tag:theconversation.com,2011:/es/topics/nuclear-proliferation-8287/articlesNuclear proliferation – The Conversation2024-02-08T20:28:17Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223522024-02-08T20:28:17Z2024-02-08T20:28:17ZAre American nuclear weapons returning to the United Kingdom?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574141/original/file-20240207-20-1vhhx4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C225%2C5184%2C2925&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A U.S. Air Force fighter jet takes off from RAF Lakenheath in the U.K. in 2018. American nuclear weapons may soon be hosted there.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In August 2023, nuclear weapons researchers <a href="https://fas.org/publication/increasing-evidence-that-the-us-air-forces-nuclear-mission-may-be-returning-to-uk-soil/">Matt Korda and Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists reported</a> it was increasingly apparent the United States was upgrading its <a href="https://installations.militaryonesource.mil/in-depth-overview/raf-lakenheath">Lakenheath military base</a> in the United Kingdom. </p>
<p>This base hosted American nuclear weapons in the past, which raises questions about whether they’re returning. Citing Pentagon documents it obtained, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/01/26/us-nuclear-bombs-lackenheath-raf-russia-threat-hiroshima/"><em>The Telegraph</em> also reported</a> on the developments, noting it would be the first time in 15 years that U.S. nuclear weapons would be stationed on British soil. </p>
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<p>While there is no official confirmation about the move, <em>The Telegraph</em> reports that the U.S. is currently building the specific facilities needed to store nuclear weapons at Lakenheath. </p>
<p>This would also mean that for the first time since 1972, NATO is considering an expansion to its <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm">nuclear sharing arrangements</a>. Through these arrangements, the U.S. has stationed some of its nuclear weapons on its allies’ territory since the early days of the Cold War. </p>
<h2>Hosting American nukes</h2>
<p>At its height in the 1960s, 13 states hosted American nuclear weapons at the same time, including Canada. Yet in the last few decades, this number has gradually dwindled to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/nuclear-weapons-europe-mapping-us-and-russian-deployments">only five NATO members: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey</a>. <a href="https://www.nti.org/countries/canada/">Canada withdrew in 1984</a>, as did Greece in 2001. The United Kingdom was the most recent country to exit the scheme in 2009.</p>
<p>The nuclear weapons hosted by the five participants are <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3571660/department-of-defense-announces-pursuit-of-b61-gravity-bomb-variant/">B61 gravity bombs</a> and can be delivered by aircraft, such as German and Italian Tornados, F-22s and the newer American F-35s. Under nuclear sharing, they would be flown into combat by the European participants’ own pilots. </p>
<p>Their yield is variable, and can be as high as more than <a href="https://www.popsci.com/technology/new-nuclear-gravity-bomb-b61-13/">five times</a> that of the <a href="https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/museums/nmusn/explore/photography/wwii/wwii-pacific/bombardment-japan/bombs-atomic/little-boy-hiroshima.html">“Little Boy” bomb dropped on Hiroshima that killed more than 100,000 people</a>.</p>
<p>While B61 gravity bombs are perceived to have little military utility, this move is important in terms of optics and is clearly connected to Russia’s hostility toward the West, its war in Ukraine and Moscow’s <a href="https://time.com/6266418/russia-belarus-nuclear-weapons/">own announcement</a> that it <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65932700">would deploy</a> some of its nuclear weapons in Belarus. </p>
<h2>High international threat environment</h2>
<p>Russia’s war against Ukraine has fundamentally altered the international security environment. European members of NATO, especially those bordering Russia, are experiencing heightened insecurity. </p>
<p>Whereas the post-Cold War security environment had made NATO members question the relevance of nuclear sharing, recent events have reignited the debate on the alliance’s nuclear capabilities. </p>
<p>In the 2010s, members <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2021.1941603">like Germany</a> were questioning their participation in the scheme. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, that is no longer the case: consensus among nuclear sharing participants has been strengthened. </p>
<p>In a forthcoming research article in <em>International Affairs</em>, we surmise this kind of reinforcement or expansion of nuclear sharing could be the result of the Ukraine war and the changing threat perception of NATO members, which has slowed down the political momentum of anti-nuclear voices.</p>
<p>From NATO’s perspective, nuclear sharing serves two important goals. The first is to deter rivals or potential enemies by demonstrating U.S. resolve and strength. The second is to reassure NATO’s own members. </p>
<p>Stationing its bombs in Europe means the United States cannot sit out conflicts in the region. Reassuring NATO nations is the goal that appears most closely connected to this new development, as European members have repeatedly called for a reinforcement of NATO’s stand against Russia.</p>
<p>NATO members, particularly those in eastern Europe, fear a Russian invasion of their territory. By stationing some of its nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom again, the U.S. is matching Russia’s new deployment in Belarus. But more importantly, it makes clear its presence in Europe isn’t fleeting.</p>
<h2>Nuclear sharing remains contentious</h2>
<p>Ever since the 2000s, there has been considerable pressure coming from citizens in NATO nations to withdraw from nuclear sharing. German, <a href="https://www.egmontinstitute.be/app/uploads/2014/01/KDGnonproliferatie.pdf">Belgian and Dutch</a> decision-makers publicly considered removing the bombs from their territory. </p>
<p>In the absence of credible and overt threats to their security, and without forceful pressure coming from NATO itself, it had become difficult for these countries’ leaders to uphold the arrangement. After all, it’s hard for a democratic state to pursue certain avenues when it lacks the public support to do so. </p>
<p>The current Russian threat has overtaken these preoccupations.</p>
<p>Much like any other political arrangement, however, NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement can be contentious and subject to renegotiations, as shown by <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-05/poland-is-in-talks-with-us-about-nuclear-weapons-president-says">Poland’s demands</a> to also host American nuclear weapons. </p>
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<p>NATO and its member states will no doubt use this opportunity to update its case for nuclear sharing and the existence of the alliance itself as it marks its <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_222205.htm">75th anniversary</a> in <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50115.htm">July 2024</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222352/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Émile Lambert-Deslandes receives funding from the Department of National Defence's MINDS program and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stéfanie von Hlatky has received funding from the NATO Science For Peace and Security Programme for research on Women, Peace, and Security.</span></em></p>NATO members, particularly those in eastern Europe, fear a Russian invasion of their territory. By stationing some of its nuclear weapons in the U.K. again, the U.S. could ease those fears.Émile Lambert-Deslandes, PhD student in International Relations, Queen's University, OntarioStéfanie von Hlatky, Associate Professor of Political Studies and Fellow at the Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen's University, OntarioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2003952023-02-22T09:08:57Z2023-02-22T09:08:57ZRussia pulls out of New Start nuclear treaty – we’ve already seen how such agreements have limited aggression against Ukraine<p>Vladimir Putin’s decision to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/21/putin-russia-halt-participation-new-start-nuclear-arms-treaty">pull out of the New Start nuclear weapons treaty</a> with the United States will have predictable responses. </p>
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<p>Stocks in defence corporations will rise at the prospect of new markets for nuclear missiles. Disciples of deterrence will reassure the public that arms control was never really needed. Those who fear the end of the world as we know it will sound the alarm – playing into Putin’s hands, some will say, by causing alarm and weakness in the west.</p>
<p>Others may point out that the US and Nato have such <a href="https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/defence/104574/nato-vs-russia-who-would-win#:%7E:text=The%20combined%20total%20of%20Nato,times%20as%20many%20military%20ships.">technical and financial dominance</a> that Putin is damaging his own interest by giving up controls. On the contrary, leaving Russia unconstrained to attach comparatively cheap and terrifying nuclear weapons to any aircraft, vessel or missile will be a nightmare for deterrence planners.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/what-is-new-start-nuclear-arms-treaty-2023-02-21/">new strategic arms reduction treaty</a> was the latest in a series of agreements stretching back half a century <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USRussiaNuclearAgreements">between the US and Russia (and before, the USSR) </a> on their nuclear weapons. The treaty limits each state to no more than 1,550 nuclear weapons fitted to up to a total of 700 missiles and aircraft. </p>
<p>There have been no limits on anti-missile missile systems since 2002 when the US <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002-07/news/us-withdraws-abm-treaty-global-response-muted">ended an agreement on these</a>. This is one factor motivating Putin to abandon controls on missiles as <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-the-us-win-world-war-iii-without-using-nuclear-weapons-94771">US defences improve along with conventional strike missiles</a>. </p>
<p>New Start includes provisions for each side to inspect the other’s weapons to verify the agreement is working. And, at present, neither the US or Russia are accusing the other of violations.</p>
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our weekly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>The types of missiles and planes governed by New Start can carry thousands more weapons than they do at present. Back in the 1970s, nuclear bombs were routinely as small as 10cm in diameter so that large numbers of <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Multiple-Independently_New-1.pdf">multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles</a> could be fitted to a single missile. </p>
<p>It was the prospect of unlimited production of such weapons that concentrated the minds of US and Soviet decision makers to realise that they had a collective interest in limits.</p>
<p>From the Russian perspective, ending New Start is a natural result of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/12/putin-russia-us-missile-defense-nato-ukraine/">failing to get US agreement on missile defences</a> and conventional strike weapons.</p>
<h2>Arms treaties can work</h2>
<p>One treaty in particular has shown the value of disarmament during the Ukraine war. It might be surprising given the bombardments of Ukraine, but the 1987 <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty">intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty</a> has <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-gorbachevs-1987-inf-missile-treaty-has-limited-the-arsenal-available-to-putin-189750">denied Russia thousands more missiles</a> that it could have used.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-gorbachevs-1987-inf-missile-treaty-has-limited-the-arsenal-available-to-putin-189750">Ukraine war: how Gorbachev's 1987 INF missile treaty has limited the arsenal available to Putin</a>
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<p>Thanks to the agreement struck by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, leaders of the US and USSR respectively at the time, Russian forces attacking Ukraine have not been able to use ground-to-ground ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges from 500km to 5,500km.</p>
<p>The treaty was actually <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-nuclear-treaty-between-russia-and-the-us-is-falling-apart-can-it-be-saved-111024">cancelled by Donald Trump in 2019</a>. But only <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_162996.htm">one Russian missile type</a> that apparently violated the treaty – <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ssc-8-novator-9m729/#:%7E:text=The%20SSC%2D8%20is%20a,a%20range%20of%202%2C500%20km.">the 9M729</a> – exists. And as it has a nuclear-only role, it has not, so far, been used in Ukraine. </p>
<p>When the INF treaty was implemented, thousands of the Soviet Union’s most modern missiles were decommissioned, along with their US equivalents. Today a huge proportion of Russian munitions used in Ukraine are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/06/19/world/europe/ukraine-munitions-war-crimes.html">vintage Soviet systems</a>. </p>
<p>With conventionally armed INF missiles of similar vintage with ranges over 500km, Lviv and other centres in western Ukraine could have been devastated. Russia has instead had to use limited numbers of missiles built for air and sea launch as well as manned bombers to attack targets deeper than 500km from Russian (and Belarusian) territory.</p>
<p>The process that produced the extraordinarily effective INF treaty provides important guidance for a renaissance in disarmament in the 21st century. Back then – despite an intense confrontation between the two antagonists – successful agreements were reached to avert a catastrophic nuclear exchange. </p>
<h2>Negotiate from strength</h2>
<p>How could new arms reduction treaties be put in place? “Negotiate from strength” is a powerful argument in diplomacy. Fortunately, the US and its allies already enjoy a more than <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-force-planning-and-impact-ukraine-war#:%7E:text=If%20one%20uses%20the%20NATO,17.8%20times%20the%20Russian%20figure.">ten-to-one superiority</a> in military spending over Russia. </p>
<p>Unless western taxpayers have been badly served, this spending has translated into effective technologies, despite the Kremlin’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/hypersonic-missiles-are-fuelling-fears-of-a-new-superpower-arms-race-172716">rhetoric over hypersonics</a> and Putin’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-produces-first-nuclear-warheads-poseidon-super-torpedo-tass-2023-01-16/">doomsday nuclear torpedoes</a>. </p>
<p>Nuclear powers often argue that nuclear disarmament is necessarily connected to concerns they have about non-nuclear forces and security in their regions. This is evident in the outbreaks of violence between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, as well as the devastation caused by conventional forces which has been so evident in Ukraine.</p>
<p>A new global initiative might pick up the call from the G20 that “<a href="https://www.theweek.in/news/world/2022/11/15/g20-communique-set-to-state-that-todays-era-must-not-be-of-war.html">ours must not be an era of war</a>” the subject of an upcoming <a href="https://scrapweapons.com/todays-era-must-not-be-of-war/">event at SOAS University of London</a>. Following the INF treaty mantra of a <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0113keeperfile/">zero option</a>, such an initiative could seek a global zero on missiles of all kinds down to a range of, say, 150km. </p>
<p>Negotiation is rarely easy, but Putin’s Russia is far weaker than was the Soviet Union with whom solid agreements were made. Meanwhile, Ukraine should have all the support it needs to restore its territorial integrity and the return of its citizens – not least the thousands of <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-identify-nearly-14000-children-abducted-deported-russia-1774522">kidnapped children</a>. But in the end weapons control is essential to survival in the long term.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200395/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dan Plesch receives funding from the the Rowntree |Trust. </span></em></p>Russia is walking away from the last remaining treaty designed to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.Dan Plesch, Professor at the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1929352022-10-28T00:02:07Z2022-10-28T00:02:07ZDealing with a ‘bloody messy’ world – the urgent foreign policy challenges facing NZ<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492212/original/file-20221027-37192-mm2840.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C33%2C7465%2C4943&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jacinda Ardern addressing the UN General Assembly in September 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since Jacinda Ardern described the state of world affairs as “<a href="https://www.1news.co.nz/2022/07/07/jacinda-ardern-says-the-world-is-bloody-messy-in-sydney-speech/">bloody messy</a>” earlier this year there have been few, if any, signs of improvement. Ukraine, China, nuclear proliferation and the lasting impacts of a global pandemic all present urgent, unresolved challenges.</p>
<p>For a small country in an increasingly lawless world this is both dangerous and confronting. Without the military or economic scale to influence events directly, New Zealand relies on its voice and ability to persuade.</p>
<p>But by placing its faith in a rules-based order and United Nations processes, New Zealand also has to work with – and sometimes around – highly imperfect systems. In some areas of international law and policy the machinery is failing. It’s unclear what the next best step might be.</p>
<p>Given these uncertainties, then, where has New Zealand done well on the international stage, and where might it need to find a louder voice or more constructive proposals?</p>
<h2>Confronting Russia</h2>
<p>Strength and clarity have been most evident in New Zealand’s response to the Russian attack on Ukraine. There has been no hint of joining the <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/09/1129102">abstainers</a> or <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129492">waverers</a> at crucial UN votes condemning Russia’s actions.</p>
<p>While it can be argued New Zealand could do more in terms of <a href="https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2022/0006/latest/whole.html">sanctions</a> and <a href="https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/europe/ukraine/russian-invasion-of-ukraine">support</a> for the Ukrainian military, the government has made good use of the available international forums.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-plays-the-annexation-card-pushing-the-war-in-ukraine-into-a-dangerous-new-phase-191165">Putin plays the annexation card, pushing the war in Ukraine into a dangerous new phase</a>
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<p>Joining the <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-join-international-court-justice-case-against-russia">International Court of Justice case</a> against “Russia’s spurious attempt to justify its invasion under international law” and <a href="https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/russia-ukraine-war-nz-supports-international-call-for-war-crimes-accountability/IJLKMF24BBAWXRPIKUPLSNVEHU/">supporting the International Criminal Court</a> investigation into possible war crimes in Ukraine are both excellent initiatives.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, similar avenues have been blocked when it comes to other critical issues New Zealand has a vested interest in seeing resolved properly.</p>
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<h2>China and human rights</h2>
<p>This has been especially apparent in the debate about human rights abuses in China, and allegations of genocide made by some countries over the treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang.</p>
<p>New Zealand and some other countries correctly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/04/new-zealand-draws-back-from-calling-chinese-abuses-of-uyghurs-genocide">avoided</a> using the word “genocide”, which has a <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml">precise legal meaning</a> best applied by UN experts, not domestic politicians. Instead, the government called on China to provide meaningful and unfettered access to UN and other independent observers.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-will-china-interact-with-the-world-over-the-next-5-years-xis-new-speech-holds-clues-192594">How will China interact with the world over the next 5 years? Xi’s new speech holds clues</a>
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<p>While not perfect, the visit went ahead. The eventual report by outgoing UN human rights commissioner Michelle Bachelet concluded that China had committed <a href="https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/22273382/22-08-31-final-assesment_unhr.pdf">serious human rights violations</a>, which could amount to crimes against humanity.</p>
<p>This should have forced the international community to act. Instead, 19 countries voted with China to block a debate at the UN Human Rights Council (17 wanted the debate, 11 abstained). The upshot was that China succeeded in driving the issue into a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/06/un-vote-ignore-human-rights-abuses-china-leaves-west-dead-end">diplomatic dead-end</a>. </p>
<p>Allowing an organisation designed to protect victims to be controlled by alleged perpetrators isn’t something New Zealand should accept. The government should make it a diplomatic priority to become a member of the council, and it should use every opportunity to speak out and keep the issue in the global spotlight.</p>
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<h2>Arms control</h2>
<p>Elsewhere, New Zealand’s foreign policy can arguably be found wanting – most evidently, perhaps, in the area of nuclear arms regulation.</p>
<p>Advocating for the complete prohibition of <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/475395/new-zealand-s-strong-and-firm-stance-on-nuclear-weapons-more-important-than-ever-ardern">all nuclear weapons</a>, as the prime minister did at the UN in September, might be inspiring and also good domestic politics, but it doesn’t make the world safer.</p>
<p>With the risk of nuclear conflagration at its <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/biden-armageddon-nuclear-risk-cuban-missile-crisis-russia-tensions/">highest since the Cuban missile crisis</a>, a better immediate goal would be improving the regulation, rather than prohibition, of nuclear weapons. This would entail convincing nuclear states to take their weapons off “<a href="https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/05/Hair-Trigger-Alert-Policy-Brief.pdf">hair-trigger alert</a>”.</p>
<p>The other goals should be the adoption of a <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/no-first-use/">no-first-use</a> policy by all nuclear powers (only <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/12/21/china-and-international-debate-on-no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons-pub-86070">China</a> has made such a commitment so far), and a push for regional arms control in the Indo-Pacific to rein in India, Pakistan and China.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nukes-allies-weapons-and-cost-4-big-questions-nzs-defence-review-must-address-188732">Nukes, allies, weapons and cost: 4 big questions NZ's defence review must address</a>
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<h2>Pandemic preparedness</h2>
<p>Finally, there is the danger of vital law and policy not just failing, but not even being born. This is the case with the World Health Organization’s so-called “<a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/01-12-2021-world-health-assembly-agrees-to-launch-process-to-develop-historic-global-accord-on-pandemic-prevention-preparedness-and-response">pandemic treaty</a>”, designed to better prevent, prepare for and respond to the next global pandemic.</p>
<p>New Zealand set out some <a href="https://www.health.govt.nz/system/files/documents/pages/new-zealand-submission-to-the-inb-april-2022.pdf">admirable goals</a> in its submission in April, but these have been watered down or are missing from the first <a href="https://apps.who.int/gb/inb/pdf_files/inb2/A_INB2_3-en.pdf">working draft</a> of the proposed agreement.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/on-the-brink-global-crises-ranging-from-climate-to-economic-meltdown-demand-radical-change-190641">On the brink: Global crises ranging from climate to economic meltdown demand radical change</a>
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<p>This shouldn’t be accepted lightly given the lessons of the past two-and-a-half years. Transparency by governments, a precautionary approach and the meaningful involvement of non-state actors will be essential.</p>
<p>Similarly, improved oversight of the 59 laboratories spread across 23 countries that work with the most dangerous pathogens is critical. Currently, only a <a href="https://theconversation.com/fifty-nine-labs-around-world-handle-the-deadliest-pathogens-only-a-quarter-score-high-on-safety-161777">quarter of these labs</a> score highly on safety. The proposed treaty does little to demand the kind of <a href="https://iegbbr.org/">biosecurity protocols</a> and <a href="https://www.iso.org/standard/71293.html">robust regulatory systems</a> required to better protect present and future generations.</p>
<p>As with the other urgent and difficult issues mentioned here, New Zealand’s future is directly connected to what happens elsewhere in the world. The challenge now is to keep adapting to this changing global order while being an effective voice for reason and the rule of law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192935/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Gillespie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Small states have limited power to influence global events, but New Zealand can still up its game in an increasingly lawless and dangerous world.Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of WaikatoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1869852022-07-14T12:32:34Z2022-07-14T12:32:34ZEnriching uranium is the key factor in how quickly Iran could produce a nuclear weapon – here’s where it stands today<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473964/original/file-20220713-9624-ktt0iy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C435%2C3199%2C1858&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A cascade of gas centrifuges at a U.S. enrichment plant in Piketon, Ohio, in 1984. Iran is using similar technology to enrich uranium.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/69/Gas_centrifuge_cascade.jpg">U.S. Department of Energy</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Iran’s nuclear program was a major topic in President Joe Biden’s July 13-16, 2022 trip to the Middle East. The most challenging part of producing nuclear weapons is making the material that fuels them, and Iran is known to have produced uranium that is near-weapons grade.</em> </p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked Brandeis University professor <a href="https://www.brandeis.edu/facultyguide/person.html?emplid=45b03f10247276eeaf30fadbc8afc2261b06795d">Gary Samore</a>, who worked on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation in the U.S. government for over 20 years, to explain why uranium enrichment is central to Iran’s nuclear ambitions and where the Iranian effort stands now.</em></p>
<h2>What does it mean to enrich uranium?</h2>
<p>Natural uranium contains two main isotopes, or forms whose atoms contain the same number of protons but different numbers of neutrons. It’s about 99.3% uranium-238 and 0.7% uranium-235. The uranium-235 isotope can be used to generate nuclear power for peaceful purposes, or nuclear explosives for military purposes. </p>
<p>Enrichment is the process of separating out and increasing the concentration of U-235 to higher levels above natural uranium. Generally speaking, lower levels of enriched uranium, such as uranium with 5% U-235, are commonly used for nuclear reactor fuel. Higher levels of enrichment, such as 90% U-235, are most desirable for nuclear weapons. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473966/original/file-20220713-2711-jxjxxz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Diagram of a single centrifuge for enriching uranium." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473966/original/file-20220713-2711-jxjxxz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473966/original/file-20220713-2711-jxjxxz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473966/original/file-20220713-2711-jxjxxz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473966/original/file-20220713-2711-jxjxxz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473966/original/file-20220713-2711-jxjxxz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473966/original/file-20220713-2711-jxjxxz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473966/original/file-20220713-2711-jxjxxz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A gas centrifuge separates uranium-235 atoms, which can sustain a nuclear chain reaction, from much more abundant atoms of uranium-238, which cannot. As the centrifuge rotates at high speed, uranium hexafluoride gas is pumped into it. The heavier U-238 molecules move toward the outer edge, and the lighter U-235 molecules move toward the center. The ‘product stream’ of gas enriched in U-235 is pumped through many more centrifuges, increasing the concentration of U-235 at each stage.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gas_centrifuge#/media/File:Countercurrent_Gas_Centrifuge.svg">Inductiveload/Wikipedia</a></span>
