tag:theconversation.com,2011:/es/topics/zine-el-abidine-ben-ali-48717/articlesZine el-Abidine Ben Ali – The Conversation2021-08-06T14:52:40Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1656982021-08-06T14:52:40Z2021-08-06T14:52:40ZTunisia: the complex issues behind the presidential power-grab<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/414813/original/file-20210805-19-vrockg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=3%2C3%2C2005%2C1499&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tunisian president Kais Saied has dismissed the prime minister and taken power.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Presidency of Tunisia handout</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ten years on from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/arab-spring-after-a-decade-of-conflict-the-same-old-problems-remain-154314">Arab uprisings</a>, Tunisia has often been presented as a rare success story. Elsewhere Egypt sank into an army dictatorship, Syria, Libya and Yemen into bloody civil war. In other countries, meanwhile, such as Bahrain, the protests were put down with ferocity and the old regimes dug in against change.</p>
<p>In Tunisia, the protests toppled the corrupt regime of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12196679">Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali</a>. An interim government called elections and parties previously banned, such as the Islamist Ennahda, were allowed to campaign and take their place in the political mainstream. A new constitution was written and the country appeared to be on a road to democracy. </p>
<p>So, there was widespread international consternation when, on the evening of July 25, Tunisian president, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/tunisia-kais-saied-displayed-authoritarian-streak">Kais Saied</a> – an independent politician and former law professor – dismissed the prime minister, Hichem Mechichi, froze the activities of the parliament and revoked the immunity of parliamentarians. To give himself cover, he invoked <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/north-africa/2021/07/27/What-is-article-80-and-how-did-Tunisia-s-president-use-it-to-back-his-decisions-">Article 80 of the Tunisian constitution</a> that allows for the president to take emergency measures in situations of imminent danger.</p>
<p>Many people I’ve been speaking to have been wondering whether what seemed like a positive transition towards democracy is under threat. On the other hand, some foreign policy analysts speculated that maybe Tunisians “<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210727195740/https:/foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/27/saied-coup-tunisia-might-not-want-democracy/">never wanted democracy</a>”.</p>
<p>Both positions represent a simplistic view of political developments in Tunisia over the past ten years. What’s happening now is not a sudden diversion of an otherwise linear democratic transition. Nor can we infer from current events that Tunisian democracy has been “doomed to fail” all along.</p>
<p>Economist Branko Milanovic complained on Twitter that political scientists “(…) after ten years of praising democracy in Tunisia, (…) suddenly have nothing to say.”</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1421576784546603009"}"></div></p>
<p>It’s complicated. What has been praised by observers over the past ten years – and what Tunisians have been proud of – is interwoven with issues that have drawn criticism from both observers and protesters within Tunisia.</p>
<p>The decade has been marked by political and social struggles, both in and outside of political institutions. Divisions are not clear cut. Tunisia has managed to organise a peaceful handover of power and three free and fair elections for both presidency and parliament, which were followed by often tortuous negotiations around the formation of a government based on the results. The country also started dealing with its repressive past through an ambitious <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17502977.2021.1882756">transitional justice process</a>.</p>
<p>But actually finishing the 2014 constitution proved problematic. To overcome a deadlock in the process of writing the constitution, a conflict-resolution mechanism was established: the 2013 National Dialogue. This mechanism was internationally praised and four Tunisian civil society organisations <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2015/tndq/facts/">won the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize</a> for its “for its decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia”.</p>
<p>This forum included members of parties represented in the National Constituent Assembly, but each party had the same number of participants, rather than representation being based on their strength in the Assembly. Outside parliament, participating politicians negotiated compromises on the broader lines of political conflict, to bring the constitutional process back on track. It also led to a rapprochement between the Ennahda party and Nidaa Tounes, a party that included many members of the “old regime”.</p>
<p>While finishing of the constitution was a milestone in Tunisia’s democratic development, several of the people I interviewed at the time mentioned that the conflict-resolution mechanism paved the way for political decisions being taken through deals made between elites. Since it led to a reconciliation of adversarial political factions, there was not much interest in dismantling “the system” – structures in politics, economy and the justice sector that had enabled repressive rule – at a deeper level.</p>
