tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/coup-14032/articlescoup – The Conversation2023-08-20T09:27:05Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1854482023-08-20T09:27:05Z2023-08-20T09:27:05ZCivilian support for military coups is rising in parts of Africa: why the reasons matter<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543212/original/file-20230817-25-4iakmh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The clamour for coups among citizens is rising</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the night of <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/142678/togo-who-killed-sylvanus-olympio-the-father-of-togolese-independence/">13 January 1963</a>, Togo’s President Sylvanus Olympio was shot dead by rebels in the first military coup staged in Africa. A long list, as shown below, was to come. From the 1960s to the end of the millennium, there were an average of four military coups a year on the continent. By the end of the 1990s this phenomenon seemed to have faded away. </p>
<p>But since August 2020 six African nations have suffered seven coups or attempted coups. </p>
<p>First came <a href="https://theconversation.com/malis-predictable-coup-leaves-an-unclear-path-to-civilian-rule-144774">Mali</a>, in August 2020. The military took advantage of social unrest and insecurity caused by the activities of violent extremists. Mali had two coups or attempts in a nine-month span. </p>
<p>In April 2021, <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-signs-of-a-true-transition-in-chad-a-year-after-idriss-debys-death-181203">Chad</a> followed the same path. In March 2021, there was a coup attempt in Niger, and in September 2021 it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/guinea-coup-highlights-the-weaknesses-of-west-africas-regional-body-167650">Guinea’s</a> turn. A month later, it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-the-longer-the-conflict-lasts-the-higher-the-risk-of-a-regional-war-204931">Sudan</a>. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/jihadism-and-military-takeovers-in-west-africa-burkina-faso-coup-highlights-the-links-193972">Burkina Faso</a>, an attack in November 2021 led to the coup in January 2022. </p>
<p>More recently, a coup was <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">launched in Niger</a>, deposing President Mohamed Bazoum. Two days later, General Abdourahamane Tchiani declared himself the leader of Niger. </p>
<p>All together, that’s more than <a href="https://defishumanitaires.com/en/2019/11/27/the-sahel-is-a-demographic-bomb/">100 million people</a> being ruled by the military after power was seized violently. All are in the Sahel. This has alerted governments in the region.</p>
<p>Researchers, analysts and journalists have pointed to mismanagement, incompetence, corruption, economic crisis and state weakness as the main factors propelling military coups all over the world and, of course, in Africa. State weakness is a factor in the recent instances in Africa. They have happened partly because of governments’ failure to stem the spread of groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State all over the Sahel. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-why-an-ecowas-led-military-intervention-is-unlikely-211136">Niger coup: why an Ecowas-led military intervention is unlikely</a>
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<p>But there are two intertwined characteristics that differentiate Africa from the rest of the world. One is the public support of many citizens on the streets when there is a coup. The other is the society’s rising support for military rule as a form of government. Popular support for military rule has grown in the last 20 years.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589346.2022.2072582">research</a> explored the reasons for this. I used survey data to examine whether support for nondemocratic rule was mainly due to poor institutional and economic performance or to an existing so-called authoritarian personality and culture in the region. This type of personality refers to values existing in certain societies that make them more prone to embrace authoritarian forms of government. </p>
<p>This distinction is relevant because if the reason for military rule support is cultural, then societies will continue to endorse authoritarian regimes. If the reason is institutional performance, then as long as incumbent governments perform efficiently, both politically and economically, democratic support will overcome authoritarian support.</p>
<h2>Citizen discontent</h2>
<p>I carried out a quantitative analysis using <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a> survey data gathered from 37 African countries, both from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis looked for underlying factors propelling the rise in support for military rule. </p>
<p>Respondents were asked about the extent of their support for military rule as a form of government plus a number of other potential explanatory questions such as perception of corruption, governing and opposition parties performance, economy evaluation and socio-demographic issues like their level of education.</p>
<p>The data shows that from 2000 to the present, the level of support for military rule as a form of government has doubled, from 11.6% of people supporting “much” or “very much” military rule as a form of government to 22.3%. Of the 37 countries <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">analysed</a>, there were 11 where support for military dictatorship was decreasing and 26 where this figure was on the rise. The latest <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/young-africans-show-tolerance-for-military-intervention-a-wake-up-call-afrobarometer-ceo-tells-german-leaders/#:%7E:text=Afrobarometer%20findings%20from%2028%20African,if%20elected%20leaders%20abuse%20power.">Afrobarometer data</a> shows that support for democracy has fallen in the last year. Out of 38 countries, only four show decreasing support for military rule since 2000, whereas 34 show higher support for higher military rule than in 2000.</p>
<p><a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">Support</a> for military rule was higher in “partly free” and “not free” countries than in “free” countries. (They were categorised according to the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world">Freedom House</a> index.) </p>
<p>But there were some exceptions. In <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">South Africa</a>, which is a constitutional democracy with regular elections, one in three South Africans supported military rule as a form of government. In democratic Namibia the level of support showed that one in four Namibians supported military rule.</p>
<h2>Reasons to support military rule</h2>
<p>The analysis points to three conclusions:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>In sub-Saharan Africa, the legitimacy of military rule is mainly based on institutional performance and economic management. These are weakened by jihadist organisations rapidly expanding throughout the region. State institutions are not able to tackle their expansion throughout the region.</p></li>
<li><p>In North Africa, institutional performance plays a role but authoritarian personality plays a larger role in the support for military rule.</p></li>
<li><p>Education seems to be an antidote against authoritarianism. Those with higher level of education, according to survey data, show higher level of democratic endorsement.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The study’s findings suggest that people in sub-Saharan Africa are fed up with their governments for many reasons, including security threats, humanitarian disasters and lack of prospects. Waiting for the next elections to take place to change government does not seem to them to be a good option. Opposition parties do not seem to enjoy a better image. For the survey respondents, the solution appears to be to welcome the military to intervene.</p>
<p>If citizens perceive that politicians don’t care about them, this will invite the military to continue overthrowing civil governments, with society publicly legitimising their intervention in politics. </p>
<p>If military, political and economic solutions are not found, military coups in the region will increase and people will continue gathering on the streets to welcome them. Niger’s recent coup may not be the last one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185448/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlos García Rivero is Research Fellow at the Centre for International and Comparative Politics, at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. </span></em></p>Citizen expectations of governments are not being met by most elected leaders.Carlos García Rivero, Associate Professor, Universitat de ValènciaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1923242022-10-13T12:21:58Z2022-10-13T12:21:58ZJan. 6 Committee’s fact-finding and bipartisanship will lead to an impact in coming decades, if not tomorrow<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489460/original/file-20221012-11-ym4nec.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C0%2C5773%2C3855&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A tweet from former President Donald Trump is shown on a screen at the House Jan. 6 committee hearing on June 9, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/tweet-from-former-president-donald-trump-is-shown-on-a-news-photo/1241210230">Jabin Botsford/POOL/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The committee formed to investigate the role of former President Donald Trump and key aides in last year’s Capitol insurrection faced high stakes as it held its 10th and possibly last public hearing on Oct. 13, 2022.</p>
<p>Since the committee debuted its evidence in prime time on June 9, 2022, Vice-Chair Liz Cheney of Wyoming, one of two Republicans on the committee, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/16/us/politics/harriet-hageman-liz-cheney-wyoming.html">lost her House seat in a primary election</a>. The other GOP committee member, Rep. Adam Kinzinger of Illinois, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/10/29/rep-adam-kinzinger-wont-seek-reelection-next-year-517599">announced last year that he isn’t running for reelection</a>. </p>
<p>Should Republicans regain the House majority in November’s midterm elections, presumptive Speaker Kevin McCarthy could disband, or reconstitute, the committee. Some GOP House members have indicated that they <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/15/politics/house-republicans-investigation-plans-trump/index.html">might use their newfound control over investigations to probe the committee members themselves</a> over how they have conducted their work. </p>
<p>Thus, the committee faces a ticking clock as it wraps up its hearings and <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/09/26/jan6-committee-hearing-sept28-trump">finalizes its report</a>, which may recommend criminal charges against Trump and crucial election security reforms. However, it is possible that there will be no immediate legal, policy or political ramifications of the committee’s work. </p>
<p>But as <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/claire-leavitt-1351188">a scholar of oversight</a> who in 2019 spent a year working on the Democratic majority staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Reform, I believe the committee’s work will have historic impact. That effect, though, may take years to be seen and felt.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489406/original/file-20221012-22-pvivst.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman dressed in a black jacket and white shirt wipes tears from her face while giving testimony at a table in a large room filled with people." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489406/original/file-20221012-22-pvivst.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489406/original/file-20221012-22-pvivst.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489406/original/file-20221012-22-pvivst.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489406/original/file-20221012-22-pvivst.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489406/original/file-20221012-22-pvivst.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489406/original/file-20221012-22-pvivst.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489406/original/file-20221012-22-pvivst.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Wandrea ‘Shaye’ Moss, a former Georgia election worker, becomes emotional while testifying as her mother, Ruby Freeman, watches during a hearing held by the House January 6th committee on June 21, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/wandrea-arshaye-shaye-moss-former-georgia-election-worker-news-photo/1241441997?phrase=january%206%20committee%20wandrea&adppopup=true">Michael Reynolds-Pool/Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Accountability and effectiveness</h2>
<p>Although 919 people have been <a href="https://www.insider.com/all-the-us-capitol-pro-trump-riot-arrests-charges-names-2021-1">charged with crimes in relation to the Capitol insurrection thus far</a>, there’s still a lot the committee doesn’t know – or hasn’t revealed – <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/06/29/trump-january-6-timeline/">about Trump’s direct involvement in the insurrection</a>. </p>
<p>And no matter how compelling a case the committee’s final report might make, the Department of Justice <a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/white-collar-and-criminal-law/doj-is-likely-to-wait-past-election-to-reveal-any-trump-charges">may simply choose not to indict</a> the former president. </p>
<p>In terms of policy changes that could emerge from the committee’s efforts, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/electoral-count-act-reform-bill-passes-house-of-representatives-today-2022-09-21/">the House passed the Presidential Election Reform Act</a> in September 2022, which among other provisions clarifies the vice president’s role in the certification of Electoral College votes. The Senate has taken bipartisan action on their version of the bill, but its fate is still uncertain. </p>
<h2>Courting the public</h2>
<p>Political scientist Paul Light argues that the most “high impact” investigations over the course of American history achieved their success <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/LIghtPaperDec2013.pdf">“through a mix of fact-finding, bipartisanship, and strong leadership</a>.” The Jan. 6th Committee took an approach that emphasized facts in presenting its case to the American people. </p>
<p>It dampened charges of partisanship leveled by Trump and his GOP supporters by granting Republicans Cheney and Kinzinger prominent roles. <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/lessons%E2%80%94and-limits%E2%80%94-jan-6-committee">Cheney chaired the committee’s final prime-time hearing this past summer</a>. And the committee showcased extensive testimony from officials whose Republican bona fides are unimpeachable, such as former <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpwCApZh6KQ">Attorney General William Barr</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2022/cassidy-hutchinson-jan-6-hearing-testimony-illustrated/">former White House aide Cassidy Hutchinson</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=06QUOzmMyec">Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger</a>. </p>
<p>The committee also maximized its visibility by <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/06/06/jan-6-committee-adviser-james-goldston">hiring former ABC News President James Goldston</a> to produce the hearings, and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/bradadgate/2022/07/09/the-january-6-hearings-are-the-best-television-series-of-the-summer/">approximately 55 million people watched at least part of the hearings this past summer</a>. </p>
<p>The committee even dominated the cultural conversation by highlighting meme-able moments, including Republican Senator Josh Hawley of Missouri running from the rioters <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2022/07/22/josh-hawley-running-video-capitol/">after raising his fist in solidarity earlier that morning</a>. </p>
<p>There is also <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/20/jan-6-hearings-trump-support-falls-00046662">some, though not overwhelming, evidence</a> that the hearings diminished support for Trump both in the polls and among donors. However, it’s worth recalling that public opinion as the Watergate scandal was unfolding did not reflect the extent to which <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/05/15/how-america-viewed-the-watergate-scandal-as-it-was-unfolding/">President Nixon’s legacy would suffer as a result</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489412/original/file-20221012-24-1dn0nj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man wearing glasses and in a dark suit, sitting in front of an American flag along with a woman in a white jacket and wearing glasses." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489412/original/file-20221012-24-1dn0nj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489412/original/file-20221012-24-1dn0nj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489412/original/file-20221012-24-1dn0nj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489412/original/file-20221012-24-1dn0nj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489412/original/file-20221012-24-1dn0nj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489412/original/file-20221012-24-1dn0nj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489412/original/file-20221012-24-1dn0nj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The committee’s leaders were Democratic Rep. Bennie Thompson, left, chairman, and Republican Rep. Liz Cheney, vice chairwoman.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/representative-and-committee-chairman-bennie-thompson-and-news-photo/1241482478?phrase=january%206%20committee%20thompson%20cheney&adppopup=true">Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Taking time to unfold</h2>
<p>Assessing the full impact of the investigation requires patience – probably decades’ worth. </p>
<p>I believe the House Jan. 6 committee’s legacy will depend on how its in-depth rendering of the events surrounding the 2020 election and the ensuing insurrection is presented, repeated and understood by successive generations of Americans. </p>
<p>Congress had originally planned to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pelosi-mccarthy-jan6-committee/2021/07/21/21722d44-ea41-11eb-84a2-d93bc0b50294_story.html">establish an independent body</a> to investigate the Capitol attacks, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/05/26/999930573/why-a-9-11-commission-is-popular-but-may-not-happen-for-the-jan-6-capitol-attack">modeled on the 9/11 Commission</a> – an idea killed by Senate Republicans last year. So the House committee’s work constitutes, at least thus far, the authoritative public record on the insurrection, with no credible competitor. </p>
<p>This record will serve as a permanent, invaluable cache of information for future investigators, both inside and outside of Congress. It will also inform and inspire the scholars, journalists, novelists and <a href="https://deadline.com/2022/01/january-6-insurrection-movie-billy-ray-adam-mckay-1234916344/">filmmakers</a> who are already shaping the public’s collective understanding of a watershed moment in the history of American democracy. </p>
<p>The Jan. 6th committee’s <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/09/22/jan-6-report-book-publishers-new-yorker">unpublished report is in hot demand from publishers</a>. It is <a href="https://www.msnbc.com/the-beat-with-ari/watch/jan-6-report-is-1-bestseller-in-america-before-release-exclusive-melber-foreword-on-coup-conspiracy-149050437948">already a bestseller in presales</a>, despite the fact that it will be freely available as part of the public domain.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.historians.org/research-and-publications/perspectives-on-history/october-2020/a-new-view-of-event-history-collective-consciousness-as-a-historical-force">process by which events become part of the public consciousness</a> is slow and often imperceptible, but it is a legacy arguably as important as the discrete electoral or policy outcomes that emerge – or not – in the short term. </p>
<p>As one of my students at Smith College recently put it: “Being sixteen years old and watching people attack the Capitol - I never thought I’d see anything like it. The way my grandparents talk about JFK’s assassination or the Kent State massacre is the way I might talk about this to my kids someday.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192324/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Claire Leavitt has received funding from the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) and the Levin Center for Oversight and Democracy.</span></em></p>A lot of facts have come forward through the efforts of the House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the United States Capitol. What will its efforts mean to the US?Claire Leavitt, Assistant professor of government, Smith CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1916222022-09-30T14:14:26Z2022-09-30T14:14:26ZNigeria’s Independence Day is a time to reflect on political gains and challenges – and a way forward<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487475/original/file-20220930-13-gwzr37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman selling Nigerian flags in preparation for Nigeria's independence anniversary in Lagos on September 30, 2020. Photo by Olukayode Jaiyeola/NurPhoto via Getty Images.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/woman-selling-nigerian-flags-reacts-as-she-display-flags-news-photo/1228808113">Olukayode Jaiyeola/NurPhoto via Getty Images.</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em><a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/Independent-Nigeria">Nigeria got independence from Britain on 1 October 1960</a>. As the country celebrates its political journey in the last 62 years, political scientist Ayo Olukotun takes a look at the nation’s political development, gains and challenges. He also offers the way forward.</em></p>
<h2>How would you describe Nigeria’s political development?</h2>
<p>Well, in terms of evolution, the nation appears to be shedding the toga of unitarism and <a href="https://www.sunnewsonline.com/jackboot-democracy/">jackboot politics</a> – at least for now. However, there are residues of the long years of military rule in today’s civilian democracy. Nigeria is still quite authoritarian.</p>
<p>One example would be a report recently released by the National Human Rights Commission. Discipline was recommended against some police officers because they allegedly <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/556400-abuja-endsars-panel-indicts-72-police-officers-for-human-rights-violations.html">brutalised civilians</a>. And, despite the <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2021/10/20/what-led-to-endsars-protests/">EndSARS protests</a> against police brutality in 2020, not much has changed in terms of their behaviour.</p>
<p>There is also presidential omnipotence. <a href="https://za.opera.news/za/en/politics/829f9dd5586062ecfdf683cff27cca43">The Nigerian president is about the most powerful president in Africa</a>. This power is made possible by the <a href="http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm">1999 constitution</a>, a unitary document masquerading as a federalist one. State governors, too, are protected by the constitution. Nobody dares challenge them: in one instance a <a href="https://saharareporters.com/2021/10/11/breaking-ebonyi-governor-umahi-orders-arrest-journalist-over-facebook-posts-about">journalist was arrested</a> for statements a governor considered uncomplimentary.</p>
<h2>What about political gains?</h2>
<p>One of the gains is the fact that we have not had a coup since 1999, although there <a href="https://authorityngr.com/2022/08/17/how-jonathan-escaped-coup-plot-ex-army-spokesman/">have been coup rumours</a>. We appear, for now, to have overcome democratic regression – unlike other countries in West Africa and other parts of Africa where you have one-man rule, coup d’etats and so on.</p>
<p>Another gain is freedom of speech. Nigerians can now express themselves, unlike during the military era. However, as evidenced by the journalist’s experience I described, this gain is being eroded by authoritarian governors and leaders. </p>
<h2>What is working against Nigeria’s development?</h2>
<p>Despite the launching of some anti-corruption agencies, there is still large scale corruption. Take the former accountant general of the federation, who has been <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/544180-efcc-set-to-arraign-former-accountant-general-ahmed-idris-over-n109bn-fraud-charges.html">charged with stealing N109 billion</a>. And there are other cases of corruption involving former office holders. </p>
<p>Then look at how the last primaries by the major political parties <a href="https://theconversation.com/money-is-breaking-democracy-in-nigeria-184595">were monetised</a>. One contender withdrew because, <a href="https://thenationonlineng.net/updated-why-i-quit-pdp-presidential-race-by-hayatu-deen/">he said</a>, the process was “obscenely monetised”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/money-is-breaking-democracy-in-nigeria-184595">Money is breaking democracy in Nigeria</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Poverty is another challenge. The political leaders have turned poverty into a weapon against the people. Ethnicity and religious bigotry are also holding back Nigeria’s political and economic development. </p>
<h2>What should Nigeria be doing to uplift itself?</h2>
<p>We must go back to federalism or what some people call true federalism: power should be devolved to the federating units. These are the federal, state and local governments.</p>
<p>Many have called for this over time because <a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/our-work/devolution/english-devolution">Britain, which is a unitary nation, embraced power devolution</a>. If unitary states are reaping the benefits of devolution, why not Nigeria? The council flats that you hear about in the UK are built by local governments and that system works far better than our own councils. Also, their police are decentralised and they are effective. The same is true in several parts of Europe.</p>
<p>Before now political leaders in northern Nigeria opposed state police, but now <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/northern-governors-monarchs-meet-canvass-state-police-to-contain-insecurity/">northern governors, leaders and monarchs</a> have been calling for state police because of the high level of insecurity in those areas. </p>
<p>There must also be more focus on corruption. What we have under President Muhammadu Buhari is like a contest between anti-corruption and politics. In my opinion, politics has overtaken anti-corruption – that is why ministers who have fraud cases at the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission are still in office. The government finds it difficult to nail them because of political issues and deals.</p>
<p>There are other things that a nation that wants to move forward should do; quality education is one of them. We should invest in education. But Nigeria is not funding education at all levels. And the universe has disappeared from our nation’s university system: what makes it global has disappeared over time.</p>
<h2>Do you think Nigeria has a future?</h2>
<p>It depends on how the public office holders behave. All of them come with rosy promises. They promise heaven and earth. At the end of the day maybe they achieve only 10% of those promises. But if they can up their game there’s no reason why Nigeria can’t progress. </p>
<p>Twenty years ago, Nigeria was predicted to be similar to one of the Asian Tigers (South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan). It was going to grow at a comparable rate to these nations. Instead it has been regressive.</p>
<p>At independence <a href="https://medium.com/@david.himbara_27884/in-1960-china-was-poorer-than-most-african-countries-but-here-is-china-bankrolling-africa-b7b0b10f41ba">in 1960, Nigeria was richer than China</a>. China is a world power today. Nigeria could be a continental power, or bigger, if the leaders and the followers can reverse the current tide of regression and corrupt politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191622/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ayo Olukotun does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If Nigeria’s public office holders behave, there’s no reason why the country can’t progress.Ayo Olukotun, Professor and Chair of the department for Governance and Political Science, Olabisi Onabanjo UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1759322022-02-01T14:21:42Z2022-02-01T14:21:42ZThe African Union at 20: a lot has been achieved despite many flaws<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443160/original/file-20220128-17-kh828w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gunter Fischer/Education Images/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There’s a widespread view that the African Union – and its bureaucracy – are glorified servants of African governments. This view is supported by <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epub/10.1080/09557571.2019.1628707?needAccess=true">scholars</a> and by the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/8/4/the-african-union-israel-and-the-futility-of-appeasement">media</a>.</p>
<p>But is it accurate? I address this question in a recent <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0002039721990394">article</a> as the organisation marks its 20th anniversary this year.</p>
<p>The African Union was negotiated, and signed by African governments in 1999. Its <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">founding treaty</a> would not have come into existence if at least two-thirds of the 54 African governments and Western Sahara had not ratified and deposited it on May 26, 2001.</p>
<p>My paper shows that since its official launch in 2002, the African Union has developed considerable agency. I defined this as its capacity to shape the agenda and decisions in Africa and on global affairs. </p>
<p>There is no question that the African Union has its challenges. It is financially weak and dependent on external donors. It is often seen as a club of old men that is inaccessible to ordinary Africans. And it has implementation deficits, with its work sometimes held back by poorly governed states. </p>
<p>Yet, the organisation is often at the heart of agenda-setting, decision-making, rule creation, policy development and strategic leadership for the African continent. </p>
<p>It is, therefore, an oversimplification of the complex relationship between the African Union and its members to treat the pan-African bureaucracy as a mere servant of the continent’s governments. The African Union and its bureaucracy are neither glorified messengers nor docile followers of the orders of African governments. </p>
<p>It has marshalled its 55 members to take common positions on many critical global issues. These have included <a href="https://library.au.int/ezulwini-consensus-and-africas-quagmire-united-nations-security-council-reform-unpacking-dynamics">building consensus</a> on United Nations reforms, the COVID-19 <a href="https://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article-abstract/120/826/172/116764/The-African-Union-Makes-Its-Mark-in-the-Pandemic">response</a>, and financing of <a href="https://au.int/en/newsevents/20220122/high-level-meeting-financing-african-union-beyond-covid-19-enhancing-resilience">African development</a>. </p>
<h2>Measuring impact, and failures</h2>
<p>My paper shows the various pathways that the African Union exercises agency. It offers a nuanced way to understand how the union: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>shapes the drafting of international treaties</p></li>
<li><p>enforces regulations, promises and treaties</p></li>
<li><p>represents the collective will of member states</p></li>
<li><p>sets agenda, and directs, influences and shapes thinking at the global level</p></li>
<li><p>offers strategic leadership.</p></li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Drafting international treaties.</strong> The African Union has contributed to the drafting of treaties to promote <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf">peace</a>, democracy and good <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36384-treaty-african-charter-on-democracy-and-governance.pdf">governance</a>. </p>
<p>Many of its treaties contain global firsts. This is true even though many member states still have loopholes in protecting democracy.</p>
<p>It has been able to contribute to treaties because it’s attracted some of the best policy minds on the continent. <a href="https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/AU-UN-Peace-Security-Partnership-Power-Politics-ECDPM-Discussion-Paper-305-2021.pdf">This research</a> shows that African Union staff are some of the most highly educated international civil servants in the world. They also have extensive work experience.</p>
<p><strong>Enforcing regulations, promises and treaties.</strong> The African Union has developed a well-oiled machine promoting <a href="https://au.int/en/psc">peace and security</a>. </p>