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<h2>For military purposes, why are higher levels of enrichment important?</h2>
<p>The higher the level of enrichment, the smaller the amount of nuclear material necessary to produce a nuclear weapon. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.iaea.org/">International Atomic Energy Agency</a> identifies 25 kilograms (55 pounds) of 90% enriched uranium as a “significant quantity” necessary for a simple nuclear weapon. But larger amounts of lower-enriched uranium can also work. </p>
<p>For example, the “<a href="https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/196219/little-boy-atomic-bomb/">Little Boy</a>” atomic bomb that the U.S. dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945 used about 64 kilograms of uranium (141 pounds) enriched to <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2015/02/the-weight-of-a-butterfly/">an average of 80% U-235</a>. </p>
<p>From a nuclear weapons design standpoint, smaller amounts of higher-enriched nuclear material are more desirable because that reduces the size and weight of the nuclear weapon and makes it easier to deliver. As a result, modern nuclear weapons based on uranium typically use uranium enriched to 90% to 93% U-235, which is known as weapons-grade uranium, for the primary fuel. </p>
<h2>What had Iran achieved prior to the 2015 nuclear deal?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal">2015 nuclear deal</a> between Iran, the U.S. China, France, the United Kingdom, Russia and Germany put significant restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, in return for relief from a number of international sanctions. When the deal was adopted, Iran had mastered the basic technology for enriching uranium with gas centrifuges – cylinders that spin uranium in gas form at very high speeds to separate the heavier U-238 isotope from the lighter U-235 isotope. </p>
<p>At its two principal enrichment facilities, <a href="https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/natanz-enrichment-complex/">Natanz</a> and <a href="https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/fordow-fuel-enrichment-plant/">Fordow</a>, Iran was operating about 18,000 first-generation IR-1 centrifuges and about 1,000 second-generation IR-2 centrifuges. It had also accumulated a stockpile of roughly 7,000 kilograms (about 15,430 pounds) of low-enriched uranium (under 5%) and about 200 kilograms (440 pounds) of 20% enrichment uranium. </p>
<p>Based on these capabilities, Iran’s “<a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/irans-nuclear-breakout-time-fact-sheet">breakout time</a>” to produce about 25 kilograms (55 pounds) of 90% enriched uranium – enough for a single nuclear weapon – was estimated to be one or two months. </p>
<p>Breakout time is not intended to suggest that Iran would necessarily decide to produce weapons-grade uranium at these inspected facilities, because the risk of detection and of potential negative international reaction is very high. </p>
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<h2>How did the nuclear deal constrain Iran’s activities?</h2>
<p>The 2015 nuclear deal put physical constraints on Iran’s enrichment program for 10 to 15 years, including the number and type of centrifuges Iran could operate, the size of its stockpile of low-enriched uranium and its maximum enrichment level. </p>
<p>For 15 years, no enrichment would take place at Fordow, and Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium would be limited to 300 kilograms (660 pounds) at a maximum enrichment level of 3.67%. And for 10 years, its centrifuges would be limited to about 6,000 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz. </p>
<p>In order to meet these physical limits, Iran <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/world/middleeast/iran-hands-over-stockpile-of-enriched-uranium-to-russia.html">shipped out to Russia</a> most of its stockpile of low-enriched uranium and its entire stockpile of 20% enriched uranium. It also <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2015-11-19/iran-dismantling-centrifuges-iaea-reports">dismantled for storage inside Iran</a> most of its IR-1 centrifuges and all of its more advanced IR-2 centrifuges. As a consequence of these limits, Iran’s “breakout time” was extended from a month or two before the deal to about one year after the deal.</p>
<p>After year 10 of the deal, however, Iran was allowed to start replacing its IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz with more advanced models, which it was permitted to continue to research and develop during the first decade of the deal. As these more powerful advanced centrifuges were installed, breakout time would probably have shrunk to about a few months by year 15 of the deal.</p>
<p>As part of the deal, Iran also agreed to enhanced international inspections and monitoring of its nuclear facilities. </p>
<h2>What has Iran done since President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the nuclear deal in 2018?</h2>
<p>Since the U.S. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html">withdrew from the nuclear deal</a>, Iran has gradually exceeded the agreement’s limits. It has increased its stockpile of 5% enriched uranium; resumed producing 20% enriched uranium; initiated production of 60% enriched uranium, resumed enrichment at Fordow; and manufactured and installed advanced centrifuges at both Natanz and Fordow. </p>
<p>Iran has also begun to restrict international monitoring of its nuclear facilities. In June 2022, for example, Iran announced that it was disconnecting cameras installed under the 2015 nuclear deal to monitor its nuclear facilities.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ZRaaaSxJSBc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi reacts to Iran’s removal of monitoring cameras from its nuclear facilities.</span></figcaption>
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<p>As of May 2022, the International Atomic Energy Agency estimated that Iran had about 1,000 kilograms (2,200 pounds) of 5% enriched uranium, about 240 kilograms (530 pounds) of 20% enriched uranium and <a href="https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/06/gov2022-24.pdf">40 kilograms (88 pounds) of 60% enriched uranium</a>. </p>
<p>As a result of this growing stockpile of enriched uranium and the use of advanced centrifuges, Iran’s estimated breakout time has been reduced to a few weeks. So far, however, Iran has not decided to begin production of weapons-grade (90%) enriched uranium, even though it is technically capable of doing so. </p>
<p>Most likely, Iran is behaving cautiously because its leaders are concerned that producing weapons-grade uranium would trigger a strong international reaction, which could range from additional sanctions to military attack.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186985/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gary Samore Samore previously served as President Barack Obama’s White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and President Bill Clinton’s Senior Director for Non-proliferation and Export Controls.</span></em></p>Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons centers on producing weapons-grade uranium. Here’s what reports about Iran enriching uranium indicate about its progress toward the bomb.Gary Samore, Professor of the Practice of Politics and Crown Family Director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1819862022-05-05T14:27:59Z2022-05-05T14:27:59ZUkraine war: Russian tests and Putin’s threats recall the nuclear fears of the cold war<p>Russia is reported to have held drills this week simulating “<a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/putin-just-did-a-dry-run-of-nuclear-capable-missile-strikes">nuclear-capable strikes</a>”. According to a <a href="https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12419904@egNews">statement by Russia’s ministry of defence</a>, forces of the Baltic Fleet in the Kaliningrad region, conducted training sessions to “deliver mock missile strikes with the crews of the Iskander operational-tactical missile systems”. The Iskander has a range of about 300km, so missiles launched from the Kaliningrad region could strike targets in western Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic States and even parts of Germany. </p>
<p>The latest drills follow the unveiling, on April 29, of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-tests-new-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-2022-04-20/">Russia’s new Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)</a>. The missile can deliver their payloads onto targets in the US up to 18,000km away. </p>
<p>Vladimir Putin said Sarmat “has no analogues in the world and will not have for a long time to come” and would be “food for thought for those who, in the heat of frenzied aggressive rhetoric, try to threaten our country”.</p>
<h2>Mutually assured destruction</h2>
<p>I am a researcher at RAF Fylingdales a <a href="http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/roadmap/irm/internet/surwarn/cat/html/bmws.htm">ballistic missile early warning (BMEWS)</a> station on the North York Moors. I have spent the past three years building the <a href="https://fylingdalesarchive.org.uk/blog/">Fylingdales Archive</a>, which charts the station’s 60-year history of watching the skies for signs of nuclear attack by ICBMs. BMEWS was built in response to the <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.org/thisday/oct4/ussr-launches-sputnik/">launch of Sputnik</a> in October 1957. Sputnik was the world’s first artificial satellite, launched from the top of the world’s first ICBM, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R-7_Semyorka">R-7</a>. The satellite demonstrated that the Soviet Union had the capability to <a href="https://airandspace.si.edu/exhibitions/space-race/online/sec200/sec250.htm">place a nuclear weapon on a rocket</a> and strike anywhere on Earth with little warning.</p>
<p>Early in 1958, in response to Sputnik, the US Congress signed into existence measures that form the foundations of modern strategic nuclear deterrence. In addition to BMEWS, Congress also approved the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SM-65_Atlas">Atlas</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SM-68_Titan">Titan</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGM-30_Minuteman">Minuteman</a> ICBM programmes. These technologies formed the basis of what became known as <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/z9jpn39/revision/2">mutually assured destruction</a> (Mad), meaning both sides of a potential nuclear conflict have enough firepower to destroy each other and the rest of the world.</p>
<h2>Mistakes and miscalculations</h2>
<p>Deterrence strategies such as Mad depend on a delicate game of psychological poker, the risk being that your opponent’s reaction might be far beyond what was anticipated. </p>
<p>The dangers of this did not take long to materialise. In the early 1960s, the US had its <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PGM-19_Jupiter">Jupiter</a> intermediate-range ballistic missiles stationed in Turkey and Italy, which Moscow felt could destroy Russia before it had a chance to retaliate. To level up their deterrent posture, Moscow started to deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461566/original/file-20220505-22-x6glb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="CIA map of Cuba from the 1962 missile crisis." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461566/original/file-20220505-22-x6glb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461566/original/file-20220505-22-x6glb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461566/original/file-20220505-22-x6glb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461566/original/file-20220505-22-x6glb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461566/original/file-20220505-22-x6glb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461566/original/file-20220505-22-x6glb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461566/original/file-20220505-22-x6glb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Flashpoint: CIA map showing the Soviet military presence in Cuba at the time of the 1962 missile crisis.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Karolis Kavolelis via Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>What ensued went into the history books as the <a href="https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/cuban-missile-crisis">Cuban missile crisis</a> – a standoff between the US and Soviet Union, with, between them, 29,700 warheads (the US had 26,400 to the Soviet Union’s 3,300). Each of these weapons on average was <a href="https://www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/effects/wenw/note1.html">tens of times more powerful</a> than the weapons used against Hiroshima. Happily, sanity prevailed and none were fired.</p>
<p>Following this crisis, measures were put in place to ease nuclear tensions between the US and the Soviet Union. These included establishing a hotline between Washington DC and Moscow and limiting the number of operational ICBMs. But this period of relative detente proved to be short-lived.</p>
<h2>The war scare and arms control</h2>
<p>The early 1980s marked a period of renewed mistrust between the nuclear superpowers and a growth in the size of nuclear arsenals. By 1986, there were 70,000 nuclear warheads shared almost equally between the US and Soviet Russia. How close the two sides came to confrontation was illustrated by the “<a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/aa83/2021-02-17/able-archer-war-scare-potentially-disastrous">war scare</a>” of November 1983. Soviet nuclear forces <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-1983-military-drill-that-nearly-sparked-nuclear-war-with-the-soviets-180979980/">misinterpreted a Nato exercise called Able Archer 83</a> for the start of a nuclear attack. Soviet nuclear forces in Europe were put on five-minute standby to launch a preemptive nuclear strike.</p>
<p>Once again, constructive dialogues began between Washington and Moscow were renewed, culminating in the historic <a href="https://adst.org/2016/09/the-cold-war-truly-over-1986-reykjavik-summit/">Reykjavik summit</a> between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986, widely seen as the beginning of the end of the cold war. </p>
<p>The summit began decades of disarmament, beginning with the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 1987. The INF eliminated intermediate-range ballistic missiles from US and Soviet arsenals. It also paved the way for the <a href="https://nuke.fas.org/control/start1/chron.htm">Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (Start)</a>, which effectively put a cap on nuclear proliferation, at least between the world’s two big nuclear superpowers.</p>
<p>But the end of the Soviet Union brought an uncertain time for arms control processes as central command structures fragmented. The breakup of the Soviet Union also dangerously increased the number of countries with nuclear weapons. In 1991 <a href="https://www.nti.org/countries/lithuania/">Lithuania</a>, <a href="https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/belarus-overview/">Belarus</a> and <a href="https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/ukraine-overview/">Ukraine</a> were left in possession of over 2,000 former Soviet warheads. Following the signing of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-is-the-budapest-memorandum-and-why-has-russias-invasion-torn-it-up-178184">Budapest Memorandum</a> in January 1994 these weapons were returned to Russia and became subject to disarmament process set out by Start.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-is-the-budapest-memorandum-and-why-has-russias-invasion-torn-it-up-178184">Ukraine war: what is the Budapest Memorandum and why has Russia's invasion torn it up?</a>
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<p>These arms reduction regimes were so successful that by 2012, 80% of the US and Russian nuclear peak stockpiles <a href="https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2013/06">had been eliminated</a>.</p>
<h2>Eve of destruction?</h2>
<p>But world leaders appear to have developed a renewed appetite for <a href="https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/uk-nuclear-weapons-in-a-third-nuclear-age/">nuclear weapons</a>. In 2019, countries such as China (US$10 billion – or £8 billion) and India (US$2.3 billion) <a href="https://www.icanw.org/report_73_billion_nuclear_weapons_spending_2020">have made significant invesments</a> in their strategic nuclear forces. Meanwhile, the UK announced in 2021 that it will increase its stockpile <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/mar/15/cap-on-trident-nuclear-warhead-stockpile-to-rise-by-more-than-40">from 180 warheads to 240</a>.</p>
<p>Donald Trump’s withdrawal of the US from the historic INF Treaty in September 2019, blaming Russia for deploying cruise missiles that breached the INF agreement, was also a bitter blow for disarmament campaigners.</p>
<p>Putin has used the threat of nuclear war several times in recent years. His movement of the Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad in 2018 was a direct threat to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/08/russia-confirms-deployment-of-nuclear-capable-missiles-to-kaliningrad">Baltic states such as Poland and Lithuania</a>, both members of Nato. And now Russia is demonstrating that, if it wants, they are there to be used.</p>
<p>In the absence of arms control, nuclear weapons maintain their dangerous symbolic allure for leaders such as Putin. But the stark truth is that nuclear weapons have always put the world in catastrophic danger.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181986/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Mulvihill receives funding from Arts and Humanities Research Council for 'Turning Fylingdales Inside Out: making practice visible at the UK's ballistic missile early warning and space monitoring station' AH/S013067/1</span></em></p>Russia is raising the stakes with upgraded ballistic missiles and blood-curdling threats from the KremlinMichael Mulvihill, Interdisciplinary Research Associate, School of Geography, Politics and Sociolog, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1677542021-09-17T14:39:51Z2021-09-17T14:39:51ZMissile tests: how North and South Korea became locked in a dangerous arms race<p>Recent tit-for-tat missile tests on the Korean peninsula have ratcheted up tensions in the region. On September 15, North Korea launched two short-range ballistic missiles off its east coast, just two days after it tested a new long-range cruise missile capable of reaching targets in Japan and South Korea. Hours later, South Korea tested a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, making it one of only seven countries with this technology.</p>
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<p><em>You can listen to more articles from The Conversation, narrated by Noa, <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/audio-narrated-99682">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>This <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/the-arms-race-on-the-korean-peninsula-is-intensifying/21804767">has been reported</a> as the latest development in an arms race on the Korean peninsula. But the military purpose of ballistic missiles for the DPRK (North Korea) is completely different from that of those developed by its neighbour to the south.</p>
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<p>Parallel to the development of a nuclear weapons capability, the DPRK started to build and deploy ballistic missiles in the 1980s. Their main purpose was to provide the means to deliver nuclear warheads against “enemy targets” in the event of a conflict. South Korea, meanwhile, renounced nuclear weapons in 1975 when it ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The country initiated a limited conventional missile programme in the late 1980s. </p>
<p>North Korea’s missile programme developed from cold war-era Soviet missiles with subsequent modifications to increase range and accuracy. Pyongyang’s aim has been to develop a credible nuclear deterrent (or threat) against a nuclear superpower on the other side of the world – the United States. </p>
<p>This required ballistic missiles with an intercontinental range as well as a significant stockpile of tested nuclear devices. North Korea’s programme has continued to depend heavily on <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/world/asia/north-korea-missiles-ukraine-factory.html">Soviet/Russian technology</a> with some other imports, most likely <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/07/05/chinese-involvement-in-north-koreas-nuclear-missile-program-from-warheads-to-trucks/?sh=6658d95e6f2f">from China</a>. </p>
<p>The North’s medium-range missiles can threaten Japan and South Korea. While South Korea and the US are thought to be North Korea’s most likely adversaries in any conflict, threatening to destroy South Korea is problematic for a North Korean leadership ostensibly dedicated to Korean unification. The <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hwasong-15-kn-22/">Hwasong-15</a>, tested in 2017, has come closest to demonstrating a capability of targeting the United States.</p>
<p>Recent developments nevertheless could dramatically change the strategic situation on the Korean peninsula and northeast Asia. In response to the North Korean threat, South Korea and Japan have deployed ballistic missile defences provided by the US. But these systems would only provide imperfect protection if North Korea were to launch a determined nuclear attack at very short range.</p>
<p>South Korea was initially provided with missile technology by the US in the 1970s. The country’s indigenous missile programme started by reverse engineering US missiles and has developed from there. In June it was announced that the US and South Korea had agreed to scrap <a href="https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/06/us-south-korea-ballistic-missile-range-limit">restrictions on the range and weight of the latter’s missiles</a> agreed in 1979.</p>
<p>The aim of South Korean ballistic and cruise missiles armed with conventional warheads is to target North Korean command-and-control centres and hardened military facilities buried deep underground. What South Korea calls its “<a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/country_tax/south-korea/">kill chain</a>” is designed to aggressively respond to any level of North Korean aggression with “massive punishment and retaliation”.</p>
<p>The successful launch of its submarine-based missile shows that South Korea – whose <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-military-analysis-idUSKCN1VW03C">annual military budget</a> is well in excess of North Korea’s entire GDP) has highly modern and versatile forces that mean it can at least hold its own in a conventional conflict. But due to the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, South Korea needs to continue to rely on US extended nuclear deterrence. </p>
<h2>Show of strength</h2>
<p>For North Korea, these tests are not primarily designed to improve missile designs. Instead they are about demonstrating to its own population that North Korea is a great and powerful nation. It also has the aim of demonstrating its military strength to potential adversaries, especially South Korea and the United States.</p>
<p>North Korea also uses these tests as a way to mitigate diplomatic isolation and as leverage to generate international aid. During the Trump administration, the accelerating scale of North Korean nuclear and missile testing resulted in Trump first threatening “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/09/politics/trump-fire-fury-improvise-north-korea/index.html">fire and fury</a>” followed by the summits with Kim Jong-un. The summits achieved little, except to enhance Kim’s public standing – both internationally and with his own public. </p>
<p>Increasingly severe <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-know-about-sanctions-north-korea">international sanctions</a> have hit North Korea hard – although Pyongyang has invested heavily in trafficking and moneylaundering routes to mitigate the impact on North Korean elites. A UN expert panel <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/un-panel-experts-report-north-korea-more-advanced-weaponry-better-sanctions-evasion">concluded earlier this year</a> that “the North Korean regime is evading sanctions at a faster rate than the international community is able to tighten the sanctions regime”. </p>
<p>This has meant that while that there is now a serious risk of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/1/humanitarian-disaster-looms-in-north-korea">another major famine</a>, the country’s weapons programme has continued at a steady pace. It now has plenty of capacity to make its own missiles. </p>
<h2>Stalemate</h2>
<p>The resumption of missile tests and the restart of operations of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor signal a renewed effort by the DPRK to push ahead with its nuclear weapons programme. Once again, this will primarily serve a political end – to turn around the political and economic impasse that it finds itself in. </p>
<p>The Biden administration, meanwhile, is trying to position itself between the policy of “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43908853">strategic patience</a>” (waiting for North Korea to implement its previous commitments to denuclearise) of the Obama administration and the “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/the-grand-bargain-in-hanoi-take-shape-but-can-trump-and-kim-close-the-deal/2019/02/25/dfc068c0-38c2-11e9-b786-d6abcbcd212a_story.html">grand bargain</a>” (full diplomatic relations and economic benefits in return for giving up nuclear weapons) promoted by Trump.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-nuclear-proliferation-and-why-the-madman-theory-is-wrong-about-kim-jong-un-167939">North Korea, nuclear proliferation and why the 'madman theory' is wrong about Kim Jong-un</a>
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<p>Washington remains committed to forcing North Korea to halt its nuclear weapons programme, but has failed to articulate how that might be achieved. In the absence of credible diplomatic initiatives, the tension between North Korea on one side and South Korea and the US on the other is likely to grow. Expect further missile launches – and possibly nuclear weapons tests – in the near future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167754/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth received funding from the Korea Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Owen Greene has received funding in the past from Japan's Research Council, the Foreign Ministry of Japan; and from the USA State Department and Ford Foundation. He is co-founder and Chair of the Board of the independent non-profit NGO VERTIC (Verification Research, Training and Information Centre), which has research projects relating to the implementation of UNSC sanctions on DPRK.. </span></em></p>Diplomacy is needed to head off an arms race between North and South Korea.Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordOwen Greene, Professor of International Security and Development, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1679392021-09-15T19:01:18Z2021-09-15T19:01:18ZNorth Korea, nuclear proliferation and why the ‘madman theory’ is wrong about Kim Jong-un<p>The two <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/nkorea-fired-unidentified-projectile-yonhap-citing-skorea-military-2021-09-15/">missile tests</a> conducted by North Korea in recent days have reopened discussions about the country, its leadership, its foreign policy, its perception around the world and the use (and usefulness) of nuclear weapons as an option within global politics.</p>
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<p><em>You can listen to more articles from The Conversation, narrated by Noa, <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/audio-narrated-99682">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency announced on September 12 that it had test-fired a new long-range cruise missile, believed by analysts to be the country’s first missile with the capacity to carry a nuclear warhead.</p>
<p>Three days later the South Korean military said the North had launched “two unidentified ballistic missiles” into the Sea of Japan, prompting Japan’s outgoing prime minister, Yoshihide Suga, to order his country’s defence agencies to investigate.</p>
<p>North Korea usually makes grand nuclear statements like the ones we have seen in recent days during early September to mark the <a href="http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/1.html">founding of the DPRK on September 9 1948</a>. As such, these tests are as much about domestic propaganda and internal regime prestige as they are about threat to the outside world. </p>
<p>More broadly though, North Korea’s advance of its nuclear weapons technology – <a href="https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/nuclear/">off and on since the 1950s</a> – has made its integration with the rest of the international community much less likely. This is primarily on account of its development coming at considerable cost and sacrifice to the small nation. </p>
