tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/far-right-9377/articlesFar right – The Conversation2024-03-13T16:57:07Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2254872024-03-13T16:57:07Z2024-03-13T16:57:07ZI’ve studied extremism for years – here’s what Rishi Sunak should be doing instead of pursuing new definitions for the word<p>When Rishi Sunak stepped outside 10 Downing Street to make a speech on March 1, he had knowingly fuelled speculation that he was about to call an election. Prime ministers who broadcast live to the nation at a lectern outside 10 Downing Street on a Friday night are generally about to make a big announcement. </p>
<p>Instead, Sunak delivered an address on political extremism. But rather than giving a balanced assessment of the extremism problem, the prime minister’s Downing Street speech seemed heavily slanted towards the Islamist variety. He said, for example, “we must draw a line” when protesters call for “violent jihad”. And rather than choosing to speak about conciliation or cohesion, he said we must “prevent people entering this country whose aim is to undermine its values”.</p>
<p>What few references Sunak made to the far-right threat were based on the flawed premise that it and Islamism are “two sides of the same extremist coin”. They are, in fact, separate and differentiated problems – and the far right <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-prevent/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2022-to-march-2023">increasingly</a> trumps Islamism as a threat. More people are now referred to the government-run Prevent counter-extremism programme for worrying far-right views than Islamist views, for example.</p>
<p>Over the past ten years, the UK has seen significant shifts towards a more vocal form of far-right extremism – both in terms of ideas and political activism.</p>
<p>We have seen the rise of UKIP and its various successor parties. The party was initially conceived of as a mechanism to pressure the Conservative party into harder Euroscepticism but since its Brexit goal has been achieved, it has evolved into something else. Its focus now seems to converge on more <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/ukip-interim-manifesto/">radicalised forms of anti-Islam protests</a>.</p>
<p>Recent <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-68314949">polling</a> suggests the right-wing Reform UK party is soaking up discontents on the Conservative party’s right flank and again <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/14d4089f-504e-43ec-a104-7272569ce0df">resetting</a> the party’s main agenda. Reform’s most recent defector from the Conservative Party is Lee Anderson, a former deputy chairman who says “Islamists have got control of our country” and that migrants should go back to France.</p>
<p>There has also been a worrying rise in far-right terror attacks in the past decade. Most infamously, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/23/thomas-mair-slow-burning-hatred-led-to-jo-cox-murder">Thomas Mair</a> murdered Labour MP Jo Cox in June 2016 and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42886464">Darren Osborne</a> attacked a mosque in Finsbury Park in June 2017. There have been several other far-right terror plots since that haven’t made the headlines.</p>
<h2>Tolerating the intolerant</h2>
<p>With this far-right shift and concerns over increasing Islamist extremism in reaction to the Gaza conflict, one of the serious tasks now facing us as democrats is how to respond to political extremism. </p>
<p>To what extent should we <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24hqxs">tolerate the intolerant</a> within liberal democracies? How do thresholds, enacted in policy and law, between unpalatable views and dangerous actions look in concrete reality when dealing with political extremism? And how should our leaders and the police respond to extremists when they are found to be operating in a specific town or city?</p>
<p>Published in 2018, my <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Anti-Islamic-Protest-in-the-UK-Policy-Responses-to-the-Far-Right/Allchorn/p/book/9781138299634">book</a> and research has tried to shed light on some of these questions. One of the first comprehensive surveys of far-right counter tactics in the UK, it looked at how mainstream politicians have tried to deal with anti-Islam street movements, the EDL and Britain First.</p>
<p>Looking at specific cases in Birmingham, Bradford, Luton, Leicester and Tower Hamlets, I found that local politicians successfully used counter tactics to curtail the divisive and disorderly aspects of these protests. These were mainly exclusionary tactics – placing restrictions on the locations of protests, the groups themselves and the movement of individuals.</p>
<p>One particular challenge was how local folklore or rumours were seized upon by both the mainstream, including the media, and extremist groups. </p>
<p>In Tower Hamlets, for example, the normalisation of the narrative that Islamist extremism is rife in the borough and that there are “no-go zones” for anyone other than Muslims saw the area being keenly targeted by the far right. </p>
<p>In Leicester, it was rumours that the EDL were planning to attack a mosque (and the subsequent counter-reactions to this) that needed to be addressed when far-right mobilisations became apparent. Indeed, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-923X.2006.00763.x">“cumulative extremism”</a> can be as much of a problem as extremism itself.</p>
<p>This type of situation should be something that is keenly avoided in the government’s approach to extremism now, if it does truly believe, as Sunak suggested, that Islamist extremism is on the rise as part of Gaza protests. </p>
<p>The main argument of my book is that an “inclusionary turn” is needed when dealing with any hue of “extremist” protest. Building on <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Western-Democracies-Challenge-Extremism-Democracy/dp/0415553873">Ami Pedahzur’s (2004)</a> notion of an “immunised” democracy, I subscribe to the notion that better cross-community contact, grassroots educational initiatives against prejudice and a re-engagement between politicians and disaffected constituencies are all important preventative methods when dealing with political extremism. </p>
<p>Such basic everyday measures are needed to build a broader civic movement against extremism in the years and months to come. This might, for example, include mainstream politicians and police visiting local communities that have heightened concerns around protests to liaise with them and listen to them. It might mean paying greater attention to extremist myth-making online.</p>
<p>As democrats, we need to make sure that our responses are not based on the stigmatisation and racialisation of others. Extremism is a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest-2023/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest-2023-accessible">multifaceted threat</a> that can feed off of grievances and animosities – both real and imagined. </p>
