tag:theconversation.com,2011:/es/topics/south-east-asia-14153/articlesSouth-east Asia – The Conversation2023-08-24T02:03:32Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2120142023-08-24T02:03:32Z2023-08-24T02:03:32ZLeakage or spillover? Conservation parks boost biodiversity outside them – but there’s a catch, new study shows<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544193/original/file-20230823-23-fvjmxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=146%2C0%2C1514%2C1005&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Southern Red Muntjac deer peering at a camera trap.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s easy to assume protected areas such as national parks conserve wildlife – that seems obvious. But what is the proof? And how does park success vary across different ecosystems – in deserts versus tropical rainforests, or wetlands versus oceans? </p>
<p>While we can use satellite imagery to measure the effect of protected areas in reducing human impacts such as logging, you can’t see the animals from space. In particularly dense tropical rainforests, it was nearly impossible to accurately monitor wildlife, until remotely triggered camera traps became available in the past decade.</p>
<p>There is a longstanding conservation debate on the benefits that protected areas such as national parks have for biodiversity. </p>
<p>Some scientists have argued that conservation success inside park boundaries may come at the expense of neighbouring unprotected habitats. Essentially, they suggest parks displace impacts such as hunting and logging to other nearby areas. The technical term for this is <a href="https://rest.neptune-prod.its.unimelb.edu.au/server/api/core/bitstreams/018f26e0-7629-51b3-8bf4-5b3b4323c91d/content">leakage</a>. </p>
<p>On the other hand, marine parks have often reported higher biodiversity nearby. Fish reproduce successfully inside park boundaries and their offspring disperse, benefiting surrounding habitats in a “<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1617138116300255">spillover</a>” effect. </p>
<p>We set out to see which of those effects actually prevails in protected land areas and their surrounds. Our <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-023-06410-z">new study</a>, published today in Nature, shows parks do enhance bird diversity inside their borders. Large parks also support higher diversity of both birds and mammals in nearby unprotected areas.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Rare rainforest species captured by camera traps used by the research team in protected areas across South-East Asia.</span></figcaption>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-new-major-players-in-conservation-ngos-thrive-while-national-parks-struggle-199880">The new major players in conservation? NGOs thrive while national parks struggle</a>
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<h2>What did the study look at?</h2>
<p>We recruited an international team of scientists to conduct a comprehensive analysis of bird and mammal diversity inside and outside parks across South-East Asia. We used more than 2,000 cameras and bird surveys across the region.</p>
<p>South-East Asia is one of the <a href="https://www.wildcru.org/news/south-east-asias-hotspots-of-biodiversity/">most biodiverse regions</a> on Earth, but <a href="https://rdcu.be/dkacH">hunting is a key concern</a>. It’s a prime suspect for why diversity has often been assumed to decline outside protected park areas. </p>
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<img alt="Three people attaching a camera trap to a tree" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544154/original/file-20230823-23-c916v8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544154/original/file-20230823-23-c916v8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544154/original/file-20230823-23-c916v8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544154/original/file-20230823-23-c916v8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544154/original/file-20230823-23-c916v8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544154/original/file-20230823-23-c916v8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544154/original/file-20230823-23-c916v8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Members of the research team set up a camera trap in Sumatra.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors</span></span>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544167/original/file-20230823-21-2hnt2u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Pheasant in a rainforest clearing" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544167/original/file-20230823-21-2hnt2u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544167/original/file-20230823-21-2hnt2u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=598&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544167/original/file-20230823-21-2hnt2u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=598&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544167/original/file-20230823-21-2hnt2u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=598&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544167/original/file-20230823-21-2hnt2u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=751&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544167/original/file-20230823-21-2hnt2u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=751&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544167/original/file-20230823-21-2hnt2u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=751&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A Silver Pheasant eyes the camera.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors</span></span>
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<p>Hunters are mobile, so hunting bans within park boundaries may only displace these activities to nearby unprotected areas, undermining their net benefit. To be honest, we were surprised mammal diversity was higher outside large parks. It’s common to see hunters both inside and outside parks in many countries. </p>
<p>We expected hunters’ removal of game animals would reduce diversity outside parks. However, it appears large parks limit the impacts of hunting so it does not completely remove these animals. Specifically, when comparing unprotected areas near large reserves to unprotected areas that didn’t border large reserves, we found large reserves boosted mammal diversity in unprotected areas by up to 194%.</p>
<p>However, a sad note from our study was the finding that only larger parks significantly enhanced mammal diversity, casting doubt on the effectiveness of smaller parks for mammal conservation. Recent work in the region suggests many <a href="https://science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.abq2307">large mammals persist in small parks</a>, but our study shows the presence of a few resilient animals in small parks doesn’t scale up to higher biodiversity overall.</p>
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<img alt="A wild cat in a rainforest clearing" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544195/original/file-20230823-15-65e55z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544195/original/file-20230823-15-65e55z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=315&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544195/original/file-20230823-15-65e55z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=315&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544195/original/file-20230823-15-65e55z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=315&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544195/original/file-20230823-15-65e55z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544195/original/file-20230823-15-65e55z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544195/original/file-20230823-15-65e55z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A Marbled Cat looks back at the camera.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors</span></span>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-protecting-land-for-wildlife-size-matters-heres-what-it-takes-to-conserve-very-large-areas-201848">In protecting land for wildlife, size matters – here's what it takes to conserve very large areas</a>
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<h2>Not all parks are equal</h2>
<p>These findings are especially timely for the United Nations, which recently announced more ambitious biodiversity targets, including significant expansions of global protected areas. The <a href="https://www.unep.org/resources/kunming-montreal-global-biodiversity-framework">UN strategy</a> is to conserve 30% of Earth’s lands and waters by 2030 – the so-called “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/global-environment-summit-idAFL8N32R3GW">30 by 30 goal</a>”. Massive expansions of the global area of protected land will be difficult and expensive, but our results support this approach.</p>
<p>The work provides a clear case for park design to consider size. Larger parks routinely had higher bird diversity. Large mammals such as tigers and elephants travel huge distances and don’t see park boundaries drawn on maps. Larger parks support these wide-ranging animals that move across entire landscapes.</p>
<p>Considering the UN’s goal of increasing protected area to 30% of the world’s surface, our findings support the creation of fewer larger parks, rather than many smaller ones. </p>
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<img alt="Elephant's foot and trunk in a rainforest clearing" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544161/original/file-20230823-23-kgl0vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544161/original/file-20230823-23-kgl0vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=315&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544161/original/file-20230823-23-kgl0vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=315&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544161/original/file-20230823-23-kgl0vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=315&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544161/original/file-20230823-23-kgl0vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544161/original/file-20230823-23-kgl0vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544161/original/file-20230823-23-kgl0vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A Thai elephant captured by the camera trap moments before destroying it.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors</span></span>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/protecting-30-of-australias-land-and-sea-by-2030-sounds-great-but-its-not-what-it-seems-187435">Protecting 30% of Australia's land and sea by 2030 sounds great – but it's not what it seems</a>
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<h2>Next steps in South-East Asia and Australia</h2>
<p>Our findings also provide a much-needed conservation “win” for South-East Asia. Despite being a biodiversity hotspot, the region suffers from <a href="https://earth.org/deforestation-in-southeast-asia/">high rates of forest loss</a> and hunting, which pose threats to birds and mammals.</p>
<p>Our team built a collaborative network and massive database to conduct the analysis, and this can also be used to answer other questions. Our next project will quantify shifts in abundance – the numbers of animals rather than numbers of species – inside and outside parks. We suspect parks will support increased mammal and bird abundances, even more than increased in wildlife diversity.</p>
<p>Based on the success of the Asian collaborative network project, a related team is now building a domestic collaborative network and database to conduct similar analyses, called <a href="https://www.ecologicalcascades.com/wildobs">Wildlife Observatory of Australia</a>. Key questions will include the impact of fire and climate change on Australia’s wildlife diversity and abundance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212014/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The research discussed in this article was supported by the United Nations Development Programme, NASA grants NNL15AA03C and 80NSSC21K0189, the National Geographic Society’s Committee for the Research and Exploration award #9384–13, the Australian Research Council Discovery Early Career Researcher Award DECRA #DE210101440, the Universiti Malaysia Sarawak, the Ministry of Higher Education Malaysia, Nanyang Technological University Singapore, the Darwin Initiative, Liebniz-IZW, and the Universities of Aberdeen, British Columbia, Montana and Queensland. Mammal data collection in one study area (out of 65) was funded by Sarawak Energy Berhad; no personnel from that agency participated in the data collection or analysis or reviewed the manuscript before it was submitted.</span></em></p>The UN ‘30 by 30’ biodiversity strategy aims to set aside 30% of land as protected areas. New research shows these areas do support biodiversity, but big parks also increase it outside their borders.Matthew Scott Luskin, Researcher and Lecturer in Conservation Science, The University of QueenslandJedediah Brodie, Research Fellow, Institute of Biodiversity and Environmental Conservation, Universiti Malaysia Sarawak; Associate Professor and John Craighead Endowed Chair of Conservation, University of MontanaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1770122022-02-14T16:08:22Z2022-02-14T16:08:22ZElephant ivory: DNA analysis offers clearest insight yet into illegal trafficking networks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446275/original/file-20220214-19-1fzwj1t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5485%2C3329&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/guangzhou-china-jan-6-2014-chinese-760119226">Plavi011/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Poaching rare wildlife for teeth, tusks, fur, horns and other body parts is a crime which threatens many species with extinction, but the evidence which could incriminate traffickers is often difficult to access, hard to interpret, or piecemeal. </p>
<p>To discover more about the criminal networks sustaining this trade, researchers in the US, Kenya and Singapore have extracted as much data as possible from the products of illegal elephant ivory trafficking in Africa.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-021-01267-6">The new study</a> analysed the DNA of tusk ivory seized from 49 large shipments impounded in African ports between 2002 and 2019. The researchers sampled 111 tonnes of ivory from at least 4,320 poached African elephants – a fraction of the total haul. These included ivory from the <a href="https://www.iucn.org/news/species/202103/african-elephant-species-now-endangered-and-critically-endangered-iucn-red-list#:%7E:text=The%20African%20savanna%20elephant%20(loxodonta%20africana)%20is%20now%20listed%20as,on%20the%20IUCN%20Red%20List.&text=The%20IUCN%20Red%20List%20now,imagination%20all%20over%20the%20world">savanna and forest elephant species</a> which are both listed on the International Union for the Conservation of Nature’s Red List of threatened species.</p>
<p>African savanna elephants, which live in the grasslands of eastern central Africa, have declined by at least 60% over the past 50 years, but the number of forest elephants, found in western central Africa, has decreased by more than 86% in 31 years.</p>
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<img alt="An elephant wades through shallow water with a calf beneath her." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446298/original/file-20220214-25-aaxeox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446298/original/file-20220214-25-aaxeox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446298/original/file-20220214-25-aaxeox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446298/original/file-20220214-25-aaxeox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446298/original/file-20220214-25-aaxeox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446298/original/file-20220214-25-aaxeox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446298/original/file-20220214-25-aaxeox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Forest elephants (mother and calf) in a Congolese swamp.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_forest_elephant#/media/File:Loxodontacyclotis.jpg">Thomas Breuer</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>While 111 tonnes may sound like a lot of tusk, it is likely the tip of the ivory iceberg. The new analysis indicated where many elephants are being poached in Africa, where they are being shipped from and the consumer markets in south-east Asia and elsewhere they are destined for. It found that most tusks came from repeated poaching of the same elephant populations and implicated a handful of large, interconnected networks. This knowledge could help law enforcement officials link multiple shipments to a single group, thereby tying together a raft of crimes and illuminating the true scale of criminal activity.</p>
<h2>Inside the ivory trade</h2>
<p>Remarkably, the data indicates that most of the 49 shipments confiscated from across Africa contained ivory from the same bands of close relatives. This suggests the tusks of several elephants poached in one place were split up and packed into separate shipping containers for transport: mainly on cargo ships, although some went via road or rail to different countries. By spreading their illegal load across numerous vessels, traffickers reduce the risk of losing a large ivory store. With nearly one billion shipping containers <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.aat0625">travelling the world</a> each year, not all of them can be thoroughly checked.</p>
<p>The new data indicates that the power brokers of the elephant ivory trade network are transnational criminal organisations. Matching tusks that came from elephants in the same families – including parents and offspring and siblings – between different shipments helped to identify three major criminal groups based in Mombasa in Kenya, Kampala in Uganda and Lomo in Togo.</p>
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<img alt="A large vessel laden with colourful containers in a busy harbour." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446300/original/file-20220214-29677-qvcwgm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446300/original/file-20220214-29677-qvcwgm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446300/original/file-20220214-29677-qvcwgm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446300/original/file-20220214-29677-qvcwgm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446300/original/file-20220214-29677-qvcwgm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446300/original/file-20220214-29677-qvcwgm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446300/original/file-20220214-29677-qvcwgm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Lots of potential hiding places for contraband.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/container-ship-industrial-port-import-export-1570847962">Avigator Fortuner/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>The Mombasa and Kampala groups may well be arms of a single large organisation, with links across <a href="https://baselgovernance.org/publications/SNA_IWT">east Africa and south-east Asia</a>. Nevertheless, the possible links between criminal groups, ports and countries described in the study are probably an underestimate, given the high likelihood that most illegal ivory shipments pass undetected. There are practical constraints on DNA sampling and analysis too – not all tusks in every captured shipment can be genetically analysed.</p>
<p>I was alarmed to learn that my old stomping-ground, Uganda, where I was privileged to see and be among wild elephants on numerous occasions, has become a hub for this trade. The ivory illegally shipped from Uganda in this study was not principally from Ugandan elephants, but drew heavily from populations in Tanzania and Kenya instead. The data also revealed a growing web of connections between ports in different countries, indicating the expanding reach of the criminal organisations in the network.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446295/original/file-20220214-17-1m2yas2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Four maps of central Africa depicting genetic connections between ivory seizures over time." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446295/original/file-20220214-17-1m2yas2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446295/original/file-20220214-17-1m2yas2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446295/original/file-20220214-17-1m2yas2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446295/original/file-20220214-17-1m2yas2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446295/original/file-20220214-17-1m2yas2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446295/original/file-20220214-17-1m2yas2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446295/original/file-20220214-17-1m2yas2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Blue lines connect any two ivory seizures containing one or more genetic matches.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-021-01267-6">Wasser et al. (2022)/Nature Human Behaviour</a></span>
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<p>The most recent seizure in the dataset also contained 12 tonnes of <a href="https://reports.eia-international.org/out-of-africa/">scales</a> belonging to pangolins – the most poached animals in the world. Other ivory shipments included rhino horn. In many cases, the cover load in containers hiding animal parts is timber, but even the timber tends to originate from <a href="https://www.interpol.int/News-and-Events/News/2020/Forestry-crime-targeting-the-most-lucrative-of-environmental-crimes">illegal harvests</a>. This shows that criminal organisations behind ivory trafficking are routinely engaging in multiple wildlife and environmental crimes involving many other protected species and <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/Money-laundering-and-illegal-wildlife-trade.pdf">laundering the revenue</a>.</p>
<p>Trafficking groups may change which ports they use to distribute ivory to evade increased law enforcement at an existing one. These groups appear to be large, with transnational transport networks. This means that effective law enforcement must be similarly expansive and adaptable, involving government at various levels, scientists, conservation groups and the private sector. The role of institutional corruption cannot be overlooked either. At least some of the impounded ivory was taken from a <a href="https://intpolicydigest.org/the-enterprise-the-burundi-stockpile-and-other-ivory-behind-the-extradition/">Burundi government stockpile</a>.</p>
<p>Including the tusks that were not sampled, lead author of the study Samuel Wasser estimates the number of elephants represented by the total haul at 17,619. Some quick maths suggests that approximately 84,945 tonnes of elephant mass was removed, over 17 years, from the ecosystems which these animals contributed to – roughly equivalent to three times the weight of the Statue of Liberty. Considering the majority of illegal ivory shipments that pass through undetected, the scale of this <a href="https://esajournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/ecy.1557">ecological loss</a> is massive.</p>
<p>Understanding the networks that illegal wildlife products travel can help. But while there is demand for elephant ivory, poaching and illegal trafficking will continue. Alongside more effective law enforcement, there must be a major effort to promote <a href="https://files.worldwildlife.org/wwfcmsprod/files/Publication/file/2gga0z78ui_ReducingDesireforIvory_011917_print.pdf/%20https://globescan.com/2021/10/26/consumer-demand-for-ivory-remains-decline-wwf-fifth-annual-china-survey-finds/">behaviour change</a> among the people who buy illegal wildlife products and so fund the trade. </p>
<p>Investment in and ownership of illegal wildlife products must become <a href="https://theconversation.com/rhino-horn-must-become-a-socially-unacceptable-product-in-asia-103498">a badge of shame</a> rather than a status symbol.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177012/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jason Gilchrist does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new study reveals the major players and routes involved.Jason Gilchrist, Ecologist, Edinburgh Napier UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1572302021-03-17T02:31:01Z2021-03-17T02:31:01ZCOVID is forcing millions of girls out of school in South-east Asia and the Pacific<p>In response to reports of <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-03-17/coronavirus-australia-live-news-covid-19-latest/100013798">surging COVID cases in Papua New Guinea</a>, the Australian government will provide greater emergency support to deliver vaccines, increased testing capacity and clinical advice to our near neighbours.</p>
<p>This is part of a broader program <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/australias-partnership-covax-delivers-vaccines-our-neighbours">to deliver vaccines and medical support</a> to Australia’s partners throughout Asia and the Pacific with Fiji, Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines so far receiving doses. </p>
<p>While these are welcome efforts, more needs to be done to understand and respond to the long-term implications of this pandemic on countries in our region — particularly for girls, <a href="http://contemporarysecuritypolicy.org/adolescent-girls-in-protracted-crises-promoting-inclusion-and-advancing-peace/">who have often been overlooked</a> in crisis recovery planning. </p>
<p>At the heart of understanding this are the barriers and opportunities to girls’ access to education.</p>
<p>Prior to the pandemic, there had been significant improvements in girls’ enrolments in school in South-east Asia and the Pacific. But the pandemic threatens those gains, with more girls leaving the classroom due to caring responsibilities, financial constraints, family violence and child marriage. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.plan.org.au/publications/smart-successful-strong/">new report by Plan International</a> shows between January and June 2020, 24,000 applications for underage marriage had been lodged with Indonesia’s district and regional courts. According to the report, this is more than two and a half times the total number for the whole of 2012.</p>
<p>Like rates of education, this represents a reversal in a previously positive trend, in this case of decreasing cases of child marriages.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-raising-the-minimum-age-for-marriage-is-not-enough-for-indonesia-to-put-an-end-to-child-brides-123765">Why raising the minimum age for marriage is not enough for Indonesia to put an end to child brides</a>
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<h2>Girls dropping out of school</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.unicef.org/eap/media/7146/file/Issue_Brief%3A_Issue_Brief%3A_COVID-19_and_Girls%E2%80%99_Education_in_East_Asia_and_Pacific.pdf">UNICEF reported</a> the last two decades saw a halving of the number of girls out of school from 30 million to 15 million. But <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000373992">UNESCO now estimates</a> 1.2 million additional girls in the region could drop out of school due to the effects of COVID-19. </p>
<p>While the data varies from country to country, the overall picture suggests the pandemic will exacerbate existing gender inequalities and have long-term implications for girls and their communities.</p>
<p>Across the region girls drop out of school because their <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GiHA%20WG%20analysis%20%20brief.pdf">care responsibilities at home have dramatically increased</a> as family members fall victim to the virus or return home because the pandemic has stalled migratory work.</p>
<p>Before the pandemic, women and girls in the Pacific in particular faced some of the highest rates of gender-based violence in the world. <a href="https://pacificwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ThematicBrief_COVID19gender_Pacific_March2021.pdf">This has dramatically increased in 2020</a>.</p>
<p>For example, <a href="https://pacificwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ThematicBrief_COVID19gender_Pacific_March2021.pdf">in Fiji calls to the national domestic violence helpline</a> during the lockdown period — between February and April 2020 — increased by over seven times. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/knowledge-products/20201119_SDD_Policy_Paper_Covid-19.pdf">UNESCAP similarly documented</a> heightened calls to helplines in Singapore, Malaysia, India and Samoa, and increased pressures on violence shelters and women’s organisations in Indonesia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Australia, Tonga and China. Violence at home is a major barrier to girls’ participation in education.</p>
<p>Prior to the pandemic, <a href="https://www.5050foundation.edu.au/assets/reports/documents/Our-Education-Our-Future-Policy-Reportcompressed.pdf">the cost of school fees</a> was also identified as a barrier to girls’ education in the region. The economic hardship brought on by the pandemic — combined with pre-existing attitudes that devalue girls’ education — will likely see girls taken out of school permanently. </p>
<p>Crisis also brings about increases in child, early and forced marriage. <a href="https://www.savethechildren.org.au/media/media-releases/covid-19-causing-greatest-surge-of-child-marriages">Save the Children has estimated</a> the pandemic will cause an additional 2.5 million child marriages worldwide, with an estimated 200,000 more girls experiencing child marriage in South Asia in 2020. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-parts-of-the-world-bride-price-encourages-parents-to-educate-daughters-64100">In parts of the world, bride price encourages parents to educate daughters</a>
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<p>This increase is in response to poverty and economic hardship, crowding in homes, and as a result of sexual violence. Girls who are married and experience early pregnancy <a href="https://www.globalpartnership.org/blog/child-marriage-and-education-impacts-costs-and-benefits">almost never return to school</a>.</p>
