tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/eu-referendum-5556/articlesEU referendum – The Conversation2023-11-14T13:41:19Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2176032023-11-14T13:41:19Z2023-11-14T13:41:19ZRishi Sunak’s decision to bring back David Cameron has distracted us all for now, but the long-term strategy is flawed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559286/original/file-20231114-17-9oaq62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=816%2C1443%2C4614%2C2781&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/number10gov/53328934922/">Number 10/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Former prime minister David Cameron’s return as foreign secretary in Rishi Sunak’s government was surprising, to say the least. Only four former prime ministers have gone on to serve again in government, and none since Alec Douglas-Home returned as foreign secretary under Edward Heath in 1970.</p>
<p>Sunak surely has more in mind than some shocked headlines, but working out the strategic thinking behind the move is perplexing for two reasons. First because Cameron is not a particularly popular politician. Second because, even setting that aside, he is the wrong kind of person to bring back to serve the Conservative strategy that has the best chance of working at the next general election. </p>
<p>It is difficult to pin down how the public felt about Cameron just prior to his resignation in 2016, because there was such a febrile atmosphere at the time. The Brexit referendum, in which Cameron was one of the faces of the Remain campaign, coloured everything. </p>
<p>However, we know that a few months before the referendum he had worse favourability ratings than Jeremy Corbyn, Labour leader of the time <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/politics/articles/15108-camerons-ratings-now-lower-corbyns">(–24 to –22 net favourability).</a> </p>
<p>Expert surveys also concluded at the time that Cameron was <a href="https://theconversation.com/academics-rate-david-cameron-among-worst-post-war-prime-ministers-66780">among the worst post-war prime ministers</a>, below even the crisis-stricken Gordon Brown and Heath. More to the point, asked about his return as foreign secretary, <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/survey-results/daily/2023/11/13/8bdf8/1">just 24% of the public believe it was a good decision</a>. </p>
<p>Surely a lot of this is down to Brexit. Half the country opposed it and Cameron was the prime minister who made it (and the years of post-Brexit tumult) happen. </p>
<p>It was Cameron who called the referendum in the first place and Cameron who failed to convince voters to back Remain. Boris Johnson (another <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/sep/06/boris-johnson-likens-himself-to-roman-cincinnatus-who-returned-as-dictator">Cincinnatus-in-waiting</a>) would face similar obstacles if he were to return, but at least he would go down better with many Leave supporters.</p>
<p>Looking at other aspects of Cameron’s legacy, the picture is hardly any rosier. The Cameron years were not boom times. They were an “age of austerity” marked by spending cuts, stagnant wages, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/national-institute-economic-review/article/is-the-uk-productivity-slowdown-unprecedented/287949348D9BBA0223B3EA7E532C4B22">flatlining productivity</a> and an economy that barely grew. </p>
<p>The merits of fiscal retrenchment in the wake of a financial crisis can be debated. But even judged on its own terms – the goal of eliminating the deficit within a single parliament – the Cameron government’s <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/george-osborne-deficit-reduction-target-budget-austerity-chancellor-coalition-a8234341.html">austerity package failed</a>. </p>
<p>The centrepiece for Cameron’s vision for the country, his <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1099-0860.2010.00351.x?casa_token=-PgxgHLd_XsAAAAA%3A3XyHGen26nqetX6BV5HYARgf383Q5Bxe0l-QBOEbtRYnOZqHt48XneJklnPXnNJx6jaYmEZ4DXAyQso">“big society” policy</a>, has barely left a trace. This was meant to fix “broken Britain”, but what legacy is there to claim when with around <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/yes-five-million-are-on-out-of-work-benefits-heres-the-proof/#:%7E:text=The%20five%20million%20figure%20%27seems,out%2Dof%2Dwork%20benefits">5 million people on out-of-work benefits</a> and with COVID having exposed the dire state of so many of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-austerity-made-the-uk-more-vulnerable-to-covid-208240">Britain’s public services</a>? </p>
<h2>Choosing the blue wall over the red wall?</h2>
<p>When considered in relation to what is presumably still the Conservative strategy going in to the next general election, it makes just as little sense. </p>
<p>The now-ousted Suella Braverman was a prominent Conservative culture warrior but Sunak has hardly shied away from campaigning along these lines himself. His clear intention to harness resentment over climate change policies as an electoral strategy is a case in point. </p>
<p>However, Cameron’s appointment sends mixed messages in this regard because, as PM, Cameron had a very prominent green agenda and embraced the commitment to reduce the UK’s emissions by 80% (relative to 1990 levels) by 2050. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/david-cameron-returns-how-can-a-prime-minister-make-someone-who-isnt-an-mp-foreign-secretary-and-what-happens-now-217601">David Cameron returns: how can a prime minister make someone who isn't an MP foreign secretary? And what happens now?</a>
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<p>Sunak needs to appeal to working-class voters in red wall seats in the north of England – the constituents won over by Boris Johnson in 2019. But Cameron is a classic home counties Tory, precisely the kind of politician deemed out of touch in the Brexit years. </p>
<p>Perceptions of his elitism were only reinforced by revelations that he <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/da2a2686-1efa-4fd4-bee4-79cc9d9a89a2">personally texted</a> Sunak when he was chancellor to lobby for the finance company Greensill Capital to gain access to a Bank of England COVID loan scheme. </p>
<p>Cameron’s appointment also jars with Sunak’s recent Conservative conference speech, in which he attempted to distance himself from a failed <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ya7INY7R9rU">“30-year political status quo”</a> and criticised a system characterised by vested interests. This presumably encompasses his new foreign secretary’s time as prime minister.</p>
<p>Which begs the question: what is in this for Sunak? Cameron will bring considerable experience to his new role in government, and he is a capable media performer. Both these traits are in high demand after the attrition in cabinet in recent years, but they are hardly game-changers. </p>
<p>His appointment may also help shore up Conservative support in a handful of marginals in southern England. But at what cost in other parts of the country? </p>
<p>Perhaps the biggest single benefit of the move is that it instantly shifted the focus away from Braverman and limited the amount of mischief she could make in the aftermath of her departure, but even that does very little to help Sunak beyond the very short term. </p>
<p>It’s doubtful that pulling any rabbit out of the hat could change the likelihood of a big Conservative loss at the next general election, but if there is one, this almost certainly isn’t it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217603/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Byrne does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sunak recently attacked ‘30 years of the status quo’ and promptly appointed a man who governed for six of those years to his top team.Christopher Byrne, Assistant Professor in British Politics, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2134222023-09-18T14:54:09Z2023-09-18T14:54:09ZTears, compromise, divorce – what it’s like to leave the UK because of Brexit<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547822/original/file-20230912-5779-74mjw1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=21%2C7%2C4723%2C3151&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock/NicoElNino</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nicole and Hemmo have two children. Our team visited them at home just a few days before they moved to the Netherlands. Piles of boxes filled every room of the house, ready to be shipped over the coming days. Althought they had lived in the UK for several years, Brexit forced them to reassess where their family’s future lay.</p>
<p>Nicole, who is German and has two children, told us:</p>
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<p>Leaving feels like a funeral, because you don’t realise what’s going to happen until too late, because you’re so busy with doing things beforehand, preparing for it and then once it has happened, you only realise weeks and weeks later what you lost, what you’re missing.</p>
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<p>The whole family had agreed to leave the UK but choosing a destination proved more laborious, not least because “going back home” was not an option – at least not for everyone at the same time. Nicole is originally from Germany, her husband Hemmo is Dutch and her children were born in the UK.</p>
<p>Nicole’s family, <a href="https://eurochildrenblog.files.wordpress.com/2019/10/eurochildren-brief-3-llp-ns-2.pdf">like thousands in the UK</a>, embodied the EU aspiration of a pan-European citizenry, moving across multiple nations and settling together in another. These families had to come to terms with what the UK’s 2016 decision to leave the EU meant for them and their future. </p>
<p>But leaving was rarely straightforward. Exit trajectories, our research recently published in <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00380261231194506">The Sociological Review</a> shows, are far from linear. They often require numerous adjustments based on the configuration of the family unit. Our study delves deep into these untold stories revealing a complex web of hopes, challenges, sacrifices and entanglements.</p>
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<p>Faced with diverging interests, needs and expectations, families who eventually moved away from the UK due to Brexit pursued two main strategies of accommodating their differences. Some sought to compromise spatially, negotiating and choosing a destination that would suit most family members. </p>
<p>“Going home” was the main choice for same nationality families, although even for them, there were several challanges to overcome. This was particularly the case for children who were born in the UK and had never lived in the country of origin of their parents and were not fluent in the country’s language. </p>
<p>For mixed-nationality families, the choice was often guided by work opportunities and strength of family networks, as in the case of Nicole and Hemmo. </p>
<p>Others sought to find a solution temporally, planning the exit strategy not as a one-off event but something taking place over a longer period. Some members of the family would emigrate first and the rest of the family would join at a later stage.</p>
<h2>When Brexit leads to divorce</h2>
<p>Our study shows that these accommodations were not always successful. Diverging and or conflicting aspirations leading in some cases to family breakups.</p>
<p>Maria, a French mother, told us how the UK’s divorce from the European Union was the reason she ended up divorcing her British husband. When Brexit happened, Maria wanted to talk about its consequences with her husband, but he was not interested. </p>
<p>She then started to think about buying a place in France where she could feel at home, where she could feel safe. As she felt unsupported and dismissed, eventually she decided to return to France alone and divorced her husband. She hoped that her grownup children would want to join her at some point in the future but that is far from certain:</p>
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<p>This is what Brexit is costing me really. This is the biggest thing. To force me to not live in the same country as my children and possibly to not live in the same country as my future grandchildren as well, if they might settle down in the UK, which looks fairly probable.</p>
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<p>Maria’s story and the many others we collected show that going “home” is easier said than done. Return journeys can expose intricate intergenerational tensions, challenges, and accommodations, especially for people who have had children in the UK and don’t know any other home.</p>
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<img alt="Two women holding up protest signs in London against Europeans being used as Brexit 'bargaining chips'." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547825/original/file-20230912-7671-865oqt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547825/original/file-20230912-7671-865oqt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547825/original/file-20230912-7671-865oqt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547825/original/file-20230912-7671-865oqt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547825/original/file-20230912-7671-865oqt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547825/original/file-20230912-7671-865oqt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547825/original/file-20230912-7671-865oqt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">EU citizens were often seen protesting in the pre-Brexit years.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock/Ms Jane Campbell</span></span>
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<p>The experiences of the EU families who left Britain show how a major political event such as Brexit reverberates in the lives of real people. Thousands of EU-born Britons who often had lived in the UK for years no longer felt welcome. Many of them eventually left. </p>
<p>As Olga, a Polish woman with two UK-born children, put it: </p>
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<p>In the day of the referendum results, my husband and I looked through the window and realised that at least half of those people had voted against us. That’s how it was. So, despite owning a house in the UK, what else, having a wonderful job, in six months we decided to leave.</p>
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<p>To many of them, Brexit was a seismic event, and its aftershocks are still being felt after years, but their voices have hardly been heard in the public conversation on Brexit.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-uks-island-identity-has-long-shaped-its-political-outlook-is-that-why-it-currently-feels-so-adrift-209276">The UK's island identity has long shaped its political outlook – is that why it currently feels so adrift?</a>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nando Sigona has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council for "EU families and Eurochildren in Brexiting Britain" (<a href="http://www.eurochildren.info">www.eurochildren.info</a>) (ES/R001510/1).
Godin, M., & Sigona, N. (2023) 'Infrastructuring exit migration: Social hope and migration decision-making in EU families who left the UK after the 2016 EU referendum'. The Sociological Review, available at <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00380261231194506">https://doi.org/10.1177/00380261231194506</a></span></em></p>The plight of those who felt compelled to leave when that reality ended is often overlooked.Nando Sigona, Professor of International Migration and Forced Displacement and Director of the Institute for Research into Superdiversity, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1827322022-05-26T10:47:28Z2022-05-26T10:47:28ZWhy Denmark is voting on its defence relationship with the EU – and what it says about democracy in Europe<p>On June 1, voters in Denmark will take part in a referendum on whether to end the country’s opt-out from EU defence policy, which prohibits Denmark from participating in EU defence matters. This means that when the EU deploys personnel under its <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/common-security-and-defence-policy_en">common security and defence policy</a>, Denmark <a href="https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/3400436/European_defence_cooperation_and_the_Danish_defence_opt_out_diis_april_2020.pdf">participates</a> in civilian but not military operations. </p>
<p>This was one of <a href="https://www.thedanishparliament.dk/en/eu-information-centre/the-danish-opt-outs-from-eu-cooperation">four arrangements</a> secured when Danes voted “no” to the 1992 Maastricht treaty to establish the EU. Along with defence policy, Denmark opted out of the euro, justice and home affairs. The European Council also agreed to a Danish <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:41992X1231&rid=1">declaration</a> that EU citizenship could only ever complement national citizenship – not replace it. These four arrangements for Denmark persuaded voters to support the Maastricht treaty in a second referendum in 1993. </p>
<p>The citizenship arrangement later became the norm for all member states through the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf">1997 Amsterdam treaty</a>, which ratified that EU citizenship is supplementary to citizenship of a member state and cannot replace it.</p>
<p>The decision to hold a vote on the defence opt-out reveals a deeper shift in EU constitutional politics. Faced with contentious issues, governments are increasingly turning to single-issue referendums.</p>
<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 changed the security situation in Europe in a heartbeat. Finland and Sweden previously opted to remain outside Nato but have <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-sweden-and-finland-eye-the-nato-option-but-its-a-security-dilemma-for-the-west-181354">now submitted applications</a>. Denmark, a founding member of Nato, is now forced to rethink its foreign policy, including its arm’s-length relationship with the EU.</p>
<p>Faced with a war on its eastern border, and the arrival of <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">more than four million Ukrainian refugees</a>, the EU has agreed to supply <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/729301/EPRS_ATA(2022)729301_EN.pdf">lethal weapons to Ukraine</a> – the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/28/eu-adopts-new-set-of-measures-to-respond-to-russia-s-military-aggression-against-ukraine/">first time</a> it has done so for any country. EU member states also agreed to commit up to <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-rapid-deployment-capacity_en#:%7E:text=To%20that%20end%2C%20the%20EU,EU's%20broad%20crisis%20management%20toolbox.">5,000 troops</a> to a new rapid reaction force, and to engage in live exercises on land and sea. This is part of a <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/">new strategy</a> to make the EU a stronger military actor. </p>
<p>Denmark cannot participate in such efforts, potentially leaving it more vulnerable to external threats than most EU member states. The EU’s <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses_/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses_en.pdf">mutual defence clause</a> guarantees aid and assistance from other member states when one is subject to aggression. It <a href="https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/Ambiguous-alliance-Neutrality-opt-outs-and-European-defence.pdf">remains unclear</a> the extent to which Denmark can invoke or benefit from that provision, given its special status. </p>
<p>A coalition of four Danish political parties proposed the referendum in March, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/06/denmark-to-hold-referendum-eu-defence-opt-out">calling on Danes</a> to reverse the opt-out. If the Danish people vote to remove the opt-out, Denmark will be able to fully participate in EU military operations and cooperate on the growth of EU military capabilities, while also growing its own military budget. If the people vote no, Denmark will remain outside EU defence policy, which will continue to develop without it.</p>
<h2>Single issue referendums</h2>
<p>In the past, national governments primarily looked to national parliaments to approve changes to their countries’ relationship with the EU. But persistent problems of <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_1867">public trust in both governments and parliaments</a> make it difficult for these institutions alone to give their consent to EU policies and questions of European integration. </p>
<p>Since 1972, nearly 50 referendums have been held on issues relating to the EU, the most common being treaty revision or a decision to join the EU. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2022.2032286">Our research</a> shows the growing importance of single-issue referendums focused on specific policies or questions about European integration. Member states are rarely obliged to hold single-issue referendums. They choose to do so when the way they usually engage with the EU is under strain. Examples include Greece’s 2015 referendum on negotiations with the EU and International Monetary Fund, Hungary’s 2016 referendum on the relocation of refugees and the UK’s 2016 vote to leave the EU. </p>
<p>After Denmark secured its four opt-outs from elements of the Maastricht treaty, the political consensus was that a referendum would be required to opt into any of these areas. This was not a legal but a political requirement – and it established single-issue referendums as integral to how Denmark participates in the EU.</p>
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<img alt="An EU flag and the flag of Denmark flying side by side against a blue sky" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464762/original/file-20220523-26-xrglrz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464762/original/file-20220523-26-xrglrz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464762/original/file-20220523-26-xrglrz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464762/original/file-20220523-26-xrglrz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464762/original/file-20220523-26-xrglrz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464762/original/file-20220523-26-xrglrz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464762/original/file-20220523-26-xrglrz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">In the June 1 referendum, Danish voters will decide on whether to change the country’s defence relationship with the EU.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/european-union-eu-danish-flag-denmark-1086053966">oleschwander / Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>So far, two opt-in referendums have been held in Denmark, but have not resulted in change. In 2000, voters rejected joining the euro despite widespread support from political parties and <a href="https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/article/2000/denmark-votes-no-to-the-euro">trade union leaders</a>.</p>
<p>In 2015, a referendum on ending the country’s <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012E%2FPRO%2F22">opt-out</a> from <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12008E067">EU justice and home affairs</a> also ended in defeat. </p>
<h2>Voting against the government</h2>
<p>Denmark is no isolated case. Of the six single-issue EU referendums called by governments since 2000, four went against the preferences of the government. And Hungary’s controversial refugee relocation referendum resulted in the “no” vote that the government sought, but failed to secure the required turnout. Greece’s government won a “no” vote against the terms of financial assistance from its international creditors, but this made little practical difference to negotiations. </p>
<p>This makes Denmark’s upcoming referendum politically fraught, with polls giving the “yes” side an <a href="https://www.altinget.dk/artikel/trods-klodset-start-paa-kampagnen-fastholder-ja-siden-sin-foering-i-afstemningen-om-forsvarsforbeholdet">unconvincing lead</a>, given the large share of undecideds. The fact that four political parties have proposed the referendum means it will not simply be a vote on the popularity of the government. It will also be on the single issue of whether voters think the security situation has changed enough to allow “more EU” in Denmark.</p>
<p>The Danish government has already <a href="https://www.thelocal.dk/20220411/danish-government-promises-new-referendum-in-event-of-supranational-eu-army/">promised</a> that should the EU seek to establish a supranational army, there would be yet another referendum to decide whether Denmark would participate. Whatever the result, single-issue referendums will remain a feature of EU constitutional politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182732/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>EU member states are increasingly turning towards single-issue referendums to decide major constitutional issues.Imelda Maher, Dean of Law and Sutherland Full Professor of European Law, University College DublinDermot Hodson, Professor of Political Economy, Birkbeck, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1629742021-06-23T16:09:28Z2021-06-23T16:09:28ZBrexit: five years after the referendum, here are five things we’ve learned<p>On June 23 2016 the UK went to the polls to decide the future of the country’s EU membership. The vote to leave the EU – decided by a slim but definite majority of 51.9% to 48.1% – ushered in major constitutional, social, economic and political upheavals, as the country sought to define exactly what Brexit would mean. Five years later, here’s what we’ve learned.</p>
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<h2>1. We know a lot more</h2>
<p>The day after the referendum, the second most Googled question in the UK was “What is the European Union?”. The most frequent question for the search engine was: “What does it mean to leave the European Union?”.</p>
<p>This is not entirely surprising. Even the Brexit secretary himself, Dominic Raab, it turns out, “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-46142188">hadn’t quite understood</a>” how reliant the UK’s goods trade is on crossing the English Channel. Some expectations were thus necessarily confounded. The promise on the <a href="https://fullfact.org/europe/our-eu-membership-fee-55-million/">side of a bus</a> to use the £350 million the UK spent on the EU to fund the NHS turned out to be good advertising but bad misuse of statistics. Yet the <a href="https://fullfact.org/economy/brexit-and-economic-apocalypse/">economic apocalypse</a> foretold by those opposing Brexit has failed to materialise, too. </p>
<p>What we have learned instead is a vast array of details about trade and governance we never knew we needed. From Article 50 to Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, from <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-facts/what-are-the-henry-viii-powers/">Henry VIII powers</a> to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-47216870">GATT XXIV</a>, from the fish we like to eat and the kind of chicken we don’t, Brexit has been a steep learning curve for us all. And not all of it in good time: underestimating Northern Ireland and the <a href="https://www.cer.eu/insights/theresa-mays-irish-trilemma">border trilemma</a> may turn out to be one of Brexit’s biggest blind spots.</p>
<h2>2. We are still divided</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/news/2018/oct/will-people-new-project-albert-weale">The myth</a> of the “will of the people” has been a political linchpin of Brexit. But while the referendum result was definitive, it showed an electorate split practically down the middle. In five years, this rift between Remainers and Leavers has not dissipated. On the contrary, Brexit identities <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103485/1/Divided_by_the_vote.pdf">now mean more</a> to us than party-political affiliations.</p>
