tag:theconversation.com,2011:/es/topics/surveillance-377/articlesSurveillance – The Conversation2024-03-18T10:59:45Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2230352024-03-18T10:59:45Z2024-03-18T10:59:45Z2024 Senegal election crisis points to deeper issues with Macky Sall and his preferred successor<p>The botched attempt by Senegalese president <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Macky-Sall">Macky Sall</a> to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/3/senegals-macky-sall-postpones-presidential-election">postpone</a> the presidential election has stirred unnecessary tension in an already strained electoral process. The move reflected deeper governance problems in the country.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/3/senegals-macky-sall-postpones-presidential-election">Sall’s decree</a>, subsequently <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/02/16/constitutional-council-plunges-senegal-into-the-unknown-by-overturning-election-postponement_6531088_124.html">annulled by the Constitutional Council</a>, was the latest in a range of government interventions that exceeded the scope of the executive authority. These have included the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/01/22/sonko-wade-not-listed-among-official-candidates-of-feb25-presidential-election/">disqualification</a> of key opposition candidates, the manipulation of judicial procedures, and the arbitrary detention of dissenting figures.</p>
<p>Sall’s 12-year tenure has been marked by contradictions. His administration boosted investment in transport and urban infrastructure. Notably, he worked on the <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/319731593403262722/text/Senegal-Transport-and-Urban-Mobility-Project.txt">motorway network</a>, the new Diass international airport, the development of major roads and the completion of public transport projects.</p>
<p>But these investments have not translated into improvements in the lives of Senegalese. Thousands of young people still go on <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1072143/politique/tribune-whatshappeninginsenegal-quand-le-drame-des-migrants-passe-au-second-plan/">perilous journeys</a> to Europe having lost hope of fulfilling their potential in their own country.</p>
<p>This is the backdrop to his move to postpone the elections in a last bid to secure a winning strategy for his camp. His anointed successor, <a href="https://www.ecofinagency.com/public-management/1109-44836-senegals-macky-sall-endorses-pm-amadou-ba-as-2024-successor">Amadou Ba</a>, remains a contested figure within the ruling <a href="https://www.senegel.org/en/movements/political-parties/poldetails/2">Alliance for the Republic Party</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Amy-Niang">I have a research interest</a> in state formation in west Africa. As I <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781786606525/The-Postcolonial-African-State-in-Transition-Stateness-and-Modes-of-Sovereignty">have argued</a> in my work, states sustain themselves by producing and alienating internal “others”. This refers to a scenario where governments assert sovereignty not against outside forces but against internal cultural groups and existing logics of governance. Sall’s style of government follows this pattern closely. </p>
<h2>Crisis within his party</h2>
<p>Sall <a href="https://fr.africanews.com/2024/02/10/senegal-macky-sall-se-justifie-sur-le-report-de-la-presidentielle//">said</a> he was postponing elections because of an alleged conflict between parliament and the Constitutional Council. The parliament had approved the creation of a commission of inquiry into the process of validation of presidential candidacies by the Constitutional Council.</p>
<p>Sall in fact latched onto <a href="https://www.bbc.com/afrique/articles/c1vywrx3xx9o">an accusation</a> of corruption levelled by Karim Wade against two Constitutional Council judges following Karim’s disqualification from running in the election due to his dual citizenship.</p>
<p>But the most plausible reason was a crisis within the ruling camp. The Alliance for the Republic is a divided party that is going to the elections in disarray. Sall’s chosen successor, <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/world/senegal-pm-amadou-ba-named-ruling-party-candidate-for-president/">Ba</a>, has generated little enthusiasm among voters. He symbolises the status quo. An affluent candidate, Ba has the difficult task of convincing an impoverished electorate that he is up to the task. </p>
<p>Sall overstepped his constitutional powers. The Senegalese <a href="https://adsdatabase.ohchr.org/IssueLibrary/SENEGAL_Constitution.pdf">constitution’s limitation</a> of the president’s term duration can’t be amended. Further, according to the <a href="https://dge.sn/sites/default/files/2019-01/CODE%20ELECTORAL%202018_0.pdf">electoral code</a>, the decree setting a date for presidential elections must be published no later than 80 days before the scheduled ballot. Sall postponed the poll just 12 hours before the campaigning was due to start, and <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/02/14/senegal-authorities-restrict-internet-access-and-ban-march//">22 days before the ballot</a>.</p>
<p>Sall’s attempt at postponing the elections, which has fostered a climate of distrust in the integrity of the electoral process, has left Senegal embroiled in a serious constitutional crisis. His decree brought forth two important issues:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the government’s commitment to an orderly handover of power</p></li>
<li><p>the integrity of the democratic process.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Erosion of a democratic tradition</h2>
<p>Since 2021, a series of protests and riots have pitted Ousmane Sonko, a key opposition figure facing rape allegations, and his supporters against a government accused of manipulating the judiciary to thwart a serious candidate. As a result, the economy has been severely disrupted. Each day of protests causes an estimated <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/restaurants-water-towers-unrest-dents-senegals-economy-2023-06-09/">$33 million loss</a> in economic output. </p>
<p>Further, Sall has used security and defence forces to establish an order of fear. He has resorted to heavy-handed measures against opposition figures and dissenting voices within civil society through arbitrary detention and prosecution. His government has systematically <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/05/senegal-violent-crackdown-opposition-dissent">restricted</a> the freedom of assembly, banned protests, suppressed independent media and mobilised public resources to bolster the ruling party.</p>
<p>For all these reasons, Senegal has seen an erosion of institutions meant to uphold the rule of law, foster political participation and ensure public accountability.</p>
<p>Sall was elected in <a href="https://fr.allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00016260.html">2012</a> after a tumultuous period under the flamboyant government of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdoulaye-Wade">President Abdoulaye Wade</a>. Sall owes his entire political career to Wade’s patronage. Yet their relationship soured when it became evident that Sall harboured ambitions to challenge Wade’s son, <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/profile/id/254/page/4">Karim</a>, who was being groomed to succeed his father. </p>
<p>Sall pledged to deliver virtuous and frugal governance. But public euphoria soon petered out as scandals involving cabinet ministers and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/06/25/senegal-soupconne-de-corruption-le-frere-du-president-macky-sall-demissionne_5481292_3212.html">close family members</a> laid bare the corruption within the administration.</p>
<p>In 2023, amid much brouhaha over the validity of a third term, Sall <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66093983">yielded</a> to public pressure after <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/senegalese-opposition-rally-against-president-sall-s-possible-third-term-ambition-/7091705.html">violent protests</a>. These resulted in the most serious political crisis since the 1960s, claiming over 60 lives and leading to the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/22/senegal-pre-election-crackdown">arrest</a> of over 1,000 people.</p>
<h2>Where to for Senegal?</h2>
<p>In compliance with the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/senegal-presidentsets-presidential-election-for-march-24-4547872">Constitutional Council ruling</a>, Sall has finally agreed to organise elections before his exit.</p>
<p>As the election day of 24 March draws near, the absence of key contenders, and uncertainties regarding the electoral procedures, inject an element of unpredictability. </p>
<p>Furthermore, the erosion of trust is such that the Senegalese public still doubts Sall’s commitment to fulfil his obligations and facilitate an orderly handover.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223035/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amy Niang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Attempts to postpone Senegal’s election indefinitely reflect deeper governance problems within Macky Sall’s administration, and the shortcomings of his chosen heir, Amadou Ba.Amy Niang, Head of Research Programme, Council for the Development of Social Science Research in AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2256282024-03-13T21:35:03Z2024-03-13T21:35:03ZDigital surveillance is omnipresent in China. Here’s how citizens are coping<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581384/original/file-20240225-28-qjmkpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C34%2C3817%2C2121&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Chinese government may access the data collected by Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Xiaomi and other operators. How are citizens coping with this constant digital surveillance?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Do you ever think about the digital footprint you leave when you are browsing the web, shopping online, commenting on social networks or going by a facial recognition camera? </p>
<p>State surveillance of citizens is growing all over the world, but it is a fact of everyday life in China, where it has <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003403876-4/surveillance-china-ariane-ollier-malaterre?context=ubx&refId=4b23b424-16f8-41ce-89e5-09d719356614">deep historical roots</a>.</p>
<p>In China, almost nothing is paid for in cash anymore. <a href="https://search.worldcat.org/fr/title/1043756337">Super apps</a> make life easy: people use Alipay or WeChat Pay to pay for subway or bus tickets, rent a bike, hail a taxi, shop online, book trains and shows, split the bill at restaurants and even pay their taxes and utility bills. </p>
<p>The Chinese also use these platforms to check the news, entertain themselves and exchange countless text, audio and video messages, both personal and professional. Everything is linked to the user’s mobile phone number, which is itself registered under their identity. The government may access the data collected by Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Xiaomi and other operators. </p>
<p>Much has been written about <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/poi3.291">blacklists</a> (listing authors of “trust-breaking” behaviours, such as not settling one’s debts), <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/353602055_Blacklists_and_Redlists_in_the_Chinese_Social_Credit_System_Diversity_Flexibility_and_Comprehensiveness">redlists</a> (listing authors of commendable behaviours, such as volunteering) and commercial and public <a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/china-social-credit-system-explained">“social credit”</a> systems. However, recent research has shown that these systems are still <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/369147865_Civilized_cities_or_social_credit_Overlap_and_tension_between_emergent_governance_infrastructures_in_China">fragmented and scattered in terms of data collection and analysis</a>. They also rely at least partly on <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-99-2189-8">manual</a> rather than digitized or algorithmic processes, with little capacity to build integrated citizen profiles through compiling all the available data.</p>
<p>How do Chinese citizens experience this constant surveillance? In my book <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Living-with-Digital-Surveillance-in-China-Citizens-Narratives-on-Technology/Ollier-Malaterre/p/book/9781032517704"><em>Living with Digital Surveillance in China: Citizens’ Narratives on Technology, Privacy and Governance</em></a>, I present research I conducted in China in 2019. Specifically, the book is based on 58 semi-structured in-depth interviews with Chinese participants recruited through colleagues at three universities in Beijing, Shanghai and Chengdu.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People hunched over their mobile phones ride on a train" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578075/original/file-20240226-18-45emg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578075/original/file-20240226-18-45emg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=292&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578075/original/file-20240226-18-45emg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=292&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578075/original/file-20240226-18-45emg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=292&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578075/original/file-20240226-18-45emg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578075/original/file-20240226-18-45emg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578075/original/file-20240226-18-45emg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">On the Beijing metro, commuters consult their smartphones, where people get information, entertain themselves and exchange countless messages, both personal and professional.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Unmasking and punishing violators, improving morality</h2>
<p>Like my colleagues <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1461444819826402">Genia Kostka</a> and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3958660">Chuncheng Liu</a>, I discovered that many participants in my research frame surveillance as indispensable for solving China’s problems. </p>
<p>Underpinning this support is a coherent system of anguishing narratives, to which redemptive narratives respond. The anguishing narratives emphasise the moral shortcomings that the research participants attribute to China: almost every participant brought up the <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003403876-6/rules-monitoring-raise-people-moral-quality-ariane-ollier-malaterre?context=ubx&refId=9424fad5-6e42-4823-874b-3a4adbf97a7b">“lack of moral quality”</a> of their fellow citizens, whom they said behaved like children with little moral sense. </p>
<p>In the context of this shame-inducing narrative, surveillance is framed as a welcome solution to enforce the rules by punishing violators and getting people to behave better. According to the participants, moral shortcomings are responsible for the <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003403876-7/national-humiliations-civilisation-dream-ariane-ollier-malaterre?context=ubx&refId=0167048c-9288-4a50-af2d-67ef75ca2d9a">“century of humiliations”</a> that China has experienced since the Opium Wars and the Japanese invasions; according to this discourse, “civilizing” the population will enable China to gain the international recognition it so ardently desires. </p>
<p>Finally, wanting to protect privacy was often seen by participants as a <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003403876-8/saving-face-ariane-ollier-malaterre?context=ubx&refId=26e22dfc-2812-429d-a0b8-2df3e5fab205">desire to hide shameful secrets in order to save face</a>. Here too, surveillance is viewed positively, as a tool to unmask shady behaviours and promote morality. </p>
<p>These three narratives of shame and fear are countered by two redemptive ones, that serve as an antidote: that of the <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003403876-10/government-protection-order-ariane-ollier-malaterre?context=ubx&refId=3bc7328b-b04b-45c3-91fc-80e059436273">government as a protective figure</a>, i.e., one that acts like a benevolent parent who guarantees the security and prosperity of its children, and the resolutely techno-optimistic one of <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003403876-11/technology-magic-bullet-ariane-ollier-malaterre?context=ubx&refId=061fee9e-9fa6-4088-8fa3-9bcff0f94b6b">technology as a magic bullet</a> where technological advances is credited as the potential to solve all of China’s problems, and as a civilizing force that will propel China towards international recognition. </p>
<h2>Four types of mental tactics for distancing oneself from surveillance</h2>
<p>Yet the people I spoke to also expressed <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003403876-14/misgivings-objections-ariane-ollier-malaterre?context=ubx&refId=a410f3e8-32c4-469e-9f52-c26deefb50c5">frustration, fear and anger</a> about state surveillance. Almost 90 per cent of them adopted one or more <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003403876-13/mental-tactics-dissociate-oneself-surveillance-ariane-ollier-malaterre?context=ubx&refId=89ae4273-b251-495c-8293-92e28ba99ef3">mental tactics</a> to distance, and mentally protect themselves, from surveillance. </p>
<p>In my analysis I identified four different types of tactics:</p>
<p><strong>1 – Brushing surveillance aside</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><p>Denying or minimizing the existence of surveillance: “Nobody is watching. The government does not want to spend money to pay people to watch all the time. When they need it, they check; otherwise, no one is watching.”</p></li>
<li><p>Ignoring it: “If I don’t like the loss of privacy and freedom, I choose to ignore it, I don’t think of it.” Or: “Yes, it’s true, but it does not harm me. It does not remind me all the time. Sometimes I choose to ignore it.”</p></li>
<li><p>Normalizing it: “In China everyone shares their credit card information, their address, their ID. We feel secure.”; “Most governments use social media as a tool to spy.”</p></li>
<li><p>Redefining restrictions as temporary, or as occurring less than in the past, or less for oneself than for others, such as civil servants. Some redefine freedom itself: “It’s the country that makes the laws, the regulations, it’s like that in all countries. Other behaviours are a matter of my freedom, for example what I’m going to have for lunch.”</p></li>
</ul>
<p><strong>2 – Othering surveillance targets</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><p>Because I’m just an ordinary citizen: “I’m not a big potato, there’s no need for people to intentionally find me.”</p></li>
<li><p>Or because I’m a good person and “the blacklist is just for criminals”: “We think that improving public behaviour will make the environment and surroundings better for us, for the ones who obey the rules in the first place.”</p></li>
</ul>
<p><strong>3 – Wearing blinders</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><p>By focusing on everyday life: “Most people don’t care about these things. They care about money and power.”</p></li>
<li><p>Or, by focusing on the present: “We can’t live without Zhifu [Alipay], or Didi. We have facial recognition, CCTV is everywhere. It won’t harm me at present, so far, it does not do actual harm, so I’m not that concerned.”</p></li>
</ul>
<p><strong>4 – Resorting to fatalism</strong></p>
<p>“Nobody can avoid it… I don’t know how to avoid this risk, I just accept it.”; “We think it’s useless to spend time discussing the social credit system since we can’t change it.”</p>
<h2>The cognitive and emotional weight of surveillance</h2>
<p>In short, the way the Chinese citizens I spoke to experience digital surveillance is characterized by strong psychic tensions: the same persons who support surveillance as being indispensable in the Chinese context are also and nevertheless expressing the heavy burden that coping with such exposure places on them. </p>
<p>This weight is both cognitive, as evidenced by the range of self-protective mental tactics to dissociate oneself from surveillance, and emotional, as conveyed in participants’ strong emotions and <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003403876-15/self-censorship-ariane-ollier-malaterre?context=ubx&refId=3f08cb71-224e-498d-ac93-917dafa6d0aa">particularly telling body language</a>.</p>
<p>So, what about us? We, in Western liberal democracies, are also exposed to digital surveillance. And our surveillance ideas are also shaped by our own socio-political, cultural, and economic contexts, with significant variations across different Western societies. My work suggests that some of our own privacy and surveillance narratives are quite close to the Chinese ones, while others clearly differ. </p>
<p>What about you? How do you see your own relationship to digital surveillance?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225628/count.gif" alt="La Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ariane Ollier-Malaterre has received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. She is a member of the Work and Family Researchers Network, the Association of Internet Researchers and the Academy of Management.</span></em></p>State surveillance of citizens is growing all over the world, but it is a fact of daily life in China. People are developing mental tactics to distance themselves from it.Ariane Ollier-Malaterre, Professeure de management et titulaire de la Chaire de recherche du Canada sur la régulation du digital dans la vie professionnelle et personnelle; Canada Research Chair in Digital Regulation at Work and in Life, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2244772024-03-11T12:26:13Z2024-03-11T12:26:13ZAre private conversations truly private? A cybersecurity expert explains how end-to-end encryption protects you<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580537/original/file-20240307-24-mrho7r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1080%2C719&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Several popular messaging apps, including Messenger, Signal, Telegram and WhatsApp, use end-to-end encryption.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/openrightsgroup/50534017012/in/dateposted-public/"> Open Rights Group/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Imagine opening your front door wide and inviting the world to listen in on your most private conversations. Unthinkable, right? Yet, in the digital realm, people inadvertently leave doors ajar, potentially allowing hackers, tech companies, service providers and security agencies to peek into their private communications. </p>
<p>Much depends on the applications you use and the <a href="https://www.passcamp.com/blog/data-encryption-standards-what-you-need-to-know/">encryption standards</a> the apps uphold. <a href="https://www.ibm.com/topics/end-to-end-encryption">End-to-end encryption</a> is a digital safeguard for online interactions. It’s used by many of the more popular messaging apps. Understanding end-to-end encryption is crucial for maintaining privacy in people’s increasingly digital lives. </p>
<p>While end-to-end encryption effectively secures messages, it is not foolproof against all <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories">cyberthreats</a> and requires users to actively manage their privacy settings. As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=0ixaP0AAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">cybersecurity researcher</a>, I believe that continuous advancements in encryption are necessary to safeguard private communications as the <a href="https://www.enzuzo.com/blog/digital-privacy-definition">digital privacy</a> landscape evolves.</p>
<h2>How end-to-end encryption works</h2>
<p>When you send a message via an app using end-to-end encryption, your app acts as a cryptographer and encodes your message with a <a href="https://www.thesslstore.com/blog/cryptographic-keys-101-what-they-are-how-they-secure-data/">cryptographic key</a>. This process transforms your message into a <a href="https://www.hypr.com/security-encyclopedia/cipher">cipher</a> – a jumble of seemingly random characters that conceal the true essence of your message. </p>
<p>This ensures that the message remains a private exchange between you and your recipient, safeguarded against unauthorized access, whether from hackers, service providers or surveillance agencies. Should any <a href="https://www.fortinet.com/resources/cyberglossary/eavesdropping">eavesdroppers</a> intercept it, they would see only gibberish and would not be able to decipher the message without the <a href="https://sensorstechforum.com/what-is-decryption-key/">decryption key</a>.</p>
<p>When the message reaches its destination, the recipient’s app uses the corresponding decryption key to unlock the message. This decryption key, securely stored on the recipient’s device, is the only key capable of deciphering the message, translating the encrypted text back into readable format.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580578/original/file-20240307-23-3a9gom.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A diagram showing three document icons linked left to right by two arrows with key icons above the arrows" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580578/original/file-20240307-23-3a9gom.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580578/original/file-20240307-23-3a9gom.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=281&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580578/original/file-20240307-23-3a9gom.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=281&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580578/original/file-20240307-23-3a9gom.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=281&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580578/original/file-20240307-23-3a9gom.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580578/original/file-20240307-23-3a9gom.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580578/original/file-20240307-23-3a9gom.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">When you send a message using end-to-end encryption, the app on your phone uses the recipient’s public key to encrypt the message. Only the recipient’s private key, stored on their phone, can decrypt the message.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Asymmetric_encryption_scheme.png">MarcT0K/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This form of encryption is called <a href="https://ssd.eff.org/module/deep-dive-end-end-encryption-how-do-public-key-encryption-systems-work">public key, or asymmetric, cryptography</a>. Each party who communicates using this form of encryption has two encryption keys, one public and one private. You share your public key with whoever wants to communicate securely with you, and they use it to encrypt their messages to you. But that key can’t be used to decrypt their messages. Only your private key, which you do not share with anyone, can do that. </p>
<p>In practice, you don’t have to think about sharing keys. Messaging apps that use end-to-end encryption handle that behind the scenes. You and the party you are communicating securely with just have to use the same app.</p>
<h2>Who has end-to-end encryption</h2>
<p>End-to-end encryption is used by major messaging apps and services to safeguard users’ privacy. </p>
<p>Apple’s <a href="https://www.apple.com/privacy/features/">iMessage</a> integrates end-to-end encryption for messages exchanged between iMessage users, safeguarding them from external access. However, messages sent to or received from non-iMessage users such as SMS texts to or from Android phones do not benefit from this level of encryption.</p>
<p>Google has begun rolling out end-to-end encryption for <a href="https://support.google.com/messages/answer/10262381?hl=en">Google Messages</a>, the default messaging app on many Android devices. The company is aiming to modernize traditional SMS with more advanced features, including better privacy. However, this encryption is currently limited to one-on-one chats.</p>
<p><a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2023/12/default-end-to-end-encryption-on-messenger/">Facebook Messenger</a> also offers end-to-end encryption, but it is not enabled by default. Users need to start a “<a href="https://parentzone.org.uk/article/facebook-secret-conversations">Secret Conversation</a>” to encrypt their messages end to end. End-to-end encrypted chats are currently available only in the Messenger app on iOS and Android, not on Facebook chat or messenger.com.</p>
<p><a href="https://faq.whatsapp.com/490592613091019">WhatsApp</a> stands out for its robust privacy features, implementing end-to-end encryption by default for all forms of communication within the app. </p>
<p><a href="https://signal.org/">Signal</a>, often heralded by cybersecurity experts as the gold standard for secure communication, offers end-to-end encryption across all its messaging and calling features by default. Signal’s commitment to privacy is reinforced by its open-source protocol, which allows independent experts to verify its security. </p>
<p><a href="https://telegram.org/faq">Telegram</a> offers a nuanced approach to privacy. While it provides strong encryption, its standard chats do not use end-to-end encryption. For that, users must initiate “<a href="https://core.telegram.org/blackberry/secretchats">Secret Chats</a>.”</p>
<p>It’s essential to not only understand the privacy features offered by these platforms but also to <a href="https://www.telemessage.com/privacy-settings-in-mobile-messaging-apps-how-to-configure-and-which-app-protects-your-privacy-best/">manage their settings</a> to ensure the highest level of security each app offers. With varying levels of protection across services, the responsibility often falls on the user to choose messaging apps wisely and to opt for those that provide end-to-end encryption by default. </p>
<h2>Is end-to-end encryption effective?</h2>
<p>The effectiveness of end-to-end encryption in safeguarding privacy is a subject of much debate. While it significantly enhances security, no system is entirely foolproof. Skilled hackers with sufficient resources, especially those backed by security agencies, can sometimes find ways around it. </p>
<p>Additionally, end-to-end encryption does not protect against threats posed by <a href="https://www.seciron.com/blog/10-signs-that-your-mobile-device-is-compromised/">hacked devices</a> or <a href="https://usa.kaspersky.com/resource-center/preemptive-safety/phishing-prevention-tips">phishing attacks</a>, which can compromise the security of communications.</p>
<p>The coming era of <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/are-quantum-computers-about-to-break-online-privacy/">quantum computing</a> poses a potential risk to end-to-end encryption, because quantum computers could theoretically break current encryption methods, highlighting the need for continuous advancements in encryption technology. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, for the average user, end-to-end encryption offers a robust defense against most forms of digital eavesdropping and cyberthreats. As you navigate the evolving landscape of digital privacy, the question remains: What steps should you take next to ensure the continued protection of your private conversations in an increasingly interconnected world?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224477/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robin Chataut does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>End-to-end encryption provides strong protection for keeping your communications private, but not every messaging app uses it, and even some of the ones that do don’t have it turned on by default.Robin Chataut, Assistant Professor of Cybersecurity and Computer Science, Quinnipiac UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2231302024-02-12T21:19:30Z2024-02-12T21:19:30ZThe use of technology in policing should be regulated to protect people from wrongful convictions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574851/original/file-20240212-28-7lu7es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4288%2C2848&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In 2010, police at the G20 summit in Toronto filmed protestors.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The proliferation of technology for everyday living can be seen through <a href="https://mashable.com/article/chatgpt-ai-essays-classroom-materials-teachers-react">ChatGPT writing term papers</a> or <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/robot-cat-gatineau-restaurant-1.6224125">robots serving meals at a restaurant</a>. </p>
<p>Technology can also be used towards less utilitarian ends. Unfortunately, deepfakes — digitally altered images of people — <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jan/13/what-are-deepfakes-and-how-can-you-spot-them">can be used to spread misinformation</a>.</p>
<p>A new edited volume, which I co-edited, considers the use of everyday technologies in the criminal justice system, <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003323112">ranging from detecting deception to web sleuthing to help law enforcement solve crime</a>. </p>
<h2>Technology and policing</h2>
<p>Consider the use of body-worn cameras by police, as in the fatal shooting of Ontario Provincial Police Const. Greg Pierzchala in December 2022. Footage from his body camera will provide evidence during <a href="https://lfpress.com/news/local-news/slain-officer-was-wearing-body-camera-that-could-provide-key-evidence-experts">the trial of his accused killers</a>.</p>
<p>Police investigations have also been aided by private citizen sleuths via technology, who gather evidence to help police identify criminals. This was the case with <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/luka-magnotta-guilty-of-1st-degree-murder-in-jun-lin-s-slaying-1.2875989">convicted murderer Luka Magnotta</a>, where an online network <a href="https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/luka-rocco-magnotta-online-sleuths">identified him in cat torture videos</a> and provided the information to law enforcement agencies. </p>
<p>Another use of technology can be for public surveillance for crime prevention through the application of facial recognition software.</p>
<p>Security cameras are now a ubiquitous feature in public places. In 2021, it was estimated that <a href="https://geographical.co.uk/science-environment/whos-watching-the-cities-with-the-most-cctv-cameras">one billion security cameras were being used around the world</a>. China is listed as having about <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/cities/articles/2020-08-14/the-top-10-most-surveilled-cities-in-the-world">54 per cent of all surveillance cameras</a>. </p>
