tag:theconversation.com,2011:/es/topics/nord-stream-2-106392/articlesNord Stream 2 – The Conversation2022-10-06T16:46:28Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1920592022-10-06T16:46:28Z2022-10-06T16:46:28ZUkraine recap: bad news from the battlefield for Putin, renewed nuclear threats from Russia<p>Vladimir Putin had barely finished his speech last Friday welcoming four new regions into Mother Russia, when his mouthpiece, Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov admitted that they didn’t actually know where the borders of these regions were. “We will clarify everything today,” he said, when quizzed as to whether Russia was laying claim to those parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions still under Ukrainian control.</p>
<p>But Putin and his advisers are no clearer now as to how much of their neighbour’s land they have claimed than they were a week ago. The stunning success of Ukraine’s counteroffensives in the south and east have pushed Russian troops out of thousands of square kilometres of territory, in the process taking large numbers of prisoners and capturing huge amounts of Russian military equipment.</p>
<p>Precious Chatterje-Doody, who researches politics and international affairs at the Open University, believes the sham referendums and annexations were as much for <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putin-announces-annexation-of-four-regions-but-his-hold-on-them-may-be-flimsy-191641">domestic consumption</a> as anything else. Support for the war in Russia, despite what polling might suggest, appears to be waning – particularly since the Kremlin announced its partial mobilisation last month. You’ve only got to look at the numbers of military-age Russians flooding across the borders of neighbouring countries to see that the urge to risk life and limb for the motherland is not exactly irresistible for many. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putin-announces-annexation-of-four-regions-but-his-hold-on-them-may-be-flimsy-191641">Ukraine war: Putin announces annexation of four regions, but his hold on them may be flimsy</a>
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<p>For the Russian president, bad news on the battlefield has been compounded by political pressure from the right wing. There has been growing criticism of the way Putin has been conducting the campaign, which many feel should have long ago been upgraded from “special military operation” to all-out war.</p>
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<p>Jules Sergei Fediunin, a political scientist at the Raymond Aron Centre for Sociological and Political Studies in France, <a href="https://theconversation.com/has-vladimir-putin-been-outflanked-by-the-russian-far-right-191781">has identified</a> some of the prime movers in Russia’s far-right, who range from military veterans, to ultra-nationalists to the increasingly visible military bloggers (<em>milbloggers</em>). These people represent an increasingly powerful tendency in Russian politics, writes Fediunin – and it’s uncertain to what extent Putin will be able to keep them onside.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/has-vladimir-putin-been-outflanked-by-the-russian-far-right-191781">Has Vladimir Putin been outflanked by the Russian far right?</a>
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<p><strong><em>This is our weekly recap of expert analysis of the Ukraine conflict.</em></strong>
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<h2>Nuclear sabre rattling</h2>
<p>Another of Putin’s allies who has been urging an escalation in Ukraine is the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, who is urging the Russian president to make good on his threat to defend Russia with “all available means” at their disposal, meaning tactical nuclear weapons. The Russian leadership has hinted several times over the past seven months that it might be prepared to resort to its nuclear arsenal if it feels there is an existential threat to Russia. And, since the annexations, fighting is mainly taking place on what the Kremlin considers to be Russian soil.</p>
<p>As Christoph Bluth of the University of Bradford <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-the-biden-administration-is-responding-to-putins-threats-to-go-nuclear-191889">notes here</a>, the US and Nato have taken pains to play down these threats as so much bluster. But the US secretary of defense, Lloyd Austin, recently revealed that Washington had “been war-gaming” its response. Bluth has looked into a variety of ways in which Russia might deploy its nuclear arsenal and talks us through the possible US response. We must hope that cool heads prevail on both sides of the Atlantic.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-the-biden-administration-is-responding-to-putins-threats-to-go-nuclear-191889">Ukraine war: how the Biden administration is responding to Putin's threats to go nuclear</a>
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<p>Coincidentally, we’re not far off the 60th anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis, 13 days during which the world stood on the brink of nuclear war after Russia deployed medium-range nuclear missiles to Cuba and the US blockaded the island and demanded their removal. The crisis deepened after Soviet anti-aircraft missiles shot down a US spy plane over Cuba.</p>
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<p>The crisis pitted a relatively inexperienced US president, John F. Kennedy, against a hardheaded Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, both of whom were reportedly under pressure to escalate from influential hawks in their respective administrations. Tom Vaughan, who researches nuclear politics at Aberystwyth University, <a href="https://theconversation.com/nuclear-war-does-it-take-luck-or-reasoning-to-avoid-it-lessons-from-the-cuban-missile-crisis-60-years-on-191239">recounts the crisis</a> and draws parallels with today’s situation.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/nuclear-war-does-it-take-luck-or-reasoning-to-avoid-it-lessons-from-the-cuban-missile-crisis-60-years-on-191239">Nuclear war: does it take luck or reasoning to avoid it? Lessons from the Cuban missile crisis, 60 years on</a>
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<h2>Away from the battlefield</h2>
<p>With his eyes firmly on the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing in about ten days, the last thing Xi Jinping must want is to become embroiled in nuclear brinkmanship in Europe. Xi has consistently backed Putin, but has tempered his position with a degree of ambiguity, simultaneously refusing to condemn Russia’s actions while at the same time restating his firmly held position on the sanctity of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.</p>
<p>The University of Birmingham’s Stefan Wolff and Tatyana Malyarenko of the National University Odesa, believe that Xi’s support for Putin is finite, with one of the main red lines being any use of nuclear weapons on Russia’s part. For Xi, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-chinas-lukewarm-support-for-russia-is-likely-to-benefit-kyiv-heres-why-191790">increasing asymmetry of the two countries’ relationship</a>, in which Russia is increasingly the junior partner, is not such an undesirable outcome. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-chinas-lukewarm-support-for-russia-is-likely-to-benefit-kyiv-heres-why-191790">Ukraine war: China's lukewarm support for Russia is likely to benefit Kyiv – here's why</a>
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<p>Meanwhile the perpetrator of what looks likely to have been deliberate sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea remains unclear. But the episode is a sobering pointer for the damage that could be done by a mischievous power bent on wreaking real havoc with vital infrastructure. </p>
<p>As Christian Bueger, a professor of international relations at the University of Copenhagen, points out, this raises the question of the vulnerabilities of European pipelines, electricity and internet cables. This, says Bueger, appears to be what is known as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/nord-stream-pipeline-sabotage-how-an-attack-could-have-been-carried-out-and-why-europe-was-defenceless-191895">“grey-zone” attack</a>, so called because it could either have been perpetrated by a rogue state or by a group acting indirectly on behalf of state interests. What makes it all the more tricky is that it’s the first carried out underwater, where at present there is little surveillance in place. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/nord-stream-pipeline-sabotage-how-an-attack-could-have-been-carried-out-and-why-europe-was-defenceless-191895">Nord Stream pipeline sabotage: how an attack could have been carried out and why Europe was defenceless</a>
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<h2>The trouble with conscription</h2>
<p>We mentioned earlier that some of Putin’s right-wing allies want him to double down on the war and call for mass mobilisation, which implies a general conscription of fighting-age men. This has rarely been a popular move, particularly when the cause is not an existential one as it was for many of the allied countries in the second world war. </p>
<p>And it appears that nobody is immune to a degree of cynicism when it comes to making hard political choices as to who to send off to risk life and limb. Kevin Fahey, a political scientist at the University of Nottingham, has analysed archival information about how the US conducted conscription in the second world war. He reveals that the Democratic Roosevelt administration <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-what-the-history-of-wwii-conscription-shows-us-about-who-gets-sent-to-the-front-lines-191607">systematically rigged</a> the call up to favour their party at the next election, taking fewer conscripts from swing states where sending people’s boys off to fight might have boosted the chances of their Republican rivals. <em>Plus ça change,</em> you might say.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-what-the-history-of-wwii-conscription-shows-us-about-who-gets-sent-to-the-front-lines-191607">Russia: what the history of WWII conscription shows us about who gets sent to the front lines</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a weekly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192059/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Some of the key articles from our coverage of the war in Ukraine over the past week.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1917642022-10-05T02:09:05Z2022-10-05T02:09:05Z‘Hybrid warfare’: Nord Stream attacks show how war is evolving<p>It’s not yet clear who carried out the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/qa-nord-stream-gas-sabotage-whos-being-blamed-why-2022-09-30/">attacks on the Nord Stream gas pipelines</a> in the Baltic Sea last week, although many Western nations are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/oct/01/truss-nord-stream-gas-pipeline-russia-damage-sabotage">suspicious</a> it was an act of sabotage by Russia.</p>
<p>What is clear is that the ruptures have added to already heightened tensions and an impending energy crisis in the region.</p>
<p>While further investigations are required, if Russia was behind such sabotage, we can view it as an evolution of “hybrid warfare”, because it would highlight how the energy sector and critical infrastructure can be strategically targeted as an unconventional warfare method.</p>
<p>If the damage to Nord Stream is deemed to be a deliberate act of sabotage, there will likely be an escalation in the regional conflict.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/nord-stream-leaks-where-will-europe-get-its-gas-from-now-191529">Nord Stream leaks: where will Europe get its gas from now?</a>
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<h2>What is hybrid warfare?</h2>
<p><a href="https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/irc_97_900-1.pdf">Traditionally</a>, war was conducted on a battlefield, between two states in a defined territory. This is no longer the case. As technology has become more advanced, and the enemy more sophisticated, states have moved further away from this traditional warfare style. </p>
<p>Now warfare is conducted across multiple battle domains: air, land, sea, space and through cyberspace, and often simultaneously. </p>
<p><a href="https://jmss.org/article/view/73754">Hybrid warfare</a> refers to newer and more unconventional methods of fighting a war. It can occur across the political, economic and civil spheres, often blending several warfare tactics.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-hybrid-warfare-and-what-is-meant-by-the-grey-zone-118841">Explainer: what is 'hybrid warfare' and what is meant by the 'grey zone'?</a>
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<p>Hybrid warfare blurs the lines between conventional and unconventional warfare, as well as the <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/ihls/7/1/article-p63_4.xml?language=en">distinction</a> between times of peace and war. As stated by <a href="https://ung.edu/institute-leadership-strategic-studies/_uploads/files/bachmann-gunneriusson-hybrid-wars-16-sep-2016-scientia-militaria.pdf">NATO</a>, hybrid warfare can include a variety of tactics such as terrorism, migration, piracy, corruption and ethnic conflict.</p>
<p>While hybrid warfare isn’t a new concept, advances in technology have allowed hybrid strategies to be executed in new ways, such as <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2670527">cyber attacks</a> and information warfare.</p>
<p>Many commentators are concerned Russia or other states with similar military capabilities could <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-threat-to-undersea-internet-cables/">attack underwater internet cables</a>.</p>
<p>It’s therefore understandable why some European politicians are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/28/nord-stream-blasts-hybrid-war-eu-russia-sabotage">claiming</a> that if such critical energy infrastructure has been sabotaged, this would herald a new stage of hybrid warfare.</p>
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<p>The recent development of new underwater technology, such as autonomous underwater drones, could also feasibly be utilised to achieve military goals. Such hybrid warfare strategies being employed in maritime zones will likely lead to further discussion on the applicability of the international law of the sea.</p>
<p>It’s important to note we’re not saying who we think caused the Nord Stream damage. We simply want to highlight that if a state or non-state actor were to be found responsible, such an incident could be considered an act of hybrid warfare.</p>
<h2>Energy as a weapon</h2>
