tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/china-336/articlesChina – The Conversation2024-03-28T09:58:19Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2267842024-03-28T09:58:19Z2024-03-28T09:58:19ZInvisible lines: how unseen boundaries shape the world around us<p>Our experiences of the world are diverse, often changing as we move across borders from one country to another. They can also vary based on language or subtle shifts in climate. Yet, we rarely consider what causes these differences and divisions. </p>
<p>In this episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a> podcast, we speak to geographer Maxim Samson at De Paul University in the US about the unseen boundaries that can shape our collective and personal perceptions of the world – what he calls “invisible lines”.</p>
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<p>For Samson, invisible lines are: “Boundaries and belts that shape our understanding of and interactions with the planet, even though these boundaries and belts are, to all intents and purposes, unseen.” </p>
<p>While we may not be able to see these lines on a conventional map, people often know that they exist. </p>
<p>One example is the history of redlining in the US. Originating in the 1930s, the practice involved government-backed mortgage lenders colour-coding neighbourhoods. Green denoted the most desirable areas while red marked the highest-risk zones, often inhabited by Black communities.</p>
<p>Although redlining was officially outlawed in 1968 and the lines are no longer marked on any maps, their enduring impact resonates across America today. One example is Detroit’s <a href="https://detroithistorical.org/learn/encyclopedia-of-detroit/eight-mile-road#:%7E:text=Spanning%20more%20than%2020%20miles,east%2Dwest%20throughout%20the%20region.">8 Mile road</a>, which still segregates the city along racial lines – with predominantly African American neighbourhoods to the south, and predominantly white, affluent areas are to the north of 8 Mile.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/removing-urban-highways-can-improve-neighborhoods-blighted-by-decades-of-racist-policies-166220">Removing urban highways can improve neighborhoods blighted by decades of racist policies</a>
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<p>But it’s not just in cities that these boundaries exist. One example Samson gives from nature is the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wallace_Line">Wallace line</a>, which runs through parts of Indonesia and marks a sharp transition in flora and fauna between the Asian and Australian regions. On one side, you get what are considered Asian animals such as monkeys; on the other, marsupials associated with Australia.</p>
<p>Another invisible line is the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qinling%E2%80%93Huaihe_Line">Qinling-Huaihe line</a>, which separates China into two distinct regions: the humid and subtropical south and the dry, temperate north.</p>
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<p>In the early 20th century, this was identified as roughly the dividing line between places where the average January temperature would be below zero, and where it wouldn’t fall out that low. So, if you live north of the line, your town probably has a heating system. If you live south of it, it wouldn’t have one. </p>
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<p>This distinction has informed government policy and led to different levels of development in the south versus the north. By recognising the seemingly innocuous Qinling-Huaihe line, it’s possible to discern disparities in economic development, inequality and air pollution between China’s southern and northern regions that might otherwise be obscured.</p>
<p>For Samson, analysing these kinds of boundary can help understand different access to education, employment opportunities and public services, depending on which side of the invisible line someone falls.</p>
<p>Listen to the full interview with Maxim Samson on <a href="https://pod.link/1550643487">The Conversation Weekly podcast</a>. </p>
<p><em>A transcript of this episode will be available shortly.</em></p>
<p><em>This episode of The Conversation Weekly was written by Mend Mariwany and Katie Flood. Gemma Ware is the executive producer. Sound design was by Eloise Stevens, and our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. Stephen Khan is our global executive editor, Alice Mason runs our social media and Soraya Nandy does our transcripts.</em></p>
<p><em>You can find us on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/">theconversationdotcom</a> or <a href="mailto:podcast@theconversation.com">via email</a>. You can also subscribe to The Conversation’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter">free daily email here</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a> or find out <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">how else to listen here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226784/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maxim Samson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Maxim Samson speaks to The Conversation Weekly podcast about the hidden lines that explain variations in everything from access to education to animal speciesMend Mariwany, Producer, The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The ConversationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2266172024-03-28T00:40:03Z2024-03-28T00:40:03ZCritics of NZ joining AUKUS need to answer a crucial question: what exactly is an independent foreign policy?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584630/original/file-20240327-18-b7jv5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=38%2C46%2C5113%2C3364&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.au/detail/news-photo/australian-prime-minister-anthony-albanese-us-president-joe-news-photo/1473352798?adppopup=true">Leon Neal/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Last week’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/australia-uk-sign-new-defence-pact-2024-03-20/">visit of the Australian and British defence and foreign ministers</a> to Adelaide and Canberra is another step in the evolution of the trilateral AUKUS security and technology partnership.</p>
<p>Highlights of the visit included the signing of a new defence and security agreement, and the formal appointment of British firm BAE and Australian government-owned company ASC to build submarines under the “pillar one” component of AUKUS. </p>
<p>The visit was an important reminder that Australia’s 2021 decision to initiate AUKUS was one of the most important developments for New Zealand’s foreign policy since the breakdown of the ANZUS alliance in the mid-1980s.</p>
<p>Membership in AUKUS “<a href="https://www.1news.co.nz/2024/02/02/nz-eyes-aukus-pillar-two-what-is-it-and-how-could-it-impact-us/">pillar two</a>” would represent a valuable contribution to New Zealand’s security, the ANZAC alliance and regional security.</p>
<h2>What is an independent foreign policy?</h2>
<p>AUKUS’ growing strategic significance has two implications for New Zealand. </p>
<p>First, it highlights the imperative for greater clarity in our foreign policy discourse, beginning with the concept of New Zealand’s “independent foreign policy” and Australia’s role in it.</p>
<p>Former prime minister Helen Clark and former National Party leader Don Brash recently stated their <a href="https://www.odt.co.nz/news/national/pushback-new-zealands-aukus-bid-grows">opposition to New Zealand’s participation in AUKUS</a>, citing the incompatibility between membership and maintaining our independent foreign policy. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-zealand-is-reviving-the-anzac-alliance-joining-aukus-is-a-logical-next-step-223425">New Zealand is reviving the ANZAC alliance – joining AUKUS is a logical next step</a>
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<p>This is curious logic. There are certainly questions that need to be answered before making a decision on AUKUS pillar two – not least if we can actually afford membership, and whether there is domestic support from the electorate. </p>
<p>But the danger posed by AUKUS to an independent foreign policy is not one of them. </p>
<p>Quite the opposite, in fact. If the concept of an independent foreign policy means anything, it surely must mean New Zealand retains the ability to make foreign policy decisions based on its national interests. </p>
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<img alt="Helen Clark standing in front of a microphone" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584912/original/file-20240327-16-bmnri5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584912/original/file-20240327-16-bmnri5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584912/original/file-20240327-16-bmnri5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584912/original/file-20240327-16-bmnri5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584912/original/file-20240327-16-bmnri5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584912/original/file-20240327-16-bmnri5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584912/original/file-20240327-16-bmnri5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Former prime minister Helen Clark has urged New Zealand’s political leaders to stay out of the AUKUS partnership.</span>
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<h2>Time to define independence</h2>
<p>Close alliances and partnerships with other states are clearly compatible with both foreign policy independence and New Zealand’s national interests. After all, few alliances in contemporary world politics have been as enduring or as close as the ANZAC alliance.</p>
<p>There is therefore no persuasive reason to preemptively rule out New Zealand’s AUKUS membership — as AUKUS critics appear to have done. </p>
<p>Moving forward, our independent foreign policy concept needs to be defined more rigorously – including <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2023.2177253">a consideration of costs, benefits and responsibilities</a>. </p>
<p>Equally significantly, the AUKUS critics’ commentary undervalues Australia’s role in New Zealand’s foreign policy. We need to correct this blind spot. </p>
<p>Like it or not, New Zealand’s decision on AUKUS pillar two will invariably be seen by Canberra as a signal of its commitment to the ANZAC alliance. How can it not be? </p>
<p>New Zealand’s <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/opinion/129520670/can-the-anzac-alliance-meet-increasing-geopolitical-challenges">limited response</a> to the unprecedented sanctions policy imposed on Australia by China since 2020 might be viewed in some quarters as necessary pragmatism, but it has come at the cost of alliance solidarity. </p>
<p>Do AUKUS critics view our reticence in that instance as an example of the effective functioning of an independent foreign policy? It would be instructive to know the answer.</p>
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<h2>Foreign policy needs to be strategic</h2>
<p>Second, a fit-for-purpose foreign policy cannot be indifferent to strategic context. We are a long way from the <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/12/biden-post-cold-war-00061428">historically benign era</a> that existed from the end of the Cold War to the onset of US-China strategic competition in 2017. </p>
<p>The onus is therefore on AUKUS critics to explain how exactly they propose to provide for New Zealand’s national security if it is not through AUKUS. If New Zealand does not invest in AUKUS, what exactly is the critics’ vision for the ANZAC alliance? </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-defence-dilemma-facing-nzs-next-government-stay-independent-or-join-pillar-2-of-aukus-212090">The defence dilemma facing NZ's next government: stay independent or join 'pillar 2' of AUKUS?</a>
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<p>Given the persistent budgetary challenges New Zealand faces, how does passing up on the pillar two technology aspect of AUKUS increase security? </p>
<p>The share of New Zealand’s total trade with the states that are either AUKUS members or have expressed an interest in joining – Canada, Japan and South Korea – surpasses our trade with China. How much does New Zealand value its credibility with these partners? </p>
<p>Are we expected to believe the AUKUS critics’ preference for taking policy actions that diverge substantially from those partners will serve New Zealand well in the new era of great power rivalry?</p>
<h2>AUKUS gives New Zealand agency</h2>
<p>AUKUS critics appear to share former defence minister Andrew Little’s sober and accurate 2023 assessment that “we do not live in a benign strategic environment”. </p>
<p>But their critique of AUKUS suggests that they have not rigorously thought through the implications of Little ‘s statement.</p>
<p>Don Brash <a href="https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/don-brash-why-on-earth-would-we-join-aukus-in-any-form/RRH363EAWRCFRHHOSPEFGXVQCM/">recently asked</a> why New Zealand would join AUKUS in any form. The answer is clear. </p>
<p>New Zealand can either take a proactive approach to security and help shape the regional environment through AUKUS membership and a rebooted ANZAC alliance. Or it can adopt a reactive high-risk foreign policy that places New Zealand’s fortunes in the hands of fate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226617/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Khoo has received research funding from the Australian National University, Columbia University, and the Asia New Zealand Foundation in Wellington. He is a non-resident principal research fellow with the Institute of Indo-Pacific Affairs in Christchurch. </span></em></p>Remaining outside of AUKUS will mean New Zealand is increasingly vulnerable to global political instability.Nicholas Khoo, Associate Professor of International Politics and Principal Research Fellow, Institute for Indo-Paciifc Affairs (Christchurch), University of OtagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2266682024-03-27T14:37:30Z2024-03-27T14:37:30ZChina’s UK election hack – how and why the Electoral Commission was targeted<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584522/original/file-20240326-24-tyjinv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=95%2C36%2C4793%2C2763&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock/Gago design</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The UK government has accused China of hacking the UK Electoral Commission, gaining access to information about millions of voters.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of the incident, the UK and US governments have <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-68654533">sanctioned</a> a company that is a front for the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS), Wuhan Xiaoruizhi Science and Technology, and affiliated individuals for their involvement in the breach and for placing malware in critical infrastructure.</p>
<p>The UK and many other countries have growing concerns over cyber operations that target national security, technological innovation and economic interests. China has been linked to state-sponsored cyber espionage activities for some time. Targets have included foreign governments, businesses and critical infrastructure. </p>
<p>While China is not inherently a threat to the UK, the two countries have a complex relationship that is characterised by both cooperation and competition. China has economic influence over the UK and the two compete on innovation. But China’s military ambitions, human rights record and reputation for covert influence campaigns require careful diplomatic and strategic management.</p>
<p>It’s not clear what precisely motivated the attack on the Electoral Commission but such attacks are generally linked to various strategic interests. States may target foreign electoral organisations with the aim of influencing election results or more generally to undermine democratic processes, including by damaging trust among voters. They may seek leverage with whatever information they gather, either economically or in terms of global positioning. </p>
<p>These activities are not unique to China. In a deeply connected and increasingly digitised world, many states are strategically motivated to engage in subterfuge of this kind.</p>
<h2>How this kind of attack works</h2>
<p>The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-258a">already detailed</a> the methods deployed by affiliates of the MSS in their cyber espionage. They systematically exploit vulnerabilities in software and systems, penetrating federal government networks and commercial entities. </p>
<p>Their approach demonstrates a deep understanding of cyber warfare and intelligence gathering and a high level of expertise. It’s clear that significant resources have been put at their disposal.</p>
<p>Central to their strategy is the active exploitation of vulnerabilities. They meticulously search for and take advantage of weaknesses across target systems and software. By identifying these security gaps, they manage to bypass protective measures and infiltrate sensitive environments, aiming to access and extract valuable information.</p>
<p>In gathering intelligence, these operatives scour publicly available sources – including the media and public government reports – to accumulate critical data on their targets. This could range from specifics about an organisation’s IT infrastructure and employee details to potential security lapses. Such intelligence lays the groundwork for highly targeted and effective cyberattacks.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, they scan for vulnerabilities in the system itself, uncovering essential details like open ports and the services running on them. This will include any software that may be ripe for exploitation due to known vulnerabilities.</p>
<p>The operatives then leverage all this information to gain unauthorised access. They exploit system flaws to induce unexpected behaviours, allowing for the installation of malware, data theft and system control. </p>
<p>The ultimate aim of these operations is the exfiltration of data, such as the names and addresses of British voters in the case of the Electoral Commission. They illicitly copy, transfer, or retrieve data from compromised systems, targeting personal information, intellectual property and government or commercial secrets. </p>
<h2>The pencil is mightier than the keyboard</h2>
<p>It was known by August 2023 that the Electoral Commission had come under attack but the suspects have only now been named publicly.</p>
<p>Despite the breach, the Electoral Commission claims that the core elements of the UK’s electoral process remain secure and that there will be <a href="https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/media-centre/electoral-commission-response-cyber-attack-attribution-0">“no impact”</a> on the security of elections. This is in part because so much of the British system is paper based. People are processed by hand when they go to a polling station on election day, they use pencil and a paper ballot to vote, and their votes are counted by hand.</p>
<p>These factors make it very difficult to influence the outcome of a British election via a cyberattack, unlike in countries that use electronic voting machines or automated vote counting. Paper ballots and records, being tangible and physically countable, provide a verifiable trail. So even in the event of a cyber intrusion, the fundamental act of casting and counting votes remains untainted by digital vulnerabilities. </p>
<h2>Stronger systems are still needed</h2>
<p>The attack nevertheless raises questions about the effectiveness of existing monitoring and logging systems for detecting data breaches. The attack accessed not only the electoral registers but also the commission’s email and control systems. The data potentially accessed included UK citizens’ full names, email addresses, home addresses and phone numbers.</p>
<p>Nor is the commission the only target in the British political system. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) assesses with a high degree of certainty that APT31, an advanced persistent threat group affiliated with the Chinese state, has engaged in reconnaissance activities targeting <a href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/china-state-affiliated-actors-target-uk-democratic-institutions-parliamentarians">UK parliamentarians</a>.</p>
<p>To secure its elections from cyber threats like those from APT31, the UK government is already improving the overall resilience of its elections cyberinfrastructure. It is working closely with the NCSC to identify threats and emerging trends. These efforts are likely to include regular security audits, penetration testing and the adoption of secure software development practices to ensure that systems are robust.</p>
<p>What’s perhaps most significant in the case of the Electoral Commission hack, however, is the fact that the UK government has called China out so explicitly. This is a strategy decided on with allies as a way of holding perpetrators more accountable. </p>
<p>Publicly attributing cyber attacks to specific state actors or groups sends a clear message that such activities are being monitored and will not go unchallenged. This strategy of transparency and accountability is pivotal in establishing international norms and expectations for state behaviour in cyberspace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226668/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Soraya Harding does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>British elections are pencil and papers affairs, which makes them difficult to hack. But the breach of millions of people’s details is still a deeply serious matter.Soraya Harding, Senior lecturer in Cybersecurity Intelligence and Digital Forensics, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2265562024-03-26T16:34:29Z2024-03-26T16:34:29ZChinese acquisitions in the Bordeaux vineyards: have their new owners really been neglecting them?<p>Since 2012, more than 200 acquisitions have been made by Chinese investors in Bordeaux’s prestigious <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/french-wine-73590">vineyards</a>, mainly from the country’s economic, political and artistic elite. A leading example is Alibaba founder <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/jack-ma-10294">Jack Ma</a>, who bought several châteaux, including <a href="https://www.terredevins.com/actualites/le-chateau-de-sours-revoit-les-choses-en-grand">Château de Sours</a> in the Entre-Deux-Mers appellation. Actress <a href="https://www.vitisphere.com/actualite-94717-les-chateaux-de-zhao-wei-fonctionnent-normalement-malgre-sa-disgrace-en-chine.html">Zhao Wei</a> has set her sights on several châteaux in the Saint-Émilion appellation.</p>
<p>These transactions, involving members of China’s elite and prestigious assets in Europe, stand out in the world of mergers and acquisitions. Regarded indiscriminately as “ego deals”, <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/conspicuous-consumption.asp">“conspicuous consumption”</a> or “self-interest transactions”, such atypical acquisitions are <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/tie.21967">widely decried in the academic financial literature</a> because they can produce few or no synergies, and are therefore doomed to failure. There have been instances of Bordeaux châteaux acquired by Chinese investors, which have been <a href="https://www.rts.ch/info/monde/13265418-dans-le-vignoble-bordelais-des-rachats-chinois-au-gout-de-bouchon.html">left to rot</a> by their new owners. Reportedly, <a href="https://www.francetvinfo.fr/france/nouvelle-aquitaine/gironde/bordeaux/vignoble-bordelais-sur-200-domaines-achetes-par-les-chinois-une-cinquantaine-est-a-vendre_5532906.html">around 50 of them</a> have been also put up for sale by their once-enthusiastic owners.</p>
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<p><em>RTS report, November 2023.</em></p>
<p>However, a closer look shows that Chinese acquisitions in the Bordeaux vineyards are far from uniformly ending up in failures and selloffs. This is reflected by our <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/362930206_In_vino_vanitas_Social_dynamics_and_performance_of_Chinese_chateau_acquisitions_in_the_Bordeaux_vineyards">recent research paper</a> which analyses the post-acquisition performance of 123 Bordeaux châteaux acquired by Chinese investors between 2008 and 2015.</p>
<h2>What motives for such acquisitions?</h2>
<p>Applying a sociological approach to these acquisitions has allowed us to show that some of them did create value, not only economically but also symbolically. With the opportunity to gain social distinction, these properties were acquired for the prestige they confer to their owners.</p>
<p>The new owners perceive their prestigious possessions as an extension of themselves and so take particular care of them. They strongly commit to renovating the property, maintaining the cellars and, above all, enhancing the wine quality. We have many accounts of Chinese-owned châteaux investing in new winemaking techniques, hiring top oenologists such as Michel Rolland and Stéphane Derenoncourt, and replanting part of the vineyards. These acquisitions have often prevented these châteaux from getting bankrupt while improving their wine ranking in the major wine guides. For instance, the <a href="https://www.hachette-vins.com/">Hachette Wine Guide</a>, which covers all French AOC vineyards, shows significant progress for the wines produced by some of these Chinese-owned châteaux.</p>
<p>A case in point is the Andrew and Melody Kuk couple, who in 2013 acquired <a href="https://www.sudouest.fr/vin/investisseurs-chinois-a-pomerol-les-epoux-kuk-reaffirment-leur-attachement-au-terroir-17148857.php">La Commanderie in Pomerol</a>. Having made their fortune in finance and communication in Hong Kong, they renovated the vineyard’s winemaking facilities and refurbished the property’s building. After just a few years, the wine from this château, once described as a “sleeping beauty”, is regularly featured in the rankings of the best Bordeaux wines.</p>
<p>These acquisitions, integrated in a clear strategy aiming to climb up the social ladder, are distinct from the few Bordeaux château acquisitions conducted by Chinese billionaires, which attract most of the media covering. Standing already at the top of the social hierarchy, these distinctive acquirers have little commitment to their wineries and frequently change their conspicuous hobbies as their social position does not depend on the success of their acquired assets. For this specific category of elite acquirers, the post-acquisition outcome is often a deterioration in performance.</p>
<p>Statistically, we reported a significant correlation between upward social mobility strategies and improved wine quality in the rankings.</p>
<h2>In the wine industry and beyond</h2>
<p>More generally, our sociological approach provides keys to understanding the motives behind these “conspicuous acquisitions” that were conducted on an international scale by the economic, sporting and artistic elites. This concept, dating back to the end of the 19th century, has been coined by the American economist and sociologist <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Thorstein-Veblen">Thorstein Veblen</a>, who analysed the lifestyle and purchasing behaviour of the elite class at that time. While some of the purchasing behaviour of this elite class does not seem rational from the point of view of economic science, Veblen provided an alternative rationale, mostly based on strategies of social affirmation.</p>
<p>Concentrated in industries such as sport, luxury hotels, resorts and real estate, these prestigious acquisitions are made by “high net-worth individuals”, whose number is estimated to 22 million worldwide, with combined wealth hovering around <a href="https://www.capgemini.com/insights/research-library/world-wealth-report/">83 trillion dollars</a>. Their continuously growing number results from the macroeconomic implementation of neoliberal policies since the late 1970s, the collapse of the USSR and the rise of emerging economies.</p>
<p>Part of this fortune is spent on <a href="https://www.enograf.com/media/pdf/Profit%20ili%20zadovoljstvo%20-%20kompletan%20izvestaj.pdf">socially motivated acquisitions</a>. Two of the major European football clubs, Paris Saint-Germain and Manchester City, are owned by sovereign wealth funds linked to the ruling Qatari and Emirati families, and until recently Chelsea FC was owned by the Russian oligarch Roman Abramovitch. In the hotel industry, French palace hotels such as the Bristol, the George V and the Meurice are owned by wealthy foreigners (respectively, the German family group Oetker, Saudi Prince Al-Walid Ben Talal Al Saoud and the Sultan of Brunei).</p>
