tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/failed-state-44091/articlesfailed state – The Conversation2023-07-18T14:32:55Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2098832023-07-18T14:32:55Z2023-07-18T14:32:55ZNelson Mandela’s legacy is taking a battering because of the dismal state of South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538003/original/file-20230718-27-ey48jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nelson Mandela, the late first president of democratic South Africa, is credited with the relatively peaceful transition from apartheid rule.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Per-Anders Pettersson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The multiple concerns about the dismal state of South Africa – including a <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/06/15/cf-south-africas-economy-loses-momentum-amid-record-power-cuts">stagnant and failing economy</a>, a seemingly incapable state, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/state-capture-report-chronicles-extent-of-corruption-in-south-africa-but-will-action-follow-174441">massive corruption</a> – have led to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/rule-of-law-in-south-africa-protects-even-those-who-scorn-it-175533">questioning</a> of the political and economic settlement made in 1994 to end apartheid. The settlement is <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Nelson-Mandela">strongly associated with Nelson Mandela</a>, who oversaw its progress to a successful conclusion. He subsequently underpinned it by promoting reconciliation with white people, especially Afrikaners, the former rulers.</p>
<p>The questioning of the 1994 settlement, and therefore Mandela’s legacy, has different dimensions, running through diverse narratives. One, associated with a faction of the governing African National Congress (ANC) that claims to stand for “<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-ret-and-what-does-it-want-the-radical-economic-transformation-faction-in-south-africa-explained-195949">radical economic transformation</a>”, is that the settlement was a “sell-out” to “<a href="https://theconversation.com/white-monopoly-capital-an-excuse-to-avoid-south-africas-real-problems-75143">white monopoly capital</a>”. Another is the inclination to lay the blame for state failure <a href="https://theconversation.com/rule-of-law-in-south-africa-protects-even-those-who-scorn-it-175533">on the constitution</a>, thereby deflecting responsibility for massive governance failures away from the ANC.</p>
<p>Yet another stems from the frustrations of recent black graduates and the mass of black unemployed for whom there are <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/Media%20release%20QLFS%20Q4%202022.pdf">no jobs</a>. There are also huge numbers of people without either <a href="https://apsdpr.org/index.php/apsdpr/article/view/372/739">adequate shelter</a> or <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=16235#:%7E:text=More%20than%20half%20a%20million,high%20risk%20of%20acute%20malnutrition.">enough to eat</a>. South Africans want someone to blame. While their search regularly targets a wide range of usual suspects, it also leads to a questioning of what Mandela really left behind. </p>
<p>It does not help that Mandela continues to be lionised by many, if not most, white people, who despite much grumbling about the many inconveniences of life in South Africa have largely continued to prosper.</p>
<p>This means that those of us who are social scientists and long-term observers of South Africa’s politics and history need to think carefully about how we think critically about Mandela’s legacy.</p>
<h2>Questioning Mandela’s legacy</h2>
<p>From a historian’s view the questioning of Mandela’s legacy is normal. Historians are always asking new questions and reassessing the past to gain new insights about the role important political leaders play.</p>
<p>This has posed particular problems for Mandela’s biographers. Biography has always had a problematic relationship with history as a discipline. This partly stems from history’s reluctance to endorse “Great Men” versions of the past. Partly from the more generic problem of assessing individuals’ role in shaping wider developments. Thus it has been with Mandela. Nonetheless, the six or seven <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=Mandela+biopgraphies&rlz=1C1GCEA_enZA1007ZA1007&oq=Mandela+biopgraphies&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIJCAEQABgNGIAEMgkIAhAAGA0YgAQyCQgDEC4YDRiABDIJCAQQABgNGIAEMggIBRAAGA0YHjIICAYQABgNGB4yCAgHEAAYDRgeMggICBAAGA0YHjIKCAkQABgFGA0YHtIBCDQ5NjNqMWo3qAIAsAIA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8">significant biographies of Mandela</a> may be said to revolve around the following arguments.</p>
<p>First, Mandela played a critical role in preventing a descent into total civil war. It was brutal enough as it was. Narratives at the time often suggested that the period 1990-94 was a “<a href="https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2019-07-09-sas-transition-to-democracy-miracle-or-mediation">miracle</a>”, a difficult but “peaceful transition to democracy”. But this was misleading. <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02167/04lv02264/05lv02335/06lv02357/07lv02372/08lv02379.htm">Thousands died</a> in political violence during this time.</p>
<p>Mandela’s biographers argue that his initiating negotiations with the regime from jail, independently of the ANC, was crucial. Without his actions, the apartheid state would not have come to the party. This, even though by the time FW de Klerk, its last president, came to power, it was seeking a route to a settlement. </p>
<p>Second, Mandela played his cards carefully in steadily asserting his authority over the ANC. Although the ANC in exile had carefully choreographed the imprisoned Mandela as an icon around which international opposition to apartheid could be mobilised, there remained much questioning within the organisation following his release about his motivations and wisdom. Also whether he should replace the ailing <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-is-celebrating-the-year-of-or-tambo-who-was-he-85838">Oliver Tambo</a> as its leader. That he proceeded to convince his doubters by constantly proclaiming his loyalty to the ANC, its militant “line” and his subjection to its discipline while simultaneously edging it towards negotiations is said to have been key to his establishing his claim to leadership. This was necessary to convince his doubters within the ANC that it could not defeat the regime on the field of battle. Hence there was a need for compromise with the regime.</p>