<p>The vast majority of referendum voters have stuck to their initial vote – over <a href="https://whatukthinks.org/eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/WUKT-Brexit-Analysis-v4.pdf">four in five say</a> they would vote the same way again. Although <a href="https://whatukthinks.org/eu/questions/should-the-united-kingdom-remain-a-member-of-the-european-union-or-leave-the-european-union-asked-after-the-referendum/">surveys have shown</a> a consistent majority for Remain since 2016, this is very slight: the British public are still more or less evenly divided on the issue. This was clear even in the 2019 general election, decisively won by the Conservatives under the first past the post system, where 52% of votes were cast for (opposition) parties advocating a second referendum. </p>
<p>Only one issue seems to unite both sides: a general <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-success-five-years/">dislike of the deal</a> that was obtained.</p>
<h2>3. We trust a lot less</h2>
<p>In a more complex, interconnected world, trust – in our fellow members of society, our institutions, between governments – is pivotal. Trust <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41802142">describes acts</a> not yet committed but to be reckoned with: it is a vehicle for coping with the essential unpredictability of people and institutions. </p>
<p>If distrust in government was a major <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-and-political-trust/">predictor of Leave</a> voters, it also arguably fuelled discontent with parliament and the judiciary, which the Conservatives accused in their 2019 election manifesto of “thwarting the democratic decision of the British people”. Now it is Remain voters, feeling they are on the losing side, who are <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/research-papers/brexit-and-beyond-public-opinion/">less satisfied</a> with democratic standards. </p>
<p>Following often acrimonious negotiations, trust between the EU and the UK has also taken a hit. Both sides have <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-uk-brexit-talks/">told the press</a> only this month that trust is now at an all-time low – and increasingly hinges on the good faith in the way the Brexit divorce deal, including the Northern Ireland protocol, is being implemented or challenged. </p>
<p>A highly complex <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5801/ldselect/ldeucom/246/24606.htm">governance structure</a> with specialised committees, working groups, partnership councils and dispute settlement mechanisms will seek to ameliorate problems. Whether it is enough remains to be seen.</p>
<h2>4. Brexit is far from done</h2>
<p>Boris Johnson famously vowed to “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-50222315">Get Brexit Done</a>”. While we have indeed exited the European Union, Brexit is far from over. Given the UK’s decision to leave the customs union and the single market, the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/relations-united-kingdom/eu-uk-trade-and-cooperation-agreement_en">trade and cooperation agreement</a> is the thinnest of deals. It provides for duty and quota-free trade of all goods, but introduces business, industry, and Brexit observers to a rich vocabulary of non-tariff barriers, level playing field provisions, and customs red tape. </p>
<p>Not least due to this “disintegration shock”, there will be pressure (and incentives) to improve on the deal. Negotiations are likely to go on for years, perhaps even decades. A particular sticking point remains the Northern Ireland protocol – which Boris Johnson negotiated, signed, convinced parliament to approve and won a general election on, yet which the UK’s chief negotiator now <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/eb35a108-6186-42a4-b401-5e1df0e2c64a">describes as</a> unexpectedly unworkable. The protocol is the Brexit conundrum in a nutshell: until we reach an agreement on its implementation, Brexit will not be done.</p>
<h2>5. Brexit will have lasting effects on both sides</h2>
<p>In the past decade, the <a href="https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/news/2011/oct/10-questions-about-eurozone-crisis-and-whether-it-can-be-solved">global financial and eurozone crises</a> exposed the weaknesses of the EU’s economic governance; the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/europes-migration-crisis">migration crisis</a> exposed the limits of intra-European solidarity, and the <a href="http://dcubrexitinstitute.eu/2019/07/new-leaders-and-old-problems-brexit-and-the-rule-of-law-crisis/">rule of law crisis</a> in Hungary and Poland exposes its very <em>raison d’etre</em> as fragile. </p>
<p>In this context, Brexit brought on unprecedented unity among the 27 – yet also, if perhaps not sufficiently, a soul-searching: a function of longer-term dissatisfaction with the nature of the union. Having lost a key member state, the EU will need to address not only a changed internal landscape, but also redefine its complicated and not always satisfactory relationship to neighbours and partners. </p>
<p>On the UK side, Brexit has heralded what some have called a “<a href="https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2020/05/28/the-united-kingdoms-constitution-and-brexit-a-constitutional-moment/">constitutional moment</a>”. We have seen an increasingly strained relationship between <a href="https://academic.oup.com/pa/article/74/2/443/5855887">parliament and the executive</a>, antagonistic relationships with devolved governments, and an ongoing discussion over the role of the courts. How the government will use its new regulatory powers may also change the shape of the British state. </p>
<p>As far as the future relationship between both sides is concerned, this is still being defined. Yet geographical proximity, volume of trade, the importance of the “EU orbit” and the very entrenchment of our links means the UK will not float off into the Atlantic. We will wrangle with each other, and ourselves, for some time to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162974/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The UCL European Institute, which Uta Staiger directs, has received funding from the European Commission through its Jean Monnet programme.</span></em></p>After the Brexit referendum, the most-Googled question in the UK was ‘What does it mean to leave the European Union?’ Five years later, we still don’t have the full answer.Uta Staiger, Executive Director, UCL European Institute, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1600422021-04-30T12:02:25Z2021-04-30T12:02:25ZScottish independence: what’s at stake in May elections<p><em>This is a transcript of episode 13 of The Conversation Weekly podcast “<a href="https://theconversation.com/scotland-why-may-election-is-crucial-for-independence-movement-and-the-uk-podcast-159883">Scotland: why May election is crucial for independence movement, and the UK</a>”. In this episode, as Scotland prepares to vote in landmark parliamentary elections on May 6, we explore why the question of independence from the UK is dominating the debate. And a team of researchers working with fruit flies, has discovered a biological switch that can turn neuroplasticity on and off in the brain. What might that mean?</em></p>
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<p>Dan Merino: Hello and welcome to The Conversation Weekly.</p>
<p>Gemma Ware: This week, as Scotland prepares to vote in parliamentary elections on May 6, why the question of independence is dominating the debate. </p>
<p>Kezia Dugdale: If there’s a majority for independence you will see the SNP demand the right to hold a referendum and you’ll see Boris Johnson say no to it very quickly.</p>
<p>Dan: And – a team of researchers working in fruit flies, have discovered a biological switch that can turn neuroplasticity on and off in the brain. </p>
<p>Sarah Ackerman: Plasticity is really important for us to form and maintain connections in the brain. </p>
<p>Gemma: I’m Gemma Ware in London.</p>
<p>Dan: And I’m Dan Merino in San Francisco. You’re listening to The Conversation Weekly, the world explained by experts. </p>
<p>Gemma: People in countries around the world are clamouring for independence – or to secede from the nations that govern them. From Kurdistan in the Middle East, to Kashmir in India, or the Anglophone Ambazonia region of Cameroon. </p>
<p>Dan: Yep, there’s even a secessionist movement here in California, though it’s relatively tame in the grand scheme of things.</p>
<p>Gemma: In recent decades, some parts of the world have voted in referendums for independence. South Sudan became an independent country in 2011 after a brutal conflict, as did East Timor in 2002. </p>
<p>Dan: Elsewhere, independence movements have led to constitutional and political crises. In 2017, Catalonia in Spain held an independence referendum which was ruled illegal by the country’s constitutional court. </p>
<p>But the Catalan parliament went ahead and unilaterally declared independence anyways. This was accompanied by a brutal crackdown by the Spanish police and the eventual arrest of Catalan pro-independence leaders.</p>
<p>Gemma: And that brings us to Scotland, where there is loud and growing support for independence from the United Kingdom. Now Scots are heading to the polls on May 6 in elections for the Scottish parliament. </p>
<p>Dan: Scotland held an independence referendum seven years ago in 2014, and voted to remain in the UK. But a lot’s happened since then.</p>
<p>Gemma: Yes, and the Scottish National Party – known as the SNP – led by Scotland’s first minister, Nicola Sturgeon – is arguing that the circumstances have changed so significantly that they warrant a second referendum, or indyref2. </p>
<p>Gemma: If pro-independence parties win a majority in the Scottish parliament – Sturgeon will ask the UK government in Westminster, led by Prime Minister Boris Johnson, for a second referendum on Scottish independence. To find out more about what’s at stake in these upcoming elections, I’ve spoken to three experts, including one high-profile politician turned academic, to explain the situation. </p>
<p>Kezia Dugdale: Hello, I’m Kezia Dugdale. I’m the director of the John Smith Centre at the University of Glasgow, where I also teach public policy. </p>
<p>Gemma: Before that, Kezia was a politician. She served as leader of the Scottish Labour Party between 2015 and 2017 and represented Edinburgh and the Lothians in the Scottish parliament, for nearly a decade. I asked Kezia why questions about the constitutional arrangements between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom are dominating the debate ahead of the Scottish parliamentary elections on May 6. </p>
<p>Kezia: So we’ve had a Scottish parliament since 1999. So this is the 21st year or so of devolution. The parliament’s very much coming of age and it’s matured and it has substantially more powers than it did when it first opened its doors in 1999. So it’s largely responsible for health, education, housing policy, justice and communities. It’s increasingly got more powers around welfare, certain powers to do with, for example, disability benefits, and also increasing tax powers. But the vast majority of the social security system, foreign policy, defence are all still reserved to the UK parliament. So is the constitution, but that doesn’t mean that it doesn’t completely dominate Scottish politics. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-has-changed-peoples-minds-on-independence-qanda-with-kezia-dugdale-former-scottish-labour-leader-159858">'Brexit has changed people's minds on independence': Q&A with Kezia Dugdale, former Scottish Labour leader</a>
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<p>So after the 2011 Scottish parliament elections, the SNP had a majority, and they used that majority to call for an independence referendum. There was a two and a half year campaign with the referendum taking place in September 2014. The no side won that with 55% of the vote to the yes side’s 45%. And we thought that that would be the end of the constitutional question, but I’m afraid that’s not been the case. Because it was a relatively close margin, questions around the settlement that the Scottish parliament has and it’s continued place in the United Kingdom have continued to dominate. And they’re dominating this election campaign. </p>
<p>So whether you are yes or no, what you were in 2014, what you are today, is still the biggest dominating factor over how you will vote in party political terms. So if you’re a Yes voter, very likely SNP, perhaps Green, if you’re a No voter, the vote splits three ways between Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats.</p>
<p>Gemma: Over the past few years, calls for a second independence referendum have been growing louder. To understand where the support for this indyref2 is coming from, we need to go back to what’s happened since Scotland voted to remain part of the UK in 2014.</p>
<p>Darryn Nyatanga: My name is Darren Nyatanga and I’m a final year PhD candidate at the University of Liverpool, where I’m researching the constitutional impacts of Brexit on the UK’s unionship.</p>
<p>Gemma: Darren explains that in the immediate aftermath of the independence referendum, the UK government in Westminster moved to devolve more powers to Scotland.</p>
<p>Darryn: So during the campaign for that referendum on independence, the three main parties in Westminster – so at the time that was the Conservatives and the Lib Dems who were in coalition together, and the Labour party – made a pledge to devote more powers to Scotland if they voted to remain within the UK. So they honoured this vow, it was known as “the vow”, by passing a law, known as the Scotland Act of 2016, which devolved extensive powers, including fiscal powers to Scotland, and it also insured the permanency of the Scottish parliament and the Scottish government within the UK’s constitutional order, something which meant a lot to nationalists, because the debate really was about Scottish institutions making Scottish decisions. </p>
<p>Gemma: But then, a few months later, the UK held another referendum, on whether to leave the European Union. The UK as a whole voted 52% to leave, 48% to remain, and the path to Brexit was set in motion. But in Scotland, 62% of the population voted to remain as part of the EU. </p>
<p>Darryn: So this meant that Scotland was taken out of the EU against its democratic will. So this is the point that the Scottish government have been hammering on in relation to their need to have a second vote on independence because for them there’s a significant change in circumstances prevailing from the 2014 vote. </p>
<p>Gemma: Economically, Scotland’s situation has also changed significantly since 2014. To find out more about the state of its economy, I called up economist Graeme Roy, a colleague of Kezia Dugdale’s at the University of Glasgow, where he’s dean of external engagement at the School of Social Sciences.</p>
<p>Graeme: The UK is one of the most unequal economies on a regional basis in Europe. But within that Scotland, outside of London and the southeast, the really strong parts of the UK economy, Scotland comes in pretty much next on most indicators. And it has core strengths in areas that you’d expect in things like energy with the North Sea, but also in other areas such as financial services, and that’s propelled it to be a relatively strong economy within the UK. There are challenges though as well, like many other parts of Europe: de-industrialisation, issues around social inequality et cetera. So it’s very much a mixed bag, it’s got its core strengths but its also got its challenges. </p>
<p>Gemma: You mentioned there the North Sea so you’re talking oil there but the oil economy has has actually shifted dramatically even in the last few years, hasn’t it?</p>
<p>Graeme: Very much so. So North Sea oil is fairly much in its twilight years. There’s still potential there for the next couple of decades but it’s on a much smaller scale than it has been in the past. The opportunity, and where policy makers are focusing their attention both at a Scottish and a UK level is the ability to shift into new forms of energy.</p>
<p>Gemma: As you’ve written in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/scottish-independence-referendum-why-the-economic-issues-are-quite-different-to-2014-154119">piece for The Conversation</a>, the economic questions were kind of a big part of the of the independence referendum that Scotland had in in 2014, but what’s changed since then?</p>
<p>Graeme: So quite a lot has changed actually. So firstly, there’s been quite a number of changes to the economic context. The changes in the oil and gas industry has removed a significant potential source of revenue for any future independent Scotland. Oil prices are lower and the tax system is now much more generous in terms of taxing less than it had in the past. And that really matters in a Scottish context because it’s got higher public expenditure than the rest of the UK so oil revenues would have been one way to help it support that. I think the other change is obviously COVID and Scotland like every other country in the world has gone through a tremendous economic upheaval. </p>
<p>I think the second thing is about the politics of all of this, and the politics have clearly also changed since 2014. Brexit being the obvious example of that, where in 2014 the argument was that voting to stay part of the UK was a way to guarantee and be, retain membership of the European Union. But obviously then the subsequent referendum in 2016, and the UK now leaving, has changed that. And that has a number of implications, in particular for issues around borders, issues around potential currency choices. The whole dynamics of that debate has changed. </p>
<p>Gemma: After a prolonged Brexit negotiation period with many twists and turns, the UK finally left the EU on January 31 2020. But the full effects of Brexit weren’t felt until January 1 this year, when a transition period ended and the new rules governing the relationship between the UK and the rest of the EU came into effect. </p>
<p>Graeme: The immediate challenges have been concentrated largely in a relatively small number of sectors so things like fishing and the ability to get products, fresh products to market quickly have been impacted negatively impacted by some of the challenges at borders during the switchover to the new Brexit arrangements. </p>
<p>I think the biggest challenge, though, I think for the Scottish economy, as for the UK economy, is less about the immediate impact of Brexit but more about the longer-term challenges. So about nearly half of all Scottish international exports go into the EU. We have an ageing population so we rely on migrants coming in to Scotland to help support our economy, and Scotland’s done well through universities and businesses with that collaboration with Europe. So it’s those things that will gradually be eroded over time that I think are the greatest concern for the Scottish economy.</p>
<p>Gemma: All this has increasingly boosted support for an independent Scotland. Here’s Kezia Dugdale again.</p>
<p>Kezia: Since January 2020 there have been 25 opinion polls on the constitutional question. Twenty-two of them have shown yes ahead of no which is very new. I think there were only two polls ever in the run up to 2014 that had yes ahead of no. So now you’re looking at for the past nearly 18 months yes being consistently ahead. </p>
<p>Gemma: There have been some recent exceptions, with a few polls showing no just back in front, which some analysts suggest may be down to the success of the UK’s coronavirus vaccine rollout. But in general, Kezia says the reason people have moved from no to yes, in favour of independence in the past few years, has to do with Brexit. </p>
<p>Kezia: What’s changed since 2014? Again you need to look at who they are. They are people age 25 to 45, tend to live in urban centres like Edinburgh or Glasgow or along the central belt, where at least two thirds of Scotland’s population can be found. They are educated to a university degree level, mostly. They are socially centre-left but economically centre ground or to the centre-right. So by that I mean there are supporters of gay marriage but they don’t want high taxes, right. So they’re that type of voter. They are passionately proudly pro-European in their identity and almost all of them voted Remain and they’re very angry about it.</p>
<p>So if presented with a binary choice and that binary choice is an independent Scotland in Europe with a progressive leader or staying in the United Kingdom led by, by Boris with a sort of “Little Britain Brexit” mindset they’re choosing the progressive independent Scotland in Europe. They might not like it. They certainly don’t love it but it’s better than what they’ve got.</p>
<p>Gemma: All these issues are now swirling around as Scotland goes to the polls on May 6, in an election campaign taking place in the shadow of the pandemic. Scotland relaxed some of its coronavirus restrictions on April 26, but still, this has been an election campaign like no other. I asked Graeme Roy what the pro-independence movement’s economic case for independence is now going into these elections.</p>
<p>Graeme: The case for the economics of independence is very much built around gaining powers of an independent country like many other small independent countries in Europe and using them in a way that is explicitly targeted to the challenges and opportunities within the Scottish economy. And they often point to other countries that they would like to be comparable to, so Denmark, Norway, places like that that they can say well look these countries are successful and arguably more successful in the UK in many ways, have better outcomes. If Scotland was to be independent then we could seek to follow their lead and have the same quality of life and same strong economy as they do. Of course that’s easy to say. The ability to actually do that is much harder. </p>
<p>Gemma: And let’s look at the flip side there. So the unionist parties, the main one being the Conservative party but also Labour is also a unionist party, is against independence – what is their argument, I guess for economically remaining part of the United Kingdom?</p>
<p>Graeme: One is their argument that Scotland actually does well within the UK. They would also argue that Scotland receives higher public spending per head than most other parts of the UK and therefore again that’s an advantage that Scotland gets by being part of the UK that would be removed if it tried to go on its own and pay for everything on its own. And I think the other strand then is just to, to highlight the point that any transition from the status quo to a new model would be challenging and there’d be uncertainty and particularly in a post-COVID world or when we’re trying to recover from one of the greatest economic shocks we’ve ever had, this challenge of trying to do that at that point in their view wouldn’t make sense.</p>
<p>Gemma: The SNP’s election manifesto says that the party will seek to hold a second referendum “after the COVID crisis is over” – a timeframe widely interpreted as being within the five year term of the next parliament, so before 2026. But under UK law, the Scottish government cannot agree to unilaterally hold an independence referendum. It must seek the permission of the government in Westminster to do so – via something called a Section 30 order. Here’s Darryn Nyatanga again. </p>
<p>Darryn: So the UK government has thus far continued to refuse to grant this order in council, with the prime minister, Boris Johnson, stating that the vote in 2014 was a once-in-a-generation vote. </p>
<p>Gemma: And if Scotland should choose to have a referendum on its own that might spell further kind of questions down the line?</p>
<p>Darryn: Yes, I think this would turn more from a political question into a legal question because the Supreme Court will probably be tasked with looking into the competencies of the Scottish government on, basically unilaterally, holding a referendum.</p>
<p>Gemma: If Scotland did decide to hold a referendum without Westminster’s approval, and then unilaterally declare independence, like Catalonia did in 2017, this could lead to serious questions about the legitimacy of the outcome. And damage any future SNP bid for Scotland to rejoin the EU. </p>
<p>Darryn: International recognition of a newly independent state is much more likely to be forthcoming if the independence process is perceived to have been legitimate. So for Scottish independence, then, it needs to be done in a legitimate manner. And the decision must be accepted by the UK, the EU and the rest of the international community. This is key because the Scottish government want independence, but with EU membership. So if the EU does not recognise the legitimacy of the independence, then they most likely wouldn’t be forthcoming in terms of accepting them as a member state. </p>
<p>Gemma: So the way it’s held really matters?</p>
<p>Darryn: Really does matter, yes.</p>
<p>Gemma: Nicola Sturgeon has ruled out making a unilateral declaration of independence. But this makes the results of the upcoming elections – and the size of the majority – all the more important. Here’s Kezia Dugdale again.</p>
<p>Kezia: So we have 129 members of the Scottish parliament, you’ve got 73 constituency seats. The remaining 56 seats are made up of eight regions which each elect seven MSPs proportionately, using a formula called the De Hond’t system. And this combination of first past the post and PR means that we’ve had a more colourful parliament than you would expect in the UK system. But this system of PR, where it’s called the additional member system overall, is designed to produce coalitions. In fact it’s supposed to stop outright majorities.</p>
<p>Gemma: And that is what happened, until 2011, when the SNP won a majority in the Scottish Parliament for the first time. It was this majority that then led the Conservative prime minister at the time, David Cameron, to agree to the Scottish independence referendum. At the 2016 Scottish parliamentary elections, in the wake of the defeat for the yes campaign in that referendum, the SNP narrowly lost its overall majority, falling short by two seats. But Nicola Sturgeon still remained as first minister of a minority government.</p>
<p>Ahead of May 6, the polls have the SNP well in the lead, but it’s unclear whether they have enough support to get an overall majority. Kezia Dugdale thinks this will be difficult.</p>
<p>Kezia: We’re now back in the strange situation where because it happened once people think it can be recreated, which is quite unfair actually on the SNP because they found the sweet spot in 2011, this imaginary sweet spot where they broke the system. It will be very difficult for them to replicate that. </p>
<p>Gemma: But the Green Party is also running on a pro-independence ticket, as is a new party, called Alba, lead by Alex Salmond, the former leader of the SNP who split from the party in bitter and controversial circumstances after allegations of sexual assault. He was acquitted of all charges in 2020, but the affair led to a flurry of other legal challenges and government inquiries that at one point earlier this year appeared to threaten Sturgeon’s own position as first minister. </p>
<p>Even if the SNP doesn’t win an outright majority in May, if more than half of the seats in the Scottish parliament go to parties running on a pro-indepenence platform, the pressure will mount on Boris Johnson to grant Scotland a second referendum. I asked Kezia what options Nicola Sturgeon has available. </p>
<p>Kezia: She has zero options because she’s ruled out what’s commonly referred to as UDI, a universal declaration of independence. I think she’s right to rule that out. So this all boils down to mandates and morality really, right? So if there’s a majority for independence you will see the SNP demand the right to hold a referendum and you’ll see Boris Johnson, I think, say no to it very quickly. The question is how long that no will hold for and what the argument that underpins it is.</p>
<p>So the first thing they’ll say is not during a pandemic. They might say not now, not ever, you said once in a generation. That’s a much riskier strategy for the UK government to take. And there’s a growing school of thought that says if the majority is big, if independence or a second independence referendum feels somehow inevitable, it’s in the UK government’s interest to go now rather than delay for a long period of time.</p>
<p>Gemma: She says that’s because of the current state of pandemic in the UK. </p>
