tag:theconversation.com,2011:/es/topics/muslims-1073/articlesMuslims – The Conversation2024-01-26T13:20:10Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2207252024-01-26T13:20:10Z2024-01-26T13:20:10ZFrance’s biggest Muslim school went from accolades to defunding – showing a key paradox in how the country treats Islam<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569761/original/file-20240117-21-kh948e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1%2C1022%2C680&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Students attend a class at the Averroès school in Lille, France, in September 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/students-attend-a-class-at-the-averroes-high-school-in-news-photo/1801185507?adppopup=true">Sameer Al-Doumy/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>France is famously strict on enforcing <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13310-7_6">what it calls “laïcité</a>”: keeping religion out of the public sphere. Yet more than <a href="https://www.vie-publique.fr/rapport/289657-lenseignement-prive-sous-contrat">7,500 private schools</a> receive government funding, and most are Catholic. In a country where about 1 in 10 people are Muslim, just three Muslim high schools receive state support – or did.</p>
<p>In December 2023, local authorities of the French Ministry of the Interior confirmed a decision to <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/frances-largest-muslim-school-threatened-closure-amid-scrutiny/story?id=105542824">revoke state funding from Lycée Averroès</a>, France’s largest and most acclaimed private Muslim high school. Authorities cited “<a href="https://www.la-croix.com/dissensions-autour-du-lycee-musulman-averroes-prive-de-subventions-publiques-20231211">serious breaches of the fundamental principles of the Republic</a>,” <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2023/11/27/lycee-prive-musulman-averroes-avis-consultatif-favorable-a-la-resiliation-du-contrat-avec-l-etat_6202633_3224.html">raised concerns over certain texts in religious education classes</a>, and accused administrators of opaque financial management, among various alleged infractions. </p>
<p>None of these claims are supported by previous inspection reports, and <a href="https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/hauts-de-france/nord-0/lille/lycee-musulman-averroes-syndicats-politiques-directeur-de-grande-ecole-tour-d-horizon-des-soutiens-affiches-2884994.html">many French scholars and activists have denounced the decision as politically motivated</a>, setting off a political firestorm.</p>
<p>Lycée Averroès, located in the suburbs of Lille, opened in 2003 and was granted state funding in 2008. In 2013, it was named the best high school in France, <a href="https://www.la-croix.com/Urbi-et-Orbi/Actualite/France/Le-lycee-musulman-Averroes-de-Lille-meilleur-lycee-de-France-2013-03-28-926203">according to the Parisien newspaper’s rankings</a>, and has consistently <a href="https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/1309270/article/2023-03-29/lille-averroes-et-faidherbe-dans-le-top-3-des-lycees-de-la-region">ranked among the region’s best</a> in recent years. Teachers and administrators <a href="https://www.lycee-averroes.com/">pride themselves</a> on being dedicated to both French Republican and Islamic values. As <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00344087.2017.1303768">our research</a> has shown, the school often goes above and beyond to teach civic values such as equality and laïcité.</p>
<p>In many French Muslim communities, the school is seen as a beacon – an example of a Muslim institution that succeeded <a href="https://ballardbrief.byu.edu/issue-briefs/religious-discrimination-against-muslims-in-france#:">despite discrimination</a>, <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/islam-and-the-governing-of-muslims-in-france-9781350214538/">political tensions around Islam</a>, and the French Republic’s <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/122/article/843095">strict secularism</a>.</p>
<p>The defunding decision represents a common paradox in contemporary France: Many of the steps its government takes to supposedly protect “<a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/french-brief-reinforcing-principles-republic-french-paradox">French Republican values</a>,” better “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12942">integrate” Muslim minorities</a> or prevent radicalization have the potential <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/france-terrorism-muslims-confusion/2020/11/13/e40332be-2042-11eb-ad53-4c1fda49907d_story.html">to do the opposite</a>.</p>
<h2>High scores, high scrutiny</h2>
<p>Private schools in France <a href="https://books.openedition.org/pur/109889?lang=en">can receive state funding</a> for up to <a href="https://www.cafepedagogique.net/2023/06/02/enseignement-prive-8-milliards-de-fonds-publics-et-pas-de-controles/">about three-quarters of their operating budgets</a> if they agree to certain stipulations. Teachers can provide optional religious education, but otherwise must follow the national curriculum and admit students of any religious background, based on merit alone. </p>
<p>The first Muslim schools opened in 2001, and <a href="https://www.theses.fr/2021UPSLP080">dozens more have been established</a> since. But <a href="https://books.openedition.org/pur/109988?lang=en">as the first one to be granted state funding</a>, Averroès has been under <a href="https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/973367/article/2021-04-01/suspension-des-subventions-du-lycee-averroes-le-tribunal-administratif-rappelle">particularly close scrutiny</a> since its inception. The school has previously faced controversies related to <a href="https://www.leparisien.fr/societe/lycee-musulman-averroes-a-lille-la-region-sommee-de-verser-500-000-euros-a-letablissement-12-10-2022-LMTHICKKVNCR7PXBLWSUY4D6JQ.php">funding it received from an organization in Qatar</a>, and a former teacher’s claims, made a decade ago, that Averroès was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20150206-teacher-quits-french-muslim-school-over-insidious-islamism">teaching “Islamism</a>.”</p>
<p>According to an <a href="https://static.blast-info.fr/attachments/stories/2023/gS9HjS-QQnumCrLXl7NLOw/attachment-kaCAkdjcQz2hkp2n1H3ixA.pdf">official 2020 report</a>, from 2015 through 2020 Averroès was inspected 13 times, making it “the most inspected school” in the region. Notably, it stated that “nothing in the observations … allows (us) to think teaching practices don’t respect republican values.”</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570988/original/file-20240123-29-tsqi0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A statue of a seated man in robes on a pedestal, in front of a brightly lit stone wall at night." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570988/original/file-20240123-29-tsqi0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570988/original/file-20240123-29-tsqi0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=758&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570988/original/file-20240123-29-tsqi0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=758&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570988/original/file-20240123-29-tsqi0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=758&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570988/original/file-20240123-29-tsqi0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=953&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570988/original/file-20240123-29-tsqi0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=953&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570988/original/file-20240123-29-tsqi0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=953&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A statue of the medieval Muslim philosopher Averroes in Cordoba, Spain.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/wall-and-averroes-memorial-royalty-free-image/500351883?phrase=averroes&adppopup=true">Domingo Leiva/Moment Open via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Several public figures have argued that the decision to defund Averroès is representative of “<a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2023/12/16/la-decision-de-deconventionner-le-lycee-averroes-a-lille-est-inequitable-et-disproportionnee_6206186_3232.html">inequitable and disproportionate” treatment</a> that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105022">French Muslims often face</a> compared to their non-Muslim peers. As our research has shown, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01416200.2022.2131735">many Muslim schools undergo more</a> surveillance and criticism <a href="https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/090223/homophobie-au-lycee-stanislas-six-mois-de-silence-du-ministre-qui-confinent-la-lachete">compared to their Catholic</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359479.001.0001">Jewish</a> counterparts. </p>
<p>These double standards largely stem from a political environment rife with <a href="https://www.senat.fr/rap/r19-595-1/r19-595-12.html">fears over Islamic extremism</a> after <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20210905-how-the-november-2015-attacks-marked-a-turning-point-in-french-terror-laws">numerous high-profile attacks on French soil</a>. </p>
<p>However, policies intended to <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2020/11/18/le-projet-de-loi-contre-l-islam-radical-et-les-separatismes-finalise-et-transmis-aux-deputes-et-senateurs_6060131_823448.html">save French Muslim youth from radicalization</a> can have an adverse effect, making young Muslims feel that they are <a href="https://doi.org/10.3917/scpo.broua.2005.01">not seen as fully French</a>, and further alienating them. </p>
<p>For some, this sense of unequal treatment manifests in <a href="https://apnews.com/article/religion-paris-radicalism-secularism-france-951fe2ff0b42e8954193f6f9293b0803">frequent protests</a> and other <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09639489.2018.1440197">demands for justice</a>. But it has sometimes fueled riots, vandalism and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2024/01/17/les-emeutes-de-juillet-2023-dernier-episode-d-une-crise-politique-sans-fin_6211398_3224.html">social unrest</a>.</p>
<h2>Security and separatism</h2>
<p>Other policies that affect education and were made in the name of French secularism have also drawn controversy for potentially discriminating against Islam.</p>
<p>For example, a broad 2021 measure often referred to as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/15/frances-controversial-separatism-bill-explained#:%7E:text=Under%20a%20so%2Dcalled%20%E2%80%9Cseparatism,be%20banned%20from%20French%20territory.">the “separatism law</a>” aimed <a href="https://www.vie-publique.fr/en-bref/283224-loi-separatisme-entree-en-vigueur-des-premieres-dispositions">to combat perceived nonallegiance to French values</a>. Among many requirements, the law made independent schools harder to open and easier for the state to close. </p>
<p>Although the text of the <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/rdr/1749">law does not explicitly mention Muslims</a>, the <a href="https://doi.org/10.3917/migra.183.0003">political discourse surrounding the law</a> clearly targeted Islam. In an October 2020 speech defending the legislation, President Emmanuel Macron stated, “What we must tackle is Islamist separatism,” which he accused of “<a href="https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2020/10/02/fight-against-separatism-the-republic-in-action-speech-by-emmanuel-macron-president-of-the-republic-on-the-fight-against-separatism">repeated deviations from the Republic’s values</a>.” </p>
<p>Yet there is <a href="https://theconversation.com/separatisme-et-si-la-politique-antiterroriste-faisait-fausse-route-149078?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=bylinetwitterbutton">little evidence of such alleged “separatism</a>.” Rather, studies have <a href="https://www.ined.fr/en/publications/editions/document-travail/trajectories-and-origines-survey-on-population-diversity-in-france-initial-findings-en/">consistently shown</a> that Muslim support for French institutions mirrors that of the larger population.</p>
<p>Other examples of policies that purport to rein in radicalization, but may further fuel Muslims’ isolation, include the 2023 <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/09/05/france-s-century-long-crusade-against-religious-symbols-at-school-from-the-crucifix-to-the-abaya_6124828_7.html">ban on abayas in public schools</a> and the <a href="https://www.editions-harmattan.fr/livre-la_politisation_du_voile_en_france_en_europe_et_dans_le_monde_arabe-9782747578875-18971.html">2004 “headscarf” law</a> that banned “ostentatious” <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691147987/the-politics-of-the-veil">religious symbols from public schools</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570989/original/file-20240123-17-fcypz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="About half a dozen women in headscarves look frustrated as they hold signs on the street." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570989/original/file-20240123-17-fcypz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570989/original/file-20240123-17-fcypz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570989/original/file-20240123-17-fcypz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570989/original/file-20240123-17-fcypz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570989/original/file-20240123-17-fcypz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570989/original/file-20240123-17-fcypz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570989/original/file-20240123-17-fcypz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Veiled or not veiled, we want equality’: Parents and supporters protest in 2019 against a proposal to ban mothers who wear headscarves from school trips.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/parents-and-members-of-le-collectif-66-des-mamans-en-colere-news-photo/1146681939?adppopup=true">Raymond Roig/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One study argues the 2004 ban <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000106">harmed Muslim girls’ graduation rates</a>, subsequently affecting their employment opportunities. Similarly, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/french-schools-ban-on-abayas-and-headscarves-is-supposedly-about-secularism-but-it-sends-a-powerful-message-about-who-belongs-in-french-culture-213543">abaya ban</a> has been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/27/how-do-you-distinguish-between-an-abaya-and-a-maxi-dress">criticized by human rights activists</a>, <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230830-un-criticises-france-for-banning-abaya-in-schools/">the United Nations</a> and the <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/releases-statements/uscirf-concerned-frances-expanding-interpretation-ban-religious">U.S. Commission for Religious Freedom</a> for unduly restricting freedom of religious expression and potentially fueling discrimination. </p>
<h2>The future of pluralism</h2>
<p>Based on <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/muslim-and-catholic-experiences-of-national-belonging-in-france-9781350380448/">our fieldwork</a>, we believe France’s Muslim schools <a href="https://theconversation.com/muslim-schools-are-allies-in-frances-fight-against-radicalization-not-the-cause-149802">may help reduce radicalization</a> and one of its causes: young people’s sense that being both fully French and fully Muslim <a href="https://www.europe1.fr/societe/selon-un-sondage-ifop-pour-le-journal-du-dimanche-78-des-francais-jugent-la-laicite-menacee-3927717">is incompatible</a>.</p>
<p>As one young French Muslim told us, “I’ve always been made to feel as though I’m not ‘une vraie française’ (a real French person).” Such “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09639489.2017.1323199">everyday exclusion</a>” can fuel <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-migrations-societe-2023-4-page-3.htm">alienation</a>, <a href="https://arcade.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/article_pdfs/Occasion_v09_hargreaves_final.pdf">resentment</a> or even <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09639489.2022.2147913">emmigration</a>.</p>
<p>Institutions like Averroès, however, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00344087.2017.1303768">offer a haven</a> from the <a href="https://iupress.org/9780253218346/muslim-girls-and-the-other-france/">discrimination students may experience in public schools</a>, and create a space for pupils who want to wear a headscarf or abaya. In addition, they actively <a href="https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/provence-alpes-cote-d-azur/bouches-du-rhone/marseille/rentree-marseille-eleves-musulmans-catholiques-se-rassemblent-hommage-samuel-paty-1890562.html">denounce terrorism</a> and <a href="https://www.20minutes.fr/lille/1512739-20150108-lille-hommage-charlie-hebdo-lycee-musulman-averroes">radicalization</a>.</p>
<p>But recent actions suggest that the French government may have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-closes-mosques-with-powers-that-some-critics-say-use-secretive-evidence-2022-04-05/">lost confidence in Muslim institutions</a> as a way to foster French values. France shut down <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/france/#:%7E:text=The%20government%20dissolved%20by%20decree,21%20mosques%20since%20November%202020.">672 Muslim establishments between 2018 and 2021</a>, including mosques and <a href="https://www.newarab.com/news/france-has-shut-down-dozens-mosques-islamic-schools">independent Muslim schools</a>.</p>
<p>Most immediately, the decision to defund Averroès will impact its students and staff. The school offers scholarships to <a href="https://static.blast-info.fr/attachments/stories/2023/gS9HjS-QQnumCrLXl7NLOw/attachment-kaCAkdjcQz2hkp2n1H3ixA.pdf">approximately 62% of its student body</a>, including its nonstate-funded middle school – a number which will likely prove untenable without funding.</p>
<p>More broadly, such steps may intensify challenges to French Muslims’ sense of value and belonging, obstructing the path toward peaceful pluralism and paradoxically <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/31/opinion/france-terrorism-muslims.html">increasing the risk of radicalization and separatism</a>.</p>
<p>Yet we believe there is a third risk, as well. The French Republic considers secular neutrality and equality <a href="https://editionsdelaube.fr/catalogue_de_livres/etre-francais/">core pillars of French identity</a>, but many critics view its policies on Islam as prime examples of inequality and bias. Such discord may <a href="https://www.ldh-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/HL195-Idees-en-debat-Loi-sur-le-separatisme-la-liberte-de-culte-entravee.pdf">undermine these values’ legitimacy</a>, if not their very essence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220725/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vincent Geisser is affiliated with organization
President of the Center for Information and Studies on International Migration (CIEMI, Paris)</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carol Ferrara and Françoise Lorcerie do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some of the measures the French government has taken to fight radicalization can do the opposite, three social scientists argue.Carol Ferrara, Anthropologist & Assistant Professor, Department of Marketing Communication, Emerson CollegeFrançoise Lorcerie, Professeure, Aix-Marseille Université (AMU)Vincent Geisser, Sociologue, Aix-Marseille Université (AMU)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2169772024-01-03T13:43:29Z2024-01-03T13:43:29ZThe Lotus Sutra − an ancient Buddhist scripture from the 3rd century − continues to have relevance today<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566359/original/file-20231218-23-ldln3o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1%2C0%2C1189%2C601&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Lotus Sutra scroll praising the manifold mercies of the bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/44849">Universal Gateway chapter of the Lotus Sutra/Calligrapher: Sugawara Mitsushige/The Metropolitan Museum of Art Collection</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>State legislatures across the United States have introduced <a href="https://www.equalityfederation.org/tracker/cumulative-anti-transgender">over 400 bills to limit transgender Americans’ rights</a>. Many of these bills’ sponsors, such as the Christian nonprofit Alliance Defending Freedom, cite Christian values as well as the values of the other <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/rag/11/1/article-p67_5.xml">Abrahamic faiths</a> – Judaism and Islam – to justify their anti-trans positions. </p>
<p>The Alliance Defending Freedom claims that Christians, Jews and Muslims view gender as binary and defined only by biology, though these religions’ <a href="https://therevealer.org/beloved-transgender-children-and-holy-resistance/">diverse followers</a> actually hold a <a href="https://theconversation.com/muslims-protesting-against-lgbtq-pride-are-ignoring-islams-tradition-of-inclusion-209949">range of views</a> on <a href="https://therevealer.org/turning-to-the-talmud-to-find-gender-diversity-that-speaks-to-today/">LGBTQ+ issues</a>. Historically, these religions were often more accepting of varied gender identities before <a href="https://publicseminar.org/2018/07/gender-as-colonial-object/">colonialism imposed binary gender</a> as a universal concept. </p>
<p>Religious <a href="https://www.ihs.gov/lgbt/health/twospirit/">values from multiple</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/for-indonesias-transgender-community-faith-can-be-a-source-of-discrimination-but-also-tolerance-and-solace-193063">traditions</a> have supported <a href="https://therevealer.org/many-paths-to-freedom-transgender-buddhism-in-the-united-states/">transgender identity</a>. <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/buddhist-masculinities/9780231210478">As a scholar of Buddhism and gender</a>, I know that several Buddhist texts treat gender as fluid. One such text is the Lotus Sutra, one of the most popular Buddhist scriptures in East Asia. Its core message is that everyone, no matter their gender or status, has the potential to become a Buddha. </p>
<p>The Lotus Sutra conveys its <a href="https://tricycle.org/magazine/greater-awakening/">message of universal Buddhahood</a> in several stories that depict transformations between male and female bodies. For example, a dragon girl instantly transforms into the masculine body of a Buddha, proving that female bodies are not barriers to awakening.</p>
<p>Elsewhere, the Lotus Sutra describes how the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.013.167">bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara</a>, known as Guanyin in Mandarin and Kannon in Japanese, takes on male or female forms depending on the needs of the audience. </p>
<h2>The dragon girl’s gender transformation</h2>
<p>To understand the story of the dragon girl, it is important to understand how Buddhas’ bodies were defined as masculine in early Buddhism. Most people are familiar with the historical figure Siddhartha Gautama as “the Buddha,” but Buddhists believe that <a href="https://tricycle.org/beginners/buddhism/why-do-buddhists-talk-about-many-buddhas/">several “Buddhas,”</a> or enlightened teachers, have been born throughout history. All of these Buddhas are said to possess 32 marks that distinguished their bodies from regular bodies. </p>
<p>One of these marks was a sheathed penis, which meant that Buddha bodies were male by definition. In addition, Buddhist texts identified five roles, including Buddha, that were off-limits to women. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-lotus-sutra/9780231081610">Lotus Sutra</a>, the Buddha’s disciple, Shariputra, refers to these limitations when he rejects the idea that the dragon girl could quickly attain Buddhahood: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“You suppose that in this short time you have been able to attain the unsurpassed way. But this is difficult to believe. Why? Because the female body is soiled and defiled, not a vessel for the Law. How could you attain the unsurpassed bodhi? … Moreover, a woman is subject to the five obstacles. First, she cannot become a Brahma heavenly king. Second, she cannot become the king Shakra. Third, she cannot become a Mara demon king. Fourth, she cannot become a wheel-turning sage king. Fifth, she cannot become a Buddha. How then could your female body attain Buddhahood so quickly?”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, the dragon girl proves Shariputra wrong by instantly attaining Buddhahood, transforming her young, female, nonhuman body into the male body of a Buddha. Women in premodern East Asia <a href="https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rec3.12270">found inspiration</a> in the dragon girl’s story because it showed that their own female bodies were not barriers to enlightenment. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A scroll with golden etching on a black background depicting a scene from the life of the Buddha." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557848/original/file-20231106-21-qgdfq9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557848/original/file-20231106-21-qgdfq9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=655&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557848/original/file-20231106-21-qgdfq9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=655&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557848/original/file-20231106-21-qgdfq9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=655&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557848/original/file-20231106-21-qgdfq9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=824&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557848/original/file-20231106-21-qgdfq9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=824&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557848/original/file-20231106-21-qgdfq9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=824&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This scroll from the ‘Devadatta’ chapter of the Lotus Sutra depicts the 8-year-old daughter of the Dragon King emerging from her palace beneath the sea to offer a precious, radiant jewel to the Buddha on Eagle Peak.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/44851">The Metropolitan Museum of Art</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The bodhisattva’s gender fluidity</h2>
<p>Another inspiration from the Lotus Sutra can be found in the Chapter of Universal Salvation, which focuses on the <a href="https://south.npm.gov.tw/english/ExhibitionsDetailE003110.aspx?Cond=c176e479-7c87-462c-9b58-9b3900ca851e&appname=Exhibition3112EN">bodhisattva of compassion, Avalokiteshvara</a>. A bodhisattva is an advanced spiritual being who postpones enlightenment to help people in the world. </p>
<p>According to this chapter, Avalokiteshvara will adopt any form to save people. Avalokiteshvara can become a monk, nun, layman, laywoman, rich man, rich man’s wife, young boy, young girl, human or nonhuman, depending on the audience’s needs. </p>
<p>In China, this passage provided scriptural support for Avalokiteshvara’s perceived <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/kuan-yin/9780231120296">transformation from a male to female figure</a>. Indian Buddhist texts described Avalokiteshvara as male, but in China people came to see Avalokiteshvara as female. </p>
<p>Though scholars have not found one single explanation for this transformation, the Lotus Sutra passage offers justification for Avalokiteshvara’s gender fluidity. Images of Avalokiteshvara from China, Japan and Korea can depict the bodhisattva as masculine, feminine or androgynous.</p>
<h2>The Lotus Sutra and transgender inspiration</h2>
<p>Due to the Lotus Sutra, Avalokiteshvara has become an inspiration and icon for transgender, gender-fluid and nonbinary people in and beyond East Asia. At Japan’s <a href="https://matcha-jp.com/en/9828">Shozenji Temple</a>, head nun Soshuku Shibatani, who underwent gender reassignment surgery, has said, “The Kannon Bodhisattva has no gender identity,” using Avalokiteshvara’s Japanese name. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://blog.stheadline.com/article/detail/1116787/%E9%9D%9E%E7%94%B7%E9%9D%9E%E5%A5%B3">blog post</a> from Taiwan quotes from the Lotus Sutra in describing Avalokiteshvara as a nonbinary figure who transcends any single gender identity. </p>
<p>However, Avalokiteshvara’s role as a transgender icon is not universally accepted. Another <a href="https://n.yam.com/Article/20130509462739">Taiwanese blogger</a> reported that a friend of theirs argued with their description of the bodhisattva as transgender. In April 2022, an Avalokiteshvara statue in The Burrell Collection in Glasgow, Scotland, labeled as a transgender icon, <a href="https://www.museumsassociation.org/museums-journal/news/2022/04/glasgow-life-defends-trans-label-in-burrell-collection-after-politicisation-row/">resulted in protests</a>. The anti-trans group For Women Scotland argued that the label unnecessarily politicized the statue. </p>
<p>Despite these objections, more and more people have found inspiration in Avalokiteshvara as a transgender, nonbinary or gender-fluid figure. Just as the Lotus Sutra’s story of the dragon girl inspired Buddhist women in premodern East Asia, Avalokiteshvara’s gender fluidity offers inspiration to people today. </p>
<p><em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/authwall?trk=bf&trkInfo=AQHFNdxAPOLqfAAAAYyDQhP4XlW43CSxFWDpq9-1rWWyWub3I-5Wq7BJL_wg5vkC0-EEWdyTHjmNbcHqNfYuNJ4krmD_PiPpjOatEpoVecRRhBp70u5VgTWb2HOF7POqNQMpnmg=&original_referer=&sessionRedirect=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.linkedin.com%2Fin%2Fmarissa-posani-8473432a6%2F">MJ Posani</a>, an undergraduate student at the University of Tennessee, contributed to the research for this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216977/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Megan Bryson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For many Buddhists today, both in East Asia and across the world, the Lotus Sutra offers religious support for various gender identities.Megan Bryson, Associate Professor of Religious Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2185032023-12-18T20:54:25Z2023-12-18T20:54:25ZAfter seeing the struggle of Palestinians in Gaza, TikTok users are learning about Islam<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565693/original/file-20231214-24-fcuu3e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C77%2C7380%2C3469&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Connection between Muslims and non-Muslims on TikTok has created a rare space for empathy to flourish.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/after-seeing-the-struggle-of-palestinians-in-gaza-tiktok-users-are-learning-about-islam" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>The ongoing conflict in Gaza between Hamas and Israel is playing out on screens like never before. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/17/surrounded-by-death-gaza-content-creators-fight-to-get-the-truth-out">Through social media</a>, millions are witnessing the violence that has killed <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/longform/2023/10/9/israel-hamas-war-in-maps-and-charts-live-tracker">thousands since Oct. 7</a>.</p>
<p>People have turned to social media to learn about the history and politics of the region. And increasingly, many are using it to learn about Islam after witnessing the plight of Palestinians in Gaza, giving rise to a movement around exploration of the religion. </p>
<p>In particular, TikTok has seen a spike in posts, livestreams and discussions about the Qur'an, with many citing the displays of Islamic faith they’ve seen in Gazans as their inspiration. </p>
<p><a href="https://ads.tiktok.com/business/creativecenter/hashtag/islam?period=120&countryCode=&">TikTok analytics</a> show the hashtag #Islam has rapidly gained popularity since early October. In that time, videos using the hashtag have garnered more than 35 billion views globally, one billion views in the United States and 360 million in Canada, with the majority of viewers aged 18-24.</p>
<h2>TikTok challenging narratives</h2>
<p>In November, I spoke with six North American TikTokers who have taken part in the online movement by posting content about their faith journey. They shared insights about what they’ve learned, reactions from their audiences and their thoughts on the crisis in Gaza.</p>
<p>“You see women running out of rubbled buildings holding their lifeless child, and the first thing they do is thank Allah (God),” said TikToker <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@graves.hunter">Hunter Graves (@graves.hunter)</a> when I had a conversation with him. Graves is a 21-year-old college senior in Nashville. </p>
<p>In the past two months, he has posted several videos discussing Islam. In some, he showcases books he’s purchased; in <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@graves.hunter/video/7293886118410456366">others</a>, he lightheartedly muses about the religion and that he is “lowkey thinking bout becoming a Muslim.” </p>
<p>One <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@graves.hunter/video/7294058523921730862">video expressing his excitement</a> over terms like <em>alhamdullilah</em> (praise be to Allah) gained almost two million views.</p>
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<p>On Oct. 27, Graves <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@graves.hunter/video/7294838257714466091">posted a video</a> taking his <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/shahadah"><em>shahada</em></a> — the formal declaration of faith whereby one becomes Muslim — at a mosque and officially “reverting,” the term used by some converts to Islam. “With faith, suffering has meaning,” he told me.</p>