<p>In 2020, Toronto had approximately <a href="https://torontosun.com/news/local-news/toronto-becoming-a-camera-city-but-still-pales-in-comparison-to-london-england">2,000 cameras at city-owned facilities</a>. </p>
<p>Security cameras may or may not be used in conjunction with facial recognition software.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574850/original/file-20240212-22-v0paoz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a close-up of a security camera with a city at night in the background" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574850/original/file-20240212-22-v0paoz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574850/original/file-20240212-22-v0paoz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574850/original/file-20240212-22-v0paoz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574850/original/file-20240212-22-v0paoz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574850/original/file-20240212-22-v0paoz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574850/original/file-20240212-22-v0paoz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574850/original/file-20240212-22-v0paoz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Security cameras are becoming regular features of outdoor public spaces.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Finding faces</h2>
<p>Facial recognition uses software to identify or confirm someone’s identity using an image of their face. Captured faces are compared to a database, often for the purposes of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-does-facial-recognition-work">crime prevention</a>. </p>
<p>Some retailers have used facial recognition to help reduce theft. In 2022, Josh Soika, an Indigenous man, was confronted by a security guard due to being “flagged” as having <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/first-nation-apology-store-accused-1.6620457">stolen previously from the store</a>. Later, it was determined that <a href="https://retail-insider.com/bulletin/2022/11/facial-recognition-in-stores-in-canada-may-pose-problems-amid-ai-based-misidentification-potential/">Soika was misidentified by the artificial intelligence (AI)</a> used by Canadian Tire for facial recognition. </p>
<p>In 2023, Canadian Tire Corporation and its dealers have since agreed to <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/canadian-tire-bc-facial-id-technology-privacy-commissioner-1.6817039">no longer use facial recognition technology</a>.</p>
<p>In the United States recently, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) banned the pharmacy chain Rite Aid for five years from using facial recognition software to identify customers who have stolen merchandise or <a href="https://www.supermarketnews.com/retail-financial/rite-aid-now-banned-using-facial-recognition-ftc-next-five-years">displayed other problematic behaviours</a>. In some instances, Rite Aid workers would follow “identified” customers around, accuse them of stealing and call police. People of colour were falsely identified at a greater rate than white customers.</p>
<p>It is important to note that someone who has shoplifted in the past isn’t <a href="https://theconversation.com/policing-is-not-the-answer-to-shoplifting-feeding-people-is-217046">necessarily planning to shoplift again</a>. </p>
<p>The use of facial recognition software in Canada is controversial. In 2021, it was reported that Toronto police used Clearview AI, a facial recognition software, in 84 investigations, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/toronto-police-report-clearview-ai-1.6295295">with at least two cases proceeding to prosecution</a>. Once it was discovered by the police chief however, the practice was stopped.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ai-technologies-like-police-facial-recognition-discriminate-against-people-of-colour-143227">AI technologies — like police facial recognition — discriminate against people of colour</a>
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<h2>Discrimination and AI</h2>
<p>Accuracy rates with facial recognition software <a href="https://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2020/racial-discrimination-in-face-recognition-technology/">are above 90 per cent</a>, but <a href="https://ucalgary.ca/news/law-professor-explores-racial-bias-implications-facial-recognition-technology">that number is greatly reduced within certain demographics</a>. Facial recognition software is documented to misidentify women, racialized people and those between the ages of 18-30 years, <a href="https://news.mit.edu/2018/study-finds-gender-skin-type-bias-artificial-intelligence-systems-0212">with accuracy reduced to 35 per cent</a>.</p>
<p>In February 2023, Porcha Woodruff, a 32-year-old pregnant Black woman from Detroit, was arrested for robbery and carjacking based on a facial recognition match. Police used AI that had run an image of a carjacker caught on video through a mugshot database that contained Woodruff’s photo, and incorrectly matched it. </p>
<p>Woodruff was <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2023/08/07/michigan-porcha-woodruff-arrest-facial-recognition/">jailed for 11 hours and went into labour</a>. The charges were dropped, and Woodruff is currently suing the <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/detroit/news/detroit-woman-at-center-of-facial-recognition-lawsuit-responds-to-police-chiefs-claims/">city of Detroit and the Detroit Police Department</a>.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/CmO4Mv1uDew?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">CBS Detroit interviews researcher Dorothy Roberts about Porcha Woodruff’s misidentification due to facial recognition technology.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Consequences of misidentification</h2>
<p>According to the U.S.-based Innocence Project, over 70 per cent of known wrongful convictions are due to <a href="https://innocenceproject.org/eyewitness-misidentification/">mistaken identification by people as a contributing factor</a>. The Canadian Registry of Wrongful Convictions finds approximately <a href="https://www.wrongfulconvictions.ca/issues/eyewitness-identification">a third of their cases involved false identification</a>.</p>
<p>People can show what is known as “<a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00208">own-race bias</a>” when identifying faces; people are more accurate when <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00208">identifying faces of their own race than other races</a>. </p>
<p>The misidentification of a perpetrator — whether by a human or an AI program — can lead to the same consequences: being charged, prosecuted or wrongfully convicted. Technology, as with humans, isn’t always accurate and may succumb to similar biases.</p>
<p>Legislation must keep up to protect people’s rights and privacy. As technology evolves, adequate information and full transparency needs to be provided to the public on how, when and where a technology is in use. It also is clear that much more research is needed to <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003323112">better understand the impact of technology</a> on the criminal justice system.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223130/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joanna Pozzulo receives funding from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. </span></em></p>Police use of surveillance technologies — like security cameras and artificial intelligence — is becoming more widespread. Measures are needed to protect people’s privacy and avoid misidentification.Joanna Pozzulo, Chancellor's Professor, Psychology, Carleton UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2228832024-02-08T03:40:45Z2024-02-08T03:40:45ZSolving the supermarket: why Coles just hired US defence contractor Palantir<p>What does the Australian supermarket chain Coles have in common with the CIA? As of last week, both are clients of <a href="https://www.palantir.com/about/">Palantir Technologies</a>, a US tech company “focused on creating the world’s best user experience for working with data”.</p>
<p>In a three-year deal, Coles plans to deploy Palantir’s tools across more than 840 supermarkets to <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/coles-brings-in-pentagon-s-palantir-for-cost-cutting-20240202-p5f1tq">cut costs</a> and “redefine how we think about our workforce”. </p>
<p>The tech company, named after magical seeing stones from the Lord of the Rings, offers comprehensive software that collects, organises and visualises a client’s data in “<a href="https://hcommons.org/deposits/item/hc:34683/">one platform to rule them all</a>”. For an intelligence agency, Palantir’s tools might help <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QIT4hv4tnek">identify a terror cell</a> through phone calls and financial transactions; in a healthcare organisation, they might find ways to save money by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tljWVIUbulg">shortening emergency department stays</a>.</p>
<p>For Coles, the <a href="https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20240201306532/en/Palantir-Partners-with-One-of-Australia%E2%80%99s-Leading-Retailers">goal</a> is to “optimise its workforce” by analysing “over 10 billion rows of data, comprising each store, team member, shift and allocation across all intervals in a day, every day”. </p>
<p>The announcement is <a href="https://www.itnews.com.au/news/coles-to-run-palantir-analytics-suite-across-its-supermarkets-604698">linked</a> to Coles’ plan to save a billion dollars over the next four years, and follows a 2019 <a href="https://news.microsoft.com/en-au/features/coles-takes-trip-down-the-aisles-with-microsoft/">big data deal with Microsoft</a>, an effort to build <a href="https://www.afr.com/companies/retail/coles-faces-ocado-delivery-and-cost-blowout-20230818-p5dxik">robotic delivery centres</a>, and the introduction of <a href="https://www.news.com.au/finance/business/retail/experts-warn-about-customer-privacy-after-drastic-security-moves-by-supermarkets/news-story/66e0ee85491eacf49fe18e30ee49197e">customer-tracking cameras</a> and other high-tech security measures.</p>
<h2>The Palantir process</h2>
<p>What might this Palantir–Coles collaboration look like in practice? </p>
<p>Typically, Palantir first sends out “forward-deployed engineers” to begin work with an organisation’s data, which is often messy, incomplete and fragmented. These engineers work with different branches and stakeholders to bring the data together into a single compatible whole called “<a href="https://www.palantir.com/explore/platforms/foundry/ontology/">The Ontology</a>”, which contains all the information deemed relevant. </p>
<p>Then the data can be fed into Palantir’s platforms – in this case, customisable software called <a href="https://www.palantir.com/platforms/foundry/">Foundry</a> and the <a href="https://www.palantir.com/platforms/aip/">Artificial Intelligence Platform</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-tech-billionaires-visions-of-human-nature-shape-our-world-144016">How tech billionaires' visions of human nature shape our world</a>
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<p>The platforms let clients explore the data through <a href="https://betterprogramming.pub/palantir-foundry-the-data-operating-system-that-is-not-talked-about-enough-9fb1c98a6b3d">dense but user-friendly interfaces</a> populated by columns and rows, boxes and lines. The Artificial Intelligence Platform also brings ChatGPT-like language models into the mix. </p>
<p>Users might compare earnings between branches, flag a store that seems inefficient, or identify an upcoming period of high spending based on historic patterns. </p>
<p>All of this probably seems banal, or even boring. It’s certainly less overtly problematic than Palantir’s work with governments and law enforcement, which has been slammed for enabling <a href="https://slate.com/technology/2020/09/palantir-ice-deportation-immigrant-surveillance-big-data.html">data-driven deportation</a> or <a href="https://theintercept.com/2021/01/30/lapd-palantir-data-driven-policing/">racist policing</a>, and seen the company described as “<a href="https://slate.com/technology/2020/01/evil-list-tech-companies-dangerous-amazon-facebook-google-palantir.html">evil</a>”. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/high-tech-surveillance-amplifies-police-bias-and-overreach-140225">High-tech surveillance amplifies police bias and overreach</a>
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<p>However, the deal doesn’t need to be overtly malevolent to be meaningful. A technology of surveillance and control is quietly <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Countering-the-Cloud-Thinking-With-and-Against-Data-Infrastructures/Munn/p/book/9781032374154">becoming infrastructure</a>, moving from front-page news to something ticking along silently in the background. In this sense, Palantir shifts from the visible to the operational, imperceptibly but powerfully shaping the lives and livelihoods of Australian supermarket employees and shoppers. </p>
<h2>Optimising the workforce</h2>
<p>We can briefly sketch out three implications of the deal.</p>
<p>First, by inking this deal, Coles frames itself as future-forward and logistically driven. Groceries and grocery-store labour become more data, just like the hedge funds, healthcare, or immigrants that other Palantir clients coordinate. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/coles-and-woolworths-are-moving-to-robot-warehouses-and-on-demand-labour-as-home-deliveries-soar-166556">Coles and Woolworths are moving to robot warehouses and on-demand labour as home deliveries soar</a>
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<p>Supermarkets have been under fire over the past year for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/may/22/australias-big-supermarkets-increased-profit-margins-through-pandemic-and-cost-of-living-crisis-analysis-reveals">increasing profit margins</a> through a pandemic and cost-of-living crisis, and accused of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/jun/05/coles-woolworths-court-accused-of-underpaying-workers">underpaying workers</a>. </p>
<p>The Palantir deal continues this extractive trajectory. Rather than paying workers more or passing savings onto customers, Coles has chosen to invest millions in technology that will “address workforce-related spend” as part of a <a href="https://theshout.com.au/national-liquor-news/coles-ceo-outlines-strategies-for-christmas-and-beyond/">larger effort to cut costs</a> by a billion dollars over the next four years. Food (and the labour needed to grow, pack and ship it) is transformed from a human need to an optimisation problem. </p>
<h2>A walled garden</h2>
<p>Second, dependence. As <a href="https://meson.press/books/ferocious-logics/">my own research found</a>, Palantir clients tend to enjoy the all-encompassing data and new features but also become dependent on them. Data mounts up; new servers are needed; licensing fees are high but must be paid. </p>
<p>Much like Apple or Amazon, Palantir’s services excel at creating “vendor lock-in”, a perfect walled garden which clients find hard to leave. This pattern suggests that, over the next three years, Coles will increasingly depend on Silicon Valley technology to understand and manage its own business. A company that sells a quarter of Australia’s groceries may become operationally reliant on a US tech titan.</p>
<h2>A way of seeing</h2>
<p>Finally, vision. What Palantir sells is fundamentally a way of seeing. Its dashboards promise <a href="https://meson.press/books/ferocious-logics/">a God’s eye view</a> that can stretch across an entire organisation or zoom in to granular detail to locate that “needle in the haystack” insight. </p>
<p>The claim is that this data-driven view is a shortcut to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1472586X.2014.887268">total knowledge</a>, a way to map every operation, reveal every important element, and identify every inefficiency. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574260/original/file-20240208-23-vimnk3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A complex diagram illustrating the Palantir 'ontology' and how it can be used in an organisation." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574260/original/file-20240208-23-vimnk3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574260/original/file-20240208-23-vimnk3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574260/original/file-20240208-23-vimnk3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574260/original/file-20240208-23-vimnk3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574260/original/file-20240208-23-vimnk3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574260/original/file-20240208-23-vimnk3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574260/original/file-20240208-23-vimnk3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Palantir promises a ‘total view’ of an organisation that allows full control and optimal decision-making.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://blog.palantir.com/connecting-ai-to-decisions-with-the-palantir-ontology-c73f7b0a1a72">Palantir</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Yet the data inevitably excludes significant social, financial and environmental information. The sweat of workers struggling to pack at pace, the belt-tightening of consumers struggling to make ends meet, and the struggle of farmers to survive unexpected climate impacts will go untracked. </p>
<p>Such details never appear on the platform – and if they’re not data, they don’t matter. Will Palantir’s data-driven myopia translate to how Coles views its workers and customers? </p>
<p>By placing Palantir at the heart of its operations, Coles quietly smuggles in several key assumptions: that food is a commodity to be optimised, that paying for labor is a risk rather than a responsibility, and that data can capture everything of importance. At a time of <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House/Agriculture/FoodsecurityinAustrali/Report/Chapter_7_-_Food_insecurity">increased food insecurity</a>, Australians should strongly question whether this is the direction one of our major grocery providers should take.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222883/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luke Munn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Coles plans to ‘optimise its workforce’ with big data and AI tools from a controversial tech company.Luke Munn, Research Fellow, Digital Cultures & Societies, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2226992024-02-07T13:19:28Z2024-02-07T13:19:28ZDOJ funding pipeline subsidizes questionable big data surveillance technologies<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573845/original/file-20240206-28-bp34iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6720%2C4476&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Predictive policing aimed to identify crime hot spots and 'chronic' offenders but missed the mark.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/los-angeles-ca-lapd-captain-elizabeth-morales-speaks-during-news-photo/624080088">Patrick T. Fallon for The Washington Post via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Predictive policing has been shown to be an ineffective and biased policing tool. Yet, the Department of Justice has been funding the crime surveillance and analysis technology for years and continues to do so despite criticism from researchers, privacy advocates and members of Congress.</p>
<p>Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., and U.S. Rep. Yvette Clarke, D-N.Y., joined by five Democratic senators, called on Attorney General Merrick Garland to <a href="https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-and-clarke-press-justice-department-to-end-funding-for-flawed-predictive-policing-systems">halt funding</a> for <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/predictive-policing-explained">predictive policing technologies</a> in a letter issued Jan. 29, 2024. Predictive policing involves analyzing crime data in an attempt to identify where and when crimes are likely to occur and who is likely to commit them.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/letter_to_doj_predictive_policing_and_title_vi_1242024.pdf">request</a> came months after the Department of Justice <a href="https://gizmodo.com/justice-department-kept-few-records-on-predictive-polic-1848660323">failed to answer</a> basic questions about how predictive policing funds were being used and who was being harmed by arguably <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s12103-020-09557-x">racially discriminatory algorithms</a> that have <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci10060234">never been proven to work as intended</a>. The Department of Justice <a href="https://gizmodo.com/justice-department-kept-few-records-on-predictive-polic-1848660323">did not have answers</a> to who was using the technology, how it was being evaluated and which communities were affected.</p>
<p>While focused on predictive policing, the senators’ demand raises what I, a law professor who <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=5ZX7SbEAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">studies big data surveillance</a>, see as a bigger issue: What is the Department of Justice’s role in funding new surveillance technologies? The answer is surprising and reveals an entire ecosystem of how technology companies, police departments and academics benefit from the flow of federal dollars.</p>
<h2>The money pipeline</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://nij.ojp.gov/">National Institute of Justice</a>, the DOJ’s research, development and evaluation arm, regularly provides seed money for grants and pilot projects to test out ideas like predictive policing. It was a National Institute of Justice grant that funded the first predictive policing <a href="https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/predictive-policing-symposium-november-18-20-2009">conference in 2009</a> that launched the idea that past crime data could be run through an algorithm to <a href="https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev/750/">predict future criminal risk</a>. The institute has <a href="https://nij.ojp.gov/funding/awards/list?field_award_status_value=All&state=All&field_funding_type_value=All&field_served_nationally_value=All&form_topic=&fiscal_year=&combine_awards=Predictive+Policing&awardee=&city=#awards-awards-list-block-jyhir1inpckhocqi">given US$10 million dollars</a> to predictive policing projects since 2009. </p>
<p>Because there was grant money available to test out new theories, academics and startup companies could afford to invest in <a href="https://www.npr.org/2013/07/26/205835674/can-software-that-predicts-crime-pass-constitutional-muster">new ideas</a>. Predictive policing was just an academic theory until there was cash to start testing it in various police departments. Suddenly, companies launched with the financial security that federal grants could pay their early bills. </p>
<p>National Institute of Justice-funded <a href="https://nij.ojp.gov/library/publications/risk-terrain-modeling-spatial-risk-assessment">research</a> often turns into for-profit companies. Police departments also benefit from getting money to buy the new technology without having to dip into their local budgets. This dynamic is one of the hidden drivers of police technology.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/WXnElg9alF8?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">How predictive policing works – and the harm it can cause.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Once a new technology gets big enough, another DOJ entity, the <a href="https://bja.ojp.gov/">Bureau of Justice Assistance</a>, funds projects with direct financial grants. The bureau funded police departments to test one of the biggest place-based predictive policing technologies – <a href="https://bja.ojp.gov/funding/awards/list?field_award_status_value=All&state=All&field_funding_type_value=All&field_served_nationally_value=All&fiscal_year=&combine_awards=Predpol&awardee=&city=#awards-awards-list-block-gkgdpm1ooymuyukj">PredPol</a> – in its early years. The bureau has also funded the purchase of other <a href="https://bja.ojp.gov/funding/awards/list?field_award_status_value=All&state=All&field_funding_type_value=All&field_served_nationally_value=All&fiscal_year=&combine_awards=Predictive&awardee=&city=#awards-awards-list-block-gkgdpm1ooymuyukj">predictive technologies</a>.</p>
<p>The Bureau of Justice Assistance funded one of the most <a href="https://theintercept.com/2018/05/11/predictive-policing-surveillance-los-angeles/">infamous</a> person-based predictive policing <a href="https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/losangelesspi.pdf">pilots in Los Angeles</a>, operation LASER, which targeted “chronic offenders.” Both experiments – PredPol and LASER – failed to work as intended. The <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5766472-BPC-19-0072#document/p32/a486274">Los Angeles Office of the Inspector General</a> identified the negative impact of the programs on the community – and the fact that the predictive theories did not work to reduce crime in any significant way.</p>
<p>As these DOJ entities’ practices indicate, federal money not only seeds but feeds the growth of new policing technologies. Since 2005, the Bureau of Justice Assistance has given <a href="https://bja.ojp.gov/doc/jag-program-fact-sheet.pdf">over $7.6 billion</a> of federal money to state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies for a host of projects. Some of that money has gone directly to new surveillance technologies. A quick skim through the <a href="https://bja.ojp.gov/funding/awards/list">public grants</a> shows approximately $3 million directed to <a href="https://bja.ojp.gov/funding/awards/list?field_award_status_value=All&state=All&field_funding_type_value=All&field_served_nationally_value=All&fiscal_year=&combine_awards=facial+recognition&awardee=&city=#awards-awards-list-block-gkgdpm1ooymuyukj">facial recognition</a>, $8 million for <a href="https://bja.ojp.gov/funding/awards/list?field_award_status_value=All&state=All&field_funding_type_value=All&field_served_nationally_value=All&fiscal_year=&combine_awards=shotspotter&awardee=&city=#awards-awards-list-block-gkgdpm1ooymuyukj">ShotSpotter</a> and $13 million to build and grow <a href="https://bja.ojp.gov/funding/awards/list?field_award_status_value=All&state=All&field_funding_type_value=All&field_served_nationally_value=All&fiscal_year=&combine_awards=RTCC&awardee=&city=#awards-awards-list-block-gkgdpm1ooymuyukj">real-time crime centers</a>. ShotSpotter (now rebranded as SoundThinking) is the leading brand of <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/technology/3558382-gunshot-detection-system-expanding-rapidly-in-us-despite-criticism/">gunshot detection technology</a>. Real-time crime centers combine security camera feeds and other data to <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/real-time-crime-centers-rtcc-us-police/">provide surveillance for a city</a>.</p>
<h2>The questions not asked</h2>
<p>None of this is necessarily nefarious. The Department of Justice is in the business of prosecution, so it is not surprising for it to fund prosecution tools. The <a href="https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/brief-history-nij">National Institute of Justice</a> exists as a research body inside the Office of Justice Programs, so its role in helping to promote data-driven policing strategies is not inherently problematic. The <a href="https://bja.ojp.gov/about">Bureau of Justice Assistance</a> exists to assist local law enforcement through financial grants. The DOJ is feeding police surveillance power because it benefits law enforcement interests.</p>
<p>The problem, as indicated by Sen. Wyden’s letter, is that in subsidizing experimental surveillance technologies, the Department of Justice did not do basic risk assessment or racial justice evaluations before investing money in a new technological solution. As someone who has <a href="https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev/749/">studied predictive policing</a> for over a decade, I can say that the questions asked by the senators were not asked in the pilot projects. </p>
<p>Basic questions of who would be affected, whether there could be a racially discriminatory impact, how it would change policing and whether it worked were not raised in any serious way. Worse, the focus was on deploying something new, not double-checking whether it worked. If you are going to seed and feed a potentially dangerous technology, you also have an obligation to weed it out once it turns out to be harming people.</p>
<p>Only now, after <a href="https://stoplapdspying.org/action/our-fights/data-driven-policing/predictive-policing/">activists have protested</a>, after scholars have <a href="https://nyupress.org/9781479892822/the-rise-of-big-data-policing/">critiqued</a> and after the original predictive policing companies have shut down or <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/soundthinking-geolitica-acquisition-predictive-policing/">been bought by bigger companies</a>, is the DOJ starting to ask the hard questions. In January 2024, the DOJ and the Department of Homeland Security asked for public comment to be included in a report on law enforcement agencies’ use of facial recognition technology, other technologies using biometric information and predictive algorithms. </p>
<p>Arising from a mandate under <a href="https://cops.usdoj.gov/Public_Trust_and_Safety_EO">executive order 14074</a> on advancing effective, accountable policing and criminal justice practices to enhance public trust and public safety, the DOJ Office of Legal Policy is going to evaluate how predictive policing affects civil rights and civil liberties. I believe that this is a good step – although a decade too late. </p>
<h2>Lessons not learned?</h2>
<p>The bigger problem is that the same process is happening again today with other technologies. As one example, <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/real-time-crime-centers-rtcc-us-police/">real-time crime centers</a> are being built <a href="https://crosscut.com/investigations/2023/07/federal-aid-supercharging-local-wa-police-surveillance-tech">across America</a>. Thousands of security cameras stream to a <a href="https://statescoop.com/real-time-crime-centers-police-privacy/">single command center</a> that is <a href="https://www.policemag.com/technology/article/15635270/how-technology-powers-real-time-crime-centers">linked</a> to automated license plate readers, gunshot detection sensors and 911 calls. The centers also use video analytics technology to identify and track people and objects across a city. And they tap into data about past crime.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573642/original/file-20240206-21-hcjcrr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A wall of monitors shows aerial and street views of a city" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573642/original/file-20240206-21-hcjcrr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573642/original/file-20240206-21-hcjcrr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573642/original/file-20240206-21-hcjcrr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573642/original/file-20240206-21-hcjcrr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573642/original/file-20240206-21-hcjcrr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573642/original/file-20240206-21-hcjcrr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573642/original/file-20240206-21-hcjcrr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Real-time crime centers like this one in Albuquerque, N.M., enable police surveillance of entire cities.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/NewMexicoFightingCrime/edee0f4a6fcc4a12a30dfa1f0d5a8959/photo">AP Photo/Susan Montoya Bryan</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Millions of <a href="https://www.themarshallproject.org/2022/09/07/how-federal-covid-relief-flows-to-the-criminal-justice-system">federal dollars from the American Rescue Plan Act</a> are <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/08/16/1194115202/real-time-crime-centers-which-started-in-bigger-cities-spread-across-the-u-s">going to cities</a> with the specific designation to <a href="https://epic.org/two-years-in-covid-19-relief-money-fueling-rise-of-police-surveillance/">address crime</a>, and some of those dollars have been <a href="https://epic.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/EPIC-ARPA-Surveillance-Funding-Table.pdf">diverted to build real-time crime centers</a>. They’re also being <a href="https://bja.ojp.gov/funding/awards/15pbja-22-gg-02156-jagx">funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance</a>.</p>
<p>Real-time crime centers can do predictive analytics akin to predictive policing simply as a byproduct of all the data they collect in the ordinary course of a day. The centers can also scan entire cities with powerful computer vision-enabled cameras and react in real time. The capabilities of these advanced technologies make the civil liberties and racial justice fears around predictive policing pale in comparison. </p>
<p>So while the American public waits for answers about a technology, predictive policing, that had its heyday 10 years ago, the DOJ is seeding and feeding a far more invasive surveillance system with few questions asked. Perhaps things will go differently this time. Maybe the DOJ/DHS report on predictive algorithms will look inward at the department’s own culpability in seeding the surveillance problems of tomorrow.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222699/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>I have worked as an unpaid consultant on two NIJ grants. I did not receive any compensation. One grant was an early NIJ grant to the Risk Terrain Modeling folks at Rutgers (which became Simsi). I have not had any relationship with them in years and took no money. I was also on an NIJ grant around the ethics of predictive policing. Again, I did not receive any financial compensation for the role. </span></em></p>Predictive policing has been a bust. The Department of Justice nurtured the technology from researchers’ minds to corporate production lines and into the hands of police departments.Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Professor of Law, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2221652024-02-05T14:19:18Z2024-02-05T14:19:18ZSurveillance and the state: South Africa’s proposed new spying law is open for comment – an expert points out its flaws<p>In early 2021, the South African Constitutional Court <a href="https://collections.concourt.org.za/bitstream/handle/20.500.12144/36631/%5bJudgment%5d%20CCT%20278%20of%2019%20and%20279%20of%2019%20AmaBhungane%20Centre%20for%20Investigative%20Journalism%20v%20Minister%20of%20Justice%20and%20Others.pdf?sequence=42&isAllowed=y">found</a> that the country’s <a href="https://www.ssa.gov.za/">State Security Agency</a>, through its signals intelligence agency, the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2013-06-21-00-spy-wars-south-africa-is-not-innocent/">National Communication Centre</a>, was conducting <a href="https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/827/how-bulk-interception-works">bulk interception of electronic signals</a> unlawfully. </p>