<h2>No moral high ground</h2>
<p>It can be argued that, given the indiscriminate barbarity of the destruction that a nuclear attack would cause, no state has a moral right to nuclear weapons over that of another state. But countries which already have a nuclear arsenal will often push the line that while it’s OK for <em>them</em> to have a nuclear stockpile, other countries do not necessarily have that right. These communications often rely on a manufactured sense of who is responsible and stable-minded and who is irresponsible and unstable. In short, it is an attempt to create a polarised world of good and evil.</p>
<p>This simplistic polarisation is encouraged through government communications regarding foreign policy. But they also depend on wider more implicit perception management strategies. These include harnessing the agendas of global mainstream news media and exporting popular culture products, films, television programmes and the like, that seek to encourage certain worldviews and to marginalise ones that are undesirable to the world’s most powerful nations.</p>
<p>It should always be remembered that the United States is the only state to have used nuclear weapons as an act of war (twice during 1945). Yet it declares North Korea to be a nuclear threat based on its “madness” (Donald Trump repeatedly called Kim Jong-un “mad”). But if we are to believe revelations from the <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Peril/Bob-Woodward/9781982182915">upcoming book Peril</a> by journalists Bob Woodward and Robert Costa, America’s top military personnel had to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/14/us/politics/peril-woodward-book-trump.html">take action</a> in the final months of the Trump administration to limit any risks of a nuclear showdown with China.</p>
<p>It’s probably true to say that few aspiring candidates for high office are going to say that they would never use their country’s nuclear capability in any circumstance. But it could also be said that any head of government who boasts of their readiness to use nuclear weapons is demonstrating their lack of fitness to govern. But, as the first part of this paragraph suggests, no candidate is likely to make this assertion.</p>
<h2>‘Madman’ theory wrong</h2>
<p>There is no evidence that the previous leaders of North Korea, Kim Il-sung or Kim Jong-il, were assessed by psychologists and found to be suffering from mental ill health. This is also true of Kim Jong-un, the country’s current leader – in fact before Kim’s summit with Trump in 2018, a former State Department psychiatrist, Kenneth Dekleva, who creates psychological profiles of foreign leaders, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/06/11/618975650/a-psychological-profile-of-north-korean-leader-kim-jong-un">told America’s National Public Radio</a> that: “I think the madman theory was wrong.”</p>
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<p>I would say he’s smart, that he’s a very, very savvy diplomat, a leader with a sense of gravitas. He wants to be a player on the world stage.</p>
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<p>For <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9780230005310">Simon Cross</a>, a colleague of mine at Nottingham Trent University, “madness” is an imprecise term and a cultural construct that does not require a trained medical professional to identify it, but it resonates with ease with audiences when uttered by someone they trust. <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9780230218802">Stephen Harper</a> at the University of Portsmouth, says our perception of what represents “madness” is based on uncritical interpretations of the past and fantasies and inclinations within the human mind towards what he calls “self-haunting”. These tropes are perpetuated, confirmed and even encouraged at the persuasion of powerful individuals reinforced by mainstream media content.</p>
<p>So, for example, the Hollywood films Team America: World Police (2004) and The Interview (2014), despite being satires of North Korea’s leaders, promote this idea of the North Korean leader and his senior advisers as mad. And Trump <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mWyXyqxxAM4">kept hammering at this</a> with his regular references to Kim as a “madman”, as “crazy” and as a “little rocket man”. </p>
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<p>North Korea’s prevailing international image of being mad is thus predominantly the creation of hostile external parties. But Pyongyang has also played up to it at times when it has been deemed useful – as the psychologist Dekleva said earlier in this article, it could be a useful tool of diplomacy. This is a theme explored by Niccolo Machiavelli in his book <a href="https://library.fes.de/libalt/journals/swetsfulltext/12119493.pdf">The Prince</a> in 1517.</p>
<p>That said, what is perhaps most interesting is the extent to which recent US administrations and their allies appear to have come to believe the madness story – despite the fact that they are largely responsible for it. This has been the case with successive US administrations – but whether they genuinely believe it, or perpetuate it because it is convenient to their wider foreign policy ambitions to do so, remains to be seen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167939/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Colin Alexander does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>North Korea’s test of two new missile systems have stoked fears of a nuclear confrontation in Asia. But the North Korean leader may not be as unstable as he is made out.Colin Alexander, Lecturer in Political Communications, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1556952021-02-22T15:50:00Z2021-02-22T15:50:00ZBiden and the Iran nuclear deal: what to expect from the negotiations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385577/original/file-20210222-13-mhr4b2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C5991%2C3979&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Regional powerplay: the nuclear deal has complex implications for the regin.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dilok Klaisataporn via Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Joe Biden was sworn in as the 46th president of the United States, speculation was rife that one of the first things his administration would do would be to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/17/world/middleeast/iran-biden-trump-nuclear-sanctions.html">seek re-entry to the Iran nuclear deal</a> that had been quit by his predecessor in the White House.</p>
<p>The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed between Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and the European Union in 2015, known as “<a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/iran-nuclear-deal-15757">the Iran nuclear deal</a>”, was considered a stunning diplomatic achievement. Iran agreed to limit or eliminate its enriched uranium sources in return for receiving financial and economic relief from the UN sanctions. </p>
<p>But in 2018, in a snub to the joint diplomatic venture, the then US president, Donald Trump, tweeted his country’s withdrawal, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/art-worst-deal-trump-blasts-iran-agreement-n809986">stating that</a>: “I think it was one of the most incompetently drawn deals I’ve ever seen…we got nothing.” He claimed that Iran had been using the financial relief, including the oil export money, to support terrorist organisations in the Middle East. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia was a cornerstone of Trump’s Middle East policy as the geopolitical counterweight against Iran. The country was instrumental in the negotiations of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/28/trumps-middle-east-peace-plan-key-points-at-a-glance">Middle East Peace Plan</a>, brokered by Jared Kushner. A <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/19/politics/jared-kushner-saudi-arms-deal-lockheed-martin/index.html">US$110 billion (£78.3 billion) defence deal with the Saudis</a> was signed by Trump in his first official visit to Riyadh in May 2017. </p>
<p>During the same visit, the Saudis <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/21/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-iran-donald-trump.html">successfully convened</a> several Muslim state representatives for a speech by Trump that declared Iran as the main threat in the region. The killing of Iranian military commander <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/05/general-qassam-suleimani-obituary">Qassem Suleimani</a> by the USA in January 2020 took the main enemy of Saudi Arabia’s ruling crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), off the Middle East chessboard.</p>
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<p>Trump’s reluctance to take retaliatory steps following the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45812399">murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi</a> in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul demonstrated his unswerving support to the crown prince, the de facto ruler of the kingdom. Trump showed the same reluctance regarding Saudi Arabia’s <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen">involvement in the Yemeni civil war</a> – another move by MBS, launched in March 2015, to rival the Iranian presence in Syria.</p>
<p>One of Biden’s first messages to Saudi Arabia has been that it should no longer rely on the USA’s unconditional support. White House press secretary Jen Psaki’s announcement of “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-16/biden-to-recalibrate-saudi-arabia-ties-away-from-crown-prince">recalibrating</a>” USA-Saudi relations between counterpart-to-counterpart on 16 February is a signal to the crown prince that his unrestrained behaviours will not be tolerated by the Biden administration.</p>
<h2>What to expect from negotiations</h2>
<p>Meanwhile Iran’s hand will be stronger in any prospective negotiations than in those before the deal was struck. During the first negotiations, the Syrian civil war had just started and Assad’s future was uncertain. The possibility of a new regime, especially one supported and financed by Saudi Arabia, would have meant for Tehran the loss of an important ally and would have disrupted Iranian support for Hezbollah in Lebanon.</p>
<p>The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Shia militias were fighting Islamic State (IS), while <a href="https://www.vox.com/2018/11/20/17996024/the-us-and-iran-are-tacitly-cooperating-in-iraq">indirectly benefiting from the US airstrikes</a> in support of the Iraqi military. Following the deal’s announcement in July 2015, the nature of the war changed: Russia intervened in September 2015 on the side of the Assad regime and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34572756">the Revolutionary Guard involvement in the war accelerated</a> by training a further 100,000 Syrian fighters to join the Assad forces. The defeat of IS and Trump’s decision to withdraw the American forces from Syria in October 2019 presented opportunities for the Syrian regime to expand and consolidate its power – as well as Iran’s influence.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-donald-trumps-decision-to-abandon-kurdish-fighters-in-syria-means-for-the-kurds-assad-and-russia-124815">What Donald Trump's decision to abandon Kurdish fighters in Syria means for the Kurds, Assad and Russia</a>
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<p>What’s more, since the US withdrew from the deal, Iran has enriched nuclear fuel <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/18/us/politics/biden-iran-nuclear.html">beyond the limits agreed by the 2015 deal</a>. It has also stopped international inspections of the nuclear sites. On February 10, the International Atomic Agency <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-nuclear-program-11610564572">informed its members</a> that “Iran had been producing uranium metal, a material vital for nuclear weapons.” In other words, because of the acceleration of its nuclear programme following Trump’s decision, Iran is closer to having atomic weapons.</p>
<p>Advances in nuclear capability and the more stable situation in Syria strengthen Iran’s hand at the negotiating table. And, <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/01/27/russia-opposed-to-widening-scope-of-iran-nuclear-deal-a72758">with Russia on its side</a>, Iran might resist the US desire to broaden the agreement to include clauses such as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/17/world/middleeast/iran-biden-trump-nuclear-sanctions.html">the halt of its military involvement</a> in Syria, Libya and Iraq.</p>
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<img alt="An array of missiles with Iranian flags in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385587/original/file-20210222-21-qux72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385587/original/file-20210222-21-qux72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385587/original/file-20210222-21-qux72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385587/original/file-20210222-21-qux72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385587/original/file-20210222-21-qux72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385587/original/file-20210222-21-qux72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385587/original/file-20210222-21-qux72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Aggressive stance: Iran’s military museum, Tehran.</span>
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<p>Another potential difficulty concerns domestic politics in Iran. Iranian foreign policy is made by agreement between the supreme leader, the president and the heads of the Supreme National Security Council and Assembly of Experts. While executive power lies with the president, <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/20/prospects-for-change-in-iranian-foreign-policy-pub-75569">the supreme leader must approve the policy</a>.</p>
<p>In 2015, the hardline supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei gave a reluctant approval to the moderate president Hassan Rouhani’s policy on the deal. <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2015/02/where-does-irans-supreme-leader-really-stand-on-nuclear-negotiations/">Although it is impossible to know what was in Khamenei’s mind</a>, the Iranian economy, gravely damaged by the sanctions, and uncertain geopolitical context in the broader Middle East were likely reasons. But since then, the hardliners have been emboldened, partly because of the new UN sanctions introduced in September 2019 and the killing of Soleimani. </p>
<p>The Iranian presidential elections in June 2021 will be a battleground between the moderates and hardliners. One of the candidates, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/11/biden-policies-trumpism-iran-presidential-candidate-hossein-dehghan">Hossein Dehghan</a>, a military adviser to Khamenei has already criticised Rouhani’s moderate position. </p>
<p>The Iran nuclear deal is a joint effort by several countries. While Trump’s decision to withdraw did not kill the deal, it seriously wounded it. Like Trump, Biden would like the deal to be a key part of his administration’s vision in the Middle East – but this might be tougher than he anticipates.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155695/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ali Bilgic does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US president is sending a message to Saudi Arabia. But it might also find that negotiations with Tehran are tougher.Ali Bilgic, Reader in International Relations and Security, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1522502020-12-21T11:57:42Z2020-12-21T11:57:42ZNato-Russia tensions: what a Biden administration can do to lower the temperature<p>When Vladimir Putin faced the world’s media recently for his annual <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-europe-55356699">end-of-year press conference</a>, he was characteristically aggressive. </p>
<p>Asked by a BBC journalist whether, as Russia’s president for 20 years, he accepted any responsibility for the current “woeful state of relations” between his country and the west or whether the Russian authorities were “always white and fluffy” (a Russian expression for squeaky clean), he was scathing in his reply:</p>
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<p>About us being “white and fluffy”. In comparison with you, yes we are … We heard you promise that Nato is not going to expand to the east – but you didn’t keep your word.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Putin’s words reflect a general freeze in relations between Russia and the west that has been developing over some years. This prompted a group of former US, European and Russian diplomats, generals, researchers and political figures, supported by the <a href="https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/">European Leadership Network</a> (ELN), to write a <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/russian-and-western-envoys-make-joint-plea-to-avoid-war-qqwgzrntg">letter</a> to the UK’s Times newspaper on December 8 to call for action in Moscow and for Nato to restore talks on how to impose limits on military activity in Europe. </p>
<p>This has become increasingly urgent over the past few years. If the United States and Russia don’t agree to extend <a href="https://fas.org/blogs/security/2020/10/new-start-2020_aggregate-data/">New START</a> (as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is known) by February 5 2021, there will be no legally binding treaty that would set verifiable limits on their nuclear weapons which make up 90% of the world’s nuclear arsenal, for the first time since the 1970s. </p>
<p>How to handle relations with Russia will be one of Biden’s top foreign policy priorities when he moves into the Oval Office after his inauguration on January 20. During the recent election campaign the president-elect <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/joe-biden-democratic-presidential-candidate-kamala-harris-60-mintues-interview-norah-odonnell-2020-10-25/">identified Russia</a> as the “biggest threat to America right now in terms of breaking up our security and our alliances”. </p>
<p>Nato-Russia relations have been in the deep freeze since 2014 when Russia <a href="https://theconversation.com/now-crimeas-in-the-bag-where-next-for-putin-and-russia-24521">annexed Crimea</a>. Russia’s provocative behaviour since has included a build-up of Russian military forces and impromptu exercises in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. </p>
<p>Nato member states, meanwhile, have continued their policies of sanctions, strengthening the alliance’s eastern defence posture and limiting diplomatic relations with Russia. The security dilemma has only worsened in Europe since the US <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-09/news/us-completes-inf-treaty-withdrawal">terminated</a> the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in August 2019 due to repeated Russian violations. </p>
<h2>Positive steps</h2>
<p>The ELN experts <a href="https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/group-statement/nato-russia-military-risk-reduction-in-europe/">recommend</a> a series of measures suggesting that “these steps can contribute to an atmosphere, in which resolution of those difficult political issues becomes more achievable”. </p>
<p>But this requires Nato to overcome three crucial obstacles. Nato solidarity must be repaired after four years in which criticism by the outgoing US president Donald Trump has called the transatlantic partnership into question. There needs to be renewed political will in both Washington and Moscow for restoring arms control agreements. And renewed attempts at diplomacy in the west’s relationship with Russia must address Russia’s <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/russia-in-the-world/">precarious dilemma</a>, caught in stagnation after the collapse of the Soviet Union but hungry for recognition of its great power status.</p>
<p>These steps are key if diplomacy is to have a chance. Here, Biden’s election could reverse the some of the more worrisome tendencies in US foreign policy under outgoing president Donald Trump. Under Biden, the US will follow a “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2017-12-05/how-stand-kremlin">hang tough, but keep talking</a>” policy towards Russia, based on more international engagement and better cooperation with Nato’s European members. </p>
<p>There is hope that a more coherent US policy will increase the chances of renewing the Russia-Nato dialogue. This would provide the opportunity to cooperate with Moscow on issues such as climate change, coronavirus, counterterrorism, and Iran’s nuclear programme.</p>
<h2>More diplomacy needed</h2>
<p>Biden can also help Nato to again become an effective platform for negotiations. But this is only possible if Washington changes its rhetoric and remains interested in issues of European security as well as arms control. Trump’s <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/157842/us-cant-win-arms-race-russia-china">confrontational rhetoric</a> needs to give way to confidence-building measures where there are <a href="https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse276-EN.pdf">strong incentives</a> to reduce the risk of escalation, misperceptions and potential misunderstandings.</p>
<p>Nato could start by addressing Russia’s long-term fears dating back to the end of the <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/abmtreaty">Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty</a> in 2002. The US could reassure the Russians by allowing them to inspect Nato <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/smd/2019/08/02/adapting-nato-missile-defense-to-survive-enemy-contact/">missile defence sites</a> in Romania and Poland. </p>
<p>Discussions in 2021 for the updating of the <a href="https://www.osce.org/fsc/74528">Vienna Document</a> – the politically binding agreement that provides for the exchange and verification of information about armed forces and military activities – will also be very important to “<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/osce-ministerial-council-joint-statement-on-the-vienna-document">restoring trust and increasing mutual confidence</a>”. And allies of the US must keep emphasising the importance of the Open Skies Treaty, something that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2020/11/22/trump-administration-exits-open-skies-treaty/">Biden has said he supports</a>.</p>
<p>All of this will not be secured overnight. Patience is necessary, as well as a willingness to see common ground to make the relationship between Russia and Nato functional; but also a dose of realism, and especially transatlantic cooperation and predictability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152250/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Calls to keep talking are getting louder out of fear of escalation and ultimately war – but why are diplomatic relations so difficult for Nato and Russia?Amelie Theussen, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern DenmarkDominika Kunertova, Senior Researcher, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology ZurichLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1302482020-03-11T11:47:16Z2020-03-11T11:47:16ZWhy is the UAE, where solar energy is abundant, about to open four nuclear reactors?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319135/original/file-20200306-118960-2eir4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=88%2C79%2C1955%2C1280&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Construction underway at Barakah nuclear power plant in the UAE. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/iaea_imagebank/26967070154/in/photolist-dQG6ZU-dQAaMg-dQAaNx-H5Zhrq-dSd5pJ">IAEA Imagebank/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is building the world’s <a href="https://bigthink.com/technology-innovation/dubai-solar-power">largest concentrated solar power plant</a>, capable of generating 700 megawatts. During daylight, solar power will provide cheap electricity, and <a href="https://www.irena.org/remap">at night the UAE</a> will use stored solar heat to generate electricity. </p>
<p>But at the same time, the first of four new nuclear reactors <a href="https://gulfbusiness.com/uae-officially-starts-operations-at-barakah-nuclear-power-plant/">was completed</a> in early March in the UAE, built by the South Korean Electric Power Corporation, KEPCO. The nuclear power plant is named Barakah. </p>
<p>The UAE’s investment in these four <a href="https://www.nuclearconsult.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Gulf-Nuclear-Ambition-NCG-Dec-2019.pdf">nuclear reactors risks</a> further destabilising the volatile Gulf region, damaging the environment and raising the possibility of nuclear proliferation.</p>
<h2>Safety flaws</h2>
<p>The UAE nuclear contract remains South Korea’s one and only export order, despite attempts by KEPCO to win contracts in Lithuania, Turkey, Vietnam and <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-nuclear/south-koreas-kepco-loses-preferred-bidder-status-for-uk-nuclear-project-idUKKBN1KL1YK">the UK</a>. Barakah, construction of which <a href="https://www.enec.gov.ae/news/latest-news/enec-begins-construction-of-uaes-first-nuclear-energy-plant/">began in 2012</a>, is in the Al Dhafra region of Abu Dhabi, on the coast.</p>
<p>Although nuclear reactor design has evolved over time, key safety features <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613325/how-greed-and-corruption-blew-up-south-koreas-nuclear-industry/">haven’t been included at Barakah</a>. This is important, since these reactors might not be able to defend against an accidental or deliberate airplane crash, or military attack. In response, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), which owns Barakah, told The Conversation that the plant “meets all national and international regulatory requirements and standards for nuclear safety.”</p>
<p>Particularly worrying is the lack of a “<a href="https://www.crcpress.com/Nuclear-Engineering-Handbook/Kok/p/book/9781482215922">core-catcher</a>” which, if the emergency reactor core cooling system fails, works to keep in the hot nuclear fuel if it breaches the reactor pressure vessel. ENEC stressed the plant’s design contained safety features equivalent to the core-catcher design, and was certified by the UAE’s Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation, which gave Unit 1 at the plant an <a href="https://fanr.gov.ae/en/media-centre/news?g=01d112c7-91b4-42be-a2e3-e254e8b5a65b">operating licence</a> in February 2020.</p>
<p>All this is further complicated by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-nuclear/south-korea-charges-100-with-corruption-over-nuclear-%20scandal-idUSBRE99905O20131010">large-scale falsification</a> of KEPCO quality control documents in South Korea in a case unrelated to Barakah, which ended up in a far-reaching criminal investigation and <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/s-korea-jails-nuclear-workers-over-bribe-scandal">convictions</a> in 2013 in South Korea.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319369/original/file-20200309-118881-oby2f1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319369/original/file-20200309-118881-oby2f1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319369/original/file-20200309-118881-oby2f1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319369/original/file-20200309-118881-oby2f1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319369/original/file-20200309-118881-oby2f1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319369/original/file-20200309-118881-oby2f1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319369/original/file-20200309-118881-oby2f1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A field of solar panels in Dubai.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/dubai-united-arab-emirates-january-17-795953449">By Dominic Dudley/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Proliferation risks</h2>
<p>The tense Gulf strategic geopolitical situation makes new civil nuclear construction in the region even more controversial than elsewhere, as it can mean moves towards nuclear weapon capability, as <a href="https://theconversation.com/nuclear-powers-once-shared-their-technology-openly-how-irans-programme-fell-on-the-wrong-side-of-history-124299">experience with Iran has shown</a>. </p>
<p>Following <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-refineries-drone-attack.html">military strikes</a> against Saudi oil refineries in late 2019, nuclear energy safety in the region increasingly revolves around the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2665799e-dad2-11e9-8f9b-77216ebe1f17">broader issue of security</a>. This is especially the case since some armed groups may view the UAE’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/48f44b08-caa5-11e9-a1f4-3669401ba76f">military operations</a> in Yemen as a reason to target nuclear installations, or intercept enriched uranium fuel or waste transfers. </p>
<p>Such spillover from foreign policy – and politics more generally – will increasingly <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/the-ultimate-middle-east-missile-target-nuclear-reactors">dovetail</a> with nuclear safety considerations in the region.</p>
<p>Perhaps disconcertingly, Yemeni rebels <a href="https://www.janes.com/article/89233/yemeni-rebels-claim-second-cruise-missile-attack">already claim</a> to have fired a missile at the Barakah nuclear power plant site in 2017. Although UAE denied the claim, saying it had an air defence system capable of dealing with any threat, protection of Barakah won’t be an easy task. </p>
