tag:theconversation.com,2011:/es/topics/moscow-31780/articlesMoscow – The Conversation2024-03-25T18:55:03Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2265592024-03-25T18:55:03Z2024-03-25T18:55:03ZWhy Russia fears the emergence of Tajik terrorists<p>It has emerged that the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68652380">four gunmen charged</a> in the murder of at least 139 concert-goers at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall theatre <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68652380">were all citizens</a> of the small post-Soviet nation of Tajikistan in Central Asia. </p>
<p>Does their nationality have anything to do with their alleged terrorism? Many Russians probably think so.</p>
<p>Tajikistan, a landlocked country of 10 million sandwiched between Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and China, is the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/tajikistan/">most impoverished</a> of the former Soviet republics. Known for its corruption and political repression, it has chafed under the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/tajikistans-eternal-ruler-emomali-rakhmon/a-55234401">iron-fisted rule</a> of President Emomali Rahmon since 1994. </p>
<p>There are estimated to be well over <a href="https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/society/20220214/more-than-3-million-tajik-citizens-reportedly-officially-registered-in-russia-last-year">three million Tajiks</a> living in Russia, about one-third of the total Tajik population. Most of them hold the precarious status of “<a href="https://iwpr.net/global-voices/pressure-central-asian-migrants-russia-grows">guest workers</a>,” holding low-paying jobs in construction, produce markets or even cleaning public toilets. </p>
<p>While Russia’s <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/03/04/russias-population-nightmare-is-going-to-get-even-worse">declining population</a> has led to increasing reliance on foreign workers to fill such needs within its labour force, the attitude of Russians towards natives of Central Asia and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Caucasus">the Caucasus region</a> is generally negative. </p>
<p>It’s similar to the American stereotype about Mexicans so infamously expressed by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime/">Donald Trump</a> in 2015: “They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.” </p>
<p>Non-Slavs are systematically <a href="https://strongcitiesnetwork.org/resource/online-russian-language-hate-and-discrimination-against-central-asian-migrants/">discriminated against</a> in Russia, and since 2022 they have been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/1/is-russia-recruiting-muslim-migrants-to-fight-its-war-in-ukraine">disproportionately conscripted</a> and sent to Ukraine to serve as cannon fodder at the front.</p>
<h2>Tajik exclusion</h2>
<p>As I have described in a <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/ca/history-of-the-tajiks-9780755649655/">recent book</a>, few nations in history have seen their standing so dramatically reduced as the Tajiks have over the past 100 years. </p>
<p>For more than a millennium, the <a href="https://sogdians.si.edu/introduction/">Tajiks — Persian-speaking descendants of the ancient Sogdians who dominated the Silk Road</a> — were Central Asia’s cultural elite. </p>
<p>Beginning with what’s known as the <a href="https://www.cais-soas.com/CAIS/Geography/samanid.htm">New Persian Renaissance of the 10th century</a> when their capital, Bukhara, came to rival Baghdad as a centre of Islamic learning and high culture, Tajiks were the principal scholars and bureaucrats of Central Asia’s major cities right up to the time of the Russian Revolution. </p>
<p>The famous medieval polymath Avicenna was an ethnic Tajik, as were the hadith collector Bukhari, the Sufi poet Rumi, and many others.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/avicenna-the-persian-polymath-who-shaped-modern-science-medicine-and-philosophy-142667">Avicenna: the Persian polymath who shaped modern science, medicine and philosophy</a>
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<p>But as the most significant purveyors of Central Asia’s Islamic civilization, Tajiks were seen by the Bolsheviks as representing an obsolete legacy that socialism aimed to overcome. </p>
<p>The Tajiks were virtually excluded from the massive social and political restructuring imposed on Central Asia during the early years of the Soviet Union, with most of their historical territory, including the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03068377608729816">fabled cities of Samarkand and Bukhara</a>, being awarded to the Turkic-speaking Uzbeks who were seen as being more malleable. </p>
<p>Only as late as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Tajikistan">1929 were the Tajiks given their own republic</a>, consisting mostly of marginal, mountainous territory and deprived of any major urban centres.</p>
<h2>Impoverished</h2>
<p>Throughout the 20th century, the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/tajikistan/tajikistan-poverty-biggest-threat-peace">Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic was the most impoverished and underdeveloped</a> region of the former Soviet Union, and it has retained that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/09/-sp-post-soviet-world-need-to-know-tajikistan">unfortunate status</a> since independence in 1991. </p>
<p>From 1992-1997, the country was plunged into a devastating civil war that destroyed what infrastructure remained from the Soviet period. Since that time, Rahmon has used the threat of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/25/how-tajikistans-president-extended-his-term-for-life-rahmon-isis-migrant-imf/">renewed civil conflict</a> to vindicate his absolute rule. </p>
<p>The spectre of <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/rahmon-tajikistan-taliban/31476036.html">radical Islam</a> emanating from neighbouring Afghanistan — <a href="https://minorityrights.org/communities/tajiks/">where the Tajik population considerably outnumbers that of Tajikistan</a> — has provided additional justification for Rahmon’s repressive policies.</p>
<p>In today’s Tajikistan even those with a university education find it almost <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11398444">impossible to earn a salary</a> that would enable them to build a normal family life. </p>
<p>Disempowered and humiliated by the system, they are easy prey for radical Islamic preachers who give them a sense of value and purpose. </p>
<p>The added backdrop of financial desperation makes for an explosive cocktail: one of the suspects in the recent Moscow attacks reportedly told his Russian interrogators that he <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/25/four-men-showing-signs-of-severe-beating-charged-over-moscow-concert-attack">was promised a cash reward of half a million Russian rubles (about US$5,300) to carry out his alleged atrocities.</a>.</p>
<h2>Terrorism as desperation?</h2>
<p>Normal, sane human beings everywhere are horrified by terrorist acts regardless of how they are justified by their perpetrators, and the long-suffering people of Tajikistan are no exception.</p>
<p>But unfortunately, the conditions under which a small number of extremists can perceive the psychopathic murder of innocent civilians for cash or ideology as an attractive option show no signs of abating. </p>
<p>Russia’s laughable attempt to somehow link the Moscow attacks <a href="https://theconversation.com/isis-ks-attack-in-moscow-risks-escalating-the-russia-ukraine-war-226472">to Ukraine</a> is a clumsy diversion from the consequences of its relations with Central Asia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226559/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Foltz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>News that four of the suspects in the Moscow terror attacks are Tajik will likely result in further demonization against people already facing poverty and discrimination, despite a glorious history.Richard Foltz, Professor of Religions and Cultures, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2264692024-03-24T22:20:44Z2024-03-24T22:20:44ZHow Moscow terror attack fits ISIS-K strategy to widen agenda, take fight to its perceived enemies<p><em>Russia is reeling from the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/03/23/world/moscow-shooting">worst terror strike on its soil in a generation</a> following an attack on March 22, 2024, that <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-moscow-concert-hall-attack-islamic-state-753291d25dad26a840459ee8f448d59e">killed at least 137 concertgoers</a> in Moscow.</em></p>
<p><em>The attack has been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/23/islamic-state-khorasan-isis-moscow-explainer/">claimed by the Islamic State group</a>. And <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/24/vladimir-putin-terror-attack-russia/">despite Russian authorities expressing doubt</a> over the claim, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-moscow-concert-hall-attack-islamic-state-753291d25dad26a840459ee8f448d59e">U.S. officials told The Associated Press</a> that they believed ISIS-K, a South and Central Asian affiliate of the terrorist organization, was behind the assault.</em></p>
<p><em>It comes amid heightened concern over the scope of ISIS-K activities following recent terrorist operations in countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-terror-blast-highlights-success-and-growing-risk-of-isis-k-regional-strategy-220586">including Iran</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/31/world/asia/pakistan-bombing-isis.html">and Pakistan</a>. The Conversation turned to <a href="https://www.clemson.edu/cbshs/about/profiles/index.html?userid=ajadoon">Clemson University’s Amira Jadoon</a> and <a href="https://www.american.edu/profiles/students/sh5958a.cfm">Sara Harmouch of American University</a> – terrorism experts who have tracked the activities of ISIS-K – to explain what this latest deadly attack tells us about the organization’s strengths and agenda.</em></p>
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<h2>What is ISIS-K?</h2>
<p>ISIS-K, short for Islamic State Khorasan Province, is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">regional affiliate</a> of the larger Islamic State group.</p>
<p>The affiliate group <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/">operates primarily in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region</a>, although it has presence throughout the historical “Khorasan” – a region that includes parts of the modern-day nations of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, along with other Central Asian countries. </p>
<p>Established in 2015, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">ISIS-K aims to establish</a> a physical “caliphate” – a system of governing a society under strict Islamic Sharia law and under religious leadership – in the South and Central Asian region.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s beliefs follow the ideology of its parent organization, the Islamic State group, which promotes an extreme interpretation of Islam and sees secular government actors, as well as non-Muslim and Muslim minority civilian populations, as legitimate targets.</p>
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<img alt="A man in fatigues stands on rubble, broken walls are behind him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A Taliban fighter checks a destroyed ISIS-K safehouse on Feb. 14, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/699c02b437504085a34732c9264ae1d9?ext=true">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</a></span>
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<p>The group is known for its extreme brutality and for targeting both government institutions and civilians, including mosques, educational institutions and public spaces.</p>
<p>Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, ISIS-K’s key objectives <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/isis-k-resurgence">have been to diminish</a> the <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/the-taliban-cant-take-on-the-islamic-state-alone/">now-ruling Taliban’s legitimacy</a> in the war-ravaged nation, assert itself as the rightful leader of the Muslim community and emerge as the principal regional adversary to regimes it deems oppressive. </p>
<p>Moreover, the Taliban’s transition from an insurgency group to a governing entity left numerous militant factions in Afghanistan without a unifying force – a gap that ISIS-K has aimed to fill.</p>
<h2>Why was Russia targeted by ISIS-K?</h2>
<p>ISIS-K has <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/the-islamic-states-anti-russia-propaganda-campaign-and-criticism-of-taliban-russian-relations/">long framed</a> Russia as one of its main adversaries. It has heavily featured anti-Russian rhetoric in its propaganda and <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">has attacked</a> Russia’s presence within Afghanistan. This includes a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/blast-in-kabul-kills-2-russian-embassy-staff-/6731342.html">suicide attack</a> on Russia’s embassy in Kabul in 2022 that left two Russian Embassy staff and six Afghans dead.</p>
<p>The broader Islamic State group has targeted Russia for several reasons.</p>
<p>They include <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-enduring-duel-islamic-state-khorasans-survival-under-afghanistans-new-rulers/">long-standing grievances</a> relating to Moscow’s historical interventions in Muslim-majority regions like Chechnya and Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russia’s partnerships with regimes opposed by the Islamic State group, notably Syria and Iran, have <a href="https://doi.org//10.1080/09546553.2019.1657097?journalCode=ftpv20">positioned Russia as a primary adversary</a> in the eyes of the terrorist organization and its affiliates. </p>
<p>In particular, Russia has been a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/10/1/what-has-russia-gained-from-five-years-of-fighting-in-syria">key ally of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad</a> since the beginning of Syria’s civil war in 2011, providing military support to the Assad regime against various opposition groups, including the Islamic State group.</p>
<p>This direct opposition to the terrorist group and its caliphate ambitions has rendered Russia as a prime target for retaliation.</p>
<p>Moreover, <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90584">Russia’s cooperation</a> with the Taliban – ISIS-K’s key nemesis in Afghanistan – adds another layer of animosity. The Islamic State group views countries and groups that oppose its ideology or military objectives <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/Criezis_CreateConnectDeceive_09222022_0.pdf">as enemies</a> of Islam, including actors who seek to establish relations with the Taliban.</p>
<p>By attacking Russian targets, ISIS-K in part seeks to deter further Russian involvement in the Middle East. But also, such attacks provide high publicity for its cause and aim to inspire its supporters worldwide.</p>
<p>As such, for the Islamic State brand, the Moscow attack serves as retribution for perceived grievances held against Russia, while also projecting global reach. This approach can provide significant dividends, especially for its South and Central Asian affiliate, in the form of increased recruitment, funding and influence across the jihadist spectrum.</p>
<h2>What does the attack tell us about ISIS-K capabilities?</h2>
<p>The mere association of ISIS-K with this attack, whether it was directly or indirectly involved, bolsters the group’s reputation.</p>
<p>Overall, the attack signals ISIS-K’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-terror-blast-highlights-success-and-growing-risk-of-isis-k-regional-strategy-220586">growing influence</a> and its determination to make its presence felt on the global stage.</p>
<p>Being linked to a high-profile attack in a major city far from its base in Afghanistan indicates that ISIS-K can extend its operational reach either directly or through collaboration with like-minded militant factions.</p>
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<span class="caption">More than 100 people were killed in a blast in Kerman, Iran, on Jan. 3, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kerman-iran-iranian-emergency-services-arrive-at-the-scene-news-photo/1898125916?adppopup=true">Mahdi/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>The scale and sophistication of the attack reflect advanced planning, coordination and execution capabilities. This only reaffirms unequivocally ISIS-K’s intent, adaptability and determination to internationalize its agenda. </p>
<p>Similar to ISIS-K’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-terror-blast-highlights-success-and-growing-risk-of-isis-k-regional-strategy-220586">attack in Iran</a> in January 2024 that left over 100 dead, this latest atrocity serves to reinforce ISIS-K’s stated commitment to the broader global jihadist agenda of the Islamic State group, and helps broaden the appeal of its ideology and recruitment campaign.</p>
<h2>How does this fit ISIS-K’s strategy?</h2>
<p>The attack in Moscow serves as a powerful recruitment and propaganda tool by attracting international media attention to the group. This allows it to remain politically relevant to its audiences across South and Central Asia, and beyond. </p>
<p>But it also helps divert attention from local setbacks for ISIS-K. Like its parent organization Islamic State group, ISIS-K has been confronted with military defeats, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/25/politics/isis-k-leader-killed-taliban-kabul-airport-bombing/index.html">loss of territory and leadership</a> and diminishing resources.</p>
<p>In the face of such challenges, ISIS-K’s potential links to the attack in Moscow remind observers of its persistent threat and adaptability.</p>
<p>By targeting a major power like Russia, ISIS-K aims to project a broader message of intimidation aimed at other states involved in anti-Islamic State group operations and undermine the public’s sense of security.</p>
<p>Additionally, operations such as the Moscow attack seek to solidify ISIS-K’s position within the broader Islamic State group network, potentially securing more support and resources.</p>
<p>More broadly, the strategy follows a process of “<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-terror-blast-highlights-success-and-growing-risk-of-isis-k-regional-strategy-220586">internationalizing” ISIS-K’s agenda</a> – something it has pursued with renewed vigor since 2021 by targeting the countries with a presence in Afghanistan, including Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China and Russia, marking a deliberate expansion of its operational focus beyond local borders.</p>
<p>The Moscow attack, following the January assault in Iran, suggests that ISIS-K is intensifying efforts to export its ideological fight directly to the territories of sovereign nations.</p>
<p>It is a calculated strategy and, as the Moscow attack has exemplified, one that has the potential to strike fear in capitals far beyond ISIS-K’s traditional base.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226469/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>At least 137 people were killed in the Moscow attack – the latest in a a series of ISIS-K operations outside its traditional stronghold.Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, School of Public Affairs, American UniversityAmira Jadoon, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Clemson UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2264722024-03-24T12:06:44Z2024-03-24T12:06:44ZISIS-K’s attack in Moscow risks escalating the Russia-Ukraine war<p>A music concert in suburban Moscow became the scene of a bloody terrorist attack on March 22 as gunmen with automatic weapons and Molotov cocktails <a href="https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/moscow-russia-shooting-03-23-24/index.html">killed more than 130 people</a> and injured dozens more. </p>
<p>Immediately after the attack, speculation emerged about who was responsible.</p>
<p>Although Ukraine was quick <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/ukraine-denies-involvement-in-moscow-terrorist-attack-as-putin-presses-upon-us-for-information/ar-BB1knhBz">to deny any involvement</a>, Russian President <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/23/world/europe/moscow-attack-putin.html">Vladimir Putin used a short televised statement</a> to his nation to suggest, without evidence, that Ukraine was prepared to help the terrorists escape.</p>
<p>However, ISIS — and specifically its Afghanistan subsidiary ISIS-K — later <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/antoniopequenoiv/2024/03/22/isis-claims-responsibility-for-moscow-shooting-that-left-40-dead/?sh=1edfabbc7d0d">claimed credit</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-would-islamic-state-attack-russia-and-what-does-this-mean-for-the-terrorism-threat-globally-226464">Why would Islamic State attack Russia and what does this mean for the terrorism threat globally?</a>
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<p>Russia has yet to acknowledge ISIS was responsible. But regardless of who the terrorists were representing, the Moscow attack demonstrates two key concerns.</p>
<p>First, terrorist organizations — meaning those who use violence for political purposes without the specific backing of a government — can use pre-existing conflicts and the resulting media attention to advance their interests. Second, the actions of these organizations have the potential to further exacerbate ongoing conflicts.</p>
<h2>The use of sub-state paramilitaries</h2>
<p>Many countries find it useful to employ sub-state entities and paramilitaries to achieve their objectives. <a href="https://theconversation.com/paramilitaries-in-the-russia-ukraine-war-could-escalate-and-expand-the-conflict-206441">Both Russia and Ukraine have used and continue to employ such groups</a> to conduct acts their soldiers are ill-suited to carry out or where plausible deniability is needed. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/paramilitaries-in-the-russia-ukraine-war-could-escalate-and-expand-the-conflict-206441">Paramilitaries in the Russia-Ukraine war could escalate and expand the conflict</a>
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<p>While using these forces has certain <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003193227/serbian-paramilitaries-breakup-yugoslavia-iva-vuku%C5%A1i%C4%87">advantages for a country</a>, it’s simultaneously problematic because it leads to questions over who is actually behind the actions.</p>
<p>Attacks earlier this year by Yemen-based Houthi groups on ships in the Red Sea are an example of this issue. The Houthi are <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/irans-support-houthis-what-know">commonly seen</a> as an Iranian proxy group. Even though there are close ties between the Houthi and the Iranian state, the Houthi <a href="https://theconversation.com/yemens-houthis-and-why-theyre-not-simply-a-proxy-of-iran-123708">are not controlled by Iran</a>. Assuming Iran is directly behind the attack on Red Sea shipping is at best questionable and at worst outright false.</p>
<p>While assessing the role that a state has in <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/five-myths-about-sponsor-proxy-relationships">directing its proxies and paramilitaries</a> is difficult, this pales in comparison to the difficulty in linking states to international terrorist organizations. It is an ambiguity that terrorist groups can exploit.</p>
<h2>Media attention: Oxygen for terrorists</h2>
<p>Defining terrorism is an exercise fraught with peril. The <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/disciplining-terror/terrorism-fever-the-first-war-on-terror-and-the-politicization-of-expertise/12E123D58AA0437750CB882B066E2B6B">politicization of the term</a> since the post-9/11 war on terror has given new meaning to the expression that “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/05/is-one-mans-terrorist-another-mans-freedom-fighter/257245/">one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter</a>.”</p>
<p>Typically, however, <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/defining-terrorism">policymakers</a> <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-science-research-and-methods/article/is-terrorism-necessarily-violent-public-perceptions-of-nonviolence-and-terrorism-in-conflict-settings/9BA6C161346EEE1563A7DC2639066A02">and academics</a> define terrorist groups as non-state organizations that seek to use violence or the threat of violence against civilians to achieve political objectives, with some ambiguity on which entities can perform it.</p>
<p>In the 21st century, the diffusion of <a href="https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/scales-dynamics-outsourcing/14566">communication technologies</a> and the <a href="https://archive.org/details/whatsnextproblem0000unse/page/82/mode/2up">24-hour news cycle</a> has provided terrorist groups with newfound means to capture international attention.</p>
<p>Video can be uploaded in real time by terrorist groups, and international attention can soon follow. The news media, however, is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/7/9/the-problem-is-not-negative-western-media-coverage-of-africa/">highly selective</a> in what it covers.</p>
<p>Due to media selectivity, terrorist organizations seek <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272717301214">to maximize their audience</a>. One way to do so is by linking their activities to ongoing events. ISIS-K’s attack in Moscow demonstrates this trend.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s decision to attack the Moscow music venue was not purely opportunistic. ISIS and its subsidiary organizations <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-23/what-is-isis-k-moscow-terror-attack/103623852">blame Russia</a> for its role in destroying ISIS in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s strike against Moscow therefore fits its own agenda, while also advancing its goals. The problem is the potential for escalation.</p>
<h2>Escalating the Russia-Ukraine conflict</h2>
<p>There is still much that is unknown about the attack. One can, however, draw out some of the potential consequences.</p>
<p>American authorities had <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/23/europe/us-had-warned-russia-isis-was-determined-to-attack-intl-hnk/index.html">previously warned Russia</a> that an attack was imminent. The Russian authorities dismissed the warning.</p>
<p>Putin even stated before the attack that American <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-dismissed-us-warnings-about-a-potential-terror-incident-as-blackmail-just-3-days-before-concert-hall-attack/ar-BB1knpXu">warnings to that effect</a> were a form of blackmail. So even a genuine warning from the United States was seen by Russian authorities in the light of the broader Russia-Ukraine conflict.</p>
<p>The aftermath of the attack has the potential to magnify these concerns. Putin claimed that four people involved in the conflict were captured <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/moscow-attackers-were-helped-ukraine-180044785.html?guccounter=1">attempting to flee</a> to Ukraine.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-would-islamic-state-attack-russia-and-what-does-this-mean-for-the-terrorism-threat-globally-226464">Why would Islamic State attack Russia and what does this mean for the terrorism threat globally?</a>
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<p>That seems questionable: the Russia-Ukraine border is one of the most militarized locations in the country due to the war. The result, however, is that the alleged escape attempt has allowed Russian politicians <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/prominent-russians-blame-ukraine-for-moscow-shooting-amid-fears-of-war-with-west/ar-BB1kpnj8">to link the attack</a> to Ukrainian authorities, despite Ukrainian <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-not-involved-moscow-attack-says-kyiv-military-intelligence-spokesman-2024-03-23/">protests to the contrary</a>.</p>
<p>Russian authorities will have to act; any state would in the aftermath of such an assault. But retaliation is all the more likely given <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/23/world/europe/putin-russia-moscow-attack.html">Putin’s consistent messaging</a> as a protector of the Russian people.</p>
<p>Eliminating terrorism, however, is an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/world/europe/war-on-terror-bush-biden-qaeda.html">incredibly difficult if not impossible</a> task, as demonstrated by the American experience. The Russia-Ukraine war, however, is providing a convenient arena for Russian authorities to redirect the grief and outrage in the aftermath of the tragic attack.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226472/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ukraine has denied any involvement in the terrorist attack that killed dozens of people in Moscow, but that doesn’t mean Russia won’t try to use the event as a way to escalate its war with Ukraine.James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2237662024-02-16T17:23:51Z2024-02-16T17:23:51ZAlexei Navalny: reported death of Putin’s most prominent opponent spells the end of politics in Russia<p>Reports <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/16/russian-activist-and-putin-critic-alexei-navalny-dies-in-prison">of the death</a> of Russia’s most famous opposition leader, Alexei Navalny, in an Arctic prison camp are shocking, but not entirely unexpected. It draws a line under Russia’s political development over the past two decades by highlighting that a challenge from within is no longer possible.</p>
<p>Navalny was the last public politician to pose a real challenge to the Kremlin, but his attempt to overthrow the regime failed long before what appears to be his untimely death in prison.</p>
<p>His unrealistic calculations about the impact of his return to Russia in 2021 led to the dismantling of the remnants of any organised opposition that was not sanctioned – and controlled – by the Russian state. </p>
<p>Navalny ended up in prison, his supporters arrested or fled abroad. As a result, when the invasion of Ukraine came, there were very few street protests against it.</p>
<p>Active in Russian politics for <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/protests-poisoning-prison-life-russian-opposition-leader-alexei-107288919#">more than 20 years</a>, Navalny’s main focus was identifying and rooting out state corruption, an issue with almost limitless material in modern Russia. He embraced new methods of bringing his investigations to as wide an audience as he could, notably the internet, particularly via his YouTube channel. Some of his <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1202972/most-popular-videos-by-alexei-navalny/">most popular clips</a> have tens of millions of views.</p>
<p>But corruption investigations and blogging were not enough to really challenge Putin’s status quo in Russian politics. That’s why Navalny increasingly turned to the direct action of mass street protests. </p>
<p>His big break <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/10/russia-protests-election-vladimir-putin">came in 2011</a>, when allegations of widespread fraud in the December 2011 Duma elections, coupled with the announcement of Putin’s return to the presidency the previous September, brought tens of thousands of protesters on to the streets of Moscow.</p>
<p>Although the protests were not organised by Navalny, his charisma and more radical rhetoric made him the most prominent face of the protests, overshadowing more established opposition leaders such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/01/boris-nemtsov">Boris Nemtsov</a>. However, the mass protests of 2011-12 failed to prevent Putin’s re-election in March 2012, and eventually fizzled out.</p>
<p>But the protests prompted the Kremlin to change tack and experiment with allowing the opposition to stand in elections. Navalny was the main beneficiary, being registered for the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/09/alexei-navalny-recount-moscow-election">Moscow mayoral elections</a> in the summer of 2013. This was Navalny’s only real chance of winning power in Russia’s tightly controlled electoral system.</p>
<p>He campaigned enthusiastically and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/09/alexei-navalny-recount-moscow-election">won a respectable 27% of the vote</a>. But it also showed the limits of his appeal. Moscow was at the time one of the most opposition-leaning cities in Russia, one of the few regions where Putin got less than 50% in the 2012 presidential election. </p>
<p>If the opposition could really challenge the Kremlin, it was in Moscow. But turnout was extremely low at 32%, and the incumbent mayor, Sergey Sobyanin, won the 51% he needed to avoid a run-off with Navalny.</p>
<p>This was indicative of the opposition’s problem: reliance on restriction to a committed core of supporters whose passion for change didn’t spill over into the general population.</p>
<h2>Last roll of the dice</h2>