<p>Bulk interception <a href="https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/827/how-bulk-interception-works">involves</a> the surveillance of electronic signals, including communication signals and internet traffic, on a very large scale, and often on an untargeted basis. If intelligence agents misuse this capability, it can have a massive, negative impact on the privacy of innocent people. </p>
<p>The court found that there was no law authorising the practice of bulk surveillance and limiting its potential abuse. It ordered that the agency cease such surveillance until there was. </p>
<p>In November 2023, the South African presidency responded to the ruling by tabling a bill to, among other things, plug the gaps identified by the country’s highest court. The <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/B40-2023_General_Intelligence_Laws.pdf">General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill</a> sets out how the surveillance centre, based in Pretoria, the capital city, should be regulated.</p>
<p>I have researched intelligence and surveillance for over a decade and also served on the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">2018 High Level Review Panel on the State Security Agency</a>. <a href="https://intelwatch.org.za/2023/11/17/briefing-note-general-intelligence-laws-amendment-bill-gilab/">In my view</a>, the bill lacks basic controls over how this highly invasive form of surveillance should be used. This compromises citizens’ privacy and increases the potential for the state to repeat previous abuses. I discuss some of these abuses below. </p>
<h2>The dangers</h2>
<p>Intelligence agencies use bulk interception to put large numbers of people, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/03/everyone-is-under-surveillance-now-says-whistleblower-edward-snowden">even whole populations</a>, under surveillance. This is regardless of whether they are suspected of serious crimes or threats to national security. Their intention is to obtain strategic intelligence about <a href="https://www.nsa.gov/Signals-Intelligence/Overview/">longer term external threats</a> to a country’s security, and that may be difficult to obtain by other means. </p>
<p>Former United States National Security Agency contractor <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance">Edward Snowden’s</a> leaks of classified intelligence documents showed how these capabilities had been used to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN25T3CJ/">spy on US citizens</a>. The leaks also showed that British intelligence <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/12/08/british-spying-tentacles-reach-across-africa-s-heads-of-states-and-business-leaders_5045668_3212.html">spied on African</a> trade negotiators, politicians and business people to give the UK government and its partners unfair trade advantages.</p>
<p>In the case of South Africa, around 2005, rogue agents in the erstwhile <a href="https://irp.fas.org/world/rsa/index.html">National Intelligence Agency</a> misused bulk interception to <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/igreport0.pdf">spy on</a> senior members of the ruling African National Congress, the opposition, business people and civil servants. This was despite the agency’s mandate being to focus on foreign threats. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-new-intelligence-bill-is-meant-to-stem-abuses-whats-good-and-bad-about-it-220473">South Africa's new intelligence bill is meant to stem abuses – what's good and bad about it</a>
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<p>These rogue agents were able to abuse bulk interception because there was no law controlling and limiting how these capabilities were to be used. A 2008 commission of inquiry, appointed by then-minister of intelligence <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/ronald-ronnie-kasrils">Ronnie Kasrils</a>, <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-background-papers/Intelligence-In-a-Constitutional-Democracy.pdf">called</a> for this law to be enacted. The government refused to do so until it was forced to act by the Constitutional Court ruling. </p>
<p>The government <a href="https://www.anchoredinlaw.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Answering-Affidavit-DG-State-Security-Agency.pdf">justified</a> its refusal to act by claiming that the National Communication Centre was regulated adequately through the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/act39of1994.pdf">National Strategic Intelligence Act</a>. The court rejected this argument because the act failed to address the regulation of bulk interception directly. </p>
<h2>What the Constitutional Court said</h2>
<p>The 2021 Constitutional Court <a href="https://collections.concourt.org.za/bitstream/handle/20.500.12144/36631/%5bJudgment%5d%20CCT%20278%20of%2019%20and%20279%20of%2019%20AmaBhungane%20Centre%20for%20Investigative%20Journalism%20v%20Minister%20of%20Justice%20and%20Others.pdf?sequence=42&isAllowed=y">judgment</a> did not address whether bulk interception should ever be acceptable as a surveillance practice. However, it appeared to accept the <a href="https://www.anchoredinlaw.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Answering-Affidavit-DG-State-Security-Agency.pdf">agency’s argument</a> that it was an internationally accepted method of monitoring transnational signals. But the legitimacy of this practice is <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3115985-APPLICANTS-REPLY-to-GOVT-OBSERVATIONS-PDF.html">highly contested internationally</a>. That’s because this form of surveillance usually extends far beyond what is needed to protect national security.</p>
<p>The court <a href="https://collections.concourt.org.za/bitstream/handle/20.500.12144/36631/%5bJudgment%5d%20CCT%20278%20of%2019%20and%20279%20of%2019%20AmaBhungane%20Centre%20for%20Investigative%20Journalism%20v%20Minister%20of%20Justice%20and%20Others.pdf?sequence=42&isAllow">indicated</a> that it would want to see a law authorising bulk surveillance that sets out “the nuts and bolts of the Centre’s functions”. The law would also need to spell out in</p>
<blockquote>
<p>clear, precise terms the manner, circumstances or duration of the collection, gathering, evaluation and analysis of domestic and foreign intelligence.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The court would also be looking for detail on</p>
<blockquote>
<p>how these various types of intelligence must be captured, copied, stored, or distributed.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>What the amendment bill says</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/B40-2023_General_Intelligence_Laws.pdf">amendment bill</a> provides for the proper establishment of the National Communication Centre and its functions. This includes the collection and analysis of intelligence from electronic signals, and information security or cryptography. A parliamentary <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee/335/">ad hoc committee</a> has set a <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/media-statement-ad-hoc-committee-general-intelligence-laws-amendment-bill-extends-deadline-written-submissions#:%7E:text=Unfortunately%2C%20the%20timeline%20to%20process,over%206%20000%20written%20submissions.">deadline</a> of 15 February 2024 for public comment.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-intelligence-agency-needs-speedy-reform-or-it-must-be-shut-down-200386">South Africa's intelligence agency needs speedy reform - or it must be shut down</a>
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<p>The bill says, in vague terms, that the centre shall gather, correlate, evaluate and analyse relevant intelligence to identify any threat or potential threat to national security. But it doesn’t provide any of the details the court said it would be looking for. This is a major weakness.</p>
<p>The bill has one strength, though. It states that the surveillance centre needs to seek the permission of a retired judge, assisted by two interception experts, before conducting bulk interception. The judge will be appointed by the president, and the experts by the minister in charge of intelligence. The position is <a href="https://www.ssa.gov.za/AboutUs">located in the presidency</a>.</p>
<p>However, it does not spell out the bases on which the judge will take decisions. The fact that the judge would be an executive appointment also raises doubts about his or her independence.</p>
<h2>Inadequate benchmarking</h2>
<p>The bill fails to incorporate international benchmarks on the regulation of strategic intelligence and bulk interception in a democracy. These require that a domestic legal framework provide what the European Court of Human Rights <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22001-210077%22%5D%7D">has referred to</a> as “end-to-end” safeguards covering all stages of bulk interception.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-intelligence-watchdog-is-failing-civil-society-how-to-restore-its-credibility-195121">South Africa's intelligence watchdog is failing civil society. How to restore its credibility</a>
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<p>The European Court <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22001-210077%22%5D%7D">has stated</a> that a domestic legal framework should define</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the grounds on which bulk interception may be authorised</p></li>
<li><p>the circumstances</p></li>
<li><p>the procedures to be followed for granting authorisation </p></li>
<li><p>procedures for selecting, examining and using material obtained from intercepts</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The framework <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22001-210077%22%5D%7D">should also set out</a> </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the precautions to be taken when communicating the material to other parties</p></li>
<li><p>limits on the duration of interception </p></li>
<li><p>procedures for the storage of intercepted material</p></li>
<li><p>the circumstances in which such material must be erased and destroyed </p></li>
<li><p>supervision procedures by an independent authority</p></li>
<li><p>compliance procedures for review of surveillance once it has been completed.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The bill does not meet these requirements. </p>
<p>Incorporating these details in regulations would not be adequate on its own, as the bill gives the intelligence minister too much power to set the ground rules for bulk interception. These rules are also unlikely to be subjected to the same level of public scrutiny as the bill. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/zondo-commissions-report-on-south-africas-intelligence-agency-is-important-but-flawed-186582">Zondo Commission's report on South Africa's intelligence agency is important but flawed</a>
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<p>The fact that the presidency is attempting to get away with the most minimal regulation of bulk interception raises doubt about its <a href="https://www.stateofthenation.gov.za/assets/downloads/State%20Capture%20Commission%20Response.pdf">stated commitment</a> to intelligence reform to limit the scope for abuse, and parliament needs correct the bill’s clear deficiencies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222165/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Duncan receives funding from the British Academy and is a director of the non-governmental organisation Intelwatch. </span></em></p>The fact that the presidency is attempting to get away with minimal regulation of bulk interception raises doubt about its commitment to ending intelligence abuse.Jane Duncan, Professor of Digital Society, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2172262024-01-19T13:42:15Z2024-01-19T13:42:15ZFace recognition technology follows a long analog history of surveillance and control based on identifying physical features<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569962/original/file-20240117-29-ri412u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5272%2C3598&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Today's technology advances what passport control has been doing for more than a century.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/controll-of-passports-at-the-frontiers-between-beuthen-and-news-photo/548866047">ullstein bild via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>American Amara Majeed was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48061811">accused of terrorism</a> by the Sri Lankan police in 2019. Robert Williams was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/technology/facial-recognition-arrest.html">arrested outside his house</a> in Detroit and detained in jail for 18 hours for allegedly stealing watches in 2020. Randal Reid <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/31/technology/facial-recognition-false-arrests.html">spent six days in jail</a> in 2022 for supposedly using stolen credit cards in a state he’d never even visited.</p>
<p>In all three cases, the authorities had the wrong people. In all three, it was face recognition technology that told them they were right. Law enforcement officers in many U.S. states are <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/hidden-role-facial-recognition-tech-arrests/">not required to reveal</a> that they used face recognition technology to identify suspects.</p>
<p>Face recognition technology is the latest and most sophisticated version of <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/biometrics">biometric surveillance</a>: using unique physical characteristics to identify individual people. It stands in a <a href="https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-identity-and-security/government/inspired/history-of-biometric-authentication">long line of technologies</a> – from the fingerprint to the passport photo to iris scans – designed to monitor people and determine who has the right to move freely within and across borders and boundaries.</p>
<p>In my book, “<a href="https://www.press.jhu.edu/books/title/12700/do-i-know-you">Do I Know You? From Face Blindness to Super Recognition</a>,” I explore how the story of face surveillance lies not just in the history of computing but in the history of medicine, of race, of psychology and neuroscience, and in the health humanities and politics.</p>
<p>Viewed as a part of the long history of people-tracking, face recognition techology’s incursions into privacy and limitations on free movement are carrying out exactly what biometric surveillance was always meant to do.</p>
<p>The system works by converting captured faces – either static from photographs or moving from video – into a series of unique data points, which it then compares against the data points drawn from images of faces already in the system. As face recognition technology improves in accuracy and speed, its effectiveness as a means of surveillance becomes ever more pronounced.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569964/original/file-20240117-15-h4ovvh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="faces in a crowd highlighted and annotated with dates and times" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569964/original/file-20240117-15-h4ovvh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569964/original/file-20240117-15-h4ovvh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569964/original/file-20240117-15-h4ovvh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569964/original/file-20240117-15-h4ovvh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569964/original/file-20240117-15-h4ovvh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569964/original/file-20240117-15-h4ovvh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569964/original/file-20240117-15-h4ovvh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Paired with AI, face recognition technology scans the crowd at a conference.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/live-demonstration-uses-artificial-intelligence-and-facial-news-photo/1080200068">David McNew/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Accuracy improves, but biases persist</h2>
<p>Surveillance is predicated on the idea that <a href="https://theconversation.com/surveillance-is-pervasive-yes-you-are-being-watched-even-if-no-one-is-looking-for-you-187139">people need to be tracked</a> and their movements limited and controlled in a trade-off between privacy and security. The assumption that less privacy leads to more security is built in.</p>
<p>That may be the case for some, but not for the people disproportionately targeted by face recognition technology. <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Histories-of-Surveillance-from-Antiquity-to-the-Digital-Era-The-Eyes-and/Marklund-Skouvig/p/book/9781032021539">Surveillance has always been designed</a> to identify the people whom those in power wish to most closely track.</p>
<p>On a global scale, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2018.1493938">there are</a> <a href="https://longreads.tni.org/stateofpower/settled-habits-new-tricks-casteist-policing-meets-big-tech-in-india">caste cameras in India</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/30/uyghur-tribunal-testimony-surveillance-china">face surveillance of Uyghurs in China</a> and even <a href="https://mynbc15.com/news/spotlight-on-america/facial-recognition-technology-in-school-hallways-states-face-a-divisive-debate">attendance surveillance</a> <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.7302/21934">in U.S. schools</a>, often with low-income and majority-Black populations. <a href="https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/how-is-face-recognition-surveillance-technology-racist">Some people are tracked more closely</a> than others.</p>
<p>In addition, the cases of Amara Majeed, Robert Williams and Randal Reid <a href="https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/how-is-face-recognition-surveillance-technology-racist">aren’t anomalies</a>. As of 2019, face recognition technology <a href="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2019/NIST.IR.8280.pdf">misidentified Black and Asian people</a> at up to <a href="https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2019/12/nist-study-evaluates-effects-race-age-sex-face-recognition-software">100 times the rate of white people</a>, including, in 2018, a disproportionate number of the <a href="https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/amazons-face-recognition-falsely-matched-28">28 members of the U.S. Congress</a> who were falsely matched with mug shots on file using Amazon’s Rekognition tool.</p>
<p>When the database against which captured images were compared had only a limited number of mostly white faces upon which to draw, face recognition technology would offer matches based on the closest alignment available, leading to a pattern of highly racialized – and racist – false positives.</p>
<p>With the expansion of images in the database and increased sophistication of the software, <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/strategic-technologies-blog/how-accurate-are-facial-recognition-systems-and-why-does-it">the number of false positives</a> – incorrect matches between specific individuals and images of wanted people on file – has <a href="https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/frt-accuracy-performance/">declined dramatically</a>. Improvements in pixelation and mapping static images into moving ones, along with increased social media tagging and <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/691288/your-face-belongs-to-us-by-kashmir-hill/">ever more sophisticated scraping tools</a> like those developed by Clearview AI, have helped decrease the error rates.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/12/19/federal-study-confirms-racial-bias-many-facial-recognition-systems-casts-doubt-their-expanding-use/">The biases</a>, however, remain deeply embedded into the systems and their purpose, explicitly or implicitly targeting already targeted communities. The technology is not neutral, nor is the surveillance it is used to carry out.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569966/original/file-20240117-21-awurl6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Pen and ink illustration of suited hands using calipers to measure a man's forehead to back of his head" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569966/original/file-20240117-21-awurl6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569966/original/file-20240117-21-awurl6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569966/original/file-20240117-21-awurl6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569966/original/file-20240117-21-awurl6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569966/original/file-20240117-21-awurl6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=576&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569966/original/file-20240117-21-awurl6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=576&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569966/original/file-20240117-21-awurl6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=576&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Physiognomy went beyond recognition of an individual and tried to connect physical features with other characteristics.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/illustration/head-royalty-free-illustration/1399373778">clu/DigitalVision Vectors via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Latest technique in a long history</h2>
<p>Face recognition software is only the most recent manifestation of global systems of tracking and sorting. Precursors are rooted in the now-debunked belief that bodily features offer a unique index to character and identity. This pseudoscience was formalized in the late 18th century under the rubric of the <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674036048">ancient practice of physiognomy</a>.</p>
<p>Early systemic applications included anthropometry (body measurement), fingerprinting and iris or retinal scans. They all offered unique identifiers. None of these could be done without the participation – willing or otherwise – of the person being tracked.</p>
<p>The framework of bodily identification was adopted in the 19th century for use in criminal justice detection, prosecution and record-keeping to allow governmental control of its populace. The intimate relationship between face recognition and border patrol was galvanized by the <a href="http://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/passport-photos-history-development-regulation-mugshots">introduction of photos into passports</a> in some countries including Great Britain and the United States in 1914, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108664271">a practice that became widespread by 1920</a>.</p>
<p>Face recognition technology provided a way to go stealth on human biometric surveillance. Much early research into face recognition software was <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/secret-history-facial-recognition/">funded by the CIA</a> for the purposes of border surveillance.</p>
<p>It tried to develop a standardized framework for face segmentation: mapping the distance between a person’s facial features, including eyes, nose, mouth and hairline. Inputting that data into computers let a user search stored photographs for a match. These early scans and maps were limited, and the attempts to match them were not successful.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569967/original/file-20240117-23-u3alzk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Woman looks at screen with her image on a vending machine" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569967/original/file-20240117-23-u3alzk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569967/original/file-20240117-23-u3alzk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569967/original/file-20240117-23-u3alzk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569967/original/file-20240117-23-u3alzk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569967/original/file-20240117-23-u3alzk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569967/original/file-20240117-23-u3alzk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569967/original/file-20240117-23-u3alzk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A customer pays via facial recognition at a smart store in China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/nov-6-2018-a-visitor-tries-facial-recognition-payment-in-a-news-photo/1058496364">Huang Zongzhi/Xinhua News Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>More recently, private companies have <a href="https://fortune.com/longform/facial-recognition/">adopted data harvesting techniques</a>, including face recognition, as part of a long practice of <a href="https://theconversation.com/data-brokers-know-everything-about-you-what-ftc-case-against-ad-tech-giant-kochava-reveals-218232">leveraging personal data for profit</a>.</p>
<p>Face recognition technology works not only to unlock your phone or help you board your plane more quickly, but also in promotional store kiosks and, essentially, in any photo taken and shared by anyone, with anyone, anywhere around the world. These photos are stored in a database, creating ever more comprehensive systems of surveillance and tracking.</p>
<p>And while that means that today it is unlikely that Amara Majeed, Robert Williams, Randal Reid and Black members of Congress would be ensnared by a false positive, face recognition technology has invaded everyone’s privacy. It – and the governmental and private systems that design, run, use and capitalize upon it – is watching, and paying particular attention to those whom society and its structural biases deem to be the greatest risk.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217226/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sharrona Pearl receives funding from Interfaith America.</span></em></p>Face recognition technology follows earlier biometric surveillance techniques, including fingerprints, passport photos and iris scans. It’s the first that can be done without the subject’s knowledge.Sharrona Pearl, Associate Professor of Bioethics and History, Drexel UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2204732024-01-11T15:54:30Z2024-01-11T15:54:30ZSouth Africa’s new intelligence bill is meant to stem abuses – what’s good and bad about it<p>When South Africa became a constitutional democracy <a href="https://www.britannica.com/question/How-did-apartheid-end">in 1994</a>, it replaced its apartheid-era intelligence apparatus with a new one aimed at serving the country’s new democratic dispensation. However, the regime of former president Jacob Zuma, 2009-2018, deviated from this path. It <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">abused</a> the intelligence services to serve his political and allegdly corrupt ends. Now the country is taking steps to remedy the situation.</p>
<p>In November 2023, the presidency published the <a href="https://pmg.org.za/bill/1197/">General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill</a>. It proposes overhauling the civilian intelligence agency, the <a href="http://www.ssa.gov.za/">State Security Agency</a>, to address the <a href="https://www.saflii.org/images/state-capture-commission-report-part-5-vol1.pdf">abuses</a>.</p>
<p>The bill is extremely broad in scope. It intends to amend 12 laws – including the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/act39of1994.pdf">main</a> <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a65-020.pdf">intelligence</a> <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/docs/120224oversight_0.PDF">laws</a> of the democratic era. </p>
<p>Parliament has set itself a <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/38063/">1 March deadline</a> to complete work on the bill before it dissolves for the national election expected between <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/elections/whats-new-in-the-2024-elections-electoral-amendment-act">May and August</a>. </p>
<p>I have researched intelligence and surveillance for over a decade and also served on the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">2018 High Level Review Panel on the State Security Agency</a>.</p>
<p>In my view, some of the proposals in the bill risk replacing the old abuses with new ones. The bill seeks to broaden intelligence powers drastically but fails to address <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/38207/">longstanding weaknesses in their oversight</a>. </p>
<h2>Ending abuse</h2>
<p>The bill is meant to respond to major criticisms of the State Security Agency during Zuma’s presidency. The critics include the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">High Level Review Panel</a> and the <a href="https://www.saflii.org/images/state-capture-commission-report-part-5-vol1.pdf">Commission of Inquiry into State Capture</a>. </p>
<p>The main criticism of the panel appointed by Zuma’s successor Cyril Ramaphosa in 2018 was that under Zuma, the executive <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">repurposed</a> the agency to keep him in power, along with his supporters and others dependent on his patronage. In 2009, he merged the erstwhile domestic intelligence agency, the National Intelligence Agency, and the foreign agency, the <a href="https://www.ssa.gov.za/AboutUs/Branches">South African Secret Service</a>, by <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/security/national-security/ssa-takes-shape-legislation-to-follow/">presidential proclamation</a>, to centralise intelligence. This made it easier for his regime to control intelligence to achieve nefarious ends. The state capture commission made <a href="https://www.saflii.org/images/state-capture-commission-report-part-5-vol1.pdf">similar findings</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-surveillance-law-is-changing-but-citizens-privacy-is-still-at-risk-214508">South Africa’s surveillance law is changing but citizens’ privacy is still at risk</a>
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<p>The most important proposal in the bill is to abolish the <a href="https://nationalgovernment.co.za/units/view/42/state-security-agency-ssa">State Security Agency</a>. It is to be replaced by two separate agencies: one for foreign intelligence, and the other for domestic. The proposed new South African Intelligence Service (foreign) and the South African Intelligence Agency (domestic) will have separate mandates.</p>
<p>Abolishing the State Security Agency would be an important step towards accountability, as set out in the 1994 <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/white-papers/intelligence-white-paper-01-jan-1995#:%7E:text=The%20goal%20of%20this%20White,relevant%2C%20credible%20and%20reliable%20intelligence.">White Paper on Intelligence</a>. </p>
<p>The proposed names of the envisioned new agencies have symbolic importance. They suggest a shift away from a focus on state security, or protection of those in positions of power. Instead, it puts the focus back on human security. This is the protection of broader society, as <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/white-papers/intelligence-white-paper-01-jan-1995#:%7E:text=The%20goal%20of%20this%20White,relevant%2C%20credible%20and%20reliable%20intelligence.">required</a> by the 1994 White Paper.</p>
<h2>The dangers of over-broad definitions</h2>
<p>However, the new mandates given to the two new agencies, and the definitions they rely on, are so broad that abuse of their powerful spying capabilities is almost a foregone conclusion.</p>
<p>The bill says the new agencies will be responsible for collecting and analysing intelligence relating to threats or potential threats to national security in accordance with <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/chp11.html#:%7E:text=198.,to%20seek%20a%20better%20life.">the constitution</a>.</p>
<p>The bill defines national security as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the capabilities, measures and activities of the state to pursue or advance any threat, any potential threat, any opportunity, any potential opportunity or the security of the Republic and its people …</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This definition is extremely expansive. It allows the intelligence services to undertake any activity that could advance South Africa’s interests. This is regardless of whether there are actual national security threats. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-intelligence-watchdog-is-failing-civil-society-how-to-restore-its-credibility-195121">South Africa's intelligence watchdog is failing civil society. How to restore its credibility</a>
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<p>This creates the potential for overlap with the mandates of other state entities. However, unlike these, the intelligence agencies will be able to work secretly, using their extremely invasive <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2013-06-21-00-spy-wars-south-africa-is-not-innocent/">surveillance</a> <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-07-28-the-awful-state-of-lawful-interception-in-sa-part-two-surveillance-technology-thats-above-the-law/">capabilities</a>.</p>
<p>Such capabilities should only be used in exceptional circumstances when the country is under legitimate threat. To normalise their use in everyday government functions threatens democracy.</p>
<p>Intelligence overreach has happened elsewhere. Governments are increasingly requiring intelligence agencies to ensure that policymakers enjoy <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/national-security-surveillance-in-southern-africa-9780755640225/">decision advantages</a> in a range of areas. These include bolstering trade advantages over other countries.</p>
<p>For example, whistleblower <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance">Edward Snowden’s</a> leaks of classified US and UK intelligence documents showed how the countries misused broad interpretations of national security to engage in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/25907502">industrial espionage</a>.</p>
<p>The UK government used its powerful <a href="https://www.gchq.gov.uk/">signals intelligence capability</a> to <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/12/08/british-spying-tentacles-reach-across-africa-s-heads-of-states-and-business-leaders_5045668_3212.html">spy on</a> African politicians, diplomats and business people during trade negotiations. These abuses mean intelligence mandates should be narrowed and state intelligence power should be reduced.</p>
<h2>Human security definition of national security</h2>