<p>The extent of the damage to the Nord Stream pipelines, which carry natural gas from Russia to Europe, could exacerbate the already vulnerable situation of Europe’s energy crisis.</p>
<p>Controlling and targeting natural resources for military gain has occurred in several past conflicts. For example in Syria, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2018.1433469">Islamic State controlled an oil refinery</a> and surrounding territory, thereby <a href="https://jmss.org/article/view/73754/55220">sustaining</a> their financial model.</p>
<p>Also, the resultant ecological impact of the damaged Nord Stream’s gas emissions is reminiscent of an incident in the first Gulf War when <a href="https://magazin.nzz.ch/nzz-am-sonntag/international/der-krieg-in-der-grauzone-ld.1705413">Saddam Hussain deliberately</a> destroyed oil fields and platforms to create an ecological hazard.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-vladimir-putin-uses-natural-gas-to-exert-russian-influence-and-punish-his-enemies-162413">How Vladimir Putin uses natural gas to exert Russian influence and punish his enemies</a>
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<h2>A false flag operation?</h2>
<p>But the damage caused to Nord Stream isn’t within the boundaries of a territory where a conflict is occurring. It has happened in the international waters of the Baltic Sea, just outside the boundaries of the exclusive economic zones of Germany, Denmark, Poland and Sweden. It’s this feature of the incident that shows how hybrid warfare strategies have evolved – specifically how such tactics don’t need to remain in the conflict zone itself.</p>
<p>Indeed, the Nord Stream incident wasn’t an attack on Western or NATO states’ territories directly. As such, these are hallmarks of a “<a href="https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/09/nord-stream-leaks-underline-gray-zone-risks/377701/">grey zone</a>” act – coercive tactics which don’t meet the threshold of conventional military warfare.</p>
<p>If Russia is responsible, it could also be understood as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-are-false-flag-attacks-and-could-russia-make-one-work-in-the-information-age-177128">false flag operation</a>. A false flag attack is one in which the actor aims to <a href="https://magazin.nzz.ch/nzz-am-sonntag/international/der-krieg-in-der-grauzone-ld.1705413#back-register">pin blame for the incident on an adversary</a>, and to distort and weaken the opponent’s military cohesion. Such an operation would result in disinformation and could be used to trigger further military action. </p>
<p>It’s interesting to note that Putin has blamed the Nord Stream attacks <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-spy-chief-says-moscow-has-evidence-west-behind-sabotage-nord-stream-2022-09-30/">on the United States</a>, and the Russian ambassador to the United Nations said last week the US has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-has-much-gain-nord-stream-damage-russia-says-un-2022-09-30/">much to gain</a> from the explosions.</p>
<p>Such an approach would likely aim to weaken the West’s <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/09/15/vladimir-putins-war-is-failing-the-west-should-help-it-fail-faster">cohesion</a> and willingness to continue supporting humanitarian and military efforts in the region.</p>
<p>Whoever the perpetrator is, such actions send a clear signal to the rest of the world as to the power, reach and willingness to cause disruption beyond the traditional boundaries of a conflict zone.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191764/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sascha-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann received funding from the Australian Department of Defence for research regarding grey zone and information operations targeting Australia. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meredith Primrose Jones does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If the Nord Stream attacks were an act of sabotage, this shows how energy infrastructure can be strategically targeted as an act of ‘hybrid warfare’.Meredith Primrose Jones, Researcher - Oceania Cyber Security Centre; Researcher - Centre for Cyber Security Research and Innovation, RMIT UniversitySascha-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann, Professor in Law and Co-Convener National Security Hub (University of Canberra) and Research Fellow (adjunct) - The Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University- NATO Fellow Asia-Pacific, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1915292022-09-30T17:23:04Z2022-09-30T17:23:04ZNord Stream leaks: where will Europe get its gas from now?<p>Accusations continue to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/sep/27/nord-stream-1-2-pipelines-leak-baltic-sabotage-fears">fly</a> about the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/sep/28/nord-stream-methane-gas-leaks-may-be-biggest-ever-with-warning-large-climate-risk">cause of major leaks</a> from the two Nord Stream pipelines transporting gas through the Baltic Sea from Russia to Europe. </p>
<p>Until this latest development, Russia had maintained that western sanctions were behind disruptions to supply from the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, as maintenance and repair of essential equipment could not proceed. The German company Siemens that supplied the equipment maintains that this <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/nord-stream-supplies-halted-germany-siemens-dispute-russia/32017225.html">isn’t the case</a>. Politicians across Europe have accused Russia of blackmail and of weaponising the supply of natural gas.</p>
<p>Whatever the truth, most of Europe will now have to face winter 2022, and likely beyond, without any Russian pipeline gas. The EU is determined to end its reliance on Russian gas <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_3131">as soon as possible</a>, a process that might be accelerated by current events. </p>
<p>The next two winters are going to be very challenging for all of Europe’s gas consumers: households, businesses and industry. But moves are in play that will fundamentally change the continent’s position in global gas markets.</p>
<p>In the past, Europe played a balancing role: a place where liquefied natural gas (LNG) cargoes were sent, normally in the summer months, when demand was low in Asia. As such, LNG was marginal in European gas security relative to Russian pipeline gas. </p>
<p>If, by 2027, Europe no longer imports Russian gas of any kind, then it will have to compete with Asia as a centre of demand. How long it will take for the LNG market to increase supply to meet Europe’s new demand is unclear, but the global market will rebalance as a result.</p>
<h2>A bleak winter ahead?</h2>
<p>Russia supplied around <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/58888451">40%</a> of all the gas consumed in the EU in 2021. Germany is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/21/how-reliant-is-germany-and-europe-russian-gas-nord-stream">especially reliant</a> on this supply of cheap gas. Gas only generates about 15% of the country’s electricity but many rely on it for heating and it is vital to heavy industries such as <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/german-gas-policy/">petrochemicals</a> that use a lot of energy. </p>
<p>Drastic measures are now necessary to secure alternative supplies, reduce gas demand and prepare for the possibility of shortages this winter. The EU’s <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_4608">Save Gas for a Safe Winter</a> programme aims to reduce overall gas demand by 15% across the bloc this winter by asking people to turn down thermostats in homes and offices, for example. Further measures are expected in the coming days.</p>
<p>The good news for supply to Europe is that its other sources of pipeline gas – Norway, North Africa and Azerbaijan – are all flowing normally. Winter storage is over 80% full, which is well ahead of the EU’s deadline to hit this milestone by the <a href="https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/oies-podcast-series-impact-of-russia-ukraine-war-on-energy-markets-series-19/">end of October</a>. Europe’s ability to get through the winter without a gas supply crisis will depend in large part on the weather: not just how cold it is, but also how sunny and windy, as gas backs up renewable power generation in many countries. </p>
<p>Otherwise, Europe needs to attract flexible LNG cargoes to Europe (that is, supplies that are not tied into long-term contracts which dominate in Asia). EU member states and members of the European Economic Area are expected to import 41 billion cubic metres more LNG than in 2021, covering 67% of the expected drop in <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e192f020-d53e-4a0f-9e17-301d44eadcff?shareType=nongift">Russian imports</a>. </p>
<p>This remarkable progress was aided by China’s LNG demand falling almost 25% this year compared to last due to its zero-COVID policy and the slowdown in its economy. Nevertheless, this still leaves a significant supply gap and there are <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e192f020-d53e-4a0f-9e17-301d44eadcff?shareType=nongift">warning signs</a> of growing competition from other parts of Asia for winter LNG supplies. </p>
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<img alt="The blue pilot light inside a white gas boiler." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487508/original/file-20220930-24-nhfo3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487508/original/file-20220930-24-nhfo3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487508/original/file-20220930-24-nhfo3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487508/original/file-20220930-24-nhfo3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487508/original/file-20220930-24-nhfo3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=605&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487508/original/file-20220930-24-nhfo3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=605&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487508/original/file-20220930-24-nhfo3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=605&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A cold winter would be calamitous for households already struggling to afford heating.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/blue-fire-burning-gas-nozzle-water-234004252">Anton Kudelin/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>All hands on deck</h2>
<p>To ensure this gas can be imported, however, Europe needs better LNG infrastructure (the terminals that unload LNG from ships, store it and then convert it to a gas that is injected into pipelines that carry it to consumers). It is currently running beyond full capacity due to congestion everywhere: gas is held up by full pipelines, which causes <a href="https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/oies-podcast-series-impact-of-russia-ukraine-war-on-energy-markets-series-19/">short-term fluctuations</a> in local gas prices. </p>
<p>Global LNG shipping capacity is also <a href="https://www.freightwaves.com/news/lng-shipping-rates-top-100000day-oil-tanker-rates-still-rising">stretched</a>, and rates for hiring an LNG tanker to ship gas to Europe are topping US$100,000 (£90,173) a day – a 60% rise in the last month.</p>
<p>All around Europe’s coasts new LNG import terminal projects are being planned. One industry analysis suggests that the EU total import capacity could <a href="https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2350499-europe-eyes-42pc-rise-in-lng-import-capacity-by-2026">increase by 42%</a> by 2025. But it takes time to build these permanent LNG terminals. In the meantime, Europe has been busy leasing floating regasification and storage units – large ships that are moored and unload the LNG from specialist carriers and convert it into gas for pipelines.</p>
<p>The same industry analysis suggests that Europe’s import capacity will grow faster than additional LNG supplies, resulting in increased competition and a tight market for the next few years. Certainly, Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz has been on <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-28/uae-is-finalizing-deal-to-send-six-more-lng-cargoes-to-germany?sref=PF2RkEmW">a whistlestop tour</a> of LNG-exporting countries like the United Arab Emirates to fill his new terminals. </p>
<p>Fortunately, by 2026-27, there will be a wave of new LNG supply to fill these terminals as production expands in Qatar and new projects come onstream in the US. The current crisis is also prompting new investments, particularly in the US, and the industry is even talking about <a href="https://www.woodmac.com/news/editorial/what-will-the-gas-market-look-like-in-a-net-zero-world/">a danger of oversupply</a> by the end of the decade.</p>
<p>But the EU doesn’t just want to pivot away from Russian gas, it is seeking to drive down gas demand by accelerating its deployment of renewable power, improving the energy efficiency of its building stock, electrifying domestic heating and finding alternatives to gas use in industry, such as hydrogen. This means that Europe’s LNG needs may well peak by the end of the decade, contributing to global oversupply. </p>
<p>The natural gas industry hopes that Asia will then pick up the slack, but that is by no means certain. Europe’s response to the current gas crisis may mean that by 2030 it is consuming far less gas than might otherwise have been the case and that it is further down the road to meeting its climate change targets, as well as improving its energy security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191529/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Bradshaw receives funding from UKRI to support his participation in the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) and the NERC-ESRC research programme on Unconventional Hydrocarbons. He consults with international energy companies and NGOs and is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.</span></em></p>Pipeline rupture may cause EU gas demand to peak sooner than expected.Michael Bradshaw, Professor of Global Energy, Warwick Business School, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1752682022-03-22T15:27:54Z2022-03-22T15:27:54ZWhy Russian gas could disrupt Germany’s plan for a bolder climate agenda<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453619/original/file-20220322-27-13wepld.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C5799%2C3370&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A coal power plant in Niederaussem, Germany.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Markue / shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After 16 years under conservative Angela Merkel, Germany gained new leadership late last year. Following a “climate election” that saw the issue surpass COVID-19 as voters’ <a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2021/09/24/the-climate-has-overtaken-covid-19-as-german-voters-top-concern">top concern</a>, Europe’s largest economy is now ruled by a progressive three-party “Alliance for Freedom, Justice and Sustainability” comprising Social Democrats, Greens and Liberals.</p>