<p>Kezia: As the health element of the pandemic crisis comes to a close. The economic element of the crisis just begins. There are serious concerns now about what happens to business, when the furlough payments end, the system that was supporting so many jobs. Huge number of lost opportunities for young people. A suggestion we could have seriously high rates of youth unemployment come Christmas. Knowing all that, the government are currently spending a lot. We’ve got one of the most right-wing chancellors we’ve seen in my lifetime and he’s spending like a left-wing socialist.</p>
<p>So there’s lots of money swishing around and there’s lots of money coming to Scotland just now and there’s lots of means by which you can demonstrate the value of the United Kingdom to Scotland just now, because of the receipts that are coming in to Scottish bank accounts, whether that be in government or elsewhere. In 18 months time that spending has to stop. It’s going to run out and the UK government will then have to decide what taxes have to go up and what public sector saving decisions or cuts have to be made in order to balance the books. So the longer you wait to hold a second independence referendum, the less advantageous the
circumstances are for the UK government to make the arguments they want to make.</p>
<p>Gemma: Your prediction is that she will ask for one. Westminster will say no. Do you then see there being kind of this, this big standoff or will there just be continual asks? How will it, how will it play out?</p>
<p>Kezia: Yes there’ll be a lot of Punch and Judy-style back and forth politics and every time the UK government says no, it will work in the SNP’s favour to be quite honest, because it reaffirms everything they tell the electorate about the UK government not observing the will of the people of Scotland. </p>
<p>Gemma: For Darryn Nyatanga, the UK is heading towards a constitutional crisis, where it’s quite possible that a majority of people in Scotland don’t want to be part of the UK, but haven’t got a way to leave. </p>
<p>Darryn: For the Conservative party, they are more than happy to continue with the current arrangements of centralisation, but with devolution. Longer-term, if Scotland is to remain within the UK’s union, then its constitutional settlement definitely needs to be reformed. So the best way to do so in my opinion is to radically alter the constitutional status of the United Kingdom as a whole. So moving from a unitary state where power is centred within London, so within the capital, to a federal state. So Canada, for instance, has proven that nationalism can be contained within a federal system. So the largest secessionist party in Quebec, despite spells in government, has so far been unsuccessful in leading the province to succession from Canada. So this is mostly owed to the fact that Quebec under federalism enjoys high levels of autonomy and central representation, something which Scotland lacks at the moment.</p>
<p>Gemma: I asked Graeme Roy what options might be put on the table, to alleviate the inevitable anger of the SNP and its electorate if Westminster continues to refuse Scotland a second referendum even if there is a pro-independence majority. </p>
<p>Graeme: So it’ll be really interesting to see whether part of any response from the UK parties and the UK government is to open up a conversation about what more powers could be given with the hope of trying to satisfy the people who might be on the borderline between wanting Scotland to have more autonomy and the decisions in Edinburgh to be taken at a much more local level and bespoke level for Scotland, but they maybe would be happy with that rather than going to full independence. </p>
<p>Dan: What always interests me about these kind of secessionist movements is that the people can vote and do whatever they need to do, but at the end of the day, the ruling government really has all the cards and that creates interesting scenarios.</p>
<p>Gemma: Yeah and whatever the outcome on May 6, politicians in Edinburgh and in London are gonna have to weigh up their options very carefully. </p>
<p>Gemma: If you want to hear more from Graeme Roy and Kezia Dugdale, you can listen to their podcast <a href="https://open.spotify.com/show/0YQoD0wLwjz1T1ahaWOKnb">Spotlight, from the University of Glasgow</a>, discussing public policy and the political process through a Scottish lens. Search for Spotlight on Spotify to listen. </p>
<p>You can also follow The Conversation’s ongoing coverage of the Scottish elections by clicking the links in the show notes, where you can also find a link to a recent article by Graeme Roy on <a href="https://theconversation.com/scottish-independence-referendum-why-the-economic-issues-are-quite-different-to-2014-154119">how Scotland’s economic circumstances have changed since 2014</a>. </p>
<p>Dan: For our next story this week we’re going to join a researcher named Sarah Ackerman to talk about her <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03441-2">new paper on neuroplasticity</a> – and that is the ability of the brain to basically change its structure. Her team was running experiments in fruit flies to try and study why brains in young animals can change so much more easily than the brains in old animals. </p>
<p>Gemma: This heightened neuroplasticity when we’re younger is why kids can learn languages much more easily than adults.</p>
<p>Dan: And there’s still a lot researchers don’t know about this vital ability of the brain. Many diseases are caused by too little or too much neuroplasticity, so being able to turn it or or turn it off has some obvious medical benefits. Sarah and her team wanted to learn what controls these changes to help fight diseases, yes, but this work could also potentially unlock the super-powered learning that comes with a malleable brain.</p>
<p>Sarah: My name is Sarah Ackerman, and I am a post-doctoral fellow in the <a href="https://www.doelab.org/people">Doe Lab</a> at the University of Oregon. I’m really broadly interested in how the body makes and maintains a functioning brain. And specifically what I have been focusing on in my research really for the last ten years since I was a graduate student, is on this special group of cells called glia.</p>
<p>So the human brain is made up of billions of neurons that talk to one another, and this communication is what allows us to do what we need to do. But 50% of the human brain is actually not made of neurons, but made up of these other cell types called glia. And the fact that there are so many of them means that they must be doing something important, but they’ve been largely ignored by the neuroscience community for a long time because we just didn’t know what they did.</p>
<p>So I’m interested in how these glial cells are instructing the neurons to form these connections that allow us, for example, to move through our environment.</p>
<p>Dan: OK. So we’ve got the brain, 50% neurons, 50% glia. What are they doing? </p>
<p>Sarah: We know that there are lots of different types of glial cells. They’re present both in the brain, the spinal cord, out on our nerves, in our limbs.
And in general, we can say that they are necessary for the long-term health of neurons. And they’ve become really a focus of neuroscience research because there’s a lot of evidence that in different neurological disorders or neurodegenerative disorders that these glia are becoming sick and dying. So I think one of the most studied cases of this is in multiple sclerosis where you get loss of the glial cells that wrap around neurons in the brain. And when you lose those glia, the neurons die and then you end up with multiple sclerosis. And so we know there’s a lot of variety. They do a lot of things, but if we were to sum it up into one word, they’re there to allow neurons to survive for a long time. </p>
<p>Cause if you think about it, the neurons that are present in our adult brains, they’re the same neurons that were born when you were in the womb and so they have to make it a long time. And these glia are what are there to help them. </p>
<p>Dan: The importance of the cells that keep neurons alive – that has got to be huge. But your research was looking at something a little more specific than just the, like, maintenance, so to speak. What was it that you were looking at?</p>
<p>Sarah: Yeah, so there’s this one type of glia called an astrocyte and they’re called astrocytes cause they have this really beautiful star shaped structure in the brain. So if you, if you strain to look at them, you see these little stars kind of all throughout the nervous system and these are these astrocytes.
And specifically what I was looking at is the role of these astrocytes in neuro-plasticity. OK, so neuroplasticity is this big word, but all it really means is the ability of neurons to change their shape and to change their signalling strength in response to, for example, experiences. And so what I was studying is how these glial cells are shaping or instructing the level of plasticity that occurs in the brain at different periods in well, in this case, the fruit fly’s life, but hopefully this will extend into how this works in humans as well. </p>
<p>Dan: OK, so we’ve got neuroplasticity allows basically neurons to change. Why is that important? What does that mean for me?</p>
<p>Sarah: Neuroplasticity allows for you to learn and embrace new tasks. So you have probably heard the phrase “practice makes perfect”. So when we practice a certain task, for example, playing a piano or learning a new sport, this engages or turns on plasticity in the brain, and this allows those neurons to start changing and strengthening their connections so that you become a better player over time. And so plasticity is really important for us to form and maintain those connections in the brain that enable us to do different tasks.</p>
<p>Dan: Your work was looking at how astrocytes – those star-shaped cells – can turn off plasticity. So what do you mean turn that off? It sounds like I’d always want my plasticity on full crank, 100%, right?</p>
<p>Sarah: Yeah, that’s a great question. So we know that neuroplasticity is really, really strong in a child’s brain. So for example, I’m sure many of your listeners like me have tried to learn a new language at some point in their adult life and found it to be like just impossible, where children can pick up multiple languages really quickly. So what is the deal with that? </p>
<p>Well, in childhood, the brain is super plastic or malleable and that allows kids to learn new tasks and skills really quickly. But then at some point in our maturing brain, this plasticity starts to wane. And so the question is why? Why would we not want to be like super plastic all the time? Well, there’s some evidence that prolonged plasticity, beyond childhood, is linked or can contribute to neurological conditions where you see kind of the activity of neurons is not controlled well in the brain. So think of epilepsy or schizophrenia. And so there’s a certain point in our life where we want these neural connections to be solid. We want there to be a little bit of flexibility for learning and memory, but not so much dramatic plasticity that the connections are constantly rearranging.</p>
<p>Dan: OK, so we’ve got this need to shut down plasticity or control it or limit it in some way. Why fruit flies?</p>
<p>Sarah: Fruit flies are really an excellent model for neuroplasticity because while they’re simple, they have many of the same cell types, including astrocytes and neurons. And they have many of the same genes that are present in humans. And in fact, there have been six Nobel prizes awarded for research in flies that changed our understanding of how biology works in humans.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394317/original/file-20210409-13-1a039sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A colorful microscope image of a developing fruit fly brain." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394317/original/file-20210409-13-1a039sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394317/original/file-20210409-13-1a039sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=342&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394317/original/file-20210409-13-1a039sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=342&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394317/original/file-20210409-13-1a039sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=342&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394317/original/file-20210409-13-1a039sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394317/original/file-20210409-13-1a039sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394317/original/file-20210409-13-1a039sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this image showing a developing fruit fly brain on the right and the attached nerve cord on the left, the astrocytes are labeled in different colors showing their wide distribution among neurons.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sarah DeGenova Ackerman</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And so I wanted to use the fruit fly in order to identify different ways that the brain restricts plasticity to these earlier developmental stages or these young brains. And fly is a great model for that, because we have the ability to change the activity of neurons, in other words, to induce plasticity at different stages and see what happens under different manipulations.</p>
<p>And so what I found is that the neurons in the fruit fly brain are really plastic early in life as, as we know for humans as well, and then this plasticity wanes. But if I got rid of these astrocytes, these glial cells, these neurons maintain their plasticity much later in development.</p>
<p>Dan: This stuff could potentially have relevance to humans and people, and you know, potentially other animals too. But what are some of those potential applications? </p>
<p>Sarah: There are a lot, they’re all kind of a ways down the road, but in humans, like spinal cord injuries or neck injuries, for example, there’s very limited recovery for these patients because of failure to re-engage in the mature nervous system. So my goal is to use the fly to identify common and core principles that regulate plasticity so that we might take advantage of these pathways or try to find therapies or drugs that alter or work through these pathways to either increase or dial up plasticity or dial down plasticity whenever it’s needed. Or even, you know, age related, memory loss that doesn’t shoot all the way to dementia. All of these conditions are somehow influenced by plasticity mechanisms, just going awry, whether too much or too little or at the wrong time. And so if we can really understand the basic mechanisms that are shaping plasticity, this could become a way that we could really impact a lot of lives. </p>
<p>Dan: Awesome. Well, Sarah, thanks to you and to your undergrad for making a difference. </p>
<p>Sarah: Thank you. </p>
<p>Dan: You can read an article that Sarah Ackerman has written about her research on theconversation.com. We’ll put <a href="https://theconversation.com/astrocyte-cells-in-the-fruit-fly-brain-are-an-on-off-switch-that-controls-when-neurons-can-change-and-grow-158601">a link</a> in the show notes. </p>
<p>Gemma: To end this episode. We’ve got some reading recommendations from our colleague, Moina Spooner at The conversation in Nairobi, Kenya.</p>
<p>Moina: Hi, this is Moina Spooner from The Conversation, based in Kenya. We’ve had a couple of big stories in the East African region this week. The first is on Somalia, where there have been clashes between militia groups and soldiers of the federal government. Claire Elder, a lecturer from the London School of Economics and Political Science, explains how the current government’s decision on April 12 to seek a two-year extension has thrown Somalia’s fragile political process into disarray. With the situation now escalating, she argues that external mediation is needed as <a href="https://theconversation.com/somalia-toxic-elite-politics-and-the-need-for-cautious-external-mediation-159270">toxic elite politics take root</a> and the political window for a Somali-led process is closing.</p>
<p>Another big story in the region is Kenya’s announcement that it’s going to close the country’s two main refugee camps, Kakuma and Dadaab. This means that all the refugees will now need to be repatriated. It would affect over 400,000 people, most of whom are of Somali origin. Kenya is trying to legitimise this action by labelling the refugees as a threat to national security.</p>
<p>The pretext is that the camps are abetting terrorists, namely Al-Shabaab. Oscar Mwangi, an associate professor of political science from the National University of Lesotho, argues that in doing so, Kenya has <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-kenya-is-on-thin-ice-in-its-justification-for-sending-somali-refugees-back-home-159356">failed to comply with international law by compromising the refugees’ rights</a>. And that Kenya has also disregarded its commitments to international humanitarian obligations. That’s all for me for now. Take care and I hope you enjoy the reads.</p>
<p>Gemma: Moina Spooner there in Nairobi. That’s it for this week. Thanks to all the academics who’ve spoken to us for this episode. And to The Conversation editors Laura Hood, Steven Vass, Jane Wright, Moina Spooner and Stephen Khan for their help. And thanks to Alice Mason, Imriel Morgan and Sharai White for our social media promotion. </p>
<p>Dan: You can find us on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a>, on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/?hl=en">theconversationdotcom</a> or send us an email at podcast@theconversation.com. And if you want to learn more about any of the things we talked about on the show today, there are links to further reading in the shownotes, and you can also sign up for our <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter?utm_campaign=PodcastTCWeekly&utm_content=newsletter&utm_source=podcast">free daily email</a>. </p>
<p>Gemma: The Conversation Weekly is co-produced by Mend Mariwany and me, Gemma Ware, with sound design by Eloise Stevens. Our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. </p>
<p>Dan: And I’m Dan Merino. Thanks so much for listening everyone.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160042/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A transcript of episode 13 of The Conversation Weekly podcast, including new research on neuroplasticity in the brain.Gemma Ware, Head of AudioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1317952020-03-10T13:06:43Z2020-03-10T13:06:43ZUK born children of migrants ‘feel more discriminated against’ than parents<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319323/original/file-20200309-167285-an69h0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4800%2C2342&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/crowd-people-street-city-center-279379322">Dmitry Nikolaev/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As well as being illegal and unjust, discrimination can have a massively negative impact on people who experience it. It affects their <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24547896">life satisfaction</a>, sense of belonging and <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24547896">mental health</a>. </p>
<p>Migrants are one group that commonly faces discrimination. This can be due to having a foreign accent or being visibly different because of ethnicity or race. Foreign qualifications can also cause problems for migrants as many employers don’t recognise them as readily, so the approporiate job opportunities are often beyond reach. But <a href="https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migrants-and-discrimination-in-the-uk/">our recent analysis</a> has also shown that migrants and their descendants experience discrimination differently. </p>
<p>Our findings show that between 2016 and 2018, a third of adult children of migrants in the UK felt they belong to a <a href="https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migrants-and-discrimination-in-the-uk/">group that is discriminated against in British society</a>. This figure was higher for people whose parents had been born outside of the EU. </p>
<h2>Expectations of being equal</h2>
<p>The reasons why UK-born children of migrants are more likely than their parents to feel that people with their background face discrimination are complex. But in part it may be down to the fact that people who migrated to the UK compare their experience to life in their country of origin and feel that they have benefited from moving – even if they still face some disadvantages.</p>
<p>Children of migrants on the other hand, most of whom are born and have spent their entire lives in the UK, might have higher expectations of equal treatment compared to their migrant parents.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319324/original/file-20200309-57209-dkwz2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319324/original/file-20200309-57209-dkwz2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319324/original/file-20200309-57209-dkwz2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319324/original/file-20200309-57209-dkwz2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319324/original/file-20200309-57209-dkwz2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319324/original/file-20200309-57209-dkwz2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319324/original/file-20200309-57209-dkwz2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Second-generation migrants in Britain report more discrimination.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/large-group-people-going-by-bus-88940803">Gemenacom/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Our new briefing on <a href="https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migrants-and-discrimination-in-the-uk/">migrants and discrimination in the UK</a> also shows that migrants from countries outside the EU – most of whom are from South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa – are more likely to feel they are part of a discriminated group compared to European migrants, who are mostly white.</p>
<p>This echos <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-4446.12676">existing research</a> from the UK which shows that levels of discrimination faced by Caribbean, black African and Pakistani minorities are similar and have remained pretty constant during the last half century. </p>
<h2>Brexit and migration</h2>
<p>In the UK, migrants born in the EU have traditionally experienced lower levels of discrimination than non-white migrants from South Asia or Africa. But it seems as though this has changed since the Brexit referendum. </p>
<p>Different sources of data show that people born in the EU who are now living in the UK, feel they experienced higher levels of discrimination during 2016. This was especially the case among <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1710479?casa_token=aWBe5WyhYtoAAAAA%253AvDBq68WgaDk1z3oSrMxcfJBZjFpj16v6mVS28V9RfHHuBCp9bahZ1XIg0P-LbSA6UGrFqabDBjAYXg">Polish migrants</a>. </p>
<p>This is maybe not totally surprising though as <a href="https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/96/4/1649/4987933">prior research</a> shows how when politicians and the media have negative narratives about a particular group, the public’s attitudes towards that group tend to worsen – at least in the short term.</p>
<h2>Equality and the future</h2>
<p>The Race Relations Act of 1968 was <a href="https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-8360#fullreport">a ground-breaking piece of legislation when it was introduced</a> more than 50 years ago. It prohibited discrimination on grounds of race in housing, employment and public services for the first time. </p>
<p>The UK was one of the first countries in Europe to pass racial anti-discrimination legislation and still has one of the most favourable anti-discrimination policies in Europe, according to the <a href="http://www.mipex.eu/anti-discrimination">Migrant Integration Policy Index</a>. </p>
<p>Today, the UK is still one of the few countries in Europe collecting <a href="https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/">data on ethnicity</a> to monitor the situation and experiences of nonwhite British minorities in different spheres of society – such as at work, in education or within the judicial system. Nonetheless, as our findings show discrimination still feels like a reality for many migrants and nonwhite British minorities. </p>
<p>It’s difficult to predict how people’s perceptions of discrimination will change over the coming weeks, months and years. But if previous research is anything to go by, they will probably be affected by how much migrant-related issues are discussed in the media and in political debates – along with the framing used for these discussions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131795/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mariña Fernández-Reino does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Second-generation migrants in Britain report more discrimination.Mariña Fernández-Reino, Researcher, The Migration Observatory, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1212672019-07-31T14:31:01Z2019-07-31T14:31:01ZDominic Cummings: Boris Johnson’s new adviser will relish his controversial status<p>One of Boris Johnson’s first “controversial” decisions on becoming prime minister of the UK was to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jul/24/dominic-cummings-of-vote-leave-to-be-named-key-johnson-adviser">appoint Dominic Cummings as a senior political adviser</a>. An unfamiliar face outside of Westminster, Cummings is best known for his significant role as campaign director for Vote Leave – as portrayed in the film “<a href="https://www.channel4.com/programmes/brexit-the-uncivil-war">Brexit: The Uncivil War</a>”, where he was <a href="https://www.radiotimes.com/news/tv/2019-04-01/brexit-the-uncivil-war-cast/">played by Benedict Cumberbatch</a>. </p>
<p>Just a week after he was given his new job, footage emerged of Cummings <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jul/30/dominic-cummings-tories-do-not-care-about-poor-people-or-the-nhs">telling an audience</a> in 2017 that Tory MPs “don’t care about the poor or the NHS”. Meanwhile Nigel Farage, leader of the Brexit Party, has <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/dominic-cummings-can-t-be-trusted-at-no-10-says-nigel-farage-3pprxlwgk">said Cummings can’t be trusted</a> in his new role at 10 Downing Street.</p>
<p>Farage and Cummings are, of course, familiar with each other’s work, with both fighting (separately, but sometimes against each other) for the UK to leave the EU. And Cummings is no doubt confident in his own ability to get things done at his new office. Within the Vote Leave campaign, he was seen by many as the strategist extraordinaire. </p>
<p>And it was while appearing before a Treasury select committee to talk about Vote Leave that Cummings is supposed to have made one of his most profound and concerning statements: <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/20/accuracy-is-for-snake-oil-pussies-vote-leaves-campaign-director-defies-mps">“Accuracy is for snake-oil pussies”</a>. In other words, one might infer, accuracy is for “quacks”. It lacks importance, and is unnecessary.</p>
<p>Consider next the pledge on that famous <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/vote-leave-brexit-lies-eu-pay-money-remain-poll-boris-johnson-a8603646.html">big red Brexit bus</a> which toured the country ahead of the EU referendum – that £350m per week should be clawed back from Europe and handed over to the NHS. </p>
<p>While that amount equals (more or less) the gross <a href="https://theconversation.com/fact-check-how-much-does-the-uk-actually-pay-to-the-eu-58120">UK contribution to the EU</a>, it ignored any monies coming from the EU back to the UK. It was eye catching, effective and essentially not true.</p>
<p>In appointing Cummings to advise Boris Johnson – who <a href="https://theconversation.com/boris-johnson-lacks-character-competence-and-credibility-say-leadership-experts-120548">has a reputation</a> for playing fast and loose with the truth – there is a feeling among some that statements from the new prime minister’s office may sound more like propaganda than fact. </p>