<p>Its initiatives have included developing an institutional design for mediation, political dialogue, early warning systems and peace-support operations. These have changed the game of peace missions and led to relative success. One example is the intervention in <a href="https://gsdrc.org/document-library/lessons-from-the-african-union-mission-for-somalia-amisom-for-peace-operations-in-mali/">Somalia</a>.</p>
<p>The Union has also been effective in changing the mindset of African political elites from their traditional posture of indifference to one that encourages them to intervene in each other’s affairs. It intervened swiftly in the post-election violence in Kenya in <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC-e5aca3f5e">2007</a> and rapidly deployed <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/39226-doc-176._the_african_union_operations_in_comoros-maes_and_operations_democracy.pdf">Operation Democracy</a> in the Comoros in 2008. </p>
<p><strong>Collective will, setting the agenda and shaping thinking.</strong> The African Union has used the power of recommendations to great effect. </p>
<p>It used it to rally members to support a slate of African candidates vying for positions in international organisations. Examples include the election of <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20170519/african-ambassadors-urge-support-dr-tedros-adhanom-african-union-endorsed">Ethiopia’s Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus</a> as Director-General of the World Health Organization
and <a href="https://www.news24.com/News24/au-leaders-back-rwanda-to-head-francophonie-group-20180702">Rwanda’s Louise Mushikiwabo</a> as Secretary-General of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie. </p>
<p>In addition, <a href="https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/AU-UN-Peace-Security-Partnership-Power-Politics-ECDPM-Discussion-Paper-305-2021.pdf">studies</a> indicate that the African Union was able to get members to take common positions on more than 20 major issues. </p>
<p>Many of these positions shaped global debate and decisions. These include influencing the terms of engagement between the UN and regional organisations. </p>
<p>But the union has also convened and mobilised for bad causes. An example was the shielding of the former President of Sudan, Omar al Bashir, and Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta from calls to appear before the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24452288">International Criminal Court</a> to answer charge of crimes against humanity.</p>
<p><strong>Strategic leadership.</strong> The African Union has shown it is capable of providing leadership and acting as advisor to governments and intergovernmental agencies. </p>
<p>It successfully developed forward-thinking development frameworks such as <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview">Agenda 2063</a> and the <a href="https://au.int/en/ti/cfta/about">African Continental Free Trade Agreement</a>. It has also created development agencies, including the African Union Development Agency <a href="https://www.nepad.org/">NEPAD</a>.</p>
<p>The African Union has been good at socialising African governments to accept development ideas and make them pillars of national growth <a href="https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-703">plans</a>. </p>
<p>It has also <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/06/08/africa/mastercard-africa-cdc-vaccine-intl/index.html">mobilised resources</a> to boost the continent’s development initiatives. This has included efforts to make COVID-19 <a href="https://www.unicef.org/supply/african-unions-african-vaccine-acquisition-trust-avat-initiative">vaccines</a> available to member states.</p>
<p>But there are weaknesses. </p>
<p>The African Union resource mobilisation has been <a href="https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/au%E2%80%99s-dependency-donors-big-shame">criticised</a> for deepening Africa’s dependence on international partners. Some also <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2673-3986/2/4/42">argue</a> that the union is good at coming up with lofty ideas but is often unable or unwilling to implement them. </p>
<h2>Problems</h2>
<p>The organisation has been held back by the constant push to reform it. </p>
<p>Between 2002 and 2009, Muammar Gaddafi’s relentless hounding to get it changed to a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-summit-gaddafi-idUSTRE66Q70620100727">union government</a> became a serious distraction and major impediment to the implementation of its programmes.</p>
<p>And since 2016, a process to <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/the-kagame-reforms-of-the-au-will-they-stick/">reform the institution</a> led by Rwandan President Paul Kagame has sowed division among the leaders of the commission. The process paralysed staff for almost five years and weakened the AU commission, as former South African President Thabo Mbeki <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201901150631.html">observed</a>. </p>
<p>Old habits – such as the cult of personality, concentration of power in the office of the chairperson of the commission, and shrinking of spaces for popular participation in decision-making – have set in over the past few years.</p>
<p>The rotation of the chairperson of the union largely among leaders who have questionable democratic credentials also suggests that the union has moved into the orbit of a particular group of African leaders. This is made up of authoritarian leaders who have turned the institution into a conservative and risk-averse body. </p>
<p>An example of a more conservative approach is the <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/the-au-reneges-on-its-stance-against-coups-detat">softening</a> of its zero-tolerance position on military regimes. </p>
<p>It has been soft on recent coup makers. This is in contrast to its outspoken stance in previous years and the steps it took to ostracise military regimes in Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tome and Principe in 2003, Togo in 2005, Mauritania in 2005 and 2007, Guinea in 2008, Mali in 2012, as well as Egypt and Central African Republic in 2013. </p>
<p>The recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-coup-latest-sign-of-a-rise-in-the-ballot-box-being-traded-for-bullets-175642">resurgence of coups on the continent</a> suggests that the African Union needs to revisit its position on unconstitutional changes of governments and strengthen its agenda to promote democracy.</p>
<p>The continent needs a stronger African Union leadership on this issue – and many others – over the next 20 years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175932/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Kwasi Tieku receives funding from Insight Grants from The Social Sciences and Humanities Research )</span></em></p>Despite the criticisms the African Union has faced over the last two decades, it is far from being a docile follower of the orders of its member states.Thomas Kwasi Tieku, Associate Professor of Political Science, King's University College, Western UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1743222022-01-06T17:49:57Z2022-01-06T17:49:57ZHow democracy gets eroded – lessons from a Nixon expert<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439578/original/file-20220105-25-vvz7b9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=51%2C0%2C8575%2C5678&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Security fences stand near the U.S. Capitol on January 5, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/security-bike-fences-stand-near-the-west-front-of-the-u-s-news-photo/1237552629?adppopup=true">Drew Angerer/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Now that more than a year has passed since the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/01/05/1069977469/a-timeline-of-how-the-jan-6-attack-unfolded-including-who-said-what-and-when">Jan. 6, 2021, assault on the Capitol</a>, the 2020 election and the republic, it’s evident that the attack never really ended. Instead, it spread out to other, less visible, more vulnerable targets.</p>
<p>Donald Trump had hoped to reverse his election loss in a single, decisive, dramatic confrontation between his supporters and the republic’s, broadcast live around the world. His plan backfired, filling our screens with vivid illustrations of authoritarianism’s most repugnant ills: chaos, lawlessness, violence, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-confederate-battle-flag-which-rioters-flew-inside-the-us-capitol-has-long-been-a-symbol-of-white-insurrection-153071">racism</a>, <a href="https://m.dailykos.com/stories/2021/12/31/2070342/-Memories-of-an-insurrection-A-reporter-s-perspective">fascism</a> and all manner of hatred run amok. The blatancy of the subversion provoked an immediate backlash, even among <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/03/trumpworld-jan-6-526291">some Republicans</a>.</p>
<p>Had he studied democratic erosion before becoming a practitioner, Trump would know that <a href="https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/print/volume-100-issue-4/stealth-authoritarianism/">effective authoritarians tighten their grips on government gradually, stealthily</a> undermining courts, legislatures, election officials, news organizations, political opposition and other institutions strong enough to check them.</p>
<p>The coup by a thousand cuts is the stuff of nightmares for democracy’s defenders and the dream of authoritarian politicians.</p>
<p>“The story of democratic erosion in other countries is that it happens invisibly, you don’t have this <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/is-there-a-smoking-gun-in-the-january-6th-investigation">tanks-in-the-streets</a> moment,” <a href="https://sites.dartmouth.edu/nyhan/">Brendan Nyhan</a> told The New Yorker. Nyhan is a Dartmouth political scientist and co-director of <a href="https://brightlinewatch.org/">Bright Line Watch</a>, a group of political scientists who “monitor democratic practices, their resilience, and potential threats.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439548/original/file-20220105-23-jmeg8o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Rioters bearing flags breaking into the Capitol building" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439548/original/file-20220105-23-jmeg8o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439548/original/file-20220105-23-jmeg8o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439548/original/file-20220105-23-jmeg8o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439548/original/file-20220105-23-jmeg8o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439548/original/file-20220105-23-jmeg8o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439548/original/file-20220105-23-jmeg8o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439548/original/file-20220105-23-jmeg8o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A pro-Trump mob breaks into the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, to disrupt certification of President-elect Joe Biden’s Electoral College win over President Donald Trump.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/pro-trump-mob-breaks-into-the-u-s-capitol-on-january-6-2021-news-photo/1359579580?adppopup=true">Win McNamee/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Destructive conspiracy theories</h2>
<p>Democratic erosion in America depends on the conspiracy theory, destructive and demonstrably false, that the 2020 election was stolen. As the author of a <a href="https://www.upress.virginia.edu/title/4886">couple of</a> <a href="https://www.upress.virginia.edu/title/4984">books</a> on Richard Nixon – who, before Trump, was the biggest conspiracy theorist to inhabit the White House that we know of – I see conspiracy theories less as failures of rationality and more as <a href="https://theconversation.com/american-support-for-conspiracy-theories-and-armed-rebellion-isnt-new-we-just-didnt-believe-it-before-the-capitol-insurrection-173486">triumphs of rationalization</a>. </p>
<p>When Nixon muttered to White House aides that he was the victim of a conspiracy of <a href="https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/41698">Jews, intellectuals and Ivy Leaguers</a>, “arrogant” people he said placed themselves above the law, he did so to justify arrogantly placing himself above the law. Nixon launched a real conspiracy against an imaginary one, plotting real crimes – <a href="https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/secret-white-house-tapes/i-want-brookings-institute-safe-cleaned-out">breaking into the Brookings Institution</a>, <a href="https://www.upress.virginia.edu/title/4886">leaking grand jury information</a> damaging to Democrats – against those he deemed real criminals, despite a chronic lack of evidence.</p>
<p>Likewise, when conspiracy theorists <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/26/us/politics/republicans-voter-fraud.html">falsely claim the last election was stolen</a>, they’re putting the pieces in place for themselves to steal the next one. Not by anything as blatant as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/us/politics/pence-trump-election.html">pressuring a vice president to publicly shirk his duty to certify the vote</a>, but by subtler means, such as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-allies-election-oversight/2021/11/28/3933b3ce-4227-11ec-9ea7-3eb2406a2e24_story.html">taking over the offices that handle vote certification at the state level</a>. </p>
<p>Rep. <a href="https://hice.house.gov/">Jody Hice</a>, a Republican who voted against certifying President Joe Biden’s victory, is running to unseat Georgia Secretary of State <a href="https://sos.ga.gov/index.php/general/secretary_brad_raffensperger">Brad Raffensperger</a>, a Republican who would not bow to pressure from Trump to “<a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-smoking-gun-tape-is-worse-than-nixons-but-congressional-republicans-have-less-incentive-to-do-anything-about-it-152643">find</a>” enough votes to reverse the election result. <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/01/04/1069232219/heres-where-election-deniers-and-doubters-are-running-to-control-voting">Fifteen election-denying Republicans</a> are running for secretary of state, according to NPR, raising the risk that people who refuse to accept the results of the last presidential election will decide whether to certify the results of the next one. </p>
<p>Georgia’s Republican-controlled legislature revealed who controls the party by stripping Raffensperger of his vote on the <a href="https://sos.ga.gov/index.php/elections/state_election_board">state election board</a>, which sets election rules and investigates allegations of fraud. They have also passed new election laws targeting local boards. “The laws allow Republicans to remove local officials they don’t like,” the New York Times reported. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/19/us/politics/republican-states.html">Most</a> of those removed initially were Democrats, at least half of them people of color.</p>
<p>Georgia’s not alone. In at least eight other states, Republican-controlled legislatures took power from those who kept the last election honest, such as secretaries of state and local election officials, and handed it to <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dozen-state-laws-shift-power-elections-partisan-entities/story?id=79408455">partisan entities</a>, ABC News reported. Many, if not all, of those <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Secretary_of_State_(state_executive_office)">secretaries of state were partisan officials</a>, though they largely behaved in nonpartisan ways. </p>
<p>Much reporting has focused rightly on the most prominent result of lies about voter fraud, “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/04/us/politics/gop-voting-rights-democrats.html">voting integrity</a>” legislation. Those stories have focused on how little such legislation does to solve the already-minuscule problem of <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/ap-review-finds-far-too-little-vote-fraud-to-tip-2020-election-to-trump">voter fraud</a> in America, and on how much the legislation does to <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/fox-news-chris-wallace-confronts-texas-gov-over-making-voting-harder-people-color-1608621">create problems</a> for people who want to vote, especially if those people tend to vote Democratic.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439549/original/file-20220105-25-1wzz6om.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Richard Nixon, in a dark suit and flashing a 'V for victory' sign with both hands in front of an arena of supporters." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439549/original/file-20220105-25-1wzz6om.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439549/original/file-20220105-25-1wzz6om.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439549/original/file-20220105-25-1wzz6om.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439549/original/file-20220105-25-1wzz6om.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439549/original/file-20220105-25-1wzz6om.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439549/original/file-20220105-25-1wzz6om.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439549/original/file-20220105-25-1wzz6om.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Republican Richard Nixon, standing in 1968 before an arena of supporters, had to moderate his positions to appeal to Democratic voters, who were in the majority when he ran for a variety of offices.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/republican-presidential-candidate-richard-nixon-standing-on-news-photo/3226426?adppopup=true">Hulton Archive/Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>False claims, real threats</h2>
<p>Less attention has focused on the influx of <a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/heeding-steve-bannons-call-election-deniers-organize-to-seize-control-of-the-gop-and-reshape-americas-elections">conspiracy</a> <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/11/pennsylvania-election-threat/620684/">theorists</a> at the local level of election administration, where they could warp elections in several ways. They could discriminate in enforcing voter-ID laws, make people cast provisional ballots that are subject to challenge, set up polling places in ways that create long lines, and <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/11/pennsylvania-election-threat/620684/">more</a>, said <a href="https://allvotingislocal.org/our-team/scott-seeborg/">Scott Seeborg</a>, Pennsylvania state director of <a href="https://allvotingislocal.org/about/">All Voting Is Local</a>, a nonpartisan group fighting to “remove discriminatory barriers to the ballot.”</p>
<p>If election workers reject false accusations of election fraud, they may face <a href="https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/reuters-unmasks-trump-supporters-terrifying-us-election-workers-2021-11-09/">death threats</a>. The news service Reuters documented over 800 <a href="https://graphics.reuters.com/USA-ELECTION/THREATS/mopanwmlkva/">hostile, threatening messages</a> to election workers related to the conspiracy theories, including, “We’re coming after you and every other mother—-r that stole this election;” “Everyone with a gun is going to be at your house;” and “We are now watching your children and loved ones.”</p>
<p>These threats aren’t being screamed on television before the eyes of the outraged majority; they appear without warning, Reuters reports, often anonymously, in individual voicemail and email boxes, inspiring fear without provoking backlash.</p>
<p>By these means and more, authoritarians are seizing the power to win elections without winning a majority of the vote. This is something Nixon never dared try. </p>
<p>In every race he ran – for <a href="https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-article-vice-president-nixon-look-magazine">House</a>, <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/first/m/mitchell-tricky.html">Senate</a>, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/interactives/party-id-trend/">vice president and president</a> – Nixon faced an electorate where Democrats held a numerical advantage. This forced him to moderate his politics and policies, to broaden their appeals to the majority. </p>
<p>[<em>Over 140,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>Today, Republicans can win not only the White House, but the Congress and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/11/07/us/politics/redistricting-maps-explained.html">gerrymandered state legislatures</a>, without winning a majority. “We are witnessing <a href="https://time.com/6127193/supreme-court-reform-expansion/">a minority takeover of our democracy</a>,” constitutional law scholar Kermit Roosevelt wrote in TIME. It’s taking place not just nationally, but at the state and local level.</p>
<p>This is why democracy’s defenders – Republicans, Democrats, and all people of good will – must not make Trump’s mistake, thinking that the nation’s future will be decided in a single, public, climactic showdown. It depends on a thousand little struggles with enormous stakes, on unsung efforts of unknown heroes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174322/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ken Hughes is a researcher with the Presidential Recordings Program of the University of Virginia's Miller Center. The program's work is funded in part by grants from the National Historical Publications and Records Commission.</span></em></p>The January 6, 2021, Capitol riot happened a year ago. But the attempt to disrupt the peaceful transfer of power was just one part of a larger, and more long-term, attempt to undo US democracy.Ken Hughes, Research Specialist, the Miller Center, University of VirginiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1683822021-09-22T07:06:12Z2021-09-22T07:06:12ZCoup d’État en Guinée: Comment faire marche-arrière<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422287/original/file-20210921-17-1mpa8y7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Le colonel Mamady Doumbouya (c) s'est oint comme le chef de la Guinée après avoir renversé Alpha Conde</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">JOHN WESSELS/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>La résurgence des militaires en quête de pouvoir en Afrique de l’Ouest menace les progrès difficilement acquis dans la région depuis le début des années 1990. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/11/uncertainty-in-guinea-after-military-coup-topples-alpha-conde">Le coup d’État militaire en Guinée</a> est le troisième dans la région en un an.</p>
<p>Récemment, <a href="https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/la-reputation-cherement-acquise-de-cedeao-en-danger/">14 des 15 membres</a> de la Communauté économique des États d’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO) ont suivi une tendance démocratique, selon les données de Freedom House et du Center for Systemic Peace. Mais aujourd’hui, seuls 11 sont dans cette voie, et certains demeurent au bord du précipice du recul démocratique.</p>
<p>La succession récente de coups —y compris au Mali en août 2020 et en mai 2021, et au Tchad en avril 2021— a des implications inquiétantes pour la stabilité dans une région déjà sous le joug de menaces grandissantes à sa sécurité. Si le coup devient une façon viable de prendre le pouvoir, qui empêchera d’autres de s'engouffrer dans la brèche?</p>
<p>Reconnaitre les coups d’État militaires revient à normaliser ces prises de pouvoirs illégales. D'un seul coup, ils anéantisssent les droits et les protections des citoyens. Les décisions régaliennes sont réduites aux caprices des membres d’une junte et des hommes en uniforme qui ont rendu leur ascension au pouvoir possible. Le pustschiste peut faire ce qu’il veut. La demande de la junte guinéenne de geler les comptes étatiques auprès de la Banque centrale afin de <a href="https://www.latribune.fr/depeches/reuters/KBN2G60CW/guinee-la-junte-demande-a-la-banque-centrale-de-geler-les-comptes-du-gouvernement.html">“sécuriser les actifs de l'Etat”</a> en est une parfaite illustration.</p>
<p>En Afrique, les coups militaires ont une triste réputation quant à leurs effets sur le bien-être des citoyens. La Guinée en est un cas d’école. Après avoir pris le pouvoir par un coup d’État en 1984, le régime du Colonel Lansana Conté s’est caractérisé par deux décennies de gouvernance répressive, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/04/24/dying-change/brutality-and-repression-guinean-security-forces-response-nationwide">d’abus des droits humains et de mauvaise gestion</a>.</p>
<p>En 2008, <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7796902.stm">le coup d’État</a> perpétré par le capitaine Moussa Dadis Camara après la mort de Conté a davantage plongé la Guinée dans l’instabilité. En 2009, lors d’une manifestation contre le régime de Camara tenue au stade national de Conakry, les forces de <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/12/17/bloody-monday/september-28-massacre-and-rapes-security-forces-guinea">sécurité ont massacré au moins 150 personnes et violé des dizaines de femmes</a>, un évènement pour lequel ils demeurent tristement célèbres.</p>
<p>Ces expériences avec la gouvernance militaire ont laissé les Guinéens traumatisés, appauvris et isolés sur le plan économique.</p>
<p>Il est donc clair qu’il faut défaire le coup d’État en Guinée. La question est : quelle est la meilleure manière de le faire? Toute reconnaissance du coup risquerait d’encourager de futures interventions des militaires.</p>
<p>Jusqu’à présent, la condamnation de ce coup a été unanime. De plus, la CEDEAO et l’Union africaine <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20210910-l-union-africaine-suspend-%C3%A0-son-tour-la-guin%C3%A9e-apr%C3%A8s-le-coup-d-%C3%A9tat">ont suspendu la Guinée</a> et <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/west-african-bloc-imposes-sanctions-guinea-junta-2021-09-16/">imposé des sanctions</a> contre la junte.</p>
<p>C’est une bonne première étape. Mais elle doit être suivie par d’autres actions concrètes qui refuseront toute reconnaissance à la junte. La <a href="https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-58583410">délégation envoyée par la CEDEAO</a> à Conakry doit demander un retour rapide à l’ordre constitutionnel et à une transition politique civile qui restaurera la gouvernance démocratique.</p>
<p>Néanmoins, rendre son fauteuil au Président Alpha Condé n’atteindrait non seulement pas cet objectif, il balayerait aussi sous le tapis la manière douteuse dont il était resté au pouvoir.</p>
<h2>Le glissement autoritaire de Condé</h2>
<p>La présidence d’Alpha Condé s’est distinguée par ses <a href="https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/guineea-a-la-croisee-des-chemins/">dérives autoritaires</a>, notamment l’arrestation de dirigeants de l’opposition, les violations de la liberté de presse, l’interdiction des manifestations et la mise au pas du système judiciaire et de la commission électorale. Mais sa manœuvre la plus controversée a été <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/guinea-third-term-weather-forecast-constitutional-storm-clearing-west-african-sky">le tripotage constitutionnel</a> qui lui a permis de briguer un troisième mandat. En effet, la constitution de 2010 <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/new-guinean-constitution-all-costs-africas-latest-third-term-quagmire">avait formellement interdit au président</a> de faire plus de deux mandats.</p>
<p>La campagne pour la présidentielle de 2020 s’est caractérisée par les <a href="https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2020/04/10/guinee-un-referendum-entache-de-violences">stratégies autoritaires habituelles</a>: la violence contre l’opposition et l'interdiction de leurs meetings, et le musellement des médias. Les résultats officiels ont donné à Condé <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-guinea-election/guineas-conde-wins-presidency-with-59-5-of-vote-election-commission-idUSKBN2790HZ">59% des voix</a> et la majorité même dans les régions normalement acquises à l’opposition.</p>
<p>Ces résultats ont déclenché des manifestations, des arrestations, une répression de l’opposition qui a causé <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201026-more-than-20-people-killed-in-post-election-unrest-guinea-over-past-week">la mort de plus de 20 personnes</a>. L’opposition a déposé un recours auprès de la Cour constitutionnelle, qui contrôlée par des personnes fidèles au président, a évidemment validé les résultats officiels. Ces violations flagrantes au processus électoral ont poussé certains de ses détracteurs à les qualifier de « <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2020-10-14-we-should-not-ignore-guineas-constitutional-coup/">coup rampant </a>».</p>
<p>Mais la CEDEAO, l’Union africaine et la communauté internationale n'ont proféré que des critiques <a href="https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/desamorcer-crise-politique-guinee/">modérées</a> et se sont contentés de rappeler la nécessité de respecter la nouvelle constitution de 2020.</p>
<p>Les revendications de Condé qu'il est le président légitime sont donc peu fondées. Lui rendre sont fauteuil ne suffirait pas à remettre la Guinée sur la voie de la démocratie et risquerait même d’alimenter l’instabilité.</p>
<h2>Des voies au retour de la démocratie</h2>
<p>La Guinée pourrait emprunter plusieurs chemins pour revenir à l'ordre constitionnel. Ces options vont au-delà d'accepter la déchéance de Condé comme un fait accompli et améliorerait la gouvernance démocratique, tout en permettant la tenue de nouvelles élections.</p>
<p>La première option verrait Condé retrouver son siège, avec comme condition que les Nations unies organisent de nouvelles élections dans les six mois. Cette approche verrait la junte se désister, tout en reconnaissant la nature contestée du mandat présidentiel de Condé.</p>
<p>Cette option s'inspire des récents évènements au <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53210473">Malawi</a> et au <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41807317">Kenya</a> où les tribunaux ont invalidé les résultats d’élections frauduleuses et ordonné la tenue d’un nouveau scrutin présidentiel. Étant donné la politisation des tribunaux aujourd’hui suspendues en Guinée, une telle décision devrait peut-être émaner de la Cour de justice de la CEDEAO qui <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/10/guinea-presidential-election-we-won-and-have-the-receipts-to-prove-it/">prendrait en compte</a> les preuves du décompte parallèle des voix recueillies par l'oppostion.</p>
<p>Une deuxième possibilité verrait la CEDEAO invalider le référendum constitutionnel de 2020 de la Guinée. Cette option annulerait la base sur laquelle Condé a brigué un troisième mandat et s’alignerait sur les engagements du <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/CompilationDemocracy/Pages/ECOWASProtocol.aspx">Protocole sur la démocratie et la bonne gouvernance</a>. Le président du Nigeria Muhammadu Buhari a <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/483978-buhari-urges-ecowas-to-take-proactive-steps-to-prevent-coups-in-sub-region.html">fermemement préconisé le recours aux dispositions</a> de l ’article 45 du protocole qui déterminerait cette option.</p>
<p>En l’absence de toute reconnaissance de la communauté internationale et des institutions financières, la junte serait forcée de céder la place à un gouvernement civil d’intérim. Celui-ci organiserait de nouvelles élections, selon la constitution de 2010 et sans la participation d’Alpha Condé.</p>
<p>Une troisième option serait de rendre à Condé son fauteuil, qui, au service de la paix et de la stabilité, démissionnerait, lui permettant de sauver la face et de restaurer la constitution. En contrepartie de sa libération, il serait aussi protégé de futures poursuites judiciaires. Selon l’article 55 de la <a href="https://guilaw.com/la-constitution-de-2020/">constitution de 2020</a>, le président de l’Assemblée nationale s’en trouverait doté de l’autorité exécutive et organiserait de nouvelles élections dans les 90 jours.</p>
<p>Tous ces scenarios n’envisagent aucun rôle pour l’armée. Toute reconnaissance de ce coup ne ferait qu’en encourager d’autres. Les soi-disant transitions dirigées par l’armée au Mali et au Tchad se poursuivent à pas de tortue, démontrant l’absence de volonté pour les dirigeants militaires d’abandonner le pouvoir.</p>
<h2>L’ordre constitutionnel en priorité</h2>
<p>L'absence de soutien de la CEDEAO et de la communauté internationale au processus démocratique sont à l'origine de la situation malencontreuse dans lequel se trouve aujourd’hui le pays. Cela veut dire, paradoxalement, que la CEDEAO se retrouve dans la position difficile de devoir négocier avec une junte pour remettre la Guinée sur la voie de la démocratie.</p>
<p>La CEDEAO devrait se rappeler cette leçon à chaque fois que de futurs présidents sortants tentent <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438721000296?via%3Dihub">de contourner les limitations de mandats</a> et d’organiser des élections frauduleuses. Agir pour prévenir les prises de pouvoir anticonstitutionnelles sous toutes les formes, que ce soit les coups d’État militaires ou les coups rampants, doit être une priorité pour la CEDEAO.</p>