<p>Muhammad Kolila, an imam at the <a href="https://www.theddic.org/">Downtown Denver Islamic Center</a>, told me people are using social media to spread knowledge, challenge biases and express solidarity. </p>
<p>“You can do a lot with social media,” he said, adding that some are linking the struggle of Palestinians to those of Indigenous people in North America and South African apartheid. Many TikTokers say the movement has deconstructed negative beliefs about Islam that they grew up with.</p>
<p>What’s happening online contrasts with <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1354067X221103996">the anti-Muslim sentiment that has been growing in the West</a> since the early 21st century. The Canadian Senate Committee on Human Rights recently released a report outlining the frequency and harms of <a href="https://sencanada.ca/en/info-page/parl-44-1/ridr-islamophobia/">discrimination, violence and online hate against Canadian Muslims</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-islamophobia-and-anti-palestinian-racism-are-manufactured-through-disinformation-216119">How Islamophobia and anti-Palestinian racism are manufactured through disinformation</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@6toedcats">Madison (@6toedcats)</a>, a 24-year-old from Tampa, Fla., posted a <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@6toedcats/video/7293756127429414190">teary-eyed video</a> in mid-October, seeking local Muslim women to support her journey to becoming a Muslim. She had previously researched Islam online but said that Palestine was the tipping factor. </p>
<p>“It clicked in my head — I am thinking of myself as Muslim, why am I not Muslim already?” she expressed to me in an interview. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tiktok.com/discover/gingerbeardprog">Charlie Bowling (@gingerbeard.prog)</a>, who considers himself agnostic, posts videos listening to and reading the Qur'an. “I see the Palestinian faith that has kept them so willing and strong,” he told me, “when I started reading the Qur'an, I wanted to document my journey.”</p>
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<h2>History repeats itself</h2>
<p>Following the 9/11 attacks, a similar phenomenon of <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/post-911-islam-converts_n_935572">people exploring Islam</a> occurred, <a href="https://hwpi.harvard.edu/pluralismarchive/news/reports-women-converting-islam-after-911">particularly among women</a>. Current interest mirrors that, but it is now happening through social media and before a much wider audience. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@camelawidad">Camela Widad (@camelawidad)</a> began learning about Islam in the months prior to 9/11 and officially converted in 2003. </p>
<p>“We started to see people go ‘What? Is it really a religion that promotes terrorism?’ And that’s when I saw it gain momentum,” she told me. In her eyes, access to social media today has humanized Muslims. </p>
<p>Islam has kept individuals in Gaza <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/sumud-palestinians-form-steadfastness-continues-grow-stronger">steadfast in the face of adversity</a>, appealing to audiences on social media. Religion comforts individuals by providing answers to existential questions about life, death and suffering. The Qur'an encourages connection between lessons from its stories and the present day, contributing to its value in times of hardship.</p>
<p>The surge in online content is also inspiring some to re-explore their faith. <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@bbyfatz?_t=8iCyo2SwrnZ&_r=1">Fatima Abdi (@bbyfatz)</a>, a fashion influencer with over 83,000 followers, became distanced from Islam as a teen, but has started to find her way back. Seeing others’ videos inspired her to put more action into her belief — she’s started sharing parts of her faith and modest fashion journey with her audience.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@consciouscorn">Cornell Jones (@consciouscorn)</a> reverted to Islam three years ago. When I spoke to him in November, he said the current crisis in Gaza feels like a loss in humanity, but TikTok has allowed him to “make room for faith in Allah.” Jones said he’s received many messages asking about his reversion experience.</p>
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<h2>The dangers of social media</h2>
<p>While social media can be great, Kolila warns against rushing into Islam or comparing one’s journey to others online. “Walk to the faith, not the people,” he said. Seeking reputable sources is key. “Just because we have a platform, it doesn’t mean we have the authority,” said Jones. </p>
<p>Abdi and Graves added that being open about faith online can come with harsh scrutiny.</p>
<p>Connection between Muslims and non-Muslims on TikTok has created a rare space for empathy to flourish. At its core, the movement has allowed people to come together, learn and unlearn. In a time of stark inhumanity and collective grief, doing this might just be what helps us cope.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218503/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nahid Widaatalla does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>TikTok has seen a spike in posts, livestreams and discussions about the Qur'an, with many citing the displays of Islamic faith they’ve seen in Gazans as their inspiration.Nahid Widaatalla, Dalla Lana Fellow in Journalism and Health Impact, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2185962023-11-28T02:14:47Z2023-11-28T02:14:47ZAt a time when journalism needs to be at its strongest, an open letter on the Israel/Hamas war has left the profession diminished<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562011/original/file-20231128-19-vlf74t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=30%2C6%2C4059%2C2146&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/pov-female-war-journalist-correspondent-wearing-1982400632">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The journalists who signed an <a href="https://form.jotform.com/233177455020046">open letter</a> to Australian media organisations last week calling for ethical reporting on the war in Gaza have succeeded in intensifying the dispute over whether the coverage has been fair. At the same time, they’ve called their own impartiality into question.</p>
<p>At last count, the letter had attracted 270 signatories from journalists at a range of institutions including the ABC, Guardian Australia, The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, The Conversation and Schwartz Media.</p>
<p>At the Herald and The Age, both owned by the Nine company, senior editorial executives, including the papers’ editors, have <a href="https://www.news.com.au/finance/business/media/sydney-morning-herald-says-journalists-who-signed-gaza-petition-now-unable-to-participate-in-any-reporting-related-to-the-war/news-story/6a5acb546faea77a7da974c6cfe29a36">banned those staff</a> who signed the letter from having any role in covering the war.</p>
<p>The ABC’s director of news, Justin Stevens, did not go that far, but <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/media/journalist-union-meaa-backs-scepticism-campaign-against-israel/news-story/c7932eabaa30edbf1eb5765ed4618b02">warned his staff</a> that if they signed the letter, their ability to cover the story impartially may be brought into question.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/abc-chief-is-right-impartiality-is-paramount-when-reporting-the-israel-gaza-war-218100">ABC chief is right: impartiality is paramount when reporting the Israel-Gaza war</a>
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<h2>Addressing journalist deaths</h2>
<p>The signatories to the letter, in addition to the individuals, were the journalists’ section of the Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance (MEAA) and its house (branch) committees at the ABC and Guardian Australia. It is not clear exactly under whose auspices the letter was written, but it is clear it has the endorsement of the union. </p>
<p>The letter raises two main issues. </p>
<p>One is that the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) has killed <a href="https://cpj.org/">at least 53</a> journalists in the course of the present conflict and has a history of targeting journalists. </p>
<p>The letter provides links to reputable organisations – Reporters Without Borders, the International Federation of Journalists, the Committee to Protect Journalists – each of which provides substantial detailed evidence making a strong case against the Israeli Defence Force.</p>
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<p>The letter states: </p>
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<p>As reporters, editors, photographers, producers, and other workers in newsrooms around Australia, we are appalled at the slaughter of our colleagues and their families and apparent targeting of journalists by the Israeli government, which constitutes a violation of the Geneva Conventions.</p>
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<p>That much of it can be defended as an attempt to stand up for press freedom and hold the Israeli forces to account.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/more-than-one-journalist-per-day-is-dying-in-the-israel-gaza-conflict-this-has-to-stop-217272">More than one journalist per day is dying in the Israel-Gaza conflict. This has to stop</a>
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<h2>Clear implications of pro-Israel bias</h2>
<p>However, the letter then goes on to argue in a veiled but unmistakable way that the Australian media’s coverage of the war has been pro-Israel. </p>
<p>This is achieved by a series of what, on the surface, look like journalistic motherhood statements:</p>
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<p>We call for […] Australian newsroom leaders to be as clear-eyed in their coverage of the atrocities committed by Israel as they are of those committed by Hamas.</p>
<p>The immense and disproportionate human suffering of the Palestinian population should not be minimised.</p>
<p>Apply as much professional scepticism when prioritising or relying on uncorroborated Israeli government and military sources to shape coverage as is applied to Hamas […] The Israeli government’s version of events should never be reported verbatim without context or fact-checking.</p>
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<p>The clear implication is that this is not being done, and that taken together they add up to a pro-Israel bias that needs to be corrected. </p>
<p>That is a highly contestable proposition and it needs evidence, but none is provided.</p>
<p>The letter goes on to urge that “adequate coverage be given to credible allegations of war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing and apartheid”.</p>
<p>The position taken by the ABC on the use of these terms was <a href="https://theconversation.com/abc-chief-is-right-impartiality-is-paramount-when-reporting-the-israel-gaza-war-218100">set out</a> ten days ago by its managing director and editor-in-chief, David Anderson. He said the ABC would report other people’s use of them but would not adopt them for itself.</p>
<p>This is the conventional way for impartiality to be applied when such politically charged language is used. When they are reporting atrocities of the kind perpetrated by both sides in this war, on what authority do journalists take it upon themselves to apply these definitions?</p>
<h2>Messy fall-out amid messy messaging</h2>
<p>A further question concerning impartiality then arises: does signing this letter disqualify a journalist from being involved in covering the war? Does it justify the action taken by the Herald and The Age?</p>
<p>Those two newspapers have traditionally taken a strict line on these issues, and their decision this time is consistent with that tradition. Many years ago, a Herald reporter was taken off the reporting of state politics when he declared his membership of the Labor Party.</p>
<p>The reason given by the editorial executive who made this decision was not that his coverage had been biased but that there would be an apprehension among those who knew of his affiliation that his coverage might be biased.</p>
<p>A strict line on impartiality is fine, if it is applied impartially, but Crikey has <a href="https://www.crikey.com.au/2023/11/03/australian-journalists-politicians-trips-israel-palestine/">drawn attention</a> to an uncomfortable fact: that three of the four editorial executives at Nine who imposed the ban have participated in trips to Israel sponsored by pro-Israeli groups.</p>
<p>You might think the handling of these problems by the media industry and the journalism profession couldn’t get much messier, but it could.</p>
<p>On November 11, a group of journalists calling themselves MEAA Members for Palestine <a href="https://overland.org.au/2023/11/meaa-members-in-solidarity-with-palestine/">published a separate letter</a> in Overland magazine, and in this there was nothing veiled about the position they took.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/i-just-find-it-very-hard-to-talk-about-it-without-getting-emotional-top-journalists-reveal-their-trade-secrets-to-leigh-sales-211426">'I just find it very hard to talk about it without getting emotional': top journalists reveal their trade secrets to Leigh Sales</a>
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<p>They condemned the Australian government’s support for what they called Israel’s genocidal assault on Gaza, called on the government to demand that Israel withdraw its forces and stop the bombing in Gaza, and condemned “the silencing and intimidation that our members experience when expressing support for, or reporting on, Palestine”.</p>
<p>They called on the Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance to support the Palestinian solidarity movement and join with trade union action across the world to “end all complicity and stop arming Israel”.</p>
<p>As a trade union, the alliance undoubtedly has the right to take sides, even in a war. But doing so is irreconcilable with the professional ethical obligations of its members to report impartially. </p>
<p>The Overland letter and the more restrained open letter to the media organisations might be two separate documents but it would be naïve in the extreme not to think that the first was parent to the second.</p>
<p>The whole episode, including the obvious hypocrisy of the Nine editorial management, has left the profession and the industry diminished at a time when Australian society needs them to be at their strongest.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218596/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Denis Muller does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hundreds of Australian journalists signed an open letter to news organisations calling for better coverage of the war. It calls their impartiality into question.Denis Muller, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancing Journalism, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2163352023-10-30T12:31:16Z2023-10-30T12:31:16ZPalestinian Christians and Muslims have lived together in the region for centuries − and several were killed recently while sheltering in the historic Church of Saint Porphyrius<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556003/original/file-20231026-17-mhk4es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=23%2C93%2C7791%2C5214&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Children at an Orthodox Christmas Mass at the Church of Saint Porphyrius in Gaza City on Jan. 7, 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/young-altar-servers-take-part-in-the-orthodox-christmas-news-photo/1246056243">Mahmud Hams/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/israeli-airstrike-hits-greek-orthodox-church-in-gaza-killing-more-than-a-dozen">A bomb struck the complex of the historic Church of Saint Porphyrius</a> in Gaza on Oct. 19, 2023, killing more than a dozen of the hundreds of Christians and Muslims taking shelter inside and wounding others. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://religion.utk.edu/people/christine-shepardson/">historian of Roman Christianity</a> who focuses on the Eastern Mediterranean, I am often confronted by the complexity of this region. Many Christian and Muslim families in Gaza today were <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1136662">displaced in 1948</a>, after the United Nations divided this formerly Ottoman land into new Arab and Jewish states. Today’s Palestinian Christians occupy a complicated place in this contested land. </p>
<p>The Church of Saint Porphyrius, or Porphyry, is named for a fifth-century bishop remembered for building a church in the city and <a href="https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/porphyry.asp">destroying the local temples to the Roman gods</a>. The <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/2023/10/20/destruction-everywhere-leaves-gazas-heritage-sites-in-ruins/">current building</a> is a 19th-century renovation of a church European Crusaders built in the 12th century over the remains of its fifth-century predecessor, which had been converted to a mosque. While the <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/israel-west-bank-and-gaza/west-bank-and-gaza/">number of Christians in Gaza</a> dwindled to a little over a thousand in 2022, with roughly 50,000 more in the West Bank and Jerusalem, the <a href="https://archive.org/details/PalestineCensus1922/page/n7/mode/2up">1922 census of the British Mandate of Palestine</a> reported over 73,000 in this region where Christians have lived ever since Christianity began.</p>
<h2>Gaza’s early Christians</h2>
<p>As Jesus’ first followers spread the word about the significance of his life, death and resurrection, church communities sprang up around the Mediterranean. In the early fourth century, the church historian Eusebius of Caesarea commemorated Christians who died in the Roman persecution under Emperor Diocletian, including Christians from Gaza and their bishop, Silvanus, in his “<a href="https://www.gorgiaspress.com/history-of-martyrs-in-palestine-by-eusebius-bishop-of-caesarea">History of Martyrs in Palestine</a>.”</p>
<p>Toward the end of the fourth century, a western Christian nun named Egeria <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/egerias-travels-9780856687105?cc=us&lang=en&">wrote a journal of her travels</a> to Christian sites in Egypt, Mount Sinai, Roman Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia. She described stopping to see the places of biblical events and receiving the blessing of Christian monks living in each region.</p>
<p>Early Christianity flourished in the port city of Maiuma before spreading to the main city of Gaza, a center of Greek learning. In 325, Bishop Asclepas represented Gaza at Emperor Constantine’s famous Council of Nicaea, <a href="https://earlychurchtexts.com/public/nicene_creed.htm">which established the Nicene Creed</a> that defines the central tenets of Christian belief for most of the world’s Christians today. Twenty-first-century Palestinian Christians include a variety of communities with ties to this early history.</p>
<h2>Christians and Muslims in medieval Gaza</h2>
<p>In the early fifth century, the small Christian community of Gaza found a zealous leader in Bishop Porphyry, whose forceful efforts to Christianize the city are commemorated by the historical church building dedicated to his memory today.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556004/original/file-20231026-25-9m3h1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Women, with their head covered, stand in church pews, along with children." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556004/original/file-20231026-25-9m3h1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556004/original/file-20231026-25-9m3h1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556004/original/file-20231026-25-9m3h1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556004/original/file-20231026-25-9m3h1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556004/original/file-20231026-25-9m3h1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556004/original/file-20231026-25-9m3h1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556004/original/file-20231026-25-9m3h1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Palestinian Orthodox Christians attend an Orthodox Christmas Mass at the Saint Porphyrius Orthodox Church in Gaza City on Jan. 7, 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinian-orthodox-christians-attend-an-orthodox-news-photo/503825408?adppopup=true">Mohammed Asad/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the decades after Bishop Porphyry’s death in 420, Christians in the eastern Mediterranean, including the Christians of Roman Palestine, were divided over politicized theological conflicts. Those came to a head in 451 at the Roman emperor’s church <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Acts_of_the_Council_of_Chalcedon.html?id=4WG1MQEACAAJ">Council of Chalcedon</a>, in modern-day Turkey, which defined the Son of God in two natures, one human and one divine. </p>
<p>Many of Roman Palestine’s neighbors in Egypt, Syria and Mesopotamia rejected this council because they believed the Son of God had a single nature, at once human and divine. They are called “miaphysite” Christians, which in Greek means “one nature.”</p>
<p>Most Christians of Roman Palestine, however, accepted the council and remained in the imperial church of Rome and Constantinople that centuries later, in 1054, divided into Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. Miaphysites, Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholics today all have churches in the land that was Roman Palestine.</p>
<p>Less than a decade after the death of Islam’s Prophet Muhammad in 632, his followers governed Palestinian Christians, and as a result Arabic rather than Greek <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691146287/the-church-in-the-shadow-of-the-mosque">has been the first language</a> of most of the region’s Christians for more than a thousand years.</p>
<p>When medieval Christian <a href="https://www.pennpress.org/9780812220834/the-crusades-and-the-christian-world-of-the-east/">Crusaders reached Jerusalem</a> from western Europe in 1099, they found not only the Muslims they had come to attack but also these ancient local Christian communities caught in the complex conflicts of the region.</p>
<h2>Palestinian Christians today</h2>
<p>Most Palestinian Christians today are Arab Christians and part of the Eastern Orthodox Church under the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem. Other local Christians are miaphysites in the Syrian, Coptic, Ethiopian and Armenian Orthodox churches. </p>
<p>Still other Christians in this region, such as Maronites, Chaldeans, Syrian Catholics, Greek Catholics and local Roman Catholics, recognize the authority of the pope and are in communion with the Roman Catholic Church. A variety of Protestant churches have also more recently arrived in the region. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556008/original/file-20231026-25-f80a15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People wailing in grief around the covered body of a dead person." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556008/original/file-20231026-25-f80a15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556008/original/file-20231026-25-f80a15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556008/original/file-20231026-25-f80a15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556008/original/file-20231026-25-f80a15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556008/original/file-20231026-25-f80a15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556008/original/file-20231026-25-f80a15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556008/original/file-20231026-25-f80a15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Relatives mourn during an Oct. 20, 2023, funeral ceremony for Palestinians who were killed in Gaza’s Church of Saint Porphyrius in Gaza City.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/relatives-mourn-during-the-funeral-ceremony-for-news-photo/1735021871">Photo by Ali Jadallah/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While diaspora communities span the globe, including many across North and South America, hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Christians continue to live in Israel, the West Bank, Jordan and Lebanon, with <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-palestine-gaza-christians-christmas-celebration-permits-denied">smaller populations in Gaza</a> and other countries in the region. Christian and Muslim communities have been neighbors in this land for over 1,300 years. And last week they sheltered and suffered together in Gaza’s St. Porphyrius Church when it was bombed. </p>
<p>In oversimplifying the story of the Middle East to binary categories – Muslims and Jews, right and wrong, terrorists and innocent – we lose the ability to understand the deeply layered history of this complex region. Meanwhile, the land of Gaza itself is in mourning under a thick ashen shroud.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216335/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christine Shepardson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many Christian and Muslim families in Gaza today were displaced following the creation of new Arab and Jewish states. Today, Palestinian Christians occupy a complicated place in this region.Christine Shepardson, Distinguished Professor in the Humanities, Department of Religious Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2142782023-10-09T13:32:55Z2023-10-09T13:32:55ZEthiopia: religious tension is getting worse – 5 factors driving groups apart<p>Religion is highly present in Ethiopia. It’s visible in churches and mosques, in clothing, and in public rituals. </p>
<p>The country’s main religious communities are Orthodox Christians, Muslims and Protestants. It’s home to one of the world’s oldest churches and has the third-largest Muslim population in sub-Saharan Africa. Orthodox Christians account for <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">about 43% of the population, while approximately 33% are Muslims</a>. Protestant Christianity arrived in the late 19th century and has expanded rapidly in recent decades to account for an estimated 20% of the population. </p>
<p>Ethiopia is <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">often portrayed</a> as a unique case of harmonious inter-religious relations where Christians and Muslims have lived peacefully together for centuries. But the country has also seen religious conflicts. </p>
<p>In the last three decades, there has been a worsening of religious tension. In <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/27/ambush-kills-20-muslim-worshippers-in-ethiopias-amhara-region#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20incident%20happened%20yesterday%20when,three%20people%20and%20wounding%20five.">2022</a>, for instance, more than 20 people were killed following attacks on Muslims in the north-western city of Gondar.</p>
<p>Ethiopia is constitutionally a secular state. Religion has no formal place in politics. Shared spaces and government buildings are to be free from any religious expressions. However, this has been unevenly practised. Religion is present everywhere. </p>
<p>I am a scholar of religion, with extensive <a href="https://religion.ufl.edu/directory/terje-ostebo/">fieldwork and research experience</a> in religion, ethnicity and politics in Ethiopia. In a recent <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">paper</a>, I analysed the developments over the last decades that have affected inter-religious relations, worsened polarisation and produced conflicts.</p>
<p>In my view, five factors have contributed to the rise in religious tensions.</p>
<p>First, the political transition in 1991, which allowed for greater expression of religious activities and changed the religious landscape. Second, the expansion of Christian Protestantism from the early 1990s. Third, the rise of a more visible and assertive Muslim population. Fourth, the response from the Ethiopian Orthodox church to a loss of influence. Finally, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abiy-Ahmed">Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed</a> allowing religion to enter the public political discourse.</p>
<h2>Growing conflict</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/08/15/ethiopia-risks-sliding-into-another-civil-war">Civil war</a> and <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/08/25/two-ethnic-revolts-rack-ethiopia-at-the-same-time">ethnic conflicts</a> have dominated news coming out of Ethiopia in recent years. Religious and ethnic identities are closely connected, but the ethnic dimension of conflict has tended to overshadow the growing tensions between religious communities.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.eip.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Ostebo-et-al-2021-Religion-ethnicity-and-charges-of-Extremism-in-Ethiopia-final.pdf#page=14">2018</a>, young rioters burned churches and killed several priests in Jijiga, in the eastern Ethiopian state of Somali. In <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ethiopia/">2020</a>, Muslim properties were attacked in Harar, eastern Ethiopia, during celebrations of an Orthodox Christian holiday. In <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/27/ambush-kills-20-muslim-worshippers-in-ethiopias-amhara-region#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20incident%20happened%20yesterday%20when,three%20people%20and%20wounding%20five.">2022</a>, attacks on Muslims in Gondar turned deadly. Such incidents have eroded trust between Ethiopia’s religious communities. </p>
<p>Inter-religious violence is often blamed on so-called extremist elements. However, a closer look reveals a more complex picture. </p>
<h2>The drivers</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/Socialist-Ethiopia-1974-91#ref1033852">political transition in 1991</a> and the arrival of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front led to important changes to the political, social and cultural landscape. Seeking to promote equal rights for the country’s ethnic and religious groups, the new government lifted formal restrictions on religious activities. </p>
<p>This affected the balance of power between religious groups. Historically, Ethiopia’s inter-religious co-existence was made possible by one community dominating the others. </p>
<p>Since its establishment in the fourth century, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church had been intimately tied to the state. The domination of the church contributed to the marginalisation of other religious communities. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/Socialist-Ethiopia-1974-91">1974 Ethiopian Revolution</a> ended the state-church marriage, and the changes after 1991 further eroded the church’s position and brought other religious communities in from the shadows. </p>
<p>The second driver of tensions has been the rise of Protestantism. Initially brought by western missionaries in the late 19th century, the religion was mainly found in Ethiopia’s non-Orthodox southern region. Protestantism grew rapidly after 1991, with churches and ministries expanding into traditional Orthodox and Muslim areas. On occasion, this has led to violent conflict. In <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">2006 and 2010</a>, for instance, clashes erupted in the southwestern area of Jimma.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/religion-was-once-ethiopias-saviour-what-it-can-do-to-pull-the-nation-from-the-brink-171763">Religion was once Ethiopia's saviour. What it can do to pull the nation from the brink</a>
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<p>The 1991 changes also led to Islam becoming more visible in the country. Various Islamic reform movements began strengthening religious identity among Muslims and countering their historically marginalised position. This produced a more assertive community. Muslims have become more active in Ethiopia’s social and political life. Numerous mosques have been built across the country. And Muslims have become increasingly visible through a changing dress code, particularly the use of veiling among women, and through public celebrations of religious holidays. </p>
<p>Many Christians, both Orthodox and Protestant, interpret a more visible and assertive Muslim community as proof of Islamic “extremism”. It’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41240192">commonly claimed</a> that mosques and religious schools are funded by Saudi Arabia. And that the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i4FMpXkKFzQ&t=29s">ultimate aim</a> of Ethiopia’s Muslims is political power. </p>
<p><a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?hl=en&lr=&id=_6lVEAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&ots=FAYRrOHs-A&sig=2baPJasl1_wE5VUWCtnWka-M_Vg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">Research</a> has shown that Saudi religious activism has actually dwindled over the last years. But the narrative about such ties continues to fuel suspicions and affect Christian-Muslim relations. </p>
<p>All these developments have been challenging for the Orthodox church. Many of its members are <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">changing their affiliation to Protestantism</a>. The Orthodox church has made efforts to limit this. It has, for instance, prohibited the construction of Protestant churches and mosques in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/arts/design/churches-of-aksum-and-lalibela.html">Lalibela and Axum</a> in Ethiopia’s north. The church has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48634427">declared</a> these cities as sacred Orthodox spaces. </p>