<p>Time to scramble fighter aircraft or fire surface-to-air missiles may be limited, as the attacks in Saudi Arabia indicated. Not only that, but the increase in transport of radioactive materials into and through the Gulf once the reactors at Barakah start up will, unfortunately, present a major maritime risk. </p>
<h2>Environmental concerns</h2>
<p>The Gulf is one of the most water-scarce regions in the world, and Gulf states <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/sep/29/peak-salt-is-the-desalination-dream-over-for-the-gulf-states">rely on desalination</a>. Radioactive release to the marine environment following an accident or deliberate incident at Barakah would have significant pollution consequences for desalination and drinking water in the region. </p>
<p>And the UAE coast is a vulnerable environment, critically important for a very large range of marine life. Extensive mangrove habitats grow on and in coastal fine sediments and mudflats, notable for their ability to sequester radioactivity. Acting as a “sink” and concentrating radioactivity over time, normal operational nuclear discharge from Barakah will <a href="https://www.nuclearconsult.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/UAE-marine-and-nuclear-TD-J-A4.pdf">inevitably lead to</a> human inhalation and ingestion.</p>
<p>ENEC, which runs Barakah, told The Conversation it had taken comprehensive measures to ensure the safe and secure transportation of nuclear components and fuel, and that it adheres to the highest international safety standards, including regarding accidental radioactive releases.</p>
<p>The debate over nuclear power and climate is hotting up, with <a href="https://institutions.newscientist.com/article/2185486-environmentalists-must-embrace-nuclear-power-to-stem-climate-change/">some scientists suggesting</a> new nuclear can help. Yet, the International Panel on Climate Change <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/srocc/">recently reported</a> that extreme sea-level events will significantly increase, whether emissions are curbed or not. All coastal nuclear plants, including Barakah, will be <a href="https://ensia.com/features/coastal-nuclear/">increasingly vulnerable</a> to sea-level rise, storm surges, flooding of reactors and spent fuel stores. The UAE’s governmental environmental assessment of global heating’s impact on Barakah is conspicuous by its absence.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/to-cut-carbon-emissions-and-keep-the-lights-on-it-has-got-to-be-nuclear-power-35062">To cut carbon emissions and keep the lights on, it has got to be nuclear power</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Since not all energy policy choices are equal, the case for nuclear power in the Middle East has never been strong. While lower CO₂ emissions and improvement in renewable technology is one explanation for the dynamic global ramp in new renewable generation and the fall in new nuclear, the main driver seems to be the <a href="https://blogs.imf.org/2019/04/26/falling-costs-make-wind-solar-more-affordable/">plummeting costs</a> of the former and the <a href="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-658-25987-7_5.pdf">increasing costs</a> of the latter.</p>
<p>So it’s strange that the UAE has cast significant resources at nuclear power, when other viable options already exist. The <a href="https://www.enec.gov.ae/doc/uae-peaceful-nuclear-energy-policy-5722278a2952f.pdf">UAE’s Nuclear Energy policy</a> says that its pursuit of nuclear energy is based on a plan to increase its electricity supply and diversify its electricity mix. Yet, since new nuclear seems to make little economic sense in the Gulf, which has some of the best solar energy resources in the world, the nature of Emirati interest in nuclear may lie hidden in plain sight – nuclear weapon proliferation. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article was updated on March 25 to include responses from the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation. The date at which Barakah began construction has also been corrected – it was 2012 not 2011 – and an incorrect reference to the name meaning divine blessing in Arabic has been removed.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130248/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Dorfman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new nuclear plant called Barakah is nearing completion in the UAE. But it risks further stabilising the volatile Gulf region.Paul Dorfman, Honorary Senior Research Associate, Energy Institute, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1189812019-06-18T19:24:21Z2019-06-18T19:24:21ZNuclear weapons and Iran’s uranium enrichment program: 4 questions answered<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280049/original/file-20190618-118518-1rrwzqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">United Nations Security Council members listen to Iranian Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Eshagh Al-Habib, left, during a meeting on Iran's compliance with the 2015 nuclear agreement, Dec. 12, 2018, at UN headquarters. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/UN-Iran/ffffc6cd3d19438488232554ab1950df/162/0">AP Photo/Mary Altaffer</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Editor’s note: Iran has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48784786">breached a limit on enriching uranium</a> that was imposed in a <a href="https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1651/">2015 agreement</a> restricting its nuclear activities. Under the deal, the United States and five other world powers lifted economic sanctions they had imposed to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. But President Trump <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html">removed the U.S. from the deal</a> in 2018 and <a href="https://www.state.gov/iran-sanctions/">reimposed sanctions</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Miles Pomper, a senior fellow at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, explains what uranium enrichment is and why it is central to both peaceful nuclear energy programs and building nuclear weapons.</em></p>
<h2>1. What is uranium enrichment?</h2>
<p>Uranium can fuel nuclear power plants and nuclear bombs because some of its isotopes, or atomic forms, are <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/fissile-material.html">fissile</a>: Their atoms can be easily split to release energy.</p>
<p>Freshly mined uranium contains more than 99% of an isotope called uranium 238, which is not fissile, plus a tiny fraction of uranium 235, which is fissile. Enrichment is an industrial process to increase the proportion of U-235. It’s usually done by passing uranium gas through devices called centrifuges, which rotate at high speeds. This process sifts out U-235, which is lighter than U-238. </p>
<p>Commercial nuclear power plants run on low-enriched uranium fuel, which contains 3-5% U-235. Further processing can produce highly enriched uranium, which contains more than 20% U-235. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/9D6e_dGjGIM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Moderate and conservative Iranian leaders have been debating whether to pursue nuclear weapons since the country’s 1979 revolution.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>2. How is enriching uranium connected to making nuclear weapons?</h2>
<p>The same technology is used to enrich uranium for either nuclear power or nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons typically contain uranium enriched to 80% U-235 or more, which is known as weapon-grade uranium. </p>
<p>Nuclear weapons can also can be powered with plutonium, but Iran would need to irradiate uranium fuel in its Arak nuclear reactor and build an additional facility to separate plutonium from the spent fuel to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/08/science/irans-unsung-plutonium-concession-in-nuclear-deal.html">take that route</a>. Currently its uranium work poses a more immediate risk.</p>
<p>Both nuclear power and nuclear weapons rely on nuclear <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/chain-reaction.html">chain reactions</a> to release energy, but in different ways. A commercial nuclear power plant uses low-enriched uranium fuel and various design elements to generate a slow nuclear chain reaction that produces a constant stream of energy. In a nuclear weapon, specially designed high explosives cram together enough weapon-grade uranium or plutonium to produce an extremely fast chain reaction that generates an explosion. </p>
<p>Producing a nuclear weapon involves more than making highly enriched uranium or plutonium, but experts generally view this as the most time-consuming step. It’s also the stage that is most visible to outsiders, so it is an important indicator of a country’s progress.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280059/original/file-20190618-118526-16sg8x9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280059/original/file-20190618-118526-16sg8x9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280059/original/file-20190618-118526-16sg8x9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=308&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280059/original/file-20190618-118526-16sg8x9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=308&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280059/original/file-20190618-118526-16sg8x9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=308&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280059/original/file-20190618-118526-16sg8x9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280059/original/file-20190618-118526-16sg8x9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280059/original/file-20190618-118526-16sg8x9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Building K-33 at the Oak Ridge site in Tennessee enriched uranium for U.S. nuclear weapons from 1954-1985. The plant was demolished in 2012.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://flic.kr/p/cHJ9Jd">DOE</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>3. How good is Iran at enriching uranium?</h2>
<p>Iran’s work on uranium enrichment has proceeded in fits and starts, but now experts generally believe that if it exits the nuclear deal, it could make enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon. </p>
<p>These efforts began in the late 1980s, while Iran was engaged in a bloody war with Iraq. The first centrifuges and designs were provided by Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist who <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-01-31/long-shadow-aq-khan">ran a black market network</a> for nuclear technologies from the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/12/world/a-tale-of-nuclear-proliferation-how-pakistani-built-his-network.html">1970s through the early 2000s</a>. These machines were poor-quality, frequently secondhand models and often broke down. And the United States and Israel reportedly carried out <a href="http://www.isisnucleariran.org/reports/detail/isis-resources-on-the-stuxnet-worm/">espionage operations, including cyberattacks</a>, to further disable Iran’s enrichment ability. </p>
<p>Iran continues to have technical problems in producing <a href="http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/update-on-irans-compliance-with-the-jcpoa-nuclear-limits/">more advanced centrifuges</a>. Nonetheless, it improved their performance sufficiently in the years leading up to the 2015 deal that observers widely believe Iran could produce enough material for a nuclear weapons program. The 2015 agreement deal set limits on Iran’s research and development activities to limit further progress, but Iran has been <a href="http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/iaea-iran-safeguards-report-analysis-iran-pushes-past-an-advanced-centrifug">testing the legal boundaries of these restrictions</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280060/original/file-20190618-118526-4jy4u5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280060/original/file-20190618-118526-4jy4u5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280060/original/file-20190618-118526-4jy4u5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280060/original/file-20190618-118526-4jy4u5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280060/original/file-20190618-118526-4jy4u5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280060/original/file-20190618-118526-4jy4u5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280060/original/file-20190618-118526-4jy4u5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280060/original/file-20190618-118526-4jy4u5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this photo released May 22, 2019 by his office, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei speaks to a group of students in Tehran, Iran. Khamenei publicly chastised the country’s moderate president and foreign minister Wednesday, saying he disagreed with the implementation of the 2015 nuclear deal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Iran-Persian-Gulf-Tensions/16da4da6c0a248e89f95be331d104881/18/0">Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>4. How does the Iran deal limit Iran’s activities?</h2>
<p>The agreement limits how much uranium Iran can enrich and to what level. It also specifies how much enriched uranium Iran can stockpile, how many and what types of centrifuges it can use, and what kinds of <a href="https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/joint-comprehensive-plan-action-new-standard-safeguards-agreements/">research and development activities it can conduct</a>. </p>
<p>All of these limits are designed to prevent Iranian scientists from amassing enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon – roughly 10 to 30 kilograms (22 to 65 pounds), depending on the device’s design and the bomb-makers’ sophistication and experience – in under a year. That delay is seen as long enough to give the international community time to respond if Iran decided to go nuclear. </p>
<p>The agreement also restricts Iran’s plutonium separation research, and requires it to accept <a href="https://www.iaea.org/">International Atomic Energy Agency</a> inspections to ensure that it is not using peaceful nuclear activities as a cover to produce weapons. </p>
<p>Under the agreement, restrictions on Iran’s enrichment activities were scheduled to start easing in 2026 and largely end in 2031, although international monitoring would continue after that.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118981/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Miles A. Pomper is affiliated with James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies </span></em></p>Iran’s leaders are threatening to breach a 2015 agreement that froze their country’s nuclear program. What is uranium enrichment, and what would it mean for Iran’s ability to build nuclear weapons?Miles A. Pomper, Senior Fellow, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, MiddleburyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1188072019-06-14T15:17:12Z2019-06-14T15:17:12ZWhat George Bush and the neocons can teach us about fighting climate change<p>Be under no illusion, the world is losing the fight against climate change. The amount of CO₂ in the atmosphere <a href="https://www.co2.earth/daily-co2">continues to increase</a>, meaning humanity is forcing the Earth closer to cataclysmic alterations that will <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_version_report_LR.pdf">reshape the entire biosphere</a>. But the UK could capitalise on the momentum gained through its recent <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-theresa-may-we-will-end-uk-contribution-to-climate-change-by-2050">net zero emissions pledge</a> to take the lead and herald a shift towards serious global climate action. How? By copying a strategy followed by – of all people – the George W Bush-era neoconservatives. </p>
<p>Hear me out. Those who disagree with my opening statement will of course point to the Paris Agreement: a global alliance that boasts <a href="https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification">185 signatories</a> fighting back <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/13/paris-climate-deal-cop-diplomacy-developing-united-nations">against climate change</a>. Yet Paris is a reflection of international law, which means it represents only the lowest common denominator that those negotiating parties could agree. For this reason the agreement is premised on state discretion, taking the form of “nationally determined contributions” where countries decide for themselves how much they will cut their emissions.</p>
<p>The agreement does have positive attributes, and there is scope to argue that it is useful. But it is not able to compel states to hit the <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/2018/10/08/summary-for-policymakers-of-ipcc-special-report-on-global-warming-of-1-5c-approved-by-governments/">ambitious targets necessary</a> to stave off the threat of more warming. <a href="https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/">Climate Tracker</a> illustrates this by finding that five states are “critically insufficient” in their efforts to prevent more than a 1.5°C increase, and a further 19 states are at least “insufficient”. </p>
<h2>Beyond the Paris Agreement?</h2>
<p>Countries could instead deal with contentious international threats by stepping away from the usual processes of international law, and introducing frameworks that aim to uncompromisingly challenge the root of the menace. And there is some precedent. One example is the 2003 <a href="https://www.psi-online.info">Proliferation Security Initiative</a> (PSI) – a set of principles designed predominantly by the US to curb the international transfer of materials related to nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>Crucially the PSI was not negotiated. Instead states were invited to endorse a framework of principles that had already been created. The argument was that a typical treaty would be too slow, too cumbersome, and reflect the usual challenges of international law, ruling out any serious responses. </p>
<p>The PSI was able to attract 11 countries at its inception, and currently <a href="https://www.psi-online.info/psi-info-en/botschaft/-/2205942">107 countries</a> have endorsed its principles. Its success is measured by the fact it is still in operation today and is considered to have <a href="http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/The-Proliferation-Security-Initiative-txt.pdf">increased cooperation</a> and indeed reduced the transfer of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00908320601071421?needAccess=true">nuclear weapon material</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/279541/original/file-20190614-158941-rx6tiv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/279541/original/file-20190614-158941-rx6tiv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/279541/original/file-20190614-158941-rx6tiv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/279541/original/file-20190614-158941-rx6tiv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/279541/original/file-20190614-158941-rx6tiv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/279541/original/file-20190614-158941-rx6tiv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/279541/original/file-20190614-158941-rx6tiv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hardline neoconservative John Bolton, now president Trump’s national security adviser, helped set up the PSI in his then role as under-secretary of state for arms control.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Christopher Halloran / shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The context was of course 9/11, which drove the US and its allies to pursue aggressive international policy absent any meaningful reflection on what those policies would mean for the multilateral landscape. Among the neocons who partly ran Bush’s foreign policy, the prevailing mood was that extreme times call for extreme measures against a threat they could not easily grasp. Sound familiar? </p>
<p>There is a certain irony in linking the PSI to climate change, as the same Bush administration was <a href="https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/six-years-of-deceit-192430/">actively against</a> a robust climate policy. Yet though it lacks in international diplomacy, the same strategy offers clear practical advantages.</p>
<p>The PSI was only possible because the US was determined that the threat of nuclear weapons was so severe that it had to lead on a response. This is precisely the type of leadership that is lacking on climate change.</p>
<h2>A role for the UK?</h2>
<p>There have been some positives in 2018, and the UK has emerged <a href="https://theconversation.com/mexico-puts-us-to-shame-on-climate-action-but-new-presidents-pledge-on-oil-industry-is-worrying-118428">as a potential climate leader</a>. Following the paralysis of London by activist group <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/extinction-rebellion-69561">Extinction Rebellion</a>, the UK parliament took the unprecedented step of declaring a climate emergency, though what this means precisely <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-becomes-first-country-to-declare-a-climate-emergency-116428">remains unclear</a>. Then there was the announcement of legislation to target <a href="https://theconversation.com/net-zero-emissions-by-2050-says-uk-government-now-what-118712">net zero emissions by 2050</a> by the outgoing prime minister, Theresa May.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/279548/original/file-20190614-158949-cbujd9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/279548/original/file-20190614-158949-cbujd9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/279548/original/file-20190614-158949-cbujd9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/279548/original/file-20190614-158949-cbujd9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/279548/original/file-20190614-158949-cbujd9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/279548/original/file-20190614-158949-cbujd9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/279548/original/file-20190614-158949-cbujd9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/279548/original/file-20190614-158949-cbujd9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Extinction Rebellion protest in London, April 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">photopsist / shutterstock</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>So how to capitalise on that momentum, and spread it worldwide? My suggestion is that the UK follow the precedent of the PSI and create a Climate Security Initiative (CSI). A CSI could encompass a set of bold principles to reduce emissions and champion green technology, going well beyond the Paris Agreement and propelling the UK into a leadership position that other like-minded states would be able to support.</p>
<p>There already exist a number of states that could form an initial CSI group, all willing to commit to radical steps to fight climate change. Ireland, for instance, has also declared a <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ireland-climate-emergency-united-kingdom-greta-thunberg-global-warming-a8909396.html">climate emergency</a>. New Zealand, too, has begun the legislative process to become <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/landmark-climate-change-bill-goes-parliament-1">carbon neutral by 2050</a>, while Finland has <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/finland-carbon-neutral-fossil-fuels-climate-change-global-warming-a8943886.html">targeted 2035</a>. </p>
<p>Of course the proliferation threat does differ from climate change. The latter is intrinsically linked to the global economy and the behaviour of billions of people. Decarbonising humanity will mean radical change on an unprecedented scale, spanning from the state to the individual. Yet we can choose to control this change through net zero aspirations, or we can have it forced on us through a radially altered climate not necessarily conducive to human existence. </p>
<p>The benefit of a CSI approach is that not only can it be designed to meet the threat head on, something the Paris Agreement has failed to do, but also if led by the UK it will help to counteract the narrative that the developed world simply isn’t doing enough to combat its historic role in emissions creation. A CSI offers the UK a way to transfer its recent political declarations into tangible action, without being stifled by international law.</p>
<p>If the UK really wants to “<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-theresa-may-we-will-end-uk-contribution-to-climate-change-by-2050">lead the world to a cleaner, greener form of growth</a>” it has to look beyond the Paris Agreement, and beyond its own borders – something a Climate Security Initiative could achieve.</p>
<hr>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/imagine-newsletter-researchers-think-of-a-world-with-climate-action-113443?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=Imagineheader1118807">Click here to subscribe to our climate action newsletter. Climate change is inevitable. Our response to it isn’t.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118807/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This article is part of a wider research project currently being undertaken by the author. Ash Murphy has no other relevant affiliations or interests to declare.</span></em></p>Though they were against climate action, the neocons showed that diplomacy can successfully be ignored when facing a huge threat.Ash Murphy, PhD Researcher, International Environmental Governance, Keele UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1140552019-05-07T11:22:18Z2019-05-07T11:22:18ZWhat geology reveals about North Korea’s nuclear weapons – and what it obscures<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/272792/original/file-20190506-103057-o9joev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pedestrians in Tokyo pass a television screen broadcasting a report on May 4, 2019 that North Korea has fired several unidentified short-range projectiles into the sea off its eastern coast.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Japan-North-Korea-Missile/1c5b528c87434184abfb8e89886b92c3/15/0">AP Photo/Koji Sasahara</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>North Korea’s leader, Chairman Kim Jong Un, clearly is in no hurry to demilitarize his country. In the wake of two historic yet unproductive summits with President Trump, Kim made a state visit in April to Moscow, where he made clear that his country will not give up its nuclear weapons <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-arrives-in-russian-far-east-ahead-of-first-ever-summit-with-kim-jong-un/2019/04/24/a2d941f8-65c6-11e9-a698-2a8f808c9cfb_story.html?utm_term=.520ded083162">without international security guarantees</a>. North Korea also tested what appeared to be short-range missiles on <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/18/world/asia/north-korea-weapons-test.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage">April 18</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-korea-fires-several-short-range-projectiles-south-korean-military-says/2019/05/03/511efe92-6e0f-11e9-be3a-33217240a539_story.html?utm_term=.2b75e21a2a13">May 4</a>.</p>
<p>These tests are reminders that North Korea’s military forces, particularly its nuclear arsenal, pose a serious threat to the United States and its Asian allies. This reclusive nation is a high-priority U.S. intelligence target, but there are still large uncertainties about the power of its nuclear weapons. North Korean scientists <a href="https://theoutline.com/post/2944/what-science-is-like-in-north-korea?zd=1&zi=l3tyywxr">work in isolation from the rest of the world</a>, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/us/north-korea-refugees-defectors-usa-utah.html">defectors are far and few between</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/rogersma/">My research</a> focuses on improving techniques for estimating the yield, or size, of underground nuclear explosions by using physics-based simulations. Science and technology give us a lot of tools for assessing the nuclear capabilities of countries like North Korea, but it’s still difficult to track and accurately measure the size and power of their nuclear arsenals. Here’s a look at some of the challenges.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/QoWABYMlhBs?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Experts say the US and North Korea are closer to nuclear war than many Americans believe.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>A nation in the dark</h2>
<p>For an isolated nation like North Korea, developing a functional nuclear weapons program is a historic feat. Just eight other sovereign states have accomplished this goal – the five declared nuclear weapons states (the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China) plus Israel, India and Pakistan.</p>
<p>North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons since the mid-1980s. Paradoxically, in 1985 it also joined the <a href="http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt">Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT</a>, under which it pledged not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. But by 2002, U.S. intelligence discovered evidence that North Korea was producing enriched uranium – a technological milestone that can yield explosive material to power nuclear weapons. In response the U.S. suspended fuel oil shipments to North Korea, which prompted the North to leave the NPT in 2003.</p>