<p>These are all personalities whose wealth does not originate from the target industry and who made the acquisitions to gain access to, or reaffirm their affiliation with, the international elite.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226556/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pierre-Xavier Meschi is Chairman of Atlas-AFMI (Association Francophone de Management International).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexandre Bohas ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Contrary to popular belief, only a minority of Bordeaux vineyards bought by Chinese investors have had a negative outcome.Alexandre Bohas, Professeur d'Affaires internationales, ESSCA School of ManagementPierre-Xavier Meschi, Professeur des Universités en sciences de gestion, Affillié à Skema Business School, IAE Aix-Marseille Graduate School of Management – Aix-Marseille UniversitéLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2265042024-03-26T04:10:21Z2024-03-26T04:10:21ZPolitics with Michelle Grattan: Kim Beazley on Kevin Rudd, being an ambassador, and a possible second Trump presidency<p>Kim Beazley, a former Labor leader, served as Australia’s ambassador in Washington between 2010 and 2016. He is widely respected for his expertise in foreign and defence policy. </p>
<p>In this podcast episode, Beazley discusses the brouhaha over Donald Trump’s denigrating comments about Kevin Rudd, the present Australian ambassador in Washington. We also canvass wider alliance issues and the recent visit to Australia by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who included a meeting with Paul Keating among his engagements. </p>
<p>On Kevin Rudd’s future, Beazley says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I have hopes that he could serve under a second term of President Trump – if there is a second term, which I also hope does not occur. I think you’ve got to remember, ambassadors don’t see much of presidents. We do when we’re accompanying the Australian prime minister somewhere. But aside from that, we see people [in] much more lowly positions than presidents. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>On why AUKUS is so important to Australia now: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Back in the 80s, we had a very different perspective. We had the capacity to basically defend ourselves with some of the equipment provided by the Americans and with their intelligence […] We now find ourselves in a situation where we can’t really defend ourselves without the United States assisting. […] It is just totally vital to us now. I don’t think that those of us who were in politics in the 80s have really caught up with that. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>On China, Beazley says Australia walks the tightrope: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We’re trying to keep a situation where nothing goes wrong. […] We wish the Chinese well – absolutely. But there are lines in the sand that you have to draw in all these things.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Beazley was Labor leader during Anthony Albanese’s first years in parliament. He says of the man who became PM: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>He’s always been a pragmatist. That’s the first point. The second point is when you get to the position that he is in, you understand that the survival of Australia is not guaranteed, that the changing circumstances around us are not necessarily in Australia’s favour.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226504/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kim Beazley, a former Labor leader and Australia's ambassador in Washington joins us to talk about Donald Trump's denigrating comments about Kevin Rudd, AUKUS and the Australia-Chinese relationship.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2238782024-03-21T14:35:28Z2024-03-21T14:35:28ZPangolins in Africa: expert unpacks why millions have been traded illegally and what can be done about it<p>Pangolins are fascinating creatures known for their unique appearance and distinctive scales. They are mammals belonging to the order Pholidota and are <a href="https://www.savepangolins.org/what-is-a-pangolin">native to Africa and Asia</a>. Due to their primary diet of ants and termites, pangolins are often referred to as “scaly anteaters”.</p>
<p>The African pangolin species are dispersed throughout southern, western, central and east Africa. </p>
<p>Pangolins face rapid declines across Asia and Africa, with all eight species classified as <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/mammals/facts/pangolins#:%7E:text=There%20are%20eight%20species%20of,bellied%E2%80%94are%20listed%20as%20vulnerable.">vulnerable, endangered</a>, or critically endangered. They are <a href="https://www.savepangolins.org/threats">threatened</a> by poaching and habitat loss, driven by the demand for their meat and scales.</p>
<p>Pangolins are the <a href="https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2023-02-17-operation-pangolin-launches-save-world-s-most-trafficked-wild-mammal">most trafficked wild mammal in the world</a>. <a href="https://davidshepherd.org/species/pangolins/trade-statement/">Their meat is considered a delicacy</a> in Asia while their scales are also used in traditional medicines, fetching huge sums on the black market. As many as <a href="https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2023-02-17-operation-pangolin-launches-save-world-s-most-trafficked-wild-mammal">8.5 million pangolins</a> are estimated to have been removed from the wild in west and central Africa for the illegal trade between 2014 and 2021. </p>
<p>The trade route analysis of pangolin trafficking <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2665910720300876">points to</a> Lagos as the main connection point both domestically and worldwide, including south-east Asian countries. Malaysia, Laos and Singapore also serve as key transit countries for pangolin-scale shipments from Nigeria.</p>
<p>China and Vietnam are the main <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2665910720300876">destinations for these illegal shipments</a>.</p>
<p>I am a zoologist who’s passionate about the environment and biodiversity conservation. I am also the founder and chair of Pangolin Conservation Guild Nigeria. In my view, effective protection, law enforcement and changes in consumer behaviour are necessary to address the complex drivers of poaching and trafficking.</p>
<h2>What makes pangolins special</h2>
<p>Pangolins are interesting for a number of reasons. </p>
<p><strong>Scales:</strong> Unlike any other mammals, they are covered with keratin scales. This adaptation is a defence against predators. The scales, <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/mammals/facts/pangolins">made of the same material as human fingernails</a>, provide armour-like protection as they curl into a ball when threatened, shielding their vulnerable underbelly. The scales can account for up to <a href="https://www.awf.org/blog/5-things-you-didn%E2%80%99t-know-about-pangolin">20% of a pangolin’s total body weight</a>. A pangolin’s scales are a reminder of the incredible diversity of adaptations in the natural world. </p>
<p><strong>Habitats:</strong> Pangolins, as a group, are also adaptable to different environmental conditions. Their habitats include tropical forests, dry woodlands and savannahs. Some pangolin species, like the white-bellied, are adept climbers and spend much of their time in the canopy, foraging for insects among the branches. These arboreal habits provide them with both food and shelter, as well as protection from ground-dwelling predators. Other pangolin species, such as the ground pangolins, live on the forest floor or in grasslands. They may dig burrows underground where they retreat for rest and safety, particularly during the heat of the day or to escape potential threats.</p>
<p><strong>Defence:</strong> The name “pangolin” <a href="https://www.wwf.org.uk/learn/fascinating-facts/pangolins">originates</a> from the Malay word <em>pengguling</em>, which translates to “rolling up”. They tuck in their head and limbs and curl into a tight ball when faced with danger, wrapping their body in a protective layer of overlapping scales. This has helped pangolins survive predators such as big cats, hyenas and humans. </p>
<p><strong>Diet:</strong> <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9686612/#:%7E:text=The%20food%20of%20pangolins%20in,feeding%20%5B15%2C16%5D.">Pangolins primarily feed on ants and termites</a>, making them essential players in controlling insect populations within their ecosystems. They find the insects using their keen sense of smell and their tongues – which are often longer than their bodies. These long tongues are coated with sticky saliva, allowing them to probe deep into ant and termite nests to extract their prey. Their strong claws are also well-suited for tearing open insect nests and breaking through hard soil to uncover hidden prey. Pangolins’ diets play a crucial role in maintaining the health and stability of their environments.</p>
<h2>Pangolins in Africa</h2>
<p>In west and central Africa, the giant pangolin is distributed in a variety of habitats, including primary and secondary forests, swamp forests and wooded savannahs. Temminck’s pangolin (<em>Smutsia temminckii</em>) is the <a href="https://africanpangolin.org/discover/temmincks-ground-pangolin/#:%7E:text=Smutsia%20temminckii,to%20date%20weighing%2019%20kg">most widely distributed African pangolin</a>, occurring mainly in southern and east Africa. The <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/B9780128155073000083">black-bellied pangolin</a> (<em>Phataginus tetradactyla</em>) is an arboreal pangolin species, and occurs in west and central Africa. The <a href="https://pangolinsg.org/portfolio/white-bellied-pangolin/#:%7E:text=Distribution,%3B%20Togo%3B%20Uganda%3B%20Zambia">white-bellied pangolin</a> (<em>Phataginus tricuspis</em>) is the most frequently encountered pangolin in Africa. The white-bellied pangolin is <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S277281372200018X?via%3Dihub">found in north-central and south-western Nigeria</a>.</p>
<p>In Nigeria, pangolins are found in various habitats, including <a href="https://www.savepangolins.org/what-is-a-pangolin">forests, savannahs and grasslands</a>. Their distribution and abundance in Nigeria are uncertain, highlighting the need for further research and conservation efforts.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/400-000-african-pangolins-are-hunted-for-meat-every-year-why-its-time-to-act-111540">400,000 African pangolins are hunted for meat every year -- why it's time to act</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Lagos, Nigeria’s commercial capital, serves as a hub for the illegal trade of pangolins. It is a transit route to Cameroon and is involved in shipments of pangolins from sub-Saharan Africa to Asia. Cameroon is at <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/peace-poaching-and-pangolins-central-africa">the centre of wildlife trafficking in central Africa</a>. It is both a source country of animal products as well as a transit route for contraband from neighbouring Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic.</p>
<p>In 2022, Nigerian customs officials <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67134651">seized</a> 1,613 tonnes of pangolin scales and arrested 14 people. In October 2023, Nigeria <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-destroys-seized-pangolin-parts-deter-wildlife-trafficking-2023-10-17/">burned</a> four tonnes of seized pangolin scales, valued at US$1.4 million. Officials said this was the first time they had publicly destroyed seized wildlife products to discourage illegal trafficking. </p>
<h2>Why pangolin conservation is important</h2>
<p>Pangolin conservation is crucial for several reasons. </p>
<p>Firstly, pangolins play a vital role in ecosystems by controlling insect populations, particularly ants and termites, which helps maintain ecological balance. </p>
<p>They also contribute to soil health through their digging behaviour, which aerates the soil and promotes nutrient cycling.</p>
<p>Moreover, pangolins are indicators of ecosystem health. Their presence or absence can reflect the overall well-being of their habitats. Protecting pangolins helps safeguard biodiversity and the integrity of their ecosystems.</p>
<p>They also have cultural and economic value in many regions, contributing to ecotourism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223878/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olajumoke Morenikeji is affiliated with the Pangolin Conservation Guild Nigeria, which she founded. The organisation educates and creates awareness on pangolin conservation, conducts scientific research, collaborates with relevant organisations, advises policymakers, and facilitates pangolin rescue, rehabilitation and release into protected forest areas. I also chair the West Africa region International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Species Survival Commission (SSC) Pangolin Specialist Group.</span></em></p>Pangolins are among the most trafficked and poached mammals in the world.Olajumoke Morenikeji, Professor Department of Zoology, University of IbadanLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2251482024-03-21T12:25:24Z2024-03-21T12:25:24ZFor centuries, owls were considered to bring bad luck in many cultures as well as in the US, but the outpouring of grief in New York over Flaco shows how times have changed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582910/original/file-20240319-18-c403qf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=28%2C0%2C6332%2C3736&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tributes left at a memorial for Flaco the owl in Central Park in New York.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/EscapedOwlCentralPark/0e033d63fec14c708cde28f9250f19da/photo?Query=flaco%20owl&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=37&currentItemNo=20">AP Photo/Bebeto Matthews</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>There has been an <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/02/24/1233703492/flaco-new-york-owl-dies-building-collision">outpouring of grief in New York City</a> ever since the beloved Eurasian eagle-owl Flaco died on Feb. 23, 2024, after striking a building. In 2023, after escaping from Central Park Zoo, Flaco survived for over a year on his own, captivating New Yorkers.</p>
<p>Mourners <a href="https://abc7ny.com/videoClip/14465905/">are leaving notes and flowers</a> at the base of an old oak tree in Central Park, reportedly a favorite roost of his. <a href="https://www.artandobject.com/news/fans-call-statue-honor-beloved-owl-flaco#">Thousands have signed a petition for a statue in his honor</a>. Figure skaters honored him with a show called “<a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/flaco-the-owl-remembered-with-fly-be-free-ice-show-at-central-parks-wollman-rink/">Fly. Be Free</a>.” </p>
<p>This reaction to Flaco’s death would be mystifying for many people around the world. I <a href="https://www.macalester.edu/anthropology/facultystaff/arjunguneratne/">have spent a decade studying</a> the history of ornithology in Sri Lanka, including local beliefs in the owl as a bird that foretells deaths. Meanwhile, in some societies, owls were (and are) seen as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/24750263.2023.2254823">a symbol of wisdom</a> or even a sign of good luck.</p>
<p>But, by far, the most widespread belief about owls is that they are associated with witchcraft and death. </p>
<p>In much of the world – in African societies, among <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jsh/shw089">African Americans in the U.S. South</a> and the <a href="https://ugapress.org/book/9780820328157/spirits-of-the-air/">Indigenous people</a> <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/M/bo34116501.html">of the Americas</a>, and throughout South and Southeast Asia as well as in Europe – owls are seen as harbingers of death. The Cajuns, French-speaking refugees who settled in Louisiana’s bayou country after being driven out of Nova Scotia by the British, <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/534893">feared the screech of an owl</a>.</p>
<p>The American philosopher Henry David Thoreau <a href="https://archive.vcu.edu/english/engweb/transcendentalism/authors/thoreau/walden/chapter04.html">wrote in his book “Walden</a>” that owls “represent the stark twilight and unsatisfied thoughts which all have.” Nineteenth and early 20th century Americans <a href="https://www.carolinabirdclub.org/BOCC/Non-Passerines/25%20Owls/01%20Strigidae%20Family%20True%20Owls.pdf">were more likely to shoot an owl as an undesirable predator</a> than leave flowers at a memorial for one. But Flaco’s year of fame shows <a href="https://www.press.jhu.edu/books/title/9080/owls-united-states-and-canada">the sea change in the way Western cultures have come to regard owls</a> since Thoreau’s time. </p>
<h2>Birds of ill-omen</h2>
<p>During the Tang dynasty, which ruled China from the seventh to the 10th century, owls were thought to bring bad luck; they were despised for <a href="https://doi.org/10.3406/befeo.2016.6236">supposedly eating their mothers</a>. The Aztec god of death, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1215/00141801-8266452">Mictlantecuhtli, is accompanied by an owl</a>. Jahangir, one of the Mughal emperors of India, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417523000245">sought to control the sale of owl meat in his empire</a> because it was believed to be an ingredient for sorcery. </p>
<p>Such beliefs also prevailed in Europe. The Roman philosopher Pliny the Elder, who died in the eruption of Mount Vesuvius, said the owl was a “<a href="https://www.press.jhu.edu/books/title/9080/owls-united-states-and-canada">monster of the night … [and] a direful omen</a>.” In the European Middle Ages, owls were thought to accompany witches. No wonder, then, that J.K. Rowling has Harry Potter’s mail delivered by an owl. </p>
<p>The French call the barn owl “chouette effraie des clochers,” literally, “the scary owl of the bell towers.” Shakespeare made use of the idea that owls foretold death in many of his plays. For instance, Lady Macbeth says, “It was the owl that shrieked,” foretelling the murder of Duncan by her husband. </p>
<p>These beliefs lingered in England until World War II, when they began to disappear. </p>
<h2>The legend from Sri Lanka</h2>
<p>For centuries, people living in rural areas in Sri Lanka <a href="https://youtu.be/p46A3HMuoCo?feature=shared">have believed in a “devil bird,” or “ulama</a>” in the local Sinhala language, that foretold a death. </p>
<p>The basis of this belief was a legend that told of a man who, to punish his wife, gave her the flesh of her murdered child to cook. On discovering the truth, she fled screaming into the jungle. As the legend goes, she was turned into the ulama by the gods. In some versions of the tale, she was reborn as the devil bird. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/p46A3HMuoCo?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The sound of the ulama.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Ever since, she is believed to haunt the jungle, her terrible cries foretelling a death in the community of whoever happens to hear them. </p>
<p>Such beliefs made sense to British colonizers, including planters carving out coffee estates in remote, forested areas during the 19th century. They would have heard strange, blood-curdling cries from the forests that surrounded their houses. The local villagers’ explanations for these cries would have made sense to them. The British, after all, also came from a society where superstitions concerning owls – the definitive birds of the night – <a href="https://books.google.com.vc/books?id=66N7I_6M7WUC&printsec=copyright#v=onepage&q=owls&f=false">were a part of folk belief</a>. </p>
<p>The identity of the ulama was <a href="http://archives.sundayobserver.lk/2004/01/18/fea14.html">extensively debated</a> throughout the 19th and early 20th century by ornithologists, who attributed these night sounds to some species of owl. Colonial British ornithologists eventually determined that the <a href="https://www.biodiversitylibrary.org/item/61724#page/215/mode/1up">ulama was a species of large owl</a>, probably the <a href="https://ebird.org/species/sbeowl1">spot-bellied eagle-owl</a>. The identification is said to have been clinched when an eagle-owl was shot one moonlit night by a planter while it was making the ulama’s cry. </p>
<h2>Celebration of owls today</h2>
<p>The development of both scientific knowledge of birds and the popular hobby of birding has given people who live in the U.S. and Britain a decidedly different take on owls. Urbanization may also have something to do with it. Sri Lankan beliefs in the ulama, for example, are much less prevalent in urban areas than in the countryside. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An illustration showing an owl sitting on top of a red polka dot couch with a honey pot resting on it, and a bear standing in front." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582912/original/file-20240319-16-8obym8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582912/original/file-20240319-16-8obym8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582912/original/file-20240319-16-8obym8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582912/original/file-20240319-16-8obym8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582912/original/file-20240319-16-8obym8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582912/original/file-20240319-16-8obym8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582912/original/file-20240319-16-8obym8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An antique postcard showing Winnie-the-Pooh and Owl.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/reproduction-of-antique-postcard-shows-winnie-the-pooh-and-news-photo/1318727117?adppopup=true">Igor Golovniov/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In popular literature and culture in North America and Britain, owls have had their reputations rehabilitated. In A.A. Milne’s “Winnie-the-Pooh,” Owl is a likable bird who does his best to be intelligent and erudite. The National Audubon Society, one of the oldest bird conservation organizations in the U.S., sells <a href="https://www.audubon.org/marketplace/plush-birds#!">cuddly owl toys</a> that will hoot when squeezed. There’s even an annual <a href="https://www.festivalofowls.com/">International Festival of Owls</a> in Houston, Minnesota, where owls are celebrated. </p>
<p>That New Yorkers want to erect a memorial to Flaco is a remarkable instance of the ongoing rehabilitation of a group of birds that are charismatic, fascinating and quite undeserving of the bad rap they’ve been given over thousands of years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225148/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arjun Guneratne receives funding from American Council of Learned Societies and Council of American Overseas Research Centers for work on the history of ornithology.</span></em></p>Owls, once seen as harbingers of death, are now celebrated in popular literature and culture in North America and Britain.Arjun Guneratne, Professor of Anthropology, Macalester CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2261862024-03-20T19:55:20Z2024-03-20T19:55:20ZWhat Article 23 means for the future of Hong Kong and its once vibrant pro-democracy movement<p><em>Lawmakers in Hong Kong <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/19/hong-kong-article-23-security-law/">passed new security legislation</a> on March 19, 2024, handing authorities in the semi-autonomous city-state further power to clamp down on dissent.</em></p>
<p><em>The law, under <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/19/what-is-article-23-hong-kongs-new-draconian-national-security-law">Article 23</a>, has been decades in the making but was resisted for a long time by protesters who feared the legislation’s effect on civil liberties in Hong Kong, a special administrative region in China that has become increasingly under the thumb of Beijing.</em></p>
<p><em>To explain what the adoption of Article 23, which is set to be signed into law on March 23, 2024, means for the future of Hong Kong, The Conversation turned to Michael C. Davis, a <a href="https://jgu.edu.in/jgls/prof-michael-c-davis/">law professor</a> who taught constitutional law and human rights in Hong Kong for more than 30 years, most recently at the University of Hong Kong, and is the author of “<a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/freedom-undone/9781952636448">Freedom Undone: The Assault on Liberal Values in Hong Kong</a>.”</em></p>
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<h2>What is the background to Article 23?</h2>
<p>Article 23 has a lengthy backstory. It is an article in the <a href="https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/index/">Basic Law of Hong Kong</a> requiring the Hong Kong government to enact a local ordinance governing national security. The Basic Law itself is effectively the constitution of Hong Kong. Its promulgation by the central government was part of China’s obligation under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 – the treaty providing for Hong Kong’s return to China. Thirteen years later, in 1997, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-40426827">territory was transferred to Chinese rule</a> after more than a century under the British. </p>
<p>The Basic Law established a largely liberal constitutional order for post-handover Hong Kong. This included guarantees of the rule of law and basic freedoms, as well as a promise of ultimate universal suffrage. It was formally adopted by China’s National People’s Congress in 1990.</p>
<p>Basic Law Article 23 requires the Hong Kong government to “on its own” enact certain national security laws relating to treason, secession, sedition, subversion or theft of state secrets, and to regulate foreign organizations.</p>
<p>The Hong Kong government first put forward an Article 23 bill in 2003. But due to concerns over the implications for press and organizational freedoms, as well as expanded police powers, the proposed bill <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-68594448">met with widespread opposition</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A uniformed police officer puts his fingers in his ears in front of a sign that has the number 23 crossed out." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Noisy protests help defeat an earlier version of Article 23 in 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/police-officer-puts-his-fingers-in-his-ears-to-protect-news-photo/1258921548?adppopup=true">Peter Parks/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span>
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<p>A group of seven leading lawyers and two legal academics, including myself, challenged the proposed bill in a collection of pamphlets that highlighted its deficiencies under international human rights standards. Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3178339/july-1-2003-500000-take-hong-kongs-streets-protest-against">half a million protesters</a> took to the streets of Hong Kong. </p>
<p>In the face of such opposition and the consequent withdrawal of support by a leading pro-goverment party, the bill was withdrawn. </p>
<p>Rather than come forward with a replacement bill that would address human rights concerns, the government opted to let Article 23 languish for two decades.</p>
<p>Then, in 2020, Beijing <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/hong-kong-national-security-law-10-things-you-need-to-know/">imposed a national security law</a> that gave Hong Kong authorities greater power. It led to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/one-year-hong-kong-arrests-117-people-under-new-security-law-2021-06-30/">arrest and repression of opposition figures</a> in Hong Kong, silencing the once-vibrant democracy movement. </p>
<p>With no effective opposition left and the threat of arrest for anyone who speaks out, the pro-Beijing Hong Kong government decided now was the time to ram through a more extreme version of the bill.</p>
<p>The Hong Kong government, with Beijing’s encouragement, was able to open up a short consultation on the new Article 23 legislative proposal with little or no opposition expressed. </p>
<p>The process was facilitated by a “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/hong-kong-patriots-only-election-falls-flat-with-record-low-turnout-2023-12-11">patriots only” electoral system</a> imposed by Beijing in 2021 that has tightened Beijing’s grip over the Hong Kong legislature, leading to unanimous support for the bill.</p>
<h2>How will it affect civil liberties in Hong Kong?</h2>
<p>In tandem with the 2020 Beijing-imposed national security law, the new Article 23 legislation will have a dramatic effect on civil liberties.</p>
<p>The national security law – with its vague provisions on secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion – has already been used along with a colonial-era sedition law to arrest and silence dissent in Hong Kong. Many opposition figures <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/20/world/asia/hong-kong-democracy-leaders.html">are in prison or have fled into exile</a>. And those with dissenting views who remain have largely gone silent. </p>
