tag:theconversation.com,2011:/es/topics/youth-unemployment-2052/articlesYouth unemployment – The Conversation2024-02-20T14:27:38Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2215042024-02-20T14:27:38Z2024-02-20T14:27:38ZLagos: drugs, firearms and youth unemployment are creating a lethal cocktail in Nigeria’s commercial capital<p>Lagos is the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1218259/largest-cities-in-africa/#:%7E:text=Lagos%2C%20in%20Nigeria%2C%20ranked%20as,living%20in%20the%20city%20proper.">most populous</a> city in Africa and a regional economic giant, having west Africa’s busiest seaport. It is the centre of commercial and economic activities in Nigeria.</p>
<p>The city’s <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2019-july-2019/africa%E2%80%99s-megacities-magnet-investors">population</a> is estimated to be 20 million people. The existence of informal settlements makes it difficult to come up with a more precise number.</p>
<p>Lagos has <a href="https://www.african-cities.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/ACRC_Lagos_City-Scoping-Study.pdf">grown</a> rapidly since Nigerian independence in 1960, when its estimated population was 763,000 people. In the 1980s, its population reached 2.7 million. The government of Lagos state estimates that <a href="https://insidebusiness.ng/18245/rapid-urbanization-86-migrants-enter-lagos-every-hour-ambode/">86 young migrants</a> arrive every hour.</p>
<p>This rapid urbanisation has been poorly managed. The result is crumbling public infrastructure, poor sanitation, poverty, and shortages of employment opportunities, food, social services, housing and public transport. </p>
<p>These challenges combine to make the city susceptible to criminal activities. Organised crime and violent conflicts are a public safety and security challenge. </p>
<p>The issue of crime has been with Lagos for years. In 1993, the Nigerian government <a href="https://ludi.org.ng/2023/07/10/crime-prevention-through-public-space-design-a-lagos-story/#:%7E:text=The%20rapid%20population%20growth%20without,leading%20to%20high%20crime%20rates.">described</a> Lagos as the “crime capital of the country” with the emergence of the “<a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-area-boys-growing-menace-streets-lagos">Area Boys</a>”, a group of social miscreants. </p>
<p>The 2017 <a href="https://nigerianstat.gov.ng/elibrary/read/786">statistics</a> on reported crime incidences in Nigeria by the <a href="https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/">National Bureau of Statistics</a> shows that Lagos has remained in a class of its own. Lagos State had the highest percentage share of total cases reported with <a href="https://nigerianstat.gov.ng/elibrary/read/786#:%7E:text=Lagos%20State%20has%20the%20highest,205(0.2%25)%20cases%20recorded.">50,975</a> (37.9%) cases recorded. </p>
<p>I have been <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=jDncA6MAAAAJ&hl=en">researching</a> various aspects of crime and insecurity in Nigeria, particularly in the country’s south-west. I currently lead the <a href="https://www.african-cities.org/">African Cities Research Consortium</a> safety and security domain research in Lagos.</p>
<p>I contributed to a recent <a href="https://www.african-cities.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/ACRC_Working-Paper-7_February-2024.pdf#page=26">paper</a> about residents’ experiences and perceptions of safety in six African cities: Nairobi, Bukavu, Freetown, Mogadishu, Lagos and Maiduguri. </p>
<p>My research identified various drivers of insecurity in Lagos. They included youth migration and unemployment; inequality and poverty; the visible network of organised youth criminal groups; proliferation of small arms and drugs; inadequate preparedness of the city government; police corruption; the high rate of out-of-school children; and poor urban planning.</p>
<p>I argue that for residents to feel secure, the government needs to include these drivers in approaches to solving security challenges in Lagos. </p>
<h2>Unemployment, firearms and drugs</h2>
<p>In my African Cities Research Consortium safety and security domain research in Lagos, unemployment and the proliferation of small firearms and drugs stand out as trends. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://medium.com/@olaoyeleye09/navigating-unemployment-in-lagos-nigeria-1a55c2a5e0b5">survey</a> on Navigating Unemployment in Lagos, Nigeria revealed that 48.31% of the respondents were unemployed and the majority were between 25 and 34 years old.</p>
<p>In Lagos, youth of 18-40 years make up about half of the <a href="https://www.urbanet.info/youth-employment-in-lagos/#:%7E:text=In%20Lagos%2C%20youth%20are%20believed,equalling%20over%2010%20million%20people.">population</a>, equalling over ten million people facing high rates of unemployment. I do not have current unemployment data but in its fourth quarter 2020 nationwide survey, the National Bureau of Statistics <a href="https://mepb.lagosstate.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2022/02/MACRO-ECONS-FLYER-DECEMBER-2021-edition-1.pdf">estimated</a> a 37.14% unemployment rate in Lagos, and 4.52% underemployment rate.</p>
<p>According to my research participants, drug abuse and illicit arms have become serious issues. Some of the city precincts in communities such as Ikorodu, Somolu, Agege, Bariga, Ojo, Oshodi, Mushin and Badagry have become warehouses and destinations for firearms and drugs. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://enactafrica.org/research/ocwar-t/silencing-the-guns-in-cities-urbanisation-and-arms-trafficking-in-bamako-and-lagos">recent survey</a> published by <a href="https://enactafrica.org/research/organised-crime-index#:%7E:text=The%20ENACT%20Africa%20Organised%20Crime,organised%20crime%20across%20the%20continent.&text=The%20ENACT%20Index%20is%20a,organised%20crime%20on%20the%20continent.">ENACT Transnational</a> on organised crime in Africa has shown that between 2010 and 2017, the largest supply of live ammunition transported into Nigeria illegally was intercepted at Lagos. This was made up of 21,407,933 items of live ammunition and 1,100 pump action guns.</p>
<p>Most of the illegal weapons pass through ports in west Africa; some are imported over land borders. While the country’s <a href="https://omaplex.com.ng/an-overview-of-the-gun-regulations-in-nigeria-the-current-stance-and-the-way-forward/">law forbids</a> random possession of firearms, my research respondents say it is surprisingly common for young miscreants to carry firearms in Lagos.</p>
<p>The police have <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/ssouth-west/409520-blacksmith-two-others-arrested-for-illegal-firearms-fabrication.html">confirmed</a> that hooligans acquire illicit firearms from local blacksmiths who make them, and from corrupt security officers. </p>
<p>In 2022, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2022/09/23/the-lagos-drug-bust">discovered</a> a warehouse in a residential estate in Ikorodu with 1.8 tonnes of cocaine. This was the largest single cocaine seizure in the country’s history.</p>
<p>In November 2023, security agents <a href="https://leadership.ng/navy-intercepts-boats-with-n200m-illicit-drugs-in-lagos/">intercepted</a> cannabis in Ibeshe, Iworoshoki and Badagry, and in January 2024, the drug law enforcement agency <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/656790-nigerian-authorities-intercept-hard-drugs-from-us-arrest-suspect-official.html">intercepted</a> cannabis at Ikeja.</p>
<h2>Impacts of unemployment, small arms and drugs in Lagos</h2>
<p>Findings from <a href="https://www.african-cities.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/ACRC_Working-Paper-7_February-2024.pdf#page=26">my research</a> in Lagos show respondents perceive high levels of violent crime in the city. Youth aged 13 to 40 are mostly the perpetrators.</p>
<p>While there are no accurate statistics of daily violent crime incidences, residents are <a href="https://punchng.com/daredevil-daylight-robbers-return-to-lagos-streets/">complaining</a>. </p>
<p>In 2022, the police <a href="https://securityandsafetymatters.wordpress.com/2022/11/24/lagos-police-says-over-three-hundred-people-brutally-murdered/">reported</a> that no fewer than 345 people were murdered in Lagos – the highest number in years. </p>
<p>Young people have formed themselves into street gangs. My research respondents spoke of violent encounters in which their assailants used firearms and were often under the influence of alcohol or drugs or both. This was the experience of 18 respondents, out of a sample of 50 randomly selected respondents.</p>
<p>Some respondents described street gangs in Lagos who are constantly high on drugs and have no regard for human life. Other respondents said drugs were accessible and affordable even for unemployed youth. Respondents believed that a combination of a large youth population, unemployment and easy access to drugs and illicit firearms was proving deadly.</p>
<h2>Preventing and treating the issues</h2>
<p>The crime triangle in Lagos – youth unemployment, drugs and illicit arms – requires urgent attention. </p>
<p>My study in Lagos shows that a widespread sense of economic hopelessness exacerbates the use of drug and firearms by young people in Lagos. Youth who embrace this culture of violence are those who feel that they have no stake in the city and no trust in the government to provide opportunities for them.</p>
<p>Thus, the state and communities must address the lack of opportunities and alternatives, reaching out to marginalised youth and providing them with an environment in which they can lead a fulfilling life. An effective strategy is one that provides legitimate activities and job opportunities for them. </p>
<p>Government action is required to ensure that opportunities exist for training in a trade or life skill. This would enable youth to make better choices and find productive employment. They could be socially responsible and play an active role in the city rather than becoming a threat in their communities.</p>
<p>Government has the authority to control the supply and use of firearms and drugs. </p>
<p>Special operations should be directed at drug addicts and unlicensed firearms carriers. The approach should be to disrupt the market for illicit arms and drugs. </p>
<p>Security agencies can work with communities to discover new dealing locations and make buyers feel vulnerable and uncomfortable through sting operations – pretending to be dealers or users. </p>
<p>Urban planning approaches could also be applied such as inclusive planning of informal settlements, installation of security cameras and street lighting, limiting access to problematic streets through road changes, removal of transport stops used by drug and firearms users and their dealers, and improved signage.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221504/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adewumi I. Badiora does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Youth migration, unemployment, proliferation of small arms and drugs are some of the drivers of violent crimes in Lagos.Adewumi I. Badiora, Senior Lecturer, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Olabisi Onabanjo UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2228252024-02-15T13:43:31Z2024-02-15T13:43:31ZSouth Africa has spent billions in 4 years to create jobs for young people: how their wages affect the broader economy<p>In October 2020 the South African government launched a collection of public employment programmes, initially intended as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The initiative, called the <a href="https://www.stateofthenation.gov.za/employment-stimulus-dashboard">Presidential Employment Stimulus</a>, has been extended since then. The total budget allocation to March 2024 was R42 billion (US$2.1 billion). </p>
<p>By December 2023 it had directly created <a href="https://pres-employment.openup.org.za/img/February_2024_Update.pdf">1.8 million jobs and livelihood opportunities</a>. These have been mostly temporary jobs in public employment programmes such as school education assistants. It has also included financial support to various sectors. </p>
<p>An important question is how much the programme’s spending stimulates economic activity in local communities and nationally. That is, to what extent it supports job creation or higher incomes outside the programme.</p>
<p>South Africa has an exceptionally high unemployment rate (<a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02113rdQuarter2023.pdf">32% or 41%, depending on the definition</a>), particularly concentrated among the youth. <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?end=2022&locations=ZA&start=1990">Economic growth has been stagnant</a> for the last 15 years, and increasing pressure has been placed on the national budget. While the core objective of a public employment programme is to provide direct employment and <a href="https://fundawande.org/img/cms/news/Limpopo%20Second%20Midline%20Report%202023%20V03.pdf">improve service provision</a>, in this context it is also important to understand how it might stimulate economic activity.</p>
<p>At the <a href="https://www.saldru.uct.ac.za/">Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit</a> at the University of Cape Town, we were commissioned by the Presidency to draw on our knowledge of programme evaluation and South Africa’s social assistance policy to try to answer this question. <a href="https://www.afd.fr/en/ressources/stimulus-effects-large-public-employment-programme">We evaluated</a> spending associated with the largest component of the programme – the <a href="https://www.education.gov.za/Programmes/BEEI.aspx">Basic Education Employment Initiative</a>. </p>
<p>We found that the programme likely does support broader economic activity, and these effects partly persist after the end of the programme. Participants buy goods which are produced to some extent in local value chains, and which employ local labour, rather than being imported. The programme spending does not just “disappear”, but recirculates in the South African economy.</p>
<h2>The study</h2>
<p>The Basic Education Employment Initiative has employed about 245,000 young people per phase to assist schools across the country. The duration of employment has varied with each phase. More recently it has been eight months. Participants are employed in full-time positions and are paid the monthly national minimum wage, which is approximately R4,000 (US$209).</p>
<p>The programme completed its fourth phase in 2023. Since it was launched in December 2020 it has employed over 850,000 young people, becoming the <a href="https://www.stateofthenation.gov.za/employment-stimulus-dashboard">largest</a> youth employment programme in South Africa’s history. </p>
<p>In our study, we focused on phases 2 and 3 of the programme, from November 2021 to August 2022. </p>
<p>First, we looked at how the programme affected participant spending patterns. We then estimated what kind of economic activity this spending supported.</p>
<p>Our initial evidence came from a WhatsApp survey of 31,250 participants we ran with <a href="https://www.harambee.co.za/">Harambee Youth Employment Accelerator</a>, a non-profit which supported the programme in partnership with the Department of Basic Education. Harambee holds contact details of most participants for phases 2 and 3, with permission that the records may be used for programme evaluation. </p>
<p>The survey response rate was unfortunately low. But it showed participants spent their cash mostly on groceries (about 50%), transport and rent. </p>
<p>Most of their income went to necessities, much of it from local stores. </p>
<p>However, our main evidence comes from information provided by a leading grocery retailer. The retailer gave us limited access to fully anonymised sales records from its loyalty rewards programme. </p>
<p>In partnership with <a href="https://omnisient.com/">Omnisient</a>, a privacy-preserving data collaboration platform, we were able to see who in the data was a participant in the programme and who wasn’t, while retaining individual anonymity. We explain in the paper how this was done without revealing or sharing any personally-identifying information. The data collaboration partnership went through a rigorous legal process and received University of Cape Town Research Ethics clearance.</p>
<p>Using this data, we found that average participant spending at the retailer increased from R327 (US$17) per month before the start of the programme to R437 (US$23.50) during the programme. </p>
<p>When compared to a control sample of other customers who shopped at the same locations and kinds of stores as the participants, using a statistical analysis method called <a href="https://mixtape.scunning.com/09-difference_in_differences">difference-in-differences</a>, we found that participant spending sharply increased by 15% during the programme. </p>
<p>Even after the programme ended, participants’ spending remained 4% higher than the baseline. </p>
<p>This might be due to participant savings during the programme, or participants being better placed to find work after the programme ends. </p>
<p>But this aggregate spending increase hides quite a lot of variety, per Table 1. In the largest spending categories, participant spending increased by 16% (groceries; refrigerated and frozen perishables) and 20% (toiletries), but in some smaller categories the percentage increase was much higher (off a low base).</p>
<p>For example, spending on home and small appliances increased by 51%, and kitchenware by 40%. In general, percentage spending increases were lower for food items. This was unsurprising as these necessities already took up a large part of participants’ budget before the programme.</p>
<p>This means the spending increase of 15% at the retailer is likely an underestimate of how much the programme increased participant spending overall, because food items make up over 80% of expenditure at the retailer and are therefore over-represented. </p>
<p>Another reason the 15% increase is probably an underestimate is because we can only see each individual’s shopping, and not the rest of their household. But some participants were probably shopping on behalf of their family before the programme, and during the programme someone else took over shopping responsibilities, using income from the Basic Education Employment Initiative.</p>
<h2>Income effects</h2>
<p>What can we then say about who receives income from this increased expenditure? This part of the paper is exploratory and speculative, because we cannot directly see how spending from the programme flows through the economy, and how firms respond to this increased revenue.</p>
<p>Instead, we have to use back-of-the-envelope calculations to scale up the expenditure, use <a href="https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/input-outputtables.htm">input-output data</a> from Stats SA to guide assumptions about which industries produce which kinds of goods, and use other firm data to see how firms’ wage bills and profits usually respond to sales increases. In our paper we explain the methods, assumptions and limitations in detail.</p>
<p>With these caveats in mind, the implied direct effect of the programme on the retailer’s sales is about R8 million (US$417,500) per month. Directly, this likely increased the wage bill for workers at the retailer by about R1 million (US$52,188) per month. </p>
<p>Indirectly, the increase in the retailer’s sales would have increased demand from their suppliers, and in turn their suppliers’ suppliers, which we estimate increased employment and wages outside the retailer by another R1.7 million (US$88,734) per month. </p>
<p>What about participant spending outside the retail firm? By scaling up the retailer-specific results, we estimate that overall the programme generates about R38 million (US$2 million) per month in additional value added in the national economy, which translates to R19 million (US$991,473) in additional employment and wages per month, R13 million (US$678,376) of which went towards local community employment.</p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>The main beneficiaries of the Basic Education Employment Initiative programmes are the young people who are directly employed by it, and the students in the schools. But the money does not get “thrown away” – one person’s spending is another person’s income. </p>
<p>And the participants do buy goods which are produced locally, using local workers. When evaluating the costs and benefits of the programme, and similar programmes such as social grants, these “extra” economic benefits need to be part of the calculation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222825/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Budlender received funding for this research from Agence française de développement (AFD) with the support of the European Union. This independent academic research was commissioned by the South African Presidency. He has previously done academic research and policy advisory work for the South African Presidency and National Treasury.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ihsaan Bassier received funding for this research from Agence francaise de developpement (AFD) with the support of the European Union. This independent academic research was commissioned by the South African Presidency. He has previously done academic research and policy advisory work for the South African Presidency and National Treasury. </span></em></p>When evaluating the costs and benefits of the employment programme, and similar ones such as social grants, ‘extra’ economic benefits need to be part of the calculation.Joshua Budlender, PhD candidate in Economics, UMass AmherstIhsaan Bassier, Researcher in Economics, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2130022023-10-31T16:47:08Z2023-10-31T16:47:08ZWhy it’s so hard to be young in Britain right now<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556109/original/file-20231026-28-s9l4ee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=82%2C49%2C5420%2C3555&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/young-female-her-unemployed-husband-many-587565332">Cast of Thousands/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>If you’re taking the first steps in your career right now, you’re doing so in the face of a high cost of living and an increasingly inaccessible housing market. You may well be facing the reality that you will be <a href="https://www.ucl.ac.uk/ioe/news/2018/nov/younger-people-could-be-worse-their-parents-generation-their-whole-lives">worse off</a> than your parents’ generation.</p>
<p>The UK’s youth (15-24) unemployment rate fell from almost 15% in September 2020 to 9% in August 2022, but is <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peoplenotinwork/unemployment/timeseries/mgwy/lms">now rising again</a> reaching 12.7% in July this year. This is higher than the average for developed economies and much higher than the likes of <a href="https://data.oecd.org/unemp/youth-unemployment-rate.htm">Germany and Japan</a>.</p>
<p>There is also a serious gender disparity – one of the <a href="https://data.oecd.org/unemp/youth-unemployment-rate.htm">highest</a> among developed countries. The <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/280329/youth-unemployment-rate-by-gender-uk/#:%7E:text=Youth%20unemployment%20rate%20in%20the%20UK%201992%2D2023%2C%20by%20gender&text=As%20of%20the%20second%20quarter,and%209.8%20percent%20for%20women.">unemployment rate</a> among young males (14.6%) is significantly higher than females (9.8%). </p>
<p>This is even more pronounced in some regions. For example, in the West Midlands, young men are more than two and half times more likely to be unemployed than women. Young men, in particular, have a <a href="https://archive.discoversociety.org/2020/04/01/its-not-like-that-anymore-young-men-searching-for-work-in-the-service-economy/">harder</a> time finding work during tough economic times.</p>
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<p><em><strong><a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/quarter-life-117947?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+YP2022&utm_content=InArticleTop">This article is part of Quarter Life</a></strong>, a series about issues affecting those of us in our twenties and thirties. From the challenges of beginning a career and taking care of our mental health, to the excitement of starting a family, adopting a pet or just making friends as an adult. The articles in this series explore the questions and bring answers as we navigate this turbulent period of life.</em></p>
<p><em>You may be interested in:</em></p>
<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/make-new-friends-and-become-a-role-model-why-you-should-consider-volunteering-if-youre-in-your-20s-or-30s-209939?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+YP2022&utm_content=InArticleTop">Make new friends and become a role model: why you should consider volunteering if you’re in your 20s or 30s</a></em></p>
<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/girl-math-may-not-be-smart-financial-advice-but-it-could-help-women-feel-more-empowered-with-money-211780?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+YP2022&utm_content=InArticleTop">‘Girl math’ may not be smart financial advice, but it could help women feel more empowered with money</a></em></p>
<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/why-young-workers-are-leaving-fossil-fuel-jobs-and-what-to-do-if-you-feel-like-climate-quitting-214759?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+YP2022&utm_content=InArticleTop">Why young workers are leaving fossil fuel jobs – and what to do if you feel like ‘climate quitting’</a></em></p>
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<p>The number of young people not in education, employment or training is <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peoplenotinwork/unemployment/bulletins/youngpeoplenotineducationemploymentortrainingneet/august2023">estimated</a> to be 11.6%. The pandemic has led to fewer opportunities for young people to get into work, such as <a href="https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06113/SN06113.pdf">apprenticeships</a>, and <a href="https://www.oxfordcollege.ac/news/skills-gap-statistics-uk/">skills gaps</a> are making it hard to break into a number of industries. </p>
<p>And new figures show that the number of young people unable to work due to long-term sickness has <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/10/17/britain-long-term-sickness-under-35s-over-50s/">drastically increased</a> since the pandemic.</p>
<h2>The problems with youth unemployment</h2>
<p>This is not just a concern for people currently trying to find work, but has repercussions for the economy overall. Higher rates of unemployment and inactivity among youth adversely affect long-term wages and productivity. It can also lead to wider socioeconomic consequences, including a high <a href="https://www.london.gov.uk/press-releases/mayoral/driving-factors-behind-violence-affecting-young-pe">crime rate</a>. </p>
<p>A recent study by PwC, an accounting firm, suggests that reducing the UK youth unemployment rate by just 5% (bringing it in line with the German level) would boost the economy by <a href="https://www.pwc.co.uk/press-room/press-releases/pwc-youth-employment-index-2022.html">£38 billion</a>. The government has committed to investing in <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-outlines-ambitious-plans-to-level-up-activities-for-young-people">youth services</a> in an effort to boost employability, but clearly this doesn’t go far enough. </p>
<p>The UK could look to other countries for inspiration on how to address this. Germany has a strong <a href="https://www.expatrio.com/studying-germany/german-education-system/german-dual-apprenticeship-system">dual apprenticeship system</a> and Australia’s <a href="https://www.dewr.gov.au/work-dole">work for the dole</a> programme have both helped youth employment in these countries. </p>
<p>A further problem is that so many young people who are employed are <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/articles/theoccupationsmostdependentonolderandyoungerworkers/2023-05-31#:%7E:text=Retail%20was%20the%20largest%20type,working%20in%20retail%20(13%25).">dependent on work</a> in low-paid sectors like retail and hospitality. <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268122001299">These sectors</a> do not see higher increases in wages even if there are productivity increases, and do not have a great prospect of career progression. </p>
<h2>The challenge of home ownership</h2>
<p>There has been a substantial <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/bulletins/housepriceindex/june2023">increase</a> in house prices in the UK in recent decades, particularly in big cities where young people seek job opportunities. The average house price in London is <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/bulletins/housepriceindex/june2023">estimated</a> to be well over £500,000, more than three times the price in the north-east of England. </p>
<p>The rising house prices, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-wages-should-keep-up-with-inflation-the-economic-case-for-getting-a-pay-rise-186851">stagnating wages</a> and increase in mortgage rates have made it <a href="https://ifs.org.uk/books/barriers-homeownership-young-adults">almost impossible</a> for many young people to step on the property ladder. The average age of first-time buyers is <a href="https://www.money.co.uk/mortgages/first-time-buyer-mortgages/statistics">around 33</a>, a two-year increase compared with pre-pandemic estimates.</p>
<p>Decreasing home ownership has been a problem for young people in the <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/01/younger-generations-homeownership-housing-market-wealth-inequality/">US and Europe</a> too. But home ownership among young people in the UK is <a href="https://www.oecd.org/housing/no-home-for-the-young.pdf">lower</a> than the OECD average. And with mortgage rates not <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-mortgage-rates-will-not-return-to-recent-lows-any-time-soon-201619">expected</a> to come down in the near future, the outlook remains bleak.</p>
<h2>Steps you can take</h2>
<p>Almost <a href="https://www.thersa.org/reports/young-peoples-economic-security">half</a> of the population aged 16-24 are in financially precarious positions, and many are in debt. The <a href="https://www.thersa.org/globalassets/_foundation/new-site-blocks-and-images/reports/2022/01/cost_of_independence.pdf">numbers</a> are stark: 50% of those aged 16-18, 75% of those aged 19-21 and 80% of those aged 22-24 are in debt. While a good chunk of this is for study-related loans, it also includes buy-now-pay-later schemes, personal loans and overdrafts. </p>
<p>This speaks to the challenges posed by the cost of living crisis, but also the lack of financial literacy, budgeting and planning habits among young people. According to a recent <a href="https://mybnk.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Report-Summary-Document.pdf">survey</a> by Compare the Market, only 41% of young people are financially literate. </p>
<p>While it won’t mitigate the wider economic problems, you can take <a href="https://www.alanboswell.com/news/financial-tips-for-young-adults-some-of-the-key-tricks-to-help-secure-a-stable-future/#Prioritise%20your%20debts">small steps</a> to improve your financial skills by tracking spending, prioritising debts and wisely using credit cards. It is important to be aware of misinformation, including <a href="https://theconversation.com/scams-and-cryptocurrency-can-go-hand-in-hand-heres-how-they-work-and-what-to-watch-out-for-182033">cryptocurrency scams</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/get-rich-quick-schemes-pyramids-and-ponzis-five-signs-youre-being-scammed-205798">get-rich-quick schemes</a>. </p>