<p>Then the North resumed a previously shuttered program to extract plutonium from spent uranium fuel. Plutonium-based nuclear weapons are more energy-dense than uranium-based designs, so they can be smaller and more mobile without sacrificing yield.</p>
<p>North Korea <a href="http://eqinfo.ucsd.edu/special_events/nuclear_tests/north_korea/">conducted its first nuclear test</a> on Oct. 6, 2006. Many experts <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2006/10/north-korean-bomb-may-be-bust-science">considered the test to be unsuccessful</a> because the size of the explosion, as determined from seismograms, was relatively small. However, that conclusion was based on incomplete information. And the test still served as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2011.554992">powerful domestic propaganda tool and international display of might.</a></p>
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<h2>More tests, more uncertainty</h2>
<p>Since 2006 North Korea has conducted five more nuclear tests, each one larger than the last. Scientists are still working to measure their yield accurately. This question is important, because it reveals how advanced the North Korean nuclear program is, which has implications for global security.</p>
<p>Estimates of the size of North Korea’s most recent test in September 2017 place it between 70 and 280 kilotons of TNT equivalent. For reference, that’s five to 20 times stronger than the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima. In fact, the explosion was so strong that it caused the mountain under which it was detonated to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1029/2018GL077649">collapse by several meters.</a> </p>
<p>We have a variety of tools for gaining knowledge about these events, ranging from satellite imagery to radar and seismograms. These methods give us an idea of North Korea’s capabilities, but they all have drawbacks. One difficulty common to all of them is uncertainty about geological conditions at the test site. Without a good understanding of the geology, it’s difficult to accurately model the explosions and replicate observations. It is even harder to constrain the error associated with those estimates. </p>
<p>Another, less understood phenomenon is the effect of fracture damage at the test site. North Korea has conducted all of its nuclear tests <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punggye-ri_Nuclear_Test_Site">at the same location</a>. Field experiments have shown that such repeat tests dampen the outgoing seismic and infrasound waves, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1785/0120130206">making the explosion appear weaker than it actually is</a>. This happens because the rock that was fractured by the first explosion is more loosely held together and acts like a giant muffler. These processes are poorly understood and contribute to even more uncertainty.</p>
<p>Additionally, <a href="http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2017AGUFM.S12B..04R">my research</a> and work by <a href="http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2017AGUFM.S43H2960S">other scientists</a> have shown that many types of rock enhance the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1785/0120110204">production of earthquake-like seismic waves</a> by underground explosions. The more energy from an explosion that gets converted into these earthquake-like waves, the more difficult it becomes to estimate the size of the explosion. </p>
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<h2>What do we know?</h2>
<p>What U.S. officials do know is that North Korea has an active nuclear weapons program, and any such program poses an existential threat to the United States and the world at large. Intelligence experts in <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/north-korea-believed-have-60-nuclear-weapons-south-korea-says-n915721">South Korea</a> and nuclear scientists in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-nuclear-study/north-korea-may-have-made-more-nuclear-bombs-but-threat-reduced-study-idUSKCN1Q10EL">United States</a> estimate that North Korea has between 30 and 60 nuclear weapons in reserve, with the ability to produce more in the future. </p>
<p>It’s still unclear how far North Korea can deliver nuclear weapons. However, their ability to produce plutonium enables them to make small, easily transportable nuclear bombs, which increase the threat.</p>
<p>In the face of such developments, one course of action available to the U.S. that would serve our country’s national security interests is to negotiate with North Korea in good faith, but accept nothing less than complete nuclear disarmament on the Korean peninsula. And any such agreement will have to be verified through disclosures and inspections to ensure that North Korea doesn’t cheat.</p>
<p>That’s impossible if U.S. experts don’t have an accurate accounting of what the North has achieved so far. The more that Americans negotiators know about Pyongyang’s nuclear activities to date, the better prepared they will be to set realistic terms if and when North Korea decides – as other nations have – that its future is brighter without nuclear weapons.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114055/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marshall Rogers-Martinez has received funding from the Air Force Research Laboratory and Defense Threat Reduction Agency. He previously worked at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the Global Security division.</span></em></p>North Korea is a major military threat to the US and its Asian allies, but exactly how powerful are its nuclear weapons? An earth scientist explains why it’s hard to answer this question.Marshall Rogers-Martinez, PhD Candidate, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1158652019-04-24T08:54:54Z2019-04-24T08:54:54ZNuclear weapons might save the world from an asteroid strike – but we need to change the law first<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270542/original/file-20190423-175539-so185q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/success?u=http%3A%2F%2Fdownload.shutterstock.com%2Fgatekeeper%2FW3siZSI6MTU1NjA3NTAyNiwiYyI6Il9waG90b19zZXNzaW9uX2lkIiwiZGMiOiJpZGxfMTM1NDM0OTQ4IiwiayI6InBob3RvLzEzNTQzNDk0OC9tZWRpdW0uanBnIiwibSI6MSwiZCI6InNodXR0ZXJzdG9jay1tZWRpYSJ9LCIxMnhnUGR3WlVsUktvY0w2WUpMUWpkR01QWjAiXQ%2Fshutterstock_135434948.jpg&pi=33421636&m=135434948&src=U6VwZmCfK8h-NDpTQXZ8SQ-1-11">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The schlocky 1998 Bruce Willis movie <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120591/">Armageddon</a> was the highest grossing film of that year. The blockbuster saw a master oil driller (Willis) and an unlikely crew of misfits place a nuclear bomb inside a giant asteroid heading for Earth, blow it up – and save humanity. Armageddon isn’t exactly a documentary: it’s packed full of sci-fi nonsense. But, 20 years on, its basic plot – of using a nuclear explosion to avert a cataclysmic asteroid collision – doesn’t seem quite as silly as it did at the time.</p>
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<p>Major asteroid impact is a low-probability, but high-consequence risk to life on Earth. Large <a href="https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov">“Near Earth Objects” (NEOs)</a> don’t hit Earth often, but it only takes one (just ask the dinosaurs – oh, wait, you can’t). Of course, low probability risks are easily dismissed, however high the consequences of them manifesting might be – and until recently the countries of the world largely viewed the threat posed by NEOs as something best left to Hollywood.</p>
<p>But that’s all changed, following the impact (in more ways than one) of the meteoroid that hit <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-meteorite-idUSBRE91E05Z20130215">Chelyabinsk in Russia in 2013</a>, which injured more than 1,000 people. Suddenly, the NEO threat became “real”, and major players – the US, Russia and the EU – all started pumping money into NEO preparedness, and developing formal strategies for response (see, for example, the production of the US’s first ever <a href="http://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/national_near-earth_object_preparedness_strategy_tagged.pdf">National Near-Earth Object Preparedness Strategy</a> in December 2016).</p>
<p>At the UN, we’ve recently witnessed the creation of an embryonic <a href="http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/topics/neos/index.html">international institutional infrastructure</a> to detect and respond to asteroids. As part of all this – and in line with <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/the-plans-to-use-nuclear-weapons-to-blow-up-incoming-asteroids/280593/">increasing scientific opinion</a> – there is also a notable focus at governmental and intergovernmental levels on the use of nuclear weapons as our best hope. The US and Russia have even mooted working together on a <a href="https://energy.gov/articles/united-states-russia-sign-agreement-further-research-and-development-collaboration-nuclear">nuclear planetary defence initiative</a>. All of a sudden, it seems Bruce Willis and his team might be put on NASA’s speed-dial, after all.</p>
<h2>What the law says</h2>
<p>As a lawyer I can’t help but wonder how these recent developments sit with international law. Not well, it would seem. At the intersection of nuclear non-proliferation law and space law, various Cold War-era treaties would appear to rule out nuclear planetary defence. The legal picture is not always clear – the relevant law was drafted with the superpower arms race in mind, after all, not asteroids. But if a collision-course NEO was identified, it can at least be said that a proposed nuclear response would be very likely to violate international law. </p>
<p>For example, <a href="http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf">Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty</a> prohibits stationing nuclear weapons in space, which would apparently rule out nuclear NEO defence, at least if a nuclear defence system was located in space (rather than being launched from Earth).</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.state.gov/t/isn/4797.htm">1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty</a> is an even bigger barrier for most states (although, notably, not all of the nuclear powers are party to it – but the US and Russia both are). Article I(1)(a) of that treaty prohibits “any … nuclear explosion … in … outer space”. And these are just the key treaties: there are a number of other possible legal hurdles, too. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-huge-asteroid-wiped-out-the-dinosaurs-but-what-danger-do-smaller-ones-pose-90133">A huge asteroid wiped out the dinosaurs, but what danger do smaller ones pose?</a>
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<p>So what? If it came to a choice between legal niceties and saving humanity from extinction, there wouldn’t be much of a choice at all: law shouldn’t be a global suicide pact. Indeed, one nuclear power, Russia, has already <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/12103720/EU-Russia-may-nuke-asteroids.html">indicated</a> that – if that asteroid appeared – it likely would opt for “launch first, litigate second”.</p>
<p>But ignoring the law is always a dangerous business, and it’s not hard to envisage nuclear powers using the vague threat of “asteroids” as a pretext for developing new warheads, or even for launching nukes into space. And if they do so in unapologetic violation of international law, they’ll also circumvent all the checks and balances that the law can provide. That threat is maybe more worrying than the threat of some hypothetical space rock.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270543/original/file-20190423-175535-1ww0a6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270543/original/file-20190423-175535-1ww0a6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270543/original/file-20190423-175535-1ww0a6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270543/original/file-20190423-175535-1ww0a6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270543/original/file-20190423-175535-1ww0a6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270543/original/file-20190423-175535-1ww0a6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270543/original/file-20190423-175535-1ww0a6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Earth’s saviour?</span>
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<p>In a <a href="https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1831&context=hastings_international_comparative_law_review">major article</a> just published in the Hastings International & Comparative Law Review, I argue that international law needs to work out a way to thread this needle.</p>
<p>The law has to protect us from states using asteroids as a pretext for dodging nuclear disarmament obligations, or – gulp – nuclear aggression in space, while at the same time providing for a limited, safeguarded exception that would allow for multilateral nuclear planetary defence, should it ever come to pass that we need the “nuclear option” to save ourselves.</p>
<h2>A solution?</h2>
<p>As such, I propose either treaty amendment (or, more likely, the adoption of additional protocols) to carve out a new, bespoke legal exception for the use of nuclear weapons in space, in instances where a large collision-course NEO was identified and verified, and where the balance of independent scientific option clearly supported a nuclear response.</p>
<p>At the same time, to promote certainty, protect against abuse and increase the chances of success through the pooling of expertise and resources, I also argue for the creation of a new multilateral decision-making and oversight body, composed of all states (or as many states as possible), and which additionally included direct input from independently appointed scientific experts and organisations. </p>
<p>The aim is that the new body would be equipped both to stop countries misusing the new legal exception to develop militarised nuclear space programmes, while at the same time avoiding the deadlock issues associated with existing institutions (such as, for example, the UN Security Council) if humanity has to act quickly to avoid going the way of the dinosaurs. </p>
<p>All of this would be extremely complex (legally, politically and financially) and would take a huge amount of time to set up. But when it comes to the “asteroid threat”, time is not an issue. Until it is. So I suggest we get started now.</p>
<p>The political and scientific context has changed since 2013 but the legal context is still stuck in the thinking of the 1960s – and we need to update it. If we don’t, we really could risk Armageddon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115865/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James A Green does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Bruce Willis saved the Earth with a nuclear weapon in the 1998 film Armageddon, but the law would need to change for him to do it now.James A Green, Professor of Public International Law, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1122762019-02-22T23:12:26Z2019-02-22T23:12:26ZWhy proposals to sell nuclear reactors to Saudi Arabia raise red flags<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/260460/original/file-20190222-195861-1fyoxnd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Saudi Arabia has many possible motives for pursuing nuclear power.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/nuclear-power-plant-by-night-190788197?src=nq1h28czRqWpBfF9AMU-GQ-1-76">TTstudio/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>According to a congressional report, a <a href="http://ip3international.com/">group that includes former senior U.S. government officials</a> is lobbying to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-trump-appointees-promoted-selling-nuclear-power-plants-to-saudi-arabia-over-objections-from-national-security-officials-house-democratic-report-says/2019/02/19/6a719762-3456-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html?utm_term=.d3c35345c906">sell nuclear power plants to Saudi Arabia</a>. As an expert focusing on the Middle East and the <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=UaJkFIoAAAAJ&hl=en">spread of nuclear weapons</a>, I believe these efforts raise important legal, economic and strategic concerns.</p>
<p>It is understandable that the Trump administration might want to support the U.S. nuclear industry, which is <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-demise-of-us-nuclear-power-in-4-charts-98817">shrinking at home</a>. However, the <a href="https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/5743865/House-Oversight-Whistleblowers-Saudi-Nuclear.pdf">congressional report</a> raised concerns that the group seeking to make the sale may have have sought to carry it out without going through the process required under U.S. law. Doing so could give Saudi Arabia U.S. nuclear technology without appropriate guarantees that it would not be used for nuclear weapons in the future.</p>
<h2>A competitive global market</h2>
<p>Exporting nuclear technology is lucrative, and many U.S. policymakers have long <a href="https://www.thirdway.org/report/getting-back-in-the-game-a-strategy-to-boost-american-nuclear-exports">believed</a> that it promotes U.S. foreign policy interests. However, the international market is <a href="https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/nuclear-power-continues-its-decline-as-renewable-alternatives-steam-ahead">shrinking</a>, and competition between suppliers is stiff. </p>
<p>Private U.S. nuclear companies have trouble competing against state-supported international suppliers in Russia and China. These companies offer complete construction and operation packages with attractive financing options. Russia, for example, is willing to accept spent fuel from the reactor it supplies, relieving host countries of the need to manage nuclear waste. And China can offer lower construction costs. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia declared in 2011 that it planned to spend over US$80 billion to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/saudi-nuclear-idAFLDE75004Q20110601">construct 16 reactors</a>, and U.S. companies want to provide them. Many U.S. officials see the decadeslong relationships involved in a nuclear sale as an opportunity to influence Riyadh’s nuclear future and preserve U.S. influence in the Saudi kingdom.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/260463/original/file-20190222-195876-ilvh5l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/260463/original/file-20190222-195876-ilvh5l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/260463/original/file-20190222-195876-ilvh5l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/260463/original/file-20190222-195876-ilvh5l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/260463/original/file-20190222-195876-ilvh5l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/260463/original/file-20190222-195876-ilvh5l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/260463/original/file-20190222-195876-ilvh5l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/260463/original/file-20190222-195876-ilvh5l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Of the 56 new reactors under construction worldwide, 39 are in Asia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-releases-country-nuclear-power-profiles-2017">IAEA</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
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<h2>Why does Saudi Arabia want nuclear power?</h2>
<p>With the world’s second-largest known petroleum reserves, abundant untapped supplies of natural gas and high potential for solar energy, why is Saudi Arabia shopping for nuclear power? Some of its motives are benign, but others are worrisome. </p>
<p>First, nuclear energy would allow the Saudis to increase their fossil fuel exports. About one-third of the kingdom’s daily oil production is consumed domestically at subsidized prices; substituting nuclear energy domestically would free up this petroleum for export at market prices. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia is also the <a href="https://www.albawaba.com/business/saudi-arabia-desalination-plants-red-sea-coast-1077706">largest producer of desalinated water</a> in the world. Ninety percent of its drinking water is desalinated, a process that burns approximately 15 percent of the 9.8 million barrels of oil it produces daily. Nuclear power could meet some of this demand.</p>
<p>Saudi leaders have also expressed clear interest in establishing parity with Iran’s nuclear program. In a March 2018 interview, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/saudi-crown-prince-talks-to-60-minutes/">warned</a>, “Without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.” </p>
<p>As a member in good standing of the <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text">Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</a>, Saudi Arabia has pledged not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, and is entitled to engage in peaceful nuclear trade. Such commerce could include acquiring technology to <a href="https://tutorials.nti.org/nuclear-101/uranium-enrichment/">enrich uranium</a> or separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. These systems can be used both to produce fuel for civilian nuclear reactors and to make key materials for nuclear weapons.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Adel Al-Jubeir, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the U.S., discusses his government’s concern about Iran’s nuclear program.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>US nuclear trade regulations</h2>
<p>Under the <a href="https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Atomic%20Energy%20Act%20Of%201954.pdf">U.S. Atomic Energy Act</a>, before American companies can compete to export nuclear reactors to Saudi Arabia, Washington and Riyadh must conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement, and the U.S. government must submit it to Congress. Unless Congress adopts a joint resolution within 90 days disapproving the agreement, it is approved. The United States currently has <a href="https://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/2017/266975.htm">23 nuclear cooperation agreements</a> in force, including Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt (approved in 1981), Turkey (2008) and the United Arab Emirates (2009). </p>
<p>The Atomic Energy Act requires countries seeking to purchase U.S. nuclear technology to make legally binding commitments that they will not use those materials and equipment for nuclear weapons, and to place them under International Atomic Energy Agency <a href="https://www.iaea.org/topics/basics-of-iaea-safeguards">safeguards</a>. It also mandates that the United States must approve any uranium enrichment or plutonium separation activities involving U.S. technologies and materials, in order to prevent countries from diverting them to weapons use. </p>
<p>American nuclear suppliers claim that these strict conditions and time-consuming legal requirements <a href="https://www.pillsburylaw.com/images/content/3/3/v2/332/NuclearExportControls.pdf">put them at a competitive disadvantage</a>. But those conditions exist to prevent countries from misusing U.S. technology for nuclear weapons. I find it alarming that according to the House report, White House officials may have attempted to bypass or sidestep these conditions – potentially enriching themselves in the process.</p>
<p>According to the congressional report, within days of President Trump’s inauguration, senior U.S. officials were promoting an initiative to transfer nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia, without either concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement and submitting it to Congress or involving key government agencies, such as the Department of Energy or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. One key advocate for this so-called “<a href="http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/rngs/TEST-TEST/010051ZP4H5/pdf-redacted.pdf">Marshall Plan” for nuclear reactors in the Middle East</a> was then-national security adviser Michael Flynn, who reportedly <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/flynn-backed-plan-transfer-nuclear-tech-saudis-may-have-broken-n973021">served as an adviser</a> to a subsidiary of IP3, the firm that devised this plan, while he was advising Trump’s presidential campaign.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/260461/original/file-20190222-195876-7vowa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/260461/original/file-20190222-195876-7vowa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/260461/original/file-20190222-195876-7vowa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/260461/original/file-20190222-195876-7vowa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/260461/original/file-20190222-195876-7vowa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/260461/original/file-20190222-195876-7vowa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/260461/original/file-20190222-195876-7vowa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/260461/original/file-20190222-195876-7vowa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">President Donald Trump, accompanied by national security adviser Michael Flynn and senior adviser Jared Kushner, speaks on the phone with King of Saudi Arabia Salman bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud shortly after taking office, Jan. 29, 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Trump-Saudi-Arabia/03aa15ac350c4078a87c62dffd753cbf/4/0">AP Photo/Manuel Balce Ceneta</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>The promoters of the plan also reportedly proposed to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-flynn-nuclear-exclusive/exclusive-mideast-nuclear-plan-backers-bragged-of-support-of-top-trump-aide-flynn-idUSKBN1DV5Z6">sidestep U.S. sanctions against Russia</a> by partnering with Russian companies – which impose less stringent restrictions on nuclear exports – to sell reactors to Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>Flynn resigned soon afterward and now is cooperating with the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 campaign. But IP3 access to the White House persists: According to press reports, President Trump met with representatives of U.S. industry, a meeting organized by IP3 to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-trump-appointees-promoted-selling-nuclear-power-plants-to-saudi-arabia-over-objections-from-national-security-officials-house-democratic-report-says/2019/02/19/6a719762-3456-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html?utm_term=.b90ee7dfbc6d">discuss nuclear exports to Saudi Arabia</a> as recently as mid-February 2019. </p>
<h2>Rules for a Saudi nuclear deal</h2>
<p>Saudi leaders have <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/saudi-arabia.aspx">scaled back</a> their planned purchases and now only expect to build two reactors. If the Trump administration continues to pursue nuclear exports to Riyadh, I believe it should negotiate a nuclear cooperation agreement with the Kingdom as required by U.S. law, and also take extra steps to reduce nuclear proliferation risks. </p>
<p>This should include requiring the Saudis to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s <a href="https://www.iaea.org/topics/additional-protocol">Additional Protocol</a>, a safeguards agreement that give the agency additional tools to verify that all nuclear materials in the kingdom are being used peacefully. The agreement should also require Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear fuel from foreign suppliers, and export the reactor spent fuel for storage abroad. These conditions would diminish justification for uranium enrichment or opportunities for plutonium reprocessing for weapons. </p>
<p>The United States has played a leadership role in preventing nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, one of the world’s most volatile regions. There is much more at stake here than profit, and legal tools exist to ensure that nuclear exports do not add fuel to the Middle East fire.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112276/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chen Kane receives funding from the US Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration.</span></em></p>Exporting nuclear technology is lucrative, but without strict safeguards, buyers could divert it into bomb programs. Why is Saudi Arabia shopping for nuclear power, and should the US provide it?Chen Kane, Director, Middle East Nonproliferation Program, Middlebury Institute, MiddleburyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/958292018-05-02T12:20:12Z2018-05-02T12:20:12ZNetanyahu’s attempt to discredit the Iran nuclear deal doesn’t hold water<p>Benjamin Netanyahu created a global media storm when he announced ownership of new documents that would question Iran’s nuclear deal. Twitter feeds were full of conjecture debating what he would reveal – most probably some information showing Iran had continued its nuclear activities clandestinely after <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33521655">the nuclear deal</a> had been reached between Iran and the so-called P5+1 powers (China, France, Russia, the UK, the US and Germany) in 2015. </p>
<p>But in the end, all Netanyahu’s presentation revealed was that Israel is still questioning the credibility of the deal in itself.</p>
<p>Netanyahu’s main argument was that the newly obtained documents showed that the deal “was built on lies”. He claimed that while Iran has always denied that it was pursuing nuclear weapons before the deal, the documents acknowledge that Iran had, under a project dubbed Project Amad, tried to develop nuclear weapons before 2003. He also added that Iran had in the past strived to fit a nuclear payload onto its <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/shahab-3/">Shahab 3</a> ballistic missile.</p>