<p>My research involved interviewing politicians from different parties, representatives of civil society organisations, international organisations, and NGOs. Especially civil society representatives frequently remarked that with the departure of Ben Ali, only the “head of the corrupt regime” had left the country, while the deeper structures were still in place.</p>
<p>Political deal-making became the order of the day and the push for transitional justice and accountability became less important. People told me that badly needed reforms of the justice and security sector were only pursued on a superficial level and not systematically. The revolution had paved the way for some previously excluded actors to get into positions of political power – <a href="https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190670757.001.0001/oso-9780190670757">Ennahda</a>, for example, whose members had been persecuted, has been either the strongest or second strongest party in parliament.</p>
<p>But, instead of working towards dismantling repressive structures, working towards an even more inclusive political system, and reforming institutions, Ennahda made deals with politicians from the “old regime” and staffed institutions with <a href="https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/the-tunisian-exception-success-and-limits-of-consensus-french.pdf">their own people</a>. This merely perpetuated the impression of a nepotistic and corrupt political class. In addition, police violence <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2021/0707/Why-police-violence-proves-a-stubborn-problem-for-democratic-Tunisia">remains a problem</a>, emphasising the need for further structural reforms. </p>
<p>In the same vein, Ennahda’s on-again, off-again support for transitional justice was perceived as an attempt to steer financial benefits through reparations towards its own constituents. </p>
<p>Against <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2e7de0c4-d9ad-4150-a163-05795cd91584">the background</a> of a poorly performing economy and a catastrophic pandemic situation, the party’s recent demands for €3 billion (£2.5 billion) in reparations caused <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/07/tunisians-decry-coup-while-presidents-supporters-claim-second-revolution">public outrage</a> at the end of July 2021. The protests that followed were cited by Saied as a reason to take over power. </p>
<p>The failure to establish a Constitutional Court – which was supposed to be set up by 2015 – shows the limits of this deal-making logic. Parliament has been unable to agree on the nomination of judges. Under the constitution is is supposed to be the Constitutional Court’s role to decide on ending the emergency situation. </p>
<p>So it remains unclear when and how things will return back to “normal functioning of state institutions and services” as Article 80 dictates. But it is clear that it is not only necessary to appoint a new government to ensure democracy in Tunisia, but to work towards reforms of repressive structures, social justice and accountability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165698/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mariam Salehi is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Marburg and a guest researcher at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. She received funding from the German Ministry of Education and Research.
</span></em></p>Viewing Tunisia as an Arab Spring success story was always too simplistic.Mariam Salehi, Visiting Researcher of Global Governance, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/902452018-01-17T16:16:43Z2018-01-17T16:16:43ZTunisia is back on a knife edge – here’s why<p>While celebrating the seventh anniversary of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-years-on-tunisias-jasmine-revolution-continues-from-the-ground-up-52848">ousting of</a> president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisians <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/14/tunisian-government-plans-social-reforms-after-week-of-unrest">have been</a> demonstrating against their government. Thousands have been taking to the streets in Tunis and throughout the country, <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20180109-tunisia-protests-price-hikes-deadly">in some cases</a> leading to arrests and running battles with the police. </p>
<p>The focus of the protests has been the government’s <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/tunisia-protests-is-there-a-trade-off-between-a-strong-economy-and-democracy/a-42087864">austerity budget</a>, which includes hikes to the prices of basic goods and services. This, the protesters argue, will make life even more difficult for ordinary Tunisians who are already struggling to get by. </p>
<p>It is the latest of numerous demonstrations against the government and its economic policies, which <a href="https://www.hsfk.de/en/publications/publication-search/publication/the-quest-for-social-justice-in-tunisia-socioeconomic-protest-and-political-democratization-post-2/">have been increasing</a> since 2015. So what is going on, and where should the country go from here?</p>
<h2>Vive la revolution?</h2>
<p>Tunisia made international headlines in 2011 when mass demonstrations erupted, inspiring the famous wave of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12482315">Arab Uprisings</a> that swept through the likes of Libya, Egypt and Syria. Over a quarter of Tunisians participated, backed by the overwhelming majority of the country’s 11m inhabitants. </p>