<p>The Orthodox church has also sought to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">reclaim its lost space</a> by, for example, celebrating religious holidays through highly visible ceremonies. During its Meskel holiday in September this year, the Addis Ababa government <a href="https://apanews.net/this-years-ethiopian-meskel-festival-sees-low-turnout-tight-security/#:%7E:text=The%20laity%20is%20restricted%20from,Shirts%20was%20not%20allowed%20too">placed restrictions</a> on the celebration.</p>
<p>The church’s responses have provoked reactions among other religious communities, particularly Muslims who view its actions as an attempt to curb the space they have carved out for themselves. </p>
<p>Finally, Abiy’s political language is laced with semi-religious references. The prime minister is a practising Pentecostal. His acknowledgement of religion has enabled actors to lift religion into the public sphere in ways that have <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429426957-45/strains-pente-politics-j%C3%B6rg-haustein-dereje-feyissa">sharpened boundaries and added to the tensions</a>. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Religious identities and belonging are important in today’s Ethiopia. Changes over the last decades have, however, deepened inter-religious tensions. There is potential to alleviate these tensions. Doing this will require political and religious leaders to communicate across religious boundaries to accommodate Ethiopia’s plurality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214278/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Terje Ostebo have receive funding from USAID.</span></em></p>News coverage of Ethiopia’s ethnic conflicts has overshadowed the growing tensions and polarisation between religious communities.Terje Ostebo, Chair of the Department of Religion and Professor at the Department of Religion and the Center for African Studies, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2135152023-09-20T12:25:56Z2023-09-20T12:25:56ZTinmel – Morocco’s medieval shrine and mosque – is one of the historic casualties of the earthquake<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548893/original/file-20230918-161679-css6uf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=53%2C17%2C3940%2C2622&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A group of men praying in front of the mosque in Tinmel village that has suffered serious damage in the recent earthquake.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/group-of-men-pray-in-front-of-the-famous-tinmel-mosque-news-photo/1665626248?adppopup=true">Matias Chiofalo/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/morocco-earthquake.html">damage from the earthquake</a> that struck Morocco on Sept. 8, 2023, is still being assessed. Moroccans are grappling not just with the loss of thousands of lives, but also with the widespread destruction of their cultural heritage and historical sites.</p>
<p>Among them is a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I3ktb6Wfe84">12th-century mosque in the village of Tinmel</a>, about 4 miles from the epicenter of the quake that flattened many of the villages in the Atlas Mountains. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/I3ktb6Wfe84?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Tinmel Mosque after the earthquake.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The mosque at Tinmel was originally built to commemorate the figure of <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/almohads-9781780764054/">Ibn Tumart, founder of the Almohad movement</a> that ruled an empire stretching from Mali to Spain from 1147 to 1269. Ibn Tumart was a Muslim reformist who advocated for greater accessibility and clarity in Islamic law and scripture. The Atlas tribes spoke little Arabic and lived in remote villages, so Ibn Tumart translated the Quran into the vernacular and issued <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/37452011">the call to prayer in the local Berber dialect</a>. </p>
<p>After Ibn Tumart’s death, his tomb at Tinmel became a shrine, marked by a simple whitewashed dome in front of the mosque. Under the Almohads, Ibn Tumart <a href="https://www.academia.edu/33889579/Peregrinaci%C3%B3n_y_ceremonial_en_las_mezquitas_almohades_el_caso_de_la_mezquita_de_Tinmal">was venerated as a saint</a>, and the early Almohad caliphs were also buried alongside him, turning Tinmel into a potent site of spiritual and social memory.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.smu.edu/Meadows/AreasofStudy/ArtHistory/Faculty/stockstillabbey">architectural historian who specializes in medieval Morocco</a>, I have spent many years visiting and researching Tinmel. For nearly 900 years, Tinmel was central to a distinctly Moroccan Islamic tradition, but the events of the past week have thrown its future into doubt.</p>
<h2>Unusual architecture</h2>
<p>Built in 1148 by Ibn Tumart’s successor, Abd al-Muʾmin, the mosque embodied the core principles of Almohad architecture. A rectangular prayer hall was supported by plaster-coated piers, while a façade of geometric ornamentation emphasized the niche that indicated the direction of prayer, the mihrab.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549116/original/file-20230919-29-q9jkap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Stucco archway with geometric designs" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549116/original/file-20230919-29-q9jkap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549116/original/file-20230919-29-q9jkap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549116/original/file-20230919-29-q9jkap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549116/original/file-20230919-29-q9jkap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549116/original/file-20230919-29-q9jkap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549116/original/file-20230919-29-q9jkap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549116/original/file-20230919-29-q9jkap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The mihrab of the Tinmel Mosque, prior to its collapse in the earthquake.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Abbey Stockstill</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The structure was designed to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004392618_012">encourage circumambulation</a> around the mosque, with the ornamental decoration intensifying the experience. The closer one moved toward the mihrab, <a href="https://doi.org/10.4000/perspective.7545">the more elaborate the design became</a>, drawing the eye of the viewer in.</p>
<p>But the mosque’s most unusual element was its minaret, which wrapped around the exterior of the mihrab. A staircase behind the niche led to the upper story of the structure, where the call to prayer could be issued out over the valley.</p>
<p>Historically, minarets were never constructed in conjunction with the mihrab, but off to the side or opposite the mihrab. Tinmel’s minaret was thus both <a href="https://www.academia.edu/67879496/From_the_Kutubiyya_to_Tinmal_The_Sacred_Direction_in_Muminid_Performance">unique and innovative</a>. </p>
<p>Positioned on a steep hillside, with the mihrab and the minaret both facing the slope down toward the seasonal stream known as the Wadi N'Fiss, the mosque and its shrine looked larger and more monumental than their physical size suggested.</p>
<h2>A center for religious study</h2>
<p>After the collapse of the Almohad dynasty, Tinmel fell under the <a href="https://brill.com/display/title/21963">administration of the provincial sheikhs</a> who governed the Atlas territories.</p>
<p>When the Almohads’ competitors, the Marinids, succeeded in replacing the dynasty to rule much of Morocco between 1244 and 1465, they systematically demolished many of the Almohads’ most precious sites, including Tinmel. They sent soldiers to ransack the village and the shrine, though the mosque itself was left standing. </p>
<p>There is no architectural evidence to suggest precisely where Ibn Tumart’s tomb and those of the Almohad caliphs were located. <a href="https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-the-almoravid-and-almohad-empires.html">Scholars continue to debate</a> how the shrine, the dynasty tombs and the mosque may have fit together as a complex for pilgrims. </p>
<p>But despite Tinmel’s deterioration after the Almohads fell from power, the site remained a powerful place in Moroccan Islam. <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/123497080">Ritual recitations of the Quran</a> were still being carried out twice a day in the 14th century, and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511698309">pilgrims continued to visit</a> the site for another 200 years.</p>
<p>The site remained a <a href="https://books.openedition.org/pumi/12063">center for religious study</a> where men from the Atlas villages could gather and learn about the Quran and the hadith, which are stories of Muhammad’s life and actions.</p>
<h2>An uncertain future</h2>
<p>By the 20th century, the mosque had fallen into disrepair as a result of neglect and political instability in the Atlas Mountains.</p>
<p>An <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/490386868">archaeological survey of the site</a> and <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/32372229">advocacy from local historians</a> inspired a 1995 restoration under the aegis of Morocco’s Ministry of Culture. The site was a <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/452/">tentative place</a> on the UNESCO World Heritage list, pending a full application from the Moroccan government.</p>
<p>The mosque’s plaster ornaments were conserved and the prayer hall’s brick piers reinforced, although the roof remained open to the sky – the original roof, likely wooden, had long since deteriorated. </p>
<p>Earlier this year, more renovations began <a href="https://www.maroc-hebdo.press.ma/rehabilitation-mosquee-tinmel">with the hopes of adding a museum</a> that could help contextualize Tinmel within the larger scope of Moroccan history and welcome more visitors.</p>
<p>The earthquake on Sept. 8 has set this project back indefinitely. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/16/world/middleeast/morocco-earthquake-heritage.html">Five of the workers at the site</a> – all local to the region – died in the disaster, and the site was further damaged. Although <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/morocco-earthquake-damages-historic-mountain-mosque-2023-09-10/">the Moroccan government has committed</a> to rebuilding the mosque, the details of how this will be accomplished and funded are unclear.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213515/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abbey Stockstill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Morocco is grappling not just with the loss of lives from the recent earthquake, but with the destruction of its cultural heritage – a 12th century mosque in the village of Tinmel is among them.Abbey Stockstill, Assistant Professor of Art History, Southern Methodist UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2105372023-09-05T12:31:07Z2023-09-05T12:31:07ZSaudi reforms are softening Islam’s role, but critics warn the kingdom will still take a hard line against dissent<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545381/original/file-20230829-17-2c62j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=41%2C8%2C1762%2C1183&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SaudiArabiaHistoryofSuccession/9eb082a3e58543aea3bc012814e60aad/photo?Query=saudi%20arabia%20mbs&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=25&currentItemNo=3">AP Photo/Pavel Golovkin, pool, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The crown prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, or “MBS,” is bringing a new vision of a “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41747476">moderate, balanced”</a> Saudi Islam by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/21/world/middleeast/mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabia.html">minimizing the role of Saudi religious institutions</a> once seen as critical to the monarchy. </p>
<p>For decades, Saudi kings provided support to religious scholars and institutions that advocated an austere form of Sunni Islam known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-wahhabism-in-saudi-arabia-36693">Wahhabism</a>. The kingdom enforced <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139047586.005">strict codes of morality</a>, placing restrictions on the rights of women and religious minorities, among others. </p>
<p>Under MBS, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-women-drive.html">women have been allowed to drive</a>; <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/11/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-islam-wahhabism-religious-police.html">co-educational classrooms</a>, <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2017/12/12/Saudis-welcome-decision-to-allow-public-cinemas">movie theaters</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/30/middleeast/saudi-arabia-biggest-rave-mime-intl/index.html">all-night concerts</a> in the desert – in which men and women dance together – are a new normal. </p>
<p>Scholars <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/experts/1663">Yasmine Farouk</a> and <a href="https://politicalscience.columbian.gwu.edu/nathan-j-brown">Nathan J. Brown</a> call the diminishing role of Wahhabi religious scholars within Saudi domestic and international policy nothing short of a “<a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/07/saudi-arabia-s-religious-reforms-are-touching-nothing-but-changing-everything-pub-84650">revolution</a>” in Saudi affairs.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/saudi-crown-prince-lambasts-his-kingdoms-wahhabi-establishment">MBS acknowledges</a> that these reforms risk infuriating certain constituents or could even provoke retaliation. As a scholar who studies <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/and-god-knows-the-martyrs-9780190092153?cc=us&lang=en&">interpretations of Islamic law</a> to justify or contest militancy, I’ve followed these reforms closely.</p>
<p>In the past, Saudis who challenged the authority of Wahhabis have provoked unrest. When King Fahd, who ruled between 1982-2005, rejected the advice of his Wahhabi scholars and allowed the U.S. military to station weapons and female service members on Saudi soil, several of them <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511809439">supported a violent insurrection</a> against him.</p>
<p>MBS <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/04/mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabia-palace-interview/622822/">seems unconcerned</a> with such challenges. In an interview broadcast widely throughout the kingdom, MBS <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/saudi-crown-prince-lambasts-his-kingdoms-wahhabi-establishment">chastised Wahhabi scholars</a>, accusing some of falsifying Islamic doctrines. He then detained a major Wahhabi scholar <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/25/middleeast/saudi-cleric-sheikh-salman-al-awda-intl/index.html">from whom he once sought counsel</a>, charging him with crimes against the monarchy. MBS <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41747476#:%7E:text=Prince%20Mohammed%20defended%20the%20reforms,to%20live%20a%20normal%20life.">defended these actions</a>, claiming, “We are returning to what we were before. A country of moderate Islam that is open to all religions, traditions and people around the globe.”</p>
<h2>Negotiating Wahhabism</h2>
<p>This proclaimed return of “moderate Islam” echoes the reforms of MBS’s grandfather, King Abdulaziz, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511993510.008">founder of the modern Saudi kingdom</a>. This vision rejects policies toward Wahhabi Islam favored by his uncles, King Faisal and King Khalid.</p>
<p>Between 1925 and 1932, Abdulaziz suppressed Wahhabi scholars and militants who had demanded that he uphold <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9780691241609/wahhabism">their version of “pure Islam”</a> and not open the kingdom to trade and development. He did the opposite and asserted the supremacy of the monarchy.</p>
<p>The booming Saudi oil economy developed by Abdulaziz required his son, King Faisal, who ruled from 1964 to 1975, to <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674049642">reconsider the monarchy’s relationship</a> with Wahhabism. Unlike Abdulaziz, Faisal believed Wahhabis would help him save the kingdom.</p>
<p>Saudis who felt left behind in the emerging Saudi oil economy had found an inspirational symbol of liberation in Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who helped overthrow the Egyptian monarchy in 1952 and implemented plans to redistribute Egyptian wealth.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674049642">Faisal encouraged</a> Wahhabi scholars to work with politically driven Islamists to reject the revolutionary politics of Abdel Nasser’s Egypt and craft a new vision of Islam for Saudi youth.</p>
<p>Faisal permitted Wahhabi scholars to reform Saudi educational institutions with their conservative Islamic curriculum. Abroad, Faisal’s scholars presented Wahhabism as <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=25998">an authentic Islamic alternative</a> to the Cold War ideologies of the U.S. and USSR. Wealthy Saudis, these Wahhabi scholars argued, had a religious duty to promote Wahhabism across the globe.</p>
<h2>Resisting Wahhabism</h2>
<p>Faisal’s reforms met with success. King Khalid, who followed Faisal, continued to favor Wahhabi scholars, particularly while responding to two major challenges in 1979. </p>
<p>A group of Saudi students, who believed Faisal’s and Khalid’s reforms to be illegitimate, seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Islam’s most sacred site, for two weeks in 1979. An attack on the Grand Mosque was viewed as an attack on the monarchy itself, which claims the mantle of “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A black and white photograph showing smoke rising above the minarets of a mosque with other buildings in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-dated-november-1979-of-burning-meccas-great-mosque-news-photo/51398174?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The seizure came to a violent end with combined action by French and Saudi military forces. Afterward, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/jul/25/inside-the-kingdom-robert-lacey-book-review">Khalid agreed</a> to elevate religious officials who affirmed the Islamic credentials of the monarchy.</p>
<p>Also in 1979, other Saudi youth traveled to join the resistance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. One such Saudi who answered the call that year was Osama bin Laden, who would establish al-Qaida in 1988. </p>
<p>Bin Laden’s and al-Qaida’s grievances against the monarchy emerged following King Fahd’s acceptance of an increased deployment of U.S. soldiers to Saudi soil following Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/products/1952-messages-to-the-world">Bin Ladin proclaimed</a> the presence of American infidels in Saudi Arabia to be a defilement of Islamic holy lands, an “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511809439.003">affront</a>” to Islamic sensibilities, and demanded the destruction of the monarchy. Al-Qaida launched anti-Saudi insurgent campaigns lasting through 2010.</p>
<p>Not all conservative Islamist leaders called for violence. As historian <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/middle-east-centre/people/madawi-al-rasheed">Madawi Al-Rasheed</a> notes, many Saudi scholars <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/muted-modernists/">framed themselves as reformers</a> who sought to correct Fahd’s departures from “authentic” Islam and restore Faisal’s vision.</p>
<p>When MBS speaks of a “moderate Islam” he is not just condemning the violence of al-Qaida. He’s abandoning the monarchy’s accommodations of the Wahhabi establishment. He <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/saudi-crown-prince-lambasts-his-kingdoms-wahhabi-establishment">blames some Wahhabi scholars</a> for the violence that the monarchy faced in 1979 and again in the the 1990s and 2000s. </p>
<p>He has worked quickly to erase those accommodations and, like his grandfather, affirm the supremacy of the monarchy.</p>
<h2>A ‘moderate Wahhabism’ for Saudi society?</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man, wearing a headdress, walking past a display sign of 'Vision 2030.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Saudi Vision 2030’ aims to bring a complete Saudi political, economic, educational and cultural transformation.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many of these revolutionary changes occurred amid the 2016 unveiling of “Saudi Vision 2030,” a plan for complete Saudi political, economic, educational and cultural transformation. MBS believes that this will meet the demands of Saudis under the age of 30 – who <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/fuller20030601.pdf">number more than 60%</a> of the kingdom’s population.</p>
<p>The religious curriculum shaped by King Faisal is gone, replaced with a “Saudi first” education, which <a href="https://agsiw.org/the-saudi-founding-day-and-the-death-of-wahhabism/">removes Ibn abd al-Wahhab</a>, the founder of Wahhabism, from textbooks and emphasizes Saudi patriotism over a Wahhabi Islamic religious identity. Saudi Arabia <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200125-saudi-arabia-to-stop-funding-mosques-in-foreign-countries/">has announced it will no longer fund</a> mosques and Wahhabi educational institutions in other countries.</p>
<p>Saudi religious police, once tasked with upholding public morality, saw their <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/64501">powers curtailed</a>. They no longer have powers of investigation or arrest. They cannot punish behaviors deemed morally inappropriate.</p>
<p>Critics remain unimpressed, noting that demoting religious officials does not diminish the violence of the Saudi state. Religious police continue their online surveillance of social media. In 2018, Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist, was killed <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/10/06/read-jamal-khashoggis-columns-for-the-washington-post/">following his calls</a> for a continued voice for Islamist reformers in Saudi Arabia. <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/women-saudi-arabia-make-gains-overall-rights-remain-issue-n838296">Al-Rasheed argues</a> that the images of a new Saudi society conceal suppression of Saudi reformers. Some observers note that a growing Saudi “<a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/01/08/many-saudis-are-seething-at-muhammad-bin-salmans-reforms">surveillance state</a>,” with capacities to peek into the private lives of Saudis, underwrites these reforms. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://schar.gmu.edu/profiles/pmandavi">Peter Mandaville</a>, a scholar of international affairs, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/live/BbxJAWvM1tc">observes, the “moderate Islam” offered by MBS is complicated</a>. On the one hand, it characterizes a new tolerant Saudi Arabian Islam. Yet, inside the kingdom, Mandaville argues that the “moderate Islam” of MBS demands that Saudi youth – as good Muslims – will submit to the authority of the monarchy over the kingdom’s affairs.</p>
<p>Some observers believe this might not be enough. <a href="https://www.law.utoronto.ca/faculty-staff/full-time-faculty/mohammad-fadel">Mohammad Fadel</a>, a professor of Islamic legal history, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/saudi-arabia-mbs-religious-reform-incoherent-modernism">argues that the current configuration of the Saudi monarchy is incompatible</a> with “the kind of independent thought the crown prince is calling for in matters of religion.” Saudi society will flourish, he adds, “when Prince Mohammed recognizes the right of Muslims to rule themselves politically.”</p>
<p>With these reforms to Wahhabism, MBS hopes to secure the loyalty of a generation of young Saudis. As Saudi history would indicate, however, such a bargain requires constant renegotiation and renewal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210537/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nathan French does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar who has closely followed reforms that MBS has made to Wahhabism, an austere form of Islam, explains the changes taking place in the Saudi kingdom and their impact.Nathan French, Associate Professor of Religion, Miami UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2118492023-08-29T12:26:36Z2023-08-29T12:26:36ZQuran burning in Sweden prompts debate on the fine line between freedom of expression and incitement of hatred<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544675/original/file-20230824-19-8rlhm4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=168%2C38%2C8433%2C5665&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iraqis raise copies of the Quran during a protest in Baghdad, Iraq, on July 22, 2023, following reports of the burning of the holy book in Copenhagen.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/QuranProtests/a55d505a51d943e58a22e22e6536ba60/photo?Query=raqis%20raise%20copies%20of%20the%20Quran%20during%20a%20protest%20in%20Tahrir%20Square%20on%20in%20Baghdad,%20Iraq&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=779&currentItemNo=0&vs=true">AP Photo/Hadi Mizban</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Swedish government is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/sweden-raise-terrorist-threat-assessment-daily-dn-2023-08-17/">concerned about national security</a> following several incidents involving the burning of the Quran that have provoked demonstrations and outrage from Muslim-majority countries.</p>
<p>The spate of Quran-burning incidents followed <a href="https://www.thequint.com/news/world/far-right-leader-rasmus-paludan-burns-quran-in-sweden-worldwide-condemnation-from-muslims-turkey-saudi-pakistan">an act of desecration</a> by far-right activist Rasmus Paludan on Jan. 21, 2023, in front of the Turkish embassy in Stockholm. On Aug. 25, Denmark’s government said it would “criminalize” desecration of religious objects and moved a bill <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/25/world/europe/denmark-quran-burning.html#:%7E:text=Denmark's%20government%20said%20on%20Friday,in%20many%20Muslim%2Dmajority%20countries.">banning the burning of scriptures</a>. </p>
<p>While freedom of expression is a fundamental human right in liberal democracies, the right to express one’s opinion can become complex when expressing one’s views clashes with the religious and cultural beliefs of others and when this rhetoric veers into hate speech.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.arminlanger.net/">scholar of European studies</a>, I’m interested in how modern European societies are trying to navigate the fine line between freedom of expression and the need to prevent incitement of hatred; a few are introducing laws specifically addressing hate speech. </p>
<h2>Death penalty for insulting God and church</h2>
<p>Since medieval times, because of the dominant role of Christianity in political and cultural life, blasphemy against Christian beliefs in European countries was severely punished. </p>
<p>For instance, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108242189.018">the Danish Code from 1683 punished people</a> by cutting off their tongue, head or hands. Similarly, in Britain, both on the main island and in its overseas colonies, blasphemy was punished with executions. In 1636, English Puritan settlers in Massachusetts <a href="https://whyy.org/articles/anti-blasphemy-laws-have-a-history-in-america/">instituted the penalty of death</a> for blasphemy. </p>
<p>For centuries, blasphemy laws were viewed by religious and civil leaders as safeguards for keeping society orderly and strengthening religious rules and influence. These laws showed how much power and influence religious groups wielded back then. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544778/original/file-20230825-21-am7gat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A black and white painting showing a church leader holding a crucifix and wood being piled up to burn a man, while a crowd looks on." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544778/original/file-20230825-21-am7gat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544778/original/file-20230825-21-am7gat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544778/original/file-20230825-21-am7gat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544778/original/file-20230825-21-am7gat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544778/original/file-20230825-21-am7gat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544778/original/file-20230825-21-am7gat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544778/original/file-20230825-21-am7gat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A painting showing a man being executed for heresy in July 1826.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/08/AUTODAF%C3%89_A_VALENCE_%28Juillet_1826%29.jpg">(E)manccipa-Ment via Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During the Enlightenment, from the 1600s to the 1700s, <a href="https://world101.cfr.org/contemporary-history/prelude-global-era/what-enlightenment-and-how-did-it-transform-politics">religious institutions began losing power</a>. Advocating for a strict separation of church and state, France became the first country to repeal its blasphemy law in 1881. Seven other European countries repealed their laws between the 1900s and 2000s, including <a href="https://www.eurel.info/spip.php?rubrique542&lang=en">Sweden</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/02/denmark-scraps-334-year-old-blasphemy-law">and, more recently, Denmark</a>.</p>
<h2>European landscape of blasphemy laws</h2>
<p>Several countries in Europe retain blasphemy laws, but their approaches are highly varied. Often the laws may not prevent present-day acts like dishonoring of religious texts. </p>
<p>In Russia, legislators introduced a federal law in 2013 <a href="https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/3729/13-05-03-LA-russia.pdf">criminalizing public insults</a> of religious beliefs. This followed some provocative performances by the Moscow-based feminist protest art group Pussy Riot. One such protest, a “punk prayer,” in a Moscow cathedral in 2012 criticized the close ties between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Putin regime. </p>
<p>Since 1969, the German penal code has forbidden the public slander of religions and worldviews. While Germany rarely enforces this law, in 2006 an anti-Islam activist got a <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/man-who-made-koran-toilet-paper-escapes-jail-1.1019869">one-year suspended prison sentence</a> for distributing toilet paper with the words “Quran, the Holy Quran” printed on it. </p>
<p>Austria and Switzerland have laws quite similar to Germany’s in this regard. In 2011, a person in Vienna was fined for calling the Islamic prophet Muhammad a pedophile. This case later went up to the European Court of Human Rights, which supported the Viennese court’s decision. The court said that the person wasn’t trying to have a useful discussion but instead <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-6234980-8105265&filename=Judgment%20E.S.%20v.%20Austria%20-">just wanted to show that the prophet Muhammad shouldn’t be respected</a>.</p>
<p>Spain, too, takes a <a href="https://www.mjusticia.gob.es/es/AreaTematica/DocumentacionPublicaciones/Documents/Criminal_Code_2016.pdf">strong stance against religious disrespect</a>. Its penal code makes it a crime to publicly belittle religious beliefs, practices or ceremonies in a way that could hurt the feelings of followers. While Spain introduced this law to safeguard Catholic interests, <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/national-laws-on-blasphemy-spain">it also covers religious minorities</a>. </p>
<p>Italy, another Catholic-majority country, punishes acts deemed to be disrespectful to religions. Its penal code has been used to punish actions that insult Christianity. For example, in 2017 <a href="https://hyperallergic.com/410323/hogre-jesus-chared-with-public-offense-italy/">authorities charged an artist</a> for depicting Jesus with an erect penis.</p>
<h2>Contemporary debate</h2>
<p>The Quran burnings in Sweden and Denmark, aren’t random – they’re part of a broader agenda of targeting Muslims that’s <a href="https://bridge.georgetown.edu/research/burning-the-quran-is-not-free-speech/">being pushed by far-right groups</a> across Europe. </p>
<p>In many European countries, lawmakers and others are asking whether these book burnings should be seen as exercises of free expression or more as incitement based on religion. </p>
<p>A few countries are introducing new legislation to <a href="https://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/2064/1/Amicus76_Kearns.pdf">curb hate speech against religious communities</a>. For example, in 2006 England got rid of the blasphemy law and <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/2490/introduction/made">introduced The Racial and Religious Hatred Act</a>, which makes it an offense to stir up religious hatred. After repealing its blasphemy law in 2020, Ireland has been discussing the introduction of a <a href="https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/74ed9-new-bill-to-tackle-hate-crime-and-hate-speech-includes-clear-provision-to-protect-freedom-of-expression/">hate speech law</a>, which will criminalize any communication or behavior that is likely to incite violence or hatred.</p>