<h2>Why does this matter for pandemic recovery?</h2>
<p>The benefits of ensuring girls’ access to education is not just for women and girls’ rights; it will be seen throughout the community. </p>
<p><a href="http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/775261531234655903/pdf/128171-replacement-HighCostOfNotEducatingGirls-Web.pdf">Where girls have access to education</a>, they are more likely to earn more, marry and have children later, make better informed decisions about their health and well-being, and are more able to exercise independent decision making. </p>
<p>Across the region it has been demonstrated that where there is greater gender equality and women and girls are able to access their rights, <a href="https://www.futureswithoutviolence.org/wp-content/uploads/FWV_blueprint_1-Evidence.pdf">societies are stronger, more peaceful</a> and <a href="http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/775261531234655903/pdf/128171-replacement-HighCostOfNotEducatingGirls-Web.pdf">prosperous</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-schools-become-battlegrounds-during-conflict-93851">Why schools become battlegrounds during conflict</a>
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<p>Building resilient communities is essential, as COVID sits among climate change, political instability, regional forced migration and other crises that will continue to challenge the region. <a href="https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/focus-areas/women-poverty-economics/gender-and-climate-change">Women and girls will be at the forefront</a> of <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/food-security-and-covid-19-recognising-women-s-leadership">addressing all of these crises</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/partnerships-for-recovery-australias-covid-19-development-response.pdf">Australia’s long-term strategy</a> for supporting COVID recovery in the region focuses on the three pillars of health security, stability and economic recovery. While there is a commitment to “protecting the most vulnerable, especially women and girls”, this pledge has been made against the backdrop of <a href="http://devpolicy.org/aidtracker/trends/">nearly a decade of decreasing aid</a>. </p>
<p>Australia’s contributions to the <a href="http://devpolicy.org/aidtracker/commitments/global-partnership-for-education/">Global Partnership for Education</a> — an effort to strengthen education systems in developing countries — has fallen dramatically since 2014 when it pledged US$151 million. <a href="https://www.globalpartnership.org/content/donor-contributions-gpe">In 2020 Australia pledged</a> close to US$35 million, while Canada, France, Germany and the United States pledged between US$88-90 million each. </p>
<p>This needs to be reversed if we are to address the complex insecurities facing girls and their communities in the aftermath of COVID. Access to education for all children needs to be prioritised, with particular recognition of the unique barriers for girls.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157230/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katrina Lee-Koo has received research funding from the Australian Research Council, the Australian Government, the World YWCA, and Plan International.</span></em></p>Around 33,000 child marriages took place in 2020 in Indonesia, a new report shows. This comes with more girls in Australia’s region dropping out of school and taking on more caring responsibilities.Katrina Lee-Koo, Associate professor of International Relations, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1543022021-03-11T11:17:32Z2021-03-11T11:17:32ZUS-Japan relations: why two new leaders need a fresh approach to the alliance in the Asia-Pacific<p>When Joe Biden was sworn in as the 46th President of the United States, global reaction was overwhelmingly <a href="https://time.com/5908777/joe-biden-world-reaction/">positive</a> – and, in some parts of the world, bordering on the euphoric. In recent addresses, Biden <a href="https://www.state.gov/">has asserted</a> that “American alliances are our greatest asset” and pledged to maintain the so-called “<a href="https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/us-president-joe-biden-renews-quad-with-allies-despite-beijing-pressure-2372903">Quad</a>” of the US, India, Australia and Japan to counter Chinese hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. </p>
<p>Japan’s response to the new “leader of the free world”, though, has been comparatively understated. This may come as something of a surprise given the vitriolic pursuit of outgoing president, Donald Trump, by the <a href="https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2021-01-11/editorial-trump-needs-to-be-punished-impeach-him-again">mainstream media</a> and academia in the English-speaking world. </p>
<p>Trump was not universally admired in Japan <a href="https://www.asahi.com/articles/DA3S14763703.html">either</a> – his support among the mass of Japanese voters was on a low par with former US presidents Dwight D Eisenhower, the two <a href="https://www.nhk.or.jp/politics/articles/feature/36988.html">Bushes and Jimmy Carter</a>. But he was notably more popular among Japan’s revisionist political elite, the right-leaning media and some conservative groups <a href="https://ysandpartners.com/jp/blog/u-s-president-trump-looks-good-in-japan/">within society</a>.</p>
<p>One reason for this is that he was viewed by many as a “no nonsense” president. In contrast, previous US leaders such as <a href="https://www.nhk.or.jp/politics/articles/feature/36988.html">Barack Obama</a> were widely venerated among the Japanese population, but he and other Democrat presidents have often championed foreign policies that were unpopular with Japan’s political elite. </p>
<p>For example, Bill Clinton was regularly accused of “<a href="https://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/NewPerspectives/new_curtis.pdf">Japan-passing</a>” – in favour of a focus on improved US-China relations. Meanwhile Obama’s “<a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=5VOrCwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=Pivot+to+Asia+obama+china&ots=P1vkjqNZ86&sig=0OAs8bw7B_ZSzTK2ce61beIu_H4&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Pivot%20to%20Asia%20obama%20china&f=false">pivot to Asia</a>” ruffled feathers by seemingly allowing China’s ascendancy to regional hegemony. </p>
<p>When it comes to acting as a buffer against the supposed threats of China and North Korea, nowhere matters more than the south-western island chain of Okinawa. Okinawa’s main island hosts almost <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-row-over-military-bases-on-okinawa-spells-trouble-for-us-japan-relations-72685">75% of US forces in Japan</a> as well as several new <a href="https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/english/">Japan Self Defense Force</a> (JSDF) facilities.</p>
<p>Trump upset Okinawans by demanding even more <a href="https://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/499115">host nation support</a> for military bases on the islands. He also strained relations with former prime minister, Shinzo Abe, when he agreed to summits with the PM’s longstanding adversary, Kim Jong-Un. Yet his relationship with Abe was closer than most. Abe’s aids even boasted that the Japanese premier was the only world leader who could <a href="https://diamond.jp/articles/-/171772">communicate effectively</a> with Trump. </p>
<p>Moreover, Trump’s demands that Japan contribute more towards sharing the security burden in the Asia Pacific in one sense aligned with much of Japan’s right-of-centre <a href="https://www.jimin.jp/news/?category=policy">policymaking elite</a>. This is because the Trump administration was in effect pushing Japan towards assuming the status of a “normal” state in political and military terms. This has long been the goal of <a href="https://apjjf.org/site/make_pdf/3873">leading conservative political figures</a> from Japan’s ruling LDP party. </p>
<h2>Constitutional constraints</h2>
<p>Japan is currently restricted by its anti-militarist constitution, which prohibits the use of armed forces to <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/article9.php#:%7E:text=Article%209%20of%20Japan's%20Constitution%20reads%20as%20follows%3A&text=Aspiring%20sincerely%20to%20an%20international,means%20of%20settling%20international%20disputes.">resolve international conflict</a>. Many of those relatively receptive to Trump’s demands are also in favour of revising the constitution to remove these constraints, not to mention being firmly in favour of his <a href="https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/09j012.pdf">hard line against China</a>. </p>
<p>Conversely, Biden is associated with Obama’s pivot to Asia and more inclusive relations with Beijing. So there is suspicion over his intentions in the region. So far, the new president’s administration has touted an approach of continued <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1f5b1cde-2164-406c-8535-368a624cca62">strategic rivalry with China</a>. This includes using Japan as a buffer against Chinese expansion. But the extent to which Japan’s newly elected successor to Abe, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-54143029">Yoshihide Suga</a>, formerly the chief cabinet secretary and close ally of the former prime minister, can trust America’s acclaimed saviour is less clear. </p>
<p>This has been compounded by a perception of possible irregularities. However dubiously, Biden has been accused of personal and electoral <a href="https://www.4cmitv.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/newyorker.com-Will-Hunter-Biden-Jeopardize-His-Fathers-Campaign.pdf">wrongdoing</a>. Interestingly, such allegations have gained more traction in the Japanese media than in many other countries. For example, many leading media sources in the US and UK dismissed Trump’s accusations of election fraud as <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-trumps-election-fraud-claims-arent-showing-up-in-his-lawsuits-challenging-the-results-150505">baseless</a>. In Japan, meanwhile, more than one source has presented these claims as at the very least <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TiFusTALvM0">debatable</a>. </p>
<h2>Legitimate questions</h2>
<p>Such debate includes questioning how votes were cast and counted in key battleground states. For instance, use of Dominion software for ballot-counting has been pointed to within Japan as grounds for potential <a href="https://gendai.ismedia.jp/articles/-/77556?page=3">suspicion</a>. And although not covered by many western media channels, the almost complete blackout of Trump’s complaints over the non-coverage of allegations of corruption against Biden’s son, Hunter, connected to business dealings in China, has also <a href="https://kakaku.com/tv/channel=12/programID=13024/page=81/">raised eyebrows</a>.</p>
<p>Finally, the perceived hypocrisy of big tech companies that promote free speech censoring the former president’s online presence has been discussed across Japanese media channels. Even Japan’s traditionally Democrat-leaning mainstream news outlets have voiced concerns over this as amounting to censorship of <a href="https://www.asahi.com/articles/DA3S14769639.html">free speech</a>. </p>
<p>For all these concerns, Biden’s arrival on the scene has raised hopes of a more stable <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/11/08/a-biden-presidencys-impact-on-the-asia-pacific/">US foreign policy</a> in the Asia Pacific. Nevertheless, questions remain in Japan. Is Biden going to provide the kind of regional stability befitting of “the <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/fora80&div=78&id=&page=">American pacifier</a>”? Is his administration any more trustworthy than Trump’s was? </p>
<p>Either way, the president’s mental lucidity, physical stamina and ability to lead the free world will remain under close scrutiny. His greatest challenge will be consolidating a US-Japan security alliance that can credibly balance against China in the 2020s and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154302/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ra Mason does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>On the surface, Japan and the US are firm friends. But there are some interesting dynamics at play.Ra Mason, Lecturer in International Relations and Japanese Foreign Policy, University of East AngliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1565242021-03-08T15:59:28Z2021-03-08T15:59:28ZMyanmar coup: how China could help resolve the crisis<p>As the west <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1086482">scrambles</a> for realistic and effective options in response to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/myanmar-coup-99739">recent coup in Myanmar</a>, eyes are increasingly falling on its large neighbour to the north. What, if anything, is China prepared to do to de-escalate tensions, including bringing violence to an end?</p>
<p>Myanmar’s <a href="https://www.scmp.com/topics/myanmars-changing-ties-china">relations with China</a> have been shaped by domestic factors such as the south-east Asian country’s decades-long commitment to neutrality and widespread concerns over Beijing’s economic dominance. International factors such as China’s push for greater influence in the region and the rivalry with the US have also been important. </p>
<p>Relations between the two countries have been referred to as “kinsfolk” (<a href="https://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/publication/773">pauk-phaw in Burmese</a>), a term first used in the 1950s. Though clearly asymmetric, the China-Myanmar relationship is not a simple story of patron and client. </p>
<p>Mutual recognition in the late 1940s was followed by warm relations in the 1950s and a border treaty in 1960. But the political climate changed for the worse in the 1960s, due to Beijing’s support for the Burmese Communist Party and China’s intention to export its own revolution. Anti-Chinese riots in Yangon in 1967 did little to improve ties. </p>
<p>Under Deng Xiaoping, relations improved, but the 1988 takeover by Myanmar’s military – the Tatmadaw – ended the socialist era (1962-1988) and opened the way to repression, sanctions and some degree of isolation. Yet, China stood shoulder to shoulder with the generals at the same time as <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2020/chinas-conflict-mediation-in-myanmar/">supporting some rebel “ethnic armed organisations”</a>, making Beijing a winner whatever the outcome of the conflicts.</p>
<p>China’s relations <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/26/china-myanmar-coup-democracy/">improved significantly</a> when Myanmar’s National League for Democracy formed a government. Its de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, was regarded as a stable and reliable partner. Along with <a href="https://www.mmtimes.com/news/singapore-surpasses-china-myanmars-biggest-investor.html">Singapore</a>, China is now Myanmar’s main commercial partner and a <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/specials/infographic-30-years-chinese-investment-myanmar.html">leading provider</a> of foreign direct investment. </p>
<p>Military ties also exist, although in recent years the country has shopped for arms supplies and training in <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Coup/Myanmar-embraces-Russian-arms-to-offset-China-s-influence">Moscow</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5aa36fac-7686-4067-ad1a-46a0f4c0d3ea">New Delhi</a>. Beijing, meanwhile, has been traditionally unimpressed with the generals’ xenophobia and nationalism and the army’s often obscure modus operandi.</p>
<h2>China’s response</h2>
<p>Beijing’s reaction to the recent coup was unusually fast (it does not usually provide a running commentary on government implosions or power grabs). The Xinhua <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-02/02/c_139713877.htm">news agency referred</a>, in an extraordinary feat of euphemism to the coup as a “major government reshuffle”. </p>
<p>On February 2 China – and Russia – <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-55913947">blocked</a> strong wordings of condemnation by the UN Security Council on the coup. But on February 4 Beijing <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14430.doc.htm">agreed to a statement</a> that voiced “deep concern at the declaration of the state of emergency imposed in Myanmar by the military and the arbitrary detention of members of the government including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi”. The UN called for immediate release of all those detained and pressed for continued support of the democratic transition in Myanmar. </p>
<p>Some observers note how <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2021/02/china-the-geopolitical-winner-of-myanmars-coup/">China could benefit</a> from the coup, while <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/02/what-myanmars-coup-means-china/618101/">others point</a> to risks and possible losses for Beijing. But there is one simple reason why China should care about Myanmar, and that is not the reputational damage that comes from siding closely with the State Administration Council, as the junta calls itself now. </p>
<p>Instability is bad for <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/02/what-myanmars-coup-means-china/618101/">China’s flagship project</a>, the Belt and Road Initiative. An internationally isolated Myanmar would put a spoke in the wheel of the central idea of the BRI – connectivity. </p>
<p>An economy brought to a halt and instability fuelled by street violence will lead to Myanmar returning to being an economic cul-de-sac, not a crossroads and link to other markets. Critical infrastructure such as the <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-protesters-say-attack-chinas-pipelines-internal-affair.html">Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines</a> could be exposed and suffer in a dramatic surge in violence.</p>
<h2>What can China do?</h2>
<p>There are certain positions China won’t take. It won’t issue rebukes, it won’t back UN sanctions, nor will it support external intervention. So expecting Chinese endorsement for UN action is probably a non-starter. </p>
<p>There are at least three things that China could do to help that are not incompatible with the country’s past record or at risk of jeopardising its political and economic interests in Myanmar. The steps below are consistent with the BRI’s aims of enhancing regional connectivity.</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Beijing could help bring about a reduction of tension on the streets by requesting – solely or in conjunction with UN partners – that political prisoners detained since February 1 be released. </p></li>
<li><p>China is unlikely to express its position in the form of open general rebukes. But specific actions and events can be condemned – the use of live ammunition on protesters can be referred to as “not acceptable”. </p></li>
<li><p>China could press for the state of emergency to be lifted before February 2022 (as currently expected). But this does not resolve the disagreement as to the legitimacy of the November elections, the official rationale for the coup.</p></li>
</ol>
<p>Although Beijing has pressured Myanmar to repatriate the Rohingya people who fled ethnic cleansing in the country in 2017, China did little to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-geopolitics-helped-create-the-latest-rohingya-crisis-84309">halt the crisis</a> in the first place. Stability in the region was paramount and the Rohingya were regarded as collateral damage. </p>
<p>The other issue is COVID-19. Due to measures isolating the country from the rest of the world and recurrent curfews, the previous authorities managed to cushion some of the public health effects of the pandemic – at a considerable economic cost. China could score some diplomatic points by <a href="https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/china-promises-myanmar-300000-vaccine-doses">supplying vaccines</a> and playing a greater role in addressing the combined public health and economic crisis, which would be a win-win for both countries. </p>
<p>China has the opportunity to turn its diverse economic, security and political linkages into leverage, and to a good end (ceasing violence). This should not be wasted.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156524/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matteo Fumagalli receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/S00405X/1). </span></em></p>Beijing is shaping as an important player in the international effort to resolve the political situation in Myanmar.Matteo Fumagalli, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1545262021-02-03T15:24:17Z2021-02-03T15:24:17ZMyanmar coup: how the military has held onto power for 60 years<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382241/original/file-20210203-21-90gvwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">h</span> </figcaption></figure><p>The military once again hold the reins of power in Myanmar. Citing constitutional provisions that give the military control in national emergencies, army officers <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-military-reverts-to-its-old-strong-arm-behaviour-and-the-country-takes-a-major-step-backwards-154368">detained government leaders</a> in the early hours of February 1 2021, including state counsellor and popular national leader Aung San Suu Kyi. </p>
<p>An announcement on military television said the move was in response to “fraud” during last year’s general election. A spokesman said power had been handed to the army’s commander-in-chief, General Min Aung Hlaing, who would hold power for one year, after which there would be new elections.</p>
<p>Military control of the government is <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12992883">nothing new</a> for the Burmese people. In one way or another the military has controlled the country since 1962. The post-independence civilian government got off to a bad start in 1948. In July 1947 the charismatic nationalist leader General Aung San, the father of Aung San Suu Kyi, was assassinated and leadership was inherited by the less politically agile U Nu. </p>
<p>Civil War broke out in 1949 between the government and an array of different insurgent forces, including communist and ethnic armies. As the civil war waged on and national politics became increasingly divisive, the military came to see itself as the only force that could hold the country together. </p>
<p>General Ne Win, who took power in a military coup, took the country economically and politically down a road informed by a new ideology that mixed together Buddhism and Marxism, known as the “<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0305750X81900437">Burmese Way to Socialism</a>”. It brought an end to democratic institutions and civil liberties. Nationalisation of the economy and the forced sales by farmers of produce to the government removed private incentives and ruined the economy, leading to mass protests in the rainy season of 1988. </p>
<p>These displays of pent-up frustration including hundreds of thousands of protesters in the streets forced Ne Win to step down. This brought to the fore Aung San’s daughter, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11685977">Aung San Suu Kyi</a> and a new political force, the <a href="https://nld-official.org/en/">National League for Democracy</a> (NLD). Another military takeover followed, overtly to “restore order”, with the promise of new general elections in 1990. </p>
<p>When Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD swept the elections, the military cried foul and arrested her, preventing the NLD from taking power.</p>
<h2>Military motivations</h2>
<p>During nearly six decades in power, the military has been guided by several motivations. Chief among them are the army’s <a href="https://www.tni.org/en/article/resolving-ethnic-conflict">majoritarian nationalism</a> dominated by the Burmese-speaking, Budhdist, Bamar ethnic group and the fear of any open democracy in which ethnic minorities, roughly <a href="https://burmacampaign.org.uk/about-burma/ethnic-groups/">30% or so of the population</a>, might gain too much power. </p>
<p>But the most durable motivation is that keeping control of – or at least maintaining a secure veto – over civilian government is a permanent necessity for the Burmese military. The upper echelons of the military and their families have <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20600">used their control to enrich themselves</a>, largely at the expense of pre-existing political and social elites. The continued wealth of their families would be threatened by any new government that could punish the corruption, reverse the land transfers and demand transfer of foreign bank accounts whose existence explains in part why most <a href="https://www.adb.org/countries/myanmar/poverty#:%7E:text=In%20Myanmar%2C%2024.8%25%20of%20the,day%20in%202019%20is%202.7%25.">Burmese are so poor</a>. </p>
<p>The military has followed a pattern of controlling the government for as long as it can in one guise and then, when a crisis hits, reinventing the official purpose for its continued control under another guise – and another name. So the <a href="http://www.myanmar-law-library.org/law-library/laws-and-regulations/laws/revolutionary-council-laws-1962-1974/">Revolutionary Council</a> in 1962 gave way to the Burma Socialist Programme Party government in 1974. This gave way to the <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/1997/11/20/formerly-known-as-slorc">State Law and Order Restoration Council</a> in 1988, followed by the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/State-Peace-and-Development-Council">State Peace and Development Committee</a> in 1997, which in turn was replaced in 2010 by the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12358204">Thein Sein interim government</a>.</p>
<p>What had been touted as a true democratic transition when the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/04/30/vote-nowhere/may-2008-constitutional-referendum-burma">2008 constitution</a> was implemented, actually set up a system whereby the military still maintained enough power, through its veto power and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/10/myanmar-democracys-dead-end">control of a 25% block of parliamentary seats</a>, to block any reforms that would lead to real change. This was particularly the case given they had banned NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi from becoming president.</p>
<p>But this changed in 2016 when the NDL, having won won an earlier round of elections in 2015, created the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/06/asia/aung-san-suu-kyi-state-counsellor-role-created/index.html">office of state counsellor</a> for Aung San Suu Kyi. The move allowed to take her place as de facto leader, with Win Myint as the figurehead president.</p>
<h2>Strange allies</h2>
<p>In 2017, the Myanmar military launched a brutal assault on the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar">Rohingya ethnic group</a> in the province of Rakhine in Western Myanmar. Thanks to social media campaigns on platforms such as like Facebook, the majority Bamar Budhdist population had been whipped up into an anti-Islamic frenzy. Aung San Suu Kyi did not oppose the military’s actions as the military had hoped, which would have lost her a great deal of popular support.</p>
<p>Instead she denied the military’s culpability, joined in the military’s political game of not recognising the Rohingya as a nationalist cause, supported the arrest of journalists who had discovered evidence for the military’s actions and even defended the military, most recently in 2019 in the International Court of Justice. These actions were the reason she has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/23/aung-san-suu-kyi-fall-from-grace-myanmar">lost the human rights halo</a> she once held in the eyes of the world.</p>
<p>But rather than win the military’s favour, army leaders were perturbed that their actions had not cost her and the NLD Burmese public support. Her continued popularity was demonstrated in November 2020 when the NLD <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-54899170">swept the elections</a>. The military’s fear that it was losing the nation, and that Aung San Suu Kyi might use this support to force constitutional changes, override the military’s control and bring their game to an end, meant that something had to be done.</p>
<p>The current military front party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/analysis/myanmars-losing-party-keeps-pushing-claims-election-fraud-seeks-overturn-outcome.html">claimed election fraud</a> – perhaps drawing a lesson from Donald Trump in the United States. On January 28, Myanmar’s election commission <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/myanmar-election-commission-rejects-militarys-fraud-claims-aung-san-suu-kyi-military-allegations-myanmar-military-b1794548.html">rejected these claims</a> and validated the NLD victory. </p>
<p>Planning for the takeover of the government evidently began immediately. I have been told privately that there were two days of Chinese-brokered negotiations between NLD leaders and the military that came to naught when Aung San refused to budge to military demands. The military moved the next morning and Burmese woke up to yet another version of military control.</p>
<p>As so many times after so many coups and “corrective moves” made before, the future of the country is in the military’s hands. Sooner or later military rule in Myanmar will assume yet another guise – with another claim that it marks the beginning of a real transition. But only until it threatens to actually lead to real change. Then Myanmar is likely to see the cycle repeated again. Politics moves slowly in Myanmar – the military likes it that way.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154526/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Professor Michael W. Charney is affiliated with Forces of Renewal for Southeast Asia and teaches at SOAs, the University of London.