<p>Se plier à de telles manigances, jusifiées en l'occurence par soit-disant l'intérêt général et la stabilité, ne fait que semer les graines d'une future instabilité.</p>
<p><em>Cet article est d’abord paru dans The Conversation sous une licence Creative Commons. Vous pouvez lire l’original (en anglais) <a href="https://theconversation.com/guinea-coup-has-left-west-africas-regional-body-with-limited-options-but-there-are-some-168092">ici</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168382/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Reconnaitre le coup en Guinée ne ferait qu’encourager de futures interventions des militaires. Mais rendre son fauteuil à Alpha Condé ne rétablirait pas la démocratie.Joseph Siegle, Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic StudiesDaniel Eizenga, Research Fellow, Africa Center for Strategic StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1680922021-09-17T17:08:19Z2021-09-17T17:08:19ZGuinea coup has left west Africa’s regional body with limited options. But there are some<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421641/original/file-20210916-13-8u1hfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Colonel Mamady Doumbouya (C) and his team of Guinean special forces listen as he holds talks with religious leaders at the People's Palace in Conakry on September 14, 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">JOHN WESSELS/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The resurgence of power-seeking militaries in west Africa poses a serious threat to the hard-earned democratic progress made in the region since the early 1990s. The recent <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/11/uncertainty-in-guinea-after-military-coup-topples-alpha-conde">military coup in Guinea</a> was the third in the region in a year. </p>
<p>Just a few years ago, <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/ecowas-risks-its-hard-won-reputation/">14 of the 15 members</a> of the Economic Community of West Africa States (Ecowas) were democratic leaning, according to data from Freedom House and the Center for Systemic Peace. Today, only 11 qualify, with others teetering on the precipice of democratic backsliding.</p>
<p>The recent string of coups – Mali in August 2020 and May 2021, and Chad in April 2021 – has sobering <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/autocracy-and-instability-in-africa/">implications for instability</a> in a region already beset by growing security threats. Once the precedent for a coup as a viable means to gain power takes hold, what’s to stop others?</p>
<p>Recognising military coups normalises these extralegal seizures of power. It simultaneously dissolves in one fell swoop the basic rights and protections of citizens. Government decision-making is reduced to the capriciousness of the coup leader and the people in uniform who made his ascent to power possible. He has the power to do as he pleases. The demand by the Guinean junta for the Central Bank to freeze all state accounts to “<a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-09-10/guinea-junta-freezes-state-assets-as-regional-officials-come">secure the state’s assets</a>” is a prime example. </p>
<p>Military coups in Africa have a terrible track record for the well-being of citizens. Guinea is a case in point. Colonel Lansana Conté took power in a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1984/04/04/world/guinea-s-military-assumes-control-seals-off-nation.html">1984 military coup</a>. He then oversaw more than two decades of repressive rule characterised by <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/04/24/dying-change/brutality-and-repression-guinean-security-forces-response-nationwide">human rights abuses and misgovernance</a>. </p>
<p>Following Conté’s death in 2008, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara led a <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7796902.stm">military coup</a> that plunged Guinea into further instability. Notoriously, during a protest against Camara’s rule in 2009, security forces <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/12/17/bloody-monday/september-28-massacre-and-rapes-security-forces-guinea">killed at least 150 protestors and raped dozens of women</a> at the national stadium in the capital city, Conakry.</p>
<p>These experiences of military rule have left Guineans traumatised, impoverished and economically isolated.</p>
<p>The need to walk back the coup in Guinea is therefore clear. The question is how best to do so. Any recognition of the coup could incentivise future military interventions. </p>
<p>The coup has so far been met with universal international condemnation. Ecowas and the African Union, moreover, have <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210910-african-union-suspends-guinea-after-coup-ousting-cond%C3%A9">suspended Guinea’s membership</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/west-african-bloc-imposes-sanctions-guinea-junta-2021-09-16/">imposed sanctions</a> against the junta. </p>
<p>This is a good start. But it must be followed by further concrete actions that deprive the junta of any recognition. The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-58583410">Ecowas delegation</a> sent to Conakry needs to demand a swift return to constitutional order and a civilian political transition that can restore democratic governance.</p>
<p>Yet, simply restoring President Alpha Condé to office would fail to accomplish this. It would sweep under the carpet the dubious basis on which he has retained power.</p>
<h2>Condé’s creeping authoritarianism</h2>
<p>As president, Alpha Condé used <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/guinea-at-a-crossroads/">increasingly authoritarian tactics</a>. They included the arrest of opposition leaders, limiting press freedoms, banning protests and stacking the judiciary and national electoral commission. Most controversial was <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/guinea-third-term-weather-forecast-constitutional-storm-clearing-west-african-sky">his manoeuvring to secure a third term</a> by amending the constitution. The country’s 2010 constitution <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/new-guinean-constitution-all-costs-africas-latest-third-term-quagmire">explicitly forbade presidents</a> from serving more than two.</p>
<p>The October 2020 presidential campaign exhibited the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2020/04/10/guinee-un-referendum-entache-de-violences">usual authoritarian strategies</a>: violence against opposition supporters, blocking of rival candidate rallies, and suppression of the media. The official results gave Condé majorities in opposition strongholds and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-guinea-election/guineas-conde-wins-presidency-with-59-5-of-vote-election-commission-idUSKBN2790HZ">59% of the total vote</a>.</p>
<p>The results ignited protests, arrests and a crackdown on the opposition leaving <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201026-more-than-20-people-killed-in-post-election-unrest-guinea-over-past-week">more than 20 people dead</a>. The opposition filed an appeal to the Constitutional Court which, packed with Condé appointees, validated the official results. The flagrant electoral violations led some <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2020-10-14-we-should-not-ignore-guineas-constitutional-coup/">to equate Condé’s actions to a “creeping coup”</a>.</p>
<p>But Ecowas, the African Union and the international community <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/defusing-political-crisis-guinea/">offered only muted criticism</a>, citing the need to abide by the amended 2020 constitution.</p>
<p>Condé’s claims to the presidency and legitimacy, accordingly, are highly tenuous. Simply reinstating him would be insufficient to restore Guinea to a democratic track and would risk fostering further instability.</p>
<h2>Pathways back to democratic rule</h2>
<p>Several possible paths could be followed to return Guinea to constitutional order. These options move beyond treating Condé’s ouster as a <em>fait accompli</em> and enhance prospects for legitimate democratic governance in Guinea by calling for new elections.</p>
<p>The first option would be the reinstatement of Condé with the stipulation that the United Nations administer new elections within six months. This approach would result in the military stepping down while recognising the contested nature of Condé’s presidential claim. </p>
<p>This option would build on recent examples in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53210473">Malawi</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41807317">Kenya</a> where courts nullified the results of fraudulent elections and ordered new presidential contests. Given the politicised and now suspended courts in Guinea, such an invalidation may need to come from the Ecowas Court of Justice, drawing on the <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/10/guinea-presidential-election-we-won-and-have-the-receipts-to-prove-it/">parallel vote count</a> evidence gathered by the opposition.</p>
<p>A second possibility would be for Ecowas to declare Guinea’s 2020 constitutional referendum invalid. Adopting this stance would negate Condé’s basis for a third term and align with the commitments laid out in the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/CompilationDemocracy/Pages/ECOWASProtocol.aspx">Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance</a>. Nigeria’s president, Muhammadu Buhari, <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/483978-buhari-urges-ecowas-to-take-proactive-steps-to-prevent-coups-in-sub-region.html">has strongly advocated for invoking</a> the provisions of Article 45 of the protocol consistent with such an approach. </p>
<p>Lacking any recognition from the international community or financial institutions, the military would be forced to step away from power in lieu of an interim civilian government. This interim government would organise new elections without Condé’s participation and be held under the 2010 constitution’s provisions. </p>
<p>A third option would have Condé restored as president. However, in the interest of stability and peace in Guinea, he would then resign. This would allow Condé to save face and restore the constitution. In exchange for his release, he would be spared subsequent prosecution. Per Article 55 of the <a href="https://guilaw.com/la-constitution-de-2020/">2020 constitution</a>, executive authority would then pass to the president of the National Assembly with new elections organised within 90 days.</p>
<p>Absent from any of these scenarios would be an ongoing role for the military. Any recognition of the coup will simply encourage further coups. So-called military-led transitions in Mali and Chad, furthermore, are moving at a snail’s pace, revealing the disincentives for recognised military leaders to relinquish power. </p>
<h2>Prioritising constitutional order</h2>
<p>The failure of both Ecowas and the international community to support democratic processes when Condé was seeking a third term is what led to the existing predicament. It means, ironically, that Ecowas is in the difficult position of having to negotiate with coup leaders to restore Guinea to a democratic path. </p>
<p>The regional body should keep this lesson in mind when future <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438721000296?via%3Dihub">incumbents attempt to circumvent term limits</a> or oversee fraudulent elections. Acting to prevent unconstitutional seizures of power in any form, whether military coups or creeping coups, must be a priority for Ecowas.</p>
<p>Going along with such schemes, justified at the time as in the interest of maintaining stability, only sows the seeds of future instability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Any recognition of the coup could incentivise future ones. Yet Alpha Condé can’t simply be restored to office, sweeping under the carpet the dubious basis on which he has retained power.Joseph Siegle, Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic StudiesDaniel Eizenga, Research Fellow, Africa Center for Strategic StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1664192021-08-24T14:15:31Z2021-08-24T14:15:31ZMali’s roadmap for lasting peace has laudable goals: but it doesn’t go far enough<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417556/original/file-20210824-23-10j7w8v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of the M5 opposition movement show their support for the military junta, calling for a new and inclusive Mali in Bamako in June.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Hadama Diakite</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Prior to the military coup in 2012, Mali was praised for <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9780230604636">its transition to democracy in West Africa</a>. That is no longer the case. </p>
<p>Malians are caught between the stubborn legacies of a colonial past, a global political economy that has left them impoverished, a dysfunctional government, violent inter-ethnic conflicts, and attacks from terrorists and their own armed forces. It is considered the epicentre of violence in a violent region. It is, therefore, no wonder that <a href="https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/mali/central-mali-populations-caught-between-terrorism-and-anti-terrorism">the prognosis for peace and human security for Mali has become so dire</a>. </p>
<p>In 2020 as jihadist and inter-ethnic violence escalated, support for Malian president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita had plummeted. This was despite the fact that he had been elected by a large majority in 2013 and re-elected five years later. By August 2020, as elections were approaching, he <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/19/malis-keita-resigns-as-president-after-military-coup">resigned</a> after being detained in a military-led coup. </p>
<p>Then, by May 2021, the country experienced its <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/29/what-next-after-malis-coup">second coup</a> in nine months, this time by some members of the transitional leadership itself on the grounds that the transitional government wasn’t following its own charter. Weeks earlier, a former rebel leader who had been part of the peace process was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/13/mali-ex-rebels-say-prominent-leader-shot-dead">assassinated</a>. </p>
<p>Violent groups, including those linked to al-Qaeda and Islamic State, frequently unleash attacks in north, central and eastern Mali, and their presence <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/6/25/its-time-for-a-reality-check-in-mali">is spreading</a> into the country’s south and across borders.</p>
<p>It is against this background that Malian prime minister Choguel Kokalla Maïga <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/07/31/malian-pm-choguel-kokalla-maiga-presents-2021-2022-action-plan//">announced</a> a government action plan to the governing National Transitional Council to prepare for presidential and legislative elections in February and March 2022. The plan was approved quickly by the governing council.</p>
<p>The plan includes the contributions of 25 ministerial departments under the chairmanship of the prime minister, with the <a href="https://www.ml.undp.org/content/mali/fr/home/presscenter/articles/2021/journees-d-evaluation-du-plan-d-action-du-gouvernement-avec-l-ap.html">support of the United Nations Development Program</a>. </p>
<p>The basic components of the plan fall into four categories – strengthening national security, driving institutional reforms, holding elections and promoting good governance. These are the key areas that must be addressed to increase trust in the peace process set in motion by the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/pdfs/EN-ML_150620_Accord-pour-la-paix-et-la-reconciliation-au-Mali_Issu-du-Processus-d'Alger.pdf">2015 Algiers Peace Accords</a> which brought a partial ceasefire to parts of the country.</p>
<p>In my view, it is unlikely that the plan will reduce armed conflict and reform political institutions enough to achieve its goals. It will not lead to a more sustainable peace unless it is more inclusive and can connect what a professor of conflict resolution, Pamina Firchow, describes as <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/reclaiming-everyday-peace/BEB6532292D692933AABC68EFFF9ACB3">everyday peace at the local level</a> with measures to ensure national security.</p>
<p>But that doesn’t mean the plan should be ignored or opposed. Rather, it means that more needs to be done to achieve its goals.</p>
<h2>Strengthening national security</h2>
<p>This is the central component of the plan. The prime minister praised the peacekeeping efforts of the Malian Armed Forces and emphasised the need to respond to terrorist attacks, especially in the northern and central regions of the country. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the plan calls for better military training and equipment. At the same time, there is a commitment to demilitarise the country, to reorganise economic production away from military purposes, and to reintegrate former state and non-state armed combatants into the civilian economy by providing vocational training and job opportunities. </p>
<p>To carry out these security plans, the government promises to make the 2015 Algiers Peace Accords <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/laccord-dalger-cinq-ans-apres-un-calme-precaire-dont-il-ne-faut-pas-se-satisfaire">more inclusive</a>. </p>
<p>One way to do this would be to integrate some of the non-state armed forces into the national army to better protect local communities from criminal violence and intransigent insurgents. This would create the kind of everyday peace in the markets, schools and neighbourhoods that is now lacking. </p>
<p>Yet the plan does not go this far.</p>
<h2>Political and institutional reforms</h2>
<p>There have been a number of meetings in recent years for this purpose. Based on the recommendations that have come out of these forums, the plan calls for a series of national meetings that will give voice, without censorship, to all citizens from the local to the national level.</p>
<p>The prime minister gave the assurance that the recommendations resulting from these meetings will be enforceable during the remaining six months of the transition period and afterwards.</p>
<p>According to the prime minister, there is an</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…urgent need for reforms to renovate not only the political framework and adapt the fundamental texts of the Republic, but also endow our country with strong and legitimate institutions that will allow lasting political stability and social peace.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But this language alone is unconvincing coming from him. He has shown very little interest in democracy, local or national, throughout his career, beginning with his early association with the former authoritarian leader <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/22/world/africa/moussa-traore-dead.html">Moussa Traore</a>.</p>
<h2>A general election</h2>
<p>The action plan calls for “transparent, credible and inclusive general elections” to lead Mali’s return to a “normal constitutional order”. It stresses, in particular, the inclusion of refugees and displaced people. To this end, a single election management body will be established to ensure free and fair elections.</p>
<p>While a highly desirable goal, the mechanisms for conducting such elections do not exist. And it is unrealistic to think they could be created in such a short time. </p>
<p>One might even ask whether the president and prime minister are simply setting things up for an extension of the 18-month charter for the transitional government and their own leadership roles within it.</p>
<h2>Good governance and a stability pact</h2>
<p>To root out corruption, the plan calls for a “social conference” that will produce a new “social stability pact”. This will be the basis for a new social contract between citizens and the government that will “improve the living conditions of the populations and ensure a fair distribution of national wealth”.</p>
<p>Through negotiations and compromise, the conference will address the root causes of violence and inequality, not merely their symptoms. Ample funds will be provided for “basic social services” such as health and education, and bring civil service salaries into “harmony”.</p>
<p>This too, albeit vague, is a laudable goal. But it ignores the way in which heavy reliance on foreign aid can short circuit the relationship between citizens and the state, replacing political loyalty with clientelism. </p>
<p>Another telling silence is the absence of any mention of the work of the Malian Commission for Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation, which has been interviewing refugees and displaced people for the last five years to prepare the ground for reparations. </p>
<p>I have been involved in the peacebuilding process, working with Malian teachers, artists and activists since 2004 to develop university-level peace-building courses and community programmes in the country. Since 2016 our team has worked with the commission to disseminate information on the causes and effects of armed violence in Mali, and creating materials to prepare citizens for local peace-building dialogues. </p>
<p>At a minimum, the plan should have referenced the work of the commission, especially its involvement with refugees and internally displaced persons.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Even though confidence in the 2015 peace agreement and in the 2020 provisional government has faltered, many Malians <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ad386-malians_eager_for_change_still_look_to_democracy-afrobarometer_dispatch-25aug20.pdf">still prefer</a> democracy over one-party and military rule. This is an encouraging sign. </p>
<p>There is much that needs to be done before a new government can be elected, however. The action plan’s generalities may buy the president and prime minister a prolongation of the transition, but that may be all. New elections under the current circumstances might only heighten political frustration, and lead to more inter-ethnic violence and an increased terrorist presence in the region, with Mali as its epicentre.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166419/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen L. Esquith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Whatever its flaws, it doesn’t mean the government action plan should be ignored or opposed. Rather, more needs to be done to achieve its goals.Stephen L. Esquith, Professor of political theory and global ethics, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1624282021-06-23T20:04:22Z2021-06-23T20:04:22ZWith Aung San Suu Kyi facing prison, Myanmar’s opposition is leaderless, desperate and ready to fight<p>As Aung San Suu Kyi finally <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-06-15/aung-san-suu-kyi-trial-court-myanmar-unwell/100215214">faced court</a> last week to defend herself against a litany of politically motivated <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/cases-against-deposed-myanmar-leader-aung-san-suu-kyi-2021-06-10/">charges</a>, Myanmar is continuing its downward spiral into <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-brink-state-failure">state failure</a>.</p>
<p>Suu Kyi was arrested following the February 1 coup by the military and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-57424594">charged</a> with alleged corruption, inciting public unrest and other offences. If she is found guilty, which is a near certainty, she may well be imprisoned for the rest of her life.</p>
<p>The popularity of Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) party have been consistently <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/myanmars-emerging-landscape-looks-beyond-suu-kyi.html">underestimated</a> by a range of domestic and international analysts, and even by the Myanmar military itself. But her role will now change as her case takes a stop-start journey through the tightly held and persistently manipulated judicial process. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1407528999404802050"}"></div></p>
<p>With Suu Kyi facing another lengthy detention, Myanmar’s diverse democracy movement is now operating independently of the NLD and its ageing leadership. Nearly five months after the coup, opposition to the junta is growing, but it is effectively leaderless and has been de-linked from Suu Kyi’s fate.</p>
<p>Most troubling, the evolving <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/burma-myanmar/2021-06-11/myanmars-coming-revolution">crises</a> facing the long-suffering people of Myanmar are not just framed by political repression and violence. They include the heavy burdens of poverty, food shortages and unemployment, along with the collapse of the healthcare and education systems. </p>
<p>The coup-makers have put their own narrow interests — eliminating the NLD and retaining absolute power — in front of everything else. Even the COVID-19 pandemic receives almost no attention under the current conditions. </p>
<p>It is no wonder millions of Myanmar people are so angry and fed up — and why some are looking for more violent solutions. There is now potential for the country’s smouldering civil wars in its mountainous borderlands to spread into its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/01/rise-of-armed-civilian-groups-in-myanmar-fuels-fears-of-civil-war">major cities</a>.</p>
<h2>Increasing violence on both sides</h2>
<p>The ongoing reign of terror by the military junta includes the recent burning of more than <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/17/myanmar-village-destroyed-clashes-military-anti-junta">200 homes</a> in a village in central Myanmar and the <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/tortured-to-death-in-myanmar-regime-custody.html">tortures and deaths</a> of at least 21 detainees. </p>
<p>Altogether since the start of the coup, some 900 people have been <a href="https://www.livemint.com/news/world/myanmar-un-special-envoy-decries-violence-says-900-civilians-already-killed-11624059887693.html">killed</a> during protests or other activities and almost 5,000 others are <a href="https://twitter.com/aapp_burma/status/1405493461365653505">currently detained</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407831/original/file-20210623-27-1aecsc3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407831/original/file-20210623-27-1aecsc3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407831/original/file-20210623-27-1aecsc3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407831/original/file-20210623-27-1aecsc3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407831/original/file-20210623-27-1aecsc3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407831/original/file-20210623-27-1aecsc3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407831/original/file-20210623-27-1aecsc3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Smouldering houses in Kinma village after military troops burned it the night before.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In response, there is a growing <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/06/20/myanmar-sinks-deeper-into-civil-war-as-anti-army-groups-multiply">militancy</a> among some civilians, with the establishment of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/01/rise-of-armed-civilian-groups-in-myanmar-fuels-fears-of-civil-war">people’s defence forces</a> across Myanmar.</p>
<p>In addition, ethnic armed groups in Myanmar’s periphery, some of which have been at war with the military since the 1940s, have joined forces with the protest movement. For the first time since the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2013/08/08/209919791/as-myanmar-opens-up-a-look-back-on-a-1988-uprising">1988 uprising</a> against the military, civilians from the Bamar (Burman) ethnic majority are now being <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/15/our-only-option-myanmar-civilians-take-up-arms-for-democracy">trained by these groups</a> or have enlisted with them.</p>
<p>Attacks on government forces include <a href="https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/myanmar-hit-more-300-bombing-attacks-february-1-coup">bombings</a>, targeted <a href="https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/ward-administrator-in-hlaing-tharyar-shot-dead">assassinations</a> of village administrators and those seen to support the junta, and the killing of 25 alleged “<a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/only-myanmar-regime-undercover-soldiers-murdered-not-civilians-kndo.html">undercover soldiers</a>” by an ethnic armed group in Kayin (Karen) State. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1406560848403783690"}"></div></p>
<p>The United Nations has expressed <a href="https://twitter.com/UNinMyanmar/status/1405506354115141638">alarm</a> at the “recent acts of violence that illustrate a sharp deterioration of the human rights environment across Myanmar”.</p>
<p>Some seasoned analysts have <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-terrorism-and-demands-international-politics">argued</a> the increasing militancy of the military’s opponents may cause problems for the protest movement, with the junta better able to paint them as terrorists and the international community becoming uncomfortable supporting a violent “terrorist” movement. </p>
<p>A pragmatic response is for the political wings of the opposition, including the exiled <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/06/19/recognising-myanmars-national-unity-government/">national unity government</a>, formed by the NLD and ethnic minority representatives, to ensure there is adequate distance between themselves and any violent operations. </p>
<p>This is a standard model in Myanmar’s long decades of conflict, as seen with the separation of the civilian and military wings of various ethnic minority organisations such as the Karen National Union and Karen National Liberation Army. </p>
<p>The model obviously presents risks, however, as civilian leaders can expect to be held to account for the activities of their militant peers.</p>
<h2>Some faint hopes of reconciliation</h2>
<p>In the hope of rehabilitating the patchy reputation of Myanmar’s democrats as a force for human rights, the national unity government announced a seismic shift in official policy toward the Muslim Rohingya community in early June.</p>
<p>The government pledged to implement a new citizenship act that bases “citizenship on birth in Myanmar or birth anywhere as a child of Myanmar citizens”. This should effectively offer Rohingya and some other ethnic minorities full citizenship for the first time.</p>
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<p>This statement is part of a broader shift in public sentiment regarding the Rohingya across most of Myanmar. Until recently, they have been largely friendless in the country, enduring decades of discrimination and repression. This included the brutal <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2020.1813251">clearance operations</a> in 2017 that led to 740,000 refugees fleeing into Bangladesh in a matter of months.</p>
<p>The coup has resulted in a reassessment of the treatment of the Rohingya. A recent <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/14/myanmars-pro-rohingya-social-media-campaign-shows-mass-support">social media campaign</a>, for instance, featured people wearing black and adopting the three-fingered salute of the opposition under the “Black4Rohingya” hashtag. </p>
<h2>International response must be stronger</h2>
<p>These positive developments come at a time when the international community appears increasingly powerless to effect positive change in Myanmar.</p>
<p>Calls to ban arms exports and economic engagement with the military are growing much louder. But direct material support for the Myanmar’s democrats will be just as important, as will the creation of a viable model of regional diplomacy. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/06/myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi-goes-on-trial-asean-indecision-enabling-military-rampage/">Association of Southeast Asian Nations</a> (ASEAN) has again proved too slow and inept when faced with a serious test of its mandate.</p>
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<p>An important UN General Assembly <a href="https://twitter.com/UN_News_Centre/status/1406054125716992002">resolution</a> on June 18 calling on “<a href="https://undocs.org/en/A/75/L.85/Rev.1">all member states to prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar</a>”, meanwhile, passed with an overwhelming majority. However, several ASEAN members, along with Russia and China (<a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Coup/Myanmar-embraces-Russian-arms-to-offset-China-s-influence">Myanmar’s major arms suppliers</a>), abstained. </p>
<p>The courage and creativity of the protesters and the civil disobedience movement have already won them much credit with Myanmar’s desperate population. But in the months ahead, this alone will not be enough to succeed.</p>