<p>Third, Mandela is credited with successfully steering the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/convention-democratic-south-africa-codesa">negotiations which led to South Africa’s democracy</a>. That he played a limited part in negotiating much of the nitty-gritty of the new constitution is acknowledged. Yet, this is combined with recognition of his acute judgment of when to place pressure on the regime to secure concessions and when to adopt a more conciliatory line. Generally, it is agreed that the ANC outsmarted the apartheid government during the negotiations. Praise is correctly showered on Mandela for his role in bringing both the far right, under <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02426/05lv02691.htm">Constand Viljoen</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/buthelezis-retirement-wont-end-ethnic-traditionalism-in-south-africa-102213">Mangosuthu Buthelezi</a>’s quarrelsome Inkatha Freedom Movement <a href="https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/g/files/toruqf5601/files/Policy_Note_ID137.pdf">into the 1994 election at the very last moment</a>, without which it would have lacked legitimacy.</p>
<p>Fourth, while today it is recognised that a narrative of the time – that South Africans had negotiated the finest constitution in the world – was overcooked, the negotiations resulted in the country becoming a constitutional democracy. </p>
<p>We now know, of course, that the ANC has subverted much of the intention of the constitution and undermined many of its safeguards. <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-ruling-party-has-favoured-loyalty-over-competence-now-cadre-deployment-has-come-back-to-bite-it-199208">Its cadre deployment policy</a> of appointing loyalists to key state institutions has severely diminished the independence of the state machinery. Furthermore, the ANC has merged party with state. Above all, it has severely weakened the capacity of parliament to <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-parliament-fails-to-hold-the-executive-to-account-history-shows-what-can-happen-192889">hold the president and ministers accountable</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">State Capture Commission</a> has laid bare the mechanics of all this in great detail. It has placed huge responsibility for this upon the ANC. Nonetheless, it is widely recognised by civil society that the constitution and the law still provide the fundamental basis for exacting political accountability. This is confirmed by the many judgments the Constitutional Court has <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-south-africas-constitutional-court-protecting-democracy-107443">rendered against the government</a>.</p>
<p>Fifth, while his critics often argue that Mandela leant over too far to appease whites, the counter-argument is that this grounded democracy. At the beginning of his <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/318431.Long_Walk_to_Freedom">autobiography</a>, Mandela presents the struggle in South Africa as a clash between Afrikaner and African nationalisms. His role during negotiations can be viewed through the prism of his conviction of the need to reconcile these, as one could not defeat the other. Without reconciliation, however imperfect, there could be no making of a new nation. After all, what was the alternative? </p>
<h2>Capturing Mandela’s legacy</h2>
<p>There is never going to be a final assessment of Mandela’s legacy. How it is regarded will continue to change, depending on the destination South Africa travels to. If it really does become a “<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-political-risk-profile-has-gone-up-a-few-notches-but-its-not-yet-a-failed-state-170653">failed state</a>”, as the doomsters predict, there will be much need for reexamination of whether this failure has its roots in the constitutional settlement which Mandela did so much to bring about. For the moment, however, Mandela continues to inspire South Africans who place their hopes in constitutional democracy. What other hopes do they have?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209883/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is never going to be a final assessment of Mandela’s legacy. How it is regarded will continue to change, depending on the destination South Africa travels to.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1706532021-12-14T14:33:07Z2021-12-14T14:33:07ZSouth Africa’s political risk profile has gone up a few notches: but it’s not yet a failed state<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434759/original/file-20211130-26-rfceqc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Looters rampage through a shopping centre in the city of Durban during lawlessness triggered by the arrest of former president Jacob Zuma</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In July, South Africa suffered the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57818215">worst violence since the 1990s</a>. Highways were blocked and businesses, warehouses and other property looted and set alight. More than 300 people died. </p>
<p>In mid-October, people were again shocked when a group of men, said to be Somali nationals, openly <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/eastern-cape/we-are-not-at-war-bheki-cele-slams-rifle-brandishing-men-in-wake-of-gqeberha-violence-fdca7ffc-8226-44df-9c66-e7739f6d650e">brandished high calibre weapons</a> during a fight between Somali shop owners and local taxi drivers in public view in Gqeberha, Eastern Cape. </p>
<p>Not long after 56 people, said to be disgruntled military veterans, <a href="https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-10-15-anc-military-veterans-arrested-after-allegedly-holding-ministers-hostage/__;!!LRJdiIM!SZcV1USZ800B4zCKx2F2qTCIilUCjyTzLg5_g9ef6W6N-1ITPBUYNfjixYqFjCRns6_J%24">were arrested</a> after allegedly holding two government ministers and a deputy minister hostage in Pretoria. They allegedly <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-liberation-war-veterans-are-angry-heres-why-170596">demanded compensation</a> for their role in the liberation struggle against minority white rule. </p>
<p>These violent incidents led to a question being asked: has South Africa become a <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/weekend-argus/news/south-africa-not-a-failed-state-yet-3d74e6b1-48e8-4e42-9236-b4578c24aa4d">failed state</a>? The issue has <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2020-09-22-is-south-africa-a-failing-or-failed-state-lets-stop-with-the-useless-labels/">come up</a> and warnings sounded <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/9/10/south-africa-heading-towards-becoming-a-failed-state-report">before this year’s events</a>.</p>
<p>I teach political risk analysis – in essence the study of potential harms to a country’s stability and future. The work entails providing new, comprehensive current-day political risk analyses of South Africa each year. This has to be based on a variety of variables, ranging from ‘legitimacy of government’ to ‘safety and security’ to ‘socio-economic conditions’ and many more.</p>
<p>The concept of a <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-background-papers/Definition-of-a-Failed-State.pdf">failed state</a> is contested. But, in general, it applies to states where the administrative, political, and economic systems have become so weak that key governmental functions become inoperable or even disintegrate.</p>