<p>Sweden passed a hate speech law in 1970 protecting racial, ethnic, religious and sexual minorities. Swedish authorities pointed to this legislation when they <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/swedish-police-approve-small-anti-koran-demonstration-mosque-2023-06-28/">took action against a Quran-burning incident</a> that occurred in front of a mosque in June 2023. </p>
<p>The police argued that the Quran burning wasn’t just about religion but specifically <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/why-does-sweden-allow-quran-burnings-it-has-no-blasphemy-laws-/7190103.html">targeted the Muslim community</a>. This was evident, according to the authorities, as the incident took place in front of a mosque <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/swedish-police-approve-small-anti-koran-demonstration-mosque-2023-06-28/">during the Islamic holiday of Eid</a>, setting it apart from other burnings that took place outside of the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/14/copy-of-quran-desecrated-outside-stockholms-royal-palace">Swedish Royal Palace</a>, <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/swedish-police-grant-permit-for-protest-outside-iraqi-embassy-in-stockholm-where-quran-was-burned">the Turkish and Iraqi embassies</a> and other public spaces. Because of the existing hate speech law focusing on incitement against minorities rather than religions, the activist received a fine from the police.</p>
<p>In recent weeks, some have called for a stricter application of the hate speech law and have demanded a ban on all Quran-burning events for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66310285">implicitly inciting hatred against Muslims</a>. </p>
<h2>A global challenge</h2>
<p>This discussion isn’t limited to Europe alone. Even in the U.S., there’s an ongoing debate about the boundaries of free speech. The First Amendment of the Constitution allows free speech, which some can interpret as the right to burn holy books.</p>
<p>Terry Jones, for instance, is a controversial Christian pastor from Florida. He organized <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/florida-pastor-terry-joness-koran-burning-has-far-reaching-effect/2011/04/02/AFpiFoQC_story.html">Quran-burning events</a> in Gainesville in 2011 <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012%2F04%2F29%2F211022">and 2012</a>. His only legal consequence was a <a href="https://talkabout.iclrs.org/2019/12/10/1045/">US$271 fine from Gainesville Fire Rescue</a> for not following fire safety rules. </p>
<p>Following Jones’ announcement that he was going to burn the Quran, President Barack Obama said that the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/president-obama-terry-jones-koran-burning-plan-destructive/story?id=11589122">pastor violated U.S. principles of religious tolerance</a>. Legal scholar <a href="https://law.yale.edu/jack-m-balkin">Jack Balkin</a> recommended <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/09/10/balkin.first.amendment/index.html">using free speech</a> in promoting pluralist values to counter Jones’ hatred. Scholar of law and religion <a href="https://talkabout.iclrs.org/authors-2/iclrs-authors/jane-wise/">Jane Wise</a> suggested that the <a href="https://talkabout.iclrs.org/2019/12/10/1045/">U.S. could follow the English example</a> by banning hate speech. </p>
<p>As societies change, I believe it has become important to recognize when freedom of speech has turned into promoting hatred. Figuring out where this boundary lies, understanding the standards applied and uncovering potential biases can spark important conversations. While a solution that applies to every single country may not exist, it’s essential to engage in this dialogue, recognizing its complexity and the varying perspectives across societies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211849/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Armin Langer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Several countries across Europe are introducing new legislation to curb hate speech against religions, even as they get rid of older blasphemy laws.Armin Langer, Assistant Professor of European Studies, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2034962023-08-25T12:27:24Z2023-08-25T12:27:24ZHow some Muslim and non-Muslim rappers alike embrace Islam’s greeting of peace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542497/original/file-20230814-40119-gg4ymy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C6%2C1022%2C680&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Phife and Q-Tip of A Tribe Called Quest perform in 1994.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/phife-and-q-tip-of-a-tribe-called-quest-news-photo/524328162?adppopup=true">Tim Mosenfelder/CORBIS/Corbis via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ever since the United States’ “war on terror” began, American media has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/yes-muslims-are-portrayed-negatively-in-american-media-2-political-scientists-reviewed-over-250-000-articles-to-find-conclusive-evidence-183327">rife with stereotypes</a> of Muslims as violent, foreign threats. Advocates trying to push back against this characterization sometimes emphasize that “Islam means peace,” since the two words are <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VZeiUG8KemM">derived from the same Arabic root</a>.</p>
<p>Indeed, the traditional Muslim greeting “al-salamu alaykum” means “<a href="https://www.wnyc.org/story/islamic-roots-hip-hop/">peace be upon you</a>.” Some Americans were already familiar with the phrase, thanks to an unexpected source: hip-hop culture, which <a href="https://theface.com/music/hip-hop-islam-religion-french-montana-rapsody-krept">often incorporated</a> the Arabic phrase.</p>
<p>This is but one example of <a href="https://theconversation.com/knowledge-of-self-how-a-key-phrase-from-islam-became-a-pillar-of-hip-hop-208559">Islam’s deep intertwining</a> with the threads of hip-hop culture. In her groundbreaking book “<a href="https://nyupress.org/9781479894505/muslim-cool/">Muslim Cool</a>,” scholar, artist and activist <a href="https://lsa.umich.edu/ac/people/faculty/drsuad.html">Suad Abdul Khabeer</a> shows how Islam, specifically Black Islam, was a crucial part of hip-hop’s roots – asserting the faith’s place in American life. From prayerlike lyrics to tongue-in-cheek references, Islam and other religions are woven into hip-hop’s beats. </p>
<p>That’s the focus of <a href="https://www.bu.edu/articles/2021/religion-and-hip-hop-margarita-guillory/">a class we teach at Boston University</a>. One of us is a <a href="https://www.bu.edu/religion/faculty/margarita-guillory/">professor of religion, history and pop culture</a>, while the other is <a href="https://www.bu.edu/religion/faculty/jeta-luboteni/">a graduate student in Islamic Studies</a>.</p>
<h2>More than ‘hello’</h2>
<p>In Muslim cultures, “al-salamu alaykum” is more than a way of saying hello. It points to the spiritual peace of submitting to God – and not only in this life. Saying “peace be upon you” is a prayer that God will grant heaven to the person with whom you are speaking. Many Muslims believe that “salam” is also the greeting heard upon entering heaven. </p>
<p>The Quran instructs Muslims that “when you are greeted with a greeting, <a href="https://quran.com/en/an-nisa/86">respond with a better greeting or return it</a>.” This means that the proper response to “al-salamu alaykum” is, at a minimum, to respond in kind: “wa alaykum al-salam.” </p>
<p>This exchange has been adapted by several rap artists – including Rick Ross, who does not identify as Muslim, and turns the phrase’s meaning on its head. Ross uses the greeting in the hook of his song “By Any Means,” referencing <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/african-american-history/speeches-african-american-history/1964-malcolm-x-s-speech-founding-rally-organization-afro-american-unity/#:%7E:text=We%20declare%20our%20right%20on,existence%20by%20any%20means%20necessary.">a famous speech by civil rights leader Malcolm X</a>, who was a minister of the Nation of Islam for many years until shortly before his assassination. In 1964, Malcolm X declared African Americans’ right “to be respected as a human being … by any means necessary.”</p>
<p>Half a century later, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQrZDL8x5tk">Ross rapped</a>,</p>
<pre class="highlight plaintext"><code>By any means, if you like it or not
Malcolm X, by any means
Mini-14 stuffed in my denim jeans
Al-salaam alaykum, wa alaykum al-salaam
Whatever your religion kiss the ring on the Don
</code></pre>
<p>Ross’s use of the phrase, right after he mentions Malcolm X, appears to insinuate that if one wishes him peace, he will wish them the same. However, if one wishes him violence, he will not hesitate to respond in kind.</p>
<h2>‘Peace to all my shorties’</h2>
<p>Other hip-hop artists have used “al-salamu alaykum” in many different ways, including lyrics that show broader familiarity with the laws of Islam. For example, it is sometimes contrasted with pork, which is prohibited in Islam, and by extension, the police – the “pigs,” in derogatory slang – though it is more common for non-Muslim singers to use it in this way.</p>
<p>“Tell the pigs I say Asalamu alaikum,” Lil Wayne says in “Tapout,” a song that has little else to do with Islam. Joyner Lucas likewise raps, “I say As-salāmu ʿalaykum when I tear apart some bacon,” in the song “Stranger Things.” Combinations of the sacred and the profane <a href="https://ethnomusicologyreview.ucla.edu/journal/volume/12/piece/507">are present throughout hip-hop</a>, not limited to references to Islam. </p>
<p>Finally, many rappers, particularly those who are Muslim, use the greeting in a more straightforward manner. In their 1995 song “Glamour and Glitz,” A Tribe Called Quest raps:</p>
<pre class="highlight plaintext"><code>Peace to all my shorties who be dying too young
Peace to both coasts and the land in between
Peace to your man if you're doing your thing
Peace to my peoples who is incarcerated
Asalaam alaikum means peace, don't debate it
</code></pre>
<p>Here they affirm and assert that the core of the greeting is one of peace and harmony – not only between people, but between all of God’s creations. </p>
<h2>Shared identity</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542498/original/file-20230814-32504-5bx01a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man with braided hair in a white t-shirt with neon patterns on it gestures and holds a microphone on stage." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542498/original/file-20230814-32504-5bx01a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542498/original/file-20230814-32504-5bx01a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542498/original/file-20230814-32504-5bx01a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542498/original/file-20230814-32504-5bx01a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542498/original/file-20230814-32504-5bx01a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542498/original/file-20230814-32504-5bx01a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542498/original/file-20230814-32504-5bx01a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">French Montana performs during the premiere of ‘For Khadija,’ a documentary about his family, at the 2023 Tribeca Festival.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/french-montana-performs-during-the-for-khadija-premiere-news-photo/1499098244?adppopup=true">Arturo Holmes/Getty Images for Tribeca Festival</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But even if Muslims come in peace, society may not see them that way – and that experience of discrimination often comes through in some lyrics. Rapper French Montana, who immigrated to the Bronx – <a href="https://theconversation.com/hip-hop-at-50-7-essential-listens-to-celebrate-raps-widespread-influence-211298">the birthplace of hip-hop</a> – from Morocco, raps in his 2019 song “Salam Alaykum:” </p>
<pre class="highlight plaintext"><code>As-salamu alaykum,
That pressure don’t break,
It don’t matter what you do,
they still gon’ hate you
</code></pre>
<p>It’s a harsh recognition that whatever one’s actions, whether violent or peaceful, they may still result in racism – a realization he shares with some fellow Muslim rappers in Europe. A comedic take on this is done by Zuna and Nimo in their 2016 song “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4xRsDnKgHZc">Hol’ mir dein Cousin</a>,” where at the start of the song, Nimo states he has a shipment of “haze–” marijuana, but at the end of the video, it turns out the shipment is of “Hase–” bunnies. Yet, throughout the song the rappers speak about violence and drug trade, painting a conflicting picture of innocence versus guilt. </p>
<p><a href="https://fas.yale.edu/book/new-ladder-faculty-2021-2022/humanities/fatima-el-tayeb">Fatima El-Tayeb</a>, a scholar of race and gender, calls hip-hop a “diasporic lingua franca” <a href="https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/european-others">in her 2011 book “European Others</a>,” highlighting how an art form created by African Americans, and speaking to their experiences, has become one of the main ways minorities around the world speak about their struggles and successes. Some young Muslims in Europe, for example, <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315884813-18/hip-hop-muhammad-amir-saeed">use hip-hop</a> as a key way to assert their sense of belonging in societies.</p>
<p>In hip-hop, “al-salamu alaykum” is not treated as though it were part of a foreign culture. These rappers’ beats create a space where it’s OK to be Muslim – a space in which Islam is not merely tolerated, but recognized as a valuable part of pop culture.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203496/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In many parts of the world, hip-hop has become a way for Muslim artists to assert their belonging and identity.Margarita Guillory, Associate Professor of Religion, Boston UniversityJeta Luboteni, Ph.D. Student in Religion, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2018672023-08-04T01:52:43Z2023-08-04T01:52:43ZAustralia will soon have its first Islamic bank. What does this mean, and what are the challenges?<p>Islamic banks have become an integral part of the financial system in many Muslim-majority countries, as well as in nations with sizeable Muslim minorities such as the United Kingdom, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Thailand.</p>
<p>Australia is poised to join them. From mid-2024,
<a href="https://islamicbank.au/">Islamic Bank Australia</a> is set to offer Australia’s 813,000 Muslims a banking service aligned with their religion’s strictures against profiting from interest or investing in harmful industries such as alcohol or gambling.</p>
<p>The fundamental distinguishing feature of an Islamic bank is its adherence to Islamic, or Sharia, law. As such, Islamic banks differ from their counterparts in four main ways: they do not charge or pay interest; they don’t engage in property speculation or activities such as derivatives trading; they do not invest in businesses that are deemed unlawful by Islam; and they typically appoint a second board specifically to oversee their compliance with these rules.</p>
<p>Why do these rules and conventions exist, and how do they work in practice?</p>
<h2>1. No interest</h2>
<p>For devout Muslims, conventional banking services are problematic because of the main way most banks make profit – by charging interest on loans.</p>
<p>Islam’s holy book, the Quran, prohibits all transactions associated with interest. The third chapter (the <a href="https://www.al-islam.org/enlightening-commentary-light-holy-quran-vol-3/section-11-usury-forbidden-means-achieving-success">Surah Al-Imran, verse 130</a>) says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>O’ you who have Faith! Do not devour usury, doubled and multiplied, and be in awe of Allah; that you may be prosperous.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Usury refers to lending money at unreasonable interest rates, but the term is <a href="https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/usury">sometimes used</a> to mean any charging of interest at all. Judaism and Catholicism have also traditionally outlawed usury, although historically they have allowed more wiggle room in how this is applied. </p>
<p>Sharia law prohibits banks from charging any interest on loans at all. But that doesn’t mean Islamic banks are opposed to earning profit.</p>
<p>To comply with Sharia law, an Islamic bank enters into a joint venture or partnership agreement with depositors and borrowers, which allows sharing of profit and loss between bank and customers.</p>
<p>Islamic banks provide loans under a profit-and-loss contract rather than one involving interest-based repayments. In this arrangement, borrowers pay an agreed share of their profits to the bank.</p>
<p>Similarly, deposits with the bank don’t earn interest, but instead they earn a return that will rise or fall in line with the bank’s overall profits.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-finance-provides-an-alternative-to-debt-based-systems-191168">Islamic finance provides an alternative to debt-based systems</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>One potential pitfall of this model is it might encourage borrowers to take unnecessary business risks, knowing their bank will share the losses. This, in turn, would potentially reduce the returns to those who have deposited funds with the bank and also increase the credit risk for banks.</p>
<p>To help guard against this risk, borrowers typically agree to allow the bank to act as a partner in the business, rather than simply as a creditor. This lets the bank monitor the business’s performance more closely, and share directly in its profits and losses.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Hands using laptop showing blurred spreadsheet and graphs" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541149/original/file-20230804-27-htvbrx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541149/original/file-20230804-27-htvbrx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541149/original/file-20230804-27-htvbrx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541149/original/file-20230804-27-htvbrx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541149/original/file-20230804-27-htvbrx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541149/original/file-20230804-27-htvbrx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541149/original/file-20230804-27-htvbrx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Rather than paying interest, business borrowers typically share a portion of their profits with the bank.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Campaign Creators/Unsplash</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>2. No speculative assets</h2>
<p>The Quran (<a href="https://www.al-islam.org/enlightening-commentary-light-holy-quran-vol-3/section-36">Surah Al-Baqarah, verse 275</a>) says: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>…Allah has permitted trading and forbidden usury.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>From this, Islamic scholars infer that purchasing land or property purely for speculation is not permissible, but buying it to undertake economic activities is allowed. This means Islamic banks cannot engage in the kind of debt-based financing that underpins the home or business loans offered by many Australian banks.</p>
<p>Instead, an Islamic bank can finance a home purchase by taking part-ownership of the property, according to the proportion of the purchase price that was provided by bank finance rather the buyer’s own funds. </p>
<p>Similarly, Islamic banks can provide loans to buy land that will be used for economic activities, but cannot profit purely from land price appreciation.</p>
<p>Shariah law also prohibits Islamic banks from engaging in derivatives trading (trading in financial products such as futures contracts, options or swaps) because this involves speculating on an asset’s market performance, rather than on economic activity itself. </p>
<h2>3. No ‘socially harmful’ business</h2>
<p>Sharia law does not allow an Islamic bank to finance economic sectors that are deemed harmful to people’s wellbeing, such as alcohol, tobacco, gambling, adult entertainment, pork products, or arms production.</p>
<h2>4. Islamic corporate governance</h2>
<p>Islamic banks typically appoint two boards: a regular board of directors similar to those that govern most banks, and a Sharia supervisory board to oversee compliance with Islamic laws. </p>
<h2>What are Islamic Bank Australia’s prospects?</h2>
<p>The main challenge for Islamic Bank Australia will be to gain accreditation from the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (<a href="https://www.apra.gov.au/">APRA</a>), which regulates Australia’s commercial banking industry. The bank says it is planning to apply for this in mid-2024, after which it can open to the public.</p>
<p>Next, it will need to attract a significant client base. As of October 2022 it reportedly had <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-12/australia-first-islamic-bank-granted-lending-licence-from-apra/101458162">almost 8,000 prospective customers</a> on its waiting list.</p>
<p>The arrival of Sharia-compliant banking will bring some new issues for Australia’s banking sector more broadly. </p>
<p>Australia does not yet have any supervisory body for monitoring Sharia-compliant banking, meaning all responsibility in this area would fall to the bank’s own supervisory board. In many Muslim-majority countries, such as Malaysia for example, a separate Sharia Advisory Council, typically appointed by the country’s central bank, oversees the Islamic finance industry. </p>
<p>Islamic Bank Australia’s Sharia committee has <a href="https://islamicbank.au/shariah-committee/">three members</a>: Malaysia-based Ashraf Md Hashim, who also sits on that country’s Sharia Advisory Council; Mohamed Ali Elgari, an Islamic economics academic in Saudi Arabia; and Australia-based Islamic banking scholar Rashid Raashed.</p>
<p>Many other Islamic banks worldwide also have overseas Sharia scholars sitting on their boards. But given the complexity of the role, these appointees will need to be familiar with current practices in Australia’s financial landscape too.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-islamic-banking-more-risky-compared-to-conventional-banking-62993">Is Islamic banking more risky compared to conventional banking?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>A related issue is the question of how Islamic Bank Australia will interact with Australia’s existing banks. Besides adhering to Sharia law, it will also need to comply with all of Australia’s banking regulatory requirements. In doing so, it will inevitably come across interest-based transactions. </p>
<p>For example, Islamic Bank Australia must maintain an account for settling any transactions with the Reserve Bank, and will have to refer to existing benchmarks, such as the underlying interest rate, as references for the dividends and charges applied to customers under its profit-and-loss contracts. </p>
<p>Islamic Bank Australia and existing banks will have to get used to adapting to the rules and customs, but it has been done successfully in other Western countries and so Australia should be no exception.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201867/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Islamic banks must follow Sharia law, and as such take a different approach to traditional Australian banks. They don’t charge interest, and are much more selective about which activities they fund.Md Safiullah (Safi), Senior Lecturer in Finance, RMIT UniversityAbul Shamsuddin, Professor of Finance, University of NewcastleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2098402023-07-27T20:35:02Z2023-07-27T20:35:02Z‘The Kerala Story’: How an Indian film ignited violence against Muslims and challenges to interfaith marriage<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/the-kerala-story-how-an-indian-propaganda-film-ignited-violence-against-muslims-and-challenges-to-interfaith-marriage" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>A controversial low-budget Indian feature film <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-65481927"><em>The Kerala Story</em>,</a> about a <a href="https://time.com/6280955/kerala-story-movie-india/">discredited anti-Muslim conspiracy theory</a>, has been causing a political storm, going all the way to India’s Supreme Court. </p>
<p>The movie has helped circulate the idea of <a href="https://theconversation.com/indias-love-jihad-anti-conversion-laws-aim-to-further-oppress-minorities-and-its-working-166746">“love jihad,”</a> a right-wing conspiracy theory that Muslim men are predators and out to marry and steal Hindu women. These ideas date back to the British colonial era and have far-reaching implications for people’s everyday lives. </p>
<p>The trailer claimed <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/4/kerala-story-film-on-alleged-indian-isil-recruits-gets-pushback">32,000 Hindu girls had been converted to Islam by Muslim men with the intent of recruiting them to ISIS.</a> </p>
<p>Once the film came out, citizens <a href="https://scroll.in/latest/1048448/amid-row-the-kerala-story-trailer-changed-from-being-the-story-of-32000-women-to-that-of-3-girls">tried to get it banned by sending a petition to the India’s Supreme Court</a>. </p>
<p>“Love jihad” is a conspiracy theory that claims Muslim men are converting Hindu and Christian women to Islam. Allegedly, the men feign love, get the women pregnant and eventually traffic them. The motive? To increase the Muslim population of India, perpetuate fanaticism and ultimately establish an Islamic state. </p>
<p>According to a recent <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/06/29/religious-segregation/">Pew Report</a>, 99 per cent of married people in India share the same religion as their spouse. Muslims account for approximately <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/projected-population-of-muslims-in-2023-to-stand-at-1975-crore-govt-in-lok-sabha/article67106178.ece">14 per cent</a> of India’s population. </p>
<p>There is no such thing as a “love jihad” and an investigation by India’s National Investigation Agency has said there is <a href="https://thewire.in/politics/nia-love-jihad-kerala-hadiya">no evidence of “love jihad” taking place.</a></p>
<h2>Political fallout</h2>
<p>The figure of 32,000 women in the film’s trailer was immediately <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/entertainment/movies/movie-the-kerala-story-an-attempt-to-destroy-states-communal-harmony-ruling-cpim-opposition-congress/article66792442.ece">challenged by Indian political leaders</a> and also debunked by <a href="https://www.altnews.in/32000-kerala-women-in-isis-misquotes-flawed-math-imaginary-figures-behind-filmmakers-claim/">fact-checkers from the website, Alt News</a>. </p>
<p>The filmmakers agreed to change the number and a new trailer was released. <a href="https://scroll.in/latest/1048448/amid-row-the-kerala-story-trailer-changed-from-being-the-story-of-32000-women-to-that-of-3-girls">It removed and replaced “32,000 girls” with “the true stories of three girls.”
</a> </p>
<p>And the movie went forward with its release, which according to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/23/india/indian-film-kerala-story-controversy-intl-hnk/index.html">some news reports, was successful at the box office</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539600/original/file-20230726-15-pfd09i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539600/original/file-20230726-15-pfd09i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=274&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539600/original/file-20230726-15-pfd09i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=274&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539600/original/file-20230726-15-pfd09i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=274&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539600/original/file-20230726-15-pfd09i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539600/original/file-20230726-15-pfd09i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539600/original/file-20230726-15-pfd09i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A cinema in Bangalore, India. (CP)</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Challenges in the Indian Supreme Court</h2>
<p>Some politicians decried the propagandist nature of the movie and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-65523873">in West Bengal, it was banned by the government</a>. Politicians there said the film <a href="https://scroll.in/latest/1049228/the-kerala-story-contains-manipulated-facts-and-hate-speech-west-bengal-tells-sc">“manipulated facts and contains hate speech in multiple scenes”</a> and they banned the film to <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/entertainment/bollywood/mamata-banerjee-announces-ban-on-the-kerala-story-in-west-bengal-film-producer-reacts-101683546969420.html">“avoid violence and hatred.”</a> </p>
<p><a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/prohibition-order-not-tenable-sc-stays-west-bengal-governments-ban-on-the-kerala-story/articleshow/100326856.cms">The Indian Supreme Court</a> lifted the state ban though agreed that a disclaimer on the film was necessary. The disclaimer indicated that the film provides “no authentic data” to support the 32,000 figure and that it presents fictionalized accounts.</p>
<p>Other politicians, including some from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, promoted the film. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-65481927">Some of them even offered complimentary tickets or organized free screenings</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://thewire.in/film/kerala-story-prime-minister-modi-misleading-claim">Prime Minister Narendra Modi</a> endorsed the movie, assigning to it a distinct legitimacy. </p>
<h2>Islamophobia from the 19th century</h2>
<p>The idea of “love jihad” is both current and historical with notions coming from Indian and Hindu nationalism as well as 19th-century British colonial narratives. Both streams constructed Muslim men as hypersexual and hyperaggressive. </p>
<p>In the 19th century, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230108196">Hindu scholars and new religious organisations (like Arya Samaj and Hindu Mahasabha)</a> began producing a new Hindu-centric version of Indian history. This history grew in response to British colonialism but <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvzgb88s">at the same time, shared similarities with British colonial ideas</a>.</p>
<p>The British portrayed themselves as just rulers, partly by contrasting themselves with their casting of Muslim kings as hypersexual fanatics. </p>
<p>They pointed to a medieval darkness marked by the lust and tyranny of Muslim rulers. Mughal rulers were <a href="https://dvkperiyar.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/We-or-Our-Nationhood-Defined-Shri-M-S-Golwalkar.pdf">portrayed as rapists attacking both Hindu women and “Mother India”</a>. This portrayal included the Muslim <a href="https://brill.com/display/title/5969?language=en">Prophet Muhammad who was portrayed in some places as sexually perverse</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.448955">These ideas became part of the curriculum</a> in certain Indian states and elite Hindu scholars, educated at colonial schools, <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvzgb88s">perpetuated these narratives in their writing</a>. And the idea of a type of “love jihad” became part of the discourse created through pamphlets, novels, newspapers and magazines — especially in North India.</p>
<p>By the late 19th century, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230108196">India was constructed around Hindu heterosexual relationships and family values</a> in opposition to Muslim sexual deviance and rampant Muslim sexuality.</p>
<p>In 1923, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230108196">Madan Mohan Malaviya, the president of the Hindu Mahasabha</a> said in a speech, “hardly any day passes without our noticing a case or two of kidnapping of Hindu women and children by not only Muslim <em>badmashes</em> (rogues) and <em>goondas</em> (hooligans), but also men of standing and means.” </p>
<h2>Challenges to interfaith marriage</h2>
<p>Today, it’s not just <em>The Kerala Story</em> that has circulated the “love jihad” myth. Reportage in Hindu nationalist media continues to make headlines.</p>
<p><em>Organiser</em>, a magazine run by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a network of Hindu nationalist organizations, recently reported that <a href="https://organiser.org/2023/06/28/181109/bharat/madhya-pradesh-three-cases-of-love-jihad-following-same-pattern-like-film-the-kerala-story-reported-in-a-month/">three cases of love jihad following the same pattern as those in ‘The Kerala Story’ were reported in a month</a>.</p>
<p>Love jihad’s centrality to Hindu nationalist politics has led to specifically stringent laws <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/12/1068">focused heavily on sexuality and marriage</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indias-love-jihad-anti-conversion-laws-aim-to-further-oppress-minorities-and-its-working-166746">India’s 'love jihad' anti-conversion laws aim to further oppress minorities, and it's working</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><a href="https://theintercept.com/2021/07/03/love-jihad-law-india/">Hindu vigilantes, in partnership with the police,</a> launch missions to separate interfaith couples. Muslim men have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/21/they-cut-him-into-pieces-indias-love-jihad-conspiracy-theory-turns-lethal">brutalized, killed, forced into hiding and incarcerated</a> using <a href="https://www.loc.gov/item/2018298841/">historic anti-conversion laws</a>. </p>