<p>Elections in today’s Russia are a foregone <a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-is-sure-to-win-so-whats-the-point-of-elections-in-russia-93170">conclusion</a>, but they are also a potential vulnerability for the Kremlin. There is a fine balance that the Kremlin has to strike between control of elections and their legitimacy. Too much control, or outright fraud, and the legitimising value of the elections is reduced. </p>
<p>This can lead to potentially destabilising results, as the mass protests in Moscow in 2011 or the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/13/belarus-unprecedented-crackdown">protests in Belarus in 2021</a> showed, and as happened in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/26/ukraine.usa">2004 Ukrainian elections</a>, which led to the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-ukraines-orange-revolution-shaped-twenty-first-century-geopolitics/">first Orange Revolution</a>.</p>
<p>Navalny understood this well, and made participation in the 2018 presidential election his main goal. His strategy was to cause enough trouble for the authorities in the run-up to the vote, particularly through various street demonstrations, to force the authorities to allow him to stand as an official candidate in these elections.</p>
<p>To this end, he set up a regional network of Navalny HQs that ran in parallel with his main anti-corruption organisation, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-navalny-corruption-foundation/31938527.html">FBK (the Anti-Corruption Foundation)</a>. This gave Navalny a potential nationwide reach, in contrast to the old Moscow-centred opposition.</p>
<p>This strategy didn’t produce the desired result of getting Navalny on to the ballot. But it seemed to rattle the authorities enough to want to take care of the “Navalny problem”. </p>
<h2>Poison and imprisonment</h2>
<p>In August 2020, Navalny <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-suspected-poisoning-why-opposition-figure-stands-out-in-russian-politics-144836">fell ill on a flight</a> and, according to the German doctors who treated him, escaped near-certain death from a Novichok weapons-grade chemical agent.</p>
<p>He returned from Germany in January 2021 and was <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-novichok-didnt-stop-russian-opposition-leader-but-a-prison-sentence-might-153480">immediately arrested</a> on landing in Moscow. The mass protests that followed were unusual for their regional scale, but not enough to really challenge the Kremlin. Instead, the authorities banned Navalny’s organisations in Russia and either arrested or forced those who worked for them to flee Russia.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-novichok-didnt-stop-russian-opposition-leader-but-a-prison-sentence-might-153480">Alexei Navalny: Novichok didn't stop Russian opposition leader – but a prison sentence might</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Navalny’s fate became the main point of contention for Moscow in its dealings with western governments and media. Navalny was the obligatory subject of high-level contacts with the Russian authorities, with Joe Biden’s national security adviser Jake Sullivan <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-56794744">warning that Russia would suffer consequences</a> if Navalny died in prison.</p>
<p>But all this paled into insignificance after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine at the end of February 2022. Overnight, Navalny’s fate seemed diminished against the backdrop of Europe’s biggest war since 1945.</p>
<p>Navalny’s own agenda of generating enough domestic protest to topple the regime became obsolete as the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/03/russia-kremlins-ruthless-crackdown-stifles-independent-journalism-and-anti-war-movement/">new anti-opposition laws were enforced</a> and most of his most ardent supporters fled the country. Navalny tried to stay relevant by promoting his views from prison, including a <a href="https://4fishgreenberg.medium.com/alexey-navalny-on-the-anniversary-of-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-2aa18f5602c4">call to end the war</a> by handing over all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, and paying reparations to Ukraine. It’s not clear that he gained any supporters in Russia, but he certainly appealed to those in exile and to western governments.</p>
<p>With the West and its allies imposing an unprecedented level of sanctions on Russia and providing Ukraine with the military support to defeat Putin on the battlefield, there’s literally nothing else the west can do to punish Russia over Navalny’s fate.</p>
<h2>The rest is dictatorship</h2>
<p>Alexei Navalny was clearly a very brave and charismatic politician who posed the most significant domestic challenge to Putin’s regime in more than a decade. He never really came close to toppling Putin, and perhaps often <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-novichok-didnt-stop-russian-opposition-leader-but-a-prison-sentence-might-153480">overestimated his level of support</a> within Russia.</p>
<p>With the news of his untimely death in prison, the question remains whether he could have done more from exile in the west. He would have joined a long list of Russian opposition leaders, from former oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky to chess champion Garry Kasparov, who have virtually no influence on what happens in Russia. But Navalny’s refusal to go down that road, and his belief in his own importance, is precisely what has made him stand out in Russian politics.</p>
<p>Ultimately, Navalny’s death draws a line under the era when politics was politics in Russia. Today there is only Putin’s own personal authoritarianism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223766/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Titov does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The opposition leader was poisoned and sent to a brutal prison camp where he is reported to have died.Alexander Titov, Lecturer in Modern European History, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2043292023-08-02T12:40:04Z2023-08-02T12:40:04ZHow the Soviet century wrote itself into the Moscow cityscape<p>The phrase “the Soviet century”, which refers to the hundred years following the Russian revolution of 1917, is generally understood to be about the political sphere – at home and beyond. Quite how that translates into the material world though is best appreciated through a deep dive into the Soviet city. </p>
<p>From <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674057876">Moscow</a> to <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520208230/magnetic-mountain">Magnitogorsk</a>, Soviet urban spaces have long provided crucial insights into the nature of the socialist project and <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691178905/moscow-monumental">its connections</a> with the wider world. </p>
<p>German historian Karl Schlögel’s 2018 book, Soviet Century: Archaeology of a Lost World, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/25dc9e07-8254-4809-bb8b-bcecead8fc76">newly translated</a> from the German into English by Rodney Livingstone, shows in painstaking archaeological detail how the socialist project transformed the spaces in which Soviet citizens lived. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An archival photograph of a revolutionary street in Russia." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539815/original/file-20230727-21-g4fqlq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539815/original/file-20230727-21-g4fqlq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539815/original/file-20230727-21-g4fqlq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539815/original/file-20230727-21-g4fqlq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539815/original/file-20230727-21-g4fqlq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539815/original/file-20230727-21-g4fqlq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539815/original/file-20230727-21-g4fqlq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bolshevik soldiers march on Nikolskaya Street in Moscow in 1917.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/79/Armed_soldiers_carry_a_banner_reading_%27Communism%27%2C_Nikolskaya_street%2C_Moscow%2C_October_1917.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After coming to power in 1917, the Bolsheviks sought to reshape the way people, both local and foreign, engaged with their physical and social environment. The ideological principles of rationality, scientific thought and collective living were forcibly implemented within the urban environment. As Schlögel puts it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Soviet Union was not only a political system with a debatable beginning and an end, but a form of life with its own history, maturity, decline and fall. With its practices, values and routines, it shaped the citizens of the nation for many generations to come. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Daily life</h2>
<p>The Soviet urban environment shaped daily interactions between the USSR and the outside world – both on an elite and an ordinary level. From the staircases and communal toilets to the athletes’ parades and balletic performances it hosted, the cityscape remains as something to be deciphered. As Schlögel puts it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The world can be read via the history of things.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Schlögel pays as much attention to the ostentatious elements of Soviet Moscow as he does to the “common things” <a href="https://cdclv.unlv.edu/archives/nc1/boym_everyday.html">highlighted</a> by American-Russian cultural theorist Svetlana Boym. He devotes chapters to the queues, communal apartments, toilets and staircases, kitchens and cookbooks, clothing, packaging, rubbish, tattoos, graffiti, day-trip destinations, health resorts and dorm rooms. </p>
<p>During the interwar period, Moscow transformed from a largely commercial town of winding, narrow streets, dotted with churches and merchant villas, into a model socialist capital. The city was to boast new infrastructure, open public spaces for the workers and apartment buildings for the Soviet elite. By 1957, with the construction of the last of Stalinist skyscrapers – known as the Seven Sisters – the city’s new skyline was complete. </p>
<p>This urban metamorphosis was <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/675491">essential</a> to showcasing the Socialist experiment to foreign visitors. Right from the start, journalists, diplomats, intellectuals, anti-colonial activists and professionals came to experience, challenge and participate in the creation of the new state. </p>
<h2>The symbolic centre of the Soviet universe</h2>
<p>The symbolic centre of the Soviet universe was located at the Red Square. Since 1924, this public space had housed Lenin’s Mausoleum, beneath the long red-brick wall of the Kremlin. Above the mausoleum was a podium from which the Soviet leadership would preside over special events and military parades during state holidays. </p>
<p>Select foreign dignitaries, from General (later President) Dwight Eisenhower to the Cuban leader Fidel Castro, would stand there too. Similarly, laying wreaths at the mausoleum became a customary ritual for Soviet international allies. This confirmed the monument’s function, as Schlögel put it, as “one of the 20th-century’s key pilgrimage sites”. </p>
<p>The area of central Moscow – within walking distance of the Kremlin – housed all key Soviet institutions responsible for foreign policy decision making. These included the headquarters of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the villa of the Soviet Solidarity Committee. </p>
<p>As I have shown in my recent book, <a href="https://apps.crossref.org/coaccess/coaccess.html?doi=10.5149%2F9781469665887_Telepneva">Cold War Liberation</a>, the cadres who staffed these institutions remained critical to Soviet international allies in Africa. </p>
<p>Joseph Stalin’s death, in 1953, led to greater exchanges with the outside world. Foreigners became more visible in urban spaces. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An archival photograph of the Red Square in Moscow." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539821/original/file-20230727-19-olbehh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539821/original/file-20230727-19-olbehh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539821/original/file-20230727-19-olbehh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539821/original/file-20230727-19-olbehh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539821/original/file-20230727-19-olbehh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539821/original/file-20230727-19-olbehh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539821/original/file-20230727-19-olbehh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Red Square in 1961.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10648/a9e9bebe-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84">Nationaal Archief, CC0</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Soviet student life</h2>
<p>In contrast to the Soviet citizens, foreigners – particularly from the west – were often separated from the rest of society in spatial and social terms. Schlögel describes how western diplomats and journalists lived in closely supervised “gated communities” such as foreign embassies. </p>
<p>One group of foreigners who had access to the Soviet capital in a way no other foreigners could were international students. The event that marked a new era of openness was the <a href="https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1956-2/international-youth-festival/">Sixth World Festival of Youth and Students</a>, held in Moscow, in the summer of 1957. </p>
<p>In anticipation of the festival, the city’s tourist infrastructure was upgraded. Moscow’s streets, public parks, hotels and theatres filled up with thousands of foreign and Soviet youths partying, watching performances and <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230523432_5">making love</a>.</p>
<p>Most foreign students in the USSR received scholarships and (relatively) generous stipends as an expression of “socialist internationalism.” In Moscow and other cities, the Soviet authorities promoted “friendship of the people” in campuses and dormitories, which Schlögel describes as “melting pots”. They also organised educational and cultural events, film screenings and tours to advertise the achievements of socialist modernity.</p>
<p>These students were not confined to the gated communities in which Western diplomats and journalists lived. Instead, they moved relatively freely around the city, to varying degrees of friendship or hostility, on the part of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/slavic-review/article/histories-of-color-blackness-and-africanness-in-the-soviet-union/77C75C10D1B69E8AC2A992B7A74C4375">Soviet citizens.</a> </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An archival photo in black and white of Moscow." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539818/original/file-20230727-17-x5uju5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539818/original/file-20230727-17-x5uju5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539818/original/file-20230727-17-x5uju5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539818/original/file-20230727-17-x5uju5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539818/original/file-20230727-17-x5uju5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539818/original/file-20230727-17-x5uju5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539818/original/file-20230727-17-x5uju5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Moscow in 1967.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10648/ab11758e-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84">Nationaal Archief, CC0</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Contemporary Moscow has undergone another major transformation. Since 2010, the area around the Kremlin, in particular, has been scrubbed of all vestiges of the post-Soviet 1990s – from billboards to kiosks – and pedestrian zones expanded. This <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/anti.12266">neoliberal urbanisation</a> has been triggered by several factors, including the global financial crisis, the rise of a local protest movement and elite rivalries.</p>
<p>Just as in Soviet times, though, the underlying motivation is the same. The Russian capital exists to broadcast prestige, to audiences domestic and foreign.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204329/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natalia Telepneva does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A monumental book, newly translated into English, describes in painstaking, archeological detail, how the socialist project transformed the spaces in which Soviet citizens lived.Natalia Telepneva, Lecturer in International History, University of Strathclyde Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2099822023-07-21T11:52:19Z2023-07-21T11:52:19ZRussia-Africa summit provides a global stage for Moscow to puff up its influence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538045/original/file-20230718-25-9ghvqm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Russia-Africa Summit in 2019 in Sochi, Russia. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Forty-three African heads of state attended the <a href="https://summitafrica.ru/en/news/podvedeny-itogi-pervogo-sammita-i-ekonomicheskogo-foruma-rossija-afrika-roskongress-prodolzhit-rabotu-na-afrikanskom-treke-v-period-do-sledujuschego-foruma/">2019 Russia-Africa summit</a>. They had high hopes that Russia would emerge as a new source of investment and trade for the continent. Russian president Vladimir Putin promised to double Russian trade with Africa in five years to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/as-the-us-looks-elsewhere-russia-seeks-a-closer-relationship-with-africa/2019/10/25/7e329124-f69e-11e9-b2d2-1f37c9d82dbb_story.html">US$40 billion</a>.</p>
<p>Since then, Russian <a href="https://www.ecofinagency.com/public-management/0903-43450-africa-imports-seven-times-more-russian-products-than-it-exports-to-moscow">trade with the continent has contracted</a> to US$14 billion. It is lopsided, with Russia exporting seven times as much as it imports from Africa. Additionally, 70% of this trade is <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1063407/russia-leading-trade-partners-in-africa-by-trade-volume/">concentrated in just four countries</a>: Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and South Africa.</p>
<p><a href="https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/WIR2022-Regional_trends_Africa_en.pdf">Russia invests very little in Africa</a>. It accounts for 1% of the foreign direct investment that goes to the continent. <a href="http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1561950939&Country=Egypt&topic=Economy&subtopic=Ope_2">Mauritius is a larger source of foreign direct investment</a> for Africa. Additionally, Russia’s gross domestic product has <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/RUS/russia/gdp-gross-domestic-product">shrunk in value from US$2.3 trillion in 2013</a> to US$1.8 trillion in 2021.</p>
<p>Despite these diminishing economic ties, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russia-is-growing-its-strategic-influence-in-africa-110930">Russia’s influence in Africa</a> has rapidly expanded since 2019. It has deployed troops to the continent and become the dominant external partner in a handful of countries. <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-disinformation-in-africa/">Russian disinformation campaigns</a> in at least 16 African countries are shaping the information environment on the continent. </p>
<p>This has largely been <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2021/09/17/russia-asymmetric-strategy-expanding-influence-in-africa-security-moscow/">achieved through irregular means</a>. These include propping up isolated, autocratic regimes through a combination of the deployment of <a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-mercenaries-in-africa-why-there-hasnt-been-any-effective-opposition-to-drive-them-out-207318">Wagner paramilitary forces</a>, electoral interference, disinformation and arms-for-resources deals.</p>
<p>Each of these tactics is destabilising for the host country. </p>
<p>Predictably, half of the two dozen African countries where Russia has been actively plying its influence <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/russia-interference-undermine-democracy-africa/">are in conflict</a>. Russia has similarly undermined <a href="https://theconversation.com/rising-instability-in-mali-raises-fears-about-role-of-private-russian-military-group-174634">UN operations in African countries</a> where Moscow is vying for influence, further compounding instability.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-russia-is-on-a-charm-offensive-in-africa-the-reasons-arent-pretty-187711">Why Russia is on a charm offensive in Africa. The reasons aren't pretty</a>
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<p>Despite Russia’s increasingly aggressive policies on the continent and internationally, roughly the same number of African heads of state are expected to participate in this year’s <a href="https://summitafrica.ru/en/">St Petersburg summit</a> as in 2019. More significant than any commercial deals announced are the political and financial benefits Russian and African elites are expecting to gain. Having closely followed <a href="https://africacenter.org/in-focus/russia-in-africa/">Russia’s disruptive interventions in Africa</a> for many years, the main losers will be ordinary citizens who will pay for these exclusive partnerships – through higher taxes, greater instability and less freedom. </p>
<p>The Russia-Africa summit has obvious benefits for Moscow. It conveys a perception of normalcy following <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682">Russia’s invasion of Ukraine</a>, an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/icc-putin-war-crimes-ukraine-9857eb68d827340394960eccf0589253">International Criminal Court war crimes arrest warrant for Putin</a> and the aborted <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-wagner-prigozhin-9acbdf1eda849692ca0423a4116058d1">insurrection led by Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin</a>. </p>
<p>While Russian-African economic ties are modest, the continent provides Russia with a global stage from which Moscow can puff up its geostrategic posture. Africa matters more to Russia than Russia does to Africa.</p>
<h2>The upside for Moscow</h2>
<p>Given Russia’s track record of destabilisation on the continent since 2019, it begs the question why African leaders would even consider attending the <a href="https://summitafrica.ru/en/">St Petersburg summit</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mali-catastrophe-accelerating-under-junta-rule/">Security has deteriorated</a> in every African country where Wagner has been deployed, while <a href="https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/">human rights abuses have surged</a>. Local communities have been intimidated into leaving their homes where Wagner has been given mining access, effectively annexing these territories.</p>
<p>Moscow curries favour with some of these regimes by providing <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/russia-in-africa/">protection from international sanctions</a> for human rights violations or for violating democratic practices. Unsurprisingly, the African countries where Russia is most involved have <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/russia-interference-undermine-democracy-africa/">median democracy scores of 19</a>. The African democracy median is 51 on <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores">Freedom House’s 100-point scale</a>.</p>
<p>The summit is a chance to show it’s business as usual for Russia. And that Russia is not a pariah, but enjoys the implicit endorsement of its violations of international law by African heads of state.</p>
<p>Russia will likely use this year’s summit to falsely claim that western sanctions are limiting the export of Russian (and Ukrainian) food and fertiliser to Africa, distracting attention from Russia’s culpability for <a href="https://theconversation.com/here-are-the-terrible-costs-of-vladimir-putins-enduring-war-in-ukraine-184367">triggering the disruption in global grain supplies</a>.</p>
<p>The summit also highlights the increasing importance of Africa to Russian foreign policy. Africa remains the continent <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-fresh-warning-that-africa-needs-to-be-vigilant-against-russias-destabilising-influence-178785">most welcoming of Russian engagement</a>. It’s also the least willing to criticise Moscow for its <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2022/9/29/russia-ukraine-live-news-annexed-regions-could-join-by-tuesday-2#:%7E:text=Latest%20Ukraine%20updates%3A%20US%20calls%20Russian%20annexation%20a%20'land%20grab',-By%20Edna%20Mohamed&text=US%20Secretary%20of%20State%20Antony,is%20illegal%20under%20international%20law.">land grab in Ukraine</a>. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov has made <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-russia-is-on-a-charm-offensive-in-africa-the-reasons-arent-pretty-187711">at least eight visits to Africa</a> since Russia launched its attack in March 2022.</p>
<h2>Dubious benefits to Africa</h2>
<p>Anaemic investment, normalising autocracy, fomenting instability and intervening in African domestic politics doesn’t sound like a winning strategy for building a long-term partnership. </p>
<p>It’s one thing to take a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-64759845">non-aligned posture</a> on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which may seem like a far-off conflict. But why would African leaders continue to engage with a foreign actor with an active record of undermining stability on the continent?</p>
<p>A clear-eyed assessment of national interests isn’t compelling. The instability caused by Russia’s irregular tactics threatens to spill across borders and is creating crises of sovereignty on the continent. </p>
<p>The upending of the rule of law is simultaneously damaging the continent’s budding reputation as a reliable destination for investment and international partnerships.</p>
<p>Russia’s influence operations are nearly always aimed at helping incumbent (typically autocratic) regimes retain power. Opaque mining and arms deals are frequently part of the package. African leaders benefiting from these tactics welcome Moscow’s overtures.</p>
<p>Other African leaders see engaging with Russia as a tactic to get more support from the west.</p>
<p>A minority may naively see their participation as a genuine opportunity to gain more Russian investment or encourage more constructive Russian engagement. Expected announcements of mining, energy, grain, transport and digitisation deals at the summit will provide a justifying fig leaf to all attendees. Even if such plans never materialise.</p>
<h2>Reality check</h2>
<p>The reality is that <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/russia-in-africa-undermining-democracy-through-elite-capture/">Russia’s strategy of elite cooption</a> is widening the gap between African leaders’ and citizens’ interests. Citizens regularly say <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/africans-durable-demand-for-democracy/">they want more democracy</a>, job creation and upholding of the rule of law. Russian engagements on the continent are undermining all three.</p>
<p>The “interests gap” between African leaders and citizens points to another takeaway from the summit: most African political leaders won’t be championing reforms on citizen priorities for better governance, development and security. Rather, leadership on these interests will need to come from African civil society, media and independent judiciaries.</p>
<p>Moscow is sure to use this year’s gathering in St Petersburg to conjure up the imagery of shared Russian and African interests. The key question for African citizens to ask is: whose interests are being served?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209982/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph Siegle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Russia-Africa summit has obvious benefits for Moscow: it conveys a perception of normalcy and the tacit approval of African elites.Joseph Siegle, Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, University of MarylandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2070582023-06-06T13:35:45Z2023-06-06T13:35:45ZUkraine war: the psychological and political impact of the drone attacks in Russia – an expert explains<p>Every military action communicates something. The recent drone strikes in Moscow during which three residential and high-rise buildings were targeted certainly did so. </p>
<p>This unprecedented attack arguably communicated to Muscovites that Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation” is nothing but a euphemism for a war that has now reached the Russian capital. </p>
<p>It also communicated to the Kremlin that Russian soil is not immune from the sort of military strikes it has inflicted upon Kyiv.</p>
<p>Many commentators have argued that these attacks are a “<a href="http://theconversation.com/moscow-drone-attacks-are-a-morale-booster-for-ukraine-and-a-warning-for-russia-heres-why-206797">boost to morale</a>” for Ukrainians and undermine Putin’s hyperbolic narrative on the war’s success, and I agree. The Kremlin has downplayed the threat and reassured the public that its air defences can mitigate any future attack. </p>
<p>But what exactly is the psychological impact of these strikes on ordinary Russians themselves? And what sort of response could this enable?</p>
<p>The reaction from Moscow residents has been tainted by profound shock and fear. One woman who witnessed the attack <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/could-drone-attacks-in-moscow-change-how-russian-people-perceive-putins-war-in-ukraine">said</a> that the whole ordeal was “scary. You sit at home and this thing flies at your window. Of course it’s dangerous.” A security guard who was also present, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/30/moscow-drone-attack-mayor-reports-minor-damage-to-buildings">expressed that</a> “no one understood what was happening”.</p>
<p>The war in Ukraine has felt like a distant issue for most Russians, until now. Muscovites now demonstrate a palpable fear of being injured or killed by one of those drones. Even though no civilian was killed or severely injured in this latest attack, the spectre of the war coming home can make the imagination run wild. </p>
<p>Since the invasion in February 2022, Russians (except for soldiers and their families) have yet to experience any sense of the trauma that Ukrainians have recently experienced. Westerners may hope that drone attacks will prompt the Russian public to put greater pressure on the Kremlin to bring the war to an end. </p>
<p>But director of the Moscow-based polling company the Levada Center, Denis Volkov, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/could-drone-attacks-in-moscow-change-how-russian-people-perceive-putins-war-in-ukraine">argues that</a> “single events do not have big impacts” on support for the Russian president. </p>
<h2>Rallying the Russian people?</h2>
<p>Conversely, these attacks could provide the Kremlin with the necessary rhetorical ammunition to bolster domestic support for their shameful foreign policy. They could exploit the psychological fragility, caused by the drone attacks, to turn the shock and anxiety of Russians into outright anger against Ukraine. </p>
<p>Those ideologically supportive of Putin are likely to have their views reaffirmed, while people who have thus far been politically indifferent or apathetic could all of a sudden become more receptive to the Kremlin’s narrative. Periods of emotional instability and anxiety can produce all sorts of behavioural changes – not least the search for violent retribution. </p>
<p>The attack on the dam in Nova Khakovka in southern Ukraine during the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65818705">early hours on Tuesday</a> could well be evidence of this psychological shift to further punish Ukraine. </p>
<p>My own <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/whats-the-psychology-behind-putins-decision-to-invade">research</a> on the psychology of war has shown that people are more likely to support a war when the dangers they themselves face are properly explained. It helps when the conflict is framed as a “clash of civilisations”. This has been the case with the war in Ukraine – the Kremlin’s propaganda has deliberately tied Ukraine to the terms fascism and Nazism.</p>
<p>Putin has argued that Russia’s actions in Ukraine are necessary to free people from the yoke of western neo-imperialism. Now there is evidence of the Kremlin framing this latest development in terms of “terrorism”. In response to the attack in Moscow, <a href="http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/71256">Putin stated</a>:</p>
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<p>The Kiev regime has chosen a different path – attempts to intimidate Russian citizens with strikes at residential buildings. This is an obvious terrorist approach … Of course, Ukrainian citizens cannot speak out because of the total terror against civilians.</p>