</span></em></p>After arresting Aung San Suu Kyi once again, the army is clearly not ready to relinquish control.Michael W. Charney, Professor of Asian and Military History, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1510482020-11-27T17:53:36Z2020-11-27T17:53:36ZCambodia: treason trials the latest in the country’s slide to autocracy<p>If you are simply going on the number of political trials in Cambodia at the moment, the country would seem to be politically unstable – a hotbed of unrest. Hundreds of people are on trial for incitement, conspiracy, and violence endangering the nation. But the prime minister, Hun Sen, who has been in power since 1985, <a href="https://www.information.gov.kh/detail/361323">regularly insists</a> that his tenure has been characterised by peace, stability and development – despite <a href="https://www.khmertimeskh.com/677630/hun-sen-touts-peace-coup-attempt-thwarted/">internal</a> and <a href="https://pressocm.gov.kh/en/archives/13782">external</a> threats. He is the world’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-23257699">longest-serving head of government</a>. </p>
<p>Stable or not, more than 100 people were summoned to attend Phnom Penh Municipal Court on Thursday November 26 2020 on charges including violence endangering Cambodian institutions (Article 451 Criminal Code), conspiracy (Article 453) and incitement to commit a felony (Article 495). The cases were immediately adjourned until 2021. </p>
<p>This marks the latest event following a series of arrests over the past 18 months of people affiliated with the former <a href="https://thediplomat.com/tag/cambodia-national-rescue-party-cnrp/">Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP)</a>, raising alarm among civil society organisations including <a href="https://aseanmp.org/publications-2/">ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights</a>, <a href="https://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-resources/news/3882-csos-express-concern-over-judicial-harassment-of-former-cambodia-national-rescue-party-members">national organisations</a>, <a href="https://www.forum-asia.org/?p=32840">Forum Asia</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/02/cambodia-over-145-opposition-members-summoned">Human Rights Watch</a>.</p>
<p>Some background is necessary to understand these events, both in terms of the current politics of Cambodia and in terms of the fractured relationship between two of the main players: the country’s prime minister, <a href="http://www.samdechhunsen.gov.kh/">Samdech Techo Hun Sen</a>, and his long-time antagonist, <a href="http://samrainsyanz.org/">Sam Rainsy</a> – interim leader of the CNRP.</p>
<h2>Current political situation</h2>
<p>Cambodia has a bicameral system, with its members of parliament elected to the National Assembly and an upper Senate comprising senators elected primarily by local councillors. Cambodia’s previous local elections in June 2017 brought victory for the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) but increased gains for the CNRP. The subsequent general election in July 2018 resulted in what is effectively a one-party state, <a href="https://theconversation.com/cambodia-heads-towards-one-party-state-and-a-democratic-crisis-85515">as foreseen</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/cambodia-heads-towards-one-party-state-and-a-democratic-crisis-85515">Cambodia heads towards one-party state – and a democratic crisis</a>
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<p>Following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/one-party-to-rule-them-all-cambodias-supreme-court-rules-the-dissolution-of-opposition-party-87761">decision of the Supreme Court</a> to legally dissolve the CNRP, the CPP – led by Hun Sen – won all 125 seats in the 2018 National Assembly election and the 58 seats of the 62-member Senate that are indirectly elected.</p>
<p>Kem Sokha, former president of the CNRP, was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/02/world/asia/cambodia-kem-sokha-arrest-hun-sen.html">arrested and detained</a> in September 2017 (after the successful local elections) on charges of treason and conspiracy with foreign states, <a href="https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/ministry-slams-murphy">notably the USA</a>. His trial commenced in January 2020 and was greeted with concern by national <a href="https://www.licadho-cambodia.org/pressrelease.php?perm=445">civil society groups</a> and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25472">UN special procedure mandate holders</a>. Proceedings were <a href="https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/sokha-trial-delay-mutually-agreed">suspended indefinitely</a> in March due to the COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
<p>He was <a href="https://vodenglish.news/kem-sokha-on-tour-goodwill-trips-or-a-way-to-do-politics/">banned from all political activity</a>, as were <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-politics/cambodias-main-opposition-party-dissolved-by-supreme-court-idUSKBN1DG1BO">118 former senior CNRP figures</a>. “Political activities” is a term accorded <a href="https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50774284/khmers-help-khmers-pm-tells-officials-not-to-hinder-sokha-from-aiding-flood-victims/">a broad scope</a> of interpretation by the authorities in Cambodia. </p>
<p>But history is somewhat more complex – many of those summoned this week were linked to <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Sam-Rainsy">Sam Rainsy</a>, CNRP president, currently in self-imposed exile. Both he and Hun Sen regularly engage in verbal spats, often deploying personal, highly inflammatory rhetoric which, as UN special rapporteur, I have <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24579&LangID=E">regularly condemned</a>. To understand their fractured and fractious relationship, a little history will help.</p>
<h2>Sam Rainsy and Hun Sen</h2>
<p>Sam Rainsy has been in or on the periphery of politics in Cambodia for most of the modern period. He was first elected as a member of the royalist FUNCINPEC party at the UN-administered elections <a href="http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2051_93.htm">in 1993</a>. He served as minister of economy and finance before <a href="http://archive.ipu.org/hr-e/158/158cmbd1.htm">his expulsion</a> a year later. He then founded the Khmer Nation Party – subsequently renamed Sam Rainsy Party – and was reelected in the 1998 and 2003 general elections with his party gaining seats. </p>
<p>In 2005, in the wake of a number of (criminal) defamation charges lodged against him, Rainsy had his parliamentary immunity revoked and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/02/06/cambodia-opposition-politicians-arrested-forced-flee">he fled</a>. He was tried in absentia, convicted and, following a royal pardon at the request of Hun Sen, he returned to Cambodia in 2006, standing in the 2008 general elections.</p>
<p>This pattern of exile, trial in absentia and pardon was repeated over the subsequent decade. In August 2019, he announced his intention to return to Cambodia in November that year. Aggressive rhetoric and tensions <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25260&LangID=E">ratcheted up</a>, with authorities denouncing this as a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-politics-idUSKBN1WM11V">planned coup</a>. CNRP members and affiliates were arrested and many had travel documents revoked. Sam Rainsy <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/8/cambodias-sam-rainsy-faces-hurdles-as-he-attempts-to-return-home">claimed</a> he was prevented from travelling to Asia. </p>
<p>At the same time around 70 former Cambodia National Rescue Party associates and members, considered supporters of Sam Rainsy, who had been arrested, were <a href="https://undocs.org/A/HRC/45/51">released from detention</a> and Kem Sokha was <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/11/cambodia-reprieve-for-kem-sokha-a-token-gesture-that-should-not-distract-from-human-rights-crisis/">released from house arrest</a>. Sam Rainsy remains overseas.</p>
<h2>To the future</h2>
<p>It is now two and a half years until the next scheduled general election and less than 18 months before local elections. Commentators such as <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/with-new-arrest-cambodias-permanent-crackdown-intensifies/">Sebastian Strangio</a> and <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2020/11/hun-sen-goes-for-the-legal-kill-against-rival-cnrp/">David Hutt</a> highlight the continuing crackdown on political opposition while also probing for signs of <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2020/10/strongman-hun-sen-showing-signs-of-weakness/">political weakness</a> in advance of the next elections. It’s an “all time low” for democracy, as the director of the Cambodian Centre for Human Roghts, Chak Sopheap <a href="https://southeastasiaglobe.com/cambodias-peace-and-democracy/">has noted</a>. Indeed it was <a href="https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/pm-vows-protect-hun-family">recently reported</a> that Hun had said there could be no compromise or rapprochement.</p>
<p>The trials are the latest in a long line of proceedings against opposition political actors in Cambodia. Laws on plotting, incitement and defamation are regularly invoked to arrest and detain individuals. Often, individuals are then released from detention under judicial supervision, so neither detained nor charged. Under Cambodian law, release under judicial supervision can be indefinite with charges resurrected years later, contrary to <a href="https://undocs.org/A/HRC/45/51">international human rights</a>.</p>
<p>The future for Cambodia’s constitutionally enshrined liberal multiparty democracy is not positive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/151048/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rhona Smith is currently the independent UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia. This article is written in her private, academic capacity and does not necessarily reflect views of the United Nations. She declined to provide a profile picture.</span></em></p>In 35 years as leader, prime minster Hun Sen has steadily undermined democracy in Cambodia.Rhona Smith, Professor of International Human Rights, Newcastle Law School, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1012092018-08-13T13:00:00Z2018-08-13T13:00:00ZRohingya crisis: a year since it shocked the world, what’s changed?<p>This August marks a full year since one of the 21st century’s worst refugee crises gripped the world’s attention. In 2017, an unprecedented number of Rohingya Muslim refugees began fleeing Myanmar’s Rakhine state for neighbouring Bangladesh, after Myanmar’s military launched a crackdown in response to attacks on border posts by Rohingya rebels. This crisis is, as <a href="https://www.rte.ie/news/world/2018/0702/974683-un-rohingya/">rightly pointed out</a> by UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, “a humanitarian and human rights nightmare”; the United Nations <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/564622-un-human-rights-chief-points-textbook-example-ethnic-cleansing-myanmar">described</a> the military offensive in Rakhine that provoked the exodus as a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing”.</p>
<p>A full year later, the plight of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya people is as abject as ever. In June 2018, Myanmar’s government signed an <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/06/1011491">agreement</a> with the United Nations that will lead to the “voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable” repatriation of some 700,000 Rohingya refugees back to their homes, or their place of choosing. At the same time, Myanmar’s civilian and military powers seem to have entirely ignored international condemnation of the crackdown and allegations that it amounted to ethnic cleansing, and Aung San Suu Kyi’s government is still insisting that only refugees with the correct identity documents can return.</p>
<p>Small wonder then that the Rohingya themselves remain pessimistic. A recent <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/03/myanmar-military-land-grab-as-security-forces-build-bases-on-torched-rohingya-villages/">Amnesty International report</a> on the crisis stated that former Rohingya villages – some of which had been burned to the ground – are now the site of new construction, including new roads and infrastructure for the military. Amnesty fears that the new construction makes it even less likely that the roughly 1m refugees who fled to Bangladesh will ever be able to return to their homes.</p>
<p>But even if the repatriation agreement is accepted at face value, without the oversight of the United Nations, Myanmar’s military cannot be trusted to broker the conflict-affected population’s competing demands fairly. It already stands accused of widespread violence against Rohingya Muslims within Rakhine state. The post-repatriation time will remain a period during which the big challenge will be about how to restore relationships across the divides in question.</p>
<p>And this challenge seems almost impossible. The agreement between the UN and the government of Myanmar is far from detailed, and violence against the Rohingya population is far from over, Rohingya refugees are hardly be keen to return home. </p>
<p>The reality is that without a deal on work rights, citizenship and so on, there are deep concerns that Rohingya refugees will be repatriated only to face a situation barely changed since they fled. In the meantime, the monsoon season has already started in Bangladesh, and there are grave concerns for the safety of the refugees. The situation is serious: caught between extreme weather, funding shortfalls and uncertainty about their future, the Rohingya refugees are still living in a humanitarian catastrophe.</p>
<h2>Dereliction of duty</h2>
<p>This disaster was created by the Myanmar government’s brutal policies. A <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-genocide.html">recent report by the organisation Fortify Rights</a> confirmed that Myanmar’s military systematically planned a genocidal campaign to rid the country of Rohingya Muslims. But the United Nations Security Council has avoided the “G” word since the exodus began in August 2017; to formally utter it would, in principle, have committed the council’s members to robust action that they are clearly unwilling to take.</p>
<p>As long as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-un/china-russia-block-u-n-council-concern-about-myanmar-violence-idUSKBN16O2J6">China and Russia</a> are on Myanmar’s side, an intervention by the Security Council seems out of the question. Neighbouring India also shares <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2115839/why-do-china-india-back-myanmar-over-rohingya-crisis">no love for the Rohingya</a>. Meanwhile, the rest of the world is still <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/storms-raise-risk-water-contamination-bangladesh-s-cash-strapped-rohingya-refugee">struggling to bring relief</a> to the refugees. For the Rohingya refugees however, repatriation is not an option but an imperative, the only alternative to the limbo of protracted displacement.</p>
<p>The job of implementing the sustainable repatriation and reintegration of the Rohingya refugees obviously falls to Myanmar itself. So far, the government has done nothing to indicate that it will take that responsibility seriously – and beyond token humanitarian assistance, the countries of the global north have made no major commitment to resolve this crisis.</p>
<p>Somewhere along the line, it has been forgotten that Rakhine is one of Myanmar’s poorest and least developed states. According to <a href="https://www.iom.int/appeal/iom-appeal-myanmar-rakhine-state-april-2016-april-2018">World Bank estimates</a> it suffers a poverty rate of 78%, dramatically higher than the national average of 37.5%. And since 2012, as communal violence between Buddhist and Muslim communities swept Rakhine, the authorities <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/22/burma-end-ethnic-cleansing-rohingya-muslims">dramatically intensified</a> their crackdown, deploying excessive lethal force, conducting mass arrests, and blocking aid to displaced Muslims.</p>
<p>The Rohingya are discriminated against in many ways, and are denied legal rights to challenge this discrimination. Their demand is not for an independent state per se, but rather for identity and recognition within the state. The Rohingya crisis is therefore not only a humanitarian emergency, but also concerns issues of security, identity and development. Unless these challenges are addressed, the long-term reconciliation processes in both communities will always be more conjecture than reality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101209/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The author would like to thank Rhiannon Dempsey, Carlo Morelli and Grant Hill, at the University of Dundee, for their valuable comments and observations.</span></em></p>One of the world’s worst refugee crises is still unfolding, and conditions on the ground have barely improved.Abdullah Yusuf, Lecturer in Politics, University of DundeeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/969682018-05-31T08:59:29Z2018-05-31T08:59:29ZWhy are Asia’s women politicians facing a backlash?<p>In the global struggle to get more women into high political office, one of the more hopeful fronts is Asia. Taiwan recently celebrated two years of its first female president, <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1902315/pioneers-politics-tsai-ing-wen-joins-asias-growing-list-women-who-lead">Tsai Ing-Wen</a>, and its national legislature includes <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-35333647">43 women</a> (38% of seats). Other Asian countries, such as <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-43666134">South Korea</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13723451">Thailand</a>, have also had women heads of government. Some <a href="http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm">Asian parliaments</a> have more women MPs than many of their Western counterparts. </p>
<p>These are major advances – but is Asia really making headway on gender equality? It’s widely assumed that when women start to become political leaders, gender equality benefits, but <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1065912917745162">my own research</a> on the political representation and participation of women in Asia calls that assumption into question. To achieve real equality, Asian countries will need to do a lot more than just get more women representatives and leaders elected.</p>
<p>It’s true that women’s political presence has serious implications. Female MPs are generally imagined to act in the interests of women at large, and they also <a href="https://digest.bps.org.uk/2013/04/17/female-political-role-models-have-an-empowering-effect-on-women/">signal to the public that they are as capable of leadership as men</a>. Their example can motivate other women to actively engage in politics, too. In many parts of the world, female MPs are crucial role models for other women and girls, inspiring them to envision themselves as equal to men and by extension to enter political life. </p>
<p>But in much of Asia, these positive effects are hard to see.</p>
<p>In my research, I looked at 13 countries sampled by the Asian Barometer – a public opinion survey in East and Southeast Asia. They were Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. In these places, women’s legislative presence is not met with an increase in women’s political engagement; in fact, it seems to trigger a backlash. </p>
<p>In these countries, the rise of women politicians is actually discouraging women in general from engaging in politics. As the presence of women MPs increases, Asian women are less likely to discuss politics with family and friends, to turn out to vote, to campaign for candidates, or to protest. And even as women’s political representation increases, the gender gap in these various political activities persists.</p>
<p>Given the usual optimistic assumptions about the effect of having women enter politics, why should this be?</p>
<h2>Setting examples</h2>
<p>One explanation could be that when female politicians take the helm but gender equality doesn’t improve, their presence may be seen as tokenistic. </p>
<p>In many of the Asian countries I’ve studied, the advancement of women in politics is strikingly disconnected from women’s economic and social lives more generally. Parts of Sub-Saharan Africa aside, East and Southeast Asia are marked by a greater discrepancy between women’s political rights and their social rights than any other part of the world. As long as this disparity persists, there’s little reason for women to suddenly get inspired to engage in politics.</p>
<p>More than that, where women politicians decline to use their power to advocate for women’s rights, female voters will hardly be thrilled. Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-Wen, is known for <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/please-dont-downplay-gender-madame-president-the-china-post">a thin agenda when it comes to women’s issues</a>, and her cabinet includes <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-36309137">only four women</a> – notably fewer than sat in previous male-led cabinets. Should she run for a second term in 2020, that record won’t exactly inspire female voters.</p>
<p>And then there are the less edifying examples. In South Korea, former president <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/world/asia/park-geun-hye-impeached-south-korea.html">Park Geun-hye</a> ended up <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/06/former-south-korea-president-park-geun-hye-guilty-of-corruption">impeached and jailed</a> for corruption. When other women campaign and are nominated for the presidency, or indeed other high offices, her bad example will loom large.</p>
<p>Clearly, having women in government is a good end in itself. But in an era when women’s political representation is on the rise – albeit slowly – it’s crucial to ensure that gender equality in political institutions isn’t just a matter of numbers. The measure of its impact isn’t just the number of women occupying positions of power, but visible changes that benefit women outside political institutions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96968/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shan-Jan Sarah Liu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The measure of women’s political advancement isn’t the number of female leaders, but the changes they make to everyday women’s lives.Shan-Jan Sarah Liu, Lecturer in Comparative Politics, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/963692018-05-10T14:20:22Z2018-05-10T14:20:22ZMalaysia’s first new government in six decades revels in a shocking victory<p>In an shocking upset, the coalition that has ruled Malaysia for all 61 years since independence, Barisan Nasional (BN), has lost power. It was ousted by a coalition of four parties, Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope), whose combined seats amounted to a parliamentary majority. Its candidate for prime minister, 92-year-old <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44063675">Mahathir Mohamad</a>, has now been sworn in. A former BN prime minister of 22 years, he now becomes the world’s oldest sitting elected leader.</p>
<p>This is a galling defeat for BN, which was widely expected to win yet again. In the last vote in 2013, it retained enough seats to govern even though it <a href="https://www.malaymail.com/s/588309/bn-powered-to-hard-fought-victory-in-ge13">lost the popular vote</a>. In this election, it was expected to retain a majority, or at least be able to work together with the third party of significance, the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2018/04/22/islamic-party-aims-to-hold-the-key-in-malaysia-s-election">Malaysian Islamic Party</a>.</p>
<p>BN also usually benefits from the highly racialised nature of Malaysian politics. Its largest member party, The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Malays-National-Organization">United Malays National Organisation</a> (UMNO) has previously retained overwhelming ethnic Malay support. By contrast, the Democratic Action Party, part of the Pakatan Harapan coalition, is widely distrusted among Malays partly because of its image as a party of the ethnic Chinese population.</p>
<p>During the campaign, BN did all it could to put obstacles in Pakatan Harapan’s path. It was <a href="https://www.globalbersih.org/electoral-information-2/delineation/">widely criticised for gerrymandering constituency boundaries</a>, and democratic freedoms were <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-east-asia-takes-stock-after-a-year-of-alarming-democratic-decline-69185">undermined</a> by an <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/2018-03-27-malaysias-bill-outlawing-fake-news-raises-concern-about-media-freedom/">anti-fake news law</a> and various sedition laws. Mahathir’s face was even <a href="https://mothership.sg/2018/04/mahathir-image-billboard-gone/">gouged out of campaign billboards</a>.</p>
<p>BN expected to <a href="https://www.themalaysianinsight.com/s/43572/">benefit from an anticipated low turnout</a>, and all the stops were pulled out to make voting harder. The vote was held on a Wednesday rather than a weekend; polling centres closed at 5pm, even though people were still waiting to vote. The election was called a full month before polling day, but nominations were only confirmed on April 28, meaning many Malaysians living abroad either didn’t receive their postal ballots in time or weren’t given sufficient notice to plan a trip home. </p>
<p>In the end, BN still fell short of its usual majority. But even after the results came in, there were concerns that it would obstruct the transfer of power. The electoral commission was much slower than usual to <a href="http://www.thesundaily.my/news/2018/05/10/political-analyst-takes-swipe-ec-chairman-live-tv">confirm the counts</a>, and there were also concerns that the Agong (king) <a href="http://www.thesundaily.my/news/2018/05/10/palace-confirms-mahathir-won%E2%80%99t-be-sworn-today">would not swear in Mahathir</a> on the day. BN delayed its press conference until the morning after the results, with some questioning whether it was attempting to thwart Pakatan Harapan by persuading opposition partners in the state of Sabah to jump ship.</p>
<h2>Caught out</h2>