<p>One response to the chatter about “love jihad,” is an Instagram channel called <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/10/countering-love-jihad-by-celebrating-indian-interfaith-couples">India Love Project</a> launched to celebrate stories of interfaith love and marriages. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539606/original/file-20230726-25-5qmkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539606/original/file-20230726-25-5qmkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539606/original/file-20230726-25-5qmkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539606/original/file-20230726-25-5qmkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539606/original/file-20230726-25-5qmkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539606/original/file-20230726-25-5qmkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539606/original/file-20230726-25-5qmkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This photo of a newlywed couple is from the Instagram account called the India Love Project. The groom is Muslim and the bride is Hindu-Punjabi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.instagram.com/p/CptlucmPFgr/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igshid=MzRlODBiNWFlZA%3D%3Dhttps://www.instagram.com/p/CptlucmPFgr/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igshid=MzRlODBiNWFlZA%3D%3D">(India Love Project)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Hopefully, such efforts continue to address Islamophobia and broaden to include a larger public discourse looking at transnational Islamophobic interlinkages, both past and present.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209840/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wajiha Mehdi receives funding from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Public Scholars Initiative UBC, International Development Research Centre Canada and the University of British Columbia</span></em></p>A controversial low-budget Indian feature film about a discredited anti-Muslim conspiracy theory has been causing a political storm, going all the way to India’s Supreme Court.Wajiha Mehdi, PhD Candidate, Institute for Gender, Race, Sexuality and Social Justice, University of British ColumbiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2099492023-07-24T22:41:35Z2023-07-24T22:41:35ZMuslims protesting against LGBTQ+ pride are ignoring Islam’s tradition of inclusion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538666/original/file-20230721-15-blqc6r.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C38%2C8640%2C5703&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman gives a thumbs-down as she takes part in a protest against LGBTQ+ Pride in Ottawa, June 9, 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Sean Kilpatrick</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/muslims-protesting-against-lgbtq-pride-are-ignoring-islams-tradition-of-inclusion" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Each summer, Pride is celebrated across the world in support of LGBTQ+ inclusion, diversity and human rights. Given the <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-must-all-speak-out-to-stop-anti-lgbtq-legislation-204805">recent backlash</a> against LGBTQ+ communities in Canada and elsewhere, Pride is more important than ever to promote visibility and challenge discrimination.</p>
<p>In recent months, some Muslim communities in Canada and the United States have protested against LGBTQ+ inclusion. Socially conservative Muslims have criticized what they see as growing LGBTQ+ “indoctrination” in schools and society more broadly. </p>
<p>In Michigan, a Muslim majority city council <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/jun/17/hamtramck-michigan-muslim-council-lgbtq-pride-flags-banned">banned Pride flags</a> from being flown on city property. In Ottawa, young children at an anti-LGBTQ+ protest <a href="https://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/adam-ottawa-muslims-should-think-twice-about-criticizing-pride-at-schools">stomped</a> on Pride flags. </p>
<p>Similar protests also took place in <a href="https://calgary.ctvnews.ca/protesters-rally-against-pride-month-activities-at-calgary-schools-1.6445237">Calgary</a> and <a href="https://edmonton.citynews.ca/2023/06/07/teacher-muslim-students-skipping-pride/">Edmonton</a>, where one teacher was surreptitiously recorded lecturing Muslim students about skipping school as part of a national protest movement against Pride month activities. The <a href="https://twitter.com/nccm/status/1666255330207059968">National Council of Canadian Muslims</a> cited the teacher’s comments as Islamophobic.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538799/original/file-20230721-8651-2flzrr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Kids stomp on pride flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538799/original/file-20230721-8651-2flzrr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538799/original/file-20230721-8651-2flzrr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538799/original/file-20230721-8651-2flzrr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538799/original/file-20230721-8651-2flzrr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538799/original/file-20230721-8651-2flzrr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538799/original/file-20230721-8651-2flzrr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538799/original/file-20230721-8651-2flzrr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Children step on Pride flags during a protest against Pride in Ottawa, June 9, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Sean Kilpatrick</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Pride and protest</h2>
<p>This year the Christian anti-abortion group <a href="https://www.campaignlifecoalition.com/clc-blog/id/272/title/national-pride-flag-walk-out-day">Campaign Life Coalition</a>, organized a National Pride Flag Walk-Out Day on June 1 designed to target Pride month celebrations in public schools. The walk-out protests were also supported by a series of “pray-ins” held at Catholic school boards and dioceses across Canada.</p>
<p>Given their vast financial resources and faith networks, Christian evangelicals have redoubled their efforts targeting LGBTQ+ communities, which have been buoyed by recent political lobbying successes in <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/19/africa-uganda-evangelicals-homophobia-antigay-bill/">Uganda</a>, which saw the government pass some of the harshest anti-LGBTQ+ laws in the world. </p>
<p>In Canada, conservative religious groups are also trying to <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9185095/parentsvoice-bc-school-board-elections/">take over school boards</a> by having candidates run in elections under the guise of “parent voice” and anti-LGBTQ+ platforms. </p>
<p>Much of this rhetoric is couched within language about parental rights and protecting kids, which is inherently premised on the belief that teaching about LGBTQ+ identities is wrong.</p>
<p>These tactics are not new but harken back to the days of gay rights opponents like <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/nbc-out/out-news/1970s-christian-crusader-anita-bryant-helped-spawn-floridas-lgbtq-cult-rcna24215">Anita Bryant</a>. Her 1970s “Save Our Children” campaign sought to roll back anti-discrimination laws and prohibit gay and lesbian people from teaching in schools or working in public services. </p>
<p>These campaigns branded gay and lesbian communities as pedophiles who posed a direct threat to the moral fabric of society and helped launch the careers of noted homophobic televangelists such as <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/assault/interviews/falwell.html">Jerry Falwell</a>, <a href="https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/pat-robertson-dead-obituary-1234766208/">Pat Robertson</a>, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna6074380">Jimmy Swaggart</a> and others.</p>
<p>Today’s right-wing talk show pundits and politicians use similar language and tropes that link LGBTQ+ identities with odious terms like “<a href="https://www.hrc.org/press-releases/new-report-anti-lgbtq-grooming-narrative-surged-more-than-400-on-social-media-following-floridas-dont-say-gay-or-trans-law-as-social-platforms-enabled-extremist-politicians-and-their-allies-to-peddle-inflamatory-discriminatory-rhetoric">groomer</a>.” What’s old is new again, but with a twist in logic and strange new alliances.</p>
<h2>Building new coalitions</h2>
<p>Seeking to build new coalitions of support, far-right evangelicals have been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/16/opinion/conservatives-muslims-lgbtq.html">courting conservative Muslims</a> to jump on their homophobic bandwagon against LGBTQ+ rights and inclusion. </p>
<p>Sadly, some conservative Muslim leaders are now fanning the flames of hatred against sexual and gender minorities. For example, some <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylUAgl6oUJY">conservative imams</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WDbiV4VqEug">Muslim think tanks</a> have latched onto similar narratives about the moral decay of Western societies and the dangers of Pride movements. They <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=57rRT3O5tB0">warn against allying</a> with the “progressive left” and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LURR5oUAsJs">against supporting LGBTQ+ equality</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538667/original/file-20230721-38392-7sbh1p.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A person in a green shirt holds a paper that reads: hate is not holy." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538667/original/file-20230721-38392-7sbh1p.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538667/original/file-20230721-38392-7sbh1p.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538667/original/file-20230721-38392-7sbh1p.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538667/original/file-20230721-38392-7sbh1p.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538667/original/file-20230721-38392-7sbh1p.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538667/original/file-20230721-38392-7sbh1p.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538667/original/file-20230721-38392-7sbh1p.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A counter-protester carries a sign confronting a protest against Pride in Ottawa, June 9, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Sean Kilpatrick</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Muslim accommodation of gender diversity</h2>
<p>Muslim societies have historically accepted gender diversity. Even today, despite societal discrimination, there exists a variety of diverse gender identities like the <a href="https://rpl.hds.harvard.edu/religion-context/case-studies/gender/third-gender-and-hijras">hijras</a> of South Asia and the <a href="https://brian-whit.medium.com/transgender-issues-in-the-middle-east-9f40d0559afa">khanith</a> of the Middle East. </p>
<p>In South Asia, multiple gender identities such as the <a href="https://medium.com/@QueeristanPK/transgender-non-binary-and-khawaja-serai-b562570bd426">zenana, chava, kothi</a> and so on exist. On the Sulawesi Island of Indonesia there is also recognition of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/travel/article/20210411-asias-isle-of-five-separate-genders">multiple gender traditions</a>.</p>
<p>There is also Islamic scholarship on the accommodation of gender and sexual minorities in Islam. This includes work by one of us <a href="https://roam.macewan.ca/items/52ecbcdd-86a6-43a7-b3f5-c7cea519fa37">(Junaid B. Jahangir)</a> on the issue of Muslim same-sex relationships. This research offers an invitation to traditionally trained Muslim scholars to revisit the issue with a renewed perspective. </p>
<p>Moreover, this scholarly work builds on the seminal contributions of researchers like Islamic studies scholar <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Homosexuality-in-Islam/Scott-Siraj-Al-Haqq-Kugle/9781851687015">Scott Kugle</a> and writer <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/ca/islam-and-homosexuality-2-volumes-9780313379000/">Samar Habib</a>. </p>
<p>In addition, gender identities are well recognized in Islamic jurisprudence. The <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/603399">mukhannathūn (effeminate men) of Medina</a> inhabited the social space during the time of the Prophet. Muslim jurists derived laws of inheritance, funeral and prayer for the <a href="https://read.dukeupress.edu/jmews/article-abstract/14/2/152/135014/Intersex-Bodies-in-Premodern-Islamic">khuntha mushkil (indeterminate gender)</a> individuals.</p>
<p>Traditional Islamic texts offered such individuals <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs10508-016-0754-y">prayer space</a> between the rows of men and women. The <a href="https://shamela.ws/book/11430">Encyclopedia of Islamic Jurisprudence</a> documents rulings on the marriage of such persons. </p>
<p>In 2016, a group of clerics in Pakistan issued <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-clerics-issue-fatwa-on-third-gender-rights/a-19360321">religious edicts</a> permitting third-gender individuals to marry. </p>
<p>There have also been edicts <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15532739.2016.1250239">permitting gender reassignment surgery</a> issued from the highest bodies of both Sunni and Shia Islam. </p>
<p>However, allowance of gender reassignment surgery does not automatically translate into acceptance. For instance, while Iran is deemed as <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9745420/">“the global leader for sex change,”</a> it remains heavily opposed to LGBTQ+ rights.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538800/original/file-20230721-25-urmb7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Trans women, some wearing hijabs, sit around a table reading from copies of the Quran." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538800/original/file-20230721-25-urmb7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538800/original/file-20230721-25-urmb7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538800/original/file-20230721-25-urmb7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538800/original/file-20230721-25-urmb7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538800/original/file-20230721-25-urmb7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538800/original/file-20230721-25-urmb7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538800/original/file-20230721-25-urmb7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trans women attend a Quran reading class in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, Nov. 6, 2022. Muslim societies have historically accepted gender diversity.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Dita Alangkara)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Avoiding the anti-LGBTQ+ bandwagon</h2>
<p>Nonetheless, when Muslim groups in Western democracies jump on the anti-LGBTQ+ bandwagon, they act against the longstanding accommodation of sexual and gender diversity in their own tradition.</p>
<p>Our main worry is for LGBTQ+ Muslim youth who may be isolated without support from their families and communities. Thankfully, there are <a href="https://hearttogrow.org/">Muslim community groups</a> providing important sexual health education which embraces Islamic laws and traditions.</p>
<p>This community education is especially important when youth struggle with their sexuality and gender in an environment where they cannot be open about their identities. Muslim leaders like the late Maher Hathout <a href="http://www.straighttalkpodcast.com/when-homosexuality-hits-home/">acknowledged</a> and offered a compassionate view on Muslims struggling to reconcile sexual and religious identities. </p>
<p>Islamic teachings on sexual and gender diversity are far more diverse than what many conservative groups would like us to believe. Discrimination based on religious dogma undermines and threatens the individual freedoms essential to secular and democratic societies. Building more inclusive societies means we must all challenge prejudice and hate from both within and outside our communities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209949/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Muslim teachings on sexual and gender diversity are far more diverse than what many conservative groups would like us to believe.Junaid B. Jahangir, Associate Professor, Economics, MacEwan UniversityKristopher Wells, Associate Professor, Faculty of Health and Community Studies, MacEwan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2084442023-07-12T20:27:05Z2023-07-12T20:27:05ZCanadian law enforcement agencies continue to target Muslims<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536418/original/file-20230709-145234-1zd726.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2995%2C1904&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People hold signs during a protest in Montréal against Islamphobia in 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Graham Hughes</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/canadian-law-enforcement-agencies-continue-to-target-muslims" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>As Canadians, we often take pride in perceiving ourselves as different from the United States, proudly <a href="https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=2848&context=wmlr">asserting our contempt</a> about <a href="https://vancouversun.com/news/conversations-that-matter-we-cant-be-smug-about-canadian-democracy">events south of the border</a>.</p>
<p>Yet, a haunting question lingers: have we fallen into some of the same practices we so vehemently condemn, specifically systemic Islamophobia?</p>
<p>On Canada Day in 2013, John Nuttall and Amanda Korody were <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/alleged-canada-day-bomb-plot-targeted-b-c-legislature-1.1408115">arrested by the RCMP</a> after allegedly attempting to bomb the British Columbia legislature. </p>
<p>The arrests were widely celebrated as a victory in the global war on terror. However, three years later, Canadians discovered that the arrests were not the success story the RCMP portrayed them to be. </p>
<p>In July 2016, Justice Catherine Bruce of the B.C. Supreme Court <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9097868/nuttall-and-korody-sue/">ruled that the RCMP manufactured</a> the case against them and entrapped Nuttall and Korody. </p>
<p>The case represents the only terrorism trial in North America where entrapment was successfully invoked by the defence to overturn terrorism convictions, leading to a stay of proceedings and ultimately the couple’s acquittal. However, behind this groundbreaking case lies a darker truth — the deeply concerning tactics deployed by the RCMP. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A tall man embraces a shorter woman wearing a black head scarf." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536414/original/file-20230709-196949-2zr9v8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536414/original/file-20230709-196949-2zr9v8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536414/original/file-20230709-196949-2zr9v8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536414/original/file-20230709-196949-2zr9v8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536414/original/file-20230709-196949-2zr9v8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536414/original/file-20230709-196949-2zr9v8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536414/original/file-20230709-196949-2zr9v8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">John Nuttall and Amanda Korody embrace at B.C. Supreme Court after a judge ruled the couple were entrapped by the RCMP in a police-manufactured crime in Vancouver in 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Darryl Dyck</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Inside Project Souvenir</h2>
<p>In a tale that reads like a Hollywood thriller, the RCMP found themselves entangled in a web of intrigue when they received a tip from CSIS in February 2013 that Nuttall had been purchasing potassium nitrate and making some violent pro-Islamic remarks.</p>
<p>In response, the RCMP launched an elaborate surveillance operation it called Project Souvenir.</p>
<p>Undercover “Officer A” roped Nuttall into a fictitious jihadist organization planning a large-scale attack on the West. Nuttall, tasked by Officer A with devising the plan, presented a wide range of grandiose ideas, from train hijackings to firing rockets over the B.C. legislature. </p>
<p>As the operation unfolded, it became clear that Nuttall was not capable of carrying out any of the proposed plans. Officer A threatened Nuttall with expulsion from the organization if he did not come up with a viable attack plan. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"740316183522611200"}"></div></p>
<p>Ultimately, a plan came together about planting pressure cookers at the legislature in Victoria. Yet Nuttall’s lack of knowledge and incompetence in handling explosives became glaringly apparent.</p>
<p>This led Officer A to promise Nuttall that all resources, including the elusive <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Photos/igphoto/2001510222/">C4 explosive</a>, would be provided. </p>
<p>On Canada Day in 2013, Officer A gave the couple a ride to the legislature, where they planted the pressure-cooker bombs. Later that afternoon, the couple was arrested.</p>
<h2>The over-policing of Muslims</h2>
<p>Despite <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/newsinteractives/features/john-nuttall-amanda-korody-rcmp-terror">Nuttall’s long criminal history spanning 20 years</a>, he only seemed to attract the attention of RCMP after his conversion to Islam. </p>
<p>It became evident in the trial that the police lacked substantial evidence to support any suspicions about the couple. There was no corroboration for the CSIS alert that initiated the investigation in the first place, but police proceeded with it anyway.</p>
<p>It seemed instead the police were profiling the couple based on their religion, and falsely associating devout religious beliefs with political violence and terrorism. </p>
<p>The RCMP allocated around <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/project-souvenir-john-nutall-amanda-korody-investigation-overtime-1.3468323#:%7E:text=Documents%20obtained%20by%20The%20Canadian,was%20code%20named%20Project%20Souvenir.">$1 million in overtime payments to 200 Mounties</a> for this five-month operation. </p>
<p>This raises the question of whether Muslim communities in Canada are over-policed, as <a href="https://utorontopress.com/9781487545901/systemic-islamophobia-in-canada/">suggested by University of Toronto law professor Kent Roach</a>.</p>
<p>The RCMP’s unwavering determination to proceed with the investigation, disregarding <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/newsinteractives/features/john-nuttall-amanda-korody-rcmp-terror">warnings of a potential police-generated crime</a> within the police ranks, poses the question: were investigators fuelled by stereotypes and discrimination? </p>
<p>What Roach describes as “over-policing” of Muslims has led to rampant human rights abuses. Alarming parallels emerge in cases like <a href="https://www.amnesty.ca/legal-brief/case-maher-arar/?gclid=Cj0KCQjwtamlBhD3ARIsAARoaEykUENR2ZN5F8zx0qW_V6UOHsdkTI_lMsLqghp5mmWWb-6vBC2QnxkaAuLREALw_wcB">Maher Arar</a>, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/abdullah-almalki-apology-ottawa-morning-1.4032265">Abdullah Almalki</a> and other targeted Muslim Canadians, where intelligence may have stemmed from guilt by association and anti-Muslim stereotypes. </p>
<p>These cases paint a brutal picture of the over-policing of Muslims in Canada, underpinned by suspicions of Muslims as terrorists. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A bearded man listens to a question at a news conference. A row of Canadian flags is behind him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536417/original/file-20230709-21-ryopai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536417/original/file-20230709-21-ryopai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536417/original/file-20230709-21-ryopai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536417/original/file-20230709-21-ryopai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536417/original/file-20230709-21-ryopai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536417/original/file-20230709-21-ryopai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536417/original/file-20230709-21-ryopai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Maher Arar, an Ottawa telecommunications professional wrongly accused of having ties to terrorism when arrested by American security officials in 2002, listens to a question at a news conference in Ottawa in 2006.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Tom Hanson</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Mass surveillance</h2>
<p>A <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/23326492231151587">recent study</a> by criminology and sociology academics Baljit Nagra and Paula Maurutto sheds further light on CSIS’s mass surveillance of Muslims in Canada. </p>
<p>The study documents how CSIS fosters a culture of informants and reveals how racial narratives surrounding perceived “radicalized extremist” Muslims have provided legitimacy for sweeping surveillance at the hands of intelligence services under the guise of the war on terror.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/csis-targeting-of-canadian-muslims-reveals-the-importance-of-addressing-institutional-islamophobia-199559">CSIS targeting of Canadian Muslims reveals the importance of addressing institutional Islamophobia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>CSIS adopts a “radicalization” framework, which identifies religious devotion as a marker that labels young Muslims as “at risk” for potential indoctrination into “radical extremism,” directly linking Islam to potential terrorism. </p>
<p>As we reflect on the safeguarding of our rights and freedoms, we are confronted with a humbling realization: we may not be so different from our neighbours south of the border. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hate-crimes-associated-with-both-islamophobia-and-anti-semitism-have-a-long-history-in-americas-past-116255">Hate crimes associated with both Islamophobia and anti-Semitism have a long history in America's past</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Canada must continue examining the tactics and decision-making processes employed by its law enforcement agencies.</p>
<p>In doing so, we must reflect on the profound consequences of over-surveillance on the freedoms of religion, expression and association — particularly for Muslim Canadians — and their impact on equality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208444/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Basema Al-Alami is affiliated with the Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies at University of Toronto</span></em></p>Canada must reflect on the profound consequences of over-surveillance on the freedoms of religion, expression and association — particularly for Muslim Canadians — and their impact on equality.Basema Al-Alami, SJD Candidate, Faculty of Law, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2087342023-07-05T12:22:20Z2023-07-05T12:22:20ZChristians in Pakistan risk greater persecution from blasphemy laws, while living in poverty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534895/original/file-20230629-13286-eqhpah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=43%2C54%2C7176%2C4689&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pakistani Christians praying at a church.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/PakistanChristmas/1ed02288065d49d7850a31b29b43b6c5/photo?Query=christians%20pakistan&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=2518&currentItemNo=40">AP Photo/Fareed Khan</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two Christian Pakistani teenagers, one 18 and another 14, were <a href="https://www.christianpost.com/news/2-christian-teens-accused-of-blasphemy-in-pakistan.html">arrested in their homes</a> in Lahore in May 2023 on charges of blasphemy after a policeman claimed he heard them being disrespectful of the Prophet Muhammad. </p>
<p>Among Muslim-majority countries, Pakistan has the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26916355">strictest blasphemy laws</a>. People <a href="https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/pakistans-anti-blasphemy-laws/#:%7E:text=Section%20295C%20forbids%20insults%20to,death%20penalty%20should%20be%20mandatory.">jailed under these laws</a> risk <a href="http://www.federalshariatcourt.gov.pk/en/home/">a sentence of life in prison</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/21/world/asia/pakistan-blasphemy-laws.html">and worse still, even death</a>. Christians and other religious minorities make up a mere 4% of Pakistan’s population, but they account for <a href="https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/pakistans-anti-blasphemy-laws/#:%7E:text=Section%20295C%20forbids%20insults%20to,death%20penalty%20should%20be%20mandatory.">about half of blasphemy charges</a>. </p>
<p>As if navigating blasphemy laws weren’t hardship enough, Christians who live in major cities like Lahore are often relegated to poorly paid and hazardous jobs like sanitation work. The nation of Pakistan was created 76 years ago but during this time the lives of its Christian citizens have grown ever more difficult.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/myriam-renaud-343058">scholar of world religions</a>, I have studied how the evolution of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-are-madrasa-schools-and-what-skills-do-they-impart-99497">hard-line version of Islam in Pakistan</a> has come to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/16/is-pakistan-safe-for-christians/">shape this country’s national identity</a> and contributed to the persecution of its Christian minority.</p>
<h2>Hindu converts to Christianity</h2>
<p>Many Christians in Pakistan trace their religious affiliation to the activities of <a href="https://history.wisc.edu/publications/christianity-in-india-from-beginnings-to-the-present/">missionary societies</a> during the 19th and early 20th centuries in the Punjab region of what was then British-ruled India. </p>
<p>Early evangelization efforts by both the British and Americans in Hindu-majority India focused on upper-caste Hindus. The evangelizers assumed that these elites would use their influence to convert members of the lower castes. However, this approach led to few converts. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/caste-doesnt-just-exist-in-india-or-in-hinduism-it-is-pervasive-across-many-religions-in-south-asia-and-the-diaspora-180470">caste system</a> is a tiered socioeconomic system that consigns people to a particular group, or caste. In Hinduism, this system is part of its religious worldview. People are born into a particular caste. </p>
<p>There are some <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43052102">3,000 castes in India</a>, each associated with a range of occupations. People from the lowest castes are often expected to do work that is considered “polluting,” such as skinning animals, removing the bodies of the unclaimed dead and cleaning toilets. Because castes are rigid categories, their members are blocked from upward mobility.</p>
<p>In the late 19th century, American missionaries in India decided <a href="https://www.mqup.ca/nationalism-and-minority-identities-in-islamic-societies-products-9780773528482.php">to focus directly on the least advantaged</a> and began to <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Imperial_Fault_Lines.html?id=z9c3AcIDCKkC">baptize Hindus of low or no caste</a>. The missionaries’ new approach proved successful, in part because <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Christianity_in_India.html?id=mXgSDAAAQBAJ">conversion to Christianity</a> offered hope of escape from Hinduism’s caste system. By the 1930s, for example, many members of the largest menial caste in India’s Punjab region had converted to Protestant Christianity.</p>
<p>In 1947, the country of Pakistan was carved out of Indian territory to establish a homeland for Muslims, who were a minority in India. The section of the Punjab where most Christians lived became part of Pakistan. </p>
<p>The majority of those Christians chose to remain in the newly created Pakistan. They believed that they would fare better there because, in principle, Islam rejects social divisions like castes on theological grounds. </p>
<h2>Lower socioeconomic status</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534897/original/file-20230629-26782-wnno82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Women, with heads covered, seated in pews, inside a church with red hanging decorations." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534897/original/file-20230629-26782-wnno82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534897/original/file-20230629-26782-wnno82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534897/original/file-20230629-26782-wnno82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534897/original/file-20230629-26782-wnno82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534897/original/file-20230629-26782-wnno82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534897/original/file-20230629-26782-wnno82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534897/original/file-20230629-26782-wnno82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pakistani Christian women attend the Christmas Mass at a church in Peshawar, Pakistan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/PakistanChristmas/331743ae23494157992442e1f9625446/photo?Query=church%20pakistan&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=930&currentItemNo=4">AP Photo/Mohammad Sajjad</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In practice, after the creation of Pakistan, not much changed economically or socially for the Christians who stayed: The <a href="https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/761014">caste system continued to exist</a> in the new country. </p>