<p>The State Security Agency used its presentation to parliament on the bill to seek broad mandates. Its <a href="https://pmg.org.za/files/231129Presentation_of_GILAB_Final.pptx">presentation</a> says it seeks to give effect to the national security principles in <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/chp11.html#:%7E:text=198.,to%20seek%20a%20better%20life.">section 198</a> of the constitution. The section states that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>national security must reflect the resolve of South Africans, as individuals and as a nation, to live as equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be free from fear and want and to seek a better life.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This principle is actually based on the human security definition of national security. The <a href="https://www.un.org/en/ga/">United Nations General Assembly</a> calls this freedom from fear and freedom from want. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/surveillance-laws-are-failing-to-protect-privacy-rights-what-we-found-in-six-african-countries-170373">Surveillance laws are failing to protect privacy rights: what we found in six African countries</a>
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<p>In its broadest sense, human security protects individuals from a wide range of threats and addresses their underlying drivers. These include <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231962570_Critical_Human_Security_Studies">poverty, underdevelopment and deprivation</a>. State security, on the other hand, is about protecting the state from threats. </p>
<p>If social issues are <a href="https://www.libraryofsocialscience.com/assets/pdf/Waever-Securitization.pdf">securitised</a> – or treated as national security issues requiring intervention by the state’s security services – it becomes difficult to distinguish the work of these agencies from the social welfare arms of the state.</p>
<h2>What needs to happen</h2>
<p>International relations scholar Neil MacFarlane and political scientist Yuen Foong Khong <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000147585">suggested</a> in 2006 that it was possible to address this conundrum by maintaining the focus on broader society as the entity that needs protection, rather than the state. </p>
<p>Legislators need to take a <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000147585">similar approach</a> when debating the bill. They should narrow the focus of the envisaged two new agencies to domestic and foreign threats of organised violence against society, such as genocide or terrorism. By doing so, they would still be recognising the best of what human security has to offer as an intelligence doctrine, while providing a much more appropriate focus for civilian intelligence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220473/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Duncan receives funding from the British Academy and is a director of Intelwatch, a non-governmental organisation devoted to strengthening democratic oversight of state and private intelligence. </span></em></p>The bill seeks greater intelligence powers but neglects oversight.Jane Duncan, Professor of Digital Society, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2193602023-12-15T13:22:30Z2023-12-15T13:22:30ZA US ambassador working for Cuba? Charges against former diplomat Victor Manuel Rocha spotlight Havana’s importance in the world of spying<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564965/original/file-20231211-19-9ppems.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C8%2C2830%2C2074&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A U.S. Justice Department image showing Victor Manuel Rocha during a meeting with an FBI undercover employee. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/FormerAmbassadorArrested/b4d90c09c592424a9f30e01c3c7a423c/photo">U.S. Department of Justice via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The U.S. Department of Justice announced on Dec. 4, 2023, that Victor Manuel Rocha, a former U.S. government employee, had been arrested and faced federal charges for secretly acting for decades as <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-us-ambassador-and-national-security-council-official-charged-secretly-acting-agent">an agent of the Cuban government</a>. Rocha joined the State Department in 1981 and served for over 20 years, rising to the level of ambassador. After leaving the State Department, he served from 2006-2012 as an <a href="https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/national-international/manuel-rocha-charged-as-intelligence-mole-for-cuba-served-as-career-us-diplomat-in-latin-america/4919137/">adviser to the U.S. Southern Command</a>, a joint U.S. military command that handles operations in Latin America and the Caribbean.</em></p>
<p><em>Harvard Kennedy School intelligence and national security scholar <a href="https://calderwalton.com/">Calder Walton</a>, author of “<a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Spies/Calder-Walton/9781668000694">Spies: The Epic Intelligence War Between East and West</a>,” provides perspective on what <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-us-ambassador-and-national-security-council-official-charged-secretly-acting-agent">U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland described</a> as “one of the highest-reaching and longest-lasting infiltrations of the United States government by a foreign agent.”</em></p>
<h2>How common is it for spies to embed in foreign governments?</h2>
<p>Every state seeks to place spies in this way. That’s the business of human intelligence: providing insights into a foreign government’s secret intentions and capabilities. </p>
<p>What makes Rocha’s case unusual is the length of his alleged espionage on behalf of Cuba: four decades. It’s important to emphasize the word alleged here – the case is underway, and Rocha has not yet offered a defense, let alone been convicted. </p>
<p>If proved, however, Rocha’s espionage would place him among the longest-serving spies in modern times. Allowing him to operate as a spy in the senior echelons of the U.S. government for so long would represent a staggering U.S. security failure.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Victor Manuel Rocha’s arrest is the culmination of a multiyear security investigation.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>What can a spy in this kind of position do?</h2>
<p>Typically, an embedded spy would be tasked by his or her recruiting intelligence service to take actions like stealing briefing papers, secret memorandums and other materials that show what decision-makers are thinking. Such work quickly resembles movie scenes – photographing secret documents, swapping information in public places or depositing it under lampposts and bridges. </p>
<p>Having an agent reach ambassador level would be a prize for any foreign intelligence service. Rocha held senior diplomatic postings in South America, including Bolivia, Argentina, Honduras, Mexico and the Dominican Republic. This would have given him, and thus his Cuban handlers, access to valuable intelligence about U.S. policy toward South America — and anything else that crossed his desk. </p>
<p>An embedded spy can also act as an “agent of influence” who works secretly to shape policies of the target government from within. This will be something to look for as the federal government discloses more information to support its charges against Rocha. </p>
<p>Presumably the U.S. intelligence community either already has carried out a damange assessment, or is urgently now conducting one, reviewing what secrets Rocha had access to during his diplomatic service – and whether, as ambassador to Bolivia, he may have shaped U.S. policy at the behest of Cuban intelligence.</p>
<h2>Has Cuban intelligence partnered with Russia, in the past or now?</h2>
<p>Cuban intelligence worked closely with the Soviets during the Cold War. After Fidel Castro took power in Cuba in 1959, Soviet intelligence maintained close personal liaisons with him. Cuba’s intelligence service, the DGI, later known as the DI, received <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Spies/Calder-Walton/9781668000694">early training and support from the KGB</a>, Russia’s former secret police and intelligence agency.</p>
<p>From the 1960s through the 1980s, Cuban intelligence operatives acted as valuable proxies for the KGB in Latin America and various African countries, particularly Angola and Mozambique. But they didn’t just follow Moscow’s direction. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://cri.fiu.edu/faculty/brian-latell/">Brian Latell</a>, a former U.S. intelligence expert on Latin America, has shown, Castro’s intelligence service was often <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781137000019/castrossecrets">far more aggressive</a> than the Soviet Union in supporting communist revolutionary movements in developing countries. Indeed, at times, the KGB had to try to <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Spies/Calder-Walton/9781668000694">rein in Cuban “adventurism</a>.” </p>
<p>One of Cuba’s greatest known espionage feats was recruiting and running a high-flying officer at the U.S. <a href="https://www.dia.mil/">Defense Intelligence Agency</a>, <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/True_Believer.html?id=cpksAAAAYAAJ">Ana Montes</a>, who spied for Cuba for 17 years before she was detected and convicted. To the best of my knowledge, there is no publicly avilable U.S. damage assessment of her espionage, but one senior CIA officer told me it was “breathtaking.”</p>
<p>Cuban intelligence recruited Montes while she was a university student and encouraged her to join the Defense Intelligence Agency. There, using a short-wave radio to pass coded messages and encrypted files to handlers, Montes betrayed a massive haul of U.S. secrets, including identities of U.S. intelligence officers and descriptions of U.S. eavesdropping facilities directed against Cuba. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Ana Montes spied for Cuba at the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency for 17 years. She returned to her native Puerto Rico in 2023 after serving 20 years in prison.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Cuban and Russian intelligence agencies maintained their ties after the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed. That relationship has only strengthened since Vladimir Putin, an old KGB hand, took power in the Kremlin in 1999. </p>
<p>Putin’s government reopened a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/16/russia-reopening-spy-base-cuba-us-relations-sour">massive old Soviet signals intelligence facility in Cuba</a>, <a href="https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80t01782r000100710001-8">near Havana</a>. This facility had been the Soviet Union’s largest foreign signals intelligence station in the world, with aerials and antennae pointed at Florida shores just 100 miles away. </p>
<p>Soviet records reveal that Moscow <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/christopher-andrew/the-sword-and-the-shield/9780465010035/?lens=basic-books">obtained valuable information from U.S. military bases in Florida</a>. Russia may well still be trying to try to eavesdrop on U.S. targets today from Cuba, although the U.S. government is doubtless alert to such efforts and is likely undertaking countermeasures.</p>
<p>Cuban intelligence today is also collaborating with China, which reportedly plans to open <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/cuba-to-host-secret-chinese-spy-base-focusing-on-u-s-b2fed0e0">its own eavesdropping station in Cuba</a>. Beijing has significant influence over Cuba as its largest creditor and, following in Soviet footsteps, views the island as a valuable intelligence collection base and a “bridgehead” — the KGB’s old code name for Cuba — for influence in Latin America.</p>
<h2>If Rocha is proved guilty, how would he rank historically among other spies?</h2>
<p>It remains to be seen what damage Rocha may have done while allegedly working as a Cuban spy. His tenure in the U.S. government, however, would place him right up there with the most successful, and thus damaging, spies in modern history. </p>
<p>The longest-running Soviet foreign intelligence agent in Britain, Melita Norwood, <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/christopher-andrew/the-sword-and-the-shield/9780465010035/?lens=basic-books">spied for the KGB for four decades</a>. When she was exposed in 1999, the unrepentant 87-year-old great-grandmother was quickly dubbed “the great granny spy” in the British tabloid press. </p>
<p>In the United States, the highest Soviet penetration of the executive branch was probably <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/christopher-andrew/the-sword-and-the-shield/9780465010035/?lens=basic-books">Lauchlin Currie</a>, who was President Franklin Roosevelt’s White House assistant during World War II. Records obtained after the Soviet Union’s collapse reveal that <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/christopher-andrew/the-sword-and-the-shield/9780465010035/?lens=basic-books">Currie acted as a Soviet agent</a>. </p>
<p>The greatest damage to U.S. national security, however, was done in the 1980s and 1990s by <a href="https://www.usni.org/press/books/circle-treason">Aldrich Ames at the CIA</a> and <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/A-Spy-in-Plain-Sight/Lis-Wiehl/9781639364572">Robert Hanssen at the FBI</a>. Each man betrayed a wealth of secrets, including U.S. intelligence operations. The information that Ames stole for the Soviets led to the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/06/12/naming-those-betrayed-by-ames/5ed7accf-bcdd-4b8a-9de5-75a2b422044a/">arrest and execution</a> of Soviet agents working for U.S. intelligence behind the Iron Curtain. </p>
<p>In due course, we will find out whether Rocha occupies a place of similar ignominy in U.S. history.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219360/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Calder Walton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Cuba gets less attention as an espionage threat than Russia or China, but is a potent player in the spy world. Its intelligence service has already penetrated the US government at least once.Calder Walton, Assistant Director, Applied History Project and Intelligence Project, Harvard Kennedy SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2191872023-12-07T13:30:02Z2023-12-07T13:30:02ZHow new reports reveal Israeli intelligence underestimated Hamas and other key weaknesses<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563705/original/file-20231205-17-4sueqx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C0%2C1272%2C720&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, center, meets with his security cabinet on Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Hamas attack.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/israeli-prime-minister-benjamin-netanyahu-holds-a-meeting-news-photo/1711825822">Haim Zach (GPO) / Handout/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After the surprise Hamas terrorist attack on Israel from the Gaza Strip on Oct. 7, 2023, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-did-israeli-intelligence-miss-hamas-preparations-to-attack-a-us-counterterrorism-expert-explains-how-israeli-intelligence-works-215410">many observers were puzzled</a> about how Israel could have been caught completely off-guard. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmu.edu/cmist/about-us/people/faculty/haleigh-bartos.html">We</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=eHm-LrkAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">were</a> among those puzzled, and <a href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/what-went-wrong-three-hypotheses-on-israels-massive-intelligence-failure/">proposed three possible reasons</a>:</p>
<ol>
<li>Israeli leaders may have underestimated Hamas’ capabilities and misunderstood its intentions.</li>
<li>Israeli intelligence may have been tricked by Hamas’ secrecy, missing signs that it was planning and training.</li>
<li>Israeli intelligence leaders may have been so wedded to their prior conclusion that Hamas was not a major threat that they dismissed mounting evidence that it was preparing for war.</li>
</ol>
<p>New revelations from recent media coverage have shed additional light on what happened, which mostly confirm the role of faulty threat assessments, Hamas’ improved operational security, and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctv182jrtn.10">confirmation bias</a>. </p>
<h2>An official assessment</h2>
<p>On Oct. 29, The New York Times reported that since May 2021, Israel’s military intelligence leaders and National Security Council had <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/29/world/middleeast/israel-intelligence-hamas-attack.html">officially assessed</a> that “Hamas had no interest in launching an attack from Gaza that might invite a devastating response from Israel.” </p>
<p>As a result, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and security leaders diverted attention and resources away from Hamas and toward what they saw as more existential threats: Iran and Hezbollah. For instance, in 2021, the Israeli military <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/top-israeli-intel-unit-wasnt-operational-on-october-7-due-to-personnel-decision/">cut personnel and funding for Unit 8200, a key military surveillance unit</a> watching Gaza. In 2022, the unit <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/29/world/middleeast/israel-intelligence-hamas-attack.html">stopped listening in on Hamas militants’ radio communications</a>, though it apparently gathered other intelligence.</p>
<p>The U.S. made a similar shift, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/u-s-all-but-stopped-spying-on-hamas-in-years-after-9-11-ebe8d61d">focusing on the Islamic State group and other militants</a>, leaving intelligence gathering on Hamas to Israel.</p>
<h2>Revealing surveillance</h2>
<p>Within days of Oct. 7, Egypt revealed that it had shared with Israel high-level warnings of impending Hamas violence – “<a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/egypt-intelligence-official-says-israel-ignored-repeated-warnings-of-something-big/">something big</a>.” </p>
<p>A Guardian report in early November revealed that Hamas leaders who had planned the attack <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/07/secret-hamas-attack-orders-israel-gaza-7-october">took special measures</a> to avoid being detected by Israeli intelligence, including passing orders only by word of mouth, rather than by radio or internet communication. But Hamas’ planning did not totally escape detection. </p>
<p>The Times of Israel reported in late October that Israeli troops of the Combat Intelligence Corps surveilling the Israel-Gaza border months before Oct. 7 saw Hamas militants <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/surveillance-soldiers-warned-of-hamas-activity-on-gaza-border-for-months-before-oct-7/">digging holes, placing explosives, training frequently</a> and even practicing blowing up a mock fence. Their warnings were ignored. The Financial Times reported in early November that Israeli security leaders had also ignored specific alerts of Hamas training exercises from civilian <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f1ec2502-8220-491c-95e0-5f1504ce9554">volunteers in southern Israel who eavesdropped</a> on Hamas communications.</p>
<p>The Financial Times also reported that weeks before the Hamas attack, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/277573ae-fbbc-4396-8faf-64b73ab8ed0a">Israeli border guards</a> sent a classified warning to the top military intelligence officer in the southern command. They had detected a high-ranking Hamas military commander overseeing rehearsals of hostage-taking and warned that Hamas was training to imminently “blow up border posts at several locations, enter Israeli territory and take over kibbutzim.” The officer who received the message dismissed it as an “imaginary scenario.” Other leaders considered the warning unremarkable.</p>
<h2>A detailed plan</h2>
<p>On Nov. 30, The New York Times reported that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/30/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-attack-intelligence.html">Israeli intelligence obtained a detailed Hamas plan of attack</a> more than a year before Oct. 7. The plan ran to 40 pages and included specifics that actually were part of the attack, including an opening rocket barrage, drones knocking out security cameras and automated weapons at the border, and gunmen crossing into Israel in paragliders as well as on foot and by motorcycle.</p>
<p>The newspaper also reported that in July 2023, a Unit 8200 analyst observed Hamas training activities that lined up with the Hamas plan, which was code-named “Jericho Wall” by Israeli officials. The analyst determined that Hamas was preparing an attack designed to provoke a war with Israel. Superior officers dismissed her assessment, saying the “Jericho Wall” plan was only aspirational primarily because they thought Hamas lacked the capacity to carry it out.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563714/original/file-20231205-28-ftbv9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People walk past a fortified tower with cameras and weapons on top." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563714/original/file-20231205-28-ftbv9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563714/original/file-20231205-28-ftbv9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563714/original/file-20231205-28-ftbv9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563714/original/file-20231205-28-ftbv9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563714/original/file-20231205-28-ftbv9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563714/original/file-20231205-28-ftbv9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563714/original/file-20231205-28-ftbv9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Israel’s defenses include stations like this guard tower in the West Bank, with robotic weapons that can fire tear gas, stun grenades and sponge-tipped bullets, using artificial intelligence to track targets.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IsraelRobotGun/8473ec72946f4d8eacbb3da6acbd7171/photo">AP Photo/Mahmoud Illean</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A reflection on the Israeli intelligence community</h2>
<p>These recent reports make clear that Israeli officials had enough intelligence to step up security. The fact that they did not suggests they may have dismissed all that evidence in favor of other information they had, which suggested Hamas was not interested in or capable of going to war with Israel.</p>
<p>But that may not have been the only problem. Recent studies point to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X20903072">increasing fissures</a> in civil-military relations in Israel. For example, populist right-wing Israeli politicians in recent years have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/psquar/qqad121">viewed senior intelligence officials with skepticism</a> as potential leftist rivals, which could have led Netanyahu’s Likud government to be hostile to alternative viewpoints and various intelligence warnings on Hamas. </p>
<p>Although we cannot observe the extent of politicization among the senior Israeli intelligence ranks, the behavior of intelligence leaders who dismissed warnings prior to Oct. 7 is <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26593670">consistent with groupthink</a>, a phenomenon that experts say may occur when social pressure, a leader’s influential position or self-censorship leads groups to express homogeneous views and make uniform – and usually poorer – decisions. </p>
<p>The fact that superiors ignored warnings from the Unit 8200 analyst and the Border Defense Corps is consistent with the idea that groupthink about <a href="https://www.newsnationnow.com/world/war-in-israel/ex-israeli-ambassador-intelligence-military-surprise-failure/">Hamas’ capabilities and intentions</a> led to confirmation bias dismissing Hamas as an imminent threat.</p>
<p>Some of the ignored intelligence analysts were young women, who have said they <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/surveillance-soldiers-say-oct-7-warnings-ignored-charge-sexism-played-a-role/">believe sexism could have been a reason</a> male superiors ignored their warnings.</p>
<p>Another form of prejudice may also have been at play. Israel has focused intensely on its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X20903072">technological advantages over its enemies</a>, assigning large numbers of personnel to electronic and cyber warfare units. Perhaps <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f1ec2502-8220-491c-95e0-5f1504ce9554">technological optimism</a>, faith in what the Financial Times described as “aerial drones that eavesdrop on Gaza and the sensor-equipped fence that surrounds the strip,” won out. Maybe a reliance on technology led to a false sense of security, and even the dismissal of other forms of intelligence that, it turned out, had uncovered Hamas’ real plans.</p>
<h2>A turn toward the future</h2>
<p>In the wake of the Hamas attacks, Israel’s security apparatus will need to investigate these weaknesses further and undertake reforms. So far, it remains unclear how many people, and at what levels of the Israeli government, received the various warnings in advance of Oct. 7. Therefore, it’s not yet clear what specific changes in Israel might prevent a similar failure in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219187/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Recent media coverage mostly confirms the role of faulty threat assessments, Hamas’ improved operational security, and confirmation bias.John Joseph Chin, Assistant Teaching Professor of Strategy and Technology, Carnegie Mellon UniversityHaleigh Bartos, Associate Professor of the Practice in Strategy and Technology, Carnegie Mellon UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2148572023-10-09T19:10:38Z2023-10-09T19:10:38ZDoes your employer have to tell if they’re spying on you through your work computer?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552447/original/file-20231006-15-qydplx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=45%2C54%2C5986%2C3961&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The COVID pandemic stimulated an irreversible shift in where, when and how we work. This 21st-century model of working – dubbed the “new normal” – is characterised by increased <a href="https://theconversation.com/morning-or-evening-type-choice-of-hours-is-the-next-big-thing-in-workplace-flexibility-194170">flexibility and productivity gains</a>. </p>
<p>Yet this reshaping of work, underpinned by technology, has also <a href="https://theconversation.com/work-life-balance-in-a-pandemic-a-public-health-issue-we-cannot-ignore-155492">eroded our work-life boundaries</a> – and persisting 20th-century attitudes are preventing us from successfully managing the new normal.</p>
<p>We find ourselves struggling with “<a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/worklab/why-managers-and-employees-cant-agree-on-how-much-work-is-getting-done">productivity paranoia</a>”: a term used to describe managers’ concerns that remote and hybrid workers aren’t doing enough when not under supervision. </p>
<p>As a result, we’re seeing a surge in the use of electronic monitoring and surveillance devices in the workplace. These devices allow managers to “watch over” employees in their absence. This practice raises serious legal and ethical concerns.</p>
<h2>Big bossware is here</h2>
<p>In a survey of 20,000 people across 11 countries, <a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/worklab/work-trend-index/hybrid-work-is-just-work">Microsoft reported</a> 85% of managers struggled to trust their remote-working employees. In Australia, this figure was 90%.</p>
<p>In 2021, American research and consulting firm Gartner estimated
the number of large firms tracking, monitoring and surveilling their workers had <a href="https://www.gartner.com/en/articles/the-right-way-to-monitor-your-employee-productivity">doubled</a> to 60% since the start of the pandemic. </p>
<p>Electronic monitoring and surveillance technology can capture screenshots of an employee’s computer, record their keystrokes and mouse movements, and even activate their webcam or microphones. </p>
<p>On one hand, these <a href="https://home.coworker.org/worktech/">“bossware” tools</a> can be used to capture employee and production statistics, providing businesses with useful evidence-based analytics. </p>
<p>The other side is much darker. These devices are indiscriminate. If you’re working from home they can pick up audio and visual images of your private life. </p>
<p>Managers can be sent notifications when data “indicate” an employee is taking breaks or getting distracted. </p>
<p>Some aspects of electronic monitoring and surveillance are legitimate. For instance, it may be necessary to safeguard an organisation’s data access and transfers. </p>
<p>But where are the boundaries? Is your organisation legally obliged to tell you about electronic intrusions? Alternatively, what can you do if you find out you’re being watched without being informed?</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/not-big-brother-but-close-a-surveillance-expert-explains-some-of-the-ways-were-all-being-watched-all-the-time-194917">Not Big Brother, but close: a surveillance expert explains some of the ways we’re all being watched, all the time</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The legal framework</h2>
<p>A complex array of regulation governs workplace privacy and surveillance in Australia. <a href="https://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-02/privacy-act-review-report_0.pdf">Proposed reforms</a> to the Privacy Act 1988 are set to strengthen privacy protections for private-sector employees. </p>
<p>However, this legislation doesn’t specifically cover workplace surveillance. Instead, a patchwork of laws in each state and territory regulate this matter. </p>
<p>Specific legislation regulates the surveillance of workers in <a href="https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-2005-047">New South Wales</a> and the <a href="https://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/2011-4">Australian Capital Territory</a>. Importantly, surveillance must not be undertaken unless the employer has provided at least 14 days’ notice. This notice must include specific details about the surveillance that will be carried out. Employers must also develop and adhere to a surveillance policy. </p>
<p>In both states, employers can only record visual images of an employee while they’re “at work”. This is broadly defined to capture any place where work is carried out. </p>
<p>Covert surveillance is prohibited unless the employer has obtained a court order. In this case it’s restricted to situations where the employee is suspected of unlawful activity.</p>
<p>Even then, a covert surveillance order would not be granted where this unduly intrudes on the employee’s privacy. Covert surveillance for the purpose of monitoring work performance is expressly prohibited. </p>
<p>Other states and territories don’t have specific electronic workplace surveillance laws. Employers must instead comply with more general surveillance legislation.</p>
<p>Broadly speaking, employees must give consent, express or implied, to any surveillance. In practice, such consent is usually obtained through the implementation of a workplace surveillance policy, which employees must agree to when they accept the job. So if you’ve signed a contract without reading the fine print, you may have agreed to being surveilled via electronic monitoring tools.</p>
<p>Currently, <a href="https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-1971-050">Queensland</a> and <a href="https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-1991-021">Tasmania</a> provide the most limited protection for employees. Their surveillance legislation is limited to the regulation of listening devices. </p>
<p>Enterprise agreements, employment contracts and workplace policies may also limit or prohibit the use of surveillance devices. In practice, however, most employees will lack the bargaining power to negotiate the inclusion of any such terms in their employment contract.</p>
<h2>The law is failing to keep up</h2>
<p>In 2022, a parliamentary <a href="http://classic.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/other/nsw/NSWLCSelCPubInq/2022/7.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=nsw%20consol_act%20wsa2005245%20s10">select committee</a> reporting on the future of work in NSW observed the current regulatory framework is failing to keep pace with rapid advancements in electronic monitoring and surveillance. </p>
<p>The report criticised legislation that simply allows an employer to notify workers surveillance will be carried out, with no mechanism for this to be negotiated or challenged. The situation is slightly better in the ACT, where employers must consult with workers in good faith about any proposed surveillance activities.</p>
<p>Workers who suspect their employer is spying on them should review their workplace surveillance policies. They may need to reflect carefully on how they use their work computer.</p>
<p>Where an enterprise agreement applies, the <a href="https://www.fwc.gov.au/issues-we-help/common-issues-workplace/resolve-dispute-your-workplace">Fair Work Commission</a> can arbitrate surveillance disputes. A worker who is dismissed following intrusive surveillance may be able to <a href="https://www.fwc.gov.au/job-loss-or-dismissal/unfair-dismissal/process-unfair-dismissal-claims">challenge the dismissal</a> on the basis of it being unfair. </p>
<p>Workers who haven’t been informed of their employer’s surveillance practices can also lodge a complaint with the relevant authority or regulator, who may have powers to investigate and prosecute offences. </p>
<p>To thrive in our “new normal” work landscape, we’ll need to address the gap between the existing legal protections and the capabilities (and potential harms) of electronic monitoring and surveillance. For now, it remains a significant legal and ethical challenge. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/bunnings-kmart-and-the-good-guys-say-they-use-facial-recognition-for-loss-prevention-an-expert-explains-what-it-might-mean-for-you-185126">Bunnings, Kmart and The Good Guys say they use facial recognition for 'loss prevention'. An expert explains what it might mean for you</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214857/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacqueline Meredith receives funding from an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Holland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The electronic monitoring and surveillance of employees is on the rise as growing numbers of people switch to hybrid and at-home work.Jacqueline Meredith, Lecturer in Law, Swinburne University of TechnologyPeter Holland, Professor in Human Resource Management and Employee Relations, Swinburne University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2117952023-10-02T15:07:18Z2023-10-02T15:07:18ZEven before deepfakes, tech was a tool of abuse and control<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548852/original/file-20230918-23-ds1krb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=35%2C13%2C2959%2C1980&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/young-indian-woman-looking-her-smart-410099035">William Perugini/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Of the many “<a href="https://futureoflife.org/open-letter/pause-giant-ai-experiments/">profound risks to society and humanity</a>” that have tech experts worried about artificial intelligence (AI), the spread of fake images is one that everyday internet users will be familiar with.</p>