<p>Pakatan Harapan had problems of its own. While it has a well-oiled electioneering machine in its traditional urban strongholds, things were much harder in rural constituencies. I myself saw on the ground its candidates were badly under-resourced compared to their BN counterparts.</p>
<p>And yet, Pakatan Harapan netted a comfortable majority. It captured seats outside its usual territory, taking Johor (the birthplace of UMNO) and making gains in both Negeri Sembilan and Sarawak, both traditionally BN turf. Sabah’s Heritage Party also won seats in Sabah, further eroding BN’s tally. And all the while, Pakatan Harapan maintained its dominance in Penang, Kuala Lumpur and Selangor. It even toppled some of BN’s most senior figures, including the presidents of the Malaysian Chinese Association and the Malaysian Indian Congress. </p>
<p>Some in Malaysia are wondering whether BN lost in a “Malay Tsunami”, with rural Malays gravitating towards Pakatan Harapan thanks to Mahathir’s legacy as prime minister, which made him a <a href="http://www.newmandala.org/what-mattered-in-ge14/">credible alternative</a> to the incumbent, Najib Razak. But along with competition for racial interests, what did for BN were the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33447456">various</a> <a href="http://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/cover-story-fixing-ailing-felda">scandals</a> that have engulfed it, and Najib in particular. His family members have also been criticised for their <a href="https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/294993">luxurious lifestyle</a>, a serious liability in a country where <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/asia/2013/12/98136.html">many still live on the poverty line</a>.</p>
<p>All in all, this is a remarkable moment for Malaysia. But it’s only the beginning. </p>
<h2>Onward and upward?</h2>
<p>So far, many of the signs are good. The press already seems more willing to be openly critical, and former injustices are apparently going to be reversed. Mahathir is seeking a pardon for <a href="https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/423999">Anwar Ibrahaim</a>, an opposition leader who was imprisoned for dubious charges of sodomy. His wife will serve as deputy prime minister, and his daughter is now a member of parliament. There are hopes for wide reaching reformation.</p>
<p>The fall of BN coincides with rising concerns over standards of living, which <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/malaysia-general-election-race-card-costs-of-living-concerns-10220262">seemed to dominate peoples’ concerns</a> at the ballot box. BN made some unpopular moves in recent years, implementing a hated <a href="http://www.asiaone.com/malaysia/najib-gst-hardest-decision-i-ever-made-malaysias-pm">goods and services tax</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/business-30140728">ending fuel subsidies</a>. Pakatan Harapan has promised to reverse both in wide programme of reforms, which many Malays hope could raise much of the population out of near-poverty. Pakatan Harapan focused on good governance during the campaign, and pointed to its successes running the state of Penang.</p>
<p>But since this is the first time in modern Malaysian history that an opposition has formed a national government, the incomers need to find new ways to do things. And that won’t be easy. Pakatan Harapan is to some degree an alliance of convenience, its parties held together mainly by anti-BN and anti-Najib sentiments. The coalition is under the pressure of high expectations, and the reforms it’s proposed won’t be easy to pass. Its victory is also somewhat tainted by the fact that Mahathir himself <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2059518.stm">served as a BN prime minister for 22 years</a>, making him a part of the old guard.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, the moment is to be savoured. Malaysia might now be in for some dramatic changes – and that’s exactly what the majority of Malaysians are hoping for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96369/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Edwards does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After 61 years, Malaysia has finally seen the opposition take control. What now?Scott Edwards, Doctoral Researcher in International Relations, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/901492018-01-16T13:34:21Z2018-01-16T13:34:21ZPhilippines’ dictator Duterte turns on the media that helped elect him<p>Journalism in the Philippines has long been a <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/04/asia/philippines-deadly-for-journalists/index.html">dangerous trade</a>, one that carries a very real risk of murder with little likelihood of accountability. Yet it is vitally important that Filipinos have a robust critical press to question a government up to its neck in <a href="https://theconversation.com/rodrigo-dutertes-first-year-a-human-rights-disaster-the-world-prefers-to-ignore-80442">human rights abuses</a>. That’s why many are despairing at the news that the authoritarian administration of President Rodrigo Duterte is trying to ban a leading critical outlet, <a href="https://www.rappler.com/nation/193725-amnesty-international-rappler-sec-statement">Rappler</a>.</p>
<p>Rappler is a social media-driven digital news platform. Initially based on Facebook, it was founded in 2011 by author and journalist Maria Ressa, who now finds herself cast as an opposition figure – taking her place alongside other notable <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/07/rodrigo-duterte-strong-filipinas-philippines-cory-aquino-gloria-arroyo">female figures</a> standing up to Duterte. Many of them are being marginalised, silenced, or worse.</p>
<p>Duterte’s vice-president, Leni Robredo, is <a href="https://www.rappler.com/nation/172938-leni-robredo-evolves-duterte-first-year">effectively gagged</a> by her position in office, and Duterte’s plan to federalise the country’s political system <a href="https://www.rappler.com/nation/193612-leni-robredo-camp-abolish-ovp-federalism">would see her post abolished</a>. Senator <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-38362274">Leila De Lima</a> is still in prison on trumped up charges after almost a year; the judicial process is moving <a href="https://www.rappler.com/nation/193021-de-lima-more-difficult-2018">at a glacial pace</a>.</p>
<p>By banning Rappler, Duterte is not just removing a key platform for dissent, but one of the vehicles that put him in office – effectively pulling up the ladder behind him. Rappler exposed how Duterte’s campaign and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-12-07/how-rodrigo-duterte-turned-facebook-into-a-weapon-with-a-little-help-from-facebook">administration</a> deployed an aggressive (often abusive) digital <a href="https://www.rappler.com/nation/148007-propaganda-war-weaponizing-internet">strategy</a>, using an <a href="http://beta.philstar.com/headlines/2017/07/24/1721044/duterte-camp-spent-200000-troll-army-oxford-study-finds">army of trolls</a> against anyone asking critical questions – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/03/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-nofilter-president-no-joke-journalists-women">myself included</a>. </p>
<p>But before he became a serious contender for the presidency, Duterte was all too happy to exploit both Rappler’s rapidly growing and politically engaged young audience and its dynamic platform to speak directly to people through their phones. His strategy provided plenty of video clips for social media, and left traditional outlets lagging behind.</p>
<h2>Riding the tiger</h2>
<p>Lessons can be learnt from Rappler’s story without doling out blame. It’s hard to assess just how much the site influenced Duterte’s victory, but the questions are awkward enough as it is. Did its journalists ask enough critical questions early on? Did they inadvertently help create this monster? And is digital media responsible for helping breed these leaders and agendas? </p>
<p>After his victory, Duterte initially continued to offer Rappler remarkable access and a stream of lurid quotes, successfully raising his and Rappler’s international profiles. Between repeatedly <a href="https://www.rappler.com/nation/189799-duterte-jokes-pope-francis-leila-de-lima-rosary">insulting the Pope</a> (this in a staunchly Catholic country) and former US president, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-president-barack-obama-son-of-a-bitch-a7226201.html">Barack Obama</a>, Duterte <a href="https://twitter.com/rapplerdotcom/status/735843622340300801">took two female journalists</a> (including Rappler’s Pia Ranada) on a “ride-along” through his home town of Davao, where they visited his “watering hole”. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"953089727237799936"}"></div></p>
<p>This was a man who has all but admitted to running <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/17/duterte-harry-has-been-dirty-long-time">death squads</a> while he was mayor, yet Rappler <a href="https://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/134743-transformation-rody-duterte-president">publicised</a> his “transformation”. Less than a week later, the other journalist on that assignment, GMA7’s Mariz Umali, was hardly shown much professional respect when Duterte <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/02/philippines-duterte-accused-of-disrespect-after-wolf-whistling-female-journalist">wolf-whistled her on live TV</a>. </p>
<p>It might seem harsh to look back on this tawdry backstory, especially given the country was enthralled by Duterte at the time. But Rappler’s is a cautionary tale. The Philippines needs its journalists to be sceptical and on constant guard. Media outlets who curry favour with leaders can expect no guarantee that those leaders won’t turn on them in the end.</p>
<h2>Dark times</h2>
<p>Rappler is just the most recent casualty in Filipino journalism. According to the the International Federation of Journalists, for a quarter of a decade now, only Iraq has been <a href="http://globalnation.inquirer.net/135916/ph-2nd-most-dangerous-country-for-journalists-in-past-25-years-ifj">a more dangerous beat</a>. But Duterte is waging a culture war on an already perilously weak fourth estate, mobilising sympathetic forces to frame events in his favour. Witness the viral <a href="http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/945007/philippine-news-updates-mocha-uson-sass-rogando-sasot-bbc-jover-laurio-pinoy-ako-blog">footage</a> of the BBC’s Jonathan Head being cornered by pro-Duterte blogger Sass Sasot, or the appointment of singer/blogger <a href="https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/investigative/185560-mocha-uson-posts-news">Mocha Uson</a> to the office of presidential communications. </p>
<p>While Ressa, Rappler’s CEO, is now pitched against Uson in a <a href="http://www.manilatimes.net/maria-hate-mocha/293147/">pantomime</a> tabloid spat, the country slides into authoritarian rule. The unpleasant odour of the Marcos dictatorship, whose legacy Duterte has <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/will-reburying-marcos-be-dutertes-downfall/">hardly shied away from</a>, is in the air once again.</p>
<p>Duterte has embarked on various ambitious plans to change the Philippines as he sees fit. He is determined to roll out a dangerous and poorly conceived plan to federalise the country and devolve power away from Manila. Known as #PHederalism, this plan risks legitimising local warlords and clan-based politics, with all the corruption and violence they entail. </p>
<p>Many Filipinos remember the <a href="https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/189284-maguindanao-massacre-trial-updates">Maguindano massacre</a> before the 2010 elections, where 58 people – including 32 journalists – were hacked to death, allegedly by members of the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11139653">Ampatuan clan</a>. The perpetrators used an industrial-sized excavator belonging to the provincial government to bury the victims in <a href="http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/706031/maguindanao-massacre-widows-cannot-forgive-ampatuan-sr">mass graves</a>. The chief suspect, <a href="https://www.rappler.com/nation/99713-maguindanao-massacre-suspect-andal-ampatuan-sr-dead">Andal Ampatuan Sr</a>, head of the notorious clan and elected governor of Maguindanao, died in custody in 2015; the trial of the rest of the clan has barely progressed in five years.</p>
<p>With Rappler muffled, who will be left to ask the tough questions about #PHederalism? Or about justice for those massacred at Maguindano? Or the victims of drug war and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/02/philippines-president-duterte-drugs-war-death-squads">Duterte’s notorious death squads</a>? Regardless of who’s asking them, those questions will have to be posed to Duterte’s spokesman, <a href="https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/133490-rodrigo-duterte-presidential-spokesperson-salvador-panelo">Salvador Panleo</a> – the Ampatuan clan’s former lawyer. As the Philippines’ authoritarian turn accelerates, the risks that come with dissent and scrutiny are becoming ever more dangerous.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90149/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Rodrigo Duterte’s authoritarianism has progressed from death squads and martial law to cracking down on press freedom.Tom Smith, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/880412017-11-23T14:54:59Z2017-11-23T14:54:59ZMyanmar and Bangladesh strike a shameful deal on Rohingya refugees<p>Many Rohingya people who have fled the ethnic cleansing in Myanmar are now living as refugees in Bangladesh. And now, the two countries have reportedly struck a deal to return them home. Returning Rohingya people to the hands of their persecutors not only violates international law, but raises fundamental questions about how the world protects those fleeing the most heinous crimes and abuses. </p>
<p>This deal comes just days after <a href="https://theconversation.com/ratko-mladics-conviction-and-why-the-evidence-of-mass-graves-still-matters-87976">Ratko Mladic</a> was sentenced to life imprisonment for his role in the Srebrenica massacre, which took place in Bosnia even as news cameras <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-europe-18102216/footage-of-mladic-entering-srebrenica-played-at-trial">broadcast footage</a> around the world – in much the same way as they have documented this latest crisis of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/myanmar-scorched-earth-campaign-fuels-ethnic-cleansing-of-rohingya-from-rakhine-state/">ethnic cleansing</a>. </p>
<p>As far as Myanmar is concerned, the deal will ease the increasing pressure it faces from both the United Nations and its Asian neighbours. The Myanmar government has no interest in welcoming Rohingya refugees home with open arms; those Rohingya who remain in Myanmar are treated as an alien people, denied citizenship and basic rights, and systematically persecuted. The Myanmar government maintains that the recent spike in violence did not amount to ethnic cleansing, that it was not state-sponsored, sanctioned or condoned, and that the Rohingya are safe to return. But those words are empty. </p>
<p>Abundant <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/myanmar-scorched-earth-campaign-fuels-ethnic-cleansing-of-rohingya-from-rakhine-state/">first-hand reports</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-asia-41646881/rohingya-crisis-drone-footage-shows-thousands-fleeing">documentary footage</a> all point to the same thing: ethnic cleansing conducted by state actors. <a href="http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=57490">Top UN officials</a> have been using the term “ethnic cleansing” for some time, and the US secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, is <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/11/275848.htm">now using it too</a>.</p>
<p>Given that Myanmar is refusing to take responsibility for the atrocities, let alone to provide guarantees of protection and justice for the Rohingya, it beggars belief not just that the country is asking those refugees to return, but that Bangladesh would provide its support. </p>
<p>Under international law, refugees who flee atrocities are afforded fundamental protections. Above all, they are protected by the principles of offering asylum and of <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/uk/excom/scip/3ae68ccd10/note-non-refoulement-submitted-high-commissioner.html">non-refoulement</a> – protection against return to a country where a person has reason to fear persecution.</p>
<p>Bangladesh will of course insist that Myanmar wants these people to return, and that only those choosing to do so voluntarily will be returned. But that ignores the facts on the ground. Rohingya refugees’ options are bleak: remain in the squalid camps, somehow escape into Bangladeshi society with no formal documentation or status, or return home and face persecution.</p>
<h2>Bleak future</h2>
<p>Bangladesh has not acceded to the <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/uk/1951-refugee-convention.html">1951 Refugee Convention</a> or its <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html">1967 Protocol</a>. The country has no law to regulate the administration of refugee affairs or guarantee refugees’ rights. And despite many decades of persecution and abuses in Myanmar, Bangladesh has never allowed the Rohingya to claim asylum. Those who make it to Bangladesh are placed in overcrowded camps without basic provisions, and there they remain unless they choose to return to Myanmar.</p>
<p>The idea of voluntary return stems from a <a href="http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/modify-10312017161158.html">1993 agreement</a> between Bangladesh and Myanmar, under which those Rohingya who can prove their identity must fill in forms with the names of family members, their previous address in Myanmar, their date of birth, and a disclaimer that they are returning voluntarily. But those who do choose to return will face extortion, arbitrary taxation, and restrictions on freedom of movement. Many will be required to undertake <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-forcedlabour/forced-labor-shows-back-breaking-lack-of-reform-in-myanmar-military-idUSKCN0PC2L720150702">forced labour</a>, and some will face state-sponsored violence and extrajudicial killings.</p>
<p>Those who remain in Bangladesh, on the other hand, face a lifetime in camps where human rights abuses are rife, with insufficient and inadequate food, water, housing or healthcare. Fleeing these camps leaves them undocumented and vulnerable to <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-persecution-of-rohingya-muslims-is-producing-a-ready-supply-of-slaves-46108">trafficking, exploitation and abuse</a>.</p>
<p>Whatever individual Rohingya people in Bangladesh might decide to do, their future is bleak. And that’s not good enough. The international community has long known about the systematic persecution of this people. The international community has long ignored the atrocities perpetrated against them. And the international community has long tolerated the cover-ups and excuses from the government of Myanmar. This time it needs to be different. </p>
<p>Bangladesh should step up and provide refuge to those who have been seeking it for 25 years. Myanmar’s neighbouring states and allies should help properly resettle the hundreds of thousands of undocumented Rohingya who have fled Myanmar, and Myanmar itself should be held to account for the atrocities it commits. There’s no point saying “never again” unless action is taken.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88041/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rosa Freedman receives funding from the AHRC, the British Academy, the ESRC, and the Jacob Blaustein Institute.</span></em></p>Refugees’ rights are protected by international law. Why are the Rohingya being returned home?Rosa Freedman, Professor of Law, Conflict and Global Development, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/842342017-09-19T14:05:56Z2017-09-19T14:05:56ZMyanmar’s Rohingyas: victims of a democracy still under military sway<p>As the forced expulsion of the Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar gathers pace and attracts increasing international condemnation, it’s clear that the world either ignores or misunderstands the truth behind Myanmar’s politics. The violent campaign against the Rohingyas is not the disease, but merely a symptom of a political system that has been failing for decades. </p>
<p>When Aung Yan Suu Kyi <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/06/asia/aung-san-suu-kyi-state-counsellor-role-created/">took office in 2016</a>, it was widely perceived as heralding a new democracy, which transferred power from an authoritarian military regime and handed it back to the people. Suu Kyi’s election became synonymous with the success of peaceful resistance in the name of freedom, a triumph over a long-embedded and despotic junta.</p>
<p>But in reality, nothing changed – and the rapidly escalating <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/05/more-than-120000-rohingya-flee-myanmar-violence-un-says">Rohingya crisis</a> confirms that the supposed transfer of power has done little to resolve the tensions in the civil-military relationship. </p>
<p>This failure stems partly from the legacy of the military regime, and partly from Myanmar’s geostrategic significance and natural resources, which impel the country’s powerful allies to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-un/china-russia-block-u-n-council-concern-about-myanmar-violence-idUSKBN16O2J6">ward off any effective UN Security Council resolutions</a> against the state’s grave human rights violations.</p>
<p>In domestic terms, Suu Kyi’s rise to power has ultimately made little or no meaningful constitutional impact. The <a href="https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/03/economist-explains-3">constitution of 2008</a> guarantees the military 25% of seats in Myanmar’s parliament, the Assembly of the Union, but it can only be amended with the votes of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-35808921">more than 75% of parliamentarians</a>. This de facto military veto safeguards the same regime that’s held sway since the 1960s. Suu Kyi might be the effective head of state, but it’s the military that calls the shots.</p>
<p>This in turn means there’s little hope for resolution in the current Rohingya crisis. Citizenship laws dating back to 1982 bar the recognition of Rohingyas as an ethnic group, and prevent them from holding Myanmar passports. By <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/myanmar-criticised-excluding-rohingyas-census-150529045829329.html">excluding the Rohingyas from the 2015 census</a>, the regime scotched any hope of ending the decades of human rights violations the Rohingyas have suffered.</p>
<p>Both before and since Suu Kyi took power, the government has responded to the Rohingyas’ deteriorating situation by simply digging in its heels. The former president, Thein Sein, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/un-rejects-thein-sein%E2%80%99s-potential-rohingya-plan">declared</a> in 2012 that the only solution to the crisis was to export the Rohingyas to a “third country” or leave their future to the United Nations. And today, the notionally civilian government seems no more able or willing to take responsibility for the problem. </p>
<p>Suu Kyi might have been a beacon of hope, but behind the scenes, it’s been business as usual. With the military effectively in charge, those trying to help the Rohingyas have their hands tied firmly behind their backs, and the domestic impetus for change is relatively weak – especially now it’s becoming apparent that the persecution of the Rohingyas is not some frenzied, chaotic outburst of ethnic violence, but <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/22/burma-end-ethnic-cleansing-rohingya-muslims">a concerted national policy</a>.</p>
<h2>In limbo</h2>
<p>Given Suu Kyi’s long history in the democratic struggle, the world rightly expects her to stand up for the Rohingyas. But to do so would risk going against the will of her own people, and might even motivate the military to replace her. They have the constitutional power to do so; if she strays too far from popular opinion, they could soon have the backing of the Burmese people. </p>
<p>So when Suu Kyi <a href="http://www.npr.org/2017/04/25/525604502/myanmars-aung-san-suu-kyi-criticized-for-treatment-of-rohingya">says</a> she’s just a politician and “not Mother Theresa”, she is not balancing competing interests and deterring aggressors, but settling into a life of grisly realpolitik. All the while, the Rohingya crisis damages her credibility among those who campaigned for her release.</p>
<p>Certain other outside powers, however, take a different stance. <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/indias-balancing-act-in-myanmar/">China, India, and Russia</a> lend Myanmar unwavering support, and back the government line that the crisis stems not from extreme structural problems in the Myanmar polity but from Rohingya “terrorism” that destabilised a period of peace. The EU <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=P8-RC-2017-0525&format=XML&language=EN">called on the UN and ASEAN to help</a>, but without some kind of consensus, there is no international mandate to exert pressure.</p>
<p>It seems the <a href="https://theconversation.com/aung-san-suu-kyi-victory-will-test-commitment-to-human-rights-in-myanmar-50041">supposed democratic sea-change of 2015</a> has done nothing to solve the civil-military tension in Myanmar. Though soldiers and generals might not be in direct control, they keep their guns on show, and make sure a small but crucial number of personnel are installed in politically active roles. While they can no longer make overarching changes to the political system, they have successfully stymied any constitutional efforts to undercut their power any further. </p>
<p>The result is a political system in limbo, and a government with little incentive to change its ways. In response to international criticism, Myanmar offered some refugees the opportunity to return, but only on the condition that they <a href="http://www.euro-burma.eu/news/show/19599/">produce papers confirming their citizenship</a> – papers which the 1982 laws prevent them from holding in the first place. The government seems reluctant to acknowledge that the problem is spiralling out of control; instead, with China and Russia’s backing, it’s trying to convince the world that this very fragile country is far more stable than it actually is.</p>