<p>This, in turn, affects the ability of a government to support or improve the conditions of life for most of the citizenry.</p>
<p>Looking at South Africa, it can be argued that some things in the country are still the same since 1994 in terms of the <a href="http://dspace.nwu.ac.za/handle/10394/19408">broad macro-political</a> risk profile of the country. Yet, serious political risks – such as war, revolution, a coup d’état, hostile neighbours, military involvement in politics – remain relatively low.</p>
<p>Even violent racial or ethnic conflict do not seem to be of major concern as they have never threatened the post-1994 democratic project in any substantial manner.</p>
<h2>Risk factors</h2>
<p>Political risk relating to several variables in the socio-economic domain are increasingly of considerable concern. For example, government shortcomings in providing or facilitating enough <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-safrica-homes-feat-idUSKCN22615J">housing, water, electricity</a> and <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02113rdQuarter2021.pdf">jobs</a> to millions of people is a huge source of frustration. </p>
<p>As much as South Africa has changed for the better in certain areas in the sense that it has, for example, become a <a href="https://www.globalintegrity.org/2020/09/25/towards-more-racially-just-societies-learnings-from-south-africa/">more racially just society</a> several new red flags have begun to appear in the past two decades. </p>
<p>The country witnessed increasingly high levels of violence and or dissatisfaction associated with <a href="http://www.labour.gov.za/strikes-in-2018-reaches-a-high-in-the-past-five-year-%E2%80%93-department-of-employment-and-labour">labour unrest</a>. <a href="https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/everything-you-need-to-know-south-africa-protests/?gclid=CjwKCAjwwsmLBhACEiwANq-tXInfvpw8OKpiQ4i81GT1zMNij6Kf4LIYM7wLrrOZeks3EFZ7n1TH9BoCR_YQAvD_BwE">Violent protests</a> have become a common phenomenon. In fact, risk in the form of violent service delivery protests and other <a href="https://td-sa.net/index.php/td/article/view/643/1111*">unrest has increased</a> markedly. </p>
<p>Other forms of socio-economic frustrations also increased as well as <a href="https://www.citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/2174661/put-out-the-fires-and-act-ramaphosa/">xenophobia</a>.</p>
<p>Importantly, the <a href="https://www.saferspaces.org.za/understand/entry/what-is-the-situation-in-south-africa">cost of violence</a> to the economy is among the highest in the world. The 2021 <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/#/">Global Peace Index</a> recently placed the national cost of violence in South Africa is a staggering 19% of the country’s GDP. This is the 16th highest rate in the world. </p>
<p>Overall the country ranked <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/#/">128th out of 161 countries</a> in the most recent Global Peace Index, which is an index measuring the peacefulness of countries on the basis of 23 quantitative and qualitative indicators. </p>
<p>A number of other factors also pose high degrees of political risk. These pertain to a need for <a href="https://www.intransformation.org.za/2021/05/22/visionary-leadership-needed-in-south-africa-to-reduce-inequality/">solid and visionary political leadership</a> at all levels of government to deal with a range of governance problems, high levels of <a href="https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/cw-annual-report-average-11-whistle-blower-reports-a-day-in-2020/?gclid=CjwKCAjwwsmLBhACEiwANq-tXHwJAPx2o88fqIKVQvgjXK5mKBUkJguMDFqd-Cg1JXzQqmyK_gUeUBoCB3YQAvD_BwE">corruption</a>, <a>inefficient government administration</a>, especially at <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2020-02-11-local-government-crisis-rooted-in-incompetence-and-corruption/">municipal level</a>. Added to this is the need to tackle the never-ending institutional challenges facing Eskom, the power utility, resulting in <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/energy/477278/eskoms-problems-are-far-worse-than-we-thought-analysts/">erratic electricity supply</a> to the detriment of the economy.</p>
<p>Underlying the protests and related frustrations are <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview#1">several years of low economic growth</a> and <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-03-02-00-sa-counts-cost-of-poor-governance/">poor governance</a>. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02113rdQuarter2021.pdf">Unemployment is extremely high</a>, amid low levels of education and skills. <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=14415">Youth unemployment</a>, especially, remains one of South Africa’s most pressing challenges. </p>
<p>Another problem area is <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-01-22-law-enforcement-agencies-incompetent-and-compromised-da/">incapacitated law enforcement institutions</a>. Recently, <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/33357/">parliamentarians expressed concern</a> that the country’s law enforcement agencies did not have the capacity to handle situations like civil unrest, if it was more widespread than the recent unrest in July 2021. In fact, the Human Rights Commission recently heard that the South African Police Service was not “<a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-11-22-outmanned-outgunned-outrun-police-commissioner-sitole-admits-saps-failings-as-sahrc-hearings-continue/">equal to the task</a>” when riots and looting broke out in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng in July.</p>
<p>For the Police Commissioner to admit before a commission of inquiry that a country’s police force was <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-11-22-outmanned-outgunned-outrun-police-commissioner-sitole-admits-saps-failings-as-sahrc-hearings-continue/">outmanned, outgunned and outrun</a> when called upon to protect citizens, their property and public property against the looters, is most concerning.</p>
<p>In view of the above, the broad macro-political risk profile of the country has changed fundamentally and worsened substantially <a href="https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/">from 2006 to 2021</a>. In this context, the country’s political risk profile must be considered a matter of serious concern.</p>
<p>So, is the country now a failed state or about to become one?</p>
<h2>Where South Africa stands</h2>