<p>The government could also play a role through compulsory financial education. As the Confederation of British Industry has also <a href="https://www.cbi.org.uk/articles/how-can-government-and-business-improve-the-uk-s-financial-literacy/">suggested</a>, there is a need for a national strategy, working with industry and other private sector partners to improve financial literacy and awareness.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213002/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Youth unemployment is on an upward trajectory.Kausik Chaudhuri, Senior Lecturer in Economics, University of LeedsMuhammad Ali Nasir, Associate Professor in Economics, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2137512023-10-08T19:27:10Z2023-10-08T19:27:10ZChina’s youth unemployment problem has become a crisis we can no longer ignore<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550512/original/file-20230927-27-lvu3t0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=149%2C286%2C1757%2C712&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Youth unemployment is a global problem, but in China the rate - <a href="https://www.visualcapitalist.com/youth-unemployment-in-oecd-and-china/#:%7E:text=Listed%20below%20is%20the%20youth,the%20second%20quarter%20of%202023.&text=Announced%20in%20June%2C%20China's%20youth,when%20it%20was%20below%2010%25.">21.3%</a> - is particularly alarming, not just because it’s high, but because it could affect other economies and geopolitical relations.</p>
<p>The release of the rate, which more than doubled the pre-COVID rate of May 2018, coincided with China’s National Bureau of Statistics announcing it would no longer report age specific data because it needed to “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/15/business/china-youth-unemployment.html">improve and optimise labour force survey statistics</a>”.</p>
<p>Youth unemployment is a complex issue, but even more so in China as a result of government policy and society’s expectations.</p>
<p>Under the <em>Hukou</em> system, households in China are required to register, and authorities then determine where they live and work and which public services they can access.</p>
<p>The system often stops rural residents taking advantage of urban opportunities, which can limit their work prospects.</p>
<p>The stress and uncertainty experienced by this demographic is only worsened by the expectations that come with being the only child in the family as a result of China’s one child policy, which was abandoned only seven years ago.</p>
<h2>The “Ant Tribe” phenomenon</h2>
<p>The term “Ant Tribe” was <a href="https://www.abebooks.com/ant-university-graduates-village-inhabited-Record/8875034122/bd">coined in 2009</a> by sociologist Lian Si to describe highly educated young people stuck in low-paying, temporary jobs that hinder skill advancement.</p>
<p>These young people can’t accumulate social capital, leading to a negative cycle that’s hard to escape. This diminishes their return on their investment in education and highlights a breakdown in the career ecosystem.</p>
<p>The “Ant Tribe” phenomenon is more than just a sign of a flawed economy. It also reveals a deeper emotional and psychological issue. Being over educated and underemployed causes significant <a href="https://hbr.org/2012/03/tackling-the-trauma-of-unemplo">emotional trauma</a>, including anxiety, depression and hopelessness.</p>
<p>This emotional toll is further complicated by societal shifts such as the “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-12-07/why-people-are-quitting-jobs-and-protesting-work-life-from-the-u-s-to-china">lying flat</a>” movement and the rise of “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/26/economy/china-youth-unemployment-intl-hnk/index.html">full time children</a>” in China.</p>
<p>These trends challenge traditional markers of success and redefine family expectations, adding another layer to the psychological complexities faced by the younger generation. The impact can be long-lasting, leading to a <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24567295/">less productive and innovative workforce</a>.</p>
<h2>Weaknesses in the education system</h2>
<p>Despite rapid expansion in higher education, a disconnect exists between university curricula and job market needs.</p>
<p>Programs often favour theory over practical skills, leaving graduates ill-equipped for work. For example, engineering students might focus on equations and theories but miss out on real-world applications such as internships.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Chinese students in a classroom taking notes" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551925/original/file-20231003-15-y9vbtu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551925/original/file-20231003-15-y9vbtu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551925/original/file-20231003-15-y9vbtu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551925/original/file-20231003-15-y9vbtu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551925/original/file-20231003-15-y9vbtu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551925/original/file-20231003-15-y9vbtu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551925/original/file-20231003-15-y9vbtu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Overqualified candidates flood the jobs market, forcing many to return to study.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/search/chinese-academics?image_type=photo">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>Additionally, the market faces a glut of overqualified candidates, especially in the technology, finance and healthcare sectors. This imbalance drives many towards further studies.</p>
<p>In 2023, a total of 4.74 million students took the postgraduate entrance exam, a staggering <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1207914/china-number-of-applicants-for-postgraduate-entrance-examination/#:%7E:text=The%20number%20of%20applicants%20for,generally%20been%20rising%20in%20China">135% increase</a> on the 2.01 million test takers in 2017. This cycle exacerbates youth unemployment and underemployment. </p>
<h2>The wider impact</h2>
<p>The ripple effect of China’s youth unemployment crisis is not to be underestimated. Drawing on warnings from <a href="https://www.unicef-irc.org/article/1061-violence-peace-and-stability-the-youth-factor.html">UNICEF</a>, high unemployment rates can lead to <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/link-joblessness-social-unrest/">civil unrest</a>, especially in nations with a large youth population.</p>
<p>The Chinese Communist Party has long maintained its <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-china-combined-authoritarianism-with-capitalism-to-create-a-new-communism-167586">authoritarian approach</a> by securing a social licence based on economic stability and prosperity.</p>
<p>If rising youth unemployment erodes this licence by fostering political disengagement or radicalisation, China could experience a significant <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-03/china-s-jobless-youths-may-pose-political-risk-top-adviser-says">internal power shift</a>.</p>
<p>In a globally connected world, such turmoil could spill over into international relations. Civic unrest can make a country less stable and thus <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00318.x">less attractive to foreign investment</a>, especially among nations with close economic ties to China.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-the-worlds-largest-higher-education-boom-74789">Inside the world's largest higher education boom</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Such an internal upheaval also threatens to destabilise supply chains globally, given China’s pivotal role in <a href="https://www.gmfus.org/news/chinas-dominance-global-supply-chains">global supply chains</a>.</p>
<p>Historical examples such as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/fading-hope-why-the-youth-of-the-arab-spring-are-still-unemployed-60588">Arab Spring</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-young-britons-really-think-about-brexit-and-their-prospects-outside-the-eu-86490">Brexit</a> show internal dissatisfaction and social unrest can have ripple effects on a country’s international relations.</p>
<p>The Arab Spring led to the overthrow of multiple governments, created regional instability, influenced global oil prices, and necessitated the resetting of foreign policy by Western countries.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Large group of people carrying placards protesting against Brexit" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551939/original/file-20231004-21-471onj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551939/original/file-20231004-21-471onj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551939/original/file-20231004-21-471onj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551939/original/file-20231004-21-471onj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551939/original/file-20231004-21-471onj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551939/original/file-20231004-21-471onj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551939/original/file-20231004-21-471onj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Instability in Britain caused by Brexit led to changes in foreign policy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/search/brexit-protests?image_type=photo">Shutterstock</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Similarly, Brexit impacted global trade agreements, led to political realignment, and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/48544279">caused the European Union to reconsider its future direction</a>, affecting its collective foreign policy.</p>
<p>While youth unemployment is a global dilemma, the extent of the problem in China and its potential broader impact on interconnected economies means we can’t afford to ignore it.</p>
<h2>What can China do to solve the problem?</h2>
<p>China can find policy inspiration from successful initiatives in other countries, such as Germany’s <a href="https://www.bibb.de/datenreport/en/175376.php">dual vocational training system</a>. This system ensures students are both academically prepared and practically skilled, better aligning education with labour market demands.</p>
<p>Addressing the urban/rural divide is equally crucial. By offering financial incentives including tax breaks and grants, China could promote job growth in rural areas. Australia and the United States have adopted similar models to attract healthcare workers to <a href="https://www.ruralhealth.org.au/partyline/article/targeting-incentives-attract-more-doctors-nurses-and-allied-health-professionals-rural">less populated regions</a>. </p>
<p>China also needs to do something to reduce the emotional toll of chronic unemployment which worsens the longer graduates are out of work. Post-COVID, the issue is exacerbated, with 40% of Chinese youth <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7173777/">reported</a> to be susceptible to mental health challenges. </p>
<p>This is where <a href="https://headspace.org.au/">mental health services</a> such as those available in Australia that are tailored to <a href="https://www.headtohealth.gov.au/support-for-young-people#:%7E:text=headspace%20provides%20assessment%2C%20early%20intervention,online%20support%20through%20their%20website">young people</a> could help. Besides benefiting the individual, these programs contribute to a more engaged, productive workforce essential for national well being.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/young-educated-and-underemployed-are-we-building-a-nation-of-phd-baristas-53104">Young, educated and underemployed: are we building a nation of PhD baristas?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The precarious nature of the gig economy can further deepen the unemployment crisis. Some European countries such as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/french-court-orders-uber-pay-some-18-mln-drivers-company-appeal-2023-01-20/#:%7E:text=In%202020%2C%20France%27s%20top%20court,workers%20such%20as%20paid%20holidays.">France</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/dutch-court-rules-uber-drivers-are-employees-not-contractors-newspaper-2021-09-13/">the Netherlands</a> consider gig workers employees and offer social security benefits. A similar model could be implemented in China, providing benefits such as health insurance and retirement plans.</p>
<p>Finally, the scale and complexity of youth unemployment requires a multi-pronged approach that extends beyond national borders.</p>
<p>Countries should actively share successful employment strategies and cooperate on international initiatives to create job opportunities for youth. Collaboration is the key to developing a globally stable, productive young workforce.</p>
<p>Investing in young people isn’t just good policy. It’s a moral imperative for global stability and shared prosperity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213751/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christian Yao does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Youth unemployment is a complex issue but even more so in China as a result of government policy and society’s expectations.Christian Yao, Senior Lecturer, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of WellingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2126722023-09-01T08:57:49Z2023-09-01T08:57:49ZGabon coup: Bongo’s rule ended by failed promises and shifting alliances<p><em>The Bongo family’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-bongo-run-re-election-august-2023-07-09/">56 year hold</a> on power in Gabon was abruptly brought to an end with a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/gabon-coup-military-ali-bongo-house-arrest/a-66668078">military coup</a> on 30 August. The military takeover happened hours after election results were announced that gave Ali Bongo Ondimba <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-ali-bongo-wins-third-term-after-disputed-election-2023-08-30/">a third term</a>. Gyldas Ofoulhast-Othamot, a professor of public and international affairs with <a href="https://www.academia.edu/36832992/The_Quick_Rise_and_Fall_of_the_Developmental_State_in_Gabon_2009_2016">published research on Gabon</a>, explains factors that may have contributed to the ouster.</em></p>
<h2>Did Gabon’s recent election stack up as ‘free and fair’?</h2>
<p>The presidential election on 26 August was the sixth since the formal end of the one-party state in 1990. Like the others, it was contentious from the start. </p>
<p>The particular issue this time was that three elections (presidential, parliamentary and local) took place at once. This had never been done before. In the context of autocratic and dynastic rule in Gabon, it was bound to be problematic. </p>
<p>It’s no surprise that the poll was reported to be <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/ousting-gabons-unpopular-leader-smokescreen-soldiers-seize-power-102825125#:%7E:text=The%20head%20of%20Gabon's%20elite,and%20a%20lack%20of%20transparency.">chaotic</a>. It appears to have been a mixture of ineptitude and wilful incompetence and chaos. Polls opened late. Some opposition ballots were said to be missing. As a result voting had to be extended in some areas. </p>
<p>Finally, immediately after the vote, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-vote-president-bongo-seeks-extend-56-year-family-dynasty-2023-08-26/">internet</a> was cut and a curfew put in place, rarely a sign of a regime confident that it has won at the polls.</p>
<p>The many <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/revision-gabonese-constitution-between-contestation-modernization-and-inconsistencies">constitutional</a>, legal and electoral changes before and after the elections severely undermined the integrity of the vote. </p>
<p>Perhaps the most contentious change was the last-minute addition of the single ballot. This meant that voters who selected a member of parliament automatically voted for the presidential candidate in the same party – even if it wasn’t their first choice.</p>
<p>Collectively, all the changes seemed designed to give the incumbent the advantage. They made for flawed elections. </p>
<p>Finally, the result, which gave Ali Bongo Ondimba the victory with over <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-ali-bongo-wins-third-term-after-disputed-election-2023-08-30/">64%</a> of votes cast, was announced while people were asleep. No advance notification was given as it had been in previous contests. </p>
<p>All signs were that it was a rigged election. </p>
<p>The leaders of the junta used that as a justification for their takeover.</p>
<h2>What are the weaknesses in Gabon’s political makeup?</h2>
<p>Gabon <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20230830-the-republic-of-gabon-in-dates">became independent</a> from France on 17 August 1960. That’s 63 years ago. Except for its first president, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Leon-Mba">Leon M’ba Minko</a> (1960-1967), the Bongo family has governed the country for 56 years – (<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/gabon-omar-bongo-death-reports">Omar Bongo Ondimba from 1967 to 2009</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-46074728">Ali Bongo Ondimba</a> from then on until 30 August 2023). </p>
<p>Political domination by a single family is the country’s main weakness. The political system has been tailored to serve the interests of one family only and its domestic and foreign allies. </p>
<p>In this context, it becomes difficult to engineer the types of reforms necessary for a country to modernise and regenerate itself. </p>
<p>Bongo’s father maintained control through patronage and balancing the involvement of various societal (ethnic) groups. But in the 1990s this became more difficult because of the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/51a316ff18.html">return of multipartyism</a> and a decline in oil reserves which made patronage more challenging. </p>
<p>In some ways, Ali Bongo Ondimba’s attempt to go beyond the political equilibrium created by his father doomed him. He promised reforms and a state that would improve the lives of all the people. But he failed to deliver. </p>
<p>With ever shifting domestic elite alliances and popular demand for better living conditions and for the Bongo regime to end, it was only a matter of time before the military switched sides. It was that or continued repression with the potential for more blood being spilled, as happened in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/31/gabon-election-results-disputed-incumbent-ali-bongo-victor-jean-ping">2016</a>.</p>
<h2>What about the economy? How are ordinary people faring?</h2>
<p>Well endowed in natural resources, Gabon is regarded by the World Bank as an upper-middle-income country with a <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=GA">GDP per capita of US$8,820</a>. This is among the <a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/gabon-market-overview#:%7E:text=Gabon's%20per%20capita%20GDP%20of,not%20reflect%20its%20relative%20wealth.">highest</a> in sub-Saharan Africa. Gabon used to be called the “<a href="https://bondsloans.com/news/gabon-a-step-in-the-right-direction">Kuwait of Africa</a>” because of its oil and natural resources wealth and its small population of <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/gabon/overview">2.3 million</a>. </p>
<p>But its population remains poor. Only a small elite has benefited from the country’s wealth. Unemployment is said to be as high as <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=GA">37%</a>, with <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/07/08/gabon-report-slams-record-of-ali-bongos-second-term//">35%</a> of Gabonese living below the poverty line of US$2 a day.</p>
<p>When Ali Bongo Ondimba came to power in <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/who-is-president-ali-bongo/a-46983878">2009</a>, he <a href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/GAB">promised</a> economic reforms. But by 2016, economic stagnation was still the norm. <a href="https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2023/07/gabon-power-outage-causes-flight-delays-at-leon-mba-international-airport-in-libreville-as-of-july-25">Power cuts are frequent</a>, running tap water has become a rare commodity, and inequalities have increased.</p>
<h2>What history does the military have in the country’s affairs?</h2>
<p>This is the third coup in Gabon’s history. </p>
<p>The first was in <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/gabon-latest-in-a-series-of-coups-in-africa/2979571">1964</a> under President Leon M’ba Minko. France intervened to reinstate him. </p>
<p>The last two coups have been under Ali Bongo Ondimba. In 2019, it was led by junior officers and was short-lived. Nevertheless, it exposed the frailties of his regime, especially after he suffered a stroke in Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>This time it appears that the military brass are all in, at least those who matter in the Republican Guard (GR in French). </p>
<p>In my view the military has been central to the Bongo regime maintaining its power for all those years. </p>
<p>For instance, in 1993 and 2016 when the Bongo regime was under duress, only military intervention and repression of opposition groups ensured its survival. </p>
<p>Also, the loyalty of the members of the state security and defence apparatus has always been well rewarded. The Republican Guard, the most equipped and well financed of all the armed forces, exemplifies that. </p>
<p>The difference now is that it has decided to be king rather than staying behind the scenes as the kingmaker. </p>
<p>Its aims are not clear yet – democratic and republican or authoritarian rule. </p>
<h2>What difference is this coup likely to make?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/30/who-is-brice-oligui-nguema-alleged-coup-leader-in-gabon">General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema</a>, the leader of the junta, does not appear to be related to the Bongo family. </p>
<p>He entered the Bongo circle through his relationship with the long-time former commander of the Republican Guard, André Oyini. Over time, he rose through the ranks to become Omar Bongo Ondimba’s last military aide. </p>
<p>Given that proximity to the Bongo family, it looks like a palace revolution rather than true political change. Ali Bongo Ondimba was the heir of a political system built by his father since the 1960s. That system has not collapsed overnight. </p>
<p>Yet the junta, and more generally the security and defence forces, will have to take into account political, economic and social decay and popular aspirations when deciding the path forward. If not, instability will become the norm.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212672/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gyldas A. Ofoulhast-Othamot is not affiliated with any political organizations either in the U.S. or Gabon. However, in the two most recent presidential elections, as a private citizen of Gabon, he endorsed both Jean Ping (2016) and Albert Ondo Ossa (2023).</span></em></p>Failed developmental promises, ever shifting domestic elite alliances and popular demand for better living conditions contributed to the military removal of Gabon’s Ali Bongo Ondimba.Gyldas A. Ofoulhast-Othamot, Assistant professor of political science, St. Petersburg CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116152023-08-22T13:19:50Z2023-08-22T13:19:50ZZimbabwe election: Can Nelson Chamisa win? He appeals to young voters but the odds are stacked against him<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543288/original/file-20230817-27-gcauag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nelson Chamisa, leader of Zimbabwe's main opposition Citizens Coalition for Change, addresses supporters at a rally.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Auntony / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/7/28/profile-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-nelson-chamisa">Nelson Chamisa</a>, the 45-year-old leader of Zimbabwe’s main opposition party, the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), is making a second bid to be Zimbabwe’s next president. </p>
<p>A lawyer and a pastor, Chamisa is the most formidable candidate against the ruling Zanu-PF led by President Emmerson Mnangagwa. The incumbent took over after the coup that ousted the country’s founding president Robert Mugabe in 2017. </p>
<p>Chamisa is over three decades younger than his (<a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/08/03/profile-emmerson-mnangagwa-zimbabwe-s-crocodile-president//">81-year-old</a>) opponent, and the youngest person running for president in this election. His youthfulness has been a major issue in this election, as it was in the last. </p>
<p>At least 62% of the population is <a href="https://zimbabwe.unfpa.org/en/topics/young-people-2">under 25</a>. They are <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-youth-speak-out-independence-day/2718352.html">“born-frees”</a> who feel the brunt of Zimbabwe’s failing economy. The actual unemployment rate is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-42116932">unclear</a>; some claim it is as high as <a href="https://worldhelp.net/zimbabwe-unemployment-as-high-as-80-amid-pandemic/">80%</a>. The government claims it is <a href="https://www.zimstat.co.zw/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/2021_Fourth_Quarter_QLFS_Report_8032022.pdf#page=13">18%</a>. What is true is that many of Zimbabwe’s youth eke a living in the informal sector, estimated to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-informal-sector-organisations-in-zimbabwe-shape-notions-of-citizenship-180455">90% of the economy</a>. </p>
<p>Many young graduates have settled for being street vendors or have taken the dangerous <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-precarious-road-zimbabweans-travel-to-seek-a-new-life-in-south-africa-58911">illegal track</a> across the crocodile infested Limpopo River to find work in neighbouring <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/zimbabwe-immigration/">South Africa</a>. Others with some financial means seek work overseas, even if it’s below their qualifications.</p>
<p>It is to this demographic that Chamisa is speaking directly. He promises the young a <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2023/08/gift-mugano-unpacking-the-ccc-manifesto-launched-by-nelson-chamisa/">total revamp of the economy</a>. His messaging often includes glossy pictures of high-rise buildings and modernised highway networks that stand in contrast to many dilapidated roads and buildings in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>As a political scientist who focuses on voting behaviour, migration and social media, I think Chamisa would have a more than fair chance to win in a truly free and fair election. He resonates with the country’s large disenchanted youth, mainly because of the poor state of the economy. However, campaigning in autocratic conditions is not ideal for the opposition. His and his party’s weakness are also serious hurdles.</p>
<h2>Youth appeal</h2>
<p>According to the independent African surveys network <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>, 67% of Zimbabweans are <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/zimbabwe_r8_diss1-zs-bh-11june21-v2_17june2021finalreleaseversion.pdf">unsatisfied with the direction the country is taking</a>. </p>
<p>In its recently released <a href="https://www.zimeye.net/2023/08/09/download-ccc-manifesto-a-new-great-zimbabwe-blueprint/">election manifesto</a>, the Citizens Coalition for Change promises to transform Zimbabwe into a US$100 billion economy over the next 10 years. The World Bank puts the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-heads-to-the-polls-amid-high-inflation-a-slumping-currency-and-a-cost-of-living-crisis-209841">battered economy</a> at just under <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/country/ZW">US$ 21 billion</a>. </p>
<p>Chamisa defines himself as a social democrat who believes in providing substantial welfare. His party’s manifesto promises universal healthcare and basic education. He also promises to open Zimbabwe to international trade and re-engagement, ending over 20 years of <a href="https://www.commonwealthroundtable.co.uk/commonwealth/africa/zimbabwe/opinion-zimbabwes-continued-isolation/">isolation</a>. The country was suspended from the Commonwealth and excluded from debt relief programmes due to ongoing human rights abuses. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe was once Africa’s breadbasket but can no longer <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/dec/15/we-could-have-lost-her-zimbabwes-children-go-hungry-as-crisis-deepens">feed</a> its small population of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ZW">just over 16 million</a> people.</p>
<p>Chamisa’s appeal to the youth vote has been received along partisan lines. For supporters of the ruling party, he is too young, too naïve, <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/chamisa-incompetent-western-puppet-faking-political-bravery/">too western-leaning</a>, and lacks liberation credentials. For his support base of mostly young urbanites, Chamisa’s youth is his <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-02-07-zimbabwes-voters-favour-nelson-chamisa-over-president-mnangagwa-survey-shows/">trump card</a>. They have turned the age mockery from Zanu-PF into a campaign slogan, “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxqs4l0RGaA">Ngapinde Hake Mukomana</a>” (let the young man enter the state house). </p>
<p>Chamisa is popular, as shown by huge attendance at his rallies. But will this be enough to help him win his first election as the founding leader of CCC? </p>
<h2>Voter apathy, funding and harassment</h2>
<p>Chamisa and his party face a number of hurdles. The first is getting the youth to vote. </p>
<p>Youth political participation in Zimbabwe has historically been very <a href="https://mg.co.za/thoughtleader/2023-08-12-zimbabwes-2023-elections-who-votes-and-why/">low</a>. Although the election body, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, is still to release a full voter’s roll, analysis by the Election Resource Center shows that <a href="https://twitter.com/ercafrica/status/1692100040196575545?s=20">while 85%</a> (6.6 million) of eligible voters are registered, only a third are under the age of 35. </p>
<p>In addition to voter apathy, Chamisa must contend with other hurdles within the opposition movement and the usual obstacles of running for office in electoral authoritarian state. </p>
<p>Chamisa <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2022-01-25-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-nelson-chamisa-forms-new-political-party/">founded</a> the CCC following his forced exit from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2021. The married father of three had been mentored by the opposition movement’s founder, the late <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/19/zimbabwes-opposition-leader-died-heres-what-you-need-to-know/">Morgan Tsvangirai</a>. But Tsvangirai’s death <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43066175">in 2018</a> ended Chamisa’s career in the party as divisions grew between him and the old guard. </p>
<p>The formation of the CCC helped him draw in a younger generation of politicians like <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/longform/2022/7/7/the-zimbabwean-political-leader-fighting-for-her-countrys-future">Fadzayi Mahere</a>. But it also opened up Chamisa to new problems. The CCC has <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/politics-zimbabwe-elections-economy-human-rights-violations/">little money</a> against Zanu-PF’s elections war chest.</p>
<p>Chamisa lost access to state funds and opposition institutions when he left the MDC. His departure also left him with few friends at home or abroad. </p>