<p>Even today, most Pakistani Christians living in major cities are <a href="https://www.ucanews.com/news/christians-upset-over-controversial-pilgrimage-advert/80233">consigned to poorly paid jobs in the sanitation industry</a>. Pakistan’s government has adopted a <a href="http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-077-2017/">systemic policy</a> of reserving sanitation posts for religious minorities. </p>
<p>Newspaper ads for sanitation workers, including by government agencies, explicitly call for non-Muslims. One of Asia’s Catholic news agencies, UCANews, reported that in May 2017, the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation issued a call for 450 sanitation workers, <a href="https://www.ucanews.com/news/children-of-a-lesser-god-pakistans-sanitation-workers/79884">offering contracts</a> that required employees to be non-Muslim and to take this oath: “I swear by my faith that I will only work in the position of a sanitary worker and not refuse any work.” </p>
<p>In Pakistan’s northwest city of Peshawar, as many as 80% of Christians are sanitation workers. According to the 2022 census, 3.27% of urban <a href="https://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/tables/population/POPULATION%20BY%20RELIGION.pdf">Pakistanis living in Punjab</a> province are Christian. However, in Lahore, Punjab’s capital city, Christians account for <a href="http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/christians-required-only-as-sweepers/">76% of sanitation workers</a>. </p>
<p>Subject to widespread discrimination, Christians are often refused other work. Confined to low-wage jobs, Christians experience widespread poverty, even in the relatively prosperous Punjab. A <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edinburgh-scholarship-online/book/37892/chapter-abstract/332392693?redirectedFrom=fulltext">2012 survey in Lahore</a> found that, for Christian families of five, the average monthly income was US$138 — a per capita daily income of 92 cents - which is well below the poverty line defined by the World Bank. In contrast, during the same year, the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/226956/average-world-wages-in-purchasing-power-parity-dollars/">average monthly income for all Pakistanis</a> was US$255.</p>
<h2>Blasphemy laws target minorities</h2>
<p>The condition of Christians only worsened when Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan’s dictatorial president from 1978 to 1988, started <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2759814?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">the Islamization of the country</a>. </p>
<p>Originally, for example, Pakistan’s blasphemy laws were general in nature. They punished offenders who wounded the religious sensibilities of other people. Only a handful of charges were filed until Zia added several Islam-specific clauses to this nonsectarian code. These changes included making blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad punishable by a minimum sentence of life in prison, and possibly death. Since Zia’s rule, <a href="https://crss.pk/blasphemy-cases-in-pakistan-1947-2021/">hundreds of blasphemy cases</a> have been filed.</p>
<p>Anthropologist <a href="https://honorsandawards.iu.edu/awards/honoree/1333.html">Linda Walbridge</a>, writing about <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=z9c3AcIDCKkC&pg=PA1&vq=christian+colonies&dq=punjabi+presbyterian&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=3#v=onepage&q=christian%20colonies&f=false%20https://books.google.com/books/about/Nationalism_and_Minority_Identities_in_I.html?id=82jaiJ48vZQC">Pakistani Christians</a>, notes that by the 1990s these “Christians certainly believed they were the targets of systematic oppression.” That oppression, she observed, came largely “in the form of laws that have increasingly been used against them.” </p>
<p>Indeed, laws intended to protect Islam have sometimes been used against Christians and other minorities to settle personal scores or business disputes. In one incident, a Christian couple refused to pay back their Muslim employer who had lent them money. A mob burned them alive after he <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/05/world/asia/pakistani-christian-couple-accused-of-blasphemy-is-killed-by-angry-mob.html">accused them of blasphemy</a>. </p>
<p>The father of one of the arrested teenagers <a href="https://www.christianpost.com/news/2-christian-teens-accused-of-blasphemy-in-pakistan.html">told the The Christian Post</a>, “Our Muslim neighbors have known us for years, and they know we would never indulge in anything that could hurt their religious sentiments.” Prosecuting authorities reviewing the teenagers’ case may lean in their favor, but if the past is any indication, the authorities themselves will <a href="https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Pakistan-On-Trial-Blasphemy-Laws-Publications-Thematic-Reports-2015-ENG.pdf">face intimidation, threats and accusations</a>. </p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of a piece <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-pope-francis-choice-of-a-pakistani-cardinal-means-for-christians-of-the-country-97604">first published on June 28, 2018.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208734/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Myriam Renaud does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Consigned to jobs in sanitation and other hazardous fields, Christians, the largest religious minority group in Pakistan, face a difficult time in the country.Myriam Renaud, Affiliated Faculty of Bioethics, Religion, and Society, Department of Religious Studies, DePaul UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2085712023-06-28T00:18:39Z2023-06-28T00:18:39ZAn unbroken covenant with God: what the Hajj means for Muslims<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534208/original/file-20230627-15-rjhwty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ashraf Amra/ AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Millions of men, women and children have converged on Mecca this week for the Hajj pilgrimage. The Saudi government says it will be the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/25/largest-hajj-pilgrimage-in-history-begins-in-saudi-arabia">largest crowd ever</a> for the pilgrimage.</p>
<p>The Hajj pilgrimage is, at its core, a pilgrimage towards God. This presents a paradox of sorts. If God is beyond time and space, then what is the purpose of travelling to a particular place? Is God not present now, everywhere? </p>
<p>The celebrated author Gai Eaton <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1398960">offers an elegant response</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Our sense of the divine Presence is blunted. We need to find it focused on a particular place and, for the Muslim, that place is the Ka'ba at Mecca, which he has faced every time he prayed and to which he now journeys in pilgrimage.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>A transformative experience</h2>
<p>Within the Islamic worldview then, the Ka’ba functions as the locus of hearts. I use the plural “hearts” here, for the pilgrimage is not only an individual religious obligation. It is a communal act that strengthens ties of kinship between Muslims in a way that resembles nothing else. </p>
<p>When the pilgrims prepare to don the Hajj attire, they discard more than their clothes. Nationality, race and socio-economic status are tossed to the wayside — prince and pauper unite as pilgrims. All distinctions are left behind. </p>
<p>The experience can be transformative, particularly for those embarking on the pilgrimage for the first time. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Female police officer welcoming Hajj pilgrims with rose petals in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534215/original/file-20230627-26-evdjnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534215/original/file-20230627-26-evdjnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534215/original/file-20230627-26-evdjnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534215/original/file-20230627-26-evdjnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534215/original/file-20230627-26-evdjnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534215/original/file-20230627-26-evdjnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534215/original/file-20230627-26-evdjnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Saudi policewoman throws flowers at Bangladeshi pilgrims as they arrive at the airport in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for the hajj this week.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Amr Nabi/ AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The renowned activist and minister Malcolm X was compelled to re-evaluate his views on race in the wake of his Hajj experience. In his <a href="https://islam.uga.edu/malcomx.html">Letter From Mecca</a>, he wrote: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>There were tens of thousands of pilgrims, from all over the world. They were of all colours, from blue-eyed blondes to black-skinned Africans. But we were all participating in the same ritual, displaying a spirit of unity and brotherhood that my experiences in America had led me to believe never could exist between the white and non-white.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Coupled with his societal reflections was an internal revolution, one that stirred his heart. In <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/malcom-x-in-mecca-2353496">his autobiography</a>, he writes: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>In my thirty-nine years on this earth, the Holy City of Mecca had been the first time I had ever stood before the Creator of All and felt like a complete human being.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/millions-of-muslims-prepare-to-perform-the-hajj-amid-calls-for-a-boycott-121618">Millions of Muslims prepare to perform the hajj amid calls for a boycott</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Road to Mecca fraught with challenges</h2>
<p>For Muslims then, the return of Hajj pilgrims to pre-pandemic numbers this year (or even surpassing them) represents another opportunity for this reorientation towards God. </p>
<p>Granted, globalisation has drawn the world closer, denting the impact of encountering people from completely different walks of life. Despite this, the Hajj pilgrimage remains unparalleled in its capacity to turn hearts, both individually and collectively.</p>
<p>All this is not to say that the experience is one of ease and comfort. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1673407059747028992"}"></div></p>
<p>If the history of the Hajj pilgrimage has demonstrated anything, it is the road to Mecca is often fraught with challenges. The most recent challenges confronting potential pilgrims have been unforeseen, drastically altering the Hajj experience. </p>
<p>The COVID pandemic saw pilgrimage to the holy sites halted for two years, with only <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2021/7/18/in-pictures-hajj-in-mecca-during-covid-pandemic">a limited number of Saudi residents</a> permitted to perform the pilgrimage. </p>
<p>As the pandemic slowly subsided, many Muslims in other countries who had waited with eager anticipation booked their travel plans. But they were met with a new complication. </p>
<h2>The struggle for getting a spot</h2>
<p>In 2022, the Saudi government announced that all those intending to perform the pilgrimage from several Western countries, including the US, UK, Australia, New Zealand and the European Union, must <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/07/01/motawif-hajj/">register through the Motawif website</a>. Those who had already made bookings were advised to immediately cancel them and register through Motawif. </p>
<p>This would place the registrant into a lottery-type system, replacing the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/7/7/a-new-hajj-booking-system-leaves-tour-operators-out-in-the-cold?traffic_source=KeepReading">Hajj travel tours</a> that had operated locally in these countries for many years.</p>
<p>The Saudi administration claimed it was trying to remove the middle man and make the Hajj travel package process smoother and more affordable. Many testimonies, however, appear to confirm the contrary. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/technology-remains-at-the-heart-of-the-hajj-206267">Technology remains at the heart of the hajj</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Registrants criticised the persistent technical failures of Motawif, and those who were lucky enough to make it to Mecca bemoaned the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/6/29/hajj-booking-system-changes-leave-many-muslims-disappointed">disorganised mess</a> that greeted them upon their arrival.</p>
<p>The Saudi claim of increased affordability was also contested. Prices for a Hajj package vary, depending on the level of luxury that the pilgrim desires during their stay in the holy cities. When factoring in all costs, however, the total <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-22/hajj-lottery-saudi-arabia-upsets-muslim-australians-pilgrimage/101169798">price for the package hovered</a> in the range of US$7,000 to $13,500 (A$10,000 to $20,000) per person. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Picture of a security officer looking at CCTV monitors in Mecca during Hajj" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534210/original/file-20230627-29-7mwt03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534210/original/file-20230627-29-7mwt03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534210/original/file-20230627-29-7mwt03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534210/original/file-20230627-29-7mwt03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534210/original/file-20230627-29-7mwt03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534210/original/file-20230627-29-7mwt03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534210/original/file-20230627-29-7mwt03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Saudi authorities have put in place a large-scale security plan to ensure the safety of the pilgrims and smooth proceedings of the Hajj.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Amr Nabil/ AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For many Muslims in the West, a more affordable Hajj package was viewed as desirable. In reality, though, prices remained high — the only difference being the Saudi government collected the profits.</p>
<p>This year, the Saudi authorities have ditched the short-lived Motawif system. Rather than operating on a lottery basis, it has now been replaced with a new <a href="https://hajj.nusuk.sa/">first-come, first-serve</a> system. Only time will tell whether this new system is feasible, or whether it will go the way of Motawif.</p>
<p>Despite these challenges, Muslims from around the world continue to flock to the Hajj. Through this ritual, they direct their hearts individually and collectively towards the Ka’ba. In doing so, they step out beyond time, linking the past and present in an unbroken covenant with God.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208571/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ali Hammoud does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Millions of men, women and children are converging on Mecca for the Hajj pilgrimage, a return to pre-pandemic numbers.Ali Hammoud, PhD candidate, Western Sydney UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2062672023-06-22T16:59:33Z2023-06-22T16:59:33ZTechnology remains at the heart of the hajj<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532431/original/file-20230616-23-novafc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=24%2C0%2C8068%2C4913&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iranian pilgrims pose for a selfie during the hajj pilgrimage in 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SaudiArabiaHajj/00c994b4debf44c18cd331df8cac397a/photo">AP Photo/Amr Nabil</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The hajj – <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-hajj-101641">the annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca</a>, Saudi Arabia, which Muslims are expected to make once in their lives if they are able – is expected to begin June 26 and last for five days. In 2023, <a href="https://www.arabianbusiness.com/abnews/hajj-2023-saudi-arabia-to-receive-2-million-pilgrims">approximately 2 million pilgrims will participate</a>, close to the annual <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/617696/saudi-arabia-total-hajj-pilgrims/">numbers of pilgrims</a> in years before the COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
<p>Their visits, like those in generations past, will be enhanced, and even made possible, by modern technology. </p>
<p>In recent years, the Saudi government has developed smartphone apps aimed at organizations of pilgrim groups. Pilgrims use apps themselves, with guides to help them find and pray at specific holy locations. And they document their journey, both physical and spiritual, on social media platforms like <a href="https://www.instagram.com/explore/tags/hajj2023/">Instagram</a> and <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/tag/hajj2023">TikTok</a>. </p>
<p>The country is rolling out <a href="https://twitter.com/MoHU_En/status/1416070942166499329">smart cards</a> for pilgrims to access hajj services and information, as well as make cashless payments.</p>
<p>And in 2022, the Saudi government established an online system by which prospective pilgrims from the U.S., Australia and Western Europe must enter a digital lottery for visas allowing them to <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-caravans-to-markets-the-hajj-pilgrimage-has-always-included-a-commercial-component-184418">make the hajj</a>. As for Muslim-majority countries, <a href="https://www.natvisa.com/saudi-arabia-blog/pilgrimage-visa-saudi-arabia">one visa is allocated</a> per 1,000 Muslims in each country. Those who are granted visas must <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-hajj-western-pilgrims-not-able-book-travel-agencies">book their travel through the Saudi government</a>, rather than through travel agencies in their home countries.</p>
<p>As those changes have occurred, news coverage about the hajj has often mentioned the technology involved, describing it as <a href="https://me.mashable.com/culture/23967/hajj-2023-expo-from-smartcards-to-ai-saudi-arabia-is-changing-the-face-of-pilgrimage-with-tech">a new phenomenon</a> that is “<a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/gulf-news/2023/01/11/hajj-expo-2023-all-you-need-to-know-about-the-pilgrimage/">transforming” the pilgrimage</a>. </p>
<p>Yet as a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=s3BLaAgAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">historian of the Middle East</a> and an expert on contemporary Islam, I know that technology has been at the heart of the hajj since the mid-1800s. Transportation and communications technologies have long been fundamental to governments’ management of the pilgrimage and to pilgrims’ spiritual experiences.</p>
<h2>Travel technology</h2>
<p>As far back as the 1850s, steamship technology made it possible for many more Muslims to make the pilgrimage even if they lived long distances from Mecca. </p>
<p>According to scholar <a href="https://daily.jstor.org/daily-author/eric-schewe/">Eric Schewe</a>, “<a href="https://daily.jstor.org/how-european-empires-helped-shape-the-hajjhow-european-empires-helped-shape-the-hajj/">European shipping lines sought Hajj pilgrims as passengers to supplement</a>” the money they made from shipping commercial cargo through the Suez Canal. By dropping off pilgrims at Arabian ports along a route their ships were already traveling, merchants were able to make a little extra income around the time of the hajj.</p>
<p>And the pilgrims appreciated the safety, speed, reliability and lower cost of steamship travel. As a result, they could reach the hajj more quickly and more cheaply than at any earlier period in history. From the 1880s to the 1930s, the <a href="https://daily.jstor.org/how-european-empires-helped-shape-the-hajjhow-european-empires-helped-shape-the-hajj">number of pilgrims going on hajj each year quadrupled</a>.</p>
<p>While steamships helped those traveling by water, rail helped those coming by land – especially those from Russia, whose multi-leg journeys often included travel by train to Odessa, in today’s Ukraine, or another Black Sea port, where they <a href="https://russia-islworld.ru/main/how-russian-muslims-went-to-the-hajj-in-the-past/">crossed to Istanbul by steamship</a> and then to Mecca via caravan. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532299/original/file-20230615-21-df5gh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A photographic panorama of a holy space." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532299/original/file-20230615-21-df5gh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532299/original/file-20230615-21-df5gh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=224&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532299/original/file-20230615-21-df5gh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=224&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532299/original/file-20230615-21-df5gh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=224&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532299/original/file-20230615-21-df5gh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532299/original/file-20230615-21-df5gh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532299/original/file-20230615-21-df5gh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘The honoured Ka‘bah and the Meccan sanctuary,’ 1880 photography by Sadiq Bey.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Khalili_Collection_Hajj_and_Arts_of_Pilgrimage_Arc.pp-0254.2.jpg">Khalili Collections via Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Communications technology</h2>
<p>The telegraph also played an important role in the hajj. The Ottoman government used its extensive telegraph network to govern and as <a href="https://trafo.hypotheses.org/30676">a sign of independence</a> from European powers; one key link was from the capital in <a href="https://www.archnet.org/sites/20029">Istanbul through Damascus, Syria, to Mecca</a>. European consular officials, rail and steamship companies and even individual pilgrims used the telegraph system for hajj-related communications.</p>
<p>Other communications technologies also affected the pilgrimage. <a href="http://cup.columbia.edu/book/imperial-mecca/9780231190770">Colonial powers with Muslim populations worried</a> that the mass gathering of Muslims would lead to political unrest. They also worried about public health. </p>
<p>The speed of rail and steam travel meant that pilgrims could bring infectious diseases home with them, as happened with the <a href="https://www.lectures.iastate.edu/lectures/pilgrims-passport-pandemics-past-mecca-and-hajj-under-quarantine-cholera-covid-19">cholera epidemics that broke out regularly</a> during the hajj in the 1800s. </p>
<p>Many governments introduced tracking regulations that relied on print technologies: The Dutch in 1825 began requiring pilgrims to get passports, while the French in 1892 began requiring Algerian pilgrims to have travel permits. The British government in 1886 gave travel agency Thomas Cook an <a href="https://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/package-tour-to-mecca-how-the-hajj-became-an-essential-part-of-the-british-calendar">exclusive contract for hajj travel from India</a>, requiring pilgrims to pre-purchase tickets for each leg of the journey. </p>
<p>Together, these regulations helped pilgrims get through the hajj safely. But they also worked to minimize its potential political and public health risks for the colonial powers that governed most of the world’s Muslim population.</p>
<h2>Into the modern era</h2>
<p>The spread of commercial air travel starting in the 1940s changed hajj dynamics further: Flying was even faster, cheaper and safer than steamship travel. It offered to further open hajj participation to more Muslims, but created massive logistical, political and economic challenges as the number of pilgrims increased six or seven times <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/0195171071.001.0001">between 1950 and 1980</a>.</p>
<p>New communications technologies further popularized the hajj. For example, radio stations covered the hajj, starting in the 1940s in Mandate Palestine, with pilgrim letters broadcast to listeners at home. Like earlier <a href="https://www.britishpathe.com/asset/251774/">cinema newsreels</a>, television from the 1960s showed viewers footage of pilgrims circumambulating or walking around the Kaaba, one of the key hajj rituals. This footage helped inspire them to want to go on hajj as well. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, growing literacy rates allowed Muslims to read the increasing number of <a href="https://www.meccabooks.com/266-handbook-for-hajj-and-umrah-9780860373407.html">printed hajj guides</a> helping them navigate lodging, eating and worship. <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/M/bo20313514.html">Contemporary hajj travelogues</a> recording pilgrims’ experiences are part of a classical genre of Middle Eastern travel literature, known in Arabic as the <a href="https://funci.org/the-emergence-of-the-rihla-or-travel-literature/?lang=en">rihla</a> or seyahetname; both terms describe books of travels that typically included pilgrimage.</p>
<p>As pilgrims <a href="https://twitter.com/shen_shiwei/status/1289250173961396224/photo/1">celebrated their ability to travel to the hajj</a> via airplane, glitches happened. In 1952, the Saudi government’s last-minute cutting a hajj entry tax encouraged thousands of additional pilgrims to fly to Beirut, where Lebanese airline companies had no seats available. Instead, the <a href="https://roadsandkingdoms.com/2014/when-uncle-sam-rolled-out-the-magic-carpet-for-hajj/">United States Air Force organized an airlift</a> that transported nearly 4,000 stranded pilgrims from Beirut to Mecca in time to make the hajj.</p>
<p>Again, communications technologies played an important role in pilgrim management. In the 1950s, <a href="https://www.papertotravel.com/MP-323/photo/5723">British-governed Malaysia</a> issued so-called “pilgrim passports,” which collected all information relevant to a pilgrim’s travel, from vaccination dates to next of kin contact information. Saudi-issued hajj visas evolved from handwritten and handstamped in the <a href="https://www.ebay.com/itm/314050359157">1970s</a> to digitally stamped, bar-coded visas by the <a href="https://www.papertotravel.com/MP-576/photo/10717">late 2000s</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532432/original/file-20230616-25-p8kviv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd of people moves through a tunnel." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532432/original/file-20230616-25-p8kviv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532432/original/file-20230616-25-p8kviv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532432/original/file-20230616-25-p8kviv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532432/original/file-20230616-25-p8kviv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532432/original/file-20230616-25-p8kviv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532432/original/file-20230616-25-p8kviv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532432/original/file-20230616-25-p8kviv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Massive numbers of people make the hajj every year, requiring significant effort for crowd control and safety.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/prospective-pilgrims-continue-their-worship-to-fulfill-the-news-photo/1241839087">Ashraf Amra/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Large numbers of travelers</h2>
<p>Historically, a tiny minority of Muslims envisioned making the pilgrimage at any point in their lives. Even today, most Muslims will never be able to go on hajj, and most who do will go only once. </p>
<p>But the <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2023/04/354870/global-muslim-population-exceeds-2-billion">global Muslim population</a> numbers just over 2 billion, so even a small fraction of their total means a lot of people. The 2 million expected on this year’s hajj are still just 0.1% of the world’s Muslims.</p>
<p>With travel and communications eased, Mecca’s ability to handle all those visitors at once has become <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/features/2023/04/03/Umrah-crowd-control-How-Saudi-authorities-are-ensuring-safety-of-pilgrims-">the major challenge</a>. The stakes are high for the Saudi Ministry of Hajj and <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-fears-put-a-halt-to-the-muslim-pilgrimage-of-umrah-but-not-yet-the-hajj-132943">Umrah</a>: It is expected to provide a safe, healthy and spiritually meaningful experience for all pilgrims, while avoiding any bad press for the host country. Umrah, known as the “lesser pilgrimage”, is recommended but not required for Muslims. It includes many of the hajj rituals but can be completed at any time of the year.</p>
<p>Now, with its own digital tools and devices in the hands of many pilgrims, the 21st century hajj fits within the longer history of technology and the hajj, a story nearly 200 years old. Even as the specific technologies have changed, their importance to the management of the hajj and to pilgrims’ spiritual experiences remains constant.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206267/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Stanton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Saudi government is using digital technology to help the hajj run smoothly and safely – the latest updates in a 200-year history of technology and the hajj.Andrea Stanton, Associate Professor of Islamic Studies & Faculty Affiliate, Center for Middle East Studies, University of DenverLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1982272023-05-16T12:40:14Z2023-05-16T12:40:14ZThe Nation of Islam: A brief history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524990/original/file-20230508-27-z0kken.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C15%2C2627%2C2021&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Malcolm X helped lead the Nation of Islam until 1964.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/black-muslim-ldr-malcolm-x-explalining-why-he-is-quitting-news-photo/50333814?adppopup=true">Truman Moore/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>May 2023 marks 98 years since the birth of civil rights leader <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s12111-020-09487-2">Malcolm X, formerly Malcolm Little</a>.</p>
<p>Malcolm X was a <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/731577#info_wrap">spokesperson for the Nation of Islam</a>, or NOI, and helped to lead the organization until he left in 1964 – the year before <a href="https://time.com/5778688/malcolm-x-assassination/">his assassination</a>. </p>
<p>The NOI, whose role in civil rights movements is a focus of <a href="https://mi.byu.edu/directory/joseph-r-stuart">my research</a>, included leaders such as Elijah Muhammad and <a href="https://scholarworks.iu.edu/iupjournals/index.php/muslimphilanthropy/article/view/5341">Louis Farrakhan</a>, who along with Malcolm X are known for their fiery rhetoric and teachings on race. </p>
<p>The NOI, which teaches a Black supremacist message and advocates for racial separatism, has also been labeled a hate group by the <a href="https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/nation-islam">Southern Poverty Law Center</a>.</p>
<p>While the organization once boasted half a million members, the group is now relatively small. Currently it has an <a href="https://www.archives.gov/research/african-americans/black-power/nation-of-islam">estimated membership of roughly 35,000</a> – but prominent NOI members, such as boxer and onetime Malcolm X friend <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17460263.2018.1474129">Muhammad Ali</a>, attracted wide public interest in the movement. Today, its influence continues to extend well beyond its membership. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/gvOAuxFCGeU?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The friendship between Malcolm X and Muhammad Ali continues to fascinate modern audiences.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Although Malcolm X – and other prominent members like Ali – left the NOI, thousands of students each year learn about the group from Malcolm X’s “<a href="https://www.wnyc.org/story/american-icons-autobiography-malcolm-x/">Autobiography</a>,” originally published in 1965. </p>
<p>Malcolm X’s influence on popular culture also remains significant. He inspired <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uKqrNu5YO6o">a Hollywood biopic</a> and is referenced in the work of artists such as <a href="https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/camerastylo/article/view/35837">Beyoncé</a>, <a href="https://youtu.be/NhvwbnB5WTo">Tupac Shakur</a> and <a href="https://genius.com/Snoop-dogg-gangsta-wit-it-lyrics">Snoop Dogg</a>, who was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/music/2009/mar/02/snoop-dogg-nation-islam">briefly associated with NOI</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/DGL2SyMd21g?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">
The legacy of Malcolm X has helped the NOI to maintain a high profile in modern popular culture. An example is ‘Master Fard Muhammad’ (official video), 2021.