<p>Cummings was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-47712040">found in contempt of parliament</a> earlier this year. The Digital Culture, Media and Sport select committee was investigating fake news in relation to the EU referendum campaign. It asked Cummings to give oral evidence to explain some of his emails. Cummings did not attend, and was found to be in contempt. According to Cummings, he offered to give evidence but was rebuffed.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-the-uncivil-war-what-it-told-us-and-what-it-didnt-109532">Brexit: The Uncivil War – what it told us, and what it didn't</a>
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<p>Elsewhere, he has been scathing of many politicians, on both sides of the Brexit divide, most notably his <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/david-davis-thick-as-mince-says-brexit-boss-dominic-cummings/">comments about former Brexit secretary David Davis</a> (“thick as mince, lazy as a toad and vain as Narcissus”), but also <a href="https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2019/03/the-erg-are-remains-useful-idiots/">of groups such as the European Reform Group</a> (“useful idiots for Remain”).</p>
<p>Cummings has also been highly critical of the UK civil service after working in the Department for Education for six years (as special advisor to Michael Gove). </p>
<p>In short, Cummings is highly critical of the whole Westminster-Whitehall structure – and those who work there. <a href="https://dominiccummings.com/2014/10/30/the-hollow-men-ii-some-reflections-on-westminster-and-whitehall-dysfunction/">He has written</a>:</p>
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<p>The processes for selecting, educating, and training those at the apex of politics are between inadequate and disastrous, and political institutions suffer problems that are very well known but are very hard to fix – there are entangled vicious circles that cause repeated predictable failure.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>According to Cummings, the whole system is not set up to cope with the pressures of the modern day, and nobody within the system is willing to address this. Cummings, on the other hand, has a plan.</p>
<h2>Radical overhaul?</h2>
<p>It involves a radical overhaul. The current system, in his eyes, involves political decision makers simply making the same mistakes over and over again, and not learning from them. </p>
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<p>The frustrations in seeing repeated mistakes, with a hugely overly bureaucratic structure that appeared more focused on process than developing and delivering policy, were apparently exposed to Cummings on his first day at the Department for Education. And what he believes are the levels of ineptitude within the civil service (or at least within the DfE) became more obvious to Cummings the longer he was in post.</p>
<p>Cummings <a href="https://dominiccummings.com/2014/10/30/the-hollow-men-ii-some-reflections-on-westminster-and-whitehall-dysfunction/">summed up his response</a> to this “dysfunction”:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Can we change course? There is a widespread befuddled defeatism that nothing much in Westminster can really change and most people inside the Whitehall system think major change is impossible even if it were necessary. This is wrong. Change is possible. </p>
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<p>He went on: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We do not have to live with the permanent omnishambles that we have become acclimatised to […] sometimes nothing happens in decades, and sometimes decades happen in weeks. Big changes are possible if people are prepared.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This, then, is Johnson’s new advisor in 10 Downing Street. An individual with a track record of successful manipulation, who is highly critical of the Whitehall-Westminster system and who has been found in contempt of parliament. </p>
<p>The former prime minister David Cameron once described Cummings as “a career psychopath”. But perhaps that was because Cameron enjoyed his position in the “permanent omnshishambles” of which Cummings was so contemptuous. </p>
<p>Now that unconventional career has brought Cummings a position at the top table of UK politics. It is an appointment widely acknowledged to have sent shivers down the spines of politicians and civil servants – which is no doubt the very reaction for which Cummings would have been hoping.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121267/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alistair Jones does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The man who led Vote Leave now has the ear of the UK’s prime minister.Alistair Jones, Associate Professor of Politics, De Montfort UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1201272019-07-12T10:06:28Z2019-07-12T10:06:28ZBrexit: it’s not just where Britain’s going that matters, but how it gets there<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/283834/original/file-20190712-173338-av9hmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=26%2C14%2C946%2C464&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">viksof/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>We’re talking a lot about Brexit in Britain. Whether it’s our hopes or – more likely – our frustrations, it’s the subject that we never quite seem to escape from.</p>
<p>But take a step back and think what those conversations focus on: outcomes. I’m guessing many people have a pretty good idea of what their family, friends and colleagues would like the end point of this process to be. It’s no coincidence that more people <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-identities-how-leave-versus-remain-replaced-conservative-versus-labour-affiliations-of-british-voters/">identify</a> as Leavers or Remainers than as members of political parties.</p>
<p>Probably much less clear is how the potential outcomes – leaving the EU without a deal, leaving with a deal or remaining – are going to come about. The referendum was an exercise in ends, not means. </p>
<p>The two campaigns fought for votes with sweeping promises, but no fixed single plan. The vote wasn’t like a general election, where the winners have to take office and make good on their manifesto. Instead, the incentive was for campaigners to say whatever would get people to send votes their way, and if they won then they’d decide what that meant.</p>
<p>That’s why most of the second half of 2016 was spent with politicians arguing that they knew what the people wanted from Brexit.</p>
<h2>Making it up as we go</h2>
<p>The referendum also failed to produce any consensus about what happened next: it was a decision that lacked a rationale and a roadmap. It’s one thing to say we want to take back control, but quite another to translate that into a practical course of action. And so we’ve had to make it up as we go along.</p>
<p>Of course, all politics is like this. The vagaries of life mean we’re never quite confronted with what we expected. But usually that happens within a fairly well-defined range of parameters, with a political system that can make improvised decisions on the basis of generally-agreed principles.</p>
<p>Brexit hasn’t fitted into that mould, for three reasons.</p>
<p>First, its scope is so broad that its implications touch on every area of our political, economic and social lives. Second, its novelty means that we lack useful benchmarks to judge our actions: in legal terms it might simply be leaving an international organisation, but it clearly goes far beyond that.</p>
<p>And third, the division that the referendum exposed and reinforced between different sections of British society have made it very hard to find common ground.</p>
<p>The upshot has been a growing willingness, from all sides, to do whatever it takes to secure the outcome they want. The UK has gone from being one of the more sedate political systems of the world to one where ever more creative takes on the constitutional and parliamentary procedure are being suggested. </p>
<p>Conservative leadership contender Boris Johnson has not ruled out <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-48936711">proroguing</a>, or shutting down, parliament in order to push through a no-deal Brexit. Meanwhile, the Conservative MP Dominic Grieve managed to get parliament to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-48930417">approve an amendment</a> to a piece of legislation regarding Northern Ireland, which could make shutting down parliament more difficult. And the former prime minister, <a href="https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/political-parties/conservative-party/news/105201/john-major-vows-take-boris-johnson-court-if">John Major, suggested he</a> may take a future Johnson government to court to prevent parliament being shut down. </p>
<h2>The means matter</h2>
<p>Brexit matters. The choice we eventually make will have profound implications for decades to come, both for the UK and for its place in the world. But that is precisely why it’s essential that the manner of taking that decision matters as much as the decision itself.</p>
<p>Already we see how distrust of the people and processes that have got us this far has poisoned our ability to progress. Whether you think campaigners broke the rules in the referendum or you think judges are enemies of the state or you feel the media is a cheerleader rather than a reporter of what’s happening, if we don’t trust the way we make the decisions, then we risk also losing trust in the decisions themselves.</p>
<p>All of which brings us to one of the bigger questions of politics: do the ends always justify the means?</p>
<p>History shows us that part of what makes a democracy work, and work in a sustainable way, is a consensus about rules. Constitutions embody and embed that consensus in a way that is different from other rules for precisely that reason. </p>
<p>But extraordinary exceptions have a habit of becoming the norm, as with the <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9780203997130">emergency powers</a> given to governments post 9/11; the revolution justifies the counter-revolution. We can disagree on what to do, but we need to agree on how we make a decision between the choices facing us – leaving with a deal, leaving with no deal or remaining – otherwise we risk damaging everything that follows.</p>
<p>Usually, this is the point where the author offers a solution, but you’ll not get that here. It’s not for me to tell you what to do, beyond sitting down together and working together to see where our common ground lies. And if we find that our existing political processes won’t work to resolve this – for example, a general election – then we need to agree on new ones that do.</p>
<p>So as politicians and the public alike work on their plans this summer, they might want to reflect on not the “what” of Brexit, but also the “how”. Maybe that might make some of those Brexit conversations a bit more productive and enlightening.</p>
<p><em>This article has been jointly published with The UK in a Changing Europe.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120127/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Usherwood receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council, as Deputy Director of the "UK in a Changing Europe" programme. He sits on the academic advisory board of Modern Europe. The views expressed in this article do not reflect those of the research councils.</span></em></p>The referendum was an exercise in ends, not means. But the way Britain deals with the result is crucial.Simon Usherwood, Reader in Politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1151762019-04-25T09:56:00Z2019-04-25T09:56:00ZThree lessons for leadership from the Brexit mess<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270787/original/file-20190424-121254-jmay7x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">David Cameron did not expect to lose the Brexit referendum.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Diana Vucane / Shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Remember David Cameron? He’s the prime minister who gambled his career – and the stability of his country – on the UK’s Brexit referendum. He unsuccessfully bet his job that he could persuade the UK to remain in the EU. Cameron has surely reflected long and hard on his role in the wave of uncertainty that has since engulfed the UK. His successor, Theresa May, is now struggling to lead the country through the Brexit process. </p>
<p>Their mistakes offer a number of lessons for would-be leaders. Not just political ones, but business leaders too. They can be summed up, thus: ignore your people at your peril. Consumed with hubris, Cameron assumed that the British electorate would vote in favour of remaining. He downplayed the role of emotions in a crucial vote and he took one chance after another while in power. May’s handling of Brexit has also been <a href="https://theconversation.com/theresa-mays-handling-of-brexit-is-a-classic-case-of-bad-leadership-108646">riddled with miscalculation</a>.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270781/original/file-20190424-121258-11t5bm0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270781/original/file-20190424-121258-11t5bm0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=573&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270781/original/file-20190424-121258-11t5bm0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=573&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270781/original/file-20190424-121258-11t5bm0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=573&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270781/original/file-20190424-121258-11t5bm0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270781/original/file-20190424-121258-11t5bm0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270781/original/file-20190424-121258-11t5bm0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">David Cameron.</span>
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<p>In May 2016, we started providing advisory to businesses on Brexit, and worked closely with more than 150 executives. Among them, some have thrived since the fateful June 23 vote. Despite the turmoil and the struggles of the political elites, we found that economic decision makers now realise three powerful and poignant lessons of Brexit leadership.</p>
<h2>1. Spend more time with customers</h2>
<p>London’s political elite invested in multiple pollsters, experts and statisticians to predict the outcome of the Brexit referendum. The day before Brits took to the ballot box, many polls prophesied a <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-poll-brexit-remain-vote-leave-live-latest-who-will-win-results-populus-a7097261.html">ten-point victory for the Remain campaign</a>. Mastermind of the Leave campaign, Dominic Cummings, on the other hand, simply went to the pub and spoke to everyday voters. Dozens of conversations later, he had the understanding and messaging that would see Vote Leave triumphant.</p>
<p>Majorities can be silent and invisible – Donald Trump’s presidential win in 2016 <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/03/pious-progressives-have-created-a-spiral-of-silence-which-could/">was also unexpected by many polls</a>. Voter preferences, like customer preferences, are often difficult to define. They struggle to articulate their real interests and, without clear information, emotional responses prevail. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B0777TZ2JZ/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1">Two separate studies</a> of 1,000 retail, tech, financial services and healthcare leaders around the globe confirm the value of customer research in understanding the business. This means that after absorbing the analytics, leaders still have to make the key judgement calls and not take the numbers completely at face value. They need to leave the office and gather the real, on-the-ground customer research to get a finer grained understanding of things.</p>
<h2>2. End complacency before it kills you</h2>
<p>David Cameron’s decision to call the Brexit referendum seemed more like an embarrassed answer to a child’s dare than a planned, strategic, historical step forward. The British government was arrogant and complacent, and as one consultant for the government put it to us: “Ministers really believed people would do everything their prime minister told them to.” From a mix of hubris and naivety, Cameron made strong assumptions about his people.</p>
<p>Instead, Brexiters used the referendum as a chance to “take control”. This was their campaign slogan and the referendum gave them space and an audience to express a voice of divergence. </p>
<p>Today, the best leaders are those that keep a finger on the pulse of the workforce. Cameron should have predicted that the consequence of giving the Brexiters legitimacy would be that he could lose control of his party. This would have ultimately helped him plan accordingly.</p>
<h2>3. Promote transparency</h2>
<p>Britain is in complete disarray over the course of Brexit. The country’s leaders seem to be grabbing for words and ideas ad hoc, with no concrete plan in place, and the original deadline for departing the EU has long gone. “It’s fair to say that Brexit has been characterised by panic,” business journalist and neuroscientist, Kirsten Levermore told us.</p>
<p>Without question, negotiating the Brexit deal is one of the greatest challenges a leader could imagine. Differences of opinion run deep and the political balance can shift at any moment, jeopardising months of effort. But, like all boards and business leaders facing great change, politicians must contain the panic of their peers and people, or risk figurative – or even literal – riots on the streets. </p>
<p>But Levermore added: “Silence is deafening – it is saying that leaders don’t know what is going on, or what they are going to do about it. It can be difficult for leaders to know what and how much to share in times of crisis … but the really important thing is that they say something to fill the void.” </p>
<p>In the context of Brexit, the public on both sides of the debate has been looking at their leaders with increasing defiance – while the government seems to lack a clear direction, and keeps its cards close to its chest, better communication on the path forward would help unite opinion around a common solution rather than division.</p>
<h2>A long road ahead</h2>
<p>The UK government still seems a long way away from a clear solution to Brexit. But there is much to learn from the current struggles, from the fundamental mistake of David Cameron to assume he would win the referendum and hold one without a proper plan in place, to the struggles of his successor Theresa May when it comes to finding a platform of agreement with her own members of parliament.</p>
<p>The Brexit negotiations have become a political game rather than an exercise of democracy. Business leaders, like political ones, when facing such a divisive situation, should consider going back to the drawing board – listening, taking stock and feeding back to their followers to keep them on board.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115176/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>They can be summed up, thus: ignore your people at your peril.Benjamin Laker, Professor of Leadership, Henley Business School, University of ReadingThomas Roulet, Senior Lecturer in Organisation Theory and Fellow in Sociology & Management, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1151872019-04-12T13:21:04Z2019-04-12T13:21:04ZBrexit: five essential reads to help you understand Britain’s relationship with the EU right now<p>Nearly three years after the British public voted to leave the European Union, it is no exaggeration to say that a solution is no closer to being found. Indeed, Brexit looks more difficult and perhaps more distant than ever.</p>
<p>How did one of the world’s oldest democracies and largest economies end up in this deadlock? It’s true that the current UK prime minister, Theresa May, has a lot to answer for – but Brexit is a much bigger tale than that. It is a product of British peculiarities grafted onto European politics. It’s a story that could really only happen on this odd archipelago. It’s a very British farce indeed.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>If, to the outside eye, the UK’s current behaviour seems counter-intuitive, in reality, as Christopher Fear describes in his history of Brexit, it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-road-to-brexit-how-did-the-uk-end-up-here-114661">ever thus</a>. When the project of European integration first kicked off on the continent in the 1950s, France and Germany led several other nations into projects to pool their industrial and economic resources. The UK refused to take part.</p>
<p>Swayed by notions of being the plucky island nation that saved Europe from fascism, and by (very) long tales of a “glorious” imperial past, the UK had an inbuilt exceptionalism right from the start. However, just ten short years later, the six nations that had started the European Union were recovering well from World War II while Britain lagged behind economically. At that time it had become the “sick man of europe” and, by the early 1960s, it wanted into the club.</p>
<p>Eventually becoming a member in 1973, the challenges membership brought for certain sections of British society were on display from the outset. Many on the right liked the economic elements of the project but feared social integration in Europe. On the left, some favoured international solidarity but were unenthusiastic about the economic ethos underpinning the European project. </p>
<p>These matters remain central to the Brexit muddle of 2019. </p>
<h2>The many trials of Theresa May</h2>
<p>Given the tensions endemic to Britain’s relationship with Europe, Brexit was always going to be a difficult job. But boy oh boy, if we wanted a lesson in how not to do it, then the hapless Theresa May has given us that.</p>
<p>At the very start of negotiations, she drew unrealistic red lines, setting the wrong tone with the EU and leaving her entirely at the mercy of hardline Brexit supporters in her party. Most importantly, these red lines left her making promises she couldn’t keep. As Matthew Flinders, director of the Sir Bernard Crick Centre for the Public Understanding of Politics, puts it, “<a href="https://theconversation.com/all-too-hard-understanding-brexit-theresa-may-and-the-british-humiliation-114644">her political antennae were broken</a>”. </p>
<p>And yet she has stuck ever more fervently to her position, to prove she was still fighting for the Brexit cause. Hence so many months of mantras, denial and repetition.</p>
<p>For anyone witnessing the sight John Bercow, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/19/world/europe/brexit-speaker-john-bercow.html">newly famous Speaker of the House of Commons</a>, desperately trying to maintain order as May battled with members of parliament, there is a salutatory lesson: as in life, as in politics – even for occupants of the highest offices in the land, blindly stomping your feet and demanding the impossible gets you nowhere. </p>
<h2>The possible trade deals</h2>
<p>Such an intransigent and intractable approach to the Brexit negotiations has led May and the whole political class to this point: unable to agree how to leave and, crucially, unable to agree what a future relationship between the UK and the EU would look like.</p>
<p>By now, the question at the centre of the matter is how the UK will operate economically in the region after leaving the EU. <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-options-for-brexit-trade-explained-114932">Maria Garcia</a> has set out the pros and cons of the five different options currently on the table. </p>
<p>But, it’s clear from these options that there is a problem. Each faces opposition on political grounds. As so much of the Brexit debate – on both the Remain and Leave sides – has shown, no one really had a problem with the UK’s current trade relationship with the EU. The debate around leaving revolved around emotional reasons: fears over lost imperial supremacy, over a fading national identity.</p>
<p>Now these emotional questions must somehow be answered with an economic model. One of the great ironies of the Brexit endgame is that the debate has been reduced to questions of trading relationships, when even the most ardent champions of free trade in the UK were happy with old relationship. If anything represents the madness of Brexit, it is the sight of politicians who campaigned for Brexit on the basis of sovereignty and “taking back control” now pushing for new economic relationships with the EU that actually cede control and sovereignty. </p>
<h2>What is the backstop?</h2>
<p>If the future trading relationship was an area never properly discussed in the EU referendum campaign, there was one other issue that was entirely neglected: <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-backstop-this-is-why-its-so-hard-to-talk-about-a-northern-ireland-deal-106182">Northern Ireland</a>. </p>
<p>Northern Ireland was a disputed territory, beset by what was essentially a civil war, known as “The Troubles”, for 30 years. One side wanted a unified island of Ireland, the other side to remain in the UK. Hostilities ceased in 1998 with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement.</p>
<p>That agreement stated that there can be no return of a border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Of course, after Brexit that border becomes the only land border between the UK (of which Northern Ireland is a part) and the EU (of which the Republic is a member).</p>
<p>An invisible border works while both sides are part of the same regulatory systems on trade but becomes impossible if checks have to be made, such as on goods coming into the UK from the EU, or if taxes need to be levied.</p>
<p>And since all of May’s proposals so far have involved having different regulatory systems, she has had to undertake many political contortions to try to solve the riddle. Cue the famed backstop. This fallback mechanism comes into play if the two sides fail to strike a future trade deal that avoids having to have a hard border. But it effectively means the UK would stay in the EU’s customs union, which is an unacceptable compromise for many. </p>
<p>Whatever the form, the border question remains dangerously unanswered. It is the primary sticking point for MPs from many different sides of the debate. A question for historians will be why no one thought in any detail about what Brexit would mean for Northern Ireland – one of the major challenges in modern British history – before the vote to leave.</p>
<h2>The delay</h2>
<p>We’ve just learned that Brexit is to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-extended-to-october-31-why-the-eu-chose-a-six-month-reprieve-for-its-awkward-partner-115186">delayed – potentially until October 31</a>. So what happens between now and the new deadline? Despite it being clear more than ever before that May and her Brexit project is an abject failure, she, as ever, vows to carry on.</p>
<p>That means she might continue to push for her deal to be approved, perhaps with some endorsement from Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour opposition. The two parties are now officially in talks to find a way forward.</p>
<p>However, May’s seeming inability to compromise over the past few years makes this unlikely. Some hope that a fresh referendum will be held on May’s deal, potentially with the option of remaining in the EU on the ballot. Others hope for an election, though it’s unclear whether that would provide a solution to the Brexit predicament. </p>
<p>Whatever scenario unfolds in the months ahead, the incredible thing to note is that all options are now very much on the table – including cancelling Brexit altogether. That might seem like a very peculiar outcome indeed to the 2016 vote to leave the European Union. But then, that vote itself, and the campaign to enact it, as our experts show, has been nothing if not peculiar.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115187/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andy Price does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Years after voting to leave the EU, the UK still has no clear plan of how to make Brexit work. These five articles chart the history of an intractable problem.Andy Price, Head of Politics, Sheffield Hallam UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1148682019-04-10T08:50:23Z2019-04-10T08:50:23ZBrexit: the differing versions of democracy deployed by both sides of Britain’s political impasse<p>Brexit is a deeply divisive issue. Even democracy itself turns out to be a source of disagreement. For some, democracy requires the UK to leave the EU quickly and by whatever means necessary to respect the result of the 2016 referendum. For others, democracy means a second referendum with the possibility of reversing the decision to leave.</p>