<p>He argues that what some see as disorganisation and isolation is <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/theindependent/local-news/article/200013680/chamisa-its-time-for-clarity-not-ambiguity">strategic ambiguity</a>. He claims that his party keeps its cards closely guarded against infiltration and manipulation.</p>
<p>Chamisa has valid reasons to do so. The ruling party has successfully co-opted opposition leadership by offering patronage. The ruling party also uses courts to their advantage and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/45b09177-bfbe-41ea-9cbd-ea4c0218f447">violence against</a> opponents. </p>
<p>In 2007, in the months leading up to the election, Chamisa suffered a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna17646957">fractured skull</a>. In 2021, his party reported threats to his life when his envoy was attacked using a <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-assailants-attack-nelson-chamisa-vehicle-leader-safe/6277026.html">homemade bomb</a>. Members of his party have been beaten up, and others have even lost <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/local-news/article/200014816/ccc-member-stoned-to-death-in-harare-violence">their lives</a>. Job Sikhala, a senior member of the opposition, has been in jail for over a year on <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/zimbabwe-conviction-and-sentencing-of-opposition-leader/">unclear charges</a>. </p>
<h2>One man show</h2>
<p>Chamisa’s vagueness on policy adds to his challenges. On the social platform X, where he has more than a <a href="https://twitter.com/nelsonchamisa?s=20">million followers</a>, he regularly only shares <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/chamisas-followers-says-they-are-tired-of-bible-verses/">Bible verses</a> or ambiguous messages. This is a lost opportunity for a candidate counting on the youth vote.</p>
<p>His party structures are unclear and it has yet to release its constitution. The only formal position in the party is his position of president. Everyone else is known only as a change agent. </p>
<p>Chamisa has not announced a running mate. This feeds into rumours that he has weak leadership skills and prefers to centre power on himself. One might even wonder if he does not trust his supporters.</p>
<p>Still, those supporting him say they do not need to know his structures. Zimbabweans are hungry for change after four decades of Zanu-PF rule. Many who hoped for change after Mugabe’s ouster are dismayed by the continuing economic challenges and increasing militarisation of the Zimbabwean politics. For these voters, Chamisa is the change they hope to see.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211615/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chipo Dendere receives funding from the American Association of University Women (AAUW) and Wellesley College to support research. </span></em></p>Nelson Chamisa defines himself as a social democrat who believes in providing substantial welfare to support healthcare and basic education.Chipo Dendere, Assistant Professor, Africana Studies, Wellesley CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2086762023-07-13T15:24:47Z2023-07-13T15:24:47ZLooking for work? 3 tips on how social media can help young South Africans<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535248/original/file-20230703-268117-cyhffd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Young people are especially quick to adapt to new technology.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">i_am_zews/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa has a growing unemployment rate. Statistics show the unemployment rate to be above 60% for those aged 15-24 and over 40% for those aged <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=15407">25-34 years</a>. Rankings from the World Bank position South Africa as having the <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/unemployment-by-country">highest unemployment rate in the world</a>. </p>
<p>This runaway unemployment rate not only creates precarious, limiting circumstances for individual young people but also poses a threat to the country’s economic growth and global competitiveness.</p>
<p>Another, much more positive statistic from the International Telecommunications Union positions young people as active <a href="https://www.itu.int/hub/publication/d-ind-ict_mdd-2022">adopters of technology</a>. Three-quarters of 15- to 24-year-olds globally use the internet actively. Though the figures show this uptake to be mostly in developed countries, there is progress on the African continent in terms of technology infrastructure to lead to <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20220727/african-internet-governance-forum-2022-africa-strives-improve-digital">internet usage</a>.</p>
<p>These developments are also noted in South Africa. The country’s internet penetration rate stood at <a href="https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2023-south-africa#:%7E:text=Internet%20use%20in%20South%20Africa%20in%202023&text=South%20Africa%27s%20internet%20penetration%20rate,at%20the%20start%20of%202023">72.3%</a> of the total population at the start of 2023. This paves the way for greater use of social media.</p>
<p>Our interest as researchers is how young people can use social media to overcome the unemployment challenge in South Africa.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://sajhrm.co.za/index.php/sajhrm/article/view/2047/3254">study</a> we carried out found three key ways for young people to enhance their employability using social media. Our findings, like those of some other <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0747563213002070?via%3Dihub">studies</a>, place high importance on the role of social media in a context of high unemployment. </p>
<p>For the study, we interviewed 15 human resources specialists whose work largely focused on recruitment and selection. They help some of South Africa’s leading corporate companies to find the best candidates for certain roles. These were their three key pieces of advice.</p>
<h2>1. Using social media to edify a personal brand</h2>
<p>All the interviewees in our study agreed that social media could be used to edify an individual’s brand. This is something that is becoming common and <a href="https://www.searchenginejournal.com/what-is-personal-branding-why-important/327367/#:%7E:text=Personal%20branding%20is%20the%20process%20of%20creating%20an%20identity%20for,work%20on%20your%20personal%20brand">encouraged globally</a>.</p>
<p>The aim here is clear: through your social media activity you convey a message about yourself. This can be useful to reach out to the outside world in advertising your skills set. Social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram and LinkedIn are a valuable resource for young jobseekers to achieve this. </p>
<h2>2. Using social media to widen your networks</h2>
<p>Once young people have an idea of what their online “brand” will be, they can start to network. This may be with other jobseekers or prospective employers. Networking offers an opportunity to learn about the world of work, including the challenging labour market. Using information from networking, young people can be better equipped to respond to uncertainty. </p>
<p>Networking on social media platforms could involve attending webinars and discussion forums. A number of social media platforms offer tools enabling interaction through text, audio or video. One participant in our research described the strength of networking like this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Networking allows you to build your social capital on two fronts. First, you get access to interact with important stakeholders such as prospective employers. Second … not only information but a learning space from the experience of others. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Interviewees warned that young jobseekers should not compromise their personal brand. One said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Graduates should be warned about the kind of stuff they should and should not post on social media and ensure that their online media presence is closely monitored and updated so that they are aware of what others can see about them. Social media allows for quick and easy judgement-making …</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Universities should consider offering social media and personal branding training awareness so that future graduates are not only aware of complexities in the labour market but also prepared to meet them. Graduate placement offices within universities could take on this training role. </p>
<h2>3. Using social media as a platform for continued learning</h2>
<p>Social media presents young people with an endless reservoir of information about the world. It includes job postings, learnership and internship opportunities, and tips on how to be marketable in an ever changing job market. </p>
<p>One participant in our study with experience recruiting in the technology sector expressed this view:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For any young person I would say continue to use social media as a fountain of learning. Learn about the world of work through social media. Importantly, also learn about yourself and how you could fit into such a world.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Tackling unemployment</h2>
<p>Our research suggests that young people should learn how to search for job opportunities, and advertise their skills and profiles on social media. This can help them tap into a network that might give them a better chance in a situation of high unemployment. </p>
<p>High data <a href="https://mybroadband.co.za/news/cellular/429334-how-much-1gb-of-data-costs-in-south-africa-vs-the-world.html">costs</a> remain a challenge. Companies and content developers can assist here in developing websites that can be accessed with no data cost implication.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208676/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Willie Tafadzwa Chinyamurindi receives funding from the National Research Foundation; National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences and the National Heritage Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liezel Cilliers receives funding from the National Research Foundation and the South African Medical Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Obrain Tinashe Murire does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By building and maintaining a personal brand, young social media users can identify work opportunities.Willie Tafadzwa Chinyamurindi, Professor, University of Fort HareLiezel Cilliers, Professor in Health Informatics, University of Fort HareObrain Tinashe Murire, Senior lecturer in People Development and Technology, Walter Sisulu UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2029692023-05-15T09:57:46Z2023-05-15T09:57:46ZMillions of young South Africans are jobless: study finds that giving them ‘soft’ skills like networking helps their prospects<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524872/original/file-20230508-230994-qc2h0f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Study finds that soft rather than technical skills are more effective in getting rural youth jobs.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The fact that more than half of the South African population <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022021.pdf#page=26">is under 30 years</a> could be beneficial for the country’s economic growth and development. But South Africa has not been able to reap this <a href="https://arabstates.unfpa.org/en/topics/demographic-dividend-6">demographic dividend</a>. This is largely due to <a href="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s43151-020-00012-6.pdf?pdf=button">a skills mismatch</a>.</p>
<p>That’s why <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/Presentation%20QLFS%20Q3%202022.pdf#page=16">60%</a> of its young people (between the ages of 15 and 25) are unemployed. The situation was made worse by the COVID-19 pandemic. Its impact on the labour market disproportionately affected <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/media/wits-university/faculties-and-schools/commerce-law-and-management/wits-school-of-governance/documents/COVID-19%20and%20the%20labour%20market-.pdf">young</a> and low-skilled workers.</p>
<p>A major cause of youth unemployment in South Africa is <a href="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s43151-020-00012-6.pdf?pdf=button">the mismatch</a> between what employers want and what young people have. This is mostly characterised by technical under-skilling relative to the expectations of employers. </p>
<p>The country’s schooling system has failed young people, with many learners going through the basic education system without acquiring the necessary literacy and <a href="http://www.ci.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/367/Child_Gauge/South_African_Child_Gauge_2015/Child_Gauge_2015-Schooling.pdf">numeracy</a> skills.</p>
<p>In response to the unemployment crisis, the South African government established the <a href="http://www.old.dalrrd.gov.za/doaDev/sideMenu/About%20us/NARYSEC%20booklets%20May%202013.pdf">National Rural Youth Service Corps</a> programme in September 2010, targeting young people in rural areas who are the most disadvantaged. It is still <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/government-programmes/national-rural-youth-service-corps-programme">running today</a>.</p>
<p>The programme’s main objective was to equip participants with technical and vocational skills to enhance their employment prospects, or ability to create their own businesses. Participants receive a stipend during their two years of participation. They are also trained in leadership, networking, and problem-solving. </p>
<p>We sought to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/10353046221138400">assess the effectiveness</a> of the programme in bridging the skills mismatch. We also wanted to identify the skills most likely to be associated with labour market success.</p>
<p>We used a blended methodological approach, combining quantitative and qualitative analyses. This enabled us to capture the data on skills accumulation and the related labour market outcomes. It also provided us with the human narratives. </p>
<p>Among participants who had jobs, we found that the key determinant of their success was the improvement in their soft skills, including problem-solving, networking and leadership skills. The same was true for the participants who had started businesses; soft skills proved significantly more effective than technical skills.</p>
<p>These results highlight the critical role of soft skills, echoing a growing call in <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0143831X11427589">other countries</a> for increased emphasis on soft-skills in employment support programmes.</p>
<p>Overall, despite some success in helping rural youth improve their technical and soft skills, the programme has a number of weaknesses that limit its effectiveness in linking its graduates to stable employment or viable enterprise creation. These include insufficient support to programme alumni after their exit, and a mismatch between acquired skills and what employers want. </p>
<h2>Effectiveness and weaknesses of the programme</h2>
<p>We also examined the relevance, effectiveness, transformative effects, and equitable inclusiveness of the programme. In addition, we looked at the behaviour of the participants, including changes in attitudes, commitments and the social and cultural values of individuals and groups.</p>
<p>Most of the participants as well as the programme implementation officials we interviewed described the programme as a relevant policy intervention to address the unemployment problem among rural youth. </p>
<p>However, they said its implementation raised practical challenges for participants. One key weakness was the programme’s failure in supporting graduates to find stable employment. It is estimated that less than 10% of exited graduates benefit from such support.</p>
<p>A major factor is that the administration of the programme does not have sufficient human and financial resources to commit to post-graduation support. It also lacks adequate administrative structures to track graduates and provide them with the administrative and material resource assistance they need to secure employment.</p>
<p>Similarly, programme participants who start businesses are left without support. There’s also a lack of business networks in rural areas. Networks often assist new start-ups to integrate in local value chains. </p>
<p>In addition, the mismatch between the technical skills taught within the programme and what employers require is a significant impediment to the success of graduates. This makes it difficult for graduates to find sustainable employment or create viable enterprises post-graduation.</p>
<p>Most key informants – those whose positions enabled them to have access to important information relevant to the interview topic – were of the view that the skills and qualifications obtained from the programme were inferior to those obtained from technical vocational education and training colleges. This is despite these colleges being deemed <a href="https://ukzn-dspace.ukzn.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10413/19661/Msibi_Khanyisile_Jane_2021.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y">inadequate</a> to the task of closing the technical skills gap. </p>
<p>Where the programme has been most successful has been in ensuring the participation of women. They make up more than half of its participants.</p>
<h2>Implications and recommendations</h2>
<p>It is therefore not surprising that programmes like the National Rural Youth Service Corps have not had a noticeable impact on South Africa’s youth unemployment crisis. To succeed, there must be greater synergy between various stakeholders involved in rural enterprise development and employment creation.</p>
<p>There must also be an alignment of skills taught to learners and the needs of employers. Graduates must be assisted with relevant resources, especially land and start-up capital.</p>
<p>In addition, support for graduates must be streamlined to ensure effective tracking of participants when they graduate and that their needs are assessed properly. </p>
<p>Lastly, we cannot overemphasise the importance of soft skills to the success of youth in the job market – they should form the core of any programme for youth employment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202969/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A mismatch between the skills employers want and what young people have is the major cause of youth unemployment in South Africa. Soft skills are key.Chijioke Nwosu, Senior Lecturer, University of the Free StateAlexis Habiyaremye, Associate Professor in the School of Economics, University of JohannesburgThomas Habanabakize, Researcher in School of Economics and Finance, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2018592023-03-16T05:16:18Z2023-03-16T05:16:18ZUnemployment rate back down to 3.5%. It’s anyone’s guess when things will turn<p>The latest labour force data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics shows employment in February increasing by 64,600, and the (seasonally adjusted) unemployment rate declining from 3.7% to 3.5%. </p>
<p>It’s confirmation that it’s still too early to declare that the labour market has reached a turning point, after which we can expect the rate of unemployment will rise for some time. </p>
<p>Employment growth has been slowing over the past year, but ups and downs from month to month make it difficult to work out how fast that is happening. Meanwhile, the rate of unemployment is stubbornly resisting moving too far from 3.5%. </p>
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<h2>Predictions have been hard</h2>
<p>Making any predictions for the labour market since mid-2022 has been more difficult than usual. </p>
<p>In the first six months of 2022, employment grew by 56,600 per month, while the rate of unemployment fell from 4.2% to 3.5%. But for the next three months, average employment growth was only 11,700, and the unemployment rate ticked up slightly. It looked like, maybe, the end of the expansion.</p>
<p>But no. In the months to October and November, employment growth was back to 47,700 a month, and the jobless rate moved down.</p>
<p>December and January brought decreases in employment. But it’s always difficult to draw predictions from these months. This year’s January numbers also came with <a href="https://www.abs.gov.au/articles/insights-job-attachment-january-2023">an asterisk</a> from the Australian Bureau of Statistics: a much larger number of persons than usual were classified as waiting to start work, raising the prospect of a healthy boost in employment in February, which is what has happened.</p>
<p>So if a labour market slowdown is underway, it is gradual and slow, rather than the “falling off a cliff” variety. For that reason, it’s likely to take a while longer to know exactly where we are heading.</p>
<h2>But more young people are in jobs</h2>
<p>Not everything about the labour market is unpredictable, however. On the contrary, most of the changes we’ve seen since mid-2021, once the Australian labour market started recoverng from the initial impact of COVID-19, are exactly what we would have expected.</p>
<p>When the labour market is growing strongly, we expect this will benefit most of the groups who usually face the biggest difficulties getting into work: those with lower skill levels, who live in regions with less employment opportunities, and young people. This is <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1c2ciDez0TtUVM3vBD1e8oqh2I6BZwt2_/view">indeed what has happened</a>.</p>
<p>The likelihood of those without a post-school qualification being employed has increased 2 percentage points between 2019 and 2022, double the 1-point increase for those with a Bachelor’s degree or above.</p>
<p>In the 25% of regions with the lowest rates of employment, the proportion with jobs in 2022 was 2.2 percentage points higher than 2019. That increase was about three times more than in the 25% of regions with the highest employment rates.</p>
<p>Since immediately before the onset of COVID, the proportion of people aged less than 25 in employment has grown by 6.3 percentage points, compared with a 1.9 percentage point increase for those aged 25 to 64 years.</p>
<h2>And educational enrolments have fallen</h2>
<p>For the young, there has been another consequence of the strong labour market that we’ve learned to expect: more in jobs means <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1hAYu8Np3CypqAuHdot3dF2Bp9STLqAk7/view">fewer studying</a>. Between February 2021 and December 2022 the proportion of those aged 15-24 in full-time tertiary education fell from 24.3% to 21.6%. </p>
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<p><strong>Employment vs education</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515706/original/file-20230316-249-mtdkrg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515706/original/file-20230316-249-mtdkrg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515706/original/file-20230316-249-mtdkrg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=233&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515706/original/file-20230316-249-mtdkrg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=233&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515706/original/file-20230316-249-mtdkrg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=233&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515706/original/file-20230316-249-mtdkrg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515706/original/file-20230316-249-mtdkrg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515706/original/file-20230316-249-mtdkrg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Proportion employed vs proportion in full-time tertiary education.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/latest-release">ABS Labour Force</a></span>
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<p>A <a href="https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2019/sep/education-choices-and-labour-supply-during-the-mining-boom.html">similar withdrawal was observed</a> in the late 2000s, during the mining boom, in the states of Western Australia and Queensland.</p>
<p>It’s having this past experience to draw on that, of course, makes it easier to see patterns in the impact of recovery, than to know where the rate of unemployment is about to head in coming months.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201859/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeff Borland receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>Australia’s employment growth is slowing, but the ups and downs from month to month make it hard say what happens next.Jeff Borland, Professor of Economics, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2015782023-03-14T14:26:54Z2023-03-14T14:26:54ZNigeria’s central bank made critical mistakes that doomed the country’s currency redesign<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515118/original/file-20230314-17-ybroa7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People queue outside a bank in Lagos on February 22, 2023. Nigeria was hit with a scarcity of cash after the central bank began to swap old Naira notes for new bills.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Patrick Meinhardt / AFP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nigeria has successfully <a href="https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Currency/historycur.asp">introduced new banknotes</a> on about 10 occasions since independence in 1960. So why has the latest attempt been so controversial and traumatic? And what measures need to be taken to avoid a future debacle? </p>
<p>Nigeria’s central bank <a href="https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2022/CCD/Naira_Redesign.pdf">announced the introduction of new banknotes</a> last November, with the changeover to new notes scheduled for mid-December. The rollout of the policy disintegrated into chaos, amid mounting anger among ordinary Nigerians.</p>
<p>The rollout of the currency change was <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/585737-timeline-naira-redesign-policy-from-inception-to-supreme-court-judgement.html">disastrous</a>. The fallout included:</p>
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<li><p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigerian-court-extends-old-banknotes-dec-31-amid-cash-shortage-2023-03-03/">Severe shortages</a> of the new banknotes.</p></li>
<li><p>Precipitous <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/mi/research-analysis/nigeria-cash-crisis-hits-activity-in-february-mar23.html">declines</a> in business transactions (especially in the informal sector). </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/952e8047-63a9-4a91-8f15-6f00cd388a95">Long queues</a> at bank premises and overcrowded banking halls</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://punchng.com/protesters-target-banks-atms-battle-security-forces/">Attacks</a> on bank staff and destruction of bank property, including ATMs that failed to dispense cash. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The policy also led to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-06/governors-sue-nigeria-over-naira-redesign-as-cash-vanishes">lawsuits</a> by some state governors against the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Federal Government.</p>
<p>I have identified five factors that marred the redesign policy, most of which could have been avoided by the Central Bank of Nigeria.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-currency-redesign-and-withdrawal-limits-questionable-policy-and-bad-timing-197813">Nigeria’s currency redesign and withdrawal limits: questionable policy and bad timing</a>
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<h2>Litany of errors</h2>
<p><strong>Cost-benefit:</strong> An egregious error committed by the central bank was its violation of the principle of <a href="https://online.hbs.edu/blog/post/cost-benefit-analysis">cost-benefit analysis</a>. This is a simple rule in economics that implores policy makers to undertake an initiative only when the benefits exceed the costs. One should ask: What were the benefits of introducing the policy? What were the potential costs at the time of implementation? </p>
<p>The central bank justified the <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-currency-redesign-and-withdrawal-limits-questionable-policy-and-bad-timing-197813">redesign policy</a> as follows: to rein in counterfeiting, promote a cashless economy by limiting the amount of the new banknotes that can be withdrawn, reduce the large quantity of dirty notes circulating in the economy, discourage hoarding, curb crimes like kidnapping and terrorism, and head off illicit financial transactions. </p>
<p>It also saw the policy as a way of addressing the huge amount of currency outside the formal financial sector; 85% of banknotes circulate outside the banking system, largely because of hoarding and illicit financial transactions. </p>
<p>And the cost? If indeed the central bank considered the cost, it obviously underestimated it. How would anyone ignore the large-scale disruptions in the economy and loss of productivity that the policy caused, not to speak of the stress and anxiety inflicted on Nigerians? </p>
<p><strong>Communication:</strong> Of all the pitfalls that doomed the currency redesign policy, at least as conceived originally, the lack of effective communication about the overarching goals and modus operandi of the exercise was the most devastating. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s central bank threw a basic element of strategic planning and communication to the winds when it failed woefully to communicate and educate the public about expectations, prior to launching the policy. According to <a href="https://www.wilmingtonbiz.com/insights/dallas__romanowski/why_communication_is_essential_to_successful_planning/3175">strategic planners</a>, a major policy initiative that is not well communicated, from the top of the strategy planning pyramid to the bottom, is bound to fail.</p>
<p>The central bank should have sought the buy-in of major stakeholders, especially the National Economic Council and the National Assembly. The central bank would have had a better chance of avoiding the ferocious push-back it got. </p>
<p>The central bank finally began rolling out a <a href="https://www.arise.tv/cbn-intensifies-nationwide-awareness-on-redesigned-naira/">communication plan</a> by late December 2022. But this was too little too late. By then Nigerians had already characterised the policy as <a href="https://sunnewsonline.com/unending-pains-of-naira-redesign-policy/">decidedly punitive</a>. The <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2023/02/14/between-naira-redesign-project-and-politicians-vested-interest/">narrative</a> that had gained ground was that the change was designed to curtail the ability of politicians to buy votes during the 2023 elections.</p>
<p>This inevitably raised the question of why millions of Nigerians should suffer because of politicians? </p>
<p>The central bank’s mishandling of communication was also manifested in the fact that it <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/03/07/naira-redesign-cbn-silence-keeps-banks-business-owners-in-confusion/">failed</a> to issue policy guidelines to commercial banks and the public days after the Supreme Court nullified the bank’s earlier deadline. This has exacerbated the <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/one-week-after-scourt-ruling-cbns-silence-stokes-confusion/">confusion</a> associated with the policy, as merchants and businesses continue to reject the old notes, despite the court’s rulings. </p>