<p>And so the military retains its power, even as its actions reveal Myanmar’s once-celebrated democracy to be the elaborate PR stunt it is. Meanwhile, the Rohingyas face <a href="https://theconversation.com/rohingya-crisis-this-is-what-genocide-looks-like-83924">horrendous human rights abuses</a> – victims of a political regime crippled by cynicism and inertia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84234/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Once a beacon of democratic hope, Myanmar’s ‘civilian’ government is showing its true nature.Abdullah Yusuf, Lecturer in Politics, University of DundeeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/804422017-07-10T09:11:11Z2017-07-10T09:11:11ZRodrigo Duterte’s first year: a human rights disaster the world prefers to ignore<p>Rodrigo Duterte’s first year as president of the Philippines should never be forgotten – for all the wrong reasons. For those directly affected by his brutal and lawless “war on drugs”, which has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-duterte-drugs-idUSKBN19G05D">claimed the lives of thousands of people</a>, the only hope is for an end to the suffering. But in the absence of a clear international declaration against Duterte’s disastrous regime, that hope is in vain. </p>
<p>The sad fact is that much of the suffering Duterte is inflicting <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/may/10/donald-trump-rodrigo-duterte-philippines">was entirely predictable</a>. The Philippines’ human rights institutions are fragile, and Duterte came to office with a well-known record as a mayor who <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-death-squad.html?_r=0">sanctioned death squads</a> to dole out vigilante justice in his city. But the international community <a href="https://theconversation.com/dutertes-obama-insult-was-shameful-but-the-west-has-turned-a-blind-eye-to-much-much-worse-64037">failed</a> to respond to his election with due alarm, and it is still failing to realise the sheer destruction the Duterte administration is causing. How bad will it need to get before other nations back away from him?</p>
<p>Nominally aimed at tackling a <a href="https://theconversation.com/just-how-big-is-the-drug-problem-in-the-philippines-anyway-66640">much-hyped but poorly understood</a> methamphetamine “crisis”, the scores of extra-judicial killings have resulted in little capture of the networked organised crime Duterte says is behind the “drug menace”. Instead people are gunned down in the middle of the street by vigilantes or by an increasingly brazen police force, whether <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/29/philippines-disband-police-anti-drugs-units-war-rodrigo-duterte-south-korea">during arrest or in custody</a>. Their corpses are left in the street, sometimes with a cardboard sign saying “drug user” or “pusher”. </p>
<p>This is a matter of social cleansing, with many of the victims among the poorest people in Filipino society. And yet many nations refuse to sign a UN declaration condemning the policy.</p>
<p>During the second half of 2016, Duterte <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/07/duterte-anti-us-philippines-isolationist-foreign-policy-insult-barack-obama-china">exploited</a> his country’s rising importance to the US by <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-history-behind-philippine-president-dutertes-obama-insult-65075">coarsely insulting Barack Obama</a> with impunity. But Trump <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/straight-from-the-us-state-department-the-pivot-to-asia-is-over/">couldn’t care less</a> about Obama’s “pivot to Asia”, and Duterte has duly pivoted to public words of admiration. Trump returned the favour by <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-praised-rodrigo-duterte-for-unbelievable-job-on-the-drug-problem-in-philippines/">praising Duterte</a> for his “unbelievable job on the drug problem”. </p>
<p>So far, Western powers have failed to show much care for the Philippines’ dire human rights situation. While <a href="http://globalnation.inquirer.net/158643/eu-presses-duterte-govt-human-rights-issues-war-vs-drugs">the EU</a> has perhaps been the most consistent and high-profile Duterte critic, one of its members has been particularly unhelpful. Britain’s <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/brexit-liam-fox-trade-visit-philippines-president-rodrigo-duterte-human-rights-nhs-nurses-a7667711.html">grovelling post-Brexit vote trade visit</a> signalled it is perfectly ready to deviate from the EU’s collective stance against human rights abuses once it quits the bloc. </p>
<p>As if that wasn’t bad enough, the UN high commissioner for human rights had to admonish Britain’s prime minister, Theresa May, for <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/theresa-may-human-rights-gift-dictators-un-chief-statement-latest-a7809556.html">comments about</a> human rights getting “in the way” of the fight against terrorism. It was a “gift to despots” said the commissioner. It is a gift to Duterte, and it only makes the situation worse for Filipinos, who are forced to bear the brunt of his violent rule.</p>
<h2>Rebranding the threat</h2>
<p>It doesn’t have to be this way. Duterte is vulnerable and sensitive to foreign criticism, and has little with which to protect himself other than insults. Yet countries such as <a href="http://www.skynews.com.au/video/program/program_featured/2017/06/29/australia-urged-to-hold-duterte-to-account.html">Australia</a> and <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/philippines-marawi-rodrigo-duterte-us-forces-joining-battle-besieged-isis-maute-a7784736.html">the US</a> are providing military assistance to Duterte apparently without applying any serious pressure. </p>
<p>Their help with <a href="http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/06/23/1712907/australia-sends-spy-planes-marawi">airborne intelligence</a> and “special forces liaison” is offered on the pretext of fighting a local militant group <a href="https://theconversation.com/panic-about-is-in-the-philippines-masks-a-very-real-war-in-the-country-65196">supposedly linked to IS</a>, now laying siege to the city of <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/marawi-siege-isis-linked-militants-dump-bodies-civilians-rampage-philippines-a7760566.html">Marawi</a>. </p>
<p>It’s one thing to overlook Duterte’s war on drugs to help him fight a violent insurgency notionally linked to the so-called Islamic State (IS), but even that flawed alliance has its problems. How can these countries defend their support for a leader who publicly says he is willing to <a href="http://www.rappler.com/nation/174210-duterte-soldiers-killing-civilian-presence">kill civilians</a> – in direct opposition to international humanitarian law?</p>
<p>Duterte is using IS as a pretext for more abuses, and headlines linking the situation in the southern Philippines to IS with little to no evidence play into his hands. But alas, this tendency has a long history. </p>
<p>The Philippines’ half-century-old Muslim insurgency has repeatedly been spuriously accused of links with global militant Islamist networks, notably al-Qaeda during the US’s own post-9/11 “war on terror”. Now, the same claims are simply being rehashed to fit the narrative of a new global threat.</p>
<p>Those nations with interests and relationships with Duterte deserve to be held to account for their silence and tolerance of his crimes. They also need to wake up to the consequences of their inaction. Both the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/duterte-says-the-international-criminal-court-doesnt-worry-him/2017/06/03/8a8f0c62-44d6-11e7-b08b-1818ab401a7f_story.html?utm_term=.ab854fd32d9b">International Criminal Court</a> and the <a href="http://time.com/4768509/philippines-agnes-callamar-un-duterte-drug-war/">UN’s rapporteur on extra-judicial killings</a> have had Duterte in their sights for much of his first year – if not since his time as mayor. </p>
<p>If Western nations want to uphold the legitimacy of these institutions and the values of universal human rights, they must support them and help put pressure on this calamitous despot.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80442/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It turns out that the president of the Philippines is exactly who he said he was.Tom Smith, Lecturer in International Relations, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/748562017-03-21T10:09:40Z2017-03-21T10:09:40ZA rattled Saudi Arabia pivots for support to South-East Asia<p>Capital cities across Asia spent the last month <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-asia-idUSKBN16P051">rolling out the red carpet</a> for a rarely seen visitor: Saudi Arabia’s ageing King Salman, accompanied by a hundreds-strong diplomatic entourage including senior princes, businessmen and ministers. Taking in Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Japan, China and the Maldives, the king spent March leading a concerted effort to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s commercial links with Asia’s fast-growing economies.</p>
<p>The House of Saud doesn’t usually go in for long state visits, and no Saudi king has visited Indonesia for half a century. So the fact that the Saudi king committed to a full month away in this part of the world speaks volumes about his government’s mood after a series of strategic miscalculations.</p>
<p>Saudi rulers have always worried about the prospect of diplomatic isolation, and stronger relations with Asia are in some ways part of the usual agenda. But they’ve now become a lifeline with which to save the kingdom from its bad bets in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia’s recent efforts to settle its <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-years-of-proxy-war-saudi-arabia-and-iran-are-finally-squaring-up-in-the-open-52713">incessant rivalry with Iran</a> have not paid off, and after <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2016/02/15/news/economy/opec-saudi-russia-output/">flooding the market</a> with cheap oil and <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-saudi-idUSKBN0KA1OP20150101">engineering a fall in the oil price</a> to Iran’s detriment, the Saudis are now themselves faced with a festering budget deficit, forcing them to slash spending on infrastructure and reduce civil servant perks to get finances under control.</p>
<p>Elsewhere, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/yemen-a-calamity-at-the-end-of-the-arabian-peninsula-67954">devastating war in Yemen</a> is exposing Saudi Arabia to both military pressure and severe international condemnation for the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/15/saudi-led-air-strike-yemen-hospital-kills-at-least-seven">humanitarian catastrophe</a> the campaign has caused. Recent <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-opec-meeting-idUKKBN13P0JA">decisions</a> taken in Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), meanwhile, forced Saudi Arabia to swallow a big hit on its oil production, suggesting that it can no longer afford an aggressive anti-Iran policy in Yemen without new allies and partners to shore it up.</p>
<p>In these squeezed times, South-East Asia’s growing economies have much to offer to the Saudis.</p>
<h2>Finance diplomacy</h2>
<p>Historically, the pilgrimage from Asia to Islam’s holy cities of Mecca and Medina has been an important revenue source for the kingdom’s volatile budget, but King Salman’s failing regional fortunes and financial problems have placed renewed impetus on moving the kingdom away from its traditional dependence on oil.</p>
<p>King Salman has found a receptive audience in the Asian capitals. Malaysia is already making a strong turn to the Saudi fold; in early 2016, it joined <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-hosts-joint-military-exercise">military exercises</a> in northern Saudi territory involving around 150,000 soldiers, 2,540 warplanes, 20,000 tanks, and 460 helicopters. The exercise has been fuelling rumours that Malaysia might be swayed to join Saudi Arabia’s military campaign in Yemen, which already benefits from the support of several other Muslim-majority states.</p>
<p>This is not a strange expectation. Personal relations between Prime Minister Najib Razak and the Saudi royal family are reported to be strong, and the Saudis played a key role in helping to save Razak’s political career from a <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33447456">major scandal</a>. By publicly confirming Razak’s claim that an unaccounted US$681m in his bank accounts was a donation from the Saudi royal family, the Saudis helped to counter accusations that he had in fact siphoned the money from heavily indebted state investment fund 1MDB.</p>
<p>Economic opportunities abound. Upon arrival in Kuala Lumpur in late February, national oil and gas company Saudi Aramco signed a US$7 billion agreement with Malaysian oil company Petronas. The deal will pump Saudi investment into a Malaysian petrochemical project valued at US$27 billion, making Aramco the single largest investor in Malaysia. The deal is also expected to improve Malaysia’s chances to compete in oil refining and energy storage, an industry currently monopolised by Singapore in South-East Asia.</p>
<p>Indonesia, too, hopes to attract billions of dollars in Saudi investment. The two countries have signed more than ten memorandums of understanding, building on cultural and religious projects, promoting educational exchange and intensifying trade. <a href="http://www.saudiaramco.com/en/home/news-media/speeches/JVwith-Pertamina.html">Together with Indonesia’s Pertamina</a>, Saudi Aramco has committed to expand Indonesia’s biggest refinery in Java. The total value of the agreements stretches <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/economy/2017/03/03/SR13-5-billion-pacts-signed-during-Saudi-Indonesia-business-meet.html">into the billions</a>.</p>
<p>The Saudis are highly skilled in this sort of fast-paced “finance diplomacy”. Like estranged family members coming home with presents, they bring in their wake large sums of money for development finance and the promise of several billions of dollars of investment opportunities for the relations they hope to cultivate. </p>
<p>And beyond pure financial interests, it’s worth remembering that these joint investment ventures create the sort of long-term partnerships that give external partners a stake in Saudi Arabia’s own security and development. These sorts of financial patronage projects extend far beyond trade and commerce – since the 1970s, Saudi oil money has persistently found its way to foreign schools, charities, mosques and nonprofits to promote a religious ideology which is at odds with the traditional brand of <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/14/indonesias-moderate-islam-is-slowly-crumbling/">moderate Islam</a> practised in South-East Asia. Donations by dozens of Saudi <a href="http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/resources/charity-in-islam/waqf/">waqfs</a> (Islamic charitable endowments) all fuel the elite’s drive to project itself as the leader of Sunni Muslims the world over.</p>
<p>Investment with the heft the Saudis offer is too tempting to pass up, but King Salman’s visit will only help export his country’s hardline doctrine to places where that could do without it. Both Malaysia and Indonesia urgently need to ease tensions between restive religious communities, but Saudi Arabia aims to open more Islamic schools across South-East Asia, increasing not only literacy in the Arabic language but also Saudi religious teaching and influence. That could be a heavy price tag indeed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74856/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Babak Mohammadzadeh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The House of Saud’s recent efforts to push back against Iran have not paid off. Time to lock in some more allies.Babak Mohammadzadeh, PhD Candidate in Politics and International Studies, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/711332017-02-08T08:33:45Z2017-02-08T08:33:45ZA disappointing start to democracy: Myanmar’s winners and losers<p>Myanmar’s troubled transition recently suffered a tragic loss when a highly respected public figure was assassinated. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/world/asia/myanmar-u-ko-ni-yangon-assassination-daw-aung-san-suu-kyi.html?_r=0">U Ko Ni</a> was a long-standing member of the National League for Democracy (NLD), a lawyer and expert on constitutional reform and an adviser to Aung San Suu Kyi. He was also Muslim, and his murder is tragically consistent with anti-Muslim persecution in Myanmar – and with a wider context of political disappointment. </p>
<p>On January 20, the UN Special Rapporteur for Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, made an unusually frank <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21107&LangID=E">end of mission statement</a>. She described a lack of official co-operation with her mandate, including the denial of access to areas of Kachin State, and identified a catalogue of human rights violations. Among them were the suppression of peaceful protest and political dissent, arbitrary detention, forced labour in prisons, attacks on civilians in Kachin and Rakhine states, and systematic and institutionalised discrimination against the Rohingya.</p>
<p>Her findings were reinforced on February 3 by a “<a href="http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/MM/FlashReport3Feb2017.pdf">flash report</a>” from the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, based on interviews with more than 220 Rohingya who fled Myanmar in the wake of a military “lockdown” in Rakhine State in October 2016. </p>
<p>The report describes terrible acts committed during that time: gang rape, torture and beating, indiscriminate shooting to kill, the use of grenades against civilians, people being locked in houses which were set on fire. The report notes that “while discrimination against the Rohingya has been endemic for decades in North Rakhine State … the recent level of violence is unprecedented”.</p>
<p>These accounts make for sobering reading. For the past five years, Myanmar has supposedly been engaged in a process of political reform; at least, this was the world’s rationale for repealing sanctions and mounting massive foreign aid interventions. The UK alone provided <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/412358/Burma-summary-V2.pdf">nearly £300m</a> in aid to Myanmar between 2011 and 2016, to support the country’s economic, political and social “transformation”. But is there a transformation to support?</p>
<h2>Plain to see</h2>
<p>Myanmar’s November 2015 elections saw the NLD win a convincing victory. Many international news reports at the time implied that this amounted to a revolution, a regime change akin to the 1994 defeat of apartheid in South Africa. But Myanmar’s political transition to date has not advanced by radical upheaval but via a carefully managed process with clearly defined winners and losers.</p>
<p>The clearest winners to date have been the military, who have evaded any accountability for killings, torture and persecution committed under military rule. The country’s former leaders and their cronies have now smoothly transferred their political control to the economic sector, taking control of huge swathes of lucrative industries, from mining and logging to tourism and telecommunications.</p>
<p>On the other side are the losers. These certainly include the Rohingya and other Muslims, who face intense persecution in a climate of fervid Burmese and Buddhist nationalism. It also includes members of the country’s ethnic nationalities and the ethnic armed groups. The nationwide ceasefire process and <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/the-problem-with-the-21st-century-panglong-conference/">21st Century Panglong Conference</a> has thus far been characterised by empty rhetoric by the government rather than a serious commitment to political federalism. </p>
<p>Others losing out in Myanmar’s transition include <a href="http://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/civil-society-forum-calls-for-greater-participation-in-decision-making.html">wider civil society</a>, which has long been marginalised by the government and is now also steamrollered by powerful international agencies and corporations. Protesters and others who believed that an NLD government would protect <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/free-speech-advocates-protest-myanmar-telecom-law/3689230.html">freedom of assembly and association</a> have been sorely disappointed. The needs of Myanmar’s vast population of displaced people – including refugees in neighbouring countries and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced – have been entirely ignored.</p>
<p>Since the onset of reforms in Myanmar in 2011, the government has consistently been given the benefit of the doubt. A “wait and see” attitude has prevailed: wait until the elections have been held, wait until the new government is in place, wait until we can determine the true extent of change. Well, we have waited, and we can see that the new government looks much like the old regime. Military cronies, mining companies and wealthy corporations are benefiting; ethnic nationalities, religious minorities and refugees are, as before, at the sharp end.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71133/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kirsten McConnachie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The world has waited hopefully for democracy to blossom in Myanmar. But the new regime looks much like the old one.Kirsten McConnachie, Assistant Professor, School of Law, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/691852016-12-15T14:36:36Z2016-12-15T14:36:36ZSouth-East Asia takes stock after a year of alarming democratic decline<p>As <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/world/americas/western-liberal-democracy.html">democracy’s stability</a> is questioned around the world, South-East Asia in particular has seen another year of democratic decline. Many countries remain undemocratic, and others have taken a worryingly repressive turn. Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines have all suffered setbacks; Myanmar has failed to fulfil the high hopes following the election of its first civilian president for decades, and Indonesia faces serious problems, too.</p>
<p>After such a precipitous decline, 2017 will be a critical year. Unless these countries’ trajectories change soon, darker times are ahead.</p>
<p>Two years after a democratically elected government was thrown out by a <a href="https://theconversation.com/myths-that-have-kept-thailand-together-now-risk-tearing-it-apart-following-military-coup-27082">coup</a>, Thailand endured another year of uncertainty about the state of its democracy and remains under a military government. A new constitution, <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/politics/thailands-democracy-in-military-custody">criticised</a> for undermining elected representation and accountability, was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-37013950">approved by a referendum</a>, boosting the military government’s legitimacy and licensing its repressive rule. </p>
<p>Worries about the military’s assertive attitude surged in October as Thais <a href="https://theconversation.com/thailand-mourns-its-king-and-heads-into-the-unknown-67031">mourned the death</a> of the aged King Bhumibol, a symbol of national unity. His successor, King Rama X, does not enjoy the same level of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2016/10/14/thai-kings-successor-could-threaten-the-future-of-the-monarchy/?utm_term=.ef0b5a5de394">popularity or authority</a> – and with the country’s beloved patriarch gone, any future transition to civilian government promises to be a rough ride indeed.</p>
<p>Malaysia, meanwhile, has seen some alarming government crackdowns of its own. There has been mounting pressure over a scandal involving 1MDB, a state-owned investment fund, from which funds have allegedly been <a href="http://www.wsj.com/specialcoverage/malaysia-controversy">misappropriated on a massive scale</a>. There are questions over whether the government and Prime Minister Najib Razak are implicated, something he denies.</p>
<p>Many Malaysians are also <a href="http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2016/09/16/wan-azizah-tells-voters-to-object-to-redelineation-exercise/">alarmed</a> at an Electoral Commission redelineation exercise, which they regard as an effort to gerrymander parliamentary districts in favour of the ruling coalition. </p>
<p>The Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (known as Bersih, meaning clean) responded with a <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/19/asia/malaysia-protests-bersih-five/">massive rally</a> in November demanding that Najib step down. The Security Offences (Special Measures) Act, which is meant to safeguard national security, was used before the rally to <a href="http://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/11/191449/bersih-challenges-igp-reveal-purported-evidence-justifying-marias-detention">detain Bersih’s leadership</a>. </p>
<p>It is not the only accusation of security legislature being <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21005&LangID=E">misused</a> to prevent dissent. An opposition MP has been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/malaysia-quash-sentence-against-whistle-blowing-mp/">imprisoned</a> under the Official Secrets Act for the release of a report on the IMDB scandal, and a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/27/malaysian-cartoonist-arrested-for-criticism-of-prime-minister-najib-razak">cartoonist</a> is the latest of many government critics to be arrested under Malaysia’s repressive sedition laws. </p>
<h2>Crackdowns and dashed hopes</h2>
<p>Concerns over democracy in the Philippines following Rodrigo Duterte’s <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-javad-heydarian/the-end-of-philippine-dem_b_9666998.html">election as president</a> are also being realised. A wave of vigilante killings against those accused of being criminals has claimed <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-dutertes-drug-war-rare-evidence-of-a-police-role-in-the-killing/2016/12/06/3a89d830-b6ee-11e6-9fa1-ff5eb54db157_story.html">around 4,500 lives</a>. </p>
<p>Duterte’s reputation for endorsing and ignoring such actions extends back to his tenure as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/04/philippines-secret-death-squads-police-officer-teams-behind-killings">mayor of Davao</a>. He has made statements threatening the same actions against <a href="http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/848933/duterte-threatens-to-kill-human-rights-activists-if-drug-problem-worsens?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter">human rights activists</a>, and recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/14/philippines-president-rodrigo-duterte-personally-killed-criminals">admitted to killing criminals himself</a> while mayor. “I was really looking for a confrontation so I could kill,” he said.</p>