<p>The draft bill expands on the national security law in key areas: the stealing of state secrets, insurrection, sabotage and external interference in Hong Kong.</p>
<p>It essentially embraces mainland China’s comprehensive national security regime, which has long focused on suppressing internal opposition, targeting numerous areas of local civil life, impacting organizational, press and academic freedoms.</p>
<p>Included in Article 23 is the adoption of the mainland’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/28/world/asia/china-state-secrets-law.html">broad definition of “state secrets</a>,” which can even include reporting or writing on social and economic development policies. </p>
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<p>The legislation expands the potential use of incarceration with both lengthy sentences upon conviction and longer holding of suspects before trial.</p>
<p>Article 23 also intensifies <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/30/hong-kong-article-23-new-national-security-laws-explained-what-do-they-mean">scrutiny of “foreign influence</a>” – making working with outsiders risky for Hong Kong citizens.</p>
<p>The draft legislation speaks disparagingly of activism under the guises of fighting for or monitoring human rights and is critical of “so-called” nongovernmental organizations.</p>
<p>All of this makes working with or supporting international human rights organizations perilous. </p>
<p>In short, in the space of two decades, Hong Kong’s liberal constitutional order has been transformed into a national security order with weak or no protections for basic freedoms.</p>
<h2>What is the wider context to Article 23?</h2>
<p>To understand this legislation, one must appreciate the Chinese Communist Party’s deep hostility to liberal values and institutions, such as the rule of law, civil liberties, independent courts, a free press and public accountability. Such liberal ideas are viewed as an existential threat to party rule. </p>
<p>This mindset has led to a dramatic expansion of the party’s <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/china-vows-to-safeguard-national-security-with-new-laws-at-conclave-/7520474.html">national security agenda</a> under current leader Xi Jinping. </p>
<p>Beijing has emphasized economic development in recent decades, staking its legitimacy on economic growth – betting that people will care more about their standard of living than about political freedoms. But as <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/15/china-needs-reforms-to-halt-significant-growth-declines-imf-chief.html">growth declines</a>, leaders’ concerns about security and dissent have grown, placing such security even above economic development.</p>
<p>This has led to the comprehensive national security concept now being imposed on Hong Kong. </p>
<p>With Beijing advancing an agenda that casts liberal, democratic ideas as a threat, a liberal Hong Kong on the country’s border became impossible for the Chinese Communist Party to ignore.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of protesters shelter under umbrellas" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Protestors in Hong Kong use umbrellas as improvised shields in 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protestors-using-improvise-shield-to-push-toward-police-news-photo/1191713262?adppopup=true">Kwan Wong/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Widespread <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48607723">protests in Hong Kong in 2019</a> both exacerbated this concern and offered an opportunity for Beijing to address the perceived threat under the <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202112/1240540.shtml">claim that protesters were advancing a so-called “color revolution</a>.”</p>
<p>Having long nurtured its loyalist camp to rule Hong Kong, these loyal officials became the instrument of the crackdown.</p>
<h2>What does the lack of protest now say about the pro-democracy movement?</h2>
<p>It tells us that the mainland national security regime imposed on Hong Kong has effectively intimidated the society, especially those with opposition views, into silence. </p>
<p>Hong Kong’s pro-democratic camp had <a href="https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.5563">historically enjoyed majority support, at around 60%</a> of the voters in the direct elections that were allowed for half of the legislative seats.</p>
<p>The introduction of loyalists-only elections led to a dramatically reduced turnout.</p>
<p>This and emigration patterns tend to show that the majority of Hong Kong people do not support this new illiberal order.</p>
<p>Be that as it may, with most of their pro-democratic leaders either in jail or exile, they dare not speak out against the new national security regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226186/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael C. Davis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the space of two decades, Hong Kong’s liberal constitutional order has been transformed into a security regime that grants citizens few civil libertiesMichael C. Davis, Professor of Law and International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2235822024-03-20T16:35:50Z2024-03-20T16:35:50ZFriend-shoring: what Biden wants to achieve by trading with allies rather than rivals<p>The tendency to move production and trade away from countries considered to be political rivals or national security risks and towards allies, so-called <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0714">“friend-shoring”</a>, is a <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/02/friendshoring-global-trade-buzzwords/">hot topic</a> among economists. The term popped up during the COVID pandemic, a time of significant disruption to supply chains, and gained further traction when Russia invaded Ukraine.</p>
<p>One of the most high-profile results of a friend-shoring policy is that Canada and Mexico have recently replaced China as America’s largest trading partners by total trade, while Mexico has overtaken China as America’s top importer (see figures below). This followed the introduction of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Zhaohui-Wang-22/publication/338085025_Understanding_Trump's_Trade_Policy_with_China_International_Pressures_Meet_Domestic_Politics/links/5fdf5d53299bf140882f7481/Understanding-Trumps-Trade-Policy-with-China-International-Pressures-Meet-Domestic-Politics.pdf">Donald Trump’s trade strategy</a>, which aimed to reduce US dependence on Chinese goods – partly for political reasons and partly because of Trump’s perception of China as a rival power. </p>
<p>Joe Biden has also <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/09/biden-to-sign-chips-act-china-competition-bill.html">placed restrictions on trade</a> with China in an attempt to strengthen US competitiveness with China and grow the US tech industry.</p>
<p>The US <a href="https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/2019/us-china-trade-war-tariffs-date-chart">raised tariffs</a> on imports from China significantly during the Trump administration. These levels remain high, making the costs of importing goods from China to the US more expensive. </p>
<p>In addition, the International Labor Organization Global Wage <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---travail/documents/publication/wcms_862569.pdf">Report 2022-23</a> shows that China has experienced the highest rate of real wage growth among all G20 countries over the period 2008-22, also pushing up the price of Chinese goods. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2023/08/30/what-is-friendshoring">Biden administration</a> continues to champion friend-shoring, which has further encouraged companies to shift production from China to Mexico as they weigh up geopolitical risks against differences in the costs of production. </p>
<p>While data on the number of firms relocating production is not available, the latest trade data (see Figures 1 and 2) suggests Mexico has managed to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2ca4da83-f858-4215-88e7-544adf0aa18e">capitalise</a> on the US-China rivalry.</p>
<p>Closer relationships with allies can be created by forming new trade agreements, for example, the <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement#:%7E:text=The%20United%20States%2DMexico%2DCanada%20Agreement%20(USMCA)%20entered,farmers%2C%20ranchers%2C%20and%20businesses.">US, Mexico, Canada Agreement (USMCA)</a>, which is more about geopolitics and friend-shoring than lowering tariff barriers as was the case of its predecessor, the <a href="https://www.trade.gov/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta">North America Free Trade Agreement (Nafta)</a>. </p>
<p>But the USMCA was also a product of its time. US political will had shifted towards undermining political competitors and setting out anti-China political statements that resonated with voters. </p>
<p>Trump, a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/naftas-economic-impact">consistent critic of Nafta</a>, had argued that it undermined American jobs and wages, a statement that undoubtedly played well in US industrial states experiencing manufacturing decline. A paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research suggested that far more US jobs were lost due to <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w21906/w21906.pdf">competition with China</a>.</p>
<h2>Doing business with your friends</h2>
<p>Friend-shoring is a new term for something that has been around for a long time. Countries engaged in sanctions, blockades, and friend-shoring during the first and second world wars on a much <a href="https://yalebooks.co.uk/book/9780300270488/the-economic-weapon/">larger scale</a>. </p>
<p>In 1948, the US initiated economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, a 50-year-long strategy that started with export restrictions and was solidified by the Export Control Act of 1949. </p>
<p>These sanctions, intensified after the Battle Act of 1951, were aimed at limiting strategic goods to the Soviet bloc and became a permanent fixture of cold war policy following the escalation of the <a href="https://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Embargoes-and-Sanctions-Cold-war-sanctions.html">Korean war</a>.</p>
<p>Data analysis shows how trade responds to political factors. For over sixty years, trade economists have made extensive use of <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4037001">the gravity model</a> of trade, which has provided empirical evidence that countries tend to trade more with countries geographically closer to them as well as where there is a common language, common legal system, common exchange rate regime and shared colonial history. </p>
<p>Research also shows how political distance between countries and formal military alliances affects trade. </p>
<p><strong>Value of US imports from top five trading partners in 2010-23:</strong></p>
<p><strong>US trade with countries by value:</strong></p>
<p>Governments can use trade policy to strategically support their own industries, so reducing trade with rivals can be part of a political agenda based on boosting domestic manufacturing (and jobs) rather than relying on imports. The <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/">US Chips and Science</a> Act, and in the EU, the <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/european-chips-act_en">European Chips Act</a>, are examples of policies that can inflict economic pain on adversaries while ensuring domestic production of this key component in high-technology manufacturing. </p>
<p>However, developing an industry takes time. By the time the industry is established, it <a href="https://www.piie.com/publications/piie-briefings/2021/scoring-50-years-us-industrial-policy-1970-2020">may not pay off</a>, either due to falling prices caused by increased supply or an economic slowdown that suppresses demand. </p>
<p>In the case of US chips, it is particularly interesting to note that the existing industry focuses on design and production of high-quality chips. Therefore, the latest policy will see low-cost microchips, the mainstay of the Chinese chip industry, start to be produced in the US and compete with the established US high-end suppliers. </p>
<p>The US has experienced the negative effects of these types of policies before. Just consider the US support for the steel industry, a popular choice among US presidents, including the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e0219409-b863-41fb-bbcb-6be9ad6f0a4e?emailId=c8a49fc1-229a-4246-984b-42598eccb2e6&segmentId=2785c52b-1c00-edaa-29be-7452cf90b5a2">current administration</a>. Under the Trump administration, this saw <a href="https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/trumps-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-are-cascading-out-control">25% tariffs</a> imposed on steel imports, which benefited the US industry but imposed costs on steel users. </p>
<p>Countries such as <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/a-special-relationship-australia-safe-from-trump-s-tariffs-for-now-20190603-p51tyr.html">Australia</a> were exempt from this policy, while <a href="https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/trumps-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-are-cascading-out-control">other allies</a>, such as the EU, were hit hard. Industrial policy can reduce dependence on rivals, but it’s not clear that friends always get special treatment.</p>
<p>Other policies can tie in with a friend-shoring agenda. The new generation of <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/twec.13213">EU trade agreements</a> deal with issues including labour rights and environmental protection, making it clear that third countries that want to do business with the EU need to meet the same standards. The EU has also been debating new anti-forced labour legislation, so this type of legislation may also start to get more serious consideration in the UK, for instance.</p>
<p>Friend-shoring policies aren’t new, but the slogan is. Self-sufficiency at the national level can inflict short-term pain on adversaries but may hold limited benefits in the medium term. However, there is broader acceptance that businesses need to have the certainty of trading bloc friends. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.oecd.org/trade/topics/regional-trade-agreements/#:%7E:text=Regional%20trade%20agreements%20(RTAs)%20cover,World%20Trade%20Organization%20(WTO).">Half of all trade</a> currently takes place between members of trade blocs, and recent trade data for the US and Mexico (see figures above) suggests that trade blocs may become more important over time as production moves.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223582/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Canada and Mexico have replaced China as the US’s largest trading partners, due to friend-shoring policies.Karen Jackson, Reader in Economics, University of WestminsterOleksandr Shepotylo, Senior Lecturer in Economics, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2260362024-03-20T15:56:09Z2024-03-20T15:56:09ZMumpreneurs: a growing entrepreneurial force in Chinese society<p>While much ink has been poured over China’s economic growth in recent decades, the contributions of Chinese women often receive less attention. With the pressure of the <a href="https://www.ined.fr/en/publications/editions/population-and-societies/china-s-new-three-child-policy-what-effects-can-we-expect/">“three-child policy”</a>, being a mother isn’t a mere personal choice, it’s a part of national demographic strategy. To navigate their lives, many Chinese mothers are now turning to what has been referred to as “mumpreneurship”. A January 2024 search for “妈妈创业” (the term in Chinese) showed 69.9 million results on Baidu, China’s primary search engine, compared to just 2.6 million English results on Google.</p>
<p>The term <em>mompreneur</em> was coined in 1996 by Patricia Cobe and Ellen Parlapiano, two entrepreneurs who caught global attention with a <a href="http://www.mompreneursonline.com/">website</a> and <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/author/list/624570.Patricia_Cobe">books</a> on the theme. Unlike <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0016718510001284">female entrepreneurs</a>, mumpreneurs are motivated to achieve work-life harmony by merging the identities of <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0266242611435182">motherhood and business ownership</a>. It’s typical to observe the boundaries of two roles blurring.</p>
<p><a href="https://journals.openedition.org/travailemploi/10041/">Prior research</a> indicates that the mumpreneurs movement has its roots in the United States in the 1990s, and that it saw further growth in France in the 2000s, as the Internet gained strength. The researchers defined it as a “feminised form of non-salaried work, in which independence is considered the ideal way to combine work and family.”</p>
<h2>Mumpreneurship in China</h2>
<p>Our ongoing research focuses on mumpreneurs in Chinese urban areas. We find that most are between the ages of 31 and 45, resourceful, educated and digitally savvy. Chinese women’s age at first birth is getting older, <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202302/1285983.shtml">30.36 in Shanghai in 2022</a>. According to a <a href="https://www.199it.com/archives/1418770.html">2022 Chinese Female Entrepreneurs Research Report</a>, women start their businesses at a young age, 36% before 30, 50% between 31 to 40.</p>
<p>Covid-19 has played a key role in driving the growth of mumpreneurship. Many parents are stepping back from the corporate life due to the economic downturn in China. Mumpreneurs are most commonly found in urban regions such as Beijing, Shanghai and Great Bay area, notably Shenzhen, where robust support networks and resources exist. Preferred sectors are children’s education and social services, HR consulting, psychotherapy consulting, and beauty-related industries. Businesses typically have small teams of no more than 10. Many of their leaders actively engage and enjoy the popularity on social media like TikTok and Xiaohongshu. One of our interviewees, DanDan, has pioneered a <a href="http://xhslink.com/ARVTnC">“divorced companion mumpreneurial business model”</a> (离婚搭子创业 in Chinese) in education and social-media marketing services that has received significant attention. She and her business partner have recently been invited to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vb7MlUvMNhs"><em>Super Diva</em></a>, a show spotlighting Chinese mothers from diverse backgrounds.</p>
<p>Contrary to the promise of work-life balance, Chinese mumpreneurs are driven and <a href="https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20231205A054G400">relentlessly self-improving</a> and are often sleep-deprived. Support can come from a range of source, including their partner, parents, paid services such as nannies, cleaners and drivers, and sometimes company employees. Office and family space are frequently within walking distance or even overlapping.</p>
<p>As in other Asian countries, K–12 education in China is highly competitive. Chinese mothers are often perceived to face triple expectation from the society, family, and themselves, while Chinese fathers can have more leniency. Our study reveals that when it comes to education, some Chinese mumpreneurs disagree with both 鸡娃 (Ji Wa) <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/09/06/1024804523/forget-tiger-moms-now-chinas-chicken-blood-parents-are-pushing-kids-to-succeed">Chicken Blood parenting</a> and traditional laissez-faire motherhood. Instead, they believe in a spiritual maternal role, working to strengthen the emotional and personal construction of their children. Annie, a mumpreneur who works in human resources, remarked:</p>
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<p>“I disagree with cramming, stressful, and result-oriented education. It’s essential for me to nurture my son’s capacity for happiness. It pains me to witness the prevalence of depression among Chinese children.”</p>
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<p>While mumpreneurs value motherhood, for them it doesn’t consistently rank as the top priority. Instead, there’s unanimous agreement on the importance of prioritising the “me” as an individual, encompassing financial, physical, and mental self-care. Additionally, there’s a recurring theme indicating that a woman’s awakening process is influenced by her education and the duration of her marriage. As for the role of “wife”, it’s often optional, and many mumpreneurs are single, divorced or cohabiting with partners to whom they are not married.</p>
<h2>A social movement</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www-annualreviews-org.em-lyon.idm.oclc.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052615-025801">rise of a social movement</a> is primarily facilitated by three key factors: more chances to influence politics, support networks, and shaping public opinion through messages. In China, the government has been making a strategic push to compensate for the country’s <a href="https://chinapower.csis.org/china-demographics-challenges/">demographic challenges</a>, which will become increasingly acute in the coming years. The country’s “one-child policy” was established in 1980, and it took more than a quarter-century to transit to the “two-child policy”, enacted in 2016. Less than five years later, the “three-child policy” came into force in 2021.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">“China pushes three-child policy” (NBC News).</span></figcaption>
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<p>The increasing female power in China is another catalyst for the mumpreneurship movement. Since 1949, there has been remarkable progress in the economic, educational, and health status of Chinese women. The changing social perceptions could be sensed in the language used to describe them, from 大婶 (Aunty) to 爷 (Ye) meaning lord or master, and 女王 (Nu Wang) meaning queen. Women are being progressively liberated from the expectation of a life centred on supporting her family, children, and husband. Women in China are embracing more diverse values and contributing to a more inclusive society.</p>
<p>The support ecosystem for mumpreneurs has matured. These include the <a href="http://mqcy.cwdf.org.cn/">“@SHE Entrepreneur Plan”</a>, which is operated by the China Women’s Development Foundation. It has grown increasingly influential over the last 28 years and now covers more than 20 provinces. At the grassroots level, <a href="https://www.huxiu.com/article/37107.html">mumpreneur communities</a> are spreading with the help of social media. Interesting examples include Lamabang.net.com, Babytree.com (a sort of Facebook for parents and kids), ci123.com and 研究生 Yan Jiu Sheng (which highlights research on pregnancy).</p>
<p>Given their presence, our study mainly focuses on the mumpreneurs in urban areas. Given that the country’s spatial disparity, future research could explore mumpreneurship in rural areas. This may reveal differences in entrepreneurial motivation, motherhood definition, social capital and social networking.</p>
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<p><em>Special thanks to Chen Liu (DBA candidate from Durham University and EM Lyon Business School) and Hanrui Liu (MSc in international marketing and business development, EM Lyon Business School) for their contributions to the ongoing research project.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226036/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lisa Xiong ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>With the pressure of China’s “three-child policy”, many women are motivated to achieve work-life harmony by merging the identities of motherhood and business ownership.Lisa Xiong, Associate Professor in Strategy & Organization, EM Lyon Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2262222024-03-20T05:45:30Z2024-03-20T05:45:30ZPolitics with Michelle Grattan: Cyber expert Lesley Seebeck on TikTok’s future in Australia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583058/original/file-20240320-22-b7bprd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=29%2C29%2C4854%2C2716&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Imaged Provided by Lesley Seebeck</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United States House of Representatives has passed a bill to force TikTok’s owner, ByteDance, to either sell TikTok to a non-Chinese company or face a ban in the US.</p>
<p>While the measure won’t come into effect until the American Senate agrees, it has re-engaged a debate over TikTok’s risk to national security, as well as its impact on young people and the implications for free speech if there was a ban. </p>
<p>The Albanese government has flagged it won’t blindly follow the US action but instead will rely on advice from its security agencies. </p>
<p>The government, however, earlier banned TikTok from official devices. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/if-tiktok-is-banned-in-the-us-or-australia-how-might-the-company-or-china-respond-225889">If TikTok is banned in the US or Australia, how might the company – or China – respond?</a>
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<p>Lesley Seebeck, former CEO of the Cyber Institute, Australian National University, and former chief investment and advisory officer at the Digital Transformation Agency, joins us to discuss the concerns about TikTok.</p>
<p>On the security implications, Seebeck offers some advice</p>
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<p>I think, certainly, banning on the official devices is worthwhile. I’d also strongly recommend that any journalists or anyone that may feel that they’re of interest to the Chinese state also think twice about having TikTok on their phones. </p>
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<p>While the American bill offers TikTok an out if it is sold to a non-Chinese company, Seebeck says that is unlikely to happen,</p>
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<p>The problem is that China has made it clear that it will not sell it […] which tells you a lot about the fact that China sees this as a strategic asset […] This is very sensitive technology that would be handed over. </p>
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<p>On why there’s so much concern around China owning TikTok,</p>
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<p>If you looked at China 20 years ago, we would be much more comfortable because it was not the place it is now becoming – more and more authoritarian and assertive under XI Jinping. Things like the national security laws are deeply concerning – the one that’s just passed in Hong Kong – [they] give us a sense of what could be exerted extraterritoriality.</p>
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<p>Seebeck highlights why TikTok’s data collection differs from that of other platforms like Facebook.</p>
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<p>People often say, well, TikTok’s collecting data, but so does Facebook and all the rest. But it’s a different way of doing things, because what drives TikTok is the algorithm and that real time responsiveness, which makes it so attractive.</p>
<p>What TikTok does, it’s a constant refresh of data to drive that algorithm. So every time you click on a video […] or you might be following an influencer, and they change, it’s this constant interaction. So the data they’re collecting allows a lot more granularity and a lot more sense about what you might do.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226222/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>TikTok has come into the spotlight after the US. congress proposed a bill to force it's sale away from Chinese owned company ByteDance. To discuss this we're joined by Cyber expert Lesley Seebeck.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2258892024-03-20T01:44:50Z2024-03-20T01:44:50ZIf TikTok is banned in the US or Australia, how might the company – or China – respond?<p>TikTok’s owner is once again navigating troubled waters in the United States, where the US House of Representatives has <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/03/14/1238435508/tiktok-ban-bill-congress-china">issued an ultimatum</a>: divest or face shutdown within six months. </p>
<p>In Australia, Opposition Leader <a href="https://www.crikey.com.au/2024/03/15/tik-tok-ban-peter-dutton-chris-minns-nsw-bail-tabcorp/">Peter Dutton</a> and Senator <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/mar/17/liberal-mp-urges-australia-to-follow-us-in-tiktok-crackdown-calling-app-a-serious-threat-to-national-security">James Paterson</a>, the shadow home affairs spokesperson, want Canberra to follow suit.</p>
<p>TikTok, owned by the Beijing-based tech giant ByteDance, has been here before. It <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/03/11/trump-tiktok-donor-china-foreign-policy/">fought off</a> a similar order by the Trump administration banning the video-creating and sharing app in the United States several years ago. </p>