</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Thanks largely to Malcolm X, the NOI is now a household name, but its teachings remain controversial, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00377996.2015.1059794">particularly among Muslims</a>.</p>
<h2>A radical alternative to Christianity?</h2>
<p>W.D. Fard, <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Islam_in_the_African_American_Experience/4XMuLWlTgjMC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=wallace+fard+peddler&pg=PA148&printsec=frontcover">a peddler by day and preacher by night</a>, established the NOI in 1931 in Detroit, Michigan. </p>
<p>He taught that God was a Black man who taught the first human beings Islam. Accordingly, Fard framed Islam as “the natural faith” for people whose ancestors came from Africa, before colonization and slavery had forced Christianity onto them. He argued that Black people should abandon Christianity in favor of Islam as their ancestral religion. </p>
<p>Fard also taught that <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=B4OrEAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT9&dq=w+d+fard&ots=vprkriaDP5&sig=A1TWVKCR2wCHWEnSqxkUQL-myCQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=w%20d%20fard&f=false">Christianity</a> was “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/mj/kjaa006">the white man’s” religion</a> and a corrupted form of Islam used to promote <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/rel11060305">white supremacy</a>. The message <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/02/16/a-brief-overview-of-black-religious-history-in-the-u-s/">appealed to Black migrants from the South</a>, who were sometimes looked down upon by Northern Black Protestants. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1964/06/29/archives/man-in-the-news-man-of-myth-and-fact-elijah-muhammad.html">Fard disappeared from the historical record</a> in the mid-1930s.</p>
<h2>Malcolm X and the NOI</h2>
<p>Malcolm X joined the NOI while incarcerated in 1952. He became an international spokesman for the group, using his fierce wit and sense of humor to debate Black and white leaders on matters of race, religion and politics. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Some of Malcolm X’s speeches continue to resonate today.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1963/12/05/archives/malcolm-x-silenced-for-remarks-on-assassination-of-kennedy-head-of.html">Malcolm X was suspended from the NOI in 1963</a> for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/film/2019/feb/19/malcolm-x-oxford-kill-me-soon-assassination-tariq-ali">his comments about President John F. Kennedy’s assassination</a>. The following year, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1964/10/04/archives/malcolm-rejects-racist-doctrine-also-denounces-elijah-as-a.html">he renounced the NOI</a>, converted to Sunni Islam, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1964/05/08/archives/malcolm-x-pleased-by-whites-attitude-on-trip-to-mecca.html">completed the hajj</a> and formed a Black civil rights organization called the <a href="https://archives.nypl.org/scm/25609#:%7E:text=The%20Organization%20of%20Afro%2DAmerican,people%20of%20the%20African%20Continent">Organization of Afro-American Unit, or OAAU</a>. This group sought to unite all Black people across the globe and conditionally accepted help from white people committed to Black freedom. The NOI, on the other hand, focused on the U.S. and refused all help from white Americans.</p>
<p><a href="https://edition.cnn.com/specials/malcolm-x">Malcolm X was assassinated</a> on February 21, 1965, during an OAAU event in New York. <a href="https://innocenceproject.org/news/branded-malcolm-xs-assassins-for-half-a-century-two-men-are-finally-exonerated-heres-why-that-matters/">The identity of his killers remains a mystery</a>. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">‘Who Killed Malcolm X?’ 2020 Netflix documentary (official trailer)</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A new era</h2>
<p>When Elijah Muhammad died in 1975, his son, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199929269.013.6">Warith Deen Mohammed</a>, transformed the NOI into the “World Community of al-Islam in the West.” He downplayed previous teachings about Black supremacy and aligned the movement closer to Sunni Islam. In 1977, however, a protégé of Elijah Muhammad’s and Malcolm X’s named Louis Farrakhan “restored” Elijah Muhammad’s Nation of Islam. Farrakhan assumed leadership of the group and emphasized Elijah’s teachings on race. </p>
<p>W.D. Fard, the NOI’s founder, and his successor Elijah Muhammad did not seem to know much about Sunni or Shiite Islam’s teachings. Fard did not cite the Quran to his followers, and Elijah Muhammad did not read the book <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/An_Original_Man/-l6BQgAACAAJ?hl=en">until after assuming the NOI’s leadership</a>. </p>
<p>As the group grew after World War II, Muhammad and other leaders became more familiar with mainstream Islamic tenets. They changed the name of their meeting places from “temples” to “mosques” and incorporated the Quran and Arabic phrases into their teachings and community organizing. </p>
<p>While the movement has changed its practices to align more closely with global expressions of Islam, many Muslims <a href="https://doi.org/10.1525/rac.2002.12.2.167">do not consider the NOI</a> part of <a href="https://doi.org/10.47175/rissj.v1i2.40">the Ummah</a>, the global community of Muslims.</p>
<h2>Not universally considered Muslim</h2>
<p>The NOI’s unique theology is one of the reasons the group is not accepted into the Ummah. </p>
<p>Other forms of Islam maintain that God is eternal, nonhuman and singularly divine. The NOI, however, teaches that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004354371_008">W.D. Fard</a> was “God in person” who called <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9809.12684">Elijah Muhammad</a> as his prophet. </p>
<p>Despite this significant deviation from mainstream forms of Islam, the NOI follows four of the five pillars of Islam: five daily prayers (salat), giving alms to the poor (zakat), pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) and a month of fasting during Ramadan.</p>
<p>NOI Muslims did not practice Ramadan until 1988, when <a href="https://noi.org/ramadan-fasting/">Farrakhan instructed members</a> to fast “with the entire Islamic world.” </p>
<h2>Changing attitudes?</h2>
<p>That change led to opportunities for intra-Muslim cooperation but also underscored the limited acceptance of the NOI that continues among many other Muslim groups. </p>
<p>For example, in 2000, NOI members prayed with <a href="https://pluralism.org/news/ramadan-helps-bring-orthodox-muslims-and-nation-islam-followers-together">Houston Muslims during</a> Ramadan, allowing the NOI to connect with other American Muslims. </p>
<p>However, these cross-Muslim events have not continued in Houston. Nor are they common elsewhere. The lack of sustained pan-Muslim events might suggest that, even when religious practice aligns, there remain obstacles to the building of relationships between mainstream and NOI Muslims. </p>
<p>While both the NOI and Malcolm X remain controversial, for many admirers X’s work has taken on <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/rhac166">new significance</a> for today’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10646175.2017.1288179">racial justice movements</a>. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Malcolm X’s legacy continues in today’s movements for racial justice.</span></figcaption>
</figure><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198227/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph R. Stuart does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The civil rights leader Malcolm X was famously part of the Nation of Islam until his break from the group in 1964. What is the history behind this small but influential religious movement?Joseph R. Stuart, Postdoctoral Fellow, Brigham Young UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2043052023-05-02T20:20:41Z2023-05-02T20:20:41ZFrench football: how Ramadan 2023 reignited the old debate over religion’s place in sport<p>Ramadan came to an end in mid-April, and it was not without controversy in the world of professional football. Should breaks be granted, for example, to allow practising players to hydrate? In a <a href="https://actu.fr/sports/football/ramadan-la-fff-refuse-que-les-matchs-de-football-soient-interrompus-pour-rompre-le-jeune_58605151.html">reminder to referees</a>, the French Football Federation (FFF) stated that stopping matches for this reason was not acceptable, in accordance with the neutrality of football and the desire to keep sports and religion separate. While the request was not explicitly put forward by the players, the international defender Lucas Digne <a href="https://www.footmercato.net/a9011806871116954734-la-prise-de-position-forte-de-lucas-digne-sur-le-ramadan">took to Instagram</a> to react to the e-mail:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“[In] 2023, we can stop a match for 20 minutes for decisions, but not [one] minute to drink water.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In England, where he plays, a different choice has been made. Whether rules are flexible or stricter, players sometimes deliberately kick the ball out of bounds to allow practising the few Muslim players to break their fast on the sidelines without interrupting the game. The goalkeeper for Tunisia, for example, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44354369">faked injury</a> during a match at sundown to enable his teammates to rush to drink water and snack on dates.</p>
<p>Recently, the coach of FC Nantes excluded a player who was observing Ramadan on a match day, specifying that the decision sought to protect both the player’s health and performance, and by extension that of the team. On the other hand, some point to the stellar performances of players like Karim Benzema who claim to observe the fast. These would be proof <a href="https://www.onzemondial.com/liga/real-madrid-benzema-booste-par-le-ramadan-la-theorie-se-confirme-827544">of the absence of negative impacts on sports performance</a>, and even of positive impacts.</p>
<p>Earlier in April, allegations of racism by Paris Saint-Germain’s coach, Christophe Galtier, also added oil to the fire. According to the former Azurian sporting director Julien Fournier, Galtier had privately complained of the number of Muslims and black players within his team. The case highlighted the extent to which the question of religion in sport is not only linked to the freedom of worship, but above all to the fight against discrimination.</p>
<p>As academics researching religious expression in the workplace, we find these events typical of contemporary French attitudes.</p>
<h2>Religious expression in the workplace: generally peaceful regulation</h2>
<p>Religious expression in the workplace refers to the demonstration of individuals’ faith in their professional context. This may involve prayers or the donning of religious symbols at the office, or requesting schedule adjustments or time off to practice. Some elements are more diffuse because their religious character is not explicitly mentioned, but they can still be identified as such by colleagues.</p>
<p>In spite of France’s culture of <a href="https://theconversation.com/frances-la-cite-why-the-rest-of-the-world-struggles-to-understand-it-149943">secularism</a>, known in French as <em>laïcité</em>, religious expression in the workplace does not tend to stir controversy. When it does, problems are usually resolved with the intervention of local management. The latter can make do with more or less defined processes within the organisation. Management is often carried out on an individual scale and aims not to transgress the rules in place in the organisation. Only a minority of cases do so and receive a quick and firm response from the hierarchy.</p>
<p>Some companies thus choose to more or less explicitly regulate religious expression in the workplace based on criteria defined by the legislature and jurisprudence, including safety, hygiene, or commercial interest. They may use internal regulations or guidelines for this purpose. However, in accordance with the principle of secularism, what prevails outside of public service missions is indeed freedom of conscience, always accompanied by freedom of worship.</p>
<h2>Religion in professional football: nothing new!</h2>
<p>The debate over football players’ faith is <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/mondial-2006/article/2006/06/15/foot-et-religion-le-meilleur-et-le-pire_783998_669420.html">old news</a>. For many years, including in the French championship, teams have been multicultural, multi-faith, and simply very diverse. Identity issues cannot remain at the door of the company, even when it takes the form of a green grass field and thousands of people pay to watch its employees work.</p>
<p>This is especially true as players have all the characteristics of what we call “high performers” or “talents”. This gives them a fairly strong negotiating power and reduces individual-organisation asymmetries. Many players celebrate their goals by referring to their beliefs or directly praising the god they pray to, for example by raising their index finger toward the sky.</p>
<p>Some players also have the habit of <a href="https://theconversation.com/liverpool-fcs-mohamed-salahs-goal-celebrations-a-guide-to-british-muslimness-93084">prostrating themselves after a goal</a>, individually or collectively, as a sign of adoration, like Liverpool star striker Mohamed Salah. There are even sports media outlets that create all-star teams based on religion.</p>
<p>Furthermore, some footballers have always invoked their faith as a source of motivation and commitment. French player <a href="https://www.la-croix.com/Sport/Olivier-Giroud-Je-suis-arme-bouclier-foi-2019-10-12-1201053809">Olivier Giroud</a> frequently cites his evangelical Christian faith as a lever for calming down and cultivating patience when sports results are not up to par. He even wrote a book about it. We have also heard of <a href="https://theconversation.com/jeunes-sportifs-dopes-au-neoliberalisme-et-a-la-religion-cherchent-avenir-meilleur-109462">“doping by religion”</a> in the football world.</p>
<h2>A complex phenomenon</h2>
<p>The recent controversies in the world of football recall the pondering of many an HR manager over how to best reconcile religious practice with jobs that might be physically and psychologically demanding. Some clubs, including in France, will elaborate plans with the players on how to manage the Ramadan period, adapting their diet and training accordingly.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.afmd.fr/manager-lexpression-religieuse-au-travail">Different case studies</a> recall some well-known elements in the management of religious practices in the workplace. First, it is important to define a rule, communicate it, ensure it is correctly carried out, and own up to it. Leaving aside the contents of the rule, in this regard the FFF has made a choice and is able to justify it, whether one agrees with it or not.</p>
<p>Second, the management of religious behaviour at work raises the question of the relationship between common rules and individual rules. Stopping the game for everyone, for example, changes the common rules of the game in favour of an individual religious rule. Waiting for players to hydrate and snack while a ball has gone out of bounds maintains the common rule while showing a collective willingness to understand particularities, give them a place, without prioritising them.</p>
<p>Excluding an employee who is fasting from the group, even if done publicly, may appear dissonant compared to other teams and contexts that adapt the practices of technical staff or dietary plans to the player’s constraints. Clubs have also issued exemptions from double training sessions to fasting players. On the one hand, individual identity allows one to break free from a collective rule, and on the other, working conditions adapt to it. Two accommodations that are not of the same nature.</p>
<p>In football, as elsewhere, the management of religious practices at work raise issues of maintaining equity among all people, whether believers or not, managing the irreversible impacts that may result from more or less reasonable accommodations, and more broadly, respecting individual beliefs and supporting them as long as they do not contravene the rules of collective functioning and the purpose of the organisation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204305/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hugo Gaillard is member of the Board of the French Association of Human Ressources Management (AGRH).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lionel Honoré collabore avec l'Institut Montaigne dans le cadre de l'Observatoire du Fait Religieux en Entreprise</span></em></p>The French Football Federation has recently ruled against breaks for religious motives. But if French players’ attitude during the 2023 Ramadan are anything to go by, the debate is far from closed.Hugo Gaillard, Maître de conférences en Sciences de gestion, Le Mans UniversitéLionel Honoré, Professeur des Universités, IAE de Brest, Université de Bretagne Occidentale, LEGO, IAE BrestLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2004072023-03-27T19:55:55Z2023-03-27T19:55:55ZWhat does ‘secularism’ mean in the Iran protests?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516992/original/file-20230322-18-mqnqty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C44%2C4980%2C3233&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iranian women protesting the death of Mahsa Amini gather outside the Iranian consulate in Istanbul, Turkey on Oct. 17, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Emrah Gurel)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/what-does--secularism--mean-in-the-iran-protests" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Since the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/events-iran-since-mahsa-aminis-arrest-death-custody-2022-10-05/">death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini in September 2022</a>, much has been said and written about the protests in Iran. Amini died while in the custody of Iran’s morality police. She was arrested for supposedly wearing her hijab incorrectly.</p>
<p>Her death triggered widespread protests against the morality police, the government and a host of other issues facing the country. A recurrent theme of discussion surrounding the protest movement has focused on its so-called secular nature.</p>
<h2>Why ‘secularism’ is problematic</h2>
<p>In December 2022 <em>TIME</em> magazine published a <a href="https://time.com/heroes-of-the-year-2022-women-of-iran/">piece written by Iranian-American writer Azadeh Moaveni</a> who characterized the uprising in Iran as educated, liberal and secular. Other commentators have pointed out that protesters have not used religious slogans. This differentiates this protest movement from previous ones. It is secular in nature and therefore, historically significant.</p>
<p>In January 2023 I attended a symposium at the University of Toronto called <em><a href="https://www.humanities.utoronto.ca/events/women-life-liberty-iran%E2%80%99s-democratic-future">Women, Life, Liberty: Iran’s democratic future</a></em> in which the protests were described by some commentators as secular. For example, in one of the panels called <em>A Charter of Rights for a Democratic and Pluralistic Iran</em>, secularism was described as one of the common demands of the Iranian people whether they joined the street protests or not.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516798/original/file-20230321-2335-blk3ma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman face away from the camera stands in front of a burning tire and raises her hand and makes a victory sign." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516798/original/file-20230321-2335-blk3ma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516798/original/file-20230321-2335-blk3ma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516798/original/file-20230321-2335-blk3ma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516798/original/file-20230321-2335-blk3ma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516798/original/file-20230321-2335-blk3ma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516798/original/file-20230321-2335-blk3ma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516798/original/file-20230321-2335-blk3ma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mahsa Amini’s death has triggered nation-wide protests in Iran against the government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Middle East Images)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These kinds of statements are meant to demonstrate the extent to which the political regime is rejected by Iranians. The assumption underpinning this narrative is that the government’s ideology stands in opposition to the secular views of most Iranians.</p>
<p>One of the most important, and challenging, narratives on secularism is the belief that European secularism is a global tendency, and that secularism is incompatible with religion. </p>
<p>In the West, secularism is closely tied to the removal of religion from public spaces, and the decline in its influence on social and behavioural practices. For example, in France, the government has created a new <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/france-launches-new-body-aiming-to-reshape-islam/a-60671015">Forum on Islam</a> to reshape Islam in the country. The forum is made up of Muslim figures handpicked by the government. Examples like these are not about a separation of the state from religion. Rather they are about increasing the state’s control over religion and religious institutions.</p>
<p>However, using the term secularism, especially in this sense, does not necessarily help us understand what is happening in Iran today. These narratives are often based on conventional meaning of secularism. Consequently, they do not necessarily resonate well with the views and demands of Iranian people.</p>
<h2>Rejecting state control of religion</h2>
<p>The protests in Iran are about rejecting the state’s regulation of religiosity in public life, and not about rejecting religion in Iranian society.</p>
<p>Narratives that put secularism against religiosity contrast with the images and chants that have emerged from the protests in Iran. In November 2022 one <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-protests-against-woman-s-death-in-hijab-case-spread-to-16-provinces-/6756363.html">video clip</a> from the protests showed women in <a href="https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/chador">chadors</a> marching on the streets chanting “Go ahead for revolution with or without hijab.” Western conceptions of secularism cannot explain images of chador-wearing women taking part in protests against the Iranian government.</p>
<p>But views on secularism in Iran vary considerably. Political scientist <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/secular-age-beyond-the-west/charles-taylors-a-secular-age-and-secularization-from-below-in-iran/35A07B00683E237A49AA7B7B97CEEE22">Nader Hashemi</a> argues that the desire for secularism has emerged within the civil society among intellectuals, Iranian youth and the urban middle class who are disillusioned with the government.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516799/original/file-20230321-2329-blk3ma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman in a face mask and sunglasses carries a sign that reads: women life freedom" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516799/original/file-20230321-2329-blk3ma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516799/original/file-20230321-2329-blk3ma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516799/original/file-20230321-2329-blk3ma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516799/original/file-20230321-2329-blk3ma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516799/original/file-20230321-2329-blk3ma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516799/original/file-20230321-2329-blk3ma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516799/original/file-20230321-2329-blk3ma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The protests in Iran are about rejecting the state’s regulation of religion and not about rejecting religion in Iranian society.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Middle East Images)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Iranian-American writer <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/iran-secular-shift-gamaan.html">Dina Nayeri</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-secular-shift-new-survey-reveals-huge-changes-in-religious-beliefs-145253">and others</a> have argued that there is a decline of religious beliefs and practices among Iranians. In other words, that Iran is undergoing a process of secularization.</p>
<p>On the other hand, <a href="https://www.mqup.ca/sacred-as-secular-products-9780228008477.php">sociologist Abdolmohammad Kazemipur</a> suggested that the state has gone through a secularization process for pragmatic reasons. He states that in post-revolution Iran, the state itself has moved to a more secular political philosophy as a pragmatic response to political pressures.</p>
<p>The types of people and groups that have been involved in the protests suggest that the movement transcends debates around secularism versus religion. The protests were sparked by the morality police’s treatment of Amini. But many <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-unions-and-civil-rights-groups-demand-democracy-and-social-justice-201422">other issues</a> have been raised by protesters including corruption, alarming unemployment, failed international policies and oppression of minorities.</p>
<p>Protests have also taken place in <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20230316-iran-s-baloch-population-lead-anti-regime-protests-six-months-after-mahsa-amini-s-death">Sistan and Baluchestan</a>, a southeastern province populated by many Sunnis. Those protests have received support from the local Sunni <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-molavi-abdolhamid-anti-establishment-sunni-cleric">Imam Molavi Abdolhamid</a>.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-secular-shift-new-survey-reveals-huge-changes-in-religious-beliefs-145253">recent study</a> shows considerable change in Iranians’ religiosity. Around 40 per cent of the participants still self-identified as Muslim and 78 per cent said they believed in God. The study also showed that 72 per cent of participants are against mandatory hijab laws.</p>
<p>Religion still remains an important dimension of Iranian life. And religious segments of Iranian society have been expressing their solidarity with the protests.</p>
<p>How can we make sense of these facts about the situation in Iran? Secularism as a label cannot fully explain the ongoing situation in Iran. Instead, the protest movement in Iran is a rejection of the state’s control over how people express their religious beliefs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200407/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roodabeh Dehghani does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Narratives that pit secular protesters against a religious regime do not necessarily explain the protests in Iran or what they are calling for.Roodabeh Dehghani, PhD candidate, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1995592023-02-22T18:23:24Z2023-02-22T18:23:24ZCSIS targeting of Canadian Muslims reveals the importance of addressing institutional Islamophobia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511508/original/file-20230221-18-jwylk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=29%2C0%2C4962%2C3330&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muslim Canadians face mass surveillance that brings entire communities under suspicion.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There has been an uproar recently among politicians who have called for the <a href="https://montreal.citynews.ca/2023/02/02/amira-elghawaby-apology/">resignation of Amira Elghawaby</a>, Canada’s first <a href="https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2023/01/26/prime-minister-announces-appointment-canadas-first-special">special representative on combating Islamophobia</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510974/original/file-20230219-332-lgmx5d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=142%2C284%2C8484%2C5458&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman wearing a hijab and glasses" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510974/original/file-20230219-332-lgmx5d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=142%2C284%2C8484%2C5458&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510974/original/file-20230219-332-lgmx5d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510974/original/file-20230219-332-lgmx5d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510974/original/file-20230219-332-lgmx5d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510974/original/file-20230219-332-lgmx5d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510974/original/file-20230219-332-lgmx5d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510974/original/file-20230219-332-lgmx5d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Amira Elghawaby was appointed as Canada’s first special representative on combating Islamophobia on Jan. 26, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Sean Kilpatrick</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The position was created in January 2023 to address the longstanding discrimination, <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2022001/article/00013-eng.htm">hate crimes</a> and intolerance faced by Muslim communities across the country. </p>
<p>In recent years, Canada has witnessed the highest number of Muslims killed in <a href="https://www.nccm.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Policy-Recommendations_NCCM.pdf">hate-motivated attacks</a> out of all the G7 countries. </p>
<p>The controversy stems over Elghawaby’s <a href="https://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/columnists/elghawaby-and-farber-quebecs-bill-21-shows-why-we-fear-the-tyranny-of-the-majority">2019 criticism</a> of Québec’s Bill 21. The law prohibits public servants from wearing religious symbols like hijabs, turbans, yarmulkes and crosses. </p>
<p>The bill has been criticized for unfairly impacting Muslim communities — <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/bill-21-impact-religious-minorities-survey-1.6541241">particularly Muslim women</a>.</p>
<p>There was also criticism of <a href="https://montrealgazette.com/news/quebec/quebec-activists-lawyers-express-support-for-embattled-amira-elghawaby">remarks Elghawaby made</a> in response to an <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-term-bipoc-is-a-bad-fit-for-the-canadian-discourse-on-race/">opinion piece</a> that said French Canadians were the largest group in Canada to be victimized by British colonialism.</p>
<p>In response, Bloc Québécois leader Yves-François Blanchet, has called on the federal government to <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-trudeau-must-drop-elghawaby-and-get-rid-of-anti-islamophobia-position/">scrap the position</a> of the special representative on combating Islamophobia altogether. </p>
<p>However, our research on the treatment of Canadian Muslim communities by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), shows how vital it is to address <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/racism-descrimination-claims-canadian-security-intelligence-service-1.6083353">institutional Islamophobia</a>.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/23326492231151587">our recent study</a> we interviewed 95 Muslim community leaders living in five major Canadian cities to learn about their experiences with CSIS. </p>
<p>This study is the first of its kind to map the anti-Muslim tactics employed by CSIS in its racialized surveillance of Muslim communities. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511510/original/file-20230221-22-v2yb4a.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Men bow in prayer at a mosque." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511510/original/file-20230221-22-v2yb4a.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511510/original/file-20230221-22-v2yb4a.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511510/original/file-20230221-22-v2yb4a.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511510/original/file-20230221-22-v2yb4a.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511510/original/file-20230221-22-v2yb4a.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511510/original/file-20230221-22-v2yb4a.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511510/original/file-20230221-22-v2yb4a.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Men pray at the Hamilton Mountain Mosque in Hamilton, Ont. Mosques have become frequent targets of surveillance by CSIS.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Cole Burston</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Muslims face mass surveillance</h2>
<p>We found that CSIS adopts specific surveillance practices that are informed by Islamophobic tropes. This works on the premise that Islam and any expression of religious devotion to it represents a potential terror suspect. </p>
<p>Consequently, CSIS engages in mass surveillance that brings entire Muslim communities under suspicion. It relies on <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/islastudj.7.2.0215">false radicalization assumptions</a> that depict Muslim communities as hotbeds of extremism that must be contained through aggressive surveillance strategies.</p>
<p>CSIS engages in mass surveillance with devastating and prolonged effects on Muslim communities. We found that mosques have been transformed into sites of surveillance rather than a safe place for religious worship and community gatherings. </p>
<p>CSIS treats mosques as sites of radicalization and incubators of extremism in order to legitimize its intensive policing and infiltration. CSIS monitors who enters and exits them, and members, especially imams, are subject to interrogation and forced to provide intelligence on their congregations. We found there is a persistent deployment of CSIS operatives at mosques. </p>
<p>Muslim youth in particular are heavily targeted by CSIS. Those who attend mosques, are involved in Muslim student organizations, attend Muslim gatherings or summer camps are frequently interrogated by CSIS, often without their parents’ permission. </p>
<p>Muslim university students who we spoke to informed us they have found recording devices in their campus prayer spaces, and had their social media scanned. The result is that Muslim youth are subjected to extreme forms of state surveillance. At the University of Toronto, faculty and lawyers have even set up a <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/csis-students-university-muslim-campus-1.5229670">support line</a> to help Muslim students and provide representation when they are contacted by CSIS. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510976/original/file-20230219-358-ztot2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An elderly man carries a placard that reads: Question authority, in front of a roadside sign that says Canadian security Intelligence service" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510976/original/file-20230219-358-ztot2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510976/original/file-20230219-358-ztot2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510976/original/file-20230219-358-ztot2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510976/original/file-20230219-358-ztot2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510976/original/file-20230219-358-ztot2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510976/original/file-20230219-358-ztot2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510976/original/file-20230219-358-ztot2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">CSIS has used mass surveillance to target and monitor Muslim Canadian communities.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(CP PHOTO/Fred Chartrand)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>CSIS relies on coercive techniques</h2>
<p>A key CSIS tactical strategy is the use of coercive techniques to pressure ordinary citizens to become informants. We were informed that CSIS threatens to show up at the workplaces of individuals who refuse to talk to them. They particularly seek out refugees or those with precarious immigration status.</p>
<p>They also use aggressive tactics such as making unannounced visits to people’s homes in the middle of night; actions that intimidated entire families, including children. We were informed that this is a common practice as individuals are unable to access legal counsel or community support at such times.</p>
<h2>Political activism targeted</h2>
<p>Those politically active and critical of the Canadian state found themselves at higher risk for interrogation. In our study, we found those who criticize state policies — particularly concerning politics in the Middle East — come under increased surveillance. </p>
<p>We were informed of the deep chilling effect this has on Muslim communities. Those we interviewed spoke about being fearful of voicing their concerns regarding state practices, as they believe this would incur CSIS surveillance. </p>
<p>This level of political suppression directly violates the <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-23/">CSIS Act</a>. This act prohibits investigation of lawful advocacy and dissent. </p>
<p>The result for Muslim communities is a culture of suspicion and internal fear. We were informed of the common suspicion that others in the community are working for CSIS. Furthermore, some concealed being approached by CSIS because they believe they could be ostracized within their own communities. </p>
<h2>Islamophobia institutionalized in Canada</h2>
<p>CSIS is just one institution that racially targets Muslims. There are a host of other counter-terrorism laws and practices that also operate to reproduce racist perceptions and assumptions about Muslims. For example, our previous research has documented how <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azz066">Canada’s no-fly list</a> and security practices at <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/canajsocicahican.41.2.165">Canadian border crossings</a> function as endemic practices of institutionalized racism. They target Canadian Muslims, exacerbate racial profiling and subject people to demeaning treatment.</p>
<p>Contrary to the demands for Elghawaby’s dismissal, our work speaks to the vital need for a special representative on combating Islamophobia and to make addressing Islamophobia an urgent priority.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199559/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Baljit Nagra receives funding from SSHRC. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paula Maurutto receives funding from SSHRC. </span></em></p>A recent study highlights how mass surveillance of Muslim communities by Canadian intelligence is based on racist stereotypes about Muslims.Baljit Nagra, Associate Professor, Criminology, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaPaula Maurutto, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1987142023-02-14T17:39:49Z2023-02-14T17:39:49ZLocal journalism is under threat at a time when communities need more inclusive reporting<p>The future of local newspapers is under threat, according to parliament’s <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/378/digital-culture-media-and-sport-committee/news/175585/more-support-needed-to-halt-damaging-decline-of-local-journalism-dcms-committee-warns/">digital, culture, media & sport committee (DCMS) report</a> released in early 2023. </p>
<p>This report into the sustainability of local journalism comes at a time when <a href="https://pressgazette.co.uk/news/trust-in-news-uk/">public trust</a> in the national media is falling, while <a href="https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/52789">online disinformation, polarisation and hatred</a> towards minorities continues to rise.</p>
<p>But my research shows <a href="https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/studentTheses/how-a-society-tells-a-story-about-itself">local journalism</a> is capable of providing an important antidote to this. And therefore it should be recognised as an essential element for nurturing our diverse, civic communities. </p>