<p>This is the first time the Greens have shared power since 1998-2005, years that saw the acceleration of the “Energiewende” (energy transition), a trailblazing project that has stalled over the past decade. With the party’s co-leaders heading both the foreign ministry and a new economy and climate “super ministry”, many expect Germany to step up efforts to once again lead on climate change and turbocharge the national Energiewende.</p>
<p>Likewise, there are high hopes for Germany’s new chancellor, Social Democrat Olaf Scholz. As Hamburg mayor, he brought that city’s energy grids back under municipal control to promote renewables following a popular referendum - despite initially opposing the idea - displaying a pragmatic approach to green policymaking. With such figures now at the levers of power, a bolder climate plan appears possible. </p>
<p>Toward that end, the new government approved an ambitious agenda, including objectives by <a href="https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/future-german-governments-key-climate-and-energy-plans-2021-coalition-treaty">2030</a> to phase out coal (eight years earlier than envisioned under Merkel), achieve 80% renewable electricity (up from the prior 65% goal), earmark 2% of land for onshore wind, and achieve 50% climate-neutral heating. It has also set big targets on electric vehicles, train electrification, green hydrogen and rooftop solar, with the overall aim of reaching climate neutrality by 2045.</p>
<h2>“The bridge has collapsed”</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-invasion-2022-117045">Russia’s invasion of Ukraine</a> has made all of this significantly harder to achieve. Germany’s energy transition has for years been predicated on the notion of Russian gas as a “bridge fuel” between a coal-powered past and renewable future, yet supply and sanctions-related concerns linked to the conflict are challenging this strategy. According to climate state secretary <a href="https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/emissions-45-2021-after-pandemic-slump-transport-and-heating-fail-targets">Patrick Graichen</a>, “the bridge has collapsed” as a result of the war in Eastern Europe, which “has broken the narrative of natural gas as a bridging technology”. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453624/original/file-20220322-24-15tzaa3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Nord 2 pipeline" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453624/original/file-20220322-24-15tzaa3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453624/original/file-20220322-24-15tzaa3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453624/original/file-20220322-24-15tzaa3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453624/original/file-20220322-24-15tzaa3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453624/original/file-20220322-24-15tzaa3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453624/original/file-20220322-24-15tzaa3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453624/original/file-20220322-24-15tzaa3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nord Stream 2 construction is complete, but the pipeline remains idle.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Frame Stock Footage / shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Greens’ participation in government has further undermined the prospect of natural gas as a bridge fuel. The natural gas-sceptic party has long opposed the Nord Stream 2 pipeline between Russia and Germany, with foreign minister Annalena Baerbock lambasting the project as <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/baerbock-against-operating-permit-for-nord-stream-2/">contrary to EU rules</a> even before it was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/germanys-scholz-halts-nord-stream-2-certification-2022-02-22/">put on ice</a> following events in Ukraine.</p>
<h2>A slow decade</h2>
<p>Trouble was already brewing well before this, however. Despite impressive achievements into the early 2010s, the intervening period saw missed targets and a slower rate of renewable energy deployment. In a landmark case last year, Germany’s highest court even ruled the country’s 2019 Climate Change Act to be <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-climate-law-is-partly-unconstitutional-top-court-rules/a-57369917">partially unconstitutional</a> for failing to safeguard the rights of future generations.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453626/original/file-20220322-19-pyw6jt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Nuclear power plant" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453626/original/file-20220322-19-pyw6jt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453626/original/file-20220322-19-pyw6jt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453626/original/file-20220322-19-pyw6jt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453626/original/file-20220322-19-pyw6jt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453626/original/file-20220322-19-pyw6jt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453626/original/file-20220322-19-pyw6jt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453626/original/file-20220322-19-pyw6jt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brokdorf Nuclear Power Plant was shut down in December 2021, as Germany phases out nuclear power.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gabriele Rohde / shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Now, just as Germany attempts to simultaneously close all its coal-fired (by 2030) and nuclear (by the end of 2022) power plants, rapidly rising energy prices mean lower- and middle-income households are footing an excess proportion of the Energiewende’s hefty bill. This seriously threatens the project’s popular support. </p>
<p>Calls to boycott Russian oil and gas over Ukraine present another headache for the government. Indeed, economy and climate minister Robert Habeck recently claimed that an overnight embargo on Russian fossil fuels, as part of wider sanctions, would lead to petrol shortages, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/14/russian-gas-oil-boycott-mass-poverty-warns-germany">poverty and mass unemployment</a>.</p>
<h2>Bring back energy democracy?</h2>
<p>One solution to Germany’s energy transition woes would draw on the country’s federal system to kick-start progress. German municipalities and states have historically played a pioneering role environmentally, with the Energiewende launched largely thanks to grassroots efforts. </p>
<p>From clean energy cooperatives to citizens’ initiatives pushing for greener municipal- and state-level policies, these experiments in “<a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-31891-2">energy democracy</a>” stemming from the 1970s were buoyed by complementary laws passed at the federal level, particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s. This meeting of bottom-up and top-down approaches provided the foundation for the Energiewende’s initial successes.</p>
<p>Over the past ten years, the energy transition has shifted agency and power from enterprising citizens and communities to large corporations, under the federal government’s aegis. As the scope for citizen-driven contributions was curtailed, so too was the pace of the Energiewende. Targets once exceeded now regularly go unmet. To reverse this trend, a national reappraisal seems in order.</p>
<h2>From Energiewende to “Zeitenwende”</h2>
<p>The war in Ukraine has put a spoke in the wheel here, but it may yet serve to fast-track the Energiewende. A proportionate and graduated Russian energy embargo, intelligently conceived, could present a unique opportunity for Germany to pursue alternative means of powering its energy transition far into the future.</p>
<p>The costs might not be as high as predicted either, with some <a href="https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkpbs/ECONtribute_PB_028_2022.pdf">experts</a> suggesting an embargo could impact the country’s economy less than COVID-19, in the short term leading to a fall in GDP of between 0.5% and 3%, compared with a 4.5% decline during the 2020 pandemic. Meanwhile, renewables could be massively expanded to help make up the shortfall, with coal, for example, providing a temporary backup solution (nuclear remains a domestic bugbear).</p>
<p>Ultimately, whether the government’s promises are kept and the Energiewende’s potential is fulfilled remains to be seen. What is clear is that, beyond the immediate risks, this is also a moment pregnant with possibility – a potential “Zeitenwende” (historical turning point) for Germany, Europe, and the wider world.</p>
<p>Posterity will not look kindly if the new government fails to seize this generational opportunity to restore Germany’s climate – and moral – leadership. </p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Imagine weekly climate newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Trevelyan Wing does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The ‘Energiewende’ relies on gas as a bridge between a coal-powered past and renewable future.Trevelyan Wing, Centre Researcher and PhD Candidate, Cambridge Centre for Environment, Energy and Natural Resource Governance (CEENRG), University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1774022022-02-24T10:49:01Z2022-02-24T10:49:01ZUkraine: how Europe’s energy demands have made the crisis worse<p>In response to <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/russia-invaded-ukraine-tanks-boris-johnson-b983810.html">Russia’s invasion</a> of eastern Ukraine, the German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, announced that <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-business-germany-europe-berlin-79e3dafb0d231f6a033613b7dab78cdf">Germany has suspended</a> certification of the new Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline between his country and that of Vladimir Putin. The fast-moving crisis in Ukraine throws into sharp relief the fissures that threaten European and transatlantic unity. Nowhere are these tensions more visible than in how countries are approaching their energy needs.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/how-vladimir-putin-uses-natural-gas-to-exert-russian-influence-and-punish-his-enemies-162413">Nord Stream 2</a>, which will bypass Ukraine by carrying gas under the Baltic Sea – and more broadly Europe’s demand for gas at a time of exceptionally high energy prices – is not a primary reason for the Ukraine crisis but it is a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a-MZxwBwvqg">contributing factor</a>. The pipeline has meant <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d8216f03-904f-44ce-ac92-43969dd6adc4">Germany and the US</a> have not been in full agreement on how to respond to Russia, with the US stating that an invasion would bring an end to the pipeline. </p>
<p>Permanently cancelling the pipeline is a much bigger decision to take now than before construction and one that all the nations due to be supplied with the gas it is set to carry – Czech Republic, Austria and Italy, as well as Germany – will carefully consider. Even Germany’s current suspension may prove temporary should the west come to an agreement with Russia.</p>
<p>This has made a unified transatlantic and Europe-wide response uncertain and helped create an opportunity for Vladimir Putin that he has now exploited. Quite how durable transatlantic unity in the face of this new challenge proves to be could foretell the strength of Nato and the EU in the years to come. </p>
<p>Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and non-Nato/EU member Ukraine, which do not stand to benefit from the new pipeline, <a href="https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/bitstream/handle/20.500.11850/118248/1/eth-49432-01.pdf">have opposed</a> it for years. The way Poland has been left out of the deal has led it to <a href="https://euobserver.com/foreign/21486">compare both</a> Nord Stream connections to the 1939 <a href="https://emerging-europe.com/news/polish-minister-compares-nord-stream-2-with-molotov-ribbentrop-pact/">Molotov-Ribentrop</a> non-aggression pact between Nazi Germany and the USSR that divided Poland between them.</p>
<p>France’s position has been more ambiguous. The French president, Emmanuel Macron, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/france-macron-nordstream-idUSP6N2F203Z">has cautioned</a> that the pipeline should not increase Europe’s reliance on Russian gas. French energy minister Bruno Le Maire, however, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/the-eu-should-not-be-carried-by-us-in-nord-stream-2-shut-down-french-economy-minister-says/">recently criticised</a> the idea of cancelling it. </p>
<p>Germany’s energy policy is crucial here. The country is pursuing aggressive <a href="https://apnews.com/article/climate-business-environment-germany-berlin-f76c1940b28c3c8adf8251e3ac7fb6da">carbon-reduction targets</a>, while also <a href="https://www.bundestag.de/webarchiv/textarchiv/2011/34915890_kw26_angenommen_abgelehnt-205788">phasing out</a> nuclear power production. As a result, Germany is investing tens of billions of euros in renewable energy. </p>
<p>Solar and wind power remain, however, reliant on fossil fuels – coal, oil and natural gas – to compensate for cloudy or calm periods. German <a href="https://youtu.be/GUSxm5TVGCw?t=600">clean energy policy</a> dictates that <a href="https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Artikel/Energy/gas-natural-gas-supply-in-germany.html">natural gas</a> be the favoured choice. </p>
<p>One third of Germany’s gas already comes from Russia. It planned to rely on <a href="https://www.nord-stream2.com/media/documents/pdf/en/2017/03/nsp2_nord-stream-2-and-climate-protection_eng_2016_12_07.pdf">Nord Stream 2</a>, which doubles the original capacity of Nord Stream 1, for additional capacity. Instead, Germany is now taking up the US’s offer of American natural gas. </p>
<p>Berlin taking Nord Stream 2 out of play is among the most serious sanctions yet against Russia. Halting the pipeline impacts the Kremlin on a financial level. New <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-impact-of-western-sanctions-on-russia/">energy sanctions</a>, unlike those extant sanctions against individuals and Russian state-owned enterprises, may have come as a surprise. </p>