<p>How can the idea of democracy support two such seemingly contradictory conclusions? One body of expert knowledge that is particularly good at helping us to make sense of conundrums of this sort is democratic theory, a form of theory that seeks to both define democracy and evaluate actual democratic practices and institutions. </p>
<p>Democracy means “rule by the people”. But since the range of possible meanings that can be attributed to the terms “rule” and “people” are so numerous, democratic theory starts from the assumption that this basic definition does not take us very far.</p>
<p>Democracy means different things to different people and so the word has been attached to a range of different concepts and supporting theories. Liberal democracy, republican democracy, socialist democracy, participatory democracy and deliberative democracy are perhaps some of the more familiar terms.</p>
<p>The fact that there are so many different theories is a reminder that the meaning of democracy is not settled and that actual democracies are a work in progress. But it becomes a problem when people who use the term democracy to defend their views are either unable or unwilling to explain what they mean by it. Which brings us back to Brexit.</p>
<h2>Liberal democracy</h2>
<p>Often those who are pro-Brexit claim that a second referendum would <a href="http://commentcentral.co.uk/the-fallacy-of-a-second-referendum/">undermine people’s trust</a> in democracy. Presumably, those who hold this view believe that a second referendum would represent a departure from “rule by the people”. Yet those calling for a second referendum argue that if parliament were to decide that a second referendum is required, then this wouldn’t represent a departure from democracy <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/brexit-vote-theresa-may-ed-davey-confidence-final-say-people-vote-a8729356.html">since parliament is sovereign</a>. </p>
<p>What’s key here is understanding what kind of democracy each side of the debate believes it is upholding. </p>
<p>Presumably, for those arguing that the 2016 referendum must be respected at all costs, democracy means that if I roll the dice and win, I cannot be compelled to role the dice again. For the sake of argument, let us suppose this to be based on <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=GxjdOk-ZeccC&pg=PR7&lpg=PR7&dq=Is+Democracy+Possible+Here?+chapter+5&source=bl&ots=a5lngTb49L&sig=ACfU3U0B059ySnqzwwv-ofA1qyF-gmiJZA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjc89OL9MDhAhXbVBUIHZveArwQ6AEwBXoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=Is%20Democracy%20Possible%20Here%3F%20chapter%205&f=false">liberal democratic theory</a>. </p>
<p>While liberal theories come in different forms, they normally insist that individuals and their rights are what matter most. As long as we act within our rights, government is duty bound not to try to tell us what to think. Each of us has a right to form a view about Brexit. It follows that government must respect those views without further question – its sole job is to aggregate those views into a collectively binding decision. And just as it is not the government’s place to tell us what to think, it is not its place to require us to reconsider our earlier decisions. </p>
<h2>Deliberative democracy</h2>
<p>So what theory of democracy might be called upon to support those who claim that a second referendum should be welcomed? One obvious candidate is <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Why_Deliberative_Democracy.html?id=1qaOH4GWG8cC">deliberative democracy</a>. On a deliberative view, political decisions ought to be decided on their merits. Of course, people are still entitled to their views. But what they cannot do is simply impose those views on others. Since political decisions are collectively binding they should be mutually justifiable. People should give reasons for their views but should be equally willing to listen to what others have to say. </p>
<p>In the ideal case, the result is a consensus. However, since in reality consensus is very hard to reach – time is often short, evidence tends to be incomplete, and risks and benefits can be highly uncertain – decisions will typically need to be treated as provisional. In other words, an initial decision can always be revisited. On a deliberative view, therefore, a second referendum may actually be required now amid the Brexit stalemate. Short of a consensus, people should continue to test their views and in principle be prepared to change them.</p>
<p>The upshot, therefore, is that different democratic theories are likely to give different answers to the same question. Even so, it’s surely better to know what we’re arguing over when we disagree about democracy than to find ourselves at odds without ever really understanding why. </p>
<p>Democratic theory is not easy. But it is parliamentarians’ responsibility to “do” democratic theory on our behalf – and be clearly seen to do so. Unfortunately, all too many of them seem ill-equipped or unwilling. The former might be forgiven, the latter should never be.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114868/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian O'Flynn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What sort of democracy is now required to break the Brexit deadlock?Ian O'Flynn, Senior Lecturer in Political Theory, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1146612019-04-04T12:51:55Z2019-04-04T12:51:55ZThe road to Brexit: how did the UK end up here?<p>Britons are typically a polite bunch. They’re fearful of giving offence and traditionally slow to take it. But the project of withdrawing from the European Union (Brexit) has got more people shouting their opinions and finding people to blame than anything anyone can remember.</p>
<p>The prime minister and her government are weak, and both parliament and electorate are divided. The referendum was in 2016 but the country still doesn’t know when it is leaving the EU – or even if it is leaving at all. How did it all come to this? The only adequate answer is very long and very complex. But there are certain standout moments in the UK’s relationship with the EU that have shaped the story.</p>
<h2>Early difficulties</h2>
<p>One is the UK’s troubled quest to join the European Communities (EC) in the first place. Its first two attempts were <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-42165383">vetoed by the French</a>, but Britain was finally admitted in 1973 – without a referendum.</p>
<p>The Labour party sought to exploit ongoing unease by promising a public vote on whether to stay in the EC if it were to win the October 1974 general election, though the party itself was split on the issue. Labour did indeed win the election, and the following year the pro-European “Yes” campaign won the referendum with 67% of the vote, on a 65% turnout. This seemed to demonstrate that referendums on Europe could win elections and <a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-for-david-cameron-from-the-european-referendum-of-1975-42365">resolve party in-fighting</a>.</p>
<p>The following decade saw the emergence of two explicitly distinct visions for Europe. On one side, that of the EC, and, on the other, that of the iconic British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher. The EC sought to centralise ever more political power and economic regulation in its own institutions. Thatcher recognised the economic convenience of the Common Market, but grew ever more suspicious of the programme of political union.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirigisme">dirigisme</a> she had spent much of her career rolling back in the UK could be reimposed across the entire EC by relatively new and unaccountable institutions. In her <a href="https://youtu.be/D_XsSnivgNg">“Bruges speech”</a> in 1988, and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-27053536/euro-moments-thatcher-says-no-no-no-to-europe">in the House of Commons in 1990</a>, Thatcher signalled her divergence from the project of ever closer union.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Thatcher takes on Europe.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Conservatives lost power to Labour in 1997. But while Britain remained a member of the bloc, many Conservative MPs maintained Thatcher’s views on Europe.</p>
<h2>Eastward expansion, westward migration</h2>
<p>From 2004 to 2007 the EU expanded to encompass former Communist states including Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. The Labour government of the time (assuming that other member states would do the same) chose not to impose temporary travel restrictions on migrants from the new territories. It forecast only 5,000 to 13,000 arrivals. In fact, 129,000 people came in the first two years (2004-05).</p>
<p>To many Britons, it appeared not only that the government had lost control of immigration, but that no British government could ever regain control again while the UK was under the EU’s freedom of movement laws. Euroscepticism gained new public appeal from the recognition that continuously rising immigration would have implications for infrastructure, housing, public services and welfare, social relations and the job market. Such concerns later sharpened in view of the European migrant crisis.</p>
<p>While the nation’s main political parties had avoided the issue of immigration, the UK Independence Party (UKIP), led by plain-speaking Nigel Farage and <a href="https://theconversation.com/pints-and-pratfalls-for-ukip-all-publicity-is-good-publicity-38885">devoted above all to taking the UK out of the EU</a>, filled the vacuum. Farage reassured voters that it was neither racist nor xenophobic to want to see immigration controlled. His party’s growing popularity seemed to threaten the electoral hopes of both main parties, but especially those of the Conservatives.</p>
<h2>The ‘once-in-a-lifetime’ referendum</h2>
<p>The most momentous European policy call of any prime minister since 1973 was David Cameron’s decision to offer an in/out referendum on EU membership in his <a href="https://theconversation.com/manifesto-check-the-conservatives-take-a-combative-approach-to-the-eu-40206">2015 general election campaign</a>. Some have blamed this decision, and therefore Cameron personally, for every twist and turn of the subsequent Brexit process. Some have even painted the whole affair as nothing but the explosion of Conservative party in-fighting. But such explanations overlook the role of 17.4m Leave voters, and the widespread assumption that Leave would not win.</p>
<p>By 2015 Cameron was under pressure to recover those traditional working-class voters who identified more with UKIP than with Cameron’s brand of cosmopolitan social liberalism. UKIP’s growing success in European elections had shown that eurosceptic votes were out there to be won. A promised referendum could win them back, and the ensuing Remain victory would contain Conservative eurosceptic MPs for a generation. For Cameron’s team, the risk of holding a vote was hard to gauge, but the political strategy seemed strong.</p>
<p>On referendum day, more people turned out than have ever voted for anything in the UK, delivering a 52% to 48% result in favour of leaving the EU. <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-resignation-why-british-pm-david-cameron-had-to-go-61594">The next day Cameron announced his intention to resign</a>.</p>
<h2>Enter Theresa May</h2>
<p>In what followed, the home secretary Theresa May emerged as Cameron’s successor. Though herself a cautious Remainer, May wanted to be the prime minister who would finally satisfy Britain’s long-running suspicion of European political unification and more recent anxieties about the freedom of movement. She saw that the UK could leave the single market and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice while retaining the benefits of other more peripheral EU programmes. Many eurosceptics also pointed to growing economic activity beyond Europe that EU rules prevented British business from exploiting fully.</p>
<p>May had inherited from Cameron a majority in the House of Commons, but a slim one. Delivering her vision of Brexit against strong opposition in the country and in parliament would be much easier with a larger majority of Conservative MPs. With this in mind, and Labour performing poorly in opinion polls, May called a snap election for June 2017. But although she attracted the largest number of votes for the Conservatives since 1992, Labour also did much better than expected. May’s plan had backfired. She lost her majority, alienated many Conservative MPs, and weakened her government’s power in parliament.</p>
<h2>Article 50 and the rules of engagement</h2>
<p>On March 29 2017, May formally announced the UK’s intention to leave the EU. <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-article-50-the-law-that-governs-exiting-the-eu-and-how-does-it-work-60262">Article 50</a> of the Treaty on European Union states that once this happens, there will be two years during which the terms of withdrawal will be agreed. Then, only once the member state is outside of the EU, the negotiations for a future relationship can begin (the EU is not allowed to negotiate “with itself”).</p>
<p>These rules are not accidental. They are supposed to prevent member states from using false notification of withdrawal as political leverage in internal disputes. But these rules also give the EU the stronger negotiating position, making any secession very unattractive. The EU cannot be forced to relinquish (or to retain) any of its existing powers against its own will, unless no agreement is reached. Neither can it be forced to discuss the terms of the future relationship until this first stage is complete.</p>
<p>This is what has given rise to disagreements over the open and <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-why-was-the-irish-border-backstop-so-crucial-to-brexit-deal-defeat-113398">practically invisible land border</a> between Northern Ireland (which is an integral part of the UK) and the Republic of Ireland (which is not, but is in the EU).</p>
<p>The terms of the 1998 peace deal that ended the 30-year armed conflict between British and Irish Republican groups require that the border remains open. But if Northern Ireland leaves the EU customs union with the rest of the UK, customs checks may be needed, perhaps on the border. The terms of the future relationship between the UK and the EU might have enabled (and still might enable) the border to remain open. But the EU’s rules do not permit the future relationship to be discussed until the withdrawal is agreed first.</p>
<h2>The detested deal</h2>
<p>The UK and the EU agreed the terms of withdrawal, and published the details in November 2018. The agreement was met with instant criticism, including from the Brexit minister, who had not been privy to some major decisions. So far, it has been defeated three times in parliament.</p>
<p>Some MPs are blocking the agreement because they hope that its failure will lead to the abandonment of the Brexit project altogether. Others, notably the Conservatives’ most eurosceptic MPs, oppose it because it surrenders too much power to the EU, and weakens the UK’s position for negotiations on the future relationship.</p>
<p>Crucially, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) also opposes the withdrawal agreement, on account of the “<a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-why-was-the-irish-border-backstop-so-crucial-to-brexit-deal-defeat-113398">backstop</a>” condition that it proposes for maintaining an open border with the Republic of Ireland. The proposal is that Northern Ireland will remain in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-with-brie-common-market-2-0-proposal-explained-through-the-import-and-export-of-cheese-114330">customs union</a> with the Republic of Ireland, and therefore with the EU.</p>
<p>This arrangement would not (necessarily) apply to any other part of the UK, only Northern Ireland, and would continue to apply if the rest of the UK does not later establish the sort of relationship with the EU that would allow the border to remain open. This proposed regulatory difference between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK is unacceptable to the DUP, which is strongly protective of Northern Ireland’s union with Great Britain.</p>
<p>The DUP fears that the “backstop” arrangement loosens Northern Ireland’s ties with the rest of the UK, and strengthens the claims of Irish Republicans to sovereignty over Northern Ireland. And because May still needs the support of the DUP’s ten MPs to <a href="https://theconversation.com/conservatives-strike-deal-with-the-dup-experts-react-80101">sustain her minority government</a>, it has been impossible for her to ignore their opposition.</p>
<p>Brexit was always going to be complicated, since the UK had spent 40 years entangling itself with the growing political, legal, and economic institutions of the EU – and especially complicated given that the majority of politicians (including the prime minister) actually voted to Remain.</p>
<p>But many of the particular frustrations could not have been foreseen. May’s government has been unable to deliver any kind of Brexit largely because of the unique parliamentary arithmetic produced by the 2017 general election. Labour has, for a long time, maintained a strategically ambiguous position on Brexit, preferring to point to mishandling and calling for another election, but it has failed to secure one. In any case, it’s unclear who will win the general election when it eventually comes. But voters will certainly have a lot to think about.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114661/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Fear does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s easy, now, to think of this as Theresa May’s story – but Thatcher, Blair and Cameron all played their part.Christopher Fear, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of HullLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1146442019-04-03T11:00:57Z2019-04-03T11:00:57ZAll too hard: understanding Brexit, Theresa May and the British humiliation<p>In a <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/brexit-90-say-handling-of-negotiations-is-national-humiliation-sky-data-poll-11670995">recent poll</a>, 90% of the British public agreed that the way Brexit negotiations were being handled was a “national humiliation”. A lot of people have described the current situation as a constitutional crisis but they are wrong: the word “crisis” is not strong enough to capture the gravity of the situation. What’s being played out is the political equivalent of the Game of Thrones (or <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/game-of-unknowns-what-to-expect-from-this-historic-week-in-westminster-a4013261.html">“Game of Unknowns”</a> as the London Evening Standard labelled it recently). There’s fantasy, despair, intrigue, betrayal and the likelihood that all the leading characters are going to suffer horrible fates. </p>
<p>In fairness, if blame and ridicule is to be allotted for this sorry state of affairs, then it should really go to <a href="https://theconversation.com/theresa-may-the-worst-prime-minister-ever-david-cameron-got-britain-into-this-mess-109988">David Cameron</a>, the prime minister who led the UK into its Brexit referendum and then promptly exited once the result was returned. Never before has a prime minister cut and run to leave their successor with such a total and utter mess.</p>
<p>But life isn’t fair and Cameron is no longer the lead character in this drama. That unfortunate role is now played by Theresa May. Despite Cameron’s actions, she is the one who is most likely to go down as the worst prime minister in British political history. That is, of course, unless she can suddenly pull the biggest rabbit that anyone has ever seen out of her hat. Based on her premiership so far, that is clearly not going to happen. Period.</p>
<p>So how did May manage to dig herself into such a tight and apparently inescapable hole?</p>
<p>The answers to this question are as numerous as they are interwoven but all combine to create a tragicomedy of truly epic proportions. This is a prime minister who just can’t stop digging. </p>
<p>Like Frank Sinatra, she’ll always be able to say “I did it my way” but looking back it seems she made a series of mistakes. </p>
<p>The first mistake was that when faced with the needs of a divided nation and the needs of a party that has always been split over Europe, she put her party first. Although understandable, the problem with this strategy was that the distance between the hard-right anti-Europeans, at one extreme, and the softer core of the party (including Remainers), was always going to be too wide for any policy position or proposal to span.</p>
<p>The second mistake was that when faced with this dilemma she attempted to placate the right of her party. That immediately alienated almost everyone else. At the time she was at least cushioned by a small but relatively stable majority in the House of Commons (of 17 seats) but she made the surprise decision to call a snap election in June 2017. This may well be remembered as the ultimate folly. She asked the public for a mandate to deliver a <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-whats-the-difference-between-hard-and-soft-brexit-66524">hard Brexit</a> and they <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-election-hung-parliament-casts-doubt-over-theresa-mays-future-79169">simply did not give it to her</a>. In the blink of a political eye she went from a slim majority to a minority government, propped up with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-price-tag-of-a-uk-government-bargaining-bungs-and-a-billion-in-the-bank-80158">costly support</a> of Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party. No clear mandate, no clear majority, authority badly weakened. </p>
<p>Looking back, the morning after that election was the moment to reassess and change tack towards a softer Brexit. The fact that May never took that option reveals a deeper flaw – her political antennae were broken. The description of her as a “<a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/life/why-being-called-a-bloody-difficult-woman-is-the-ultimate-compli/">bloody difficult woman</a>” had once been viewed as a positive trait (it cast has as dogged, committed, relentless and the rest) but over time it morphed into her Achilles heel. She was engaging in a dangerous game of political brinkmanship with both the European Union and the House of Commons. </p>
<p>As Brexit day got closer, so her mantra of “my deal or no deal” simply got louder. I simply don’t think she ever understood how European politics operates – she seemed genuinely shocked and puzzled when the European Union refused to accede to her demands and just kept marching forward gripped by a peculiar strain of that most dangerous political malady: hubris syndrome – an excessive confidence in a specific vision or policy, contempt for alternative advice, disconnection from day-to-day reality.</p>
<p>May has not been outmanoeuvred by the European Union. It’s closer to the truth to say that the 27 European partners have simply stood together with a mixture of befuddlement and surprise at the UK’s implosion. Let’s not kid ourselves that Europe is to blame for the UK’s situation. May made a conscious decision to “go hard” in an attempt to hold her party together and it is this that has brought the system to its knees. </p>
<p>Now, years after the referendum and with the originally planned Brexit day of March 29, 2019 missed, May is exhausted – physically and emotionally. How she copes with the burden of office and keeps going (head down, carry-on-regardless, battle on, stiff upper lip) is beyond me but the cracks are showing. Her <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-47636011">bizarre attack</a> on parliament at prime minister’s questions a few weeks ago – ironically for MPs daring to block Brexit – may have united the House of Commons against her, but it was also a rare glimpse of May the person struggling under pressure. </p>
<p>She has no magic wand to wave. There is no Executive Order she can sign to end the impasse. The United Kingdom remains a parliamentary state and so if a prime minister cannot control parliament they are in office but not in power. And that is where Theresa Mary May finds herself at the moment. If promising to step down could not persuade enough of her own MPs to support her was not enough of a humiliation, the fact that parliament has effectively seized control of the agenda must be the ultimate disgrace for any prime minister. </p>
<p>She just went too hard.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114644/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Flinders does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>One wrong turn after another has left the British prime minister cornered.Matthew Flinders, Founding Director of the Sir Bernard Crick Centre for the Public Understanding of Politics, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1144632019-04-01T12:27:32Z2019-04-01T12:27:32ZBrexit is not just Theresa May’s disaster – Britain’s whole political class has failed a nation<p>For all the <a href="https://theconversation.com/theresa-may-loses-another-brexit-vote-heres-why-april-12-is-now-the-key-date-to-watch-114543">complexity</a> that surrounds how (and, crucially, if) the UK leaves the European Union, the story of how it got into its current situation is actually incredibly simple. The Brexit that Prime Minister Theresa May has tried to engineer, a product of the internal tensions of her own party, was doomed from the start.</p>
<p>Coming to power as she did in the aftermath of the referendum, May made the one decision from which all her other missteps of the last few years would stem: she chose to represent one side, and one side only of the Brexit debate, and used this as the guiding star for her entire approach to Brexit.</p>
<p>From the moment she took office, she drew the reddest of red lines. At her Conservative Party conference speech in 2016, she introduced the mantras that would come to define her. We heard that <a href="https://theconversation.com/so-what-does-brexit-mean-64980">“Brexit means Brexit”</a>, that Britain would have a bright future as a sovereign nation outside of the EU.</p>
<p>A few months later at <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-read-theresa-mays-brexit-speech-71359">Lancaster House</a>, she told the country she aimed to end the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in the UK. That essentially meant committing to leaving the single market and the customs union. Across these speeches she also introduced into the political lexicon the phrase that has haunted most politicians since – that the “losers” of the 2016 referendum must respect the result as the “will of the people”.</p>
<p>Later still, as prime minister, May called a snap election in the name of helping her deliver Brexit. She openly dismissed anyone opposing Brexit – which at the very least meant the 16.5m who had voted remain – as <a href="https://theconversation.com/just-who-exactly-is-playing-games-theresa-may-and-political-opportunism-76418">“playing games with politics”</a>.</p>
<p>In hock to the hardline Brexiteers within her own party, May pushed a for a version of Brexit that would make this small group of around 100 or so individuals happy, regardless of what millions out in the country thought.</p>
<p>The impact of this approach should not be underestimated. It not only polarised the national debate, entrenching the fissures brought forth by the referendum, but it bound May to an approach to Brexit negotiations that rendered her deal dead on arrival. Her commitment to essentially a pure Brexit meant a border between the UK and the EU in Ireland, or a softening of the very parameters she had staked her entire project on. It’s not hard to see how this would end.</p>