<p>The rule of law in the Philippines is therefore not in great shape. And besides Duterte’s ever more controversial statements and the remarkably brutal crackdown on drug crime, November saw the burial of former dictator Ferdinand Marcos in the national Heroes’ Cemetery. Duterte <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/06/world/asia/philippines-duterte-marcos-burial.html?_r=0">supported</a> the decision to put Marcos there, raising the prospect that the country’s history of dictatorship could be <a href="http://time.com/4583037/philippines-marcos-burial-duterte-human-rights-protest/">whitewashed</a>.</p>
<p>In Myanmar, meanwhile, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/nov/13/barack-obama-optimistic-burma-change-slowdown-concern">optimism</a> that greeted its first full democratic elections in 2015 has rapidly faded. At first, the signs were good: the military-imposed constitution, under which Aung San Suu Kyi was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-35967763">prevented from becoming president</a>, was neatly circumvented after the elections when she was was appointed State Counsellor, a new role with formal power. The military’s last efforts to maintain a grip on the country seemed futile – but there are other, more alarming problems afoot. </p>
<p>There has been a surge of violence against Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslim minority, a situation so dire that a UN official described it as <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/burma-rohingya-myanmar-muslims-united-nations-calls-on-suu-kyi-a7465036.html">ethnic cleansing</a>. The government is under <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/burma-rohingya-myanmar-muslims-united-nations-calls-on-suu-kyi-a7465036.html">international</a> and <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/12/08/indonesia-raises-rohingya-concerns-with-suu-kyi-retno.html">regional</a> pressure to address the violence, and yet Suu Kyi has stayed silent. Such events demonstrate ongoing deficits in human rights and representation in Myanmar’s democratic process, <a href="http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2016/12/09/what-does-the-bloodshed-in-rakhine-state-tell-us/">as well as the lack of control the government has over the military</a>.</p>
<h2>The success story?</h2>
<p>This leaves Indonesia, the region’s last real democratic holdout. But all is not well there either. </p>
<p>The ongoing row over an <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-38285515">alleged blasphemous statement</a> by Jakarta’s Christian governor, known as Ahok, shows that Indonesia’s political elites are still heavily invested in <a href="http://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/bigger-than-ahok-explaining-jakartas-2-december-mass-rally/">identity politics</a>. Hundreds of thousands of people protested demanding Ahok’s imprisonment, even though the case is not settled and the evidence highly equivocal.</p>
<p>Indonesia is far from the only country facing the problem of identity politics, but it could nonetheless backfire in the long run if the rule of law is undermined by what some have called “<a href="http://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/mobocracy-counting-the-cost-of-the-rallies-to-defend-islam/">mobocracy</a>”. </p>
<p>Some attribute this to the growing prominence of political Islam in the democratic system, but there’s rather more to it than that: Indonesia is extremely diverse, meaning it’s naturally prone to ethnic and religious rifts and conflicts. And as long as identity politics work, this could exacerbate issues and lead to internal security issues. </p>
<p>It is also tarnishing the image projected abroad of Indonesia as a <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/08/04/insight-muhammadiyah-and-indonesia-s-international-identity.html">moderate, tolerant, and progressive</a> Muslim country, nurtured and developed over a full decade by the <a href="http://www.newmandala.org/from-yudhoyono-to-jokowi-can-indonesia-keep-rising/">Yudhoyono</a> administration. </p>
<p>The strength of Indonesia’s democracy is a beacon for the region. If it starts to fail, South-East Asia could start to lose hope that hard-won democratic rule is really sustainable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69185/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Moch Faisal Karim receives funding from the Indonesia Endowment Fund for Education (LPDP). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Edwards does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From stubborn military rule to religious ‘mobocracy’, five young democracies show signs of slipping backwards.Scott Edwards, Doctoral Researcher in International Relations, University of BirminghamMoch Faisal Karim, PhD Researcher, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/686252016-11-14T15:41:27Z2016-11-14T15:41:27ZChina grapples with the mixed blessing of a Trump victory<p>Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency was followed with amazement and apprehension across East Asia. China in particular was on tenterhooks – and now it needs to figure out what to do.</p>
<p>In the short-term, the outcome suits Beijing’s objectives. First and foremost, it provides a rich vein of propaganda fodder. The venom of the campaign, coupled with the West’s general atmosphere of disaffection and economic stagnation, are certainly themes that the Chinese media have been quick to latch on as evidence of the “rigged” Western system. </p>
<p>The first-past-the-post electoral principles that guide the American and British electoral systems can be easily mystified in China and Russia as a means of manipulating election results behind the scenes by plutocrats and the military. After all, how can Hillary Clinton have <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/opinion/clintons-substantial-popular-vote-win.html">won the popular vote</a> and all the major cities and still been denied the White House? In China, whose privileged urbanites are deeply suspicious of people they regard as mere country bumpkins, such a scenario is the ultimate democratic turnoff.</p>
<p>The campaign has also provided plenty of material for the argument that the “free” Western media is in fact mind-numbing and ineffectual. While America’s mainstream media was supposedly heavily tilted towards Clinton, or at least away from her rival, Trump managed to beat the elite at their own game with little more than his blustering reality-TV delivery and Twitter account.</p>
<p>His victory also puts a major dent in democracy’s worldwide appeal. Whereas Chinese party officials are only promoted to the national stage after many years’ gruelling experience in provincial posts, Trump’s record in public office is nonexistent. That <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/opinion/election-night-2016/heres-what-happened-with-the-latino-vote">29% of the Hispanic vote went to Trump</a> despite his assailing of “bad hombres” is grist to the mill, as is the fact that white women <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/hillary-clinton-white-women-vote/507422/">did not desert him</a>.</p>
<p>This is all a gift to Beijing. But the Sino-American relationship is so complex, and so crucial to the stability of the rest of the world, that the election of Trump will inevitably have much deeper ramifications.</p>
<h2>Wiggle room</h2>
<p>In the intermediate term, Trump’s victory buys China time to advance its maritime claims in the South and East China seas. On this front, the election counts as a bullet dodged: during her time as secretary of state, Clinton was the brain behind the Obama administration’s much-heralded “<a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/03/the-legacy-of-obamas-pivot-to-asia/">pivot to Asia</a>”, and was all set to galvanise more support in East and South-east Asia to constrain China’s manoeuvres there. </p>
<p>For Trump, it seems economic interests at home will take precedence over traditional alliances and shared values. If he actually follows his professed non-ideological, business-like approach to international relations, he will hollow out the democratic values through which many other countries in the region, too, feel bound to the US.</p>
<p>Both <a href="http://time.com/4517524/north-korea-missile-rocket-test-japan-threat/">Japan</a> and <a href="http://thediplomat.com/tag/thaad-deployment-to-south-korea/">South Korea</a> are terrified of North Korea; without the assurance of American support against potential attacks, they may decide to seek refuge in new Chinese security guarantees. And from non-democratic <a href="https://theconversation.com/vietnam-is-struggling-to-unite-its-mekong-neighbours-against-china-63969">Vietnam</a> to democratic Indonesia, the region’s heavyweights have been sitting on the fence for quite some time: they are deeply troubled by China’s new assertive foreign policy, its military buildup and historical claims to nearly all the <a href="https://theconversation.com/troubled-waters-conflict-in-the-south-china-sea-explained-59203">South China Sea</a>. </p>
<p>Having watched Obama cold-shoulder first Egypt’s <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2011/01/obama-pulls-away-from-mubarak-048412">Hosni Mubarak</a> and then the <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/saudi-media-indicates-obama-sold-us-out/">Saudis</a>, the US’s south-east Asian allies now worry about just how reliable their superpower backer will be in a regional crisis. Some seem outright dismissive of it: the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte – who endorsed Trump as someone who like himself is <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/10/asia/duterte-trump-military-exercises/">fond of swearing</a> – declared before the election that his country’s alliance with the US was <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/philippines-duterte-china-announces-split-161020131226993.html">over and done with</a>.</p>
<p>Further afield, in Central Asia and the Middle East, Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric and apparently isolationist bent might offer China much more breathing space. It could drive more allies into Xi Jinping’s <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/09/02/whats-driving-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative/">One Belt, One Road</a> initiative, a programme to better connect China with its post-Soviet western neighbours. It could even see China boosting its presence in the <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/26/chinas-thirst-oil-foreign-policy-middle-east-persian-gulf/">Persian Gulf</a>. </p>
<p>Trump has vowed to make the Saudis, Japanese and NATO pay more for American security guarantees. Yet the government in Beijing is keen to learn from Western mistakes, and will think hard before it takes up any costly military deployment beyond its immediate periphery. Who will fill the looming security vacuum in Asia remains to be seen; besides China, Russia <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-japan-tempt-russia-into-an-alliance-against-china-60888">clearly has ambitions</a> in that direction.</p>
<h2>Delicate balance</h2>
<p>Trump’s economic regeneration plan, such as it is, could be a major boost to China’s economic credentials. Much of his policy rhetoric, after all, is about <a href="http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/trump-promises-make-infrastructure-major-focus/">huge investment in infrastructure</a> aimed at catching up with the quality of China’s recently completed airports, high-speed rail and motorways. He can, in short, be portrayed as a closet admirer of the <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-13/china-trumps-trump-when-it-comes-to-infrastructure">Chinese developmental-state model</a>. He may often invoke the need for deregulation and lower taxes, but to blue-collar America he projects big-government assistance funded by divesting from costly obligations overseas. </p>
<p>Pragmatism, isolationism and non-interventionism are all principles that the Chinese government can relate to. Nevertheless, in the long run, Trump’s election poses very new serious challenges to China’s rise as an economic and trading titan. </p>
<p>If Putin and Trump strike some sort of cosy deal to defuse their two countries’ tensions, they could spell trouble for the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f8959924-cab6-11e5-a8ef-ea66e967dd44">closer relations</a> Moscow and Beijing currently enjoy. The One Belt, One Road initiative, for instance, is contingent on Russian assent. If it loses the precedence it enjoys in Russia, China will not be able to easily compensate with added heft elsewhere.</p>
<p>Trump is unpredictable, and he has already proven he would have no hesitation to demonise China if it proved uncooperative in helping him bring about economic turnaround in the US. Whether his plans can be achieved without slapping import duties on Chinese goods remains to be seen – and China has already tried to deter him with an <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/14/apple-iphones-could-be-hit-if-trump-imposes-a-45-percent-tariff-on-china-exports-beijing-warns.html">array of threats</a>, including over potential iPhone tariffs.</p>
<p>The last two decades have been defined by Sino-American interdependence on the world stage, with the US cast as policeman and China as banker and sweatshop. But globalisation and neoliberalism have now been placed in the dock; the old order suddenly looks unsustainable. China has a huge opening on its hands, but it knows better than to dive in headfirst. </p>
<p>In a phonecall with Trump after he declared victory, Xi Jinping reportedly told the president-elect that co-operation was their “<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-china-idUSKBN1390D3">only choice</a>”. He may prove to be right.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68625/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Niv Horesh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China may have more to gain from Trump’s rise than any other nation – but the risks of a miscalculation are enormous.Niv Horesh, Visiting Research Fellow, School of Government and International Affairs, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/680192016-11-08T12:52:48Z2016-11-08T12:52:48ZHow can we tackle abuse in the global garment industry?<p>The global garment industry is a major generator of jobs, exports and economic growth. The EU’s market share is valued at <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/279757/apparel-market-size-projections-by-region/">US$350 billion</a>. But the people who make our clothes are struggling – in precarious, poorly paid and often dangerous work. The collapse of the Rana Plaza factory building in Bangladesh <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/31/rana-plaza-bangladesh-collapse-fashion-working-conditions">killed 1,138 people</a>. These workers were supplying brands on UK high streets: Benetton, Mango, Matalan and Primark. </p>
<p>In response to protests from workers and consumers, many brands have signed up to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/03/11/work-faster-or-get-out/labor-rights-abuses-cambodias-garment-industry">voluntary codes of conduct</a>. But factories’ compliance is notably partial: more likely when cheap to implement, benefits owners, conforms to social norms, and does not alter the balance of power. <a href="http://www.global-labour-university.org/fileadmin/GLU_Working_Papers/GLU_WP_No.38.pdf">Labour abuses continue</a>.</p>
<p>Box-ticking codes of conduct <a href="https://cleanclothes.org/resources/publications/ccc-clec-betterfactories-29-8.pdf">seldom amplify workers’ collective strength</a>. Their activism is often deterred by the threat of job loss and police brutality. Governments are often reluctant to uphold workers’ rights, for fear of firms relocating overseas. This mobility of capital (and immobility of labour) creates a global <a href="http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=race-to-the-bottom">race to the bottom</a>.</p>
<p>Despite these constraints, workers are still pushing for reform. Mass strikes and demonstrations have led to concerted increases in the minimum wage across South-East Asia. In Vietnam, <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100177390">wildcat strikes</a> comprising 200,000 workers led to a 30% increase in the minimum wage and mandated annual increases thereafter. Successful activism <a href="http://jir.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/02/17/0022185614564378.full.pdf">galvanises further mobilisation</a> by demonstrating that <a href="http://column.global-labour-university.org/2013/11/better-work-or-ethical-fix-lessons-from.html">workers can influence wage negotiations</a>. Union power also strengthens the the International Labour Organisation’s ability to <a href="http://web.mit.edu/amengual/www/Amengual_Chirot_20150730.pdf">enforce minimum wage compliance</a>.</p>
<h2>Gender inequalities weaken unions</h2>
<p>Among the many constraints impeding Asian trade unions are gender ideologies and inequalities. Key here are “norm perceptions”: beliefs about what others think and do. These widespread expectations of acquiescent women and assertive men mean that unions are often patriarchal and authoritarian. Union leaders in Bangladesh and Cambodia often lecture at women, <a href="http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/singapur/07907.pdf">rather than listening</a> to them. Women’s priorities are <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1354570042000198227#.V2JKvbsrJD8">marginalised</a>. </p>
<p>In Indonesia, research shows a large number of workplaces terminated women employees upon pregnancy, but <a href="http://apirnet.ilo.org/resources/briefing-paper-on-trade-unions-in-indonesia">no union raised this issue</a>. If women perceive unions as unresponsive, they may be <a href="http://betterwork.org/global/wp-content/uploads/Impact-Research-Indonesia-Baseline-Report-Worker-Perspectives-from-the-Factory-and-Beyond.pdf">reluctant to approach representatives</a> and <a href="http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/singapur/07907.pdf">engage</a> in union activities (as observed in Bangladesh, Cambodia and Indonesia).</p>
<p>Male-dominance of union leadership seems self-perpetuating. With little exposure to women leaders, many assume they are less capable of leadership. Women may also be reluctant to speak out due to concerns about how they will be <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Organising_Labour_in_Globalising_Asia.html?id=v3z0ndoDKtcC">perceived and treated by others</a>. <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Organising_Labour_in_Globalising_Asia.html?id=v3z0ndoDKtcC">Assertively negotiating with employers</a>, <a href="http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---sro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_204166.pdf">addressing large rallies</a> and <a href="http://courses.arch.vt.edu/courses/wdunaway/gia5274/Mills2005.pdf">leading demonstrations</a> are commonly regarded as masculine traits in Bangladesh, Cambodia and Thailand. Women who transgress these norm perceptions may be chastised, which in turn deters others. Working-class women may also doubt their capacity to challenge dominant men. “Don’t hit a stone with an egg,” cautions <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00045608.2014.944452">one Cambodian proverb</a>. </p>
<p>With minimal support for women leaders, unions remain patriarchal. So, many women disengage. This is hugely significant in a mostly female workforce. Indeed, women’s limited participation in union activities was identified as the <a href="http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/singapur/07907.pdf">most widely identified internal problem</a>, by Cambodian unionists. </p>
<p>To strengthen the power of workers, it seems imperative to tackle gender inequalities. A growing body of evidence suggests that <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13545700601184880">gender ideologies weaken with exposure</a> to <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379412000480">women demonstrating their equal competence</a> in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269696369_%2527Gender_Sensitisation_in_the_Zambian_Copperbelt%2527">socially valued, masculine roles</a>. Exposure to female mechanics, managers and union leaders could be amplified through active labour market interventions: scholarships, in-service training, gender quotas. For example, France’s national development agency has lent the Garment Manufacturers Association in Cambodia US$3.26m <a href="http://www.afd.fr/jahia/webdav/site/afd/shared/PORTAILS/PAYS/CAMBODGE/CKH%201080_centre_formation_textile_en.pdf">to establish a training institute</a> that improves the sector’s sustainability. They might have stipulated gender quotas for training programmes for mechanics and mangers.</p>
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<p>Connecting women with peers in neighbouring countries may also help. Seeing feminist victories elsewhere – gender quotas in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines – could boost confidence in the possibility of social change and catalyse further action. </p>
<h2>Brexit opportunity?</h2>
<p>Besides supporting feminist campaigns, the UK government could provide trade incentives for improved working conditions. While international trade reform is clearly enormously complex, it is not impossible. It may be more feasible than trying to shift gender ideologies and promote good governance overseas. </p>
<p>Brexit may even present a crucial window of opportunity. The UK could go further than existing EU agreements by making the expansion of export quotas conditional upon improved working conditions. Ideally, this would be monitored by the International Labour Organisation (as occurred between <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/files/WDCambodia1.pdf">Cambodia and the US</a>, 1999-2004). </p>
<p>With trade incentives for improved labour standards, British consumers would be supporting better jobs (rather than sweatshops). Encouragingly, the UK’s international development secretary, Priti Patel, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/60c86574-9471-11e6-a1dc-bdf38d484582">has signalled support for pro-development trade policies</a>. Indeed, international development isn’t just about foreign aid interventions over there; it’s also about <a href="http://www.owen.org/blog/8667">getting our own house in order</a>. </p>
<p>Trade incentives for improved working conditions would also demonstrate progressive global leadership, showcasing Britain’s continued commitment to inclusive development.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68019/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alice Evans does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Trade incentives and more inclusive union leadership could improve working conditions in the garment industry – particularly for women.Alice Evans, Lecturer in Human Geography, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/678682016-11-07T07:40:58Z2016-11-07T07:40:58ZUncertainty on security and trade worry allies in Asia as US election approaches<p><em>This article is part of The Conversation Global’s ‘The View From …’ series, explaining how governments and citizens in key countries and regions worldwide view the US presidential election. Today, we look at how nations in East Asia see the election and what they expect from the results</em>. </p>
<p>The impending US presidential election is causing some consternation among nations in East Asia that have been traditional allies of the country. Both security and economic interests, in the guise of the 12-member <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32498715">Trans-Pacific Partnership</a> (TPP) – seven of which hail from the Asia-Pacific – are causing anxiety, particularly because of the kinds of statements made by Republican candidate Donald Trump on the campaign trail.</p>
<p>Some middle and small powers, such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/thailands-crackdown-on-chinese-dissidents-reinforces-the-coalition-of-authoritarians-66634">Thailand</a> and <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/lessons-from-obamas-southeast-asia-trip/">Malaysia</a>, had already shifted their focus – if not their political support – to China. It remains to be seen if the incoming president will trigger a diplomatic shift for the whole region.</p>
<h2>Facing uncertainty</h2>
<p>The US has cultivated friendships in Asia since the end of the second world war. As a major international power, it has offered the region public goods, such as <a href="http://fpc.state.gov/212107.htm">security</a> and the shelter of its <a href="http://nwp.ilpi.org/?p=1221">nuclear umbrella</a>, as well as facilitating <a href="http://www.cfr.org/trade/future-us-trade-policy/p36422">market economy and free trade</a>. </p>
<p>Many American allies such as Australia, Japan, South Korea and Singapore, would be happy to see Hillary Clinton become the next American president, in part because she was responsible for the Barack Obama administration’s “<a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/what-exactly-does-it-mean-that-the-us-is-pivoting-to-asia/274936/">pivot to Asia</a>” strategy when she was the secretary of state. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/obama-administrations-pivot-asia">policy saw the US aiming to shift</a> its strategic focus and necessary military capability back to Asia, and strengthen American alliances in the region. American <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/comment/as-us-marines-arrive-in-darwin-australia-must-consider-its-strategic-position-20160422-goco5s.html">deployment of marine forces in Darwin</a> in northern Australia is one the best examples of the policy in action. </p>
<p>Since China has established an <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1960954/beijing-ready-impose-air-defence-identification-zone-south-china-sea">air defence identification zone</a> in the East China Sea (also <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/13/china-declares-right-to-set-up-air-defence-zone-in-south-china-s/">possible in the South China Sea</a> at some stage), and the reclaimed the reefs in the South China Sea, it’s likely Clinton will stick to the policy.</p>