<p><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1748048516656305?journalCode=gazb">Research shows</a> how the media can portray Muslims in disproportionately negative ways. They are often represented as the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/discourse-analysis-and-media-attitudes/8305B860E5CCFFE9918986B21FCAD15D">problematic outsider of British society</a>, often portrayed using stereotypes or as “a menace to the west”.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/documents/college-artslaw/ptr/90172-univ73-islamophobia-in-the-uk-report-final.pdf">recent survey</a> on Islamophobia in Britain found Muslims were perceived as the second “least liked” group in the UK, according to polling. <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2021-to-2022/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2021-to-2022">Home Office figures</a> released in October 2022 show how Muslims are much more likely to be the victims of religious hate crimes than any other religious group.</p>
<h2>Local journalists and community spirit</h2>
<p><a href="https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/studentTheses/how-a-society-tells-a-story-about-itself">My research</a> has shown that the local media, in particular, has the potential to provide more inclusive ways of reporting on stories involving Muslims.</p>
<p>I conducted interviews with local journalists working for newspapers in areas with relatively large Muslim populations including London and Blackburn. The results showed there were conscious efforts to ensure their reporting did not cause harm to the Muslims within the communities they served. I found that local journalists saw Muslims as an integral part of their local community rather than outsiders.</p>
<p>Muslim celebrations and festivals were covered by local journalists. Stories about terrorist incidents were featured as well as concerns of Islamophobic attacks on local Muslims. And contributions of Muslims to civic life were reported in the same way as anyone else, as were crimes or wrongdoings.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I attempt to go the extra mile in my reporting to get a more truthful picture of where the community is and the real lives of the people within it,” one local journalist told me. “For me, it’s about pushing back against the atomised bullshit that we do see coming back at us online. The reason it’s important to tell stories truthfully and accurately is to push back against this dehumanising narrative that is out there.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Of course, it would be an oversimplification if we took the experiences learned from these particular journalists and applied them to local media as a whole. But <a href="https://iupress.org/9780253221261/the-anthropology-of-news-and-journalism/">other studies</a> of local journalism have also highlighted their often distinctive newsroom cultures. Journalists and their readers are seen to be part of a <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Local-Journalism-and-Local-Media-Making-the-Local-News/Franklin/p/book/9780415379540">single community</a> with common values and goals. This closeness to the communities they serve can often translate to a more considered approach to reporting, as well as a greater reluctance to sensationalise or demonise. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003178217-3/trust-ethics-local-journalism-julie-firmstone-john-steel-martin-conboy-charlotte-elliott-harvey-carl-fox-jane-mulderrig-joe-saunders-paul-wragg">Research</a> also points to the commitment of local journalists to create a sense of community and to defend it. </p>
<h2>Threats ahead</h2>
<p>However, as the <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/378/digital-culture-media-and-sport-committee/news/175585/more-support-needed-to-halt-damaging-decline-of-local-journalism-dcms-committee-warns/">DCMS committee report</a> highlights, the landscape of local journalism is changing and not in a good way. Between 2009 and 2019, more than 300 regional newspaper titles were shut down. During the week of February 6 2023, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-64581579">it was announced</a> that three hundred employees at publisher DC Thomson will be made redundant. The company publishes newspapers including Aberdeen’s Press & Journal and The Courier in Dundee.</p>
<p>There are serious concerns in the same report that without considerable government intervention, the decline in local journalism will have a harmful impact on civic life. Communities in the most deprived areas of the UK are most likely to be affected. </p>
<p>The DCMS report shows local publishers are struggling to keep up with larger media organisations in the move towards online news services. This is leading to losses in revenues and resources. To combat this, the DCMS committee has called on the government to help local news organisations gain charitable status while providing funding to support innovation, startups and new technology. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A selection of different newspaper brands are stacked in a display." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509138/original/file-20230209-20-dn1h0z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509138/original/file-20230209-20-dn1h0z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509138/original/file-20230209-20-dn1h0z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509138/original/file-20230209-20-dn1h0z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509138/original/file-20230209-20-dn1h0z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509138/original/file-20230209-20-dn1h0z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509138/original/file-20230209-20-dn1h0z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/dolgellau-gwynedd-wales-uk-august-8-1474678949">Wozzie/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The upcoming <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/365/business-energy-and-industrial-strategy-committee/news/173840/report-consumers-at-risk-if-digital-markets-unit-not-given-teeth-say-mps/">digital markets, competition and consumer bill</a> in Westminster will be closely watched by media experts to see how it affects smaller publishers. </p>
<p>Concerns for local journalism are not just about its survival in an increasingly digital news market, however. It is more a case of recognising that nurturing a community spirit is one solution to countering wider hatred, disinformation and polarisation. </p>
<p>Research by campaigning group <a href="https://www.mediareform.org.uk/media-ownership/who-owns-the-uk-media">the Media Reform Coalition</a> shows how nearly 84% of local newspapers are now owned by just six companies. And while consolidation has been a lifeline for some newspapers, for others it risks extinguishing the close community connection that appears to be vital for the inclusive and balanced civic journalism we need.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198714/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nadia Haq receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)</span></em></p>Local journalism should be recognised as an essential element for nurturing the UK’s diverse, civic communities.Nadia Haq, ESRC Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Cardiff UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1986472023-02-06T13:27:21Z2023-02-06T13:27:21ZThe politics of blasphemy: Why Pakistan and some other Muslim countries are passing new blasphemy laws<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506698/original/file-20230126-24317-zg6pjr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=30%2C38%2C5111%2C3472&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People gather around the body of a man who was killed when an enraged mob stoned him to death for allegedly desecrating the Quran, in eastern Pakistan in February 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/PakistanBlasphemy/627a5c4fb72347f4b181cbe63397b031/photo?Query=pakistan%20blasphemy%202022&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=15&currentItemNo=13">AP Photo/Asim Tanveer</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Jan. 17, 2023, Pakistan’s National Assembly unanimously voted to expand the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-muslim-countries-are-quick-at-condemning-defamation-but-often-ignore-rights-violations-against-muslim-minorities-184624">laws on blasphemy</a>, which carries the death penalty for insulting the Prophet Muhammad. The new law now extends the punishment to those deemed to have insulted the prophet’s companions, which could include thousands of early Muslims, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/21/world/asia/pakistan-blasphemy-laws.html">with 10 years in prison or life imprisonment</a>.</p>
<p>Human rights activists <a href="https://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/amendments-to-blasphemy-laws-create-further-room-for-persecution/">are concerned that the expanded laws could target minorities</a>, particularly Shiite Muslims who are critical of many leading early Muslims. </p>
<p>Pakistan has the world’s <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Blasphemy%20Laws%20Report.pdf">second-strictest blasphemy laws after Iran</a>. About <a href="https://herald.dawn.com/news/1154036">1,500 Pakistanis</a> have been charged with blasphemy over the past three decades. In a case covered by the international media, Junaid Hafeez, a university lecturer, was <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/junaid-hafeez-pakistani-academic-given-death-sentence-for-blasphemy/a-51762475">sentenced to death</a> on the charge of insulting the prophet on Facebook in 2019. His sentence has been under <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN1YP07F?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews">appeal</a>.</p>
<p>Although no executions have ever taken place, extrajudicial killings related to blasphemy have occurred in Pakistan. Since 1990, more than <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46465247">70 people have been murdered</a> by mobs and vigilantes over allegations of insulting Islam.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/islam-authoritarianism-and-underdevelopment-global-and-historical-comparison?format=PB">My research</a> shows that blasphemy laws historically emerged to serve the political and religious authorities, and they continue to have a role in silencing dissent in many Muslim countries. </p>
<h2>Blasphemy and apostasy</h2>
<p>Of the <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Legislation%20Factsheet%20-%20Blasphemy_3.pdf">71 countries</a> that criminalize blasphemy, 32 are majority Muslim. Punishment and enforcement of these laws <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/blasphemy/index.php">vary</a>. </p>
<p>Blasphemy is punishable by death in Iran, Pakistan, <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/blasphemy/index.php#Afghanistan">Afghanistan</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/world/asia/brunei-stoning-gay-sex.html">Brunei</a>, <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Africa%20Speech%20Laws%20FINAL_0.pdf">Mauritania</a> and <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/national-laws-on-blasphemy-saudi-arabia">Saudi Arabia</a>. Among non-Muslim-majority countries, the <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Blasphemy%20Laws%20Report.pdf">harshest blasphemy laws are in Italy</a>, where the maximum penalty is two years in prison.</p>
<p>Half of the world’s 49 Muslim-majority countries have additional laws <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/29/which-countries-still-outlaw-apostasy-and-blasphemy/">banning apostasy</a>, meaning people may be <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/apostasy/index.php">punished for leaving Islam</a>. All countries with <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/29/which-countries-still-outlaw-apostasy-and-blasphemy/">apostasy laws</a> are Muslim-majority. Apostasy is often <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/blasphemy/index.php">charged along with blasphemy</a>. </p>
<p>Laws on apostasy are quite popular in some Muslim countries. According to a 2013 <a href="https://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-overview/">Pew survey</a>, about 75% of respondents in Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia favor making sharia, or Islamic law, the official law of the land. Among those who support sharia, around 25% in Southeast Asia, 50% in the Middle East and North Africa and 75% in South Asia say they support “executing those who leave Islam” – that is, they support laws punishing apostasy with death.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two firefighters stand in puddles in a burned-out between ." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Firefighters in a factory torched by an angry mob in Jhelum, Pakistan, after one of the factory’s employees was accused of desecrating the Quran, Nov. 21, 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/pakistani-firefighters-stand-in-a-burnt-out-factory-torched-news-photo/498134476?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The ulema and the state</h2>
<p>My 2019 book “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/islam-authoritarianism-and-underdevelopment-global-and-historical-comparison?format=PB">Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment</a>” traces the roots of blasphemy and apostasy laws in the Muslim world back to a historic alliance between Islamic scholars and government.</p>
<p>Starting around the year 1050, certain Sunni scholars of law and theology, called the “ulema,” began working closely with <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/V/bo5951736.html">political rulers</a> to challenge what they considered to be the sacrilegious influence of <a href="https://www.fulcrum.org/concern/monographs/s1784m135#toc">Muslim philosophers</a> on society. </p>
<p>Muslim philosophers had for three centuries been making major contributions to <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691135267/the-crest-of-the-peacock">mathematics</a>, <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/T/bo28119973.html">physics</a> and <a href="http://press.georgetown.edu/book/georgetown/medieval-islamic-medicine">medicine</a>. They developed the <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/305233/the-house-of-wisdom-by-jim-al-khalili/">Arabic number system</a> used across the West today and invented a forerunner of the modern <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674050044&content=toc">camera</a>.</p>
<p>The conservative ulema felt that these philosophers were inappropriately influenced by <a href="http://cup.columbia.edu/book/a-history-of-islamic-philosophy/9780231132206">Greek philosophy</a> and <a href="https://archive.org/stream/renaissanceofisl029336mbp/renaissanceofisl029336mbp_djvu.txt">Shiite Islam</a> against Sunni beliefs. The most prominent name in consolidating Sunni orthodoxy was the respected Islamic scholar <a href="https://fonsvitae.com/product/the-book-of-knowledge/">Ghazali</a>, who died in the year 1111.</p>
<p>In several <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/A/bo16220536.html">influential books</a> still widely read today, Ghazali declared two long-dead leading Muslim philosophers, <a href="https://fonsvitae.com/product/hardback-al-ghazali-deliverance-error-al-munqidh-min-al-dalal-works-copy/">Farabi and Ibn Sina</a>, as apostates for their unorthodox views on God’s power and the nature of resurrection. Their followers, Ghazali wrote, <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/I/bo3624354.html">could be punished with death</a>. </p>
<p>As modern-day historians <a href="https://uncpress.org/book/9780807856574/the-politics-of-knowledge-in-premodern-islam/">Omid Safi</a> and <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/al-ghazalis-philosophical-theology-9780195331622?cc=us&lang=en&">Frank Griffel</a> assert, Ghazali’s declaration provided justification to Muslim sultans from the 12th century onward who wished to <a href="https://www.iep.utm.edu/ibnrushd/">persecute</a> – even <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/as-Suhrawardi">execute</a> – <a href="https://criticalmuslim.com/issues/12-dangerous-freethinkers/abbasid-freethinking-humanism-aziz-al-azmeh">thinkers</a> seen as threats to conservative religious rule. </p>
<p>This “ulema-state alliance,” <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Islam_Authoritarianism_and_Underdevelopm/xjCdDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&bsq=%22ulema-state%22">as I call it</a>, began in the <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/V/bo5951736.html">mid-11th century</a> in <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691165851/lost-enlightenment">Central Asia</a>, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/continuity-and-change-in-medieval-persia-aspects-of-administrative-economic-and-social-history-11th-14th-century/oclc/16095227">Iran</a> and <a href="https://www.sunypress.edu/p-3207-a-learned-society-in-a-period-o.aspx">Iraq</a> and a century later spread to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/history/middle-east-history/knowledge-and-social-practice-medieval-damascus-11901350?format=PB">Syria</a>, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/muslim-cities-in-the-later-middle-ages/02685655C9C18404192B9FE3E43E75D5">Egypt</a> and <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/muqaddimah-an-introduction-to-history/oclc/307867">North Africa</a>. In these regimes, questioning religious orthodoxy and political authority wasn’t merely dissent – it was apostasy.</p>
<h2>Wrong direction</h2>
<p>Parts of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/history/european-history-general-interest/rise-western-world-new-economic-history?format=PB">Western Europe</a> were ruled by a similar alliance between the Catholic Church and monarchs. These governments assaulted free thinking, too. During the Spanish Inquisition, between the 16th and 18th centuries, <a href="https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/publication/2150452">thousands of people</a> were tortured and killed for apostasy.</p>
<p>Blasphemy laws were also in place, if infrequently used, in various European countries until recently. <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/quran-burner-denmark-facebook-blasphemy-laws-repeal-a7771041.html">Denmark</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/27/ireland-votes-to-oust-blasphemy-ban-from-constitution">Ireland</a> and <a href="https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20160714/local/repealing-blasphemy-law-a-victory-for-freedom-of-speech-says-humanist.618859">Malta</a> all recently repealed their blasphemy laws. But they persist in many parts of the Muslim world. </p>
<p>In Pakistan, the military dictator <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/opinion/pakistans-tyranny-of-blasphemy.html">Zia-ul-Haq</a>, who ruled the country from 1978 to 1988, is responsible for its harsh blasphemy laws. An ally of the <a href="https://nation.com.pk/14-Oct-2016/10-things-you-need-to-know-about-pakistan-s-blasphemy-law">ulema</a>, Zia <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/565da4824.pdf">updated blasphemy laws</a> – written by British colonizers to avoid interreligious conflict – to defend specifically Sunni Islam and increased the maximum punishment to death. </p>
<p>From the 1920s until Zia, these laws had been applied <a href="https://nation.com.pk/14-Oct-2016/10-things-you-need-to-know-about-pakistan-s-blasphemy-law">only about a dozen times</a>. Since then, they have become a powerful tool for crushing dissent.</p>
<p>Some dozen Muslim countries, including <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/29/world/iran-drops-death-penalty-for-professor-guilty-of-blasphemy.html">Iran</a> and <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/egypt-atheism-illegal-crackdown-non-believers-religion-islam-772471">Egypt</a>, have undergone a <a href="https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812264.001.0001/acprof-9780199812264">similar process</a> over the past four decades. </p>
<h2>Dissenting voices in Islam</h2>
<p>The conservative ulema base their case for blasphemy and apostasy laws on a few reported sayings of the prophet, known as hadith, primarily: “<a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Freedom_of_Religion_Apostasy_and_Islam/MrhBDgAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=apostasy+hadith+change+religion+kill&pg=PT87&printsec=frontcover">Whoever changes his religion, kill him</a>.” </p>
<p>But many <a href="https://english.kadivar.com/2006/09/29/the-freedom-of-thought-and-religion-in-islam-2/">Islamic scholars</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/14/opinion/islams-problem-with-blasphemy.html">Muslim intellectuals</a> reject <a href="https://yaqeeninstitute.org/jonathan-brown/the-issue-of-apostasy-in-islam/#.XjcRFy2ZNKN">this view as radical</a>. They argue that Prophet Muhammad never <a href="https://yaqeeninstitute.org/jonathan-brown/the-issue-of-apostasy-in-islam/#.XjcRFy2ZNKN">executed</a> anyone for apostasy, nor <a href="https://archive.org/details/MuhammadAndTheJewsAReExaminationByBarakatAhmad_201702">encouraged</a> his followers to do so. Criminalizing sacrilege isn’t based on Islam’s main sacred text, the Quran, either. It contains over <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315255002">100 verses</a> encouraging peace, freedom of conscience and religious tolerance. </p>
<p>In Chapter 2, Verse 256, the Quran states, “There is no coercion in religion.” Chapter 4, Verse 140 urges Muslims to simply leave blasphemous conversations: “When you hear the verses of God being rejected and mocked, do not sit with them.”</p>
<p>By using their political connections and <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691130705/the-ulama-in-contemporary-islam">historical authority</a> to interpret Islam, however, the conservative ulema have marginalized more <a href="https://oneworld-publications.com/progressive-muslims-pb.html">moderate voices</a>. </p>
<h2>Reaction to global Islamophobia</h2>
<p>Debates about blasphemy and apostasy laws among Muslims are influenced by international affairs.</p>
<p>Across the globe, Muslim minorities – including the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/israel/palestine">Palestinians</a> under Israeli occupation, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/10/world/europe/photos-chechen-war-russia.html">Chechens</a> of Russia, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/16/india-free-kashmiris-arbitrarily-detained">Muslim Kashmiris</a> of India, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis?gclid=CjwKCAiAsIDxBRAsEiwAV76N8zrlJqhi65w6DzRLwTrDYleM8U7DFswwKp61f3Oiav1Bq4schYpKzhoCfh4QAvD_BwE">Rohingya</a> of Myanmar and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html">Uyghurs</a> of China – have experienced persecution. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Several men and women, with faces covered, walk on a beach after being arrested." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Rohingya of Myanmar are among several Muslim minorities facing persecution worldwide. Rakhine state, Myanmar, Jan. 13, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/rohingya-people-who-were-arrested-at-sea-in-december-walk-news-photo/1193446518?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Alongside persecution are some <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-court-allows-courtroom-headscarf-ban/a-42857656">Western policies</a> that discriminate against certain Muslims, such as laws prohibiting <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/9781108476942">headscarves in schools</a>.</p>
<p>Such laws and policies can create the impression that Muslims are <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/157082/islamophobia-understanding-anti-muslim-sentiment-west.aspx">under siege</a> and provide an <a href="https://lb.boell.org/en/2012/08/15/muslim-political-theology-defamation-apostasy-and-anathema">excuse</a> for the belief that punishing sacrilege is a defense of the faith.</p>
<p>Instead, blasphemy laws have served political agendas of populist politicians and their <a href="https://www.populismstudies.org/religious-populism-and-vigilantism-the-case-of-the-tehreek-e-labbaik-pakistan/">religious supporters in Pakistan</a> and some <a href="https://religiousfreedominstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/FORIS2_Blasphemy_ONLINE.pdf">other Muslim countries</a>.</p>
<p>Moreover, these laws contribute to <a href="https://deadline.com/2014/10/ben-affleck-comes-to-blows-with-bill-maher-over-his-opinions-toward-islam-video-845912/">anti-Muslim stereotypes</a> about religious intolerance. Some of my Turkish relatives even discourage my work on this topic, fearing it fuels Islamophobia. </p>
<p>But my research shows that criminalizing blasphemy and apostasy is more political than it is religious. The Quran does not require punishing sacrilege: Authoritarian politics do.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/execution-for-a-facebook-post-why-blasphemy-is-a-capital-offense-in-some-muslim-countries-129685">piece first published on February 20, 2020</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198647/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ahmet T. Kuru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A political scientist explains the history of blasphemy laws in Muslim-majority nations and how they play a role in silencing dissent.Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1936892022-11-14T13:26:34Z2022-11-14T13:26:34ZThe veil in Iran has been an enduring symbol of patriarchal norms – but its use has changed depending on who is in power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494691/original/file-20221110-25-c211vj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=59%2C0%2C3934%2C2658&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In much of the media outside Iran, female protesters not wearing the headscarf have been highlighted as symbols of defiance.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IranProtests/61ea947c119b40ab8d64c0b1f701fe35/photo?Query=iran%20protest%20woman&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=624&currentItemNo=294">AP Photo/Middle East Images, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In images of the uprising that followed the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini on Sept. 16, 2022, perhaps the most iconic ones, aside from that of Amini herself, are those of unveiled Iranian women photographed from behind, facing police barricades or raising a fist at the scene of mass protests.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-63097629">wide use of images of Iranian female protesters</a>, without the headscarf, in the Western media highlights how the veil can often be seen as the single most important measure of women’s rights and well-being. </p>
<p>Indeed, oftentimes outside of Iran, wearing a veil is seen as oppression – and its removal as emancipation and freedom. This understanding, however, fails to take into account the veil’s broader symbolism and ignores the complex history of mandatory veiling and unveiling in Iran in the 20th and 21st centuries. </p>
<h2>Islamic Republic and the veil</h2>
<p>During the 1979 revolution, veiling became a symbol of resistance to the Pahlavi monarchy that ruled from 1925 to 1979. For many during the revolution, the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511815249">veil was a symbol of authentic national identity</a>. It was used to push back against the Westernization and erosion of Iranian values that ignited the revolution.</p>
<p>After the Islamic Republic, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, came to power, the veil became compulsory. Since then, certain forms of veiling – such as donning the chador, a cloaklike garment that covers the entire body and is required of women visiting a mosque in Iran – have come to be seen as <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/women-and-politics-iran-veiling-unveiling-and-reveiling?format">signaling affiliation with</a> or support for the Islamic Republic. </p>
<p>Less comprehensive forms of veiling, such as a rusari, or head scarf, and the knee-length tunic or coat known as a rupush, are understood as signs of minimum cooperation and potentially a rejection of the norms of the Islamic Republic. These types of veiling allow the wearer to adjust the amount of hair shown and the fit and the length of the tunic. Women accused of “bad hijab,” as Amini was, are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2014/jun/19/iran-morality-police-patrol">typically those adopting this form of veiling</a>. </p>
<p>However, in pre-1979 Iran, wearing the veil did not necessarily mean that a woman was straightforwardly “religious.” Instead, it could <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Anti-Veiling-Campaigns-in-the-Muslim-World-Gender-Modernism-and-the-Politics/Cronin/p/book/9781138687202">signal a variety of other social meanings</a>, such as being conservative, upholding traditional values or an indication of personal modesty, among others. </p>
<h2>Pahlavis and the era of modernization</h2>
<p>Indeed, four decades before the Islamic Republic was established, the Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, had forced women to remove their veils through the Mandatory Unveiling Act of 1936. </p>
<p>Pahlavi, who installed himself as king in 1925 after overthrowing the Qajar monarchy, viewed the entry of unveiled women into public spaces as an essential component of modernity, modeled on Western norms. </p>
<p>As a consequence of the 1936 act, women were prohibited from veiling in public. Refusal to comply was met with <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Making-of-Modern-Iran-State-and-Society-under-Riza-Shah-1921-1941/Cronin/p/book/9780415450959">sometimes violent enforcement</a> and removal of the offending garment. While men too were instructed to wear European-style trousers, suits and hats, it was women’s bodies that were at the nexus of these reforms. </p>
<p>Pahlavi’s complex project of modernization included reforms to law and education, and the end of gender segregation of many public spaces. The reforms offered women greater rights and protections should their husbands choose to divorce them, and opened up new educational opportunities. But Pahlavi viewed the presence of unveiled women in public space as essential to signaling these changes. </p>
<p>My book “<a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=20296">Burying the Beloved</a>” examines how ideas about women’s personhood and rights were explored during this period by novelists in Iran, particularly through stories about marriage. This era saw the publication both of the first novel by a woman and the first female protagonist in Persian fiction. Novels of this period <a href="https://www.halbanpublishers.com/a-persian-requiem">revealed social anxieties around the legal reforms</a> that gave women larger roles in society and more rights in marriage. </p>
<p>Pahlavi abdicated in 1941, during World War II, and his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who ascended the throne, adopted a more lenient attitude toward this law. He did not rescind it, but neither did he violently enforce it. At the same time, the modernity his regime promoted was signaled by a cosmopolitan secularism – <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/women-and-politics-iran-veiling-unveiling-and-reveiling?format=HB">no veiled woman</a> could hope to advance in the diverse areas of society, politics and economy patronized and controlled by the monarchy during his rule, which lasted until 1979. </p>
<p>Social and familial pressures <a href="https://upf.com/book.asp?id=9780813024714">reigned over women’s veiling</a>, accompanied by changing cultural mores facilitated by virtually wholesale adoption of Western sartorial styles, cinema and other media. </p>
<h2>Dying to show their hair?</h2>
<p>Over the past few weeks, I have repeatedly seen comments on news articles that insist, “Women in Iran are literally dying to show their hair!” But a rejection of the head scarf in the context of these protests is not a simple demand for one personal freedom.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1572596744973881344"}"></div></p>
<p>Instead, it should be understood as a rejection of many things. Protesters in Iran are pushing back against an oppressive regime that has refused to brook any dissent and has destroyed voices for reform through imprisonment, exile or death. They are also pushing back against a long history of laws, beginning before the 1979 Revolution, that have used women’s bodies as symbols of political ideology. </p>
<p>The veil that is being removed is therefore not an insistence only on the right to personal freedom and expression – though it may be that for some who are removing it – but also a rejection of patriarchal norms that have animated both the pre-revolutionary regime and the Islamic Republic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193689/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amy Motlagh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The veil as a symbol of oppression has once again moved to center stage in Iran, but it’s important to know about the history of veiling – and mandatory unveiling.Amy Motlagh, Associate Professor of Comparative Literature and Middle Eastern/South Asian Studies, University of California, DavisLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1908282022-10-05T12:19:42Z2022-10-05T12:19:42ZWhy most Muslims – but far from all – celebrate Mawlid, the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487165/original/file-20220928-14-hxq307.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=32%2C24%2C5434%2C3680&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Girls chant religious slogans while celebrating Mawlid al-Nabi in Karachi, Pakistan in 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/PakistanProphetBirthday/0a5266c2029a4e7bb44bb61387e3ec96/photo?Query=mawlid&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=76&currentItemNo=7">AP Photo/Fareed Khan</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most Muslims celebrate the birth of the Prophet Muhammad on the 12th day of the third month of the Islamic calendar, Rabi’ al-awaal – which starts on the evening of Oct. 7 in 2022. Muslims view <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/mawlid">the celebration</a>, called Mawlid al-Nabi or simply the Mawlid, like many other Islamic celebrations: as a sign of respect and adoration of Muhammad, whom they believe to be God’s messenger.</p>
<p>According to Muslim tradition, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/24846478">Muhammad was a righteous</a> man born around A.D. 570, whom God designated as his final prophet. He learned God’s message by heart and recited it. Later on, the verses were written down to preserve the text – what is now the Quran.</p>
<p>Most countries with majority Muslim populations, from Pakistan to Malaysia to Sudan, commemorate the prophet’s birthday each year. The most colorful celebrations are carried out <a href="https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/4/34296/Why-is-Mawlid-al-Nabi-celebrated-with-Arouset-El-Moulid">in Egypt</a>, with Sufi <a href="https://sufischool.org/practices/dhikr.html">dhikr poetry</a> commemorating the prophet, and games, toys and colorful sweets given to kids. </p>
<p>Yet not all Muslims will mark the holiday. In a few countries, like Saudi Arabia, it’s just like any other day. The focus of <a href="https://www.uml.edu/fahss/political-science/faculty/abdelkader-deina.aspx">my research</a> is how Muslim societies relate to their faith, including their sense of <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/43953977">social justice</a> and their expectations of governments. While most Muslim countries encourage commemorating the Mawlid, the opposite is true in communities shaped by the ultra-conservative Wahhabi school of Islam, whose <a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-arabias-influence-in-southeast-asia-too-embedded-to-be-disrupted-106543">global influence</a> has rapidly expanded in recent decades.</p>
<h2>Wahhabi disapproval</h2>
<p>The Wahhabi movement <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saud/cron/">was started in 1744</a> by Muhamed Ibn Abdel Wahab, a religious scholar and reformer in what is today Saudi Arabia. Muhamed Ibn Saud, a political leader considered the founder of the Saud dynasty, legitimized his authority by <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/wahhabi-islam-9780195169911?cc=us&lang=en&">seeking Ibn Abdel Wahab’s religious opinions</a>. Ibn Saud was eager to wrest more power from the Ottoman Empire, which controlled much of the peninsula at the time.</p>
<p>Since then, Wahhabism has <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197532560.001.0001">spread across the Muslim world</a> in countries such as Yemen, the post-Soviet states, Tunisia and Egypt – especially after <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/24/the-iranian-revolution-a-timeline-of-events/">the 1979 Iranian Revolution</a>, which spurred Iran’s rise as a regional power and prompted Saudi Arabia to <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/history-saudi-iranian-competition">try and compete</a>.</p>
<p>An austere school of Islam, Wahhabism often encourages the literal interpretation of the Quran and is especially suspicious of any practices they see as idolatry. For example, Saudi authorities have <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB109278623272594322">clamped down</a> on worship at saints’ tombs and razed some holy sites entirely. In extreme cases, Salafis – a related school of Islam – have claimed that the relics and statues of ancient Egypt <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/15/egyptian-idol/">should be destroyed</a>. In Saudi Arabia, the religious police, called mutaween, guard the prophet’s burial grounds in Medina during pilgrimage seasons to prevent visitors from touching it or praying close to it.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Men look at an ornately decorated shrine inside a mosque as security officers stand nearby." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487871/original/file-20221003-1006-fdyz1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487871/original/file-20221003-1006-fdyz1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487871/original/file-20221003-1006-fdyz1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487871/original/file-20221003-1006-fdyz1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487871/original/file-20221003-1006-fdyz1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487871/original/file-20221003-1006-fdyz1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487871/original/file-20221003-1006-fdyz1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Muslims visit the burial chamber of the Prophet Muhammad at Masjid al-Nabawi in Medina, Saudi Arabia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/muslims-visit-the-rawdah-mubarak-burial-chamber-of-prophet-news-photo/1241939037?adppopup=true">Ashraf Amra/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Conservatives frown upon adoration of the prophet. Wahhabi puritans consider the Mawlid heretical, citing a saying of the prophet, called a hadith: Every heresy is a misguidance, and every misguidance will end in hell. The word for “heresy” here, “bid'ah,” is often used to condemn Muslim practices <a href="https://www.almasjid.com/content/dangers_innovations_islam_bid%E2%80%99ah">seen as innovations</a>, like celebrating the prophet’s birthday.</p>
<h2>Celebrating with awe</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2002-09-01/wahhabism-critical-essay">Critics of Wahhabism</a> argue that it compromises people’s relationship with God by cutting off instinctual human behavior, like wanting to honor a prophet.</p>
<p>As opposed to the literal and conservative focus on the oneness of God, which Wahabis emphasize, most Muslims <a href="https://www.patheos.com/blogs/altmuslim/2012/02/prophet-muhammad%E2%80%99s-birthday-to-celebrate-or-not-to-celebrate/">observe the prophet’s birthday</a> as <a href="https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/34904/Why-do-Muslims-celebrate-Mawlid-al-Nabawi">a sign of love</a>, respect and awe.</p>
<p>The Mawlid is celebrated in many ways and forms in the Muslim world, whether it is quietly observed by fasting and reading the Quran, or by kids dressing up in bright colors and getting a tiny horse or a doll made out of sugar. The practices vary, but the one thing they articulate are the admirable qualities of the prophet and how dear he is to his followers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190828/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Deina Abdelkader does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Wahhabi school of Islam has spread throughout the world, along with its disapproval of the holiday.Deina Abdelkader, Associate Professor of Political Science, UMass LowellLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.