<p>The protesters were demanding “isqaat an-nizaam”, the downfall of the regime. This didn’t just mean the overthrow of Ben Ali and his cronies, but an end to a system shot through with corruption, leeching wealth from ordinary citizens to the rich, and denying people jobs and a decent life – all under the façade of electoral democracy. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202289/original/file-20180117-53292-36bovj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202289/original/file-20180117-53292-36bovj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202289/original/file-20180117-53292-36bovj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=724&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202289/original/file-20180117-53292-36bovj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=724&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202289/original/file-20180117-53292-36bovj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=724&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202289/original/file-20180117-53292-36bovj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=909&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202289/original/file-20180117-53292-36bovj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=909&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202289/original/file-20180117-53292-36bovj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=909&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Ben Ali in office.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tunisie_President_Ben_Ali.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
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<p>After the revolution, moves towards truly free elections gave Tunisians some hope that they would enjoy real democracy; that politicians would finally hear and heed their needs. Indeed, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/tunisia">international commentators</a> and academics have <a href="http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm">hailed</a> the country as the <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-bright-spot-in-tunisia">lone bright spot</a> in a region beset with civil wars, counterrevolutions and open conflict. </p>
<p>Tunisians’ lived experience has been rather different. By 2014, the Arab Transformations survey showed that the hopes and expectations of the revolution had turned to anger at the failure of successive governments to deliver on promises of economic reform, job creation, and responding to people’s needs. </p>
<p>Indeed, according to our <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316553681_Arab_Transformations_Project_Data_Set_SPSS_Version">ArabTransformations survey</a> from that year, Tunisians did not see their country as a democracy: few saw it as outright dictatorship (14%), but fewer still (11.5%) saw it as fully democratic. If it were fully democratic, went the prevailing view, it would heed the will of the people. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9783319690438">our book</a> published this month, we trace how three years after the revolution, people still saw lack of employment and corruption as the major problems facing their country. They had little trust in government, political leaders, religious leaders, civil society, or even fellow citizens. </p>
<p>They thought that their own and the country’s economic situation had deteriorated since 2010; they were fearful of terrorism and worried about security. Half the population were worried about their employment, and 60% of young people were worried about job opportunities. Where Ben Ali’s removal had been greeted with euphoria, now there was mounting disillusion and despair. </p>
<h2>From despair to …</h2>
<p>Disillusion has since kept building, according to the <a href="http://www.arabbarometer.org/country/tunisia">2016 Arab Barometer</a>. Successive governments have either been unwilling or unable to fulfil their citizens’ demands for economic and political inclusion. </p>
<p>Economic “liberalisation” before the revolution <a href="https://www.globalpolicy.org/social-and-economic-policy/the-three-sisters-and-other-institutions/the-international-monetary-fund/51295-will-neoliberalism-make-a-comeback-in-africa-via-tunisia.html">brought praise</a> from the IMF. But measures including privatisation, public spending cuts and trade liberalisation increased unemployment, with most people seeing no benefit from economic growth. Ben Ali held on to power and corruption and crony capitalism got worse. </p>
<p>Since the revolution, Tunisia has continued to implement these failed policies – at the behest of the international financial institutions and Western governments. The IMF <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-economy-idUSKBN16508T">postponed</a> part of Tunisia’s most recent $2.8 billion (£2 billion) loan last year, only <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/tunisia-economy-imf/tunisia-ready-for-decisive-action-on-economy-imf-says-idUSL8N1OE5EW">reinstating it</a> after the government agreed to accelerate cuts to public spending. </p>
<p>These policies have continued to produce economic stagnation, increased government debt and reliance on development assistance and soft loans. Corruption <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/10/25/tunisia-s-corruption-contagion-transition-at-risk-pub-73522">remains a problem</a> and the unemployment rate <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/524516/unemployment-rate-in-tunisia/">is still</a> in double figures, <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/MNA/tunisia/breaking_the_barriers_to_youth_inclusion_eng_chap3.pdf">especially</a> among university graduates. Tourism continues to struggle after the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/28/tunisia-attack-how-a-man-with-a-parasol-could-38-people-on-the-beach">terrorism of 2015</a>, even though it <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-economy-tourism/foreign-tourist-numbers-up-24-percent-in-tunisia-so-far-in-2017-idUSKBN1CM1WK">has been improving</a>. </p>