<h2>Failings across the board</h2>
<p>May’s own mishandling of the entire project should form the centre of any analysis of how the UK got where it is now. However, she had many handmaidens helping her along the way.</p>
<p>Indeed, almost all MPs were blindsided by the result of the referendum. They were then rapidly cowed into submission by the “will of the people” mantra. The overwhelming parliamentary support for <a href="https://theconversation.com/article-50-triggered-heres-what-happens-now-74436">triggering Article 50</a> in February 2017 is a great example of this. </p>
<p>But there are individual MPs, and smaller groupings, who would help dye May’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-and-the-sin-of-originalism-the-past-should-not-define-the-future-81860">red lines</a> even redder. Of course, the European Research Group (ERG) has been key. Vocal ideologues like Iain Duncan Smith and Jacob Rees Mogg have kept the pressure up, hoping for a hard Brexit. For all their protestations, such a plan has never come close to carrying majority support in parliament. </p>
<p>In addition to the ERG, there are individual politicians who appear to view the whole exercise as one, great political game. Boris Johnson is the example par excellence. He amends his position on May’s deal according only to how it seems to apparently benefit his own leadership aspirations. And Nigel Farage – the most arch of the arch Brexiteers, who played a major role in the Brexit campaign, even if not an official one – continues to make great personal headway out of the whole farrago. He has radio shows, TV appearances, transport in <a href="https://www.indy100.com/article/nigel-farage-channel-4-news-private-plane-interview-strasbourg-watch-video-8731276">private jets</a>. He has most recently even been seen enjoying <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/nigel-farage-and-jeanclaude-juncker-pictured-arm-wrestling-ahead-of-brexit-debate-a4101991.html">jolly japes</a> with his supposed enemies in the EU.</p>
<p>But perhaps the greatest helping hand May has had in limping towards the sad end of her Brexit project has come from the opposition. Blindsided by the fact that many of their constituencies voted Leave, and led by a man who is historically a eurosceptic, Labour has failed throughout the past two years to do the one thing the House of Commons is built to engender. Labour’s approach has been constructive ambiguity. </p>
<p>Though this may now finally be shifting at the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/mar/30/tom-watson-labour-must-back-another-referendum-to-win-elections">eleventh hour</a>, for nearly three years, Labour has neither come out against May’s Brexit or Brexit in general out of fear of its Leave constituents. It has therefore failed to challenge the government on its legislative programme. It has robbed the country of the one thing it needed more than ever in face of a minority government that wasn’t listening – strong and clear opposition.</p>
<p>None of the above is particularly new, or hidden, or opaque: it is there in the historical record, for all of us to see. And it must be seen: to move past the unparalleled failure of May’s Brexit, the UK needs to learn – and quickly – from the woeful mistakes of a woefully unprepared political class.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114463/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andy Price does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The prime minister will be the key protagonist in Brexit the movie, but there are parts for everyone.Andy Price, Head of Politics, Sheffield Hallam UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1139662019-03-20T17:08:20Z2019-03-20T17:08:20ZTheresa May requests short Brexit extension: how to understand this reckless move<p>Before the October 1964 general election, Harold Wilson was reported to have stated “<a href="https://www.parliament.uk/about/art-in-parliament/online-exhibitions/parliamentarians/harold-wilson/image-1/">a week is a long time in politics</a>”.</p>
<p>Never has that maxim been truer than in relation to the politics of Brexit and the publication of prime minister Theresa May’s letter to Donald Tusk, president of the European Council, <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/787434/PM_to_President_of_the_European_Council.pdf">requesting an extension</a> to the Article 50 period until June 30 2019. </p>
<p>Less than a week earlier, a day after MPs had for a second time rejected May’s European Union withdrawal deal by a thumping majority of 149, her own de facto deputy prime minister David Lidington had <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2019-03-14/debates/74319E9E-D222-474C-8182-34997A16C472/UK%25E2%2580%2599SWithdrawalFromTheEuropeanUnion">told the House of Commons</a> that the government was opposed to seeking a short extension rather than a long one, <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2019-03-14/debates/74319E9E-D222-474C-8182-34997A16C472/UK%E2%80%99SWithdrawalFromTheEuropeanUnion">stating:</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In the absence of a deal, seeking such a short and, critically, one-off extension would be downright reckless and completely at odds with the position that this House adopted only last night, making a no-deal scenario far more, rather than less, likely. Not only that, but from everything we have heard from the EU, both in public and in private, it is a proposal it would not accept.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Less than a week later, without parliamentary support for her deal, May has sought that very short, one-off and “downright reckless” extension, which is completely at odds with the House of Commons’ position.</p>
<p>A number of important consequences are likely to follow on from May’s actions on what may become known as her “Reckless Wednesday”.</p>
<p>Her request for a short extension is, for a start, unlikely to be accepted by all 27 European Union member states without more concessions from the UK. Upon receiving May’s letter, Tusk said the extension would be possible if MPs approved her deal first. </p>
<p>The EU’s chief negotiator Michel Barnier had previously reiterated that the EU27 would only countenance such an extension if it received “a concrete plan from the UK” which increased the chances of ratification of the withdrawal agreement, or if the UK requested more time to rework the non-binding <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-19-1758_en.htm">political declaration</a> setting out the rough plan for the future relationship between the UK and EU. </p>
<p>May’s request letter has not set out a persuasive “concrete plan”. She cannot guarantee that any third meaningful vote on her EU Withdrawal deal will see her deal passed by MPs. She cannot even guarantee, at this stage, that a third vote will happen – given that the speaker of the House of Commons has warned that she cannot ask MPs to vote again on exactly the same proposal. In her letter, May merely states that it remains her intention to put the deal to the house for a third vote, without saying how that is to come about.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1108370594809212928"}"></div></p>
<p>Nor has May requested more time to rework the political declaration. She has instead requested that the European Council approve the supplementary documents to the withdrawal agreement and political declaration <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/787434/PM_to_President_of_the_European_Council.pdf">agreed</a> with Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission – precisely the deal rejected by the House of Commons.</p>
<h2>Was this a resignation letter?</h2>
<p>What’s more, by ruling out a much longer extension, May has increased the odds of a no-deal Brexit. A longer extension might have enabled a clear plan to be implemented to enable cross-party support to be built for an alternative to her own withdrawal agreement. That seems unlikely in the shorter timeframe. </p>
<p>With that longer extension and threat to Brexit now explicitly ruled out by May, many of the hardcore of European Research Group Conservative MPs will feel that a further defeat for the government in any third vote will increase the likelihood of their preferred no-deal scenario. It will also have the bonus effect of ridding the Conservative Party of a leader and prime minister they have openly opposed, but failed to unseat in last December’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/theresa-may-survives-confidence-vote-but-her-brexit-deal-is-still-in-deep-trouble-108728">vote of no confidence</a>.</p>
<p>In effect, May has set out the timetable and personal terms for her own resignation and departure as prime minister. If, as seems probable, the House of Commons rejects her EU withdrawal deal for an historic third (and likely final) time – so that Tusk cannot agree to a short extension – and then votes to seek an extension from the European Union beyond June 30, in order to allow sufficient time to negotiate an alternative Brexit or to hold a general election or further referendum, May will have little choice but to resign.</p>
<p>In the foreword to her party’s 2017 <a href="https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto">election manifesto</a>, May stated: “Brexit will define us: our place in the world, our economic security and our future prosperity.”</p>
<p>Rarely were truer words spoken. Brexit has defined May’s premiership. It has been a shambles from first to last. It has put at risk the UK’s place in the world, and compromised its economic security and future prosperity. It was for precisely those reasons that, on April 25 2016, May herself had <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretarys-speech-on-the-uk-eu-and-our-place-in-the-world">advocated</a> the UK remaining in the EU.</p>
<p>Article 50 was triggered by May without a concrete plan for its delivery which could command the support of her own MPs, let alone a majority of the House of Commons. Now, on her own “Reckless Wednesday”, May has sought an extension to Article 50, again without a concrete plan which can command the support of her own party or the House of Commons. By her own hand, May has written her own political obituary as prime minister.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113966/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Just a week after her government said seeking a short extension would be a wrong move, the prime minister has folded.Simon Lee, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of HullLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1136072019-03-14T19:12:23Z2019-03-14T19:12:23ZUK to seek Brexit delay: what you need to know about the latest parliamentary vote<p>The House of Commons has voted to delay Brexit beyond March 29, sending Theresa May to Brussels to ask for more time. But MPs voted against a series of amendments that would have translated into more specific demands on timing. </p>
<p>The government motion referred to two kinds of extension. The first would come into play if MPs vote to accept May’s deal. It would give the government up until June 30 to finalise its plans. The second, longer period comes into play if MPs continue to oppose May’s deal. There is no timeframe specified for this but the motion commits the government to returning to Brussels to ask for more time. It also makes it clear that this will probably mean that the EU would “require a clear purpose for any extension” and that the UK would have to take part in European elections being held in May. </p>
<p>As an indication of where MPs’ preferences lie, a vote on permitting an extension only until the end of June was defeated by three votes.</p>
<p>In the end, parliament voted to leave the government in charge of deciding how to end the current stalemate. But the timekeeper for this process is the EU, not the House of Commons. The session was a reminder that taking back control is more a seductive aspiration than a realisable objective.</p>
<p>The day before this latest vote, there was a moment when Michael Gove misspoke in parliament. Before rapidly correcting himself, he declared that “the House voted to give the people of this country a choice as to whether we were to remain in the European Union and leave it”. Ironically, this slip of the tongue captures the contradictions of how MPs approach Brexit, as revealed in parliament this week.</p>
<p>They want it both ways: they want to avoid leaving the EU without a deal but they have <a href="https://theconversation.com/theresa-may-loses-another-brexit-vote-is-it-time-she-just-gave-up-113294">twice rejected</a> the only deal on offer. Whoever gets MPs to coalesce around the existing deal or build consensus for an alternative course of action will have solved the Brexit conundrum.</p>
<p>The result of this week’s votes in the House Commons is to leave Brexit at the mercy of time. According to UK law, withdrawal from the EU is still scheduled to take place at 11pm on March 29. This date reflects the fact that Theresa May triggered the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-article-50-the-law-that-governs-exiting-the-eu-and-how-does-it-work-60262">formal withdrawal process</a> – something the 2016 referendum alone could not do – on March 29 2017. An EU country requesting to leave has a two-year period to negotiate a suitable exit.</p>
<p>Of course, timing has been crucial since the beginning of negotiations on EU withdrawal. Theresa May has consistently sought to run down the Brexit clock, notably by <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-vote-postponed-what-parliament-must-do-now-to-fix-theresa-mays-mess-108518">manipulating the schedule for voting</a> on her withdrawal agreement. Her hope was that fear of a no-deal scenario would be enough to persuade MPs to back her deal. But we have now reached an existential stage. The nature of Brexit time is open to question.</p>
<p>EU leaders can, if they all agree when they meet on March 21-22, extend the period of Article 50 negotiations and thus create more time before Brexit happens. This god-like power of turning back the hands of time depends, as in an ancient religious rite, on the UK achieving the necessary goodwill. It is not that EU leaders are jealous and avenging, on the contrary, it is their pragmatism that means an Article 50 extension cannot be taken for granted.</p>
<h2>What happened to the second referendum?</h2>
<p>The EU has made clear what is required to postpone Brexit: a <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-delay-what-it-would-take-for-the-eu-to-agree-article-50-extension-112576">concrete reason</a>. This could be a brief period of additional time to pass legislation related to the current withdrawal agreement or, for a longer extension, a complete rethink of how to approach Brexit, such as a general election or second referendum.</p>
<p>Before voting on the government motion, MPs rejected by a majority of 249 an amendment by Sarah Wollaston, who quit the Tories to join the new Independent Group, asking for an extension in order to organise a new referendum. The politics of this move were messy, even by current standards. Even supporters of a so-called “people’s vote” opposed supporting this amendment on the grounds the timing was inopportune and it would not be won. </p>
<p>Labour MPs were in a particular bind as the party is committed to finding a new strategy for dealing with Brexit. Labour’s official position was to abstain – although 25 of its MPs rebelled.</p>
<p>Jeremy Corbyn preferred to heap pressure on the prime minister by seeking, unsuccessfully, to prevent her from holding a third vote on the withdrawal agreement. In other words, the UK will need to get even closer to a no-deal Brexit before a sufficient number of MPs are willing to consider the radical option of going back to the people to break the deadlock. </p>
<p>Whichever option curries favour in an unruly parliament where party discipline has broken down, May will forever be associated with delay tactics. Her legacy is now set to be defined by one of three dilatory outcomes. A last-minute deal (only delivered perhaps by June 30) secured by the threat of a postponed and potentially softer Brexit; an unwanted no deal caused by running out of time; or a longer delay to reconsider the very idea of Brexit. In all three cases, her time as prime minister will soon be up.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113607/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Glencross has received funding from the European commission. He is affiliated with The Foreign Policy Research Institute.</span></em></p>A series of amendments failed, but the prime minister must now appeal for more time.Andrew Glencross, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1129172019-03-06T10:15:38Z2019-03-06T10:15:38ZWhat if England voted to leave the EU in a second referendum but the rest of the UK wanted to stay?<p>The Brexit process has exacerbated many of the disunities within the UK’s territorial constitution. Division rules at Westminster, Stormont remains deadlocked, and the Scottish National Party is poised to call for a <a href="https://www.snp.org/westminster-parties-are-incapable-of-serving-scotlands-interests-and-always-will-be/">second independence referendum</a>. Meanwhile, polling in England suggests that many people think <a href="https://whatukthinks.org/eu/questions/if-part-of-the-price-of-brexit-was-scotland-leaving-the-uk-do-you-think-that-would-be-a-price-worth-paying/">breaking up the UK</a> is perhaps a price worth paying to deliver Brexit.</p>
<p>Throughout the Brexit process, the prime minister has reiterated her desire to secure a deal that “<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-promises-deal-to-strengthen-the-union">strengthens the bonds</a>” that unite the four component parts of the UK – England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. From the outset, however, this has proven to be more a false promise than a political reality.</p>
<p>At the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results">referendum</a>, only two of the four component parts of the UK – England and Wales – voted to leave the EU. This was enough to swing an overall UK-wide majority in favour of leave, but it went against the will of the Scottish and Northern Irish electorate. In both these parts of the country, significant majorities voted to remain – 62% and 55.8%, respectively.</p>
<p>Despite this, the UK government interpreted the result as reflecting a position of UK-wide solidarity. The UK would leave the EU “as one”, with no differentiated deals for any part of the UK.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the devolved administrations have routinely highlighted the need for any deal to reflect the opinion of each of the component parts of the UK, and for the devolved administrations to play an active role in deliberations. To date, the role of the devolved administrations in this process has been limited, and subject to the final decision-making power of the UK government.</p>
<h2>A second referendum?</h2>
<p>All this raises the question of how things would shake out in a second referendum. It is relatively safe to assume that majorities in Scotland and Northern Ireland would vote to remain, were it an option on the ballot. And despite its original vote, a <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/wales/2019-02-22/polls-shows-welsh-voters-prefer-mays-brexit-deal-to-leaving-eu-without-a-deal/">recent opinion poll</a>, suggests Wales would now also vote to remain. But there is far less certainty about England. </p>
<p>This creates the dilemma that if England votes contrary to the rest of the UK, the fallout could further reaffirm the incongruity of territorial politics in the UK. On the one hand, should England’s vote be lost within a UK-wide majority that matches the vote in the devolved nations, the demands for an English “voice” within the Union would likely gain additional traction. This is doubly significant as Brexit has been interpreted as an expression of English nationalism which, if suppressed in a second vote, may pose further problems down the line. </p>
<p>On the other hand, if England’s vote swings the overall UK result in its favour, the devolved administrations would once again see their choice unrepresented in a “national” vote. </p>
<p>Under this scenario, if the UK government were to again follow the will of only part of the UK, and fail to effectively address the arguments of the devolved administrations, the constitutional repercussions could be severe. Such a scenario could hand significant capital to nationalist groups, adding fuel to the SNP’s demands for a fresh independence vote, as well as likely bolstering support for nationalists in Wales. </p>
<p>Even if every part of the UK voted to remain, it is likely that events of the past few years will still leave their mark. While this scenario may promise a short-term fix, it is unlikely to provide a long-term solution to the UK’s constitutional woes. The UK government’s actions throughout the Brexit process will serve as a lasting reminder to those in the devolved parts of the UK – particularly the nationalists – of their lack of equality within the territorial constitution. </p>
<p>Events such as the UK government’s decision to pass the EU (Withdrawal) Act without <a href="https://theconversation.com/fact-check-can-wales-and-scotland-block-the-brexit-repeal-bill-81041">securing the consent</a> of the Scottish government, the limited reference to the devolved parts of the UK in the draft withdrawal agreement, and the threats that have been allowed to emerge to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-changing-the-good-friday-agreement-because-of-brexit-is-such-a-dangerous-idea-110392">Good Friday Agreement</a> and the Irish border, each leave a lasting precedent of vulnerability and distrust in the minds of the devolved administrations. </p>
<p>With this in mind, it is unlikely that a second referendum will deliver salvation for the Union. Instead, there needs to be a much broader and long-lasting change in Westminster culture. The UK government needs to promote the equality and security of the UK’s component parts in the decision-making process and provide for the security of the devolution settlements. Considering the current political landscape, it appears that only through such long-lasting changes will Brexit potentially strengthen the bonds of the United Kingdom.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112917/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gareth Evans does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Westminster has consistently disregarded the concerns of the devolved administrations over Brexit.Gareth Evans, Lecturer in Law, Staffordshire UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1125682019-02-27T12:19:32Z2019-02-27T12:19:32ZBrexit uncertainty has hurt UK economy – extending Article 50 could hurt it even more<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261208/original/file-20190227-150694-1uodhor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Britain's future relationship with the EU remains unclear.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/westminster-london-uk-january-17-2019-1287233671?src=t7YMbzew2z7o58KThFXZeg-1-59">Amani A / Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Three years on from its vote on EU membership and the UK still has little idea what its future relationship with the EU might turn out to be. Under pressure from europhile members of her cabinet, Theresa May has finally decided that running the Brexit clock down is in nobody’s interest. Instead, she has now taken the perhaps equally disappointing decision to kick the Brexit can <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-47373996">further down the road</a>, if politically necessary.</p>
<p>Just how far down the road is itself not clear. If May’s withdrawal agreement does not pass on March 12, she has promised a vote on March 13 on whether MPs support a no-deal Brexit. And if that fails, there will be another vote on March 14 on requesting an extension to the Article 50 negotiation process – thereby delaying Brexit. It remains unclear how long this would be for, although EU sources have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/feb/24/brexit-could-be-delayed-until-2021-eu-sources-reveal">suggested</a> 21 months as a plausible length for defining the future relationship between the EU and UK.</p>
<p>In the meantime, both consumers and businesses are paying the Brexit price. This is because, in the presence of ongoing economic policy uncertainty, the sterling exchange rate takes a hit as foreign investors become less willing to trust, and therefore invest, in the UK economy. To see this, the following graph plots movements in economic policy uncertainty (which is <a href="http://www.policyuncertainty.com/uk_monthly.html">calculated</a> from newspaper reports regarding policy uncertainty from 11 UK newspapers) and the sterling exchange rate. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261210/original/file-20190227-150724-1p368i.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261210/original/file-20190227-150724-1p368i.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261210/original/file-20190227-150724-1p368i.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261210/original/file-20190227-150724-1p368i.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261210/original/file-20190227-150724-1p368i.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261210/original/file-20190227-150724-1p368i.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261210/original/file-20190227-150724-1p368i.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261210/original/file-20190227-150724-1p368i.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Conversation | Data: Economic Policy Uncertainty Index and Bank of England</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The graph shows how uncertainty sky rocketed in the aftermath of the EU referendum of June 2016. As policymakers adjusted to the reality of the referendum result, policy uncertainty declined and more so following from March 2017 when Mrs May triggered Article 50 in an attempt to enter “meaningful” negotiations with the EU. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the never-ending negotiations have definitely taken their toll, as evidenced from the visible spike in policy uncertainty in 2018 and early 2019. Rising policy uncertainty causes the pound to depreciate versus the US dollar. This, in turn, translates into inflation and adds pressure on the Bank of England to either raise interest rates (to combat inflation) or become less unwilling to stimulate the economy by cutting interest rates <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/10/11/pushing-the-boe-to-the-limit-what-a-no-deal-brexit-will-mean-for-uk-exchange-and-interest-rates/">if a damaging no-deal Brexit becomes reality</a>.</p>
<p>Large swings in the exchange rate, combined with higher policy uncertainty, means that UK exporters face constant uncertainty over their earnings and future investments. This makes them less willing to invest. Not only does this deprive the economy of new jobs, it also undermines the UK’s productivity prospects, adding to the country’s well-known “<a href="https://theconversation.com/debunking-the-uks-productivity-problem-88042">productivity puzzle</a>” (very weak productivity growth in the aftermath of the 2008-09 financial crisis which leaves little room for strong wage increases). </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261211/original/file-20190227-150708-17pdqn7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261211/original/file-20190227-150708-17pdqn7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261211/original/file-20190227-150708-17pdqn7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261211/original/file-20190227-150708-17pdqn7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261211/original/file-20190227-150708-17pdqn7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261211/original/file-20190227-150708-17pdqn7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261211/original/file-20190227-150708-17pdqn7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Conversation | Data: ONS</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