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<p>He framed the strikes as an attack on innocent Russian “citizens”. His choice to represent the drone strikes with the terms “intimidate” and “terrorist”, served to inscribe the Ukrainian regime as evil – a regime which had resorted to a path commonly associated with non-state actors. </p>
<p>He not only represented Moscow’s residents as victims of Ukrainian terrorism, but spoke of how the Ukrainian government had terrorised its own people – further evidence of his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/mar/05/putin-ukraine-invasion-white-nationalists-far-right">saviour complex</a>. </p>
<p>His statement introduced the concept of terrorism as an additional frame to devalue the legitimacy of Ukraine’s political leadership. The use of the term and its labelling can have a dehumanising effect on the subject with which it is proscribed to.</p>
<p>This sort of discourse encourages public discussion around a “war on terror” narrative. This can enable a whole set of actions which would otherwise be harder to legitimise – including punitive attacks on key Ukrainian infrastructure and further mobilisation of Russian forces. </p>
<h2>The Motherland needs you</h2>
<p>Russia has suffered terrible losses in Ukraine, with the UK Ministry of Defence estimating that up to <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/3864475-russian-death-toll-in-ukraine-war-could-be-up-to-60000-uk-intelligence/">60,000 of its soldiers have died</a>. The consequences of ordering up another round of mobilisation could be severe for Putin. </p>
<p>To avoid a mass exodus of fighting-age men and circumvent domestic unrest, he has relied on mercenaries such as the Wagner Group. Just after the incident in Moscow, deputy state duma chairman, Petr Tolstoy <a href="https://t.me/petr_tolstoy/1782.">wrote on his Telegram page</a>: “We need the mobilisation of all forces and means.”</p>
<p>Ordinary Russian men have no ambition of being used as cannon-fodder for a war which has no benefit to their lives. But answering the call to protect Russia from Ukrainian terrorists and assert control over national security, could persuade more to join up. </p>
<p>This would depend on how many more attacks occur inside Russia – and how effectively the Kremlin’s propaganda can exploit the emotions of a fearful and anxious public.</p>
<p>Given the strength of the Russian narrative surrounding the country’s massive sacrifice of lives in the fight against the Nazis in the second world war, giving one’s life for the motherland has a <a href="https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/great-patriotic-war-russia-invasion-ukraine">special meaning in Russian society</a>. Given the right conditions, it is very possible for Putin to exploit this to continue his military crusade in Ukraine.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207058/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Soodavar works in the UK Parliament.</span></em></p>Now Russians may start feeling the fear that has afflicted ordinary Ukrainians since February 2022.Ben Soodavar, Researcher, Department of War Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2067972023-06-01T13:44:45Z2023-06-01T13:44:45ZMoscow drone attacks are a morale booster for Ukraine and a warning for Russia – here’s why<p>A wave of approximately 30 drones <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/what-do-we-know-about-ukraines-drone-strike-moscow-2023-05-30/">appeared</a> in skies around the Russian capital, Moscow, on May 30. Though widely sensationalised as a major attack against the heart of the Russian government, they caused only <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65753825">minor damage</a>, mostly to high-rise buildings.</p>
<p>These drones were not intended to cause major destruction. Rather, they were meant to send a message that Ukraine – which has <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/d6ab357a-feb2-11ed-be2d-6982544ae552">not claimed</a> responsibility for the strikes – has both the capacity and will to strike back at the capital of its enemy invader.</p>
<p>Although different in scale, this is not the first such strike against Moscow. In early May, Russia alleged that Ukraine had targeted Vladimir Putin with a drone strike, which Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, promptly <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65471904">denied</a>. And Ukraine is thought to have been behind a series of <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-drones-are-transforming-the-conflict-bringing-russia-on-to-the-frontline-196229">drone strikes against airbases</a> in Russia’s Kursk, Saratov and Ryazan regions, up to 300 miles inside Russian territory.</p>
<p>More recently, the Russian defence ministry <a href="https://eng.mil.ru/en/special_operation/news/more.htm?id=12468312@egNews">claimed</a> that a Ukrainian drone attack on one of its spy ships the Black Sea, the Ivan Khurs, had failed. There have also been drone strikes against Russian <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-drone-sparks-fire-russian-refinery-governor-2023-05-31/">oil pipelines and refineries</a> including near the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/fire-oil-refinery-russias-krasnodar-likely-caused-by-drone-governor-2023-05-31/">crucial</a> oil export hub for Russia. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-drone-attack-on-kremlin-logic-suggests-a-false-flag-to-distract-russians-ahead-of-victory-day-on-may-9-204960">Ukraine war: drone 'attack' on Kremlin – logic suggests a false flag to distract Russians ahead of Victory Day on May 9</a>
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<p>Drone strikes are not the only way in which the war has come home to Russia. The Belgorod region, to the north of the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, has seen a spectacular <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65674773">ground assault</a> raid by the so-called <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0b57c31b-814d-4554-91d8-d49b066cea69">Russian Volunteer Corps and Free Russia Legion</a> (two Ukraine-based far-right Russian militia groups), which took the Russian military two days to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/175720c7-9312-4a56-964a-d20f8ec5377a">repel</a>.</p>
<p>Because of its strategic location as a training and staging ground, Belgorod has repeatedly come under attack. In October 2022, two gunmen <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63273599">killed</a> 11 soldiers at a training ground, wounding a further 15. The region has also been <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-belgorod-drone-explosion-ukraine-border/32358759.html">repeatedly</a> struck by Ukrainian artillery, missiles and drones since the beginning of Russia’s invasion in February 2022. These <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belgorod-governor-says-eight-wounded-by-ukrainian-shelling-civilians-be-2023-06-01/">strikes</a> have become more frequent and intense in recent weeks.</p>
<h2>Intensifying air war</h2>
<p>The bigger picture that emerges from all this has two important dimensions. First, it suggests that at the moment, there is a lull in the ground war and an intensification of the air war. This comes after Russia’s Wagner paramilitary group finally <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-wagner-army-starts-handing-bakhmut-over-regular-troops-2023-05-25/">captured</a> the embattled city of Bakhmut on May 20.</p>
<p>The costs of the intensifying air war are particularly borne by Ukraine, which has endured <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/three-dead-further-nighttime-kyiv-attack-city-officials-2023-06-01/">daily waves</a> of drone and missile attacks since then, including on its capital Kyiv. </p>
<p>None of this has been a gamechanger for either side. If anything, it has demonstrated Russian vulnerabilities that expose the Kremlin’s version of the “special military operation” for what it is – a full-on war in which even the Russian capital is not safe from air strikes, let alone areas closer to the border with Ukraine. </p>
<p>But it has also made it easier for Kyiv to lobby western allies successfully for more military support, demonstrating the need for, and usefulness of, both air defence systems and advanced attack drones and missiles – such as the UK’s Storm Shadow missiles which, <a href="https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1662906502410018816?s=19&t=0dSwrrGfhk9DkVeHtWhVLw">according</a> to Ukraine’s defence minister Oleksii Reznikov, “hit 100% of their targets”. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-zelenskys-diplomatic-tour-has-improved-the-ground-for-a-fresh-military-offensive-but-it-needs-to-come-soon-206206">Ukraine war: Zelensky's diplomatic tour has improved the ground for a fresh military offensive – but it needs to come soon</a>
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<h2>Deportation plans</h2>
<p>The second dimension is this: while the air war and protracted battle over Bakhmut have captured most media attention, Russia has dug in deep in the Ukrainian territories that it captured and now illegally occupies. Defences against an expected Ukrainian offensive have been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65615184">massively fortified</a> along the around 1,000km of frontline and along the beaches of Crimea.</p>
<p>But Russia is also digging in in other ways. On April 27, Putin signed a decree that <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russia-ukraine-passport-forced-citizenship-donetsk-luhansk/">forces</a> residents in the occupied territories either to accept Russian citizenship or become stateless. And at the end of May, the Russian president <a href="https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3715634-putin-legalises-elections-deportation-on-occupied-territory-of-ukraine.html">approved</a> amendments to existing legislation of martial law, including forcible population transfers and holding of elections in territories where martial law has been declared.</p>
<p>This suggests that Russia is unlikely to attempt to capture additional Ukrainian territories – at least, not for now. Rather, the Kremlin seeks to consolidate its hold on what it already has illegally annexed. This is most likely an attempt to withstand Ukrainian pressure during <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/16/ukraine-spring-offensive-russia-war-putin/">Kyiv’s anticipated offensive</a> until it runs out of steam.</p>
<p>A failure by Ukraine to regain significant ground on the battlefield, in the Kremlin’s logic, might increase the chances of a ceasefire that would further strengthen its territorial control. Such an outcome might also fracture the west’s united front of support for Ukraine, especially ahead of another winter war and as the US is heading into a fiercely contested presidential election in 2024.</p>
<h2>Ukraine’s message to Russia</h2>
<p>Ukraine’s best chance of avoiding such an outcome is to make significant gains in its counteroffensive campaign. The drone strikes on Moscow can be seen as preparations for that. They will provide a boost to morale for the Ukrainian army and people, ahead of what is likely to be a costly and painful military push. They demonstrate that Ukraine is ready to take the fight to the enemy, and that no one is invulnerable to their retribution.</p>
<p>In attacking deep inside Russia, these strikes will also force Russia to keep air defences close to symbolically and strategically important assets, rather than deploying them closer to the frontline with Ukraine. </p>
<p>The attacks also send a message to the Russian people that the “special military operation” is making them less, not more, secure. Putin has so far presented the war as something that has had little impact on Russian daily lives. These drone attacks and the coming counteroffensive, with all the destruction and casualties it is sure to bring, will puncture that lie.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206797/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Hastings Dunn has previously received funding from the ESRC, the Gerda Henkel Foundation, the Open Democracy Foundation and has previously been both a NATO and a Fulbright Fellow.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>Drone strikes in Moscow are just one sign of an intensifying air war ahead of Ukraine’s offensive.David Hastings Dunn, Professor of International Politics in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of BirminghamStefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2067412023-05-31T12:40:17Z2023-05-31T12:40:17ZDrone strikes hit Moscow and Kyiv – in the growing world of drone warfare, anything goes when it comes to international law<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529174/original/file-20230530-21-ynq73b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian security forces take measures near a damaged site following a drone strike on May 30, 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1258281328/photo/drone-attack-in-moscow-damages-several-buildings-with-no-casualties.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=fFRqMsFBSdxa7qh4flT00Xviw-RiQwO4Yhrtho9x0LE=">Sefa Karacan/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>At least eight drone <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-air-defences-battle-fresh-wave-russian-attacks-2023-05-30/">strikes hit Moscow</a> in the early morning of May 30, 2023, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-30/several-moscow-buildings-damaged-in-drone-attack-mayor-says#xj4y7vzkg">damaging several buildings</a> and injuring civilians.</p>
<p>This follows Russia’s targeting residential buildings in Ukraine with a wave <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/05/30/world/russia-ukraine-drones-news#russia-ukraine-kyiv-strikes">of drone attacks</a> in late May, killing civilians.</p>
<p>While Ukraine has said it is <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-05-30-23/h_c2b6c6339841c69d4e2ebc3543598043">not “directly” responsible</a> for the strikes on Moscow, Russia’s government has called the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/05/30/world/russia-ukraine-drones-news">strikes a “terrorist attack</a>.” </p>
<p>For more than a year, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/drone-attacks-russia-bryansk-kursk-ukraine-kyiv-missiles-1800525">daily life in Ukraine</a> has been marked by aerial vehicles <a href="https://rmas.fad.harvard.edu/unmanned-aircraft-systems-drones">known as drones</a> littering the sky, creating unease and inflicting real damage in the war with Russia. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/22/1165260201/russian-drone-strike-ukraine">Both Russia</a> and Ukraine are <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-army-revamps-commercial-drones-attack-russian-tanks-trenches-2023-05-16/">using drones</a> in this war to remotely locate targets and drop bombs, among other purposes.</p>
<p>Today, drones are used in various <a href="https://www.deseret.com/23663271/things-you-can-do-with-a-drone">other conflicts but</a> are also used to <a href="https://www.insiderintelligence.com/insights/drone-delivery-services/">deliver packages</a>, <a href="https://research.noaa.gov/article/ArtMID/587/ArticleID/2687/Drones-are-helping-scientists-understand-major-weather-events">track weather</a> and entertain drone hobbyists.</p>
<p>Military drones range from small consumer quadcopters to remotely piloted warplanes – and all types are being used by militaries <a href="https://theconversation.com/drones-over-ukraine-what-the-war-means-for-the-future-of-remotely-piloted-aircraft-in-combat-197612">around the world</a>. </p>
<p>As a scholar of <a href="https://fletcher.tufts.edu/people/faculty/tara-sonenshine">public diplomacy</a> and foreign policy – and a former United States undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs – I know how important it is for people to understand drones and their proliferation, given the risks of war, terrorism and accidental drone clashes in the world today.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man wearing camouflage clothing and a green hat extends his hand and a small drone flys away from him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Ukrainian soldier launches a drone from his hand in November 2022 in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1448799062/photo/drone-school-instructors-teach-ukrainian-military-aerial-reconnaissance-and-drone-control-in.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=Ck4_N_iB9fcDwMnGvQwUHnv658v0CFkv2WTjIDaZEqE=">Elena Tita/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A buying spree</h2>
<p>The U.S. is among more than 100 countries using drones in times of conflict. </p>
<p>Terrorists have also been <a href="https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism/files/2118451e-vt-mod5-unmanned_aircraft_systems_final-web.pdf">known to deploy drones</a> because they are relatively low-cost weapons with high degrees of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/nov/18/killer-drones-how-many-uav-predator-reaper">civilian damage</a>.</p>
<p>Consumer drone shipments, globally, <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1234658/worldwide-consumer-drone-unit-shipments/">topped 5 million units</a> in 2020 and are expected to surpass 7 million by 2025.</p>
<p><a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/12/how-doctrine-and-delineation-can-help-defeat-drones/">Sales of drones globally</a> were up 57% from 2021 to 2022. </p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1754">the exponential rise</a> in drone purchases over the last few years, there are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/10/world/asia/china-taiwan-drones.html">few constraints for buyers</a>, creating a wild, wild west of uncontrolled access and usage. </p>
<p>Each country is free to decide when and where drones fly, without answering to any other country or international authority governing drones. There is little on-the-ground guidance on the rules of the sky. </p>
<h2>Different purposes</h2>
<p>Each country has a unique interest in getting and using drones.</p>
<p>China is increasingly <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/huddle/2022/11/23/the-chinese-drones-over-washington-00070641">using sophisticated drones</a> for covert surveillance, especially in international waters to patrol the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea">disputed islands in the South China Sea</a>. Its expanding drone program has influenced other countries like the U.S. to also invest <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/19/us/politics/afghanistan-drone-strike-video.html">more in the technology</a>.</p>
<p>Turkey’s military has a highly sophisticated drone, the <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/05/16/the-turkish-drone-that-changed-the-nature-of-warfare">Bayraktar TB2</a>, which is capable of carrying laser-guided bombs and small enough to fit in a flatbed truck.</p>
<p>The United Arab Emirates imports drones from China and Turkey to <a href="https://drones.rusi.org/countries/united-arab-emirates">deploy in Yemen and Libya</a> to monitor warlords in case conflict breaks out.</p>
<p>And South Korea is considering <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-koreas-yoon-vows-advance-creation-military-drone-unit-2022-12-27/">starting a special drone unit</a> after it failed to respond to a recent North Korean drone incursion. When North Korea deployed five drones toward its southern neighbor in December 2022, South Korea <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/05/10/south-korea-drone-defense-leaked-documents/">had to scramble its fighter jets</a> to issue warning shots.</p>
<h2>No rules in the air</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/world-drones/who-has-what-countries-with-armed-drones/#:%7E:text=Over%20three%2Ddozen%20countries%20in,produced%20their%20UCAVs%20at%20home.">countries with armed drones</a> are individually navigating their own rules instead of an international agreed-upon set of regulations.</p>
<p>International law prohibits the <a href="https://www.justia.com/international-law/use-of-force-under-international-law/">use of armed force</a> unless the United Nations Security Council authorizes an attack, or in the case of self-defense.</p>
<p>But short of launching a full war, drones can legally be deployed for counterterrorism operations, surveillance and other non-self-defense needs, creating a <a href="https://news.nd.edu/news/the-future-of-us-drone-policy-a-conversation-with-international-law-professor-mary-ellen-oconnell">slippery slope to military conflict</a>.</p>
<p>Figuring out the national and international rules of the sky for drone usage is hard.</p>
<p>For 20 years, experts have tried to create <a href="https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/TheArmsTradeTreaty1/TheArmsTradeTreaty.pdf">international agreements</a> on arms – and some countries supported an informal <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/att_first_six_1_scope_holtom.pdf">2016 U.N. agreement</a> that recommends countries document the import and export of unmanned aerial vehicles.</p>
<p>But these efforts never evolved into <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2020/drones-and-the-development-of-international-standards/">serious, comprehensive standards and laws</a> that kept pace with technology. There are several reasons for that. In order protect their national sovereignty, governments do not want to release drone data. They also want to avoid duplication of their technology and to maintain their market share of the drone trade.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large gray drone is stationary in front of a large American flag." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A MQ-9 Reaper drone awaits its next mission over the U.S.-Mexico border in November 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1439274747/photo/u-s-customs-and-border-protection-agents-pursue-migrants-along-mexico-arizona-border.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=PCc0OCblARHnSxxDsQj9lsCHBVb4wYSRfOL1LTAA7vk=">John Moore/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>US and drones</h2>
<p>The U.S. has wrestled with how to balance drone warfare as it became involved in overseas operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and other conflict zones.</p>
<p>The U.S. killed a top al-Qaida leader with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/cia-carried-out-drone-strike-afghanistan-us-officials-say-2022-08-01/">a drone strike</a> in Afghanistan in 2022.</p>
<p>But there have been other instances of drone strikes that resulted in unintended casualties and damage.</p>
<p>In 2021, The New York Times reported that a U.S. drone strike <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/world/asia/us-air-strike-drone-kabul-afghanistan-isis.html">on a vehicle thought to contain an Islamic State bomb</a> resulted in the deaths of 10 children – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/07/us/politics/drone-strikes-biden-trump.html">not three civilians</a>, as the U.S. said might have happened.</p>
<p>There is scant public opinion research on how American feel about the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/us-faces-immense-obstacles-to-continued-drone-war-in-afghanistan/">use of drones overseas</a>, which makes building public support for their military use difficult.</p>
<h2>Drone dangers</h2>
<p>Drone dangers are real. </p>
<p>Many drone experts, including myself, believe it is <a href="https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1162&context=jlia#:%7E:text=A%20drone%20can%20be%20considered%20a%20weapons%20platform%20or%20a,the%20use%20of%20certain%20weapons.">unsafe for each country’s military</a> to make its own decisions on drones with no rules guiding drone transfers, exports, imports and usage – and no major forum to discuss drones, as the technology continues to evolve.</p>
<p>Multiple drones can communicate with each other remotely, creating shared objectives rather than an individual drone path or pattern. Like a swarm of bees, these drones form a deadly and autonomous aerial army ripe for accidents.</p>
<p>With the advent of artificial intelligence and more sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles, drones can change speed, altitude and targeting in seconds, making them even more difficult to track and investigate. <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/22/un-talks-to-ban-slaughterbots-collapsed-heres-why-that-matters.html">Attacks can happen</a> seemingly out of the blue.</p>
<p>Drone detection is another complication, especially on the battlefield. </p>
<p>Ukrainian and Russian forces each want to know exactly where a drone originated. That can be difficult to determine, especially at night, as drones are fast-moving vehicles. Traditional radar detection has grown more sophisticated with new drone detection platforms to more accurately decipher the exact location of the drone operator.</p>
<p>In my view, the world needs new and consistent rules on drone usage for the decade ahead – better international monitoring of drone incursions and more transparency in the outcome of drone attacks.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of an <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-drones-are-swarming-the-skies-of-ukraine-and-other-conflict-hot-spots-and-anything-goes-when-it-comes-to-international-law-205898">article originally published on May 19, 2023</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206741/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tara Sonenshine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As drone strikes become a more routine part of warfare, a set of rules or standards that can help determine how they are used in warfare is needed, writes a former US diplomat.Tara Sonenshine, Edward R. Murrow Professor of Practice in Public Diplomacy, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2026362023-03-27T13:09:26Z2023-03-27T13:09:26ZUkraine war: tensions rise in Crimea as Russia prepares for a likely spring offensive<p>To paraphrase the words of <a href="https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/z-krimu-vse-pochalosya-nim-i-zavershitsya-potribno-zvilniti-77237">the Ukrainian president</a>, Volodymyr Zelensky, everything began with Crimea, and everything will end there as well. When Russia first occupied Crimea in 2014, it was a major win for Putin, who successfully called the west’s bluff by proceeding to annex the peninsula with minimal international opposition.</p>
<p>Now, as Ukrainian forces consider how to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/26/europe/war-in-crimea-russia-ukraine-intl/index.html">“de-occupy” Crimea</a>, the Russian high command needs to think about how to prevent the recapture of the one territory that they cannot afford to lose.</p>
<p>Ukraine watchers are reporting that <a href="https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1637805016009396224">Russia is digging in</a> along the northern edge of Crimea, actively <a href="https://www.avito.ru/krasnoperekopsk/vakansii/ukreplenie_okopov_2896394253">recruiting labourers</a> to help fortify the area around the Isthmus of Perekop, the <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/reference/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/perekop-isthmus">narrow strip of land</a> connecting Crimea to the rest of Ukraine. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517618/original/file-20230327-22-bgohbm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Crimea showing southern Ukraine" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517618/original/file-20230327-22-bgohbm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517618/original/file-20230327-22-bgohbm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517618/original/file-20230327-22-bgohbm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517618/original/file-20230327-22-bgohbm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517618/original/file-20230327-22-bgohbm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517618/original/file-20230327-22-bgohbm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517618/original/file-20230327-22-bgohbm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Defensive preparations are underway in Crimea ahead of a possible Ukrainian counter-offensive.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Maximilian Dörrbecker (Chumwa) via Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>Russia has been continuously reinforcing the area since its initial occupation back in 2014, more recently redoubling defences each time <a href="https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1593489267900108802?s=20">Ukrainian forces move closer</a>. As a result, both the narrow land bridge and the adjoining coastline of the Syvash Bay are now <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/crimea-annexation-russia-ukraine-war-volodymyr-zelenskyy-vladimir-putin/">hardened against attack</a>. Taken together with rumours of <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/russia-preparing-forced-evacuation-crimea-ukraine-1788424">forcible evacuation</a> of any remaining civilians, it is fair to say Russia is gearing up for something to happen in the area.</p>
<h2>Why Crimea matters</h2>
<p>Zelensky has always maintained that the war in Ukraine <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/zelensky-the-war-must-end-with-the-liberation-of-crimea/">must end with the liberation of Crimea</a>. In his nightly address, in August 2022, he said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Russia has turned our peninsula, which has always been and will be one of the best places in Europe, into one of the most dangerous places in Europe. Russia brought large-scale repression, environmental problems, economic hopelessness and war to Crimea.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Correspondingly, this has drawn harsh rhetoric from Moscow, most recently from former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev who warned that Moscow would use “absolutely any weapon” if Ukraine attempted to retake the peninsula – which many take to mean nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>Crimea is incredibly significant at the strategic level. It is a base for Russia’s <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/how-russias-black-sea-fleet-could-change-equation-ukraine">Black Sea Fleet</a>, and provides critical access to trade through ports such as Sevastopol. But in terms of the narrative of the conflict, Putin and his allies have woven Crimea into the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/world/europe/ukraine.html">Russian national myth</a>, framing it as a <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603">vital part of the nation</a>. Losing the region would be humiliating and costly for the regime.</p>
<p>For years, the idea of Ukraine reclaiming Crimea has appeared more than remote. But Kyiv’s military successes at the back end of 2022 have since changed this perception, and the recapture of Kherson back in September has put <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-after-recapture-of-kherson-the-conflict-is-poised-at-the-gates-of-crimea-195025">Ukraine within striking distance</a>. </p>
<p>So far the threat of a nuclear response has appeared to be a bluff, with Russia failing to follow through, despite a series of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/21/ukraine-says-russia-kalibr-missile-cargo-hit-in-transit-to-crimea">attacks by Ukraine</a> on Russian military installations there. And Kyiv’s narrative of needing to liberate all territory occupied by Russia since 2014 is <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/top-us-diplomat-warns-ukraine-215243147.html?">gaining international support</a>. A spring offensive to the south has been all but confirmed, with a stated objective of <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/13695">cutting off</a> Crimea from Russian support.</p>
<p>But the battle for Crimea itself is still a way off. <a href="https://twitter.com/WarintheFuture/status/1619932842297016320">Significant groundwork</a> needs to be in place before any direct offensive can take place. Nevertheless, an operation that once seemed impossible is now being seriously considered by both sides.</p>
<h2>The fight for Crimea</h2>
<p>Should it come to a military operation, Crimea is not going to be an easy fight. Options such as an amphibious or airborne assault are too risky, given that Russia still has serviceable naval <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/russian-air-defense-systems-down-ukrainian-drones-in-crimea">and air defence assets</a>. A direct approach would see a massive Ukrainian offensive down the Isthmus of Perekop. This could result in Ukrainian forces being funnelled into the area Russia is currently reinforcing, which is far from ideal.</p>
<p>If there is a place to stop a Ukrainian land force, this would be where it happens. The isthmus is an ideal choke point, with little room to manoeuvre. This <a href="https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1637805016009396224">latest round of defensive construction</a> is turning the area into a formidable position – the narrow space is ideal for <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/how-russia-is-waging-its-war-with-artillery-in-ukraine-2022-7?r=US&IR=T">Russian massed artillery</a>.</p>