<p>In a bid to mollify US security concerns about user data potentially being handed over to the Chinese Communist Party, TikTok pledged to migrate American user data to US-based <a href="https://time.com/6281946/tiktok-oracle-source-code/">Oracle Cloud</a>. However, TikTok has reportedly <a href="https://www.wsj.com/tech/tiktok-pledged-to-protect-u-s-data-1-5-billion-later-its-still-struggling-cbccf203">struggled</a> to live up to this promise. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/attempts-to-ban-tiktok-reveal-the-hypocrisy-of-politicians-already-struggling-to-relate-to-voters-225870">Attempts to ban TikTok reveal the hypocrisy of politicians already struggling to relate to voters</a>
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<h2>TikTok’s growing resistance to US pressures</h2>
<p>The platform’s survival in Western markets depends on its ability to navigate these geopolitical complexities. This situation will test TikTok’s adaptability and strategic approach, as well as the power of its user base.</p>
<p>In the past four years, TikTok has seen tremendous growth in both its user base and advertising revenue, though this has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/tech/tiktoks-american-growth-is-already-stalling-980aa276">started to slow</a> somewhat in the US. Last year, ByteDance was <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexkonrad/2023/05/04/bytedance-scrutiny-leaves-midas-investors-waiting-billions/?sh=3026954c3ccf">valued at US$220 billion</a> (A$337 billion), which was down from US$500 billion (A$766 billion) in 2021, but still ranked as the world’s most valuable non-public startup. </p>
<p>This valuation not only highlights its worldwide appeal, but also uniquely equips it to deal with US regulatory hurdles.</p>
<p>Indeed, TikTok’s response to the latest attempted US ban has demonstrated the power of its resistance. On March 7, the platform <a href="https://time.com/6898845/tiktok-ban-bill-us-congress-what-to-know/">engaged</a> its users directly with a pop-up message urging them to contact Congress to complain. In doing so, it shifted the narrative from a direct confrontation between itself and Washington to a broader conflict between the US government and American citizens over <a href="https://www.wsj.com/us-news/law/tiktok-ban-legal-court-challenges-fdc06180">freedom of expression</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="TiktokEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.tiktok.com/@cinematicscribbles/video/7343689003314597163?q=congress%20ban\u0026t=1710894882015"}"></div></p>
<p>The bill that would force ByteDance to sell the app or face a nationwide ban must still <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/15/technology/tiktok-ban-bill-senate.html">pass the Senate</a>, so public pressure may come to bear. President Joe Biden has said <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-tiktok-ban-house-china-aaa884d8c974f0a35856af5ee6aa4e99">he would sign the bill</a> if it’s passed.</p>
<p>Although the bill has widespread support on both sides of the political spectrum, senators from both parties will need to consider the potential backlash from young people in a pivotal election year. Already, former President Donald Trump – the Republican nominee in the 2024 presidential contest – has <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/11/trump-says-a-tiktok-ban-would-empower-meta-slams-facebook-as-enemy-of-the-people.html">backflipped</a> on a potential TikTok ban, which underscores ByteDance’s growing political leverage.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/politics-with-michelle-grattan-cyber-expert-lesley-seebeck-on-tiktoks-future-in-australia-226222">Politics with Michelle Grattan: Cyber expert Lesley Seebeck on TikTok's future in Australia</a>
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<p>Should the bill become law, civil liberty groups could also <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-a-tiktok-ban-in-the-u-s-could-violate-1st-amendment-rights">challenge</a> it in US Federal Court as an infringement on TikTok users’ First Amendment rights to free speech. Some groups are already <a href="https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/column-if-tiktok-is-banned-brace-epic-first-amendment-fight-2023-03-28/">mobilising</a> for action.</p>
<p>Federal judges have struck down attempted bans in the US in the past, but on different grounds. (One of these cases was brought by TikTok users, but was reportedly <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-three-tiktok-stars-beat-back-u-s-plans-to-ban-the-app-11606418513">orchestrated</a> by TikTok and its Chinese parent company.)</p>
<p>A new challenge on free speech grounds, which have yet to be tested in court, could lead to an eventual appeal to the US Supreme Court. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="TiktokEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.tiktok.com/@debateher/video/7345674449372384555?q=congress%20ban\u0026t=1710894882015"}"></div></p>
<h2>Other ways China could retaliate</h2>
<p>Although US national security officials were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-officials-brief-senators-wednesday-threats-posed-by-tiktok-aide-2024-03-18/">briefing</a> US senators on the risks posed by TikTok this week, this isn’t the sole reason the social media app has run into problems in Washington.</p>
<p>TikTok has also been targeted because of the burgeoning tech rivalry between the US and China, where many fear the spectre of a far-reaching <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/07/07/is-us-china-decoupling-heading-in-a-dangerous-direction/">tech decoupling</a> between the countries or even an outright <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/08/winning-the-tech-cold-war.html">tech cold war</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tiktok-ban-isnt-a-data-security-solution-it-will-be-difficult-to-enforce-and-could-end-up-hurting-users-202732">A TikTok ban isn't a data security solution. It will be difficult to enforce – and could end up hurting users</a>
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<p>Facing potential pressure to sell at a reduced value, ByteDance might decide to exit the US market altogether, considering the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/24/tiktok-sues-us-government-over-trump-ban.html">challenges</a> faced by other Chinese tech companies in Western countries, like <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/us-district-court-dismisses-huawei-lawsuit-that-federal-ban-is-unconstitutional/">Huawei</a>. </p>
<p>Such a decision could prompt retaliatory trade restrictions or other actions by the Chinese government due to nationalistic pressures. This could boost ByteDance’s stature in China – similar to what happened to Huawei after it was banned in the US.</p>
<p>China already blocks many US media outlets, social media platforms and other websites, such as Facebook, Twitter and Google. But it could retaliate with sanctions, as <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-imposes-sanctions-on-u-s-consulting-firm-d7a201ba">it has in the past</a> against US data firms, officials and researchers (with limited impact).</p>
<p>The Chinese government has also said any sale of TikTok would have to <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/24/tiktok-wants-to-distance-from-china-but-the-governments-getting-involved.html">comply with its law</a> on tech exports, which requires licenses for the export of certain technologies. It’s not entirely clear how the law would apply to TikTok, but some experts believe it could <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/15/business/china-tiktok-house-bill.html">encompass</a> the algorithm that powers the app. This means, theoretically, China could prevent ByteDance from selling this technology to a foreign company.</p>
<p>TikTok’s predicament in the US also could set a precedent for other Chinese tech companies, like the e-commerce <a href="https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3205544/chinese-e-commerce-apps-temu-shein-tiktok-shop-emerge-online-retail-force-us-other-overseas-markets">platforms</a> Temu and Shein. Both companies are also under <a href="https://apnews.com/article/temu-shein-forced-labor-china-de7b5398c76fda58404abc6ec5684972">increasing congressional scrutiny</a>, which likely makes them apprehensive about potential mandates for divestment or other regulatory hurdles they could <a href="https://www.wsj.com/business/retail/the-spend-spend-spend-strategy-behind-temus-rapid-ascent-in-america-d2bdefc3">face in the future</a>.</p>
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<h2>Could Australia be next?</h2>
<p>In Australia, TikTok is already banned on government-issued devices. Now, there is renewed momentum for a nationwide ban as well. </p>
<p>As a close ally of the US and a major trading partner of China, Australia is in a particularly vulnerable position. It could be forced to choose between a US strategy of decoupling its tech industry from China’s, or prioritising its improving relationship with Beijing. </p>
<p>As the debate in the US drags on, the point of difference between the two major parties in Australia will likely become more defined. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said his <a href="https://www.news.com.au/technology/online/social/anthony-albanese-reveals-australias-plans-on-tiktok-after-us-vote/news-story/9a635ec36c4f97b2b928963786008b8f">government has no plans</a> – at this stage – to follow the US lead on a TikTok ban, but this could change as the next federal election gets closer.</p>
<p>Politicians on both sides will need to take into account the impact of a potential ban among TikTok supporters, as well as the Chinese-Australian community. Many Chinese-Australians would see a ban as yet another slap in the face to their country of origin and further evidence of anti-China foreign policy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225889/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wanning Sun receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marina Yue Zhang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>TikTok has mobilised its vast user base to contest a possible US ban, plus it could challenge it in court as an infringement of people’s free speech.Marina Yue Zhang, Associate Professor, University of Technology SydneyWanning Sun, Professor of Media and Cultural Studies, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2256232024-03-19T14:07:44Z2024-03-19T14:07:44ZChina: why the country’s economy has hit a wall – and what it plans to do about it<p>China’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-68508868">annual parliamentary meetings</a> in Beijing came to a close on March 11. They were conducted under great pressure: a weak economy and high expectations from both the domestic public and international observers as to what the government can do to get the economy out of the woods.</p>
<p>The country’s leaders did not shy away from mentioning all of the economic problems facing China. But they also attempted to boost the morale of the Chinese public by outlining how the country would march into the next chapter of the Chinese story – mainly by striving to become a global leader in technology.</p>
<p>The government used the meetings to <a href="https://npcobserver.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/2024-Government-Work-Report_EN.pdf">declare</a> that it was targeting GDP growth of 5% in 2024. This is lower than the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-q4-gdp-grows-52-yy-below-market-forecast-2024-01-17/">5.2% growth rate</a> that was achieved in 2023 but higher than the International Monetary Fund’s <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/CHN">forecast</a> of 4.6%. The Chinese government did not detail how this target will be achieved, but the target itself is indicative of the leadership’s confidence about the future.</p>
<p>Over the past four decades, China’s rapid economic growth has been attributed to market incentives, cheap labour, infrastructure investment, exports and foreign direct investment. But at the time of writing, none of these drivers are working effectively. </p>
<p>Market activities are intertwined with <a href="https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/2023/chinas-state-vs-private-company-tracker-which-sector-dominates">greater state intervention</a>. A declining population has weakened the labour supply. And uncertainty surrounding China’s economy and intensified geopolitical tensions have together driven foreign investment <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Foreign-direct-investment-in-China-falls-to-30-yearlow#:%7E:text=But%20FDI%20declined%20for%20the,recorded%20in%20the%20prior%20quarter.">out of China</a>. By January 2024, inward foreign direct investment in China was less than 10% of the US$344 billion (£270 billion) it received in 2021.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-doom-loop-a-dramatically-smaller-and-older-population-could-create-a-devastating-global-slowdown-221554">China's doom loop: a dramatically smaller (and older) population could create a devastating global slowdown</a>
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<h2>Property crisis</h2>
<p>Many of the risks facing China’s economy stem from its ailing real estate sector. For decades, China’s economy was dependent on a <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/02/02/cf-chinas-real-estate-sector-managing-the-medium-term-slowdown#:%7E:text=Real%20estate%20has%20long%20been,the%20buildup%20of%20significant%20risks">booming property market</a> driven by speculative investment returns. However, this growth was largely driven by debt. To maximise their profits, developers even began selling houses before they had been built.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A view of a room full of people in China sat facing a stage." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Delegates attending the closing meeting of the Two Sessions on March 11.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://epaimages.com/search.pp">Wu Hao/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>China’s economy started to slow and, in 2020, Chinese regulators <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-08/what-china-s-three-red-lines-mean-for-property-firms-quicktake">cracked down</a> on reckless borrowing. Beijing imposed widespread lending curbs on property developers, meaning they could not borrow more money to pay back their existing debts. </p>
<p>A crisis followed. In early 2024, Evergrande – the world’s most heavily indebted real estate developer – <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/embattled-china-evergrande-back-court-liquidation-hearing-2024-01-28/">went bust</a>. And other large property developers are in trouble. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-67142093">Country Garden</a> has defaulted and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e1ffbcb4-3222-4a8e-be61-e3a6051567f5">Vanke</a> is struggling to find the new loans it needs to stay alive. </p>
<p>The government confirmed its determination to deflate the property bubble in its annual meeting. It did not highlight how to protect more property developers from defaulting, and only hinted at giving some help to allow developers to complete property projects.</p>
<p>The current weak consumer demand in China’s economy is closely related to the real estate crisis. The value of houses is <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-17/china-home-prices-fall-most-since-2015-as-downturn-persists">much lower</a> today than it was two years ago, creating fear about the future value of personal wealth. This has prompted more precautionary saving and less consumption in the face of weak social protection, leading to a general <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/feb/08/china-consumer-prices-plunge-at-fastest-rate-for-15-years-as-deflation-fears-deepen">decline in the price</a> of goods and services. </p>
<p>Demand for Chinese goods from abroad has also been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-us-pledge-joint-action-over-china-concerns-2023-05-13/">declining</a> due to trade restrictions imposed by the US and the EU, geopolitical concerns and shocks to global supply chains. This explains why throughout its annual meetings the government explicitly emphasised the need to strengthen the self-reliance of the Chinese economy. </p>
<h2>New drivers of growth</h2>
<p>The most eye-catching phrase to come out of the annual meetings was “new quality productive forces”. There are varying interpretations of the term, but they all focus on technology and innovation. </p>
<p>Chinese officials explicitly highlighted the need for China to strive to invent more products related to Artificial Intelligence (AI). The government envisions applications such as AI-powered travel agents and salespeople. </p>
<p>China has, up to this point, been better known for applying AI technologies. Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen are all <a href="https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/chinas-smart-cities-and-future-geopolitics">smart cities</a>, where advanced technologies such as AI, cloud computing and big data are used in various areas including transport, urban planning and public security.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A robot police officer driving down a street in China." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Shanghai’s first robot police officer patrolling the streets in 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/shanghai-china-dec-20-2019-shanghais-1594426684">atiger/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, transforming China’s economy from one that is driven by investment and fuelled by debt to one that is driven by innovation and technology will bring some fresh challenges. </p>
<p>First, innovation requires incentives and an institutional guarantee to reward risk-taking. Hence, the private sector needs to grow faster. <a href="https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/2023/chinas-state-vs-private-company-tracker-which-sector-dominates">Research</a> has found that the share of China’s private sector among the 100 largest listed companies in China dropped to 36.8% at the end of 2023 from 55.4% in mid-2021. </p>
<p>Second, innovation requires more highly skilled human capital. A <a href="https://www.oecd.org/future-of-work/reports-and-data/AI-Employment-brief-2021.pdf">report</a> by the OECD in 2021 concluded that the application of AI technology increases the demand for skilled employees, despite replacing low-skilled labour. This will pose a challenge for China as, up to this point, the country’s growth has been spurred by low-skilled labour. </p>
<p>Third, high-tech industries such as AI and digital services are energy intensive. China has already taken steps to diversify its energy supply, but securing energy supply chains will be essential in the longer term. </p>
<p>Heightened geopolitical tensions and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-63883047">revamped global supply chains</a> may well reduce exports of energy and other natural resources to China in the future. Many of these resources come from developing economies that have exchanged their resources for China’s infrastructure investment in the past. This is unlikely to be the case in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225623/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hong Bo previously received funding from the British Academy. </span></em></p>China is facing many economic obstacles, but Beijing remains optimistic about growth.Hong Bo, Professor of Financial Economics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2258712024-03-15T21:14:11Z2024-03-15T21:14:11ZDoes TikTok pose a security threat to Canadians?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582280/original/file-20240315-30-xv5fae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C65%2C5472%2C3571&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">TikTok poses no more of a threat to democracy than other social media platforms.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Concerns about the threats TikTok poses to privacy and liberty were raised again, as a bill to divest TikTok of its Chinese ownership or ban it <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/2318307395724">gathered steam</a> in the United States Congress. And Canada’s federal government revealed that it began investigating months ago whether foreign control of the app <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/tiktok-national-security-review-1.7143574">poses a threat to national security</a>. </p>
<p>Government officials see TikTok posing a threat to Canadians in two ways: violating our personal privacy by collecting too much data, and sabotaging our democracy through misinformation and manipulation.</p>
<p>Are these threats theoretical or real? And is there any proof supporting the concerns that the Chinese government exerts control over <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/company/1774397D:CH">ByteDance Ltd.</a>, the Beijing-based company that owns TikTok?</p>
<p>There is good reason to believe TikTok may pose a threat to our privacy, but not to our democracy. The platform may collect too much data, but fears that China will use TikTok to misinform or manipulate us for political purposes are misplaced. </p>
<p>China doesn’t need to control TikTok to influence our elections. It can do that quite easily without this. Canada’s ongoing efforts to minimize the national security threat TikTok poses won’t neutralize the threat social media poses to democracy.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/CETjQv8aqw0?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">CBC News looks into the potential ban of TikTok.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Privacy concerns are real</h2>
<p>But TikTok does pose a threat to our privacy. European regulators have <a href="https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-and-transparency-at-the-opc/proactive-disclosure/opc-parl-bp/ethi_20231025/is_20231025/">fined TikTok for collecting data</a> from users too young to provide valid consent, for misusing data and for “nudging” users toward privacy-invading conduct through default settings. </p>
<p>Class actions in Canada and the U.S. have made a <a href="https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-and-transparency-at-the-opc/proactive-disclosure/opc-parl-bp/ethi_20231025/is_20231025/">similar case</a>.</p>
<p>Cybersecurity experts have <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canada-tiktok-western-scrutiny-1.6760037">warned of how invasive the app can be</a>, as it tracks user location, incoming messages and which networks a user accessed. Permissions for this are buried deep in the app’s settings, but <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilsayegh/2022/11/09/tiktok-users-are-bleeding-data/">most users are unaware</a> or don’t bother to check.</p>
<p>In late March, Canada’s Privacy Commissioner and three provincial counterparts are set to <a href="https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-news/news-and-announcements/2023/an_230223/">table a report on an investigation</a> into how TikTok gathers and uses our data. The Commission will most likely recommend following Europe’s lead in passing legislation to require greater transparency in the data TikTok collects and further restrictions in how they can use it.</p>
<h2>Fears that China will interfere</h2>
<p>On March 1, the federal government issued a new <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/innovation-science-economic-development/news/2024/03/canada-strengthens-guidelines-on-foreign-investments-in-the-interactive-digital-media-sector.html">policy that foreign-owned platforms</a> like TikTok would face “enhanced scrutiny” under powers in the <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/I-21.8/index.html">Investment Canada Act</a>. Under the act, the government can impose conditions on foreign investors or companies where there are “reasonable grounds to believe” their involvement in Canada “could be injurious to national security.”</p>
<p>Cabinet ministers were <a href="https://www.canadianlawyermag.com/practice-areas/crossborder/federal-government-issues-additional-directions-for-interactive-digital-media/384566">clear and direct about their concerns</a>: “hostile state-sponsored or state-influenced actors may try to leverage foreign investments in the interactive digital media sector to spread disinformation and manipulate information.”</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canada-tiktok-western-scrutiny-1.6760037">Twenty-six per cent of Canadians now use TikTok</a>. Could the Canadian subsidiary of TikTok take measures to prevent the Chinese government from engaging in misinformation or manipulation?</p>
<h2>Why concerns are misplaced</h2>
<p>In February, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence issued a <a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf">threat assessment</a> that revealed TikTok accounts run by a “propaganda arm” of the Chinese government “targeted candidates from both political parties during the U.S. midterm election cycle in 2022.”</p>
<p>But as one commentator noted in the <em>New York Times</em>, the National Intelligence report did not say <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/14/opinion/tiktok-ban-house-vote.html">whether TikTok’s algorithms promoted these nefarious accounts</a>. China may have used TikTok to misinform and manipulate, but it didn’t need to do so by directing ByteDance.</p>
<p>A 2021 study by the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab dug deep into TikTok’s code and data collection abilities; its findings support the view that <a href="https://citizenlab.ca/2021/03/tiktok-vs-douyin-security-privacy-analysis/">TikTok is no more invasive</a> than Facebook, Instagram or other social media platforms. </p>
<p>The study found that both TikTok and its Chinese version, Douyin, “do not appear to exhibit overtly malicious behavior similar to those exhibited by malware.” And although Douyin contains “features that raise privacy and security concerns, such as dynamic code loading and server-side search censorship,” it found “TikTok does not contain these features.”</p>
<p>This doesn’t mean that China is not able to direct ByteDance to do things that could harm Canadians. But it does support the view that China doesn’t have to bother with ByteDance — an agent of the Chinese government (or any adversary) can readily do so by posing as an ordinary user.</p>
<p>In short, fears about Chinese interference in Canadian and American elections may be warranted. But just as Russia may have used fake accounts on Facebook to interfere in the <a href="https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2.pdf">2016 U.S. presidential election</a>, China can misinform and manipulate us by using any and all social media against us. </p>
<p>This points to the real threat to our democracy: social media we can’t control.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225871/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Diab does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>About 26 per cent of Canadians use TikTok. Regulating the app in Canada might be a better approach to avoiding external political influence.Robert Diab, Professor, Faculty of Law, Thompson Rivers UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2258702024-03-15T20:03:38Z2024-03-15T20:03:38ZAttempts to ban TikTok reveal the hypocrisy of politicians already struggling to relate to voters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582275/original/file-20240315-26-rjm6wo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C23%2C5333%2C2969&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Banning TikTok has economic implications and will affect hundreds of millions of users.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>TikTok has been under review due to national security concerns by the <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/tiktok-national-security-review-1.7143574">Canadian federal government</a> since September 2023.</p>
<p>This was reported the day after the U.S. House of Representatives voted to pass a bill potentially banning TikTok. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau says that the Canadian review of TikTok <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/federal-government-ordered-national-security-review-of-tiktok-didn-t-disclose-it-publicly-1.6807265">is not related to the current actions undertaken by U.S. lawmakers</a>, but the government is following how the situation unfolds.</p>
<p>A potential ban in the United States and possibly Canada reveals the hypocrisy of those trying to get rid of it: politicians.</p>
<h2>Government concerns over TikTok</h2>
<p>The legislation proposed by U.S. lawmakers to ban TikTok — unless their Beijing-based parent company ByteDance divests — stems from rising geopolitical tensions. The potential ban represents the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/30/facebook-tiktok-targeted-victory/">lobbying efforts</a> of Silicon Valley companies, who are finding their power in the global platform economy decreasing. </p>
