13730828279&groupId=268421">Arab peace initiative</a> called for by the much more influential Saudi Arabia in 2002. </p>
<p>So why is a caretaker prime minister (only a president, which Lebanon has not had for two years, can appoint a prime minister) spearheading a seemingly hopeless peace plan, when his country has yet to settle its own matters with Israel? </p>
<h2>No appetite for war</h2>
<p>The first and immediate reason for Mikati’s initiative is the rising worry in Lebanon that the country will be dragged into a war it simply cannot afford to participate in. </p>
<p>The Lebanese state has been effectively bankrupt since 2019, and the country has been mired with one crisis after another ever since. Its economy has contracted by 39.9% of GDP since 2018 while the Lebanese Pound has lost more than 98% of its value in that time, according to <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/05/16/lebanon-normalization-of-crisis-is-no-road-to-stabilization">World Bank estimates</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, average inflation in 2022 <a href="https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1325612/lebanon-sees-triple-digit-average-inflation-for-second-year-in-a-row.html">reached 171%</a>) and the government dept-to-GDP ratio was <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/profile/LBN">listed at 283.2%</a>.</p>
<p>This financial hole, compounded by the extraordinary <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-beiruts-port-explosion-exacerbates-lebanons-economic-crisis-144040">explosion at Beirut’s port in August 2020</a> and subsequent energy and wheat crises, has left Lebanon in one of the worst socioeconomic situations in the country’s history. So, it’s hardly surprising that the appetite for war is not exactly surging.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-beiruts-port-explosion-exacerbates-lebanons-economic-crisis-144040">How Beirut's port explosion exacerbates Lebanon's economic crisis</a>
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<p>The second impetus for Mikati is political. Lebanon has always had a peculiar position within the Arab-Israeli conflict. Parts of the country see it as an existential issue amid fears of Israeli aggression, while others have developed a more ambivalent attitude. </p>
<p>Since a brief involvement in the Arab war against Israel in 1948, the Lebanese military has avoided getting involved in any military action against Israel. </p>
<p>Hezbollah’s success in pushing Israel out of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/may/24/israelandthepalestinians.lebanon">south of Lebanon in 2000</a> and its brief campaign against Israel <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/israellebanonhezbollah-conflict-2006">in 2006</a> have led many to associate the Iran-sponsored “Party of God” with resistance against Israel. Meanwhile, many Lebanese leaders have done their best to distance themselves from Hezbollah, and the military has played a minimal role in stopping Israeli encroachments and attacks on Lebanese infrastructure.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557265/original/file-20231102-21-i09b0s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of disputed SHebaa Farms area." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557265/original/file-20231102-21-i09b0s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557265/original/file-20231102-21-i09b0s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557265/original/file-20231102-21-i09b0s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557265/original/file-20231102-21-i09b0s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557265/original/file-20231102-21-i09b0s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557265/original/file-20231102-21-i09b0s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557265/original/file-20231102-21-i09b0s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Israel has occupied a small section of territory on the Lebanon-Syrian border since 1967.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sanjay Rao/WIkimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>Hezbollah continues to gain much of its <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">legitimacy in Lebanon</a> as a resistance movement, often using as an official raison d’être Israel’s <a href="https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/227136/israel_hezbollah.pdf">continued occupation of the Shebaa Farms</a>. This is a small area of 16 square miles claimed by Lebanon that contains a few settlements. It sits on Lebanon’s border with Syria, which also runs through the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.</p>
<p>A 2022 survey conducted by the <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABVII_Lebanon_Country_Report-ENG.pdf">Arab Barometer</a> showed that 17% of respondents in Lebanon said they “strongly favour or favour” normalisation between Arab states and Israel. </p>
<p>This ranked Lebanon third among countries surveyed. And the two above it, Sudan (39%) and Morocco (31%), are both parties to the controversial <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a>, the bilateral agreements signed in 2020 and 2021 between Israel and various Arab states. For comparison, only 5% of Egyptians and Jordanians responded in the same manner.</p>
<p>Even for those Lebanese that are more openly aggressive to Israel, it seems that certain engagement rules (including restricting attacks to military outposts and surveillance equipment, and refraining from targeting civilians) – developed over the years between Hezbollah and the Israeli military – have served to bring a more satisfactory status quo. </p>
<p>In fact, another survey conducted this week by Lebanese newspaper <a href="https://www.al-akhbar.com/Home_Page/372304/_______-___-__________-___-_____-______">Al Akhbar</a> – which is often seen as supportive of Hezbollah – showed that 68% of respondents are against direct engagement, while only 52% supported limited “operations” to keep pressure on Israeli forces. </p>
<h2>Anger at Israel</h2>
<p>That said, one shouldn’t confuse a lack of appetite for war with support, or even tolerance, of Israeli internal and regional activity, not least in the latest conflict with Hamas. Protests have been taking place across Lebanon and the wider region over the past couple of weeks expressing solidarity with Palestinians, while also <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qCvcAxoAS48">condemning the west’s seemingly unconditional support</a> of Israel. </p>
<p>What’s more, 80% of respondents in Al Akhbar’s survey expressed support for Hamas’s operations and 73% were against a neutral Lebanese position in the conflict. This chimes with the views of many others in the Arab world and across a range of developing countries, that Israel is either a guilty party or has gone too far in its retaliation in Gaza. </p>
<p>Such are the delicate balances that Mikati is trying to hold with his new initiative for peace. While his plan will likely fall on deaf ears, the rest of Lebanon will be watching with bated breath as the country’s (and the region’s) fate plays out over coming weeks and months.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216850/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tarek Abou Jaoude does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Lebanon has problems enough of its own without a major conflict on its border.Tarek Abou Jaoude, Teaching Fellow in Politics and International Relations, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2166702023-11-02T09:37:05Z2023-11-02T09:37:05ZIran’s ‘axis of resistance’: how Hamas and Tehran are attempting to galvanise their allies against Israel<p>The devastating attack on Israel by Hamas on 7 October has transformed the Middle East, thrusting the Israeli-Palestinian question – considered a diplomatic side-issue for at least a decade – to the centre stage of the region’s geopolitics.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/risks-wider-war-iran-and-its-proxies">Iran’s proxies</a> have come out of these events emboldened, with players manoeuvring in a complex power game that could at any moment tip into a regional war. It is still possible to avoid such a scenario through a negotiated cease-fire.</p>
<h2>Towards a “united front”</h2>
<p>We are entering uncharted territory, with Israel’s political and military objectives as of yet not clearly defined. This makes this war of revenge different from all previous Israeli operations against Hamas, whether in terms of duration, objectives or the number of victims on both sides.</p>
<p>The rhetoric of Israeli officials, <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/israeli-president-says-no-innocent-154330724.html">some of whom have denied the existence of innocent civilians in Gaza</a>, has oscillated between maximalism and minimalism, including calls for a total occupation of Gaza <a href="https://www.lapresse.ca/international/2023-10-15/israel-et-le-hamas-en-guerre/l-occupation-de-gaza-par-israel-serait-une-grave-erreur-selon-biden.php">notwithstanding the US president’s warnings</a>, the creation of a buffer zone, and the “simple” destruction of Hamas infrastructure.</p>
<p>On 7 October, as Hamas launched its unprecedented operation, its military commander, Mohammed Deif, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/hamass-gaza-commander-deif-urges-israeli-arabs-neighboring-states-to-join-attack/">called</a> on all Arabs and Muslims and, especially, Iran and the states and organisations it dominates, to launch an all-out war against Israel. He mentioned, in order, the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran, Yemen, the Iraqi Shiite militias and Syria. He proclaimed the date as “the day when your resistance against Israel converges with ours”, in what is known as a <a href="https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1334129/le-hezbollah-consacre-lunite-des-fronts-.html">“unity of fronts”</a>, a strategy of deterrence initiated by Hezbollah.</p>
<p>The latter consists in coordinating the responses of all of Iran’s proxy militias in the region and carrying out collective defences in the event that one of them is attacked. The many fronts dominated by Iran’s proxy militias could then dissuade Tehran’s adversaries from taking action or, on the contrary, accelerate the region’s descent into total chaos.</p>
<h2>Major tensions on the Lebanese border</h2>
<p>After 7 October, the security situation rapidly deteriorated on Israel’s Lebanese border, with increasingly intense skirmishes between Tsahal and Hezbollah.</p>
<p>Two noteworthy elements have also emerged on the Lebanese front. For the first time since the end of the civil war, we have witnessed the “temporary” resurgence of the Al-Fajr forces, the military wing of Jamaa Islamiya. This Lebanese Sunni Islamist militia, which was disbanded in 1990, announced that it was taking part in hostilities beyond Israel’s Lebanese borders “in defence of Lebanese sovereignty, the Al Aqsa mosque and in solidarity with Gaza and Palestine”. On 29 October, it <a href="https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1355189/israel-intensifie-son-offensive-contre-gaza-internet-en-cours-de-retablissement-dans-lenclave-j-23-de-la-guerre-israel-hamas.html">launched missiles from Lebanon towards Kiryat Shmona, in northern Israel</a>. This militia fights almost independently of Hezbollah (although there is military coordination between the two organisations).</p>
<p>In addition, <a href="https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1354234/le-hezbollah-entraine-le-liban-dans-la-guerre-armee-israelienne.html">Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Lebanon</a> have issued communiqués taking full responsibility for several attacks against Israel launched from the Lebanese territories. This recalls the years when southern Lebanon was dominated by the military activities of the Palestinian PLO (from 1969), to the point of being nicknamed <a href="https://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/300905">“Fatah Land”</a>.</p>
<p>While their participation in the hostilities is still limited, it matters in symbolic terms. It is clear that Hezbollah is coordinating the activities of all the militias operating on the Lebanese border to send out a clear message: the area is open to all Islamist and non-Islamist factions, who are invited to join, even symbolically, in the fight against Israel in order to express their solidarity with Gaza. In other words, Hezbollah declares that this struggle is not sectarian, but unites Muslims and concerns all Arabs and Muslims.</p>
<p>This message of Muslim unity against Israel comes after years of sectarianism in the Middle East. Hezbollah has carried out only limited attacks against Israel since the end of the Israel-Lebanon war in 2006, and <a href="https://www.frstrategie.org/programmes/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/consequences-lintervention-militaire-hezbollah-syrie-sur-population-libanaise-chiite-rapports-avec-israel-2017">even intervened in Syria to support Hamas’ then-enemy, Bashar Al-Assad</a>.</p>
<p>This stance made Hezbollah very unpopular with the Sunni populations of the region. By joining the fight against Israel, Hezbollah is reaffirming itself in the eyes of all Arabs in the region not as a sectarian player, but rather as an Islamic revolutionary group that aims to put an end to Israeli arrogance.</p>
<p>This reframing corresponds to the story it tells about itself. Hezbollah sees itself as a model for Hamas and other Islamic forces fighting Israel. Despite their differences over the war in Syria, they restored relations in August 2007 and senior Hamas commanders, such as <a href="https://youtu.be/pgjiAF98s_s?si=VakJEkLE1cxkRhwc">Ismael Haniyeh</a> (the head of Hamas’s political bureau) and <a href="https://youtu.be/Hje4sfEmv0M?si=5gzcb-0hlOfjJy3z">Yahia Sinwar</a> (head of Hamas’s political bureau), publicly thanked Iran for its invaluable help with funding, logistics and arms supplies.</p>
<h2>The Abraham Peace Accords</h2>
<p>The Hamas attack came at a time in the Middle East when the United States had been attempting to extend the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-abraham-accords-could-create-real-peace-in-the-middle-east-146973">Abraham Peace Accords</a> to <a href="https://theconversation.com/rapprochement-arabie-saoudite-israel-le-difficile-pari-de-washington-213139">Saudi Arabia</a>.</p>
<p>Aimed at laying the foundations for a new security architecture in the Middle East that would benefit the US and its allies, the agreement had led to a rapprochement between Israel and several Arab states under Washington’s watch. However, it is now under threat, while any prospect of normalisation between Israel and Riyadh also appears highly unlikely.</p>