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<p>An attacking land force would be at a major disadvantage, even if they possessed naval and air superiority, which unfortunately for Ukraine, <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/in-denial-about-denial-why-ukraines-air-success-should-worry-the-west/">cannot be assumed</a>. With the isthmus effectively defended, Crimea becomes an island. This type of challenge will require different skills and equipment to address, being unlike any of the operations it has conducted so far. </p>
<p>It is no coincidence that its name – Perekop – roughly translates to <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780191905636.001.0001/acref-9780191905636-e-5785;jsessionid=38EFE6B00707CE0C0CD3DF87CB1E667C">trench</a>. The isthmus has been <a href="http://www.starforts.com/perekop.html">fortified by many great powers</a> down the centuries and history tells us it will be hard to retake with a direct assault. </p>
<p>By the time Ukraine launches its counter-offensive in the south, the reality on the ground should look different. Russia’s winter-spring offensives in the <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2023">Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts have faltered</a> and the invasion force has taken significant losses in months of heavy fighting in Bakhmut. Russian military morale is reported to be <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/will-morale-prove-the-decisive-factor-in-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine/">close to breaking point</a> with reports of friction between regular army and Wagner Group mercenaries. </p>
<p>The first aim of any Ukrainian southern offensive would be to isolate the peninsula from resupply completely. Despite <a href="https://www.newcivilengineer.com/latest/crimean-bridge-repaired-and-reopened-six-months-ahead-of-schedule-26-01-2023/">repairs to the Kerch bridge</a>, the one road link between Crimea and Russia, it has been shown be vulnerable and closing it again would mean Russia needing to resupply by sea or air, which is unsustainable for any length of time. If the peninsula can be cut off, the Russian presence in Crimea <a href="https://www.forces.net/ukraine/ukraine-plans-spring-offensive-cut-crimean-peninsula-russia">becomes unsustainable</a>.</p>
<p>The fortifications reportedly being prepared in advance of a possible Ukrainian assault show that Moscow, at least, is taking this prospect seriously. But a great deal will depend on Kyiv receiving superior weaponry in sufficient quantities to launch an attack. One thing seems certain though – the outcome of the battle for Crimea will be a <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/02/22/ukraine-crimea-russia-putin-red-line-00083857">decisive moment in the course of this conflict</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202636/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Morris does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia is reportedly preparing massive defences to prevent a lightning offensive to retake the occupied peninsula.Christopher Morris, Teaching Fellow, School of Strategy, Marketing and Innovation, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2021492023-03-22T06:06:58Z2023-03-22T06:06:58ZXi’s Moscow trip shows peace in Ukraine isn’t China’s main concern<p>Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to Moscow this week has been more about reiterating China and Russia’s shared interests, and less about any concrete pathway towards ending the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>While a <a href="https://english.news.cn/20230322/d0d39fe928af476a9bd3b3122cc1b6d4/c.html">joint statement</a> issued by the two countries yesterday said Russia aims to restart peace negotiations as soon as possible, Russian President Vladimir Putin said settling the conflict would only happen “whenever the West and Kyiv are ready for it”.</p>
<p>Indeed, while Russia made note of China’s 12-point peace plan and appreciated Beijing’s good will, no concrete proposal to end the war has emerged in bilateral discussions. Both sides were critical of Western sanctions.</p>
<p>The two countries resolved to further strengthen their “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination in the new era”.</p>
<p>Economic cooperation has dominated the visit. China has gained significant economic wins as Russia continues to face sanctions and is eager to look for assistance. Moscow welcomes Chinese businesses to replace Western companies that have vacated the Russian market due to sanctions. The two sides will also expand cooperation in the financial sector and in Eurasia.</p>
<p>Xi’s visit is also symbolically significant. This will be the 10th anniversary of his first visit to Russia after assuming the position of China’s president in 2013, and the first since securing an unprecedented third term as president earlier this month.</p>
<h2>Resentment over US dominance</h2>
<p>China-Russia relations have evolved over the past three decades to become <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/russieneireports/sino-russian-partnership-assumptions-myths-and">a unique strategic partnership</a>. </p>
<p>The countries’ relationship is firmly anchored in their opposition to the United States’ dominance of the international system. They promote “multipolarity”, the notion of multiple superpowers sharing power in the global arena, as opposed to one. And they’re vehemently opposed to “unilateralism”, the idea of any one country taking action alone without consulting the global community.</p>
<p>They often coordinate their policies on issues ranging from <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiw8Kr8r-79AhU93TgGHTYGAYgQFnoECDAQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.newsweek.com%2Frussia-china-offer-support-syria-amid-biden-moves-afghanistan-iraq-1613205&usg=AOvVaw14Sp50fLHSn6f2Oe5Zzg9f">humanitarian intervention</a> to opposing sanctions on North Korea.</p>
<p>The most important pillar of their relationship is cooperation on <a href="https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/221208_Bergmann_SinoRussian_Alignment_0.pdf?VersionId=7acp639vRIgDTxtXWguyDCO5KXDnGJPE">security and defence</a>, marked by technology transfers and joint military exercises. Russia has historically been <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-weapons-could-sustain-russias-war-effort-in-ukraine-65ca4163">a major supplier</a> of arms and military technology to China.</p>
<p>Their economic ties have made rapid progress in recent years, with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china-customs-says-trade-with-russia-hit-new-high-2022-2023-01-13/">bilateral trade</a> reaching USD$190 billion (A$283 billion) in 2022.</p>
<p>Several factors explain this. One is the complementary nature of their economic ties. China imports oil and natural gas from Russia, while Russia imports many of its consumer goods from China. </p>
<p>Western sanctions since Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014, and jacked up further since the invasion of Ukraine last year, have forced Russia to turn to China to compensate for its economic losses.</p>
<p>This partnership is further cemented by <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiT6Z6Use79AhXc9DgGHTxfA2s4ChAWegQIChAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fworld%2F2023%2Fmar%2F21%2F10-years-strengthening-ties-between-putin-xi-china-russia&usg=AOvVaw0ANtSVWpUlEjU9s9s4aUjM">the strong personal friendship</a> between Xi and Putin, who have met more than 40 times.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-wants-military-aid-from-china-heres-why-this-deal-could-help-china-too-201284">Russia wants military aid from China – here’s why this deal could help China, too</a>
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<h2>China’s dilemmas</h2>
<p>The quagmire of Russia’s bogged-down invasion of Ukraine presents China with uncomfortable policy <a href="https://www.apln.network/analysis/commentaries/chinas-dilemma-in-the-russia-ukraine-war">dilemmas</a>.</p>
<p>While sharing Russian resentment over US dominance, China is less interested in openly disrupting the international system. It’s much more integrated into the global trade and financial structure. China would <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2023/03/21/xi-putin-china-sanctions/">risk sanctions</a> if it was to offer explicit economic and military assistance to Russia.</p>
<p>At the same time, Beijing remains reluctant to openly condemn Russian actions and can ill afford to cut off ties, given its <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjrlJnQte79AhWG6jgGHU76DjsQFnoECDEQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcontent%2Fdc3ee895-4ae9-4c1f-9dfd-49261220ef1f&usg=AOvVaw1dgzk5-l_U0uh6N67jn3W4">growing strategic rivalry</a> with the US.</p>
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<p>Washington is further imposing <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6825bee4-52a7-4c86-b1aa-31c100708c3e">restrictions on technology exports to China</a>, and continues to build up regional security arrangements, from AUKUS to its Quad partnership with Australia, India and Japan. So Beijing would prefer to keep Moscow on its side rather than face the US and the West alone.</p>
<p>These explain why there’s little room for China to play an honest mediator between Ukraine and Russia to end the war.</p>
<p>The recent Iran-Saudi Arabia diplomatic truce <a href="https://time.com/6262985/china-saudi-arabia-iran-ukraine-peace-talks/">brokered by Beijing</a> heightened expectations of Xi’s visit and China’s ambition to play a peacemaker role. But the Ukraine case is vastly different and it’s much more difficult to arrive at any quick solution.</p>
<p>Xi’s <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-to-speak-with-zelensky-meet-next-week-with-putin-f34be6be">reported upcoming virtual meeting</a> with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will provide another opportunity, but no more promise, for China to demonstrate its credentials as a peacemaker.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202149/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jingdong Yuan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The recent Iran-Saudi Arabia diplomatic truce brokered by Beijing heightens expectations of Xi’s visit. But the Ukraine case is vastly different.Jingdong Yuan, Associate Professor, Asia-Pacific security, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2002992023-02-23T15:08:30Z2023-02-23T15:08:30ZUkraine war: why Russia has had such a disastrous 12 months – and what to expect next<p>When Russia’s ramshackle armies trundled into Ukraine a year ago, very few <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/world/europe/ukraine-war-military.html">gave the defenders a chance</a>. After all, they’d spent eight years unsuccessfully trying to fight off pro-Russian separatists (heavily backed by Moscow) in the east of their country. Meanwhile Russia had been ostentatiously developing and modernising its armed forces and using them with decisive effect in <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/russias-strategic-success-syria-and-future-moscows-middle-east-policy">Syria</a>. </p>
<p>Analysts – focused on Russia’s supposed “<a href="https://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf">hybrid</a>” <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/report/russian-hybrid-warfare">“approach to war”</a> had failed to appreciate two things. First, <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/advanced-military-technology-russia/03-putins-super-weapons">shiny gear</a> and <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/">buzzwords</a> does not an army make. Second, a <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2964390/ukrainians-united-in-resisting-russian-invasion/">nation in arms</a>, united, motivated and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/04/08/ukraines-iron-general-zaluzhnyy-00023901">well led</a> makes a very formidable opponent. </p>
<p>Russian forces <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russias-new-military-hardware-looked-good-on-parade-but-are-less-impressive-in-the-field-182864">looked good on parade</a> but, behind the paint and uniforms, the military was corroded by <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-military-corruption-quagmire/">corruption, graft and inefficiency</a> .</p>
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our weekly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>The men manning its modern equipment were led by generals who had <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare">failed to obey</a> the essential precept that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/12/16/world/europe/russia-putin-war-failures-ukraine.html">planning and preparation</a> <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/todayilearned/comments/1xazo1/til_the_british_army_has_an_adage_known_as_the/">prevents</a> poor performance. Troops were not trained properly, or at all, and had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/russian-soldiers-ukraine-anger-duped-into-war">little or no idea</a> of what they required to do. </p>
<p>Such planning should and does involve a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/russia-fsb-intelligence-ukraine-war/">deep appreciation of the environment</a> <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/no-war-old-spies-putin-kremlin-and-intelligence">into</a> which they are about to plunge – this is called “intelligence preparation of the battlefield”. By the way, while western generals might <a href="https://www.forces.net/russia/lord-dannat-russians-made-every-possible-military-mistake">sagely comment</a> on these matters, they made exactly the same mistakes in their <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-failed-strategy-middle-east-losing-iraq-and-gulf">disastrous wars</a> in the Middle East and Afghanistan.</p>
<p>The signs were there early on, when units of Russia’s elite <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10606279/Russian-paratroopers-doomed-raid-airport-Video-shows-elite-troops-Hostomel.html">airborne troops</a> were annihilated at <a href="https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/destination-disaster-russias-failure-at.html">Hostomel airfield</a> near Kyiv. It took a just month for Russia’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/01/fears-of-bloody-fight-for-kyiv-as-huge-russian-army-convoy-gathers-on-outskirts">chaotic and ramshackle columns</a> to be thrown back from Kyiv. </p>
<p>A highly regarded Russian tank brigade was defeated by a Ukranian armoured unit a tenth of its size at the battle of <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/12/25/how-ukraines-1st-tank-brigade-fought-a-russian-force-ten-times-its-size-and-won/">Chernihiv</a> – just one of several embarrassing defeats for Moscow’s war machine.</p>
<h2>All at sea (and in the air)</h2>
<p>Ukrainian air defences <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/russian-air-war-and-ukrainian-requirements-air-defence">were as well organised and prepared</a> as the Russian air force <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/russian-air-power-vanished-or-overstated-to-begin-with/">was inadequate</a> in all respects. They <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022">dispersed their assets</a>, ensuring the survival both of most of its aircraft and – vitally – an intact and superbly efficient ground based air defence system. This continues to defend Ukraine with panache. </p>
<p>Ukrainian airspace is <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/airpower-after-ukraine/air-denial-the-dangerous-illusion-of-decisive-air-superiority/#:%7E:text=Ukraine%20has%20successfully%20practiced%20a,skies%20to%20the%20air%20littoral.">denied to Russian aircraft</a>, with the area above the battlefield an <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/02/the-somme-in-the-sky-lessons-from-the-russo-ukrainian-air-war/">aerial no man’s land</a> where only drones venture. Russia continues to conduct a <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-doubles-down-its-failed-air-campaign">failing</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/russias-strategic-bombing-campaign-is-ill-conceived/2022/12/01/3673c02e-713e-11ed-867c-8ec695e4afcd_story.html">strategic air campaign</a> against Ukrainian civilian targets from aircraft flying deep inside Russian territory. </p>
<p>Even inside Russia, at its most vital and secure bases, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64092183">Ukrainian drone attacks</a> have forced Russia’s most capable bombers <a href="https://en.defence-ua.com/analysis/russians_hide_all_their_tu_160_bombers_yet_leave_two_in_risk_zone_and_other_anomalies_with_strategic_aircraft-5290.html">to seek safety</a>.</p>
<p>In the maritime domain, Ukraine didn’t just manage to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/ukraine-russia-moskva-military-marine-corps/629930/">sink the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet</a>. It was also able <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/30/ukraine-forces-reportedly-recapture-snake-island-in-strategic-win">to retake</a> Snake Island, which is not only <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/12/ukraine-reveals-russian-warship-go-fuck-yourself-postage-stamp">an iconic symbol</a> of Ukrainian resistance, but <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-reclaiming-snake-island-is-kyivs-biggest-strategic-victory-so-far-heres-why-186317">a vital asset in the battle</a> for the western Black Sea.</p>
<p>Russian ships <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/01/sudden-surge-in-russian-navy-ships-and-submarines-in-black-sea/">venture out now rarely</a>, and usually only to fire their <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-explosions-west-russia-missiles-black-sea/32277295.html">cruise missiles at civilian targets</a> before scurrying back to ports that find themselves under <a href="https://www.navylookout.com/considering-the-implications-of-the-attack-on-the-russian-fleet-in-sevastopol/">Ukrainian attack</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-russias-inability-to-dominate-the-sea-has-changed-the-course-of-the-war-200023">Ukraine: Russia's inability to dominate the sea has changed the course of the war</a>
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<h2>What to expect</h2>
<p>Having <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/nov/12/russia-ukraine-war-us-hails-extraordinary-victory-for-ukraine-in-kherson-kyiv-warns-moscow-mobilising-more-conscripts-live">won the battle of Kherson</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/13/ukraine-reclaim-control-of-kharkiv-and-towns-seized-at-onset-of-russian-invasion">retaken a poorly defended Kharkiv region</a> in a lightning assault, the lines have been drawn for the next, and decisive stage. </p>
<p>The war has – for now – devolved into a first world war-style slogging match, where artillery dominates.</p>
<p>Russia is now capitalising on its only advantage: <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/06/world/europe/ukraine-russia-offensive.html">sheer numbers</a> of largely poorly trained troops and mercenaries. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/44642048">It has been said</a> that quantity has a quality all its own, but in modern warfare there are serious limits to the validity of that axiom. It is true only if that quantity can be protected by some form of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/06/ukraine-welcomes-agile-armour-it-hopes-will-give-it-a-fighting-edge">armoured mobility</a> and protection (apart from <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/12/14/world/europe/russian-trench-fortifications-in-ukraine.html">deep trench systems</a>) on a battlefield saturated by artillery.</p>
<p>Western assistance has been vital and will be critical in two major respects. First, Ukraine needs to <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/russian-air-war-and-ukrainian-requirements-air-defence">strengthen its air and ground defences</a> and reconstitute them along higher-quality Nato lines. Nato and other western tanks, missiles and especially precision gun and rocket systems like the <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/national/why-is-russia-so-vulnerable-to-himars-in-ukraine">brutally effective</a> Himars, have allowed Ukraine to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/26/the-russians-have-nothing-equivalent-how-himars-help-ukraine">counter Russian advantages</a> in artillery. </p>
<p>Second, as Ukraine has taken fearful casualties including and especially in its <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-80-of-troops-killed-or-injured-in-elite-military-unit-says-commander-and-its-future-is-unclear-12639752">most experienced units</a>, training will become more and more vital. As Russia discovered early in the war, equipment is of little use unless troops have been properly trained to use it. This is especially so in <a href="https://www.benning.army.mil/mssp/Combined%20Arms%20Operations/">combined arms warfare</a>, the extremely difficult task of coordinating infantry, tanks artillery and air power. </p>
<p>Ukraine will counterattack, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230214-live-nato-chief-says-more-important-finland-sweden-join-soon-than-together">probably in the spring</a> and will need all the help it can get if it is to drive Russian forces back to their borders.</p>
<p>Drawing a parallel with the second world war where the ethics for Britain and her allies were clear, this is the “<a href="https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2022/03/81091/">good war</a>” of our generation. Over the past year it has been well fought by the men and women defending their people, country and culture. They are also defending what remains of the <a href="https://spia.princeton.edu/events/ukraine-one-year-defending-international-order">international order</a>. </p>
<p>Having defeated Russian forces at the battles of Kyiv, Kharkiv and Kherson, Ukrainian forces now need to stave off the counterattack and demonstrate to a carefully watching west that they can retake and secure their country. Their success over the next few months will define the shape of the rest of the war, determining whether victory will come this year, or whether this will be a long and even more grinding conflict.</p>
<p>Last week General Mark Miley, the chairman of America’s joint chiefs of staff, while stating that Russia has already lost strategically, argued that neither side were likely to <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/europe/neither-side-likely-to-prevail-in-russia-ukraine-war-us-general-says-20230217-p5cl8z">prevail this year</a>. If nothing else, Ukraine has demonstrated that during this phase of the war it can and will surprise us, generals, analysts and all. </p>
<p>They will do so again this year.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200299/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Ledwidge is affiliated with Globsec (Kyiv)</span></em></p>Vladimir Putin’s planning for his ‘special military operation’ failed to take into account the Ukrainian people’s staunch defence.Frank Ledwidge, Senior Lecturer in Military Strategy and Law, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2001312023-02-16T20:21:28Z2023-02-16T20:21:28ZUkraine recap: how the conflict might unfold in its second year<p>Almost exactly a year ago – on February 17 2022 – we published a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-what-would-a-russian-invasion-actually-look-like-these-are-the-three-most-likely-scenarios-177287">story by David Galbreath</a>, an expert in international security from the University of Bath. In it he pointed to the fact that – despite the Kremlin’s repeated assurances to the contrary – an invasion of Ukraine was looking more and more likely. </p>
<p>He provided three possible scenarios. The first was a decapitation of Ukraine via a rapid incursion through Belarus supported by pro-Moscow elements operating in Kyiv to remove the current government and replace it with a friendly administration. His second scenario was for a turbocharging of the war in the east which would spill out into the rest of the country –– or at least those areas with majority Russian-speaking populations, something Russia was to attempt in September when it annexed the four regions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia.</p>
<p>The third scenario was a full invasion: combining the two aforementioned options with a push to completely defeat Ukraine’s military and take total control of the country.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-what-would-a-russian-invasion-actually-look-like-these-are-the-three-most-likely-scenarios-177287">Ukraine: what would a Russian invasion actually look like? These are the three most likely scenarios</a>
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<p>We now know which option Vladimir Putin chose to take.</p>
<p>Over the next week or so -–and with the help of our colleagues in our global network – we plan to take a detailed look at 12 months of war in Ukraine: the battlefield, the diplomatic front, the geopolitical point of view and the human and economic costs. We are able to call on some of the world’s leading academic experts to explain the issues and forecast some of the developments we are likely to see as the war enters its second (and, hopefully, final) year.</p>
<p>It seems fitting, then, to look at how the conflict might now develop in 2023. Florent Parmentier and Cyrille Bret, experts in security and geopolitics at Sciences Po in Paris, see a bloody stalemate at present, in which troops on both are bogged down in bitter fighting in the east, with many hundreds of casualties (some experts – including from the <a href="https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1624662553203802112">UK’s ministry of defence</a> – believe that the attrition rate could be at its highest since the first few weeks of the war).</p>
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<p>This has a great deal to do with the season. Harsh winter weather makes it hard to manoeuvre effectively, ruling out the sort of lightning offensives with which Ukraine startled Russia in late summer in 2022. </p>
<p>Partmentier and Bret have brainstormed the <a href="https://theconversation.com/almost-a-year-on-russias-war-against-ukraine-could-go-in-three-different-directions-199556">three most likely ways</a> in which this conflict will develop in the months ahead: a major Russian military setback, with big losses of men and territory; the reverse scenario in which Russia mounts a major successful offensive having learned from the mistakes it made in 2022; and finally, a drawn-out conflict leading to exhaustion and war weariness – not only in Russia and Ukraine, but also among those Kyiv is depending on for the military supplies that are keeping the country afloat.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-year-on-russias-war-against-ukraine-could-go-in-three-different-directions-199556">A year on, Russia's war against Ukraine could go in three different directions</a>
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<p><strong><em>This is our weekly recap of expert analysis of the Ukraine conflict.</em></strong>
<em>The Conversation, a not-for-profit newsgroup, works with a wide range of academics across its global network to produce evidence-based analysis. Get these recaps in your inbox every Thursday. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapTop">Subscribe here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>It should go without saying that western military aid has been the lifeline for Ukraine’s war effort and a great deal of credit goes to the country’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, for the tireless diplomacy with which he has persuaded western leaders to supply both sophisticated weapons systems and the training to use them effectively. </p>
<p>This has happened in spite of understandable misgivings that arming Ukraine is inevitably trumpeted by the Kremlin as proof that what was planned as a limited “military exercise” in Ukraine is turning into a confrontation between Russia and Nato. </p>
<p>But David Dunn, a professor of international politics at the University of Birmingham, believes that while these misgivings are perfectly understandable in the face of Russian threats to go nuclear, by placing limits on the sorts of weapons it is supplying, the west is effectively <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-12-months-at-war-why-kyivs-western-allies-must-rethink-the-limits-of-their-military-aid-200028">hobbling Ukraine’s ability to defend itself</a>.</p>
<p>Kyiv’s allies remain adamant that they will only supply defensive weaponry and nothing that could allow Ukraine to strike at targets on Russian territory. But this ignores the fact that Russia can launch missiles from well within its own borders. A Russian jet fighter reportedly shot down a Ukrainian aircraft at a range of 200km from well within the safety of Russian airspace. Dunn believes Ukraine’s allies need to rethink this as a matter of urgency.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-12-months-at-war-why-kyivs-western-allies-must-rethink-the-limits-of-their-military-aid-200028">Ukraine 12 months at war: why Kyiv's western allies must rethink the limits of their military aid</a>
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<h2>On the Russian front</h2>
<p>Whether it can be put down to the Ukrainian people’s staunch fighting spirit, or the supply of sophisticated western weaponry that has been brought to bear on Russia’s war machine, Russian soldiers have not proved to be the formidable fighting force that some experts predicted before the Ukraine conflict started. </p>
<p>Over the months it has become clear that Putin has struggled to reinforce his front line. Reservists were called up, then civilians – and even those with medical conditions – started to be conscripted. Jails were <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/16/world/europe/russia-wagner-ukraine-video.html">recruiting grounds for criminals</a> to join the notorious Wagner mercenary units. As the casualty count rose, some soldiers were even asked to bring medical kits from home as there were not enough available in the field.</p>
<p>Morale is reported to be low, and in some cases equipment is short. None of this suggests a highly motivated fighting force, as Jenny Mathers from Aberystwyth University reports in her analysis of what the past 12 months has been like for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-the-last-12-months-has-meant-for-the-ordinary-russian-soldier-199651">ordinary Russian soldier</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-the-last-12-months-has-meant-for-the-ordinary-russian-soldier-199651">Ukraine war: what the last 12 months has meant for the ordinary Russian soldier</a>
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<p>You might think it surprising, given the death toll among his forces, that Putin can still command a great deal of public support for his conduct of the war. But then you have to consider the role of Russia’s now almost completely compliant media in promoting the war to their domestic audience. Virtually all the broadcast media consumed by the Russian public is under tight state control, while print and (much of) the online news media is also largely Kremlin-compliant. </p>
<p>James Rodgers, who teaches and researches journalism at London’s City University, was a BBC correspondent in Moscow for many years and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-12-months-on-the-role-of-the-russian-media-in-reporting-and-justifying-the-conflict-199820">talks us through</a> the iron grip with which Putin now controls Russia’s news media, something reminiscent of the Bolsheviks a century ago, who also understood the importance of controlling the message.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-12-months-on-the-role-of-the-russian-media-in-reporting-and-justifying-the-conflict-199820">Ukraine war 12 months on: the role of the Russian media in reporting – and justifying – the conflict</a>
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<h2>A wider view</h2>
<p>The people of Moldova, meanwhile, have been watching nervously – literally from the sidelines. It’s well known that Putin has long been casting acquisitive glances at Ukraine’s small neighbour, which has its own troublesome Russian enclave in Transnistria.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510681/original/file-20230216-2034-hchnp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Moldova showing the breakaway pro-Russian region of Transnistria and surrounding countries." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510681/original/file-20230216-2034-hchnp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510681/original/file-20230216-2034-hchnp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=721&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510681/original/file-20230216-2034-hchnp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=721&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510681/original/file-20230216-2034-hchnp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=721&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510681/original/file-20230216-2034-hchnp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=906&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510681/original/file-20230216-2034-hchnp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=906&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510681/original/file-20230216-2034-hchnp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=906&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Moldova is vulnerable to destabilisation from the breakaway Russian enclave of Transnistria.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Hermes Furian via Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>Stefan Wolff, an expert in international security at the University of Birmingham and a regular contributor to our coverage of the war, reports about an alleged plan, the “<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-soccer-plot-raises-fears-of-fresh-russian-attempts-to-destabilise-neighbouring-moldova-199942">soccer plot</a>”, to destabilise Moldova involving infiltration by foreign agitators from Russia, Montenegro, Belarus and Serbia. </p>