<p>A genuinely pan-ethnic, society-wide coalition is needed, along with well-timed and properly targeted support internationally, to have any chance of ending military dominance in Myanmar once and for all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162428/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Farrelly has previously received funding from the Australian Research Council for Myanmar-focussed work. He is on the board of the Australia-ASEAN Council, which is an Australian government body. These are his personal views.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With hundreds now killed since the coup and civilians increasingly taking up arms against the junta, there are fears the country could be headed toward civil war.Adam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, University of South AustraliaNicholas Farrelly, Professor and Head of Social Sciences, University of TasmaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1617232021-05-28T12:35:51Z2021-05-28T12:35:51ZMalians welcomed previous coups, but not this one<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403324/original/file-20210528-23-koax2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Colonel Assimi Goita (pictured here) led the two most recent coups.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">MICHELE CATTANI/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/25/timeline-what-happened-in-mali-since-a-military-coup-in-august">coup in Mali</a> on 24 May provoked a collective cry of frustration among many Malians <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/05/26/au-ecowas-and-french-president-condemn-mali-coup/">as well as from</a> its external partners. But it was not a great surprise. </p>
<p>Mali’s last coup was only nine months earlier, in August 2020. The transitional government put into place shortly afterwards was an awkward mix of putschists and politicians, led by a general brought back from retirement to sit in the presidential chair and a career diplomat made prime minister. Members of the junta held key cabinet positions as ministers of security and of defence, and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57239805">Colonel Assimi Goïta</a>, the coup leader, was named vice-president of the Transitional Council. </p>
<p>Goïta has now arrested the president and the prime minister and forced them to resign. </p>
<p>Why? And why has Mali endured three coups in less than a decade?</p>
<p>Regional and global players reacted with dismay. The reaction from Malians themselves was more equivocal. In Mali’s history of coups d’état – in 2020, 2012, 1991, or 1968 – all but the latest has been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/world/africa/Whats-happening-Mali-coup.html">met with enthusiasm</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53868236">even dancing</a> in the streets. Monday’s events were met with ambivalence. </p>
<p>To understand why exasperation or indifference prevailed over outrage, it helps to understand the profound disillusionment – even contempt – with which many Malians regard the political class.</p>
<h2>The unravelling</h2>
<p>In recent weeks, the power-sharing arrangement between military officers and civilians was clearly foundering. President Bah N’daw had briefly dismissed Prime Minister Moctar Ouane, before bringing him back on board. But Ouane struggled to form a government. Teachers’ salaries were going unpaid, and the country’s leading labour union had launched a strike. The steady drip of corruption never ceased. All of that, sad to say, was more or less business as usual. </p>
<p>By all accounts, the trigger for the coup was the proposal to remove members of the transitional government, prying from their hands the power they had recently seized and grudgingly shared.</p>
<p>Mali’s external partners looked aghast at this seizure of power, as the transitional agreement they worked hard to support fell apart. </p>
<p>ECOWAS, the association of West African states, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/05/26/au-ecowas-and-french-president-condemn-mali-coup/">pointed out</a> that Mali risked losing its neighbours’ support in the struggle against jihadist violence. The US, deeply engaged in Mali and in the wider Sahel, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-security-usa-idUSKBN25H23D">suspended</a> military cooperation with Mali and threatened to enact targeted sanctions. In regalian tones, French president Emmanuel Macron insisted that the coup was “unacceptable”. Rich, given that he had <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/france-changes-stance-on-chad-calls-for-civilian-government/a-57352559">condoned</a> an unconstitutional seizure of power in Chad a fortnight earlier. </p>
<p>Popular reaction in Bamako has been more nuanced.</p>
<p>Many Malians were exasperated by news of the coup, and the hashtag #Wuli (“Stand up!”) popped up in Twitter feeds. It is of course easier to tweet than to hit the streets, and the Twitterverse is hardly representative of Malian discourse. Other Bamakois, reached by phone, sighed in resignation as the political drama unfolded in the hills above town. </p>
<p>Their contempt for politicians had trumped any hope that a change of leadership – however it was achieved – would bring change.</p>
<h2>Unseemly alliances</h2>
<p>The truth is that Malian politicians – with a few notable exceptions – bear responsibility for the tumult at the pinnacle of the state. The first and most obvious is by welcoming, even celebrating, an illegal seizure of power that might open up opportunities for them. In a sclerotic system in which some of them have failed for decades to rise to the top, every coup is an opportunity. </p>
<p>This is particularly true of the coalition known as the “June 5 Movement-Rally of Patriotic Forces”, commonly referred to as “M5-RFP”. They were prominent in last summer’s <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2020/07/10/Mali-protests-Keita-Dicko">mass demonstrations</a> that helped force President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita from power. Under duress, Keita resigned, but the rewards that the civilian opposition expected failed to materialise. </p>
<p>As crowds celebrated the officers who had deposed Keita, the politicians were too eager to believe that the men in uniform had done their work for them. Yet the soldiers did not take power in order to share it. When they did parcel out positions, the leadership of the M5-RFP was disappointed: nothing for them. </p>
<p>Another coup is an opportunity to claim power that they have not been able to win on their own. </p>
<p>They might be right. </p>
<p>In August, in order to placate foreign powers, Goïta and his comrades needed civilian partners who would know their place. N’daw and Ouane seemed to be playing that role until suddenly, this week, they were not. They are off-stage, but the junta still needs some civilians among the soldiers’ camouflage.</p>
<p>Goïta <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/mali-strongman-sacks-transition-leaders-vows-elections-in-2022/articleshow/82943684.cms">declared</a> that in spite of the week’s events, elections would be held in 2022, although he did not specify that they would occur in February as had been planned. Whatever his intentions might be, he will need to expand his political base, and he will need civilians willing to accept positions in the government. Were they committed constitutional republicans – or merely cagey survivors hoping to keep a clean slate for the future – Mali’s political leaders might refuse categorically to be part of a government that has come to power by force. Instead, they cheer from the sidelines, hoping to be called off the bench and into the match.</p>
<p>With all that in mind, the question is not why stage a coup, but why not? The jihadist insurgency that has bedevilled Mali for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55147863">nearly</a> a decade has only raised the stakes for the mid-ranking officers who have actually served in the field. They see both the politicians and their own generals as corrupt and illegitimate.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Amadou Haya Sanogo, who led the disastrous coup of 2012, has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/trials-mali-01933350b6a0e7556927d776606d85df">never</a> been put on trial for his crimes, which include killing fellow soldiers. Instead, he and every other coup leader has been applauded, and each has seen his fortunes rise. </p>
<p>Why would the current crop of colonels act any differently than they have?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161723/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregory Mann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mali’s recent coup is a reflection of power wrangling between politicians and the military.Gregory Mann, Professor, Columbia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1583302021-04-02T05:36:10Z2021-04-02T05:36:10ZBotched coup in Niger points to deep fissures in the country<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393150/original/file-20210401-23-9u3p1m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Niger troops on patrol</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Sia Kambou/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Events in Niger took a dramatic turn days before the country was about to make history by conducting the first transfer of power from one democratically elected government to another since its independence from France in 1960. In the early hours of the morning a military unit, <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/452427-attempted-coup-foiled-in-niger-days-to-historic-handover.html">reportedly</a> from a nearby air base in the capital city, Niamey, launched an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56589168">attempted coup</a>. The attack was quickly repelled by presidential guards. Adejuwon Soyinka asks Olayinka Ajala, an expert on Niger Republic, to unpack what this means for the future of the country.</em> </p>
<h2>What lies behind the coup attempt?</h2>
<p>There has been tension in the country since the results of run-off presidential elections were announced on the 23rd of February when the losing side <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/violence-erupts-in-niger-after-the-opposition-rejects-election-results">rejected </a> the outcome. Mohamed Bazoum, a former interior minister, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56175439">polled </a> 55.75% of the votes against the opposition candidate and former president Mahamane Ousmane who got <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/02/23/niger-s-mohamed-bazoum-wins-presidential-election-round-2-ec/">44.25%</a>. </p>
<p>Ousmane alleged <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/24/niger-opposition-leader-declares-victory-despite-results">fraud</a>. He claimed he had polled 50.3% and that the election was rigged in favour of Bazoum.</p>
<p>While there had been an increase in violence in the country since the election results were announced, the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-56589168">attempted coup </a> on March 31 <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/niger-government-confirms-military-coup-attempt-thwarted/2021/03/31/12b81d28-9298-11eb-aadc-af78701a30ca_story.html">raised concerns</a> to new levels in the volatile country. </p>
<p>The coup attempt was barely 48 hours before the inauguration of the new president was due. It shows that there is still some appetite to truncate democracy in some sections of the military. </p>
<h2>Niger has been here before. What makes the country so volatile?</h2>
<p>Since independence from France in 1960, Niger has experienced <a href="http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/998751512408491271/pdf/NIGER-SCD-12012017.pdf">four coup d’états</a> – in 1974, 1996, 1999, and 2010. It was under military rule for a combined 23 years before <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13944995">returning to democracy in 2011</a>. </p>
<p>Three key factors explain the volatility of the country and its vulnerability to coups. </p>
<p>First is the economy. In 2019 the World Bank reported that over <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/niger/overview">40% </a> of people in the country were living in extreme poverty, a level considered extremely high by the bank. Security analysts argue that poverty increases instability – <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2010462?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">a prerequisite for coups</a>. Although not all poor countries are prone to coups, other factors such as ethnicity and <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/110/439/295/164122?login=true">political calculations</a> contribute to their likelihood. </p>
<p>Second, ethnic tensions and internal conflicts. The <a href="https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Niger-ETHNIC-GROUPS.html">largest ethnic group</a> in Niger are the Hausa which constitute about 56% of the population, followed by Zarma-Songhai (22%), Tuareg (8%) and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Niger">other small ethnic groups</a>.</p>
<p>Successive military governments in Niger have taken various steps to stifle discussion about ethnicity in a bid to prevent it from dominating the polity. But this hasn’t stopped tensions. Smaller ethnic groups, such as the Tuareg, have gone as far as <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-90206-7_2">threatening to secede from the state</a>. </p>
<p>Prior to Issoufou’s election as president in 2011, the Tuareg ethnic group engaged in constant agitation against previous regimes. But Issoufou was able to placate members of the ethnic group with <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/59827/niger-democratic-progress-hindered-by-increasing-insurgency/">political positions</a>. </p>
<p>The Tuaregs have reduced their activities in recent years. Ethnicity nevertheless remains a polarising issue in Niger. </p>
<p>These tensions surfaced during the election campaign. Bazoum is from Niger’s ethnic Arab minority. Some opposition figures used this in the run up to polling and accused him of having <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/02/19/who-is-nigerien-presidential-candidate-mohamed-bazoum/">“foreign origins”</a>. Bazoum’s retort was that his rival’s father was from Chad.</p>
<p>A third issue is division in the Nigerien army. Issoufou <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/west-africa/mali/261-frontiere-niger-mali-mettre-loutil-militaire-au-service-dune-approche-politique">attempted to unify the military by</a> increasing the number of minority groups in the organisation. Nevertheless, <a href="https://africacenter.org/fr/publication/obstacles-au-professionnalisme-militaire-en-afrique/">ethnic divisions</a> still affect it.</p>
<p>The most common criticism is that the army is negatively affected by appointments that are made along ethnic lines rather than for professional reasons. The larger ethnic groups are believed to be benefiting disproportionately from military recruitments. </p>
<h2>What role have regional players like Nigeria played?</h2>
<p>Most regional players – especially Nigeria – supported the candidacy of Bazoum. This is because he rode on a platform of continuity and he is expected to continue the legacy of President Issoufou. </p>
<p>During his campaign, he labelled his policy platform Renaissance 3, a continuation of Issoufou’s Renaissance 1 and Renaissance 2 <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201609221403.html">governing agendas</a>. </p>
<p>There is a lot of interest in Niger in the region, particularly from Nigeria. Leaders of countries in the region didn’t openly support any candidate so as not to interfere in the elections. Nevertheless, Bazoum’s continuity agenda was welcomed by them too. </p>
<p>Niger is a key part of the security infrastructure in the Sahel and West Africa regions and is a member of the G5 Sahel and Multinational Joint Task Force. This implies that allies in the region would welcome a continuation of Issoufou’s legacy especially in combating the common threats. </p>
<h2>What do recent events portend for peace and security in Niger, and the region?</h2>
<p>The attempted coup is an indication that there is still division in the country and in the security infrastructure, especially the army. Having previously identified the <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigers-democratic-transition-is-good-news-but-the-threat-of-insurgency-remains-high-152905">challenges</a> facing the new president, president elect Bazoum must ensure the country’s fragmented ethnic groups remain united to combat the security threats in the country. </p>
<p>The new president must also address the violence that’s broken out in the south west of the country. On the 21st of March 2021 armed gunmen raided several villages in southwestern Niger <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/22/gunmen-on-motorbikes-raid-niger-villages-kill-scores">killing 137</a> people and injuring several others. </p>
<p>If not addressed attacks like this will undermine peace and security, opening the door to opportunist military officers using them as excuse to stage another coup. </p>
<h2>How can the new President build confidence?</h2>
<p>Although Niger remains <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/NER.pdf">at the bottom end of the poverty index</a> and insecurity remains high, Issoufou has managed to stabilise the country. He is the longest serving civilian president and also the first to handover to another democratically elected president. </p>
<p>The new president can build on these achievements to instil confidence in the country as well as the region. President elect Bazoum must ensure aggrieved ethnic groups are placated and must remain active in the regional security architecture while boosting economic productivity at home.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158330/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Although there had been an increase in violence in Niger since the last election results were announced, the attempted coup, on March 31, raised concerns to a new level in the volatile country.Olayinka Ajala, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1547032021-02-17T13:49:27Z2021-02-17T13:49:27ZInternet blackouts in Myanmar allow the military to retain control<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384514/original/file-20210216-15-1i6ks19.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5000%2C3300&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A protester holds up a placard with an image of deposed Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi during an anti-coup rally in Mandalay, Myanmar, on Feb. 15, 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Myanmar citizens have been living under military control for weeks after the country’s military <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55902070">staged a coup</a>. Citing issues of electoral fraud in the November 2020 general elections, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-military-reverts-to-its-old-strong-arm-behaviour-and-the-country-takes-a-major-step-backwards-154368">military detained elected officials</a>, including civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, and implemented a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55889565">national internet shutdown</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384513/original/file-20210216-21-fjmer7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Aung San Suu Kyi shares a laugh with Justin Trudeau." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384513/original/file-20210216-21-fjmer7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384513/original/file-20210216-21-fjmer7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384513/original/file-20210216-21-fjmer7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384513/original/file-20210216-21-fjmer7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384513/original/file-20210216-21-fjmer7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384513/original/file-20210216-21-fjmer7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384513/original/file-20210216-21-fjmer7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Aung San Suu Kyi, the civilian leader of Myanmar and an honourary Canadian citizen, shares a laugh with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in his office in Ottawa in June 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Internet shutdowns in Myanmar represent a serious threat to democracy, but these actions aren’t entirely surprising — many Myanmar citizens have experienced all this before.</p>
<p>During the country’s history of military rule from the 1960s to 2011, the military employed many of the same tactics to gain control. The ongoing national internet shutdowns and social media bans highlight a continued cycle of anti-democratic repression and censorship employed by Myanmar’s military — although there are ways internet service providers can help the country’s censored citizens. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1361032747763007488"}"></div></p>
<p>The path to democracy in Myanmar has been slow and laborious. The election of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in 2015 and 2020 represented significant progress and suggested democracy was finally taking hold in the country. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, the coup has halted the country’s progress once again. </p>
<p>The military has been Myanmar’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/2/2/analysis-why-is-myanmar-military-so-powerful">most powerful institution</a> since its independence from Britain in 1948. The military-led coup in 1962 was followed by nearly five decades of military rule. Following general elections in 1990, the military refused to hand over power and placed the winning candidate, Aung San Suu Kyi, under <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/11/13/burma-chronology-aung-san-suu-kyis-detention">house arrest for more than 15 years</a>.</p>
<h2>Military still has might</h2>
<p>In 2008, democracy proponents were hopeful that a new constitution would finally bring democratic norms and institutions to Myanmar. But <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/21/asia/myanmar-military-the-real-power/index.html">the constitution</a> was drafted by the military regime and maintained its privileged position. For example, it gives the military “the right to take over and exercise state sovereign power” if there are any threats to national unity. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Soldiers stand next to a military truck" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384523/original/file-20210216-13-16uowkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384523/original/file-20210216-13-16uowkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384523/original/file-20210216-13-16uowkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384523/original/file-20210216-13-16uowkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384523/original/file-20210216-13-16uowkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384523/original/file-20210216-13-16uowkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384523/original/file-20210216-13-16uowkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Soldiers stand next to a military truck in Yangon, Myanmar on Feb. 15, 2021. Security forces in Myanmar have intensified their crackdown against anti-coup protesters.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Following <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-reconstruction-insig/rude-and-insolent-fraught-talks-preceded-myanmars-army-seizing-power-idUSKBN2A9225">fraught discussions</a> with the civilian government this month about the election, the military specifically cited provisions in the constitution to justify the coup and declare a state of emergency. </p>
<p>Internet shutdowns are a common tool of repression used by governments to halt the flow of web-based communication and information. Since 2019, more than 36 countries have used internet shutdowns for a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/global-5#">variety of reasons</a>. Recent shutdowns have occurred in India, Egypt, Ethiopia, Belarus and other countries.</p>
<p>Myanmar has become a frequent user of internet shutdowns. In 2007, the military junta <a href="https://opennet.net/research/bulletins/013">escalated their information warfare tactics</a> and ordered a national internet shutdown to maintain complete control. </p>
<p>In June 2019, the Myanmar civilian government initiated the world’s <a href="https://restofworld.org/2021/myanmar-one-blackout-ends-another-begins">longest internet shutdown</a> at the behest of the military, citing issues of instability and the use of internet services to co-ordinate illegal activities in Rakhine and Chin states. Lasting almost a year, the regional shutdown raised serious concerns that many citizens had been left in the dark <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/06/24/882893419/parts-of-myanmar-unaware-of-covid-19-due-to-internet-ban-advocates-say">about the global COVID-19 pandemic</a>. </p>
<p>On Jan. 31, 2021, the Ministry of Transportation and Communication — controlled by the military — <a href="https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-disrupted-in-myanmar-amid-apparent-military-uprising-JBZrmlB6">ordered a nationwide internet shutdown</a> to prevent citizens from reporting on the military coup. The move was similar to actions taken by the military in neighbouring Thailand during its 2014 coup, which focused on information control and <a href="https://citizenlab.ca/2014/07/information-controls-thailand-2014-coup/">blocked more than 56 URLs</a>.</p>
<p>Following orders to both state-run and foreign internet providers, the initial shutdown in Myanmar began around 3 a.m. Connectivity levels declined 50 per cent by 8 a.m. As access to the internet was severely restricted, the military successfully executed their coup, detaining key political leaders and NLD supporters. </p>
<h2>Using the internet ‘kill switch’</h2>
<p>Instead of a consistent network shutdown, internet shutdowns and social media bans have come in waves over the past two weeks in Myanmar. A partial internet shutdown was initially observed, shielding coup efforts. Once the military seized power, connection was restored. </p>
<p>Citizens turned to Facebook, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/feb/04/myanmar-coup-army-blocks-facebook-access-as-civil-disobedience-grows">the main source of news and communication</a> for 50 per cent of the population, to protest the coup and demand a return to democracy. On Feb. 3, the military ordered a <a href="https://www.mmtimes.com/news/myanmar-bans-facebook-temporarily.html">social media ban</a>, primarily focused on Facebook. Telenor Myanmar (part of Norway’s Telenor Group) restricted Facebook, while <a href="https://www.dica.gov.mm/en/link/myanmar-posts-and-telecommunications">Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications</a> restricted Facebook, Instagram, Messenger and WhatsApp. </p>
<p>Since Feb. 1, millions of people in Myanmar have participated in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/14/world/asia/myanmar-military-crackdown.html">civil disobedience campaigns and protests</a> on the streets and online. Although social media bans have remained in place, protesters have <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/myanmar-protests-protesters-getting-around-internet-blackout-14159342">found ways to co-ordinate</a> through encrypted messaging services and virtual private networks, known as VPNs. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/civil-disobedience-myanmars-new-normal.html">mass protests continue</a>, the military is responding with further internet shutdowns and social media restrictions. A second nationwide shutdown was ordered on Feb. 6, but connectivity was mostly restored by Feb. 7. On Feb. 14 and 15, citizens experienced <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/myanmar-experiencing-near-total-internet-shutdown-14198398">two consecutive nights of internet shutdowns</a>, allowing the military to carry out further crackdowns. </p>
<p>The military has changed its censorship technique to <a href="https://netblocks.org/reports/iraq-introduces-nightly-internet-curfew-JAp1DKBd">curfew-styled internet blackouts</a> that seriously affect the ability of citizens to communicate and verify information. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1361152641645035520"}"></div></p>
<h2>Will shutdowns continue?</h2>
<p>The various tactics used in Myanmar to quell <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/10/myanmar-protesters-streets-naypyitaw-yangon-police-coup-violence">growing protests against the coup</a> are different from previous shutdowns in 2007 and 2019, but they have a similar effect. </p>
<p>On Feb. 15, in Mandalay, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/myanmar-protests-resume-after-second-night-of-internet-shutdown/">soldiers broke up a group of 1,000 protesters</a> at the Myanmar Economic Bank using slingshots, sticks and a number of warning shots. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A policeman aims a slingshot into the air." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384562/original/file-20210216-13-pydf7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384562/original/file-20210216-13-pydf7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384562/original/file-20210216-13-pydf7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384562/original/file-20210216-13-pydf7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384562/original/file-20210216-13-pydf7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384562/original/file-20210216-13-pydf7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384562/original/file-20210216-13-pydf7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A policeman aims a slingshot towards an unknown target during a crackdown on anti-coup protesters holding a rally in front of the Myanmar Economic Bank in Mandalay, Myanmar on Feb. 15, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The military has also recently put forward a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-internet-idUSKBN2AB0WK">new cyber-security bill</a> that could give it sweeping control over online data and allow the collection and monitoring of citizens online. This bill would <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-military-has-used-surveillance-draconian-laws-and-fear-to-stifle-dissent-before-will-it-work-again-154474">severely affect privacy</a> and freedom of speech. </p>
<p>If the military regime is unable to prevent citizens from mobilizing, Myanmar will almost certainly experience continued cycles of internet shutdowns. Citizens may also be met with extreme force and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/04/dozens-countries-governments-rely-internet-shutdowns-hide-repression/">government-sanctioned violence</a>, similar to the current situation in Ethiopia. </p>
<h2>What can be done?</h2>
<p>The situation in Myanmar should be a point of international concern. Internet shutdowns prevent citizens’ ability to document violence and hold perpetrators accountable, leaving them at risk of extreme violence. </p>
<p>But the international community, including foreign ISPs, governments and <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton-internet-shutdowns-during-covid-19-will-help-spread-the-virus/">advocacy networks, can help</a> end shutdowns in Myanmar. </p>
<p>Given the vast changes to the telecommunications landscape in Myanmar, the growing number of ISP providers could undermine social media bans and internet shutdowns. Telenor Myanmar, for example, seems to have recently intentionally delayed a Twitter ban amid <a href="https://www.telenor.com/media/press-release/myanmar-authorities-orders-nationwide-shutdown-of-the-data-network">public outcry</a>. Delaying the execution of an order is one way for ISPs and telecommunication operators to resist shutdown orders, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10_dictators_digital_network.pdf">as they’ve done in Egypt</a>. </p>
<p>Telenor Group has attempted to provide details of the military’s directives, but it was <a href="https://www.telenor.com/sustainability/responsible-business/human-rights/mitigate/human-rights-in-myanmar/directives-from-authorities-in-myanmar-february-2021/">recently ordered to stop</a>. Nonetheless, the company’s actions have helped raise awareness about the situation in Myanmar, and ISPs should develop clear policies around forced shutdowns in the future in countries experiencing political upheaval.</p>
<p>Governments should also regularly denounce the use of internet shutdowns and pressure ISPs to take a stronger stance against them — in Myanmar and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154703/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cassandra Preece receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helen Beny receives funding from the Ontario Graduate Scholarship Program.</span></em></p>Internet shutdowns and social media bans in Myanmar have helped the military retain control after the Feb. 1 coup. Here’s why ISPs should develop clear policies around forced internet shutdowns.Cassandra Preece, PhD Student, Political Science, McMaster UniversityHelen Beny, PhD Student, Political Science, McMaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1543682021-02-01T05:20:54Z2021-02-01T05:20:54ZMyanmar’s military reverts to its old strong-arm behaviour — and the country takes a major step backwards<p>Just before the newly elected members of Myanmar’s parliament were due to be sworn in today, the military <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/01/aung-san-suu-kyi-and-other-figures-detained-in-myanmar-raids-says-ruling-party">detained</a> the country’s de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi; the president, Win Myint; and other key figures from the elected ruling party, the National League for Democracy. </p>