<p>Deepfakes – videos or photographs where someone’s face or body has been digitally altered so that they appear to be doing something they are not – have already been used to spread <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/07/technology/artificial-intelligence-training-deepfake.html">political disinformation</a> and <a href="https://www.euronews.com/next/2023/04/22/a-lifelong-sentence-the-women-trapped-in-a-deepfake-porn-hell">fake pornography</a>.</p>
<p>These images are typically malicious and are used to discredit the subject. When it comes to deepfake pornography, the <a href="https://uclawreview.org/2023/08/02/deepfakes-the-effect-on-women-and-potential-protections/#:%7E:text=In%202019%2C%20DeepTrace%2C%20a%20deepfake,of%20those%20involve%20women.%E2%80%9D%2019">vast majority of victims are women</a>. Generative AI – technology used to create text, images and video – is <a href="https://penntoday.upenn.edu/news/what-deepfake-porn-and-why-it-thriving-age-ai">already making</a> image-based sexual abuse easier to perpetrate. </p>
<p>A new <a href="https://theconversation.com/online-safety-bill-why-making-the-uk-the-safest-place-to-go-online-is-not-as-easy-as-the-government-claims-214290">set of laws</a> in the UK, will criminalise the sharing of deepfake pornography. But with the attention on AI and deepfakes, we cannot forget how less sophisticated technology can be used as a tool of abuse, with devastating consequences for victims.</p>
<h2>Tech and control</h2>
<p>When I began my research into technology in abusive relationships, deepfakes were just a blip on the horizon. My work focused on the <a href="https://openresearch.lsbu.ac.uk/item/8w0v4">role of smartphones</a> in the abuse of women who had fled controlling relationships. I found that perpetrators of domestic abuse were using technology to extend the reach of their power and control over their partners, a modern take on abuse tactics that were used <a href="https://connect.springerpub.com/content/book/978-0-8261-7991-3">long before</a> smartphones were in every pocket.</p>
<p>Mobile phones can be used directly to monitor and control, using GPS tracking or by bombarding a victim with texts, videos and voice calls. One participant in my <a href="https://sussex.figshare.com/articles/thesis/Beyond_proximity_the_covert_role_of_mobile_phones_in_maintaining_power_and_coercive_control_in_the_domestic_abuse_of_women/23306735">research in 2019</a> explained how her abusive partner used his phone to access social media, sending her offensive pictures via Instagram and persistent and offensive WhatsApp messages. </p>
<p>When she was out with her friends, he would first text, ring and then video call her constantly to check where she was and to see who she was with. When the participant turned off her phone, her then-partner contacted her friends, bombarding them with texts and calls. </p>
<p>This participant felt too embarrassed to make arrangements to meet with her peer group and so stopped going out. Others in similar situations might be excluded from social plans, if friends want to avoid being contacted by their friend’s abuser. Such social isolation is a frequent part of domestic abuse and an important indicator of controlling relationships. </p>
<p>According to the domestic violence charity Refuge,
<a href="https://refuge.org.uk/news/72-of-refuge-service-users-identify-experiencing-tech-abuse/">more than 72%</a> of people who use its services report abuse involving technology. </p>
<p>Mobile phones are a gateway to other gadgets, via the “internet of things” – devices that are web-connected and able to exchange data. These tools can also be weaponised by abusers. For example, using mobile phones to <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/blog/legal-matters/201907/gaslighting-in-the-age-smart-home-technology">change temperature settings</a> on a household thermostat, creating extremes from one hour to the next. </p>
<p>Confused by this, people seek explanations from their partner only to be told that this must be a figment of their imagination. <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaslighting-from-partners-to-politicians-how-to-avoid-becoming-a-victim-121828">Gaslighting techniques</a> such as this make victims question their own sanity which undermines their confidence in their own judgment. </p>
<h2>A modern panopticon</h2>
<p>With the click of a button, mobile phones allow for unprecedented surveillance of others. In the pocket of a perpetrator, they can be used to keep tabs on current and former partners any time, any place and – signal permitting – anywhere. This gives perpetrators a <a href="https://openresearch.lsbu.ac.uk/item/8w0v4">power of omnipotence</a>, leaving victims believing that they are being watched even when they are not.</p>
<p>This brings to mind the work of the 18th-century philosopher Jeremy Bentham, who introduced the concept of the “panopticon”. Bentham proposed a “perfect” prison system, where a guard tower sits in the centre, surrounded by individual cells. </p>
<p>Isolated from one another, prisoners would see only the tower – a constant reminder that they are permanently watched, even though they cannot see the guard within it. Bentham believed such a structure would result in the prisoners’ self-surveillance until eventually no locks or bars were needed.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="The interior of an empty panopticon prison, a circular, concrete room with a guard tower in the centre and dozens of cells with sunlight shining through" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548853/original/file-20230918-161679-jublh5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548853/original/file-20230918-161679-jublh5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548853/original/file-20230918-161679-jublh5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548853/original/file-20230918-161679-jublh5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548853/original/file-20230918-161679-jublh5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548853/original/file-20230918-161679-jublh5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548853/original/file-20230918-161679-jublh5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A panopticon design inside the ‘Presidio modelo’, a model prison built in Cuba, now a museum.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Presidio-modelo2.JPG">Friman/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://openresearch.lsbu.ac.uk/item/924y1">My most recent research</a> shows that mobile phones have created similar dynamics within abusive relationships. Phones take the role of the tower, and perpetrators the guards within it. </p>
<p>In this modern panopticon, victims can be out and about, visible to strangers, friends and family. Yet because of the presence of the phone, they feel they are still being watched and controlled by their abusive partners. </p>
<p>As one participant put it: “You feel there’s no freedom even when you’re out. You feel like you are locked up somewhere, you don’t have freedom, someone is controlling you.”</p>
<p>Survivors of abuse continue to monitor themselves even when the perpetrators are not there. They act in ways that they believe will please (or at least not anger) their abusers. </p>
<p>This behaviour is often viewed by others as strange, and too readily dismissed as paranoia, anxiety or more serious mental health issues. The focus becomes about the victim’s behaviour and ignores the cause – abusive or criminal behaviour by their partner. </p>
<p>As technology becomes more sophisticated, the tools and strategies available to abusers will continue to evolve. This will extend perpetrators’ reach and present new opportunities for surveillance, gaslighting and abuse. </p>
<p>Until tech companies consider the experiences of domestic abuse survivors and build safety mechanisms into the design of their products, abuse will continue to remain <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/Coercive_Control/8h0TDAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0">hidden in plain sight</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>If you are concerned about safety and abuse related to technology, please <a href="https://refugetechsafety.org">visit this advice page</a> from Refuge, the UK’s largest domestic abuse charity.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211795/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tirion E. Havard does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mobile phones have extended the reach and control of abusive partners.Tirion E. Havard, Associate Professor of Social Work, London South Bank UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2120102023-09-27T03:44:15Z2023-09-27T03:44:15ZChina’s new anti-espionage law is sending a chill through foreign corporations and citizens alike<p>Earlier this year, China <a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/202304/b964e9c05be34eb3a7090f2456a4e139.shtml">updated</a> its anti-espionage law amid an intensifying rivalry with the US and growing distrust of the Western-led international order. </p>
<p>The law broadens the scope beyond what it originally sought to prohibit – leaks of state secrets and intelligence – to include any “documents, data, materials, or items related to national security and interests.” </p>
<p>The law also empowers authorities with new surveillance powers. These include the ability to access people’s emails or social media accounts on electronic devices.</p>
<p>The Chinese government is clearly using the new catch-all provision to cast a wider net to identify “spies”. It is targeting not only Westerners working in China, but also Chinese nationals who work for foreign companies or organisations or interact with foreigners in any way. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1704318496942010654"}"></div></p>
<p>The law is more than just theoretical – it has teeth. Last month, a new national campaign was launched with rewards of up to <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-04/10/c_1120777169.htm">500,000 renminbi</a> (just over A$100,000) for anyone reporting suspicious individuals or suspected espionage activities. </p>
<p>Red banners have started appearing on Chinese streets, proclaiming </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Implement the new anti-espionage law, mobilise collective efforts to safeguard national security. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Posters with a hotline number for reporting suspicious individuals can now be found on public transport, as well.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hotline number for reporting suspicious activities.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These visible signs serve as reminders that spies could be anywhere, potentially feeding sensitive information to foreign entities that pose threats to China’s national security and interests.</p>
<h2>Implications of the new law</h2>
<p>The new law has sent a chill through multinational corporations, Chinese companies and other organisations. </p>
<p>State-owned companies or those affiliated with the government are <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0b869421-10fd-41e7-8280-5d09a224062f">distancing themselves</a> from
multinationals offering legal, investment and consultancy services, fearful of being associated with foreign entities.</p>
<p>Multinationals themselves were once welcomed with open arms to help accelerate China’s economic and technological development. Now, they find themselves entangled in a complex web of regulations governing the cross-border transfer of data and other information. Many are considering <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2f52965f-3bdb-4223-891b-e2208ad2e16e">decoupling</a> their data and IT systems from China.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1706457355058319662"}"></div></p>
<p>From an individual standpoint, anyone with foreign affiliations, including those who have returned from overseas, feel as if they are on a kind of community “watch list” upon arrival in China. </p>
<p>Some Chinese firms indicate in <a href="https://www.toutiao.com/article/7272284502448407055/?log_from=d0901d6b2a217_1693371484238">recruitment</a> drives for new employees they will not consider applicants who have returned from certain overseas regions. The perception is they may have been exposed to foreign forces who use money, friendship or even romance to coerce them into becoming an undercover agent or informant. </p>
<p>An invisible net has been cast over every stratum of Chinese society. Many Chinese people will no doubt become more hesitant in their interactions, cautious in their communication and sceptical in their collaborations. This will only further encourage people to retreat into silence or resort to coded language in both face-to-face conversations and social media. </p>
<p>And those perceived as having divergent political or ideological views will especially be under scrutiny. This includes private businesspeople, entrepreneurs and those working in non-government sectors who openly voice political or ideological values that go against the Communist Party.</p>
<p>The expansive nature of the law evokes memories of the Cultural Revolution, an era in which little trust existed in society and even among family members. </p>
<p>An unsettling divide is emerging today between those in governmental circles and everyone else. Having a foreign diploma or other affiliation was once seen as a positive, offering one a different perspective and international experience. Now, however, it could be seen as a liability or even a crime.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-and-china-may-be-ending-an-agreement-on-science-and-technology-cooperation-a-policy-expert-explains-what-this-means-for-research-212084">The US and China may be ending an agreement on science and technology cooperation − a policy expert explains what this means for research</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Ambiguity has risks</h2>
<p>The first iteration of the anti-espionage law was enacted in 2015 and was aimed at bolstering national security and generally protecting against espionage activities detrimental to the country’s interests. </p>
<p>The updated law comes in a changed world. The rivalry between the US and China has escalated in recent years in trade, technology, defence and influence over global institutions. Both nations are actively engaging in intelligence operations to understand each other’s capabilities, intentions and vulnerabilities. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/no-indication-of-aliens-spy-balloon-saga-continues-to-surprise-amid-rising-us-china-tension-199769">'No indication of aliens': spy balloon saga continues to surprise amid rising US–China tension</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>Because the new law is so expansive and ambiguous, however, the implementation and enforcement could be difficult. And it could diverge significantly from the initial objectives of lawmakers. </p>
<p>When laws are ambiguous, it leaves ample room for interpretation and potential exploitation. The lack of clarity with the revised anti-espionage law could give rise to witch hunts, leaving people vulnerable to accusations that lack substantial evidence. The ripple effect could extend beyond China’s borders, affecting academic exchanges, technological cooperation and diplomatic relations. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1704405881591619992"}"></div></p>
<p>If collaboration with the outside world becomes secondary to perceived threats, it could also deter both foreign investment and domestic private enterprises in China, stifling economic growth. </p>
<p>At a time when the Chinese economy is grappling with domestic challenges and an increasingly hostile global environment, this could hasten the “decoupling” from China that many in the West are advocating for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212010/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marina Yue Zhang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The revised law is targeting not only Westerners working in China, but also Chinese nationals who work for foreign companies or organisations or interact with foreigners in any way.Marina Yue Zhang, Associate Professor, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2136852023-09-22T12:30:58Z2023-09-22T12:30:58ZSpyware can infect your phone or computer via the ads you see online – report<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549436/original/file-20230920-25-eqmqt5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4508%2C3003&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A new type of spyware means those online ads could go from annoying to menacing.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/VirusOutbreakUnemploymentBenefits/b08e140ac8b54973ba793dd93b806b6d/photo">AP Photo/Julio Cortez</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Each day, you leave digital traces of what you did, where you went, who you communicated with, what you bought, what you’re thinking of buying, and much more. This mass of data serves as a library of clues for personalized ads, which are sent to you by a sophisticated network – <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-bad-ads-appear-on-good-websites-a-computer-scientist-explains-178268">an automated marketplace</a> of advertisers, publishers and ad brokers that operates at lightning speed. </p>
<p>The ad networks are designed to shield your identity, but companies and governments are able to combine that information with other data, particularly phone location, <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Ethics_of_Data_and_Analytics/E51kEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=advertising+privacy&pg=PA161&printsec=frontcover">to identify you and track your movements and online activity</a>. More invasive yet is <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/spyware">spyware</a> – malicious software that a government agent, private investigator or criminal installs on someone’s phone or computer without their knowledge or consent. Spyware lets the user see the contents of the target’s device, including calls, texts, email and voicemail. Some forms of spyware can take control of a phone, including turning on its microphone and camera.</p>
<p>Now, according to <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-09-14/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/revealed-israeli-cyber-firms-developed-an-insane-new-spyware-tool-no-defense-exists/0000018a-93cb-de77-a98f-ffdf2fb60000">an investigative report</a> by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, an Israeli technology company called Insanet has developed the means of delivering spyware via online ad networks, turning some targeted ads into Trojan horses. According to the report, there’s no defense against the spyware, and the Israeli government has given Insanet approval to sell the technology.</p>
<h2>Sneaking in unseen</h2>
<p>Insanet’s spyware, Sherlock, is not the first spyware that can be installed on a phone without the need to trick the phone’s owner into clicking on a malicious link or downloading a malicious file. <a href="https://www.nsogroup.com/">NSO</a>’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-pegasus-a-cybersecurity-expert-explains-how-the-spyware-invades-phones-and-what-it-does-when-it-gets-in-165382">iPhone-hacking Pegasus</a>, for instance, is one of the most controversial spyware tools to emerge in the past five years.</p>
<p>Pegasus relies on vulnerabilities in Apple’s iOS, the iPhone operating system, to infiltrate a phone undetected. Apple issued a <a href="https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213905">security update</a> for <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2023/9/8/23864150/ios-16-6-1-iphone-security-vulnerability-0-day-exploit-patch-update">the latest vulnerability</a> on Sept. 7, 2023.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457773/original/file-20220412-23-9qtbd2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Diagram showing the different entities involved in real time bidding, and the requests and responses" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457773/original/file-20220412-23-9qtbd2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457773/original/file-20220412-23-9qtbd2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457773/original/file-20220412-23-9qtbd2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457773/original/file-20220412-23-9qtbd2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457773/original/file-20220412-23-9qtbd2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457773/original/file-20220412-23-9qtbd2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457773/original/file-20220412-23-9qtbd2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">When you see an ad on a web page, behind the scenes an ad network has just automatically conducted an auction to decide which advertiser won the right to present their ad to you.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eric Zeng</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>What sets Insanet’s Sherlock apart from Pegasus is its exploitation of ad networks rather than vulnerabilities in phones. A Sherlock user creates an ad campaign that narrowly focuses on the target’s demographic and location, and places a spyware-laden ad with an ad exchange. Once the ad is served to a web page that the target views, the spyware is secretly installed on the target’s phone or computer.</p>
<p>Although it’s too early to determine the full extent of Sherlock’s capabilities and limitations, the Haaretz report found that it can infect Windows-based computers and Android phones as well as iPhones.</p>
<h2>Spyware vs. malware</h2>
<p>Ad networks have been used to deliver malicious software for years, a practice dubbed <a href="https://www.csoonline.com/article/567045/what-is-malvertising-and-how-you-can-protect-against-it.html">malvertising</a>. In most cases, the malware is aimed at computers rather than phones, is indiscriminate, and is designed to lock a user’s data as part of a ransomware attack or steal passwords to access online accounts or organizational networks. The ad networks constantly scan for malvertising and rapidly block it when detected.</p>
<p>Spyware, on the other hand, tends to be aimed at phones, is targeted at specific people or narrow categories of people, and is designed to clandestinely obtain sensitive information and monitor someone’s activities. Once <a href="https://usa.kaspersky.com/resource-center/threats/spyware">spyware infiltrates your system</a>, it can record keystrokes, take screenshots and use various tracking mechanisms before transmitting your stolen data to the spyware’s creator. </p>
<p>While its actual capabilities are still under investigation, the new Sherlock spyware is at least capable of infiltration, monitoring, data capture and data transmission, according to the Haaretz report.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/R0RVI7bghj8?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The new Sherlock spyware is likely to have the same frightening capabilities as the previously discovered Pegasus.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Who’s using spyware</h2>
<p>From 2011 to 2023, at least 74 governments engaged in contracts with commercial companies <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/03/14/why-does-global-spyware-industry-continue-to-thrive-trends-explanations-and-responses-pub-89229">to acquire spyware or digital forensics technology</a>. National governments might deploy spyware for surveillance and gathering intelligence as well as combating crime and terrorism. Law enforcement agencies might similarly use spyware <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/iphone-spyware-lets-cops-log-suspects-passcodes-when-cracking-doesn-n1209296">as part of investigative efforts</a>, especially in cases involving cybercrime, organized crime or national security threats. </p>
<p>Companies might use spyware <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-ways-your-boss-is-spying-on-you-11563528604">to monitor employees’ computer activities</a>, ostensibly to protect intellectual property, prevent data breaches or ensure compliance with company policies. Private investigators might use spyware to <a href="https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/private-investigator-on-cellphone-spyware-42193">gather information and evidence for clients</a> on legal or personal matters. Hackers and organized crime figures might use spyware to <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/spywarehome_0905.pdf">steal information to use in fraud or extortion schemes</a>.</p>
<p>On top of the revelation that Israeli cybersecurity firms have developed a defense-proof technology that appropriates online advertising for civilian surveillance, a key concern is that Insanet’s advanced spyware was legally authorized by the Israeli government for sale to a broader audience. This potentially puts virtually everyone at risk. </p>
<p>The silver lining is that Sherlock appears to be expensive to use. According to an internal company document cited in the Haaretz report, a single Sherlock infection costs a client of a company using the technology a hefty US$6.4 million.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213685/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Claire Seungeun Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>You probably won’t be targeted by spyware, but if you are, odds are you won’t know about it. The latest spyware slips in unseen through online ads as you go about your digital life.Claire Seungeun Lee, Associate Professor of Criminology and Justice Studies, UMass LowellLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2114302023-08-21T04:09:47Z2023-08-21T04:09:47ZThe interactive art of Rafael Lozano-Hemmer: psychic resonance, surveillance and a murmuration of lights<p>“They stole my face,” shouts a ten-year-old boy into a microphone, before stomping away. </p>
<p>We are in the Rafael Lozano-Hemmer exhibition Atmospheric Memory at the Powerhouse in Sydney. The boy’s photograph was taken as soon as he entered the exhibition and then publicly projected onto his shadow. </p>
<p>Like the social media it replicates, the exhibition content is a product of its users – which can feel like theft.</p>
<p>The main exhibition room, Atmospheres, contains a number of different works including a water-spray wall. The mist coming from the wall is a response to changes in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere over time. It forms cloud-like visual texts whenever audience members speak into a microphone. </p>
<p>On the walls and floor of the main exhibition room, there are projected outsize images – a moving feast of text and data. These images and data represent the chaos of the digital world and the ubiquity of digital tracking technologies in urban environments. </p>
<p>All this digital imagery and scrambled text is a bit manic and unsettling. </p>
<p>Some of these elements from the Mexican-Canadian artist Lozano-Hemmer have been separately exhibited in Australia and internationally before. But brought together, the frenetic activity of so many competing elements in one room compromises their individual effect, especially as some recording components were not working on the day.</p>
<h2>Themes of surveillance</h2>
<p>The main work in the exhibition is called Zoom Pavilion. A tower supports 24 robotic cameras, which track visitors as we enter the space and report our appearance to the projectors, throwing our images onto the floor and the walls around us. </p>
<p>This work is a collaboration between Lozano-Hemmer and the pioneering Polish projection artist <a href="https://www.krzysztofwodiczko.com/about">Krzysztof Wodiczko</a>, and presents Wodiczko’s well-known theme of surveillance. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/not-big-brother-but-close-a-surveillance-expert-explains-some-of-the-ways-were-all-being-watched-all-the-time-194917">Not Big Brother, but close: a surveillance expert explains some of the ways we’re all being watched, all the time</a>
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<p>This type of art is what Lozano-Hemmer calls “<a href="https://dam.org/museum/artists_ui/artists/lozano-hemmer-rafael/relational-architecture/">relational architecture</a>”, invoking the ideas of engagement and social experimentation (the “relational”) and the built environment.</p>
<p>He has also described these works as “platforms for public participation” and “technological theatre”: artworks that try to augment public space with gigantic interactive projections designed to bring people together in a playful way.</p>
<p>In another room, Field Atmosphonia is a dynamic light display accompanied by 3,000 different sound channels, including field recordings of insects and hundreds of types of birds. It is the complexity of the natural world transposed into the digital. </p>
<p>Imagine a murmuration of lights accompanied by sounds. Visitors walk in confused patterns, in sync with the pulses of light. Several toddlers, enchanted by the sounds and lights, run frantically away from their parents and back again.</p>
<h2>Lost connections</h2>
<p>This Sydney version of the show incorporates an eccentric variety of objects from the Museum of Applied Arts and Sciences’ collection.</p>
<p>These objects include a boomerang, two terrariums with plants and rocks, three glass-blown bush-plum shapes by artist Yhonnie Scarce and, in the foyer, a slow-moving photographic panorama of late-19th-century misty Blue Mountains from the collection of Charles Kerry. </p>
<p>The connections between these collection items and Lozano-Hemmer’s work are hard to understand, except that they all connect to the atmosphere in various ways … at a stretch. The inclusion of the boomerang and glass shapes smacks of First Nations tokenism. </p>
<h2>Recreated, reformed and re-presented</h2>
<p>The overarching idea for Atmospheric Memory is that voice activation and image recording can be stored then endlessly recreated, reformed and re-presented to the audience. </p>
<p>Lozano-Hemmer attributes the origins of this idea to British 19th-century engineer and inventor Charles Babbage, who <a href="https://www.victorianweb.org/science/science_texts/bridgewater/intro.htm">claimed</a> perfect recollection is a calculation of the movement of all air molecules and could be rewound to reveal hidden voices.</p>
<p>Lozano-Hemmer has repositioned Babbage’s interest in psychic resonance and spirit reflection alongside his technological forecasting. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-was-the-first-computer-122164">What was the first computer?</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<p>It is arguable that Babbage’s ideas really were the precursor to the digital interconnection and uncanny surveillance tactics of the 21st century, as suggested by this exhibition. But Babbage also fell for the late-19th-century mystic allure of <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fcomm.2022.894078/full">life-death illusionism</a>, replayed here as the virtual/real dichotomy. </p>
<p>Both elements (illusionism and technology) are in play in the exhibition, but are not resolved. </p>
<p>Still, the rooms were packed with families enjoying the interactive elements. Even the kids who were worried about their stolen faces seemed to be having a fun time. </p>
<p>After pointing out the central problem of the show, the same boy returned to the mic to shout “Bye!” as he scurried off after his mother.</p>
<p><em>Atmospheric Memory is at the Powerhouse Museum, Sydney, until November 5.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211430/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>This new show at the Powerhouse Museum reflects the chaos of the digital world and the ubiquity of digital tracking.Prudence Gibson, Author and Research Fellow, UNSW SydneyEdward Scheer, Professor of Performance and Visual Culture, Head of School of Art and Design, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2099882023-08-01T20:14:47Z2023-08-01T20:14:47ZOlympic star Nadia Comăneci was a Romanian ‘hero’ who defected to escape her government. What do her surveillance files reveal?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540318/original/file-20230801-17-v1arxj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=23%2C5%2C3958%2C1970&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Composite image of Nadia Comaneci at the Montreal Olympic Games, 1976.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>“On the night of 27–28 November 1989,” Stejărel Olaru writes, “seven people hurriedly but warily made their way towards the frontier between Romania and Hungary.”</p>
<p>Five-time Olympic gold-medal-winning Romanian gymnast <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nadia_Com%C4%83neci">Nadia Comăneci</a> was one of those scrambling across fields in the dark. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Review: Nadia Comăneci and the Secret Police: A Cold War Escape – Stejărel Olaru, translated by Alistair Ian Blyth (Bloomsbury)</em></p>
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<p>“By now it was after midnight and the temperature had dropped so low that the cold had become a real danger,” Olaru adds:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>although it wasn’t the only one, nor even the most significant, since the seven had embarked on the perilous adventure of their lives: they were about to make an illegal border crossing between two communist states.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These quotes, which would sit comfortably in a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_le_Carr%C3%A9">Le Carre</a> thriller, come from <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/au/nadia-comaneci-and-the-secret-police-9781350321298/">Nadia Comăneci and the Secret Police: A Cold War Escape</a> (2023). </p>
<p>Translated from Romanian by Alistair Ian Blyth, this book sheds light on state surveillance, lived experience and sport in the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Bloc">Eastern Bloc</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540335/original/file-20230801-19-jjmgjo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540335/original/file-20230801-19-jjmgjo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540335/original/file-20230801-19-jjmgjo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540335/original/file-20230801-19-jjmgjo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540335/original/file-20230801-19-jjmgjo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540335/original/file-20230801-19-jjmgjo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540335/original/file-20230801-19-jjmgjo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540335/original/file-20230801-19-jjmgjo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nadia Comaneci performing on the balance beam on her way to a gold medal in the Moscow Olympics.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The most famous gymnast in the world</h2>