<p><strong>Inappropriate timeframe:</strong> The timeframe for implementation was unrealistic and impracticable. By setting a very short timeframe for phasing out the old notes, the Central Bank of Nigeria appeared to have adopted textbook assumptions about how the Nigerian banking system works.</p>
<p>Anyone who has been to a typical commercial bank in Nigeria would know it would have been impossible for the banks to undertake the monumental task of collecting old notes and dispensing the new ones within the one-and-a-half month window originally allowed by the central bank. Overcrowding, chaos, excruciatingly slow service and unnecessary bureaucratic red tape are quite common during normal banking hours. It is not uncommon to observe people with “connection” circumvent queues and obtain preferential access to bank staff. Although Nigerian banks pride themselves as being digitised, a lot of paper-pushing still goes on within the banking system. </p>
<p>The central bank should have considered this fact and allowed for a longer timeframe for implementation.</p>
<p>There was also no persuasive rationale for the rushed implementation of the policy. Neither was the central bank able to explain why the old and new notes could not coexist, a measure the Supreme Court has now <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-64837041">mandated</a> the bank to implement. </p>
<p><strong>Conflicting goals and lack of prioritisation:</strong> Policy targeting is a major precondition for success. The focus on one unambiguous objective in past redesign policies enabled the central bank to conduct a seamless and less dramatic exercise. </p>
<p>The current redesign policy had too many goals, and it was unclear which one was the target goal.</p>
<p>Identifying target goals enables policy makers to select appropriate instruments for achieving those goals. But when there are too many goals, the danger is that an instrument designed for one goal may undermine another goal. </p>
<p>For instance, the goal of reining in money laundering and illicit financial transactions meant that the Central Bank of Nigeria needed to deliberately restrict access to the new banknotes. But this inflicted unintended hardships on innocent Nigerians who simply wanted to access their hard-earned money. </p>
<p>The central bank should have focused on one major goal. If the goal was to phase out old notes, as the bank is statutorily mandated to do, then the old and new notes could have circulated alongside each other until the old notes were phased out.</p>
<p>A casual announcement that new notes would be circulating from a given date would have been all that was needed. People would not have panicked and rushed to the banks to withdraw money. </p>
<p><strong>Economic headwinds:</strong> It is very difficult to implement a major policy initiative that negatively affects people during a period of macroeconomic instability. The central bank policy came at a bad time. Nigeria’s <a href="https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/">economy</a> is in a shambles, with a <a href="https://www.cbn.gov.ng/rates/inflrates.asp?year=2023">22%</a> inflation rate, <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1119227/forecast-unemployment-rate-in-nigeria/#:%7E:text=In%202022%2C%20the%20unemployment%20rate,constantly%20in%20the%20past%20years.">33%</a> unemployment rate – <a href="https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/">43%</a> among young Nigerians – and a growth rate of <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/NGA">3%</a>. </p>
<p>These economic challenges have been compounded by a <a href="https://punchng.com/breaking-cbn-raises-interest-rate-to-17-5/">17.5%</a> interest rate, steep declines in the value of the Naira, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-poverty-profile-is-grim-its-time-to-move-beyond-handouts-163302">widespread poverty</a>. </p>
<p>Nigerians’ tolerance for economic shocks was already at its limit when the redesign policy was launched. The policy and the confusion that accompanied it tipped them over the edge.</p>
<h2>The challenge of credibility</h2>
<p>The central bank needs to reestablish its credibility as the “people’s bank,” to reverse a self-inflicted image of an organisation that’s partisan. </p>
<p>The bank has a fiduciary responsibility of catering to the interests of its main “shareholder,” the Nigerian people. But the perception is that the bank lacks independence. To effectively discharge its statutory duties, the Central Bank of Nigeria should initiate a process of re-asserting its independence and regaining the people’s trust and confidence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201578/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Onyeiwu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are at least five errors that marred the currency redesign policy of the Central Bank of Nigeria, most of which could have been avoided.Stephen Onyeiwu, Professor of Economics & Business, Allegheny CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1996282023-02-20T13:52:18Z2023-02-20T13:52:18ZIslamist terrorism is rising in the Sahel, but not in Chad – what’s different?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511155/original/file-20230220-18-cskr5w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Local residents gather around the biggest mosque in the region for the evening prayer in Bahai, Chad.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Marco Di Lauro/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the rise of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Boko-Haram">Boko Haram</a> in Nigeria and the emergence of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-salafi-jihadist-threat">Islamist-Salafist</a> groups in northern Mali in 2013, the Sahel has increasingly been caught in the maelstrom of Islamist terrorism. </p>
<p>The region is now described as the new <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133217">global epicentre</a> of violent extremism. The population is suffering immensely, and in some areas more than <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698048/EPRS_BRI(2021)698048_EN.pdf">2 million</a> people have been displaced. Agriculture and development have come to a halt there.</p>
<p>Five explanations are usually given for the rise of Islamist terrorism in the Sahel: <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/salafism-in-nigeria/5EC64F70A4BCBD521C64C610A0A05FD8">dissatisfaction</a> with the political order, <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/publication/crime-after-jihad-illicit-business-post-conflict-mali">bad governance</a>, <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/publication/crime-after-jihad-illicit-business-post-conflict-mali">corruption</a> and <a href="https://www.africabib.org/rec.php?RID=364364319">ethnic rivalries</a> to <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/money-talks-a-key-reason-youths-join-boko-haram">economic reasons</a> such as poverty or unemployment, especially among the youth. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.undp.org/press-releases/hope-better-jobs-eclipses-religious-ideology-main-driver-recruitment-violent-extremist-groups-sub-saharan-africa">recent study</a> cited economic precarity as the main factor. This is a scenario where young people in particular face high unemployment and thus lose hope about the future.</p>
<p>Chad is one of the <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/country-insights#/ranks">poorest countries</a> in the world. It was ruled for 30 years by the authoritarian president Idriss Déby Itno, who <a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">died in 2021</a> under unexplained circumstances. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">Idriss Déby Itno offered Chadians great hope, but ended up leaving a terrible legacy</a>
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<p>The country fulfils all the conditions associated with Islamist terrorism. But, so far, the threat reaches Chad from the neighbouring countries and not from the inside. So then, what holds Chadian society together? </p>
<p>For my <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/contjas/article/view/239122">research</a> I drew on data from an opinion survey I conducted in five Chadian towns (the capital N’Djamena, Abéché, Sarh, Mongo and Moundou) from 2015 to 2016. My aim was to get the views of all ethnic and linguistic groups in the country. Long-term studies show that people do not change their political and religious attitudes overnight. In view of the actual political transition in Chad and the increase in Islamist terror in the region, the results are still valid today and could allow conclusions to be drawn for other countries.</p>
<p>The results show that one reason the threat of Islamist terrorism doesn’t come from inside is because Chadians want to live together peacefully. Other reasons include the fact that Chadians have high religious tolerance and Deby’s authoritarian regime favoured groups who had a tendency towards religious fundamentalist ideas - appeasing them with economic benefits. </p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>My research sampled 1,857 people who answered about 130 questions in face-to-face interviews. By analysing the quantitative dataset, I identified groups within Chadian society according to their propensity for democracy, cohabitation and religiosity, and their religious fundamentalist tendencies.</p>
<p>The data confirmed a high fragmentation of Chad’s society along ethnic, religious and economic lines. </p>
<p><strong>Democracy:</strong> Chad is one of the <a href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/TCD#pos4">least democratic</a> countries of the world. Yet more than half of the survey respondents supported democratic ideas. </p>
<p><strong>Tolerance:</strong> A substantial majority of respondents expressed the desire to live peacefully with other groups. But the respondents who labelled themselves Salafists – the spectrum of Salafism ranges from a spiritual renewal of Islam as in the times of Mohammed to a hybrid religious-political ideology seeking to establish a global caliphate – were the least inclined to social coexistence.</p>
<p>During individual interviews, religious Muslim and Christian leaders and opinion leaders also emphasised Chadians’ willingness to live together peacefully. They stressed that both religions are frequently represented in many families. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-the-rise-of-jihadist-movements-in-africa-42905">What lies behind the rise of jihadist movements in Africa</a>
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<p><strong>Religion:</strong> Chad, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2010/04/15/religious-affiliation-islam-and-christianity-in-sub-saharan-africa/">a predominantly Muslim society</a>, is one of the few countries in the Sahel region to have a substantial Christian minority. This is partly a legacy of French colonial rule, which fostered a Christian educated elite in the south of the country.</p>
<p>It is also a consequence of Déby’s authoritarian and corrupt rule which emphasised the balance between the different religions. However, he favoured certain groups from the north who had been Islamised for centuries. Members of these groups were over represented in the highest income categories.</p>
<p>The data confirmed that religion played an important role in the daily life of most of those interviewed. The regular observance of religious practices is firmly embedded in the everyday life of Muslims and Christians. </p>
<p>The religious practices of the other religions were also acknowledged. </p>
<p>I was particularly interested in the respondents’ tendency towards religious fundamentalist ideas that could possibly lead to religious violence. The dataset allowed me to create an “Islamist fundamentalism” index. </p>
<p>In contrast to “religiosity”, which measures religious affiliation, belief and practice, conceptualising the measurement of any <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15327582ijpr1401_4">religious fundamentalism</a> focuses on:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>a literal understanding of the sacred book of the respective religion </p></li>
<li><p>the exclusivity of one’s religion </p></li>
<li><p>the importance of religion in societal life. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The Islamist fundamentalism index also contained specific items like the introduction of Sharia law. In this way, I was able to identify respondents who were more inclined towards Islamic fundamentalism, and might even be willing to lean towards Islamist terrorism to achieve their goals.</p>
<p>The highest Islamist attitudes were expressed by more than a third of the sampled Muslim population. I found the strongest Islamist fundamentalist attitudes among respondents who attended an Arabic primary school or a Qur’anic school and had no further schooling, and among respondents with two years of higher education.</p>
<p>Only a minority of the respondents who never went to any school showed Islamist fundamentalist attitudes. </p>
<p><strong>Social profile:</strong> A large number of respondents who scored high as Islamist fundamentalists were merchants and came from high income groups. Most were most likely to have benefited economically during the Déby era. They displayed the biggest support for the late authoritarian president, embraced above average undemocratic attitudes, and supported authoritarian structures in general.</p>
<h2>What’s significant</h2>
<p>Why are these results noteworthy? </p>
<p>Research in other countries has shown that dissatisfaction and frustration about bad governance, corruption or poverty fosters the emergence of Islamist terrorism. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/jihadism-and-coups-in-west-africas-sahel-region-a-complex-relationship-176988">Jihadism and coups in West Africa’s Sahel region: a complex relationship</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In Chad, however, the profiteers of the Déby regime were the most fundamentalist. They admitted that they were willing to take to violence if they did not agree with their political leader. But, with their own position secured, they seem not to have seen any need to turn against the corrupt structures that benefited them. They had made peace with the regime.</p>
<p>Déby’s son Mahamat Déby has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56836109">taken power</a> by violating the country’s constitution. He was appointed transitional president in October 2022 following a so-called national inclusive dialogue. Like his father, he has to deal with sporadic attacks by <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/boko-haram-nigeria">Boko Haram</a> in the Lake Chad region, which is threatened by Islamist terrorism. The economic situation of the country is precarious. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chad-is-making-a-huge-effort-to-find-peace-chadians-arent-convinced-it-will-work-189268">Chad is making a huge effort to find peace: Chadians aren't convinced it will work</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Will Mahamat Déby continue to satisfy his wealthier, non-democratic compatriots, who are more inclined towards Islamist fundamentalist ideas and were the strong supporters of his father’s rule?</p>
<p>Or will he opt for democratic structures and fair distribution of resources and wealth so as not to give fundamentalist Islamist groups inside Chad a reason to turn to violence and against the state?</p>
<p>The answers to these questions are unclear. What’s needed is more knowledge about these groups and their attitudes, their behaviour and propensity for radicalisation. This will broaden our understanding of Islamist tendencies and threats, and to develop long-term peace in the Sahel.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helga Dickow received funding from the Gerda-Henkel-Foundation in the framework of the special research programme “Islam” for a research project about laicism in Chad. </span></em></p>Chad fulfils all conditions to be affected by Islamist terrorism. But the threat so far comes from its neighbours, not from the inside.Helga Dickow, Senior Researcher at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg Germany, University of FreiburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1990342023-02-13T13:13:26Z2023-02-13T13:13:26ZNigerian elections: Eight issues young people want the new government to address<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508578/original/file-20230207-21-4s8k5u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C0%2C3679%2C2445&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Young people in Nigeria seek freedom from repression and other governance failures. Photo by Olukayode Jaiyeolai/NurPhoto,
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/youth-of-endsars-protesters-display-a-placard-in-a-crowd-in-news-photo/1229058489?phrase=EndSars&adppopup=true">Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Nigeria prepares for the 25 February presidential elections, it’s interesting to consider what young Nigerians are expecting. </p>
<p>There are plenty of them: 52.2 million people aged 18-35. That’s about 28% of Nigeria’s total population and more than the entire populations of Ghana and Benin Republic put together. In spite of the prospects that this number holds, young people in Nigeria are largely marginalised from governance.</p>
<p>This election holds immense significance for young Nigerians, particularly in light of the current economic difficulties, insecurity and their exclusion from the political process and decision making. </p>
<p>I have focused various studies on the political expectations of the youth. One of my more recent <a href="https://journals.library.ualberta.ca/cjfy/index.php/cjfy/article/view/29648/21609">studies</a> looked at the relationship between youth political participation, good governance and social inclusion in Nigeria. It involved 1,208 participants selected from Nairaland.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nairaland.com/">Nairaland Forum</a> is a Nigerian website created in 2005 that now has millions of readers. The online discussion site gets an average of 8.8 million visitors daily. It has become a place for young Nigerians to voice their opinions on a wide range of economic, political and social issues. </p>
<p>I am not assuming that the perspective of Nairaland users is representative of young Nigerians as a whole. But I contend that it provides valuable insight into how they see the world. In this article I focus on expectations around governance.</p>
<p>My study found a positive relationship between youth political participation and good governance. It suggests that involving young people in politics will promote political development, improve transparency and enhance human capital.</p>
<h2>Nigeria’s governance ranking</h2>
<p>Governance covers a wide range of issues, including security, the rule of law, participation, rights and inclusion, economic opportunity, human development, and public perception. Data from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance reveals that <a href="https://iiag.online/data.html?loc=NG&view=table&meas=GOVERNANCE-AbsArmedConf-AbsUnInfGov-AbsCorrPubSect-MediaFree-EqSocEconOpp-PolPowRepWom-EffAdmin-TranspNet-AccHealth-AccWaterSanit-EduqQual-PovRedPol-IneqMitig-FoodSec&subview=rank&range1from=2016&range1to=2021&range2from=2017&range2to=2021&showLowest=true&showHighest=true&showHighlights=true&showFullContext=false&showAAT=false">overall governance in Nigeria</a> declined between 2016 and 2021. Nigeria currently ranks 30th on the continent. </p>
<p>My findings indicate that young Nigerians rank the largest declines as follows: media freedom, the representation of women, food security, corruption in the public sector, armed conflict, effective administration, undue influence on government by the political elite, and equality of socioeconomic opportunity.</p>
<h2>1. Media freedom</h2>
<p>Young Nigerians are deeply concerned about a lack of media freedom. They will want the incoming government to ensure that the media can operate freely in discharging its duties. The media, both mainstream and digital, must be protected by law and the government must ensure <a href="https://luminategroup.com/posts/news/digital-rights-in-nigeria-emerging-issues-and-opportunities">digital rights</a>, internet freedom and digital sovereignty (the right of entity to control its digital data) are upheld.</p>
<h2>2. Representation of women</h2>
<p>Young people want women to be represented better in governance and in parastatals. The incoming government must promote gender equality in its appointments, without compromising on merit. </p>
<h2>3. Food security</h2>
<p><a href="https://gjefnet.com/images/Vol2No1/2.pdf">Food security</a> is another pressing issue raised by young Nigerians. The challenges posed by climate change, such as flooding, drought and cyclones, have made people less food secure, particularly in communities near the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin. </p>
<p>Climate governance policies must be put in place to mitigate the risk. The ongoing conflict between pastoralists and farmers, made worse by the strain on resources, also needs resolution. </p>
<h2>4. Corruption</h2>
<p>The incoming government must address corruption on both the demand and supply sides. Nigeria currently ranks 150 out of 180 countries on the <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/nigeria">Corruption Perceptions Index</a>. Corruption requires the collusion of both giver and receiver. Therefore, it is necessary to address the complicity of Nigerian citizens in such activities. Petty and grand corruption in the academic, judicial and administrative sectors needs attention.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Man standing on a platform and waving a flag and surrounded by people raising their hands in protest." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508580/original/file-20230207-13-60q4xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508580/original/file-20230207-13-60q4xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508580/original/file-20230207-13-60q4xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508580/original/file-20230207-13-60q4xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508580/original/file-20230207-13-60q4xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508580/original/file-20230207-13-60q4xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508580/original/file-20230207-13-60q4xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">During the EndSARS protest, young Nigerians called for an end to police brutality. Photo by Adekunle Ajayi/NurPhoto.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/end-sars-protesters-occupy-ibadan-lagos-expressway-on-news-photo/1229049222?phrase=EndSars&adppopup=true">from www.gettyimages.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>5. Armed conflict</h2>
<p>Young Nigerians want the incoming government to deal with armed conflict. In the <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/GPI-2022-web.pdf">Global Peace Index</a>, Nigeria currently ranks 143 out of 163 countries globally. The <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/epdf/10.31920/2732-5008/2020/v1n2a5">causes</a> of armed conflict in Nigeria are multifaceted and include water stress, competition for natural resources, climate change, identity crises, perceived relative deprivation and insurgent groups like Boko Haram. These conflicts are often driven by the proliferation of small and light weapons, porous borders, and ungoverned spaces.</p>
<p>The threat of insecurity looms large over Nigeria, casting a shadow over the prospects of peace and development for young people. The prevalence of police brutality has further eroded public trust and respect for the institution. The police allegedly use excessive force in their attempts to maintain order. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://bit.ly/3HCpFcZ">EndsSARS</a> protests of 2020 were an expression of discontent with the Special Anti-Robbery Squad, which was accused of harassing, brutalising and extorting young people. </p>
<p>The youth-led protests were met with government force. This may influence voting choices in the upcoming general elections.</p>
<p>The incoming government must address the grievances that underlie armed conflict and the factors that fuel it.</p>
<h2>6. Effective administration</h2>
<p>The government must also promote effective administration and equal socioeconomic opportunity. To close the well-documented equality gap, the government must empower people to succeed in business, agriculture and technology ventures. </p>
<h2>7. Undue influence</h2>
<p>The undue influence of the political elite, known as “cabals”, impedes transparency and diminishes trust in the government. The new government must run an open system devoid of cabals. It must be accountable and involve young Nigerians in decision making.</p>
<h2>8. Equal socioeconomic opportunity</h2>
<p>The Nigerian economy is currently beset by a host of challenges, including inflation, rising debt, susceptibility to external shocks, and high unemployment. Recent data from the <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/profile/NGA">International Monetary Fund</a> indicates a negative trend across various indicators.</p>
<p>The government must demonstrate a genuine commitment to diversifying the economy by making it more conducive to investment, providing tax relief for tech companies, reallocating infrastructure spending to support local industries, and deregulating the downstream sector.</p>
<p>To help create opportunities for all young Nigerians, education needs attention. Nigeria currently ranks 33rd in <a href="https://iiag.online/data.html?loc=NG&view=table&meas=GOVERNANCE-AbsArmedConf-AbsUnInfGov-AbsCorrPubSect-MediaFree-EqSocEconOpp-PolPowRepWom-EffAdmin-TranspNet-AccHealth-AccWaterSanit-EduqQual-PovRedPol-IneqMitig-FoodSec&subview=rank&range1from=2016&range1to=2021&range2from=2017&range2to=2021&showLowest=true&showHighest=true&showHighlights=true&showFullContext=false&showAAT=false">education quality</a> on the African continent. At the primary and secondary levels, teachers are underpaid and facilities are either obsolete or lacking. According to UNICEF, there are <a href="https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/education">10.5 million</a> out-of-school children in Nigeria. At the tertiary level, institutions and researchers are underfunded, lecturers are poorly paid, facilities are dilapidated and appointments are politicised. </p>
<p>The incoming government must increase the budget for education at all levels and encourage new funding models.</p>
<h2>Tough road ahead</h2>
<p>The incoming government will have an arduous task ahead of it and will have to break with the status quo. Young Nigerians expect a government that is responsive and responsible, one that will rebuild the country and place it on the path to consolidated development. </p>
<p>Failure to meet these expectations will subject young people to poverty and increase their exodus from the country in search of greener pastures.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199034/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tope Shola Akinyetun does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Young Nigerians actively discuss politics and governance despite being kept on the sidelines. They seek a government that would promote their inclusion and solve problems affecting them.Tope Shola Akinyetun, Researcher, Lagos State University of Education Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1978132023-01-17T14:14:31Z2023-01-17T14:14:31ZNigeria’s currency redesign and withdrawal limits: questionable policy and bad timing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504649/original/file-20230116-24-a591iz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari and Godwin Emefiele, the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, present the redesigned banknotes in Abuja. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sodiq/Xinhua via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Central Bank of Nigeria <a href="https://punchng.com/just-in-buhari-unveils-new-naira-notes-at-aso-rock/">launched</a> new banknotes in November 2022. The new notes came into effect on 15 December 2022. </p>
<p>The apex bank also <a href="https://www.pensionnigeria.com/blog/cbn-imposes-new-cash-withdrawal-limits-on-nigeria-bank-accounts-full-circular-to-banks/">capped</a> withdrawal of the new banknotes at N100,000 (US$222 at the official exchange rate) per week for individuals, and N500,000 (US$1,111) for corporations. </p>
<p>Reactions across Nigeria were swift and acerbic. The National Assembly <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/national-assembly-moves-against-cbn-restrictions-on-cash-transaction/">called</a> for the suspension of the policy, at least until after the 2023 general elections.</p>
<p>Concerns were expressed that the withdrawal limits were too low and would impose hardships on Nigerians. Following those concerns, the central bank <a href="https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2022/CCD/ReNairaRedesignPolicyRevisedWithdrawal.pdf">raised</a> the limits to N500,000 per week for individuals, and N5 million ($11,111) for corporations.</p>
<p>But does Nigeria need to redesign its currency? And why is it necessary to impose withdrawal limits, especially for a country that aspires to scale back regulation and liberalise its financial sector? </p>
<h2>Why the central bank introduced the policy</h2>
<p>The bank says the new banknotes are being <a href="https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2022/CCD/Naira_Redesign.pdf">introduced</a> to rein in counterfeiting, promote a cashless economy by limiting the amount of the new banknotes that can be withdrawn, reduce the large quantity of dirty notes circulating in the economy, discourage hoarding, curb crimes like kidnapping and terrorism, and head off illicit financial transactions. </p>
<p>It also sees the policy as a way of addressing the huge amount of currency outside the formal financial sector; <a href="https://www.icirnigeria.org/naira-redesign-85-of-currency-in-circulation-outside-banking-system-emefiele/">85%</a> of banknotes circulate outside the banking system, largely because of hoarding and illicit financial transactions. </p>
<p>The introduction of the <a href="https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2015/BPSD/BVN_FAQ.pdf">Bank Verification Number</a> system, which requires depositors to have a unique number that could be used to determine who they really are, has encouraged criminals and money launderers to operate outside the banking system. The circulation of large quantities of money outside the banking system, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria, makes it challenging to conduct effective monetary policies.</p>
<p>Many pundits <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MVWo2rMCiqg">believe</a> there’s another, unspoken rationale for the policy’s rules around cash withdrawal: to discourage <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2023/01/2023-our-concerns-over-curbing-vote-buying-other-inducements-adeyanju/">vote-buying</a> during the upcoming elections. They suggest that limits on cash withdrawal would make it harder for politicians to monetise and corrupt the electoral process.</p>
<h2>Not a useful policy</h2>
<p>The central bank’s urgency is puzzling. The problems it claims the policy change will solve are not new. </p>
<p>I do not see how the policy as it’s been publicly explained will foster a cashless economy. Apart from politicians, top government officials and those involved in illicit financial transactions, most Nigerians don’t stash huge sums of cash away. How could they? The country’s <a href="https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/">unemployment rate is 33%</a>; the minimum wage is N30,000 ($67) per month. Most Nigerians don’t have enough money in their bank accounts to be worried about withdrawal limits. </p>