<p>As Wolff writes, the Moldovan government recently prevented Serbian football fans crossing into the country ahead of a European Conference League match against a Moldovan side. A takeover of Moldova – however far-fetched the idea of a “soccer plot” may sound – would allow Russia to open a second front on its southern border, close to the city of Odesa.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-soccer-plot-raises-fears-of-fresh-russian-attempts-to-destabilise-neighbouring-moldova-199942">Ukraine war: 'soccer plot' raises fears of fresh Russian attempts to destabilise neighbouring Moldova</a>
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<h2>An increasingly costly ‘cold’ war</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, thanks to the war in Ukraine, the average household’s energy costs have <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-war-has-nearly-doubled-household-energy-costs-worldwide-new-study-200104">nearly doubled on average</a> around the world, according to our team of energy experts from the universities of Groningen and Birmingham.</p>
<p>Flowing into the cost of living crisis in many countries around the world, the spike in energy prices is an inevitable drag on the morale of countries that have lined up to support Ukraine’s struggle against Russia. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-war-has-nearly-doubled-household-energy-costs-worldwide-new-study-200104">Russia–Ukraine war has nearly doubled household energy costs worldwide – new study</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a weekly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200131/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of our coverage of the conflict from the past week.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1962302022-12-08T14:50:20Z2022-12-08T14:50:20ZFour ‘fronts’ in the Ukraine-Russia war to look out for as winter bites<p>Russia had expected to be victorious long before now. Its initial plan envisaged ground assaults across Ukraine in the first ten days and a rapid capitulation thereafter. But Kyiv did not fall – and Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, refused to leave the capital, saying, “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/26/europe/ukraine-zelensky-evacuation-intl/index.html">I need ammunition, not a ride</a>,” as he rallied Ukrainians. Russian troops had withdrawn from northern Ukraine by April.</p>
<p>Moscow pursued a more limited operation in the second phase over the spring and early summer, expanding its occupation of part of southern Ukraine and seizing all of the Luhansk region and parts of neighbouring Donetsk in the east. </p>
<p>But the third phase from August through November has involved a Ukrainian fightback in the north-east and south, regaining most of the territory gained by the Russian military in the first few months.</p>
<p>A Putin victory is now hard to envisage. His “<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putin-announces-annexation-of-four-regions-but-his-hold-on-them-may-be-flimsy-191641">annexation</a>” of four Ukrainian regions is in tatters. Now the question is how far and how fast Ukraine can regain the territory occupied in 2022, and put pressure on areas held by Russian proxies since 2014.</p>
<p>What then for the fourth phase of the war which will play out over winter?</p>
<h2>The battlefield</h2>
<p>With the liberation of Kherson city, Ukrainian forces hold all areas west of the Dnipro River. The retreating Russian forces are on the east bank, having blown up all major bridges to prevent Ukrainian pursuit. But there are gathering signs of another Ukrainian push. The first troops <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/11/22/ukraine-russia-war-kinburn-spit-counteroffensive-kherson-dnipro/">crossed the Dnipro and established a foothold</a> in a village last week. </p>
<p>The Russians are moving civilians out of some settlements on the east bank, and have reportedly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/dec/01/russia-ukraine-war-live-us-hands-raytheon-12bn-ukraine-missile-systems-contract-6-million-without-power-as-winter-begins">withdrawn some troops</a> as well.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Map showing the state of hostilities in the southern regions of Ukraine." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499791/original/file-20221208-12665-4pofku.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499791/original/file-20221208-12665-4pofku.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=942&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499791/original/file-20221208-12665-4pofku.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=942&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499791/original/file-20221208-12665-4pofku.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=942&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499791/original/file-20221208-12665-4pofku.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1184&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499791/original/file-20221208-12665-4pofku.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1184&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499791/original/file-20221208-12665-4pofku.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1184&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Status of fighting in the south of Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>It remains unclear where they will establish their new defensive line. The Ukrainian pattern through the autumn has been to degrade Russian capabilities, through strikes on occupied Crimea as well as eastern Kherson, before advancing on the ground. The strikes have damaged or destroyed bases, warplanes, ammunition depots, bridges and logistics and supply positions.</p>
<p>That is likely to be the pattern through the winter as well. The rapid Ukraine advance in September has been followed by a consolidation phase which Russia has tried to disrupt with its persistent shelling. The Russians have also sought for weeks to declare a largely symbolic victory with the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/27/world/europe/ukraine-war-bakhmut.html">conquest of Bakhmut</a> in the eastern Donetsk region. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499792/original/file-20221208-7256-4pofku.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing the the line between Ukrainian- and (blue) Russian-held (red) territory running through Kherson." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499792/original/file-20221208-7256-4pofku.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499792/original/file-20221208-7256-4pofku.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1045&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499792/original/file-20221208-7256-4pofku.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1045&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499792/original/file-20221208-7256-4pofku.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1045&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499792/original/file-20221208-7256-4pofku.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1313&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499792/original/file-20221208-7256-4pofku.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1313&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499792/original/file-20221208-7256-4pofku.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1313&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Status of fighting in the east.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>The fighting has been some of the bloodiest in the war, but a Russian victory would have little strategic value. Bakhmut’s role as the southern end of Ukraine’s defensive line was overtaken by the autumn counter-offensive.</p>
<p>More important is whether Ukraine can break through the Russian lines in the Luhansk region, which would begin to roll back Russia’s summer advance and further erode Russia’s annexation of the four proxy regions.</p>
<h2>The energy front</h2>
<p>Putin’s last hope of regaining the initiative is to break Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and has escalated strikes since October 10, knocking out up to <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/ukraine-races-to-restore-power-grid-after-russia-strikes/">half of Ukraine’s power grid</a>. But Ukrainian will has not broken amid round-the-clock repairs and emergency and scheduled blackouts. </p>
<p>Now there are signs of Russia’s diminishing capacity to continue this barrage. During the strikes on December 5, for example, just over 70 missiles were launched, more than 60 of which were reportedly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/dec/05/russia-ukraine-war-live-news-russian-oil-cap-comes-into-force-kyiv-resumes-rolling-power-outages">downed by Ukrainian air defences</a>. Western officials say the Iranian drones <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-iran-drones-ukraine-war/32144946.html">have been exhausted</a>, and Tehran has not agreed to a further delivery. Russia now has a stock sufficient for only two or three more mass attacks, according to Ukraine’s presidential advisor <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/06/mikhailo-podolyak-iran-has-not-sent-ballistic-missiles-to-russia-so-far-says-ukrainian-official">Mykhailo Podolyak</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russia has been trying to break European support for Kyiv with the threat of a reduction, or even a complete halt, of energy supplies. It shut down the Nord Stream 1 pipeline and is suspected being <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russian-pipeline-explosions-sabotage-europe-energy-war-ukraine-rcna49730">behind the explosions</a> damaging both Nord Stream 1 and 2 in the Baltic Sea.</p>
<p>But this energy offensive, as well as the “grain war” has failed to dent western resolve to stand by Ukraine. European countries – individually and through the European Union – have actually <a href="https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/85418/">stepped up</a> financial and military assistance. </p>
<h2>Legal and diplomatic front</h2>
<p>On the diplomatic front, there is no prospect of negotiations. Ukraine’s precondition is Russian withdrawal from territory occupied this year. Putin shows no sign of giving up on his ambition for the eventual fall of the Zelensky government and retention of his “annexations”.</p>
<p>But there is also a focus now on justice and accountability for war crimes. The UN and the International Criminal Court are already <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/situations-under-investigations">carrying out investigations</a> in liberated areas. Even more significantly, there is now a sustained effort for Russian leaders as well as individual troops to face prosecution. Zelensky’s call for an international tribunal is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/11/30/world/russia-ukraine-war-news">now being supported</a> by France and the Netherlands as well as the Baltic States. </p>
<p>European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen said on November 30 that the European Union, with UN backing, will <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-ursula-von-der-leyen-propose-set-up-court-russia-war-crime-ukraine/">support the special court</a>. A <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2022/dec/04/russian-war-crimes-draft-resolution-circulated-un-ukraine-zelenskiy">draft UN resolution</a> is being prepared for consideration by the general assembly.</p>
<h2>Russian front</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, Putin faces pressure on multiple domestic fronts. The Russian economy, now on a wartime footing, is projected to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/russian-economy-will-not-return-pre-war-levels-until-2030-scope-2022-09-16/#:%7E:text=By%20the%20end%20of%202023,the%20credit%20rating%20watchdog's%20forecast.">contract by 8%</a> over 2022-2023. Much of the manufacturing sector, such as the automotive industry, is crippled. Russia’s oil revenue is falling, even before this week’s imposition of a price cap by the European Union, G7 countries and Australia.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-new-figures-suggest-only-one-in-four-russians-support-it-but-that-wont-be-enough-to-oust-putin-196163">Ukraine war: new figures suggest only one in four Russians support it, but that won't be enough to oust Putin</a>
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<p>The Kremlin has cracked down on dissent with detentions and the threat of lengthy prison sentences, but Putin’s mass mobilisation and the Ukrainian advances are spurring discontent within his own ranks as well as the Russian public.</p>
<p>In a November poll by the independent Levada Center, 53% of respondents favour negotiations versus 41% who want to continue the war. An internal Kremlin-commissioned poll was <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-new-figures-show-only-one-in-four-russians-support-it-but-that-wont-be-enough-to-oust-putin-196163">even starker</a> for Putin: 55% favoured peace talks and only 25% wanted a continuation of the war.</p>
<p>Winter is coming – and it’s cold across Ukraine. But the chilly winds of defeat? Those are blowing through Moscow’s Red Square.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196230/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia appears to be under increasing pressure on all fronts.Scott Lucas, Professor, Clinton Institute, University College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1898822022-09-02T18:04:44Z2022-09-02T18:04:44ZMikhail Gorbachev’s death brings many tributes – but his legacy in Africa remains ambiguous<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482469/original/file-20220902-14-yyr9fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">JOSEPH EID/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mikhail Gorbachev was the last leader of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. He <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/30/mikhail-gorbachev-dies-soviet-leader-92">presided over</a> the end of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States as well as the dissolution of the union of socialist republics. In the West, he is commonly seen as a towering historical figure who changed the course of history. </p>
<p>But Gorbachev’s legacy outside the West-Russia binary is more ambivalent. As the Soviets and Americans repaired their rift on Gorbachev’s watch, many of Africa’s political and intellectual elites were full of foreboding. As I’ve documented in <a href="https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2009.00626.x">past research</a>, the Cold War was a period that provided African nations with considerable international leverage. </p>
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<p>The superpower rivalry presented independent nations with unique opportunities to play one side against the other. For instance, Mengistu Haile Mariam, the leader of the Ethiopian Derg, declared himself Marxist-Leninist. This gave him Moscow’s backing in his war against neighbouring Somalia. And Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko successfully lobbied Western powers for military and financial assistance by showcasing his anti-Communist credentials.</p>
<p>In the late 1990s, I spent some time in Nigeria and was surprised to discover that the very same reforms that gave former Soviet citizens (like myself) the cherished opportunities of free speech and travel didn’t have a similarly positive appeal to all my African academic colleagues. </p>
<p>Gorbachev’s reforms of <em>perestroika</em> (restructuring) and <em>glasnost</em> (opening) – which brought an end to the Cold War – had a quick and devastating impact on the Soviet Union’s commitments in the developing world. Gorbachev overhauled the Soviet economy and opened up Soviet society. He was convinced that his nation was facing an inevitable decline. His ambition was to make the economy more efficient and the everyday existence of Soviet citizens less oppressive. </p>
<p>But by admitting openly to the Soviet Union’s internal problems he diverted attention away from its ideological battles. This diminished the significance of Moscow’s ties with developing nations, particularly those in Africa. Under Gorbachev, the focal point of Soviet foreign policy was a rapprochement with the west.</p>
<p>The global realignment triggered by the end of the Cold War and Gorbachev’s reforms ushered in a period of transition on the African continent. But the outcomes remained uneven. Some oppressive regimes fell; new conflicts arose. </p>
<h2>Cold War in Africa</h2>
<p>The Cold War was a political and economic rivalry that developed after the second world war between the US and the Soviet Union, and their respective allies. It overlapped with another important historical development – the collapse of the global system of European colonialism and the emergence of the postcolonial world.</p>
<p>In the battle for the hearts and minds (and resources) of the developing world, Africa loomed particularly large. In the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/book/distant-front-the-cold-war-the-ussr-west-africa-and-the-congo-1956-1964">words</a> of a prominent Russian historian of Africa, Sergey Mazov, by the 1960s Africa had emerged as a “front of the Cold War”.</p>
<p>In most of the continent’s conflicts, the Soviets took the side of forces fighting for national liberation. This was against European colonialism and, in <a href="https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2007.00508.x">South Africa</a> and <a href="https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:dab0a0a3-28a7-438a-abd6-69df2e2ab4dc">Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe)</a>, institutionalised racism.</p>
<p>The Soviets and their allies rendered crucial and often decisive support to a variety of liberation causes. Numerous affiliates of powerful independence political parties – such as the ANC in South Africa, MPLA in Angola and Frelimo in Mozambique – undertook <a href="https://uncpress.org/book/9781469665863/cold-war-liberation/">political and military training</a> behind the proverbial “Iron Curtain”. </p>
<p>Thousands of young Africans <a href="https://srbpodcast.org/2021/09/24/african-students-in-the-ussr/">travelled</a> to the Soviet Union on generous educational scholarships. They forged close personal, cultural and sentimental ties, which often endured. </p>
<p>Just like the Americans, who supported anti-Communist forces on the continent, the Soviets propped up African regimes sympathetic to their ideology. As a result, a number of independent African nations developed close political and economic connections with the Soviet Union. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/mikhail-gorbachev-southern-africans-have-a-special-reason-to-thank-him-189741">Mikhail Gorbachev: southern Africans have a special reason to thank him</a>
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<p>Soviet foreign policy had a major impact in southern Africa. The conclusion of the Cold War facilitated the independence of Namibia from South Africa and the end of South Africa’s direct military involvement in Angola’s civil war. And it ultimately led to the end of apartheid in South Africa. The Soviet Union – which supported the Angolan government and the liberation fighters in Namibia and South Africa – played no small part in these events. </p>
<p>Elsewhere in Africa, the end of the Cold War led to the eventual collapse of the bloody Mengistu Haile Mariam rule in Ethiopia and the termination of the kleptocratic reign of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire. With the disappearance of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/17/world/after-cold-war-views-africa-stranded-superpowers-africa-seeks-identity.html">East-West rivalry</a> in the developing world, these regimes lost their ideological and geopolitical significance. This meant that they also lost the support of their former superpower sponsors, the Soviet Union and the US.</p>
<h2>Unleashed instability</h2>
<p>But the end of the Cold War also unleashed new instability on the continent. This included the implosion of the Somali state, the Rwandan genocide and civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone.</p>
<p>For a number of <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202209010064.html">observers</a>, these tragedies happened because the global balance had shifted. And that was the outcome of Gorbachev’s reforms. </p>
<p>The Cold War left parts of Africa inundated with weaponry and simmering with unresolved inter-ethnic conflicts. The disintegration of Somalia into conflict <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Somalia/Civil-war">during this period</a> had a lot to do with the aftershocks of the 1977-78 Ogaden war. This was a war between the Soviet-supported communist Ethiopia and Somalia. </p>
<p>Under the weight of its own economic troubles the Soviet Union <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1948829">cut down dramatically</a> on foreign aid and withdrew from the continent. For instance, scholarships previously distributed to African students <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/484948/">largely dried up</a> as the Soviets discovered “for-profit” education. At the time, Africans residing in the USSR began to complain about the worsening climate of xenophobia and racism in the country.</p>
<h2>Putin as an anti-Gorbachev</h2>
<p>These memories have lingered among some ruling African elites. The older ANC cadres or Soviet-educated Africans, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00083968.2020.1841012">for instance</a>, now active in political and economic life of their countries. Some of them probably feel that they have few reasons to mourn Gorbachev’s passing. And such sentiments are well understood by Kremlin’s new rulers. </p>
<p>There is probably no politician more committed to this negative vision of Gorbachev’s legacy than the current president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. In a speech in 2005, he famously <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/putin-collapse-of-the-soviet-union-was-catastrophe-of-the-century-521064.html">referred</a> to the Soviet collapse as a “major geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” In the context of Russia’s growing international isolation, Putin has once again made Africa one of the primary objects of Kremlin’s global outreach.“</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189882/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maxim Matusevich is affiliated with Seton Hall University. </span></em></p>The global realignment triggered by the end of the Cold War and Gorbachev’s reforms ushered in a period of transition on the African continent.Maxim Matusevich, Professor and Director, Russian and East European Studies Program, Seton Hall UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1877112022-07-26T14:41:48Z2022-07-26T14:41:48ZWhy Russia is on a charm offensive in Africa. The reasons aren’t pretty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476058/original/file-20220726-26-ddxqbt.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov are intent on growing Russia's African influence</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kremlin/Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/why-russia-is-on-a-charm-offensive-in-africa-the-reasons-arent-pretty-187711&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>Russia is the <a href="https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/feature/russias-ongoing-charm-offensive-in-africa-78348">source</a> of less than 1% of the foreign direct investment into Africa. Substantively, then, Russia brings little to the continent. But the fact that Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is making a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/lavrov-tours-africa-amid-diplomatic-isolation/a-60745880">high-profile trip</a> to Africa in the throes of Russia’s war on Ukraine reveals how much Russia needs Africa. </p>
<p>A priority for Lavrov’s trip to Egypt, the Republic of the Congo, Uganda and Ethiopia is to show that Russia is not isolated internationally, despite expansive western sanctions. The objective is to portray Russia as an unencumbered Great Power that maintains allies around the globe with whom it can conduct business as usual. </p>
<p>Russia is also vying to <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/russias-authoritarianism-looms-over-international-order-africa-34914">normalise an international order</a> where might makes right. And democracy and respect for human rights are optional. </p>
<p>Lavrov’s Africa trip is significant, accordingly, for Russia’s geostrategic posturing. Russian messaging recasts Russia’s imperialistic land grab in Ukraine as a broader East-West ideological struggle. To the extent that Moscow succeeds in this framing, few African countries will criticise it. </p>
<p>This, in part, explains why 25 of Africa’s 54 states <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-countries-showed-disunity-in-un-votes-on-russia-south-africas-role-was-pivotal-180799">abstained or did not vote</a> to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine during the UN General Assembly resolution ES-11/1 in March. This ambivalent response was in stark contrast to the overwhelming condemnation of Russia’s aggression from every other region of the world. </p>
<p>Lavrov can also be expected to portray the <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-grain-export-deal-promises-major-benefits-for-poor-countries-if-it-holds-187595">recent Ukrainian-Russian deal</a> to unblock more than 20 million metric tonnes of Ukrainian grain for export as a humanitarian gesture by Moscow. This, even though it was Russia’s invasion and blockade of Ukrainian ports that has prevented the grain from reaching international markets. Russia’s bombing of the Ukrainian port of Odessa the day after the agreement was signed suggests that Moscow will continue to try to weaponise the food crisis. All while blaming the west. </p>
<p>Egypt and Ethiopia – key countries on Lavrov’s itinerary – have been particularly hard hit by this disruption in food supply. The Russian blockade has caused <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/commodity-prices-surge-due-war-ukraine">global grain</a> prices to double this year, creating intense political and social strains throughout Africa.</p>
<h2>What African hosts gain</h2>
<p>Focusing on ideological themes helps obscure how modest Russia’s official economic and diplomatic investments in Africa are. </p>
<p>This begs the question of what African leaders gain from hosting Lavrov at a time when Russia is under severe criticism for its unprovoked aggression and the destabilisation of global food, fuel, and fertiliser markets. The short answer is political support. </p>
<p>Russia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russia-is-growing-its-strategic-influence-in-africa-110930">expanding influence</a> in Africa in recent years is mostly a result of Moscow’s use of unofficial means — deploying mercenaries, disinformation campaigns, arms for resources deals, and trafficking of precious metals. These low-cost, high impact tools are typically employed in support of isolated African leaders with dubious legitimacy. Russian backing of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/7/russian-troops-deploy-to-malis-timbuktu-after-french-exit">beleaguered leaders</a> in Central African Republic (CAR), Mali and Sudan has been vital to keeping these actors in power. </p>
<p>Russia’s asymmetric approach to gaining influence in Africa is also notable in that these “partnerships” are with the individual leaders Moscow is propping up – and not with the broader public. It’s about <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2022/03/21/how-russia-is-pursuing-state-capture-in-africa-ukraine-wagner-group/">elite co-option</a> more than traditional bilateral cooperation. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-fresh-warning-that-africa-needs-to-be-vigilant-against-russias-destabilising-influence-178785">Ukraine war: fresh warning that Africa needs to be vigilant against Russia's destabilising influence</a>
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<p>Understanding these motivations brings Lavrov’s trip and itinerary into sharper focus. </p>
<p>Egypt’s President Abdel al Sisi is a key ally in Russia’s efforts to install a proxy government in Libya. This would enable Russia to establish an enduring naval presence in the southern Mediterranean and tap Libyan oil reserves. Sisi has also been a <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/growing-relations-between-egypt-and-russia-strategic-alliance-or-marriage-of-convenience/">Russian partner</a> in attempting to derail the democratic transitions in Sudan and Tunisia. </p>
<p>Russia, moreover, is <a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-russia-will-affect-arms-sales-to-africa-the-risks-and-opportunities-180038">a major arms supplier for Egypt</a>. A <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/russia-s-rosatom-starts-construction-of-egypt-s-first-nuclear-plant-01658424307">$25 billion Russian-financed loan</a> for Russian atomic energy company Rosatom, to construct the Dabaa nuclear power plant in Cairo, makes little economic sense. But it does provide a potential windfall for cronies of Sisi and Putin. And it is a means for Russia to gain further leverage over Sisi.</p>
<p>Lavrov’s trip to Uganda provides political cover for the increasingly <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-ugandan-state-outsources-the-use-of-violence-to-stay-in-power-180447">repressive and erratic regime</a> of President Yoweri Museveni as it attempts to orchestrate a <a href="https://theconversation.com/musevenis-first-son-muhoozi-clear-signals-of-a-succession-plan-in-uganda-181863">hereditary succession</a> to Museveni’s son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba. </p>
<p>Russia’s driving interest in Uganda is to pull another historically western-leaning African country into Moscow’s orbit. For Museveni, drawing closer to Russia sends a none-too-subtle message that he will move further towards Moscow if the west is too critical of his deteriorating human rights and democratisation record.</p>
<p>Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed is also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/feb/08/ethiopia-human-rights-abuses-possible-war-crimes-tigray">fending off fierce international criticism</a> for Ethiopia’s alleged human rights abuses in Tigray and subsequent obstacles hampering the humanitarian response in the region. Russia’s <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-violence-india-humanitarian-assistance-ethiopia-f93a9a6bc7c0845a37cf7e3e3757e1e7">thwarting</a> of UN Security Council resolutions drawing attention to the Tigray conflict and humanitarian crisis have been well appreciated in Addis. </p>
<p>Ethiopia has long maintained an independent foreign policy. But Addis Ababa is set to host the next Russia-Africa summit meeting later this year. The event would provide a high-profile platform to reinforce Moscow’s message that it remains welcome on the global stage. </p>
<p>While in Addis Ababa, Lavrov can be expected to highlight Russia’s close ties with the African Union. Fear of annoying Russia led the regional body to repeatedly put off a virtual meeting with Ukrainian president Volodymr Zelensky. When the meeting was finally (and quietly) held in July, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61864049">only four African heads of state tuned in</a>. </p>
<p>The Republic of the Congo’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Denis-Sassou-Nguesso">President Denis Sassou-Nguesso</a> has led the Central African country for all but five years since he first came to power in 1979. The country <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo">is ranked 169 out of 180 countries</a> on Transparency International’s annual corruption perception index. It has been on Moscow’s radar for <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/petrochemicals/060722-refinery-news-roundup-progress-reported-on-some-projects-in-africa">expanding control</a> of hydrocarbon exports from the Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo and CAR through Pointe Noire. This would further enhance Russia’s influence over global energy markets. </p>
<h2>Benefits to ordinary Africans?</h2>
<p>Lavrov’s visit demonstrates that there are African leaders who find political value in retaining ties with Russia, regardless of Moscow’s tarnished international reputation. </p>
<p>Notably, most of the countries on his African tour maintain significant relations with the west. Hosting a high-profile visit from Lavrov is not intended to scuttle these ties. Rather, it is an attempt to gain more leverage vis-à-vis the west.</p>