<p>Should Russia find these sanctions credible, they may prove more efficient in affecting Russian foreign policy. The White House and European leaders appear to be <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-western-allies-impose-sanctions-against-russian-interests-for-military/">avoiding other sanctions</a> that would hit the heart of Russia’s financial system, presumably leaving these for a full-scale invasion.</p>
<h2>Negotiation strategies</h2>
<p>Germany has stood out in recent years in its reluctance to penalise Russia. It has declined to send weapons to Ukraine – and has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/germany-blocks-nato-ally-from-transferring-weapons-to-ukraine-11642790772?mod=hp_trending_now_article_pos1">forbidden Estonia</a> from sending any German-built heavy artillery it owns – citing German law. </p>
<p>Critics have accused the country of using its constitution as a pretext for putting energy needs ahead of treaty obligations and European unity. They suggest German actions and rhetoric have already shaken the faith of the country’s partners in central Europe. </p>
<p>Scholz’s party, the Social Democrats, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-social-democrats-and-their-putin-sympathizers/a-18088650">has long called</a> for improved relations with Russia. The chief of the German navy resigned in January 2022 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/23/german-navy-chief-quits-after-saying-putin-deserves-respect-over-ukraine">after suggesting</a> that Russia was a natural ally for Germany to balance against a rising China. </p>
<p>Such a statement from a high-ranking official goes against official German foreign policy and foments suspicion and distrust of the country’s intent within European institutions. Newer EU and Nato members may, understandably, wonder how Germany will react to future crises.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177402/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Christopher Kolasa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Germany’s reliance on natural gas has undermined western unity in dealing with Russia, creating an opening for Vladimir Putin.Matthew Christopher Kolasa, PhD Researcher in International Relations, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1762662022-02-14T12:11:01Z2022-02-14T12:11:01ZUkraine: the economic impact of tension with Russia is part of Putin’s long-term plan<p>Europe is facing <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/01/29/how-will-europe-cope-if-russia-cuts-off-its-gas?">strong economic headwinds</a>. <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/9d5583f8-fc26-4b43-b264-efbca959d857">Record inflation</a>, the need to <a href="https://voxeu.org/article/eu-economy-after-covid-19-implications-economic-governance">recover from the pandemic</a>, and a divided response to Russian troop deployments along the Ukraine border, all chill the February air. </p>
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<p><em>You can listen to more articles from The Conversation, narrated by Noa, <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/audio-narrated-99682">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>Whether this complex situation will thaw in the coming weeks and months depends on many moving parts – including Vladimir Putin’s tanks, energy prices and the ongoing effects of COVID – and how the global community responds to them. </p>
<p>None of this is straightforward. For example, allies in the west (including Europe) have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/08/us/politics/us-sanctions-russia-ukraine.html">promised massive sanctions</a> if Russia invades Ukraine, but how effective these are as a deterrent is debatable. Russia can, in the medium term, sell much of its energy through an <a href="https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Russia-To-Supply-More-Gas-To-China-Via-New-Pipeline.html">alliance with China</a>, and avoid much of the sanctions’ impact. </p>
<p>Putin has also set up special autonomous regions within Russia as “sanctions proof” <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/giacomotognini/2022/02/02/inside-the-russian-tax-havens-set-up-by-putin-to-help-sanctioned-billionaires/?sh=19f1c688b6ec">economic sanctuaries</a>. Many of the country’s wealthiest citizens are on notice and will have had time to adjust their finances in the face of being cut off from access to western banks. Some European banks would themselves be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/europes-banks-fear-payment-system-could-be-casualty-russia-ukraine-crisis-2022-02-09/">badly hit by sanctions</a>. </p>
<p>The real economic costs of an invasion for Russia then, are far from clear. And nor, for that matter, is Putin’s ultimate goal. At the time of writing at least, it’s possible this whole tense affair may be a bluff to weaken the Ukrainian economy and sow European discord.</p>
<p>The situation is not helped by the approach of the previous chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, whose policy with Russia was always to <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/research-event/germanys-russia-policy-post-merkel-era">play for time</a>. For an energy-dependent European Union, this served to kick the possibility of conflict with Russia down the road. The new and fragile <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/news/german-parties-seal-deal-on-new-traffic-light-coalition/">German coalition government</a> has not been well prepared for the arrival of 100,000 Russian troops on the Ukraine border. </p>
<p>Complicating things further is the question mark over the massive, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2022/02/08/if-nord-stream-2-dies-what-will-it-cost-russia-where-will-europe-get-its-natural-gas/?sh=76aefc1516e7">expensive</a> and as yet <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/08/business/nord-stream-2-germany-biden/index.html">unused Nordstream 2 pipeline</a> designed to bring Russian gas into Europe. EU law requires the separation of owner and operator in pipelines, but the Russian supplier Gazprom has no wish to cede control. </p>
<p>The delays are <a href="https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/oxford-energy-podcast-the-outlook-for-nord-stream-2/">a headache</a> for both Olaf Scholz, the new and silent chancellor, and Putin. Denying the go ahead for Nordstream 2 has been a key element of <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2022/02/08/if-nord-stream-2-dies-what-will-it-cost-russia-where-will-europe-get-its-natural-gas/?sh=1d489e6116e7">US negotiations</a> while Germany’s position <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6ff5b9c5-5f06-490b-8659-f5047d75180b">seems more equivocal</a>. </p>
<p>That said, Russia could withstand some delay, as pipeline gas makes up <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russias-oil-gas-revenue-windfall-2022-01-21/">only 11% of its exports</a>. But it would affect its longer term goals of locking Germany into a closer codependent relationship, at least until net zero energy targets are more within reach. This is central to both Russia’s strategic ambition and to German energy stability, even if American and Qatari gas supplies can <a href="https://www.pipeline-journal.net/news/qatar-and-us-talks-over-supplying-gas-europe-should-russia-shut-down-gas-pipelines">come to the rescue</a> in the meantime. </p>
<p>Meanwhile Europe is doing its best to deal with the economic effects of COVID, which saw many countries take on massive amounts of debt, which must now be repaid to comply with EU fiscal rules. Added to this mix is the spectre of <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/eurozone-inflation-rises-to-fresh-record-against-expectations-11643799121">rising inflation</a>, which could yet go up even further. </p>
<p>A Russian invasion of Ukraine would likely <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/02/a-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-could-send-shockwaves-through-financial-markets-heres-how.html">spook global markets</a>, especially European stocks, and raise the price of gas, electricity and oil. </p>
<h2>Border control</h2>
<p>Back to the Ukraine border, and assurances to obtain no further Nato expansion to Ukraine for the time being may be enough, provided these are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/08/emmanuel-macron-remark-russia-set-alarm-bell-ringing-ukraine-crisis-talk-vladimir-putin">viewed as credible</a> and linked to getting Nordstream 2 flowing. </p>
<p>Keeping Europe dependent on Russian gas for as long as possible is the key to influence over Germany (and hence the EU) as well as Ukraine. It assures Russian security far more than mere territory. </p>
<p>In a complex, interdependent world, where both military and energy security are under pressure, Europe has found itself ill prepared for this moment. Its response so far <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/europe-us-try-united-talks-russia-ukraine-rcna11321">has been mixed</a>. The EU’s Baltic states tend to favour a hard line, with Germany seeking balance, and France being softer and favouring a “reset” with Russia on security issues. The UK remains preoccupied with accusations its prime minister <a href="https://theconversation.com/boris-johnson-pledges-to-fix-downing-street-after-partygate-but-this-is-a-failure-of-his-leadership-176169">broke pandemic lockdown rules</a>, and the country becomes less relevant by the day. </p>
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<p>But even if tensions around Ukraine are eased in the coming months, it is likely they will return. Europe’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-russia-probably-wont-turn-off-the-gas-but-the-problem-wont-go-away-any-time-soon-176817">persistent gas problem</a> comes at a cost. The Russian interest is to see how far they can push. </p>
<p>And the timing of Putin’s Ukraine gambit is no coincidence. He is flush with oil money, and Europe is weakened by COVID and global economic forces. It is impossible to predict what will happen next, but what seems certain in the short term is continued brinkmanship, bluff and bargaining for concessions involving <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/08/world/europe/ukraine-putin-russia.html">painful choices</a>. Trying to dance with the Russian bear is always dangerous – and especially so in an economically bleak winter.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176266/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jorge Guira does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The threat of sanctions may have little effect.Jorge Guira, Associate Professor of Law and Finance, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1768172022-02-10T14:01:03Z2022-02-10T14:01:03ZUkraine: Russia probably won’t turn off the gas, but the problem won’t go away any time soon<p>One of the key issues raised by the crisis on the Ukraine borders is the future of Europe’s gas supply. As talks have foundered over the past month, Russia’s state-controlled Gazprom <a href="https://report.az/en/energy/gazprom-overall-occupancy-level-of-european-gas-storages-drops-to-40-9/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter">warned of</a> the low levels of gas in European storage facilities. </p>
<p>The US and Europe, meanwhile, have threatened that unless Russia backs down and moves its troops away from the Ukraine border, sanctions could include <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/zacharysmith/2022/02/07/biden-vows-nord-stream-2-pipeline-will-be-canceled-if-russia-invades-ukraine/?sh=4a0945827bef">scrapping Nord Stream II</a>. This is a 750-mile pipeline connecting Russia and Germany with the potential to supply 26 million homes, alongside supporting the wider north-west European gas market. The pipeline has been completed but has not yet been certified by Germany’s energy regulator.</p>
<p>The data on the level of dependence on Russian gas is confusing due to the impact of the pandemic in 2020 that depressed demand. But, according to colleagues at the <a href="https://a9w7k6q9.stackpathcdn.com/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Gas-Quarterly-Review-Issue-16.pdf">Oxford Institute for Energy Studies</a> (OIES), in 2021 Russia supplied about 35% of the gas imported to Europe (defined as the UK and the 27 states the comprise the EU), about 31% as pipeline gas and 4% as liquefied natural gas (LNG). In the back of everyone’s minds is what happens if Russia turns off the gas taps in winter. </p>
<p>I’ve been thinking and reading a lot about this and talking to gas experts and I think that – despite the obvious concern – the consensus seems to be that it is highly unlikely that either side will want to disrupt the flow of natural gas into Europe. </p>
<p>Russia’s – and before it the Soviet Union’s – supply of natural gas to Europe has created an enduring interdependence that has survived many geopolitical upsets, such as the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the declaration of martial law in Poland in 1980s, the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and most recently Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Time and again both sides have recognised that they have too much to lose from disrupting the flow of gas. </p>
<p>At the moment, Russia is fulfilling its long-term contractual obligations to supply gas. It’s not doing any more than that – which raises the question of whether there has been a deliberate strategy of ensuring that storage remains low and the price remains high, which is good business for Gazprom. But breaking those contracts would result in financial legal and reputational damage for Russia.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Gas transportation equipment at a compressor station in Siberia" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445475/original/file-20220209-13-ghguep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445475/original/file-20220209-13-ghguep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445475/original/file-20220209-13-ghguep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445475/original/file-20220209-13-ghguep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445475/original/file-20220209-13-ghguep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445475/original/file-20220209-13-ghguep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445475/original/file-20220209-13-ghguep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The heat is on: a gas supply plant in Siberia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Grigorii Pisotsckii via Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>It’s important to remember that Russia also needs the money. About 75% of Gazprom’s income comes from these exports – and it needs that income to be able to supply gas at a lower price to its domestic consumers. According to the OIES, gas exports account for <a href="https://a9w7k6q9.stackpathcdn.com/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Gas-Quarterly-Review-Issue-16.pdf">about 6%</a> of the Russian government tax revenue – far less than oil, but not not an inconsequential amount of income for the Russian government. It’s highly unlikely they would want to do it.</p>