<p>World leaders reacted to Netanyahu’s remarks differently. Donald Trump, who’s labelled the nuclear accord “a bad deal”, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/trump-israels-allegations-against-iran-prove-he-is-100-percent-right/2018/04/30/3e14409a-4ca1-11e8-85c1-9326c4511033_video.html?utm_term=.4e09d74a14c6">said</a> that Netanyahu’s press conference proves him “100% right”. Iran’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-43958205">derided</a> Netanyahu’s comments as a stunt meant to influence Trump’s decision on whether stay in the nuclear deal or not. Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs, <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/43768/response-high-representative-mogherini-question-regarding-israeli-prime-minister-netanyahu%E2%80%99s_en">responded more coolly</a>: “What I have seen from the first reports is that Prime Minister Netanyahu has not put into question Iran’s compliance with … (the] post-2015 nuclear commitments.”</p>
<p>But beyond the diplomatic flurry Netanyahu surely intended to provoke, his press conference shows why preserving the deal is so vital. And while international organisations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) certainly need time to study the files that Netanyahu is referring to, he hasn’t actually done much to undermine the deal’s credibility.</p>
<h2>Truth and lies</h2>
<p>First of all, one of the principal reasons why reaching an agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme took more than 10 years was that the two sides could not trust each other. As former US president Barack Obama <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/04/02/president-obamas-full-remarks-announcing-a-framework-for-a-nuclear-deal-with-iran/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.0a21ae1d9eb7">famously stated</a>, the deal “is not based on trust. It’s based on unprecedented verification”. Given that Iran’s statements about its nuclear activities are immaterial as far as the deal’s premise is concerned, Netanyahu’s argument that false statements about past activities invalidate the deal doesn’t make sense.</p>
<p>More importantly, the IAEA <a href="https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-68.pdf">report</a> indicates that the international community was aware of Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities. For instance, in its 2015 <a href="https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-68.pdf">Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme</a>, the IAEA specifically mentions Project Amad and Iran’s attempts between 2002-2003 to “integrate a new spherical payload into the existing payload chamber of the re-entry vehicle for the Shahab 3 missile”. </p>
<p>In other words, the nuclear deal in fact came about partly because of the IAEA’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities, not in spite of them. And <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-remarks-at-press-conference">thanks to the deal</a> according to a statement by director general Yukiya Amano: “The IAEA now has the world’s most robust verification regime in place in Iran.” </p>
<p>The P5+1 powers who negotiated the deal with Iran trust the IAEA’s data – and the fact it exists at all shows just how much the deal matters for Iran and the world. Without the Iran nuclear deal, Iran would never accept such rigid observations on its nuclear sites. Whatever Trump and his <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-john-bolton-donald-trump-has-an-adviser-whos-radical-even-by-neocon-standards-93883">more hawkish advisers</a> might say, this is still a good deal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95829/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Meysam Tayebipour does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Israel’s prime minister failed to undermine the validity of Iran’s nuclear deal, and instead ended up demonstrating just how important it is.Dr Meysam Tayebipour, PhD Candidate, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/864862017-11-01T11:21:02Z2017-11-01T11:21:02ZTrump’s hostility to Nuclear Deal could polarise Iranian opinion even further<p>The <a href="http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf">Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</a> (JCPOA), signed on July 15, 2015 to limit Tehran’s controversial nuclear enrichment programme in exchange for sanctions relief, seems now to be under serious threat. On October 13, in a widely expected but still alarming <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-41617488">speech</a>, US President Donald Trump described the deal as “one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the US has ever entered into”, announced he would decertify it, and called for a renegotiation that would curb the Revolutionary Guards’ <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/what-is-irans-revolutionary-guard/a-40948522">ballistic missile programme</a>.</p>
<p>Although Trump stopped short of calling for a full cancellation of the JCPOA, commonly referred to as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-iran-nuclear-deal-means-and-what-it-doesnt-44685">Iranian nuclear deal</a>, his wording reveals the extent to which his new strategy differs from Obama’s. Trump expressed solidarity with the people of Iran, whom he called the Iranian dictatorial regime’s “longest-suffering victims”, and chose to use the term “Arabian Gulf” instead of the internationally recognised “Persian Gulf” – a sign of his warmth towards Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>So why, then, was Tehran’s immediate reaction so muted?</p>
<p>The Iranian president, Hasan Rouhani, attaches great importance to the deal, seen as crucial to Iran’s economic growth. Thus, although Iran’s long-term course of action probably will be determined by the US Congress decision to preserve, modify or back out of the deal on December 14, Rouhani’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif, stated after Trump’s October announcement that so long as the nuclear deal’s European signatories stick to its terms, <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/iran-we-will-stick-to-nuclear-deal-if-europe-does/a-40959819">Iran will comply as well</a>. </p>
<p>Rouhani wanted also to contain the potential harsh reaction of Iranian hardliners, who have opposed the nuclear deal since its inception, and <a href="https://rusi.org/commentary/angry-tehran-cautious-after-trump%E2%80%99s-iran-nuclear-speech">tried to avoid further domestic polarisation</a> over the deal’s merits by trying to keep the country united against Trump and defending the Revolutionary Guards against his allegations. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the Rouhani government’s efforts to simply stay the course are not sustainable long-term. A closer look at Iranian media coverage of the decertification confirms just how complex and divided the Iranian political sphere is on this critical issue.</p>
<h2>Press review</h2>
<p>Across the board, the response of media outlets to Trump’s actions threw the country’s political debate into sharp relief. The conservative and moderate media alike depicted Trump as an unreliable counterpart who cannot be trusted. Mockery, caricatures, and invitations “to study the history of the Persian Gulf” were reported in a wide range of papers such as <a href="http://www.ebtekarnews.com/">Ebtekar</a>, <a href="http://www.iran-newspaper.com/">Iran</a>, <a href="http://jamejamonline.ir/">Jaam-e Jam</a> and <a href="http://kayhan.ir/en">Kayhan</a>.</p>
<p>However, Iranian media outlets are financed by and related to all manner of different political factions, and they do not lack diversity in views. </p>
<p>The conservative media stuck to the anti-American themes that have been in constant use since the 1979 Iranian revolution. According to Jaam-e Jam, Trump has finally unveiled “his anti-Iran strategy”. For <a href="http://www.javanonline.ir/">Javal</a>, a paper close to the conservative Principlists and critical of the nuclear deal’s provisions, Trump’s attempt to mislead global public opinion reveals the US’s intention “to confront Iran’s increasing role in the region”.</p>
<p>One particularly interesting response came from conservative outlet Kayhan. Reflecting the hardliners’ longstanding opposition to the accord, the paper welcomed Trump’s speech, saying it would open Rouhani’s eyes to the unreliability of his Western partners and eventually convince him to scrap the deal.</p>
<p>More moderate papers, meanwhile, were bitter at Trump’s attack on the “historic deal”, but they showed little surprise. Ebtekar, <a href="http://www.etemaad.ir/">Etemad</a>, <a href="http://jomhourieslami.net/">Jomhouri Eslami</a> and Besharat-e Now all focused on Rouhani’s intention to preserve it with the support of the European signatories. <a href="http://www.hamdelidaily.ir/">Hamdeli</a>, <a href="http://aftabnews.ir/">Aftab</a> and <a href="http://www.sharghdaily.ir/">Sharg</a> strongly emphasised the need to “adopt a path of moderation”, while the Islamic Republic News Agency offered responses imploring Iranians not to fall into Trump’s trap and allow public opinion to become polarised.</p>
<p>While the media landscape has been reproducing the different stances of Iran’s political factions, many Iranians are using social media, primarily Twitter and Facebook, to criticise Trump for taking a harder line on the Islamic republic. Words such as “mistrust”, “bully”, and “disappointment” have been widely used, with supporters of the deal clearly afraid that Trump will eventually undermine it. Their hope is that the deal’s other signatories will stand up for it and won’t surrender to Trump’s pressures to renegotiate.</p>
<p>Iranian critics of the deal have interpreted Trump’s decertification as a sign of the JCPOA failure. This narrative is particularly alarming if we set it against surveys on Iranian public opinion. <a href="https://theconversation.com/three-ways-trumps-nuclear-strategy-misunderstands-the-mood-in-iran-85637">Researchers</a> at the Centre for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and IranPoll found that Iranian support for the deal is still high (55%), but substantially lower than it was in August 2015 (75%).</p>
<p>Due to the slow pace of economic recovery, many Iranians feel that the nuclear deal is not living up with the expectations. They blame Washington for the JCPOA ineffectiveness as they perceive the US is limiting other countries’ trade with Iran. It is not surprising therefore that Iranians do not intend to renegotiate the deal with Trump.</p>
<p>Regardless of the immediate implications of Trump’s decision, it is sure to have long-term repercussions. The number of Iranians who want to resume the controversial activities suspended under the nuclear deal is already significant, and it may well increase. With Trump in office, international investors and multinationals will think twice before entering the Iranian market, in turn undermining the positive effects of sanctions relief. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Rouhani is struggling to keep Iranian hardliners sweet; the Revolutionary Guards <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-19/iran-guards-hit-back-at-trump-with-vow-to-boost-missile-program">recently announced</a> an expansion of Iran’s missile program, and the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/iran-nuclear-deal-latest-trump-tehran-us-support-withdraw-agreement-international-a8006561.html">threatened to shred the deal</a> to pieces if the US backs out of it.</p>
<p>All this will only polarise Iranian public opinion further and undermine domestic support for the deal, which has been crucial to legitimise Rouhani’s foreign policy. The hope is that, regardless of Washington’s moves, the understanding between the Iranian President and the nuclear deal’s signatories will remain intact, and that Europeans leaders <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/04/iran-nuclear-deal-europe-trump-congress">won’t cave in</a> to Trump’s pressures.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86486/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vittorio Felci does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An insight into Iranian media and public opinion in the aftermath of Donald Trump’s speech decertifying the 2015 Iran Nuclear deal.Vittorio Felci, Researcher, Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, Lund UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/835622017-09-25T10:20:36Z2017-09-25T10:20:36ZWill North Korea sell its nuclear technology?<p>Earlier this month CIA Director <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-selling-nuke-secrets-cia-director-mike-pompeo-2017-9#5105D9VDVYFXqHq8.99">Mike Pompeo suggested</a> “the North Koreans have a long history of being proliferators and sharing their knowledge, their technology, their capacities around the world.” </p>
<p><a href="http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/how-north-korea-evades-sanctions-in-southeast-asia-the-malaysia-case/">My research has shown</a> that North Korea is more than willing to breach sanctions to earn cash. </p>
<h2>A checkered history</h2>
<p>Over the years North Korea has earned millions of dollars from the <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=mgkqDwAAQBAJ&pg=PP1&lpg=PP1&dq=andrea+berger+target+markets&source=bl&ots=HbOMp3SyeU&sig=ObF974P8pZVpB3XFW32Nhl8fdl0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi464nQ9YvWAhXJ4IMKHZfuBLwQ6AEIYDAN#v=onepage&q=andrea%20berger%20target%20">export of arms and missiles</a>, and its involvement in other <a href="https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/SCG-FINAL-FINAL.pdf">illicit activities</a> such as smuggling drugs, endangered wildlife products and counterfeit goods. </p>
<p>Still, there are only a handful of cases that suggest these illicit networks have been turned to export nuclear technology or materials to other states. </p>
<p>North Korean technicians allegedly assisted the Pakistanis in <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/27/AR2009122701205.html">production of Krytrons</a>, likely sometime in the 1990s. Krytrons are devices used to trigger the detonation of a nuclear device. </p>
<p>Later in the 1990s, North Korea allegedly transferred cylinders of low-enriched <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/23/world/evidence-is-cited-linking-koreans-to-libya-uranium.html?mcubz=0">uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to Pakistan</a>, where notorious proliferator <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/11/the-wrath-of-khan/304333/">A.Q. Khan</a> shipped them onward to Libya. UF6 is a gaseous uranium compound that’s needed to create the “highly enriched uranium” used in weapons.</p>
<p>The most significant case was revealed in 2007 when Israeli Air Force jets bombed a facility in Syria. The U.S. government <a href="https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2013/211884.htm#part3npt4">alleges</a> this was an “undeclared nuclear reactor,” capable of producing plutonium, that had been under construction with North Korean assistance since the late 1990s. <a href="http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:EijWMYG2GP8J:i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/NKSyriapdf.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us">A U.S. intelligence briefing</a> shortly after the strike highlighted the close resemblance between the Syrian reactor and the North Korean <a href="http://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/766/">Yongbyon reactor</a>. It also noted evidence of unspecified “cargo” being transported from North Korea to the site in 2006. </p>
<p>More recently, <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/150">a 2017 U.N. report</a> alleged that North Korea had been seeking to sell Lithium-6 (Li-6), an isotope used in the production of thermonuclear weapons. The online ad that caught the attention of researchers <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/us/politics/north-korea-nuclear-trump-china.html">suggested</a> North Korea could supply 22 pounds of the substance each month from Dandong, a Chinese city on the North Korean border. </p>
<p>There are striking similarities between this latest case and other recent efforts by North Korea to market arms using companies “<a href="http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/how-north-korea-evades-sanctions-in-southeast-asia-the-malaysia-case/">hidden in plain sight</a>.” </p>
<p>The Li-6 advertisement was allegedly linked to an alias of a North Korean state arms exporter known as <a href="https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/materials/summaries/entity/green-pine-associated-corporation">“Green Pine Associated Corporation.”</a> Green Pine and associated individuals <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-un/u-n-committee-sanctions-three-north-korea-companies-idUSBRE84116Z20120502">were hit</a> with a U.N. asset freeze and travel ban in 2012. The individual named on the ad was a North Korean based in Beijing formerly listed as having diplomatic status. As was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/us/politics/north-korea-nuclear-trump-china.html">noted when the Li-6 story broke</a>, the contact details provided with the ad were made up: The street address did not exist and the phone number didn’t work. However, prospective buyers could contact the seller through the online platform. </p>
<p>This case – our most recent data point – raises significant questions. Was this North Korea testing the water for future sales? Does it suggest that North Korea may be willing to sell materials and goods it can produce in surplus? Was the case an anomaly rather than representative of a trend? </p>
<h2>A supplier in search of markets?</h2>
<p>In the few public statements North Korea has made on the issue, it has <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/greitens/files/Chestnut%20-%20Illicit%20Activity%20and%20Proliferation%20-%20North%20Korean%20Smuggling%20Networks.pdf">generally denied</a> that it will seek to export nuclear technology. </p>
<p>In 2006, for example, a Foreign Ministry official <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/10/03/nkorea.nuclear/index.html">suggested that</a> the country would “strictly prohibit any threat of … nuclear transfer.” The U.N. sanctions regime would also <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1718%20%282006%29">prohibit the export</a> of nuclear technologies – although North Korea has been happy to defy the U.N. regime since its inception that same year. </p>
<p>Additionally, there have been significant developments in states which were customers, or have been rumored to have an interest, in North Korean nuclear technology in the past. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Syria has spent the past six years in a chaotic civil war. Since the 2007 bombing of the reactor, the country has shown no public signs of interest in nuclear weapons. </p></li>
<li><p>After giving up its nuclear ambitions <a href="https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/adelphi/by%20year/2006-4d94/libya-and-nuclear-proliferation--stepping-back-from-the-brink-8955">in a 2003 deal</a> Libya has seen significant political changes and unrest following the collapse of the Qaddafi regime in 2011. </p></li>
<li><p>The <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/jcpoa_what_you_need_to_know.pdf">2015 nuclear deal</a> with Iran saw the country agree to limit its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, and procure nuclear technology through a <a href="http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/pdf/160921E%20Information%20on%20procurement%20channel.pdf">dedicated channel</a>. If it continues to adhere to the deal, it has no need for illicit nuclear purchases. While some analysts <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-iran-draw-suspicion-over-possible-nuclear-cooperation-1505887905">have speculated</a> about nuclear transfers from North Korea to Iran, no public evidence supports this. It’s unclear to what extent the Iran deal will survive the whims of the Trump administration, and what the longer-term implications are for Iran’s program and other states who may seek to acquire nuclear technology as a “<a href="http://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9781137273086">hedge</a>” against Iran in the region. </p></li>
<li><p>Myanmar, another country with unfounded allegations of past <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/10/AR2010121006281.html">North Korean nuclear collaboration</a>, has undergone significant political change and has made efforts to wean itself off imports of North Korean arms. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>In other words, it’s unclear who – if anyone – would buy North Korean nuclear technology. However, the nightmare scenario of North Korea selling it to the highest bidder merits consideration. </p>
<p>It would not be the first time that an illicit procurement network turned to sales. Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/16/world/asia/16chron-khan.html?mcubz=0">shifted his attention from</a> procurement for Pakistan’s program in the 1970s and 1980s to sales to Iran, Libya and North Korea in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. The efforts of his network saw centrifuge enrichment technology, and even a weapons design, transferred in some of the most damaging transactions ever for the nonproliferation regime. </p>
<p>Following the discovery of the Khan network, the U.N. and others developed better export controls, and capabilities to detect, inspect and interdict shipments. The international community is better prepared; however, many challenges remain in preventing illicit nuclear-related trade.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83562/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Salisbury does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kim Jong Un’s regime has already earned millions from the export of arms, missiles, drugs and endangered wildlife products.Daniel Salisbury, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/835542017-09-07T21:42:15Z2017-09-07T21:42:15ZWhy UN sanctions against North Korea’s missile program failed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184794/original/file-20170905-13709-1hg9ryu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Trucks cross the friendship bridge connecting China and North Korea on Sept. 4, 2017. Trump has threatened to cut off trade with countries that deal with North Korea. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Helene Franchineau</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The past few months have seen the coming of age of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability. </p>
<p>For most of the last 20 years, the international community has been struggling to stop this from happening.</p>
<p>A sixth nuclear test on September 3 – of what was <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2017/09/us-intelligence-north-koreas-sixth-test-was-a-140-kiloton-advanced-nuclear-device/?utm_content=buffer70357&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer">possibly a hydrogen bomb</a> – followed July’s <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/north-koreas-second-icbm-test-introduced-new-features-to-the-missiles-second-stage/">two successful tests</a> of an intercontinental ballistic missile with the capability to hit the U.S. The same month, the U.S. intelligence community <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/north-korea-now-making-missile-ready-nuclear-weapons-us-analysts-say/2017/08/08/e14b882a-7b6b-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.html?utm_term=.3b4bf27f0c33">assessed that</a> North Korea’s arsenal consists of “up to 60” weapons, and that the country had successfully manufactured a compact warhead capable of being mounted on a missile. </p>
<p>My research on how nation states <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0096340213485948">illegally obtain missile technologies</a> and my experience conducting <a href="https://projectalpha.eu/outreach-workshop-in-dalian-china/">outreach related to U.N. sanctions</a> give me some insight into the methods North Korea used to make illicit procurements and the limitations in using technology-based sanctions to prevent them.</p>
<h2>Technology-based sanctions</h2>
<p>In 2006 – following North Korea’s first nuclear test – the U.N. Security Council <a href="https://undocs.org/S/RES/1718(2006)">prohibited</a> the “supply, sale or transfer” of “items, materials, equipment, goods and technology” that could contribute to the country’s missile program. </p>
<p>Efforts to prevent North Korea’s acquisition of missile technology by certain nations – notably the United States – had been <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron">underway since the 1990s</a>. However, the U.N. sanctions went further by placing standardized legal requirements on all states to prevent the development of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programs.</p>
<p>These sanctions are “universal.” That means they are obligatory for all states around the world. Each nation is responsible for implementation within its borders. Missile, nuclear and military technologies are regulated through national export control systems. Governments must grant an export license for the exports of certain goods and technologies. This allows governments to do a risk assessment on transactions and minimize the diversions to undesirable uses, such as weapons of mass destruction programs or human rights abuses.</p>
<p>In theory, all countries should have the capacity to implement these technology-based sanctions. Having an export control system has been mandatory for states since the passage of <a href="http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1540(2004)">U.N. Security Council resolution 1540</a> in 2004. However, more than a decade after this resolution was passed, many nations – particularly developing ones – are still struggling with <a href="http://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/1540-reporting-overview/">implemention</a>.</p>
<p>This has led to uneven execution of missile-related sanctions on North Korea. A recent report has described the U.N. sanctions regime as a “<a href="https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201706_whr_a_house_without_foundations_web.pdf">house without foundations</a>,” noting that not a single element of the sanctions regime “enjoys robust international implementation.” </p>
<h2>Sources of missile technology</h2>
<p>As <a href="http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/delivery-systems/">North Korea’s missile program</a> has advanced, its sources of missile technology have evolved. </p>
<p>North Korea began by importing full missile systems and seeking to reverse-engineer or replicate them. For example, after procuring short-range <a href="https://sketchfab.com/models/63dc9c5369804d008171cae0d9922f58">Scud missiles</a> from Egypt in the late 1970s, North Korea “reverse-engineered” them by the mid-1980s. The 1990s saw North Korea develop the <a href="https://sketchfab.com/models/74e8a504b63340e284da666629bac84e">Nodong</a>, a scaled-up Scud design. It also experimented with longer-range missiles in the late 1990s and mid-2000s. These Taepodong missiles drew together elements of the shorter-range systems such as their engines. The <a href="https://sketchfab.com/models/1d2f4783998146a0a574ae05c509c607">Taepodong-2</a> allegedly had an intercontinental range, although it was never successfully tested.</p>
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<p>Since taking power in 2011, Kim Jong Un has accelerated North Korea’s missile program. In the past year alone, <a href="http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cns-north-korea-missile-test-database/">the country has tested</a> four seemingly new missiles for the first time – including a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-idUSKCN10Y2B0">submarine-launched ballistic missile</a> and an <a href="http://www.usfk.mil/Media/Press-Releases/Article/1182085/us-pacific-command-detects-tracks-north-korean-missile-launch/">intermediate range ballistic missile</a>, as well as the ICBMs tested in July. Kim has also made significant progress in developing the nuclear warheads the missiles are designed to carry. The sixth nuclear test undertaken in early September – by far the largest of those conducted by the the country – was the fourth carried out under his leadership. </p>
<p>The country has also sought to learn how to produce required parts and components at home. North Korea’s program is opaque, but some episodes provide insights into where the country has been obtaining its technology.</p>
<p>Rocket debris salvaged from the sea following a satellite launch in December 2012 suggested an ongoing reliance on the international market place for parts. A 2013 <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/147">U.N. report</a> suggested the rocket had used modern components sourced from China, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S., as well as “cannibalized” Scud components and other 1980s vintage Soviet parts.</p>
<p>Since then, North Korea has continued to pursue more advanced manufacturing technologies. Footage from the leadership’s <a href="http://www.38north.org/2013/09/jlewis090413/">frequent factory visits</a> has shown that North Korea has acquired advanced machine tools of use in missile and nuclear programs. Photographs from a parade in April 2017 <a href="https://storify.com/ArmsControlWonk/ribbed-for-your-pleasure">suggest</a> that North Korea’s new submarine-launched ballistic missile was constructed with wound filament. This material is lighter and stronger than aluminum, and a significant step forward in capability.</p>