<p>To say Comăneci was well-known when she fled Romania would be an understatement. </p>
<p>Put simply, Comăneci, <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/audio/podcast-episode/nadia-comaneci-the-gymnast-who-made-olympic-history-with-a-perfect-10/wk5d54oc6">the first gymnast</a> to be awarded a perfect score of ten in an Olympic event, was, as Olaru points out, “the most famous gymnast in the world”.</p>
<p>Comăneci was <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Nadia-Comaneci">born</a> on November 12 1961 in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One%C8%99ti">Onęsti</a>, a provincial town in the Carpathian Mountains. She displayed an interest in gymnastics at an early age. </p>
<p>Her parents approved, hoping Nadia would burn off excess energy. Olaru notes that the precocious youngster “began to learn exercises on the mat, the vault, the parallel bars, and the beam, doing things she wouldn’t be able to do at home”. </p>
<p>All this, it should be added, happened while she was still in nursery. </p>
<p>By the autumn of 1969, Comăneci had enrolled at her local gymnastics centre, where she received formal training. In 1970, she became the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nadia_Com%C4%83neci#:%7E:text">youngest gymnast</a> to win at the Romanian Nationals. Success after success followed. </p>
<p>Comăneci shot to international prominence in 1975 when, at the age of 13, she dominated proceedings at the <a href="https://olympics.com/en/news/nadia-comaneci-a-pioneer-in-perfection">European Gymnastics Championships</a>.</p>
<p>“Nadia astonished not only the public,” Olaru asserts, “but also the opposing teams, who discovered a gymnast who, perfectly and unhesitatingly, could execute exercises of extreme difficulty.” </p>
<p>Comăneci’s performance had profound ramifications. In Olaru’s estimation, she single-handedly “managed to change public perceptions of the sport thanks to the perfection with which she performed her routines”. </p>
<p>Having piqued the world’s interest, Comăneci reached the pinnacle of gymnastic perfection at the <a href="https://olympics.com/en/olympic-games/montreal-1976">1976 Montreal Olympics</a>, when she scored her famous perfect ten on the uneven bars.</p>
<p>Olaru’s description of Comăneci’s remarkable routine is worth quoting:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Nadia leapt straight to a support position on the high bar and cast away from it to perform a straddled front somersault while re-grasping the same bar. Her routine was marked by moments of exquisite balance as she performed handstands and her well-known full twisting somersaults between bars. Finally, using the spring of the lower bar for lift, she span through the air before sticking a perfect landing. The whole routine had lasted a mere twenty seconds.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The arena erupted in applause. Comăneci’s name and score was on everybody’s lips and immediately started to wend their way around the world. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/4m2YT-PIkEc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Nadia Comăneci’s world-first perfect ten routine at the Montreal Olympics.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This performance transformed gymnastics and changed Comăneci’s life. She received a hero’s welcome on returning home. Her name and likeness adorned posters all over Romania. </p>
<p>Never one to miss a publicity opportunity, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicolae_Ceau%C8%99escu">Nicolae Ceaușescu</a> – Romania’s dictatorial ruler – also looked to get in on the action. He declared Comăneci an official <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hero_of_Socialist_Labour">Hero of Socialist Labour</a>. </p>
<p>In the same breath, Ceaușescu moved to safeguard what he regarded as a national asset and propaganda tool – a device that might prove useful when stoking mass patriotic sentiment. This explains why, over the coming years, Comăneci and those close to her were subjected to sustained state surveillance. </p>
<p>Compounding matters, in 1985, the Ceaușescu regime refused to let Comăneci – who was by then working as a sports ambassador – travel abroad, except to other communist countries.</p>
<p>This, in turn, accounted for Comăneci’s decision to leave Romania in 1989. She simply couldn’t stand the pressure and intrusion any more. </p>
<p>“All the restrictions in her life convinced her that she should abandon caution and do something that was not in her nature,” Olaru surmises, even if that life-threatening decision to set out to the United States likely meant she would never see her family and loved ones again.</p>
<p>Such is the dramatic personal narrative that Olaru puts forward in his book, which makes impressive use of 25,000 pages’ worth of secret police documentation, state intelligence archives and extensive wiretap recordings.</p>
<p>This, though, is but one part of a larger and more distressing story.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-from-delicate-teens-to-fierce-women-simone-biles-athleticism-and-advocacy-have-changed-gymnastics-forever-124485">Friday essay: from delicate teens to fierce women, Simone Biles' athleticism and advocacy have changed gymnastics forever</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Influential, abusive coaches</h2>
<p>I mentioned before that Comăneci and those close to her were, in the wake of her triumph in Montreal, subject to remarkable, even intolerable levels of state-sanctioned scrutiny.</p>
<p>This applied, too, to the married couple who trained Comăneci from a young age.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540336/original/file-20230801-27-uthhh0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540336/original/file-20230801-27-uthhh0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540336/original/file-20230801-27-uthhh0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=574&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540336/original/file-20230801-27-uthhh0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=574&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540336/original/file-20230801-27-uthhh0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=574&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540336/original/file-20230801-27-uthhh0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=721&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540336/original/file-20230801-27-uthhh0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=721&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540336/original/file-20230801-27-uthhh0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=721&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Coach Béla Károlyi (middle) and Nadia Comăneci (right), with gymnast Teodora Ungureanu.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B%C3%A9la_K%C3%A1rolyi">Béla</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%A1rta_K%C3%A1rolyi">Márta Károlyi</a> are two of the most influential and successful coaches in the history of gymnastics. They are also extremely <a href="https://www.texasmonthly.com/arts-entertainment/bela-karolyi-revealed/">controversial</a> - as viewers of <a href="https://www.popsugar.com/fitness/athlete-a-review-netflix-about-larry-nassar-trial-47554030">Athlete A</a> will already know.</p>
<p>Consider what Olaru has to say about the pair, who feature prominently in every chapter of his book. (In fact, there are moments when one could be forgiven for thinking Olaru is really interested in writing about the Károlyis and the secret police.) A word of warning though: this is confronting material. </p>
<p>“Today,” Olaru remarks, “it is no secret that the Károlyis used to beat their gymnasts.” </p>
<p>Indeed, “Béla Károlyi’s hand was so heavy that the victim of his abuse, a defenceless child, would be knocked over, bowled across the floor.” </p>
<p>Olaru makes the point – and the archival record supports him – that the abuse Comăneci and her peers suffered at the hands of Bela Károlyi was not only physical:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Repeated blows, verbal violence and insults, starvation, excessive and aberrant control of medical care, and the inhuman demand to train and compete even when injured caused deep wounds in the psyches of the gymnasts, who distanced themselves from him, regarding him as cruel, and certainly not as a protective father figure. Only when there was a need to manipulate them did he tell the young gymnasts he cared about them.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>How, we might ask, did Károlyi get away with such appalling behaviour?</p>
<p>The depressing conclusion Oralu reaches is that the Romanian authorities chose to ignore the multiple warnings that came their way. Officials at the very “highest level” were more than happy to support Károlyi, provided he kept on winning.</p>
<p>And this he did, up until the moment – <a href="https://sports.jrank.org/pages/2456/Karolyi-Bela-Defection.html">in March 1981</a> – when he and Márta defected to the US. </p>
<p>Having traded communism for capitalism, the Károlyis set about re-establishing themselves as trainers in their adopted state of Texas. US gymnasts were keen to work with the man who had played such an important role in Comăneci’s career. </p>
<p>Károlyi’s first major success in the US came as the coach of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mary_Lou_Retton">Mary Lou Retton</a>, who won a gold medal at the <a href="https://olympics.com/en/olympic-games/los-angeles-1984">1984 Los Angeles Olympics</a>, becoming the first US woman to win the all-round gold medal in Olympic gymnastics.</p>
<p>This achievement caught the attention of <a href="https://usagym.org/">USA Gymnastics</a>. Béla Károlyi went on to serve as a member of the US Olympic coaching staff at four more Olympic Games, and worked as <a href="https://usagym.org/bela-karolyi-to-step-aside-as-national-team-coordinator-for-usa-gymnastics/">National Team Coordinator</a> until 2001 (when Márta Károlyi took over). </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/girls-no-more-why-elite-gymnastics-competition-for-women-should-start-at-18-143182">Girls no more: why elite gymnastics competition for women should start at 18</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>America’s gymnastics community knew</h2>
<p>Given Béla Károlyi’s success in the US warrants barely a mention in Oralu’s study (which takes leave of the Károlyis not long after they make their break for the West), one could be forgiven for asking if any of this matters. </p>
<p>It matters because it’s clear the US gymnastics community was well aware of Károlyi’s reputation.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540338/original/file-20230801-19-j573dz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540338/original/file-20230801-19-j573dz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540338/original/file-20230801-19-j573dz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=863&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540338/original/file-20230801-19-j573dz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=863&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540338/original/file-20230801-19-j573dz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=863&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540338/original/file-20230801-19-j573dz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1084&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540338/original/file-20230801-19-j573dz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1084&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540338/original/file-20230801-19-j573dz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1084&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Take Joan Ryan’s <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/159298/little-girls-in-pretty-boxes-by-joan-ryan/">Little Girls in Pretty Boxes</a>, published in 1995, which exposed the abusive reality of professional gymnastics in the US. </p>
<p>Given what we have already established, it will come as no surprise to discover Béla Károlyi and his methods came under sustained attack in Ryan’s searing exposé. </p>
<p>But nothing happened. USA Gymnastics continued to place its trust - and the bodies of its athletes - in Károlyi’s hands. </p>
<p>The impression we are left with is the same one we get when reading Oralu: it seems some people are significantly more interested in the pursuit of gymnastic success than in the physical and mental health of the gymnasts themselves.</p>
<p>Troublingly, as the Károlyis’ involvement in the devastating <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USA_Gymnastics_sex_abuse_scandal">USA Gymnastics sex abuse scandal</a> of recent years demonstrates, it appears not much has changed since the days of Comăneci and the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iron_Curtain">Iron Curtain</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209988/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Howard does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nadia Comăneci was the most famous gymnast in the world when she defected from Romania in 1989. A new book includes 25,000 pages worth of secret police surveillance material.Alexander Howard, Senior Lecturer, Discipline of English, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2084442023-07-12T20:27:05Z2023-07-12T20:27:05ZCanadian law enforcement agencies continue to target Muslims<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536418/original/file-20230709-145234-1zd726.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2995%2C1904&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People hold signs during a protest in Montréal against Islamphobia in 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Graham Hughes</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/canadian-law-enforcement-agencies-continue-to-target-muslims" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>As Canadians, we often take pride in perceiving ourselves as different from the United States, proudly <a href="https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=2848&context=wmlr">asserting our contempt</a> about <a href="https://vancouversun.com/news/conversations-that-matter-we-cant-be-smug-about-canadian-democracy">events south of the border</a>.</p>
<p>Yet, a haunting question lingers: have we fallen into some of the same practices we so vehemently condemn, specifically systemic Islamophobia?</p>
<p>On Canada Day in 2013, John Nuttall and Amanda Korody were <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/alleged-canada-day-bomb-plot-targeted-b-c-legislature-1.1408115">arrested by the RCMP</a> after allegedly attempting to bomb the British Columbia legislature. </p>
<p>The arrests were widely celebrated as a victory in the global war on terror. However, three years later, Canadians discovered that the arrests were not the success story the RCMP portrayed them to be. </p>
<p>In July 2016, Justice Catherine Bruce of the B.C. Supreme Court <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9097868/nuttall-and-korody-sue/">ruled that the RCMP manufactured</a> the case against them and entrapped Nuttall and Korody. </p>
<p>The case represents the only terrorism trial in North America where entrapment was successfully invoked by the defence to overturn terrorism convictions, leading to a stay of proceedings and ultimately the couple’s acquittal. However, behind this groundbreaking case lies a darker truth — the deeply concerning tactics deployed by the RCMP. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A tall man embraces a shorter woman wearing a black head scarf." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536414/original/file-20230709-196949-2zr9v8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536414/original/file-20230709-196949-2zr9v8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536414/original/file-20230709-196949-2zr9v8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536414/original/file-20230709-196949-2zr9v8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536414/original/file-20230709-196949-2zr9v8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536414/original/file-20230709-196949-2zr9v8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536414/original/file-20230709-196949-2zr9v8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">John Nuttall and Amanda Korody embrace at B.C. Supreme Court after a judge ruled the couple were entrapped by the RCMP in a police-manufactured crime in Vancouver in 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Darryl Dyck</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Inside Project Souvenir</h2>
<p>In a tale that reads like a Hollywood thriller, the RCMP found themselves entangled in a web of intrigue when they received a tip from CSIS in February 2013 that Nuttall had been purchasing potassium nitrate and making some violent pro-Islamic remarks.</p>
<p>In response, the RCMP launched an elaborate surveillance operation it called Project Souvenir.</p>
<p>Undercover “Officer A” roped Nuttall into a fictitious jihadist organization planning a large-scale attack on the West. Nuttall, tasked by Officer A with devising the plan, presented a wide range of grandiose ideas, from train hijackings to firing rockets over the B.C. legislature. </p>
<p>As the operation unfolded, it became clear that Nuttall was not capable of carrying out any of the proposed plans. Officer A threatened Nuttall with expulsion from the organization if he did not come up with a viable attack plan. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"740316183522611200"}"></div></p>
<p>Ultimately, a plan came together about planting pressure cookers at the legislature in Victoria. Yet Nuttall’s lack of knowledge and incompetence in handling explosives became glaringly apparent.</p>
<p>This led Officer A to promise Nuttall that all resources, including the elusive <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Photos/igphoto/2001510222/">C4 explosive</a>, would be provided. </p>
<p>On Canada Day in 2013, Officer A gave the couple a ride to the legislature, where they planted the pressure-cooker bombs. Later that afternoon, the couple was arrested.</p>
<h2>The over-policing of Muslims</h2>
<p>Despite <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/newsinteractives/features/john-nuttall-amanda-korody-rcmp-terror">Nuttall’s long criminal history spanning 20 years</a>, he only seemed to attract the attention of RCMP after his conversion to Islam. </p>
<p>It became evident in the trial that the police lacked substantial evidence to support any suspicions about the couple. There was no corroboration for the CSIS alert that initiated the investigation in the first place, but police proceeded with it anyway.</p>
<p>It seemed instead the police were profiling the couple based on their religion, and falsely associating devout religious beliefs with political violence and terrorism. </p>
<p>The RCMP allocated around <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/project-souvenir-john-nutall-amanda-korody-investigation-overtime-1.3468323#:%7E:text=Documents%20obtained%20by%20The%20Canadian,was%20code%20named%20Project%20Souvenir.">$1 million in overtime payments to 200 Mounties</a> for this five-month operation. </p>
<p>This raises the question of whether Muslim communities in Canada are over-policed, as <a href="https://utorontopress.com/9781487545901/systemic-islamophobia-in-canada/">suggested by University of Toronto law professor Kent Roach</a>.</p>
<p>The RCMP’s unwavering determination to proceed with the investigation, disregarding <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/newsinteractives/features/john-nuttall-amanda-korody-rcmp-terror">warnings of a potential police-generated crime</a> within the police ranks, poses the question: were investigators fuelled by stereotypes and discrimination? </p>
<p>What Roach describes as “over-policing” of Muslims has led to rampant human rights abuses. Alarming parallels emerge in cases like <a href="https://www.amnesty.ca/legal-brief/case-maher-arar/?gclid=Cj0KCQjwtamlBhD3ARIsAARoaEykUENR2ZN5F8zx0qW_V6UOHsdkTI_lMsLqghp5mmWWb-6vBC2QnxkaAuLREALw_wcB">Maher Arar</a>, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/abdullah-almalki-apology-ottawa-morning-1.4032265">Abdullah Almalki</a> and other targeted Muslim Canadians, where intelligence may have stemmed from guilt by association and anti-Muslim stereotypes. </p>
<p>These cases paint a brutal picture of the over-policing of Muslims in Canada, underpinned by suspicions of Muslims as terrorists. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A bearded man listens to a question at a news conference. A row of Canadian flags is behind him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536417/original/file-20230709-21-ryopai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536417/original/file-20230709-21-ryopai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536417/original/file-20230709-21-ryopai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536417/original/file-20230709-21-ryopai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536417/original/file-20230709-21-ryopai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536417/original/file-20230709-21-ryopai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536417/original/file-20230709-21-ryopai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Maher Arar, an Ottawa telecommunications professional wrongly accused of having ties to terrorism when arrested by American security officials in 2002, listens to a question at a news conference in Ottawa in 2006.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Tom Hanson</span></span>
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<h2>Mass surveillance</h2>
<p>A <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/23326492231151587">recent study</a> by criminology and sociology academics Baljit Nagra and Paula Maurutto sheds further light on CSIS’s mass surveillance of Muslims in Canada. </p>
<p>The study documents how CSIS fosters a culture of informants and reveals how racial narratives surrounding perceived “radicalized extremist” Muslims have provided legitimacy for sweeping surveillance at the hands of intelligence services under the guise of the war on terror.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/csis-targeting-of-canadian-muslims-reveals-the-importance-of-addressing-institutional-islamophobia-199559">CSIS targeting of Canadian Muslims reveals the importance of addressing institutional Islamophobia</a>
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<p>CSIS adopts a “radicalization” framework, which identifies religious devotion as a marker that labels young Muslims as “at risk” for potential indoctrination into “radical extremism,” directly linking Islam to potential terrorism. </p>
<p>As we reflect on the safeguarding of our rights and freedoms, we are confronted with a humbling realization: we may not be so different from our neighbours south of the border. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hate-crimes-associated-with-both-islamophobia-and-anti-semitism-have-a-long-history-in-americas-past-116255">Hate crimes associated with both Islamophobia and anti-Semitism have a long history in America's past</a>
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<p>Canada must continue examining the tactics and decision-making processes employed by its law enforcement agencies.</p>
<p>In doing so, we must reflect on the profound consequences of over-surveillance on the freedoms of religion, expression and association — particularly for Muslim Canadians — and their impact on equality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208444/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Basema Al-Alami is affiliated with the Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies at University of Toronto</span></em></p>Canada must reflect on the profound consequences of over-surveillance on the freedoms of religion, expression and association — particularly for Muslim Canadians — and their impact on equality.Basema Al-Alami, SJD Candidate, Faculty of Law, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2077072023-06-29T12:16:21Z2023-06-29T12:16:21ZUS agencies buy vast quantities of personal information on the open market – a legal scholar explains why and what it means for privacy in the age of AI<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534425/original/file-20230627-39049-o6zul0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3840%2C2160&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Government agencies can track you, thanks to the vast amounts of personal information available for sale.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/society-and-communication-network-concept-royalty-free-image/1326558181">metamorworks/iStock via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Numerous government agencies, including the FBI, Department of Defense, National Security Agency, Treasury Department, Defense Intelligence Agency, Navy and Coast Guard, have purchased vast amounts of U.S. citizens’ personal information from commercial data brokers. The revelation was published in a partially declassified, internal <a href="https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2023/item/2390-dni-haines-statement-on-declassified-report-on-commercially-available-information">Office of the Director of National Intelligence report</a> released on June 9, 2023.</p>
<p>The report shows the breathtaking scale and invasive nature of the consumer data market and how that market directly enables wholesale surveillance of people. The data includes not only where you’ve been and who you’re connected to, but the nature of your beliefs and predictions about what you might do in the future. The report underscores the grave risks the purchase of this data poses, and urges the intelligence community to adopt internal guidelines to address these problems.</p>
<p>As a privacy, electronic surveillance and technology law <a href="https://www.annetoomeymckenna.com/">attorney, researcher and law professor</a>, I have spent years researching, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=2643050">writing</a> and advising about the legal issues the report highlights. </p>
<p>These issues are increasingly urgent. Today’s commercially available information, coupled with the now-ubiquitous decision-making artificial intelligence and generative AI like ChatGPT, significantly increases the threat to privacy and civil liberties by giving the government access to sensitive personal information beyond even what it could collect through court-authorized surveillance.</p>
<h2>What is commercially available information?</h2>
<p>The drafters of the report take the position that commercially available information is a subset of publicly available information. The distinction between the two is significant from a legal perspective. Publicly available information is information that is already in the public domain. You could find it by doing a little online searching. </p>
<p>Commercially available information is different. It is personal information collected from a dizzying array of sources by commercial data brokers that aggregate and analyze it, then make it available for purchase by others, including governments. Some of that information is private, confidential or otherwise legally protected.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534454/original/file-20230627-16-adjj2j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A chart with four columns and three rows" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534454/original/file-20230627-16-adjj2j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534454/original/file-20230627-16-adjj2j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=288&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534454/original/file-20230627-16-adjj2j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=288&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534454/original/file-20230627-16-adjj2j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=288&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534454/original/file-20230627-16-adjj2j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534454/original/file-20230627-16-adjj2j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534454/original/file-20230627-16-adjj2j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The commercial data market collects and packages vast amounts of data and sells it for various commercial, private and government uses.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Government Accounting Office</span></span>
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<p>The sources and types of data for commercially available information are mind-bogglingly vast. They include public records and other publicly available information. But far more information comes from the nearly ubiquitous internet-connected devices in people’s lives, like cellphones, <a href="https://spectrum.ieee.org/smart-home-devices-can-reveal-the-health-status-of-individuals">smart home systems</a>, cars and fitness trackers. These all harness data from sophisticated, embedded <a href="https://theconversation.com/ftc-lawsuit-spotlights-a-major-privacy-risk-from-call-records-to-sensors-your-phone-reveals-more-about-you-than-you-think-189618">sensors, cameras and microphones</a>. Sources also include data from apps, online activity, texts and emails, and even <a href="https://www.hipaajournal.com/meta-facing-scrutiny-over-use-of-meta-pixel-tracking-code-on-hospital-websites/">health care provider websites</a>. </p>
<p>Types of <a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ODNI-Declassified-Report-on-CAI-January2022.pdf">data include</a> location, gender and sexual orientation, religious and political views and affiliations, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/blog/2022/07/location-health-and-other-sensitive-information-ftc-committed-fully-enforcing-law-against-illegal">weight and blood pressure, speech patterns, emotional states, behavioral information about myriad activities, shopping patterns</a> and family and friends. </p>
<p>This data provides companies and governments a window into the “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCON52037.2021.9702450">Internet of Behaviors</a>,” a combination of data collection and analysis aimed at understanding and predicting people’s behavior. It pulls together a wide range of data, including location and activities, and uses scientific and technological approaches, including psychology and machine learning, to analyze that data. The Internet of Behaviors provides a map of what each person has done, is doing and is expected to do, and provides a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sintl.2021.100122">means to influence a person’s behavior</a>. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Smart homes could be good for your wallet and good for the environment, but really bad for your privacy.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Better, cheaper and unrestricted</h2>
<p>The rich depths of commercially available information, analyzed with powerful AI, provide unprecedented power, intelligence and investigative insights. The information is a cost-effective way to surveil virtually everyone, plus it provides far more sophisticated data than traditional electronic surveillance tools or methods like wiretapping and location tracking. </p>
<p>Government use of electronic surveillance tools is extensively <a href="https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1285">regulated by federal</a> and state laws. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the Constitution’s <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/fourth_amendment">Fourth Amendment</a>, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, requires a warrant for a wide range of digital searches. These include wiretapping or <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/389/347/">intercepting a person’s calls</a>, texts or emails; <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/10-1259">using GPS</a> or <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf">cellular location information</a> to track a person; or <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/573/373/">searching a person’s cellphone</a>. </p>
<p>Complying with these laws takes time and money, plus electronic surveillance law restricts what, when and how data can be collected. Commercially available information is cheaper to obtain, provides far richer data and analysis, and is subject to little oversight or restriction compared to when the same data is collected directly by the government.</p>
<h2>The threats</h2>
<p>Technology and the burgeoning volume of commercially available information allow various forms of the information to be combined and analyzed in new ways to understand all aspects of your life, including preferences and desires. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">How the collection, aggregation and sale of your data violates your privacy.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The Office of the Director of National Intelligence report warns that the increasing volume and widespread availability of commercially available information poses “significant threats to privacy and civil liberties.” It increases the power of the government to surveil its citizens outside the bounds of law, and it opens the door to the government using that data in potentially unlawful ways. This could include <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/yes-phones-can-reveal-if-someone-gets-an-abortion/">using location data obtained via commercially available information rather than a warrant</a> to investigate and prosecute someone for abortion. </p>
<p>The report also captures both how widespread government purchases of commercially available information are and how haphazard government practices around the use of the information are. The purchases are so pervasive and agencies’ practices so poorly documented that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence cannot even fully determine how much and what types of information agencies are purchasing, and what the various agencies are doing with the data. </p>
<h2>Is it legal?</h2>
<p>The question of whether it’s legal for government agencies to purchase commercially available information is complicated by the array of sources and complex mix of data it contains. </p>
<p>There is no legal prohibition on the government collecting information already disclosed to the public or otherwise publicly available. But the nonpublic information listed in the declassified report includes data that U.S. law typically protects. The nonpublic information’s mix of private, sensitive, confidential or otherwise lawfully protected data makes collection a legal gray area. </p>