<p>But this is a dangerous game for these African leaders. Russia has <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/countries/compare/russia/spain?sc=XE15">an economy the size of Spain’s</a>, does not provide significant investment or trade to the continent (other than grains and arms), and <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/countries/compare/russia/spain?sc=XE15">is increasingly disconnected</a> from the international financial system. </p>
<p>Moreover, foreign direct investment is <a href="https://www.atlantis-press.com/article/125965842.pdf">strongly correlated</a> with upholding the rule of law. By signalling that they are open to Russia’s lawless international order, these African leaders risk damaging their prospects for greater western investment. </p>
<p>Nine of the top 10 countries investing in Africa, comprising 90% of foreign direct investment, are part of the western financial system. It may take years for African countries to recover from the reputational damage of embracing the Russian worldview that rule of law is arbitrary. </p>
<p>Lavrov’s trip to Africa is not an isolated event. It is part of an ongoing dance. Moscow is trying to gain influence on the continent without investing in it. This strategy can only gain traction if certain African leaders see Russia as a means to validate their hold on power, despite objectionable human rights and democratic norms. </p>
<p>The advantages to Moscow and these African leaders are clear. For ordinary African citizens, not so much.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187711/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph Siegle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia is trying to normalise an international order where might makes right. And democracy and respect for human rights are optional.Joseph Siegle, Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, University of MarylandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1826092022-05-09T11:54:45Z2022-05-09T11:54:45ZUkraine: Victory Day celebrations can’t mask how badly things are going for Vladimir Putin<p>Russians gathered on May 9 for the annual <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61332283">Victory Day</a> celebrations, a hugely symbolic commemoration of Nazism’s defeat in the second world war. Elsewhere in the world, there is general agreement that Russia’s military has so far failed to achieve the strategic territorial gains that would have allowed Vladimir Putin to declare Moscow’s war aims achieved in time for the event. And so denied the opportunity to declare his own victory in Ukraine, Putin merely repeated a version of his worn-out diatribe against Nato and the west in his <a href="http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68366">speech</a> on Mosocow’s Red Square.</p>
<p>But Moscow’s climb-down began long before. Having failed to take Kyiv and to force a Ukrainian surrender in the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/first-days-war">first days and weeks</a> of the invasion, Moscow announced slightly more modest, albeit not necessarily more achievable, goals for the second stage of its aggression against Ukraine in April.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-invasion-stage-two-of-russias-war-is-ringing-alarm-bells-in-nearby-moldova-heres-why-181813">Ukraine invasion: 'stage two' of Russia's war is ringing alarm bells in nearby Moldova – here's why</a>
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<p>In the course of this second stage of the war, Russia <a href="https://english.pravda.ru/news/world/151331-russia_ukraine_second_phase/">hopes</a> to establish full control over Donbas and southern Ukraine, including Odesa, and consolidate a land corridor to Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria. This is reminiscent of the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/05/29/why-kremlin-is-shutting-down-novorossiya-project/i96u">Novorossiya project</a> pushed by the Kremlin briefly in 2014 to justify Russian territorial claims to southern Ukraine and Crimea. It is based on the historically dubious <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60604876">claim</a> that these areas, conquered by the tsarist Russian Empire in several 18th-century wars with the Ottoman Empire, have always been Russian and should therefore be a part of modern-day Russia.</p>
<p>Little progress <a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6">has been made</a> in this regard so far. Russia has achieved some initial territorial gains to the north of Luhansk, but has been pushed back around Kharkiv. Similarly – and also dating to the early days of the invasion – Russia captured much of the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-04-28-22/h_9ba5bab5d6cb55aba5cc91af5b182f8a">Kherson</a> region but had to abandon plans for a referendum there, initially scheduled for April 27, and is <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61286505">struggling</a> with the introduction of the Russian rouble.</p>
<p>Similarly, about half of the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4c58e726-a56d-4c2c-804e-ee82a4785bc3">Zaporizhzhia region</a>, including the capital after which it is named, remains in Ukrainian hands. Russian forces have not been able to advance towards Mykolaiv, the capital of the neighbouring region of the same name, either and have, in fact, been pushed further away from this strategic city by a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Nor has the Kremlin been able to take all of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis/pro-russian-forces-say-50-more-people-evacuated-from-besieged-ukraine-plant-idUSKCN2MT01V">Mariupol</a>, where Ukrainian defenders are still frustrating Russian efforts amid a humanitarian catastrophe.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461974/original/file-20220509-20-vjg8r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ukraine showing progress of Russian's invasion as of May 9, 2022." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461974/original/file-20220509-20-vjg8r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461974/original/file-20220509-20-vjg8r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461974/original/file-20220509-20-vjg8r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461974/original/file-20220509-20-vjg8r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461974/original/file-20220509-20-vjg8r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461974/original/file-20220509-20-vjg8r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461974/original/file-20220509-20-vjg8r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Ukraine invasion: where things stand as at May 9.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine#/media/File:2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine.svg">Viewsridge (Missile attacks source: BNO News)</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
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<p>While the Russian offensive in eastern and southern Ukraine has stalled, it has not ended. Russian forces have made small gains around Izyum and Popasna since the war effort was redirected to Donbas, and there remains a danger that <a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6">Ukrainian forces will be encircled</a> in the government-controlled areas of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions. </p>
<h2>Russia: from offence to defence?</h2>
<p>But Russia’s incremental gains have come at <a href="https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1522815718999289856/photo/1">significant cost</a> in terms of personnel and material, both of which are increasingly difficult to replace because of a lack of available combat-ready troops and western sanctions, which make production and repair of new equipment more difficult. But the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/05/russia-opens-artillery-barrages-in-south-and-east-ukraine">continuation of heavy fighting in Donbas</a> and of long-range attacks on major population centres and critical infrastructure in central and western Ukraine indicate that Moscow retains significant combat capabilities and is willing to bring them to bear. </p>
<p>The highly determined and successful Ukrainian defence efforts, supported by western military aid to Kyiv and simultaneously increasing economic pressure on Moscow, raise the question of how long Russia will invest in an unjustifiable aggression that is more and more difficult to sustain and lacks any sign of tangible progress. Over time, therefore, a <a href="https://iwpr.net/global-voices/ukraines-war-attrition">war of attrition</a> is more and more likely. As Russia “switches” to defence, it will entrench itself firmly in the territories it holds by then, and, in a reversal of the current situation, Ukraine will find it hard to push Russian forces back much further. </p>
<h2>Negotiations on the horizon?</h2>
<p>Ukraine’s western allies, meanwhile, have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/27/western-war-aims-are-growing-but-how-much-more-will-nato-commit-to-ukraine">pushed</a> increasingly ambitious war aims. This includes US defense secretary Lloyd Austin <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3009051/secretary-of-state-antony-j-blinken-and-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii/">saying</a> that Russia should be weakened “to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine”. UK foreign secretary Liz Truss, meanwhile, has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/27/uk-leading-g7-allies-to-weaken-putins-military-arsenal">demanded</a> that Russia be pushed out of Ukraine completely.</p>
<p>This goes beyond Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky’s <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/members-event/war-ukraine-volodymyr-zelenskyy">minimum goals</a> in any negotiations: that Russia withdraw beyond the front lines as they existed prior to the start of the invasion on February 24, 2022. But Zelensky has also made it clear that a <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/azovstal-steel-plant-rescue-influential-mediators-negotiations-zelensky-1616824">precondition</a> for Ukraine entering into negotiations was the successful evacuation of civilians (which has now been <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/ap-kharkiv-moscow-mariupol-black-sea-b2073985.html">completed</a>) and fighters from the besieged Azovstal steelworks in Mariupol.</p>
<p>There are, as yet, no signs that the war will end with anything but a negotiated deal. To assume otherwise would be to overestimate the potential for pushing Russia out of Ukraine and underestimate the human and material cost and time-frame of this. Moreover, after almost three months of war, both sides are exhausted and may crave a break in the intense fighting – to rest, regroup and resupply their forces. However such a ceasefire might come about, it would also create an <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-peace-negotiations-how-far-are-the-two-sides-from-a-settlement-that-could-stick-180428">opportunity for negotiations</a>, not least because any subsequent change in the status quo achieved by then would only be possible at probably intolerable costs.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/05/08/war-in-ukraine-a-beginning-of-a-resumption-of-un-diplomacy_5982759_4.html">increasing engagement</a> of the United Nations in mediation efforts and the recent “<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/05/1117742">Presidential Statement</a>” from the UN Security Council, which was also supported by Russia, indicate that a return to negotiations may be feasible in the near future. </p>
<p>As a “no war, no peace” situation may develop similar to what happened in 2014-2015, the west must remember the <a href="https://theconversation.com/moscow-holds-aces-as-bombing-rattles-shaky-ukraine-ceasefire-37879">ill-fated</a> Minsk Agreement of February 2015. New negotiations with Russia now need not, and should not, entail any concessions that legitimise Putin’s aggression. Moscow needs to fail in Ukraine and visibly so to deter future adventurism. But for that to be possible, negotiations need to happen and they will not even start as long as one side still believes that it can win on the battlefield. Even once the realisation sets in that this may not be possible, both sides will still aim to improve their positions on the ground before the war grinds into a stalemate. </p>
<p>The west therefore needs to further increase pressure on Russia. This means, for example, implementing the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_22_2785">EU’s sixth sanction package</a> and subsequently extending it in line with the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/08/g7-leaders-statement-2/">G7 statement</a> of May 8, 2022. At the same time, military support of Ukraine needs to continue and expand. Weakening the Russian war effort and strengthening Ukraine’s defence capabilities will be critical to minimise Kyiv’s losses – territorial and otherwise – and enhance its bargaining position in future negotiations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182609/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace. He is a past recipient of grants from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow of the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatyana Malyarenko receives funding from the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union</span></em></p>May 9 this year is “no victory day” as Putin has little to show after 74 days of aggression against Ukraine.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1825642022-05-05T16:43:17Z2022-05-05T16:43:17ZUkraine recap: tests and threats as the temperature continues to rise<p>Two months into the war the temperature of the rhetoric on both sides is warming considerably, exacerbating the conflict between Washington and Moscow, despite the US not being directly involved in the fighting.</p>
<p>Russia has tested both intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles, the latter with a sufficient range to reach targets in the US – and when the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, warned that these would be “food for thought for those who, in the heat of frenzied aggressive rhetoric, try to threaten our country”, it was clear he was thinking about the US.</p>
<p>For its part, the US has upped the stakes considerably, with US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin declaring that the US and Nato would strive to ensure that Russia emerged from the Ukraine conflict “weakened to the point that it can’t do things like invade Ukraine”.</p>
<p>Frank Ledwidge, an expert in military strategy at Portsmouth University, who has been tracking the news from the battlefield since the invasion began, has taken a look at <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-nato-and-the-us-aim-to-destroy-the-russian-military-it-looks-as-if-they-may-have-the-means-to-do-it-182255?">what this might mean</a> in terms of the way the conflict may play out, and the increasing involvement of Nato and other western countries in supplying Ukraine with state-of-the-art weaponry.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-nato-and-the-us-aim-to-destroy-the-russian-military-it-looks-as-if-they-may-have-the-means-to-do-it-182255">Ukraine: Nato and the US aim to destroy the Russian military – it looks as if they may have the means to do it</a>
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<img alt="Ukraine Recap weekly email newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><strong><em>This is our weekly recap of expert analysis of the Ukraine conflict.</em></strong>
<br><em>The Conversation, a not-for-profit news group, works with a wide range of academics across its global network to produce evidence-based analysis. Get these recaps in your inbox every Thursday. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapTop">Subscribe here</a>.</em> </p>
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<p>In turn, Russia conducted a military drill in the Baltic region, rehearsing the deployment and launch of “nuclear-capable” missiles from Kaliningrad which have the range to hit targets in western Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic states and parts of Germany. </p>
<p>Michael Mulvihill, an interdisciplinary researcher at Newcastle University, has spent the past few years engaged in a history of the UK’s early warning systems at Fylingdales in north Yorkshire. Having tracked the fears of a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the west since the second world war, he has explained the ebb and flow of proliferation and disarmament through the cold war and writes of various moments where it looked as if the world was on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russian-tests-and-putins-threats-recall-the-nuclear-fears-of-the-cold-war-181986">brink of nuclear war</a>. It’s fairly simple, he writes, the more weapons the greater the chance of disaster.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russian-tests-and-putins-threats-recall-the-nuclear-fears-of-the-cold-war-181986">Ukraine war: Russian tests and Putin's threats recall the nuclear fears of the cold war</a>
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<p>That the latest drills were held in Kaliningrad is also significant, <a href="https://theconversation.com/kaliningrad-russias-unsinkable-aircraft-carrier-deep-in-nato-territory-182541">writes Stefan Wolff</a>, a Birmingham-based expert on international security and the post-Soviet space. Kaliningrad sits between Poland and Lithuania and was taken by Josef Stalin as part of the peace settlement after the second world war. It has no land border with Russia, but is deep into Nato territory. Missile tests conducted there are freighted with extra meaning.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kaliningrad-russias-unsinkable-aircraft-carrier-deep-in-nato-territory-182541">Kaliningrad: Russia's 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' deep in Nato territory</a>
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<h2>Guns and God</h2>
<p>As Ukrainian forces have pushed Russian troops out of various areas in the north and west, they have captured significant hauls of the enemy’s weaponry – and analysis has shown up a surprising amount of western military tech incorporated into Russian military systems. This is interesting, in that Russia has been under sanctions since 2014 which should mean it can’t buy military tech, certainly from countries obeying the sanctions regimes.</p>
<p>But – as Daniel Salisbury, a historian and weapons expert at King’s College London, writes – Russia (and the Soviet Union before it) has a history of <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-the-problem-with-russias-sanctions-busting-arms-industry-182358">being able to</a> get around sanctions via legal loopholes and, when needed, espionage.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-the-problem-with-russias-sanctions-busting-arms-industry-182358">Ukraine: the problem with Russia's sanctions-busting arms industry</a>
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<p>Far from the battlefields of Ukraine, Russia’s military machine will be on display in Moscow on Monday when Russia celebrates Victory Day, the anniversary of the defeat of Nazism at the end of the second world war (similar to VE day, but celebrated a day later in Russia because of the timing of the German surrender). </p>
<p>There has been much speculation about what the day might mean for Russia’s plans for Ukraine, but as <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-victory-day-2022-and-why-commemoration-of-the-end-of-wwii-matters-today-182107">historian Miriam Dobson writes</a>, the day itself resonates for many Russians with a message of Soviet will and determination and the self-sacrifice of its young fighters, a sacrifice Putin is asking his troops to make once again in 2022.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-victory-day-2022-and-why-commemoration-of-the-end-of-wwii-matters-today-182107">Russia: Victory Day 2022 and why commemoration of the end of WWII matters today</a>
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<p>In recent years the Orthodox church has had a major role to play in Victory Day, lending a sacred aspect to the military celebration with the overtone that the red army marches with the blessing of the Christian god. Kathryn David, a professor of Russian studies at Vanderbilt University in the US, <a href="https://theconversation.com/when-putin-says-russia-and-ukraine-share-one-faith-hes-leaving-out-a-lot-of-the-story-178853">takes a look at</a> the differences between Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox traditions and writes that Moscow can’t claim exclusivity when it comes to waging a “holy war”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/when-putin-says-russia-and-ukraine-share-one-faith-hes-leaving-out-a-lot-of-the-story-178853">When Putin says Russia and Ukraine share one faith, he's leaving out a lot of the story</a>
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<h2>While you are reading this</h2>
<p>Do take the time to have a listen to this week’s Conversation Weekly podcast. The latest episode looks at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/neutrality-why-countries-choose-not-to-join-a-war-and-what-responsibilities-come-with-it-podcast-182438">concept of neutrality</a> and what it might mean for the future of Ukraine.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/neutrality-why-countries-choose-not-to-join-a-war-and-what-responsibilities-come-with-it-podcast-182438">Neutrality: why countries choose not to join a war and what responsibilities come with it – podcast</a>
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<p>The Conversation is thrilled to be able to invite you to the first event in a new series set up to explore social science perspectives on current topics of interest. <a href="https://www.eventbrite.com/e/social-science-perspectives-on-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-tickets-323359315417">Social Science Perspectives on the Russian Invasion of Ukraine – featuring Sir Lawrence Freedman</a> is on Wednesday May 18 at 18:00 at SAGE Publishing, 1 Oliver’s Yard, 55 City Road, London, EC1Y 1SP.</p>
<p>Hosted in collaboration with the Campaign for Social Science and SAGE Publishing, we’ll be holding these in-person salon-style events each quarter, providing an informal environment for like-minded people to build connections and discuss the pressing issues of the day. Join us at SAGE’s London office for free food, drinks and stimulating conversation.</p>
<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a weekly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182564/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A digest of the week’s coverage of the war against Ukraine.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1799902022-03-24T17:47:19Z2022-03-24T17:47:19ZUkraine Recap: game theory and psychology shed light on negotiations<p>As the war approaches the one-month mark, this week a lot of the thinking has shifted to how negotiations might bring the violence to an end. As western leaders gather in Brussels to discuss what might be done to pressure Russian leader Vladimir Putin to call a halt to hostilities, negotiators from Ukraine and Russia continue to meet, and there have been some reports of progress.</p>
<p>But still the killing continues, and it’s hard to think how the two sides can get any closer round the negotiating table while the Russian military continues to bombard civilians in many of the large cities. Amelia Hadfield, an expert in Russian politics, considers what <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-game-theory-can-tell-us-about-how-negotiations-might-go-179784">game theory might tell us</a> about how negotiations might proceed.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-game-theory-can-tell-us-about-how-negotiations-might-go-179784">Ukraine war: what game theory can tell us about how negotiations might go</a>
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<p>The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has called on Putin to meet him for one-on-one talks. The Kremlin has indicated its willingness for the two leaders to get together but only after the text of an agreement had been inked in and signed by the foreign ministers of both countries. Zelensky has eyeballed Putin before and will be aware of the kind of man his opponent is. </p>
<p>Psychologists Magnus Linden and George Wilkes have studied Putin’s “dark personality” and have <a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-the-psychology-behind-his-destructive-leadership-and-how-best-to-tackle-it-according-to-science-179823">given us a rundown</a> on the sort of man who brought a big dog into talks with the former German chancellor, Angela Merkel – who famously hates dogs.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-the-psychology-behind-his-destructive-leadership-and-how-best-to-tackle-it-according-to-science-179823">Putin: the psychology behind his destructive leadership – and how best to tackle it according to science</a>
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<p>A lot of labels have been used in association with the Russian leader and his regime: revolutionary, totalitarian and fascist to use but three. But language is key to understanding, and Richard Shorten, an expert in political theory, has parsed all these labels and tells us Putin is in fact a <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-not-a-fascist-totalitarian-or-revolutionary-hes-a-reactionary-tyrant-179256">reactionary tyrant</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-not-a-fascist-totalitarian-or-revolutionary-hes-a-reactionary-tyrant-179256">Putin's not a fascist, totalitarian or revolutionary – he's a reactionary tyrant</a>
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<p><strong><em>This is our weekly recap of expert analysis of the Ukraine conflict.</em></strong>
<br><em>The Conversation, a not-for-profit news group, works with a wide range of academics across its global network to produce evidence-based analysis. Get these recaps in your inbox every Thursday. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapTop">Subscribe here</a>.</em> </p>
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<h2>Bogged down</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, the war isn’t progressing as Putin would have planned. As we noted last week, the lightning advance in Ukraine prompting Kyiv’s capitulation failed to materialise. Instead, Russian troops have become bogged down and have adopted attritional siege tactics, using airstrikes and artillery to reduce some cities to rubble. </p>
<p>In the process, Russia is incurring a lot of casualties, including – incredible as it might sound – five generals, according to Ukrainian reports. <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-are-so-many-russian-generals-being-killed-179517">Jonathan Jackson reports</a> that, despite attempts at reform, Russia’s military remains inefficient and corrupt. The presence of generals on the front line is affording Ukrainian snipers opportunities to strike at some of their enemies’ most senior officers. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-are-so-many-russian-generals-being-killed-179517">Ukraine war: why are so many Russian generals being killed?</a>
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<p>Things have apparently become so bad that there is speculation that Putin is putting pressure on Belarus to enter the war to support Russia. There’s little doubt that Belarus president, Alexandr Lukashenko, is more than responsive to Putin’s will. But sending his troops into Ukraine would leave Lukashenko dangerously exposed at home, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-the-complex-calculations-that-will-decide-whether-belarus-enters-the-conflict-on-russias-side-179816">write Stefan Wolff and Anastasiya Bayok</a></p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-the-complex-calculations-that-will-decide-whether-belarus-enters-the-conflict-on-russias-side-179816">Ukraine: the complex calculations that will decide whether Belarus enters the conflict on Russia's side</a>
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<p>Zelensky, meanwhile, continues to implore Nato leaders to do more to help. Yet still they resist, arguing that the dangers of the war in Ukraine escalating to a bigger conflict involving Europe and the US are too great. </p>
<p>The risk is already high. Last week Russian shells struck a military base just a few kilometres from the Polish border, and Putin has said he considers convoys supplying arms and equipment to Ukrainian forces from Nato countries to be fair game. Kenton White, who has researched Nato politics, tells us that there are also <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-what-might-happen-if-the-war-spreads-to-a-nato-country-179434">differing opinions within Nato</a> as to how different countries might react to an attack on an ally. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-what-might-happen-if-the-war-spreads-to-a-nato-country-179434">Ukraine: what might happen if the war spreads to a Nato country</a>
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<h2>Butcher’s bill</h2>
<p>Every day brings a fresh butcher’s bill. Many of those paying the price are civilians either trying to escape to safety or trapped in cities under fire. Russia steadfastly refuses to admit targeting civilians in Ukraine, but this was very much part of its playbook after Putin intervened in Syria in 2015, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-russian-denial-of-civilian-casualties-follows-tactics-used-in-syria-179583">says Lily Hamourtziadou</a>, an expert on the death toll of war who runs the Iraq Body Count site monitoring civilian deaths there. She also says the US has often been less than candid about the civilian casualties of its military interventions, instead coining the euphemism “collateral damage”.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-russian-denial-of-civilian-casualties-follows-tactics-used-in-syria-179583">Ukraine war: how Russian denial of civilian casualties follows tactics used in Syria</a>
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<p>Another group of people under daily threat from the Russian violence are the aid workers who are trying to help the trapped civilians. There’s a depressing irony that some of the most endangered people in modern wars are the humanitarian workers who are committed to neutrality, impartiality and independence and are supposed to be protected under international law, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-aid-workers-were-forced-out-of-syria-the-same-thing-could-happen-in-this-war-179781">writes William Plowright</a>, an expert in humanitarian operations in conflict zones.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-aid-workers-were-forced-out-of-syria-the-same-thing-could-happen-in-this-war-179781">Ukraine: aid workers were forced out of Syria – the same thing could happen in this war</a>
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<h2>War’s other victims</h2>
<p>While human lives are clearly the most important currency being expended in this illegal war, spare a thought for the animals in Ukraine’s zoos, whose terror at the constant bombardment would be made far worse by their lack of understanding. Samantha Ward has researched the fate of animals in other conflicts and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraines-zoos-what-is-happening-to-all-the-animals-179147">tells us</a> that while London zoo survived two world wars, the trauma being suffered by Ukraine’s zoo animals must be enormous.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraines-zoos-what-is-happening-to-all-the-animals-179147">Ukraine's zoos: what is happening to all the animals</a>
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<p>Zoos aside, Putin’s war machine is destroying much of Ukraine’s cultural heritage – an unimaginable tragedy for posterity. One safe haven so far has been the city of Lviv in the far west of the country. But the war steadily approaches and there are fears that soon the bombs will rain down on this beautiful city, which historian <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-central-european-miracle-why-the-city-of-lviv-is-so-important-for-ukraine-179332">Christopher Mick describes</a> as an ethnic and cultural melting pot and looked on as the “soul of Ukraine”.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-central-european-miracle-why-the-city-of-lviv-is-so-important-for-ukraine-179332">'A central European miracle': why the city of Lviv is so important for Ukraine</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a weekly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The best of the past week’s coverage of the war in Ukraine.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1797842022-03-24T13:00:36Z2022-03-24T13:00:36ZUkraine war: what game theory can tell us about how negotiations might go<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453818/original/file-20220323-15-hklfu2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C34%2C5622%2C3725&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Game theory can tell us a lot about how this conflict might be resolved ... or not.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">New Africa via Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A month into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we have found out that – far from being restructured and modernised – Russia’s military remains <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-are-so-many-russian-generals-being-killed-179517">cumbersome and archaic</a> and is reportedly struggling with low morale. Ukraine’s defence meanwhile has been astonishing. The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, and Ukraine’s people have responded so robustly that, in the words of US president Joe Biden, Putin’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/world-europe-60830013">“back is against the wall”</a>. </p>