<p>Donald Trump’s proposed policy towards Asia, on the other hand, is <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/08/31/clinton-plans-to-slam-trump-as-a-dangerous-isolationist-in-american-legion-speech/">isolationist</a> in that he does not seem to want the United States to provide security for other countries any more, or to enter further free trade agreements. </p>
<p>Perhaps Trump’s calculation reflects the rational businessman he claims to be, focusing on how to minimise costs and maximise profits. He has criticised Japan and South Korea as <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-japan-idUSKCN0WM017">free riders</a> when it comes to regional security, and has even suggested these two countries obtain <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-foreign-policy.html?_r=0">nuclear weapons</a> themselves. </p>
<p>Any withdrawal of the US security guarantee would be a nightmare for these and other American allies in the region, just as it would be <a href="https://theconversation.com/european-leaders-would-see-a-donald-trump-victory-as-total-calamity-67619">for the nation’s European allies</a>. </p>
<h2>Worried allies</h2>
<p>Japan has been doing what it can to ensure its alliance with the US continues. In April, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared: “no matter who will be the next president, the Japan-US alliance is <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/japan-pm-shinzo-abe-defends-military-alliance-with-the-us-in-rebuff-to-donald-trump">the cornerstone of Japan’s diplomacy</a>”.</p>
<p>Abe met with Clinton in September to lobby for <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/20/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-clinton-meet-ny-restate-split-tpp-stances-weigh-pyongyang-threat/#.WBoQ3S197IV">continuing US military presence</a> in the region, and implementing the TPP. Hitoshi Tanaka, a former Japanese deputy minister for foreign affairs has <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/10/08/national/politics-diplomacy/unknown-quantity-outcome-presidential-election-november-affect-japan-u-s-relations/#.WBoRCC197IV">criticised Trump’s statements</a>, which Tanaka says can undermine the American role in the region, shake the confidence of its allies and weaken the credibility of its economic leadership.</p>
<p>The uncertainty created by the presidential election <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com.au/what-it-would-mean-for-australia-if-donald-trump-became-president-of-the-united-states-2016-3">also provides cause for concern in Australia</a>. In terms of values and preferences in foreign policy, Australia and the United States have human rights, democracy and free trade in common. But China has become an important trading partner for Australia because of its hunger for natural resources, such as <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/interactive/2016/us-election-impact-australia/alliances/">coal, iron ore and natural gas</a>.</p>
<p>If Trump becomes the US president, Australia will face an immediate dilemma – should Canberra strengthen its military capability in case of a possible American retreat or bandwagon with China?</p>
<p>Similar concerns also assail South Korea. Seoul has just <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/13/asia/south-korea-thaad-north-korea-china/">finalised a site</a> for implementing the Terminal High Attitude Area Defence (THAAD), which is part of a defence system offered by the United States to intercept missile and nuclear attacks from <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-thaad-idUSKCN0ZO084">North Korea</a>. Would it be rolled back if Trump enters the White House? </p>
<p>South Korea is itself now considering whether it is, in fact, better to develop <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/south-koreas-march-toward-a-strike-first-nuclear-policy-1477414963">nuclear weapons</a>, in case American foreign policy can no longer be expected to remain stable and predictable. </p>
<p>Taiwan, meanwhile, is in a rather embarrassing situation in relation to the diplomatic competition between China and the United States in that it’s neither a member of <a href="http://www.scmp.com/topics/asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-aiib">Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</a> (AIIB), which is dominated and administered by China, nor in the TPP. </p>
<p><a href="http://udn.com/news/story/1/1986777%20and%20http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20161030000056-260203">Its mass media</a> has expressed concerns that if Trump wins, he may disrupt the supportive US policy towards Taiwan.</p>
<h2>And then there’s trade</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-tpp-idUSKCN0VD08S">signed but not yet ratified</a> free trade agreement known as the TPP involves the US, Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Brunei, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Chile and Peru. For the deal to take effect, it has to be ratified by February 2018.</p>
<p>Clinton has said, “<a href="http://www.ontheissues.org/2016/Hillary_Clinton_Free_Trade.htm">I am not in favor of what I have learned</a>” about the TPP and is likely to <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/27/politics/tpp-what-you-need-to-know/">re-examine its provisions if elected</a>. But <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/28/donald-trump-vows-to-cancel-trans-pacific-partners/">Trump has decisively spoken against it</a> for threatening American jobs.</p>
<p>Singapore has been outspoken about the need to get the deal through. In speech at <a href="http://www.pmo.gov.sg/mediacentre/pm-lee-hsien-loong-us-chamber-commerceus-asean-business-council">the American Chamber of Commerce and US-ASEAN Business Council in August</a>, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said ratifying the agreement “will be a clear statement of your commitment to and your confidence in our region.”</p>
<p>Lee reiterated the message again in an interview with Time in late October, saying the United States would lose its “<a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/pm-lee-warns-of-harm-to-us-standing-if-tpp-isnt-ratified">credibility as an ally and as a deterrent</a>” if the next president just lets the TPP go.</p>
<h2>Waning influence</h2>
<p>American influence in Asia has been weakened with the rise of Chinese economic capabilities. The best evidence for this is <a href="http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2041077/four-reasons-duterte-will-have-change-tune-china-and-us">the ostensible change in Philippine foreign policy</a>. </p>
<p>President Rodrigo Duterte may have set aside territorial claims in the South China Sea (at least temporarily), in return for a Chinese investment and economic package, but at least Filippino fishers are now back in the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/29/world/asia/south-china-sea-scarborough-shoal.html?_r=0">Scarborough Shoal</a>.</p>
<p>Duterte’s diplomatic shift from the United States to China can be regarded as a pragmatic calculation. But statements, such as “<a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/25/asia/duterte-us-comments/">I am no American puppet…do not make us your dogs</a>” go far beyond concerns about who the next US president will be. Duterte’s emphasis is on nationalism and a sense of <a href="https://theconversation.com/he-may-have-insulted-obama-but-duterte-held-up-a-long-hidden-looking-glass-to-the-us-65085">rebellion against American colonial rule</a> in the Philippines.</p>
<p>Other middle and small powers within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have adopted a <a href="http://www.theasanforum.org/southeast-asian-strategies-toward-the-great-powers-still-hedging-after-all-these-years/">hedging policy</a> for a while. They buffer themselves by being on the side of the United States for security protection, while tending to the side of China for economic benefits.</p>
<p>Most of them – Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, <a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-pleads-with-vietnam-malaysia-and-brunei-to-resolve-south-china-sea-issues-bilaterally/articleshow/54312000.cms">Vietnam</a> and <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/malaysia-china-keep-low-profile-on-1403622597">Malaysia</a> – kept a low profile during the dispute in the South China Sea, even though the latter two have claims there. </p>
<p>Just two weeks ago, the <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/10/3-chinese-navy-ships-visit-vietnams-cam-ranh-bay/">Chinese navy arrived and stayed</a> in Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay. This was formerly a military port for the United States during the Vietnam War. And for the Soviet Union then Russia from 1979 to 2002. In late 2013, <a href="https://sputniknews.com/military/201605191039907645-russia-return-vietnam-military-base-analysis/">Russia and Vietnam signed an agreement</a> for repair and maintenance of submarines there. </p>
<p>Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak also went to Beijing recently to discuss various business deals, including a <a href="http://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/10/184147/malaysia-buy-navy-vessels-china-blow-us">military bid on patrol ships</a> that can fire missiles. </p>
<p>More than any other ASEAN country, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/domino-theory-or-hedging-after-the-philippines-now-malaysia-embraces-china/2016/10/31/d30984ea-9f63-11e6-b74c-603fd6bbc17f_story.html">Vietnam and Malaysia</a> seem to have made their choice between China and the United States. No matter who is the next American president, given their geographical proximity and increasing economic interdependence with China, they seem to be edging closer to their large neighbour.</p>
<p>Trump has <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-charges-china-with-yuan-manipulationagain-1474943701">expressed considerable hostility to China</a>, but Clinton isn’t likely to become a great friend to Beijing either. In international relations, great power competition rarely has room for trust or promises, and the American president must try to contain or prevent the rise of China. </p>
<p>While the nature of great power relations between China and the United States seem quite stable, what’s caught attention in China is the <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/trump-vs-clinton-battle-turning-heads-china-n677901">“chaotic” nature of US democratic system</a> itself. <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/news/china/china-donald-trump-gop-candidate-s-rise-big-news-n567726">Trump’s overblown statements</a> about the Chinese currency and terms of trade have also made headlines, although he has turned down the attacks in recent months.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-or-clinton-what-india-really-wants-from-the-us-election-67340">India is a natural ally to the United States</a> because the countries have converging values, norms and interests, such as democracy and regional stability. </p>
<p>Last but not least, we should not skip North Korea. An editorial in DPRK Today regards Trump as a <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2016/05/north-korean-editorial-supports-donald-trump/">“wise politician” and “far-sighted presidential candidate”</a>. Perhaps Kim Jong-Un is looking for a diplomatic breakthrough, but it is more likely that he doesn’t understand the American presidential election – rhetorical statements from a presidential candidate will not, after all, automatically translate into future policy.</p>
<p>The US presidential election matters most to American allies in Asia in terms of continuous commitment and credibility. But it won’t have much of an impact on the middle and small powers who have increasingly hedged on the side of China for economic gain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67868/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hak-yin Li does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Security and economic interests, in the guise of the 12-member Trans-Pacific Partnership (seven of which hail from the Asia-Pacific), are causing anxiety among US friends and allies.Hak-yin Li, Lecturer in International Relations, Chinese University of Hong KongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/673472016-10-21T14:46:46Z2016-10-21T14:46:46ZCambodia has come a long way in 25 years of peace – but it’s far from perfect<p>After decades of tragic conflict and bloodshed, Cambodia finally found a measure of peace in 1991, when 19 governments met in Paris to sign the <a href="http://peacemaker.un.org/cambodiaparisagreement91">Paris Peace Agreements</a>. This was a pivotal moment in the country’s history and it opened the door to what turned out to be a remarkable period of recovery and relative peace.</p>
<p>The agreements covered four major priorities: national reconciliation, the right of self-determination through free and fair elections, a ceasefire and cessation of outside military assistance (including the withdrawal of foreign forces), and the protection of human rights (including the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons). </p>
<p>An experimental <a href="http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicbackgr.html">United Nations Transitional Authority</a> was set up to take charge of implementing the agreements. Its mandate ended in September 1993, when the new Constitution of Cambodia was adopted and a general election successfully held.</p>
<p>The Cambodia of today is very different from that quarter of a century ago. Although it took several years for the armed conflict to end, peace and stability has brought dividends. The peace agreements paved the way for states to lift embargoes against Cambodia and a period of dramatic economic growth duly ensued, with a GDP growth rate <a href="http://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/cambodia-is-now-a-lower-middle-income-economy-what-does-this-mean">averaging 7.6% a year</a>. Once one of the world’s very poorest countries, Cambodia is classified by UNDP as a lower middle-income country. </p>
<p>Billions of dollars have been invested in aid, rebuilding and restructuring, as well as in development and investment opportunities. During a recent visit by the Chinese premier, Xi Jinping, Cambodia and China <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-china-cambodia-idUKKBN12H0SK">signed 31 agreements</a> covering everything from debt cancellation to help modernising the Cambodian armed forces. </p>
<p>The economic benefits of peace, stability and foreign investment are not shared equally among all Cambodians. To transition from a rural subsistence economy to an industrialised one is a huge challenge for any country – and especially for one where land ownership is not well documented. Sugar, cashews, rubber, tourism, even the garment industry all encroach on land once occupied by villages and families who often have little, if any, legal entitlement to their land. Indigenous peoples are especially badly affected on this front.</p>
<p>Cambodia has had a period of relative political stability. Elections have been held periodically since 1993, though they’ve often been marred by disputes and tensions. With local elections scheduled for June 2017 and national elections for 2018, Cambodia seems to have successfully embedded the practice of regularly going to the polls. With the support of foreign states, a National Election Committee is working to roll out electronic voter registration. </p>
<p>All round, the country is making good progress towards ensuring the “universal and equal suffrage” that the agreements demand. But once we look beyond the technical and legal advances, the situation leaves plenty to be desired.</p>
<h2>Room for improvement</h2>
<p>Cambodia’s two main political parties deeply distrust each other. The main opposition party, the <a href="http://www.nationalrescueparty.org/">Cambodian National Rescue Party</a>, has repeatedly <a href="http://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/boycotts-10072016165300.html">boycotted the National Assembly</a>, most recently for several months following the slew of arrests earlier this year. Its leader, Sam Rainsy, took himself into <a href="http://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/sam-rainsy-considers-return-to-cambodia-09282016143721.html">exile</a> in November 2015, and its deputy leader has been in self-imposed <a href="http://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/cambodia-national-rescue-party-leader-kem-10052016141346.html">house arrest in the party’s HQ</a> since May 2016, both avoiding various charges and prison sentences for a variety of offences. </p>
<p>The law, meanwhile, on paper adequately protects most human rights and fundamental freedoms. The post-1991 constitution obliges the state to respect the rule of law and human rights – it has been augmented by a wide range of laws, many of them drafted with the help of international experts. </p>
<p>However, in reality, many of the country’s laws are open to broad judicial interpretation and although they can be be applied in a manner which protects human rights, that is not necessarily the case. Not all Cambodians enjoy genuine equality before the law without discrimination. </p>
<p>Two-and-a-half decades since the Paris Peace Agreements were struck, it’s time Cambodia proves its independent sovereignty by revising and clarifying these laws to give better effect to the human rights treaties which it has accepted. </p>
<p>Pessimism about progress is not justified: to go from a near-failed state to a full sovereign independent member of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/asean-1956">ASEAN</a>, the UN and various other organisations is a major achievement, and it deserves to be celebrated. </p>
<p>There is undoubtedly room for improvement and development – and lessons still to learn. But this international nation-building experiment, and the progress Cambodia has made since 1991, is in many ways quite remarkable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67347/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rhona Smith is currently the independent UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia. This article is written in her private, academic capacity and does not necessarily reflect views of the United Nations. She declined to provide a profile picture.</span></em></p>Once one of the world’s very poorest countries, Cambodia has been through a remarkable two and a half decades of growth and development.Rhona Smith, Head of School, Newcastle Law School, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/670312016-10-13T17:03:03Z2016-10-13T17:03:03ZThailand mourns its king and heads into the unknown<p>After a prolonged illness, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-37643326">Thailand’s King Bhumibol has died</a> at the age of 88. His long-anticipated passing will be mourned by many (but not all) Thais – and after Bhumibol’s 70-year reign, it will compound the country’s uncertainty and instability.</p>
<p>The media is full of obituaries eulogising Bhumibol’s role in Thai society, stating he was “widely revered”, considered “semi-divine”, and was a “unifying” figure who regularly intervened to stabilise Thailand’s political system. This is far too simplistic – and it overlooks the role he often played in legitimising less-than-democratic regimes.</p>
<p>Thailand’s successive authoritarian governments relied heavily on propaganda to build up a personality cult around Bhumibol. As any visitor to Thailand will see from the ubiquitous photos of the king and obligatory standing for the national anthem in cinemas, this cult is alive and in rude health. </p>
<p>Many Thais will indeed be genuinely and deeply saddened by Bhumibol’s passing – but this cult is also enforced by draconian <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-29628191">lèse majesté laws</a>, which can land critics of the monarchy in prison for decades. Prosecutions under the laws have been mounting over the past decade as people increasingly question the monarch’s role in Thailand’s serious social and political conflict. And some say Bhumibol’s reputation as a stabilising and positive political influence is largely a myth. </p>
<p>Giles Ungpakorn, a radical government critic forced into exile in Britain by lèse majesté investigations, <a href="http://links.org.au/node/1741">has persuasively argued</a> that Bhumibol never exercised independent political influence. Instead, he was a symbol deployed by genuinely powerful groups – a network of senior military, state, political and business elites – for their own purposes. </p>
<h2>Seal of approval</h2>
<p>Far from supporting democracy during the Cold War, Bhumibol supported anti-communist paramilitaries, whose attacks on leftist youth culminated in the 1976 <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/10/commemorating-the-thammasat-university-massacre-in-thailand/">Thammasat University massacre</a> and a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/1976/oct/07/fromthearchive">military coup</a>. Ungpakorn has <a href="http://www.academia.edu/22324119/Thailand_s_Crisis_and_the_Fight_for_Democracy">argued</a> that the king’s famous public interventions against brutal military leaders in 1973 and 1992 occurred only when mass resistance had become insurmountable; his appearances “were merely attempts by the elites to keep control of events, while sacrificing unpopular dictators”. </p>
<p>In 2003, during the reign of former prime minister <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13891650">Thaksin Shinawatra</a>, Bhumibol publicly backed the government’s “war on drugs”, in which <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7260127.stm">more than 2,500 people were killed</a> without due process. Then in 2006, when a military junta overthrew Thaksin, the coup leaders promptly won the king’s <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/09/20/thailand.coup.king/">endorsement</a>. </p>
<p>By the time of the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/oddly-timed-thai-coup-a-sign-of-trouble-in-military-and-monarchy-27475">most recent military coup</a> in 2014, Bhumibol was arguably less than compos mentis, but he was nonetheless once again wheeled out to <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28923989">sanctify</a> the destruction of democracy.</p>
<p>So King Bhumibol was never a consistent supporter of democracy or even basic human rights. His role in the 2006 coup in particular – and the royal family’s <a href="http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2014/01/14/princess-chulabhorns-politics/">blatant support</a> for the anti-Thaksin “yellow-shirt” protest movement – disillusioned many Thais, fomenting growing anti-royalist and even republican sentiment among pro-Thaksin “red-shirts”. This sentiment is denied expression by the lèse majesté laws – and claims that the monarchy is universally revered therefore persist.</p>
<p>Bhumibol’s passing is therefore politically destabilising not because he was personally powerful or a linchpin for stability, but because powerful groups are worried they may no longer be able to use the monarchy for their own purposes. </p>
<p>And while state propaganda had successfully cultivated reverence for Bhumibol, the same cannot be said of Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn, who will eventually succeed his father as King Rama X. </p>
<h2>Suitable heir?</h2>
<p>Despite the lèse majesté laws, many believe Vajiralongkorn cares little for them or his royal responsibilities. He spends much of his time abroad, flying in his personal jumbo jet. </p>
<p>Now Bhumibol is dead, the incumbent military regime will use the year-long mourning process to do all it can to cultivate popular reverence for his chosen heir. But many believe the prince’s conduct, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/13/thailand-maha-vajiralongkorn-crown-prince-king">as widely reported</a>, is often unsuitable for anyone seeking to use the dubious mystique of the royal person to rubber-stamp their political designs.</p>
<p>Indeed, the monarchy’s declining lustre may explain why the forces behind the repeated attacks on Thai democracy are increasingly resorting to legal chicanery and “<a href="http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/03/31/Thailands-Judicial-Coup.aspx">judicial coups</a>” rather than royal intervention. This includes politicised lawsuits against leading pro-Thaksin politicians, the forced dissolution of their parties, and manoeuvres by the constitutional court and election commission.</p>
<p>The junta’s new constitution for a diminished democratic system – <a href="http://www.newmandala.org/real-meaning-thailands-referendum/">endorsed half-heartedly</a> by the Thai public in a referendum in August – promises more of this to come. It deliberately seeks to weaken dominant political parties and establishes powerful extra-parliamentary bodies to vet politicians and their manifestos, creating ways to remove governments not to the liking of entrenched political elites.</p>
<p>However, it is now likely that elections will be delayed until after the one-year mourning period ends, and the new king is bedded in. Whether Vajiralongkorn will consent to being disciplined by those who have long manipulated the monarchy remains to be seen. He may instead opt to continue living mostly abroad. </p>
<p>Either way, if Thailand’s political conflicts resume their former intensity following the elections, these forces will have to confront their enemies with a greatly diminished symbolic arsenal at their disposal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67031/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lee Jones does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Thailand’s supposedly beloved king was a useful tool for some of his country’s most unpleasant regimes.Lee Jones, Reader in International Politics, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/651962016-10-03T14:45:20Z2016-10-03T14:45:20ZPanic about IS in the Philippines masks a very real war in the country<p>For the past six months, the Philippine Army has been ramping up an offensive against the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-36138554">Abu Sayyaf Group</a>. President Rodrigo Duterte <a href="http://www.sunstar.com.ph/tacloban/local-news/2016/09/02/samar-soldiers-augment-troops-hunting-abu-sayyafs-sulu-495239">talks about</a> “going full force in all-out operations against it”, framing the operation as a crackdown on a group with links to Islamic State. But the connection is tenuous. </p>