<p>For Washington, this predicted outcome is all the more damaging that it comes months after the Chinese achieved a major diplomatic success <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-arabie-saoudite-un-compromis-diplomatique-sous-legide-de-pekin-201828">by negotiating a détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran</a>, which for years had backed the Houthi militias fighting Saudi Arabia in Yemen. As part of this rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran, <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/moyen-orient/20230920-guerre-au-y%C3%A9men-apr%C3%A8s-des-entretiens-positifs-les-rebelles-houthis-ont-quitt%C3%A9-riyad">talks were held between the Houthis and the Saudis</a> to support the peace process in Yemen.</p>
<h2>Yemen’s Houthis</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-etudes-2018-2-page-17.htm">Houthis</a> are another part of the Iranian axis in the region. Their rise as a Yemeni political and military player has emboldened them. They have declared that they are <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemen-rebels-threaten-to-join-hamas-attack-on-israel-if-us-intervenes-in-conflict/3014839">ready to join Hamas in an all-out war against Israel</a> to defend Gaza and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. As a show of force, on 19 October they launched three cruise missiles and drones which were <a href="https://www.opex360.com/2023/10/20/le-navire-americain-uss-carney-a-intercepte-des-missiles-et-des-drones-lances-depuis-le-yemen/">intercepted by a US destroyer in the Red Sea</a>. According to the United States, these missiles were “potentially aimed at Israel”. The attack is symbolic in itself, but it sends a strong political message that reaffirms the strategic primacy of the Houthis’ links with the Iranian-backed <a href="https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Asia-Focus-185.pdf">“axis of resistance”</a> and signals the militia’s willingness to engage militarily in regional or international wars or tensions.</p>
<p>This was clearly defined in <a href="https://youtu.be/3o81HN19Uic?si=f88VMotBX40E8izo">their leader’s speech</a>. The Houthis have a formidable <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/houthis-red-sea-missile-and-drone-attack-drivers-and-implications">arsenal of long-range missiles</a> that would be capable of striking Israel. All of them were either seized from the Yemeni state in 2014 or transported by Iran.</p>
<p>The missile attacks by the Houthis coincided with other <a href="https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1354940/les-forces-americaines-attaquees-16-fois-en-syrie-et-en-irak-depuis-le-debut-du-mois.html">attacks by Iranian-backed Shia militias</a>, targeting US bases and garrisons housing US soldiers in Iraq and Syria. Iran has strategically outsourced the risk of direct confrontation with the United States and Israel via its <a href="https://www.defense.gouv.fr/dems/syntheses-documentaires-supprimer/axe-resistance-lexpansionnisme-regional-iranien">“axis of resistance”</a>: when such attacks take place, it is not directly responsible. This positioning increases its influence in direct and indirect negotiations, as well as its regional influence.</p>
<h2>Is total war possible?</h2>
<p>Players, in conclusion, seem to be walking along the crater of a volcano. They are all waiting to learn more about the political and military objectives of Israel’s war in Gaza and to be able to assess Hamas’s capacity to resist the attack on it.</p>
<p>If the Israeli army records significant losses, the strategic position of the Iranian-backed axis will improve, at no cost to Tehran (but at a very terrible cost to the people of Gaza).</p>
<p>But what would happen if Israel threatened the very existence of Hamas after a ground invasion? Would the intense skirmishes on Israel’s Lebanese borders turn into a full-blown war? Would Iran join the hostilities? What if Israel felt strengthened by the West’s unconditional support for its right to defend itself and took this solidarity as a license to strike Iran, whose nuclear ambitions frighten the Hebrew state’s leaders? In such a scenario, and faced with Tehran’s response, will the United States use its destroyers in the Eastern Mediterranean to attack Iran and defend Israel?</p>
<p>At this stage, it is impossible to give a clear-cut answer to all these questions. All we can say is that the region seems to be heading for a new phase in which the sectarianisation of the foreign policies of the regional players will be relegated to second place, détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia will be consolidated, the Palestinian question will come to the fore for a long time to come, and the Iranian proxy militias will become increasingly assertive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216670/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hussein Abou Saleh ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>While Iran is wary of entering into direct war with Israel, Tehran has been lending support to Yemen’s Houthis, Irak’s Shia militias as well as the Lebanese Hezbollah.Hussein Abou Saleh, Docteur associé au Centre d'études et de recherches internationales (CERI), Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2168442023-11-01T17:04:53Z2023-11-01T17:04:53ZBenjamin Netanyahu’s leadership is questioned even as Israelis rally round the flag<p>Over the past year, Israel has witnessed an extraordinary wave of <a href="https://theconversation.com/israelis-protest-netanyahu-governments-brutality-and-plans-to-undermine-rule-of-law-201220">non-violent protests</a>, involving hundreds of thousands of activists from across society. The extensive demonstrations were triggered by a judicial overhaul announced by the Israeli government in early 2023. </p>
<p>The government <a href="https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-752225">passed into law in July 2023</a> the first planned change of the overhaul – a so-called “reasonableness” bill. This removed the power of the country’s supreme court (and lower courts) to cancel government decisions deemed “extremely unreasonable”. </p>
<p>The proposed judicial overhaul, which was designed to weaken the judicial branch, plunged Israel into one of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-protests-netanyahu-delays-judicial-reforms-over-fears-of-civil-war-but-deep-fault-lines-threaten-future-of-democracy-202787">most serious internal crises in its history</a>. An unprecedented pro-democracy civil movement mounted an extensive anti-government campaign aimed at stopping the judicial overhaul. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-protests-netanyahu-delays-judicial-reforms-over-fears-of-civil-war-but-deep-fault-lines-threaten-future-of-democracy-202787">Israel protests: Netanyahu delays judicial reforms over fears of 'civil war' – but deep fault-lines threaten future of democracy</a>
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<p>Each week, hundreds of thousands of Israelis demonstrated. These included several groups of reservists serving in the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) – including pilots and combat units – who refused to report to duty unless the government scrapped the judicial overall. </p>
<p>Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, presided over this internal turmoil. Yet rather than seeking a political compromise, his strategy was to sow political and social division. </p>
<p>Netanyahu and his ministers <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2023/0310/Israeli-protesters-Traitors-and-anarchists-or-best-and-brightest">denounced the pro-democracy demonstrators</a> as “traitors”, “anarchists”, and the “privileged elite”. In fact the protesters came from all walks of life: tech workers, lawyers, teachers, professionals, as well as members of the security services.</p>
<p>The pro-democracy campaigners, in turn, have referred to Netanyahu as the “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/03/world/middleeast/netanyahu-corruption-charges-israel.html">crime minister</a>”. This aims to highlight that the prime minister’s newfound impetus to weaken Israel’s judiciary arose after he became embroiled in a criminal trial. He faces multiple corruption charges: bribery, fraud and breach of trust, stemming from three separate cases. </p>
<p>Campaigners also repeatedly charged the government with violating the social contract with its citizens. They accuse the ultra-orthodox bloc, which Netanyahu relies on to hold on to power as part of his coalition, of using the judicial overhaul to preserve its economic interests and political influence and of permanently exempting ultra-orthodox males from serving in the IDF.</p>
<h2>Social resilience and political strains</h2>
<p>The murderous attacks launched by Hamas on October 7, which triggered the Israel-Hamas 2023 war, have had a unifying effect on Israeli society. The social divisions that marked the confrontations over the judicial overhaul have given way to a rare moment of social unity and rallying around the flag.</p>
<p>One of the key organisations opposing Netanyahu’s judicial overhaul, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/29/world/europe/israel-reservists-hamas-war.html#:%7E:text=Made%20up%20largely%20of%20veterans,of%20Prime%20Minister%20Benjamin%20Netanyahu.">Brothers in Arms</a>, has now turned its entire logistical, financial and human effort to support the war effort. It is also helping the communities that were devastated after more than 1,300 Israelis were murdered by Hamas terrorists and more than 230 kidnapped. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, several religious Jews volunteered with the ultra-orthodox <a href="https://zakaworld.org/">Zaka organisation</a>, which retrieves bodies and body parts after terror attacks. They have been tasked with the terrible duty of identifying victims. </p>
<p>But while Israeli society has pulled together, the country’s leadership has not risen to the occasion. Given the monumental military and intelligence failure Israel experienced on October 7, the Netanyahu government entered the war with a severe legitimacy deficit. And yet it took the prime minister five days to form an emergency government. This brought in Benny Ganz, former defence minister and the leader of the National Unity party.</p>
<p>Gantz will serve alongside Netanyahu and defence minister Yoav Gallant in the “war management cabinet”. Former chief of staff with the IDF, <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/experts/gadi-eisenkot">Gadi Eisenkot</a> (National Unity Party), and <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ron-dermer">Ron Dermer</a>, Israel’s minister for strategic affairs – and a close Netanyahu ally – will sit as observers. </p>
<p>The formation of the emergency government does not amount to a National Unity Government, which many Israelis had hoped for. Yair Lapid, the leader of the main opposition party, Yesh Atid, has so far opted not to join the government. He has justified his decision on two grounds: Netanyahu’s insistence on keeping the extreme right parties in the government and the proposal to form a double security cabinet without establishing clear lines of authority. </p>
<h2>Netanyahu’s day of reckoning?</h2>
<p>Whereas the ongoing political divide is significant, the more serious tension seems to be between Netanyahu and the security-military establishment. Since the October 7 attacks, heads of Israel’s key security organisations – the IDF and the intelligence service Shin Bet – have acknowledged their responsibility for the multilayered system failure that enabled the Hamas offensive. </p>
<p>In fact, Netanyahu has refused to assume any responsibility. Worse still, as the Israeli ground invasion into Gaza deepened, Netanyahu <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/netanyahu-blames-army-as-public-support-drains-away-xzh0sswtg">wrote on Twitter</a> (now renamed X) at 0100 on October 29: </p>
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<p>In contradiction to the lying claims: Under no circumstances and at no stage was Prime Minister Netanyahu warned about Hamas intending to go to war … Every defence official, including the heads of military intelligence and the Shin Bet [Israel’s security agency], believed Hamas was deterred and sought accommodation. This was the assessment that was presented time and time again to the prime minister and the cabinet by all defence officials and the intelligence community up to the outbreak of the war. </p>
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<p>The prime minister later deleted the message and apologised. But crucially, he did not say that what he tweeted was wrong. This leaves the strong impression that Netanyahu is still highly invested in passing the blame for Hamas’s attacks to secure his political and personal future. The fear is that this may affect his decisions in relation to the war. </p>
<p>This concern has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/31/netanyahus-political-future-looks-shakier-in-midst-of-israel-hamas-war">prompted calls</a> from business leaders, columnists, diplomats and former security personnel, to remove Netanyahu and replace the government, possibly through a <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/editorial/2023-10-30/ty-article-opinion/netanyahus-coalition-must-remove-him-immediately/0000018b-7cf1-d0f6-afeb-7ef5b1670000">constructive vote of no-confidence</a>. Netanyahu is hanging on, for now, but his day of reckoning will come, possibly even before the Israel-Hamas 2023 war is over.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216844/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amnon Aran does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many Israelis think their prime minister is incapable of leading their country at a time of such severe crisis.Amnon Aran, Professor of International Relations, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2167672023-11-01T14:01:57Z2023-11-01T14:01:57ZWhat the Israel Defence Forces can expect when they enter the ‘Gaza Metro’ tunnel system<p>Amid fears of yet another long war in the region, Israel has now begun its ground campaign in Gaza. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) has already claimed several successes in its three-week campaign, including the elimination of several terrorist leaders <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-says-it-fires-israeli-troops-pressing-gaza-ground-assault-2023-10-31/">including Ibrahim Biari</a>, who it described as a “ringleader” of the October 7 attacks, and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-soldier-freed-gaza-during-ground-operation-israeli-army-says-2023-10-30/">liberating at least one hostage</a> held by Hamas.</p>
<p>But Israel’s military commanders will know that this is unlikely to be a simple operation. Among the factors complicating their mission of eliminating Hamas is the “<a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-hamas-war-news-targets-tunnel-network-gaza-next-phase/">Gaza Metro</a>”, a vast network of interconnected tunnels within the region. Having invested heavily in subterranean infrastructure over the years, Hamas is counting on this network to aid its survival in the coming weeks.</p>