<p><strong>Growth and inflation</strong></p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202297/original/file-20180117-53317-r4x78c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202297/original/file-20180117-53317-r4x78c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202297/original/file-20180117-53317-r4x78c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202297/original/file-20180117-53317-r4x78c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202297/original/file-20180117-53317-r4x78c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202297/original/file-20180117-53317-r4x78c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202297/original/file-20180117-53317-r4x78c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202297/original/file-20180117-53317-r4x78c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p><strong>Unemployment</strong></p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202298/original/file-20180117-53289-1kvdorn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202298/original/file-20180117-53289-1kvdorn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202298/original/file-20180117-53289-1kvdorn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=266&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202298/original/file-20180117-53289-1kvdorn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=266&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202298/original/file-20180117-53289-1kvdorn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=266&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202298/original/file-20180117-53289-1kvdorn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202298/original/file-20180117-53289-1kvdorn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202298/original/file-20180117-53289-1kvdorn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>This is the environment into which the government is pitching its new <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/10/africa/tunisia-protests-intl/index.html">Finance Act</a>. It <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/tunisia-economy-budget/update-1-tunisian-parliament-approves-2018-budget-including-fiscal-reforms-idUSL8N1O90KE">includes</a> a one-point rise to VAT for many products, higher taxes on bank profits and a new 1% social security tax on employees and companies. </p>
<p>Prime minister Youssef Chahed <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/tunisia-anti-austerity-protests-turn-deadly/a-42079677">has said</a> the austerity measures will mean only one more difficult year for Tunisians, though experts <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/tunisia-protests-is-there-a-trade-off-between-a-strong-economy-and-democracy/a-42087864">are divided</a> about whether they will work. Other measures include selling off government stakes in Tunisian banks and hacking back the number of public sector employees. </p>
<p>In our view, Tunisia’s austerity has been counterproductive and will continue to be. The government should instead structurally reform the tax system to make it more redistributive; while fighting the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c4d721dc-d9cf-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482">major problems</a> of tax evasion, corruption, <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/contraband-parallel-imports-tunisia-abidi-abdelhakim/">smuggling and parallel trading</a> – <a href="https://www.ensafrica.com/news/Parallel-imports?Id=972&STitle=IP%20ENSight">where</a> products are imported without the permission of the manufacturer. </p>
<p>Whether the government has the will or authority to pursue such solutions remains to be seen. It doesn’t help that it is weak and <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/tunisia/180-endiguer-la-derive-autoritaire-en-tunisie">riddled with</a> in-fighting between coalition partners. </p>
<p>Tunisia’s international partners meanwhile need to recognise that it’s not enough to just improve the country’s voting system. Guaranteeing social and economic rights – creating decent jobs, tackling corruption – are the democratic substance without which elections remain empty promises. </p>
<p>Tunisia, like the other countries in the region, is unstable because it has failed to address the very issues that fuelled the revolution of 2011. People want more than formal political freedom and freely elected governments; they want leaders who deliver on the substance that goes with the promise of democracy – not just ballot boxes but tangible fairness. </p>
<p>In short, the roots of the current protests are not merely economic but also political; borne of repeated political failure. Ignoring citizens’ concerns and embracing the quick and easy path of repression will only further destabilise this country – be it through revolution, radicalisation or the return of dictatorship. This is the main lesson of the Arab Uprisings. Tunisia’s true friends would be wary of letting such mistakes happen again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90245/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pamela Abbott received funding from the European 7th Framework Programme for the Arab Transformations project.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Teti received funding from the European 7th Framework Programme for the Arab Transformations project.</span></em></p>Seven years after Ben Ali was deposed, Tunisians feel little happier with their lot.Pamela Abbott, Director of the Centre for Global Development and Professor in the School of Education, University of AberdeenAndrea Teti, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.