<p>The military later <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/01/aung-san-suu-kyi-and-other-figures-detained-in-myanmar-raids-says-ruling-party">announced</a> it had taken control of the country for 12 months and declared a state of emergency. This is a coup d'etat, whether the military calls it that or not.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1356029505576419330"}"></div></p>
<h2>A disputed election and claims of fraud</h2>
<p>In November, the NLD and Suu Kyi won a <a href="https://theconversation.com/aung-san-suu-kyi-wins-big-in-myanmars-elections-but-will-it-bring-peace-or-restore-her-reputation-abroad-149619">landslide victory</a> in national elections, with the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-s-military-backed-opposition-party-stares-political-abyss">faring poorly in its key strongholds</a>. </p>
<p>Humiliated by the result, the USDP <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/analysis/myanmars-losing-party-keeps-pushing-claims-election-fraud-seeks-overturn-outcome.html">alleged the election</a> was subject to widespread fraud. However, international observers, including the Carter Center, the <a href="https://anfrel.org/category/country-profiles/myanmar/">Asian Network for Free Elections</a> and the European Union’s Election Observation Mission, all declared the elections a <a href="https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/17540-myanmar-polls-a-success-international-observers.html">success</a>. The EU’s preliminary statement noted that 95% of observers had rated the process “good” or “very good”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/aung-san-suu-kyi-wins-big-in-myanmars-elections-but-will-it-bring-peace-or-restore-her-reputation-abroad-149619">Aung San Suu Kyi wins big in Myanmar's elections, but will it bring peace — or restore her reputation abroad?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Reputable local organisations, such as the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/PACEMyanmar/community/">People’s Alliance for Credible Elections</a> (PACE), agreed. These groups issued a <a href="https://www.pacemyanmar.org/mmobservers-statment-eng/">joint statement</a> on January 21 saying </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the results of the elections were credible and reflected the will of the majority voters.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yet, taking a page out of former US President Donald Trump’s book, the USDP pressed its claims of fraud despite the absence of any substantial evidence — a move designed to undermine the legitimacy of the elections. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381547/original/file-20210201-20282-1srvmqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381547/original/file-20210201-20282-1srvmqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381547/original/file-20210201-20282-1srvmqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381547/original/file-20210201-20282-1srvmqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381547/original/file-20210201-20282-1srvmqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381547/original/file-20210201-20282-1srvmqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381547/original/file-20210201-20282-1srvmqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Supporters of the Myanmar military protest the election results in Yangon last weekend.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thein Zaw/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The military <a href="https://mailchi.mp/frontiermyanmar.net/tense-election-enters-home-stretch-2948606?e=aa4da994bf">did not initially</a> back the USDP’s claims, but it has gradually begun to provide the party with more support, with the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, General Min Aung Hlaing, refusing to rule out a coup <a href="https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/2058863/military-stokes-coup-fears-amid-political-crisis">last week</a>.</p>
<p>The following day, the country’s election authorities <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/election-fraud-01282021184631.html">broke weeks of silence</a> and firmly rejected the USDP’s claims of widespread fraud — setting the stage for what Myanmar historian Thant Myint-U <a href="https://twitter.com/thantmyintu/status/1354784233428934663">called</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>[Myanmar’s] most acute constitutional crisis since the abolition of the old junta in 2010.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381548/original/file-20210201-23-y25d20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381548/original/file-20210201-23-y25d20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381548/original/file-20210201-23-y25d20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381548/original/file-20210201-23-y25d20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381548/original/file-20210201-23-y25d20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381548/original/file-20210201-23-y25d20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381548/original/file-20210201-23-y25d20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tensions have been running high ahead of this week’s opening of Myanmar’s parliament, with roadblocks set up in the capital.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Aung Shine Oo/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The civilian-military power-sharing arrangement</h2>
<p>It is difficult to see how the military will benefit from today’s actions, since the power-sharing arrangement it had struck with the NLD under the 2008 constitution had already allowed it to <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/EconomicInterestsMyanmarMilitary/A_HRC_42_CRP_3.pdf">expand its influence and economic interests in the country</a>.</p>
<p>The military had previously ruled Myanmar for half a century after General Ne Win launched a coup in 1962. A so-called internal “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10357718.2013.788126?needAccess=true&journalCode=caji20">self-coup</a>” in 1988 brought a new batch of military generals to power. That junta, led by Senior General Than Shwe, allowed elections in 1990 that were won in a landslide by Suu Kyi’s party. The military leaders, however, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798813">refused to acknowledge</a> the results.</p>
<p>In 2008, a new constitution was drawn up by the junta which reserved 25% of the national parliament seats for the military and allowed it to appoint the ministers of defence, border affairs and home affairs, as well as a vice president. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/05/26/burma-20-years-after-1990-elections-democracy-still-denied#">Elections in 2010</a> were boycotted by the NLD, but the party won a resounding victory in the next elections in 2015.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethical-minefields-the-dirty-business-of-doing-deals-with-myanmars-military-152318">Ethical minefields: the dirty business of doing deals with Myanmar's military</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Since early 2016, Suu Kyi has been de facto leader of Myanmar, even though there is still no civilian oversight of the military. Until this past week, the relationship between civilian and military authorities was tense at times, but overall largely cordial. It was based on a mutual recognition of overlapping interests in key areas of national policy. </p>
<p>Indeed, this power-sharing arrangement has been extremely comfortable for the military, as it has had full autonomy over security matters and maintained lucrative economic interests. </p>
<p>The partnership allowed the military’s “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/22/myanmar-government-rohingya-report-falls-short">clearance operations</a>” in Rakhine State in 2017 that resulted in the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2020.1813251?scroll=top&needAccess=true">exodus</a> of 740,000 mostly Muslim Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh. </p>
<p>In the wake of that pogrom, Suu Kyi vigorously defended both the country and its military at the <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/03/26/the-folly-of-aung-san-suu-kyis-bad-apple-defence/">International Court of Justice</a>. Myanmar’s global reputation — and Suu Kyi’s once-esteemed personal standing — suffered deeply and never recovered. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, there was one key point of contention between the NLD and military: the constitutional prohibitions that made it impossible for Suu Kyi to officially take the presidency. Some NLD figures have also voiced deep concerns about the permanent role claimed by the armed forces as an arbiter of all legal and constitutional matters in the country.</p>
<h2>A backwards step for Myanmar</h2>
<p>Regardless of how events unfold this week and beyond, Myanmar’s fragile democracy has been severely undermined by the military’s actions. </p>
<p>The NLD government has certainly had <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Myanmar-Politics-Economy-and-Society/Simpson-Farrelly/p/book/9780367110444">its shortcomings</a>, but a military coup is a significant backwards step for Myanmar — and is bad news for democracy in the region. </p>
<p>It’s difficult to see this action as anything other than a way for General Min Aung Hlaing to retain his prominent position in national politics, given <a href="https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/2031635/whats-next-for-myanmars-military-chief-after-65-">he is mandated to retire</a> this year when he turns 65. With the poor electoral performance of the USDP, there are no other conceivable political routes to power, such as through the presidency.</p>
<p>A coup will be counterproductive for the military in many ways. Governments around the world will likely now apply or extend sanctions on members of the military. Indeed, the US has <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/31/myanmar-coup-464252">released a statement</a> saying it would “take action” against those responsible. Foreign investment in the country — except perhaps from China — is also likely to plummet. </p>
<p>As Myanmar’s people have already enjoyed a decade of increased political freedoms, they are also likely to be uncooperative subjects as military rule is re-imposed. </p>
<p>The 2020 general election demonstrated, once again, the distaste in Myanmar for the political role of the armed forces and the enduring popularity of Suu Kyi. Her detention undermines the fragile coalition that was steering Myanmar through a perilous period, and could prove a messy end to the profitable détente between civilian and military forces.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154368/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Farrelly previously received funding for Myanmar research from The Australian Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It is difficult to see how the military will benefit from another coup, since it already enjoyed immense political and economic influence under the previous power-sharing agreement.Adam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, University of South AustraliaNicholas Farrelly, Professor and Head of Social Sciences, University of TasmaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1531452021-01-14T13:21:44Z2021-01-14T13:21:44ZCapitol siege raises questions over extent of white supremacist infiltration of US police<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378592/original/file-20210113-23-xvfvrk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C8%2C5982%2C3979&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A U.S. Capitol police officer stands at a street corner near the Capitol.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/capitol-police-officer-stands-at-a-street-corner-near-the-u-news-photo/1230481038?adppopup=true">Kent Nishimura / Los Angeles Times via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The apparent <a href="https://theappeal.org/the-cops-at-the-capitol/">participation of off-duty officers in the rally</a> that morphed into a siege on the U.S. Capitol building Jan. 6 has revived fears about <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/how-we-rise/2021/01/12/what-the-capitol-insurgency-reveals-about-white-supremacy-and-law-enforcement/">white supremacists within police departments</a>.</p>
<p>These concerns are not new. White supremacy, the belief that white people are superior to other races, has <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/hidden-plain-sight-racism-white-supremacy-and-far-right-militancy-law">long tainted elements within law enforcement</a>. As <a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO02/20200929/111003/HHRG-116-GO02-Wstate-JohnsonV-20200929.pdf">I testified before Congress just months before this assault</a>, there is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-racist-roots-of-american-policing-from-slave-patrols-to-traffic-stops-112816">long history of racism in U.S. policing</a> – and this legacy may have contributed to the violence in the Capitol in Washington, D.C.</p>
<p>Reports of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-police-investigation/off-duty-police-firefighters-under-investigation-in-connection-with-us-capitol-riot-idUSKBN29F0KH">officers involved</a> in an attack in which the <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/2021/01/decoding-hate-symbols-seen-at-capitol-insurrection/">symbols and language of white supremacy</a> were clearly on display are concerning. </p>
<p>But so too, I believe, is a policing culture that may have contributed to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-security-insight/u-s-lawmakers-say-police-downplayed-threat-of-violence-before-capitol-siege-idUSKBN29D0N9">downplaying of the risk</a> of attack before it began and the <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2021/01/07/613802462/how-the-storming-of-the-capitol-was-and-wasnt-about-police">apparent sympathetic response to attackers</a> displayed by some police officers – they too hint at a wider problem.</p>
<p>As someone who has researched and <a href="https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/28080-lcb231article2johnsonpdf">written about the chilling problem of white supremacists in law enforcement</a>, I believe the failure to confront the problem has had deadly consequences.</p>
<h2>Blue, but white first?</h2>
<p>Racism and white supremacy are problems in society, not just the police. Just after the violent Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017, 9% of Americans responding to an <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/28-approve-trumps-response-charlottesville-poll/story?id=49334079">ABC News/Washington News poll</a> said that it was acceptable to hold neo-Nazi views. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-poll/majority-of-americans-want-trump-removed-immediately-after-u-s-capitol-violence-reuters-ipsos-poll-idUSKBN29D2VG">Reuters poll</a> after the insurrection at the Capitol found that 12% of Americans supported the actions of those who took part in the attack.</p>
<p>But the percentage of police officers who hold views in support of white identity extremism may be at least as high or higher – white people are overrepresented on police forces cross the country. And surveys have found that police officers – especially white ones – diverge from the wider public on issues of race. A <a href="https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/01/11/police-views-public-views/">2017 Pew poll</a> found that 92% of white officers believe that the U.S. had made the reforms necessary for equal rights for Black Americans. This compared with just 29% of Black officers and 48% of the general public, including 57% of white Americans. This leads some to wonder whether police are more sympathetic to the rhetoric of Trump and others.</p>
<p>With their enormous power, department-issued weapons and access to sensitive information, police departments must be rid of officers with racist views for America’s security. But for the same reasons, police departments have become attractive recruiting grounds for white supremacist groups.</p>
<p><a href="https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/White_Supremacist_Infiltration_of_Law_Enforcement.pdf">The FBI warned of the problem</a> in 2006, noting: “Having personnel within law enforcement agencies has historically been and
will continue to be a desired asset for white supremacist groups.”</p>
<p>Because of the secretive nature of such groups, it is hard to say how many officers are involved. But since 2009 police officers in Florida, Alabama and Louisiana have been <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/hidden-plain-sight-racism-white-supremacy-and-far-right-militancy-law">identified as members of white supremacist groups</a>. Meanwhile, more than 100
police departments in 49 different states have <a href="https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/28080-lcb231article2johnsonpdf">had to deal with scandals</a> involving racist emails, texts or online comments sent or made by department staff. Just this week a high-ranking officer in the New York Police Department was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/11/nyregion/nypd-james-kobel-racist.html">found to be behind a string of racist posts</a> online.</p>
<h2>Misplaced sympathies</h2>
<p>When it comes to the events of Jan. 6, there appear to be three main areas of concern about the action – or inaction – of police. First, there appears little doubt that Capitol Police <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-uncomfortable-questions-facing-capitol-police-over-the-security-breach-by-maga-mob-152857">did not prepare in a way to protect the Capitol</a> for the threat lawmakers and the vice president faced. The U.S. Capitol Police Department is one of the best-funded police forces in the country; <a href="https://www.rollcall.com/2020/06/15/capitol-police-a-department-shrouded-in-secrecy/">with a budget of more than $500 million</a> and approximately 2,000 police officers, it is larger than the police force of the city of San Diego, yet the Capitol Police’s mission is to guard a few buildings and the members of Congress.</p>
<p>The rally and <a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/capitol-rioters-planned-for-weeks-in-plain-sight-the-police-werent-ready">plan to attack the Capitol were discussed on public social media platforms</a> such as Twitter, Parler, Reddit, Instagram and Facebook for law enforcement who cared to be prepared. Enrique Tarrio, a member of the far-right Proud Boys, was arrested a few days before the attack for the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/proud-boys-enrique-tarrio-arrest/2021/01/04/8642a76a-4edf-11eb-b96e-0e54447b23a1_story.html">destruction of a Black Lives Matter flag belonging to a Black church in Washington, D.C</a>. Tarrio had traveled to the District of Columbia for the Jan. 6 rally and was <a href="https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/article248458030.html">allegedly in possession of high-capacity magazines</a>. This should have been an indication that the protesters planned violence.</p>
<p>Both the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/crime-courts/fbi-nypd-told-capitol-police-about-possibility-violence-riot-senior-n1253646">NYPD and FBI warned the Capitol police</a> of the threats they were seeing online, with <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/capitol-riot-fbi-intelligence/2021/01/12/30d12748-546b-11eb-a817-e5e7f8a406d6_story.html">an FBI office in Virginia telling Capitol police that extremists were planning violence and “war” just one day before the attack</a>. </p>
<p>Yet there were no phalanxes of heavily armed police officers <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2021-01-12/the-us-capitol-riots-and-the-double-standard-of-protest-policing">as had been the case in protests in the capital against racism</a>, in which many more Black Americans were involved.</p>
<p>As such, many are legitimately asking: Was the threat posed by the rioters on Jan. 6 underestimated by police because of their race?</p>
<p>There are also questions to be asked over whether <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/capitol-riot-fbi-intelligence/2021/01/12/30d12748-546b-11eb-a817-e5e7f8a406d6_story.html">Capitol police officers were more sympathetic to Trump supporters</a> during the attack itself. One officer tasked with protecting the Capitol <a href="https://www.king5.com/article/news/nation-world/capitol-police-officers-suspended-riot/507-0c454f7e-fed5-44f3-9b84-2a6d74239645">put on</a> a red Make America Great Again cap during the attack, <a href="https://www.king5.com/article/news/nation-world/capitol-police-officers-suspended-riot/507-0c454f7e-fed5-44f3-9b84-2a6d74239645">according to the Tim Ryan</a>, the Democratic chairman of the House subcommittee that oversees funding for Capitol police. Another Capitol police officer was seen being friendly and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/11/politics/capitol-police-officers-suspended-tim-ryan/index.html">taking photographs with rioters</a>. Two Capitol police officers have been suspended and <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/01/12/2-capitol-police-suspended-10-under-investigation-after-capitol-riot/6639735002/">at least 10 others are under investigation</a> for their behavior in the uprising.</p>
<h2>Off duty, in crowd</h2>
<p>Finally, there is concern that off-duty officers holding extreme views traveled from across the country to be part of the day’s events. Reports from Capitol police officers describe cops <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/emmanuelfelton/black-capitol-police-racism-mob">flashing their badges while attempting to enter the Capitol</a>.</p>
<p>At least 28 sworn law enforcement officers attended the Jan. 6 rally, according to a <a href="https://theappeal.org/the-cops-at-the-capitol/">tally kept by the publication</a> The Appeal. They represent police departments from at least 12 different states. This number could grow.</p>
<p>Obviously there is a difference between merely attending the rally and taking part in the siege.</p>
<p>But domestic terrorism from far-right groups is a significant threat to America’s safety and security. And the actions of police on Jan. 6 – both as individuals and as a force – raise concerns. For all Americans to be truly safe, it is important to weed out far-right extremism, especially in the institution sworn to protect us all.</p>
<p>[_<a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/politics-weekly-74/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=politics-important">The Conversation’s most important election and politics headlines, in our Politics Weekly newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153145/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vida Johnson is a registered Democrat. </span></em></p>The FBI has long warned that white supremacist groups are seeking to infiltrate police, which makes the events of Jan. 6 all the more concerning.Vida Johnson, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1499902020-11-13T13:39:05Z2020-11-13T13:39:05ZRemembering Amadou Touré: Mali’s soldier of democracy who left a problematic legacy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369042/original/file-20201112-13-ts9ju7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Amadou Toumani Toure in 2005. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Gilles BASSIGNAC/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As they say in Mali’s Manding language, <em>yiriba binna</em>: a giant tree has fallen. </p>
<p>Amadou Toumani Touré, who died in an Istanbul hospital on November 10th at age 72, is being <a href="https://www.dw.com/fr/le-mali-rend-hommage-%C3%A0-lancien-pr%C3%A9sident-att/a-55558408">warmly remembered in Mali</a> as one of the country’s greatest leaders. As a 42-year-old army colonel, he led the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/27/world/mali-s-dictator-is-overthrown-in-coup.html">coup that ended more than two decades of authoritarian rule</a> and initiated the transition to multiparty democracy. </p>
<p>During his year as interim head of state, Touré enjoyed such popularity that after he broadcast a statement condemning the chaos and looting in the coup’s wake, Bamako residents recall seeing people return stolen goods to the buildings they’d taken them from. </p>
<p>When, after presiding over that transition, Touré voluntarily stepped down to make way for an elected head of state in 1992, he set a shining example for others to follow. A decade later he again served as president. Two decades later, his reputation lay in tatters.</p>
<h2>Colonel Touré</h2>
<p>In many respects Touré’s life mirrored that of postcolonial Mali and Africa at large. As a student during the regime of President Modibo Keita (1960-68), Touré trained to become a teacher and embody the values of socialist nation-building. A few months after Keita’s ouster in a military coup, however, Touré decided to join the army. He <a href="https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/mali-l-ex-president-amadou-toumani-toure-n-est-plus-10-11-2020-2400318_3826.php">became a paratrooper and rose through the ranks</a>, ultimately commanding the airborne regiment and the presidential guard.</p>
<p>In March 1991, as nascent democratic movements proliferated across Africa, Colonel Touré intervened following weeks of street protests in Bamako against the harsh and unpopular regime of President Moussa Traoré. He arrested the president, halted the bloody crackdown against demonstrators, and established an interim government. Under his leadership the foundation was laid for <a href="https://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/Legacy/sitefiles/file/46/1322/06whitehousepp3552.pdf">new democratic institutions that would reshape the country for decades to come</a>.</p>
<p>By the time he left office, Touré had become known as <a href="https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/374873585.pdf">Mali’s “soldier of democracy”</a>. In the heady, optimistic era between the end of the Cold War and the September 11th attacks in New York, he devoted himself to international advocacy. For example, he <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/health_publications/guinea_worm/wrap-up/85.pdf">campaigned with nongovernmental organisations like the Carter Center</a> to eradicate guinea worm and other infectious diseases, created a <a href="http://bamada.net/fondation-pour-lenfance-sous-le-leadership-datt-de-nouveaux-defis-a-relever-pour-le-plus-grand-bonheur-des-couches-defavorisees-un-plan-dactions-2020-2023-bientot-devoile">children’s health foundation</a>, and worked to ban landmines. He also served as mediator in the conflict-torn Great Lakes region and the Central African Republic.</p>
<h2>Return to politics</h2>
<p>After retiring from the army in 2001, Touré returned to Malian politics, capitalising on his broad public support. </p>
<p>Rather than join one of the dozens of newly established parties or form his own, he entered and <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/mali2002results1.htm">easily won the 2002 presidential election</a> as an independent. By bringing people from across Mali’s political class into his government and by preaching “consensus-based governance”, Touré sought to remain above the unruly partisan fray. </p>
<p>This approach secured him a <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/mali2007results1.htm">comfortable reelection in 2007</a>. But it is also what came to tarnish his legacy.</p>
<p>Where supporters saw Touré’s rule as open and inclusive, detractors saw it as too ineffectual to tackle serious problems – and time ultimately proved the detractors right. </p>
<p>Touré’s unwillingness to humiliate public officials guilty of embezzlement permitted a culture of impunity to harden. His reluctance to deploy troops to quell simmering unrest in Mali’s northern desert regions led him instead to back local ethnic militias and to turn a blind eye to <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Crime%20after%20Jihad.pdf">growing numbers of radical jihadi fighters and narcotraffickers</a>. Rather than implement necessary reforms of the military, Touré swelled the ranks of its generals while neglecting the rank and file. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://signal.sciencespo-lyon.fr/article/632721/Mali-nouvelles-formes-de-lutte-et-necessite-d-une-refondation-democratique">words of one prominent critic,</a> his consensus-driven approach “diluted all conflicts and emptied the political game of its content, with corruption as its foundation.”</p>
<p>These problems came home to roost as Touré’s second (and, under Mali’s 1992 constitution, final) presidential term neared its end in early 2012. Latent conflict in the north <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/2/18/tuareg-rebellion-sparks-crisis-in-mali">escalated to open warfare</a> as battle-tested Tuareg fighters bent on secession joined forces with jihadi groups. The Malian military, too poorly equipped and badly led to fight this rebellion, abandoned its northern bases in humiliating defeat.</p>
<p>By the time <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/africa/mali-coup-france-calls-for-elections.html">junior army officers mutinied in Bamako on March 21st 2012</a>, ordinary Malians were fed up with Touré and his governing style. Many believed that he had actually fomented the rebellion as <a href="https://www.academia.edu/27412070/Suspecting_the_State_How_mass_suspicion_brought_down_a_president_in_Mali_West_Africa">a pretext to cancel elections and remain in power</a>. As the mutineers closed in on the presidential palace, Touré fled into hiding and then to Senegal. Mali’s 20-year-old democratic experiment was reduced to an empty shell.</p>
<p>Touré kept a low profile as an ex-president in exile. He <a href="http://news-afrik.com/mali-ex-president-amadou-t-toure-returns-to-bamako">returned home to Mali in December 2019</a> to little public fanfare. </p>
<p>With his passing, Malians have chosen largely to remember him as a builder of democracy rather than as an agent of its demise. They pay tribute to what Touré achieved in the 1990s, when Mali seemed bright with promise, and keep silent about his subsequent missteps that helped to bring the nation to the brink amid <a href="https://theconversation.com/malis-predictable-coup-leaves-an-unclear-path-to-civilian-rule-144774">proliferating violence and a fourth coup</a>. They do this not because they are in denial about his legacy, but because they prefer not to speak ill of the dead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bruce Whitehouse does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Touré pursued a strategy he called ‘the politics of consensus’, ostensibly enabling him to work with everyone, transcend partisan divisions and advance the public interest.Bruce Whitehouse, Associate Professor, Lehigh University Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1447742020-08-20T13:08:37Z2020-08-20T13:08:37ZMali’s predictable coup leaves an unclear path to civilian rule<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353713/original/file-20200819-42861-1ef0hb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Malian Air Force deputy chief of staff Ismael Wague (centre) speaks during a press conference on August 19, 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">ANNIE RISEMBERG/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Soldiers have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/soldiers-arms-mali-crisis-deepens-live-updates-200818124326841.html">ousted</a> Mali’s President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta who has now resigned, alongside the country’s prime minister. Moina Spooner from The Conversation Africa asked Bruce Whitehouse, who has carried out studies on coups and violent extremism in Mali, to share his thoughts on what brought on this coup, and what needs to happen next to ensure stability in the country.</em></p>
<h2>What laid the ground for the recent coup in Mali and who led it?</h2>
<p>There are many long-term factors, but the immediate reason for the coup was Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta’s <a href="http://bamada.net/ibk-vu-par-confrere-francais-un-roi-faineant-tel-est-le-titre-dune-enquete-sur-ibrahim-boubacar-keita-realisee-par-le-journaliste-jean-louis-le-touzet">dismal performance as president</a>. When first elected to the office in 2013, Keita had the ideal resume, having held nearly every top post in the Malian government (foreign minister, prime minister, speaker of the National Assembly). Yet he subsequently did not address the existential threats to Mali’s people and the state, from political violence to corruption. </p>
<p>His 2013 <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201308050030.html">campaign promise</a> to root out corruption and restore the country’s dilapidated sovereignty quickly proved hollow. Scandals over his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/may/16/mali-president-boubacar-keita-private-plane-international-aid-donors">acquisition of a new presidential jet</a> and <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/42208/politique/mali-les-contrats-d-armement-surfactur-s-une-bombe-retardement-pour-ibk/">shady defence contracts</a> gave the impression that his administration would be no more transparent or upright than those that came before.</p>