<p>Besides, the country is already <a href="https://nairametrics.com/2022/12/29/with-1-8-cash-to-gdp-ratio-cashless-policy-is-nigerias-least-problem-economists/">making progress</a> in becoming cashless. During my recent seven-month stay in Nigeria, I was impressed by how I could pay the Uber driver through bank transfer with my phone, purchase assorted goods at the local market through transfers, and use point of sale to withdraw money when cash is necessary. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, if its goal, as pundits suggest, is to curb <a href="https://punchng.com/poverty-responsible-for-vote-buying-says-inec/">vote-buying</a>, then the policy still likely won’t be effective.</p>
<p>Politicians will always find a way of using money to influence the political process. They could resort to the use of foreign currencies. There has been a <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/abcon-cbns-cash-withdrawal-policy-fuelling-rush-for-dollars">surge</a> in the demand for dollars and other foreign currencies, following the announcement of the policy.</p>
<p>And then there are the new banknotes. The central bank claims it redesigned the naira to head off the nationwide spate of <a href="https://punchng.com/naira-redesign-to-tackle-kidnapping-cbn/">kidnappings</a>, terrorism and other violent crimes. But surely this will just give criminals an incentive to demand dollars or other foreign currencies from their victims.</p>
<h2>Implementation already flawed</h2>
<p>People have been given up till 31 January 2023 to return old naira notes to banks, central bank cash offices, and other designated financial intermediaries. But the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/11/15/na111621-five-observations-on-nigerias-central-bank-digital-currency">38 million</a> Nigerians (or 36% of the adult population) who don’t have a bank account have no choice but to hold on to the old notes. Banks don’t have enough of the new ones to exchange for the old ones. </p>
<p>Unbanked Nigerians cannot deposit the old notes in an account. To avoid this dilemma, the central bank should have allowed the old and new notes to coexist as legal tender, while the former is gradually phased out.</p>
<p>It’s not just the banks that don’t have access to the new banknotes. Ordinary Nigerians <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/naira-redesign-policy-comes-under-pressure/">are struggling</a>, too.</p>
<p>The top Central Bank of Nigeria officer who appeared before the National Assembly to brief members about the new policy did not <a href="https://dailytrust.com/breaking-we-dont-know-quantities-of-new-notes-printed-cbn/">readily know</a> how many banknotes had been printed. That points to the lack of planning for the implementation of the policy.</p>
<p>The bank failed to carry out due diligence in calculating the optimal quantity of the new notes needed to maintain stability in the financial system. The old naira notes are expected to be phased out by the end of January 2023, but there are <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/01/11/naira-redesign-uncertainties-over-january-31-deadline-experts-warn-cbn/">doubts</a> that the bank will meet this deadline.</p>
<p>Although the central bank has embarked on a <a href="https://dailytrust.com/theres-enough-new-naira-notes-cbn/">sensitisation exercise</a> to assure the public that things will be fine, it should have done so simultaneously with the announcement of the policy. </p>
<h2>Jitters and uncertainty</h2>
<p>The timing of the policy announcement and rollout is bad. Domestic and foreign investors are already jittery about the upcoming elections and the state of the Nigerian economy. This new policy will add another layer of uncertainty. </p>
<p>For a country that is grappling with <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2023/01/world-bank-downgrades-nigerias-2023-growth-to-2-9/">slow economic growth</a>, inflation and exchange-rate volatility, the last thing the central bank should do is destabilise the economy by introducing a policy whose immediate benefits are questionable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197813/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Onyeiwu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For a country that aspires to reduce bureaucracy and liberalise its financial sector, currency redesign and cash withdrawal limits can only be counter-intuitive.Stephen Onyeiwu, Professor of Economics & Business, Allegheny CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1951252022-12-20T09:34:25Z2022-12-20T09:34:25ZNigeria’s economy in 2022: winners and losers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497232/original/file-20221124-24-nefdwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A banner is displayed to advertise diesel available at a filling station in Lagos, Nigeria. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At the start of 2022, Nigerians hoped that, with less than two years to the end of President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration, the government would ramp up its efforts to reduce <a href="https://businessday.ng/business-economy/article/poverty-unemployment-to-worsen-unless-nigeria-achieves-7-economic-growth-in-5-years-experts/">poverty and unemployment</a>. </p>
<p>In his 2022 <a href="https://businessday.ng/news/article/buharis-2022-new-year-message-to-the-nation/">new year message</a> to Nigerians, Buhari was effusive about his intention to secure the country and address its socio-economic challenges. </p>
<p>But socio-economic conditions have since deteriorated. Budget deficits have ballooned to nearly 5% of GDP, more than the <a href="https://ngfrepository.org.ng:8443/handle/123456789/938">3%</a> recommended by the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2007. The act was supposed to ensure prudent management of the country’s financial resources and long-term macroeconomic stability. </p>
<p>Given Nigeria’s abysmal revenue generation of about 9% of GDP, over 40% of Buhari’s <a href="https://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng/index.php/2023-budget-speech-presented-by-president-muhammadu-buhari?cookie_ddd74d5a4fb8cd683cab5c32305150a6=accepted">2023 budget</a> is expected to be financed by debt. </p>
<p>Although the Nigerian economy rebounded after the difficult years of COVID-19, growing <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/gdp-growth-annual">3.5%</a> in the first three quarters of 2022, the recovery has wrought more hardship on Nigerians. </p>
<p>This is because the main drivers of growth in Nigeria – oil production and services – don’t usually benefit most Nigerians in terms of jobs and business opportunities.</p>
<p>Nigeria’s unemployment rate is about <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1119227/forecast-unemployment-rate-in-nigeria/#:%7E:text=In%202022%2C%20the%20unemployment%20rate,percent%20in%20the%20preceding%20year.">33%</a>. That number reflects only those who are actively seeking employment. Many Nigerians have given up looking for jobs, after years of fruitless efforts. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/tackling-poverty-multiple-dimensions-proving-ground-nigeria">number of Nigerians living in poverty rose</a> by 35 million in 2022.</p>
<p>The country’s inflation rate <a href="https://www.african-markets.com/en/news/west-africa/nigeria/nigeria-s-inflation-rate-accelerates-to-21-09-in-october-2022">increased to 21%</a> in 2022, compared with an <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PCPIPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD">average</a> of 10.6% for emerging and developing economies and 8.8% for the world.</p>
<p>This level of economic hardship could present further risks to Nigeria’s security. </p>
<h2>Worst hit</h2>
<p>Young people have had it worst. Youth unemployment is <a href="https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/">43%</a>. It was below <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/NGA/nigeria/youth-unemployment-rate">10%</a> prior to Buhari’s administration in 2015. </p>
<p>University students were forced to stay home for nine months during the <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/562820-asuu-strike-lecturers-students-unmotivated-but-traders-excited-as-nigerian-universities-reopen.html">prolonged strike</a> by the Academic Staff Union of Nigerian Universities. This has not happened in any other country. </p>
<p>The year 2022 has also been unkind to poor and unemployed Nigerians. Rising inflation has raised the cost of living and pushed many into poverty. About <a href="https://www.nigeriapovertymap.com/">133 million</a> Nigerians (63% of the population), are poor, as measured in multiple dimensions. </p>
<p>Because over half of Nigeria’s inflation is driven by rising food prices, many poor individuals and families face hunger. The risk of hunger has been heightened by the <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/millions-of-nigerians-face-starvation-in-the-wake-of-the-worst-floods-in-a-decade-12750490">recent flooding</a> in many parts of Nigeria, which saw over a million people lose their homes and means of livelihood.</p>
<p>With no insurance and safety nets, most of these Nigerians are left to fend for themselves.</p>
<p>Nigerian workers will remember 2022 as a year in which their purchasing power was badly <a href="https://ilostat.ilo.org/topics/working-poverty/">eroded</a>: 35% of them became extremely poor, 31% moderately poor and 23% near poor. </p>
<p>Only <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/03/21/afw-deep-structural-reforms-guided-by-evidence-are-urgently-needed-to-lift-millions-of-nigerians-out-of-poverty">17%</a> of Nigerian workers hold jobs that pay enough to prevent them from falling into poverty. </p>
<p><a href="https://businessday.ng/news/article/what-to-know-about-12-nigerian-states-owing-salaries/">Some workers</a> in the public sector have not been paid many months of salaries and allowances, forcing them to take on side jobs that are unrelated to their skills and education. This amounts to a gross misallocation of resources, which undermines Nigeria’s economic development and structural change.</p>
<h2>Unscathed</h2>
<p>While 2022 will be remembered as a very difficult year for youths, workers and the poor, the cabal that controls the Nigerian oil industry has had it easy. Buhari promised to end the corruption-infested oil subsidy, but this cabal secured a postponement. </p>
<p>Nigeria spent an estimated <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-expects-fuel-subsidy-could-cost-96-bln-2022-oil-prices-rise-2022-04-09/">US$9.6 billion</a> on the fuel subsidy in 2022. This is expected to exceed <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-petrol-subsidy-could-cost-162-billion-2023-finmin-2022-07-21/">$16 billion</a> in 2023. </p>
<p>Much of the subsidy is likely to fraudulently end up in the bank accounts of the oil cabal. The same cabal has resorted to <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/kyari-nigeria-loses-1-9bn-every-month-to-crude-oil-theft">outright theft</a> of oil from the pipelines, bunkering and artisanal refining. </p>
<p>Nigeria lost <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/nigeria-lost-2bn-to-oil-theft-between-january-and-august-this-year-senate/">$2 billion</a> to oil theft between January and August 2022. This is about <a href="https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm">5%</a> of its 2021 petroleum export of $41.4 billion. </p>
<p>Not to be outdone by the oil cabal, former Niger Delta militants now share in the oil largesse. The Buhari administration has awarded them over <a href="https://guardian.ng/opinion/the-n48-billion-tompolo-contract/">$100 million</a> (48 billion naira) in contracts to “secure” the country’s oil infrastructure. </p>
<p>Never mind that the government has deployed thousands of government-paid security operatives whose job is to do exactly what the militants are being contracted for.</p>
<p>Political elites continue to live in opulence. Despite the country’s fiscal challenges, members of the National Assembly have continued to receive their allowances and funds for constituency projects. </p>
<p>Following steep depreciation in the naira, currency speculators have had a field day. The naira plunged by <a href="https://www.fitchratings.com/research/banks/nigerian-banks-capital-resilient-to-naira-depreciation-31-10-2022">4%</a> in the official market during the year and by almost 20% in the parallel market. </p>
<p>This has posed significant challenges for manufacturers, as import costs soar amid an acute scarcity of foreign exchange. It’s harder for manufacturers to buy raw materials and expand production. The result is a further decline in their ability to generate well-paid jobs. </p>
<h2>Unmet promises</h2>
<p>The administration came to power over seven years ago, on a promise to rein in corruption, secure the country, create jobs, and alleviate poverty. It is leaving office in a few months without fulfilling those promises. </p>
<p>The Buhari administration has not left anyone in doubt that its priorities are elsewhere. In Buhari’s 2023 budget, for instance, only <a href="https://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng/index.php/2023-budget-speech-presented-by-president-muhammadu-buhari">1%</a> of the $47.3 billion was allocated to social investment programmes (cash transfers, school lunches and empowerment programmes).</p>
<p>Just <a href="https://punchng.com/four-million-nigerians-benefiting-directly-from-nsip-fg/">4 million</a> (out of over <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=NG">200 million Nigerians</a>) have benefited from the government’s social investment programmes since the administration’s inception. </p>
<p>Many of the contemporary socio-economic challenges Nigeria faces were inherited from previous administrations. But since Buhari has failed to turn things around, Nigerians continue to grapple with an era of misery, disappointment and uncertainty.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195125/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Onyeiwu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From the economic perspective, the year 2022 will be remembered, by many Nigerians, as a time of dashed hopes and disappointments.Stephen Onyeiwu, Professor of Economics & Business, Allegheny CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1759972022-10-27T14:38:50Z2022-10-27T14:38:50ZNigeria’s education for entrepreneurs needs to keep it real, not just in the classroom<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491710/original/file-20221025-20-aybb6a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An entrepreneur</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Kola Sulaimon/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Africa is home to over <a href="https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/youth/fact-sheets/YouthPOP.pdf">200 million</a> people aged between 15 and 24, according to UN data. The continent has the largest population of young people in the world. </p>
<p>This should be a sign of great productive potential. Unfortunately, youth unemployment and under-employment have held productivity back, resulting in a very <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099740006132214750/pdf/P17782005822360a00a0850f63928a34418.pdf">slow pace</a> of development in Africa. </p>
<p>Shortly after the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/17/what-is-the-arab-spring-and-how-did-it-start">“Arab Spring”</a>, when youth movements helped to topple the governments of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, the Africa Development Bank <a href="https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Economic_Brief_-_Accelerating_the_AfDB%E2%80%99s_Response_to_the_Youth_Unemployment_Crisis_in_Africa.pdf">predicted</a> that the lack of decent employment opportunities in Africa could undermine social cohesion and political stability. </p>
<p>In Nigeria, the 2020 <a href="https://harvardhrj.com/2020/11/endsars-the-movement-against-police-brutality-in-nigeria/">EndSARS protest</a> showed that youth unemployment had become an emergency needing urgent attention. </p>
<p>The highest unemployment rate recorded in Nigeria in 2020 was for young people between the ages of 15 and 24. In that age bracket, <a href="https://nairametrics.com/2020/08/14/13-9-million-nigerian-youth-are-unemployed-as-at-q2-2020-nbs/">40.8% (13.9 million)</a> of young Nigerians were unemployed.</p>
<p>Even education isn’t a guarantee of a decent job. Unemployment among people with a doctorate degree stood at <a href="https://businessday.ng/opinion/article/16-9-of-nigerias-phd-holders-are-jobless-nbs/">16.9%</a> in 2020. Many PhD graduates still roam the streets and the online space in search of decent jobs that fit into the qualification. </p>
<p>Over a decade before the EndSARS protest, Nigeria’s ministry of education, in partnership with the <a href="https://www.nuc.edu.ng/">National Universities Commission</a>, introduced an entrepreneurship skills development curriculum in Nigerian universities making it a compulsory course for University undergraduates.</p>
<p>Funds were provided for the establishment of entrepreneurship centres where students and lecturers could develop the capacity for an entrepreneurial mindset.
These centres are also meant to serve as hubs that will provide mentorship and support for faculty and student entrepreneurs. </p>
<p>The goal is to support the emergence of a university ecosystem where students and lecturers create value that will attract financial returns. This will in turn give Nigerian graduates more options in their working lives – not just competing for white collar jobs.</p>
<p>Ten years later, the rate of graduate unemployment is <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/812300/youth-unemployment-rate-in-nigeria/">still on the
increase</a>. This is beginning to expose the need to rethink the design, delivery and partnerships for implementing the Nigerian entrepreneurship education program.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.academia.edu/64846095/STUDENTS_EXPERIENCE_OF_ENTREPRENEURSHIP_EDUCATION_AS_DRIVERS_OF_ENTREPRENEURSHIP_SKILLS_ACQUISITION">PhD research</a> sought to contribute to this by exploring the student experience of entrepreneurship education in Lagos and Ogun states universities. </p>
<p>I found that participating students had a high level of entrepreneurship skills, but didn’t really want to have to use them. They did not perceive entrepreneurship as a way to achieve their goals in life, and were still hoping for white collar jobs. The solution, I believe, is for the curriculum and the teaching support to be more realistic about business – partly by drawing on actual entrepreneurs as a resource.</p>
<h2>Where to focus for impact</h2>
<p>I gave questionnaires to 2,394 final year students and conducted interviews with six directors of entrepreneurship development centres in Lagos and Ogun States. </p>
<p>One thing I wanted to understand was what aspect of entrepreneurship programmes might produce the necessary impact fastest. Student engagement, student support, teaching quality and teaching resources were the aspects I looked at. Of these, teaching quality showed the strongest potential to make an impact quickly. </p>
<p>The implication is that entrepreneurship education lecturers and facilitators need to know what to teach, what not to teach, and how to teach. </p>
<p>In a nutshell, lecturers who are entrepreneurial themselves will be better teachers of entrepreneurship. Their personal stories will make a huge difference.</p>
<p>The findings also provide evidence that effective entrepreneurship education programmes require collaboration. </p>
<p>When it comes to supporting students, only one of the universities in my study had a structured programme to help students grow the businesses they started. Other universities provided walk-in opportunities for funders and investors to support student businesses.</p>
<p>Structures should be put in place for student grants, competitions, seed funding, mentoring, accelerators and other opportunities that support student businesses. It’s up to university management to do this. </p>
<p>Support from external stakeholders would then be an extra resource rather than a pillar holding up the university’s programme.</p>
<p>One of the directors of the Entrepreneurship and Skills Development Centres pointed out that entrepreneurship education was not cheap to provide but government was not providing adequate teaching and learning resources. Large classes of over 600 students also made it hard to teach effectively. Students should be able to work in smaller groups and teams. </p>
<h2>Resources to use</h2>
<p>Government funding seems to be dwindling, as evidenced by the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-endless-lecturer-strikes-insights-from-some-essential-reads-190805">lecturers’ strike</a>. So there might be a need to attract external stakeholders to sponsor competitions, clubs and student teams. </p>
<p>The learning experience of students should entail being directly in touch with the realities of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurs. It should not only involve reading about, hearing about, talking about, or writing about entrepreneurship. </p>
<p>Facilitators of such courses should give students activities that connect them with the world of entrepreneurs. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-universities-can-find-funds-and-produce-job-creators-heres-how-190155">Nigeria's universities can find funds and produce job creators: here's how</a>
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<p>Not every aspect of the curriculum can be taught by academics. There should be linkages that provide opportunities for practising entrepreneurs to be mentors, facilitators and funders of student entrepreneurs.</p>
<p>Sometimes the street trader, roadside mechanic or roadside food vendor is the best person to teach students about starting a business. </p>
<p>Other useful models are people with many years of experience failing and succeeding as an entrepreneur. </p>
<h2>Mapping the way forward</h2>
<p>A sustained entrepreneurship skills development programme requires a collaborative approach in which universities, business people, successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurs and students are active participants. </p>
<p>University managers need to provide structures that will open up the universities for collaborations with entrepreneurs and industries to provide support in terms of seed funding, infrastructure, human resources and technical expertise. </p>
<p>The universities should base decisions about interventions and partnerships on data about what has the most impact.</p>
<p>Commercialisation of university products and outputs should be encouraged. Entrepreneurial lecturers should be valued. The system should welcome a handshake between theory and practice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175997/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bukola Amao-Taiwo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sometimes the street trader, roadside mechanic or food vendor is the best person to teach students about entrepreneurship.Bukola Amao-Taiwo, Researcher, Academic Developer,learning experience designer and Student Coach, University of LagosLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1917082022-09-30T14:58:53Z2022-09-30T14:58:53ZNigeria at 62: five essential reads on why there isn’t an inspiring story to tell<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487551/original/file-20220930-16-yoke67.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">em_concepts/shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Nigeria marks its 62nd independence anniversary, many will be checking to see if there is indeed any reason for celebrations. </p>
<p>Reasons for pessimism are not hard to find. Major statistics for the economy, security and human development paint a picture of a country in despair. </p>
<p><a href="https://businessday.ng/markets/article/explainer-why-u-s-dollar-is-stronger-than-naira/#:%7E:text=In%20the%201970s%20and%201980s,a%20statement%20from%20the%20CBN.">Time was when</a> the naira, Nigeria’s currency, was stronger than the American dollar. Those were the days Nigerians didn’t need a visa to travel to countries like the UK. And they were also the days when Nigeria’s democracy was strong.</p>
<p>They were the times when Nigerian universities were highly regarded globally and scholars looked forward to sabbaticals. And when University College Hospital in Ibadan was among the best hospitals in all the Commonwealth nations. </p>
<p>In the 1980s the Nigerian immunisation coverage was above 80% – an indication of an effective healthcare system. </p>
<p>Today, the story is not that inspiring. </p>
<p>To return to its glory days, Nigeria must deepen its democracy and invest more in education and empowerment of its largely youthful population. The most valuable resource the country has is its people – not petroleum or any other natural resources. This would in turn have an impact on the state of security in the country while ensuring an enabling environment for sustainable development. </p>
<p>At The Conversation Africa, academic experts have been looking at these issues and proffering solutions. Here are five essential reads on the Nigerian situation. </p>
<h2>Democracy and development</h2>
<p>Nigeria has been a stable democracy since 1999. Yet it has not yet attained the kind of economic development people imagined would be forthcoming. The country faces acute poverty, youth unemployment, institutional corruption and widespread insecurity. Political expert Abiodun Fatai, from Lagos State University, identifies poor quality leadership and weak institutions as two issues that have stopped Nigeria from translating its democratic dividend into better economic outcomes. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigeria-ticks-some-boxes-as-a-democracy-why-this-hasnt-translated-into-a-better-life-for-most-191357">Nigeria ticks some boxes as a democracy. Why this hasn't translated into a better life for most</a>
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<h2>How to get functional universities and graduates</h2>
<p>To solve its human capital development challenge, Nigeria needs to fix its universities. Strikes have plagued Nigeria’s university system for the better part of three decades, beginning in 1988. At the heart of the problem are disputes over arrears of unpaid salaries and repeated failed promises of the government to fund public universities. Seun Kolade, an associate professor in strategic management at De Montfort University, says to fix the problem, three fundamental areas need to be addressed: funding, revamping the curriculum and generating income. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-universities-can-find-funds-and-produce-job-creators-heres-how-190155">Nigeria's universities can find funds and produce job creators: here's how</a>
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<h2>The youthful advantage</h2>
<p>Indeed, the need to fix education and ensure that Nigeria’s youthful population is employable cannot be over emphasised. The country’s population was estimated at 206 million in 2020 and 70% were under the age of 30. Akanni Ibukun Akinyemi, professor of demography and social statistics, and Jacob Wale Mobolaji, a demographer, statistician and public health researcher, both at the Obafemi Awolowo University, describe how the size and youthfulness of Nigeria’s population offer great potential to expand the country’s capacity as the regional economic hub of Africa and globally. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-large-youthful-population-could-be-an-asset-or-a-burden-186574">Nigeria's large, youthful population could be an asset or a burden</a>
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<h2>Dwindling oil revenue</h2>
<p>More than ever before, Nigeria needs to invest in its human resources as its reliance on oil revenue becomes increasingly tenuous. Nigeria’s oil output recently hit its lowest since 1990 as its crude oil production fell below 1 million barrels per day. Angola and Libya have overtaken Nigeria as Africa’s largest crude oil producers. Petroleum professor Omowumi Iledare, at the University of Cape Coast, explains what’s happening.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigeria-is-producing-less-and-less-oil-heres-why-191199">Nigeria is producing less and less oil. Here's why</a>
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<h2>Meanwhile inflation bites …</h2>
<p>Faced with rising inflation, the Nigerian Central Bank has been increasing interest rates. According to the apex bank, the interest rate was raised to reduce inflationary pressure, narrow the negative real interest rate margin, restore investor confidence and boost remittances. Stephen Onyeiwu, Andrew Wells Robertson Professor of Economics, Allegheny College, is of the view that Nigeria shouldn’t assume that monetary policy will work in the country the way it works elsewhere.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigeria-has-just-hiked-interest-rates-why-its-the-wrong-recipe-for-curbing-inflation-184090">Nigeria has just hiked interest rates: why it's the wrong recipe for curbing inflation</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191708/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Doyin Odubanjo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Experts explain why there might not be much to celebrate and proffer solutions.Doyin Odubanjo, Executive Secretary, Nigerian Academy of ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1911942022-09-25T05:12:09Z2022-09-25T05:12:09Z5 xenophobic myths about immigrants in South Africa debunked by researchers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486093/original/file-20220922-33275-u0nvyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters and police clash during a march against illegal immigrants in South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alet Pretorius/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In South Africa, immigrants are often scapegoated as the root of socio-economic problems. In the post-apartheid landscape, Black African immigrants, mainly, from other African countries have <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-92114-9_14">been negatively stereotyped</a> as “illegal” and “job stealers” who are “criminal” as well as “diseased”.</p>
<p>This attitudinal orientation of hostility against non-nationals in a given population is <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/national-action-plan.pdf">xenophobia</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.xenowatch.ac.za/statistics-dashboard/">Since 1994,</a> more than 900 violent xenophobic incidents have been recorded in South Africa, resulting in at least 630 deaths, displacement of 123,700 people, and looting of about 4,850 shops. The eruption of xenophobic violence undermines social stability and cohesion, tolerance, the constitution of South Africa, and the social fabric on which the country’s democracy is founded.</p>
<p>Misstatements by public officials and politicians have time and again fanned the flames of xenophobia and violence associated with it. United Nations experts <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/07/south-africa-un-experts-condemn-xenophobic-violence-and-racial">recently warned</a> that “the country is on the precipice of explosive violence”. </p>
<p>Almost three decades after the county’s first democratic election, South Africa faces what <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/publication/developing-an-inclusive-equal-south-africa">commentators have dubbed</a> the triple challenge of poverty, unemployment and inequality.</p>
<p>More than half of the country’s population lives in poverty, with <a href="https://www.lifecoursehealthresearch.org/post/food-crisis-2-5-million-south-africans-experience-hunger-every-day">close to 12 million people hungry and 2.5 million experiencing hunger daily</a>. The country has a Gini coefficient of <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12930">0.65</a>, making it one of the most unequal countries in the world.</p>