<p>Recent discussion over the <a href="https://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2017-adeb/august-2b48/north-korea-icbm-success-3abb">possible Ukrainian or Russian origin</a> of North Korea’s rocket engines has been heated, with the argument <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2017/08/how-north-korea-makes-its-missiles/">refuted by some experts</a>. This reflects a broader debate regarding the genesis of the country’s recent successes: Was it the result of imported technology or testimony to North Korea’s ability to master advanced WMD technologies themselves?</p>
<h2>Evading sanctions</h2>
<p>To make these advances in their missile program, North Korea has had to evade sanctions and the broader scrutiny of the international community. Their illicit procurement techniques include using front companies, obscuring the end user, falsifying documentation and mislabeling cargo. A 2017 <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/150">U.N. report</a> notes that North Korea’s evasion techniques are “increasing in scale, scope and sophistication.”</p>
<p>North Korea’s military and weapons of mass destruction procurement networks are global in nature. <a href="http://projectalpha.eu/alpha-in-depth-north-koreas-proliferation-and-illicit-procurement-apparatus/">According to one study</a>, they have touched more than 60 countries. </p>
<p>Due to geographical proximity, historic relationship and broader trading links, China has played an unparalleled role in these networks. Many middlemen and procurement agents have operated in <a href="http://thebulletin.org/engaging-china-proliferation-prevention">China</a>, and increasingly – as the country’s private sector develops – its manufacturers have been a source of technology. A series of revelations in early 2017 demonstrated that Chinese manufacturers and Chinese-North Korean joint ventures are benefiting North Korea’s missile program – including with <a href="http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Shenyang_Machine_Tools_13Apr2017_Final.pdf">machine tools</a>, <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/150">components</a> and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-north-korean-venture-shows-how-much-sanctions-can-miss-1494191212?mod=djem10point">materials</a>.</p>
<h2>The effects of sanctions?</h2>
<p>Observers might rightfully ask: Have sanctions failed? </p>
<p>This question is complicated. It might be more useful to consider what the effects of sanctions have been.</p>
<p>The primary objectives of technology-based sanctions have been to slow and prevent North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. The recent ICBM tests clearly prove these measures have not prevented North Korea’s missile development. Whether they slowed progress is debatable. As U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley recently observed, they are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/05/south-korea-minister-redeploying-us-nuclear-weapons-tensions-with-north">unlikely to change North Korean behavior</a>.</p>
<p>What is undeniable is that sanctions have had unforeseen consequences. <a href="https://theconversation.com/to-curb-north-koreas-nuclear-program-follow-the-money-65462">Research suggests</a> that sanctions could have made North Korea’s procurement efforts more sophisticated as Chinese middlemen monetize the risk.</p>
<p>Americans tend to view North Korea as an inward-looking, economically isolated state cut off from the international community. However, the country’s illicit networks – including those supplying its missile program – are global, adaptive and resilient. That makes them difficult to shut down.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-did-sanctions-against-north-koreas-missile-program-fail-80666">an article</a> originally published on July 7, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83554/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Salisbury does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The international community has been trying to stop North Korea from developing long-range missiles for decades. So what went wrong?Daniel Salisbury, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/823512017-08-11T00:58:56Z2017-08-11T00:58:56ZWhy the withering nuclear power industry threatens US national security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181699/original/file-20170810-20110-1q2r5s3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">After spending $9 billion on a nuclear power plant construction in South Carolina, project developers have pulled the plug. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/scegnews/31860263040/in/photolist-VLcwq5-VLcvWQ-VyZp6w-VCfpQi-Vet1CY-Qxobd1-Qxob7Q-PQfwoN-R4cWo3-Qxoc51-R7ApHk-QTrYjW-Qxobuo-P3vWse-PHcYXo-P3vVYP-R4cVuQ-QxoaYy-P3vXtx-Q4cg3d-P3vWYe-P3vV6X-P3vXwZ-Q6VsVK-Q4chmq/">SCE&G</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>These are tough times for nuclear power in the U.S. Power plants under construction are facing serious delays, halts and cost overruns. Utilities in South Carolina <a href="http://www.thestate.com/news/state/article165339302.html">abandoned a project</a> to complete construction of two power plants in August, while the cost of the only nuclear plant now under construction has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/tab-swells-to-25-billion-for-nuclear-power-plant-in-georgia-1501691212">ballooned to US$25 billion</a>. </p>
<p>And it’s no secret that several existing nuclear power plants are at <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-us-shutters-aging-nuclear-plants-cutting-emissions-will-become-more-costly-50047">risk of shutting down</a>. In fact, that specter is one of the key motivations behind Energy Secretary Rick Perry’s recent request to the Department of Energy for an <a href="https://theconversation.com/are-solar-and-wind-really-killing-coal-nuclear-and-grid-reliability-76741">analysis of the challenges facing conventional power plants</a>. </p>
<p>While the environmental and reliability impacts of the closures are well-understood, what many don’t realize is that these closures also pose long-term risks to our national security. As the nuclear power industry declines, it discourages the development of our most important anti-proliferation asset: a bunch of smart nuclear scientists and engineers.</p>
<h2>Weapons inspectors</h2>
<p>The challenges facing our aging nuclear fleet are numerous. Cheap natural gas and the rapid growth of low-cost renewables like wind and solar, which have helped drive electricity prices <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-us-shutters-aging-nuclear-plants-cutting-emissions-will-become-more-costly-50047">downward</a> for the first time in decades, make it hard for nuclear power plants to operate profitably. At the same time, the variability of renewables pushes conventional thermal power plants fueled by natural gas, coal and nuclear sources to operate more flexibly to fill gaps when the sun doesn’t shine or the wind doesn’t blow.</p>
<p>This is a problem for U.S. nuclear plants, as ramping their output up and down causes wear and tear, increasing costs. And lingering safety concerns in the wake of the Fukushima disaster in 2011 don’t help either.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181700/original/file-20170810-27677-160keb8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181700/original/file-20170810-27677-160keb8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181700/original/file-20170810-27677-160keb8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181700/original/file-20170810-27677-160keb8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181700/original/file-20170810-27677-160keb8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181700/original/file-20170810-27677-160keb8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181700/original/file-20170810-27677-160keb8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181700/original/file-20170810-27677-160keb8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Inspectors from the IAEA survey the ruins of Iraq’s facility to produce highly enriched uranium in the 1990s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/iaea_imagebank/8490753593/in/photolist-dWikek-dWikde-dWikcK-dWikcr-dWoYpS-dWik5a-dWoYhd-dWik3V-dWoYfE-dWihmM-dWihkp-dWihjZ-dWoVrw-dWoVqQ-dWihht-dWoVoL-dWihgg-dWoVnh-dWihev-dWoVkE-dWihdx-dWifNg-dWifMp-dWifLT-dWoTVY-dWifJt-dWoR95-dUf1LV-dUkC5o-dUkBPf-dUkBJ5-dSsDM7-dSn5At-dSn5zD-dKipA4-dKoSvG-dKoSqj-dWtkzA-dWnGzX-dWtkz5-dWtkx1-dWtkwy-dWnGxk-dWtkp7-dWnrsz-dWt5uo-dWnrnc-dWnrkr-dWp3i9-dWp3hE">International Atomic Energy Agency</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>All of these factors are converging at once, creating significant financial losses for nuclear plant owners. At least 20 nuclear plants are at risk of <a href="http://www.thirdway.org/report/preserving-americas-clean-energy-foundation">closure</a>, if natural gas prices remain low and other market fundamentals don’t change.</p>
<p>This scenario creates headaches for power grid operators and planners who like the reliability of nuclear power plants. It also creates philosophical conundrums for environmentalists who rightly fret about the challenges of long-term radioactive waste storage but also decry the replacement of zero-carbon nuclear power with carbon-emitting natural gas plants.</p>
<p>But there is a third reason why a declining U.S. nuclear power industry will have long-term consequences: the national security risks associated with nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>It is the irony of nuclear power. While many worry that the prominence of nuclear materials for power production increases the risks of weapons proliferation, the opposite is also a problem. The loss of expertise from a declining domestic nuclear workforce makes it hard for Americans to conduct the inspections that help keep the world safe from nuclear weapons. And with the recent news about North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, the need for inspections feels like a pressing priority.</p>
<p>The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (<a href="http://www.dtra.mil/">DTRA</a>), the U.S. agency responsible for addressing these risks directly, employs <a href="http://www.dtra.mil/About/Who-We-Are/">2,000 people</a> to tackle chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. Hundreds work on the nuclear mission alone. Another <a href="https://www.iaea.org/about/staff">2,500 people</a>, including <a href="https://www.bnl.gov/isd/documents/79280.pdf">200 Americans</a>, work at the International Atomic Energy Agency (<a href="https://www.iaea.org/">IAEA</a>), a multi-national organization created for the sole purpose of ensuring peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The IAEA is tasked with conducting regular inspections of civil nuclear facilities and auditing the flow of nuclear materials and experts. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181710/original/file-20170810-20984-7azfml.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181710/original/file-20170810-20984-7azfml.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=664&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181710/original/file-20170810-20984-7azfml.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=664&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181710/original/file-20170810-20984-7azfml.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=664&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181710/original/file-20170810-20984-7azfml.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=834&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181710/original/file-20170810-20984-7azfml.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=834&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181710/original/file-20170810-20984-7azfml.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=834&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz, a nuclear physicist, was integral to the U.S. negotiation over Iran’s nuclear program.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/inl/14980223721/in/photolist-oPKyBk-hKukZ2-fJYnvb-oxxkHk-f5xCvA-fJYnoY-9Y1S7h-hJ7kwt-fJFQUx-yCpuYi-hKj6Mx-ykNMhj-fJFR1R-fJYmVU-fU1bKu-fU1bLm-fJFQLP-fJYn4q-McsFrY-oxzTWX-oxyuxe-MApUbj-eBVNFR-qKSzLK-ayx63F-eBVPvH-oPLp2B-f19vR8-HfV5C5-ayzLrq-oQ3gPT-f1oSAs-p4jrqE-PF8vuY-eBVPC6-Q4QvNa-Q29XrC-Q4Qv4e-f1oSrh-PF8t5Y-qXKLPG-Q4Qwsr-Qf5cm6-Q4Qw64-eBVQ4p-Q4QxpB-oxyact-p79eHV-oxxnoC-eBZ1Nw">Idaho National Laboratory</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many of our nuclear inspectors come from the military and national labs – whose missions are more weapons-related – and from the power sector. The demise of the power sector cuts off a flow of civilian talent that can use its background to help distinguish illegal weapons projects from peaceful programs to generate electricity. </p>
<p>Quite simply, it is in our national interest to maintain the expertise needed to staff the DTRA, while also contributing to the international agencies committed to keeping the world safe from nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>In the U.S. more than <a href="https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/03/f30/U.S.%20Energy%20and%20Employment%20Report.pdf">50,000 people</a> are currently employed making nuclear fuels or at the power plants that use them. If the nuclear industry is allowed to wither, we might not have the homegrown talent to help manage the risks.</p>
<h2>Next-generation nuclear</h2>
<p>Bailing out decades-old power plants with government handouts or <a href="https://theconversation.com/compete-or-suckle-should-troubled-nuclear-reactors-be-subsidized-62069">subsidies</a> seems like a step backwards. So how to proceed? The simplest approach is to issue zero-emissions credits (<a href="https://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/news/2017/04/06/ohio-lawmakers-taking-up-nuclear-plant-subsidies.html">ZECs</a>) or to put a price on carbon. Doing so harnesses the efficiency of markets while allowing nuclear power to compete because of its low-carbon footprint.</p>
<p>A carbon price or ZEC – which admittedly faces formidable political challenges – would be an immediate lifeline for existing power plants. That buys us time, but doesn’t take us all the way there. We also need to aggressively invest in research and development for modern nuclear fuel cycles that are smaller, flexible, less water-intensive, passively safe, proliferation-resistant and can be replicated in a factory to reduce costs. Reinvigorating the industry would create the need for a steady stream of people trained in nuclear physics and engineering. As a result, the world would be safer and cleaner.</p>
<p>There are already strong economic, reliability and environmental reasons to keep nuclear a part of the national fuel mix. Enhancing our national security makes the argument even more compelling.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82351/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael E. Webber receives funding from the U.S. Department of Energy and ERCOT (Electric Reliability Council of Texas). A full list of sponsors for Webber's research group at UT Austin is disclosed here: <a href="http://www.webberenergygroup.com">www.webberenergygroup.com</a> </span></em></p>Nuclear power plants don’t just pump out steady, carbon-free electricity; they also help produce the people the US needs for nuclear weapons inspections.Michael E. Webber, Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Deputy Director of the Energy Institute, The University of Texas at AustinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/805782017-07-19T14:07:11Z2017-07-19T14:07:11ZWhy the US’s 1994 deal with North Korea failed – and what Trump can learn from it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178830/original/file-20170719-13558-15mhh1c.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C20%2C3444%2C2412&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kim Jong-il, with whose government the US negotiated the 1994 agreement.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Wall_Painting_at_Mansudae_Art_Studio.JPG">Nicor via Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After more than two decades of testing, North Korea finally has a missile that is powerful enough to deliver a nuclear warhead to US territory – that is, to Alaska and/or Hawaii, if <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/world/asia/north-korea-war-us-icbm.html">estimates</a> are to be believed. This is an extremely dangerous development, and if the Trump administration is to avoid spiralling into a nuclear confrontation with North Korea, it needs to understand what North Korea wants and why it behaves the way it does.</p>
<p>Fortunately for Trump’s team, there is precedent here. In 1994, the Clinton administration and North Korea signed an <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31009.htm">Agreed Framework</a> that froze Pyongyang’s nuclear programme and aimed to normalise US-North Korean relations. The agreement targeted many of the issues that the two sides <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/6partytalks">continue</a> to <a href="https://www.38north.org/2010/05/looking-for-leverage-in-all-the-wrong-places/">grapple with</a> – but it soon ran into problems, and ultimately broke down in 2002. </p>
<p>Now, the north is closer than ever to a full-blown nuclear missile capability, and that puts the Trump administration under <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-missile-test-how-trumps-unpredictability-changes-the-game-77908">enormous pressure</a>. If the White House wants to get its North Korea policy right, it must try and understand why the US’s last best chance to resolve this crisis ultimately didn’t work out.</p>
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<p>Under the terms of the 1994 framework, North Korea agreed to freeze and ultimately dismantle its nuclear programme in exchange for “the full normalisation of political and economic relations with the United States”. This meant four things:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>By 2003, a US-led consortium would build two <a href="http://www.nuclear-power.net/nuclear-power-plant/reactor-types/lwr-light-water-reactor/">light-water nuclear reactors</a> in North Korea to compensate for the loss of nuclear power;</p></li>
<li><p>Until then, the US would supply the north with 500,000 tons per year of heavy fuel;</p></li>
<li><p>The US would lift sanctions, remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, and – perhaps most importantly – normalise the political relationship, which is still subject to the terms of the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10165796">1953 Korean War armistice</a>;</p></li>
<li><p>Finally, both sides would provide “formal assurances” against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>For a while, things seemed to be going well. In 1998, US officials involved in the implementation of the agreement <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-105shrg50815/pdf/CHRG-105shrg50815.pdf">testified to Congress</a> that both the US and the International Atomic Energy Agency were satisfied that there had been “no fundamental violation of any aspect of the Framework Agreement” by North Korea.</p>
<p>But on its own pledges, Washington failed to follow through.</p>
<h2>Falling short</h2>
<p>The light-water reactors were <a href="http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/A_History_of_KEDO-1.pdf">never built</a>. The US-led consortium tasked with constructing them was in severe debt; senators <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-105shrg50815/pdf/CHRG-105shrg50815.pdf">accused Clinton</a> of understating their cost while overstating how much US allies would contribute to funding them. Hawkish Republicans in Congress <a href="https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/1995/6/post-137a3484-6bba-4855-a2e8-367b4d4ceb7d">derided</a> the framework for supposedly <a href="http://dolearchivecollections.ku.edu/collections/press_releases/941019nor.pdf">rewarding aggressive behaviour</a>.</p>
<p>Heavy fuel shipments were often delayed. Rust Deming, assistant secretary of state, <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-105shrg50815/pdf/CHRG-105shrg50815.pdf">told Congress</a> that “to be frank, we have in past years not always met the fuel year deadline”. Meanwhile, Robert Gallucci, a diplomat who had negotiated the framework, <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-105shrg50815/pdf/CHRG-105shrg50815.pdf">warned that it could fail</a> unless the US did “what it said it would do, which is to take responsibility for the delivery of the heavy fuel oil”.</p>
<p>North Korea was not removed from the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism until 2008, though it had <a href="http://www.38north.org/2017/03/jdethomas031415">long met the criteria for removal</a>. A <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agreedframework">limited number</a> of US sanctions were eased, but not until 2000 – six years later than pledged in the Agreed Framework. According to Gallucci, Congressional <a href="http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/1353">scepticism</a> about the deal led to “the minimum interpretation of sanctions lifting”. As he <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-105shrg50815/pdf/CHRG-105shrg50815.pdf">told a congressional committee</a>: “the North Koreans have always been disappointed that more has not been done by the US.”</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178828/original/file-20170719-27090-twktye.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178828/original/file-20170719-27090-twktye.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=646&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178828/original/file-20170719-27090-twktye.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=646&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178828/original/file-20170719-27090-twktye.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=646&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178828/original/file-20170719-27090-twktye.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=812&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178828/original/file-20170719-27090-twktye.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=812&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178828/original/file-20170719-27090-twktye.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=812&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bill Clinton meets Cho Myong-nok, a North Korean special envoy, in 2000.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cho_Myong-nok_and_Bill_Clinton.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Most importantly, no action was taken to formally end the Korean War – which was <a href="http://thebulletin.org/prevent-nuclear-catastrophe-finally-end-korean-war10844">never technically ended</a> – by replacing the 1953 ceasefire with a peace treaty. The “formal assurances” that the US would not attack North Korea were not provided <a href="https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eap/001012_usdprk_jointcom.html">until six years after</a> the framework was signed. In the meantime, the Clinton administration unhelpfully persisted in labelling North Korea a “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/1994-03-01/confronting-backlash-states">backlash</a>” or “<a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=KgY-YsrAZz0C&pg=PA26&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false">rogue</a>” state, and throughout the 1990s, US military planning was based on the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1992-12-01/us-forces-challenges-ahead">concept</a> of fighting a simultaneous <a href="http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA359953">two-front war</a> against Iraq and North Korea.</p>
<p>This only worsened under Washington’s next regime: in 2002, the Bush administration’s <a href="http://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.6/NPR2001leaked.pdf">Nuclear Posture Review</a> listed North Korea as one country the US might have to use nuclear weapons against, while its <a href="https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf">2002 National Security Strategy</a> listed the north as a “rogue” regime against which the US should be prepared to use force. To this day, the US has <a href="http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR201/RAND_RR201.pdf">28,500 troops</a> stationed across 11 US military bases in South Korea, and the two countries continue with their <a href="https://www.38north.org/2014/02/rcollins022714/">joint annual military exercises</a> off the coast of the Korean Peninsula.</p>
<p>As abhorrent as the North Korean regime is, it’s not hard to see why the ruling clique might have concluded that Pyongyang remains in Washington’s crosshairs and that the US was never truly committed to the Agreed Framework. Still, as subsequent <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2011-09-21/negotiation-can-work-north-korea">negotiations</a> have shown, North Korea remains desperate for fuel, and its regime still exhibits a paranoid, self-serving obsession with security. Its past actions strongly suggest that the nuclear programme is a bargaining chip that Pyongyang is prepared to give up under the right circumstances.</p>
<p>The benefits of a new, more robust peace agreement are obvious: an end to the threat of nuclear war in East Asia, and a boost to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The story of the 1994 framework proves this is far from impossible, but also that it will demand both careful, determined diplomacy and a commitment to honouring any promises made. Sadly, the Trump administration so far seems capable of neither.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80578/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maria Ryan has received funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p>Kim Jong-il and Bill Clinton looked to have done a deal to curb North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme for good. What went wrong?Maria Ryan, Lecturer in American History, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/806662017-07-08T01:37:16Z2017-07-08T01:37:16ZWhy did sanctions against North Korea’s missile program fail?<p>North Korea’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40502361">successful test</a> of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), allegedly with the capability to hit Alaska, is the latest in a series of significant advances for the country’s missile program.</p>
<p>North Korea has been seeking to develop long-range missile technology for over 20 years. For much of this period, the international community has been trying to stop that from happening. </p>
<p>My research on how states <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0096340213485948">illegally obtain missile technologies</a> and my experience conducting <a href="https://projectalpha.eu/outreach-workshop-in-dalian-china/">outreach related to U.N. sanctions</a> give me some insight into the methods North Korea used to make illicit procurements and the limitations in using technology-based sanctions to prevent them.</p>
<h2>Technology-based sanctions</h2>
<p>In 2006 – following North Korea’s first nuclear test – the U.N. Security Council <a href="https://undocs.org/S/RES/1718(2006)">prohibited</a> the “supply, sale or transfer” of “items, materials, equipment, goods and technology” that could contribute to the country’s missile program. </p>
<p>Efforts to prevent North Korea’s acquisition of missile technology by certain nations – notably the United States – were <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron">underway by the 1990s</a>. However, the U.N. sanctions went further by placing standardized legal requirements on all states to prevent the development of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programs.</p>
<p>These sanctions are “universal” – obligatory for all states around the world. However, each nation is responsible for implementation within its borders. Missile, nuclear and military technologies are regulated through national export control systems. Exports of certain goods and technologies need to be granted an export license by the government. This allows governments to do a risk assessment on transactions and minimize the diversions to undesirable uses, such as WMD programs or human rights abuses.</p>
<p>Since the passage of <a href="http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1540(2004)">U.N. Security Council resolution 1540</a> in 2004, having an export control system has been mandatory for states. In theory, this should give all countries the capacity to implement technology-based sanctions. However, more than a decade after UNSCR 1540 was passed, many states – particularly developing countries – are still struggling to put in place effective systems <a href="http://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/1540-reporting-overview/">to implement</a> the legislation.</p>
<p>This has led to uneven implementation of missile-related sanctions on North Korea. A recent report has described the U.N. sanctions regime as a “<a href="https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201706_whr_a_house_without_foundations_web.pdf">house without foundations</a>,” noting that not a single element of the sanctions regime “enjoys robust international implementation.” </p>
<h2>Sources of missile technology</h2>
<p>As <a href="http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/delivery-systems/">North Korea’s missile program</a> has advanced, its sources of missile technology have evolved. </p>