<p>Zelensky is now calling for direct negotiations with the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. But the backdrop to the negotiations will be key. </p>
<p>At home, Russia is increasingly paralysed by sanctions designed to deepen its financial isolation and cause economic chaos. From its central bank to oil, gas, agricultural and precious metal exports, sanctions have – for the present – dislodged Russian economic entities from the global financial system.</p>
<p>And still the war rages. Russian troops are now opting for attrition, using heavy artillery rather than precision munitions to pummel key towns, guerrilla tactics to subdue municipal areas, and border blockades at key naval ports to starve remaining pockets of resistance into submission.</p>
<p>A fortnight ago, both sides entered negotiations with clear red lines. A <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7b341e46-d375-4817-be67-802b7fa77ef1">15-point “neutrality plan”</a> has since emerged between Ukraine and Russia, with input from Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. But at present the two sides seem further apart than ever. </p>
<p>Game theory can suggest likely next steps. Both sides are analysing their preferred passive or aggressive options, and how this translates into a strategic win, loss, or neutral outcome.</p>
<h2>Strategic choices</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/financial-theory/08/game-theory-basics.asp">Game theory</a> is the formal study of strategic choices between two sides. It’s useful to decision makers because it can illustrate the range of options open to combatants within a given crisis, and also map the likely “wins and losses” strategically decided upon by the parties involved. The challenge is applying a hypothetical spectrum to the range of passive and aggressive options, and their <a href="https://www.investing.com/analysis/game-theory-understanding-russiaukraine-tensions-impact-on-financial-markets-200618349">consequences in Ukraine today</a>. </p>
<p>To work out the possible spectrum of wins and losses as perceived by Ukraine and Russia, game theory has to align three key variables. First is the likelihood of clear escalation set against de-escalation, which can torpedo or consolidate negotiations. </p>
<p>So far, things don’t look good. Russian aggression has arguably continued to increase. The two sides are now locked in game theory’s zero-sum scenario, where a loss for one side represents an immediate gain for the other side. </p>
<p>Ukraine’s deputy prime minister, <a href="https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/status/1505689969188294657">Iryna Vereshchuk</a> has said that: “There can be no talk of any surrenders, laying down of arms. We have already informed the Russian side about this.” Zelensky’s response has been similarly steadfast.</p>
<p>The second factor is the diplomatic countermoves undertaken in parallel to the war by the US, the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-policy-document-against-russia-china/?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&utm_campaign=06024e5132-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2022_03_21_05_09&am%20p;utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_10959edeb5-06024e5132-190407085">EU</a> and <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_193368.htm?selectedLocale=en">Nato</a>. The recent high-stakes diplomacy has led to a profound closing of ranks, with the Biden <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/mar/23/joe-biden-europe-russia-ukraine-nato-g7-european-council">meeting in Brussels and Poland</a> with European, Nato and Ukrainian diplomatic, foreign and defence chiefs. Here, countermoves appear to be combining both enhanced strategic deployment of hardware to Ukraine, and further diplomatic sanctions.</p>
<p>Third is the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-27/game-theory-shows-path-to-avoid-russia-war-in-ukraine-chart">likelihood of a winning or losing payoff</a> for both sides. Russia’s payoffs have shifted from an entirely Moscow-run Ukraine to continued war by attrition, and is therefore likely to negotiate on consolidating or possibly reducing territories seized since February, rather than in 2014. </p>
<p>Western payoffs range from a worst-case scenario including the decimation of eastern Ukraine, to outcomes of a divided and politically neutral country, to preferred options of post-crisis – albeit longterm – rehabilitation. Whether payoffs translate as wins, losses or neutral depends entirely on how these individual moves are perceived by Ukrainian and Russian decision-makers, and western audiences. </p>
<h2>What now?</h2>
<p>Game theory is great at plotting the options, but crises don’t stand still. So, to truly shift the dial with Russian decision makers from tolerable to intolerable losses, Biden and his European allies now need to signal two things to Moscow. </p>
<p>First, that Russia is now facing its own endgame in Ukraine, meaning that it can’t hope to actually win this conflict and that committing to a ceasefire is only possible response. Second – and this is key to game theory – that in terms of pursuing its own “wins” in Ukraine, the west is not bluffing. It will maintain a unified and permanent pushback, from sanctions to diplomacy, from lethal arms supplies to humanitarian assistance.</p>
<p>In game theory terms, it’s unlikely Putin or his regime will ever accept that it has lost this war, or negotiate from that position. Nor is Ukraine likely to permit Russian territorial gains to be seen as “wins”, or their own defence as anything less than a moral and material win. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, negotiations will have to take place on the basis that the Ukraine crisis, however unjustly, constitutes a series of diminished – even “neutral” – wins for both sides. And this will have to be regardless of how unevenly they represent both moral wins and actual losses for Ukraine, and tactical gains and moral losses for Russia. </p>
<p>Established on the foundation of a temporary ceasefire, Russia offers of withdrawal rest on emerging security guarantees, in the form of Ukraine’s permanent strategic neutrality, the acceptance of limits on its own armed forces and the renunciation of its aim to join Nato. This includes promising not to host any “foreign” military bases or weaponry. Underwriting this security guarantee are a group of hand-picked allies including the US, the UK and Turkey.</p>
<p>But the long-term feasibility of the security guarantee remains unclear, as does what might happen to Ukrainian territories – both those seized by Russia in 2014 and then recognised by Putin before the invasion, and those occupied since the invasion began. Would Russia withdraw to where it was before the February invasion, or undertake only a limited withdrawal, maintaining troops in some key areas in eastern Ukraine? </p>
<p>Ukraine’s political identity hangs in the balance. The west needs swiftly to consolidate Ukraine as a full sovereign member of the European family of nations, possibly within the EU itself, and to rebuild the country, piece by piece as necessary. This is a reasonable, if long-term, “win” for Ukraine and the west. </p>
<p>But Russia has committed vast resources to preventing precisely this outcome. Its plan is to either overpower Ukraine and bring it under Moscow’s control, or destroy it in the process. Despite the enormous cost, the latter would still be seen as preventing a “loss” for Russia.</p>
<p>Both game theory and diplomacy require the perception of a “win” for all sides. But a win for Russia would be virtually impossible for Ukraine to accept, considering the unspeakable humanitarian losses it has suffered. It would also be deeply unjust, considering both the entirely unprovoked and unjustified manner of the Russian invasion, and the gratuitous conduct of its campaign since.</p>
<p>In order to achieve the goal of stopping the violence, then, the negotiations need to achieve a spectrum of wins and losses that, as one Russian source told the Financial Times newspaper, gives “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7b341e46-d375-4817-be67-802b7fa77ef1">every side</a>” a win. That’s hard to imagine at this point.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179784/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amelia Hadfield receives funding from a range of European and UK stakeholders under the aegis of the Centre for Britain and Europe, within the Department of Politics. </span></em></p>It’s hard to see how negotiations can succeed at this point.Amelia Hadfield, Head of Department of Politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1780922022-03-08T16:44:03Z2022-03-08T16:44:03ZHow Moscow has long used the historic Kyivan Rus state to justify expansionism<p>To justify his designs on Ukraine, Russian president Vladimir Putin has repeatedly referred to what Russians call the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russian-is-ukraine-clue-not-as-much-as-vladimir-putin-insists-173758">Kievan Rus</a>. He sees this Orthodox medieval state which centred around the contemporary Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, as the <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181">common point of origin</a> for both Ukrainians and Russians. To his mind, this means the Ukrainian people are Russian. And he believes his mission is to restore the unity of the Russian lands, as a precondition for Russia being a great power. </p>
<p>Ukrainians, meanwhile, refer to the same place as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/25/how-to-pronounce-and-spell-kyiv-kiev-ukraine-and-why-it-matters">Kyivan Rus</a> and the cradle of their own nation. These are not Russian lands but the “lands of the Rus”. The word “Rus” derives from the old east Slavic word <em>Роусь</em> (which reads as “Rous’” when you convert from Cyrillic into Roman letters). The word refers to the land of a people called Rus: the common ancestors of today’s Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. </p>
<p>Throughout history, there have been Russian rulers who have believed in <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/1584123">their mission</a> to “gather the Russian lands”, the land of the Rus. Others have simply used the idea to justify Russia’s hegemonic ambitions. </p>
<h2>The Kyivan Rus</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Kyivan-Rus">Principality of Kyiv</a> was founded on the location of contemporary Kyiv in the ninth century by Viking warrior-traders from Scandinavia (also called Varangians or Rus) who mixed with the local east Slavic population. In 988, Grand Prince <a href="https://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CV%5CO%5CVolodymyrtheGreat.htm">Volodymyr of Kyiv</a> adopted Christianity from Byzantium, not Rome, and the Rus – now a term also applied to the land – became part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-church-conflict-in-ukraine-reflects-historic-russian-ukrainian-tensions-175818">Orthodox Christian world</a>. </p>
<p>Putin refers to this event as a “<a href="https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18961">civilisational choice</a>” which shaped the future of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. It created what he calls a “common spiritual space”, an Orthodox Russian space distinct from the Latin, Roman Catholic world. By contrast, the neighbouring peoples – the Poles and the Lithuanians – took their Christianity from Rome.</p>
<p>With the arrival of Mongol troops in the mid-13th century, the land of the Kyivan Rus was broken up. The western and south-western parts, which constitute most of the territory of today’s Ukraine and Belarus, was divided between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland. Meanwhile the northern and north-eastern parts was cut off from developments in Europe for 200 years.</p>
<h2>Gatherers of the land</h2>
<p>The first historical mention of Moscow is in a chronicle from 1147. Later, Prince <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ivan-I">Ivan I</a> of Moscow (ca. 1288-1340), known as Kalita (the moneybag), was the tax collector for Sultan Ozbeg, the khan of the Golden Horde. Ozbeg awarded Ivan the title of grand prince, as rulers of Kyiv were traditionally known. And Ivan and his successors subsequently used this title to claim all the lands of the Rus including those under Lithuanian and Polish rule as their patrimony. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ivan-III">Ivan III</a> (1440-1505), his son <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Vasily-III">Vasily III</a> (1478-1533) and his grandson <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ivan-the-Terrible">Ivan IV</a>, known as Ivan the Terrible (1530-1584) were the most successful gatherers of the land of the Rus in its initial phase, annexing the lands of rival Rus princes in the north and north east.</p>
<p>After the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman army in 1453, Moscow’s religious leaders argued that a transfer of the Byzantine empire had taken place: Moscow was now the <a href="https://oxfordre.com/literature/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190201098.001.0001/acrefore-9780190201098-e-1243">third Rome</a> and the capital of Christendom. From that point, Ivan III not only called himself grand prince but also tsar, deriving from “Caesar”, the title used by the Roman and later Byzantine emperors.</p>
<p>The Moscow tsars styled themselves as the protectors of the Orthodox faith. They justified interventions in the domestic affairs of neighbouring countries by the pretext that they were protecting Orthodox believers. Similarly, the Russian government today justifies invading Ukraine by claiming the need to protect the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ethnic-russification-baltics-kazakhstan-soviet/25328281.html">millions of Russian speakers</a> living there.</p>
<p>The grand duke of Lithuania was the tsar’s main rival and he also claimed to be the ruler of the entire Rus. From the 14th century, Poland and Lithuania began <a href="https://polishhistory.pl/different-than-all-others-part1">to unite</a>; the <a href="https://polishhistory.pl/different-than-all-others-part1/">Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth</a> was eventually established in 1569. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m0010f8z">formidable opponent</a>, by the mid-17th century, Poland-Lithuania was at war with most of its neighbours. And internally, the commonwealth fought off rebellion too. The Ukrainian Cossacks, led by Hetman (military leader and ruler) <a href="https://emerging-europe.com/after-hours/the-contested-legacy-of-bohdan-khmelnitsky/?fbclid=IwAR2JNjP44zQ7RVqt8LRpXiFU1sC-ytDVl4WZBtKb6jjg9rJxejI6ezUAelU">Bohdan Khmelnitsky</a> attempted to secede, in part because of the discrimination they faced as Orthodox Christians under a Catholic ruler. </p>
<p>After some setbacks, Khmelnitsky asked for the support of the Orthodox Moscow tsar, Alexis. In 1654 the Cossacks and emissaries of Alexis signed the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Pereyaslav-Agreement">treaty of Pereyaslav</a>, thereby submitting Ukraine to Russian rule within the context of their fight against the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth. </p>
<p>Historians differ on what purpose this pact ultimately served. From the perspective of the then Cossack leaders, as well as Ukrainian historians today, this was a temporary alliance, directed against Poland-Lithuania. For the tsar, meanwhile, and for generations of Russian historians that have followed, it was the acknowledgement of Moscow’s suzerainty for all eternity. </p>
<p>Russia and Poland were then at war until 1667, when the two parties signed the <a href="https://www.historytoday.com/archive/truce-andrusovo-signed">truce of Andrusovo</a>. This agreement saw Moscow receive Ukraine west of the River Dnipro/Dnieper as well as the eastern part of today’s Belarus. In the 18th century, Poland-Lithuania was forced into the Russian sphere of influence and in 1772, was <a href="https://europecentenary.eu/partitions-of-poland-how-ceased-to-exist-a-state/">partitioned</a> between Prussia, Austria and Russia.</p>
<p>The historic imperative to gather the land of the Rus was not the primary goal of this expansionism on the part of Moscow. Rather, it was the ideological justification given by its rulers for first consolidating and expanding the Moscow state in the Russian north and then for imperial advances into Ukraine and Belarus. </p>
<p>During Soviet times, the incorporation of most of Ukraine into the <a href="https://theconversation.com/famine-subjugation-and-nuclear-fallout-how-soviet-experience-helped-sow-resentment-among-ukrainians-toward-russia-175500">Soviet Union</a> under Lenin was not driven by the idea of gathering the land of the Rus but by the desire to make Ukraine a socialist state. The concept is however implicitly contained in <a href="https://khpg.org/en/1608809553">Stalin’s justification</a> for invading eastern Poland in 1939. Soviet propaganda claimed that this was not only a social, but also a “national liberation” of Belarusian and Ukrainian “brothers and sisters”. </p>
<p>Putin also speaks of Ukrainian “brothers and sisters”. But he is waging war against them now that they have made it abundantly clear they have no wish to be “gathered” again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Mick does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Throughout history, Russian rulers have seen it as their mission to ‘gather the lands of the Rus’.Christoph Mick, Professor of Modern European History, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1785122022-03-07T19:55:52Z2022-03-07T19:55:52ZWhy did Russia invade Ukraine?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450428/original/file-20220307-85476-194bt0e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=44%2C318%2C2928%2C1657&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Memorial tanks at the Ukrainian Motherland Monument in Kyiv.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/man-walks-past-memorial-tanks-at-the-ukrainian-motherland-news-photo/1238931937?adppopup=true">Madeleine Kelly/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><figure class="align-left ">
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/curious-kids-us-74795">Curious Kids</a> is a series for children of all ages. If you have a question you’d like an expert to answer, send it to <a href="mailto:curiouskidsus@theconversation.com">curiouskidsus@theconversation.com</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>Why did Russia invade Ukraine? – Artie W., age 9, Astoria, New York</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>Ukraine and Russia are two countries that border each other in Eastern Europe. On Feb. 24, 2022, Russia <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-invades-ukraine-5-essential-reads-from-experts-177815">sent its army into Ukraine</a> and began trying to take over the country by force. </p>
<p>This invasion surprised many people, as it was the first major war in Europe for decades. But Russia and Ukraine have had a difficult relationship for centuries. To understand what’s happening now you have to dig into 1,300 years of history. </p>
<p>Both countries trace their beginnings to the same medieval kingdom, called <a href="https://www.historyextra.com/period/viking/rus-vikings-kievan-rus-rurik-vladimir-great/">Kyivan Rus</a>. It was founded in the 800s by a <a href="https://www.history.com/news/vikings-in-russia-kiev-rus-varangians-prince-oleg#:%7E:text=Vikings%20founded%20Kievan%20Rus%20in,from%20what%20is%20now%20Finland.">group of Vikings, the Varangians</a>, who came from Northern Europe to rule over the local people. Kyivan Rus spanned what is now Russia and Ukraine, and its people, <a href="https://meettheslavs.com/slavs/">the Slavs</a>, are the ancestors of today’s Russians and Ukrainians. Its capital was the city of Kyiv – the same Kyiv that is now the capital of Ukraine. Moscow, capital of today’s Russia, was also part of Kyivan Rus.</p>
<p><iframe id="GiX4j" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/GiX4j/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Kyivan Rus was conquered by Mongol armies from Asia in 1240 and split up. Kyiv became part of a new commonwealth that spanned today’s Poland and Ukraine. Moscow became a local capital of the Mongol Empire. Both Moscow and Kyiv were at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, but with different cultures based on their geography. </p>
<h2>Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union</h2>
<p>In the 1500s, descendants of the Kyivan Rus’ princes in Moscow formed an empire of their own, imperial Russia. By 1654, it included Kyiv and its Ukrainian peoples along with other lands and people from Europe and Asia. </p>
<p>In imperial Russia, some saw Ukrainians as brothers to the Russians because they shared a culture dating back to medieval times. But Ukrainians said that while both groups practiced the same religion and shared some history, Ukrainian culture – such as its food, language, art and music – was different. It was shaped by contact with different peoples and a history different from Russia’s. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.ducksters.com/history/world_war_i/russian_revolution.php#:%7E:text=The%20Russian%20Revolution%20took%20place,country%20of%20the%20Soviet%20Union.">revolution in February 1917</a> forced Russia’s leader, Czar Nicholas II, from the throne. Another revolution that same year created a new empire called <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/russia/history-of-the-soviet-union">the Soviet Union</a>.</p>
<p>Some Ukrainians didn’t want to join the new Soviet empire. They tried to form their own country. But the Soviets defeated their movement and created the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Ukraine-in-the-interwar-period">Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic</a> instead – one of a number of republics that made up the union. At first, it allowed Ukrainians to keep their culture and run their local government. But when the Soviets began to fear that Ukrainians wanted independence, they took their power away.</p>
<h2>A free Ukraine</h2>
<p>In 1991, the <a href="https://www.ducksters.com/about.php">Soviet Union collapsed</a>. Ukraine and Russia, which both had been part of the Soviet Union, became independent countries. </p>
<p>Fast forward to 2013. Ukraine’s president, Viktor Yanukovych, wanted Ukraine to be loyal to Russia. So he decided not to sign a trade agreement to bring Ukraine closer to Europe. Ukrainians protested, kicked Yanukovych out of office, and elected a government that favored Europe rather than Russia. </p>
<p>Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that despite these protests, most Ukrainians wanted <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/25/history-of-ties-between-ukraine-and-russia">ties with Russia</a>. He also <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/15/putin-ukraine-nato-membership-question-must-be-resolved-now">worried that Ukraine would join a military alliance</a> with the U.S. and Europe that would be a threat to Russia.</p>
<p>In 2014, Russia took over an area in southern Ukraine <a href="https://kids.britannica.com/kids/article/Crimea/353016">called Crimea</a>. It also sent soldiers and weapons to eastern Ukraine, claiming to be helping people who wanted to be part of Russia. In the eight years since then, about <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/russia-ukraine-conflict-photos-2014/">14,000 people have died</a>, and 1 million people have fled to escape the fighting. </p>
<h2>The current war</h2>
<p>In February 2022, Putin again claimed that <a href="https://www.rochester.edu/newscenter/ukraine-history-fact-checking-putin-513812/">Ukrainians and Russians are one people</a>. He sees Ukrainians and Russians as brother nations and says that because Russia <a href="https://www.vox.com/2022/1/30/22908600/ukraine-crisis-putin-russia-one-people-myth-nato-europe">is the older brother</a>, it should get to be in charge.</p>
<p>Most Ukrainians disagree. They have been inspired by the words of their president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy. He told Putin that Ukrainians want peace, but that if they need to, they will defend their country’s independence. </p>
<p>Putin invaded, and this time his plan is to take over the entire country. Ukrainians are now fighting the Russian army, trying to defeat what they say is an occupation. </p>
<p>In Russia, the people had no say about whether to invade. Many are <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/03/06/1084818519/russia-protests-detainments">protesting against it</a>. Many families have both Russian and Ukrainians members. Because of this, a lot of people on both sides of the border do not want to fight a war against each other. </p>
<p>The United States and much of Europe are on the side of Ukrainians. They believe Ukraine should be able to decide its own future. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Hello, curious kids! Do you have a question you’d like an expert to answer? Ask an adult to send your question to <a href="mailto:curiouskidsus@theconversation.com">CuriousKidsUS@theconversation.com</a>. Please tell us your name, age and the city where you live.</em></p>
<p><em>And since curiosity has no age limit – adults, let us know what you’re wondering, too. We won’t be able to answer every question, but we will do our best.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178512/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kathryn David does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Who are the Ukrainians and when were they part of the same empire as Russia? A scholar answers basic questions on war in Ukraine.Kathryn David, Mellon Assistant Professor of Russian and East European Studies, Vanderbilt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1780722022-03-07T14:54:49Z2022-03-07T14:54:49ZUkraine invasion: how Belarus has become Russia’s pawn<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-protests-why-people-have-been-taking-to-the-streets-new-data-154494">political crisis</a> that has gripped Belarus for the past 18 months has seen president Aliaksandr Lukashenka (the preferred Belarusian spelling; “Alexander Lukashenko” is the Russian transliteration) transition from a peacemaker to a pawn in Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine. </p>
<p>After hosting talks in 2015 to end fighting in eastern Ukraine, Belarus <a href="https://theconversation.com/3-reasons-belarus-is-helping-russia-wage-war-against-ukraine-177984">has now opted</a> to facilitate the Russian attack on its neighbour. In doing so, Lukashenka has surrendered the sovereignty of his own state without a single shot being fired on its territory.</p>
<p>The relationship between Minsk and Moscow has a long and complicated history. Until the 2020 Belarusian revolution, Lukashenka <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/09/moscow-has-limited-options-belarus">maintained</a> a cautious independence in foreign policy. This included keeping the Russian military out of Belarus. </p>
<p>The fraudulent presidential elections of August 2020, however, sparked the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-53799065">largest protests</a> in the country’s modern history. Faced with the greatest popular challenge in his 26 years in power, Lukashenka was quick to churn out anti-Nato rhetoric, aimed at Putin as much as at domestic audiences. </p>
<p>He claimed the west was fomenting the protests to destabilise Belarus and turn it into “<a href="https://www.euronews.com/2020/08/29/president-lukashenko-claims-nato-has-aggressive-plans-against-belarus">the bridgehead against Russia</a>”. This strategy worked. In Lukashenka’s vulnerable position the Kremlin <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/05/belarus-plane-action-eases-russian-military-restraints">saw an opportunity</a> and offered support. </p>
<h2>A Soviet republic</h2>
<p>Belarus first appeared on the world map after the first world war. The 1917 revolution in Russia brought down the tsarist empire. German occupation of the latter’s Belarusian lands enabled local nationalists to proclaim the Belarusian People’s Republic in March 1918. After Germany’s collapse, the Bolsheviks returned to establish a Soviet Belarusian republic in 1919. And in the chaotic years that followed, a large portion of Belarusian land went to Poland under the 1921 Riga Peace Treaty. </p>
<p>Soviet Belarus was a founding member of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922 and enjoyed a brief period of nation-building under the auspices of what historian Terry Martin terms Moscow’s <a href="https://reviews.history.ac.uk/review/278">affirmative action</a>. This Soviet policy sought to win over non-Russian minorities in the multi-ethnic union by promoting their native languages and cultures and by training local cadres. </p>
<p>From the late 1920s on, however, this process of Belarusisation was curtailed. Stalinist repressions of the 1930s hit Belarus harder than many other republics and its cultural elites were decimated. </p>
<p>The 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of non-aggression between Nazi Germany and the USSR nearly doubled Belarus’s prewar territory, gains which were not reversed after 1945. The second world war saw Belarus suffer terribly, however, losing <a href="https://www.timothysnyder.org/books/bloodlands">a greater share</a> of its population than any other European country did. </p>
<p>The war left deep scars on the national psyche but also served to cement the country’s place in the Soviet empire. Post-war investment from Moscow poured in. By the 1970s, Belarus was one of the most economically successful Soviet republics. </p>
<h2>A complicated relationship</h2>
<p>The stability and prosperity of the final Soviet decades made many Belarusians <a href="http://countrystudies.us/belarus/39.htm">reluctant</a> to see the USSR die. And even before Lukashenka was elected president in 1994, Minsk pursued closer economic and political ties with Russia. </p>
<p>Lukashenka quickly grasped that economic integration with Russia was a good idea. He pushed for economic and foreign policy cooperation between the two countries. In 1999, Belarus and Russia signed a treaty establishing the Union State. This vaguely defined entity saw both states retain their sovereignty but share some supranational institutions. </p>
<p>Most of the larger integration goals – a single currency; common taxation; a joint defence policy – never materialised, however. And the relationship between the two states was further strained by Belarus’ dependence on Russian energy resources, with Lukashenka routinely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-oil-belarus-factbox-idUSKBN1YZ0XW">haggling</a> with the Kremlin over <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/jan/09/oilandpetrol.russia">concessionary prices</a> for Russian gas and oil. </p>
<p>Belarusians, meanwhile, might have close affinity with Russia (most being Russian speakers) but they <a href="http://www.iiseps.org/?p=114&lang=en">baulk</a> at the idea of a full merger with the Russian Federation. This is partly a new habit of independence. It is also a legacy of that conflicting approach to nationalities in the later Soviet era, when ethnic identities of individual republics were promoted alongside the supra-ethnic Soviet identity. The Belarusian nation-building process did not start from scratch in 1991. It had begun well before the country gained independence from the USSR. </p>
<h2>Pivotal moment</h2>
<p>Putin’s aggressive stance on Ukraine from the early 2010s initially worried Lukashenka. Concerned about the precedent it might set for Belarus, he used nationalist rhetoric to <a href="https://globalvoices.org/2017/02/21/the-strange-death-of-russias-closest-alliance/">distance</a> his government from Russia, even as Moscow grew keener to integrate the two nations. </p>
<p>In 2014, Lukashenka avoided formally recognising Russia’s annexation of Crimea and instead made overtures to the west. By 2020, relations with the Kremlin <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/01/integration-hold-russia-and-belarus">had reached a new low</a>. </p>
<p>And then 2020 happened. Lukashenka’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/15/belarus-systematic-beatings-torture-protesters">violent crackdown</a> brought on Western sanctions, which intensified after Minsk <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-plane-hijacking-snarls-bidens-hopes-to-repair-strained-us-russia-relationship-161969">hijacked</a> an international flight over its airspace. He <a href="https://theconversation.com/trouble-on-the-belarus-poland-border-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-migrant-crisis-manufactured-by-belarus-leader-172108">manufactured</a> a migrant crisis on the Polish border, which earned Belarus widespread condemnation and further sanctions. </p>