<p>A<a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/wealth/510822/new-data-shows-what-it-takes-to-be-in-south-africas-richest-10/"> meagre 10%</a> of the population owns more than 80% of the wealth. South Africa is still “a country of two nations”, as former president Thabo Mbeki <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/1998/mbek0529.htm">once described it</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=15407">Youth unemployment is a huge problem.</a> Of the more than 10 million people aged 15-24 years, only 2.5 million are active in the labour force, either working or searching for work. Over 75% of this group is out of the labour force.</p>
<p>The significance of negative stereotyping and scapegoating in relation to the “triple challenge” is that immigrants are portrayed as the cause and a threat to national sovereignty. Inflammatory remarks about migrants by public officials and <a href="http://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-53.pdf">politicians harden mythologies</a>.</p>
<p>In a recent <a href="http://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-53.pdf">research paper</a> we set out to debunk negative immigrant myths. We provided evidence demonstrating the influence of myths on the citizenry’s perceptions, as well as contradictions. </p>
<p>The research drew from authoritative and credible sources of data and information. </p>
<p>Beyond debunking the myths, this research sets a baseline of what facts exist regarding immigrants in South Africa.</p>
<h2>Myth 1: South Africa is swamped with immigrants</h2>
<p>It is widely believed that the country is flooded with immigrants. The 2021 South African Social Attitudes Survey indicates that almost half the sample believed the country had between 17-40 million immigrants. This belief is incorrect. <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=14569">Statistics South Africa (StatsSA)</a> estimates the number to be about 3.95 million, accounting for 6.5% of the country’s population. This is not unique to South Africa.</p>
<p>This figure includes regular and irregular immigrants</p>
<h2>Myth 2: Immigrants steal jobs and employment opportunities from locals</h2>
<p>While there is anecdotal evidence that migrants are “job stealers”, in general, migrants do not appear to take employment opportunities from locals. In South Africa, <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/publication/new-study-finds-immigrants-in-south-africa-generate-jobs-for-locals">“one {regular} immigrant worker generates approximately two jobs for locals.”</a>.</p>
<p>Migrants are also more likely to be self-employed and employ South Africans.</p>
<h2>Myth 3: Immigrants contribute to, or are responsible for, high levels of crime</h2>
<p><a href="http://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-53.pdf">Our report cites</a> 2008 South African Social Attitudes Survey data which showed that 62% of the sample believed that immigrants were responsible for crime in the country. By 2016 it had gone up to 66% . Paradoxically, when asked who commits crime in their communities, most people say it is locals. For example, between 2011 and 2017, the national Victims of Crime surveys showed that 5.7%–6.7% of households stated that crime in their areas was caused by “people from outside South Africa”.</p>
<p>Statistically, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-29-iss-today-do-foreigners-really-commit-sas-most-violent-crimes/">there is no relationship between international migration in South Africa and crime.</a> There is no evidence that most foreign-born nationals commit crime, or that they are responsible for most crime in the country.</p>
<h2>Myth 4: Most immigrants are in the country illegally</h2>
<p>Often, immigrants enter South Africa with a regular status but fall into irregular status due to poor immigration policy management. The Department of Home Affairs <a href="http://www.dha.gov.za/index.php/notices/1544-temporary-measures-in-respect-of-foreign-nationals-in-light-of-a-backlog-being-experienced-in-processing-outcomes-on-waiver-applications-and-visa-applications">is struggling</a> with a visa backlog partly due to departmental dysfunction and corruption. In addition to the department’s backlogs, the cost of applying for visas is exorbitant.</p>
<h2>Myth 5: Migrants are flooding public healthcare services</h2>
<p>The Limpopo health MEC, Dr Phophi Ramathuba, recently came under the spotlight for berating an immigrant woman. The moment was caught on video which then went viral. Her remarks seemed to <a href="https://africacheck.org/fact-checks/blog/analysis-are-south-africas-public-hospitals-overburdened-foreign-patients">reinforce the myth</a> that immigrants are overburdening the country’s public healthcare system. At about 6.5% of the population, it is statistically impossible for immigrants to be responsible for the national healthcare system’s failings.</p>
<h2>Futility in scapegoating</h2>
<p>Scapegoating immigrants will not result in significantly improved healthcare service provision, reduced crime or less unemployment. </p>
<p><em>The research was conducted by Anthony Kaziboni and three colleagues from the Institute for Security Studies: Lizette Lancaster, Thato Machabaphala and Godfrey Mulaudzi.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191194/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Kaziboni does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Scapegoating immigrants will not result in significantly improved healthcare service provision, reduced crime or less unemployment.Anthony Kaziboni, Head of Research, Institute for the Future of Knowledge (IFK), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1799272022-07-15T12:18:33Z2022-07-15T12:18:33ZYoung people in the Middle East struggle to see a promising future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474159/original/file-20220714-35540-d5rtyi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2835%2C1888&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mahdi Shaban, a Palestinian living in Gaza, paid for his master's degree with earnings from digging graves.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/mahdi-shaban-who-completed-his-masters-degree-with-earnings-news-photo/1241050988">Mustafa Hassona/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Middle East’s population is growing <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?contextual=default&locations=ZQ">almost twice as fast</a> as the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?contextual=default">world overall</a>, and <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?locations=ZQ">one-third of its people</a> are under the age of 15.</p>
<p>As Joe Biden takes his first trip to the region as president, he plans to focus on the <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/07/13/biden-visit-saudi-arabia-mbs-israel-palestinians">prospects for peaceful international relations</a>. A key factor often overlooked is the Middle East’s lack of opportunities for young people.</p>
<p>As a scholar who has spent almost 20 years studying <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=GaXIwTYAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">conflict, migration and youth in the Middle East</a>, I believe their frustration could ultimately lead to an international crisis way beyond the borders of the region. </p>
<h2>A rapidly changing situation</h2>
<p>The region encompassing the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena">Middle East and North Africa</a> is diverse economically, geographically, historically, politically and socially, and often fraught with tension. <a href="https://theforum.erf.org.eg/2021/04/24/learning-long-term-consequences-armed-conflict/">Most of the major</a> armed conflicts in the last decade have occurred there – apart, obviously, from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p><a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/conflict-trends-middle-east-1989-2019">Since the pro-democracy protests and uprisings of the Arab Spring</a> in 2010, the region has experienced some sort of <a href="https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2021/06">significant conflict</a> in eight of its 21 countries: Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. </p>
<p>In addition, the region’s population is <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=ZQ">growing at a much faster rate</a> than the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?contextual=default&locations=ZQ">global average</a> – and has been since the World Bank began keeping records in 1961. Its people now number <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ZQ">over 450 million</a>, up from 300 million in 2001.</p>
<h2>Widespread youth unemployment</h2>
<p>The region’s young workers – those from ages 15 to 24 – already struggle with the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=ZQ">highest unemployment rates</a> in the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/269640/youth-unemployment-rate-in-selected-world-regions/">world</a>, averaging 25%. <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=ZQ&most_recent_value_desc=true">Thirteen</a> countries in the region have a youth unemployment rate of at least 20%, with the rate above 50% in Libya, above 40% in Jordan and Palestine, and above 30% in Algeria and Tunisia. </p>
<p>And <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?locations=ZQ">more young workers</a> are on the way.</p>
<p>The World Bank estimates that to provide employment for those currently out of a job and those who will soon be seeking work, Middle Eastern and North African nations need to <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2018/11/13/fixing-the-education-crisis-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa">create more than 300 million new jobs</a> by 2050. This number is almost <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t01.htm">twice</a> as many jobs as are currently in the U.S.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man makes a coffee at a machine in the back of a small vehicle, while another man waits." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Karrar Alaa, a 20-something Iraqi, could not find work, so he started his own small traveling coffee business in Basra.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/iraqi-karrar-alaa-aged-26-sells-coffee-by-his-travelling-news-photo/977556546">Haidar Mohammed Ali/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Economic struggles</h2>
<p>The struggle of high youth unemployment in the region is not a new challenge. Local and international governments and organizations have <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/youth-employment-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-revisiting-and-reframing-the-challenge/">tried for years</a> to create more opportunities for young people, but with little success.</p>
<p>In many Middle Eastern nations, regulations and laws about hiring and firing workers <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2012/061312.htm?id=186569">discourage employers from creating new jobs</a> when times are good, for fear they’ll have to keep those people employed when times get worse again. Other rules <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2012/061312.htm?id=186569">discriminate against young women</a> seeking work. Education and training programs <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2012/061312.htm?id=186569">don’t always line up</a> with the jobs that are available. </p>
<p>In many countries, the government is the one of the largest employers. In Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, government jobs are <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/54/vc061312">almost one-third</a> of all employment. In Egypt, government work accounts for 70% of nonagricultural jobs. In most countries, government jobs pay about 20% less than private industry, but in the Middle East, government jobs pay about 30% more on average. This means people will often just wait for a public sector job instead of taking available private sector jobs. </p>
<p>Even those young people who manage to get jobs say they often are <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/youth-employment-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-revisiting-and-reframing-the-challenge/">searching for several years</a> before landing work. During this time, they rely on financial support from their families. This causes them to experience what has been called “<a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1087433">prolonged adolescence</a>,” in which they are unable to develop financial and social independence, such as moving out and getting married, until their 20s or even their 30s.</p>
<h2>Other compounding challenges</h2>
<p>The region faces other obstacles that make it even harder for governments to tackle youth unemployment.</p>
<p>In addition to <a href="https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2021/06">internal conflict</a>, the International Monetary Fund reports that several of the region’s countries – including Egypt, Iraq and Tunisia – are facing a <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/Issues/2022/04/25/regional-economic-outlook-april-2022-middle-east-central-asia">slow economic recovery from the pandemic</a>, inflation in the costs of basic commodities such as energy and food, and financial and debt obligations needed to stabilize the economy.</p>
<p>Several countries across the region – including Algeria, Libya, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen – have <a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/finding-the-balance-population-and-water-scarcity-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/">less water than their populations need</a>.</p>
<p>There are other <a href="https://www.unep.org/resources/publication/environmental-challenges-middle-east-and-north-africa-region-paper">environmental concerns</a>, such as pollution, agriculture land scarcity and <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/49d6211b-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/49d6211b-en">poor public infrastructure</a>, which hinder sustainable economic growth. </p>
<p>The crisis in Ukraine threatens food supplies. More than one-third of Egyptians’ diets are based on wheat, but <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/blog/russia-ukraine-crisis-poses-serious-food-security-threat-egypt">85% of Egypt’s wheat</a> comes from Russia and Ukraine. Supplies have been reduced, and <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/blog/russia-ukraine-crisis-poses-serious-food-security-threat-egypt">prices are expected to rise</a> on bread and other wheat-based staple foods.</p>
<p>All these problems have contributed to varying degrees of lack of public confidence in the economies in the region. For instance, <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/">in a nationally representative survey</a>, 78% of Iraqis describe the economic situation in their country to be either bad or very bad. In Yemen, that proportion is 68%.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-crisis-poses-a-serious-threat-to-egypt-the-worlds-largest-wheat-importer-179242">Russia-Ukraine crisis poses a serious threat to Egypt – the world’s largest wheat importer</a>
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<h2>Potential effects</h2>
<p>Often the way to <a href="https://www.pesnetwork.eu/2019/09/05/lmb3-educational-attainment/">improve young people’s prospects</a> is education. But in several Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia, university-educated young people have a <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2012/061312.htm">higher unemployment rate</a> than their less-educated peers because most of the available opportunities are for low-skill jobs.</p>
<p>Rather than bringing <a href="https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2016/data-on-display/education-matters.htm">higher earnings</a>, education for Middle Eastern young people <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/2019/09/youth-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/">can deliver frustration</a>.</p>
<p>It’s no surprise, then, that vast numbers of young people – <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/covid-19-survey/#data_sets">at least one-fourth</a> of young Egyptians, Iraqis and Yemenis, and more than <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/2022/04/what-lebanese-citizens-think-about-migration/">60% of Lebanese youth</a> – are looking to emigrate, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/09/libya-new-evidence-shows-refugees-and-migrants-trapped-in-horrific-cycle-of-abuses/">often to Europe</a>.</p>
<p>All these forces at work in the Middle East – economic pressures, political conflict and water shortages – have the potential to spread international tension, refugees seeking safety and opportunity, or even disease. The challenges facing Middle Eastern nations are all made more difficult by the lack of faith their young people have in the prospect of a fulfilling future at home.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179927/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georges Naufal is a research fellow at the IZA Institute of Labor Economics and Economic Research Forum.
</span></em></p>Political and economic forces across the Middle East and North Africa combine to mean well-educated young people spend years looking for work, which delays their independence and adulthood.Georges Naufal, Associate Research Scientist, Public Policy Research Institute, Texas A&M UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1840902022-06-05T07:20:50Z2022-06-05T07:20:50ZNigeria has just hiked interest rates: why it’s the wrong recipe for curbing inflation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466614/original/file-20220601-48776-fb6nf8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Interest rate hike may not directly impact the average Nigerian</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Amos Gumulira/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Central Bank of Nigeria recently announced an <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-24/nigeria-central-bank-surprises-with-first-rate-hike-in-six-years">increase</a> in the interest rate, from 11.5% to 13%, a 1.5 percentage point hike that took effect immediately. </p>
<p>Whenever the Central Bank changes the monetary policy rate, otherwise known as the discount or interest rate, deposit and other financial institutions follow suit. Banks will therefore be raising their lending rates, which will increase the cost of borrowing and reduce the demand for money. </p>
<p>The accepted logic is that this will lead to a reduction in consumption and investment, thereby cooling off the overheated economy. </p>
<p>According to the Central Bank, the interest rate was <a href="https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2022/CCD/Central%20Bank%20of%20Nigeria%20Communique%20No.%20142%20of%20the%20Monetary%20Policy%20Committee%20Meeting%20Held%20on%20Tuesday%2024th%20May%202022.pdf">raised</a> to reduce inflationary pressure, narrow the negative real interest rate margin, restore investor confidence and boost remittances. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/inflation-should-be-viewed-as-public-enemy-number-1-heres-why-183193">Inflation should be viewed as public enemy number 1: here's why</a>
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<p>Nigeria’s inflation rate was about <a href="https://nigerianstat.gov.ng/elibrary?queries=cpi">16.8%</a> as of April 2022. The rate was at an all-time high of about 18% a year ago, but dropped to 15% in <a href="https://www.cbn.gov.ng/rates/inflrates.asp">November 2021</a>. It has been on an upward trend since then, which explains why the Central Bank took a pre-emptive measure to tame it. </p>
<p>But in my view, we shouldn’t assume that monetary policy will work in Nigeria the way it works in other countries. </p>
<p>Firstly, its effectiveness in curtailing inflation in Nigeria is blunted because price increases are caused mainly by supply constraints. These include insecurity in food-producing areas of the country, poor infrastructure, the war in Ukraine which has pushed up the price of commodities such as wheat, and falling imports due to currency depreciation.</p>
<p>In addition, Nigeria’s large informal sector has very weak linkages with the formal financial sector. About <a href="https://punchng.com/80-4-of-nigerian-employment-in-informal-sector-says-wbank/">80%</a> of Nigerians are employed in the informal sector. Unlike households in developed countries, many Nigerians will not change their economic decision-making because of the interest rate increase. </p>
<p>There are also concerns about the timing of the increase. Nigeria is facing high levels of <a href="https://nairametrics.com/2022/05/30/why-cbn-interest-rate-hike-will-not-reduce-inflation-rate-in-nigeria/">unemployment and poverty</a>. Higher rates will have knock-on effects in the broader economy. For example, the manufacturers association of Nigeria’s big <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2022/05/27/manufacturers-fault-hike-in-monetary-policy-rate/">worry</a> is that the rate hike would increase input costs and weaken the demand for manufactured goods.</p>
<p>How compelling are these concerns? Should the poor and working class in Nigeria be perturbed by the Central Bank’s decision?</p>
<h2>Who shouldn’t be worried</h2>
<p>The rate increase will not have significant effects on most low-income Nigerians for a few reasons. </p>
<p>First, domestic credit to the private sector in Nigeria is very low. It was just <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS?locations=NG">12%</a> of gross domestic product (GPD) in 2020, compared with an average of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS?locations=ZG">40%</a> for sub-Saharan Africa.</p>
<p>Nigeria is one of the 20 or so countries in the world with a domestic credit to private sector ratio of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS">below 15%</a> of GDP.</p>
<p>Credit allocation to individuals and households is also low. This is because banks usually impose onerous conditions that make it nearly impossible for many Nigerians to obtain loans. </p>
<p>As of May 2021, for instance, consumer credit accounted for only <a href="https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2021/RSD/May%202021%20Economic%20Report.pdf">10.2%</a> of total credit to the private sector. </p>
<p>Unable to obtain credit from financial institutions, many Nigerians use <a href="https://punchng.com/loan-sharks-devise-underhand-tactics-inflict-pains-on-cash-strapped-nigerian-borrowers/">loan sharks</a>. </p>
<p>The inability of many Nigerians to access loans from banks means they will not have to worry about paying higher rates on mortgages, credit cards, autos, and student loans. </p>
<p>Additionally, the rate hike will not have an impact on the prices of goods and services typically consumed by low-income Nigerians. Hikes in the prices of these basic food stuffs are driven by factors such as insecurity concerns as well as poor infrastructure that makes getting food to markets expensive. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-gloomy-may-day-awaits-nigerian-workers-181545">A gloomy May Day awaits Nigerian workers</a>
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<p>What about growth and employment? An increase in interest rate <a href="https://www.usbank.com/financialiq/invest-your-money/investment-strategies/how-do-interest-rates-affect-investments.html">raises</a> borrowing costs. This, in turn, reduces investment, production, and employment. </p>
<p>But Nigeria does not fit this narrative. Much of its economic growth is driven, not by the production of goods, but by the export of oil and gas. Though a small percentage of the GDP, oil generates <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/nigeria-faces-a-tough-time-diversifying-from-oil/a-59494125">much</a> of the foreign exchange and government revenue needed to support other sectors of the economy.</p>
<p>Because credit to the private sector in Nigeria is very low relative to GDP, the impact of the rate increase on real-sector production and employment will not be substantial.</p>
<h2>Who should be worried</h2>
<p>Nigerians in the public sector in some states of the federation should be wary of the rate hike. </p>
<p>The state governments routinely borrow from banks to cover their huge budget deficits, and government debt has been on the increase over the years. Some have accumulated <a href="https://nigeriannewsdirect.com/nlc-set-to-fight-govs-over-unpaid-salaries-pensions/">several months</a> of unpaid salaries, gratuities, and pensions. </p>
<p>The interest rate increase will raise the borrowing costs of the government and result in the allocation of a higher proportion of revenue to debt servicing. This will affect the ability of the government to meet its capital and recurrent expenditures. In turn, this could exacerbate the delays in, or non-payment of, salaries, gratuities and pensions.</p>
<h2>A dysfunctional system</h2>
<p>If Nigeria was a well-functioning economy, the rate increase would attract investors. According to the <a href="https://www.ig.com/en/trading-strategies/what-is-purchasing-power-parity--ppp---191106">purchasing power parity theory</a> of exchange rates, a fall in the inflation rate would shore up the value of the Naira.</p>
<p>In addition, the hike would lead to an increase in the value of the Naira through what’s called “Carry Trade” – when portfolio investors borrow money from countries with low interest rates and invest the proceeds to take advantage of the spread between Nigeria’s high interest rate and low rates in other countries. </p>
<p>But Nigeria isn’t a well-functioning country. It has high levels of insecurity and political uncertainty. In addition, financial regulation is weak and the financial sector is fragile. It is therefore unlikely that portfolio investors would jump at the bait of high interest rates. </p>
<p>If anything, investors are <a href="https://www.stearsng.com/premium/article/foreign-investors-are-leaving-nigeria/">pulling their money out</a> because of these uncertainties, which partly explains why the Naira has been depreciating inexorably.</p>
<h2>The wrong approach</h2>
<p>Only the middle and upper-class Nigerians would gain from any long-term positive payoffs from the interest rate hike. No matter how one views the Central Bank of Nigeria’s rate increase, it is hard to fathom how it would benefit most Nigerians.</p>
<p>In my view, the policy of influencing the direction of the economy through interest rates and money supply – known as <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2014/03/basics.htm">monetarism</a> – is not the best strategy for fostering inclusive, employment-generating and poverty-alleviating economic growth in Nigeria. </p>
<p>The challenges of high unemployment and poverty rates are more ominous than inflation in contemporary Nigeria. Many observers believe that the <a href="https://guardian.ng/opinion/columnists/boko-haram-and-the-harassment-hypothesis/">high level</a> of violence and insecurity in the country is a by-product of economic dis-empowerment, especially among the burgeoning youth population in Nigeria.</p>
<p>Prioritising inflation over inclusive economic growth, unemployment and poverty is, in my view, the wrong decision. </p>
<p>What the country needs now is <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2014/09/basics.htm">Keynesianism</a> – an economic policy regime that would mobilise funds for massive job-creating investments in infrastructure, agriculture, labour-intensive manufacturing, and agro-processing.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigeria-will-have-to-dig-deep-to-overcome-entrenched-patterns-of-poverty-177855">Nigeria will have to dig deep to overcome entrenched patterns of poverty</a>
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<p>The Central Bank already does this, albeit in a small way. To boost real-sector production and employment, it has been using “<a href="https://businessday.ng/financial-inclusion/article/cbn-introduces-11-intervention-schemes-for-non-interest-financial-institutions/">intervention funds”</a> to support strategic sectors of the economy. About 385 billion Naira (approximately $1.2 billion at the official exchange rate of 415 Naira = $1) was <a href="https://www.cbn.gov.ng/rates/mnycredit.asp">reserved</a> for intervention projects as of March 2022. </p>
<p>The funds are used to provide concessionary credit to sectors that boost the productive capacities of the economy. The aim is to ease supply constraints and ameliorate inflationary pressures. </p>
<p>Nigeria needs more of this approach.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184090/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Onyeiwu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It is hard to fathom how Nigeria’s Central Bank interest rate increase would benefit most Nigerians.Stephen Onyeiwu, Andrew Wells Robertson Professor of Economics, Allegheny CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1831652022-06-02T14:18:54Z2022-06-02T14:18:54ZSouth Africa’s economy has taken some heavy body blows: can it recover?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465478/original/file-20220526-25-g69x0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Heavy rains in April 2022 killed dozens of people and destroyed thousands of homes in Durban, South Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Darren Stewart/Gallo Images via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Economists are growing increasingly concerned about South Africa’s economy. This is because the country’s three major macroeconomic problems – lacklustre economic growth, growing inflation and very high unemployment – have been exacerbated by a series of major disruptions. </p>
<p>These include the COVID pandemic that started as a health crisis but escalated quickly to an economic crisis. Millions of people lost their jobs as economic activity came to a halt under lockdown.</p>
<p>In the middle of the pandemic <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/content/report-expert-panel-july-2021-civil-unrest">violence that lasted for eight days</a> erupted in Kwa-Zulu Natal and Gauteng. Further pressure has been piled on by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine which is <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/21/from-food-to-inflation-the-russia-ukraine-war-has-a-global-impact.html">pushing up food prices</a>. </p>
<p>The most recent blow has been devastating floods in some parts of the country that caused loss of lives and massive destruction of infrastructure, including to the country’s biggest port in Durban. </p>
<p>These events hit an already fragile economy. The South African economy has been on the receiving end since 2009. It has, since then, never returned to its initial levels of economic growth pre-2007/2008 global downturn (financial crisis). The crisis is reported to have lead to job losses of <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-l-europe-en-formation-2010-4-page-149.htm?try_download=1">about 1 million</a>. Moreover, the economic growth saw a decline from 2011 onward due a decline in demand for commodities resulting from changes in commodity prices. </p>
<p>The continuous economic stagnation was further compounded by slow-paced investment. Other domestic factors that contributed to economic stagnation included restrictive macroeconomic policies and budgetary cuts.</p>
<p>Prior to the pandemic South Africa had entered into a technical recession – when an economy experiences economic decline in two successive quarters. Gross Domestic Product growth declined by 0.6% in quarter three and -1.4% in quarter four of 2019. The trend of low growth continued, becoming worse when COVID-19 hit. </p>