<p>U.S. and Canadian governments are concerned about the control and authority China exerts over ByteDance, and the possibility they can access user data. </p>
<p>However, it is unsurprising that national security concerns are being debated about TikTok in Canada. Trudeau’s February 2023 decision to ban TikTok on <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-mobile-apps-canada-government-united-states-justin-trudeau-43b27a80a1c2bf3b55e5ccf2ce573684">government-issued mobile devices</a> followed a similar move undertaken by U.S. President Joe Biden, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/jan/20/us-tiktok-bans-university-campuses">numerous U.S. universities</a>. </p>
<p>Donald Trump also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/business/trump-tik-tok-wechat-ban.html">expressed similar concerns about TikTok</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-attempts-to-ban-tiktok-and-other-chinese-tech-undermine-global-democracy-144144">national security in 2020</a>. He has since changed his position; one of Trump’s campaign supporters is a wealthy Republican billionaire who is also <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/14/trump-tiktok-billionaire-donors-00146892">a major investor in TikTok</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1767181571876859911"}"></div></p>
<h2>Real-world implications</h2>
<p>A potential TikTok ban in the U.S. and Canada could have disastrous economic implications on the livelihoods of both Americans and Canadians.</p>
<p>TikTok is a lucrative platform for numerous small business owners and entrepreneurial platform workers. For <a href="https://windsor.ctvnews.ca/that-s-their-livelihood-windsor-ont-influencer-md-motivator-talks-possible-u-s-tiktok-ban-1.6806543">Canadian TikTok influencers</a>, their followers are predominantly composed of American users. Banning TikTok would likely mean the loss of views and interactions in the tens of thousands.</p>
<p>In the U.S., <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2023/11/15/23962766/nearly-one-third-of-young-adults-are-regularly-getting-news-from-tiktok">young people are increasingly using TikTok to access news</a>. While TikTok’s growth has been slower in Canada, it’s one of the <a href="https://socialmedialab.ca/2022/09/14/survey-finds-canadians-are-spending-less-time-on-social-media-but-tiktok-is-the-exception/">most popular apps</a> among young users. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-pandemic-measures-are-lifted-social-media-use-has-declined-with-the-exception-of-tiktok-191126">As pandemic measures are lifted, social media use has declined with the exception of TikTok</a>
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<p>It’s in accessing and circulating information where the hypocritical implications of a TikTok ban come to the forefront of this debate.</p>
<h2>U.S. politicians and TikTok</h2>
<p>President Biden first banned TikTok on government devices in <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/tiktok-ban-biden-government-college-state-federal-security-privacy-rcna63724">December 2022</a>. The move was due to the continuing debate about China’s influence over ByteDance.</p>
<p>However, TikTok was instrumental in the Biden adminstration’s communications strategy. In 2021, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/01/technology/vaccine-lies-influencer-army.html">White House partnered with social media influencers</a>, including TikTok creators, to encourage U.S. citizens to get their COVID-19 vaccine. </p>
<p>TikTok played an important role leading up to the November 2022 midterm elections. The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/10/27/tiktok-democrats-influencers-biden/">Democratic National Committee (DNC)</a> invited TikTok influencers to Washington, D.C. These influencers met with high-ranking members of Biden’s administration, interacted with former president Barack Obama, and toured key D.C. landmarks, like the Capitol and the Oval Office. These activities were all posted on TikTok as part of the DNC campaign.</p>
<p>Despite announcing that he would <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-tiktok-ban-house-china-aaa884d8c974f0a35856af5ee6aa4e99">sign legislation banning TikTok if passed</a>, Biden’s campaign recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/feb/13/joe-biden-tiktok-campaign-national-security-social-media">activated a TikTok profile</a> as part of their digital strategy for the upcoming presidential election. </p>
<p>Biden is currently <a href="https://theconversation.com/young-people-are-lukewarm-about-biden-and-giving-them-more-information-doesnt-move-the-needle-much-222233">not performing well with young voters</a>. His campaign’s decision to reestablish a TikTok presence reflects this re-election concern. It is not a wise re-election strategy to pass a TikTok ban prior to the November presidential election.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582274/original/file-20240315-18-ebnnj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6000%2C3997&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a group of people protesting with signs that read I'M ONE OF 170 MILLION AMERICANS WHO USE TIKTOK. the US capitol can be seen in the background" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582274/original/file-20240315-18-ebnnj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6000%2C3997&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582274/original/file-20240315-18-ebnnj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582274/original/file-20240315-18-ebnnj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582274/original/file-20240315-18-ebnnj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582274/original/file-20240315-18-ebnnj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582274/original/file-20240315-18-ebnnj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582274/original/file-20240315-18-ebnnj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Devotees of TikTok protest a proposed bill that would lead to a nationwide ban of the popular video app if its China-based owner doesn’t divest.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Politics and TikTok in Canada</h2>
<p>In contrast to the U.S., Trudeau’s ban of TikTok has stifled political campaigning on the platform by other Canadian politicians. </p>
<p>NDP leader Jagmeet Singh consequently <a href="https://www.thestar.com/politics/federal/pierre-poilievre-jagmeet-singh-take-tiktok-hiatus-amid-government-ban-over-privacy-concerns/article_3943a81c-ed92-5477-9335-266219980b95.html">deactivated</a> his TikTok profile. With almost 900,000 followers, Singh’s TikTok attempted to communicate with young users in a language and style they understand. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/canadas-decision-to-ban-tiktok-from-government-devices-is-bad-news-for-the-ndps-election-strategy-200980">Canada's decision to ban TikTok from government devices is bad news for the NDP's election strategy</a>
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<p>Despite these existing bans, national security reviews and the threat of new proposed bans, politicians across Canada are campaigning on TikTok.</p>
<p>The Ontario NDP began posting on TikTok in January 2024, with many of their videos using <a href="https://www.blogto.com/city/2024/02/ontario-political-flame-war-cat-memes/">cat memes</a> to advocate against Premier Doug Ford’s policies. This move is part of the Ontario NDP’s <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/P/bo70027855.html">permanent campaign</a> digital strategy gearing up for the 2026 provincial election. </p>
<p>Throughout his political career, Trudeau has cultivated his political image by using social media platforms like <a href="https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/april-2018/instagram-justin-trudeau-and-political-image-making/">Instagram</a>. It’s noteworthy that neither himself, nor the Liberal or Conservative parties have ever had a TikTok presence.</p>
<p>That’s because TikTok has been strategically used by those parties that don’t have the same <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051231157604">financial resources</a>. Political parties like the NDP see TikTok as a long term strategy to reach potential young voters. </p>
<p>If the Canadian government follows with similar legislation, these political parties will lose out on a platform where they can reach young voters.</p>
<p>Concerns about privacy and security exist with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election">all social media platforms</a>, not just TikTok. Proposed U.S. legislation banning TikTok and Canadian national security reviews showcase the insincerity of politicians and the contradictory nature of politics. Their actions reveal what they don’t want to admit: TikTok is a dominant social media platform.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225870/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aidan Moir has previously received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.</span></em></p>Proposed U.S. legislation banning TikTok and the recently revealed Canadian national security review of the app reveals the insincerity and hypocrisy of politicians.Aidan Moir, Assistant Professor, Department of Communication, Media and Film, University of WindsorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2257492024-03-15T15:15:16Z2024-03-15T15:15:16ZIs TikTok’s parent company an agent of the Chinese state? In China Inc., it’s a little more complicated<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582050/original/file-20240314-28-369bin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C5%2C3553%2C2358&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some U.S. lawmakers have grown concerned about TikTok.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-walk-past-an-advertisement-featuring-the-tiktok-logo-news-photo/2075608549?adppopup=true">Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images.</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Does the Chinese government have officials inside TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, pulling the strings? And does the storing of data from the popular social media app outside of China protect Americans?</p>
<p>These questions appear to dominate the current thinking in the U.S. over <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/13/technology/tiktok-ban-house-vote.html">whether to ban TikTok</a> if its owner, Chinese technology giant ByteDance, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/14/tiktok-ban-china-would-block-sale-of-short-video-app.html">refuses to sell the platform</a>.</p>
<p>But in my opinion – forged through <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=vXeBa0kAAAAJ&hl=en">40 years as a scholar of China, its political economy and business</a> – both questions obscure a more interesting point. What’s more, they suggest a crucial misunderstanding of the relationship between state and private enterprise in China.</p>
<p>Simply put, there’s no clear line between the state and society in China in the same way that there is in democracies. The Chinese Communist Party – which is synonymous with the Chinese state – both owns and is the nation. And that goes for private enterprises, too. They operate like joint ventures in which the government is both a partner and the ultimate boss. Both sides know that – even if that relationship isn’t expressly codified and recognizable to outside onlookers.</p>
<h2>ByteDance under the microscope</h2>
<p>Take ByteDance. The company has become the focus of scrutiny in the U.S. largely due to the outsized influence that its subsidiary <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2024/02/22/how-u-s-adults-use-tiktok/">plays in the lives of young Americans</a>. Some <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-house-vote-force-bytedance-divest-tiktok-or-face-ban-2024-03-13/">170 million Americans</a> are TikTok users, and U.S. politicians fear their data has a direct route back to the Chinese state via ByteDance, which has its head offices in Beijing.</p>
<p>Location aside, concerned voices in the U.S. cite the evidence of former ByteDance employees who suggest <a href="https://apnews.com/article/tiktok-china-bytedance-user-data-d257d98125f69ac80f983e6067a84911">interference from the Chinese government</a>, and reports that the state has quietly <a href="https://www.theinformation.com/articles/beijing-tightens-grip-on-bytedance-by-quietly-taking-stake-china-board-seat">taken a direct stake and a board seat</a> at Beijing ByteDance Technology Co. Ltd., ByteDance’s Chinese subsidiary.</p>
<p>Grilled by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce in March 2023, TikTok’s Singaporean CEO Shou Zi Chew <a href="https://apnews.com/article/tiktok-ban-ceo-congressional-hearing-bytedance-china-44d948c5b0ba18e2a714e0fa62d52779">said unequivocally</a> that ByteDance was not “an agent of China or any other country.”</p>
<p>The history of the Chinese government’s dealings with private companies suggests something more subtle, however.</p>
<h2>The rise of China Inc.</h2>
<p>Over its century-long history, the Chinese Communist Party has sought to exercise control over all aspects of the country, including its economy. In its early days, this control took the form of a heavy-handed <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/command-economy.asp">command economy</a> in which everything was produced and consumed according to government planning.</p>
<p>China took a step in a more capitalist direction in the latter half of the 20th century after the death of Mao Zedong, founder of the People’s Republic of China. But even the <a href="https://www.cato.org/publications/chinas-post-1978-economic-development-entry-global-trading-system">reforms of Deng Xiaoping</a> in the late 1970s and 1980s – credited for opening up China’s economy – were in the service of party goals. Because China’s economy was in ruins, the party’s emphasis was on economic development, and it loosened its grip on power to encourage that. The continuation of party control was still paramount – it just needed to reform the economy to ensure that goal.</p>
<p>That didn’t mean the party wanted pluralism. After decades of economic growth, and with a GDP surpassing that of the U.S. when <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3085501/china-overtakes-us-no-1-buying-power-still-clings-developing">measured by purchasing power parity</a>, the Chinese government once again started to shift its focus to a comprehensive control of China.</p>
<p>In recent years, under the increasingly <a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/Chapter_1--CCP_Decision-Making_and_Xi_Jinpings_Centralization_of_Authority.pdf">centralized control of Xi Jinping</a>, the Chinese government has evidently opted to run the entire country as a <a href="http://doi.org/10.1108/IJOEM-12-2019-1103">giant corporation</a>, with the ruling party as its management.</p>
<h2>A party with unusual power</h2>
<p>Unlike political parties in democracies, which people freely join and leave, the Chinese Communist Party resembles a secret society. <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Constitution_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China.pdf">To join</a>, you need to be introduced by two party members and tested for an extended period, and then pledge to die for the party’s cause. Quitting it also <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2017-02/05/c_1120413145.htm">needs approval by the party</a>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12023">Orders are implicit</a>, and protecting one’s superior is crucial. </p>
<p>People who don’t cooperate face serious consequences. In 2022, an official warned a resident who disobeyed the official’s order in COVID-19 testing that three generations of the resident’s descendants <a href="https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/generation-05122022062839.html">would be adversely affected</a> if he were uncooperative. The same is true of businesses: Ride-sharing company Didi incurred the party’s displeasure by listing its stocks in the U.S., and was harshly punished and forced to delist as a result – <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/china-fines-didi-global-12-bln-violating-data-security-laws-2022-07-21/">losing more than 80% of its value</a>. </p>
<p>Since those who disobey the party are weeded out or are punished and seen to have learned their lessons, all surviving and successful private businesses are <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/jack-ma-makes-ant-offer-to-placate-chinese-regulators-11608479629?page=1">party supporters</a> – either voluntarily or otherwise.</p>
<p>The rapid emergence of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009076210">China Inc.</a> has caught even seasoned Chinese entrepreneurs off guard. Consider the case of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/07/28/1021651586/chinese-billionaire-sun-dawu-is-sentenced-to-18-years-for-provoking-trouble">Sun Dawu</a>, a successful agricultural entrepreneur known for advocating for rural reform and the rights of farmers. That offended the party, and in 2020, authorities confiscated all his assets and sentenced him to 18 years in prison.</p>
<p>As if that weren’t enough, China’s National Intelligence Law granted broad powers to the country’s spy agencies and obligates companies to assist with intelligence efforts. That’s why some American lawmakers are concerned that ByteDance could be <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/will-the-us-crack-down-on-tiktok-six-questions-and-expert-answers-about-the-bill-in-congress/">forced to hand over Americans’ private data</a> to the Chinese state. <a href="https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-au/the-truth-about-tiktok">TikTok denies</a> this is the case. However, recently <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/leaked-hacking-files-show-chinese-spying-on-citizens-and-foreigners-alike">leaked files</a> of I-Soon, a Chinese hacking firm, reveal public-private collusion in data sharing is common in China.</p>
<p>That’s why I’m not convinced by TikTok’s argument that American users’ data is safe because it’s stored <a href="https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/tiktok-facts-how-we-secure-personal-information-and-store-data">outside of China</a>, in the U.S., Malaysia and Singapore. I also don’t think it’s relevant whether the party has members on the ByteDance board or gives explicit orders to TikTok.</p>
<p>Regardless of whether ByteDance has formal ties with the party, there will be the tacit understanding that the management is working for two bosses: the investors of the company and – more importantly – their political overseers that represent the party. But most importantly, when the interests of the two bosses conflict, the party trumps.</p>
<p>As such, as long as ByteDance owns TikTok, I believe ByteDance will use TikTok to support the party – not just for its own business survival, but for the safety of the personnel of ByteDance and TikTok, and their families.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225749/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaomin Li does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In China, ‘private’ businesses aren’t entirely private and the ultimate boss is the CCP, not the CEO.Shaomin Li, Eminent Scholar and Professor of International Business, Old Dominion UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2256282024-03-13T21:35:03Z2024-03-13T21:35:03ZDigital surveillance is omnipresent in China. Here’s how citizens are coping<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581384/original/file-20240225-28-qjmkpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C34%2C3817%2C2121&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Chinese government may access the data collected by Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Xiaomi and other operators. How are citizens coping with this constant digital surveillance?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Do you ever think about the digital footprint you leave when you are browsing the web, shopping online, commenting on social networks or going by a facial recognition camera? </p>
<p>State surveillance of citizens is growing all over the world, but it is a fact of everyday life in China, where it has <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003403876-4/surveillance-china-ariane-ollier-malaterre?context=ubx&refId=4b23b424-16f8-41ce-89e5-09d719356614">deep historical roots</a>.</p>
<p>In China, almost nothing is paid for in cash anymore. <a href="https://search.worldcat.org/fr/title/1043756337">Super apps</a> make life easy: people use Alipay or WeChat Pay to pay for subway or bus tickets, rent a bike, hail a taxi, shop online, book trains and shows, split the bill at restaurants and even pay their taxes and utility bills. </p>
<p>The Chinese also use these platforms to check the news, entertain themselves and exchange countless text, audio and video messages, both personal and professional. Everything is linked to the user’s mobile phone number, which is itself registered under their identity. The government may access the data collected by Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Xiaomi and other operators. </p>
<p>Much has been written about <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/poi3.291">blacklists</a> (listing authors of “trust-breaking” behaviours, such as not settling one’s debts), <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/353602055_Blacklists_and_Redlists_in_the_Chinese_Social_Credit_System_Diversity_Flexibility_and_Comprehensiveness">redlists</a> (listing authors of commendable behaviours, such as volunteering) and commercial and public <a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/china-social-credit-system-explained">“social credit”</a> systems. However, recent research has shown that these systems are still <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/369147865_Civilized_cities_or_social_credit_Overlap_and_tension_between_emergent_governance_infrastructures_in_China">fragmented and scattered in terms of data collection and analysis</a>. They also rely at least partly on <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-99-2189-8">manual</a> rather than digitized or algorithmic processes, with little capacity to build integrated citizen profiles through compiling all the available data.</p>
<p>How do Chinese citizens experience this constant surveillance? In my book <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Living-with-Digital-Surveillance-in-China-Citizens-Narratives-on-Technology/Ollier-Malaterre/p/book/9781032517704"><em>Living with Digital Surveillance in China: Citizens’ Narratives on Technology, Privacy and Governance</em></a>, I present research I conducted in China in 2019. Specifically, the book is based on 58 semi-structured in-depth interviews with Chinese participants recruited through colleagues at three universities in Beijing, Shanghai and Chengdu.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People hunched over their mobile phones ride on a train" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578075/original/file-20240226-18-45emg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578075/original/file-20240226-18-45emg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=292&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578075/original/file-20240226-18-45emg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=292&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578075/original/file-20240226-18-45emg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=292&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578075/original/file-20240226-18-45emg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578075/original/file-20240226-18-45emg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578075/original/file-20240226-18-45emg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">On the Beijing metro, commuters consult their smartphones, where people get information, entertain themselves and exchange countless messages, both personal and professional.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Unmasking and punishing violators, improving morality</h2>
<p>Like my colleagues <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1461444819826402">Genia Kostka</a> and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3958660">Chuncheng Liu</a>, I discovered that many participants in my research frame surveillance as indispensable for solving China’s problems. </p>
<p>Underpinning this support is a coherent system of anguishing narratives, to which redemptive narratives respond. The anguishing narratives emphasise the moral shortcomings that the research participants attribute to China: almost every participant brought up the <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003403876-6/rules-monitoring-raise-people-moral-quality-ariane-ollier-malaterre?context=ubx&refId=9424fad5-6e42-4823-874b-3a4adbf97a7b">“lack of moral quality”</a> of their fellow citizens, whom they said behaved like children with little moral sense. </p>
<p>In the context of this shame-inducing narrative, surveillance is framed as a welcome solution to enforce the rules by punishing violators and getting people to behave better. According to the participants, moral shortcomings are responsible for the <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003403876-7/national-humiliations-civilisation-dream-ariane-ollier-malaterre?context=ubx&refId=0167048c-9288-4a50-af2d-67ef75ca2d9a">“century of humiliations”</a> that China has experienced since the Opium Wars and the Japanese invasions; according to this discourse, “civilizing” the population will enable China to gain the international recognition it so ardently desires. </p>
<p>Finally, wanting to protect privacy was often seen by participants as a <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003403876-8/saving-face-ariane-ollier-malaterre?context=ubx&refId=26e22dfc-2812-429d-a0b8-2df3e5fab205">desire to hide shameful secrets in order to save face</a>. Here too, surveillance is viewed positively, as a tool to unmask shady behaviours and promote morality. </p>
<p>These three narratives of shame and fear are countered by two redemptive ones, that serve as an antidote: that of the <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003403876-10/government-protection-order-ariane-ollier-malaterre?context=ubx&refId=3bc7328b-b04b-45c3-91fc-80e059436273">government as a protective figure</a>, i.e., one that acts like a benevolent parent who guarantees the security and prosperity of its children, and the resolutely techno-optimistic one of <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003403876-11/technology-magic-bullet-ariane-ollier-malaterre?context=ubx&refId=061fee9e-9fa6-4088-8fa3-9bcff0f94b6b">technology as a magic bullet</a> where technological advances is credited as the potential to solve all of China’s problems, and as a civilizing force that will propel China towards international recognition. </p>
<h2>Four types of mental tactics for distancing oneself from surveillance</h2>
<p>Yet the people I spoke to also expressed <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003403876-14/misgivings-objections-ariane-ollier-malaterre?context=ubx&refId=a410f3e8-32c4-469e-9f52-c26deefb50c5">frustration, fear and anger</a> about state surveillance. Almost 90 per cent of them adopted one or more <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003403876-13/mental-tactics-dissociate-oneself-surveillance-ariane-ollier-malaterre?context=ubx&refId=89ae4273-b251-495c-8293-92e28ba99ef3">mental tactics</a> to distance, and mentally protect themselves, from surveillance. </p>
<p>In my analysis I identified four different types of tactics:</p>
<p><strong>1 – Brushing surveillance aside</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><p>Denying or minimizing the existence of surveillance: “Nobody is watching. The government does not want to spend money to pay people to watch all the time. When they need it, they check; otherwise, no one is watching.”</p></li>
<li><p>Ignoring it: “If I don’t like the loss of privacy and freedom, I choose to ignore it, I don’t think of it.” Or: “Yes, it’s true, but it does not harm me. It does not remind me all the time. Sometimes I choose to ignore it.”</p></li>
<li><p>Normalizing it: “In China everyone shares their credit card information, their address, their ID. We feel secure.”; “Most governments use social media as a tool to spy.”</p></li>
<li><p>Redefining restrictions as temporary, or as occurring less than in the past, or less for oneself than for others, such as civil servants. Some redefine freedom itself: “It’s the country that makes the laws, the regulations, it’s like that in all countries. Other behaviours are a matter of my freedom, for example what I’m going to have for lunch.”</p></li>
</ul>
<p><strong>2 – Othering surveillance targets</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><p>Because I’m just an ordinary citizen: “I’m not a big potato, there’s no need for people to intentionally find me.”</p></li>