<p>Underground engineering has a long history in warfare. From <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4020-3105-2_3">antiquity to Vietnam</a>, a range of groups have used tunnels to gain an advantage. </p>
<p>Not only can they provide <a href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/elephant-tunnel-preparing-fight-win-underground/">concealment and freedom of movement</a>, but they also present a range of challenges for the attacking force – they can be hardened against any attacks from the surface. Storming underground networks can also be prohibitively difficult for an attacker, given the limited space available.</p>
<p>Sometimes they work. Sometimes they don’t. For instance, the threat posed by western airpower caused Islamic State (IS) to construct a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/04/14/the-islamic-state-has-tunnels-everywhere-its-making-them-much-harder-to-defeat/">large network of tunnels</a>. These tunnels made <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/tunnel-warfare-the-islamic-states-subterranean-war/">surveillance and airstrikes difficult</a> and were riddled with traps, making capture by ground forces dangerous and difficult. </p>
<p>These benefits only really work if the tunnels are defended, of course, which wasn’t always the case. For instance, in the 2015 battle for Sinjar, <a href="https://info.publicintelligence.net/USArmy-BattleforSinjar.pdf">the majority of IS fighters were long gone</a> by the time Kurdish land forces arrived to liberate the city.</p>
<h2>Established network</h2>
<p>Hamas’s tunnel network presents a unique problem for the IDF. There have been tunnel networks in Gaza for years. Initially used <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2012.xli.4.6">for smuggling</a>, they were quickly turned towards offensive uses, playing a role in <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/SystemFiles/Subterranean%20Warfare_%20A%20New-Old%20Challenge.pdf">kidnapping and weapons storage</a>. </p>
<p>The Hamas subterranean networks really began to evolve after 2012, when restrictions were lifted on the importing of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/12/30/israel-eases-ban-on-gaza-building-material">building materials</a> to the region. The militant group was able to <a href="https://www.jpost.com/operation-protective-edge/exclusive-us-intelligence-source-claims-hamas-has-many-more-tunnels-than-israel-says-368364">redirect construction supplies</a> away from civilian infrastructure projects to expand its underground presence. </p>
<p>While the tunnels <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14650045.2017.1399878">vary in quality</a>, many are well equipped and hardened, and deep enough to evade detection by ground penetrating radar.</p>
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<p>Unsurprisingly, key Hamas allies, <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202310301314">including Iran</a> are boasting about the Gaza Metro. The network provides the group with a haven and a means to move around the region unobserved. </p>
<p>It places leadership and organisational infrastructure out of reach from air attacks. The system is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/27/world/middleeast/palestine-gazans-hamas-food.html">laden with supplies</a> as well as weapons and fuel. </p>
<p>Defended, booby-trapped and likely to be populated with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/israel-hostages-hamas-explained.html">human shields and hostages</a> as well as fighters, they will be challenging for even a well-equipped and capable attacking force. </p>
<p>Yet, if not addressed, Hamas may continue to operate irrespective of what happens on the surface. Indeed, as many of the tunnels lead across the border, there is a risk of further incursions, rocket strikes and attacks on IDF forces. And, given the heavily urbanised nature of Gaza, much of the network is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/30/human-shield-israel-claim-hamas-command-centre-under-hospital-palestinian-civilian-gaza-city">beneath civilian infrastructure</a>, which further complicates Israeli operations.</p>
<p>Hamas is a proficient and prolific user of tunnels. But in honing its expertise, the group has also provided Israeli forces with a decades-long crash course in how to deal with their underground operations. </p>
<p>In addition to their own experience with Hamas tunnels, the IDF can also draw upon lessons from the war on terror, where coalition forces had to contend with both <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/04/14/the-islamic-state-has-tunnels-everywhere-its-making-them-much-harder-to-defeat/">natural and purpose-built tunnels</a>, and even US experiences with <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1083168.pdf#page=%5B34%5D">drug cartels burrowing</a> on their southern border with Mexico.</p>
<h2>Bitter experience</h2>
<p>While Hamas is counting on its tunnels to cause problems, Israel already has a range of solutions. It has already gained valuable experience in underground operations, having learned hard lessons from the past. A range of innovative <a href="https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-us-congressional-committee-approves-israel-tunnel-detection-aid-1001031996">purpose-built technologies</a> and strategies can be used to provide the IDF with a technological edge. </p>
<p>Some are simple, such as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/world/middleeast/egypts-floods-smuggling-tunnels-to-gaza-with-sewage.html">flooding tunnels with sewage</a>, whereas others are more complex, involving specialised engineering. Some solutions, such as <a href="https://www.ausairpower.net/GBU-28.html">ground-penetrating explosives</a>, might be difficult to use, given the presence of civilians.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1714715794515304516"}"></div></p>
<p>Israel has known about the tunnels for a long time and is taking them seriously. <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/israel-says-it-has-attacked-gunmen-inside-hamas-tunnels-and-releases-video-from-gaza-12997068">Recent operations</a> suggest that the time spent training for <a href="https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-simulators-training-idf-soldiers-for-tunnel-warfare-1001026216">this exact scenario</a> is going to pay off, at least to a certain extent. </p>
<p>But dealing with a network of more than <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-hamas-war-news-targets-tunnel-network-gaza-next-phase/">300 miles</a> is still going to represent a massive challenge, and storming or blocking off every part of the system is probably impossible.</p>
<p>Bitter experience has taught Israel most of Hamas’s tactics already – but this does not mean that the group doesn’t have more tricks up its sleeve. Hamas’s recent offensive success was rooted in the way it used a number of relatively low-level capabilities in concert.</p>
<p>For instance, paragliders, ground assaults and rockets only have a limited impact when used individually, but together, were used to devastating effect <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/catastrophic-success-hamas">on October 7</a>.</p>
<p>Now Hamas will be hoping for the same degree of success when acting on the defensive. Depending on how Israel chooses to deal with the issue, they may find their ground forces bogged down in slow-moving subterranean activity, or risk heavy civilian casualties if they simply choose to bomb or collapse the tunnels. </p>
<p>Almost any solution Israel chooses can be turned into a Hamas advantage: both in military and political terms.</p>
<p>Ultimately Israel has no perfect solution to the complex problem posed by the Hamas underground network. But years of dealing with the Hamas Metro means the IDF is not entirely unequipped to confront the challenge. </p>
<p>It seems inevitable that the next days and weeks will be a bitter and bloody struggle, both in the streets of Gaza and as deep as 70 metres below ground.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216767/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Morris does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hamas’s 300 mile network of tunnels under Gaza is going to prove difficult and perhaps deadly for Israeli troops attempting a ground war in the territory.Christopher Morris, Teaching Fellow, School of Strategy, Marketing and Innovation, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2163402023-10-30T12:32:05Z2023-10-30T12:32:05ZJewish response to Hamas war criticism comes from deep sense of trauma, active grief and fear<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556372/original/file-20231027-19-uknyr4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=34%2C0%2C3260%2C2198&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A house in a kibbutz In Be'eri, Israel, was the scene of part of the Hamas attacks on Oct. 7, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/baby-rocking-chair-is-left-in-a-house-that-was-destroyed-in-news-photo/1723823463">Amir Levy/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>In the wake of the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-rockets-airstrikes-tel-aviv-11fb98655c256d54ecb5329284fc37d2">Hamas terror attacks</a> on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, and the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/timeline-surprise-rocket-attack-hamas-israel/story?id=103816006">Israeli military response</a>, Jewish people in Israel and around the world have, at times, been posting on social media or otherwise saying publicly that people who <a href="https://time.com/6323730/hamas-attack-left-response/">criticize Israel’s response</a> <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/israel-hamas-war-leads-to-heated-debate-and-protests-on-college-campuses">are, or might be, antisemitic</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. asked <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=pgpEt8MAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Dov Waxman</a>, director of the <a href="https://www.international.ucla.edu/israel/home">Y&S Nazarian Center for Israel Studies</a> at the University of California, Los Angeles, to explain why many Jews might feel that way.</em></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556362/original/file-20231027-27-n69su.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A person holds a sign reading 'If you are silent when terrorists murder Israelis, stay silent when Israel defends itself.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556362/original/file-20231027-27-n69su.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556362/original/file-20231027-27-n69su.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556362/original/file-20231027-27-n69su.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556362/original/file-20231027-27-n69su.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556362/original/file-20231027-27-n69su.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556362/original/file-20231027-27-n69su.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556362/original/file-20231027-27-n69su.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A demonstrator holds a sign at a rally in support of Israel in Los Angeles on Oct. 10, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/demonstrators-gather-during-a-rally-in-support-of-israel-news-photo/1717388473">Robyn Beck/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong>Why do some people appear to equate criticism of Israel with antisemitism?</strong></p>
<p>There is a perception that many Jews have – including many Jews on the left who are themselves outspoken critics of Israel – that some of the responses, particularly on social media and on some college campuses, to what’s been taking place in Israel and Gaza have been callous and one-sided at best, and in some instances shockingly amoral. Some responses have celebrated Hamas’ attack, and others have solely blamed Israel for it. Still others have been silent about that attack and have only denounced Israel’s military response.</p>
<p>There’s a widespread feeling among Jews that these kind of reactions to the horrific atrocities perpetrated against Israeli civilians don’t reflect a commitment to universal values or human rights. Rather, they exonerate Hamas and treat the mass murder of Israeli civilians as somehow acceptable or legitimate. Some suspect that there’s a double-standard at play when people furiously condemn the killing of Palestinian civilians, but say nothing, or even excuse it, when Israeli civilians are killed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556373/original/file-20231027-17-f5zyfz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd of people stand together, with one woman turning her face downward while holding an Israeli flag." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556373/original/file-20231027-17-f5zyfz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556373/original/file-20231027-17-f5zyfz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556373/original/file-20231027-17-f5zyfz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556373/original/file-20231027-17-f5zyfz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556373/original/file-20231027-17-f5zyfz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556373/original/file-20231027-17-f5zyfz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556373/original/file-20231027-17-f5zyfz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People attend an Israel Solidarity Rally at the Holocaust Memorial in Miami Beach, Fla., on Oct. 10, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-attend-the-israel-solidarity-rally-organized-by-the-news-photo/1717558812">Marco Bello/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p><strong>What are Jewish people feeling and experiencing right now?</strong></p>
<p>Many people who aren’t Jewish are responding as if what’s been taking place is just another episode of Israeli-Palestinian violence. </p>
<p>But it’s different for many Jews. My own Facebook feed is pretty much just pictures of Israelis who have been killed or are currently held captive in Gaza. Many Jews have friends and family in Israel, so it’s very personal for them.</p>
<p>Many Jews are still grieving, shocked and traumatized by what happened on Oct. 7. But other people, in the U.S. and around the world, have already moved on from Oct. 7, and they are much more concerned about the war that Israel is now waging against Hamas and the devastating <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/15/1198908600/the-emotional-impact-of-the-israel-gaza-conflict-on-jewish-and-palestinian-ameri">impact it is having on Palestinians in the Gaza Strip</a>.</p>