<p>The annual <a href="https://fragilestatesindex.org/">Fund for Peace’s Fragile State Index</a> can be taken as an authoritative indicator of international state fragility and political risk. The index maps states across the globe and ranks them in terms of 12 categories – from sustainable (shades of blue) to stable (shades of green) to warning (shades of yellow) to alert (<a href="https://fragilestatesindex.org/">shades of red</a>). </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435275/original/file-20211202-21-vy4vq5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of the world with colours indicating fragility" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435275/original/file-20211202-21-vy4vq5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435275/original/file-20211202-21-vy4vq5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435275/original/file-20211202-21-vy4vq5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435275/original/file-20211202-21-vy4vq5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435275/original/file-20211202-21-vy4vq5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435275/original/file-20211202-21-vy4vq5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435275/original/file-20211202-21-vy4vq5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fragility in the World 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://fragilestatesindex.org/">Fragile States Index</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>South Africa’s standing in the index is cause for concern. It has moved from <a href="https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/">stable in 2006 to warning in 2021</a>. This clearly indicates a much higher level of political risk in the country. Interestingly, the opposite happened to Botswana, which moved from the warning to the stable category. </p>
<p>In my view South Africa is probably still in the medium-risk category of political risk.</p>
<p>Countries like Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Chad, Sudan and South Sudan, which are either in a state of armed conflict or recovering from armed conflict, are indicated as far more ‘fragile’ on the Fragile State Index, and find themselves in the alert category. These countries are all showing high levels of institutional and social <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/harmonized-list-of-fragile-situations">fragility</a>, based on publicly available indicators that measure the quality of policy and institutions and manifestations of fragility. South Africa, on the other hand, is also miles away from experiences in these countries. </p>
<p>This implies that state failure is of much more relevance to these countries than South Africa.</p>
<p>Still, the evidence shows that political risk in the country has increased markedly in certain areas over the past two decades. It’s clear that South Africa has been moving from ‘medium risk’ into ‘high-medium risk’ or even ‘high risk’ in recent years.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, to call South Africa a failed state would be an exaggeration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170653/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theo Neethling receives funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>The evidence shows that political risk in South Africa has increased markedly in certain areas over the past two decades.Theo Neethling, Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1443092020-08-12T08:29:36Z2020-08-12T08:29:36ZRepression in Zimbabwe exposes South Africa’s weakness<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352286/original/file-20200811-18-i8su44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Emmerson Mnangagwa of Zimbabwe and President Cyril Ramaphiosa of South Africa in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South African president Cyril Ramaphosa’s <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2020/08/10/sa-special-envoys-get-red-carpet-welcome-in-zim-amid-tensions">despatch of envoys to Zimbabwe</a> in a bid to defuse the latest crisis, in which the government has engaged in a vicious crackdown on opponents, journalists and the freedoms of speech, association and protest, has been widely welcomed.</p>
<p>Such has been the brutality of the latest assault on human rights by President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s regime that something had to be done. And, as the big brother neighbour next door, South Africa is the obvious actor to do it. </p>
<p>It may be guaranteed that Ramaphosa’s envoys – <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/fholisani-sydney-mufamadi">Sydney Mufamadi</a>, a former government minister turned academic, and <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/baleka-mbete-honourable">Baleka Mbete</a>, a former deputy president of South Africa, former speaker of the National Assembly and former chairperson of the African National Congress (ANC) – were sent off to Harare with a very limited brief. They were accompanied by <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/who-is-ngoako-ramatlhodi-29368263">Advocate Ngoako Ramatlhodi</a> and diplomat <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/ndumiso-ntshinga-13b3a348/?originalSubdomain=ke">Ndumiso Ntshinge</a>.</p>
<p>The mission quickly ran into trouble. The envoys returned to South Africa without <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/ramaphosas-envoys-snub-zimbabwean-opposition-parties-after-meeting-president-mnangagwa-20200811">meeting members of the opposition</a>.</p>
<p>Observers and activists are rightly <a href="https://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/392334/zimbabweans-skeptical-as-past-envoys-in-mbeki-mugabe-era-used-as-a-whitewash-or-cover-up">sceptical</a> about how much will come out of it. The best that is seriously hoped for is that South African diplomacy will bring about immediate relief. This would include: the release of journalists, opposition figures and civil society activists from jail; promises to withdraw the military from the streets; perhaps even some jogging of the Mnangagwa government to meet with its opponents and to make some trifling concessions.</p>
<p>After all, the pattern is now well established: crisis, intervention, promises by the Zanu-PF regime to behave, and then relapse after a decent interval to the sort of behaviour that prompted the latest crisis in the first place. </p>
<p>But in a previous era, South Africa once made Zimbabwe’s dependence count.</p>
<h2>South Africa has done it once</h2>
<p>Back in 1976, apartheid South Africa’s Prime Minister John B. Vorster fell in with US plans to bring about a settlement in then Rhodesia, and hence relieve international pressure on his own government, by withdrawing military and economic support and closing the border between the two countries. </p>
<p>Ian Smith had little choice but to comply. Today, no one, not even the most starry-eyed hopefuls among the ranks of the opposition and civil society in Zimbabwe, believe that Ramaphosa’s South Africa will be prepared to wield such a big stick. The time is long past that Pretoria’s admonitions of bad behaviour are backed by a credible threat of sanction and punishment.</p>
<p>So, why is it that Vorster could bring about real change, twisting Smith’s arm to engage in negotiations with his liberation movement opponents that eventually led to a settlement and a transition to majority rule, and ANC governments – from the time of Nelson Mandela onwards – have been so toothless? </p>
<p>If we want an answer, we need to look at three fundamental differences between 1976 and now.</p>