<p>Despite decades of increasingly sophisticated and invasive commercial data aggregation, Congress has not passed a federal data privacy law. The lack of federal regulation around data <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-fog-reveal-a-legal-scholar-explains-the-app-some-police-forces-are-using-to-track-people-without-a-warrant-189944">creates a loophole</a> for government agencies to evade electronic surveillance law. It also allows agencies to amass enormous databases that AI systems learn from and use in often unrestricted ways. The resulting erosion of privacy has been <a href="https://ssrn.com/abstract=2905131">a concern for more than a decade</a>. </p>
<h2>Throttling the data pipeline</h2>
<p>The Office of the Director of National Intelligence report acknowledges the stunning loophole that commercially available information provides for government surveillance: “The government would never have been permitted to compel billions of people to carry location tracking devices on their persons at all times, to log and track most of their social interactions, or to keep flawless records of all their reading habits. Yet smartphones, connected cars, web tracking technologies, the Internet of Things, and other innovations have had this effect without government participation.”</p>
<p>However, it isn’t entirely correct to say “without government participation.” The legislative branch could have prevented this situation by enacting data privacy laws, more tightly regulating commercial data practices, and providing oversight in AI development. Congress could yet address the problem. Representative Ted Lieu has introduced the <a href="https://lieu.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/reps-lieu-buck-eshoo-and-sen-schatz-introduce-bipartisan-bicameral-bill">a bipartisan proposal for a National AI Commission</a>, and Senator Chuck Schumer has proposed <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/06/21/ai-regulation-us-senate-chuck-schumer/">an AI regulation framework</a>. </p>
<p>Effective data privacy laws would keep your personal information safer from government agencies and corporations, and responsible AI regulation would block them from manipulating you.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207707/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anne Toomey McKenna has received funding from the National Security Agency for the development of legal educational materials about Cyberlaw and funding from The National Police Foundation together with the U.S. Department of Justice-COPS division for legal analysis regarding the use of drones in domestic policing. She is affiliated with IEEE-USA, and she co-chairs IEEE's Artificial Intelligence Policy Committee; this position involves subject matter and education-related interaction with congressional staffers and the Congressional AI Caucus. </span></em></p>The government faces legal restrictions on how much personal information it can gather on citizens, but the law is largely silent on agencies purchasing the data from commercial brokers.Anne Toomey McKenna, Visiting Professor of Law, University of RichmondLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2055762023-05-18T20:02:08Z2023-05-18T20:02:08ZIs China out to spy on us through drones and other tech? Perhaps that’s not the question we should be asking<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526948/original/file-20230518-15-yttmb3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australian government agencies’ use of Chinese-made technology has been <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence/call-for-audit-as-chinese-dji-drones-join-australian-defence-force-war-games/news-story/b38a1b0b348c543d1ddaebac6a3caeea">making headlines</a> again. This time, the potential threat comes from DJI drones produced by China-headquartered company Da Jiang Innovations. </p>
<p>A cessation order signed earlier this month will see the Australian Defence Force (ADF) suspend its use of DJI products, pending a six-month <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence-chiefs-order-grounding-of-chinas-dji-drones-pending-sixmonth-security-audit/news-story/8b1230b6ae4584d63ecb0aaab53fa233">security audit</a> of the force’s supply chain. DJI drones were being used for <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence/call-for-audit-as-chinese-dji-drones-join-australian-defence-force-war-games/news-story/b38a1b0b348c543d1ddaebac6a3caeea">training and military exercises</a>. </p>
<p>DJI joins a growing list of Chinese technology producers spurring anxiety in Australia and among allies. But the disproportionate focus on Chinese-made technologies might not be doing Australia’s national security much good.</p>
<h2>A history of pointing the finger at China</h2>
<p>It is important to note DJI does <a href="https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/company/dji">have links</a> with China’s ruling political party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which has its own branch within the company. DJI also supports public security efforts in Xinjiang. Recent research has <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20594364231171013">demonstrated</a> how private surveillance companies in China will keenly adopt the CCP’s language to position themselves advantageously in the domestic market. </p>
<p>All of the above has raised national security concerns in Australia – and not for the first time. In 2018, Malcolm Turnbull’s government <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/huawei-no-way-why-australia-banned-the-world-s-biggest-telecoms-firm-20210503-p57oc9.html">blocked</a> Huawei from supplying Australia’s 5G infrastructure to ensure the security of critical infrastructure. Turnbull <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/jul/16/shameful-turnbull-rebukes-australian-business-for-criticising-china-relations">said</a> Australia must “defend our sovereignty with the same passion that China seeks to defend its sovereignty”.</p>
<p>An ongoing case is also being made against TikTok, with critics pointing to the potential for the CCP to use the app to harvest data. The platform <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/apr/04/australia-wide-ban-of-tiktok-on-government-devices-announced-as-senior-politicians-quit-the-app">was banned</a> from Australian government devices in April.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/even-if-tiktok-and-other-apps-are-collecting-your-data-what-are-the-actual-consequences-187277">Even if TikTok and other apps are collecting your data, what are the actual consequences?</a>
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<p>In another example, the shadow cyber security and home affairs minister, James Paterson, earlier this year <a href="https://www.9news.com.au/national/chinese-cctv-cameras-removed-from-australian-war-memorial/7f2c4648-d096-43d6-95ea-a23b71e03601">called for the removal</a> of all CCTV cameras at government sites supplied by China-based companies Hikvision and Dahua. This came after an audit that involved <a href="https://www.senatorpaterson.com.au/news/media-release-audit-commonwealth-riddled-by-ccp-spyware">counting</a> the number of Hikvision and Dahua cameras being used on government premises (there were more than 900).</p>
<h2>The problems, according to recent debates</h2>
<p>Paterson’s reviews of the use of TikTok, Chinese CCTV camera and DJI drones by government agencies have <a href="https://www.senatorpaterson.com.au/news/dji-drones-linked-to-chinese-military-companies-a-national-security-and-moral-concern-transcript-james-paterson-on-sharri">been accompanied</a> by two key arguments.</p>
<p>The first considers Chinese companies’ links to human rights violations. In 2022, the United Nations published an <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assesment.pdf">assessment</a> that determined there was evidence of serious human rights violations against Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim-minority people in Xinjiang province.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/even-if-tiktok-and-other-apps-are-collecting-your-data-what-are-the-actual-consequences-187277">Even if TikTok and other apps are collecting your data, what are the actual consequences?</a>
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<p>The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has <a href="https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/homepage">monitored</a> Chinese technology companies and their sales in Xinjiang since 2019, and curated a list of 27 companies supplying surveillance infrastructure to the region. DJI, Hikvision and Dahua all compete for market share in China, and this includes sales to public security agencies in Xinjiang. </p>
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<p>The second argument considers potential risks to Australia’s national security. In the case of DJI, Australia has acted in tandem with the US since 2017, when DJI drones where first prohibited from use by the US military. The same year, Australian Defence Forces <a href="https://www.news.com.au/national/politics/the-adf-requests-talk-of-a-potential-compromise-by-a-chinese-drone-be-made-secret/news-story/0c87c6ddef8392539cc3bc2499c8aa9b">suspended</a> their use of DJI drones for two weeks. A recommendation was then made to use them only in non-sensitive and unclassified contexts.</p>
<p>In 2019, the US Department of Defence <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2706082/department-statement-on-dji-systems/">banned</a> the purchase and use of drones and their components produced in China, and in 2022 <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3180636/dod-releases-list-of-peoples-republic-of-china-prc-military-companies-in-accord/">made</a> DJI a blacklisted supplier – less than a year before the ADF announced its current security audit.</p>
<h2>What should Australia be doing?</h2>
<p>In a 2017 parliamentary hearing that included a discussion on DJI drones, the ADF’s then deputy chief of information warfare, Marcus Thompson, <a href="https://www.news.com.au/national/politics/the-adf-requests-talk-of-a-potential-compromise-by-a-chinese-drone-be-made-secret/news-story/0c87c6ddef8392539cc3bc2499c8aa9b">noted</a> “there were some concerns regarding the cyber security characteristics of the device”. The conversation continued behind closed doors.</p>
<p>More recently, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Director-General Mike Burgess responded to concerns about CCTV camera use by <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/chinese-security-cameras-in-our-halls-of-power/news-story/b316e70c7f2d4702dfda77b87936834e">saying</a>: “There’s nothing wrong with the technology; it’s that the data it collects and where it would end up and what else it could be used for would be of great concern to me and my agency.”</p>
<p>These scenarios suggest, when it comes to China, there are risks of potential foreign interference, espionage and data leaks. Yet, at the same time, we don’t have concrete evidence of Chinese government agencies accessing Australians’ data via tech companies and their products. </p>
<p>Either way, starting a new debate on the use of Chinese technology every few months is not a sustainable security strategy, as much as it is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-needs-a-robust-cybersecurity-overhaul-not-whack-a-mole-bans-on-apps-like-tiktok-203158">whack-a-mole tactical response</a>. Nor is it very useful to conduct audits that merely count the number of Chinese-made devices in use.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-needs-a-robust-cybersecurity-overhaul-not-whack-a-mole-bans-on-apps-like-tiktok-203158">Australia needs a robust cybersecurity overhaul – not whack-a-mole bans on apps like TikTok</a>
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<p>Protecting Australia’s national security interests will require in-depth security reviews of all foreign technologies used, as well as a review of our overall national security strategy. ASIO <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/resources/asio-annual-report-2021-22">has</a> a foreign interference task force, which could consider incorporating the vetting of imported tech. Such an approach would help avoid hypotheticals. </p>
<p>It would also clearly articulate roles and responsibilities within government for whatever new technology comes along next. It is not just China that poses risks to Australia’s national security. Our politically driven focus on China takes away from efforts to weed out potential harms from <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/oct/21/asio-chief-says-foreign-spies-trying-to-deceptively-cultivate-australian-politicians-at-every-level">elsewhere</a>, such as <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/fake-russian-diplomats-revealed-as-heart-of-hive-spy-ring-in-australia-20230223-p5cmxz.html">Russia</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/feb/14/australia-foils-iran-surveillance-plot-and-vows-to-bring-foreign-interference-into-the-light">Iran</a> and non-state actors.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205576/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Over the years Australia has been quick to point the finger at China – most recently in relation to DJI drones. Instead, we should look closely at our own tech security policies.Ausma Bernot, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security, Charles Sturt UniversityPatrick F Walsh, Professor, Intelligence and Security Studies, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2039892023-04-19T15:58:32Z2023-04-19T15:58:32ZEmergency alert system launches in the UK: should you be worried about privacy?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521614/original/file-20230418-22-qlop3w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C17%2C2000%2C1410&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Privacy concerns over the emergency alert? Here's what you need to know.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gov.uk/alerts">gov.co.uk/Shutterstock/Canva</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When disaster strikes, it’s helpful to know what’s going on. This is why the UK government has launched an <a href="https://www.gov.uk/alerts">emergency alerts service</a>, to be used in life-threatening situations including flooding and wildfires. </p>
<p>The time has now come to test how the system works – which is why every mobile phone in the UK will get an emergency alert on Sunday, 23 April at 3pm. The message, which will appear alongside a loud alarm and vibration on millions of phones, will let the government see how this new public warning system operates. Your phone will vibrate and make a loud siren-like sound for about ten seconds – even if it’s on silent. </p>
<p><a href="https://news.sky.com/story/emergency-alerts-how-they-work-in-other-countries-including-a-few-times-when-it-has-gone-wrong-12851133">Similar systems</a> are already in place in countries such as the US, Australia, France and Japan. But while these alerts can make a <a href="https://ascelibrary.org/doi/abs/10.1061/(ASCE)1527-6988(2000)1:2(119)">big difference</a> in emergency situations, they also raise serious <a href="https://www.ohmymag.co.uk/news/uk-emergency-phone-alerts-have-citizens-concerned-about-privacy-heres-what-you-should-know_art16943.html">privacy concerns</a> which might tempt some people to <a href="https://www.gov.uk/alerts/how-alerts-work">opt out</a> from the messages. </p>
<p>Domestic violence charities have also <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/tv/news/emergency-alerts-iphone-android-turn-off-b2314745.html">expressed concern</a> that the message and loud alarm may alert abusers to secret phones that some people experiencing violence in the home may have hidden. Women’s Aid and Refuge have both <a href="https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/how-stop-uk-gov-emergency-29709068">issued advice</a> on how to turn the alerts off if you’re hiding a secret phone. </p>
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<p>National alert systems use <a href="https://www.techopedia.com/definition/6405/cell-broadcast-cb">cell broadcasting technology</a>, which allows messages to be sent to all mobile devices within a defined area without knowing their phone numbers or locations. </p>
<p>In essence, the <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11069-022-05241-x">cell broadcast system</a> is a computer that checks the message, makes sure it’s secure and valid, and then sends it via special radio signals to all the radio towers that cover the area where the message is meant to go. </p>
<p>Crucially, the message is not sent to individual phone numbers, but to groups of phones that are in the area – much like making an announcement via loudspeaker in a stadium full of people. </p>
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/HumanRights4UK/status/1637407146022240259?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1637407146022240259%7Ctwgr%5Ea710a1f9862290e12bd636dd0082e0adcbd8a495%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ohmymag.co.uk%2Fnews%2Fuk-emergency-phone-alerts-have-citizens-concerned-about-privacy-heres-what-you-should-know_art16943.html">Fears have been expressed</a> <a href="https://www.ohmymag.co.uk/news/uk-emergency-phone-alerts-have-citizens-concerned-about-privacy-heres-what-you-should-know_art16943.html">that cell broadcasting</a> could enable mass surveillance by revealing who is in a certain area at a certain time. Or by allowing authorities to track people’s movements across different areas. But are these worries really justified?</p>
<h2>Phones at risk?</h2>
<p>The Cabinet Office <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-64999417">has stated</a> that the service does not require any personal information such as someone’s identity, location, or telephone number. Nonetheless, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0267364913001325?casa_token=BHpFihBaH9IAAAAA:D8Reo6QwWu5s-NdzCOg9vtLSk0jPNVmKxwuHT9W7t16bED3nt2UHqVyGlfK7hNx7kQItMBuJOQ">research</a> shows that privacy issues can happen even when personal information is not collected.</p>
<p>It’s possible, for example, that <a href="https://www.bitdefender.co.uk/blog/hotforsecurity/americas-emergency-alert-system-is-vulnerable-to-hacker-attacks-dhs-warns/">hackers could intercept</a> an emergency alert system if the alerts are not encrypted or authenticated properly, or if there are vulnerabilities in the devices or networks that receive them. Indeed, <a href="https://securityledger.com/2020/01/seven-years-later-scores-of-eas-systems-sit-un-patched-vulnerable/">warnings about lack of security</a> and potential hacks have been <a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dhs-warns-of-critical-flaws-in-emergency-alert-system-devices/">raised in the US</a> around their <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2021/08/11/fema-emergency-alert-system/?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAANejl3TNI0cu8oU8Qqi24JV83k3UkN0FxG4uE31FlQDJ4mHLeqquX9nsnK19NfQHqo17BF4RbxyDfhlhfrFhcBLQ6M6NgkxDUyaYGQHI9f4rf-CQzt6S9nq42gHVCJTwm6h0FK7uwwaSblkmdkkekGJo0qTCtVfLdUJ_98q_1DBW">emergency alerts system</a>.</p>
<p>It’s also possible that <a href="https://metro.co.uk/2023/04/18/be-wary-of-phishing-scams-posing-as-emergency-alerts-warns-expert-18632557/">scammers</a> could use the opportunity to send false alerts to phones that include bogus links. The official alert won’t include any links or requests to reply.</p>
<p>And of course, alerts can be sent in error. In 2018, widespread panic was witnessed in Hawaii after an early-morning emergency alert mistakenly warned of an incoming ballistic missile attack. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Emergency Alert" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521609/original/file-20230418-920-j5mbhf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521609/original/file-20230418-920-j5mbhf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521609/original/file-20230418-920-j5mbhf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521609/original/file-20230418-920-j5mbhf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521609/original/file-20230418-920-j5mbhf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=652&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521609/original/file-20230418-920-j5mbhf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=652&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521609/original/file-20230418-920-j5mbhf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=652&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">This message set off widespread panic.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://twitter.com/JerryDunleavy/status/952257206208131073/photo/1">Twitter</a></span>
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<p>Hypothetically speaking, it may also be possible to profile people through an alert system. If someone acknowledges an alert quickly or follows the instructions in the alert, it could indicate that they are compliant and cooperative. </p>
<p>Whereas, if someone ignores an alert or does not follow the instructions, it could indicate that they are rebellious or suspicious. China did a similar thing in terms of <a href="https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-privacy/china-adds-covid-19-contagion-risk-ratings-to-individual-profiles-in-national-surveillance-system/">contagion risk</a> during the height of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/technology/coronavirus-surveillance-tracking-privacy.html">COVID-19</a>. </p>
<p>While the UK government says data isn’t being collected and a response isn’t required to the alert in this scenario, it should be said that, over the last ten years, the UK government’s track record in terms of state surveillance has been far from exemplary. </p>
<h2>State surveillance</h2>
<p>More specifically, the UK government has a history of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2021/05/uk-surveillance-gchq-ecthr-ruling/">abusing its surveillance powers</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/19/extreme-surveillance-becomes-uk-law-with-barely-a-whimper">violating people’s privacy rights</a>, often without public knowledge or consent. </p>
<p>In a series of <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22001-186048%22%5D%7D">high-profile</a> <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/the-queen-v-secretary-of-state-for-the-home-secretary-of-state-for-foreign-and-commonwealth-affairs/">legal cases</a>, the UK security services have been found to be in unlawful overreach of their data surveillance powers, with successive home secretaries failing to hold them to account.</p>
<p>It’s also been discovered that UK security services have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jun/07/uk-gathering-secret-intelligence-nsa-prism">shared data</a> with foreign intelligence agencies, such as the US National Security Agency, without ensuring adequate protection of people’s privacy rights. With such a track record, it’s not surprising that there’s some scepticism when it comes to the government’s management of the emergency alerts system.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/countries-tracking-citizens-phones-coronavirus-2020-3?r=US&IR=T">Fears around privacy</a> are also <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/27/coronavirus-surveillance-used-by-governments-to-fight-pandemic-privacy-concerns.html">understandable</a> given <a href="https://www.securityinfowatch.com/alarms-monitoring/emergency-safety-equipment/mass-notification-solutions/article/21209007/when-saving-lives-infringes-on-personal-privacy">concerns</a> about how similar systems could operate further afield. If a government already monitors the mobile device of a journalist, activist or whistleblower, for example – a practice that is unfortunately <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/07/the-pegasus-project-one-year-on-spyware-crisis-continues-after-failure-to-clamp-down-on-surveillance-industry/">not uncommon</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/18/ft-editor-roula-khalaf-among-180-journalists-targeted-nso-spyware">even in Europe</a> – it’s possible they could then narrow down the location of that person by checking whether they receive alerts that are sent to a specific area. </p>
<p>Despite these issues, <a href="https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/technology/960516/pros-and-cons-of-the-emergency-alert">on balance</a>, national alert systems are a useful tool for informing and protecting the public in case of emergencies. And instructing people to deactivate this function in their phones would not be responsible. At the same time, it’s a major oversimplification to <a href="https://www.avonandsomerset.police.uk/news/2023/04/emergency-alerts-national-test-to-take-place-on-sunday-23-april/">claim</a> there are no privacy risks whatsoever because the system <a href="https://fullfact.org/online/emergency-phone-alert-gdpr/">does not collect personal information</a>. </p>
<p>Indeed, <a href="https://www.pinsentmasons.com/out-law/news/uk-government-to-loosen-privacy-rules-to-enable-implementation-of-a-national-public-emergency-alert-system">privacy is not a luxury</a> or a privilege. It is a fundamental <a href="https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/human-rights-act/article-8-respect-your-private-and-family-life#:%7E:text=Article%208%3A%20Right%20to%20privacy,his%20home%20and%20his%20correspondence.">human right</a> that deserves respect and protection. This is why robust oversight of emergency alert systems is required to ensure they are not abused by governments.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203989/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stergios Aidinlis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Emergency alerts system: a lifesaving service or a threat to privacy?Stergios Aidinlis, Lecturer in Law, Keele UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1974902023-03-16T21:10:01Z2023-03-16T21:10:01ZThere Will Be No More Night: Documentary raises ethical questions about using war footage<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505704/original/file-20230121-24-oue55u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=16%2C9%2C1577%2C884&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Screenshot taken from 'There Will Be No More Night' by Éléonore Weber. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In his book <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/416-war-and-cinema"><em>War and Cinema</em></a>, cultural theorist Paul Virilio noted that modern warfare depends on the “logistics of perception.” According to him, a new arena of conflict has emerged with the development of sophisticated imaging technology. Like better weaponry, the side with better cameras often gains superiority. </p>
<p>Virilio said new imaging technology “makes darkness transparent and gives to military contestants an image of what the night is no longer able to conceal.” With thermal and night-vision cameras, any moving presence glowing in darkness becomes susceptible to gunfire by combat helicopters hovering above conflict zones. </p>
<p>Éléonore Weber’s 2020 documentary, <em><a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt10917134/">There Will Be No More Night</a></em>, reflects on this phenomenon. It uses leaked military footage from U.S. and French helicopters during war missions in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-been-20-years-since-the-us-invaded-iraq-long-enough-for-my-undergraduate-students-to-see-it-as-a-relic-of-the-past-199460">It's been 20 years since the US invaded Iraq – long enough for my undergraduate students to see it as a relic of the past</a>
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<p>The unnerving sequence of night-vision footage shows airstrikes on civilians suspected of being militants by pilots with shaky conviction. The blurry, grainy images accompany radio-transmitted exchanges between aircraft and machine gun operators, confessions of a pilot who suffers from chronic hallucinations and a scripted monologue. </p>
<p>Weber creatively uses forensic sources to contemplate the technology of modern warfare, where military-grade surveillance and imaging almost serve as a proxy for guns.</p>
<p>As we approach the 20th anniversary of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war">U.S.-led invasion of Iraq</a>, it is important to reflect on the use of war footage in media and the ethical questions around the use of footage depicting human death.</p>
<h2>Highlighting human rights abuses</h2>
<p><em>There Will Be No More Night</em> underscores the fallacy that advanced imaging provides accuracy and error-proof precision to modern war. The documentary shows how sophisticated war machines are driven by the personal idiosyncrasies of drone operators who launch deadly missiles using systems that resemble <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/science/turning-video-gamers-into-the-ultimate-drone-pilots-1.1398870">video games</a>.</p>
<p>While Virilio traced aesthetic similarities between the videography of war and cinema, Weber’s documentary film uses war footage to highlight the camera’s impairing role in contemporary conflicts.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Trailer for the documentary ‘There Will Be No More Night’ by Éléonore Weber.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The surveillance recordings document the offhanded killing of the people targeted. Weber includes the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/15/all-lies-how-the-us-military-covered-up-gunning-down-two-journalists-in-iraq">infamous Wikileaks footage</a> showing the airstrike that killed Iraqi Reuters photographer Saeed Chmagh and his colleagues in 2007. According to the pilots, Chmagh’s camera tripod resembled an RPG grenade launcher in the grainy footage. </p>
<p>In other instances, farmers carrying ploughs get mistaken for militants. Another harrowing scene depicts a person showered with bullets because he appeared unusually calm when cornered by a helicopter pilot. </p>
<p>Advanced imaging technologies in warfare seemingly operate on a peculiar logic, where framing inevitably leads to the manufacturing and annihilation of suspects. According to media theorist Harun Farocki, they generate “<a href="https://doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9781526107213.003.0004">operational images</a>” that do not merely represent but execute the functions of operations they belong to. </p>
<p>Weber’s creative use of forensic materials records a series of war violations. Scholars Patrick Brian Smith and Ryan Watson use the term “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/01634437221088954">mediated forensics</a>” to describe the use of new media technologies and practices in human rights discourse. </p>
<p>Research-activist groups like <a href="https://forensic-architecture.org/">Forensic Architecture</a>, <a href="https://situ.nyc/research">SITU Research</a> and <a href="https://lab.witness.org/">WITNESS Media Lab</a> perform forensic analysis of raw media evidence to highlight human rights issues. They do so using techniques and technologies such as <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/agricultural-and-biological-sciences/photogrammetry">photogrammetry</a>, geolocation mapping, 3D-imaging and pattern analysis to infer unseen viewpoints from limited visual evidence.</p>
<h2>A question of ethics</h2>
<p><em>There Will Be No More Night</em> sidesteps such principled forensic analysis. Instead of dissecting raw media evidence and disclosing new perspectives around specific events, it simply reproduces images of brutal killings for a generalized, self-absorbed reflection on modern warfare. </p>
<p>Consequently, the film becomes emotionally distressing and ethically dubious. One cannot discard the uneasy concerns of witnessing 125 minutes of footage depicting brutal massacres from the cockpit.</p>
<p>The documentary also humanizes one pilot, Pierre V., as he reflects on his nightmares after controlling infrared and thermal cameras for several months. But nothing is heard from the other side; those who live under the perpetual threat of the weapons and cameras, and need to devise inventive ways to escape their thermal imagery. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Irish photographer Richard Mosse discusses his documentary ‘Heat Maps’.</span></figcaption>
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<p>A related problem surfaces in the documentary project <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/culture/photo-booth/richard-mosses-heat-maps-a-military-grade-camera-repurposed-on-the-migrant-trail"><em>Heat Maps</em></a> by Irish photographer Richard Mosse. He uses thermal video cameras to construct composite images of refugee camps in and around the Mediterranean. </p>
<p>But the visually arresting photographs further expose the subjects and deny them self-representation. Mosse also enjoys freedom of movement and has control over the photographed images of the subjects — rights the subjects themselves do not have. </p>
<p>Despite its acute critique of modern warfare, <em>There Will Be No More Night</em> could have devised measures to work around the reproduction of visuals of death. Its distanced approach, driven by a voice-over commentary, fails to account for divergent perspectives. </p>
<p>What appears jarringly absent in the film are the voices of those people who are continually mapped by the imaging technologies of modern warfare and the social and psychological effects the technologies have on them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197490/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Santasil Mallik does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As we approach the 20th anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, it is important to reflect on the use of war footage in media and the ethical questions around the use of footage depicting human death.Santasil Mallik, PhD Student, Media Studies, Western UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2018572023-03-15T16:43:11Z2023-03-15T16:43:11ZDowning of US drone in Russian jet encounter prompts counterclaims of violations in the sky – an international law expert explores the arguments<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515516/original/file-20230315-28-f890z0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C23%2C1306%2C851&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A U.S. surveillance drone flies over the USS Coronado in the Pacific Ocean during an April 2021 drill.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/MideastUSNavy/922d4a9e6a1c4e98b117e4076e11343a/photo?Query=MQ-9%20surveillance%20drone&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1&currentItemNo=0">U.S. Navy/Chief Mass Communication Specialist Shannon Renfroe</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The details are disputed, but either way the result was the same: On March 14, 2023, a U.S. drone <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64957792">crashed into the Black Sea</a> after an encounter with Russian aircraft.</p>