<h2>The causal-effects of the disruptions</h2>
<p><strong>The pandemic:</strong> South Africa’s economy became more depressed during the pandemic because production in most sectors came to a halt due to hard lockdowns imposed in an effort to curb the spread of the virus. In the process various businesses shut-down temporarily, with others closing permanently. This resulted in job losses by millions of South Africans.</p>
<p><strong>The violence:</strong> In July 2021, businesses, shops and warehouses were destroyed, looted and in some instances burnt in KwaZulu-Natal and parts of Gauteng. This disruption which lasted for eight days is reported to have cost the economy more than R50 billion as well as almost <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-july-2021-protests-and-socio-political-unrest-in-south-africa/">2 million jobs</a>. </p>
<p><strong>The floods:</strong> The recent <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/south-africa/south-africa-floods-and-landslides-update-government-south-africa-south-africa">heavy rains</a> in Durban and parts of the Eastern Cape caused major infrastructural damage. It also brought to a halt production in some sectors and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/disaster/fl-2022-000201-zaf">even forced some businesses to shut-down</a>. Many businesses affected were in the process of rebuilding after being destroyed during the July 2021 unrest. The closing of shops and businesses automatically translated into job losses, further exacerbating the unemployment rate. </p>
<p><strong>The Ukraine war:</strong> Russia and Ukraine are both <a href="https://blogs.imf.org/2022/03/15/how-war-in-ukraine-is-reverberating-across-worlds-regions/">big players</a> in global food markets in terms of production of barley, maize, sunflower oil and wheat. As a result the war will lead to slow growth in the global economy and <a href="https://www.coface.com/News-Publications/News/Economic-consequences-of-the-Russia-Ukraine-conflict-Stagflation-ahead">accelerated inflation</a>. South Africa is no exception <a href="https://blogs.imf.org/2022/03/15/how-war-in-ukraine-is-reverberating-across-worlds-regions/">as prices of food items such as oil and grain shoot up</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, there is an upsurge in the prices of commodities and fuel which triggers inflationary pressures. This has led to the South Africa Reserve Bank increasing the repo rate on <a href="https://www.resbank.co.za">two consecutive occasions</a> adding an extra pinch to the consumers’ woes.</p>
<p>The most obvious question that follows is if there is anything that can be done? The answer is yes. </p>
<h2>What can be done</h2>
<p>It is evident that since the global financial crises in 2008, South Africa’s economic growth has been on the decline. Specifically, growth has been on the downward trajectory with an average growth rate of just under 1.7% for the period 2008 to 2016 and worsened further below 1% for the period 2015 to 2016. </p>
<p>This trend of decline in economic growth negatively affected job creation to the extend that it translated into a jobless growth. This was evident in 2019, when South Africa experienced a technical recession, with <a href="https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/440328">little growth and decreasing levels of employment</a>. It is more pronounced among young people. As such there is high demand for employment but low or limited supply of employment. This is due to the fact that potential employers are limited in taking on new employees or completely closing down because of the state of the economy and specifically the cost of doing business.</p>
<p>Moreover, the consumer’s <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/">purchasing power is deteriorating</a> on daily basis due to high prices for food, electricity, interest rates (cost of borrowing) and many more. This is compounded by high inflation since 2018 which <a href="https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/798731523331698204-0010022018/original/SouthAfricaEconomicUpdateApril2018.pdf">averaged 5.9%</a>. This is the inflation rate South Africa is experiencing currently.</p>
<p>There is therefore a need to think of quick economic solutions to neutralise the problems of rising unemployment, rising prices and low economic growth.</p>
<p>First, South Africa needs to address the energy crisis because it is hurting already wounded businesses. Allowing an independent power producer into the energy market would be a good start.</p>
<p>Second, there is an urgent need to accelerate the creation of labour-intensive employment (in agriculture and tourism). More so, there is a need to revive industrial-based employment which has been on the decline over the years. This type of employment will be more inclusive. </p>
<p>Third, there are a lot of youth with entrepreneurial ideas. Hence, there is a need for proactive regulations (exemptions) that minimises barriers to small and medium enterprises entering the markets that are largely dominated by bigger firms. </p>
<p>These interventions could bring about <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2019/towards%20an%20economic%20strategy%20for%20sa.pdf">inclusive growth</a>. </p>
<p>In addition, the private sector needs to get involved in funding small and meduim enterprises as part of social responsibility or giving back to the community by empowering the entrepreneurial culture.</p>
<p>Finally, the government needs to address the problem of rising prices. It needs to administer the prices of some staple food as an additional intervention to the <a href="https://safacts.co.za/list-of-zero-rated-supplies-in-south-africa/">already zero rated items</a>. Many of these are still expensive and unaffordable to many people. The administering of the prices can be temporary while working towards long term interventions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183165/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johannes P S Sheefeni does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Structural reforms to South Africa’s economy need to be accelerated.Johannes P S Sheefeni, Associate Professor - Macroeconomics & Applied Econometrics, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1804822022-04-10T13:09:44Z2022-04-10T13:09:44Z#ToxicWorkplaces: The future of youth employment in Nigeria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456972/original/file-20220407-10725-rc9vqh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C8%2C5284%2C3675&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Emphasis on innovation and entrepreneurialism in Nigeria has shifted responsibility for creating employment from employers to unemployed youths.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since Nigeria declared its aspiration to be one of the world’s <a href="https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pdfuploads/Abridged_Version_of_Nigeria%20Vision%202020.pdf">top 20 economies by 2020</a>, I have been doing research on the damaging <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12732">impact of urban restructuring and economic growth on marginalized urban women</a> in Ibadan, Nigeria. </p>
<p>However, in the past four years, my interest has widened to include the impact of the same issues on Nigerian youth. I have noticed that some youths have become “beneficiaries” of urban restructuring via job creation. Despite this, the city remains a paradoxical space.</p>
<p>While I now see sharply dressed youths rushing off to work, I also see youths engaged in various hustles to meet their daily needs. The latter observation is unsurprising, given that <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---ilo-abuja/documents/publication/wcms_819111.pdf">63 per cent of young people (aged 15-34) are underemployed or unemployed</a>.</p>
<h2>Economic growth in Nigeria</h2>
<p>There’s been a major focus on strengthening economic growth in Nigeria <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0308518X221083989">through neoliberal urban renewal projects</a> like the <a href="https://www.currentaffairs.org/2020/05/a-private-city-the-rise-of-eko-atlantic">transformation of urban spaces through real estate development</a> and “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/mar/01/we-woke-to-bulldozers-nigeria-slum-clearance-leaves-thousands-homeless">cleaning up the city</a>” to attract regional/global investors, which are expected to lead to job creation. </p>
<p>These projects have transformed the cityscape, including an increase in the number of <a href="https://www.thepalmsmall.com/about-1">elite consumer spaces</a> and <a href="https://techeconomy.ng/2022/03/microsoft-adc-new-office-commissioned-in-lagos-pantami-insists-nigeria-is-africas-investment-gateway/">service sector businesses</a>. Nigeria’s efforts to improve its business environment is shown by its increased ranking to 131st in 2019 in the world, from 169th in 2017, on the <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/688761571934946384/pdf/Doing-Business-2020-Comparing-Business-Regulation-in-190-Economies.pdf">Doing Business Index</a>.</p>
<p>In June 2021, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/nigeria-buhari-youth-jobs-pandemic-b1863298.html">told youth to “behave” for the country to attract investors</a>. Given that youth unemployment is considered a <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ft-nigeria-election-youth-unemployment-draws-global-nevin-phd">“ticking timebomb” in Nigeria</a>, it makes sense that Buhari is concerned about job creation. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man speaking from behind a podium" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456681/original/file-20220406-20-g0tty2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456681/original/file-20220406-20-g0tty2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456681/original/file-20220406-20-g0tty2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456681/original/file-20220406-20-g0tty2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456681/original/file-20220406-20-g0tty2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456681/original/file-20220406-20-g0tty2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456681/original/file-20220406-20-g0tty2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In June 2021, Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari told youth to ‘behave’ if they wanted to attract investors.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Christophe Ena)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, to what extent is Buhari concerned about the livelihoods of youths who are eventually employed as a result of these investor opportunities? It is imperative to focus on the nature and consequences of emerging employment opportunities.</p>
<h2>Is entrepreneurialism the answer?</h2>
<p>Research on African youth unemployment has increasingly focused on <a href="https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190930028.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190930028-e-38">precarity</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9655.12808">uncertainties about the future</a>. There has been emphasis on encouraging innovation and <a href="https://www.geog.cam.ac.uk/research/projects/decentwork/publications/gettingbyreport.pdf">transforming youth from job seekers to job creators and employers</a>, thus shifting responsibility for creating employment to the youth themselves. </p>
<p>However, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/s41287-016-0006-y">entrepreneurialism has been questioned as a cure-all</a>, as it does not adequately address structural issues and youth aspiration. There is what some scholars have called an “imagination gap” between the employment futures that policy-makers imagine for young people, and those that young people imagine for themselves.</p>
<p>In light of these concerns, increased scholarly attention has been paid to researching the <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal8">United Nations policy commitment to full and productive employment and decent work for all</a> from a youth-centred perspective. So far there is <a href="https://www.geog.cam.ac.uk/research/projects/decentwork/publications/gettingbyreport.pdf">limited research on young people’s perspectives and experiences</a> of work and visions for change. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman in an apron writing on a notepad" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456968/original/file-20220407-12-egu53b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456968/original/file-20220407-12-egu53b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456968/original/file-20220407-12-egu53b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456968/original/file-20220407-12-egu53b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456968/original/file-20220407-12-egu53b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456968/original/file-20220407-12-egu53b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456968/original/file-20220407-12-egu53b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">So far there has been little research done on young people’s perspectives and experiences of work.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Given deliberate efforts to increase stable wage employment, little is known about the extent to which these forms of employment are considered and experienced as “decent” by youth, and the effect of work on their psychosocial well-being.</p>
<h2>Nigerian labour laws</h2>
<p>On paper, Nigeria has a relatively strong labour act <a href="https://twitter.com/dreya_el/status/1506015481148297216">that some have argued favours the employee</a>. But the labour law is <a href="https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-employment-law-review/nigeria">murky on the duration of the work day</a>, and the <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/507087-nigerias-minimum-wage-grossly-inadequate-cant-meet-basic-nutritional-needs-of-an-adult-report.html">minimum wage is far from being a living wage</a>. Nigerian labour law is also largely silent on issues of workplace harassment.</p>
<p>It is no secret that many <a href="https://www.idosi.org/wasj/wasj36(1)18/7.pdf">employers are often in gross violation of Nigeria labour laws</a>. Employers are rarely sued for violations of the labour act because most people simply can’t afford to take legal action. There are also many government officials who own private businesses, <a href="https://qz.com/africa/663626/nigeria-has-a-culture-of-not-paying-workers-and-its-not-about-to-change-anytime-soon/">meaning they rarely face penalties</a>.</p>
<p>More so, some youth have told me that there’s very little that they can do because they fear backlash and being blacklisted as an insubordinate worker, thereby risking any future job prospects. </p>
<p>And so, they endure, placated by imaginations about future upward social mobility, no matter how rare they might be. These imaginations help youths develop coping strategies to survive their toxic work environments.</p>
<h2>#HorribleBosses</h2>
<p>On March 21, 2022, journalist Damilare Dosunmu wrote an exposé about <a href="https://techcabal.com/2022/03/21/tyranny-in-the-workplace-the-chaotic-culture-of-bento-africa/">workers’ experiences with alleged tyranny</a> at <a href="https://www.bento.africa/">Bento Africa</a>, a startup company. The article details allegations against the workplace, including employees being forced to work non-stop, verbal abuse, threats of job termination and abrupt termination. </p>
<p>This form of toxic work culture was further corroborated the next day on Twitter using the hashtags <a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/search?q=%23horriblebosses&src=typeahead_click&f=top">#HorribleBosses</a> and <a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/hashtag/ToxicWorkplaces?src=hashtag_click">#ToxicWorkplaces</a>. <a href="https://thewhistler.ng/horrible-bosses-employees-tear-into-nigerian-tech-founders-lament-toxic-work-conditions/amp/">Thousands of tweets highlighted stories of emotional and physical abuse </a> and inveighed against appalling working conditions.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1506233239748366349"}"></div></p>
<p>On March 23, a well-known Nigerian comedian, Mr. Macaroni, brilliantly captured this trending issue in “Oga and His New Driver.” In this skit, the employer tells his new employee that he doesn’t like lazy people who are paid and yet “run online and … say their employer is toxic.” </p>
<p>The employer also provides a long, ridiculous (and arguably impossible) list of tasks that should be accomplished in one day. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/kmvpqlo287g?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A skit by Nigerian comic Debo Adedayo, known by his stage name Mr. Macaroni.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After the employer is finished listing the job expectation and the work hours (3 a.m. to 11 p.m.), the employee hands him a knife and says, “<em>Kuku</em> kill me sir.” </p>
<p>Clearly, youth are not actually asking their employers to kill them in real life, but they are increasingly resisting and expressing that employers are <em>killing</em> them. Will President Buhari have the audacity to tell businesses and employers to “behave” for the sake of youth well-being? Or will he continue to let them be exploited?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180482/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Grace Adeniyi-Ogunyankin receives funding from the Canada Research Chairs Program and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. </span></em></p>Nigerian youth have increasingly been resisting and expressing their dissatisfaction with toxic workplaces.Grace Adeniyi-Ogunyankin, Assistant Professor, Departments of Geography & Planning, Gender Studies, Queen's University, OntarioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1798912022-04-02T08:25:49Z2022-04-02T08:25:49ZRising vigilantism: South Africa is reaping the fruits of misrule<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454388/original/file-20220325-23-10rx82p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of South Africa’s anti-migrant “Operation Dudula” group march in Jeppestown, Johannesburg. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michele Spatari / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Once relegated to the margins of South African politics, anti-immigrant activism has gone mainstream. Several anti-immigrant groups, including <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60698374">Operation Dudula</a>, the <a href="https://satrucker.co.za/tag/atdf/">All Trucker Foundation</a> and the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/news/were-not-xenophobic-says-south-african-first-president-mario-khumalo-e9f129df-61ee-47a9-8794-fd100e994f1d">South Africa First Party</a>, have become reference points for national debate.</p>
<p>Reflecting forms of radical protectionism, they channel the frustrations of South Africans with <a href="https://theconversation.com/state-capture-in-south-africa-how-the-rot-set-in-and-how-the-project-was-rumbled-176481">corruption</a>, <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/speaking-notes-delivered-police-minister-general%C2%A0bheki-cele-mp-occasion-release-%C2%A0quarter">crime</a>, and <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=14957">unemployment</a>. The results are campaigns to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o9k_XR1aRSI">‘clean’ the country of immigrants</a>, home invasions and <a href="https://twitter.com/ReggieReporter/status/1505828159874383873?s=20&t=8PDjo7hP7OWz92uCR9fPEA">widespread threats and violence</a>.</p>
<p>This is not a response to an immigration crisis. Immigrant numbers are <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/south-africa-immigration-destination-history#:%7E:text=The%20government's%20statistical%20agency%2C%20Statistics,in%20the%202001%2D06%20period">not higher than they have been for a decade</a>. This is a crisis of constitutional credibility. </p>
<p>Anti-immigrant activism is politics by other means, with violence likely to become common amid fundamental ruptures in governance. After years of unfulfilled promises, a youthful citizenry <a href="https://theconversation.com/here-are-five-factors-that-drove-low-voter-turnout-in-south-africas-2021-elections-173338">has lost considerable faith in formal electoral politics</a>. </p>
<p>Popular embrace of nationalism, street justice, and anti-immigrant activism reflects the ascendency of an extra-legal order. That regime is a mix of formal institutions and local fiefdoms held together by patronage and coercion. That system is now unravelling. </p>
<h2>Perils of indirect rule and patronage</h2>
<p>During the apartheid era, local gangsters often made alliances with the apartheid state. Some justified their violence and venality as a strategy to make the country ungovernable. This latter group – the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00020189908707905">‘comrade tsotsis’</a> (young thugs so-called for claiming to being anti-apartheid activists) – later connected with the post-apartheid governing party, the African National Congress (ANC). This allowed them to maintain local influence with the <a href="https://mg.co.za/editorial/2022-03-31-editorial-theres-a-crisis-coming/">tacit permission of the ANC</a>. The opposition Inkatha Freedom Party has similarly relied on its sometimes violent <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13504630.2020.1814235?casa_token=VkRbWmqNdfYAAAAA%3A1k0OuQHkjXcGSx1EFT9tRnSUyVei75c3eemaIErOdkcd_cL5WYsI3E77Swx94CX1MZvzGwzs4MVQ">network of hostel leaders</a>.</p>
<p>This created a system of ‘indirect rule’, reflecting a similar logic to the colonial administration where local ‘chieftains’ worked in complex patronage networks to keep public order. But, where the gangsters once worked under the national government, the police and officials now appear to answer to vigilantes, participating in Dudula raids under ‘<a href="https://twitter.com/newzroom405/status/1505500039774638080?s=21">sole authority of the local community</a>’. </p>
<p>The post-apartheid system of indirect rule has been expedient for the governing party. Rather than extend its presence into cities whose populations <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315867878-13/south-africa-tortured-urbanisation-complications-reconstruction-ivan-turok">swelled in the post-apartheid era</a>, it <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589346.2019.1692520">closed party offices</a>. </p>
<p>Under the country’s party list system, locally elected municipal councillors <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2020-11-27-direct-elections-bill-will-give-real-power-to-the-people/">are often absent or powerless</a>. Viewed from the perspective of the historically neglected <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03736245.1982.10559651?journalCode=rsag20#:%7E:text=Positioned%20just%20to%20the%20west,3">black residential areas</a> and informal settlements, elected officials are often more committed to <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/pad.1642">pleasing the party than the people they ostensibly represent</a>.</p>
<p>The dominant parties maintained this system of indirect rule, relying on civic associations, local chiefs and other ‘community leaders’ to deliver votes and maintain order, over two decades.</p>
<p>Unwilling or unable to displace them from local positions of authority, national, provincial, and municipal governments negotiate with them, further entrenching their power. The challenge now is that the political and economic resources the three spheres of government used to maintain this system are dwindling.</p>
<p>South Africa’s economic crisis means there are fewer government tenders available, and less money for social programmes. More importantly, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59166081">the dip in ANC support below 50% in the 2021 elections</a> means party and bureaucratic bosses now face uncertain futures. Amid this, upstarts seeking opportunities and jockeying for position engage in new alliances, mobilisation and violence. </p>
<h2>Cause for anxiety</h2>
<p>To be sure, more is going on than a crumbling patronage system. South Africans would generally prefer less immigration. There has been no time in the last two decades <a href="https://www.africaportal.org/publications/deadly-denial-xenophobia-governance-and-global-compact-migration-south-africa/">where they have broadly welcomed newcomers</a>. <a href="https://repository.hsrc.ac.za/handle/20.500.11910/18951">COVID has exacerbated concerns about immigration</a>, as <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2021-12-05-south-africas-youth-unemployment-crisis-the-clock-is-ticking-and-its-five-minutes-to-midnight/#:%7E:text=The%20latest%20official%20data%20reflect,four%20of%20the%20under%2D25s">youth unemployment hovers near 70%</a>.</p>
<p>There is clearly cause for anxiety. Politicians with <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/434851/south-africa-does-not-have-a-viable-economic-recovery-plan-analyst/">few plans for addressing this gap</a> have capitalised on these attitudes.</p>
<p>Yet, these widespread trends do little to explain the violence in specific places, at particular times, or why it is so difficult to counter. Anti-outsider violence is <a href="http://www.xenowatch.ac.za">not universal</a> nor always aimed at immigrants alone. </p>
<p>It is also not easily explained by poverty. Many of the poorest areas have remained peaceful while more prosperous ones have not. Instead, violence tends to occur repeatedly in specific neighbourhoods, because of localised political power games.</p>
<h2>Outsourcing state authority</h2>
<p>One example from <a href="https://www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/view/3118/pdf">our research</a> in Mamelodi, outside Pretoria, the country’s seat of national government, illustrates this point.</p>
<p>Its population growth has outpaced any kind of state intervention, police control, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-73073-4_5">or service provision</a>.</p>
<p>Working together, two groups have filled the political and regulatory vacuum. One is the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/SouthAfricanNationalCivicOrganisation2015/">South African National Civic Organisation</a>. The other, the Phomelong Residents Association, is a local informal group headed by self-appointed leaders. Those wanting to build, do business, or even transport goods through the area pay them or get out.</p>
<p>To finance their protest and political activities, the two groups plunder foreign-owned shops and businesses. Like the self-financing armies of old, protesters are given licence to loot. One leader <a href="https://www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/view/3118/pdf#page7">reported that</a>, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>when protesters feel hungry, they go and get food from shops to eat or take home to cook; and if shops here are closed they go to shops in other locations.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Through the distribution of resources and the eviction of foreigners, the associations legitimate their form of rule, positioned as gangster intermediaries. With popular support, they then demand attention by the municipal authorities. Cleverly, their leaders borrow the language of continued black deprivation and the need for <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-03-14-carl-niehaus-tables-radical-economic-transformation-plan-ahead-of-ace-magashules-campaign-for-anc-president/">‘radical economic transformation’</a> to legitimise themselves.</p>
<p>Another example of this indirect rule is Philani, a poor area largely neglected by city government, outside eThekwini in KwaZulu-Natal. In early 2019, the Delangokubona Business Forum <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/stories/2019/5/5cda7da04/refugees-affected-by-xenophobic-attacks-in-south-africa-in-need-of-urgent.html">displaced and kidnapped about 50 foreigners</a> living in the area.</p>
<p>Claiming to champion <a href="http://www.thedtic.gov.za/financial-and-non-financial-support/b-bbee/broad-based-black-economic-empowerment/">‘black economic empowerment’</a>, they accused foreigners of blocking the economic advancement of poor black citizens.</p>
<p>They extracted ransoms from their families and friends, while negotiating with the government for their safe return. Successful on both counts, they positioned themselves as intermediaries and peacemakers – the <em>de facto</em> local authorities.</p>
<p>As in other cases in the country, these groups <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-02-09-mafia-style-business-forum-halts-multi-million-road-project/">effectively create multi-faceted protection rackets</a>. Increasingly (and <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/bogus-mk-veterans-who-were-just-5-years-old-during-apartheid-smoked-out-as-verification-kicks-into-gear-20220317">implausably</a>) claiming to be military veterans of the anti-apartheid struggle, they use violence to create instability and instil fear to extract resources and establish legitimacy. </p>
<p>These actions create powerful local forces that demand payment from any state development projects in the areas they control. This way, the state is able to preserve the appearance of authority and constitutionalism while allowing someone else to do the dirty work of keeping people in line. But trouble ensues when the developers can no longer pay or other parties are eyeing the booty – money, houses, businesses, and votes. </p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Given the legacy of indirect rule, it is unclear who the government can call to rein in the violent leaders who effectively govern some <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/applied-and-social-sciences-magazines/townships">townships</a>. Or, indeed, if it has the desire or popular legitimacy to do so. Impunity for past misdeeds has emboldened these groups, strengthening them so much that police respond to them rather than the other way around.</p>
<p>Authority to decide who lives where, who does what, and what are appropriate standards of behaviour rests with them – rather than the constitution or town councils.</p>
<p>South Africa’s <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/nap/index.html">national action plan on xenophobia</a> calls for <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-a-plan-to-fight-prejudice-but-its-full-of-holes-114444">conversations and dialogue with these groups</a>. This is precisely the system they have manipulated to entrench their power. </p>