<p>First, Vorster was propelled into pressuring Smith by the US, which was eager to halt the perceived advance of communism by bringing about a settlement in Rhodesia which was acceptable to the West. In turn, Vorster thought that by complying with US pressure, his regime would earn Washington’s backing as an anti-communist redoubt. Today there is no equivalent spur to act. It is unlikely that US president Donald Trump could point to Zimbabwe on a map. </p>
<p>Britain, the European Union and other far-off international actors all <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/arrest-of-zimbabwe-journalist-shows-mnangagwas-heavy-hand-4b45fffd-43a2-4f0f-a81b-0feca5ebb6eb">decry</a> the human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. But they have largely given up on exerting influence, save to extend vitally needed humanitarian aid (and thank God for that). Zimbabwe has retreated into irrelevance, except as a case study as a failed state. They are not likely to reenter the arena and throw good money and effort at the Zimbabwean problem until they are convinced that something significant, some serious political change for the good, is likely to happen.</p>
<p>Second, South African intervention today is constrained by liberation movement solidarity. They may have their differences and arguments, but Zanu-PF and the ANC, which governs South Africa, remain bound together by the conviction that they are the embodiments of <a href="https://theconversation.com/southern-africas-liberation-movements-can-they-abandon-old-bad-habits-101197">the logic of history</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-liberators-turn-into-oppressors-a-study-of-southern-african-states-57213">How liberators turn into oppressors: a study of southern African states</a>
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<p>As the leading liberators of their respective countries, they believe they represent the true <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-insists-its-still-a-political-vanguard-this-is-what-ails-democracy-in-south-africa-141938">interests</a> of the people. If the people say otherwise in an election, this can only be because they have been duped or bought. It cannot be allowed that history should be put into reverse.</p>
<p>Former South African president Thabo Mbeki played a crucial role in forging a coalition government between Zanu-PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) after the latter effectively won the parliamentary election <a href="https://theconversation.com/sham-or-not-election-flaws-unlikely-to-unseat-mugabe-16737">in 2008</a>. But South Africa held back from endorsing reliable indications that MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai had also won the presidential election against Robert Mugabe. </p>
<p>As a result, Tsvangirai was forced into a runoff presidential contest, supposedly because he had won less than 50% of the poll. The rest is history. </p>
<p>Zanu-PF struck back with a truly vicious campaign against the MDC, <a href="http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1817057,00.html">Tsvangirai withdrew from the contest</a>, and Mugabe remained as president, controlling the levers of power. The ANC looked on, held its nose, and scuttled home to Pretoria saying the uneasy coalition it left behind was a job well done.</p>
<p>Third, successive Zanu-PF governments have become increasingly militarised. Mnangagwa may have put his military uniform aside, but it is the military which now calls the shots. It ultimately decides who will front for its power. There have been numerous statements by top ranking generals that they will never accept a government other than one <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics/zimbabwe-army-wont-allow-opposition-to-rule-minister-idUSKCN1IO2B9">formed by Zanu-PF</a>. The African Union and Southern African Development Community have both <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/lomedec.htm">outlawed coups</a>, but everyone knows that the Mnangagwa government is a military government in all but name.</p>
<h2>Lamentably inadequate</h2>
<p>So, it is all very well to call for a transitional government, one which would see Zanu-PF engaging with the opposition parties and civil society and promising a return to constitutional rule and the holding of a genuinely democratic election. But we have been there before.</p>
<p>The fundamental issue is how Zimbabwe’s military can be removed from power, and how Zimbabwean politics can be <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-beware-the-military-is-looking-after-its-own-interests-not-democracy-87712">demilitarised</a>. Without the military behind it, Zanu-PF would be revealed as a paper tiger, and would meet with a heavy defeat in a genuinely free and fair election.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Ibbo_Mandaza">Ibbo Mandaza</a>, the veteran activist and analyst in Harare, what Zimbabwe needs is the <a href="https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2020/05/03/no-way-national-transitional-authority/">establishment of a transitional authority</a> tasked with returning the country to constitutional government and enabling an economic recovery. Nice idea, but a pipe dream.</p>
<p>No one in their right mind believes that a Ramaphosa government, whose own credibility is increasingly threadbare because of its bungled response to the coronavirus epidemic, its corruption and its economic incompetence, has the stomach to bring this about. We can expect fine words and promises and raised hopes, but lamentably little action until the next crisis comes around, when the charade will start all over again.</p>
<p>Any relief, any improvement on the present situation will be welcomed warmly in Zimbabwe. But no one in Harare – whether in government, opposition or civil society – will really believe that Ramaphosa’s increasingly ramshackle government will be prepared to tackle the issue that really matters: removing the military from power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144309/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall is author of Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa.</span></em></p>The time is long past that Pretoria’s admonitions of bad behaviour by Zimbabwe’s leaders are backed by a credible threat of sanction and punishment.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1396802020-06-22T19:59:05Z2020-06-22T19:59:05ZIs America a ‘failing state’? How a superpower has been brought to the brink<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343082/original/file-20200622-75487-5qbwtt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/EPA/Albert Halim</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a sense <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24027184">history had ended</a>, and that the United States represented a supreme endpoint.</p>
<p>Today, the US is not dominant, it is in crisis: convulsed by riots and protest, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage">riven by a virus</a> that has galloped away from those charged with overseeing it, and heading into a presidential election led by a man that has possibly <a href="https://www.ap.org/explore/divided-america/">divided the nation</a> like no other before him.</p>