<p>Duterte isn’t the first to over-egg the group’s jihadist links. While you’d struggle to find any mention of this “war” <a href="http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/812066/army-pours-troops-into-pursuit-abus-ready-for-last-war">outside of Filipino news outlets</a>, you will find plenty of <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/07/opinions/isis-southeast-asia-liow/index.html">international stories</a> about a connection between IS and the conflict in the southern Philippines. Regularly describing the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) as IS “affiliates” or similar, these scare stories overlook the local dynamics of a complex and protracted conflict. This is an old trick – or rather, an old mistake. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/the-islamic-states-isil-asian-offensive-operations-thailand-malaysia-southeast-asia-muslim-sharia-law/">journalists</a> and “<a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/07/returning-jihad-isil-southeast-asia-160710061109667.html">security experts</a>” reporting a “connection” between IS and the ASG generally provide scant evidence for their claims. A picture of armed men in the jungle posing with the IS flag does not a south-east Asian IS network make, and the <a href="http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/08/10/16/duterte-isis-a-looming-problem-for-ph">scaremongering talk</a> of IS creating an exotic island sanctuary-cum-breeding ground is salacious, inaccurate and logically flawed. </p>
<p>It also means that deeply complex conflicts such as the one in <a href="https://theconversation.com/philippines-hopes-new-president-can-fashion-peace-from-a-war-of-many-sides-60606">Mindanao</a> are being prosecuted on flawed premises. The Filipino authorities have until recently been cautious about adopting a grand global anti-jihadist narrative, but now Duterte’s claims of an IS-ASG connection are obscuring the difficult local realities that underpin the very violence his government is fighting. </p>
<h2>History repeating</h2>
<p>As the recent spate of “untethered” IS-branded attacks in Europe have demonstrated, open-sourced jihad is not bound by physical geography. But while IS has successfully created a sense of global menace, speculation about a global jihadist network expanding into South-East Asia was also common more than a decade ago, when <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/al-qaeda-trained-in-philippines/">al-Qaeda</a> was the bogeyman of the moment. </p>
<p>As long ago as 2002, South-East Asia was dubbed the “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2002-07-01/southeast-asia-second-front">second front</a>” in the so-called “war on terror”. It seems this old and flawed al-Qaeda-centric view, which meant Muslim rebellions in the region were understood as “connected” or “networked”, has simply been revived and refitted into an IS-centric one. </p>
<p>It’s not confined to the Philippines: the August 2016 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/24/two-bombs-explode-in-thai-beach-resort-of-pattani">bombings in Thailand</a>, as well as incidents in <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2016/07/06/malaysia-a-center-of-moderate-islam-braces-for-more-isis-attacks/#6fa20a1f6520">Malaysia</a> and <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/18/asia/indonesia-isis-analysis/">Indonesia</a>, have all raised the spectre of IS influence in the region – and all with little in the way of reliable evidence. Although a <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14672710600556528">number</a> of academics <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=y38hAwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA211&dq=thayer+al+qaeda+centric+paradigm&ots=zFSuaOvThp&sig=Ck63r8qzHh2o5rGdaFHx3Vppo7U#v=onepage&q=thayer%20al%20qaeda%20centric%20paradigm&f=false">challenged</a> the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512740500188845">myopic</a> “second front” narrative at the time, the idea was quickly <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/03/jihadists-in-paradise/305613/">taken up</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140106/original/image-20161003-20230-9vyjkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140106/original/image-20161003-20230-9vyjkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140106/original/image-20161003-20230-9vyjkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140106/original/image-20161003-20230-9vyjkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140106/original/image-20161003-20230-9vyjkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140106/original/image-20161003-20230-9vyjkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140106/original/image-20161003-20230-9vyjkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Filipino soldiers head off to fight the ASG.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.epa.eu/politics-photos/defence-photos/president-rodrigo-duterte-visits-army-camps-in-volatile-sulu-island-southern-philippines-photos-52950036">EPA/Ben Hajan</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>ASG is the group most commonly cited by those who inflate the jihadist threat in the region, but despite its apparent role in a recent <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/02/asia/philippines-explosion-davao-city/">Davao night-market bombing</a>, its primary tactic remains kidnapping for ransom. It should be obvious that ASG <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/philippine-terror-group-abu-sayyaf-may-be-using-isis-link-own-agenda-1695156">draws susbstantial propaganda benefit</a> from being conflated with IS, especially given that the reality is rather less impressive when viewed with clearer eyes.</p>
<p>Yes, IS has <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/islamic-state-officially-creates-province-in-the-philippines.php">recognised</a> ASG leader Isnilon Hapilon, but this is far from the “<a href="http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/08/28/16/isis-recognizing-hapilon-a-game-changer-us-military-intel-officials">game-changer</a>” some in the West have called it. Hapilon jumped on the IS bandwagon <a href="http://www.rappler.com/nation/65199-abu-sayyaf-leader-oath-isis">back in 2014</a>, and it took two years for him to win any reciprocal gesture from his ostensible allies. </p>
<h2>About-face</h2>
<p>As things stand, the war between the government and the ASG is heating up and getting worse. Soon after Duterte apparently <a href="http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/07/22/Philippine-President-Duterte-calls-for-peace-with-Abu-Sayyaf/4671469197632/">hinted at some sort of rapprochement</a> with the ASG, the group <a href="http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/08/26/16/family-of-beheaded-teen-gets-death-threats">beheaded Patrick Almodovar</a>, an 18-year-old Filipino it had taken hostage. Duterte <a href="http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/575893/news/nation/duterte-shuts-door-on-peace-talks-with-abu-sayyaf-bandits">quickly changed tack</a>, <a href="http://www.rappler.com/nation/145392-duterte-terrorists-isis-eat-alive">threatening</a> to “eat them alive with salt and vinegar”.</p>
<p>In April and June, captives <a href="http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/06/21/Abu-Sayyaf-hostage-severed-head.html">Robert Hall</a>, and <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/25/canadian-hostage-held-for-seven-months-murdered-by-islamists-in/">fellow Canadian John Ridsdel</a> were beheaded when ransom deadlines were not met. Norwegian hostage Kjartan Sekkingstad, meanwhile, was released in September after the ASG was paid a <a href="http://www.rappler.com/nation/144163-ransom-paid-norwegian-hostage-abu-sayyaf-duterte">50m peso (US$1m) ransom</a>. </p>
<p>The authorities’ seek-and-destroy strategy is simply not working. The military has been <a href="http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/08/24/16/soldiers-were-like-sitting-ducks-vs-abu-sayyaf">vulnerable to deadly attacks</a>, and its losses are mounting; innocent children and peace workers are frequently <a href="http://www.philstar.com/nation/2016/08/23/1616474/troops-abu-sayyaf-clash-basilan">caught in the crossfire</a>. </p>
<p>In August 2016, Duterte promised that the ASG would be eliminated “<a href="http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/08/27/Duterte-Abu-Sayyaf-can-be-crushed-in-a-week.html">in a week</a>” and announced a <a href="http://www.philstar.com:8080/nation/2016/08/30/1618780/philippine-navy-blocking-abu-sayyaf-reinforcement">naval blockade</a> to intercept reinforcements, but evidently the war is set to continue. The ASG has been outgunned and outnumbered for years, and yet its campaign continues.</p>
<p>All the while, this hugely violent and costly conflict remains drastically under-reported. Instead, the media focuses on <a href="http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/08/10/16/drug-lord-taps-terror-groups-in-kill-plot-vs-duterte-pnp-chief">sensational claims</a> that drug kingpins are joining up with IS affiliates to assassinate Duterte. More scare stories of IS extending its “<a href="http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA97422971&v=2.1&u=urjy&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w&asid=b27c4fb0fb4874e8fb8b7e2387bda33a">tentacles</a>” are surely on the way.</p>
<p>For now, the spectre of IS in South-East Asia is a case of an awful lot of smoke and very little fire. And as Duterte joins in the hyperbole, many of the Philippines’ same old mistakes are already being repeated.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65196/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A major insurgency is humiliating the Filipino army and sucking in huge ransoms – but all anyone wants to talk about is Islamic State.Tom Smith, Lecturer in International Relations, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/639692016-09-07T08:17:45Z2016-09-07T08:17:45ZVietnam is struggling to unite its Mekong neighbours against China<p>Vietnam <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-vietnam-idUSKCN10K2NE">moved rocket launchers</a> into disputed territory in the South China Sea, reports recently suggested, meaning it could potentially attack land that China has controversially reclaimed. This all comes at a time of heightened tension over territorial wrangling in the region. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/13/pentagon-report-china-reclaimed-3200-acres-south-china-sea">Pentagon report</a> released in May 2016 described how China had reclaimed 3,200 acres of land in the disputed Spratly Islands, including 10,000 feet of runways and large ports. It also developed and fortified islands in the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-35593162">Paracels</a>, where it has deployed anti-aircraft missiles on <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/south-china-sea-china-has-deployed-anti-ship-missiles-on-woody-island/">Woody Island</a>. Similar US reports in 2015 detailed how China reclaimed <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-32941829">2,000 acres of land</a> over a period of just 18 months. </p>
<p>These activities compound concerns that China may be preparing to proclaim an “<a href="https://www.thetrumpet.com/article/13933.19.0.0/world/military/what-chinas-air-defense-identification-zone-could-mean-for-the-south-china-sea">air defence identification zone</a>” over the South China Sea in order to enforce its territorial claims over much of the ocean area, marked out on Chinese maps by the so-called “<a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/interview-xue-li-on-the-south-china-sea/">nine-dash line</a>” with which it marks its territorial claim on maps of the region.</p>
<p>Vietnam’s move against China follows a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-china-wont-back-off-the-south-china-sea-whatever-the-world-might-say-62248">landmark ruling</a> by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which ruled in favour of the Philippines that there was no legal basis in China’s sweeping territorial claims. The Chinese government rejects the Philippines’ claims and disputes the court’s jurisdiction, accusing it of being captured by Japanese and US foreign policy interests; it predictably condemned the court’s judgement and now refuses to honour it. </p>
<p>In order to gain leverage against China, Vietnam has for years been trying to multilaterialise the South China Sea issue within the Association of South-east Asian Nations (<a href="http://asean.org/">ASEAN</a>), which brings together ten of the region’s states into one diplomatic bloc. Vietnam’s strategy has been to forge a united ASEAN position and thereby force China to negotiate with its members collectively. </p>
<p>The Chinese government has traditionally rejected this, instead preferring bilateral negotiations with the ASEAN states who have interests in the South China Sea. And so far, it has not faced a serious challenge. </p>
<h2>Divided they fall</h2>
<p>ASEAN has <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-push-to-unite-south-east-asia-against-chinese-expansionism-could-backfire-55733">found it difficult to come to a common position</a>; the best it’s come up with is the softly worded 2002 <a href="https://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2002%20Declaration%20on%20the%20Conduct%20of%20Parties%20in%20the%20South%20China%20Sea-pdf.pdf">Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea</a>, known as the DOC, which was signed by China and all of ASEAN. Ten years later, the ASEAN members and China signed the <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/world/2012-11/20/content_27167423.htm">Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC</a>, but an actual code of conduct has never been agreed upon.</p>
<p>Certain ASEAN member states have played an outsize role in blocking it. In July 2016 during the 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Vientiane, Laos, the Cambodian delegation blocked a joint statement on the South China Sea – including any mild references to respecting legal and diplomatic processes. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136592/original/image-20160905-4795-1cp2zkz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136592/original/image-20160905-4795-1cp2zkz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136592/original/image-20160905-4795-1cp2zkz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136592/original/image-20160905-4795-1cp2zkz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136592/original/image-20160905-4795-1cp2zkz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136592/original/image-20160905-4795-1cp2zkz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136592/original/image-20160905-4795-1cp2zkz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Clubbing together? Hardly.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AMekong_River_Commission_banderole_au_Laos.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This was at least the third time that Cambodia had blocked a consensus. A month before the July summit it joined Myanmar and Laos in withdrawing its support for a strongly-worded ASEAN statement, and agreed to a soft version. Cambodia’s resistance met with words of praise from China’s foreign minister. </p>
<p>Even as far back as the <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/asean-summit-fallout-continues-on/">2012 ASEAN summit</a> in Cambodia’s capital Phnom Penh, tensions between countries over how to deal with the issue grew so hostile that the summit ended without a communiqué for the first time in ASEAN’s history. While Vietnam and the Philippines wanted the communiqué to include a reference to China’s recent actions in the disputed waters, host and chair Cambodia refused to allow this. No compromise could be negotiated. </p>
<p>Why has it stood in the way? As far as many observers and diplomats are concerned, Phnom Penh has been bought off by China, which has become the dominant funder of infrastructure not only in Cambodia but in Myanmar and Laos besides. This is thwarting efforts to unite these countries against some of China’s more aggressive projects. </p>
<p>A particular bone of contention is Chinese investment in hydroelectric dams and its control over the river’s source. This is of particular concern to Vietnam, which is last in the line of the river’s countries and only has the delta in its territory. The Mekong delta is one of Vietnam’s key rice production areas and as such is dependent on water flow from upstream, and dam construction there is a direct threat to Vietnam’s food supply. </p>
<p>And yet, ever since China began construction of the <a href="https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/8477">Manwan dam</a> on its own stretch of the Mekong in 1986, the Vietnamese government has attempted to persuade China of the dangers that the dams pose to the delta – so far to no effect. China rejects claims that its dams have any impact as far south as the delta, and has pointed out that its territorial Mekong waters only account for 16% of the river’s flow. </p>
<p>The upshot is that Vietnam has sought support from the rest of the world, and the US in particular. Washington has regularly and publicly denounced the dam-building programme. </p>
<p>In July 2012 Hillary Clinton, then US secretary of state, paid a high-profile visit to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, apparently making good on the Obama administration’s “<a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Americas/0813pp_pivottoasia.pdf">pivot to Asia</a>”. While in Laos, she <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18792282">discussed</a> the controversial construction of the Xayaburi Dam, built and financed by Thai companies, which is the first dam on the Mekong outside China.</p>
<p>The US’s interests in the region are represented in various ways. It can leverage its power through the <a href="http://lowermekong.org/">Lower Mekong Initiative</a>, a formalised partnership with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam. There’s also been an established relationship between the Mekong River Commission and the Mississippi River Commission since 2010, and the <a href="http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/06/194139.htm">US-Laos Comprehensive Dialogue</a> has been upgraded. On top of all that, US navy ships also make annual visits to Vietnam.</p>
<p>So conflicts over power and resources aren’t just playing out in in the South China Sea; they’re also standing in the way of a common resource politics in the Mekong basin. And for all that the US now has diplomatic and military skin in the game, China is far from on the defensive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63969/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oliver Hensengerth has received funding from the British Academy for related topics. The British Academy project has finished, however, and the current article is not written as part of an ongoing research project. </span></em></p>Vietnam is deeply spooked by the struggle over the South China Sea – but its friends in south-east Asia aren’t so keen to stand up to Beijing.Oliver Hensengerth, Lecturer in Politics, Northumbria University, NewcastleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/640372016-09-06T10:53:30Z2016-09-06T10:53:30ZDuterte’s Obama insult was shameful – but the West has turned a blind eye to much, much worse<p>The president of the Philippines, <a href="https://theconversation.com/philippines-lightning-rod-president-duterte-charts-a-surprising-course-62667">Rodrgio Duterte</a>, is raising the profile of his country in the international news media in a way only he can. In a warning to US President Barack Obama to stay off the subject of extrajudicial killings of drug trafficikers, he apparently called his American counterpart a “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/05/philippines-president-rodrigo-duterte-barack-obama-son-whore">son of a whore</a>”. The meeting was cancelled, and a statement later conveyed that Duterte had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/06/son-of-a-whore-was-not-meant-to-be-personal-duterte-tells-obama">not meant the remark to be personal attack</a>.</p>
<p>The problem with Duterte’s latest transgression isn’t just its diplomatic implications. It’s also another in a string of PR disasters for the Philippines in the West. It also plays directly into what Duterte himself has complained about: the voyeuristic nature of 21st-century digital news media, and the cynical and hypocritical tone of much Western coverage of his country.</p>
<p>This complaint is, it has to be said, not entirely unjustified. I have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/aug/09/kill-list-phillipines-duterte-mass-murder-china-united-states-rivalry-war-on-drugs#comments">written critically about Duterte</a>, and whatever attempts at balance I might make, I am one of the Western hypocrites. I know this, as do many other Westerners working in academia and not-for-profit and human rights organisations who have also managed to vault a story on Duterte’s most recent outrage into the mainstream press. </p>
<p>The op-eds and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/aug/23/the-guardian-view-on-the-philippine-war-on-drugs-street-justice-is-no-justice">editorials</a> that result paint Duterte as an almost rogue leader, ignoring the fact that he enjoys formidable domestic support (as well as backers among the legions of Filipinos working overseas). And we have to be straightforward and answer Duterte’s charge that Western coverage and criticism is invalidated by hypocrisy. The answer is that while many Westerners’ worthy umbrage and concern may be voyeuristic, cynical and hypocritical, these failures absolve Duterte of nothing.</p>
<p>However, a country like the Philippines garners little international interest unless beset by some sort of disaster, something it has become sadly synonymous with. It doesn’t have to be this way: the Philippines is on the rise economically, English is widely spoken, and it’s an incredibly welcoming place to visit – and yet most Westerners associate it with little more than a hazy memory of Imelda Marcos’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/23/imelda-marcos-shoe-collection-mould">shoe collection</a>, or the decline of once-great Manny Pacquiao’s boxing. </p>
<p>What Western audiences are made aware of are the regular cycles of super hurricanes and other calamities that devastate Filipino lives year after year. And on that basis, they are fed lofty condemnations of a new leader talking trash and violating human rights. But those of us watching from the West can do better. You don’t need to know a lot about the Philippines to condemn Duterte’s campaign of inciting extrajudicial killings, of course, but it helps if you do. </p>
<p>Duterte’s war on drugs did not begin when he swore his oath of office; this is a battle with a long and filthy heritage going back not only to his presidential campaign, but to 1988, when he became the mayor of Mindanao’s Davao City, the country’s third most populous city, where he was known as “<a href="http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,265480,00.html">the punisher</a>”. Yet it took both Western media attention and a great deal of time for the US government to muster the bravery to say it was “concerned” about his endorsement of vigilante violence against drug traffickers.</p>
<p>Compare that mild expression of “concern” to the language (“inappropriate and unacceptable”) the US <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/13/philippines-rodrigo-duterte-not-sorry-for-calling-us-envoy-a-gay-son-of-a-whore">immediately deployed</a> after Duterte insulted Obama. It’s not clear whether the US is as appalled by Duterte’s other <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/19/asia/philippines-rodrigo-duterte-rape-joke/">bigoted and offensive remarks</a> (to say nothing of his harsh policies) as it is when he directs them at American diplomats. </p>
<h2>Breaking the cycle</h2>
<p>The recent (limited) coverage of protests in Manila at the “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/14/filipinos-protest-ferdinand-marcos-heros-burial">hero’s burial</a>” of former dictator Ferdinand Marcos is also another troubling example of coverage without scrutiny and context. </p>
<p>Marcos was never tried after being ousted from power in the EDSA people power revolution of 1986. Having been long supported by many foreign governments, he was instead flown to Hawaii by the US Military to live out his final three years. With little if any thoughtful coverage in the West, Marcos’s escape looked to the rest of the world like a purely Philippine failing – and the role of the US and other states in helping Marcos evade justice went all but unnoticed.</p>
<p>Another example worth remembering is that of Gloria Arroyo, president from 2001-2010 and a close US ally in the war on terror years, who was facing major corruption charges before suddenly developing medical problems.</p>
<p>With Duterte in office, both Arroyo’s <a href="http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/inside-track/145264-blooming-gloria-arroyo-freedom-very-healthy">health problems and criminal charges have suddenly disappeared</a>. Little Western attention was paid to the fight to put Arroyo on trial, or to her successor’s broad anti-corruption, reformist agenda.</p>
<p>These sorry examples embody just some of the issues at play whenever the West discusses and interacts with a developing country. Developing nations’ slow and often painful reforms in are usually not popular among their own electorates, and they don’t generate international headlines. Loud-mouthed strongmen do better on both counts. </p>
<p>As a result, many countries like the Philippines struggle to escape the pattern of reformer-strongman-reformer-strongman. Reformers usually don’t last as long in office, and institutions that can defend human rights are rarely built strong enough to survive the next regime. </p>
<p>As far as the Philippines goes, the cycle needs to end with this Duterte administration. The infant reforms of the previous Aquino administration need nurturing as best as possible to put Duterte’s undoubted strength to best use. </p>
<p>And all the while, Western observers should look at themselves and consider their perspective. We need to appreciate the cynical nature of our attention to these issues and the <a href="http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/580203/news/nation/duterte-on-discussing-human-rights-with-obama-nobody-has-the-right-to-lecture-me">hypocrisy of our condemnation</a> to make any progress.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64037/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Calling Barack Obama a ‘son of a whore’ was just another PR disaster for a country already subject to lazy stereotypes.Tom Smith, Lecturer in International Relations, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.