<p>Jews are often looking for what people have to say about the massacres of Israeli civilians. Most want to hear an unequivocal condemnation of what Hamas did. Any attempt to contextualize it is seen as somehow rationalizing or minimizing Hamas’ attack, or a failure to recognize that Hamas is not simply seeking a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, but <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas">the destruction of Israel</a>. </p>
<p>And, on top of all this, Jews are becoming increasingly worried and fearful about being harassed or violently attacked by people blaming them for Israel’s actions, or just taking out their anger on them. There’s been a massive spike in antisemitic incidents in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-antisemitic-incidents-up-about-400-since-israel-hamas-war-began-report-says-2023-10-25/">United States</a> and in <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/global-antisemitic-incidents-wake-hamas-war-israel">many countries</a> since Oct. 7.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556374/original/file-20231027-25-nxu6li.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd of people stand, with one person holding a sign saying 'Bring our family back' with photos of people below the words." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556374/original/file-20231027-25-nxu6li.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556374/original/file-20231027-25-nxu6li.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556374/original/file-20231027-25-nxu6li.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556374/original/file-20231027-25-nxu6li.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556374/original/file-20231027-25-nxu6li.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556374/original/file-20231027-25-nxu6li.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556374/original/file-20231027-25-nxu6li.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Supporters of Israel demonstrate at a ‘Stand with Israel’ rally in New York City on Oct. 10, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-attend-a-stand-with-israel-vigil-and-rally-in-new-news-photo/1717510651">Ed Jones/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p><strong>What are the emotions behind this reaction?</strong></p>
<p>For many Jews, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/08/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-attack.html">specific nature of Hamas’ attack</a> – the mass slaughter and the way in which Hamas gunmen went systematically from house to house murdering families, and, in some cases, brutally butchering people – evokes deep, traumatic memories of the Holocaust.</p>
<p>What took place on Oct. 7 was the <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/was-hamass-attack-on-saturday-the-bloodiest-day-for-jews-since-the-holocaust/">largest single-day killing of Jews</a> since the Holocaust. </p>
<p>What many Jews see in Oct. 7, therefore, is not just a continuation of a long-standing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. What happened on Oct. 7, in the minds of many, is qualitatively different. </p>
<p>The fact that many other people don’t seem to recognize or acknowledge that, or respond as many Jews would hope, is why some Jews feel that there’s antisemitism lurking beneath the surface – that Israeli Jews and Zionists in general have been so dehumanized and demonized that it’s become somehow acceptable for them to be killed, even if they’re civilians, including children and babies. </p>
<p><strong>Is criticism of Israel actually antisemitic, or antisemitic under certain circumstances that people should learn to recognize or understand?</strong></p>
<p>For a long time now, Israeli officials and some right-wing, pro-Israel organizations and activists have had the knee-jerk response that any criticism of Israel is antisemitic, and they strive to delegitimize critics of Israel by labeling them antisemites. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, legitimate criticism of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, and peaceful activism in support of the Palestinians, is too often called antisemitic. </p>
<p>I think that most Jews regard criticism of Israel as legitimate, though many feel that it is sometimes excessive. Many, if not most, Jews actually criticize Israel. Nobody seriously insists that all criticism of Israel is antisemitic. The real question is, what kinds of criticism of Israel are acceptable and what might be considered antisemitic? When does criticism of Israel cross the line into antisemitism?</p>
<p>Much of the mainstream American Jewish community, including many major organizations, draws the line between <a href="https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitions-charters/working-definition-antisemitism">criticizing the actions and policies of Israeli governments</a> – toward the Palestinians, for example – and criticizing Zionism or Israel’s identity as a Jewish state. They regard the latter as delegitimizing Israel, and they see that as antisemitic.</p>
<p>In my view, it’s not necessarily antisemitic to criticize Zionism or oppose Jewish statehood, but it’s certainly true that some opposition to Zionism and Israel’s existence as a Jewish state is motivated by antisemitism.</p>
<p>In general, criticism of Israel or of Zionism is not, in and of itself, antisemitic, even if they are very harsh and unfair criticisms. However, such criticism is antisemitic when it draws on antisemitic tropes, antisemitic stereotypes or antisemitic ideas.</p>
<p>People can often draw on those things inadvertently – they don’t necessarily know what an antisemitic trope or stereotype is. So, for example, there is an old antisemitic trope called the <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/blood-libel-false-incendiary-claim-against-jews">blood libel</a> that dates back to the 11th century, claiming that Jews seek to kill Christian children to use their blood for ritual purposes. So when people say that Israel is deliberately killing Palestinian children, what some Jews are hearing is that Jews are once again being accused of wanting to kill children.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People wearing black clothes stand in front of a sign reading 'Jews for a free Palestine.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556326/original/file-20231027-22-ji659.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556326/original/file-20231027-22-ji659.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556326/original/file-20231027-22-ji659.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556326/original/file-20231027-22-ji659.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556326/original/file-20231027-22-ji659.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556326/original/file-20231027-22-ji659.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556326/original/file-20231027-22-ji659.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">American Jews in Chicago attend a service of remembrance for Israelis and Palestinians killed in fighting between Israel and Hamas.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/members-of-the-chicago-area-jewish-community-gather-at-a-news-photo/1732500854">Scott Olson/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong>After 9/11, some people criticized the U.S., not because it didn’t have the right to respond, but they criticized the nature of that response, whether it was appropriate, proportional and aimed at the right targets. Isn’t that what people are doing now regarding Israel’s response?</strong></p>
<p>Yes, and just as we accept that it’s legitimate for people to criticize the U.S., it’s also legitimate for people to criticize Israel, or for that matter, any country.</p>
<p>But there is a difference in that nobody really challenges the existence of the United States, or says there should not be a United States of America. So when people criticize the U.S. or events in American history, they’re doing that in the context of an implicit assumption that the U.S. has a right to exist and will continue to exist. </p>
<p>Whereas in the case of Israel, its existence and legitimacy are still challenged. There are still many people who would rather there not be a state of Israel, at least not a Jewish state. So criticisms of Israel can take on a different character in that context.</p>
<p>In the case of Israel, there’s another important difference. Because of Jewish history, especially the Holocaust, there is an abiding sense of vulnerability that many Jews feel. And therefore there’s a worry about Israel’s existence and future, and ultimately the security of Jews, that I don’t think applies to the United States and Americans. Americans don’t have that existential fear.</p>
<p>This all boils down to a deeply traumatized group of people whose trauma was reactivated on Oct. 7 and in the harrowing days since. There’s this intergenerational, unhealed trauma from the history of antisemitism and the Holocaust, with Jews having been vilified, demonized and attacked for so long. That’s their collective memory. And it’s been powerfully evoked, even if not always consciously, over the past few weeks.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216340/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dov Waxman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many people who aren’t Jewish are responding as if what’s been taking place is just another episode of Israeli-Palestinian violence. But it’s different for many Jews.Dov Waxman, Rosalinde and Arthur Gilbert Foundation Professor of Israel Studies, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2162972023-10-26T17:12:04Z2023-10-26T17:12:04ZDomicide: the destruction of homes in Gaza reminds me of what happened to my city, Homs<p><em>This article accompanies an <a href="https://theconversation.com/domicide-a-view-from-homs-in-syria-on-what-the-deliberate-destruction-of-homes-does-to-those-displaced-by-conflict-podcast-216374">episode of The Conversation Weekly</a> podcast featuring an interview with the author, Ammar Azzouz.</em> </p>
<hr>
<p>The Israeli bombardment of Gaza following the Hamas attack on southern Israel on October 7 has forced hundreds of thousands of Palestinians out of their homes. At least <a href="https://www.nrc.no/perspectives/2023/10-things-you-should-know-about-the-humanitarian-situation-in-gaza/#:%7E:text=At%20least%2043%20per%20cent,Works%20and%20Housing%20in%20Gaza">43% of all housing units</a> in the Gaza Strip have been either destroyed or damaged since the start of the hostilities, according to the Ministry of Public Works and Housing in Gaza.</p>
<p>Israel says that 1,400 people were killed in the Hamas attack on Israel and more than 220 taken hostage. Meanwhile, according to the health authorities in Hamas-run Gaza, more than <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/25/middleeast/al-jazeera-journalists-family-killed-in-gaza-strike-says-al-jazeera/index.html">6,500 people have been killed</a> in Israeli air strikes and more than 17,400 injured.</p>
<p>There is a modern term for what’s happening in Gaza. Domicide refers to the deliberate destruction of home, or the killing of the city or home. It comes from the Latin word <em>domus</em> which means home and <em>cide</em>, which is deliberate killing. </p>
<p>But, home here doesn’t only mean the physical, tangible built environment of people’s homes and properties, it also refers to people’s sense of belonging and identity. We are seeing in many conflicts and wars across the world that alongside the destruction of architecture, people’s sense of dignity and belonging is also being targeted. </p>
<p>There is a link between genocide and domicide: genocide refers to the killing of people and domicide to the erasure of their presence and their material culture. In 2022, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/10/domicide-must-be-recognised-international-crime-un-expert">a UN expert on housing</a> argued that domicide should be recognised as an international crime.</p>
<p>When people are continuously displaced from their homes, sometimes for decades, or even a lifetime, there’s a sense of grief and sorrow that their history is being erased. </p>
<h2>The destruction of Homs</h2>
<p>My home city of Homs, Syria, which I focus on in my <a href="https://theconversation.com/my-home-city-was-destroyed-by-war-but-i-will-not-lose-hope-how-modern-warfare-turns-neighbourhoods-into-battlefields-211627">research</a>, has been completely transformed since the 2011 uprising against the government of Bashar al Assad.</p>
<p>Over 50% of the neighbourhoods <a href="https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/download-manager-files/Homs%20RCP.pdf">have been heavily destroyed</a>, and over a quarter partially destroyed. Across the country, <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/situations/syria-situation#:%7E:text=Over%2012%20million%20Syrians%20remained,from%205.7%20million%20in%202021.">more than 12 million Syrians</a> have been displaced from their homes. Of these, 6.8 million people are displaced inside the country, and 5.4 million people live as refugees in neighbouring countries and beyond. </p>
<p>Domicidal campaigns like this also work to erase evidence that a community actually existed in a particular place and that it had a history and culture there. This is an attempt to write people out of history through destroying their homes and heritage in a way that’s systematic and deliberate. In Homs, for example, whole neighbourhoods that opposed the Assad regime were targeted and razed to the ground. In other cities, such as Damascus and Hama, entire neighbourhoods were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/01/30/razed-ground/syrias-unlawful-neighborhood-demolitions-2012-2013">wiped out</a> through new land and property laws which designate these neighbourhoods as “informal”. </p>
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<p><em>Listen to Ammar Azzouz talk <a href="https://theconversation.com/domicide-a-view-from-homs-in-syria-on-what-the-deliberate-destruction-of-homes-does-to-those-displaced-by-conflict-podcast-216374">about his research on The Conversation Weekly podcast</a>.</em> </p>
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<h2>Domicide in Gaza</h2>
<p>There is no need to compare Homs and Gaza, as each place has its own context and struggle. But I’ve been following the news continuously since the Hamas attack on Israel, and I can’t stop looking at the updates about the heavy Israeli bombing. The scale of destruction, the level of mass displacement is just so heartbreaking. Gaza has been described as an open prison and people in that open prison have been pushed away from their homes.</p>