<p>Using the most common metrics available to political scientists, there are signs the United States is failing.</p>
<p>Until very recently, this idea was extraordinary, unthinkable to all but the most radical critics. But, the US is increasingly performing poorly on key predictors of state failure: <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1162/01636600260046253">ethnic and class conflict</a>, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jack_Goldstone/publication/247638675_State_Failure_Task_Force_Report_Phase_II_Findings/links/53d911720cf2631430c3a534/State-Failure-Task-Force-Report-Phase-II-Findings.pdf">democratic and institutional backsliding</a>, and other <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=AtAyGeRRyzYC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=socioeconomic+%22state+failure%22&ots=3m2KYncYSO&sig=_rnd9LdMosNyALWWMmGkA-UitJ0&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=socioeconomic%20%22state%20failure%22&f=false">socioeconomic indicators</a> including healthcare and inequality.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/when-trump-attacks-the-press-he-attacks-the-american-people-and-their-constitution-139863">When Trump attacks the press, he attacks the American people and their Constitution</a>
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<h2>Ethnic and class conflict</h2>
<p>Comparative politics pays great attention to the role of ethnic conflict as a predictor of state failure. Those who study African countries, where most of the flare-ups are currently taking place, often observe that <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0304387815000644">ethnic conflicts are closely correlated with battles to secure key resources</a>, such as water and arable land. This closely relates the study of so-called “<a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=1TXcAAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA159&dq=grievance+studies&ots=lMCtLARVeB&sig=VU1SvrQnyHv9qF5BlG5B0ZJjlRk&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=grievance%20studies&f=false">grievance studies</a>”, which typically regards deep-seated inequalities as causing resource conflicts. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343143/original/file-20200622-160665-2x9jk7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343143/original/file-20200622-160665-2x9jk7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343143/original/file-20200622-160665-2x9jk7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343143/original/file-20200622-160665-2x9jk7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343143/original/file-20200622-160665-2x9jk7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343143/original/file-20200622-160665-2x9jk7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343143/original/file-20200622-160665-2x9jk7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Black Lives Matters protesters in Washington D.C.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Sipa USA/CNP</span></span>
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<p>However, it would be a mistake to think this is because of different ethnic groups <em>per se</em>. It is <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-10540-2_1">more to do with how inequality and poverty </a> exacerbate perceived racial and cultural fissures. The US reflects this problem, where the experience of many black Americans is telling: they feel “<a href="http://dspace.calstate.edu/bitstream/handle/10211.3/213609/AS352018EDDF73.pdf?sequence=1">criminalised at birth</a>”, and when this perception reaches a critical mass among a large enough population, states fail.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-minneapolis-burns-trumps-presidency-is-sinking-deeper-into-crisis-and-yet-he-may-still-be-re-elected-139739">As Minneapolis burns, Trump's presidency is sinking deeper into crisis. And yet, he may still be re-elected</a>
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<p>The global conflict zones that political scientists largely focus on are where groups are fighting for basic resources. These include <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/palgrave.development.1100269">water</a>, <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=f8LVDQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT6&dq=mineral+conflict+africa&ots=BVS6EEXrcw&sig=OAiVkSVKeGKQEMiOpC5zyLyyL_k&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=mineral%20conflict%20africa&f=false">mineral</a>, and other basic economic rights. </p>
<p>So, areas that are deeply impoverished, such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/flint-water-crisis">Flint, Michigan</a>, or almost any other recent area of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S235282731930182X">profound socio-economic distress</a>, are highly analogous to failed countries. They have also been some of the biggest challenges to the “united” part of the United States.</p>
<h2>Signs of increased economic inequality</h2>
<p>Yet, the economic indicators are not only dire for minority groups. America’s economy has grown at a good clip for decades, but the wealth has been taken up almost entirely by the wealthiest. For example, CEOs’ pay went from 20 times the average workers’ salary in 1965 to <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-compensation-2018/">278 times their salary in 2018</a>.</p>
<p>In real terms, only college graduates have seen their pay increase <a href="https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/the-value-of-college-2/">as a group since 1979</a>, and this occurs while <a href="http://www.nccp.org/topics/childpoverty.html">21% of American children live in poverty</a>. Moreover, health outcomes for Americans are very poor <a href="https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2020/jan/us-health-care-global-perspective-2019">compared to other OECD countries</a>, despite having the highest per capita healthcare costs <a href="http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/health-data.htm">in the world</a>.</p>
<p>Disproportionately, this is a problem affecting black Americans. This might go some way to explaining recent riots, but is far from a complete picture. All poor Americans are getting <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-poverty-statistics-ignore-millions-of-struggling-americans-118321">relatively poorer</a>, which may also explain why poor white Americans seem increasingly likely to fight against <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/the-original-underclass/492731/">the perceived injustices of other ethnic groups</a>. They do this by pitting themselves against similarly politically and economically disenfranchised groups, rather than the power system that keeps them dispossessed.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343134/original/file-20200622-75496-1xenpyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343134/original/file-20200622-75496-1xenpyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343134/original/file-20200622-75496-1xenpyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343134/original/file-20200622-75496-1xenpyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343134/original/file-20200622-75496-1xenpyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343134/original/file-20200622-75496-1xenpyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343134/original/file-20200622-75496-1xenpyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Two children paint a mural at Black Lives Plaza, Washington D.C.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/EPA/Michael Reynolds</span></span>