<p>As far as Europe is concerned, it is unlikely sanctions would target the flow of natural gas. This could exacerbate an already difficult situation which has sent prices spiralling because of the jittery markets. Disruption to the current levels of Russian gas supply could result in power cuts in parts of Europe highly dependent on Russian gas supplies. So, this would be an own goal for Europe. Sanctions can often be a double-edged sword that harm the countries that impose them as much as the intended target of the sanctions.</p>
<h2>What happens if the gas is turned off?</h2>
<p>As in any energy infrastructure, you need to maintain a certain amount of gas to keep the system working. That’s true of storage facilities, pipelines, and the like. Some industrial consumers can switch to other sources, such as fuel oil, but many may have to reduce their operations, particularly where natural gas is an input into industrial processes. </p>
<p>Compared to previous supply disruptions between Russia and Ukraine, the biggest difference this time is the context within which it’s happening: a very tight global gas market. In short, it is difficult to see where additional supplies to Europe would come from if needed. </p>
<p>If you think back before Christmas, when we were discussing the global gas crisis, it was a situation not of Russia’s making entirely – but certainly Russia was taking advantage of it. It wasn’t delivering additional supplies on the short-term spot market and it hadn’t filled up the storage facilities that it owns in Europe. </p>
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<img alt="A half-finished gas pipeline on a construction site." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445487/original/file-20220209-17-lbb3kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445487/original/file-20220209-17-lbb3kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445487/original/file-20220209-17-lbb3kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445487/original/file-20220209-17-lbb3kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445487/original/file-20220209-17-lbb3kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445487/original/file-20220209-17-lbb3kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445487/original/file-20220209-17-lbb3kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Under construction: European natural gas pipeline EUGAL near Wrangelsburg in Germany which is designed to link with the Nord Stream pipelines.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Stefan Dinse via Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>Whatever happens in the next couple of months, things will remain difficult. Because of its role in domestic heating, gas demand is strongly influenced by the weather. A prolonged cold snap in the coming weeks will draw down on storage even further. At the same time, gas backs up wind and solar in the power system and prolonged periods of low wind and sunshine promote greater gas use. Things will ease by spring – but by then storage will be very low and it will be difficult and costly to fill it for next winter. </p>
<p>If calmer heads prevail and a solution is found to the current tensions over Ukraine and the Nordstream 2 pipeline is approved over the summer, then pipeline gas supplies from Russia may increase into next winter. If not – and there are continued low levels of supply from Russia – then next winter could be just as difficult, if not more so. </p>
<p>In the longer term, the problem for Europe is that domestic gas production will continue to decline. So, unless demand is reduced, the level of gas imports will continue to rise. The lesson learnt from the latest crisis should be that Europe needs to accelerate decarbonisation of its energy system and reduce the amount of natural gas consumed. But that is easier said than done.</p>
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<p><em>This article is based on an interview Michael Bradshaw gave to The Conversation Weekly podcast: <a href="https://theconversation.com/if-russia-invades-ukraine-what-could-happen-to-natural-gas-supplies-to-europe-podcast-176812">If Russia invades Ukraine, what could happen to natural gas supplies to Europe?</a></em></p>
<iframe src="https://embed.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/6204e51348005b00123b9a03" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="190px"></iframe><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176817/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Bradshaw receives funding from NERC in relation to its Unconventional Hydrocarbons in the UK Energy System Research Programme and EPSRC in relation to his role as Co-Director for the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC).</span></em></p>Europe urgently needs to become less dependent on gas.Michael Bradshaw, Professor of Global Energy, Warwick Business School, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1768122022-02-10T12:19:56Z2022-02-10T12:19:56ZIf Russia invades Ukraine, what could happen to natural gas supplies to Europe? Podcast<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445643/original/file-20220210-17-1rp7tnh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=26%2C60%2C4459%2C2903&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Europe relies on Russia for about 40% of its natural gas. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/valve-on-main-gas-pipeline-between-2104791914">Victoria Viper B/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As frantic diplomatic efforts continue to avert a Russian invasion of Ukraine, Europe’s reliance on Russian gas supplies – and what would happen to them in the case of a war – remains an ever-present threat. In this episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a>, we speak to two experts on the geopolitics of natural gas about the history of the energy relationship between Russia and Europe, and the role gas supplies play in the current diplomatic efforts to avoid war. </p>
<p>And, the Beijing Winter Olympics are the first games to use 100% artificial snow. We talk to a sports ecologist about what that might mean for the athletes – and for the environment around the Olympic sites. </p>
<iframe src="https://embed.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/6204e51348005b00123b9a03" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="190px"></iframe>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-561" class="tc-infographic" height="100" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/561/4fbbd099d631750693d02bac632430b71b37cd5f/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Russia has been supplying western Europe with natural gas for more than 50 years. “The precise date is 1968,” says Michael Bradshaw. “That’s when the Soviet Union reached agreement with Austria to deliver natural gas by pipeline.” Bradshaw, a professor of global energy at Warwick Business School at the University of Warwick in the UK, says it’s a relationship that has “weathered a number of geopolitical crises”, including the collapse of the Soviet Union. </p>
<p>Today, Russia supplies Europe with around <a href="https://www.bruegel.org/2022/01/can-europe-survive-painlessly-without-russian-gas/">40% of its natural gas</a>, predominantly through pipelines. And according to the <a href="https://a9w7k6q9.stackpathcdn.com/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Gas-Quarterly-Review-Issue-16.pdf">Oxford Institute for Energy Studies</a>, in 2021, 22% of the gas Russia delivered to Europe – including Turkey – passed through Ukraine. That makes the question of what would happen to these gas flows in the event of a Russian invasion particularly urgent. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-how-an-armed-conflict-could-play-out-175274">Ukraine: how an armed conflict could play out</a>
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<p>The future of Nord Stream 2, a new pipeline taking gas directly from Russia direct to northern Germany, is at risk. “It’s become a symbol of how Russia is using natural gas to play out the European states against each other and to divide the European Union,” says Anastasiya Shapochkina, a lecturer in geopolitical at Sciences Po in France. </p>
<p>Construction of Nord Stream 2 finished in late 2021, but regulatory delays mean no gas is yet flowing through the pipeline. In early February, at a meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/07/remarks-by-president-biden-and-chancellor-scholz-of-the-federal-republic-of-germany-at-press-conference/">at the White House</a>, US President Joe Biden said if Russia did invade Ukraine “there will be no longer a Nord Stream 2. We will bring an end to it.” Scholz opted instead for <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-olaf-scholz-responds-to-ukraine-criticism/a-60681953">strategic ambiguity</a> about the pipeline’s future in the case of a war. </p>
<p>Bradshaw says if Russia did invade, the consensus among analysts is that “it’s highly unlikely that either side will want to disrupt the flow of natural gas – both sides have got too much to lose from doing that.” He says Gazprom, the Russian energy giant which controls the pipeline gas supply to Europe, relies on the income it makes from these gas exports to supply gas at a lower price to domestic consumers in Russia. But with global energy prices rises and the gas market very tight, if the EU imposed economic sanctions that stopped the flow of gas, Bradshaw says “that would make a bad situation even worse” for Europe. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-russia-probably-wont-turn-off-the-gas-but-the-problem-wont-go-away-any-time-soon-176817">Ukraine: Russia probably won't turn off the gas, but the problem won't go away any time soon</a>
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<p>For Shapochkina, the most optimistic scenario is that the “energy economic interdependence between Russia and Europe can be a containment factor on the conflict in Ukraine.” However, she says what will be acceptable to European leaders, and Germany in particular, remains an open question. “We could envision the scenario when Russia could be allowed, because of the energy security of Europe, to invade all it wants and still trade with Europe, and even use the Ukrainian gas system to potentially increase its volumes of exports to Europe,” she says. </p>
<p>Longer term, how much Europe will rely on natural gas from Russia depends upon the role gas plays in the energy transition towards renewables – something <a href="https://theconversation.com/natural-gas-is-a-fossil-fuel-but-the-eu-will-count-it-as-a-green-investment-heres-why-175867">currently causing controversy within the EU</a>. But in the short term, <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-the-us-find-enough-natural-gas-sources-to-neutralize-russias-energy-leverage-over-europe-175824">Europe and its allies</a> are scrambling to secure alternative sources of gas should Russia reduce its gas flows. </p>
<p>In our second story in this episode, what is the environmental impact of a winter Olympics in Beijing with 100% artificial snow? Madeline Orr, a lecturer in sports ecology at Loughborough University London in the UK, recently published research on <a href="https://www.sportecology.org/_files/ugd/a700be_9aa3ec697a39446eb11b8330aec19e30.pdf">athletes’ views of competing on artificial snow</a> – which is around 70% ice. “We had a lot of athletes who are quite excited to be competing on artificial snow, because it’s fast and it’s hard,” she says, although some of those competing in aerial events are “more concerned about the injury” from falling on a harder surface. She also explains what all this artificial snow will mean for the environment around the Beijing’s Olympic venues. (Listen from 30m30)</p>
<p>And finally, Haley Lewis for The Conversation in the Canadian capital Ottawa recommends some recent analysis of protests by truckers against COVID-19 restrictions that continue to block the city’s streets. (Listen from 42m50)</p>
<p>This episode of The Conversation Weekly was produced by Mend Mariwany and Gemma Ware, with sound design by Eloise Stevens. Our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. You can find us on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a>, on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/?hl=en">theconversationdotcom</a> or <a href="mailto:podcast@theconversation.com">via email</a>. You can also sign up to The Conversation’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter?utm_campaign=PodcastTCWeekly&utm_content=newsletter&utm_source=podcast">free daily email here</a>. </p>
<p>Newsclips in this episode are from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yOZIc9kbLl4">BBC News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=68uA1qJ2uUg">Associated Press</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xh77BLp-SFo">CG</a><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TRjiYRzeJls">TN</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b3fUd8hmgy8">CNBC</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r7JLWZN47Jg">Television</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FIm3YzGiYcg">NDTV</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ygM3cdo51w4">DW News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ClWDOZ85SmE">NBC News</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fzrayjS6Y3A">WION</a>.</p>
<p><em>You can listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a>, or find out how else to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">listen here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176812/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Bradshaw receives funding from Natural Environment Research Council in relation to its Unconventional Hydrocarbons in the UK Energy System Research Programme and Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council in relation to his role as Co-Director for the UK Energy Research Centre. Anastasiya Shapochkina is a director of Eastern Circles, a geo-economics think tank on the former Soviet space. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Madeleine Orr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Plus, the Beijing Winter Olympics are using 100% artificial snow: what does that mean for the environment, and the athletes? Listen to The Conversation Weekly podcast.Gemma Ware, Editor and Co-Host, The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The ConversationDaniel Merino, Assistant Science Editor & Co-Host of The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The ConversationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1752742022-01-20T17:18:15Z2022-01-20T17:18:15ZUkraine: how an armed conflict could play out<p>Talks between Russia and the west have failed. Moscow has described the situation in Ukraine as <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/12/europe/nato-russia-council-summit-ukraine-intl/index.html">“intolerable”</a> and “a matter of life or death”. The US president, Joe Biden, has predicted the Kremlin <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/19/politics/russia-ukraine-joe-biden-news-conference/index.html">“will move in”</a> to Ukraine.</p>