<p>Israel says it has the right to defend itself, and is targeting Hamas positions, but the scale to which <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinian-gaza-war-hamas-hostages-macron-c2482817f230580c20b898bd65e5a4c3">ordinary people’s homes</a>, hospitals and “safe areas” have been hit means what’s happening in Gaza is absolutely domicidal. People living in the north of the Gaza Strip were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-tells-gazans-move-south-or-risk-being-seen-terrorist-partner-2023-10-22/">told by Israeli authorities to move to the south</a> of the territory to the supposed “safe areas”, but the southern areas <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/10/22/south-of-gaza-strip-pounded-by-air-strikes-as-civilians-seek-refuge">continue to be bombed too</a>. The bombardment is killing civilians, killing their everyday lives and causing the mass destruction of neighbourhoods. As we have seen in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UdH7aehL_IY">videos</a>, entire buildings have been levelled.</p>
<p>Israeli-British historian Avi Shlaim, an emeritus fellow at the University of Oxford, who was born in Baghdad, and is <a href="https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/historian-criticises-spineless-cancellation-israel-lecture">considered one of Israel’s critical “new historians</a>”, called <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-10-23/israeli-british-historian-avi-shlaim-western-powers-will-be-complicit-in-israels-attack-on-gaza.html">Israel’s actions</a> “state-sponsored terrorism”. Raz Segal, an Israeli historian, <a href="https://jewishcurrents.org/a-textbook-case-of-genocide">wrote</a>: “Israel’s genocidal assault on Gaza is quite explicit, open, and unashamed.” Others argue <a href="https://www.jta.org/2023/10/09/global/rishi-sunak-visits-synagogue-as-london-is-split-by-pro-israel-and-pro-palestinian-protests">vehemently against</a> any moral equivalence with the Hamas attacks. </p>
<h2>Catastrophe for Palestinians</h2>
<p>It’s not the first time that Palestinians in Gaza have had their homes destroyed. Many of the Palestinians who live in Gaza are people who have been displaced before. This is why many academics, activists, journalists and even <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OlOdM-qPCUI">Queen Rania Al Abdullah</a> of Jordan, call for context, for situating the Palestinian struggle within <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-war-six-key-moments-for-the-gaza-strip-216185">a history</a> of suffering, dispossession and forced displacement since the <em>Nakba</em> (catastrophe) in 1948.</p>
<p>When one million people are ordered to leave their homes it’s important to understand that these people have attachment to their places, to their neighbourhoods, to their streets. The impact of displacement and loss of home can live with people for their lifetime.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/domicide-9781350248113/">my interviews with people</a> from the city of Homs, I’ve heard many people say that even if they are still living in Homs, they feel like strangers in their own city, or they feel exiled inside their own city. For people such as the Palestinian diaspora or the Iraqi diaspora or the Syrian diaspora who are unable to return to their home countries, that suffering and pain and trauma of displacement continues.</p>
<p>I imagine people have different mechanisms to cope with these traumatic events, but that’s why it’s so important to have memory projects where people at least can reflect on what happened to heal and grieve, even when, sadly, many are unable to return and some spend their lifetime in exile.</p>
<p>After researching conflicts, wars, dictatorships and occupations for several years, I always say that the pain of people start as a headline in the news media, and turns into a footnote in history. Let us resist that, let us remember the life of every human being and keep the struggle for a free and just world for everyone.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216297/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ammar Azzouz receives funding from British Academy for his research fellowship at the university. </span></em></p>An architect from Homs in Syria on what happens to people whose homes are deliberately destroyed during war.Ammar Azzouz, British Academy Research Fellow, School of Geography and the Environment, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2161492023-10-26T16:29:43Z2023-10-26T16:29:43ZWhy the Israel-Gaza conflict is so hard to talk about<p><em>With the intensification of war in the Middle East comes an intense polarization within our institutions. A historian whose family was taken hostage by Hamas, and a geographer with family in the West Bank, get together to discuss a way forward.</em> </p>
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<p>It’s hard to escape the horrific images coming out of the Middle East. And it’s excruciating to take it all in.</p>
<p>First came the news of the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas on Israel, when 1,400 people were viciously attacked and murdered and at least 200 more were kidnapped and taken hostage. </p>
<p>Then came the retaliation by the state of Israel. Almost immediately, those living in Gaza, under the leadership of Hamas, were faced with an evacuation order for more than a million people. They had their food and water supplies cut off and 6,000 bombs were dropped on them in one week. So far, more than 5,000 Palestinians have been killed, and many more injured, in Israel’s assault against Hamas. </p>
<p>Many of us have been left with a feeling of helplessness as we watch in horror. For others, this witnessing has brought personal anguish, especially for those with ties to the region. </p>
<p>For all of us though, it’s raised intense challenges about how to talk about what is happening currently and what has been happening for decades.</p>
<p>There is so much polarization. There are those that feel their pain, loss and histories of Jewish people have been dismissed. On the other hand, those attempting to apply an anti-colonial lens to the issue are being shut down and labelled as antisemitic.</p>
<p>On <a href="https://dont-call-me-resilient.simplecast.com/episodes/why-the-israel-gaza-conflict-is-so-hard-to-talk-about"><em>Don’t Call Me Resilient</em></a>, our two guests today both say our institutions need to make room for a true dialogue — where decolonization is not a bad word. They say a contextual, historical analysis is crucial to moving forward — both at home and abroad. </p>
<p>Natalie Rothman is a professor of historical and cultural studies at the University of Toronto Scarborough. She grew up in Israel. She has friends and relatives in the region, including family members who have been taken hostage by Hamas.</p>
<p>Norma Rantisi is a professor of geography and urban planning at Concordia University who has done work in the region. She has family in the West Bank and is a member of the Academics for Palestine Concordia, and the Palestinian-Canadian Academics and Artists Network.</p>
<h2>Read more in The Conversation</h2>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/jewish-scholars-defend-the-right-to-academic-freedom-on-israel-palestine-157674">Jewish scholars defend the right to academic freedom on Israel/Palestine</a>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-we-define-and-use-the-word-terrorism-in-the-israel-hamas-war-matters-a-lot-215670">How we define and use the word terrorism in the Israel-Hamas war matters a lot</a>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-wests-double-standards-are-once-again-on-display-in-israel-and-palestine-215759">The West's double standards are once again on display in Israel and Palestine</a>
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<h2>Resources</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.ijvcanada.org/unveilingthechillyclimate/">Report: Unveiling the Chilly Climate – The Suppression of Speech on Palestine in Canada</a></p>
<p><a href="https://paradigmlostbook.com/summary-3/">Paradigm Lost: From Two-State Solution to One-State Reality</a></p>
<h2>Listen and follow</h2>
<p>You can listen to or follow <em>Don’t Call Me Resilient</em> on <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/dont-call-me-resilient/id1549798876">Apple Podcasts</a>, <a href="https://open.spotify.com/show/37tK4zmjWvq2Sh6jLIpzp7">Spotify</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL_mJBLBznANz6ID9rBCUk7gv_ZRC4Og9-">YouTube</a> or wherever you listen to your favourite podcasts. </p>
<p><a href="mailto:DCMR@theconversation.com">We’d love to hear from you</a>, including any ideas for future episodes. Join The Conversation on <a href="https://twitter.com/ConversationCA">Twitter</a>, <a href="https://www.instagram.com/dontcallmeresilientpodcast/">Instagram</a> and <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@theconversation">TikTok</a> and use #DontCallMeResilient.</p>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-572" class="tc-infographic" height="100" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/572/661898416fdc21fc4fdef6a5379efd7cac19d9d5/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216149/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A historian whose family was taken hostage by Hamas, and a geographer with family in the West Bank, get together to discuss a way forward in the Middle East.Vinita Srivastava, Host + Producer, Don't Call Me ResilientAteqah Khaki, Associate Producer, Don't Call Me ResilientLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2160312023-10-20T13:44:44Z2023-10-20T13:44:44ZGaza: first aid deliveries cross into the strip as Israeli troops mass on the border<p>The population of the Gaza Strip remains cut off from <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-has-been-blockaded-for-16-years-heres-what-a-complete-siege-and-invasion-could-mean-for-vital-supplies-215359">basic supplies</a> like water, food, and electricity since Israel’s defence minister, Yoav Gallant, ordered a <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/defense-minister-announces-complete-siege-of-gaza-no-power-food-or-fuel/">“complete siege”</a>. No aid has been able to reach Gaza and the first promised convoy has just been <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/humanitarian-convoy-into-gaza-delayed/7319008.html">delayed further</a>. </p>
<p>While sieges are not illegal under international humanitarian law, there <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2019-06-27-Sieges-Protecting-Civilians_0.pdf">are rules</a> prohibiting the starvation of civilians and regulating humanitarian relief operations. </p>
<p>Transporting humanitarian relief into besieged territories is a complex challenge, but such relief is essential to minimise human death and suffering. During the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing-notes/looking-back-siege-sarajevo-20-years-after">siege of Sarajevo</a> in the 1990s, 160,000 tons of aid were delivered in more than 12,000 flights. But the population of Gaza is much larger and meeting their needs will be far more challenging. </p>
<p>Israel is massing its forces at the borders of Gaza in apparent preparation for what it says will be a ground assault to eliminate Hamas as a political and military force. Yet the vast majority of people in Gaza are not militants and have a human right to food, water and fuel. </p>
<p>Even before the latest escalation, 80% of the 2.2 million people living in Gaza were <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20415675">in need of humanitarian assistance</a>. A fortnight of airstrikes and the state of siege imposed by Israel has exacerbated this situation. The UN secretary general, António Guterres, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1142542">has called for</a> “immediate unrestricted access of humanitarian aid to respond to the most basic needs of the people of Gaza”. </p>
<h2>Limited options</h2>
<p>At the centre of the demands for humanitarian access is the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/19/egypt-rafah-crossing-aid-enter-gaza-why-closed-israel-us-egypt">Rafah border crossing</a> between Egypt and Gaza. It is the only way to enter Gaza without going through Israel. </p>
<p>While humanitarian logistics uses all modes of transport, options are limited in this situation. Humanitarian aid by sea used to arrive mainly through the <a href="https://dlca.logcluster.org/state-palestine-211-port-ashdod-israel">Port of Ashdod</a>, which is in Israel. Gaza has a small fishing port, but this is completely unsuitable for larger deliveries. </p>
<p>Using aircraft to deliver supplies in an operation similar to the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/berlin-airlift">Berlin airlift</a> of 1948-49 might seem appropriate for a besieged territory. But this is impossible because of a lack of airfields in Gaza. The <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_5051">EU humanitarian air bridge</a> to Gaza flies into <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/eu-second-humanitarian-air-bridge-flight-aid-gaza-reaches-egypt_en">Al-Arish airport</a> in Egypt. </p>
<p>As there is no safe airspace, <a href="https://blogs.hanken.fi/humlog/2023/10/20/humanitarian-air-drops-an-option-of-last-resort/">dropping aid from planes</a> is also not possible. Humanitarian air drops are generally an <a href="https://www.wfp.org/stories/airdrops-humanitarian-emergency-un-world-food-programme-sudan-syria">option of last resort</a> because of their low capacity, high cost, and operational hazards. </p>
<p>The US president, Joe Biden, has announced an <a href="https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-hamas-war-biden/card/biden-says-egypt-to-allow-gaza-aid-trucks-through-rafah-crossing-riuxyAMoa2W7065LJ0oY">agreement with Egypt</a> to let up to 20 trucks of humanitarian assistance through the Rafah crossing. These would be the first deliveries of life-saving supplies into Gaza since the start of the siege. </p>
<p>Deliveries were intended to begin on Friday October 20, but the plans have now been <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/19/middleeast/israel-gaza-hamas-war-thursday-intl-hnk/index.html">delayed by at least a day</a>. In any case, with the sole option of supplying Gaza by road, 20 trucks are <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/19/who-says-aid-ready-to-go-into-gaza-as-israeli-bombardment-continues">“a drop in the ocean of need”</a>, according to WHO’s emergencies chief Mike Ryan. </p>
<p>The World Food Programme alone has stockpiled 310 tons of supplies in Egypt, which it estimates could feed <a href="https://www.wfp.org/stories/wfp-calls-safe-access-reach-palestinians-urgent-need?&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=organicpost&utm_campaign=webstory&utm_content=text">244,000 people for a week</a>. According to Martin Griffiths, under-secretary general for humanitarian affairs with the UN, <a href="https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/mr-martin-griffiths-under-secretary-general-humanitarian-affairs-and-emergency-relief-coordinator-security-council-briefing-situation-middle-east-including-palestinian-question">100 trucks a day</a> are necessary to meet needs across Gaza. </p>