<p>Insecurity was already severe in Mali’s northern regions when Keïta took office, mainly due to jihadi militants and criminal gangs. In the subsequent seven years the situation <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/mali-real-climate-fear-and-insecurity-country-s-north-and-centre-says-expert">steadily worsened</a> as roadside bombings and raids on government targets (including military and police posts, prisons, and administrative buildings) spread to other parts of the country. Many <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-04/07/c_138952410.htm">troops have been killed</a> by militants, and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/mali-military-islamic-state-al-qaeda-jnim/2020/03/10/de3b9c26-4f33-11ea-a4ab-9f389ce8ad30_story.html">soldiers lacked the supplies and vehicles they needed to carry on the fight</a>.</p>
<p>The violence resulted in a major humanitarian crisis. By the end of 2019, the UN estimated that <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/12/1053391#:%7E:text=Unprecedented%20humanitarian%20crisis%20in%20Mali%20revealed%20in%20new%20report,-UNICEF%2FKe%C3%AFta&text=Escalating%20violence%20and%20insecurity%20in,the%20UN%20said%20on%20Thursday.">3.9 million people</a> were in need of assistance and protection – an increase of 700 000 since the beginning of the year.</p>
<p>So ordinary Malians, and military personnel alike, were frustrated with Keïta’s government. As a consequence, since June there were <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200811-malian-protesters-regroup-to-demand-the-resignation-of-president-keita">persistent and massive street protests</a> in Bamako, the capital, demanding Keïta’s resignation. </p>
<p>We don’t yet know much about the officers who led the coup. They call themselves the National Committee for the Salvation of the People and <a href="https://sahelblog.wordpress.com/2020/08/19/meet-malis-new-military-junta-the-cnsp/">appear</a> to be more highly ranked (colonels and possibly a general) than the officers who led previous coups in Mali. Colonel Assimi Goita has <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/kenya/news/africa/army-colonel-assimi-goita-now-mali-s-new-military-strongman-1921554">announced</a> himself as the new leader.</p>
<h2>This is not the first time Mali’s had a coup. The most recent one was in 2012 and, like this one, resulted in military control. How would you rate the transition to a civilian government after the 2012 coup?</h2>
<p>In many ways, the 2020 coup resembles its <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n16/bruce-whitehouse/what-went-wrong-in-mali">2012 predecessor</a>. Both began as mutinies in Mali’s largest army base in Kati, on the outskirts of Bamako. The international response to both coups has been similar: statements of condemnation and promises of sanctions by the West African regional body, ECOWAS. And both seemed to garner quick popular support. A poll conducted after the 2012 coup <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n16/bruce-whitehouse/what-went-wrong-in-mali">showed that</a> about two-thirds of Bamako residents backed the junta. The mass protests leading to this coup indicates that many Malians also support change.</p>
<p>One big difference is that the 2020 junta had President Keïta and his prime minister arrested on the first day and the president announced his resignation soon after on television. By contrast, the 2012 junta never managed to capture the president they ousted (Amadou Toumani Touré), leaving the coup’s outcome uncertain for several days.</p>
<p>Though the transition to civilian rule in 2012 appeared to happen relatively quickly - it took about a month for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17642276">ECOWAS to negotiate</a> a handover to an interim civilian government - it masked continued interference from the military who <a href="https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.bb/">retained</a> considerable power behind the scenes for many months. For instance, just a few weeks after the coup, the military orchestrated <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17642276">a mob attack</a> that sent the interim president abroad for medical treatment. </p>
<p>This situation endured until 2013, when the <a href="https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.bb/">French military intervention against jihadi militants began</a>. From my own analysis, the presence of French troops discouraged the Malian military from meddling too openly with politics.</p>
<p>In August 2013, President Keita was voted in as president and, until now, seemed to have been able to keep the military in check, but military officers leading the coup appear to have been emboldened by the street protests of the past two months.</p>
<h2>How should the transition to a civilian government this time around be handled to ensure political stability in the country?</h2>
<p>The transition to a civilian government won’t be smooth. </p>
<p>There is significant <a href="http://www.fes-mali.org/images/Rapport_Final_Malimetre_N11_Site.pdf">public distrust</a> in Bamako toward politicians. Under Mali’s 1992 constitution, the speaker of the National Assembly is supposed to become interim president and organise new elections after a president’s resignation, but President Keïta <a href="https://dailytimes.com.pk/656255/coup-in-mali-national-assembly-dissolved-president-ibrahim-and-cabinet-members-in-jail/">dissolved</a> the body prior to resigning. This leaves no obvious successor.</p>
<p>The constitution also calls for new elections to be <a href="https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Mali_1992?lang=en">organised within a very short period</a> - just 40 days - after the establishment of an interim government. Meeting this deadline proved impossible in 2012 for Mali, a poor country torn apart by conflict, and would be equally impossible in 2020.</p>
<p>This leaves the path forward uncertain and requiring negotiation between the junta, Malian civil society groups and political parties, foreign governments, and international bodies.</p>
<h2>What are the likely regional implications, if any, of this coup?</h2>
<p>West African governments don’t like to see a president, particularly an elected one, toppled from power by his own military. ECOWAS will continue issuing strong statements and talking about sanctions. This is also because heads of state throughout the region <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/08/19/apres-le-mali-a-qui-le-tour-l-afrique-de-l-ouest-sur-le-qui-vive_6049357_3212.html">don’t want their own military officers getting any ideas</a> about emulating what happened in Mali. </p>
<p>Yet we saw in 2012 that ECOWAS had neither the will nor perhaps even the capacity to isolate Mali economically. I don’t expect that has changed, but the stakes are different this time: the Sahel is a much more dangerous place in 2020 than it was eight years ago. I would expect France and the UN, which have thousands of troops in the country, to be the real drivers of an international response to this coup.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144774/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bruce Whitehouse has previously received external funding from the US government's Fulbright Program.</span></em></p>The transition to a civilian government won’t be smooth.Bruce Whitehouse, Associate Professor, Lehigh University Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1163362019-05-01T03:10:52Z2019-05-01T03:10:52ZWho is Leopoldo López, the newly freed opposition leader behind Venezuela’s uprising?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271865/original/file-20190430-136803-1lvr7w0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Venezuelan opposition leader Leopoldo López has been freed by his captors from house arrest and is backing a coup attempt against the Maduro government.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r7i3j9i3K7s">AFP/YouTube</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Venezuela’s crisis has escalated to new levels. </p>
<p>In the early morning hours of April 30, Juan Guaidó – the leader of the Venezuelan National Assembly, who swore himself in as interim president in January – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/30/venezuelas-guiado-says-final-phase-of-plan-to-oust-maduro-has-begun">called for an uprising</a> against President Nicolás Maduro’s authoritarian government. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://amd-ssl.cdn.turner.com/cnn/big/ads/2019/04/24/Dark_Sacred_Night_TPB_v01_-24LKFS_CNN_576x324.mp4">video</a> posted on social media, Guaidó, flanked by soldiers, asked Venezuelans to join him in the streets on May 1 for the final stage of “Operation Freedom.” This mass protest and military uprising would be “the beginning of the end” of a regime <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuela-is-now-a-dictatorship-96960">Guaidó and over 50 countries including the United States consider illegitimate</a>.</p>
<p>In the background of the video, standing resolutely alongside Guaidó and rebel soldiers, was a figure stunning to see: <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/13/americas/leopoldo-lpez-fast-facts/index.html">Leopoldo López</a>, Venezuela’s most famous political prisoner. </p>
<h2>Uprising in Caracas</h2>
<p>Under President Maduro, who took office in 2013, Venezuela’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/08/venezuela-protests-sign-us-wants-oil-says-nicolas-maduro">economy has faltered</a>, then collapsed. Food, medicine and electricity are scarce. Maduro has refused to budge, claiming the country’s economic troubles and <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuelans-reject-maduro-presidency-but-most-would-oppose-foreign-military-operation-to-oust-him-109135">popular unrest</a> are a <a href="http://time.com/5550481/venezuela-maduro-blackout-cyber-sabotage/">U.S. plot against him</a>.</p>
<p>López, a former mayor and presidential candidate, was a leading figure in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-idUSKCN0WE0UX">powerful protest movement against Maduro</a> that began in 2014.</p>
<p>After one major anti-Maduro march in Caracas grew violent, the popular politician was charged with “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/20/venezuela-leopoldo-lopez-arrested-violence-continues">arson and criminal incitement</a>.” The moment López waded through crying supporters to turn himself into police on May 18, 2014, he became the face of Venezuela’s fight for freedom and democracy.</p>
<p>Supporters saw him as a martyr who confronted the dictatorship rather than going into exile, as so many Venezuelan dissidents have. He was sentenced to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/11/venezuela-opposition-leader-leopoldo-lopez-sentenced-to-14-years-in-jail">14 years in prison</a>.</p>
<p>López’s face was printed on T-shirts, posters and flags that flew across the country. A website, <a href="https://www.freeleopoldo.com">FreeLeopoldo.com</a>, called for “the immediate release of Venezuelan opposition leader Leopoldo López, who was illegally imprisoned in an attempt to silence dissent and free speech.” #FreeLeopoldo spread his cause worldwide.</p>
<p>After three years, the Maduro government in 2017 conceded to intense political pressure and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/08/world/americas/venezuela-leopoldo-lopez-political-prisoner.html">released López to house arrest</a> in the swanky Los Palos Grandes neighborhood. López, caged, was the embodiment of Venezuela’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuelas-opposition-is-on-the-verge-of-collapse-86187">vanquished opposition</a>. </p>
<p>Then, three months ago, Juan Guaidó reinvigorated the resistance movement by <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuela-power-struggle-plunges-nation-into-turmoil-3-essential-reads-110419">waging a full frontal assault on Maduro</a>. And López – apparently <a href="https://www.efe.com/efe/english/world/venezuelan-opposition-leader-leopoldo-lopez-freed-from-house-arrest/50000262-3964712">freed from house arrest</a> by the soldiers guarding his home who were acting on Guaidó’s orders – has rejoined the resistance. </p>
<p>Seeing Leopoldo López standing with Guaidó on that video, as a free man, openly calling for an uprising, was a potent signal for Venezuelans after <a href="https://theconversation.com/global-series-venezuelas-collapse-81654">years of bloody protest</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-or-no-venezuelas-maduro-regime-is-probably-here-to-stay-98899">multiple thwarted coup attempts</a>.</p>
<h2>Leopoldo López’s political pedigree</h2>
<p>López is the great-great-grandson of former Venezuelan president Cristóbal Mendoza and is said to be related to <a href="http://www.militaryheritage.com/bolivar.htm">Simón Bolívar</a>, the Venezuela-born general who liberated five South American countries from Spanish rule in the early 19th century.</p>
<p>López studied economics and sociology at Kenyon College in the United States on a swimming scholarship. In 1996, he got a master’s in public policy at Harvard.</p>
<p>He began his political career in 2000, with two four-year terms as the handsome, dynamic and popular mayor of Chacao, an upper middle-class municipality of Caracas. By 2008, the end of his second term, he had a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/10/venezuelas-last-hope-leopoldo-lopez-maduro/">92% approval rating</a>. </p>
<p>That’s when President Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s late Socialist leader and Maduro’s mentor, accused López of corruption and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2014/02/21/world/americas/profile-leopoldo-lopez/index.html">banned him from running for office</a>. López was one of many popular Venezuelan politicians to face trumped-up charges that <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/13/americas/leopoldo-lpez-fast-facts/index.html">served to stop them from electorally challenging Chávez</a>.</p>
<p>In 2011 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/americas/09/16/venezuela.lopez/index.html">ruled</a> that López must be allowed to run for office – an order the <a href="http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=433753&CategoryId=10717">Venezuelan Supreme Court rejected</a>.</p>
<p>López, who planned to run for president against Chávez representing the Voluntad Popular – a political party that he, Guaidó and other opposition figures founded in 2009 – withdrew his candidacy. Instead, he backed opposition candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski. </p>
<p>Chávez won the 2012 presidential election, then died a few months into his term. Maduro, his vice president, took office in 2013.</p>
<p>López was sentenced to prison a year later. While he was jailed, López’s wife, Lilian Tintori, became a thorn in Maduro’s side. She traveled around the world meeting heads of state and denouncing human rights violations in Venezuela. She met with Latin American presidents, Pope Francis, and in February 2015, <a href="https://panampost.com/editor/2015/02/12/lilian-tintori-in-dc-we-need-international-support/?cn-reloaded=1">Joe Biden</a>.</p>
<p>In February 2017 Tintori traveled to Washington to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-an-oval-office-meeting-led-to-a-trump-tweet-that-changed-us-policy-toward-venezuela/2017/10/06/87e9b178-a52b-11e7-ade1-76d061d56efa_story.html">see U.S. President Donald Trump</a> and Vice President Mike Pence, who have both condemned Maduro and expressed public support for her husband.</p>
<p>After being received as <a href="http://www.epa.eu/war-photos/crisis-photos/leopoldo-lopez-and-his-family-enter-as-guests-to-the-chilean-embassy-in-venezuela-photos-55159633">“guests” of the Chilean government</a> at the Chilean Embassy in Caracas, Tintori, López and one of their children are now staying at the <a href="https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/05/01/inenglish/1556713845_723006.html">residency of the Spanish ambassador to Venezuela</a>. The Spanish government says they have not requested political asylum, but López cannot be arrested while in the ambassador’s residence.</p>
<p>The outcome of Guaidó’s effort to oust Maduro is uncertain. But whenever democracy is restored in Venezuela, López will surely be a presidential candidate to watch.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116336/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marco Aponte-Moreno does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Venezuela is on the cusp of a coup, and a familiar face has emerged from house arrest to lead the charge against President Nicolás Maduro.Marco Aponte-Moreno, Assistant Professor of Global Business and Member of the Institute for Latino and Latin American Studies, St Mary's College of California Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1108652019-01-31T23:07:39Z2019-01-31T23:07:39ZOdds of military coup in Venezuela rise every day Maduro stays in office<p>It would be reasonable to expect the worst for Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela’s embattled president. </p>
<p>Two weeks after Maduro’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuelans-reject-maduro-presidency-but-most-would-oppose-foreign-military-operation-to-oust-him-109135">re-inauguration</a>, opposition leader <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/venezuela-opposition-leader-juan-guaido-briefly-detained-190113161258333.html">Juan Gauidó</a> has declared himself the country’s rightful president. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuela-power-struggle-plunges-nation-into-turmoil-3-essential-reads-110419">power struggle</a> follows a <a href="http://time.com/5508686/venezuela-mutiny-national-guard-unit/">failed military mutiny</a> against Maduro, whose easy re-election in May 2018 during an economic, political and humanitarian crisis has lead many to say Venezuela is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuela-is-now-a-dictatorship-96960">dictatorship</a>. </p>
<p>Analysts worldwide are already debating whether a coup against Maduro – <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/rubio-disputes-that-the-united-states-would-participate-in-a-coup-in-venezuela/2019/01/27/0a976050-2255-11e9-ba08-caf4ff5a3433_story.html?utm_term=.e59264ae5732">with</a> or without U.S. backing – would be <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/05/its-time-for-a-coup-in-venezuela-trump/">good or bad for Venezuelan democracy</a>.</p>
<p>As a political risk analyst, it is my job to <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-coups-occurred-in-2018-will-next-year-be-so-stable-108387">predict when leaders will be overthrown</a>. Surprisingly, the <a href="https://oefresearch.org/activities/coup-cast">coup forecaster</a> I use, CoupCast, shows Maduro hanging on – at least for now.</p>
<h2>Why won’t Maduro be overthrown soon?</h2>
<p>Using historic data on the conditions behind every coup and coup attempt since 1950, CoupCast has identified six factors that can suggest a leader is at imminent risk of overthrow.</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Tenure of current leader</strong> – Longer reign equals higher coup risk.</li>
<li><strong>How long regime has been in power</strong> – Young regimes are at most risk of a coup. </li>
<li><strong>Time since last coup attempt</strong> – The longer a country goes without a coup, the less its risk of a leader being overthrown. </li>
<li><strong>Incumbent electoral defeat</strong> – Recent electoral defeats increase risk. So do long periods of incumbent victories.</li>
<li><strong>Relative precipitation</strong> – Extreme drought and excessive rainfall both raise coup risk because they can disrupt agricultural and market dynamics.</li>
<li><strong>Gross domestic product (GDP) per person</strong> – This measure of wealth distribution can provide clues into whether a leader can <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002712445732">buy off potential rivals</a> within the military. </li>
</ol>
<p>Beyond Venezuela’s <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/24/venezuelan-government-could-topple-on-its-own-even-without-new-us-sanctions-economists-say.html">economic crisis</a>, the Maduro regime does not stand out on any CoupCast factors. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/256689/original/file-20190131-108338-18mvnj2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/256689/original/file-20190131-108338-18mvnj2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/256689/original/file-20190131-108338-18mvnj2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256689/original/file-20190131-108338-18mvnj2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256689/original/file-20190131-108338-18mvnj2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256689/original/file-20190131-108338-18mvnj2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256689/original/file-20190131-108338-18mvnj2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256689/original/file-20190131-108338-18mvnj2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Venezuela’s GDP per person is relatively high compared to other countries that have seen coups.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rulers, Elections, and Irregular Governance Dataset (REIGN)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Maduro has been in office since 2013 – not long enough to be high-risk. Likelihood of a coup begins to rise after 15 years, on average.</p>
<p>The current Socialist Party regime, which <a href="http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9812/06/venezuela.results/index.html">began with Hugo Chávez in 1999</a>, has also matured enough to avoid the initial period of vulnerability that young regimes face. </p>
<p>The last coup attempt in Venezuela was a <a href="http://www.uky.edu/%7Eclthyn2/coup_data/home.htm">failed plot against Chávez in 2002</a>, a healthy 17-year buffer. The average lapse between coups is five years.</p>
<p>Venezuela’s Socialist regime has not lost a presidential election since Chávez first won, in 1998, which also bodes well for Maduro. </p>
<p>Finally, in 2019, Venezuela is not expected to have droughts, floods or other weather that is out of the norm. </p>
<p>Taken together, these factors do not suggest an imminent coup against Maduro. </p>
<h2>Rising coup risk</h2>
<p>However, Venezuela’s risk of coup increases the longer Maduro stays in power, as CoupCast’s trove of historic data shows. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/256494/original/file-20190130-109820-10pgnol.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/256494/original/file-20190130-109820-10pgnol.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/256494/original/file-20190130-109820-10pgnol.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=315&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256494/original/file-20190130-109820-10pgnol.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=315&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256494/original/file-20190130-109820-10pgnol.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=315&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256494/original/file-20190130-109820-10pgnol.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256494/original/file-20190130-109820-10pgnol.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256494/original/file-20190130-109820-10pgnol.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Venezuela’s coup risk was highest following the attempted overthrow of Hugo Chávez in 2002. But it rises the longer Maduro stays in power.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rulers, Elections, and Irregular Governance Dataset (REIGN)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Maduro’s biggest vulnerability is the prospect of further economic decline. <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2018/08/08/venezuela-in-crisis-biggest-risk-to-maduro-is-cash-and-vanishing-oil/#55f612c46c7e">Venezuela’s oil-fueled government is going bankrupt</a> due to declining petroleum production, <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuela-why-trumps-sanctions-wont-work-82970">U.S. and EU sanctions</a> and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2018/08/08/venezuela-in-crisis-biggest-risk-to-maduro-is-cash-and-vanishing-oil/#55f612c46c7e">seized assets</a>. Eventually, Maduro’s strategy of paying the military brass for its loyalty will be unsustainable. </p>
<p>Maduro’s position becomes especially precarious over time if he continues to stand for election. Authoritarians who hold elections are at <a href="http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2018/11/07/elections-and-coup-risk-in-zimbabwe-one-year-after-the-coup-detat/">higher risk of being deposed</a> – especially if they lose and stick around anyway. Venezuela’s coup risk increases the longer Maduro continues to “win” elections as well. </p>
<p>However, even the most powerful forecasting models cannot account for everything.</p>
<p>Venezuela’s deep economic crisis, for example, is somewhat misleading. Citizens are hurting badly, but the Maduro government still has enough funds to offer <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-military/caracas-spring-not-so-fast-venezuelas-armed-forces-say-idUSKCN1PH1BK">military leaders governmental appointments and economic kickbacks</a>. That make a serious plot against him <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0095327x0002600203">less likely</a>. </p>
<p>Russia, China, and Turkey have also <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/29/americas/venezuela-geopolitical-battle-intl/index.html">expressed support for the regime</a> – potentially even military backing – likely depressing coup risk further. </p>
<h2>Guaidó’s challenge really hurts Maduro</h2>
<p>The recent power struggle most similar to what’s happening in Venezuela occurred in Zimbabwe in 2008. </p>
<p>Opposition leader <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/14/morgan-tsvangirai-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-dies-aged-65">Morgan Tsvangirai</a> claimed to be the legitimate winner of a flawed election against long-time President Robert Mugabe. Mugabe retaliated with a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1">campaign of violence and intimidation</a> to secure his victory in a dubious runoff.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/256717/original/file-20190131-108334-1ijsfjv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/256717/original/file-20190131-108334-1ijsfjv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256717/original/file-20190131-108334-1ijsfjv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256717/original/file-20190131-108334-1ijsfjv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256717/original/file-20190131-108334-1ijsfjv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256717/original/file-20190131-108334-1ijsfjv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256717/original/file-20190131-108334-1ijsfjv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Juan Guaido has declared himself president of Venezuela.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Venezuela-Political-Crisis/58fe638399ce41d38141267539c7f9ac/10/0">AP Photo/Rodrigo Abd</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Tsvangirai’s power struggle didn’t unseat Mugabe, but it likely hurt his legitimacy internally. Mugabe was <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-coup-did-not-create-democracy-from-dictatorship-101510">overthrown in a military coup in November 2017</a>.</p>
<p>In my assessment, Guaidó’s challenge won’t result in Maduro’s immediate exit – but it will further weaken his base of support, both among the Venezuelan people and within the government. </p>
<p>The longer Maduro stays in power, the more likely he is to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuelans-reject-maduro-presidency-but-most-would-oppose-foreign-military-operation-to-oust-him-109135">removed by force</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110865/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clayton Besaw is a research associate with the One Earth Future Foundation, a non-profit organization that promotes peace and security in post-conflict countries.</span></em></p>A coup seems so imminent in Venezuela that people are debating whether Maduro’s overthrow would be good or bad for Venezuelan democracy. But history suggests a coup may be less likely than it seems.Clayton Besaw, Political Science Researcher, University of Central FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1006592018-09-11T02:11:09Z2018-09-11T02:11:09ZWorld politics explainer: Pinochet’s Chile<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233616/original/file-20180827-149475-1pdm6pg.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pinochet in the car, 1982 celebrating the 8th anniversary of the coup. His dictatorship in Chile was both a step forwards for neoliberalism and a step back for democracy and human rights.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pinochet_11-09-1982.JPG">Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of our <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/world-politics-explainer-59420">series</a> of explainers on key moments in the past 100 years of world political history. In it, our authors examine how and why an event unfolded, its impact at the time, and its relevance to politics today. You can read parts <a href="https://theconversation.com/world-politics-explainer-the-great-war-wwi-100462">one</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/world-politics-explainer-the-atomic-bombings-of-hiroshima-and-nagasaki-100452">two</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/world-politics-explainer-the-assassination-of-john-f-kennedy-100449">three</a> here.</em></p>
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<p>General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, a career military officer, was appointed Commander in Chief of the Chilean army by President Salvador Allende on August 1973. Eighteen days later, with the connivance, if not the assistance, of the US, he authorised a coup against Allende’s Socialist government.</p>
<p>To be clear, Pinochet’s rule was not the first, last or worst dictatorship in the history of Latin America. But it did grip the attention of western countries because of Chile’s comparatively orderly and democratic past, its institutions that made it seem closer to Great Britain than to Spain, its status as the first freely-elected Marxist government in the west, and the questionable <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=82588">role of the CIA </a>in undermining the socialist Allende’s government. </p>
<h2>What happened?</h2>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231633/original/file-20180813-2900-37uzb2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231633/original/file-20180813-2900-37uzb2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231633/original/file-20180813-2900-37uzb2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231633/original/file-20180813-2900-37uzb2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231633/original/file-20180813-2900-37uzb2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231633/original/file-20180813-2900-37uzb2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231633/original/file-20180813-2900-37uzb2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, 1986.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pinochet_en_Historia_Pol%C3%ADtica_BCN.JPG">Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On hearing the news of the coup, Allende dashed to his seat of government in the capital. Then, after his last and remarkable radio address, he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/.../salvador-allende-committed-suicide-autopsy">shot himself</a> rather than becoming a prisoner. Pinochet proclaimed himself <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/theother911/">president of the military junta</a> (dictatorship) that followed. </p>
<p>The initial plan held that Pinochet would rule only for a year, to be succeeded by the chiefs of the navy, police and air force. However, Pinochet continued to rule, eventually as President of the Republic by decree (in effect, Chile’s military dictator) up until 1988. At that point, following a constitutional obligation signed eight years earlier, he held a <a href="https://adst.org/2014/11/chiles-1988-plebiscite-and-the-end-of-pinochets-dictatorship/">national plebiscite</a>. Unexpectedly to his followers, and no doubt himself, 55% of the country voted against him. </p>