<p>The impasse was reached when the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, insisted that the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/12/10/putin-says-conflict-in-eastern-ukraine-looks-like-genocide-a75780">“looks like genocide”</a>, adding massive pressure to his diplomatic demands. Russia insists it is prepared to deploy unspecified but alarming sounding <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/31/world/europe/biden-putin-russia-ukraine-lavrov.html">“military-technical” means</a> to pursue its ends.</p>
<p>The signals are more than clear: after annexing Crimea in 2014 and sponsoring separatist movements in the Donbas, in the country’s east, Moscow is directly threatening a third incursion into Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty, massing troops on the Ukrainian border and also in Belarus, officially for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/17/russia-moves-troops-to-belarus-for-joint-exercises-near-ukraine-border">“joint exercises”</a>. </p>
<p>Beyond Ukraine, Russia is putting pressure on Nato and the EU, and attempting to change the international order with this latest round of power politics. Is Moscow bluffing – or is an escalated military conflict likely in Ukraine? If so, what are the chances that Kyiv can resist its more powerful neighbour?</p>
<h2>Pressure on Kyiv</h2>
<p>A concerted campaign of disinformation <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-facing-tonnes-of-pro-russian-disinformation-ahead-of-possible-invasion-says-government-minister-in-kiev-12498781">deployed through Russian-language media</a> aims to foment unrest in Ukraine. But eight years of war have considerably diminished the power of pro-Russian propaganda and Kyiv took further steps last year by <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-zelenskiy-bans-three-opposition-tv-stations/a-56438505">banning</a> pro-Russian media outlets.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s security services have also revealed that <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/technology/sbu-unveils-names-of-russian-hackers-attacking-ukraine-since-2014.html">several thousand cyberattacks</a> have been conducted from occupied Crimea since 2014. In mid-January, a message calling on Ukrainians to “<a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/ukraine-cyberattack-warns-nation-to-be-afraid-and-expect-the-worst">be afraid and expect the worst</a>” – purporting to be from Poland, one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters – was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59992531">revealed</a> by Ukraine’s information ministry to have probably been devised by Russia.</p>
<p>Energy security is another important part of this crisis. Moscow’s plans for Nord Stream 2 – a pipeline which is supposed to directly reach Germany through the Baltic Sea – could deny energy to Ukraine, which has already lost control of its coal deposits in the conflicted Donbas. On top of that, Ukraine could lose transit fees equivalent to approximately <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/23/nord-stream-2-how-putins-pipeline-paralysed-the-west">4% of its GDP</a>, or <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-7-billion-russian-gas-transit-deal-at-risk-amid-claims-of-political-pressure/">US$7 billion</a> (£5.1 billion).</p>
<p>But these are covert measures which must fly under the radar. The fear is that Moscow is backing itself into a diplomatic corner where the use of force is its only way to remain credible.</p>
<h2>Military scenarios</h2>
<p>Russia has built up sufficient military resources to penetrate into Ukrainian territory. But it’s unlikely to be able to take the whole country and, more importantly, hold it for any significant period, given the prospects of fierce armed resistance from Ukraine. But it has a number of options from which to launch a measured incursion.</p>
<p><strong>East</strong>: Russia could easily launch a massive operation from the eastern province of Donbas where it is supporting local militias. The main part of its <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/18/europe/ukraine-intelligence-russia-military-build-up-intl/index.html">military build-up</a> is in this area. The problem is that the main cities that Moscow could attempt to seize, Kharkiv and Dnipro, are heavily populated and would be difficult to capture occupy. </p>
<p><strong>South</strong>: The Black Sea territories, or <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/putin-and-ukraines-black-sea-lands-another-iteration-of-novorossiya/?__cf_chl_f_tk=mJ4BeBcWnBTWJ33vGHM3xcx_wrH337lCYfgqOU.sYrc-1642551644-0-gaNycGzNCSU"><em>Prichernomorie</em></a>, would be a tempting target for Russian strategists. Seizing this area would cut Ukraine off from its access to the sea and connect Russian forces from Donbas to Transnistria – a Russian-occupied region of Moldova, to the west of Ukraine. </p>
<p>Russia could launch its eastern forces as well as <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-24/russia-moving-forces-to-crimea-in-ukraine-build-up-analysts-say">pre-positioned troops</a> in Crimea. Analysts indicate that the coastal defences to the west of Crimea are quite exposed. But Russia would need to seize the cities of Marioupol, in the east, and Odessa, in the west, where the population would most likely strenuously resist Russian occupation.</p>
<p><strong>North:</strong> Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, is less than 100km from the border with Belarus, where Russia <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-moves-troops-belarus-joint-drills-ukraine-invasion-fears-rcna12533">has troops conducting joint exercises</a>. Belarus’s president, Alexander Lukashenko – an autocrat who holds on to power thanks to Moscow’s support – recently declared that his country <a href="https://tass.com/world/1367847">“won’t stand aside if war breaks out”</a>.</p>
<p><strong>West:</strong> Perhaps the most surprising direction from which a new invasion of Ukraine could come. The Pentagon recently indicated concerns of a Kremlin false-flag operation coming from <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59998988">Transnistria</a> – a Russian-speaking region of Moldova where Moscow has <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2019/09/26/russia-pulls-transnistria-strings-with-eye-on-ukraine/">kept troops</a> since the collapse of the Soviet Union.</p>
<h2>Is Ukraine ready to resist?</h2>
<p>For eight years, Kyiv has been fighting in the east of the country, beefing up its military and preparing its population to resist. But <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/09/world/europe/ukraine-military-russia-invasion.html">military sources are gloomy</a> about the prospect of being able to resist for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/09/world/europe/ukraine-military-russia-invasion.html">much longer than a week</a> without the help of western allies. </p>
<p>Air defences are weak, but Ukraine has other assets, such as drones provided by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/01/15/ukraine-russia-drones-turkey/">Turkey</a> as well as new anti-tank missiles provided by <a href="https://tass.com/world/1379343">the US</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/jan/17/uk-supplying-ukraine-with-anti-tank-weapons-mps-told">the UK</a>, with the assistance of trainers. Ukraine has also developed its own missile, which is <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/01/11/ukraines-homemade-anti-tank-missile-has-been-blasting-more-and-more-rebel-vehicles/">proving effective</a> in the field.</p>
<p>As well as its regular troops, Ukraine has its national guard, a sort of armed national police force. Backed by significant investments and advanced weaponry, it could act as a rearguard against paratroopers or special forces infiltrations. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Ukraine’s <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/hot-topic/defense-ministry-to-create-150-reservist-battalions/">defence battalions</a> now span the whole territory, following the National Resistance Act which entered into force this month. These are civilian units, military trained to use guerrilla tactics against occupying forces.</p>
<p>The Ukrainian population has also been mobilizing in support of the troops since the seizure of Crimea and the war in Donbas. And according to a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/09eedfc1-d111-40cb-a8f7-053cf03fa34a">poll</a> taken in December 2021 by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 58% of Ukrainian men and almost 13% of women declared that they are ready to take up arms. A further 17% and 25% more said they would resist through other means. </p>
<p>In what would be a classic case of asymmetrical warfare, resistance from Ukraine’s population could therefore prove a serious thorn in Moscow’s side.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175274/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julien Théron ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>With the failure of talks, a Russian incursion into Ukraine has become more likely. But any invasion would face fierce resistance.Julien Théron, Lecturer, Conflict and Security Studies, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1716842021-11-11T16:04:37Z2021-11-11T16:04:37ZBelarus: whether or not Putin is behind the border crisis, it plays into Kremlin hands<p>The migrant crisis on Belarus’s western border has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-59231136">escalated rapidly in recent days</a>, forcing Poland and Lithuania to declare a state of emergency and <a href="https://www.intellinews.com/poland-lithuania-close-borders-with-belarus-lavrov-suggests-eu-pay-belarus-to-keep-refugees-226479/">close the borders with their neighbour</a>. With 15,000 Polish border security personnel on one side of the barbed wire fence and an estimated 4,000 migrants desperately trying to get through into the west, there are fears the situation could <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-belarus-border-migrants-military-crisis-defence-leaders-europe/">spiral into violent confrontation</a>.</p>
<p>The escalation follows the promise by Belarusian president, Alexander Lukashenko, in May 2021 to “<a href="https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/world-news/europe/952979/belarus-dictator-threatens-flood-eu-with-drugs-migrants-avoid-sanctions">flood Europe with drugs and migrants</a>”. This came in retaliation for the EU’s sanctions imposed following the forced landing of a commercial plane and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/kidnapping-of-roman-protasevich-will-force-pariah-belarus-more-firmly-into-russias-orbit-161678">detention of two of the passengers</a>, opposition journalist Roman Protasevich and his partner, Russian national Sofia Sapega, by Belarusian authorities in May 2021.</p>
<p>The Belarusian military has reportedly flown in large numbers of people, many fleeing conflicts in the Middle East, and escorted them to the border with Poland where they are now trapped between Polish border defences and the Belarus military. </p>
<p>The situation plays into Russia’s hands, as it will inevitably cement Lukashenko’s dependence on the Kremlin. It will also potentially increase Moscow’s leverage in negotiations with Berlin over fast-tracking the certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, as the outgoing German chancellor, Angela Merkel, has <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-poland-border-migrants/31554609.html">called on Russia</a> to de-escalate the crisis.</p>
<p>The Polish government estimates that <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-10/poland-seeks-emergency-eu-summit-on-belarus-border-crisis?utm_source=google&utm_medium=bd&cmpId=google&sref=HYGcXWrx">approximately 4,000 migrants</a> may be gathered along its border with Belarus with more on the way, reportedly escorted by Belarusian military personnel. With Polish guards reported to be increasingly resorting to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-08/poland-warns-large-migrant-group-may-try-to-enter-from-belarus?sref=HYGcXWrx">more violent measures</a>, the situation risks a serious escalation. </p>
<p>But while the possibility of armed conflict on the border should not be entirely ruled out, it is currently highly unlikely, as such conflict threatens to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-belarus-border-migrants-military-crisis-defence-leaders-europe/">bring in Nato and Russia</a>. Lukashenko himself highlighted that <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/we-won-t-start-a-war-lukashenko-on-tensions-with-poland-over-migrants-1.4724592">he does not seek war</a>.</p>
<p>The prospects of an immediate de-escalation seem unlikely at present, given that the EU agreed this week to broaden the scope of the current sanctions against Belarus – the very thing that triggered retaliation from Lukashenko in the first place. As such, with the adoption of a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-09/eu-backs-poland-as-migrant-crisis-on-belarus-border-escalates?sref=HYGcXWrx">new sanctions package</a> likely to occur on November 25, the current crisis could well extend into December and on to 2022.</p>
<h2>Putin as puppetmaster?</h2>
<p>The crisis has also brought Russia’s role and interests into a sharp focus, with leaders in Poland <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-59226226">directly accusing Putin</a> of orchestrating it. It is unclear to what extent the Kremlin is directly involved in promoting the current crisis, but the situation nevertheless plays into Russia’s hands. It will inevitably push Lukashenko further under Moscow’s influence – something that the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/belarusalert/why-putin-dare-not-abandon-belarus-dictator-lukashenka/">Kremlin ultimately seeks</a>.</p>
<p>Notably, on November 4, Russia and Belarus finally signed the long-anticipated so-called union programmes – or <a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2021/11/04/putin-and-lukashenko-approve-28-union-programs-for-integrating-russia-and-belarus">road maps for integration</a>. These documents ultimately seek to bring the two states closer together by integrating their economic and administrative systems. </p>