<p>By the end of 2020, relentless repression had forced the protest movement underground. Belarus currently has <a href="https://prisoners.spring96.org/en">1,076</a> political prisoners, but thousands more were detained, and scores fled the country to escape persecution. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in November 2021, Minsk and Moscow <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-lukashenka-union-state/31546225.html">signed</a> a comprehensive economic integration programme and agreed a joint military doctrine. Lukashenka’s international isolation gave Putin a new ability to force Minsk to accept the presence of Russian troops on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border, only 50 miles from Kyiv. </p>
<p>This undoubtedly played a key role in Moscow’s decision to attack Ukraine. And while Minsk has claimed that its troops are not yet involved, Belarus has nonetheless taken steps to reverse its 1994 decision to abandon nuclear weapons. On February 27, 2022, a national referendum scrapped the country’s constitutional pledge to remain nuclear-free. </p>
<p>The Lukashenka regime has long falsified electoral outcomes and this referendum was no different. Anti-war sentiment remains strong among Belarusians, as demonstrated by the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/belarus-lukashenko-tightens-grip-in-referendum/a-60940398">hundreds</a> of protestors on the referendum day who came out to show solidarity with Ukraine; <a href="https://referendum2022.spring96.org/en/news/106936">800</a> were arrested. </p>
<p>Exhausted by repression and with their opposition leaders exiled or imprisoned, ordinary Belarusians have few tools at their disposal to effectively resist the government. If they were to try to fight Lukashenka, the state army and special forces would likely be used against them. But if Lukashenka decides to throw his army into Putin’s war, this could all change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178072/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natalya Chernyshova receives funding from the British Academy. </span></em></p>By allowing Russian military presence in Belarus, president Aliaksandr Lukashenka has forfeited his country’s sovereignty.Natalya Chernyshova, Senior Lecturer in Modern History, University of WinchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1767862022-03-02T13:28:01Z2022-03-02T13:28:01ZHoly wars: How a cathedral of guns and glory symbolizes Putin’s Russia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449001/original/file-20220228-12844-brw7mt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=131%2C0%2C5013%2C3408&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill, center, attends a ceremony consecrating the Cathedral of Russian Armed Forces outside Moscow. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaCathedralofRussianArmedForces/1fe8aa6c19144a4ca73d5a084cd08ef2/photo?Query=church%20russia%20armed%20forces&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=122&currentItemNo=11">Andrey Rusov, Defense Ministry Press Service via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>An updated version of this article was published on May 6, 2022. <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-a-cathedral-and-a-massive-military-parade-show-about-putins-russia-182485">Read it here</a>.</em></p>
<p>A curious new church <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/06/15/russia-inaugurates-grandiose-armed-forces-cathedral-a70567">was dedicated</a> on the outskirts of Moscow in June 2020: <a href="http://hram.mil.ru">The Main Church of the Russian Armed Forces</a>. The massive, khaki-colored cathedral in a military theme park celebrates Russian might. It was originally planned to open on the 75th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany, in May 2020, but was delayed due to the pandemic.</p>
<p>Conceived by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/20/orthodox-cathedral-of-the-armed-force-russian-national-identity-military-disneyland">Russian defense minister</a> after the country’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/18/five-years-after-crimeas-illegal-annexation-the-issue-is-no-closer-to-resolution/">illegal annexation of Crimea</a> in 2014, the cathedral embodies the powerful ideology espoused by President Vladimir Putin, with strong support from the Russian Orthodox Church.</p>
<p>The Kremlin’s vision of Russia connects the state, military and the Russian Orthodox Church. As <a href="https://behrend.psu.edu/person/olena-surzhko-harned">a scholar of nationalism</a>, I see this militant religious nationalism as one of the key elements in Putin’s motivation for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-crisis-putin-recognizes-breakaway-regions-biden-orders-limited-sanctions-5-essential-reads-177508">invasion of Ukraine</a>, my native country. It also goes a long way in explaining Moscow’s behavior toward the collective “West” and the post-Cold War world order.</p>
<h2>Angels and guns</h2>
<p>The Church of the Armed Forces’ bell tower is <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/consecration-of-the-main-cathedral-of-russian-armed-forces/30671707.html">75 meters tall, symbolizing the 75th anniversary</a> of the end of World War II. Its dome’s diameter is <a href="https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Stalin-and-Putin-disappear-from-Moscow%E2%80%99s-Victory-Church,-but-more-can-be-seen-(Gallery)-50096.html">19.45 meters, marking the year of the victory: 1945</a>. A smaller dome is 14.18 meters, representing the 1,418 days the war lasted. Trophy weapons are melted into the floor so that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/20/orthodox-cathedral-of-the-armed-force-russian-national-identity-military-disneyland">each step is a blow to the defeated Nazis</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/20/orthodox-cathedral-of-the-armed-force-russian-national-identity-military-disneyland">Frescoes celebrate Russia’s military might</a> though history, from medieval battles to modern-day wars in Georgia and Syria. Archangels lead heavenly and earthly armies, <a href="https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Stalin-and-Putin-disappear-from-Moscow%E2%80%99s-Victory-Church,-but-more-can-be-seen-(Gallery)-50096.html">Christ wields a sword</a>, and the Holy Mother, depicted as the Motherland, lends support. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Members of the armed forces walk outside a cathedral in Russia during a ceremony." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449008/original/file-20220228-15-1jyjvb2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449008/original/file-20220228-15-1jyjvb2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449008/original/file-20220228-15-1jyjvb2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449008/original/file-20220228-15-1jyjvb2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449008/original/file-20220228-15-1jyjvb2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449008/original/file-20220228-15-1jyjvb2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449008/original/file-20220228-15-1jyjvb2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Service members and young army cadets gather for an event held outside the cathedral to mark the 80th anniversary of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in World War II.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/servicemen-and-young-army-cadets-gather-for-the-candle-of-news-photo/1233588280?adppopup=true">Gavriil Grigorov\TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘Cradles’ of Christianity</h2>
<p>The original plans for the frescoes included <a href="https://khpg.org/en/1587771442">a celebration of the Crimean occupation</a>, with jubilant people holding a banner that read “Crimea is Ours” and “Forever with Russia.” In the final version, the controversial “Crimea is Ours” was replaced by the more benign “<a href="https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Stalin-and-Putin-disappear-from-Moscow%E2%80%99s-Victory-Church,-but-more-can-be-seen-(Gallery)-50096.html">We are together</a>.”</p>
<p>When Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in 2014, the Russian Orthodox Church celebrated, <a href="http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/709770.html">calling Crimea the “cradle” of Russian Christianity</a>. This mythology draws on the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/13/dont-underestimate-importance-of-religion-for-understanding-russias-actions-in-crimea/">medieval story of Prince Vladimir</a>, who converted to Christianity in the 10th century and was baptized in Crimea. The prince then imposed the faith on his subjects in Kyiv, and it spread from there.</p>
<p>The Russian Orthodox Church, also called the Moscow Patriarchate, has long claimed this event as its foundational story. The Russian Empire, which linked itself to the church, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1474225X.2014.957635">adopted this foundational story as well</a>.</p>
<h2>‘Russian World’</h2>
<p>Putin and the head of the Russian church, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt1bh2kk5.11?seq=8#metadata_info_tab_contents">Patriarch Kirill</a>, have resurrected these ideas about empire for the 21st century in the form of the so-called “<a href="https://dgap.org/en/events/russkiy-mir-russian-world">Russian World</a>” – giving new meaning to a phrase that dates to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/06/russia-and-ukraine-are-trapped-in-medieval-myths/">medieval times</a>.</p>
<p>In 2007, Putin created a <a href="https://russkiymir.ru/en/">Russian World Foundation</a>, which was charged with promotion of Russian language and culture worldwide, such as a cultural project preserving interpretations of history approved by the <a href="https://russkiymir.ru/en/grants/index.php">Kremlin</a>.</p>
<p>For church and state, the idea of “Russian World” encompasses a mission of making Russia a spiritual, cultural and political <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09668136.2018.1536780">center of civilization to counter the liberal, secular</a> <a href="https://uacrisis.org/en/russkiy-mir-as-the-kremlin-s-quasi-ideology">ideology of the West</a>. This vision has been used to justify policies at home <a href="https://publicorthodoxy.org/2022/02/01/russias-scramble-for-africa/">and abroad</a>.</p>
<h2>The Great Patriotic War</h2>
<p>Another <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-military-church/russia-inaugurates-cathedral-without-mosaics-of-putin-stalin-idUSKBN23L0K7">planned mosaic</a> depicted the celebrations of Soviet forces’ defeat of Nazi Germany – the Great Patriotic War, as World War II is called in Russia. The image included soldiers holding a portrait of Josef Stalin, the dictator who led the USSR during the war, among a crowd of decorated veterans. This mosaic <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/consecration-of-the-main-cathedral-of-russian-armed-forces/30671707.html">was reportedly removed</a> before the church’s opening.</p>
<p>The Great Patriotic War has a special, even sacred, place in Russians’ views of history. The Soviet Union <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/05/08/dont-forget-how-the-soviet-union-saved-the-world-from-hitler/">sustained immense losses</a> – 26 million lives is a conservative estimate. Apart from the sheer devastation, many Russians ultimately see the war as <a href="https://www2.helsinki.fi/en/news/society-economy/theology-of-war-in-the-russian-orthodox-tradition">a holy one</a>, in which Soviets defended their motherland and the whole world from the evil of Nazism.</p>
<p>Under Putin, glorification of the war and <a href="https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/bringing-stalin-back-in-todd-h-nelson/1132424586">Stalin’s role</a> in the victory have reached <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/10/vladimir-putin-russia-rehabilitating-stalin-soviet-past">epic proportions</a>. Nazism, for very good reasons, is seen as a manifestation of the ultimate evil.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A photo of Joseph Stalin stands next to a photo of Vladimir Putin." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449015/original/file-20220228-23-1izplnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449015/original/file-20220228-23-1izplnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449015/original/file-20220228-23-1izplnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449015/original/file-20220228-23-1izplnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449015/original/file-20220228-23-1izplnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449015/original/file-20220228-23-1izplnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449015/original/file-20220228-23-1izplnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Portraits of Soviet leader Josef Stalin (left) and Russian President Vladimir Putin on display at the opening of an exhibit called Russia - My History, 1945-2016, at Moscow’s Manege Central Exhibition Hall.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/portraits-of-soviet-leader-joseph-stalin-and-russian-news-photo/621096790?adppopup=true">Valery Sharifulin\TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The rhetoric of this militant religious nationalism has been on display as Russia threatened to and ultimately did invade Ukraine. During <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/24/putins-speech-declaring-war-on-ukraine-translated-excerpts">a speech on Feb. 24, 2022</a>, Putin bizarrely called for the “de-nazification” of Ukraine. He also spoke of fraternal relationships between Russian and Ukrainian people and denied the existence of the Ukrainian state. In his view, <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lseih/2020/07/01/there-is-no-ukraine-fact-checking-the-kremlins-version-of-ukrainian-history/">Ukraine’s sovereignty</a> is an example of extreme, chauvinistic nationalism.</p>
<p>Putin’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-claim-to-rid-ukraine-of-nazis-is-especially-absurd-given-its-history-177959">claim that Ukraine’s government is run by Nazis</a> is absurd. However, the manipulation of this image makes sense in the framework of this ideology. Painting the government in Kyiv as evil helps to paint the war in Ukraine in black and white.</p>
<h2>Messianic mission</h2>
<p>Tangible <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-follows-decades-of-warnings-that-nato-expansion-into-eastern-europe-could-provoke-russia-177999">geopolitical issues</a> may be driving Putin’s war in Ukraine, but his actions also seem motivated by a desire to <a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-is-on-a-quest-for-historical-significance-by-invading-ukraine-and-gambling-on-his-own-and-russias-glory-177887">secure his own legacy</a>. In his vision of “Great Russia,” <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-antagonism-toward-ukraine-was-never-just-about-nato-its-about-creating-a-new-russian-empire-177687">restored to its former size and influence</a>, Putin is a defender who must vanquish its enemies.</p>
<p>The Russian president himself appeared in earlier versions of the cathedral’s frescoes, along with Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. However, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-removes-vladimir-putin-mosaic-from-military-church/a-53310239">the mosaic was removed</a> after controversy, with Putin himself reportedly giving orders to take it down, saying it was too early to celebrate the country’s current leadership.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1253458434407661571"}"></div></p>
<p>Patriarch Kirill, who has called Putin’s rule a “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-russia-putin-religion/russian-patriarch-calls-putin-era-miracle-of-god-idUKTRE81722Y20120208">miracle of God</a>,” said the new cathedral “<a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/06/15/russia-inaugurates-grandiose-armed-forces-cathedral-a70567">holds the hope that future generations will pick up the spiritual baton from past generations and save the Fatherland from internal and external enemies</a>.”</p>
<p>This volatile religious nationalism manifests itself in the militarism unfolding in Ukraine.</p>
<p>On Feb. 24, 2022, the day the invasion began, Patriarch Kirill <a href="https://www.vesti.ru/article/2681581">called for a</a> swift resolution and protection of civilians in Ukraine, while reminding Orthodox Christians of the fraternal connection between the two nations. But he has not condemned the war itself and has referred to “<a href="https://mospat.ru/en/news/89032/">evil forces</a>” trying to destroy the unity of Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lena Surzhko Harned does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>To understand Russia’s war in Ukraine, look to the blend of religious and militaristic nationalism under Putin – on full display in the Church of the Russian Armed Forces.Lena Surzhko Harned, Assistant Teaching Professor of Political Science, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1758182022-02-07T13:20:46Z2022-02-07T13:20:46ZWhy church conflict in Ukraine reflects historic Russian-Ukrainian tensions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444366/original/file-20220203-15-m1uzyd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C14%2C3205%2C2119&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An Orthodox priest takes part in a rally in protest against an official visit of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople to Kyiv in August 2021.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-orthodox-priest-takes-part-in-a-rally-outside-the-news-photo/1234788699?adppopup=true">Anna Marchenko\TASS via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/soeu-2019-0037/html?lang=en">Two different Orthodox churches</a> claim to be the one true Ukrainian Orthodox Church for the Ukrainian people. The two churches offer strikingly different visions of the relationship between the Ukrainian and the Russian peoples.</p>
<h2>Two Orthodox churches</h2>
<p>The religious history of Russia and Ukraine has fascinated me since I first visited Kyiv on a scholarly exchange in 1984. In my current <a href="https://asu.academia.edu/EugeneClay">research</a> I continue to explore the history of Christianity and the special role of religion in Eurasian societies and politics. </p>
<p>Since <a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/kri.2015.0014">Russia invaded Ukraine</a> and <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/nord/85/1/article-p37_2.xml">annexed Crimea</a> in 2014, relations between the two countries have been especially strained. These tensions are reflected in the very different approaches of the two <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jcs/csz116">churches</a> toward Russia.</p>
<p>The older and larger church is the <a href="https://www.academia.edu/31722400/Was_There_an_Alternative_Metropolitan_Bishop_Onuphrius_and_His_First_Steps">Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate</a>. According to Ukrainian government statistics, this church had over <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2018.1554482">12,000 parishes</a> in 2018. A branch of the Russian Orthodox Church, it is under the spiritual authority of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2010.499283">Patriarch Kirill</a> and his predecessor, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/russ.12308">Patriarch Aleksii II</a>, both have repeatedly emphasized the powerful bonds that link the peoples of Ukraine and Russia.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two leaders of the Orthodox Church, dressed in religious attire, in the new Orthodox Church of Ukraine." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443211/original/file-20220128-25-actw8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C16%2C3584%2C2652&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443211/original/file-20220128-25-actw8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443211/original/file-20220128-25-actw8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443211/original/file-20220128-25-actw8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443211/original/file-20220128-25-actw8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443211/original/file-20220128-25-actw8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443211/original/file-20220128-25-actw8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Patriarch Bartholomew handing the formal signed decree to Metropolitan Epifaniy, the new leader of an autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine, in January 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0b/Batholomew_handing_tomos_to_Epiphanius.jpg/1200px-Batholomew_handing_tomos_to_Epiphanius.jpg">Presidential Administration of Ukraine</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By contrast, the second, newer church, the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2020.1834706">Orthodox Church of Ukraine</a>, celebrates its independence from Moscow. With the blessing of the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2020.1838726">Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople</a>, a solemn council met in Kyiv in December 2018, created the new church, and elected its leader, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-s-orthodox-church-enthrones-metropolitan-epifaniy-/29748831.html">Metropolitan Epifaniy</a>. In January 2019, Patriarch Bartholomew formally <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-ukrainian-church-officially-recognized-gains-independence-from-russia-11546796851">recognized</a> the Orthodox Church of Ukraine as a separate, independent and equal member of the worldwide communion of Orthodox churches.</p>
<p>Completely self-governing, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine was the culmination of decades of efforts by Ukrainian believers who wanted their own <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780875807898/the-orthodox-church-in-ukraine">national church</a>, free from any foreign religious authority. As an expression of Ukrainian spiritual independence, this new self-governing Orthodox Church of Ukraine has been a challenge to Moscow. In Orthodox terminology, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine claims <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/autocephalous-church">autocephaly</a>.</p>
<p>Unlike the Catholic Church, which has a single supreme spiritual leader in the pope, the worldwide Orthodox Church is divided into 14 universally recognized, independent, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2020.1841415">autocephalous or self-headed churches</a>. Each autocephalous church has its own head, or kephale in Greek. Every autocephalous church holds to the same faith as its sister churches. Most autocephalies are national churches, such as the Russian, Romanian and Greek Orthodox churches. Now, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is claiming its place among the other autocephalous churches.</p>
<p>The Orthodox Church of Ukraine has over <a href="https://www.pomisna.info/uk/vsi-novyny/dopovid-predstoyatelya-na-arhiyerejskomu-sobori-14-grudnya-2019-r/">7,000 parishes</a> in 44 dioceses. It regards Russians and Ukrainians as two different peoples, each of whom deserves to have its own separate church.</p>
<h2>The independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine</h2>
<p>The chief issue separating the Orthodox Church of Ukraine from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate is their relationship to the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21527">Russian Orthodox Church</a>.</p>
<p>The Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate has substantial autonomy in its internal affairs. Ultimately, however, it is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2010.499283">subordinate to Patriarch Kirill</a> of Moscow, who must formally confirm its leader. The church emphasizes the unity that it enjoys with the Russian Orthodox believers.</p>
<p>By contrast, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is independent of any other religious body. For the church’s proponents, this independence allows it to develop a unique Ukrainian expression of Christianity. </p>
<h2>A common Orthodox Christian tradition</h2>
<p>In both Russia and Ukraine, Orthodox Christianity is the dominant religious tradition. According to a <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/14/split-between-ukrainian-russian-churches-shows-political-importance-of-orthodox-christianity/">2015 Pew survey</a>, 71% of Russians and 78% of Ukrainians identified themselves as Orthodox. Religious identity remains an important cultural factor in both nations.</p>
<p>Orthodox Christians in both Russia and Ukraine <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41036329">trace their faith back to the conversion</a> in A.D. 988 of the Grand Prince of Kyiv. Known as Vladimir by Russians and Volodymyr by Ukrainians, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25776328">the pagan grand prince was baptized</a> by missionaries from Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire. Kyiv became the most important religious center for the East Slavs.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5699/slaveasteurorev2.94.4.0702">Destroyed in 1240</a> by the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41933117">Mongols</a>, Kyiv fell into decline even as its northern neighbor, Moscow, became increasingly powerful. By 1686, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521815291.010">Russia had conquered</a> eastern Ukraine and Kyiv. In that year, the patriarch of Constantinople formally transferred his spiritual authority over Ukraine to the patriarch of Moscow. </p>
<p>In the 20th century, a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctv177tc1q">growing nationalist movement demanded Ukrainian independence for both the church</a> and the state. Although Ukraine became an independent country in 1991, its only universally recognized national Orthodox Church remained subject to Moscow.</p>
<p>Some Ukrainian Orthodox Christians <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21566-9_14">tried to create an autocephalous church in 1921</a>, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41035820">1942</a> and <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctv177tc1q.11">1992</a>. These efforts largely failed. The churches that they formed were not recognized by the worldwide Orthodox community.</p>
<h2>Ukrainian autocephaly</h2>
<p>In April 2018 <a href="https://www.yalejournal.org/publications/the-gospel-according-to-poroshenko-politics-religion-and-the-new-church-of-ukraine">Petro Poroshenko</a>, then the president of Ukraine, again tried to form an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church. </p>
<p>No fewer than <a href="https://emerging-europe.com/news/the-explainer-the-split-in-ukraines-orthodox-church/">three different churches</a> claimed to be the true Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Poroshenko hoped to unite these rival bodies.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church dressed in religious regalia hold a service as people offer their prayers by bowing in front of them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444363/original/file-20220203-23-1ha8hso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444363/original/file-20220203-23-1ha8hso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444363/original/file-20220203-23-1ha8hso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444363/original/file-20220203-23-1ha8hso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444363/original/file-20220203-23-1ha8hso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444363/original/file-20220203-23-1ha8hso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444363/original/file-20220203-23-1ha8hso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A prayer service of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, held on the hill of St. Volodymyr in the center of Kyiv, Ukraine, in July 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/priests-the-ukrainian-orthodox-church-during-the-prayer-news-photo/1158264411?adppopup=true">Maxym Marusenko/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate was the largest church, and it enjoyed the recognition of the worldwide Orthodox community. However, it was and is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2018.1536780">subject to the Patriarch of Moscow</a> – an unacceptable status for many Ukrainians.</p>
<p>Two other churches, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate, had failed to gain recognition from other Orthodox churches.</p>
<h2>Support for Ukrainian church</h2>
<p>The ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholomew I, supported Poroshenko’s project. As the leading bishop of the ancient capital of the Byzantine Empire, Bartholomew enjoys <a href="https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.1440/86756">first place in honor</a> among all of the heads of the Orthodox churches.</p>
<p>Although Eastern Orthodox Christianity has <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2313-5778/4/2/52">no clear method of creating a new autocephalous church</a>, Bartholomew argued that he had the authority to grant this status. Because Ukraine had originally received Christianity from the Byzantines, Constantinople was Kyiv’s <a href="https://risu.ua/en/the-ecclesiastical-motherhood-of-the-orthodox-church-in-ukraine_n101284">mother church</a>. </p>
<p>In December 2018 a <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/soeu-2019-0037/html?lang=en">unification council</a> formally dissolved the other branches of Orthodoxy in Ukraine and created the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. In January 2019, Bartholomew <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/06/world/europe/orthodox-church-ukraine-russia.html">signed a formal decree</a>, or tomos, proclaiming the new church autocephalous.</p>
<h2>Support and rejection</h2>
<p>So far, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine has <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2020.1834706">received recognition</a> from four other autocephalous Orthodox churches. The churches of Constantinople, Alexandria, Greece and <a href="https://www.ukrweekly.com/uwwp/synod-of-cyprus-votes-to-recognize-ocu/">Cyprus</a> have each welcomed the new church. </p>
<p>Three other autocephalous churches have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2020.1834722">explicitly rejected</a> the new church. The <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2020.1834718">Moscow</a> Patriarchate even <a href="https://www.sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ress-2019-0008">broke communion</a> with Constantinople over its role in creating the new church. </p>
<p>Nadieszda Kizenko, a leading historian of Orthodoxy, has said that Bartholomew has <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/good-fences-make-good-neighbors-autocephaly-legitimacy-and-unity-in-ukrainian-church-life">undermined Orthodox unity</a> to create a church whose legitimacy has been questioned.</p>
<p>By contrast, the noted theologian <a href="https://www.sanktignatios.org/dr-cyril-hovorun/">Cyril Hovorun</a> greeted the Orthodox Church of Ukraine as a positive “<a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/panorthodox-challenges-and-opportunities-coming-from-the-ukrainian-autocephaly">demonstration of solidarity with … the Ukrainian people who suffered from the Russian aggression</a>.” </p>
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<h2>Two visions of history</h2>
<p>Today, the two major rival expressions of Orthodoxy in Ukraine reflect two different historical visions of the relationship between Russians and Ukrainians.</p>
<p>For the Moscow Patriarchate, Russians and Ukrainians are one people. Therefore a single church should unite them. </p>
<p>President Vladimir Putin of Russia has made this very argument in a recent <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181">essay</a>. He characterizes the Orthodox Church of Ukraine as an attack on the “spiritual unity” of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples.</p>
<p>The Orthodox Church of Ukraine holds a very different view. In an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-47408699">interview</a> with the British Broadcasting Corp., Metropolitan Epifaniy firmly rejected “Russian imperial traditions.” As a separate people with a unique culture, Ukrainians require an independent church.</p>
<p>The future of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is unclear. It enjoys the support of several of its sister churches. At the same time, it faces fierce opposition from Moscow. For now, it remains a source of controversy between Russia and Ukraine.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175818/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eugene Clay has received funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the International Research and Exchanges Board, and the Social Science Research Council.</span></em></p>The current split in Ukrainian Orthodoxy reflects a fundamental question: Are Ukrainians and Russians one people or two separate nations?J. Eugene Clay, Associate Professor of Religious Studies, School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.