<p>Pinochet retired soon after, in 1990, to what he hoped would be a quieter life as lifetime senator. But in 1998, he was detained in Britain to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/1998/oct/18/pinochet.chile">answer charges of torturing Spanish citizens</a> in Chile during his rule. He was held in Britain for 18 months before being allowed to return to Chile to answer further charges. It was the first time a former head of state <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/10/how-general-pinochets-detention-changed-meaning-justice/">had been arrested</a> based on the principle of universal jurisdiction.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233617/original/file-20180827-149472-17j9063.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233617/original/file-20180827-149472-17j9063.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233617/original/file-20180827-149472-17j9063.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233617/original/file-20180827-149472-17j9063.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233617/original/file-20180827-149472-17j9063.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233617/original/file-20180827-149472-17j9063.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233617/original/file-20180827-149472-17j9063.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Augusto Pinochet Ugarte (left) with Mario Arnello.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mario_Arnello_junto_a_Augusto_Pinochet_Ugarte.jpg">Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>He returned to face 59 criminal complaints for kidnapping, murder, and torture. Those charges never eventuated from a variety of legal complexities, principally because the Chilean Supreme Court ruled him <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/02/28/qa-return-pinochet-chile">mentally and physically unable to answer them</a>. </p>
<p>He died in 2006 without answering those charges. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, by then, his reputation was damaged, even among his supporters. This is because of the findings of <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/1990/05/truth-commission-chile-90">two National Commissions</a> detailing the arbitrary arrests, torture, incarceration, disappearances and political executions that had occurred under his dictatorship. He directed his forces first at the more extreme of the left-wing parties, the Armed Revolutionary Movement (El MIR) and the Socialists, but later none of the members of any left wing party could <a href="http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-31553.html">consider themselves safe</a>.</p>
<p>Some Chileans who had supported Pinochet’s attempt to rid the country of what he called the “communist cancer” withdrew support after allegations of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/563449ea-72b4-11dc-b7ff-0000779fd2ac">serious financial mismanagement</a> for his own benefit were revealed. For all the accusations levelled against him, Pinochet admitted nothing. Instead, he blamed his senior operatives like Manuel Contreras, his hated head of the secret police, for the terrible abuses that he himself had authorised.</p>
<h2>The impact on the development of neoliberalism</h2>
<p>One of the biggest impacts of Pinochet’s coup is his contribution to the advancement of an economic theory known as neoliberalism, which arguably has shaped the economies of many modern western countries to this day. Neoliberalism in essence means a distant retreat by the state from total economic management: it wants the state to withdraw from much regulation, encourage free enterprise and competition, and let the market determine real value. By contrast, socialist “command” economies seek to be the regulators of supply, demand and wages.</p>
<p>The last chaotic year of Allende’s presidency, marked by massive protectionism, chaotic land expropriations, strikes, food shortages (<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1973/01/12/archives/chile-rations-food-and-calls-shortage-politically-inspired.html">some artificially induced</a>) and galloping inflation, certainly demanded reform. This provided the basis for the work a group of conservative Chilean economists had discussed and planned for a decade, which was enacted after 1973.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233615/original/file-20180826-149466-3ihtyf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233615/original/file-20180826-149466-3ihtyf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233615/original/file-20180826-149466-3ihtyf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233615/original/file-20180826-149466-3ihtyf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233615/original/file-20180826-149466-3ihtyf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233615/original/file-20180826-149466-3ihtyf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233615/original/file-20180826-149466-3ihtyf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Members of the Government Junta in 1985 and Augusto Pinochet (middle)</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_Junta_of_Chile_(1973)#/media/File:Pinochet_y_la_Junta_Militar_de_Gobierno.jpg">Wikicommons</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>These economists renewed international trade, reduced inflation and divested the state of some of its assets. Some of these actions proved unwise, including <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41887539">selling some national utilities to Spanish companies</a>, which did not necessarily run them in the interests of Chile. </p>
<p>The debates about Pinochet’s economic achievements continue, especially for the period after 1982, when the benefits of neoliberal practice faltered. His successes are still held by some to be a Chilean miracle, but the reality was a situation heavily tilted in his favour at a time when political opposition was eliminated, trade unions weakened and working class wages determined by the military dictatorship. The revelations of massive human rights abuses has further tarnished some of this achievement. </p>
<h2>Contemporary relevance</h2>
<p>We can now also detect some unforeseen consequences, thanks to Chile’s long and successful tradition of reconciliation after political trauma. The ten years of centre-left rule that followed Pinochet was a remarkable achievement, as was the first four-year term of the moderate centre-right Piñera government from 2010. This was the product of the peacemaking tradition called the <a href="https://read.dukeupress.edu/radical-history-review/article-abstract/2007/97/43/30120/Truth-Justice-Reconciliation-and-Impunity-as?redirectedFrom=fulltext">via Chilena</a>, the Chilean way. </p>
<p>Those who had achieved political exile in East Germany or the Soviet Union during Pinochet’s government did not take long to discover that life under the communist state was not the <a href="https://www.amazon.com/When-Romance-Ended-Katherine-Hite/dp/0231110170">people’s utopia</a> they had hoped to achieve in their own country. </p>
<p>Some returned, somewhat disillusioned, after 1990 <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13260219.2015.1040210">to become high officials</a> in much more moderate administrations than those they had planned many years before. They had learned not to make political changes too fast. Other exiles taking refuge in western Europe learned alternatives to a program of people’s revolution in every Latin American nation as taught by Che Guevara. They came to appreciate the lessons of Euro-Communism, that political change need not be wrought by violence but negotiation and co-operation with less radical left-wing parties. </p>
<p>Some reverberations from Pinochet’s rule are still also working themselves out. Members of what was once the radical and optimistic left, who gave so much to the radical cause and suffered so grievously, now wonder about the value of their struggle under Pinochet as they contemplate the low wages of today, much unemployment and, especially, wide disillusionment in the processes of government. </p>
<p>Some of their children have come to the same, but more pointed, conclusion. Fifty or 60 Chileans were actually sent to Cuba by their parents so they could re-enter the country at a later stage to continue the armed struggle against Pinochet. The children did not enjoy the experience. The documentary <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1712517/plotsummary?ref_=tt_ov_pl">El edificio de los chilenos</a> (The Chilean House) shows the filmmaker subjecting her once-radical mother to an excoriating interrogation as to whether her ideology, and by inference, any political ideology, should supervene her duty to care for her children. </p>
<p>Pinochet is now remembered not so much as someone who saved his country from becoming a second Cuba, or for clearing the ground to test economic theory. Rather, internationally he is recalled for his sensational detention in the UK. That’s an important outcome that, perhaps, makes every retired dictator think twice before venturing from their homelands.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100659/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Read received funding from the Australian Research Council on the effects of the Cold War in Chile.</span></em></p>Forefather of contemporary neoliberalism or violent dictator – Pinochet’s complicated legacy in Chile and the world.Peter Read, Professor of History, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/880852017-12-03T10:19:57Z2017-12-03T10:19:57ZA clean break with Mugabe’s past will have to wait - even beyond elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196676/original/file-20171128-7447-t1w0v1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Emmerson Mnangagwa has officially been sworn in as interim Zimbabwean President.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Who would have thought that this year would end with <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/robert-mugabe">Robert Mugabe</a> having lost the presidency of both the governing Zanu-PF and Zimbabwe? None could have foreseen such a development being the work of his ruling party’s inner circle.</p>
<p>The whole development is clearly a product of internal Zanu-PF tensions and actions. The military top brass involved are old standing Zanu-PF cadres that have <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/112460/JUL09SSRZIMBABWE.pdf">propped Mugabe up</a> for decades. Emerson Mnangagwa, who has been sworn in as his successor, has been Mugabe’s right hand man for <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/profile-zimbabwe-president-robert-mugabe-20171115">37 years</a>. </p>
<p>Zimbabweans have every right to celebrate the end of Mugabe’s long and disastrous reign, but they would be wrong to assume that this is the end of their political problems. The same Zanu-PF leadership has taken control of this transition, making it an intra-party matter rather than a national opportunity for deepening democracy as many hope. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s first priority will be to ensure consolidation of Zanu-PF power. He may do so by positioning Zanu-PF as a born again party committed to change. He may seize the opportunity to introduce real changes in the conduct of Zanu-PF and government leadership, in economic policies and in rebuilding the social compact by showing greater maturity in relations with other political parties and civil society.</p>
<p>But, as reports surface about the harassment of some of Mugabe appointed ministers and their families at the hands of <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/zimbabwe-judge-military-action-mugabe-legal-51375327">men in uniform</a>, we are reminded that the military should never be encouraged to manage political problems because they are likely to cross the line of civil-military relations. Excessive use of military power is likely to follow.</p>
<h2>Mugabe the survivor</h2>
<p>Mugabe has survived many attempts to get rid of him before. These include the efforts of the previous opposition Zimbabwean African People’s Union <a href="http://africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/How-intellectuals-made-history-in-zimbabwe.pdf">(Zapu)</a> under Joshua Nkomo in the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Joshua_Nkomo">1980s</a>, through to the <a href="https://asq.africa.ufl.edu/files/Laakso-Vol-7-Issues-23.pdf">Zimbabwe Unity Movement in the 1990s</a> and to Movement for Democratic Change <a href="http://www.mdc.co.zw">(MDC) in the 2000s</a>. All these efforts failed because Mugabe has, at times, been popular, at times cunning and at times ruthless in preserving power – for himself and the Zanu-PF. </p>
<p>At times reliance on patronage of <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/politics/mdc-t-says-chiefs-not-zanu-pf-political-commissars/">indigenous systems of leadership</a> helped Mugabe and the party ward off challenges. Over the past 15 years, Zanu-PF has relied on the crude use of state power, <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2012/01/securitization-will-be-an-ill/">draconian security measures</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1">brutality on the streets</a>.</p>
<p>It has also resorted to buying popularity through measures such as the violent land restitution process between <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/JAE13.2Magure.pdf">2001 and 2007</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabweans at the inauguration of Emmerson Mnangagwa in Harare.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After 2007, Zanu-PF and Mugabe had to contend with a regional mediation process by the Southern African Development Community after an election they lost, but which the MDC did not win by margins needed to <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008results5.htm">form its own government</a>. Zanu-PF responded by unleashing violence and <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008postd.htm">brutality on opponents</a>. Power sharing, which gave the MDC and its leader <a href="https://benthamopen.com/contents/pdf/TOPOLISJ/TOPOLISJ-5-28.pdf">Morgan Tsvangarai</a> an opportunity to position themselves as alternatives, saw Mugabe and Zanu-PF play every trick in the book to preserve power.</p>
<p>After Zanu-PF narrowly won the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/05/robert-mugabe-zimbabwe-election-zanu-pf">2013 elections</a>, it seemed that Mugabe and his party had finally prevailed. But the power battles turned inward, as party factions jostled over who would succeed Mugabe. </p>
<h2>Zanu-PF power struggles</h2>
<p>Various factions in the Zanu-PF have crystallised into two main camps. </p>
<p>The first is Mugabe and his henchmen of the so-called <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-122610.html">Zezuru group</a>, including top heads of security forces who had wanted Mugabe to continue for a long time. They favoured Solomon Mujuru before he died and later Mnangagwa as a successor. </p>
<p>The second was made up of younger, rather flamboyant group of mainly men around Mugabe Zanu-PF politicians who had gained power and influence in the civil service. This group was known as the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/17/unpacking-the-g40">G-40</a>. In the past few years this group backed Grace Mugabe as her husband’s successor. </p>
<p>Things have hung in the balance with the G40 gaining momentum because they could influence Mugabe’s judgement and decisions through his wife and nephews. This group could make a call who needed to be fired or isolated – and the president would act accordingly. </p>
<p>For example, when moderates in the Zanu-PF and war veterans touted Vice President Joice Mujuru as possible successor to Mugabe, the G40 aimed a barrage of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/11241242/Grace-Mugabe-claims-Joice-Mujuru-plans-to-kill-her-Gaddafi-style.html">insults against her</a> and publicly declared that her time was up. Shortly afterwards Mugabe fired her and got her <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/i-was-a-clear-successor-to-mugabe-says-former-vp-joice-mujuru-20170309">expelled from the party</a>. This deepened divisions within Zanu-PF and intensified concern about the G40 and Grace Mugabe. </p>
<p>The last straw was the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/11/06/mugabe-fires-deputy-mnangagwa">firing of Mnangagwa</a> and threats against chiefs of armed forces.</p>
<p>Believing that Mugabe was being manipulated by the G40, the military stepped in to weed out those around the president. What they wanted was to persuade Mugabe to go and for Mnangagwa to replace him in as peaceful a process as possible so as not to destabilise Zanu-PF’s hold on power. The military showed great patience as it set about achieving this outcome. </p>
<p>In the end – and after citizens had taken to the streets calling for Mugabe, and the G40, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-19-today-we-have-won-zimbabweans-cheer-during-mass-rally">to go</a> – the old man <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">resigned</a>, thus avoiding an embarrassing impeachment process. </p>
<h2>New forces versus old</h2>
<p>Mugabe is gone. A faction of the Zanu-PF that had gained currency around him is being squeezed out of every space in Zimbabwe. A new faction under Mnangagwa is in place. </p>
<p>Mugabe stands as a shadow of continuity behind leaders who have been around him for decades and who have now been entrusted with the renewal agenda. Mugabe has left, but what’s been called <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/la/book/9781137543448">Mugabeism</a> remains: both the positive side of vehemently defending the sovereignty of Zimbabwe and the negative side of the brutality of state power. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa and the military have lavished him with generous post-retirement packages, honoured with a <a href="http://nairobinews.nation.co.ke/life/happy-sunset-awaits-mugabe-with-sh1billion-golden-handshake/">holiday in his name and praise</a>. The interim president has warned the deposed G-40 faction of Zanu-PF to return stolen state monies or <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/three-month-zimbabwe-amnesty-for-cash-stashed-abroad-12183516">face the law</a>. </p>
<p>A clean break with Mugabe’s heritage of violence and crude dominance will have to wait even beyond <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-needs-wide-reforms-to-have-credible-elections-but-it-may-be-too-late-83473">elections next year</a>. Zimbabwean citizens have been energised by their role in removing Mugabe. They would do well to remain vigilant, to press for more fundamental changes in the way the state behaves and insisting on democratic processes in economic policies. Otherwise they will continue to live under one Zanu-PF faction to another without real change in their lives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Siphamandla Zondi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zimbabweans have every right to celebrate the end of Robert Mugabe’s long and disastrous reign, but they would be wrong to assume that this is the end of their political problems.Siphamandla Zondi, Professor and head of department of Political Sciences and acting head of the Institute for Strategic and Political Affairs, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/880232017-11-23T11:29:45Z2017-11-23T11:29:45ZWill Mnangagwa usher in a new democracy? The view from Zimbabwe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196100/original/file-20171123-18012-fj36hx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Emmerson Mnangagwa, President-elect of Zimbabwe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Filckr/UN</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe has a new leader. Robert Mugabe is out. His former ally turned rival, Emmerson Mnangagwa, is in. What now?</p>
<p>After <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2017/nov/21/zimbabwe-celebrates-as-mugabe-resignation-announced-in-pictures">ecstatic celebrations to mark Mugabe’s resignation</a> thoughts have began to turn to what comes next. Mugabe may have exited the political scene, but it remains dominated by the same political party – <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/politics/dont-need-opposition-zanupf-business-chinamasa/">Zanu-PF</a> – that sustained his rule.</p>
<p>Moreover, the country’s president-elect, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, is hardly a breath of fresh air. Having held a series of cabinet positions under Mugabe, and served as first vice president between December 2014 and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41914768">his sacking in November 2017</a>, he looks more like a force for continuity than change.</p>
<p>As a result, talk in Harare quickly turned to what kind of leader Mnangagwa will be, and the system of government that would best serve ordinary Zimbabweans.</p>
<h2>The fork in the road</h2>
<p>My conversations with people on the streets of the capital, Harare, about the political system the country needs suggests that two distinct camps are emerging: those who want elections to be held as soon as possible, and those who say the polls should be postponed and a <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/11/16/zimbabwe-moves-to-set-up-interim-govt-as-mugabe-is-apparently-ousted/">transitional government</a> established.</p>
<p>Both of these options have genuine “pros” but also strong “cons”. As is so often the case, there is no perfect answer that solves all problems.</p>
<p>It is understandable that many Zimbabweans want a period of calm and orderly government after the twists and turns of recent weeks, and believe that it would be better to form an inclusive government that would feature representatives of all of the main political parties – a kind of <a href="https://www.academia.edu/6446844/Power_Sharing_in_Comparative_Perspective">power sharing</a> in all but name.</p>
<p>Even though I have consistently argued in favour of the value of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/democracy-in-africa/3FFB8B40059192D449B77A402ADC82A1">democracy and elections in Africa</a>, I have to admit that the “transitioners” have some viable arguments.</p>
<p>The most obvious is that a period of stability and more consensual government might facilitate much needed reform of the economy and also the wider political and legal system. After all, rival parties are unlikely to come to agreement on these issues if they are immediately thrust into an <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387803001329">election campaign</a>.</p>
<p>The “transitioners” also have a point when it comes to democracy. Few people in Zimbabwe believe that it’s possible for elections to be <a href="https://erczim.org/">free and fair</a> if they are held between July and August next year, as currently scheduled. Given this, and the current divisions within the opposition, a rush to elections is likely to result in a convincing victory for Zanu-PF under problematic circumstances.</p>
<p>A transitional arrangement would allow for much needed <a href="http://www.zesn.org.zw/wp-content/_protected/publications/publication_265.pdf">electoral reforms</a> to be put in place, creating the potential for a better quality process and a more consensual outcome later on.</p>
<h2>Testing the Crocodile</h2>
<p>But there is also another camp that wants to see Mnangagwa, popularly known as <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/special-features/zimbabwe/who-is-emmerson-the-crocodile-mnangagwa-12013101">The Crocodile</a>, to face an election as soon as possible. </p>
<p>Just like their counterparts in the “transitioner” camp, “electioneers”, have some strong arguments. Whatever one wants to call Mnangagwa’s rise to power – from <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/11/mnangagwa-coup-mphoko-missing-chipanga-now-custody-warrent-arrest-mzembi/">a coup</a> to an <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/dont-meddle-in-zanu-pf-affairs-vp-mnangagwa/">internal party squabble</a> – it is clear that it has not been a high quality democratic transition. And while it is clear that the overthrow of Mugabe was hugely popular, we don’t know if the same applies to a Mnangagwa presidency. An election would settle that question.</p>
<p>It would also give the new government a popular mandate to undertake <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/10/14/zim-needs-bold-economic-reforms-us-envoy">economic reforms</a>, whoever wins power. This could be important to the success of the reform project, because things are likely to <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2016/12/2017-looks-gloomier-zim/">get worse</a> before they get better, and the country’s economic medicine may prove to be a bitter pill to swallow.</p>
<p>Holding elections would also do one thing that postponing them will not; it will test the commitment of the new government to democratic norms and values from the get-go. One of the main reasons that Zimbabwean elections have been poor quality is that <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/03/24/zanu-pf-revives-rigging-machinery/">Zanu-PF and the military</a> have intervened to make sure this was the case. As another friend put it, “If they are really committed to doing the right thing, they can do it right away and the elections will not be too bad”.</p>
<h2>Learning from the past</h2>
<p>“Electioneers” are also motivated by scepticism that an inclusive transitional government would get much done. Both Zimbabwe and Kenya have had power-sharing governments in the recent past, and while they both introduced new constitutions they also saw high levels of corruption and limited <a href="https://www.academia.edu/6446844/Power_Sharing_in_Comparative_Perspective">security sector reform</a>. They also both led to elections that were denounced by opposition parties as being <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/12/24/2-million-votes-used-to-rig-2013-election-raila_c1478146">unfree and unfair</a>.</p>
<p>It’s fair to ask: why would it be different this time?</p>
<p>The question is particularly pertinent given the current composition of parliament. Because Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change boycotted a <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2016/05/04/mdc-upholds-poll-boycott-stance">series of by-elections</a> on the basis that they would not be free and fair, it has lost many of the seats it won in 2013. As a result, any transitional arrangement that deferred elections and “froze” the current parliament for the next three years would have a big legislative advantage to Zanu-PF.</p>
<p>It is also important to keep in mind that economics cannot be divorced from politics: Zimbabwe’s current economic difficulties stem precisely from an unaccountable political framework that ignored the interests of the people. Given that recent events have <a href="http://solidaritypeacetrust.org/1776/zimbabwe-caught-between-the-croc-and-gucci-city/">emboldened the military</a> and given them an even stronger voice within government, this is a pressing concern.</p>
<p>Deferring electoral reforms in order to focus on economic recovery may therefore prove to be a self defeating strategy.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Ultimately, the form of government that evolves in Zimbabwe will not be a product of popular dialogue. One of the distinctive features of this process is that for the most part it has been conducted behind closed doors by a <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/11/zimbabwean-not-coup/">small elite</a>.</p>
<p>Don’t be fooled by the pictures of tens of thousands of people marching on Saturday – all sides have invoked popular support, but none have actually <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/opinion/press-statement-army-gives-update-negotiations-mugabe/">encouraged ordinary people</a> to say what they want, or given them a seat at the table. This is a worrying sign if strengthening democracy is the long-term goal.</p>
<p>Recent <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-122715.html">public statements</a> by the main parties at the time of going to press suggests that they are not converging on an interim administration, and so the “electioneers” may get their wish. That could still change because <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/mdc-calls-mnangagwa-repent-join-big-tent/">talks are ongoing</a> and both sides would gain something from a delay. But if it doesn’t the people will be able to have their say on how they want their country to be run.</p>
<p>Of course, voting will not actually equate to “having a say” unless the country’s new leader follows through on his promise to build a “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/22/emmerson-mnangagwa-to-be-sworn-in-as-zimbabwes-president-on-friday">new democracy</a>”, and the ruling party can kick the habit of a lifetime. Watch this space.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88023/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After the fall of autocratic ruler Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe faces a difficult choice between the stability of a transnational government or a potentially divisive election contest.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/879612017-11-22T16:19:07Z2017-11-22T16:19:07ZZimbabweans must draw on years of democratic struggle to stop a repeat of Mugabe’s militarism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195860/original/file-20171122-6013-1nxg72y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C229%2C2977%2C1711&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabweans at home and abroad celebrated gloriously from the moment Robert Gabriel Mugabe’s belated resignation ended his 37 years of misrule. But University of South Africa doctoral candidate Enock Mudzamiri’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-beware-the-military-is-looking-after-its-own-interests-not-democracy-87712?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20November%2021%202017%20-%2088457403&utm_content=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20November%2021%202017%20-%2088457403+CID_ea6d76bea35a7c7889437092f5c5d958&utm_source=campaign_monitor_africa&utm_term=cautions">cautionary note</a> bears heeding: don’t trust the military replacement for the 93-year old Machiavellian; don’t forget that intra-party fighting for the spoils instigated the end of Mugabe’s rule.</p>
<p>There is an even more comprehensive way to examine Mugabe’s legacy and to think about how to work beyond it. Historian and decolonial theorist Professor Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s take on <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/la/book/9781137543448">“Mugabeism”</a> can help. </p>
<p>Mugabeism is a system of ideology and practice finely honed during almost four decades of Mugabe’s reign over Zimbabwe’s party-state complex. It constitutes a constant combination of <a href="http://transformationjournal.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/T84_Part7.pdf">coercion and consent</a>, from force and fraud to <a href="https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/view/717">chicanery and compulsion</a>. </p>
<p>It is all-embracing and insidious, running through the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/file%20uploads%20/hany_besada_zimbabwe_picking_up_the_piecesbook4you.pdf">military and the media</a> and even the songs and dances of Zimbabwean society. Mugabeism is almost a culture, imbricated deeply in the multifaceted and <a href="http://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/product.php?productid=2295">deep crisis</a> in the kitchen coup that almost escaped the <a href="https://omny.fm/shows/the-best-of-night-talk/who-is-the-zanu-pf-generation-40-g40">confines of Zanu-PF itself</a>.</p>
<p>Yet there is a small dimension to Mugabeism that has positive attributes. The words that evoke this dimension include liberation and freedom – positive attributes that need buttressing by democratic forces outside Mugabeism’s closed circle.</p>
<p>Bear in mind that countries – including many in Africa – have moved towards democracy incrementally. They have zig-zagged and sometimes <a href="http://www.socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/25597#.WhUzeXlx0d">regressed</a>. Not all of this activity can be dismissed as window-dressing.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe’s coup, or non coup, should be seen in this light. The question is: at the core of Mugabeism, can one see contradictions that can spell transformation out of today’s militaristic morass? </p>
<p>The answer is mostly no - due to its inextricable intertwining with the man himself. But those elements tied to more conventional ideas of democracy and reconciliation have been relevant during the past tumultuous days.</p>
<p>At one level, we cannot forget that a level of democratic discourse has infiltrated the Southern African Development Community and the African Union. Many years of dealing with coups and their consequences have taught these organisations – shambolic as they are – that coups should not be encouraged. A “real” and very bloody coup would not have been recognised, and Mugabe knew this. The military men had to feint their way to regain their position at Zanu-PF’s head. They came very close to <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/11/mugabe-outsmarted-generals-not-resign/">blowing it</a>.</p>
<p>At a more local level, it was the humiliation of a parliamentary impeachment that forced Mugabe’s hand. This dovetailed with the neighbours’ constraints. The crafters of the 2013 constitution with rules for impeachment in <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013._pdf">Section 97</a>, should take a bow. Without it, worse would have happened to the <a href="http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/films/democrats/">democrats</a> in parliament and civil society on the streets. </p>
<p>Mugabe probably thought he could foil Zanu-PF’s rather messy <a href="https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2017/11/19/BSR---Implications-of-Mugabes-removal-from-ZANU-PF-presidency">attempt</a> to dump him, but the next step was too hard to fathom. Could it have been, too, that the friendly guitarist from north of the Zambesi had a big role to play: Kenneth Kaunda had accepted his denouement by election as long ago as 1991.</p>