<p>While the details of the documents are not public, available information suggests that they have been <a href="https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/85749">significantly watered down</a>. Nevertheless, the fact that this has taken place after years of <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/05/12/why-fears-of-a-russia-belarus-merger-never-come-true-a73871">stalling by Lukashenko</a> underlines Russia’s growing leverage over Belarus.</p>
<p>The escalation of the crisis comes amid renewed reports of another <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-belarus-border-migrants-military-crisis-defence-leaders-europe/">massing of Russian troops on its border with Ukraine</a>. With the west preoccupied with the migrant crisis and Kyiv also sending troops and increasing border forces to prevent any potential spill overs, the Kremlin could take advantage of the situation to provoke further destabilisation in Ukraine. </p>
<p>However, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/11/04/europe/russia-ukraine-military-buildup-intl-cmd/index.html">reports of this most recent build-up</a> strongly indicate that it is considerably smaller than the last movement of Russian troops between March and April 2021, with Kyiv itself stating that <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/11/02/ukraine-denies-russian-military-buildup-on-border-as-defense-minister-quits-a75462">no major or new deployments have been confirmed</a>.</p>
<h2>Regional faultlines</h2>
<p>These renewed border tensions come hot on the heels of the <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2021/10/20/us-defence-secretary-underlines-support-for-eastern-europe">visit by US secretary of defense, Lloyd Austin</a>, to the Black Sea region, including Ukraine, to reiterate Washington’s support. In the past, such events and expressions of support for Ukraine’s membership in Nato have prompted <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/the-russian-military-buildup-around-ukraine-routine-seasonal-maneuvers/">a strong backlash from Russia</a>. </p>
<p>Moscow sees Ukraine and other post-Soviet states as being under its sphere of influence. As such, an escalation of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia remains unlikely – but the developments serve as a reminder about the potential for a quick escalation, especially given concerns over the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/world-news-russia-government-and-politics-crimea-ukraine-e6e8d6c0792517f753fc774713d1fe44">amount of military equipment that Russia left behind</a> on its border with eastern Ukraine when it pulled back in April.</p>
<p>The evolving migrant crisis on the Belarusian border represent the most serious escalation in regional tensions between Belarus and Europe in years. Moreover, with the EU only <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-eu-close-deal-new-round-belarus-sanctions-diplomats-say-2021-11-09/">set to expand sanctions against Minsk</a>, it remains the most likely scenario that Lukashenko will continue to pursue the current strategy of retaliation. </p>
<p>As such, the humanitarian situation in the area will also continue to deteriorate, especially amid dropping temperatures ahead of winter and reports that aid workers are <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-59231136">unable to enter the area</a>, risking a full-blown humanitarian crisis.</p>
<p>Additionally, while Russia’s direct involvement in the current crisis is unclear, it seems that the Kremlin’s leverage over Lukashenko may be the most immediate and clear way to diffuse the crisis. To that end, Berlin’s calls on Putin for assistance also highlight the importance of Russia’s influence in the situation. Any help from Russia in resolving the Belarusian crisis is likely to come at a price.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171684/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liana Semchuk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Is Russia masterminding the buildup of international migrants on the Poland-Belarus border?Liana Semchuk, PhD Candidate in Politics, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1652752021-08-04T18:13:36Z2021-08-04T18:13:36ZWhat the lifting of US sanctions means for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline<p>On 19 May 2021, Secretary of State <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-waive-sanctions-firm-ceo-behind-russias-nord-stream-2-pipeline-source-2021-05-19/">Anthony Blinken</a> announced that the United States was waiving sanctions on the <a href="https://www.nord-stream2.com/construction/overview/">Nord Stream 2</a> pipeline project.</p>
<p>The first Nord Stream pipeline, completed in 2011, links Vyborg in Russia and Greifswald in Germany via the Baltic Sea. Nord Stream 2 will link Ust-Luga in Russia to Greifswald in <a href="https://www.politikaspolecnost.cz/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/US-Sanctions-on-Nord-Stream-2-IPPS.pdf">Germany</a>. Since <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1221/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22russia%22%5D%7D&r=65">2017</a>, Washington has imposed a series of sanctions on firms and individuals involved in the construction with the aim of blocking it and stopping it permanently.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/05/19/998336244/biden-to-waive-sanctions-for-company-building-russian-gas-pipeline">Biden</a> administration admits, however, that the US sanctions are currently unlikely to succeed, as the project is almost complete and his government wants to improve relations with <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/02/22/970278644/biden-faces-decision-on-gas-pipeline-from-russia-that-could-alienate-germany">Germany</a>.</p>
<h2>Why the US opposes Nord Stream 2</h2>
<p>Washington opposes Nord Stream 2 because the pipeline will increase Europe’s <a href="http://pbr.put.ac.ir/article_115496.html">dependence</a> on Russian gas exports, and because these exports to Europe undermine the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-quelles-conditions-les-sanctions-internationales-sont-elles-efficaces-145079">effectiveness</a> of the US sanctions that have been in place against the country since 2014 due to the conflict in <a href="https://corpus.ulaval.ca/jspui/handle/20.500.11794/27745">Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>The Trump administration also had its <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019C06/">economic interests</a> in mind when imposing sanctions – by reducing access to Russian gas, it hoped to increase its own <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/08/12/opposition-to-nord-stream-2-makes-no-sense-for-america-or-europe-pub-77038">exports</a> of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to the European continent.</p>
<p>In 2017, US Congress adopted the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3364/text">Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act</a> (CAATSA) and the Senate passed the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act, both designed to block Nord Stream 2. But when the European Commission expressed its readiness to adopt counter-sanctions if the White House adopted coercive measures, discussions surrounding potential sanctions were temporarily <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07036337.2019.1708344">suspended</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/414163/original/file-20210802-24-wgvque.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of the proposed Nord Stream and connecting pipelines" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/414163/original/file-20210802-24-wgvque.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/414163/original/file-20210802-24-wgvque.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/414163/original/file-20210802-24-wgvque.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/414163/original/file-20210802-24-wgvque.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/414163/original/file-20210802-24-wgvque.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/414163/original/file-20210802-24-wgvque.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/414163/original/file-20210802-24-wgvque.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map of the proposed Nord Stream and connecting pipelines.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nord_Stream#/media/File:Nordstream.png">Samuel Bailey</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In November 2019, however, the US announced that the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2500">US National Defense Authorization Act</a> would include sanctions targeting companies and individuals involved in the construction of the pipeline. Fearing these sanctions, the Swiss company Allseas and the Italian company Saipem suspended their <a href="https://www.politikaspolecnost.cz/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/US-Sanctions-on-Nord-Stream-2-IPPS.pdf">collaboration</a> with Gazprom before the construction of Nord Stream 2 was completed.</p>
<h2>Secondary sanctions</h2>
<p>There were several problems with US sanctions against Nord Stream, mainly because of Section 232 of <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3364/text">CAATSA</a>, which allows <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019C06/">secondary sanctions</a> to be imposed on people and entities outside the US.</p>
<p>As a foreign policy tool, sanctions normally serve to influence the behaviour of sanctioned states, according to the preferences of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-quelles-conditions-les-sanctions-internationales-sont-elles-efficaces-145079">sanctioning state</a>. However, secondary sanctions force foreign companies and firms to comply with the US international agenda, even if it runs counter to the <a href="https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol89/iss3/5/">interests</a> of their own state.</p>
<p>Secondary sanctions don’t distinguish between <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/SecondarySanctions_Final.pdf">allies</a> and foes, and can target any company doing business with a partner considered hostile to the US. Washington argues that secondary sanctions do not impose any <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Sanctions%2C-Sanctions-Everywhere%3A-Forging-a-Path-Rathbone-Jeydel/19e4d82ae4b28b42ceedda6ddae1cb54110a06a7">penalties</a> on other states, but their purpose is to prevent foreign firms from accessing the US market if the US deems that these firms are pursuing activities that run counter to its <a href="https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/8675351">interests</a>.</p>
<p>The US has successfully used secondary sanctions to <a href="https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/sipri-policy-briefs/european-non-proliferation-diplomacy-shadow-secondary-sanctions">discourage</a> many European companies from investing in <a href="https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol89/iss3/5/">Iran</a> since 2017. Fearing it would be denied access to the US market, the French energy company <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/electric-power/042921-too-early-for-total-to-consider-a-return-to-iran-cfo">Total</a> withdrew from a US$1 billion partnership with Iran in 2018.</p>
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<p>The United States allows itself to adopt such policies because of its leading role <a href="https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol89/iss3/5/">world economy</a> and the notorious importance of its market for the <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/meeting_the_challenge_of_secondary_sanctions/">European</a> continent. In the case of Nord Stream 2, the European Union has publicly and vehemently opposed the measures and <a href="https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/8675351">questioned their legality</a>.</p>
<h2>Supporters of sanctions</h2>
<p>Some European countries supported Washington’s hard line on Nord Stream 2. <a href="https://www.gtreview.com/magazine/volume-18-issue-1/nord-stream-2-spells-pain-ukraine/">Ukraine</a> undoubtedly had the greatest interest in supporting the US in its attempts to block the pipeline. A significant proportion of Russian gas destined for the European market currently transits through Ukraine. Revenues generated from transit fees paid by Russia and the EU accounted for 3% of Ukraine’s total <a href="https://www.politikaspolecnost.cz/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/US-Sanctions-on-Nord-Stream-2-IPPS.pdf">GDP</a> in 2017. Nord Stream 2, connecting Russia directly to Germany, will allow Russia and the EU to save these <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_nord_stream_2_ecfr_opinions/">transit</a> fees because it bypasses Ukraine.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.politikaspolecnost.cz/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/US-Sanctions-on-Nord-Stream-2-IPPS.pdf">Poland</a> is equally opposed to the project. Poland also benefits from transit costs due to the pipelines on its territory, although to a much lesser extent than Ukraine. But Warsaw would like to become a <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_nord_stream_2_ecfr_opinions/">hub</a> for US liquefied natural gas, so the Polish government has a strong interest in supporting US measures and potentially liquefied gas exports to Europe. Finally, Poland fears that Nord Stream 2 will increase Russian <a href="https://www.politikaspolecnost.cz/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/US-Sanctions-on-Nord-Stream-2-IPPS.pdf">influence</a> in Europe.</p>
<p>As the first Nord Stream project was launched in 2006, Polish Defence Minister Radoslaw Sikorski compared the pipeline to the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/08/12/opposition-to-nord-stream-2-makes-no-sense-for-america-or-europe-pub-77038">Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact</a> of 1939, an agreement of non-aggression between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union that led to the division of Poland. Since 2006, other <a href="https://www.politikaspolecnost.cz/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/US-Sanctions-on-Nord-Stream-2-IPPS.pdf">voices</a> have spoken out against the Nord Stream 2 project, including Estonian Foreign Minister Sven Mikser and Lithuanian Prime Minister Saulius Skvernelis.</p>