<p>Ending violence against foreigners and true economic recovery can only happen by first recognising – and addressing – the hazards of South Africa’s crumbling system of indirect rule.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179891/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Loren B Landau has received funding from the national research foundation, the Mellon Foundation, Porticus Foundation, and USAID </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jean Pierre Misago does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ending violence against foreigners can only happen by first recognising – and addressing – the hazards of South Africa’s crumbling system of indirect rule.Loren B Landau, Co-Director of the Wits-Oxford Mobility Governance Lab, University of the WitwatersrandJean Pierre Misago, Researcher, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1792342022-03-17T14:09:52Z2022-03-17T14:09:52ZBoda bodas are critical to Kenya’s transport system. But they’ve gone rogue<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452233/original/file-20220315-17-1tqdrg8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Boda boda riders carry passengers at Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Sally Hayden/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Kenya’s removal of import duty on motorcycles <a href="http://www.crimeresearch.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Report-on-Boda-boda-Motorcycle-Transport-and-Security-Chalenges-in-Kenya-2018.pdf">over a decade ago</a> led to the instant creation of tens of thousands of new jobs in the transport sector, notably in the growth of motorcycle taxis, better known as boda bodas. However, the sector is also in the news for <a href="http://www.crimeresearch.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Report-on-Boda-boda-Motorcycle-Transport-and-Security-Chalenges-in-Kenya-2018.pdf">all the wrong reasons</a> – fuelling crime, mob assaults on other road users, disregard for traffic rules. A viral video in which a mob of riders <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenyan-police-arrest-16-sexual-assault-of-motorist-3740216">sexually assaulted</a> a female motorist recently amplified the rot in the sector. Policy analyst Douglas Lucas Kivoi unpacks what went wrong and what should be done to make the boda boda sector safer for everyone.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the history of boda bodas in Kenya?</h2>
<p>The government of Kenya <a href="http://aeromarine.co.ke/news/1221/76/Insurers-and-KRA-win-big-in-motorbike-rules/">zero rated</a> import duty on motorcycles of up to 250cc in 2008. This made them affordable to average Kenyan homes, previously a pipe dream. It meant that most rural and urban families could afford to own one. They also provided vulnerable constituencies in communities an avenue to lift themselves out of poverty. </p>
<p>Boda bodas filled a gap in the absence of reliable, efficient transport across Kenya, in both urban and rural areas. It also addresses the problem of a poor transport infrastructure, especially a pathetic road network. In some areas the <a href="https://africabusinesscommunities.com/features/column-phyllis-wakiaga-fix-kenyas-road-construction-challenges/">road network is so bad</a> that only motorcycles can access communities. </p>
<p>In its 2018 report the National Transport and Safety Authority documented <a href="http://www.crimeresearch.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Report-on-Boda-boda-Motorcycle-Transport-and-Security-Chalenges-in-Kenya-2018.pdf">nearly 1.4 million registered motorcycles in Kenya</a>. But, in fact, an accurate number of motorcycles operating as boda bodas remains a mystery. This lacuna pertaining to registration, regulation, monitoring and the use of motorcycle boda bodas as public service vehicle transport is a cause for concern. </p>
<h2>What social and economic role do they play?</h2>
<p>When the government liberalised the motorcycle industry, many unemployed young men took advantage of poor road networks and the chaotic transport sector to eke out a living by transporting people and goods on motorbikes. This gave rise to gangs of young men who have organised themselves into informal associations with a clear chain of command. </p>
<p>The sector’s economic contribution is immense: it is <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/how-boda-boda-riders-make-sh1bn-every-day-3743962">estimated</a> that it provides more than one million direct jobs for riders who earn roughly about less than US$10 a day. </p>
<p>Treasury is estimated to be collecting <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/how-boda-boda-riders-make-sh1bn-every-day-3743962">roughly</a> Ksh60 billion (about US$525 million) yearly in fuel taxes from boda bodas. Each consumes <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/how-boda-boda-riders-make-sh1bn-every-day-3743962">an average of Ksh300 (about US$3) worth of petrol </a>each in a day. It is, simply, a sector that cannot be wished away.</p>
<h2>What are its downsides?</h2>
<p>The boda boda transport business was in the limelight in early March 2022 for all the wrong reasons. A group of riders <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/news/counties/president-kenyatta-orders-crackdown-on-rogue-boda-boda-3741000">sexually assaulted</a> a female motorist in Nairobi. President Uhuru Kenyatta ordered a crackdown on the entire sector in a bid to instil sanity.</p>
<p>The sector has operated without decorum and decency for a long time. Drivers are not trained in road safety – most <a href="http://www.crimeresearch.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Report-on-Boda-boda-Motorcycle-Transport-and-Security-Chalenges-in-Kenya-2018.pdf">don’t even have a driving licence </a> and they are a law unto themselves. This has bred criminal gangs where impunity reigns supreme, especially on the road. The chaotic situation has put drivers in danger: some have lost their lives along with their innocent passengers. Thousands have been <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/counties/article/2001319869/wheeler-killers-boda-bodas-are-new-death-traps">maimed</a>. In <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/data-hub/surge-in-boda-boda-accidents-death-toll-sparks-reform-calls-2275742">2019</a>, for instance, 1,421 boda boda riders and pillion passengers died, compared to 1,049 motor vehicle drivers and passengers.</p>
<p>Some boda boda riders have been accused of actively participating in or abetting crime. Some have been <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/counties/central/2019-11-18-stop-ferrying-criminals-muranga-boda-boda-riders-told/">accused</a> of helping remove or conceal the bodies of those killed by criminals.</p>
<h2>What’s to be done?</h2>
<p>The entire transport sector in Kenya is extremely <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/life-and-style/dn2/technology-answer-to-kenya-s-chaotic-transport-sector-are-we-ready--198840">chaotic</a> and requires serious policy and legal interventions to tame cartels and rogue operators.</p>
<p>The lack of a comprehensive framework to regulate the public transport sector has been the country’s main undoing. Kenya’s road network lacks lanes to protect bikers and motorcycles. Urban roads need to be redesigned to accommodate motorcyclists and cyclists. </p>
<p>Because impunity is deeply entrenched in Kenya’s transport sector, it is prudent that the government adopts both short and continuous long term measures to address the menace in the boda boda sector. </p>
<p>In the short term, one consideration should be to get all boda boda drivers to attend driving schools. This may be a tall order. But the national government, National Transport Safety Authority and county governments should organise continuous training for the drivers, focusing particularly on road safety and decorum. </p>
<p>The government should also consider establishing a database of all boda boda operators in Kenya through mandatory registration, refresher training and testing. This should be followed up with a robust enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance.</p>
<p>But it’s crucial that interventions don’t affect the livelihoods of communities. All 47 county governments ought to develop humane by-laws and policies to sustainably govern and regulate the boda boda sector’s operations. This, instead of adopting a retributive penal approach of arrests, prosecution and enforcing bans on boda boda operations. </p>
<p>Counties could, for instance, designate zones of operation for boda bodas. </p>
<p>Whatever approach is taken, it must be done in consultation with all stakeholders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179234/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Douglas Lucas Kivoi currently works as a Principal Policy Analyst, Governance sector at the . The Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) .</span></em></p>The entire transport sector in Kenya is extremely chaotic and in need of urgent policy and legal interventions.Douglas Lucas Kivoi, Principal Policy Analyst, Governance Department, The Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1698662021-10-15T10:19:11Z2021-10-15T10:19:11ZWhat can be done to tackle the systemic causes of poverty in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426476/original/file-20211014-16-rg6po2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ederies Samodien offers a child apples at a shack settlement as part of a poverty relief effort in Cape Town. Almost 56% of South Africans live in poverty.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Despite gains <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_ZAF.pdf">made in the first 15 years of democracy</a>, <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-06/Report-03-10-062015.pdf">55.5% of South Africans</a> lived below the poverty line as of 2015. Coupled with <a href="https://cramsurvey.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/1.-Spaull-N.-Daniels-R.-C-et-al.-2021-NIDS-CRAM-Wave-5-Synthesis-Report.pdf">the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic</a>, household food insecurity, child hunger, and extraordinarily <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2021.pdf">high youth unemployment levels</a> have eroded the early gains made.</p>
<p>The country’s expansive <a href="https://www.gov.za/services/services-residents/social-benefits">social grants system</a>, <a href="https://www.gov.za/services/uif/uif-unemployment-benefits">insurance schemes</a> and <a href="https://www.gov.za/services/social-benefits/social-relief-distress">social relief</a> are important mechanisms for ameliorating these challenges. But they need to go further. And the country should tackle the root causes of poverty, which are systemic. This means they cannot be shifted with a single intervention. That’s because cycles of disadvantage accumulate over long periods, generate multiple barriers, and are transferred across generations.</p>
<h2>Poverty among young people</h2>
<p>Take the case of young people who are not in employment, education or training (<a href="https://www.dhet.gov.za/Planning%20Monitoring%20and%20Evaluation%20Coordination/Fact-sheet-on-NEETs-Final-Version-27-Jan-2017.pdf">NEET</a>). They are perhaps among the most vulnerable to lifelong poverty. Most <a href="http://www.opensaldru.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11090/963/2019_249_Saldruwp.pdf?sequence=1">NEET youth</a> are black Africans. They are income poor, have no post-secondary education, and live in households in which nobody works.</p>
<p><a href="http://137.158.104.7/bitstream/handle/11090/968/2019_253_Saldruwp.pdf?sequence=3">Research into the agency and resilience of NEET youth</a> found that they face multiple barriers as they attempt to secure their first job. This makes it difficult to choose between household income going to food or seeking work. They may also live far away from learning and income earning opportunities. They may have their own or other people’s children at home, or older people to care for, with few options for high-quality, low-cost care support.</p>
<p>The research found that young people try multiple strategies to make something of their lives, but are continuously derailed by a number of barriers. The end result is that some of them give up the search for work. They may even suffer poor mental health, which further erodes the possibility of escaping the poverty trap.</p>
<h2>Childhood poverty</h2>
<p>But the cycle of disadvantage begins much earlier in life, indicating the systemic and multilayered nature of poverty and disadvantage. One of our <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/sarchi-welsocdev/Documents/COP%20research%20brief.pdf">studies</a> at the University of Johannesburg assessed children in the foundation grades R and 1 (most between the ages of 6 and 8) in five schools in Johannesburg’s poorest wards. It shows that many face multiple barriers that negatively affect their well-being. </p>
<p>These barriers include food insecurity, poverty-related depression among their caregivers, or lack of access to health screening to ensure they can see and hear to be able to learn. These poverty-related barriers are likely to keep them trapped in a vicious cycle of disadvantage for the rest of their lives.</p>
<p>South Africa has invested significantly in a social wage package that includes <a href="https://www.gov.za/services/services-residents/social-benefits">social grants</a>, free basic education, healthcare, and basic services. A recent World Bank report <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/238611633430611402/south-africa-social-assistance-programs-and-systems-review">shows</a> that these have been incredibly important in limiting inequality and alleviating the worst effects of poverty. But, as the report also states,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>there appears to be no overt consideration of or attempt to align [social grants] with South Africa’s systemic development challenges.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>What the report is referring to is the need to connect the most vulnerable people with a range of public services that can address the multiple barriers poverty creates. This is crucial if South Africa is to tackle the systemic nature of poverty and disadvantage.</p>
<p>The connection of vulnerable people to a range of public services can be done through integrating public services at a national level. For instance, social grant beneficiaries could automatically be eligible for, and be informed of, complementary services such as public employment support through the <a href="http://www.labour.gov.za/About-Us/Pages/PUBLIC-EMPLOYMENT-SERVICES.aspx">Department of Labour</a>.</p>
<p>Government is considering integrating social protection with other services so that existing services and investments can have a deeper impact on poverty.</p>
<p>Such integration also needs to exist at the local level, through communities of practice. These are innovative communities of researchers and practitioners, service agencies and service users that devise breakthrough ideas and solutions to protracted problems. This approach, also called <a href="https://ssir.org/articles/entry/collective_impact">collective impact</a> by researchers, is used around the world.</p>
<h2>Communities of practice for children and families</h2>
<p>We are <a href="https://communitiesforchildwellbeing.org/">testing</a> how such communities of practice can improve outcomes for vulnerable children and NEET youth. <a href="https://communitiesforchildwellbeing.org/">The Community of Practice for Social Systems Strengthening to Improve Child Well-being Outcomes</a> (led by Professor Leila Patel) is under way. It aims to promote collaboration across different sectors to better address the complex and multiple needs of children growing up in poverty. It also aims to develop innovative, collaborative and breakthrough solutions to promote better outcomes for them.</p>
<p>In the first phase from February to November 2020 the communities of practice consortium of partners <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/sarchi-welsocdev/Documents/COP%20research%20brief.pdf">assessed</a> a sample of children who were receiving the <a href="https://www.sassa.gov.za/Pages/Child-Support-Grant.aspx">child support grant</a> and were in the foundation years of schooling. That’s because targeted interventions in nutrition, health and education at this developmental stage could result in positive outcomes for children, families and communities. </p>
<p>After <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/sarchi-welsocdev/Documents/COP%20research%20brief.pdf">gathering data</a> for 162 children’s health, home circumstances, psycho-social functioning, and school and learning experiences, potential interventions were identified that could mitigate the risks they face.</p>
<p>These interventions, rolled out in the course of 2021, considered the multilayered nature of poverty and the range of interventions a child may need. Local-level communities of practice designed action plans based on each child’s situation. These groups consist of teachers, principals, social workers, educational psychologists, community-based nurses and other health workers, and NGOs in the relevant community or school.</p>
<p>These groups work collaboratively with the schools and, crucially, with caregivers whose children have been identified as needing extra support. That includes everything from arranging eye and hearing screenings to referring families to food support programmes, and ensuring that teachers are better equipped to improve children’s numeracy and literacy.</p>
<p>Drawing on the data from our communities of practice study, we also designed and delivered educational messaging, via community radio, on promoting parental involvement in children’s education, nutrition, financial education and tips for parents and other caregivers.</p>
<p>At the time of writing the communities of practice had ensured that 50 children’s vaccinations were completed; 30 had educational assessments, with recommendations about learning support provided to schools. Twenty-five families identified as having struggles at home were referred to <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/csda/Documents/CSDA%20_%20Sihleng%27imizi%20_%20FULL%20REPORT%20_%20ConnectCashwithCare%20_%20July%202020%20_%20Web.pdf">Sihleng’imizi</a>, a family strengthening programme. </p>
<p>Caregivers who showed depressive symptoms received follow-up visits by social workers based in each school, and were to be referred to the <a href="https://www.sadag.org/">South African Depression and Anxiety Group</a>. We are collecting follow-up data to understand what changes have been observed.</p>
<h2>A promising approach</h2>
<p>The results of the child well-being project suggest that communities of practice may improve outcomes by referring children and caregivers to whichever services they need to overcome the barrier they are facing at a given time. They can also be a basis upon which to connect social grant recipients to complementary services that can unlock the multiple barriers that people living in poverty face.</p>
<p>A similar approach will soon be applied to NEET youth. The <a href="https://www.saldru.uct.ac.za/wp-content/uploads/BPS_summary_report_14_05_2020-for-web.pdf">Basic Package of Support</a> programme will pilot communities of practice in three communities. It will bring together local colleges, work-seeker support programmes, health and mental health support facilities, childcare programmes and food support programmes, among others, to collaboratively learn about the challenges that these youth face, and how to better support them. </p>
<p>Such an approach promises to ensure that young people can connect to the wide range of services and opportunities they need to break down the many barriers they face as they seek to move into learning and earning.</p>
<p>This approach, as our research projects and <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3864128/">examples from elsewhere</a> prove, is a valuable way to tackle some of the conditions that contribute to poverty.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169866/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leila Patel receives funding from the Department of Science and Technology (DST) and the National Research Foundation (NRF) for her Chair in Welfare and Social Development, and the University of Johannesburg. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lauren Graham receives funding from the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences, the British Academy, and the Capacity Building Programme for Employment Promotion via the University of Cape Town. </span></em></p>There’s a crucial need to connect the most vulnerable people with public services in order to tackle systemic poverty and disadvantage. An integrated approach is key.Leila Patel, Professor of Social Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLauren Graham, Associate professor at the Centre for Social Development in Africa, University of Johannesburg, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1694172021-10-12T14:54:21Z2021-10-12T14:54:21ZNigeria’s COVID-19 economic plan has delivered disappointing results: here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425741/original/file-20211011-13-nz3hin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Threatened by insecurity, farmers in Nigeria's farm belt are increasingly abandoning their land, leading to higher cost of food </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Kola Sulaimon/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over a year ago, Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari launched an <a href="https://theconversation.com/buharis-covid-19-economic-plan-old-wine-in-new-wineskins-141079">economic plan</a> designed to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
<p>Since the outbreak of the pandemic, Nigeria has <a href="https://covid19.who.int/table">recorded</a> 207,618 cases of infection and 2,745 deaths as of October 11, 2021. The economic effects were devastating. Economic growth turned negative in 2020, unemployment and poverty rates increased, and companies went out of business. </p>
<p>Dubbed <a href="https://www.nipc.gov.ng/product/nigeria-economic-sustainability-plan/">“Bouncing Back: Nigeria Economic Sustainability Plan”</a>, Buhari’s COVID-19 plan focused on food security, job creation (especially for young people and women), renewable energy, support for small and medium-size enterprises, manufacturing, infrastructure and social investment. </p>
<p>Cash transfers through <a href="https://nasims.gov.ng/">N-Power</a>, <a href="https://www.marketmoni.com.ng/">MarketMoni</a>, <a href="https://socialprotection.org/discover/blog/tradermoni-empowerment-scheme-nigeria">TraderMoni</a> and other initiatives were cornerstones of the plan. </p>
<p>Now it is time to assess whether the economy has bounced back or is on track to do so. </p>
<p>Prior to the pandemic, the Nigerian economy grew at 2.2% in 2019. It contracted by 1.8% in 2020. It <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2021/April/select-subjects?a=1&c=603">rebounded</a> in 2021 with a growth rate of 2.5%. But the rebound was less than expected, considering that sub-Saharan African countries grew at an average rate of 3.4%.</p>
<p>It is unclear whether Nigeria’s growth resurgence is attributable to the economic sustainability plan or to the <a href="https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/40.htm">increase</a> in the oil price. The price increased from US$41 a barrel in December 2019 to US$67 in December 2020. </p>
<p>Oil is a major driver of growth in Nigeria, accounting for about 65% of government revenue and over 90% of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/amid-oil-price-collapse-nigeria-running-out-foreign-exchange">foreign exchange earnings</a>. In 2010, when the oil price reached a record high of $110, Nigeria’s economic growth was <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2021/April/weo-report?c=694,&s=NGDP_RPCH,&sy=2010&ey=2012&ssm=0&scsm=1&scc=0&ssd=1&ssc=0&sic=0&sort=country&ds=.&br=1">11.3%</a>. </p>
<p>Nigeria could <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/03/14/figure-of-the-week-gaps-in-nigerias-public-infrastructure/">raise</a> its economic growth by three-fourths of a percent if it improved its low-quality infrastructure.</p>
<p>Political instability also hinders growth. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigeria-at-61-a-giant-with-challenging-crises-amid-opportunities-168794">Nigeria at 61: A giant with challenging crises amid opportunities</a>
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<p>## Agriculture and food</p>
<p>The economic sustainability plan prioritised agricultural development and food security. Early indications suggest that this goal is not being accomplished. </p>
<p>Under the <a href="https://statehouse.gov.ng/news/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-nigeria-economic-sustainability-plan/">plan</a>, the government intended to cultivate between 20,000 and 100,000 hectares of new farmland in each of the country’s 36 states. This should have enabled the growth of agriculture value added to hold steady at the 2019 level of 2.4%. But it <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?dsid=2&series=NV.AGR.TOTL.KD.ZG">grew</a> by only 2.2% in 2020. </p>
<p>Other African countries had higher rates of agricultural development than Nigeria by the end of 2020. Examples are South Africa (13.1%), Senegal (8.2%), Ghana (7.4%) Angola (6.9%) and Gabon (5.2%). </p>
<p>Given Nigeria’s annual population growth rate of about 2.6%, it means that food supply lagged demand in 2020. This explains the rising food prices. The composite food index <a href="https://www.proshareng.com/news/Nigeria%20Economy/Headline-Inflation-Increases-by-17.38Percent-YoY-in-July-2021--0.37Percent-Lower-Than-June-2021-Rate---NBS/58656">rose</a> by 21% in July 2021. </p>
<p>In his Independence Day speech on 1 October 2021, President Buhari <a href="https://statehouse.gov.ng/news/independence-day-speech-by-president-buhari-on-the-occasion-of-nigeria-61st-independence-anniversary/">blamed</a> hoarders for Nigeria’s food inflation. Yet hoarding typically occurs when demand exceeds supply, and when sellers expect prices to continue to rise. </p>
<p>The antidote to hoarding is a massive increase in agricultural production, which the economic sustainability plan has so far not achieved.</p>
<h2>Small business</h2>
<p>Many of the initiatives under the plan were designed to prevent businesses, especially small and medium scale enterprises, from failing. </p>
<p>The pause in the repayment of loans granted by the Central Bank of Nigeria to the recipients of its intervention programmes was extended by a year. The interest rate on the bank’s loans was cut from 9% to 5%. And the bank created a loan facility of <a href="https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2020/04/nigeria-government-and-institution-measures-in-response-to-covid.html">50 billion naira or US$122 million</a> for affected households and small and medium enterprises. </p>
<p>Yet these businesses have continued to struggle for survival. Of the 3,000 enterprises <a href="https://www.ng.undp.org/content/nigeria/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2021/20-percent-of-the-fulltime-workforce-in-nigeria-lost-employment-.html">surveyed</a> by the United Nations Development Programme and the National Bureau of Statistics, 80% said they reduced production in 2020. One in three said they knew of at least one business that had closed permanently. About 60% of the firms had endured an unexpected increase in “operational costs”. </p>
<p>In addition to supporting smaller businesses, the Central Bank of Nigeria <a href="https://www.cbn.gov.ng/FeaturedArticles/2021/articles/CBN_Manufacturing.asp">established</a> a 1 trillion naira (US$2.4 billion) facility in April 2020 for supporting manufacturing. Of this amount, 300 billion naira (US$732 million) had been disbursed as of March 2021. </p>
<p>This intervention may have given an impetus to foreign direct investment, which <a href="https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2021_en.pdf">rose slightly</a> from $2.3 billion in 2019 to $2.4 billion in 2020. This could have been through the provision of loans to foreign manufacturers to establish subsidiaries in Nigeria. And it would have been a positive signal to foreign investors.</p>
<p>COVID-19 interventions increased Nigeria’s manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.ZS?locations=NG">only marginally</a>, from 11.5% of GDP in 2019 to 12.6% in 2020. </p>
<h2>Shallow economic rebound</h2>
<p>The International Monetary Fund expects Nigeria’s economic growth to be flat at about 2.3% for the next two years. By contrast, it is <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2021/April/select-subjects?a=1&c=603">estimated</a> that sub-Saharan African countries will grow at an average of 4% during the same period. </p>
<p>This implies that the Nigerian economy is not on track to rebound at a scale needed to significantly reduce the high unemployment and poverty rates. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.ng.undp.org/content/nigeria/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2021/20-percent-of-the-fulltime-workforce-in-nigeria-lost-employment-.html">A report</a> by the United Nations Development Programme and the National Bureau of Statistics shows the unemployment rate in Nigeria <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-15/nigeria-unemployment-rate-rises-to-second-highest-on-global-list">increased</a> from 27% in the second quarter of 2020 to 33% in the fourth quarter of the same year. Youth unemployment was <a href="https://nigerianstat.gov.ng/">42.5%</a> as of July 2021. The report <a href="https://www.ng.undp.org/content/nigeria/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2021/20-percent-of-the-fulltime-workforce-in-nigeria-lost-employment-.html">found</a> that 20% of the workers in the enterprises surveyed lost their jobs in 2020. </p>
<p>The World Bank <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/using-data-combat-ongoing-crisis-and-next-nigeria">estimates</a> that 11 million Nigerians will be pushed into poverty by 2022, in addition to the 100 million (out of 200 million people in the country) who are already classified as poor. </p>
<p>The Nigerian economy would have to <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC?locations=NG">grow</a> at between 8% and 10% a year for at least 10 years before the current poverty rate of 40% could be halved. On the current trends, this is very unlikely to happen.</p>
<h2>Poor economic outlook</h2>
<p>With flat economic growth and rising inflation of about <a href="https://www.cbn.gov.ng/">17%</a>, Nigeria risks running into what economists refer to as “stagflation”. Stagflation is a lethal combination of high unemployment and inflation rates. Rising food prices and steep depreciation of the Nigerian currency are the main causes of inflation in Nigeria. </p>
<p>An attempt to rein in <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/19/investing/stocks-week-ahead/index.html">inflation</a> by raising interest rates would worsen economic growth and increase unemployment. Conversely, a strategy of promoting economic growth by reducing interest rates could push up inflation. </p>
<p>All indications are that Buhari’s COVID-19 plan has not stemmed the worsening unemployment and poverty in Nigeria and has resulted in only marginal improvements in economic growth, manufacturing and foreign direct investment. </p>
<p>The plan was not bold and big enough. There should have been massive investment in agro-processing industries, which would have created jobs for millions of unemployed Nigerian youths. </p>
<p>For <a href="https://www.yemiosinbajo.ng/how-fgs-covid-19-stimulus-package-has-been-helpful-by-osinbajo/">instance</a>, of the 2.3 trillion naira ($5.6 billion) that the government planned to spend on the economic sustainability plan, only 500 billion naira ($1.2 billion), or one-fifth, was spent as of May 2021. </p>
<p>The plan should have focused more on reviving the textile and footwear industries in the country. These industries are labour-intensive, and employed thousands of Nigerians in the 1970s and 1980s. </p>
<p>Transferring cash to a few Nigerians, supporting some small and medium scale enterprises, and saving 2 million jobs <a href="https://www.yemiosinbajo.ng/how-fgs-covid-19-stimulus-package-has-been-helpful-by-osinbajo/">as claimed</a> by the government are inadequate for uplifting the lives of millions of Nigerians who continue to endure prolonged unemployment and extreme poverty.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169417/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Onyeiwu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nigeria’s post COVID-19 economic recovery plan has resulted in only marginal improvements in economic growth, manufacturing and foreign direct investment.Stephen Onyeiwu, Andrew Wells Robertson Professor of Economics, Allegheny CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.