<h2>The issue of unity</h2>
<p>A problematic element of “Mugabeism” is the question of “unity”. It’s not an easy one in a society riven by <a href="https://oldsite.issafrica.org/country-file-zimbabwe/society">ethnic</a>, <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=MR8EiMlHw-YC&pg=PA9&lpg=PA9&dq=class+in+zimbabwe&source=bl&ots=YcFGc-CX-g&sig=bf_qiwKK21AAzM0_2gRSwk5jCAo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjJv7aAq9LXAhVXF8AKHZZkDJ4Q6AEIYDAK#v=onepage&q=class%20in%20zimbabwe&f=false">class</a>, and <a href="http://www.unesco.org/new/en/harare/about-this-office/single-view/news/calls_to_bridge_intergenerational_divide_in_africa/">generational</a> divides. </p>
<p>Perhaps we can give Mugabe the last word on this given his <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yKTmqKswH-E">utterances made in near desperation</a> after his party threw him to the wolves. While he studiously ignored the issue on everyone’s mind – resigning – he invoked “comradeship and collegiality”. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The way forward cannot be based on swapping by cliques that ride roughshod over party rules and procedures. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The party must go “back to the guiding principles … of traditions … served by successive generations who have shared ideals and values which must continue to reign supreme in our nation”. A “new ethos” too, could be “nourished by an abiding sense of camaraderie” that just might override the recent “era of victimisation and arbitrary decisions”. He zoomed in on one that had created the tensions between the <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/G40_(Zanu-PF_Faction)">G-40</a> – his wife Grace Mugabe’s faction – and <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">Lacoste</a>, the faction behind the man chosen to succeed Mugabe, Emmerson Mnangagwa:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>our inter-generation conflict must be resolved through a harmonised melding of old established players as they embrace and welcome new ones through a well-defined sense of hierarchy and succession.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Therein is buried a nutshell of tensions: old traditions of suppression jostled with the ways in which new political pretenders could be accommodated. </p>
<p>Mugabe’s key problem was thus revealed: he had wrapped up the party and state on his own person to the extent that he thought neither would survive without him. On the cusp of recall over the weekend, Mugabe was not going anywhere. He felt that after him the storms would be unleashed. This of course is the conundrum of a politics wherein the man appears to be the state and vice versa. Mugabe thought only he could resolve the tensions of the last few months, ensuring “no bitterness or vengefulness” to mar “our hallowed ideas of reconciliation”. </p>
<p>If, he said, in the 1980s Zimbabweans could reconcile with “those who oppressed us … surely this cannot be unavailable to our own … we must learn to forgive and resolve contradictions real or perceived in our Zimbabwean spirit.” </p>
<p>Yet he forgot that the spirits of reconciliation and revenge at the heart of Mugabeism, and his incarnation of these, were never resolved.</p>
<h2>Dealing with dissent</h2>
<p>The intervening years have borne much of Mugabe’s ideology of <a href="https://www.sithatha.com/books;%20https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/news/archive/2017/zimbabwe-cameron/">dealing with dissent</a>. But this time, axes were not invoked as directly as before.</p>
<p>The roots of the faction fight that led to a very old <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/special-features/zimbabwe/who-is-emmerson-the-crocodile-mnangagwa-12013101">crocodile</a> taking the throne were not resolved by Zanu-PF’s old guard embracing and welcoming the new contenders for power. The forgiveness and reconciliation, with no bitterness or vengeance did not happen within his discourse. It took the democratic phase – in this case parliament, augmented by civil society on the streets – to push the progressive elements within Mugabeism. It bears noting that these elements had to leave the party’s shell. If anything is clear at this moment, it is that Zimbabwe’s problems cannot be handled within the confines of a single political party. </p>
<p>Zanu-PF cannot pull off the unfulfilled dimensions of Mugabeism. When the state is the man and that man is Mugabe, it is all too possible that the new man will take all. The problems of absolute power loom. Yet Zimbabwean society has become more complex as years of democratic struggle have left their trace. This is the moment to push them into the era that began with Mugabe’s <a href="http://solidaritypeacetrust.org/1776/zimbabwe-caught-between-the-croc-and-gucci-city/">fall</a>. If they are not at the forefront now, the old patterns of militaristic Mugabeism will win once again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87961/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Countries - including many in Africa - have moved towards democracy incrementally. They have zig-zagged and sometimes regressed. Events in Zimbabwe should be seen in this light.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/877122017-11-21T14:04:31Z2017-11-21T14:04:31ZZimbabwe beware: the military is looking after its own interests, not democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195615/original/file-20171121-6031-14lazje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe National Army commander Constantino Chiwenga, second from left, addressing the media.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>November 2017 will go down in the history of Zimbabwe as the beginning of the end of Robert Mugabe’s <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/14/tanks-seen-heading-towards-zimbabwe-capital-harare/">37 year tyranny</a>. A tumultuous week finally culminated in <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">his resignation</a> on November 21st. One cannot understate the widespread jubilation at the demise of Mugabe and his desire to create a dynasty for himself <a href="https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/world-news/660122/Zimbabwe-news-Robert-Mugabe-Grace-Zanu-PF-Twitter-latest-situation-coup-Emmerson-Mnangagwa">through his wife Grace</a>. </p>
<p>But the optimism is misplaced because it doesn’t deal directly with the dearth of democracy in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>First, contrary to popular sentiment that the coup was meant to usher in a new era of political <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42035981">liberalisation and democracy</a>, the takeover is actually meant to deal with a succession crisis in Zanu-PF. The military made this clear when it said that it was dealing with <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/zimbabwe-military-statement-seizing-power-171115061457199.html">criminals around Mugabe</a>. And the party’s secretary for legal affairs Patrick Chinamasa indicated that removing Mugabe from the party’s Central Committee was an <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/politics/dont-need-opposition-zanupf-business-chinamasa/">internal party matter</a>. </p>
<p>Secondly, I would argue that the military resorted to a “smart coup” only after its preferred candidate to succeed Mugabe, Emmerson Mnangagwa, was fired from the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/07/vp-mnangagwa-fired">party and government</a>. </p>
<p>The way in which the military has gone about executing its plan upends any conventional understanding of what <a href="http://www.jonathanmpowell.com/uploads/2/9/9/2/2992308/powell_and_thyne_2011jpr_-_global_instances_of_coups_from_1950_to_2010.pdf">constitutes a coup d'etat</a>. It’s a “smart coup” in the sense that the military combined the frustrations of a restive population, internal party structures and international sympathy to remove a sitting president. It thereby gained legitimacy for an otherwise partisan and unconstitutional political act – toppling an elected government. </p>
<p>This begs the question: Is the military now intervening for the collective good or for its own interests?</p>
<h2>Why the military intervened</h2>
<p>It is baffling to imagine how the military has suddenly become the champion of democracy and regime change in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>It’s clear that what motivated the military commanders was a fear of losing their jobs and influence after their preferred successor was purged. They launched a preemptive strike against Mugabe to safeguard their own selfish interests as a military class and the future of their careers. </p>
<p>Given the symbiotic relationship between the Zimbabwean military and the <a href="https://rusi.org/system/files/Zimbabwe_SSR_Report.pdf">ruling Zanu-PF party</a>, it was inevitable that the top commanders would be embroiled in the party’s succession crisis. After all, the military has been the key lever behind the power of both Mugabe and his ruling Zanu-PF since 1980. </p>
<p>In the past they have acted as part of the Zanu-PF machinery, openly <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/06/09/bullets-each-you/state-sponsored-violence-zimbabwes-march-29-elections">campaigning for Mugabe</a> alongside other security agencies.</p>
<p>And they have played a key role in neutralising political opponents. Back in the 1980s the military was responsible for the massacre of thousands of civilians and Zapu supporters in <a href="https://archive.org/stream/BreakingTheSilenceBuildingTruePeace/MatabelelandReport_djvu.txt.">Matebeleland</a>. More than two decades later in 2008 they were responsible for the torture, death and disappearance of 200 opposition activists and the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/2170138/Zimbabwe-Death-toll-rises-in-Robert-Mugabes-reign-of-terror-before-election.html">maiming of hundreds more</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, <a href="http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DRC%20S%202001%20357.pdf">the UN</a> has implicated Mnangagwa and the generals in the illegal plundering of resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They have also been fingered in the disappearance of diamond revenues from Zimbabwe’s Marange <a>diamond fields</a>. </p>
<p>On top of this the military and Zanu-PF share a special relationship that has its roots in the liberation struggle. The Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu) was the political wing of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (Zanla) during the liberation war. They therefore have vested interests in the survival of the party.</p>
<p>After independence, the relationship remained intact as the military became the <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-86814.html">guarantors of the revolution</a>. Some of the same surviving commanders of Zanla are still senior high ranking officials. The commanders are also bona fide members of the ruling party and <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/112460/JUL09SSRZIMBABWE.pdf">guarantors of Zanu-PF power</a>. </p>
<p>The same securocrats are also members of the Zimbabwe National Liberation <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/Zimbabwe_National_Liberation_War_Veterans_Association">War Veterans Association</a>. This quasi paramilitary group is an auxiliary association of the ruling party and has fiercely opposed Mugabe’s attempt to create a dynasty.</p>
<h2>Military must step aside</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe goes to the polls next July to choose a new president and parliament. The elections – if conducted in a credible way – will provide the next government with the legitimacy it needs to take the country out of its political and <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-financial-system-is-living-on-borrowed-time-and-borrowed-money-86159">economic crises</a>.</p>
<p>Now that Mugabe <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">has resigned</a> the hope is that the military will allow a genuinely democratic transition to take place. All political players, including opposition parties, would need to be incorporated into a broad-based transitional authority pending credible elections. </p>
<p>But for the elections to be credible, the transitional authority would need urgently to reform the electoral system. This would ensure Zimbabweans can freely and fairly choose their leaders. Without this, peace and prosperity will continue to elude Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>In the long run, the military would do well to get out of politics instead of continuing to view itself as <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/14/chiwenga-warns-mugabe-zanu-pf">“stockholders”</a> in the country’s political affairs because of its liberation struggle credentials.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87712/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Enock C. Mudzamiri has in the past received funding from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, American Political Science Association and the National Endowment for the Humanities</span></em></p>Contrary to popular sentiment that the coup in Zimbabwe would usher in a new era of democracy, the military intervention is much more about a succession crisis in the ruling Zanu-PF.Enock C. Mudzamiri, DLitt et DPhil Student in Politics, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/878682017-11-21T13:35:37Z2017-11-21T13:35:37ZWhen the state is the man and that man is Mugabe, a new era begins with his fall<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195591/original/file-20171121-6051-ntf8kb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters at a rally outside parliament in preparation ahead of the proposed impeachment of President Robert Mugabe. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kim Ludbrook/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The parliamentary impeachment of beleaguered President Robert Mugabe - in terms of section 97 of <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013.pdf">Zimbabwe’s constitution</a> – could be the culminating moment of a <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2017-11-17-hope-remains-that-the-soft-coup-in-zimbabwe-could-lead-to-nine-easy-victories/">soft coup</a> that staves off the indignity of slipshod regional interventions, while saving the legitimacy of a régime sans a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/is-zimbabwe-set-for-a-mugabe-dynasty-with-first-lady-grace-as-vp-20171113">disgraced Mugabe dynasty</a>.</p>
<p>It <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/globe-in-zimbabwe-robert-mugabe-era-ends/article37015276/?utm_medium=Referrer:+Social+Network+/+Media&utm_campaign=Shared+Web+Article+Links">might just work</a>. But it might not.</p>
<p>Events have not transpired as the faction loyal to Emmerson Mnangagwa, the former vice president of Zanu-PF and of the country who was deposed by Mugabe earlier this month, had planned. The aim of the faction – known as the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">Lacoste faction</a> because of Mnangagwa’s nickname “The Crocodile” – was to get their leader back on the road to power. That was after his derailment by the Zanu-PF Generation 40 group <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/G40_">(aka G-40)</a>
that ostensibly rallies younger, savvy party members to take the lead, but favours Grace Mugabe to succeed her husband.</p>
<p>A number of unintended developments have led to a situation in which, a week after the army issued its limp-wristed and ambiguous statement that Mugabe should go, he remains in place and a new avenue - parliamentary impeachment - is being pursued to get rid of him.</p>
<p>It is by no means certain that Zanu-PF’s crocodiles can pull off the next stage. When the state is the man and that man is Mugabe, a new era begins with his fall.</p>
<h2>The plans that didn’t quite go to plan</h2>
<p>First, the army chiefs’ warning to Mugabe on the <a href="https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2017/11/13/BSR-General-Chiwenga%E2%80%99s-statement---all-bark-and-no-bite">night of November 13</a> that he vacate office, wasn’t met with the desired response. Rather than Mugabe taking the hint and welcoming Mnangagwa back, or telling G-40 to stop their shenanigans, Zanu-PF accused the Military Chief General Constantino Chiwenga <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41991425">of treason</a>.</p>
<p>Second, the effect of this was to trigger a real coup. The military’s round-up and detention of their enemies in G-40 was not quite bloodless: at least one of <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/11/17/mugabes-chief-security-battered/">security guards</a> protecting finance minister Ignatius Chombo was killed. The Central Intelligence Organisation’s security director Albert Ngulube came within a few inches of the same fate. And there was no ambiguity about the fact that the Commander-in-Chief had been detained by his underlings – albeit in his own chintzy <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/inside-robert-mugabes-lavish-blue-11552658?service=responsive">“Blue Roof” mansion</a>. </p>
<p>Third, the delight displayed for the well-organised war vets’ <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2017/nov/18/protesters-in-zimbabwe-call-for-mugabe-to-step-down-in-pictures">demonstrations</a> on Saturday was never going to last long. On Saturday it served the purpose of providing the army with a veneer of legitimacy. But by Monday the patience of the soldiers had begun to wear thin. They warned students <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-20-students-shut-down-university-of-zimbabwe/">who had closed down</a> the university to return to classes, encouraging them to: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>be calm and to proceed with their <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-122553.html">educational programmes</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And when Christopher Mutsvangwa, head of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association, <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/organise-sit-in-as-calls-for-president-to-resign-intensify/">announced</a> that the war vets want “the whole population to descend upon Harare”, the putschists soon released a document entitling their project <a href="http://zimbabwedigitalnews.com/2017/11/20/calm-down-zimbabwe-operation-restore-legacy-is-on-track-mugabe-and-mnangagwa-now-talking/">“Operation Restore Legacy”</a>, as if to dampen the masses’ enthusiasm. </p>
<p>Yet Sunday’s setback – the fourth – was the most severe. Mugabe’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yKTmqKswH-E">press conference</a> shocked just about <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2017-11-19-zimbabwes-mugabe-defies-expectations-of-immediate-resignation/">everybody</a>. He studiously ignored the issue on everyone’s minds: his resignation. Instead, Mugabe noted that the soldiers had raised the concerns causing all of the fuss with “comradeship and collegiality”. This issue was the, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>open public spurts [sic] between high ranking officials in party and government exacerbated by multiple conflicting messages from both the party and government [that] made the criticisms [of lack of unity] levelled against us inescapable.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There we had it. The curse of Zanu-PF’s history: disunity. It was in our faces once again. “It has to stop,” Mugabe warned, and scoled: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The way forward cannot be based on swapping by cliques that ride roughshod over party rules and procedures.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Zimbabweans must resolve their “inter-generation conflict … through a harmonised melding of old established players as they embrace and welcome new ones through a well-defined sense of hierarchy and succession”. The party must go “back to the guiding principles”, he said.</p>
<h2>Last-ditch attempt to repeat history</h2>
<p>Mugabe was not going anywhere. He was determined to preside over December’s extraordinary Zanu-PF conference that had hastened this crisis. In his view, he and only he could ensure the “processes that must not be prepossessed by any acts calculated to undermine [the congress] or to compromise the outcomes in the eyes of the public”. Only he could resolve the tensions of the last few months, ensuring “no bitterness or vengefulness” to mar “our hallowed ideas of reconciliation”. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe addressing the nation at the State House in Harare, on Sunday night.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/The Herald handout.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If in the 1980s Zimbabweans could reconcile with,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>those who oppressed us… surely this cannot be unavailable to our own… we must learn to forgive and resolve contradictions real or perceived in our Zimbabwean spirit.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Consciously or not, Mugabe was repeating a history of at least 40 years, albeit in almost mirror image. The coup makers had not forgotten: their Monday Manifesto referred clearly to the <a href="https://openparly.co.zw/2017/11/13/full-press-statement-general-chiwenga-there-is-instability-in-zanu-pf-today/">vashandi moment</a>. This was when in early 1977 Mugabe and others in the “old guard” squashed a group of young and rebellious “political soldiers” who were proving far too threatening to his liking. He sent them to <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00083968.1995.10804395">Mozambique’s prisons</a>. </p>
<p>This too was “inter-generation” conflict. But four decades ago he was on the dominant side, and dealt with the disunity somewhat differently than on November 19 2017. In 1977 he said that “we must negate” those who, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>arduously strive in any direction that militates against the party or who, in any way, seeks… to bring about change in the leadership or structure of the party by maliciously planting contradictions within our ranks. This is… the negation of the negation… the Zanu axe must continue to fall upon the necks of rebels when we find it no longer possible to persuade them into the harmony <a href="http://psimg.jstor.org/fsi/img/pdf/t0/10.5555/al.sff.document.nuzn197707_final.pdf">that binds us all</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The intervening years have borne much of Mugabe’s ideology of <a href="https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/news/archive/2017/zimbabwe-cameron/">dealing with dissent</a>. Yet, with a Panglossian view, one could believe that Mugabe has learned something over the past four decades. Now he wants all the older generations in Zanu-PF to embrace and welcome the new contenders for power. Forgiveness and reconciliation, with no bitterness or vengeance, shall prevail – under his leadership of course.</p>
<h2>Too little, too late</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, this self-interested repentance is too late for most members of Zanu-PF. Mugabe’s rhetoric is falling on deaf ears. Impeachment through parliamentary means is not a hard landing, although many hitches could <a href="https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2017/11/20/BSR-presidential-impeachment-in-Zimbabwe">still arise</a>, including a messier militaristic denouement. </p>
<p>Yet, as political scientist Ralph Mathekga <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/11/mugabe-outsmarted-generals-not-resign/">puts it</a>, if we assume the impeachment’s success and a relatively smooth Zanu-PF congress, only fully free and fair elections can resolve the contradictions unleashed by the half-measured coup that started as even less than that.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87868/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A week after the army issued its limp-wristed and ambiguous statement that Mugabe should go, he remains in place, and a new avenue - impeachment - is being pursued to get rid of him.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/877742017-11-20T17:23:20Z2017-11-20T17:23:20ZLessons for South Africa’s Jacob Zuma in Robert Mugabe’s misfortunes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195466/original/file-20171120-18574-kx9gwt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The political troubles of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe comes with lessons for his South African counterpart Jacob Zuma. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Robert Mugabe’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-military-coup-is-afoot-in-zimbabwe-whats-next-for-the-embattled-nation-87528">endgame</a> in Zimbabwe holds various lessons for his South African counterpart, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africans-should-resist-an-amnesty-deal-for-zuma-68101">Jacob Zuma</a>, as the latter too, considers his prospects towards the end of his presidency. The first, obviously, is that while, from the pinnacle of power, a country’s president may feel the monarch of all he can survey, it is always possible that the blade of the guillotine is just around the corner. </p>
<p>Accordingly, it is always prudent to keep at least two bags packed for a hasty exit: one full of suit, shirts, underwear and socks, another full of foreign currency (preferably dollars or Euros). You just never know how things might pan out, so it is best to be prepared.</p>
<p>Following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-military-coup-is-afoot-in-zimbabwe-whats-next-for-the-embattled-nation-87528">almost-coup</a>, Mugabe has been in a stronger position than many African dictators before him because the African Union has in recent years become a lover of democracy and a hater of coups. It therefore now demands that changes of leadership must have at least a veneer of <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zuma-slams-unconstitutional-take-over-of-zim-20171115">constitutionality</a>. </p>
<p>This has always been the Zimbabwean military’s weak point during this past week of flirting with political power. Hence its insistence that, despite its take-over of the airwaves, State House and parliament, alongside its house-arrest of the president and his family, its actions are not a coup. </p>
<p>In turn, this has provided Mugabe with a considerable degree of wriggle room, which he has sought to exploit to the full. Indeed, it has remained his key bargaining chip, not least because the African Union does not want to be seen as party to the overthrow of a hero of African liberation. </p>
<h2>Explicit political actor</h2>
<p>Zuma will feel confident that whereas in Zimbabwe the army has long been deeply involved in the ruling party’s internal affairs and the wider political arena, the South African National Defence Force is not an explicit political actor. He stands in no fear of a military coup (or even a Zimbabwe-style non-coup). Yet he does have to worry about what happens within his political party, the African National Congress (ANC).</p>
<p>Even if his favoured candidate, <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-woman-president-in-south-africa-sadly-top-contender-offers-more-of-the-same-71944">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a>, were to win the party leadership at the ANC’s December congress, Zuma’s continuing as South African President might be seen as a political embarrassment. If strong contender <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1643579/zumas-popularity-slides-again-ramaphosa-favourite-to-lead-anc-survey/">Cyril Ramaphosa</a> wins, even more urgent calls will be made from within the ANC for the him to be “recalled” because he will be viewed as an electoral liability. </p>
<p>It is a fair bet that, whoever wins, an excuse will be made for a delegation from the party leadership to visit the president and to ask him to stand down. Just ask former <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2008-09-20-anc-recalls-mbeki">President Thabo Mbeki</a> who was fired by his own ANC. If Zuma refuses to cooperate, then the ANC might turn to parliament, where enough ANC MPs might feel emboldened to vote with the opposition to dethrone him.</p>
<h2>Fighting for survival</h2>
<p>Like Mugabe, Zuma will be battling for a dignified exit. Even more urgently, he will be fighting for survival. In previous years, Mugabe may have feared the prospect of retribution for his sins, and would have been determined to secure immunity from prosecution. </p>
<p>Now, at 93, he is confident that once out of office he will be left in peace. He may or may not appreciate the irony that, unlike his country’s last white ruler Ian Smith, he will not be able to stay in Zimbabwe after he has been forced to stand down, but he will know that he has to leave.</p>
<p>Neither the army nor Zanu-PF will want him hanging around, fearing his ability to continue pulling strings. So off he must go, to South Africa, Dubai or Singapore (anywhere with a few decent shops for his shopaholic wife Grace). His major immediate concern then, we may presume, is safe passage and immunity for his family. We may further presume, that there is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/17/robert-grace-mugabe-missing-millions-money-zimababwe">lots of money</a> stashed away in foreign bank accounts to keep the crocodile from the door.</p>
<h2>Zuma’s tricky position</h2>
<p>Zuma is differently placed. If he loses the Presidency he stands in all sorts of dangers, not least of which is prosecution for past financial crimes and the prospect of his ending his days in prison. In other words, he has much more to bargain for, and he will be doing so from a considerably weaker position. Not least of his problems is that he is a lot younger than Mugabe, so could spend quite a few years in jail. </p>
<p>Zuma’s major strength is that, whoever wins the party leadership, the ANC will probably want to grant him immunity and get him out of the way, as otherwise they face the prospect of their former leader facing a corruption trial during the lead up to elections in 2019.</p>
<p>But for a start, there is no provision for presidential immunity in the constitution, and its grant would face a strong challenge in the courts. Furthermore, if the Gupta or other Zuma allies in the project of “<a href="https://theconversation.com/zuma-and-anc-run-out-of-road-as-bad-news-piles-up-68197">state capture</a>” were to be prosecuted, Zuma could face being dragged into court as a witness. </p>
<p>In short, Zuma will realise that it will make sense to hot-foot it out of the country, preferably to a comfortably authoritarian country which will turn down requests for extradition. </p>
<h2>The fickle people</h2>
<p>What Mugabe is learning now, and it is something of which Zuma should take good note, is that the people are an ungrateful lot, and are likely to turn against you just when you most need their support. Up till a week ago, it was presumed that Mugabe retained the backing of all who mattered in Zanu-PF and that he would again be its candidate for president at the next election. But now, like many a dictator, he is having to learn fast that the people no longer love him. </p>
<p>Past allies, like the war veterans, had already turned against him, repudiating his apparent bid for his wayward wife, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/27/zimbabwe-first-lady-grace-robert-mugabe-successor">Grace</a>, to replace him. Zanu-PF Youth leader, <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-11-16-watch--from-die-for-mugabe-to-fawning-apology-zanu-pf-youth/">Kudzai Chipanga</a>, initially declared his willingness to “die for Mugabe” and labelled Major-General Constantino Chiwenga, the leader of the non-coup, a traitor when the army first intervened. After being locked up, he shamefacedly read out an abject apology, begging forgiveness, and pleading the inexperience of youth. </p>
<p>This has been followed by all 10 provincial organisations of Zanu-PF calling for Mugabe to go, and even encouraging ordinary people to join the marches being organised by opposition parties and civil society demanding his dismissal. </p>
<p>Zuma is too wily a politician not to know that once he loses the party presidency, his support base will drain away, and that he will become known as yesterday’s man. Yet like Mugabe, he will take comfort from the regional body, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), for there is nothing his fellow presidents dread more than the prospect of any one of their number facing impeachment.</p>
<p>He will also know that, unlike Mbeki, whose stature in Africa remains high, he has no viable future as a roving ex-president. Zuma will know that if he wants to enjoy his retirement in peace, he has to leave South Africa before he gets tangled up in court proceedings.</p>
<p>His best option will be to grab those two suitcases, make a hasty exit and move in next door to Bob and Grace in Dubai.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87774/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>The unfolding misfortunes of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe hold key lessons for his South African counterpart Jacob Zuma who faces the possibility of a forced exit.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.