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<p><a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2014/05/04/thomas-pikettys-capital-summarised-in-four-paragraphs">Adding to this, a major historical study by Thomas Piketty</a> showed the disconnect between the poorest and wealthiest Americans is getting exponentially worse, the middle class is shrinking, and the wealth of the top 1% is taking up an increasing share of the pie.</p>
<h2>Is there a democratic deficit?</h2>
<p>This wealth disconnect is increasingly represented as a deficit in democracy. As <a href="https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/mgilens/files/gilens_and_page_2014_-testing_theories_of_american_politics.doc.pdf">one study showed</a>, America’s democracy is being seriously undermined. </p>
<p>In fact, “undermined” is putting it mildly: after a rigorous analysis of voting from 1982 to 2002, Gilens and Page showed the preferences of the top 10% routinely trumped those of average voters.</p>
<p>It would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of these findings. As <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-democrats-must-change-heres-how-they-can-do-it-68738">analyses of the 2016 general election showed</a>, the US states that flipped from Democrat to Republican (supposedly part of Hillary Clinton’s “firewall”) were almost exclusively part of the so called “rust belt”. Once part of America’s all-powerful manufacturing base, they are now people who feel forgotten, and increasingly angry.</p>
<p>The black and white, racial narrative of America’s woes misses an important, but even more consequential point: while there is no doubt black Americans are disproportionately suffering, an increasing majority is losing out, regardless of race.</p>
<h2>American hope</h2>
<p>The American revolution centred on the very sensible idea there should be no taxation without representation. Yet, there is now significant evidence that a majority of citizens are not being represented.</p>
<p>The US has one advantage: for all of its flaws, it remains an at least <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/america-democracy-rated-donald-trump-not-fully-democratic-us-president-report-the-economist-a8195121.html">semi-functional democracy</a>. This may well mean blame for state failure can exist with individuals or parties, rather than the entire system.</p>
<p>However, the democratic institutions of the United States continue to break down, and successive governments have proved unable to respond and listen to their citizens. Bizarrely, by the most important indicators available to political scientists, the United States is failing.</p>
<p>Even among its most ardent critics, few would consider America’s failure to be anything other than a catastrophe. The domestic deterioration of the world’s biggest nuclear and military superpower would prove unprecedented and frightening beyond rational analysis — rhetoric suggesting this is merely the new “fall of Rome” is almost glib.</p>
<p>The challenge now is whether the world’s oldest continuous democracy can live up to its own ideals.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/139680/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>George Rennie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By many measures, America is failing, and its people - in fact, the world - need the nuclear and military giant to turn itself around.George Rennie, Lecturer in Politics, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/846532017-10-05T14:51:37Z2017-10-05T14:51:37ZThe attempt to replenish Lake Chad’s water may fail again. Here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/188956/original/file-20171005-9802-10shqhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Presidents Issoufou, Yayi, Deby and Buhari at a meeting of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the body in charge of the lake replenishment project </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Afolabi Sotunde</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/1997/eirv24n35-19970829/eirv24n35-19970829_007-transaqua_an_idea_for_the_sahel.pdf">Transaqua Project</a> is a big, ambitious initiative to replenish the waters of <a href="http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2012/africa%E2%80%99s-vanishing-lake-chad">Lake Chad</a>, a fresh water inland lake in Central Africa. </p>
<p>It involves <a href="https://www.africanwaterfacility.org/fileadmin/uploads/awf/Projects/MULTIN-LAKECHAD-Water-Charter.pdf">12 countries</a> working together to build a 2 400 km canal to move about 100 billion cubic metres of water from the River Congo to the lake every year. The Lake Chad basin supports more than <a href="http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/about_freshwater/rivers/irbm/cases/lake_chad_river_case_study/">20 million people</a>.</p>
<p>If accomplished, the Transaqua Project will change the face of Africa – for better or for worse. But like other regional or transnational projects on the continent, it may be delayed or abandoned if national politics are ignored.</p>
<p>The replenishment project, mooted over 30 years ago, involves building several dams along the length of the canal. </p>
<p>The dams will potentially generate <a href="http://www.cblt.org/en/news/inter-basin-water-transfer-project-signing-memorandum-understanding-between-lcbc-and-PowerChina">15 to 25 thousand million KWh</a> of hydroelectricity and irrigate <a href="http://www.cblt.org/en/news/inter-basin-water-transfer-project-signing-memorandum-understanding-between-lcbc-and-PowerChina">50 000 to 70 000 km2 of land in the Sahel zone</a>. This will stimulate development in agriculture, industry, transport and electricity for <a href="http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/1997/eirv24n35-19970829/eirv24n35-19970829_007-transaqua_an_idea_for_the_sahel.pdf">up to 12 African countries</a>. </p>
<p>But the project is not immune from criticism. Some argue that claims that the lake is shrinking are <a href="http://jpe.library.arizona.edu/volume_23/Magrin.pdf">exaggerated</a>. Others argue that the plan poses serious <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2014:218:FULL&from=EN">environmental risks</a>. </p>
<p>It is difficult to determine whether the canal will address why the lake is drying up. And who benefits, and what the benefits will be to each country still remain unknown. It’s also possible that disagreement within and between countries could scuttle the project. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.cblt.org/en/news/inter-basin-water-transfer-project-signing-memorandum-understanding-between-lcbc-and-PowerChina">memorandum of understanding</a> for a feasibility study and the construction of the project was signed in December 2016 by the Lake Chad Basin Commission and PowerChina, the Chinese state engineering and construction firm. </p>