<p>According to the U.S. version of events, the unarmed MQ-9 surveillance drone was flying in international airspace when two Russian fighter jets <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/14/politics/us-drone-russian-jet-black-sea/index.html">dumped fuel on the drone before colliding with it</a> in violation of international law.</p>
<p>The Russian Defense Ministry <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/3/15/russia-ukraine-live-news-us-says-russian-jets-caused-drone-crash">denied that its aircraft made contact</a> with the U.S. drone. Instead, Russia asserted that the drone was flying in the direction of Russia’s borders with its transponder off, suggesting that Russia found the flight suspicious. In addition, Russia said, the U.S. drone <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/03/14/russia-forces-down-us-reaper-drone-black-sea/">violated the “temporary boundaries</a>” that Russia had established for its operations against Ukraine and crashed on its own.</p>
<p>In light of Russia’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/russias-war-on-ukraine-six-months-of-lies-implemented/">past misrepresentations</a> about its military activities during its invasion of Ukraine, I view Russia’s assertions with skepticism. Moreover, as <a href="https://www.law.virginia.edu/faculty/profile/ad5jt/2378410">someone who studies international law</a> and formerly served in the U.S. State Department as a lawyer advising on issues related to armed conflict, I see this episode as highlighting the right of countries to operate aircraft and drones in international airspace – even for the purposes of spying on another state.</p>
<h2>Showing ‘due regard’</h2>
<p>If the U.S. characterization of the facts is correct, then Russia did indeed violate international law by interfering with the U.S. drone.</p>
<p>Under Article 87 of the <a href="https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/legal/pages/unitednationsconventiononthelawofthesea.aspx#:%7E:text=The%20United%20Nations%20Convention%20on,the%20oceans%20and%20their%20resources">U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas</a>, the high seas – basically, waters that are not any country’s territorial sea or exclusive economic zone – are open to all states. And the right of a country to operate on the high seas includes the freedom of overflight. </p>
<p>The convention also states that the freedoms “shall be exercised by all states with due regard for the interests of other states in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.”</p>
<p>The United States is <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/international-treaties-united-states-refuses-play-ball#:%7E:text=UN%20Convention%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea&text=The%20United%20States%20did%20not%20ratify%20UNCLOS%20because%20of%20fears,seas%20to%20the%20United%20Nations.">not a party to the convention</a>, which was signed in 1982 and <a href="https://www.itlos.org/en/main/the-tribunal/states-parties/">currently has 168 parties</a>, including Russia. Nevertheless, the U.S. recognizes many of its provisions as customary law; indeed, a key U.S. <a href="https://usnwc.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=66281931">naval handbook</a> recognizes that “the aircraft of all states are free to operate in international airspace without interference by other states.”</p>
<p>As such, Russia violated international law when it failed to act with “due regard” for the U.S. right to engage in freedom of overflight. In fact, based on the U.S. account, Russia directly interfered with that right. And it is presumably on this basis that the State Department spokesman <a href="https://nationalpost.com/news/world/u-s-drone-crashes-into-black-sea-after-brazen-encounter-with-russian-fighter-jet">called the drone’s downing</a> a “brazen violation of international law.”</p>
<p>Any Russian concerns that the U.S. drone may have been spying on its military operations would not alter this conclusion. Freedom of overflight in international airspace includes the act of monitoring activities inside another state’s territory, as long as the monitoring occurs from within international airspace.</p>
<p>So it would not matter from the perspective of international law whether the United States was using the MQ-9 to spy on military activities inside Russia or Russian-controlled Crimea.</p>
<h2>Aircraft in conflict zones</h2>
<p>Russia appears to be taking the position that it was entitled to set up boundaries for its “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/22/putin-war-ukraine-special-operation/">special military operation</a>” in Ukraine and that the United States disregarded those boundaries.</p>
<p>Russia may be referring here to a “<a href="https://lieber.westpoint.edu/maritime-exclusion-zones-armed-conflicts/">maritime exclusion zone</a>” that Russia set up in February 2022 to prohibit navigation in the northwest portion of the Black Sea.</p>
<p>In general, the United States considers such zones to be lawful if their purpose is to direct neutral ships and aircraft away from conflict areas – they can play an important role in reducing the risk that such vessels are mistakenly attacked. The United States itself <a href="https://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.net/portals/0/NWCDepartments/Stockton%20Center%20International%20Law/2013-Zones-Manual.pdf">established</a> a “maritime safety zone” in the Mediterranean Sea in 2003 in connection with its invasion of Iraq.</p>
<p>However, neutral ships and aircraft do not become lawful targets merely because they enter such zones. Russia would only have had a reasonable claim to use force against, or interfere with, the U.S. drone if it posed an imminent threat of an armed attack or was otherwise a legitimate military target during an armed conflict. For this to be the case, the U.S. drone would have had to be taking direct part in hostilities, and it is known that the MQ-9 was unarmed.</p>
<h2>On solid ground in the skies</h2>
<p>Assuming the U.S. account is correct, it would not be the first time that a country has interfered with a U.S. surveillance aircraft in an unsafe manner and effectively downed it.</p>
<p>In 2001, a Chinese fighter jet <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL30946.pdf">bumped into a U.S. signals intelligence aircraft</a> that was operating 70 miles from China’s Hainan Island. The U.S. aircraft was damaged in a way that forced it to make an emergency landing on Hainan, while the Chinese fighter jet itself crashed. At the time, the United States <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/china/2020-10-16/reconnaissance-flights-us-china-relations">asserted that international law</a>, including the “due regard” principle, permitted the United States to conduct surveillance flights in China’s exclusive economic zone, which the U.S. considered to be international airspace. China didn’t and detained the 24 U.S. crew members, demanding an apology from Washington. Since then, China has intercepted Australian and Canadian aircraft that were engaged in routine surveillance in international airspace, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/06/01/asia/canada-china-fighter-jet-harassment-intl-hnk-ml/index.html">prompting</a> <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/05/australia-says-a-chinese-fighter-jet-intercepted-its-surveillance-craft-in-may.html">complaints</a> similar to those the United States is making now.</p>
<p>In both the China case and the recent Black Sea incident, the United States has taken a consistent, widely shared position on the use of international airspace. As such, I believe it is on solid ground in objecting to Russia’s actions as unlawful.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201857/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>I worked for the State Department from 1999-2010 and for the National Security Council from 2021-22.</span></em></p>International law states that states have to operate ‘due regard’ for the right of nations to fly drones above international waters. Washington claims Russia violated this standard in incident.Ashley S. Deeks, Professor of Scholarly Research in Law, University of VirginiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1989792023-03-02T19:38:20Z2023-03-02T19:38:20ZProtecting privacy online begins with tackling ‘digital resignation’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512989/original/file-20230301-26-syl2am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=25%2C8%2C5725%2C3819&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Going online often involves surrendering some privacy, and many people are becoming resigned to the fact that their data will be collected and used without their explicit consent.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>From <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/11/26/the-biggest-risks-of-using-fitness-trackers-to-monitor-health.html">smart watches</a> and meditation apps to digital assistants and social media platforms, we interact with technology daily. And some of these technologies have <a href="https://childdatacitizen.com/coerced-digital-participation/">become an essential part of our social and professional lives</a>. </p>
<p>In exchange for access to their digital products and services, many tech companies collect and use our personal information. They use that information to predict and influence our future behaviour. This kind of <a href="https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2019/03/harvard-professor-says-surveillance-capitalism-is-undermining-democracy/">surveillance capitalism</a> can take the form of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-dark-side-of-alexa-siri-and-other-personal-digital-assistants-126277">recommendation algorithms</a>, targeted advertising and <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/growth-marketing-and-sales/our-insights/the-future-of-personalization-and-how-to-get-ready-for-it">customized experiences</a>. </p>
<p>Tech companies claim these personalized experiences and benefits enhance the user’s experience, however <a href="https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1554&context=asc_papers">the vast majority of consumers are unhappy with these practices</a>, especially after learning how their data is collected.</p>
<h2>‘Digital resignation’</h2>
<p><a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1478214">Public knowledge is lacking</a> when it comes to how data is collected. Research shows that corporations both cultivate feelings of resignation and <a href="https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1554&context=asc_papers">exploit this lack of literacy</a> to normalize the practice of maximizing the amount of data collected. </p>
<p>Events like the <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/cambridge-analytica-facebook-privacy-awakening/">Cambridge Analytica</a> scandal and revelations of mass government surveillance by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nsa-spying-idUSKBN25T3CK">Edward Snowden</a> shine a light on data collection practices, but they leave people powerless and resigned that their data will be collected and used without their explicit consent. This is called <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1461444819833331">“digital resignation”</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512979/original/file-20230301-22-br1873.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A smartphone displaying the facebook logo." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512979/original/file-20230301-22-br1873.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512979/original/file-20230301-22-br1873.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512979/original/file-20230301-22-br1873.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512979/original/file-20230301-22-br1873.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512979/original/file-20230301-22-br1873.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512979/original/file-20230301-22-br1873.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512979/original/file-20230301-22-br1873.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In 2022 Facebook’s parent company, Meta, agreed to pay $725 million to settle a lawsuit concerning users’ personal information to be fed to Cambridge Analytica.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Michael Dwyer, File</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But while there is much discussion surrounding the collection and use of personal data, there is far less discussion about the modus operandi of tech companies. </p>
<p><a href="https://spectrum.library.concordia.ca/id/eprint/990750/">Our research</a> shows that tech companies use a variety of strategies to deflect responsibility for privacy issues, neutralize critics and prevent legislation. These strategies are designed to limit citizens’ abilities to make informed choices. </p>
<p>Policymakers and corporations themselves must acknowledge and correct these strategies. Corporate accountability for privacy issues cannot be achieved by addressing data collection and use alone. </p>
<h2>The pervasiveness of privacy violations</h2>
<p>In their study of harmful industries such as the tobacco and mining sectors, <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/653091">Peter Benson and Stuart Kirsch</a> identified strategies of denial, deflection and symbolic action used by corporations to deflect criticism and prevent legislation.</p>
<p>Our research shows that these strategies hold true in the tech industry. Facebook has a long history of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/aug/23/cambridge-analytica-facebook-response-internal-document">denying and deflecting responsibility</a> for privacy issues despite its numerous scandals and criticisms.</p>
<p>Amazon has also been harshly criticized for providing <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/jul/13/amazon-ring-doorbell-videos-police-11-times-without-permission">Ring security camera footage to law enforcement officials without a warrant or customer consent</a>, sparking <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/02/lapd-requested-ring-footage-black-lives-matter-protests">civil rights concerns</a>. The company has also created <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2022/9/20/23362010/ring-nation-mgm-amazon-mark-burnett-barry-poznick-civil-rights-cancel">a reality show using Ring security camera footage</a>. </p>
<p>Canadian and U.S. federal government employees have <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/canada-follows-u-s-europe-with-tiktok-ban-on-government-devices-2273b07f">recently been banned from downloading TikTok</a> onto their devices due to an “unacceptable” risk to privacy. TikTok has launched <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2023/2/2/23583491/tiktok-transparency-center-tour-photos-bytedance">an elaborate spectacle of symbolic action</a> with the opening of its <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PxfIGVQTfWQ">Transparency and Accountability Center</a>. This cycle of denial, deflection and symbolic action normalizes privacy violations and fosters cynicism, resignation and disengagement.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512973/original/file-20230301-424-zveqs2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A black and silver ring doorbell on a door frame." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512973/original/file-20230301-424-zveqs2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512973/original/file-20230301-424-zveqs2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512973/original/file-20230301-424-zveqs2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512973/original/file-20230301-424-zveqs2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512973/original/file-20230301-424-zveqs2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512973/original/file-20230301-424-zveqs2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512973/original/file-20230301-424-zveqs2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Amazon has faced criticism for creating a new reality show based on footage captured by Ring doorbells.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How to stop digital resignation</h2>
<p>Technology permeates every aspect of our daily lives. But informed consent is impossible when the average person is neither motivated nor <a href="https://ndg.asc.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Persistent-Misperceptions.pdf">knowledgeable enough</a> to read terms and conditions policies designed to confuse.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age_en">European Union</a> has recently enacted laws that recognize these harmful market dynamics and have started holding platforms and tech companies <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/30/tech/twitter-eu-compliance-warning/index.html">accountable</a>. </p>
<p>Québec has recently revised its privacy laws with <a href="https://www.quebec.ca/gouvernement/ministeres-et-organismes/institutions-democratique-acces-information-laicite/acces-documents-protection-renseignements-personnels/pl64-modernisation-de-la-protection-des-renseignements-personnels">Law 25</a>. The law is designed to provide citizens with increased protection and control over their personal information. It gives people the ability to request their personal information and move it to another system, to rectify or delete it (<a href="https://gdpr.eu/right-to-be-forgotten/">the right to be forgotten</a>) as well as the right to be informed when being subjected to automated decision making. </p>
<p>It also requires organizations to appoint a privacy officer and committee, and conduct privacy impact assessments for every project where personal information is involved. Terms and policies must also be communicated clearly and transparently and consent must be explicitly obtained.</p>
<p>At the federal level, the government has tabled <a href="https://ised-isde.canada.ca/site/innovation-better-canada/en/canadas-digital-charter/bill-summary-digital-charter-implementation-act-2020">Bill C-27, the <em>Digital Charter Implementation Act</em></a> and is currently under review by the House of Commons. It bears many resemblances to Québec’s Law 25 and also includes additional measures to regulate technologies such as artificial intelligence systems.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512971/original/file-20230301-20-41o1s8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A laptop showing a terms and conditions document." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512971/original/file-20230301-20-41o1s8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512971/original/file-20230301-20-41o1s8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512971/original/file-20230301-20-41o1s8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512971/original/file-20230301-20-41o1s8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512971/original/file-20230301-20-41o1s8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512971/original/file-20230301-20-41o1s8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512971/original/file-20230301-20-41o1s8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Online terms and conditions are often too long and difficult for consumers to understand.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Our findings highlight the urgent need for more privacy literacy and stronger regulations that not just regulate what is permitted, but also monitor and make accountable the firms who breach consumer privacy. This would ensure informed consent to data collection and disincentivize violations. We recommend that: </p>
<p>1) Tech companies must explicitly specify what personal data will be collected and used. Only essential data should be collected and customers should be able to opt out of non-essential data collection. This is similar to the <a href="https://gdpr.eu/cookies/">EU’s General Data Protection Regulation</a> to obtain user consent before using non-essential cookies or <a href="https://support.apple.com/en-ca/HT212025">Apple’s App Tracking Transparency</a> feature which allows users to block apps from tracking them.</p>
<p>2) Privacy regulations must also recognize and address the rampant use of <a href="https://www.vox.com/recode/22351108/dark-patterns-ui-web-design-privacy">dark patterns</a> to influence people’s behaviour, such as coercing them into providing consent. This can include the use of design elements, language or features such as making it difficult to decline non-essential cookies or making the button to provide more personal data more prominent than the opt-out button.</p>
<p>3) Privacy oversight bodies such as the <a href="https://www.priv.gc.ca/en">Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada</a> <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/houston-privacy-commissioner-promise-may-be-softening-1.6624079">must be fully independent</a> and authorized to investigate and <a href="https://financialpost.com/news/privacy-watchdogs-lament-lack-powers-tim-hortons-probe">enforce privacy regulations</a>.</p>
<p>4) While privacy laws like Québec’s require organizations to appoint a privacy officer, the role must also be fully independent and given the power to enforce compliance with privacy laws if it is to be effective in improving accountability.</p>
<p>5) Policymakers must be more proactive in updating legislation to account for the rapid advances of digital technology. </p>
<p>6) Finally, penalties for non-compliance often pale in comparison to the profits gained and social harms from misuse of data. For example, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) imposed <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penalty-sweeping-new-privacy-restrictions-facebook">a $5 billion penalty on Facebook</a> (5.8 per cent of its <a href="https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/press-release-details/2021/Facebook-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-2020-Results/default.aspx">2020 annual revenue</a>) for its role in the <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/23/17151916/facebook-cambridge-analytica-trump-diagram">Cambridge Analytica scandal</a>.</p>
<p>While this fine is the highest ever given by the FTC, it is not representative of the social and political impacts of the scandal and its influence in <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/03/20/595338116/what-did-cambridge-analytica-do-during-the-2016-election">key political events</a>. In some cases, it may be more profitable for a company to strategically pay a fine for non-compliance. </p>
<p>To make tech giants more responsible with their users’ data, the cost of breaching data privacy must outweigh the potential profits of exploiting consumer data.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198979/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many people have become resigned to the fact that tech companies collect our private data. But policymakers must do more to limit the amount of personal information corporations can collect.Meiling Fong, PhD Student, Individualized Program, Concordia UniversityZeynep Arsel, Concordia University Chair in Consumption, Markets, and Society, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1995592023-02-22T18:23:24Z2023-02-22T18:23:24ZCSIS targeting of Canadian Muslims reveals the importance of addressing institutional Islamophobia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511508/original/file-20230221-18-jwylk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=29%2C0%2C4962%2C3330&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muslim Canadians face mass surveillance that brings entire communities under suspicion.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There has been an uproar recently among politicians who have called for the <a href="https://montreal.citynews.ca/2023/02/02/amira-elghawaby-apology/">resignation of Amira Elghawaby</a>, Canada’s first <a href="https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2023/01/26/prime-minister-announces-appointment-canadas-first-special">special representative on combating Islamophobia</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510974/original/file-20230219-332-lgmx5d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=142%2C284%2C8484%2C5458&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman wearing a hijab and glasses" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510974/original/file-20230219-332-lgmx5d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=142%2C284%2C8484%2C5458&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510974/original/file-20230219-332-lgmx5d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510974/original/file-20230219-332-lgmx5d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510974/original/file-20230219-332-lgmx5d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510974/original/file-20230219-332-lgmx5d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510974/original/file-20230219-332-lgmx5d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510974/original/file-20230219-332-lgmx5d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Amira Elghawaby was appointed as Canada’s first special representative on combating Islamophobia on Jan. 26, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Sean Kilpatrick</span></span>
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<p>The position was created in January 2023 to address the longstanding discrimination, <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2022001/article/00013-eng.htm">hate crimes</a> and intolerance faced by Muslim communities across the country. </p>
<p>In recent years, Canada has witnessed the highest number of Muslims killed in <a href="https://www.nccm.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Policy-Recommendations_NCCM.pdf">hate-motivated attacks</a> out of all the G7 countries. </p>
<p>The controversy stems over Elghawaby’s <a href="https://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/columnists/elghawaby-and-farber-quebecs-bill-21-shows-why-we-fear-the-tyranny-of-the-majority">2019 criticism</a> of Québec’s Bill 21. The law prohibits public servants from wearing religious symbols like hijabs, turbans, yarmulkes and crosses. </p>
<p>The bill has been criticized for unfairly impacting Muslim communities — <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/bill-21-impact-religious-minorities-survey-1.6541241">particularly Muslim women</a>.</p>
<p>There was also criticism of <a href="https://montrealgazette.com/news/quebec/quebec-activists-lawyers-express-support-for-embattled-amira-elghawaby">remarks Elghawaby made</a> in response to an <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-term-bipoc-is-a-bad-fit-for-the-canadian-discourse-on-race/">opinion piece</a> that said French Canadians were the largest group in Canada to be victimized by British colonialism.</p>
<p>In response, Bloc Québécois leader Yves-François Blanchet, has called on the federal government to <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-trudeau-must-drop-elghawaby-and-get-rid-of-anti-islamophobia-position/">scrap the position</a> of the special representative on combating Islamophobia altogether. </p>
<p>However, our research on the treatment of Canadian Muslim communities by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), shows how vital it is to address <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/racism-descrimination-claims-canadian-security-intelligence-service-1.6083353">institutional Islamophobia</a>.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/23326492231151587">our recent study</a> we interviewed 95 Muslim community leaders living in five major Canadian cities to learn about their experiences with CSIS. </p>
<p>This study is the first of its kind to map the anti-Muslim tactics employed by CSIS in its racialized surveillance of Muslim communities. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511510/original/file-20230221-22-v2yb4a.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Men bow in prayer at a mosque." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511510/original/file-20230221-22-v2yb4a.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511510/original/file-20230221-22-v2yb4a.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511510/original/file-20230221-22-v2yb4a.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511510/original/file-20230221-22-v2yb4a.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511510/original/file-20230221-22-v2yb4a.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511510/original/file-20230221-22-v2yb4a.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511510/original/file-20230221-22-v2yb4a.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Men pray at the Hamilton Mountain Mosque in Hamilton, Ont. Mosques have become frequent targets of surveillance by CSIS.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Cole Burston</span></span>
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<h2>Muslims face mass surveillance</h2>
<p>We found that CSIS adopts specific surveillance practices that are informed by Islamophobic tropes. This works on the premise that Islam and any expression of religious devotion to it represents a potential terror suspect. </p>
<p>Consequently, CSIS engages in mass surveillance that brings entire Muslim communities under suspicion. It relies on <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/islastudj.7.2.0215">false radicalization assumptions</a> that depict Muslim communities as hotbeds of extremism that must be contained through aggressive surveillance strategies.</p>
<p>CSIS engages in mass surveillance with devastating and prolonged effects on Muslim communities. We found that mosques have been transformed into sites of surveillance rather than a safe place for religious worship and community gatherings. </p>
<p>CSIS treats mosques as sites of radicalization and incubators of extremism in order to legitimize its intensive policing and infiltration. CSIS monitors who enters and exits them, and members, especially imams, are subject to interrogation and forced to provide intelligence on their congregations. We found there is a persistent deployment of CSIS operatives at mosques. </p>
<p>Muslim youth in particular are heavily targeted by CSIS. Those who attend mosques, are involved in Muslim student organizations, attend Muslim gatherings or summer camps are frequently interrogated by CSIS, often without their parents’ permission. </p>
<p>Muslim university students who we spoke to informed us they have found recording devices in their campus prayer spaces, and had their social media scanned. The result is that Muslim youth are subjected to extreme forms of state surveillance. At the University of Toronto, faculty and lawyers have even set up a <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/csis-students-university-muslim-campus-1.5229670">support line</a> to help Muslim students and provide representation when they are contacted by CSIS. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510976/original/file-20230219-358-ztot2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An elderly man carries a placard that reads: Question authority, in front of a roadside sign that says Canadian security Intelligence service" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510976/original/file-20230219-358-ztot2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510976/original/file-20230219-358-ztot2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510976/original/file-20230219-358-ztot2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510976/original/file-20230219-358-ztot2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510976/original/file-20230219-358-ztot2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510976/original/file-20230219-358-ztot2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510976/original/file-20230219-358-ztot2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">CSIS has used mass surveillance to target and monitor Muslim Canadian communities.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(CP PHOTO/Fred Chartrand)</span></span>
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<h2>CSIS relies on coercive techniques</h2>
<p>A key CSIS tactical strategy is the use of coercive techniques to pressure ordinary citizens to become informants. We were informed that CSIS threatens to show up at the workplaces of individuals who refuse to talk to them. They particularly seek out refugees or those with precarious immigration status.</p>
<p>They also use aggressive tactics such as making unannounced visits to people’s homes in the middle of night; actions that intimidated entire families, including children. We were informed that this is a common practice as individuals are unable to access legal counsel or community support at such times.</p>
<h2>Political activism targeted</h2>
<p>Those politically active and critical of the Canadian state found themselves at higher risk for interrogation. In our study, we found those who criticize state policies — particularly concerning politics in the Middle East — come under increased surveillance. </p>
<p>We were informed of the deep chilling effect this has on Muslim communities. Those we interviewed spoke about being fearful of voicing their concerns regarding state practices, as they believe this would incur CSIS surveillance. </p>
<p>This level of political suppression directly violates the <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-23/">CSIS Act</a>. This act prohibits investigation of lawful advocacy and dissent. </p>
<p>The result for Muslim communities is a culture of suspicion and internal fear. We were informed of the common suspicion that others in the community are working for CSIS. Furthermore, some concealed being approached by CSIS because they believe they could be ostracized within their own communities. </p>
<h2>Islamophobia institutionalized in Canada</h2>
<p>CSIS is just one institution that racially targets Muslims. There are a host of other counter-terrorism laws and practices that also operate to reproduce racist perceptions and assumptions about Muslims. For example, our previous research has documented how <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azz066">Canada’s no-fly list</a> and security practices at <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/canajsocicahican.41.2.165">Canadian border crossings</a> function as endemic practices of institutionalized racism. They target Canadian Muslims, exacerbate racial profiling and subject people to demeaning treatment.</p>
<p>Contrary to the demands for Elghawaby’s dismissal, our work speaks to the vital need for a special representative on combating Islamophobia and to make addressing Islamophobia an urgent priority.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199559/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Baljit Nagra receives funding from SSHRC. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paula Maurutto receives funding from SSHRC. </span></em></p>A recent study highlights how mass surveillance of Muslim communities by Canadian intelligence is based on racist stereotypes about Muslims.Baljit Nagra, Associate Professor, Criminology, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaPaula Maurutto, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.