<li><p>Or because I’m a good person and “the blacklist is just for criminals”: “We think that improving public behaviour will make the environment and surroundings better for us, for the ones who obey the rules in the first place.”</p></li>
</ul>
<p><strong>3 – Wearing blinders</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><p>By focusing on everyday life: “Most people don’t care about these things. They care about money and power.”</p></li>
<li><p>Or, by focusing on the present: “We can’t live without Zhifu [Alipay], or Didi. We have facial recognition, CCTV is everywhere. It won’t harm me at present, so far, it does not do actual harm, so I’m not that concerned.”</p></li>
</ul>
<p><strong>4 – Resorting to fatalism</strong></p>
<p>“Nobody can avoid it… I don’t know how to avoid this risk, I just accept it.”; “We think it’s useless to spend time discussing the social credit system since we can’t change it.”</p>
<h2>The cognitive and emotional weight of surveillance</h2>
<p>In short, the way the Chinese citizens I spoke to experience digital surveillance is characterized by strong psychic tensions: the same persons who support surveillance as being indispensable in the Chinese context are also and nevertheless expressing the heavy burden that coping with such exposure places on them. </p>
<p>This weight is both cognitive, as evidenced by the range of self-protective mental tactics to dissociate oneself from surveillance, and emotional, as conveyed in participants’ strong emotions and <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003403876-15/self-censorship-ariane-ollier-malaterre?context=ubx&refId=3f08cb71-224e-498d-ac93-917dafa6d0aa">particularly telling body language</a>.</p>
<p>So, what about us? We, in Western liberal democracies, are also exposed to digital surveillance. And our surveillance ideas are also shaped by our own socio-political, cultural, and economic contexts, with significant variations across different Western societies. My work suggests that some of our own privacy and surveillance narratives are quite close to the Chinese ones, while others clearly differ. </p>
<p>What about you? How do you see your own relationship to digital surveillance?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225628/count.gif" alt="La Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ariane Ollier-Malaterre has received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. She is a member of the Work and Family Researchers Network, the Association of Internet Researchers and the Academy of Management.</span></em></p>State surveillance of citizens is growing all over the world, but it is a fact of daily life in China. People are developing mental tactics to distance themselves from it.Ariane Ollier-Malaterre, Professeure de management et titulaire de la Chaire de recherche du Canada sur la régulation du digital dans la vie professionnelle et personnelle; Canada Research Chair in Digital Regulation at Work and in Life, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2235302024-03-11T12:28:23Z2024-03-11T12:28:23ZChinese migration to US is nothing new – but the reasons for recent surge at Southern border are<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580813/original/file-20240309-22-nrn6pj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=21%2C21%2C7232%2C4807&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese migrants wait for a boat after having walked across the Darien Gap from Colombia to Panama.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/PanamaMigrants/2ba0353fc214442d94948cdd54d7139b/photo?Query=chinese%20migrants&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=195&currentItemNo=4">AP Photo/Natacha Pisarenko</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The brief closure of the Darien Gap – a perilous 66-mile jungle journey linking South American and Central America – in February 2024 temporarily halted <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/28/world/americas/migrants-darien-gap-arrests.html">one of the Western Hemisphere’s busiest migration routes</a>. It also highlighted its importance to a small but growing group of people that depend on that pass to make it to the U.S.: <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/chinese-migrants-fastest-growing-group-us-mexico-border-60-minutes-transcript">Chinese migrants</a>.</p>
<p>While a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/22/1221006083/immigration-border-election-presidential#:%7E:text=">record 2.5 million migrants</a> were detained at the United States’ southwestern land border in 2023, <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Chinese-migrants-flock-to-U.S.-Mexico-border-on-economic-pressures">only about 37,000 were from China</a>.</p>
<p>I’m a <a href="https://history.umbc.edu/facultystaff/full-time/meredith-oyen/">scholar of migration and China</a>. What I find most remarkable in these figures is the speed with which the number of Chinese migrants is growing. Nearly 10 times as many Chinese migrants crossed the southern border in 2023 as in 2022. In December 2023 alone, U.S. Border Patrol officials reported <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/02/15/migrant-encounters-at-the-us-mexico-border-hit-a-record-high-at-the-end-of-2023/">encounters with about 6,000 Chinese migrants</a>, in contrast to the 900 they reported a year earlier in December 2022.</p>
<p>The dramatic uptick is the result of a confluence of factors that range from a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-economy-property-adb-791934f7f9b83de455e8f8aa7178b628">slowing Chinese economy</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/04/china/china-two-sessions-xi-jinping-economic-challenges-intl-hnk/index.html">tightening political control</a> by President Xi Jinping to the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/chinese-migrants-use-social-media-tips-on-trek-to-us-mexico-border-/7071743.html">easy access to online information</a> on Chinese social media about how to make the trip.</p>
<h2>Middle-class migrants</h2>
<p>Journalists reporting from the border have generalized that Chinese migrants <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/24/us/politics/china-migrants-us-border.html">come largely from</a> <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/chinese-migrants-fastest-growing-group-us-mexico-border-60-minutes-transcript/">the self-employed middle class</a>. They are not rich enough to use education or work opportunities as a means of entry, but they can <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/03/business/darien-gap-china-immigration.html">afford to fly across the world</a>.</p>
<p>According to a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/migrants-find-tips-chinese-version-tiktok-long-trek-us-mexico-border-2023-04-28/">report from Reuters</a>, in many cases those attempting to make the crossing are small-business owners who saw irreparable damage to their primary or sole source of income due to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/what-is-china-s-zero-covid-policy-/6854291.html">China’s “zero COVID” policies</a>. The migrants are women, men and, in some cases, children accompanying parents from all over China.</p>
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<p>Chinese nationals have <a href="https://reimaginingmigration.org/chinese-immigrants-to-the-us-past-and-present">long made the journey to the United States</a> seeking economic opportunity or political freedom. Based on <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-border-mexico-chinese-migrants-60-minutes/">recent media interviews with migrants</a> coming by way of South America and the U.S.’s southern border, the increase in numbers seems driven by two factors.</p>
<p>First, the most common path for immigration for Chinese nationals is through a <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/chinese-immigrants-united-states">student visa or H1-B visa</a> for skilled workers. But <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/business/china-travel-coronavirus.html">travel restrictions</a> during the early months of the pandemic temporarily stalled migration from China. Immigrant visas are out of reach for many Chinese nationals without family or vocation-based preferences, and tourist visas require a personal interview with a U.S. consulate to gauge the likelihood of the traveler returning to China. </p>
<h2>Social media tutorials</h2>
<p>Second, with the legal routes for immigration difficult to follow, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/migrants-find-tips-chinese-version-tiktok-long-trek-us-mexico-border-2023-04-28/">social media accounts have outlined alternatives</a> for Chinese who feel an urgent need to emigrate. Accounts on Douyin, the TikTok clone available in mainland China, document locations open for visa-free travel by Chinese passport holders. On TikTok itself, migrants could find information on where to cross the border, as well as information about transportation and smugglers, <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/us-border-crisis/article-13141787/chinese-migrants-snakeheads-gangs-cartel-flights-border.html">commonly known as “snakeheads</a>,” who are experienced with bringing migrants on the journey north.</p>
<p>With virtual private networks, immigrants can also gather information from U.S. apps such as X, YouTube, Facebook and other sites that are otherwise blocked by Chinese censors.</p>
<p>Inspired by social media posts that both <a href="https://news.creaders.net/us/2024/01/16/2690015.html">offer practical guides and celebrate the journey</a>, thousands of Chinese migrants have been flying to Ecuador, which <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/which-countries-can-chinese-passport-holders-visit-without-visa-2024-01-29/">allows visa-free travel for Chinese citizens</a>, and then making their way over land to the U.S.-Mexican border.</p>
<p>This journey involves trekking through the Darien Gap, which despite its <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/10/how-treacherous-darien-gap-became-migration-crossroads-americas">notoriety as a dangerous crossing</a> has <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/08/americas/china-us-migrants-illegal-crossings-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">become an increasingly common route</a> for migrants from Venezuela, Colombia and all over the world.</p>
<p>In addition to information about crossing the Darien Gap, these social media posts highlight the best places to cross the border. This has led to a large share of Chinese asylum seekers <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/chinese-migrants-fastest-growing-group-us-mexico-border-60-minutes-transcript/">following the same path</a> to Mexico’s Baja California to cross the border near San Diego.</p>
<h2>Chinese migration to US is nothing new</h2>
<p>The rapid increase in numbers and the ease of accessing information via social media on their smartphones are new innovations. But there is a longer history of Chinese migration to the U.S. over the southern border – and at the hands of smugglers.</p>
<p>From 1882 to 1943, the United States <a href="https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/chinese-exclusion-act">banned all immigration</a> by male Chinese laborers and most Chinese women. A combination of economic competition and racist concerns about Chinese culture and assimilability ensured that the Chinese would be the first ethnic group to enter the United States illegally.</p>
<p>With legal options for arrival eliminated, some Chinese migrants took advantage of the relative ease of movement between the U.S. and Mexico during those years. While some migrants adopted Mexican names and spoke enough Spanish to pass as migrant workers, others used <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2700784">borrowed identities or paperwork</a> from Chinese people with a right of entry, like U.S.-born citizens. Similarly to what we are seeing today, it was middle- and working-class Chinese who more frequently turned to illegal means. Those with money and education were able to circumvent the law by arriving as students or members of the merchant class, both exceptions to the exclusion law.</p>
<p>Though these Chinese exclusion laws officially ended in 1943, restrictions on migration from Asia continued until Congress revised U.S. immigration law in the <a href="https://immigrationhistory.org/item/hart-celler-act/">Hart-Celler Act in 1965</a>. New priorities for immigrant visas that stressed vocational skills as well as family reunification, alongside then Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s policies of “reform and opening,” <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/china-development-transformed-migration">helped many Chinese migrants</a> make their way legally to the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s.</p>
<p>Even after the restrictive immigration laws ended, Chinese migrants without the education or family connections often needed for U.S. visas continued to take dangerous routes with the help of “snakeheads.” </p>
<p>One notorious incident occurred in 1993, when a ship called the Golden Venture <a href="https://www.mocanyc.org/collections/stories/golden-venture/">ran aground near New York</a>, resulting in the drowning deaths of 10 Chinese migrants and the arrest and conviction of the snakeheads attempting to smuggle hundreds of Chinese migrants into the United States.</p>
<h2>Existing tensions</h2>
<p>Though there is plenty of precedent for Chinese migrants arriving without documentation, Chinese asylum seekers have better odds of success than many of the other migrants making the dangerous journey north. </p>
<p>An estimated <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1107366/download">55% of Chinese asylum seekers are successful</a> in making their claims, often citing political oppression and lack of religious freedom in China as motivations. By contrast, only 29% of Venezuelans seeking asylum in the U.S. have their claim granted, and the number is even lower for Colombians, at 19%.</p>
<p>The new halt on the migratory highway from the south has affected thousands of new migrants seeking refuge in the U.S. But the mix of push factors from their home country and encouragement on social media means that Chinese migrants will continue to seek routes to America.</p>
<p>And with both migration and the perceived threat from China likely to be features of the upcoming U.S. election, there is a risk that increased Chinese migration could become politicized, leaning further into existing tensions between Washington and Beijing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223530/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meredith Oyen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A gloomier economic outlook in China and tightening state control have combined with the influence of social media in encouraging migration.Meredith Oyen, Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2235862024-03-07T13:09:58Z2024-03-07T13:09:58ZTampon tax: Chinese women are breaking period taboos to campaign for lower prices<p>Menstrual health and sanitary towels have been <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3814221">taboo</a> subjects for hundreds of years in China. However, things are starting to change as women begin to feel more comfortable talking about this subject in public. </p>
<p>In recent months campaign groups have been springing up to rally opposition against high levels of tax on period-related products, such as tampons and sanitary towels, using social media. </p>
<p>Grassroots organisations, such as <a href="https://thechinaproject.com/2023/10/11/end-tax-on-menstrual-products-chinese-women-say/">Period Pride</a>, use public accounts on WeChat (a popular instant messaging app) to rally public support against high prices for goods that are traditionally sold to women. </p>
<p>Another sign of an uptick in campaigning was that the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/feminist-consumers-china-push-back-pink-tax-rcna124560">hashtag</a> #PinkTax went viral on social media in the winter of 2023, making the case that items that were pink and aimed at women tended to cost more than products aimed at men. This issue will be bubbling up again on International Women’s Day (IWD), which has recently become a busy shopping day in China.</p>
<p>Period Pride has compared China with nearly <a href="https://thechinaproject.com/2023/10/11/end-tax-on-menstrual-products-chinese-women-say/">20 countries</a> which have scrapped or reduced tampon taxes. It has highlighted the discrepancy in taxing tampons compared to <a href="https://www.163.com/dy/article/IGC9JMB205563QMT.html">other products</a> on sale in China, such as tax-exempt contraceptive methods like condoms and birth control medication. A few years ago this kind of public discussion about periods and menstruation would not have happened. </p>
<p>One of the most significant issues is the price of sanitary towels. In China, the VAT rate for sanitary napkins is 13%, the highest level of taxation and is on a par with the tax rate applied to imported goods. Other goods considered necessities are taxed at 11%. </p>
<p>During the 14th session of the 13th National People’s Congress in 2021, congress deputy <a href="https://sbs.mof.gov.cn/jytafwgk_8395/2021jytafwgk_1/rddbjyfwgk/202108/t20210820_3746776.htm">Wang Zuoying</a> put forward a proposal advocating for the provision of free menstrual products to targeted groups of women. In June 2021, the ministry of finance responded saying that the existing tax rate for sanitary napkins, which is 13%, already reflects a reduction <a href="https://sbs.mof.gov.cn/jytafwgk_8395/2021jytafwgk_1/rddbjyfwgk/202108/t20210820_3746776.htm">from previous years</a>.</p>
<p>In September 2023, China released an <a href="https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-value-added-tax-law-draft-legislation/">updated draft of its VAT law</a>, and asked for public feedback. Period Pride was one of the groups that publicly argued that the tax on sanitary towels and tampons was too high.</p>
<h2>History of taboos</h2>
<p>Period blood has long been falsely regarded as impure in China, with the potential to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3814221">contaminate</a> anyone who comes into contact with it. Menstruating women were traditionally prohibited from <a href="http://journal.julypress.com/index.php/ajsss/article/view/1263">entering temples</a>, even today women in some places <a href="https://radii.co/article/menstrual-period-poverty-shame-china">are banned from worship</a> during their periods. To avoid the social discomfort associated with uttering the word “menstruation”, women often used euphemisms such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14616742.2021.1927134#:%7E:text=Resisting%20two%20invented%20characters%20and,to%20middle%2Dclass%20feminist%20activism.">“the big aunt” or “that”</a>. </p>
<p>From the early 2000s, Chinese feminists began to tackle shame and taboos around <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14616742.2022.2155209">menstruation</a>, spurred on by the influence of western feminist movements. One notable example is the debut of the dance <a href="https://chinesefeminism.org/2021/04/21/%E3%80%8A%E9%98%B4%E9%81%93%E7%8B%AC%E7%99%BD%E3%80%8B%E5%9C%A8%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%A4%A7%E9%99%86%E7%9A%84%E6%97%85%E8%A1%8C-%E4%B8%8A%E7%AF%87/">“Menarche”</a> (named after the first menstrual cycle), which featured in the Chinese adaptation of The Vagina Monologues, in 2003.</p>
<p>A Chinese social media campaign in February 2020, during the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/12259276.2022.2098554">COVID pandemic</a>, drew attention to the desperate need for women doctors and nurses to have access to sanitary pads and period pants. Many female medical workers were not given time to change their sanitary pads during their long working hours at hospitals, or did not have access to supplies. A public campaign for <a href="https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1005190">donations</a> of sanitary towels or period pants drew support, but critics argued they were nonessential items.</p>
<p>Another issue is that high prices of sanitary items leave many girls unable to afford them. In August 2020, a Weibo user shared a screenshot of <a href="https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1006124">bulk sanitary napkins</a> purchased online. The post prompted a wider discussion about how many girls in rural areas didn’t have access to these products, partly because of cost but also because of taboos. According to one report, <a href="https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1006124">5% of girls in poorer</a> rural areas across China did not use sanitary products, while 13% felt ashamed about asking their parents for money to buy them. Many girls in rural areas were using <a href="https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_10039659">rough paper, old towels, or worn-out clothing</a>.</p>
<p>In September 2022, a complaint about the unavailability of menstruation products on <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-china-a-debate-over-sanitary-pads-on-trains-reflects-long-held-beliefs-about-women-and-menstruation-192069#:%7E:text=China%20Railway%20responded%20that%20feminine,food%20is%20served%20on%20train.">high-speed trains</a> prompted a wider public discussion about making such products accessible. </p>
<p>The fact that this debate has to happen at all reveals the long-term invisibility of women’s needs and the deeply ingrained stigma associated with period products. Some of those who opposed the selling of menstrual products on trains were <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14616742.2022.2155209">concerned</a> that they were unclean and unsuitable for placement alongside food items. The <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14616742.2022.2155209">revelation</a> that some men do not even know that women cannot simply control their menstrual blood also reflects a shocking deficiency in sex education within Chinese schools, as well as a tendency among parents and educational providers to avoid discussing this topic.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>The strategy used by Period Pride highlights the political constraints in China. Facing the risk of being labelled as <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/434/article/848001/summary">agents of foreign influence</a>, feminist movements have tactfully chosen to work with the government rather than against it. Instead of resorting to protests, Period Pride encourages people to use the government-provided channels for political participation. While viewed as ineffective by some, these offer a less risky alternative to traditional protests.</p>
<p>Discussions regarding menstrual pads on high-speed trains were relatively untouched by severe censorship, as they did not directly challenge the state’s legitimacy. These conversations predominantly revolved around business interests.</p>
<p>It remains to be seen whether people’s submission of suggestions through government websites will result in any change to the tampon tax. However, even if it does not, the act of submitting suggestions and making voices heard can help to build momentum for incremental change. Public discussions on social media platforms are creating an environment in which attitudes to periods are starting to erode historical taboos.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223586/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This research is conducted together with Ming Zhang of the UK-China Media and Cultural Studies Association, who made important contributions to this piece.</span></em></p>Chinese women are ignoring taboos around menstrual products to argue for fairer prices, using social media channels.Chi Zhang, Associate lecturer in international relations, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2244382024-03-04T13:41:42Z2024-03-04T13:41:42ZDemand for computer chips fuelled by AI could reshape global politics and security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578585/original/file-20240228-18-rudxyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=28%2C0%2C6361%2C3592&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/close-silicon-die-being-extracted-semiconductor-2262331365">IM Imagery / Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A global race to build powerful computer chips that are essential for the next generation of artificial intelligence (AI) tools could have a major impact on global politics and security. </p>
<p>The US is currently leading the race in the design of these chips, also known as semiconductors. But most of the manufacturing is carried out in Taiwan. The debate has been fuelled by the call by Sam Altman, CEO of ChatGPT’s developer OpenAI, for <a href="https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/sam-altman-seeks-trillions-of-dollars-to-reshape-business-of-chips-and-ai-89ab3db0">a US$5 trillion to US$7 trillion</a> (£3.9 trillion to £5.5 trillion) global investment to <a href="https://venturebeat.com/ai/sam-altman-wants-up-to-7-trillion-for-ai-chips-the-natural-resources-required-would-be-mind-boggling/">produce more powerful chips</a> for the next generation of AI platforms. </p>
<p>The amount of money Altman called for is more than the chip industry has spent in total since it began. Whatever the facts about those numbers, overall projections for the AI market are mind blowing. The data analytics company GlobalData <a href="https://www.globaldata.com/media/technology/generative-ai-will-go-mainstream-2024-driven-adoption-specialized-custom-models-multimodal-tool-experimentation-says-globaldata/">forecasts that the market will be worth US$909 billion</a> by 2030.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, over the past two years, the US, China, Japan and several European countries have increased their budget allocations and put in place measures to secure or maintain a share of the chip industry for themselves. China is catching up fast and is <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/09/china-boosts-semiconductor-subsidies-as-us-tightens-restrictions/">subsidising chips, including next-generation ones for AI</a>, by hundreds of billions over the next decade to build a manufacturing supply chain. </p>
<p>Subsidies seem to be the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/germany-earmarks-20-bln-eur-chip-industry-coming-years-2023-07-25/">preferred strategy for Germany too</a>. The UK government has announced its <a href="https://www.ukri.org/news/100m-boost-in-ai-research-will-propel-transformative-innovations/#:%7E:text=%C2%A3100m%20boost%20in%20AI%20research%20will%20propel%20transformative%20innovations,-6%20February%202024&text=Nine%20new%20research%20hubs%20located,help%20to%20define%20responsible%20AI.">plans to invest £100 million</a> to support regulators and universities in addressing challenges around artificial intelligence. </p>
<p>The economic historian Chris Miller, the author of the book Chip War, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ai-chip-race-fears-grow-of-huge-financial-bubble/a-68272265">has talked about how powerful chips have become a “strategic commodity”</a> on the global geopolitical stage.</p>
<p>Despite the efforts by several countries to invest in the future of chips, there is currently a shortage of the types currently needed for AI systems. Miller recently explained that 90% of the chips used to train, or improve, AI systems are <a href="https://www.siliconrepublic.com/future-human/chip-war-semiconductors-supply-tech-geopolitics-chris-miller">produced by just one company</a>.</p>
<p>That company is the <a href="https://www.tsmc.com/english">Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC)</a>. Taiwan’s dominance in the chip manufacturing industry is notable because the island is also the focus for tensions between China and the US. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-microchip-industry-would-implode-if-china-invaded-taiwan-and-it-would-affect-everyone-206335">The microchip industry would implode if China invaded Taiwan, and it would affect everyone</a>
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<p>Taiwan has, for the most part, <a href="https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/content_3.php#:%7E:text=The%20ROC%20government%20relocated%20to,rule%20of%20a%20different%20government.">been independent since the middle of the 20th century</a>. However, Beijing believes it should be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-calls-taiwan-president-frontrunner-destroyer-peace-2023-12-31/">reunited with the rest of China</a> and US legislation requires Washington to <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479#:%7E:text=Declares%20that%20in%20furtherance%20of,defense%20capacity%20as%20determined%20by">help defend Taiwan if it is invaded</a>. What would happen to the chip industry under such a scenario is unclear, but it is obviously a focus for global concern.</p>
<p>The disruption of supply chains in chip manufacturing have the potential to bring entire industries to a halt. Access to the raw materials, such as rare earth metals, used in computer chips has also proven to be an important bottleneck. For example, China <a href="https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2024/technology/">controls 60% of the production of gallium metal</a> and 80% of the global production of germanium. These are both critical raw products used in chip manufacturing.</p>