<p>Even though humanitarian supplies are unable to reach Gaza, organisations have been moving them as close as possible to the Rafah crossing. Known as “<a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/JHLSCM-04-2016-0012/full/html">pre-positioning</a>”, this practice allows for a quicker response. </p>
<p>More than <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1142532">3,000 tons of supplies</a> are awaiting onward distribution on the Egyptian side of the border. These include anything from <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1142407">fortified biscuits to medical trauma kits</a>. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/19/world/middleeast/gaza-israel-aid-egypt-rafah.html">Under UN flags</a> and with international observers inspecting the cargo, it is hoped that aid can start flowing across the border soon.</p>
<h2>Dangerous and difficult</h2>
<p>But once inside Gaza, its progress will be impeded by the sustained air attacks. Much of the population of Gaza will be difficult to reach as a result as they seek shelter from the bombing. Israeli military operations endanger the lives of humanitarian personnel distributing aid and, despite their urgent needs, it remains dangerous for people to leave their shelter to collect vital supplies. </p>
<p>While the wellbeing of civilians takes priority according to <a href="https://emergency.unhcr.org/protection/protection-principles/humanitarian-principles">humanitarian principles</a>, it is hard to separate civilian needs in Gaza from politics and armed resistance. Israel is threatening to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/19/middleeast/israel-gaza-hamas-war-thursday-intl-hnk/index.html">stop all humanitarian access</a> if any aid reaches Hamas.</p>
<p>While some items such as infant formula are likely to only be useful for civilians, there is more debate about others, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/who-director-generals-opening-remarks-media-briefing-19-october-2023">such as fuel</a>. Essential for water desalination or power generators at hospitals, fuel is a life-saving supply. However, Israel is reluctant to permit its distribution as aid for fear of fuel deliveries helping Hamas. </p>
<p>Using local suppliers is an important strategy in humanitarian logistics. <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/JHLSCM-06-2020-0048/full/html">Localisation</a> has many benefits – including empowering the local economy. Increasingly, humanitarian assistance does not consist of handing out goods brought in from abroad. </p>
<p>Instead, agencies increasingly use <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/disa.12520">cash and vouchers</a> to allow people to make their own purchasing decisions. But there needs to be a functioning market in place for this approach to be suitable. This cannot be assumed in Gaza at present.</p>
<p>Ensuring a supply of fuel and clean water could also help businesses within Gaza to play a role in meeting the needs of the local population. The World Food Programme has continued to <a href="https://www.wfp.org/stories/wfp-calls-safe-access-reach-palestinians-urgent-need?&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=organicpost&utm_campaign=webstory&utm_content=text">work with local bakeries</a> to provide fresh bread to displaced people. </p>
<p>But with each day, more bakeries have to stop production because of a lack of fuel and ingredients and available supplies cannot be distributed because of destroyed infrastructure. </p>
<p>International support is needed to manage the complex logistics. The <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/palestinians-gaza-feel-safe-amid-unrelenting-israeli-airstrikes-104130523">Egyptian Red Crescent</a> and UN agencies need to play leading roles in coordinating the preparations for aid deliveries, combining regional and international logistics expertise.</p>
<p>But first <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/un-sec-gen-guterres-calls-immediate-humanitarian-ceasefire-gaza-2023-10-19/">a ceasefire</a> must be achieved to allow unimpeded access to all those in need and so ensure the safety of those engaged in humanitarian operations. A first United Nations Security Council resolution that would have called for humanitarian pauses <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-vetoes-un-security-council-action-israel-gaza-2023-10-18/">was vetoed</a> by the US.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216031/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Gaza desperately needs humanitarian aid, but it’s a complex situation which makes it hard for much-needed supplies to reach a people under siege.Sarah Schiffling, Deputy Director of the HUMLOG (Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management Research) Institute, Hanken School of EconomicsChris Phelan, Business School Associate Director, Edge Hill UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2157592023-10-19T15:38:08Z2023-10-19T15:38:08ZThe West’s double standards are once again on display in Israel and Palestine<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/the-wests-double-standards-are-once-again-on-display-in-israel-and-palestine" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>American president <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-in-israel-how-u-s-foreign-policy-has-played-a-big-role-in-the-israel-hamas-war-215384">Joe Biden</a> is among the latest western politicians to land in Tel Aviv in a show of support to Israel. </p>
<p>As Israel’s primary backer, the United States has sent <a href="https://apnews.com/article/united-states-israel-military-aid-2211b0c7bc27e13175d179a53fde3ac5">two aircraft carriers to the region and indicated it could deploy 2,000 American troops to Israel</a>. </p>
<p>Biden was also set to meet Palestinian and Arab leaders in the Jordanian capital Amman. But Jordan <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/israel-jordan-trip-biden-1.6998441">cancelled the meeting</a> after a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/18/what-is-israels-narrative-on-the-gaza-hospital-explosion">reported</a> airstrike on Oct. 17 killed around 500 people at a Gaza hospital.</p>
<p>In the days after Hamas launched <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-unprecedented-attack-against-israel-by-hamas-included-precise-armed-drones-and-thousands-of-rockets-215241">Operation Al-Aqsa Flood</a> against Israel, European and North American governments (with few exceptions) were quick to provide a unified and consistent message of support for Israel. </p>
<p>That message contains at least four interconnected elements: </p>
<p>— Israel is the victim of an unprovoked terrorist attack; </p>
<p>— Israel has the <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-remarks-to-the-press-on-president-bidens-upcoming-trip-to-israel-and-agreement-with-israel-to-develop-a-humanitarian-aid-plan-for-gaza">right to defend itself</a>; </p>
<p>— The West fully stands with Israel against the barbaric and wanton violence of the Palestinians;</p>
<p>— Hamas is to blame (either partially or fully) for all civilian deaths on both sides since they began these hostilities and forced Israel’s hand while hiding behind civilians.</p>
<h2>Palestinians erased</h2>
<p>There are a few important features of this message, but I want to focus on two that highlight the West’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/11/israel-palestine-war-biden-zelenskiy">double standards</a>. First, is the advancement of anti-Palestinian racism in the West. It is critical to underscore a salient feature of anti-Palestinian racism: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/08969205221130415">the silencing of the Palestinian critiques of Zionism and Israel</a>. </p>
<p>This is a dynamic which has its roots in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-a-un-resolution-to-commemorate-the-expulsion-of-palestinians-from-their-lands-change-the-narrative-listen-204799">Nakba (Arabic for catastrophe)</a> and erases Palestinian voices, history, presence, aspirations and identity from public discourse.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tantura-new-documentary-sparks-debate-about-israel-and-the-palestinian-nakba-189101">Tantura: New documentary sparks debate about Israel and the Palestinian Nakba</a>
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<p>Political, media and educational institutions in the West regularly sideline and silence Palestinians and their <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/11/29/cnn-fires-marc-lamont-hill-wake-remarks-criticizing-israel-calling-free-palestine/">supporters</a>. This is not just an issue among the right-wing or even centrists, but occurs across the political spectrum. Left-wing politics, including progressive spaces, that purport to be anti-racist often <a href="https://thenewpress.com/books/except-for-palestine">remain hostile to Palestinian voices</a></p>
<p>Here in Canada, a <a href="https://x.com/MayorOliviaChow/status/1711383767825211520?s=20">statement by progressive Toronto Mayor Olivia Chow</a> painted a rally in support of Palestinians as allegedly supporting violence and as a threat to the safety and security of Canadian Jews. That statement is still up on her X account. </p>
<p>This is precisely the anti-Palestinian narrative that has permeated in the West for years: that all support for Palestine is inherently violent and driven by antisemitic hatred of all Jews. Thus, in the name of anti-racism, Palestinians and their supporters are denounced <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/israel-palestine-flag-suella-braverman-b2427411.html">and even criminalized</a>.</p>
<h2>Differing reactions to civilian death</h2>
<p>Second, the double standard is on display in the reactions we have seen to the killing of Israeli civilians and the reactions — or lack thereof — to the killing of Palestinian civilians. Many are <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/9/western-leaders-accused-of-hypocrisy-over-response-to-palestine-ukraine">rightly highlighting western hypocrisy</a> by drawing comparisons to how the West responded to Russia’s war on Ukraine.</p>
<p>We need to look at how western governments have responded to the killing of Israeli civilians versus the killing of Palestinian civilians. For the Israeli state and Israeli victims, political, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/9/what-military-aid-the-us-is-sending-to-israel-after-hamas-attack">military</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-banks-tech-firms-offer-support-israel-victims-announce-aid-2023-10-13/">economic</a>, <a href="https://globalnews.ca/video/10029957/edmonton-oilers-face-criticism-for-stand-with-israel-message-at-nhl-game">cultural</a> and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/hollywood-declares-support-for-israel-as-disney-pledges-2-million/">social</a> institutions have fully mobilized to provide support.</p>
<p>The same is entirely absent for the Palestinians. For the Palestinians, there are no evacuations. Aircraft carriers are not sent to provide military support. Mainstream political and cultural discourse does not humanize Palestinian life and mourn Palestinian death. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trucks-carrying-aid-gaza-strip-arrive-rafah-crossing-witness-2023-10-17/">Aid relief is withheld</a> and used as a bargaining counter. Economic support is not forthcoming. Institutions do not send Palestinians messages of support. </p>
<p>In some ways, this silence is not surprising. No one expressing support for Israel risks losing their livelihood. Many who have voiced solidarity with Palestinians have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2023/oct/10/philadelphia-sports-reporter-loses-job-pro-palestinian-comments">lost their jobs</a>, <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2023/10/israel-gaza-war-manufactured-consent.html">been rebuked</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/67140471">suspended</a> and <a href="https://theintercept.com/2018/11/22/israel-boycott-canary-mission-blacklist/">faced doxing</a>.</p>
<h2>Western self-interest</h2>
<p>States are not moral entities, but act purely in self-interest. Palestinian freedom and liberation does not align with <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-says-the-u-s-would-have-to-invent-an-israel-if-it-didnt-exist-why-210172">the interests of the U.S.-led West</a>. </p>
<p>Therefore, western institutions repeat the increasingly weak talking point that “terrorism” is the cause of all the violence. This talking point is used to provide Israel with the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/video/-biden-is-giving-the-green-light-to-israel-to-kill-civilians-gaza-resident-says-195827781571">green light</a> to unleash uninhibited violence against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, West Bank and Jerusalem.</p>
<p>The idea that western governments and institutions are horrified by violence against civilians rings hollow because of their silence when it comes to violence against Palestinian civilians and other groups around the world. </p>
<p>For decades, Palestinians have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-nakba-75-years-after-losing-their-home-the-palestinians-are-still-experiencing-the-catastrophe-205413">expelled from their land</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/07/11/the-lopsided-death-tolls-in-israel-palestinian-conflicts/">killed and maimed</a> in <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties">great numbers</a>, including in <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220914-40-years-on-survivors-recall-horror-of-lebanon-s-sabra-and-shatila-massacre">mass atrocities</a> and many well-documented cases of sexual violence and <a href="https://www.plutobooks.com/9781783711857/captive-revolution/">torture in Israeli prisons</a>. This only scratches the surface of the violence that Palestinians continuously experience, and have experienced, since well before Hamas was formed.</p>
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<p>Palestinians continue to suffer what Palestinian scholars Nahla Abdo and Nur Masalha have called an <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/ca/oral-history-of-the-palestinian-nakba-9781786993502/">ongoing Nakba and genocide of the Palestinian people</a>. Yet, when Palestinians suffer, as they are now in Gaza, what Israeli historian and expert on genocide Raz Segal has called “<a href="https://jewishcurrents.org/a-textbook-case-of-genocide">a textbook case of genocide</a>,” western governments remain silent. </p>
<p>There was no western outrage when Israel <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/16/middleeast/israel-palestinian-evacuation-orders-invs/index.html">ordered more than a million Palestinians to leave their homes in 24 hours</a>. In February, Israeli settlers went on an <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-64784053">hours-long rampage</a> in the Palestinian town of Huwara after two settlers were shot by a Palestinian. Western condemnations of the rampage were muted or non-existent. </p>