<p>The commission represents the interests of the 12 countries involved in the project and is guided by The <a href="https://www.africanwaterfacility.org/fileadmin/uploads/awf/Projects/MULTIN-LAKECHAD-Water-Charter.pdf">Water Charter</a>. This is the main instrument that outlines the mechanisms for dispute settlement.</p>
<p>The Charter, though, focuses on dealing with conflicts between countries rather than within them.</p>
<p>It is therefore worrying that the most important country in the project, Nigeria, faces internal challenges that may affect the project. </p>
<p>The long term nature of the project demands that the participating states are relatively stable in political and economic terms. Nigeria, Cameroon and Libya account for 78% of <a href="https://www.iaea.org/technicalcooperation/presentations/Sahel/Joint_Authorities/LCBC.pdf">member contributions</a> to the commission. Libya is currently seen as a <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/happening-libya-today-170418083223563.html">failed state</a>, so the focus is on Nigeria to offer political direction for the project. </p>
<h2>Nigeria mirrors the challenges</h2>
<p>Nigeria plays a powerful role as a regional leader and a major financial member of the Lake Chad Basin. Nigeria also <a href="https://www.iaea.org/technicalcooperation/presentations/Sahel/Joint_Authorities/LCBC.pdf">pays 40%</a> of the commission’s membership contributions of €6,275,906.90 (2013 budget). </p>
<p>Three political issues in Nigeria could affect the project. </p>
<p>The first is that President Muhammadu Buhari has had an important influence on its progress. Since he assumed office in May 2015, four milestones have been reached: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Nigeria ratified the Water Charter, five years after it was signed.</p></li>
<li><p>Nigeria signed the Charter for the Lake Chad Basin into law.</p></li>
<li><p>PowerChina and the Commission signed the memorandum of understanding. </p></li>
<li><p>PowerChina and Italian firm Bonfica Spa signed a <a href="https://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2017/eirv44n32-20170811/11_4432.pdf">deal</a> to conduct the feasibility study and build the Transaqua project. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>If Buhari’s influence wanes, the project could lose momentum. </p>
<p>The second political issue is that Nigerians will go to the polls again in 2019. Buhari’s <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/onogwu-buhari-health-shines-spotlight-on-him/440808-4005738-n3vxob/index.html">health challenges</a>, combined with the country’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/world/africa/muhammadu-buhari-nigeria-boko-haram.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FNigeria&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collection">economic and political</a> challenges, have reduced his approval ratings from 67% when he was elected <a href="http://www.gallup.com/poll/196136/nigerian-president-buhari-approval-drops-second-year.aspx">to 44% in 2016</a>. </p>
<p>The re-organisation and re-emergence of the opposition People’s Democratic Party gives voters a strong alternative, especially in parts of the country without an alternative political party that can compete with their political structure and finances. </p>
<p>That party, which was in power for 16 years, might not be able to meet the financial or security commitments to the water project because of their <a href="http://newafricanmagazine.com/why-the-pdp-lost/">past history</a> in government.</p>
<p>The third factor relates to institutional politics. The executive secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Abdullahi Sanusi Imran, has stated that the Transaqua idea “<a href="http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2014/eirv41n48-20141205/35-36_4148.pdf">is much more appropriate for the situation of the Lake Chad than all other alternative solutions</a>.” But an informal conversation with a senior Nigerian government official in the course of research fieldwork expressed concern about the choice of the Transaqua idea over other alternatives. </p>
<p>These alternatives were presented in the <a href="https://afrosai-e.org.za/uploads/afrosai_intohost_co_za/cms/files/environmental_audit_on_the_drying_up_of_lake_chad_nigeria.pdf">National Audit Report of Nigeria</a> as part of the <a href="https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/giz2015-en-joint-environmental-audit-report-lake-chad.pdf">Joint Environmental Audit report</a> on the drying up of Lake Chad: a report prepared by the <a href="https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4804">Supreme Audit Institutions </a> of each of the states for the African Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions. Dissenting positions can create unnecessary friction between government agencies and make it difficult to coordinate actions.</p>
<h2>So what should come next?</h2>
<p>Amendments to the Water Charter to provide for addressing intra-national political challenges are vital; a task for the African Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Supreme Audit Institutions in their respective national domains. States could be required to outline how they might solve potential political challenges in their domains. Expectations and responsibilities should be built into the Charter beyond negotiations and gentleman’s agreements. </p>
<p>The Lake Chad Basin Commission, political office holders and government institutions should work together to make the project’s objectives a key election issue in subsequent elections. </p>
<p>Intra-national and national politics cannot be ignored. But the project should also harness local knowledge and experience, and recognise local conditions so that it’s accepted by everyone.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84653/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adegboyega Adeniran receives funding from an ANU PhD Research Grant. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katherine Daniell receives funding from the European Commission. She is a member of the National Committee of Water Engineering (Engineers Australia), a member of the Initiatives of the Future of Great Rivers, A Fellow of the Peter Cullen Water and Environment Trust, and President of the Australian-French Association for Research and Innovation.</span></em></p>The transnational project conceived 30 years ago to replenish the drying waters of Lake Chad finally seems poised to take off. But first, internal politics within member states must be overcome.Adegboyega Adeniran, PhD Candidate, Fenner School of Environment and Society, Australian National UniversityKatherine Daniell, Senior Lecturer, Fenner School of Environment and Society, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.