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<img alt="Sam Altman" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">OpenAI CEO Sam Altman has called for a US$5 trillion to $7 trillion investment in chips to support the growth in AI.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/openai-ceo-sam-altman-attends-artificial-2412159621">Photosince / Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And there are other, lesser known bottlenecks. A process called <a href="https://research.ibm.com/blog/what-is-euv-lithography">extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography</a> is vital for the ability to continue making computer chips smaller and smaller – and therefore more powerful. <a href="https://www.asml.com/en">A single company in the Netherlands, ASML</a>, is the only manufacturer of EUV systems for chip production.</p>
<p>However, chip factories are increasingly being built outside Asia again – something that has the potential to reduce over-reliance on a few supply chains. Plants in the US are being subsidised to the tune of <a href="https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2024/technology/">US$43 billion and in Europe, US$53 billion</a>. </p>
<p>For example, the Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturer TSMC is planning to build a multibillion dollar facility in Arizona. When it opens, that factory <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-microchip-industry-would-implode-if-china-invaded-taiwan-and-it-would-affect-everyone-206335">will not be producing the most advanced chips</a> that it’s possible to currently make, many of which are still produced by Taiwan.</p>
<p>Moving chip production outside Taiwan could reduce the risk to global supplies in the event that manufacturing were somehow disrupted. But this process could take years to have a meaningful impact. It’s perhaps not surprising that, for the first time, this year’s Munich Security Conference <a href="https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2024/technology/">created a chapter devoted to technology</a> as a global security issue, with discussion of the role of computer chips. </p>
<h2>Wider issues</h2>
<p>Of course, the demand for chips to fuel AI’s growth is not the only way that artificial intelligence will make major impact on geopolitics and global security. The growth of disinformation and misinformation online has transformed politics in recent years by inflating prejudices on both sides of debates. </p>
<p>We have seen it <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26675075">during the Brexit campaign</a>, during <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20563051231177943">US presidential elections</a> and, more recently, during the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-gaza-misinformation-fact-check-e58f9ab8696309305c3ea2bfb269258e">conflict in Gaza</a>. AI could be the ultimate amplifier of disinformation. Take, for example, deepfakes – AI-manipulated videos, audio or images of public figures. These could easily fool people into thinking a major <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/feb/26/ai-deepfakes-disinformation-election">political candidate had said something they didn’t</a>.</p>
<p>As a sign of this technology’s growing importance, at the 2024 Munich Security Conference, 20 of the world’s largest tech companies <a href="https://news.microsoft.com/2024/02/16/technology-industry-to-combat-deceptive-use-of-ai-in-2024-elections/">launched something called the “Tech Accord”</a>. In it, they pledged to cooperate to create tools to spot, label and debunk deepfakes. </p>
<p>But should such important issues be left to tech companies to police? Mechanisms such as the EU’s Digital Service Act, the UK’s Online Safety Bill as well as frameworks to regulate AI itself should help. But it remains to be seen what impact they can have on the issue.</p>
<p>The issues raised by the chip industry and the growing demand driven by AI’s growth are just one way that AI is driving change on the global stage. But it remains a vitally important one. National leaders and authorities must not underestimate the influence of AI. Its potential to redefine geopolitics and global security could exceed our ability to both predict and plan for the changes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224438/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alina Vaduva is affiliated with the Labour Party, as a member and elected councillor in Dartford, Kent. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kirk Chang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The effects of AI’s growth on global security could be difficult to predict.Kirk Chang, Professor of Management and Technology, University of East LondonAlina Vaduva, Director of the Business Advice Centre for Post Graduate Students at UEL, Ambassador of the Centre for Innovation, Management and Enterprise, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2236962024-03-04T13:41:31Z2024-03-04T13:41:31ZSome nations have done well out of Russia being sanctioned – here’s why<p>Since the start of the Ukraine war, the US, EU, UK and other countries including Japan and Canada have increased sanctions on Russia. By late 2023, Russia became the <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/27015/number-of-currently-active-sanctions-by-target-country/">most sanctioned country</a> in the world with over 18,000 restrictions on different items – more than the combined number of sanctions on Iran, North Korea and Syria. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60125659">Restrictions</a> include financial measures such as the freezing of the Russian central bank’s assets in the countries imposing the relevant sanctions, limiting Russia’s access to income from oil and gas exports, sanctions on technologies employed in military production such as microelectronic components, the ban on Russia’s diamond and gold exports, and other measures designed to affect Russian shoppers and business. Hundreds of international corporations have stopped working in Russia.</p>
<p>Restricting trade with a particular country, however, does not translate into lower demand for the products sanctioned. Sanctions on Russia resonate in the global economy and there are also <a href="https://time.com/6155581/russia-sanctions-global-economic-impact/">“surprising winners”</a> whose economies have benefited. </p>
<p>For instance, restrictions have diverted <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/Issues/2023/04/13/regional-economic-outlook-mcd-april-2023">trade routes</a> away from Russia to the neighbouring Caucasus and central Asia region leading to these economies, including Armenia and Kazakhstan, growing on average by 4.8% in 2022.</p>
<p>Once countries imposed bans on their exports to Russia, Putin <a href="https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/economy-and-ecology/beyond-russia-the-impacts-of-sanctions-on-the-region-6959/">started sourcing</a> supplies from other states including Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkey. This enabled Russia to have continuous <a href="https://silverado.org/news/report-russia-shifting-import-sources-amid-u-s-and-allied-export-restrictions/">access</a> to foreign goods and technology, for instance, vehicles and semiconductors.</p>
<p>The imposition of sanctions is an alternative to military conflict, and its objective is to maximise <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1574001306020278?casa_token=yLZ1fJzrHiAAAAAA:vD4t3N0oOGb3-51QcQiVttYaXsxq61_4g1ne0Od5iKHkcSav_wqiY6vLpAjAtXqpyu4iOpE589Q">economic damage</a>. They can be economic or financial imposed by governments or international institutions on states, companies and individuals, and are employed when a particular <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-are-economic-sanctions">state’s interests</a> are threatened or there are violations of international law.</p>
<h2>Russia looks for new partners</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/Issues/2023/04/13/regional-economic-outlook-mcd-april-2023">Reports</a> indicate that bilateral trade between Russia and Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan has increased since the war began. By September 2022, exports from <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/Issues/2023/04/13/regional-economic-outlook-mcd-april-2023">Kyrgyzstan</a> to Russia rose to 34% of its total exports, up from 14% in 2021. </p>
<p>Similarly, restrictions to the Russian banking sector led to a significant increase in <a href="https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/economy-and-ecology/beyond-russia-the-impacts-of-sanctions-on-the-region-6959/">net money transfers</a> from Russia to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. For example, in <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/Issues/2023/04/13/regional-economic-outlook-mcd-april-2023">Armenia</a> transfers reached 17% of GDP, and in Georgia they reached 8% of GDP. Such transfers may be done, for example, by Russians moving to third countries, people purchasing properties in those countries or by people attempting to maintain access to their money via foreign banks.</p>
<p>Changing how it imports goods has also enabled Russia to sustain military production. Countries including China, Turkey and the UAE have become <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/09/russia-sanctions-weapons-technology-exports-evasion-arms-production-missiles-chips/">hubs</a> to channel critical technologies to Russia and <a href="https://insightnews.media/is-kyrgyzstan-a-hub-for-re-export-of-goods-to-russia-in-sanctions-evasion-schemes/">bypass sanctions</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/05/17/hong-kong-s-technology-lifeline-to-russia-pub-89775">Reports</a> indicate that Hong Kong has become a hub to transfer western-built microelectronics to Russia. It doubled its semiconductor exports to Russia to about US$400 million (£316 million) worth in 2022. In the same year, Russian’s imports of semiconductors from <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/05/17/hong-kong-s-technology-lifeline-to-russia-pub-89775">China</a> steeply increased from about US$200 million to over US$500 million. Likewise, the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/05/17/hong-kong-s-technology-lifeline-to-russia-pub-89775">UAE</a> increased its exports of microchips to Russia from US$1.6 million in 2021 to US$24.3 million in 2022.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, through a military <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-ramps-up-military-rhetoric-as-kim-gives-up-on-reunification-with-south-213696">weapons deal</a>, Russia and North Korea have deepened their relationship with the increased military sales representing a new income source for the latter.</p>
<p>Other countries have gained from stepping into trade areas where Russia had dominated. In 2022, as sanctions affected the export of diamonds from Russia, there was a strong global demand leading to a <a href="https://businessweekly.co.bw/news/botswana-profits-from-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-report">20.4%</a> increase in Botswana’s diamond exports that year. Similarly, it has been reported that the UAE has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/russia-with-gold-uae-cashes-sanctions-bite-2023-05-25/">cashed in</a> as a thriving gold hub, increasing its gold imports from Russia from about 1.3 tonnes in 2021 to 75.7 tonnes, worth US$4.3 billion, between 2022 and 2023. In 2022, Russia became the UAE’s <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-09-20/russia-becomes-uae-s-top-gold-source-after-being-shut-out-of-west">main source</a> for gold imports.</p>
<p>As sanctions tighten on the Russian economy and the war continues, there’s a significant brain drain of highly skilled people from Russia. It’s estimated that <a href="https://epjdatascience.springeropen.com/articles/10.1140/epjds/s13688-023-00389-3">11.1%</a> of Russian software developers relocated between 2021 and 2022, for example. <a href="https://epjdatascience.springeropen.com/articles/10.1140/epjds/s13688-023-00389-3">Armenia</a> saw a 42% increase in developers, Cyprus 60% and Georgia 94%. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-economy-brain-drain-labor-shortage-workforce-exodus-capital-flight-2023-9?r=US&IR=T">Evidence</a> suggests that of those who have emigrated from Russia since the war began, 80% are university graduates with 100,000 IT professionals relocating in 2022. In the “receiving economies”, such levels of “brain gain” can have a significant effect as an influx of highly skilled people <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w26651/w26651.pdf">impacts innovation</a>, entrepreneurship and, ultimately, economic growth.</p>
<h2>US increases oil purchases elsewhere</h2>
<p>Asian and Middle Eastern countries are not the only places to benefit. The <a href="https://time.com/6155581/russia-sanctions-global-economic-impact/">US</a> has money flowing into its economy as investors that might have put funds into Russia look for new opportunities. </p>
<p>In addition, since imposing restrictions on the imports of Russian crude oil and products in early 2022, the US has <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/00000186-9ef3-d045-afd6-bff35efd0000">increased</a> its imports from countries such as Brazil, Iraq, Mexico and Saudi Arabia. <a href="https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbblpd_a.htm">Data</a> shows that in the period between 2021 and 2022, while Brazilian crude oil and products exports to the US increased from 143,000 to 193,000 barrels per day, Iraq’s grew from 157,000 to 311,000, Mexico’s from 711,000 to 808,000 and Saudi Arabia’s from 430,000 to 559,000.</p>
<p>So far, sanctions have yielded some of the expected outcomes. For instance, in 2022, the Russian economy contracted by 2.1% with such <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/sanctions-and-russias-war-limiting-putins-capabilities">growth</a> linked to a 14% reduction in exports and a 11% drop in imports, compared to 2021. </p>
<p>On the one hand, sanctioning countries have had to shift trade sources which have brought financial benefits to trade partners. On the other, Russia has circumvented some restrictions by shifting import sources via third parties. The benefits that third countries obtain from redirected trade may be temporary or positive in the short term, but not necessarily in the long term. This will depend on how the Russian economy is able to perform under continuous restrictions and the uncertainty that such conditions and war entail.</p>
<p>Whatever the result for Russia itself, the shifting patterns of Russia’s needs and imports have certainly boosted some other countries economies, perhaps unexpectedly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223696/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jose Caballero does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia has looked for new trading partners as sanctions bite, but also suffered a brain drain.Jose Caballero, Senior Economist, IMD World Competitiveness Center, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2247022024-03-02T13:57:59Z2024-03-02T13:57:59ZBiden executive order on sensitive personal information does little for now to curb data market – but spotlights the threat the market poses<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579300/original/file-20240301-20-u3yyne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5619%2C3743&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre took questions on the day the Biden administration announced an executive order that puts personal data privacy in a national security context.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Biden/8e243ab989c94229acc5325bd910a11f/photo?Query=White%20House%20Feb.%2028,%202024">AP Photo/Andrew Harnik</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Biden administration has identified “countries of concern” exploiting Americans’ sensitive personal data as a national emergency. To address the crisis, the White House issued an <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/02/28/executive-order-on-preventing-access-to-americans-bulk-sensitive-personal-data-and-united-states-government-related-data-by-countries-of-concern/">executive order</a> on Feb. 28, 2024, aimed at preventing these countries from accessing Americans’ bulk sensitive personal data. </p>
<p>The order doesn’t specify the countries, but news reports cited unnamed senior administration officials <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-executive-action-personal-data-protections-china-ea0fe0af31dc26b254e2724c8e53867f">identifying them</a> as China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Cuba and Venezuela.</p>
<p>The executive order adopts a simple, broad definition of sensitive data that should be protected, but the order is limited in <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/02/28/fact-sheet-president-biden-issues-sweeping-executive-order-to-protect-americans-sensitive-personal-data/">the protections it affords</a>.</p>
<p>The order’s larger significance lies in its stated rationale for why the U.S. needs such an order to protect people’s sensitive data in the first place. The national emergency is the direct result of the staggering quantities of sensitive personal data up for sale – to anyone – in the vast international commercial data market, which is comprised of companies that collect, analyze and sell personal data. </p>
<p>Data brokers are using ever-advancing predictive and generative artificial intelligence systems to gain insight into people’s lives and exploit that power. This is increasingly posing risks to individuals and to domestic and national security.</p>
<p>I am an <a href="https://www.annetoomeymckenna.com/">attorney and law professor</a>, and I work, write and teach about data, information privacy and AI. I appreciate the spotlight the order puts on the dangers of the data market by acknowledging that companies collect more data about Americans than ever before – and that the data is legally sold and resold through data brokers. These dangers underscore Congress’ failure to protect people’s most sensitive data.</p>
<p>Sensitive personal data can be fodder for blackmail, raises national security concerns, and can be used as evidence for prosecutions. This is especially true in this era of misinformation and deepfakes – AI-generated video or audio impersonations – and with <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/19-1392">recent U.S. federal</a> and <a href="https://publicportal-api.alappeals.gov/courts/68f021c4-6a44-4735-9a76-5360b2e8af13/cms/case/343D203A-B13D-463A-8176-C46E3AE4F695/docketentrydocuments/E3D95592-3CBE-4384-AFA6-063D4595AA1D">state court rulings</a> that permit states to restrict and criminalize private personal choices, including those related to reproductive rights. The executive order seeks to protect Americans from these risks – at least from those countries of concern.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/_ImomQV65VU?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">In addition to the executive order attempting to prevent adversary countries from accessing Americans’ bulk sensitive data, the Biden administration is also investigating the privacy risk posed by Chinese cars sold in the U.S.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What the executive order does</h2>
<p>The order issues directives to federal agencies to counter certain countries’ continuing efforts to access Americans’ bulk sensitive personal data as well as U.S. government-related data. Among other concerns, the order emphasizes that personal data could be used to blackmail people, including military and government personnel.</p>
<p>Under the order, the Department of Justice will develop and issue regulations that prevent the large-scale transfer of Americans’ sensitive personal data to countries of concern. </p>
<p>More broadly, the order encourages the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to take steps to boost compliance with federal consumer protection law. In part, this could help restrict overly invasive collection and sale of sensitive data and reduce the amount of financial information – like credit reports – that data brokers collect and resell. </p>
<p>The order also directs pertinent federal agencies to prohibit data brokers from selling bulk health and genomics data to the countries of concern. It recognizes that data brokers and their customers are increasingly able to use AI to analyze health and genomics data and other types of data that do not contain individuals’ identities to link data to particular individuals.</p>
<h2>Defining sensitive personal data</h2>
<p>From an information privacy standpoint, the order is significant for its broad definition of what constitutes sensitive personal data. Included in <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/02/28/executive-order-on-preventing-access-to-americans-bulk-sensitive-personal-data-and-united-states-government-related-data-by-countries-of-concern/">this umbrella term are</a> “covered personal identifiers, geolocation and related sensor data, biometric identifiers, human <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43033-1_1">omic data</a>, personal health data, personal financial data, or any combination thereof.” Not included in the definition is any data that is a matter of public record.</p>
<p>The broad definition is significant because it affirms a departure from the U.S. legal system’s <a href="https://teachprivacy.com/problems-sectoral-approach-privacy-law/">standard approach to data</a>, which is sector by sector. Generally, federal and state laws protect different types of data, like <a href="https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/index.html">health data</a>, <a href="https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=3004&ChapterID=57">biometric data</a> and <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/privacy-security/gramm-leach-bliley-act">financial data</a>, in different ways. Only the people and entities within those sectors, like your doctor or bank, are regulated in how they use the data.</p>
<p>That piecemeal approach is not well suited to the era of <a href="https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/pslr/vol123/iss3/2/">satellites and smart devices</a>, and has left much data, even very sensitive data, unprotected. For instance, smartphones and wearable devices and the apps on them sense, collect, use and disseminate vast quantities of highly revealing health-related data and geolocation data, yet such data is not covered by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act or other data protection laws.</p>
<p>By bringing these historically different categories of data under the broader and more easily understood phrase “sensitive personal data,” policymakers in the executive branch have taken a cue from the Federal Trade Commission’s work to <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/01/ftc-order-prohibits-data-broker-x-mode-social-outlogic-selling-sensitive-location-data">protect sensitive consumer data</a>. The FTC has ordered some data brokers to stop selling sensitive location information about individuals. The order also reflects policymakers’ increasing understanding of what’s required for meaningful data protection in the era of predictive and generative AI.</p>
<h2>What the executive order does not do</h2>
<p>The executive order specifies that it does not seek to upend the global data market or adversely impact “the substantial consumer, economic, scientific and trade relationships that the United States has with other countries.” It also does not seek to broadly prohibit people in the U.S. from conducting commercial transactions with entities and individuals in or “subject to the control, direction or jurisdiction of” the countries of concern. </p>
<p>Nor does it impose measures that would restrict U.S. commitments to increase public access to scientific research, the sharing and interoperability of electronic health information, and patient access to their data.</p>
<p>Notably, it does not seek to impose a general requirement that companies have to store Americans’ sensitive data or U.S. government-related data within the territorial boundaries of the U.S., which in theory would provide better protection for the data. It also does not seek to rewrite the 2023 voluntary <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/privacy-security/data-privacy-framework">Data Privacy Framework</a> for transfers of data between the European Union and the U.S.</p>
<p>In sum, it does little to change U.S. commercial data brokers’ activities and practices – except when such activities involve those countries of concern.</p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>The various agencies directed to act must do so within clearly specified time periods in the order, ranging from four months to a year, so for now it is a waiting game. In the meantime, President Joe Biden has joined a long list of people who continue to <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-agencies-buy-vast-quantities-of-personal-information-on-the-open-market-a-legal-scholar-explains-why-and-what-it-means-for-privacy-in-the-age-of-ai-207707">urge Congress</a> to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/02/28/fact-sheet-president-biden-issues-sweeping-executive-order-to-protect-americans-sensitive-personal-data/">pass comprehensive bipartisan privacy legislation</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224702/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anne Toomey McKenna is Co-Chair of the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)-USA's Artificial Intelligence Policy Committee (AIPC), which involves subject matter and education-related interaction with U.S. Senate and House congressional staffers and the Congressional AI Caucus. McKenna has received funding from the National Security Agency for the development of legal educational materials about cyberlaw and funding from The National Police Foundation together with the U.S. Department of Justice-COPS division for legal analysis regarding the use of drones in domestic policing.</span></em></p>The dangers posed by the largely unregulated commercial data market prompted the Biden administration to try to prevent adversarial countries from exploiting Americans’ sensitive personal data.Anne Toomey McKenna, Visiting Professor of Law, University of RichmondLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2240362024-03-01T17:24:48Z2024-03-01T17:24:48ZTaiwan’s election was a clear show of defiance in the face of Chinese intimidation and pressure<p>Taiwan’s recent election result highlights voters’ steadfast determination to resist China’s influence on their politics. Despite all Beijing’s efforts to sway popular support towards its preferred party, the <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/01/taiwans-democracy-prevailed-despite-chinas-election-interference">Kuomintang (KMT)</a>, the election was won by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, incumbent vice-president William Lai.</p>
<p>Lai Ching-te, who is known as William in the west and Lai Qingde in mainland China, won with 40% of the vote. A nationalist who firmly supports Taiwanese independence from China, he scored a convincing victory over KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih, who placed second with 33.5%. In third place was Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je, who received 26.5%.</p>
<p>Lai will succeed the outgoing DPP president, Tsai Ing-wen, when he is <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/five-things-you-need-to-know-about-taiwan-new-president-william-lai-elections-dpp/">inaugurated in May</a>. His election is more than just a victory for Taiwan’s democratic values. It’s an unequivocal rejection by Taiwanese voters of Beijing’s persistent and intrusive meddling in their politics.</p>
<p>Since Taiwan first held direct presidential elections in 1996, Beijing has adeptly employed a dual-faceted strategy towards the island it claims as an inalienable part of its territory. Its “carrot-and-stick approach” is meticulously designed to appeal to voters’ sense of Chinese identity while also trying to steer them way from independence candidates.</p>
<p>This is very much of a piece with China’s <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/01/taiwans-democracy-prevailed-despite-chinas-election-interference">complex relationship</a> with Taiwan. It combines military intimidation and economic incentives, with informal influence operations targeting media organisations and civil society groups.</p>
<p>Beijing reacted to Lai’s election by restating its commitment to unification: “This election cannot change the basic pattern and direction of development of cross-strait relations … that the motherland will eventually be reunified.” </p>
<h2>International reactions</h2>