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<p>In other words, the ongoing policy uncertainty affects both ends of the economy: consumers who face lower incomes and export producers who prefer not to make productive investments because looming risk poses a threat to their profits.</p>
<h2>Action required</h2>
<p>To counteract the adverse impact of increasing policy uncertainty on business investments and productivity, one option the UK government has is to aggressively cut the corporate tax rate. This currently stands at 19% for the UK (and <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/rates-and-allowances-corporation-tax/rates-and-allowances-corporation-tax">will be cut further to 17% in 2020</a>). This is already much lower than the <a href="https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE_II1">OECD average of 23.8%</a>. Since the UK’s corporate tax rate is already a lot lower than its competitors, without having much positive impact, I am afraid that May’s government is running out of options to counteract the adverse impact of uncertainty. That is, apart from dealing with the uncertainty itself.</p>
<p>But British politicians seem to be consumed with their own infighting rather than dealing with the real issue of negotiating a future working relationship with the EU. There is little to suggest that, if the Article 50 process is extended, the uncertainty fog surrounding Westminster will lift. So merely extending Article 50 will do little to reassure businesses and consumers that there is light at the end of the Brexit tunnel. </p>
<p>French statesman Charles de Gaulle <a href="https://www.azquotes.com/quote/947870">famously said</a>: “To govern is always to choose among disadvantages.” Delaying every decision instead fuels uncertainty and damages both your credibility and the economy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112568/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Costas Milas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The ongoing policy uncertainty affects both ends of the economy: consumers and producers.Costas Milas, Professor of Finance, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1125442019-02-26T12:14:25Z2019-02-26T12:14:25ZWhy Corbyn’s second referendum announcement changes everything – even if he’s still lukewarm<p>Qualified, tempered, cautious. As ever with Jeremy Corbyn and Europe, his <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-47363307">announcement</a> that the Labour Party would support a new public vote on Brexit is not straightforward. Yes, Labour would support a new vote, but only after it has put a motion on its own Brexit plan forward for a vote in the House of Commons.</p>
<p>Is this a genuine attempt, to take Corbyn at his own word, to stop a chaotic, Tory Brexit? Or is the announcement actually a cynical ploy to get at least some form of Brexit through the Commons? Remainers despairing at Corbyn’s handling of Brexit could be forgiven for worrying that it could be the latter, and the mixed messages coming out of the Labour Party HQ would not have settled the nerves.</p>
<p>Whichever of these analyses is the more accurate, one thing is for sure: the Brexit debate has changed beyond recognition as a result of this move. For the first time, the idea of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/peoples-vote-59512">second referendum</a> moved centre-stage in UK politics, and became the talking point of front bench politicians. Shadow foreign secretary Emily Thornberry <a href="https://twitter.com/Channel4News/status/1100132281342140418">told Channel 4 News</a> that should parliament vote for a second referendum, both she and Corbyn would campaign for Remain. Barry Gardiner, who has consistently argued that a second referendum would undermine democracy, told Newsnight that this was a significant policy. He was effectively (if reluctantly) supporting a second public vote.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1100132281342140418"}"></div></p>
<p>However this all plays out, this announcement means the competing narratives on Brexit will now shift – and the direction of travel inside and outside of parliament might not be fully under Corbyn’s control.</p>
<h2>Opening the floodgates</h2>
<p>A crucial shift in narrative will be around the concept of a second referendum itself. The 17.4m-strong Leave vote of 2016 has held a vice-like grip on the public psyche. It has been held up as a huge, democratic expression of the “will of the people”. Leaver and Remainer alike have buckled under the pressure of this hallowed will: the people have spoken, the politicians must enact their desire.</p>
<p>Now, however, politicians have the chance to discuss the idea of a second vote free from that type of pressure. They can discuss the vote as part of the official policy of the party of opposition. Crucially, Labour can frame this policy not as a rerun of the original referendum but as the only option left. The government has handled Brexit disastrously and now the people must have their say on whether to proceed.</p>
<p>This might not sound like much, but in the oppositional, two-party duopoly in the UK parliament it is everything – the whole of the Commons machinery is set up to address issues in exactly this way, and parliament may finally get the chance to properly discuss a fresh referendum as a result. The support of the leader of the opposition is crucial for initiating the debate, but once that debate is up and running, Corbyn does not control it. He might be lukewarm on the matter, but parliament just needs him to open the door. It can then find its own momentum.</p>
<h2>Preparing a campaign</h2>
<p>As for either side of the Brexit debate itself, their narratives will shift too. Remainers can stop arguing for a referendum to be held. That need now speaks for itself. They can instead focus on what that referendum should ask and what the campaign should look like. In truth, this has been going on for months outside the mainstream political discussions. A quick <a href="https://twitter.com/GlasgowOfoc">glance</a> at the Twitter feeds of the many groups who have been campaigning for a second vote since 2016 shows a shift in recent months away from decrying the many problems of the 2016 campaign and towards a more positive approach which champions European integration in general.</p>
<p>All of these things gain new momentum with even the merest suggestion that the national legislature is turning to discuss a second vote.</p>
<p>For Leavers too, the narratives shift significantly. For those MPs in the Labour Party who have consistently said another public vote would be a betrayal of the many constituencies who voted Leave, the rules of engagement have changed. In essence, the mandate they took from their constituents in 2016 is slowly being replaced by the mandate of an elected parliament debating the best way forward in 2019.</p>
<p>For the more extreme Leavers, the shift is no less dramatic. They may now be faced with a brutal truth that the parliament and the people are moving towards a rethink on Brexit in general, meaning that their only option to salvage any kind of Brexit may be to support an extension of Article 50 to buy some time – unthinkable even just a few days ago.</p>
<h2>The Independent Group</h2>
<p>Finally, there is one other narrative that will be crucial in the next few days: that of the emergence of and continuing need for <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/independent-group-66643">the Independent Group</a>. Let’s be clear here, this new formation has been absolutely central to the latest shift in Labour policy. With threats of up to 30 more Labour MPs defecting, Corbyn had no choice but to respond.</p>
<p>What the Independent Group does next will be crucial. Its ex-Labour members may be tempted to welcome the move and ease the tensions in the Labour Party. However, perhaps their strongest hand is to push home the point even more that Corbyn must be even clearer on the move towards a second referendum. This latter approach could be the most important narrative of all.</p>
<p>No matter what we think of the real motivation behind Corbyn’s announcement, all of these shifts in the key narratives around Brexit may actually mean that his own may motivations count for very little in the end: similar to what happened to May and her approach to Brexit, political realities mean the people and the politicians of the UK may move towards an outcome that he cannot fully control.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112544/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andy Price does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Labour leader has cautiously backed a fresh vote – and that’s all parliament needs to get the debate going.Andy Price, Head of Politics, Sheffield Hallam UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1103112019-01-22T17:29:01Z2019-01-22T17:29:01ZBrexit identities: how Leave versus Remain replaced Conservative versus Labour affiliations of British voters<p>British politics was relatively stable in the post-war decades, and voters’ strong party loyalties were influenced by their place in society. More recently, there has been a marked decline in the number of people identifying with a political party, and in the strength of that attachment. </p>
<p>Now, our new research for <a href="http://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Public-Opinion-2019-report.pdf">a report on Brexit and Public Opinion</a> by the UK in a Changing Europe research group, shows that Brexit has quickly and dramatically replaced the traditional party allegiances of Conservative and Labour in the hearts and minds of voters. While this “Brexit identity” has reinvigorated political involvement, it has come at a cost, cementing divisions in society at the moment when the prime minister has <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/2018-12-24/time-for-britons-to-come-together-urges-theresa-may-amid-brexit-divisions/">professed a desire to heal them</a>.</p>
<p>We wanted to find out whether Leave versus Remain is now a more prominent source of identity than Conservative versus Labour, and the impact the EU referendum had on this. We did this by asking respondents in all waves of the <a href="https://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/">British Election panel study</a> undertaken since spring 2016 whether: “In the EU referendum debate, do you think of yourself as closer to either the Remain or Leave side?” We then asked the same questions about respondents’ thoughts and feelings towards all of the political parties.</p>
<p>At the start of the referendum campaign in April 2016, the idea of being Leave versus Remain was, unsurprisingly, not prominent, especially for Remainers. Leavers had already developed a sense of their distinctiveness, perhaps because they were clearly outside of mainstream politics – no major party had endorsed leaving the EU. However, the number of Remainers expressing an identity grew following the referendum result and vice versa for Leavers. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255019/original/file-20190122-100288-flul30.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255019/original/file-20190122-100288-flul30.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255019/original/file-20190122-100288-flul30.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255019/original/file-20190122-100288-flul30.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255019/original/file-20190122-100288-flul30.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255019/original/file-20190122-100288-flul30.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255019/original/file-20190122-100288-flul30.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255019/original/file-20190122-100288-flul30.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Partisan identity versus Brexit identity.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Tellingly, even in mid-2018, two years after the referendum, only just over 6% of people did not identify with either Leave or Remain. Compare this with party political attachment, where the percentage with no party identity increased from 18% to 21.5% over same period – in part due to the decline of UKIP. Only one in 16 people don’t have a Brexit identity whereas more than one in five have no party identity.</p>
<h2>Remain identity strengthening</h2>
<p>At the beginning of the referendum campaign, Leave supporters tended to identify with the Leave campaign more strongly than Remainers did with the Remain one. From the last month of the campaign onwards, however, the extent to which people said they strongly identified with either side increased markedly. By the end of the campaign the two sides had almost equal strengths of identity. Most striking, however, is how the strength of the Remain identity increased dramatically following the referendum while the strength of Leave dropped slightly. Since then the average level of identification with Leave or Remain has remained higher than the strength of identification with any political party.</p>
<p>The way Leave and Remain has become embedded became even more pronounced when we looked at the social and psychological markers of identity – and we found a polarisation of identities after the referendum. </p>
<p>When asked whether: “When I speak about the Remain/Leave side, I usually say ‘we’ instead of ‘they’”, the proportion of Leavers agreeing leapt from 44% to 65% after the referendum. The proportion of Remainers agreeing rose even more substantially, from 35% to 70%. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254972/original/file-20190122-100264-h90z55.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254972/original/file-20190122-100264-h90z55.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254972/original/file-20190122-100264-h90z55.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254972/original/file-20190122-100264-h90z55.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254972/original/file-20190122-100264-h90z55.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254972/original/file-20190122-100264-h90z55.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254972/original/file-20190122-100264-h90z55.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254972/original/file-20190122-100264-h90z55.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>By comparison, when this question was asked about Labour and the Conservatives, only around 25% of people agreed with it.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254973/original/file-20190122-100292-4qlda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254973/original/file-20190122-100292-4qlda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254973/original/file-20190122-100292-4qlda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254973/original/file-20190122-100292-4qlda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254973/original/file-20190122-100292-4qlda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254973/original/file-20190122-100292-4qlda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254973/original/file-20190122-100292-4qlda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<h2>It’s personal</h2>
<p>When asked whether, “When people criticise the Remain/Leave side, it feels like a personal insult”, we saw a large increase in agreement by people on both sides following the referendum – from around 20% up to 45%, remaining stable for much of the time since. For the parties, only around 20% of Conservatives and 25% of Labour identifiers tend to respond in this way. </p>
<p>When asked whether, “I have a lot in common with other supporters of the Remain/Leave side” agreement among Leavers tends to hover around 78% and Remainers 85%. Immediately after the referendum, agreement with this statement reached no less than 93% among Remainers. For parties, the percentages agreeing with this view were only in the 60s and 70s. </p>
<p>The EU referendum seems to have resulted in a classic “in-group” versus “out-group” <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Public-Opinion.pdf">response of distancing and negative stereotyping</a>, especially from Remainers. The social and emotional intensity of these Brexit identities – held by almost everybody – is far higher than those found for political parties. </p>
<p>While party identity increased a little during the 2017 general election, especially for Labour, it then subsided. Yet Brexit identities remained prevalent and consequential even two years after the referendum. This is a long way removed from the idea that the UK “has come together” to face the challenge of Brexit. The social polarisation over the UK’s relationship with the EU is pronounced and shows no sign of diminishing.</p>
<p>The UK is likely to experience a re-shaping of politics as a result, because positions on Brexit cut across the positions of the main political parties. Both Labour and the Conservatives are beset with tensions caused by the presence of large groups of pro-Leave and pro-Remain supporters in their ranks. Some Labour MPs in northern and Midlands constituencies are nervous at the thought of Labour promoting a second referendum, while many of those in London welcome it. Some Conservatives want to address the concerns of rural voters in areas with an influx of workers from the EU, while others take an internationalist position of big business and the CBI.</p>
<p>To the degree that a Brexit identity drives voters’ political attitudes and choices, there will be increasing pressure put on the old, left-wing versus right-wing, two-party politics of Labour versus the Conservatives. As political identities are usually far more enduring than attitudes towards specific issues, it’s likely that Brexit identities will be a stable source of realignment in a political world characterised by volatility. </p>
<p><em><a href="http://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-identities-how-leave-versus-remain-replaced-conservative-versus-labour-affiliations-of-british-voters/">This article</a> was also published by the UK in a Changing Europe.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110311/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Geoffrey Evans receives funding from the Economic & Social Research Council</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Florian Schaffner is affiliated with Agora Think Tank. </span></em></p>The social polarisation over Brexit is pronounced and shows no sign of diminishing.Geoffrey Evans, Professor in the Sociology of Politics, Official Fellow in Politics, Nuffield College, University of OxfordFlorian Schaffner, Doctoral Candidate in Politics, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1097492019-01-14T11:43:04Z2019-01-14T11:43:04ZBrexit vote defeat: Theresa May’s ‘plan B’ options explained<p>The heavy defeat for Theresa May’s government on its Brexit plan is <a href="https://theconversation.com/theresa-may-brexit-deal-hammered-in-parliament-but-be-wary-of-prospects-of-a-new-consensus-approach-109930">a further stumbling block</a> on the path to the UK’s exit from the EU. Given the scale of the defeat, by a majority of 230, it’s unlikely that the prime minister will be able ask parliament to vote on her unrevised plan again – despite suggesting that this was her favoured option prior to the vote on January 15. </p>
<p>The UK government now has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jan/09/brexit-pm-may-be-forced-to-come-up-with-new-deal-three-days-after-commons-defeat">three working days to prepare a “plan B”</a> and present it to parliament. MPs would then have the chance to scrutinise this plan. </p>
<p>As the UK’s withdrawal date of March 29 is <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf">written into UK law</a>, time is of the essence. There are six possible options for the prime minister at this stage. </p>
<h2>Renegotiate with the EU27</h2>
<p>Since <a href="https://theconversation.com/postponing-the-brexit-vote-an-odd-decision-that-makes-theresa-may-look-weak-108563">postponing the first vote</a> on the withdrawal agreement in December, May has sought reassurances from the heads of the other 27 member states about the UK’s future relationship with the bloc and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-and-northern-ireland-the-latest-commitments-explained-109669">nature of the so-called “Irish backstop”</a> to prevent a hard border on the island of Ireland. </p>
<p>While these discussions could continue, the timescale makes this unlikely. If the assurances the prime minister sought from Brussels in the four weeks since December were not sufficient to get the deal through parliament, it’s unlikely she would be able to make significant further progress within three days that could revive the deal. This is not least because of the scale of the defeat suffered, with 118 Conservative MPs rebelling against their party. </p>
<p>Many EU member states have insisted the text of the agreement cannot be changed at this stage. Still, new negotiations, based upon new red lines, could be instigated. These would enable the government to seek an alternative deal based, for example, upon a <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-asked-the-british-public-what-kind-of-brexit-they-want-and-the-norway-model-is-the-clear-winner-104705">Norway plus</a> or a <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-britain-heading-for-canada-plus-plus-brexit-108782">Canada model</a>. However, the impending March 29 deadline suggests that this could only be done in conjunction with extending Article 50. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/four-options-for-uk-trade-after-brexit-62363">Four options for UK trade after Brexit</a>
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</em>
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<h2>Extend article 50</h2>
<p>Rather than focus on the nature of a new type of deal, the prime minister may ask the EU for more time to restart negotiations, extending the two-year article 50 deadline which governs the UK’s withdrawal process. This would need the approval of other member states and MPs, but it could potentially avoid the hard deadline of March 29. </p>
<p>Even if such an extension were to be agreed, it’s unclear what changes to the existing deal would be acceptable to the EU27, who have consistently refused to discuss options to alter the text. Any further negotiations would also have an added complication by overlapping with the next European parliamentary elections, scheduled for May.</p>
<h2>Public vote</h2>
<p>To overcome the deadlock in parliament, May has the option of suggesting another referendum or public vote – albeit this is something she has <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/theresa-may-categorically-rules-out-a-second-brexit-referendum-as-long-as-she-is-prime-minister_uk_5bf6dd55e4b0eb6d930ca703?guccounter=1&guce_referrer_us=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_cs=uZEHcYY0L-kJjwYP1zGKbw">previously ruled out</a>. Here, multiple options exist. One could be a referendum on the basis of the current withdrawal agreement – asking the public a simply yes/no “do you support this deal?” If accepted, this may give legitimacy to a deal that allows the UK to leave the EU on March 29. However, if May’s deal is rejected in a public vote as well as in parliament, it would be very difficult to resurrect it in any form. </p>
<p>Others, including the People’s Vote campaign, have proposed a public vote which <a href="https://www.economist.com/britain/2018/12/08/how-does-a-peoples-vote-work">includes the option</a> of remaining in the EU – though Brexiteers would argue this is an attempt to overturn the result of the 2016 referendum.</p>
<h2>General election</h2>
<p>Another way of gauging the public’s opinion without being seen to overturn the initial referendum result would be to call a general election. Political parties would be able to present competing Brexit proposals and the public could choose between these. It would also give the Conservatives a chance to change the arithmetic within the House of Commons, theoretically making it easier (assuming they won an election) for the new parliament to pass May’s deal at a second attempt. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-happens-if-parliament-rejects-a-brexit-deal-103939">What happens if parliament rejects a Brexit deal?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>An election in itself would not solve the issues generated by parliament rejecting the deal. If the next parliament didn’t immediately seek to extend article 50, it would still face the same March 29 deadline. Under British law there must be a <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/6/pdfs/ukpga_20130006_en.pdf">minimum of 25 working days between</a> the dissolution of parliament and the general election. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253641/original/file-20190114-43544-1o8lrnv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253641/original/file-20190114-43544-1o8lrnv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253641/original/file-20190114-43544-1o8lrnv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253641/original/file-20190114-43544-1o8lrnv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253641/original/file-20190114-43544-1o8lrnv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253641/original/file-20190114-43544-1o8lrnv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253641/original/file-20190114-43544-1o8lrnv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">All options raise more questions.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Melinda Nagy/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Cancel article 50</h2>
<p>In December 2019, the European Court of Justice ruled that Britain could <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/european-court-of-justice-rules-uk-can-unilaterally-revoke-article-50-and-halt-brexit-11576865">unilaterally revoke article 50</a>, without affecting its membership of the union, providing there was a genuine intention to remain a member of the EU. This could not simply be used as an extension mechanism and would commit the UK to remaining part of the EU. However, this would be unpopular with MPs who have promised to respect the result of the referendum and is unlikely to gain a majority of support in parliament. </p>
<h2>No-deal Brexit</h2>
<p>If May loses the January 15 vote and none of the above options materialise, the UK will leave the EU at on March 29 without a deal, and with <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-transition-what-will-and-wont-change-for-britons-after-march-2019-107558">no transition period</a>. This date can only be altered if parliament explicitly votes to do so. </p>
<p>Amid all the uncertainty, one thing is clear: each scenario presents its own questions and problems. In many ways these are the same questions that have been left unanswered since the 2016 referendum. For example, how can the UK talk of following the homogeneous “will of the people” given the different options discussed during the referendum campaign and the variety and complexity of issues that influenced voters’ decisions?</p>
<p>Far from resolving the issue of Britain’s membership of the EU, the questions raised by the referendum result must be explored and answered before the UK can agree upon a new relationship with the EU.</p>
<p><em>This article was updated to reflect the outcome of the parliamentary vote on the withdrawal agreement.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109749/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Kirkland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The UK government has lost a key vote on Brexit – here are the options facing the prime minister.Christopher Kirkland, Lecturer in Politics, York St John UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1088462018-12-14T16:02:18Z2018-12-14T16:02:18ZThe road to Brexit: how euroscepticism tore the Conservative Party apart from within<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250668/original/file-20181214-185240-15ersr2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PA/Stefan Rousseau</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Theresa May has survived a vote of no confidence in her leadership but to quote the prime minister: “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/society/video/2017/may/22/nothings-changed-may-claims-as-she-announces-social-care-u-turn-video">Nothing has changed</a>.” The Conservative Party remains just as divided as it was before. While divisions over Europe have been very prominent recently, they have been a thorn in the side of the party leadership for many years now. That said, looking at the situation today it’s hard to imagine how these rival ideologies have managed to coexist within the same party for so long.</p>