<p>Having tried to block the project since 2017, the United States ultimately preferred to lift sanctions on 19 May. But Biden says he remains opposed to the pipeline. And the US continues to apply secondary sanctions elsewhere in the world, most notably in Iran. In doing so, Washington is essentially forcing European businesses to follow its own foreign policy or risk being locked out of the US market.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165275/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sophie Marineau ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>By waiving sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 pipeline linking Russia and Germany, the United States is paving the way for the controversial project to go ahead.Sophie Marineau, Doctorante en histoire des relations internationales / PhD candidate in History, International relations, Université catholique de Louvain (UCLouvain)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1624132021-06-23T12:24:02Z2021-06-23T12:24:02ZHow Vladimir Putin uses natural gas to exert Russian influence and punish his enemies<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407244/original/file-20210618-22-1e9qelu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=50%2C0%2C5568%2C3667&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pipes for Russia's Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline are loaded onto a ship at a German port, June 1, 2021.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/june-2021-mecklenburg-western-pomerania-putbus-pipes-for-news-photo/1233216507">Stefan Sauer/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent U.S.-Russia summit between Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin suggests that a controversial Russian natural gas pipeline, <a href="https://www.gazprom.com/projects/nord-stream2/">Nord Stream 2</a>, is a done deal. </p>
<p>If completed as planned by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nord-stream-2-completion/gazprom-chairman-says-nord-stream-2-gas-pipeline-to-be-finished-this-year-despite-u-s-pressure-tass-idUSKBN2BI1G7">the end of this year</a>, Nord Stream 2 will convey 55 billion cubic meters of gas per year from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea and thence to the rest of Europe. It is expected to bring <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1119244/nord-stream-2-value-added-to-gdp-by-country/">US$3.2 billion</a> to Russia annually. </p>
<p>Construction had been halted for over a year by U.S. sanctions passed in 2019 on the pipeline’s construction and financing. Sanctions were <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-broadens-sanctions-to-thwart-completion-of-russian-gas-pipeline-11603193032?mod=article_relatedinline">later expanded in 2020</a>. <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/08/politics/biden-putin-summit-us-ambassador/index.html">Some Russia experts</a> expected those sanctions to be a <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/a-pipeline-deal-could-help-end-putins-ukraine-war/">bargaining chip for Biden at the recent Geneva summit to pressure Putin</a> over Russian occupation of territories in Ukraine and Georgia; <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus-leader-flies-into-russia-talks-with-putin-amid-uproar-over-air-piracy-2021-05-28/">support for Belarus’ dictatorial regime</a>; violation of human rights within Russia; and the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-fsb-poisoning-poet/31300656.html">poisoning, jailing</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/09/world/russia-navalny-groups-extremists-intl/index.html">outlawing of political opposition</a>. </p>
<p>Instead, a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-waive-sanctions-firm-ceo-behind-russias-nord-stream-2-pipeline-source-2021-05-19/">month before the summit, the White House</a> lifted sanctions on Nord Stream 2, dismaying <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/biden-comes-under-fire-congress-after-waiving-sanctions-russian-gas-n1267975">some U.S. legislators</a> and <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukrainians-fear-betrayal-over-putins-pipeline/">U.S. partners</a> <a href="https://kafkadesk.org/2021/05/21/poland-angered-by-us-president-bidens-nord-stream-ii-decision/">in Europe</a>. </p>
<p>The pipeline project is a <a href="https://www.nord-stream2.com/company/shareholder-and-financial-investors/">joint venture between</a> a handful of European gas companies and Russian giant Gazprom, a majority state-owned company that is the largest gas supplier in the world. For Putin, the pipeline is an opportunity to increase his influence in Europe by deepening the region’s dependence on Russian energy. </p>
<p>Natural gas has been the bedrock of Putin’s power both <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=9s2NCgAAQBAJ&lpg=PR11&ots=ivm6gRqcHu&lr&pg=PR1#v=onepage&q&f=false">domestically</a> and <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=9VreAGr8sk4C&lpg=PR7&ots=UqznWme4Xv&dq=putin%20and%20gas%20&lr&pg=PR7#v=onepage&q=putin%20and%20gas&f=false">internationally</a> for decades. Nord Stream 2 gives the Russian leader a new direct and powerful line of control in Western Europe. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407255/original/file-20210618-21-16dz7w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Vladimir Putin (left) and Joe Biden (right) stand in front of a door. Putin is facing the camera with a neutral expression. Biden is turned slightly to the left to look at Putin." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407255/original/file-20210618-21-16dz7w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407255/original/file-20210618-21-16dz7w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407255/original/file-20210618-21-16dz7w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407255/original/file-20210618-21-16dz7w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407255/original/file-20210618-21-16dz7w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407255/original/file-20210618-21-16dz7w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407255/original/file-20210618-21-16dz7w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Biden and Putin had a tense if cordial meeting in Geneva.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-and-us-president-joe-biden-news-photo/1233483765">Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images News via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How Putin controls Russian oil</h2>
<p>Since taking office in 2000, Putin began seizing control of the Russian gas and oil industry. He <a href="https://www.companieshistory.com/gazprom/">renationalized Gazprom</a>, the state oil company that had been privatized after the fall of the Soviet Union. </p>
<p>Scholarly research has demonstrated that regaining government <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=9VreAGr8sk4C&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=pertostate+Russia&ots=Uqzn-nc5Sv&sig=Fo-gM0mZX4V9DTSb4yOR3AKenlM#v=onepage&q=pertostate%20Russia&f=false">control over the gas and oil industry</a> contributed to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.12.018">consolidation of authoritarianism</a> in Russia. And it coincided with crackdowns on Putin’s political opposition. </p>
<p>In 2003 Mikhail Khodorkovsky, owner of the Yukos oil company and a <a href="https://khodorkovsky.com/biography/falling-afoul-of-the-kremlin/">vocal critic of Putin’s growing authoritarianism</a>, became the regime’s first famous political prisoner, after he was arrested at gunpoint and imprisoned for 10 years for tax evasion. Yukos was eventually seized by the government and absorbed into the state-owned companies.</p>
<p>By the end of his first term in office in 2004, Putin’s government had significant control over oil and gas production in Russia, which is the one of <a href="https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/RUS">largest producers and exporters in the world</a>. Proceeds collected from oil and gas sales allowed Putin to pay for his domestic agenda and boost military spending. It also gave him <a href="https://doi.org/10.2753/PPC1075-8216550401">extraordinary leverage</a> over neighboring countries that relied on Russia for their energy needs. </p>
<p>For example, in <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/new-era-gas-wars-between-ukraine-and-russia">2006 and 2009</a>, when the Ukrainian government adopted more pro-Western policies and upset the Kremlin, Russia outright <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7806870.stm">shut off the country’s gas supply</a> – and by extension, shut off the gas of countries down the supply line in Central and Western Europe, including Germany.</p>
<h2>Russia versus Europe</h2>
<p>As a direct line of supply from Russia to Europe, Nord Stream 2 could avoid such problems for Western Europe in the future. But it also opens Western Europe to the same kind of <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/what-will-the-impact-be-if-nord-stream-2-is-completed/">direct Russian pressure</a> it has used to punish Ukraine. So the proposed pipeline has been divisive.</p>
<p>Nord Stream 2 has already produced a <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/the-nord-stream-2-dispute-and-the-transatlantic-alliance/">rift between NATO allies</a>, even before its completion. </p>
<p>Sweden, Poland and the Baltic countries, for example, <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/03/31/putins-pipeline-of-aggression-how-the-nord-stream-2-threatens-the-west/">have all raised concerns</a>, citing environmental problems related to construction and maintenance of the pipeline. They worry that Russia will use its new pipeline infrastructure to increase its military naval presence in the Baltic Sea. That would increase Russia’s intelligence-gathering capacity. </p>
<p>Further “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qdynrvhDXow">crumbling NATO</a>,” as Putin puts it – sowing divisions in the alliance – would be a win for his regime. </p>
<p>The Russian leader sees NATO, which he calls a Cold War relic, as the greatest threat to Russian security. Disunity in Europe allows Russia to continue pursuing political repression of its own citizens and territorial aggression against neighboring nations with less foreign interference.</p>
<h2>Ukraine’s dilemma</h2>
<p>For Ukraine, Nord Stream 2 presents both a security and financial threat.</p>
<p>Ukraine largely <a href="https://pgjonline.com/news/2020/08-august/ukraine-says-no-plans-to-resume-gas-purchases-from-russia">stopped buying gas from Russia</a> in 2015 following Russia’s <a href="https://ua.usembassy.gov/seven-years-of-illegal-occupation-of-the-autonomous-republic-of-crimea/">2014 annexation</a> of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea and support for a <a href="https://microsites-live-backend.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine">still-deadly Russian-sponsored separatist war in Donbas</a>, in eastern Ukraine. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407257/original/file-20210618-25-i5tfig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Russian military vehicles lined up on the road for military drills." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407257/original/file-20210618-25-i5tfig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407257/original/file-20210618-25-i5tfig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407257/original/file-20210618-25-i5tfig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407257/original/file-20210618-25-i5tfig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407257/original/file-20210618-25-i5tfig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407257/original/file-20210618-25-i5tfig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407257/original/file-20210618-25-i5tfig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Russian military drill in April 2021 in Crimea, a former territory of Ukraine that was annexed by Russia in 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/USRussiaSummitNervousAllies/4b7fc2596433463a83e0aac951d64d2a">AP Photo/Russian Defense Ministry Press Service</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, Ukraine still collects up to <a href="https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/volodimir-zelenskij-pid-chas-zustrichi-z-senatorami-ssha-piv-68781">US$3 billion in annual fees</a> because Russian gas currently runs through a pipeline in Ukrainian territory to get to Europe.</p>
<p>Nord Stream 2 will deprive Ukraine of this income. According to Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky, the money lost in gas transit fees will mean Ukraine will have “<a href="https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/volodimir-zelenskij-pid-chas-zustrichi-z-senatorami-ssha-piv-68781">nothing to pay for the Ukrainian army</a>” to defend Ukraine from further Russian aggression. </p>
<p>In April 2021, observers documented a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-military-build-up-near-ukraine-numbers-more-than-150000-troops-eus-2021-04-19/">build-up of Russian military</a> at Ukraine’s border with Russia, as well as in the waters of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-orders-soldiers-back-from-ukraine-border-after-weeks-of-tension/a-57288083">Russian military pulled back after a few weeks</a>, but there is evidence that some 80,000 Russian troops remain near Ukraine, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/05/us/politics/biden-putin-russia-ukraine.html">along with military equipment</a>, including trucks and armored vehicles.</p>
<p>Zelensky says the pipeline has become a “<a href="https://www.axios.com/zelensky-biden-ukraine-russia-nord-stream-pipeline-fe50756b-6b82-43f0-b390-734ea3e95de0.html">real weapon</a>” against Ukraine. In Kyiv, fears are that once Russia stops relying on Ukraine for transit to Europe, Putin will begin to <a href="https://euobserver.com/world/152059">exert more pressure</a> on the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56678665">Ukrainian government</a> over the warring Donbas region or resume military aggression. </p>
<p>The risk may not be worth the reward of <a href="https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/gas-pipeline-nord-stream-2-links-germany-russia-splits-europe">cheaper gas prices</a> for European consumers. The economic boost that Russia will likely receive from capturing the European gas market will further enrich Putin’s kleptocratic regime – and, history shows, finance his undemocratic projects in Eastern Europe and beyond.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lena Surzhko Harned does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nord Stream 2 is a pipeline that will deliver Russian gas to Western Europe – and, by extension, increase Putin’s influence across the continent. That makes Ukraine and some other countries nervous.Lena Surzhko Harned, Assistant Teaching Professor of Political Science, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.