<p>North Korea began by importing full missile systems and seeking to reverse-engineer or replicate them. For example, after procuring short-range <a href="https://sketchfab.com/models/63dc9c5369804d008171cae0d9922f58">Scud missiles</a> from Egypt in the late 1970s, North Korea had replicated, or “reverse-engineered,” them by the mid-1980s. The 1990s saw North Korea develop the <a href="https://sketchfab.com/models/74e8a504b63340e284da666629bac84e">Nodong</a>, a scaled-up Scud design. It also experimented with longer-range missiles in the late 1990s and mid-2000s. These Taepodong missiles drew together elements of the shorter-range systems such as their engines. The <a href="https://sketchfab.com/models/1d2f4783998146a0a574ae05c509c607">Taepodong-2</a> allegedly had an intercontinental range, although it was never successfully tested.</p>
<p><iframe id="r10BA" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/r10BA/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Since taking power in 2011, Kim Jong-Un has accelerated North Korea’s missile program. In the past year alone, <a href="http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cns-north-korea-missile-test-database/">the country has tested</a> four seemingly new missiles for the first time – including a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-idUSKCN10Y2B0">submarine launched ballistic missile</a> (SLBM) and an <a href="http://www.usfk.mil/Media/Press-Releases/Article/1182085/us-pacific-command-detects-tracks-north-korean-missile-launch/">intermediate range ballistic missile</a>, as well as the ICBM tested this week. </p>
<p>The country has also sought to learn how to produce required parts and components at home. North Korea’s program is opaque, and the balance between reliance on external sources and indigenization is unclear, but some episodes provide insights.</p>
<p>Rocket debris salvaged from the sea following a satellite launch in December 2012 suggested an ongoing reliance on the international market place for parts. A 2013 <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/147">U.N. report</a> suggested the rocket had used modern components sourced from China, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S., as well as “cannibalized” Scud components and other 1980s vintage Soviet parts.</p>
<p>Since then, North Korea has continued to pursue more advanced manufacturing technologies. Footage from the leadership’s <a href="http://www.38north.org/2013/09/jlewis090413/">frequent factory visits</a> has shown that North Korea has acquired advanced computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools which are of use in missile and nuclear programs. Photographs from the recent parade in April 2017 <a href="https://storify.com/ArmsControlWonk/ribbed-for-your-pleasure">suggest</a> that North Korea’s new SLBM was constructed with wound filament. This material is lighter and stronger than aluminum, and a significant step forward in capability.</p>
<h2>Evading sanctions</h2>
<p>To make these advances in their missile program, North Korea has had to evade sanctions and the broader scrutiny of the international community. Their illicit procurement techniques include using front companies, obscuring the end user, falsifying documentation and mislabeling cargo. A 2017 <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/150">U.N. report</a> notes that North Korea’s evasion techniques are “increasing in scale, scope and sophistication.”</p>
<p>North Korea’s military and WMD procurement networks are global in nature. <a href="http://projectalpha.eu/alpha-in-depth-north-koreas-proliferation-and-illicit-procurement-apparatus/">According to one study</a>, they have touched more than 60 countries. </p>
<p>Due to geographical proximity, historic relationship and broader trading links, China has played an unparalleled role in these networks. Many middlemen and procurement agents have operated in <a href="http://thebulletin.org/engaging-china-proliferation-prevention">China</a>, and increasingly – as the country’s private sector develops – its manufacturers have been a source of technology. A series of revelations in early 2017 demonstrated that Chinese manufacturers and Chinese-North Korean joint ventures are benefiting North Korea’s missile program – including with <a href="http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Shenyang_Machine_Tools_13Apr2017_Final.pdf">machine tools</a>, <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/150">components</a> and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-north-korean-venture-shows-how-much-sanctions-can-miss-1494191212?mod=djem10point">materials</a>.</p>
<h2>The effects of sanctions?</h2>
<p>With North Korea’s successful ICBM test – and a range of other nuclear, missile and military advances – observers might rightfully ask: Have sanctions failed? This question is complicated. It might be more useful to consider what the effects of sanctions have been.</p>
<p>The primary objectives of technology-based sanctions have been to slow and prevent North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. The recent ICBM test clearly proves these measures have not prevented North Korea’s missile development. Whether they slowed progress is debatable. </p>
<p>What is undeniable is that sanctions have had unforeseen consequences. <a href="https://theconversation.com/to-curb-north-koreas-nuclear-program-follow-the-money-65462">Research suggests</a> that sanctions could have made North Korea’s procurement efforts more sophisticated as Chinese middlemen monetize the risk.</p>
<p>Americans tend to view North Korea as an inward-looking, economically isolated state cut off from the international community. However, the country’s illicit networks – including those supplying its missile program – are global and responsive. Ultimately, they will be difficult to counter.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80666/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Salisbury does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The international community has been trying to stop North Korea from developing long-range missiles for decades. So how did North Korea get one?Daniel Salisbury, Postdoctoral Fellow, MiddleburyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/774082017-05-19T05:29:55Z2017-05-19T05:29:55ZHassan Rouhani’s economic legacy may be his key to winning a second term<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169914/original/file-20170518-12237-13m4ji2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Presidential_candidate,_Hassan_Rouhani_press_conference_11.jpg">Mohammad Ali Marizad/Tasnim News Agency/Wikipedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39821565">Today’s presidential election</a> in Iran had turned into a vote of confidence for President Hassan Rouhani’s four years in office. Iran’s economic recovery and reintegration into the global economy have become key electoral topics.</p>
<p>Rouhani’s government was marked by several achievements on both the domestic and international levels.</p>
<p>The nuclear deal with the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655">international community</a> was historic for the country. In return for giving up its stockpile of enriched uranium and putting its nuclear facilities under strict international inspection, Iran was promised <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35342439">the removal of sanctions</a> that had crippled <a href="https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2013/01/19/western-economic-sanctions-and-irans-survival-strategy/">the national economy</a>. </p>
<p>The promise of Iran’s reintegration into the global economy, however, has only been partly fulfilled.</p>
<h2>Still isolated</h2>
<p>Even though the UN Security Council voted in January 2016 to lift economic sanctions, in March 2017, the Republican-dominated US <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-usa-sanctions-idUSKBN16U2VI">Congress slapped new sanctions</a> on the country. These were in response to ballistic tests conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).</p>
<p>While European states have not followed the US lead in imposing new sanctions, the benefits of the UN sanctions removal have been <a href="http://www.mepc.org/us-economic-sanctions-against-iran-undermined-external-factors">undermined</a>.</p>
<p>Iran’s financial sector continues to be isolated as major international banks stay clear of the country, partly out of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f56463dc-28fe-11e7-bc4b-5528796fe35c">fear of penalties</a> on their US operations. This has proven a major barrier to developing economic ties and attracting much need international investment in Iran’s infrastructure.</p>
<p>Notwithstanding these limitations, the country has increased its oil and gas exports, from an average of 1.3 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2015 <a href="http://parstoday.com/en/news/iran-i49150-iran_oil_exports_near_record_3_million_bpd">to 2.8 million bpd in 2017</a>. These exports are primarily going to three Asian markets: China, Japan and South Korea. </p>
<p>Oil revenue allowed the Rouhani government to bring inflation down to single digits; the inflation rate stood at 7.5% in 2016 <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ru/originals/2017/03/iran-rouhani-first-term-economic-management-goals.html#ixzz4gpZWwg8T">compared to 40% in 2013</a>. But the benefits of this increased income for the state has not trickled down to ordinary citizens. </p>
<p>Unemployment and housing affordability continue to be major issues affecting Iranian citizens, especially the youth. According to official data, national unemployment stood at <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iran/overview">12.7% in 2016</a>, which is a three-year high (3.3 million people out of total population of 79 million). Of this, <a href="http://www.payvand.com/news/17/apr/1099.html">approximately 30% are young people</a>. </p>
<h2>‘Resistance economy’ and populist promises</h2>
<p>Partially fulfilled promises made in 2013 by Rouhani, who is considered a reformist and a moderate on the domestic level, have fuelled the campaign of his competitors. </p>
<p>Conservative cleric Ebrahim Raisi now presents a real challenge as another hardliner contender, Mohammad Ghalibaf <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39923803">withdrew in his candidacy</a> on Monday May 15.</p>
<p>These candidates have been accusing Rouhani of <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-election-iran-analysis-idUKKBN1342LY">compromising too much with Western powers for no benefits</a>. This charge was consistently repeated during live debates on <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20170429-iran-presidential-election-candidates-first-tv-debate-rouhani-jobs-ghalibaf">national television</a>.</p>
<p>Both candidates have been endorsed by the <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2017/04/iran-elections-principlists-ghalibaf-raisi-jamna-consensus.amp.html">Popular Front of Islamic Revolution Forces</a>, a conservative electoral coalition formed in late 2016 to consolidate the voter base and avoid fragmentation of the conservative vote which, in the 2013 election, allowed Rouhani to win with a <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22916174">slim majority (51%)</a>.</p>
<p>The conservatives’ message is tried and tested. They make a virtue of Iran’s economic isolation by celebrating the so-called “resistance economy” and proclaim pseudo-egalitarian slogans.</p>
<p>Ebrahim Raisi’s support is also based on his possible qualification <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/irans-likely-next-supreme-leader-is-no-friend-of-the-west/2016/09/26/eb3becc0-79fb-11e6-bd86-b7bbd53d2b5d_story.html?utm_term=.f553c65e41ba">as the next Supreme Leader of Iran</a>, the successor of <a href="http://english.khamenei.ir">Ayatollah Khamenei</a>.</p>
<p>He has been the custodian of the wealthy Waqf endowment in Khorasan, and has promised Iranian citizens a monthly handout of around US$40 – to be funded by Iran’s oil revenue. Waqf is the institutionalised of alms-giving, a pillar of Islam, designed to provide welfare support to the poor and the needy. The Waqf in Khorasan also happens to be a major land and property holder. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168966/original/file-20170511-32620-1tp6nqa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168966/original/file-20170511-32620-1tp6nqa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168966/original/file-20170511-32620-1tp6nqa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168966/original/file-20170511-32620-1tp6nqa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168966/original/file-20170511-32620-1tp6nqa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=459&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168966/original/file-20170511-32620-1tp6nqa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=459&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168966/original/file-20170511-32620-1tp6nqa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=459&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ebrahim Raisi tours for his presidential election campaign in Birjand, South Khorasan Province.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://fa.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D9%BE%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87:Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Birjand_for_2017_presidential_election_advertising_03.jpg">Tasnim News Agency/Wikipedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The gesture echoes the promises of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic republic, who proclaimed that all Iranian citizens would <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/02/ayatollah-unkept-promises-20142375945717752.html">share in their nation’s oil wealth</a> following the 1979 revolution, which transformed the country from a monarchy to the Islamic Republic of Iran.</p>
<p>Former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) instituted a monthly hand-out of US$12, and, in my view, Rouhani has found it politically expedient to maintain the payments.</p>
<h2>The Supreme Leader’s candidate</h2>
<p>But despite his strong campaign, the chances of Raisi actually defeating Rouhani remain low. A recent poll put Rouhani’s support at 26%, while when Raisi and Ghalibaf ran separately, they garnerred <a href="http://ippogroup.com/poll/">12% and 9% of the vote, respectively</a>. </p>
<p>Even their combined support base did not seem enough to unseat Rouhani, although <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/world/middleeast/iran-ebrahim-raisi-president-election.html?_r=0">Raisi’s fortunes now appear to be on the rise</a>.</p>
<p>Raisi claims to represent the ideals of the Islamic revolution and to have the support of the Supreme Leader, which is difficult to verify. In the Iranian system of government, the Supreme Leader is the head of state and has the ultimate say. But Raisi’s endorsement is not documented anywhere.</p>
<p>For all the noise that conservatives make about Rouhani’s failure to live up to his promises, he still enjoys Khameinei’s approval (he <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/rouhani-becomes-president-iran-khameneis-approval-state-tv-f6C10837974">backed Rouhani in the 2013 elections</a>). </p>
<p>The Supreme Leader is very much aware of the damage that Ahmadinejad’s presidency inflicted on Iran’s economy, ultimately putting the survival of the regime in jeopardy. And there’s little indication today that he would prefer a return to isolationist policies. </p>
<h2>Iranians are no fools</h2>
<p>In the run-up to the election, Professor Sadegh Zibakalam of Tehran University told <a href="http://www.isna.ir/news/96020401984/%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%A8%D8%A7%DA%A9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%AF%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%B1-%DA%AF%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%BE%D9%88%D9%BE%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AF">ISNA news agency</a> that Iranian voters won’t be fooled by populist and baseless promises. People will ask how you are going to create jobs, he claimed. And how will you raise funds to offer handouts? </p>
<p>Zibakalam’s confidence in voter aptitude may be misplaced. But his analysis points to an important feature of the presidential campaign: the conservative camp has no economic plan and tries to compensate by grandiose sloganeering.</p>
<p>Rouhani’s return to office would give him a much-needed opportunity to follow through his agenda of reintegrating Iran into the global economy. His 2014 <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/rouhani-projects-a-friendly-image-in-davos-while-his-opponents-stir-at-home">appearance at Davos</a> and 2016 tour of Europe <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/29/world/europe/iran-hassan-rouhani-france.html?_r=0">reconnected him to world leaders</a> and projected a different image of Iran. It was an image of a country that was much more open to the world. </p>
<p>His initiatives have also been welcomed as well <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-iran-rouhani-idUSKBN16Y25E">in Russia</a> and <a href="http://www.livemint.com/Politics/3Z6YdihscdtxVkXuccFGxN/Iran-China-agree-600-billion-trade-deal-after-sanctions.html">China</a>. </p>
<p>Despite the displeasure of the Trump administration, if he returns to office Rouhani will have enough international and domestic support to keep the momentum for economic reform and growth.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77408/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shahram Akbarzadeh receives funding from the Australian Research Council. He is the interim president of the Australian Association of Islamic and Muslim Studies. </span></em></p>Iran’s economic recovery and reintegration into the global economy have become key electoral topics.Shahram Akbarzadeh, Professor of Middle East & Central Asian Politics, Deputy Director (International), Alfred Deakin Research Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/752092017-03-27T19:14:07Z2017-03-27T19:14:07ZWhy we signed the open letter from scientists supporting a total ban on nuclear weapons<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162583/original/image-20170327-18974-2kt054.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The UN is debating a total ban on all nuclear weapons.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Peacekeeper_in_silo_1987.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>These are dangerous times. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-doomsday-clock-and-why-should-we-keep-track-of-the-time-71990">Doomsday Clock</a> sits at just two and a half minutes before midnight, which represents global catastrophe.</p>
<p>The Doomsday Clock has been maintained by the <a href="http://thebulletin.org/">Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists</a> since 1947, and has only ever been closer to midnight back in 1953, when the United States and Soviet Union tested their first hydrogen bombs, and the world was locked in a very dangerous nuclear arms race. </p>
<p>A single hydrogen bomb, thousands of times more powerful than the devices used on Hiroshima or Nagasaki, would be capable of obliterating a whole city. </p>
<p>An all out war, detonating even a fraction of the roughly <a href="https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/">14,000 nuclear weapons</a> in existence today, might trigger a mini ice age. Winter would last year-round, agriculture would be destroyed, and civilisation would likely collapse. </p>
<p>The then US president Ronald Reagan put it <a href="http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40205">simply and clearly</a>: “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”</p>
<p>Today we face these fears once more. Russia and China are again flexing their military might. The United States is led by President Donald Trump, who has a more hawkish take on international affairs than his predecessors. He has also said that if any country is to have nuclear weapons, then he wants the United States to be at the “<a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/25/politics/trump-nuclear-arsenal/">top of the pack</a>”.</p>
<p>There are many potential flashpoints around the world – including Syria, the Korean peninsular, the South China Sea, Iraq, and Ukraine – and many despots and terrorists looking to cause problems. </p>
<p>There is, however, reason for hope. This week’s talks at the United Nations aim to <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/dc3685.doc.htm">negotiate a total ban on nuclear weapons</a>. These talks are the first of their kind ever to take place at the UN.</p>
<p>The aim is to stigmatise nuclear weapons, as with biological and chemical weapons. The ultimate goal is a world free of these weapons of mass destruction.</p>
<p>In support of these discussions, thousands of scientists from around the world have today released <a href="https://futureoflife.org/nuclear-open-letter/">an open letter</a> urging our national governments to achieve this goal of banning nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>The letter is signed by 23 Nobel Laureates, a past US Secretary of Defense, and many well-known scientists such as Stephen Hawking, Steven Pinker, Martin Rees and Daniel Dennett. I, too, have signed the letter. </p>
<p>As scientists, we bear a special responsibility for having invented these weapons of mass destruction. And as scientists, we are also very aware of the disastrous
effects that they could have on our planet. </p>
<p>Nuclear weapons threaten not merely those who have them, but all people who walk the Earth.</p>
<p>We urge the diplomats meeting in the United Nations today to find a way to rid the world of this evil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75209/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This article reflects Toby Walsh's personal opinion and does not represent the position of Data61.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rob Brooks does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Talks begin today at the United Nations to negotiate a total ban of nuclear weapons. Over 3,600 scientists have signed an open letter supporting the ban.Toby Walsh, Professor of AI at UNSW, Research Group Leader, Data61Rob Brooks, Scientia Professor of Evolutionary Ecology; Academic Lead of UNSW's Grand Challenges Program; Director, Evolution & Ecology Research Centre, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/735632017-03-14T10:48:17Z2017-03-14T10:48:17ZThe understandable fear of nuclear weapons doesn’t match reality<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160581/original/image-20170313-9624-hktvt8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The US's 1952 'Ivy Mike' test.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AIvyMike2.jpg">National Nuclear Security Administration/Nevada Site Office, via Wikimedia Commons</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nuclear weapons are unambiguously the most destructive weapons on the planet. Pound for pound, they are the most lethal weapons ever created, capable of killing millions. Millions live in fear that these weapons will be used again, with all the potential consequences. However, the destructive power of these weapons has been vastly exaggerated, albeit for good reasons. </p>
<p>Public fear of nuclear weapons being used in anger, whether by terrorists or nuclear-armed nations, has <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/donald-trump-nuclear-war-doomsday-clock-russia-putin-gorge-orwell-apocalypse-real-immediate-threat-a7550761.html">risen once again</a> in recent years. This is in no small part thanks to the current political climate between states such as the US and Russia and the various <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-37314927">nuclear tests</a> conducted by North Korea. </p>
<p>But whenever we talk about nuclear weapons, it’s easy to get carried away with doomsday scenarios and apocalyptic language. As the historian Spencer Weart <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/reader?id=m_exFGhuHfAC&hl=sv&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&source=gbs_atb&pg=GBS.PA17">once argued</a>: “You say ‘nuclear bomb’ and everybody immediately thinks of the end of the world.” Yet the means necessary to produce a nuclear bomb, let alone set one off, remain incredibly complex – and while the damage that would be done if someone did in fact detonate one might be very serious indeed, the chances that it would mean “the end of the world” are vanishingly small.</p>
<p>In his 2013 book Command and Control, the author Eric Schlosser tried to scare us into perpetual fear of nuclear weapons by recounting stories of near misses and accidents involving nuclear weapons. One such event, the 1980 <a href="http://www.salon.com/2016/09/14/the-night-we-almost-lost-arkansas-a-1980-nuclear-armageddon-that-almost-was/">Damascus incident</a>, saw a Titan II intercontinental ballistic missile explode at its remote Arkansas launch facility after a maintenance crew accidentally ruptured its fuel tank. Although the warhead involved in the incident didn’t detonate, Schlosser claims that “if it had, much of Arkansas would be gone”.</p>
<p>But that’s not quite the case. The nine-megaton thermonuclear warhead on the Titan II missile had a blast radius of 10km, or an area of about 315km². The state of Arkansas spreads over 133,733km², meaning the weapon would have caused destruction <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/historybookreviews/10334397/Command-and-Control-by-Eric-Schlosser.html">across 0.2% of the state</a>. That would naturally have been a terrible outcome, but certainly not the catastrophe that Schlosser evokes.</p>
<h2>Overdoing it</h2>
<p>Claims exaggerating the effects of nuclear weapons have become commonplace, especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001. In the early War on Terror years, Richard Lugar, a former US senator and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, argued that terrorists armed with nuclear weapons pose an <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/story/2003/06/15/transcript-senator-lugar-talks-mideast-peace-on-fox-news-sunday.html">existential threat</a> to the Western way of life. What he failed to explain is how. </p>
<p>It is by no means certain that a single nuclear detonation (or even several) would do away with our current way of life. Indeed, we’re still here despite having nuked our own planet more than 2,000 times – a tally expressed beautifully in this video by Japanese artist Isao Hashimoto).</p>
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<p>While the 1963 <a href="https://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty.aspx">Limited Test Ban Treaty</a> forced nuclear tests underground, around 500 of all the nuclear weapons detonated were unleashed in the Earth’s atmosphere. This includes the world’s largest ever nuclear detonation, the 57-megaton bomb known as <a href="http://www.atomicheritage.org/history/tsar-bomba">Tsar Bomba</a>, detonated by the Soviet Union on October 30 1961. </p>
<p>Tsar Bomba was more than 3,000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. That is immense destructive power – but as one physicist <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=qVmZWWqrO5IC&pg=PT5&lpg=PT5&dq=%22the+largest+bomb+that+has+ever+been+exploded+anywhere+was+sixty+megatons%22&source=bl&ots=qS3Sb6eVtu&sig=iYl2hVLHCyqMTKLvJollm-Uk6Mc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiD0qbD69PSAhXBfpAKHYxwCoAQ6AEIJjAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20largest%20bomb%20that%20has%20ever%20been%20exploded%20anywhere%20was%20sixty%20megatons%22&f=false">explained</a>, it’s only “one-thousandth the force of an earthquake, one-thousandth the force of a hurricane”.</p>
<p>The Damascus incident proved how incredibly hard it is to set off a nuclear bomb and the limited effect that would have come from just one warhead detonating. Despite this, some scientists have controversially argued that an even limited all-out nuclear war might lead to a so-called <a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11287-nuclear-winter-may-kill-more-than-a-nuclear-war/">nuclear winter</a>, since the smoke and debris created by very large bombs could block out the sun’s rays for a considerable amount of time.</p>
<p>To inflict such ecological societal annihilation with weapons alone, we would have to detonate hundreds if not thousands of thermonuclear devices in a short time. Even in such extreme conditions, the area actually devastated by the bombs would be limited: for example, 2,000 one-megaton explosions with a destructive radius of five miles each would directly destroy <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/reader?id=m_exFGhuHfAC&hl=sv&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&source=gbs_atb&pg=GBS.PA7.w.1.0.324">less than 5%</a> of the territory of the US.</p>
<p>Of course, if the effects of nuclear weapons have been greatly exaggerated, there is a very good reason: since these weapons are indeed extremely dangerous, any posturing and exaggerating which intensifies our fear of them makes us less likely to use them. But it’s important, however, to understand why people have come to fear these weapons the way we do. </p>
<p>After all, nuclear weapons are here to stay; they can’t be “un-invented”. If we want to live with them and mitigate the very real risks they pose, we must be honest about what those risks really are. Overegging them to frighten ourselves more than we need to keeps nobody safe.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This piece originally stated that the warhead on the Titan II missile involved in the Damascus Incident was a 20-megaton warhead; it was in fact a nine-megaton one. The error has been corrected.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73563/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mattias Eken does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Claims of the destructive powers of nuclear weapons have, for good reasons, been greatly exaggerated.Mattias Eken, PhD Candidate in Modern History, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.