<p>Hundreds of scholars and practitioners of international law, conflict studies and genocide studies are now <a href="https://twailr.com/public-statement-scholars-warn-of-potential-genocide-in-gaza/">sounding the alarm</a> about the possibility of genocide being perpetrated by Israeli forces against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.</p>
<p>The stories of Palestinian lives that end with the sudden drop of a bomb are not told. Palestinian voices that explain the settler colonialism they suffer remain sidelined. And Palestinian aspirations for decolonized liberation are denied.</p>
<p>The West’s institutional reaction is not just hypocritical, it is an expression of where western governments stand on the question of Palestine. The West is an active participant in the erasure of Palestine, and when moments of intensified violence like this happen, the West’s true position becomes clear for all to see.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/14/tens-of-thousands-rally-around-the-world-in-support-of-israel-and-palestinians">people power across the world</a>, including <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-israel-a-democracy-heres-what-americans-think/">in the U.S.</a>, provide reason for hope. Increasingly, many in the West are disgusted and ashamed by the erasure of Palestine and the killing of Palestinian civilians. </p>
<p>More people are joining the protests and calling for the siege on Gaza to be lifted once and for all. More people power is needed to demand that governments do everything they can to resolve this issue, which can only begin to move towards peace and justice when the Palestinian people are free.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215759/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>M. Muhannad Ayyash does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Western stances and comments on civilian deaths in Israel and Palestine highlight the double standard that permeates across western governments and institutions.M. Muhannad Ayyash, Professor, Sociology, Mount Royal UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2154652023-10-19T14:31:46Z2023-10-19T14:31:46ZIsrael and Palestine: views of students and youth activists shouldn’t be dismissed – they have shaped the conversation for years<p>University campuses have long been hubs of political activism. As young people form their own opinions away from their parents, many act passionately for causes they believe in. This includes the situation in Israel and Palestine, a regular feature of student debate in the US, UK and across Europe for decades.</p>
<p>This latest, brutal round of fighting between Israel and Hamas has heightened campus tensions <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/13/us-campuses-in-uproar-as-israel-palestine-conflict-exposes-divide">dramatically</a>.</p>
<p>Jewish students have said <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/as-a-jewish-student-at-oxford-i-fear-for-my-safety-c52qprrqs">they fear for their safety</a> due to incidents of antisemitism on campus. Others have reported feeling let down by university leadership for <a href="https://www.varsity.co.uk/news/26241">vague statements</a> about the conflict. The UK’s education minister, Gillian Keegan, has written to <a href="https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/keegan-writes-v-cs-over-concerns-jewish-students-welfare">university vice-chancellors</a> in England about concern for the welfare of Jewish students. </p>
<p>Palestinian students have also expressed concerns about <a href="https://www.brismes.ac.uk/news/brismes-statement-on-the-attack-on-free-speech-on-uk-campuses">restrictions on their speech</a> when it comes to supporting Palestinian liberation. Students at SOAS University of London were <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/10/17/london-university-temporarily-suspends-students-gaza-rally/">temporarily suspended</a> following a Gaza solidarity rally. While SOAS said the suspension was due to the students’ conduct during the rally and not the rally’s message, the SOAS Palestine Society declared this a “targeting act of political repression”.</p>
<p>University leadership often struggles to balance student safety and free speech on such a polarising issue, leading to inflammatory headlines. But this should not be a reason to dismiss campus debate. Students and young people have always been important in shaping the conversation on Israel and Palestine.</p>
<h2>The history of youth activism on Israel-Palestine</h2>
<p>Associations of Jewish youth in <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/he-x1e24-alutz-2">Europe and the US</a> moved with the first major wave of Jewish immigration between 1881 and 1903 to the British Mandate of Palestine, to work the land and build a Jewish state. Later, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2018/4/11/what-palestinians-can-teach-us-about-popular-resistance">first Palestinian intifada in 1987</a>, a largely nonviolent uprising, was mainly formed of children and teenagers. </p>
<p><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/pech.12162">I have researched</a> the rise of Israeli-Jewish anti-occupation activism over the last two decades. Until the turn of the millennium, liberal Zionist groups in Israel were the largest and most vocal element of the Israeli peace movement. They called for a two-state solution for the security of Israel.</p>
<p>A turning point came in 2000 as these groups lost traction, unsure how to respond to the increasingly violent <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-al-aqsa-remains-a-sensitive-site-in-palestine-israel-conflict-215294">Al-Aqsa</a> intifada. In their place emerged more radical groups, drawing on Palestinian narratives of anti-occupation, apartheid and settler colonialism.</p>
<p>Driven by younger Israeli activists, this more radical faction included groups such as <a href="https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/uri-gordon-anarchists-against-the-wall">Anarchists Against the Wall</a>, a direct action group formed in Israel in 2003. Their members – including students and university lecturers – joined Palestinian activists in resisting the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-middle-east-jerusalem-israel-west-bank-2ce5d9956b729ad6169c880d00068977">separation barrier</a> dividing the West Bank from Israel. </p>
<p>This radical faction’s numbers have never been more than a few hundred. They are marginalised by Israeli society and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/hundreds-protest-evictions-police-violence-in-east-jerusalem/">subjected to police and army violence</a>. But they have had a notable influence in normalising anti-occupation sentiment within the peace movement in Israel.</p>
<p>In 2009, Israeli activists initiated sit-ins and demonstrations with Palestinians who were threatened with eviction from their homes in the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of <a href="https://www.972mag.com/the-rise-of-the-sheikh-jarrah-protest-movement-as-told-by-a-veteran-activist/">Sheikh Jarrah</a>. Some of these activists were students at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a short bus ride from the neighbourhood. </p>
<p>Young Jews in the UK have also taken more progressive views on Israel and Palestine. A recent <a href="https://www.jpr.org.uk/reports/conflict-israel-and-gaza-what-do-jews-uk-think">report by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research</a> found that more secular, younger, university-educated respondents were more likely to be critical towards Israel than older, more religious or non-university educated Jews. </p>
<p>The anti-occupation voice of the younger generation is evident in the emergence of progressive Jewish groups such as Yachad, formed in 2011, and Na'amod in 2018.</p>
<h2>Students and radical activism</h2>
<p>Professor Hank Johnston, a leading scholar of social and political movements, explains that younger members of social movements are often more militant and passionate in their demands and tactics. This is true regardless of their ideological underpinnings.</p>
<p>Young activists are <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2075-4698/9/3/55">willing to take greater risks</a> for the cause they are supporting. They may not have the material resources of the older generations, but they have more disposable time, energy and ability to mobilise others.</p>
<p>As I argue <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/israeli-peace-movement-9780755643707/">in my book</a> on the changing Israeli peace movement, it is often the more radical groups who mobilise quicker in periods of tension. In doing so, they set the agenda, influencing moderate groups to take up more confrontational ideas. </p>
<p>For example, members of the Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace held illegal meetings with members of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/21/uri-avnery-obituary">in the 1980s</a>. These activists called for negotiations with Palestinians long before liberal Zionist groups mobilised under the banner of a two-state solution.</p>
<p>Since the second intifada (2000-2005), more radical Israeli groups framed the situation in Israel and Palestine as apartheid. Only years later did other Israeli human rights groups, such as <a href="https://www.btselem.org/publications/fulltext/202101_this_is_apartheid">B'Tselem</a>, officially follow suit.</p>
<p>These radical groups and viewpoints, in part driven by young people, have <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/pech.12162">influenced the narratives in Israel</a>. They are why campus tensions around the conflict are important to pay attention to. The historic significance of young voices suggest they could shape the agenda for the future.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-war-updates-on-the-conversations-coverage-of-the-conflict-215285">Israel-Hamas war: updates on The Conversation's coverage of the conflict</a>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leonie Fleischmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An expert looks at the history of youth activism on Israel and Palestine.Leonie Fleischmann, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2156402023-10-18T12:32:22Z2023-10-18T12:32:22ZHamas was unpopular in Gaza before it attacked Israel – surveys showed Gazans cared more about fighting poverty than armed resistance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554369/original/file-20231017-19-wp5fj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=25%2C155%2C5725%2C3673&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Who speaks for the Palestinians of Gaza? </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/woman-walks-past-a-mural-painting-depicting-fellow-news-photo/1203649009?adppopup=true">Mohammed Abed/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Amid the escalation of the Israel-Hamas war, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/16/opinions/israel-hamas-gaza-palestinians-oppose-terror-mohammed/index.html">observers in the region and internationally</a> <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2023/10/17/some-palestinians-support-hamas-attack-on-israel/71201312007/">continue to make assumptions</a> about Gazan public support for Hamas. </p>
<p>Mistaken assumptions such as those by U.S. presidential candidate Ron DeSantis, claiming that all Gazans are “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/desantis-israel-hamas-gaza-palestinian-refugees-water-73a468f8d030e083844d16e82684c406">antisemitic</a>,” or those that blame Gazans for “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/desantis-israel-hamas-gaza-palestinian-refugees-water-73a468f8d030e083844d16e82684c406">electing Hamas</a>” may shape debates not only on how the war is perceived, but also over relief plans for Gazans in the months ahead.</p>
<p>Any <a href="https://x.com/JacobMagid/status/1714005428428816552?s=20">reconstruction efforts</a> or <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/16/1206100831/israel-hamas-war-gaza-water-blinken-palestine">aid distribution</a> might be weighed against fears of Hamas insurgents within the Gazan population.</p>
<p>In my own research into Jihadi-Salafism and Islamism, I found that militant movements <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/33569/chapter-abstract/288035047?redirectedFrom=fulltext">provoked military interventions to exploit</a> the chaos that ensues. Moreover, such groups often <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/report/isis-governance-syria">claim to govern</a> in the “legitimate” interests of those they dominate <a href="https://merip.org/2018/10/mosul-will-never-be-the-same/">even if those populations reject</a> their rule.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/10/a-major-pivot-in-hamas-strategy/">several commentators have observed</a>, Hamas likely hopes to not just encourage a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/war-hamas-always-wanted">disproportionate response</a> from Israel, but also to use the violent aftermath of intervention to cultivate continued Gazan dependence upon it and to distract from its own <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/07/gaza-pressure-builds-hamas-solve-power-crisis-amid-heat-wave">domestic policy failures</a>.</p>
<h2>Politicians and Gaza</h2>
<p>Leaders on both sides of the conflict have tried to make justifications for their actions. Often, they use their own perception of Gazan public opinion to support their own policy objectives. </p>
<p>For example, Ismail Haniyeh, chief of Hamas’ political bureau, <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231009-haniyeh-outlines-context-and-objectives-of-hamas-operation-al-aqsa-flood/">claimed that Hamas’ actions represented Gazans</a> and “the entire Arab Muslim community.” For Haniyeh, Hamas’ usage of violence was on behalf of Palestinians <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/17/israeli-forces-attack-palestinian-worshippers-at-al-aqsa-mosque">who had been assaulted</a> in the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in September 2023, or <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/former-hamas-chief-meshaal-says-israeli-captives-include-high-ranking-officers-2023-10-16/">have suffered</a> at the hands of <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/israel-military-launches-largest-attacks-on-west-bank-in-nearly-20-year">Israeli security forces</a>, or for the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/6/palestinian-killed-as-israeli-settlers-attack-west-bank-town-of-huwara">settlers</a> in the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-65973383">West Bank</a>. </p>
<p>Israeli President Isaac Herzog, meanwhile, suggested that <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/israeli-president-says-no-innocent-154330724.html">all Gazans bore collective responsibility for Hamas</a>. As a result, he concluded, Israel would act to preserve its own self-interest against Gaza and its people.</p>