<p>Beijing also reacted angrily to messages of congratulations received by Lai from an array of world leaders including the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, and the British foreign secretary, David Cameron, who <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/14/taiwan-election-global-leaders-draw-beijings-ire-for-congratulating-new-president">said that</a> the result was “testament to Taiwan’s vibrant democracy”.</p>
<p>Western involvement with Taiwan has been complicated by the fact that <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-that-recognize-taiwan">no major western power recognises Taiwan</a> as an independent country. Instead, most countries pay at least official lip-service to Beijing’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-38285354">“one China” policy</a>. </p>
<p>This holds that Taiwan is the same country as the People’s Republic (mainland China). At the same time, Taiwan’s western allies <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-67909120">supply it with arms</a> to defend itself against any forced assimilation into China.</p>
<p>In reporting the election result, the international media focused squarely on what it suggested about Taiwan’s relations with the mainland. The message was clear in headlines such as “Taiwan voters rebuff China, ruling party gets third presidential term,” (<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/polls-open-taiwans-critical-elections-watched-closely-by-china-2024-01-13/">Reuters’</a>) or “Taiwan Elects US-Friendly President, Defying China Warnings” (<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-13/taiwan-set-to-elect-president-reviled-by-china-in-setback-for-xi">Bloomberg</a>). Throughout the west the election was billed as a defiant Taiwan refusing to back down to Beijing.</p>
<p>It was against this tense backdrop that a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-68346855">five-member US congressional delegation</a> led by the House China committee chairman, Mike Gallagher, arrived in Taipei to pay their respects to the president-elect. Gallagher, a known China hawk, assured Lai of his country’s continuing support. </p>
<p>He said: “I’m confident regardless of how the presidential election goes, we will maintain our support not only for Taiwan but also a posture of internationalism and engagement.”</p>
<p>Gallagher’s trip angered Beijing, which demanded that the US <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/china-demands-us-stop-official-contact-taiwan-congressional-107459161">cease any official contact with Taiwan</a>. “China opposes any form of official interaction between the US and Taiwan authorities and rejects US interference in Taiwan affairs in whatever form or under whatever pretext,” a foreign ministry spokeswoman said, urging Washington to be “mindful of the extreme complexity and sensitivity” of the situation.</p>
<p>Taiwanese foreign minister, Jaushieh Joseph Wu, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R0wuZR0fnmc">welcomed the visit</a>: “Taiwan has been under tremendous military, economic, and also hybrid coercion by the PRC and under these circumstances, the visit of US congressmen has been of tremendous support to Taiwan.”</p>
<h2>China ups the ante</h2>
<p>Most recently, the response from the Chinese Communist party has taken a more strident tone. Wang Huning – a key figure overseeing Taiwanese affairs in China – <a href="https://www.zytzb.gov.cn/zytzb/2024-02/23/article_2024022317133791028.shtml">urged the annual Taiwan Work Conference</a> held in Beijing on February 23 to “resolutely combat ‘Taiwan independence’ separatism, curb interference from external forces, firmly support the patriotic unification forces on the island, broadly unite Taiwan compatriots, and maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait”.</p>
<p>Communist party rhetoric has also <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/28172cc1-b3b7-4a72-88b0-5a963d0ce823">ramped up</a> towards advocates of Taiwanese independence since the election. Where previously party officials had used the term “oppose” (fandui 反对), this year it has shifted to “kill” or “combat” (daji 打击) against “Taiwan separatists.” </p>
<p>It’s a notable change in tone compared to previous conferences. This more aggressive stance would appear to affirm widespread expectations that Beijing will <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/27/taiwan-china-lai-ccp-unification-election-invasion-disinformation/">intensify its attempts</a> to push Taiwan towards unification.</p>
<p>China tried a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/09/taiwan-presidential-election-china-influence">range of gambits</a> to interfere with the recent election. These ranged from hosting visits from hundreds of pro-Beijing Taiwanese local officials in the hope that they could use their influence to sway voters (carrot) to threatening to cancel trade concessions for Taiwanese businesses (stick). </p>
<p>There was deep-fake content pushing Beijing’s message and a blizzard of other misleading online content promoting conspiracy theories about DPP candidates. Chinese aircraft and spy balloons violated Taiwan’s airspace regularly during the campaign.</p>
<p>None of this worked. Turnout for the recent election <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/taiwans-2024-elections-results-and-implications">was 71.86%</a> – significantly higher than in the most recent elections in the US and UK. And there was clear distance between Lai’s 40% of the vote and the other candidates. Clearly the Taiwanese people value their democracy and wanted to send their own message to Beijing through the best medium there is: the ballot box.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224036/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Yukteshwar Kumar is affiliated with the Conservative Party. </span></em></p>Global reaction to the recent Taiwan election, which was won by a pro-independence candidate, contrasts sharply with that of Beijing.Yukteshwar Kumar, Course Director, Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2200142024-03-01T13:32:30Z2024-03-01T13:32:30ZIs the United States overestimating China’s power?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577660/original/file-20240223-28-5lgbn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C229%2C4144%2C2586&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Made it, Mao! Top of the World?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/illustration/dominate-the-world-royalty-free-illustration/1456554749?phrase=china+power&adppopup=true">DigitalVision Vectors via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Which country is the greatest threat to the United States? The answer, according to a large proportion of Americans, is clear: China. </p>
<p>Half of all Americans responding to a <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/07/27/americans-name-china-as-the-country-posing-the-greatest-threat-to-the-us/">mid-2023 survey</a> from the Pew Research Center cited China as the biggest risk to the U.S., with Russia trailing in second with 17%. Other surveys, such as from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, <a href="https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/americans-feel-more-threat-china-now-past-three-decades">show similar findings</a>.</p>
<p>Senior figures in recent U.S. administrations appear to agree with this assessment. In 2020, John Ratcliffe, director of national intelligence under President Donald Trump, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-is-national-security-threat-no-1-11607019599">wrote that</a> Beijing “intends to dominate the U.S. and the rest of the planet economically, militarily and technologically.”</p>
<p>The White House’s current National Defense Strategy is not so alarmist, <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF">referring to China</a> as the U.S.’s “pacing challenge” – a reference that, <a href="https://www.c-span.org/video/?c5038077/pacing-challenge">in the words</a> of Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, apparently means China has “the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the power to do so.” </p>
<p>As someone who has <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/about/staff/dan-murphy">followed China</a> for over a quarter century, I believe that many observers have overestimated the country’s apparent power. Recent <a href="https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/new-book-details-chinas-economic-rise-and-now-its-fall">challenges to China’s economy</a> have led some people to reevaluate just how powerful China is. But hurdles to the growth of Chinese power extend far beyond the economic sector – and failing to acknowledge this reality may distort how policymakers and the public view the shift of geopolitical gravity in what was once called “<a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/10/27/the-chinese-century-is-well-under-way">the Chinese century</a>.”</p>
<p>In overestimating China’s comprehensive power, the U.S. risks misallocating resources and attention, directing them toward a threat that is not as imminent as one might otherwise assume.</p>
<p>Let me be clear: I’m not suggesting that China is weak or about to collapse. Nor am I making an argument about China’s intentions. But rather, it is time to right-size the American understanding of the country’s comprehensive power. This process includes acknowledging both China’s tremendous accomplishments and its significant challenges. Doing so is, I believe, mission critical as the United States and China seek to put a floor underneath a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/15/opinion/balloon-china-taiwan-biden.html">badly damaged bilateral relationship</a>.</p>
<h2>Headline numbers</h2>
<p>Why have so many people misjudged China’s power? </p>
<p>One key reason for this misconception is that from a distance, China does indeed appear to be an unstoppable juggernaut. The high-level <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/us-china-relations-interview-graham-allison">numbers bedazzle observers</a>: Beijing commands the world’s <a href="https://chinapower.csis.org/tracker/china-gdp/#:%7E:text=China%27s%20nominal%20GDP%20is%20the,States%20by%20a%20considerable%20margin.">largest or second-largest</a> economy depending on the type of measurement; it has a rapidly growing <a href="https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/the-military-balance/2024/editors-introduction/">military budget</a> and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeltnietzel/2021/08/07/us-universities-fall-behind-china-in-production-of-stem-phds/?sh=5d2ae6084606">sky-high numbers</a> of graduates in engineering and math; and oversees huge infrastructure projects – laying down nearly 20,000 miles of <a href="http://eu.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/zywj/CSTNENG/202209/P020220915789898685371.pdf">high-speed rail tracks</a> in less than a dozen years and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-20/beijing-replaces-a-huge-highway-overpass-in-only-43-hours">building bridges at record pace</a>. </p>
<p>But these eye-catching metrics don’t tell a complete story. Look under the hood and you’ll see that China faces a raft of intractable difficulties.</p>
<p>The Chinese economy, which until recently was thought of as unstoppable, is beginning to falter due to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/15/economy/deflation-explainer-us-china-economy/index.html">deflation</a>, a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-17/china-s-debt-to-gdp-ratio-rises-to-fresh-record-of-286-1">growing debt-to-gross domestic product ratio</a> and the impact of a <a href="https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/3253325/restructuring-specialists-boost-hong-kong-staff-china-property-crisis-stokes-demand">real estate crisis</a>. </p>
<h2>China’s other challenges</h2>
<p>And it isn’t only China’s economy that has been overestimated.</p>
<p>While Beijing has put in considerable effort building its soft power and sending its leadership around the world, China enjoys <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/07/27/chinas-approach-to-foreign-policy-gets-largely-negative-reviews-in-24-country-survey/">fewer friends</a> than one might expect, even with its willing trade partners. North Korea, Pakistan, Cambodia and Russia may count China as an important ally, but these relationships are not, I would argue, nearly as strong as those enjoyed by the United States globally. Even in the Asia-Pacific region there is a strong argument to say Washington enjoys greater sway, considering the especially close ties with <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3498451/japan-south-korea-us-strengthen-trilateral-cooperation/">allies Japan, South Korea</a> <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-australia-relationship">and Australia</a>. </p>
<p>Even though Chinese citizens report <a href="https://ash.harvard.edu/news/ash-center-researchers-release-landmark-chinese-public-opinion-study">broad support</a> for the Communist Party, Beijing’s <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/how-beijing-accidentally-ended-the-zero-covid-policy/">capricious COVID-19 policies</a> paired with an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/04/chinas-xi-jinping-unwilling-to-accept-western-covid-vaccines-says-us-intelligence-chief">unwillingness to use foreign-made vaccines</a> have dented perceptions of government effectiveness. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A seated man sits at. desk while another man is seen on a TV screen." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Joe Biden participates in a virtual meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-participates-in-a-virtual-meeting-with-news-photo/1353512956?adppopup=true">Alex Wong/Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Further, China’s population is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/16/business/china-birth-rate.html">aging and unbalanced</a>. In 2016, the country of 1.4 billion saw about 18 million births; in 2023, that number dropped to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/16/business/china-birth-rate-2023.html">about 9 million</a>. This alarming fall is not only in line with trends toward a shrinking working-age population, but also perhaps <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/02/28/behind-china-collapse-birth-marriage-rates/">indicative of pessimism</a> among Chinese citizens about the country’s future.</p>
<p>And at times, the actions of the Chinese government read like an implicit admission that the domestic situation is not all that rosy. For example, I take it as a sign of concern over systemic risk that China detained a million or more people, as has happened with the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights">Muslim minority in Xinjiang province</a>. Similarly, China’s policing of its internet suggests <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/study-internet-censorship-reveals-deepest-fears-chinas-government">concerns over</a> collective action by its citizens. </p>
<p>The sweeping anti-corruption campaign Beijing has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/health-china-business-covid-economy-6618e65ef6148e0c75fce4dc2a28011f#">embarked on</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/sweeping-chinese-military-purge-exposes-weakness-could-widen-2023-12-30/">purges of the country’s military</a> and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/17/business/bao-fan-china-banker.html">disappearance</a> of leading business figures all hint at a government seeking to manage significant risk. </p>
<p>I hear many stories from contacts in China about people with money or influence hedging their bets by establishing a foothold outside the country. This aligns with research that has shown that <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/programs/growthpolicy/meg-rithmire-china-global-economy">in recent years</a>, on average as much money leaves China via “irregular means” as for foreign direct investment. </p>
<h2>A three-dimensional view</h2>
<p>The perception of China’s inexorable rise is cultivated by the governing Communist Party, which obsessively seeks to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/media-censorship-china">manufacture and control narratives</a> in state media and beyond that show it as all-knowing, farsighted and strategic. And perhaps this argument finds a receptive audience in segments of the United States concerned about its own decline.</p>
<p>It would help explain why a recent <a href="https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/americans-feel-more-threat-china-now-past-three-decades">Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey</a> found that about a third of American respondents see the Chinese and American economies as equal and another third see the Chinese economy as stronger. In reality, per capita GDP in the United States is <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CN-US">six times that of China</a>. </p>
<p>Of course, there is plenty of danger in predicting China’s collapse. Undoubtedly, the country has seen huge accomplishments since the People’s Republic of China’s founding in 1949: Hundreds of millions of people <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/01/17/509521619/whos-lifting-chinese-people-out-of-poverty">brought out of poverty</a>, extraordinary economic development and <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN">impressive GDP growth</a> over several decades, and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/09/21/china-global-influence-takeaways/">growing diplomatic clout</a>. These successes are especially noteworthy given that the People’s Republic of China is less than 75 years old and was in utter turmoil during the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion">disastrous Cultural Revolution</a> from 1966 to 1976, when intellectuals were sent to the countryside, schools stopped functioning and chaos reigned. In many cases, China’s successes merit emulation and include important lessons for developing and developed countries alike.</p>
<p>China may well be the “pacing challenge” that many in the U.S. believe. But it also faces significant internal challenges that often go under-recognized in evaluating the country’s comprehensive power.</p>
<p>And as the United States and China <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/biden-pushes-for-stable-u-s-relationship-with-china-during-summit-with-xi">seek to steady</a> a rocky relationship, it is imperative that the American public and Washington policymakers see China as fully three-dimensional – not some flat caricature that fits the needs of the moment. Otherwise, there is a risk of fanning the flames of xenophobia and neglecting opportunities for partnership that would benefit the United States.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220014/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dan Murphy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most Americans see China as the biggest threat to the US. But away from headline economic figures, China has a slew of challenges.Dan Murphy, Executive Director of the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, Harvard Kennedy SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2242952024-03-01T11:49:59Z2024-03-01T11:49:59ZPanda diplomacy: what China’s decision to send bears to the US reveals about its economy<p>A <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-send-new-pandas-san-diego-zoo-rcna139926">deal was signed</a> between San Diego Zoo and China’s Wildlife Conservation Association in February 2024 that paved the way for Chinese giant pandas to return to the US by the end of the summer. </p>
<p>But this is far more than just a deal between two zoos. It suggests a <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3252870/chinas-envoys-friendship-return-us-zoo-beijing-restarts-panda-diplomacy">warming of relations</a> between the US and China, and a bid by China to help repair <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/27/economy/china-economy-challenges-2024-intl-hnk/index.html#:%7E:text=The%20Chinese%20economy%20was%20expected,(IMF)%2C%20among%20others.">its struggling economy</a>.</p>
<p>For decades, China has used <a href="https://www.diplomacy.edu/topics/panda-diplomacy/">panda diplomacy</a>, where Beijing gave or loaned its pandas as a sign of friendship or to strengthen national ties, to establish a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/01/panda-diplomacy-exit-from-edinburgh-zoo-may-signal-end-of-era#:%7E:text=As%20the%20UK's%20only%20giant,be%20coming%20to%20an%20end.">good long-term relationship with other countries</a>. However, in 2023, when China <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/08/us/politics/panda-zoo-china.html">withdrew its giant pandas</a> from the Smithsonian zoo in Washington DC, this seemed to symbolise how rocky the China-US relationship had become. </p>
<p>Two pandas were given as a gift to the US after President Richard Nixon <a href="https://nationalzoo.si.edu/animals/history-giant-pandas-zoo">visited China in 1972</a>, and this was seen as a major breakthrough in modern US-China relations. From the 1990s onwards panda diplomacy was transformed into a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/6387">long-term programme</a> involving conservation and scientific study.</p>
<p>Panda diplomacy is part of what is called <a href="https://world101.cfr.org/foreign-policy/tools-foreign-policy/what-soft-power">“soft power”</a>, how nations use their culture or heritage to influence <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/hjd/8/1/article-p49_3.xml?language=en">another country’s foreign policy</a>. Pandas are <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/L/bo3631069.html">soft and cuddly</a>, and have what it takes to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01292986.2020.1725075">win hearts and minds</a>. So, the pandas became part of an attractive part of <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/hjd/8/1/article-p49_3.xml">China’s international image</a>. </p>
<p>By sending these pandas to the US, Beijing intends to woo the American public, but also more specifically, California, the home of the US technology industry.</p>
<p>One reason for this is that Beijing needs to jump start its ailing economy. Foreign investment in China was <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Foreign-investment-in-China-turns-negative-for-first-time">lacklustre</a> in 2022. But between July and September 2023 things got a lot <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Foreign-investment-in-China-turns-negative-for-first-time">worse</a>, as foreign direct investment leaving the country outweighed that coming in. This had not happened since 1998.</p>
<p>A main reason for this drop in foreign investment stems from <a href="https://time.com/6324619/us-biden-ai-chips-china/">US restrictions</a> on exports of semiconductor technology to China. This is related to US concerns that the chips could be used by China for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/11/15/will-xi-and-biden-mend-us-china-relations-at-the-apec-summit#:%7E:text=With%20the%20Chinese%20economy%20slowing,speech%20at%20the%20business%20dinner.">military objectives</a>. To turn the economic tide, China needs to repair its trade relationship with the US, and possibly get the US government to change its policy.</p>
<p>The two giant pandas are headed for California, home to both the Silicon Valley and San Francisco, currently the <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/01/07/ai-start-ups-are-booming-in-san-francisco-s-cerebral-valley_6408847_4.html#:%7E:text=%22San%20Francisco%20is%20the%20AI,of%20more%20than%20three%20years.">world’s centres for artificial intelligence</a> development. </p>
<p>The potential of this technology is important for China. As well as the potential to add <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/quantumblack/our-insights/the-next-frontier-for-ai-in-china-could-add-600-billion-to-its-economy">$600 billion</a> (£474 billion) to the Chinese economy by 2030, it could provide <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2021/696206/EPRS_ATA(2021)696206_EN.pdf">an edge</a> for China’s powerful <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2980879/artificial-intelligence-technology-and-chinas-defense-system/">military</a>.</p>
<p>To become a world leader of artificial intelligence by <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/07/10/china-s-ai-regulations-and-how-they-get-made-pub-90117#:%7E:text=The%202017%20New%20Generation%20AI,China's%20economy%20and%20national%20power.">2030</a>, China needs talent and technological know-how. But China’s ability to enhance its artificial intelligence capacity through domestic talent is constrained by an education system steeped in <a href="https://innovationmatters.economist.com/beijing/education-artificial-intelligence">rote learning</a>.</p>
<p>Beijing’s redeployment of pandas dials up the diplomatic goodwill several notches, signalling Beijing’s seriousness in improving links with Washington. After all, the pandas represent China’s <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/environmental-practice/article/abs/environmental-reviews-and-case-studies-diplomats-and-refugees-panda-diplomacy-soft-cuddly-power-and-the-new-trajectory-in-panda-conservation/A23238335C47C1717417060B7AAB05AF">seal of approval</a> towards a foreign nation, and this move typically <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/environmental-practice/article/abs/environmental-reviews-and-case-studies-diplomats-and-refugees-panda-diplomacy-soft-cuddly-power-and-the-new-trajectory-in-panda-conservation/A23238335C47C1717417060B7AAB05AF">signals</a> a plan to build a long, prosperous working relationship.</p>
<h2>What’s the history?</h2>
<p>The Smithsonian’s zoo, arguably the birthplace of panda diplomacy in the west, had been home to giant pandas since <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/11/08/world/panda-diplomacy-us-china/index.html#:%7E:text=The%20Smithsonian%20National%20Zoo%20was,say%20whether%20it%20will%20continue.">1972</a>. It was from November 8, 2023, that the zoo lost its giant pandas for the first time in <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/11/08/world/panda-diplomacy-us-china/index.html#:%7E:text=(CNN)%20%E2%80%93%20Three%20giant%20pandas,being%20housed%20at%20the%20zoo.">more than 50 years</a>, when Mei Xiang, Tian Tian and their offspring, Xiao Qi Ji were flown back to China.</p>
<p>At that point, there were suggestions that panda diplomacy <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/08/us/politics/panda-zoo-china.html">was over</a> as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/09/28/pandas-returning-china-dc-zoo/">tensions</a> between the US and China had risen significantly. Relations between US and Chinese businesses also seemed to be getting worse. A survey by the US-China Business Council of its members in 2023 found that 34% had stopped or reduced planned investment in China <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/08/business/economy/xi-jinping-american-business-leaders-dinner.html">over the previous 12 months</a>.</p>
<p>But later in November, China’s president Xi Jinping held a four-hour summit with President Joe Biden at the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/08/business/economy/xi-jinping-american-business-leaders-dinner.html">Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) conference in San Francisco</a> and signalled that there was potential for rapprochement. Xi said that, in a world of challenges, the US and China “must handle our relations well”. Xi alluded to the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/xi-jinping-china-pandas-california-biden-summit-rcna125471">pandas’ popularity</a> with Americans. </p>
<p>He added <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/xi-jinping-china-pandas-california-biden-summit-rcna125471">that China</a> is “ready to continue our cooperation with the United States on panda conservation”, and added that China will “do our best to meet the wishes of the Californians so as to deepen the friendly ties between our two peoples”.</p>
<p>Xi also set up a dinner with hundreds of tech executives including Apple CEO Tim Cook and business leaders on the sidelines of the Apec meeting. So it would seem logical that Beijing has decided to send its national treasures to California to signal the state’s importance to the Asian superpower.</p>
<p>It looks like <a href="https://www.history.com/news/panda-diplomacy-the-worlds-cutest-ambassadors">Beijing’s willingness to send its bears</a> back to the US is part of a strategy to improve not only its political relationship with Biden, but, perhaps more importantly, to help bring back US investment, and reframe Beijing as a friendlier trading power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224295/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chee Meng Tan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The arrival of two giant pandas in San Diego is a sign of China’s need to make friends in the US tech industries.Chee Meng Tan, Assistant Professor of Business Economics, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.