<p>While there has always been some hostility in the party towards the European project, the nature of this hostility has evolved over time. In the 1975 referendum on EEC membership the party was largely in favour of remaining. Even Margaret Thatcher wore a very colourful, very European <a href="https://i2-prod.birminghammail.co.uk/incoming/article11505552.ece/ALTERNATES/s615/thatcher-jumper.png">jumper</a> to express her support of continued membership. Of course, Thatcher’s views on the European project would change over time as institutions themselves changed and evolved. This inevitably had a significant impact on the party’s future ideology.</p>
<p>However, arguably the key turning point came on September 16 1992 – otherwise known as Black Wednesday. This was when the government of John Major had to withdraw the pound from the Exchange Rate Mechanism. The crisis made the party deeply unpopular with the electorate and had a profound effect on how its MPs viewed the European Union. Many turned sour on the UK’s membership, which changed the nature of the party’s divide over Europe. What was once a debate about the ins and outs of Britain’s place in Europe became a polarisation between soft and hard euroscepticism.</p>
<h2>Rise of the eurosceptics</h2>
<p>While some europhiles remained, their numbers started to dwindle over time. Older MPs were replaced by fresher and younger MPs, most of whom were, at the very least, sceptical of the EU – and many of whom were in fact very hostile. This group was growing restless during the Conservatives’ long period in opposition under New Labour and looked back to the glory days under Thatcher for the solution to reclaiming Number 10. Euroscepticism became a key theme to <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jcms.12205">emulate</a>.</p>
<p>The UK’s continued membership of the EU became an increasingly salient issue, not least because some voters started to oppose the free movement of people that came as part of the package. New right-wing party UKIP capitalised on <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jcms.12208">negativity towards European immigration</a> to become a real electoral threat to the Conservatives. </p>
<p>The 2016 referendum was the then leader David Cameron’s attempt to stave off this UKIP threat. Like many in the political class, he believed that people would vote to remain in the EU and that the debate that haunted his party would be put to bed once and for all. However, after years of lukewarm support for Europe and a lack of engagement with the public hostility, pro-European MPs struggled during the short campaign period to convince enough voters that the UK’s membership of the European Union was actually a good thing.</p>
<p>With the victory of the Leave campaign in 2016, figures who were once on the periphery of their party were suddenly catapulted into to the forefront. They have positioned themselves as the guardians of the “will of the people” ever since.</p>
<h2>Irreconcilable differences?</h2>
<p>The big question is: where does the party go from here? Although May is safe from another leadership challenge for the next year, those who voted against her are still insisting that she should take the hint and <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/reesmogg-hails-pms-confidence-vote-terrible-as-mps-react-a4016016.html">resign</a>. The vote has not unified the party – nor has it really stabilised anything.</p>
<p>As things stand, reconciliation between the warring factions seems unlikely, so they will have to try to coexist for a while longer, although this will probably prove difficult given that the malcontents can, and likely will, continue to stir up trouble for the prime minister.</p>
<p>Given that they failed to oust their leader through the official mechanisms, the likes of Boris Johnson and Jacob Rees-Mogg may have to refocus their efforts and put pressure on her to simply resign instead. This is something that May <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-46547832">has claimed</a> she will do before the next general election, but it is unlikely her opponents will be willing to wait for this to occur naturally. Their most likely tactic will be to oppose and undermine May’s Brexit withdrawal agreement regardless of what, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-46569699">if any</a>, amendments the prime minister can secure. The almost inevitable failure to get the agreement through parliament, they may hope, will make May’s position untenable.</p>
<p>Failing that, there is always the option of trying to <a href="https://theconversation.com/theresa-may-survives-confidence-vote-but-her-brexit-deal-is-still-in-deep-trouble-108728">orchestrate</a> a vote of no confidence in the government, thus forcing a general election. But while many key figures have regularly put self-interest before their party, it seems unlikely that they would want to side with rival parties to bring about such a vote, especially when these other parties may very well fare much better in the election than their own.</p>
<p>May’s struggles are not over – and her credibility may never recover. But voters dislike divided parties and, if the different factions continue to pull further apart, it may not be just their leader whose days in office are numbered.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108846/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Stafford does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Looking back, it’s a wonder the party is still together after years of arguing about this issue.Chris Stafford, Doctoral Researcher, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1085632018-12-10T17:48:53Z2018-12-10T17:48:53ZPostponing the Brexit vote: an odd decision that makes Theresa May look weak<p>The Westminster bubble has been gripped by Theresa May’s dilemma for weeks: committed to having a vote on the deal she negotiated to leave the European Union, but facing almost certain defeat. Endless flowcharts have been drawn, pundits mined for information, and vox pops taken in high streets up and down the country.</p>
<p>And perhaps all for nothing.</p>
<p>May’s last minute announcement that the meaningful vote is to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-vote-postponed-what-parliament-must-do-now-to-fix-theresa-mays-mess-108518">postponed</a> was not the most surprising thing she could have presented to MPs, but it does go against what she and her supporters were saying up until a few hours previously. Bleak though the situation looked for Number 10, the line had very consistently been that the vote would take place and that what happened would be dealt with thereafter.</p>
<p>Even if the nominal optimism about May’s being “the best possible <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-draft-withdrawal-agreement-experts-react-107027">deal</a>” and one that delivered on the result of the 2016 referendum looked very forced, the willingness to press on did carry some weight. Importantly, we should recall that the vote was to be the first part of British ratification. Legislation was then to be passed afterwards to embody the withdrawal agreement into UK law: the time needed for this process meant that delay would cause issues down the line for getting everything sorted by March 29 next year.</p>
<p>All of this makes the postponement decision look both odd and weak. In particular, it suggests that Number 10 does not feel confident about its position right now. Rather than being willing to accept a (likely heavy) defeat and then move on with finding practical remedies, May appears to be avoiding the very first hurdle.</p>
<p>This is strange, because until the vote actually occurs, it will be hard for Number 10 or the whips to know exactly who is rebelling and how biddable they might be. As a basic rule of negotiation, delay only makes sense if you have an active plan to improve the situation for later resolution: it’s not enough to just leave things and hope they’ll sort themselves out. If nothing else, more time means more time for your opponents to move against you.</p>
<h2>May’s next move</h2>
<p>So what is May’s plan? This appears to involve two elements – one internal, the other external.</p>
<p>Externally, May is going to continue her work of the weekend and will seek some concessions from the EU. For their part, the EU institutions have been very forceful in their <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/dec/10/eu-figures-rule-out-concessions-as-theresa-may-postpones-brexit-vote">statements</a> that they will not consider any renegotiation of the withdrawal agreement, including the backstop arrangements for Ireland. </p>
<p>To her credit, May does acknowledge that any negotiated exit from the EU is going to need to include that backstop. But her stated desire to see if there is any wiggle room doesn’t come from a position of strength. There might be some scope to make changes to the political declaration on the future relationship between the UK and the EU to offer some reassurances on the backstop, but that is a non-binding agreement so it’s hard to see how it would placate MPs back home.</p>
<p>Even this would be extracted with difficulty: from the European end of things, the decision to delay the vote is just the latest in a long and antagonising process. Time and again, the UK has failed to stick with its plans and sought instead to get further concessions. The EU is much more focused on other issues – <a href="https://theconversation.com/global-compact-for-migration-what-is-it-and-why-are-countries-opposing-it-106654">migration</a>, the eurozone, Russia – so Brexit is an annoyance and one that it sees little reason to indulge.</p>
<p>It is partly for that reason that May also announced work to increase the role of the UK parliament in the backstop arrangements. One version of this was floated by May the week before the delay was announced. She said then that she’d seek to give the House of Commons a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-46463326">vote</a> on triggering the use of the backstop. Critics and commentators rightly pointed out that this was undermined by the wording of the withdrawal agreement, which makes the backstop come into effect automatically in the absence of either the transitional arrangements or a new UK-EU treaty that addresses the border in Ireland.</p>
<p>This time around, the offer is more vague, but is likely to run into the same problem: domestic arrangements will have to work around the international treaty commitments in the withdrawal agreement.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249785/original/file-20181210-76974-1b0hfio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249785/original/file-20181210-76974-1b0hfio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=340&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249785/original/file-20181210-76974-1b0hfio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=340&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249785/original/file-20181210-76974-1b0hfio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=340&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249785/original/file-20181210-76974-1b0hfio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249785/original/file-20181210-76974-1b0hfio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249785/original/file-20181210-76974-1b0hfio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The decision to postpone went down badly in the house.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">PA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Given all these difficulties, May’s decision looks more hopeful than considered.
A delay of days or even weeks isn’t going to change the situation in which she finds herself.</p>
<p>Indeed, perhaps the biggest effect will be to ramp up once more the chances of a no deal outcome. The Article 50 clock is still counting down to March 29, 2019 and each day that passes curtails the opportunities to build a consensus around a course of action.</p>
<p>For a parliament that agrees on little other than it really doesn’t want to leave the EU without a deal, even the ramping up of no deal contingency planning is going to do little to help: the case for this scenario’s undesirability has been made and accepted.</p>
<p>Desperate times may call for desperate measures, but that doesn’t mean they’re any good. May can expect a very cold Christmas.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108563/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Usherwood receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council, as Deputy Director of the "UK in a Changing Europe" programme. He sits on the academic advisory board of Modern Europe. The views expressed in this article do not reflect those of the research councils.</span></em></p>It might have looked like her only choice, but postponing the vote was the wrong move for a weak prime minister.Simon Usherwood, Reader in Politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1085182018-12-10T17:05:51Z2018-12-10T17:05:51ZBrexit vote postponed: what parliament must do now to fix Theresa May’s mess<p>Finally, after two tortuous years of negotiations, it looked like the UK’s elected representatives were about to vote on Prime Minister Theresa May’s Brexit deal. Then, despite vowing to go ahead, May decided to postpone the vote the day before. She had faced almost certain defeat and now says she will speak to EU leaders to find a new way forward.</p>
<p>Technically and legally May was within her rights to back out of the vote. However, the political optics are another thing altogether. This is a government, remember, found in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ministers-found-in-contempt-of-parliament-over-legal-advice-why-it-matters-for-brexit-108199">contempt of parliament</a> for withholding information from MPs. Pulling such an important vote out of self-interest does not look good. Doing so a day before the vote is not politic, as Speaker John Bercow pointed out after her statement. Just how much of the normal running order of UK politics is the prime minister ready to jettison?</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1072158915289182209"}"></div></p>
<p>It seems that May now intends to go back to Brussels and seek concessions around the <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-backstop-refresh-why-the-uk-and-eu-cant-agree-on-northern-ireland-105080">Irish backstop</a> – a sticking point that riled Brexiteers and Remainers MPs alike – in order to make the vote winnable at a later date. But the question here must be: what concessions? Is she going to ask that the UK as whole to stay in the customs union and maybe even the single market, which is the only real way the Irish border (and the backstop) problem disappears?</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1072106899905105921"}"></div></p>
<p>Not a chance: this would anger the Brexiteers in her party even more (if that is possible). Rather, the concession she is after is to somehow make the backstop more palatable to the people she has been appealing to from the beginning: the hard Brexiteers. That might be something like agreeing that the backstop becomes a temporary arrangement, somehow.</p>
<h2>Corbyn’s alternative?</h2>
<p>How will opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn react to this delay? Is he going to try and stick to the line that he wants a general election, promising that if – and it is a big “if” – he won that election he would go back and renegotiate with the EU?</p>
<p>If so, then his fate looks as bleak as May’s. What is it that he imagines he can offer that will provide enough fuel to power the EU27 to reopen the negotiations they have just taken so long to close? And remember, they are not just reopening negotiations with the UK, but among themselves too: they have to reach a unified position before they can agree a position with the UK. The idea that they will be able to reopen talks and get negotiations finished before the end of March is quite frankly ludicrous.</p>
<p>Apart, maybe, from one scenario: that a Labour government would offer to stay in the customs union, in the single market, accept freedom of movement and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. That may be motivation enough for the EU – but it is essentially staying in the EU in anything else but name (and decision-making power).</p>
<h2>Parliamentary power</h2>
<p>Whatever happens next, one thing is clear: the heads of the UK’s two main parties are no closer to solving this problem from their positions of leadership. It is to other MPs, then, that voters should turn. Only the House of Commons, acting as a collective body, can steer the nation through this political mess. </p>
<p>We should remember that despite all the cries of betrayal from the Brexiteers, this House of Commons as a collective entity was constituted by the people in a vote that superseded the referendum: the snap election of 2017. The MPs that sit in this parliament are the representatives the people chose to enact Brexit in 2017.</p>
<p>And key here is that this house of Commons is hung – there is no outright majority. A clearer display of where the country is at you could not find. As a reflection of that very vote, this house has found it very difficult to agree on anything as the negotiations on Brexit have progressed.</p>
<p>This, then, is the state of the House of Commons as we head into Christmas. And the reality is, everything the government and the opposition have tried so far in terms of Brexit has so far failed. MPs need to find away to coalesce around a different way forward. There needs to be a a proposal, plan or motion that will attract the magic number of 314 MPs needed for a majority in order that a way out can be enacted.</p>
<p>Crucially, we know that if such a plan were to emerge, it would not be a hard Brexit or May’s deal – that much has been proven in the run up to the originally planned vote. Whatever the proposal would be, we should remind ourselves and others that this will be the will of the people expressed via British constitutional means.</p>
<p>Whatever the focus on the role of the PM and other individual politicians in another crazy week, let’s try to remember that the collective sense of the country’s elective representatives is the key player here. Let’s hope it shows up.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108518/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andy Price does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>We can’t agree what the ‘will of the people’ was in 2016, but these are the representatives they elected in 2017.Andy Price, Head of Politics, Sheffield Hallam UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1082172018-12-07T13:33:03Z2018-12-07T13:33:03ZBrexit deadlock: this three-way referendum design could break it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249279/original/file-20181206-128190-1qhhrri.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=45%2C4%2C1285%2C631&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The 2016 EU referendum resulted in a marginal victory for Brexit and a divided nation. After two years of negotiations, politicians and voters seem further divided. The final decision may now be put back in the hands of voters in another referendum. So how could such a referendum produce an outcome to settle the debate? Or at least, could we design a referendum that will not be perceived as an effort to overturn the 2016 decision? The answer is not easy, and different designs lead to different outcomes. As we however argue, while certain designs favour consensus, others may lead to further divisions.</p>
<p>Consider the three available options on a scale running from anti to pro-EU. The two options of remaining in the EU or exiting without a deal lie at the two extremes of the scale. Leaving the EU with the negotiated deal lies somewhere between. This would make a two-option referendum controversial so a three-option vote might be preferable. However, that raises the question of how you get a meaningful mandate.</p>
<p>We argue that a “<a href="https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/voting-systems/types-of-voting-system/borda-count/">Borda count</a>” (named after the 18th-century mathematician Jean-Charles de Borda) should be used in this three-way referendum. On polling day, voters rank the three options, marking their favourite with a “1”, their second favourite with a “2”, and their worst option with a “3”. For each ballot, the rule assigns 2 points to each voter’s first option, 1 to their second, and 0 to their third. The option with most points wins.</p>
<p>With a Borda count, if an option is supported by a majority, the rule delivers it (as any other reasonable rule would do). If no single option is supported by a majority, the Borda count in the particular setting works well. As we will argue, it would most likely deliver the option that would have also won in a two-way referendum against either alternative. This would guarantee a certain degree of consensus.</p>
<h2>The setting</h2>
<p>In the case of Brexit, we think you can divide voters into four groups:</p>
<p><strong>1) “No-deal supporters”</strong> want to leave the EU without a deal. If not possible, they would rather leave the EU with a deal rather than remain. </p>
<p><strong>2) “Remain supporters”</strong> want to remain. If not possible, they would rather leave the EU with a deal than crash out of it.</p>
<p><strong>3) “Deal/no-deal supporters”</strong> want to leave the EU with a deal. Their second preference is to leave the EU without a deal and their worst option is to remain.</p>
<p><strong>4) “Deal/remain supporters”</strong> also want to leave with a deal, but they would rather remain in the EU than crash out of it. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249295/original/file-20181206-128190-1cg1bpm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249295/original/file-20181206-128190-1cg1bpm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=254&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249295/original/file-20181206-128190-1cg1bpm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=254&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249295/original/file-20181206-128190-1cg1bpm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=254&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249295/original/file-20181206-128190-1cg1bpm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249295/original/file-20181206-128190-1cg1bpm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249295/original/file-20181206-128190-1cg1bpm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">If voters’ rankings of options in the Brexit context are accurately represented in the graph, research has valuable input on building consensus in a three-way referendum.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Consider that none of the options is ranked first by at least 50% of voters. A Borda count in a three-way Brexit vote would most likely deliver the “deal” option. While this might sound like a terrible result to some, in the absence of a clear majority it’s actually the least divisive option.</p>
<p>That’s because in the absence of at least 50% of “no-deal” or “remain” supporters, accepting the deal would also win against both other options in two-option referenda. Consider a “deal” versus “no deal” referendum: “deal” and “remain supporters” vote for the deal, “no-deal supporters” oppose it. Since “no-deal” supporters are not a majority, “remainers” and “deal supporters” give the victory to the “deal”.</p>
<p>Similarly, in a “remain” versus “deal” referendum, “no deal” and “deal” supporters give the victory to the “deal”.</p>
<p>The desirable feature of the Borda count is precisely this: it delivers the consensual “deal” option in a divisive scenario where no option is supported by a clear majority. Of course, it would also deliver a victory for any of the three options if one were supported by a clear majority. Hence, while it gives both “extreme” options (“remain” and “no deal”) fair chances, it delivers a “moderate” soft Brexit in the absence of a clear majority. </p>
<p>The above features make the Borda count a credible design that treats all options equally. It’s a design that parliamentarians could get behind as momentum builds towards holding a referendum. And, should such a referendum happen, this neutral design could help deliver a result voters can trust.</p>
<h2>Consider the alternatives</h2>
<p>We think that any other system would fail to produce a result that can truly resolve this question. A <a href="https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/voting-systems/types-of-voting-system/first-past-the-post/">first-past-the-post</a> three-option referendum would obviously fail to promote consensual options. It could give the victory to one of the extreme outcomes with 34% of the total vote – with the other two options tying at 33%. </p>
<p>Others <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/23/peoples-vote-brexit-mps-second-referendum">propose</a> a two-question referendum in which question one repeats the original EU referendum question and question two asks voters to choose a preferred type of Brexit. This has similar properties to the Borda count. However, if you repeat the original referendum question on the new ballot, you invite criticism that you are simply rerunning the 2016 vote, which risks perpetuating Brexit divisions. The Borda count is more neutral: it treats all options equally.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249282/original/file-20181206-128202-2q8pgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249282/original/file-20181206-128202-2q8pgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249282/original/file-20181206-128202-2q8pgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249282/original/file-20181206-128202-2q8pgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249282/original/file-20181206-128202-2q8pgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249282/original/file-20181206-128202-2q8pgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249282/original/file-20181206-128202-2q8pgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A second referendum must be carefully designed, otherwise it could cause even further division.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">PA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In this context, there are also problems with using a <a href="https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/voting-systems/types-of-voting-system/alternative-vote/">transferable vote</a> system, as supported by Conservative MP <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/20/parliament-people-brexit-theresa-may-second-referendum">Justine Greening</a>. As with the Borda count, voters return a simple ranking. If there is no alternative ranked first by a majority, the option that got the least first preferences is eliminated. These votes are then allocated to the two other options following the second ranked option. </p>
<p>In the polarised scenario at hand, if there is no majority for one of the “remain” or “no-deal” options to guarantee those options a straight win, the “deal” option would most probably have the least first preferences. Hence the transferable vote would eliminate the moderate option first and one of the extreme options would win. This is, in our view, an undesirable feature of this system since as we previously established the moderate option would most likely win against both other options in a two-way referendum.</p>
<p>That’s why we think the three-way, Borda count vote is the best option for finding a way out of this Brexit mess.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108217/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s the fairest way to settle this debate – though in the absence of a clear majority supporting either “remain” or a “no deal” it would probably mean accepting Theresa May’s deal.Orestis Troumpounis, Senior Lecturer, Lancaster UniversityDimitrios Xefteris, Assistant Professor of Political Economy, University of CyprusLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.