<p>The Biden administration, careful not to condemn the Israeli bombardment, has sought a broader approach toward the escalation. In an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/15/us/politics/biden-israel-gaza.html">interview</a> and on social media, <a href="https://x.com/POTUS/status/1713525125478228437">U.S. President Joseph Biden observed</a> that “the overwhelming majority of Palestinians had nothing to do with Hamas’ appalling attacks, and [instead] are suffering as a result of them.” <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/president-joe-biden-2023-60-minutes-transcript/">Such suffering, Biden noted</a>, required the eventual lifting of the “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67051292">complete siege</a>” implemented by Israel against Gaza.</p>
<p>In each example, politicians used their assumptions about Gazans to support their policies. But the people in Gaza experience these policies far differently. </p>
<h2>Gazans hold mixed views of Hamas</h2>
<p>Reviewing Gazan public opinion over time reveals an ongoing sense of hopelessness living under the Israeli blockade.</p>
<p>A June 2023 poll conducted by <a href="https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/192">Khalil Shikaki</a>, professor of political science and director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, <a href="https://pcpsr.org/en/node/944">indicated that 79% of Gazans supported</a> armed opposition to Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. A Washington Institute poll from July 2023 found that only <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/polls-show-majority-gazans-were-against-breaking-ceasefire-hamas-and-hezbollah">57% of Gazans held a “somewhat positive” opinion of Hamas</a>.</p>
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<p>Further reading of those polls suggests a more nuanced story. Consider that in 2018, some <a href="https://www.unicef.org/sop/what-we-do/health-and-nutrition">25% of women in Gaza risked death in childbirth</a>, 53% of Gazans lived in poverty, and essential health care supplies were stretched thin. That same year, Shikaki found an increasing number of Gazans dissatisfied with Hamas’ government, with almost 50% hoping to <a href="https://pcpsr.org/en/node/740">leave Gaza entirely</a>.</p>
<p>In the June 2023 <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/polls-show-majority-gazans-were-against-breaking-ceasefire-hamas-and-hezbollah">Washington Institute poll</a>, 64% of Gazans demanded improved health care, employment, education and some sense of normalcy instead of Hamas’ claimed “resistance.” Over 92% of Gazans expressed outright anger at their living conditions.</p>
<p>Additionally, as Shikaki reported, over 73% believed the Hamas government to be corrupt. Yet, Gazans saw little hope for electoral change. With no election since 2006, a majority of Gazans alive today <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/gaza-strip/#people-and-society">were not old enough to have voted for Hamas</a>. </p>
<p>Support of armed resistance was not always present. When Hamas openly fought the Palestinian Authority – which governs the West Bank and questioned the legitimacy of Hamas’ victory – and seized control over the Gaza Strip in 2007, <a href="https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/230">over 73% of Palestinians</a> opposed that seizure and any further armed conflict.</p>
<p>At that time, fewer than one-third of Gazans supported any military action against Israel. Over 80% <a href="https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/231">condemned kidnapping, arson and indiscriminate violence</a>.</p>
<h2>Gazans’ shift in support for Hamas</h2>
<p>If read over time, polls of Gazans from 2007 to 2023 tell a story. They help make clear that Gazan support for armed resistance grew alongside increasing frustration, anger and a sense of hopelessness with any political solution to their suffering.</p>
<p>In 2017, scholar <a href="https://cmes.fas.harvard.edu/people/sara-roy">Sara Roy</a>, studying the Palestinian economy and Islamism, <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v39/n12/sara-roy/if-israel-were-smart">explored Gazan tolerance of Hamas, noting</a> “what is new is the sense of desperation, which can be felt in the boundaries people are now willing to cross, boundaries that were once inviolable.” </p>
<p>Gazans, Roy argued, particularly the 75% under the age of 30, felt widely varying affinities toward Hamas’ ideology or claims to Islamic legitimacy. Hamas, they noted, paid salaries when few others could. Risking targeting by Israeli soldiers was a calculated and tolerable hazard of hire if it meant a paycheck.</p>
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<img alt="A man in a cap paints the word Hamas in large letters on a wall." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554406/original/file-20231017-15-ig0cva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554406/original/file-20231017-15-ig0cva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554406/original/file-20231017-15-ig0cva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554406/original/file-20231017-15-ig0cva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554406/original/file-20231017-15-ig0cva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554406/original/file-20231017-15-ig0cva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554406/original/file-20231017-15-ig0cva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A supporter of Hamas shows his support in Gaza ahead of the 2006 elections.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinian-supporters-of-hamas-movement-write-slogans-for-news-photo/56511960?adppopup=true">Mahmud Hams/AFP via Getty Images.</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 2019, <a href="http://pcpsr.org/en/node/752">27% of Gazans blamed</a> Hamas for their living conditions. In that same poll, <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/peacetoprosperity/">55% supported any peace plan that would include</a> a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as a capital and an Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories. </p>
<p>By 2023, when <a href="https://pcpsr.org/en/node/944">Gazans polled</a> by Shikaki expressed their support for armed resistance, they did so in the belief that only such resistance – not electoral politics – would provide relief from the Israeli blockade and siege. At the same time, however, those polled expressed exhaustion with the corruption of Hamas and the ongoing unemployment and poverty of Gaza.</p>
<h2>Palestinian desperation and Hamas’ objectives</h2>
<p>Any chance for a simple return to normalcy seems lost for many Gazans, as Hamas claims to act as their “<a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231009-haniyeh-outlines-context-and-objectives-of-hamas-operation-al-aqsa-flood">legitimate resistance</a>.”</p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/war-gaza-and-death-two-state-solution">peace negotiations stalled</a> in Gaza since 2001, elections <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/84509">postponed</a>, movement out of Gaza <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67121372">impossible</a>, and now an escalating <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/16/gazas-dire-humanitarian-crisis-explained">humanitarian crisis</a>, an entire generation of Gazans is left with few options.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554403/original/file-20231017-17-3hn1z2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Several people, including women and children, running out of their homes. Behind them are some partially damaged buildings." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554403/original/file-20231017-17-3hn1z2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554403/original/file-20231017-17-3hn1z2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554403/original/file-20231017-17-3hn1z2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554403/original/file-20231017-17-3hn1z2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554403/original/file-20231017-17-3hn1z2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554403/original/file-20231017-17-3hn1z2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554403/original/file-20231017-17-3hn1z2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Palestinian families rush out of their homes after Israeli airstrikes targeted their neighborhood in Gaza City, central Gaza Strip, on Oct. 17, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXIsraelPalestinians/03fd329d897d481d8297182a223fd77a/photo?Query=gaza&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=34246&currentItemNo=2">AP Photo/Abed Khaled</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>“<a href="https://www.newsweek.com/im-gaza-i-cant-get-milk-my-crying-baby-i-feel-helpless-1835192">There is death everywhere</a>,” said 33-year-old Omar El Qattaa, a photographer based in Gaza, “and memories erased.” </p>
<p>Though 2023 polling indicated that a majority of Gazans were opposed to breaking the ceasefire with Israel, Hamas moved forward with its October attacks against their popular will. The sense of desperation felt by El Qatta, and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-residents-who-have-lost-family-fear-more-destruction-ground-assault-looms-2023-10-15/">millions of other Gazans</a>, risks becoming instrumentalized by Hamas. As <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/experts/matthew-levitt">Matthew Levitt</a>, a scholar and researcher of Hamas writes, Hamas sees politics, charity, political violence and terrorism as <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300122589/hamas/">complementary and legitimate tools</a> to pursue its policy goals. </p>
<p>As Khaldoun Barghouti, a Ramallah-based Palestinian researcher, <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2023/10/17/some-palestinians-support-hamas-attack-on-israel/71201312007/">notes</a>, the ongoing bombardment by Israel has softened Gazan frustration with Hamas – at least in the short term. Such attacks “turned blame to Hamas (over the attacks in Israel) into more anger toward Israel.” </p>
<p>How this will translate into support for alternatives to Hamas in the months ahead remains to be seen. Much will depend on how international stakeholders regain the trust of Gazans while assisting them with finding meaningful alternatives to a government and militant movement they once considered corrupt and unable to meet their basic needs.</p>
<p><em>This article was updated on Oct. 30, 2023 to correct the spelling of Matthew Levitt.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215640/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nathan French does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Politicians have used their assumptions about Gazans to support their policies. But the people in Gaza experience these policies far differently, writes a scholar of Islamism.Nathan French, Associate Professor of Religion, Miami UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2158962023-10-18T09:08:35Z2023-10-18T09:08:35ZPolitics with Michelle Grattan: Kim Beazley on Albanese’s US trip, Biden in the Middle East, and the Voice’s defeat<p>The prime minister heads to Washington next week for a state visit. Talks between Anthony Albanese and President Joe Biden will canvass progress on implementing the AUKUS agreement, Ukraine, China and the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, and of course the Middle East crisis. Biden will have just returned from his visit to Israel and will brief the PM on the situation, which has worsened by the day.</p>
<p>In this podcast, Kim Beazley, defence minister during the Hawke government, former Labor leader, and former Australian ambassador to the US, joins The Conversation to talk about the Albanese visit and the international situation.</p>
<p>On AUKUS, progress has been slowed by the need to get approval for the export of sensitive military technology, and there have been some dissident voices over the supply of US-built Virginia Class nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. </p>
<p>“We’ve got a lot to move along,” Beazley says. “The most important thing, at least to me at the moment, to move along is the process by which the approvals are given for the export of nuclear materials.” </p>
<p>On the Middle East, Beazley, from their contact in the past, is very impressed with Biden’s grasp of the detail of that fraught region. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I used to see Biden modestly regularly when I was ambassador to the US, and he was enormously impressive in his knowledge on Middle Eastern matters. I remember him having a most interesting discussion with then foreign minister Bob Carr, which I attended, on a shift in Australia’s position from opposing the Palestinian resolution in the UN […] to abstaining (which really infuriated the Americans when that was done). But Biden explaining his perception of Palestinian politics and attitudes – it was enormously sophisticated. </p>
<p>We all get caught up in this Republican propaganda […] that the president is mentally falling apart - has to be said that in this area he had great acuity. […] Biden moving into the Middle East is a totally confident man. He’s confident he knows all the nuances and confident that when he gets the intelligence about what is actually happening on the ground, he’ll have an erudite opinion on it. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>On the Voice’s defeat, Beazley, a Western Australian, says he feels “terribly depressed”. He sees the result as damaging not just for Indigenous Australians, but for Australia’s reputation abroad: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>This is not about government. This is about us, it’s about we as an Australian people and it’s not actually a good ad in the region around us that our response would be ungenerous.</p>
<p>Now the people come out and say, Oh, come off it, that’s just an elite thinking; it’s got nothing to do with the streets. That’s true. I don’t think anybody in the countries around us, or for that matter in the United States will be giving a minute’s thought to the referendum on its result. But every single elite will be. And it’s actually elites that make decisions.</p>
<p>You know, I was depressed by the way race seemed to be a factor in discussion about this whole proposition. This whole proposition had nothing to do with race. It had absolutely everything to do with originality. Who was here? Well, they have been here for 70,000 years.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215896/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In this podcast, Kim Beazley joins The Conversation to talk about the Albanese visit and the international situation.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.