<p>It is incumbent on us to have a realistic sense of the threat because how we perceive and deal with intolerant people in our society has important implications. Why? Because it has a bearing on who we are and how we function as a democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225487/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Allchorn receives funding from the British Academy and Commission for Countering Extremism. </span></em></p>New definitions don’t protect communities or deter extremists.William Allchorn, Honorary Visiting Senior Fellow, Policing Institute for the Eastern Region, Anglia Ruskin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2244882024-02-28T14:24:04Z2024-02-28T14:24:04ZThe word ‘populism’ is a gift to the far right – four reasons why we should stop using it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578095/original/file-20240226-32-7wbj6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=44%2C53%2C5946%2C3898&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">microstock3D/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>From the storming of the US Capitol on the January 6 2021, to the similar uprising in Brazil in 2023, far-right politicians are infringing on democratic ideals across the world. If we are serious about meeting the challenge they pose, we must stop treating them as legitimate, democratic actors and instead see them as the threat they really are.</p>
<p>A very big part of this effort is also quite a simple step. We must stop referring to far-right politics as “populist”. </p>
<p>In recent years, serious research on populism has reached somewhat of a consensus which makes it clear that it is secondary, at best, in defining any kind of politics. The <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/02633957211007053">two main schools of thought</a> broadly disagree on whether populism is a thin ideology which involves a moralistic element (by pitting a “pure” people against “corrupt” elite) or whether it is simply a discourse that constructs a people as being against an elite, without any further specificity attached to those two groups.</p>
<p>Crucially, though, both agree that the populist element of any given movement comes second to politics and ideology. Parties of the left and right may both use populist rhetoric, but this tells us little about how they actually govern. </p>
<p>But populism has nevertheless become a buzzword. Countless academics have jumped on the bandwagon in search of funding and citations, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-science-research-and-methods/article/whats-in-a-buzzword-a-systematic-review-of-the-state-of-populism-research-in-political-science/D9CD5E7E13DFA30FD05D41F32E6C122B">often failing to do due diligence to the literature on the topic</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Number of articles containing the words ‘populist’, ‘populism’ or ‘populists’ on Web of Science</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578097/original/file-20240226-32-sofnsh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A chart showing that the number of academic papers containing the word 'populism' has increased dramarically since 2017." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578097/original/file-20240226-32-sofnsh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578097/original/file-20240226-32-sofnsh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=301&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578097/original/file-20240226-32-sofnsh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=301&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578097/original/file-20240226-32-sofnsh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=301&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578097/original/file-20240226-32-sofnsh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578097/original/file-20240226-32-sofnsh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578097/original/file-20240226-32-sofnsh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A surge in academic papers referring to populism.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Aurelien Mondon/Alex Yates</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Beyond poor academic practice, the careless use of the word has also had a deleterious impact on wider public discourse. These four consequences should hopefully convince you to stop using the word “populist” to describe someone who is actually just a rightwing extremist.</p>
<h2>1. It masks the threat posed by the far right</h2>
<p>It should not come as a surprise that many far-right politicians, from France’s Jean-Marie Le Pen, to Italy’s <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41269-023-00327-1">Matteo Salvini</a>, have embraced the term “populism”. Even when it is used by their opponents as an insult, far-right politicians prefer the term to more accurate, but also more stigmatising terms, such as “extremist” or “racist”.</p>
<p>This could be witnessed, for example, in the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0263395720955036">Guardian’s 2019 six-month-long series on “the new populism”</a>. More often than not, the word populism was used in this series to describe far more sinister politics than the simple opposition between the elite and the people. Political personalities such as Steve Bannon are far better described as far or extreme right. These terms are not only more precise, but make the threat they pose far clearer than the murky “populism”.</p>
<h2>2. It exaggerates the strength of the far right</h2>
<p>When we use the term “populist”, we often create a semantic link between the word and “the people”. So when we allow the far right to be described as populist, we are incorrectly implying that they are tapping into what the people want or that they speak for the “silent majority” – something Nigel Farage and others love to claim.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578295/original/file-20240227-16-jdy3wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578295/original/file-20240227-16-jdy3wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578295/original/file-20240227-16-jdy3wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578295/original/file-20240227-16-jdy3wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578295/original/file-20240227-16-jdy3wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578295/original/file-20240227-16-jdy3wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578295/original/file-20240227-16-jdy3wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>Far-right parties and politicians are mounting election campaigns all over the world in 2024. Join us in London at 6pm on March 6 for a salon style discussion with experts on how seriously we should take the threat, what these parties mean for our democracies – and what action we can take. Register for your place at this <a href="https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/social-science-perspectives-on-the-far-right-tickets-838612631957?aff=theconversation"><strong>free public session here</strong></a>. There will be food, drinks and, best of all, the opportunity to connect with interesting people.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>The myth is further entrenched by the perception that the rise of “populism” is the result of choices made by people at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder – whether they are defined as the “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1070289X.2018.1552440?journalCode=gide20">white working class</a>”, the “<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00380261231186021">left behind</a>” or the “losers of globalisation”. This ignores analysis which shows that much of the support for reactionary politics <a href="https://www.race.ed.ac.uk/whiteness-populism-and-the-racialisation-of-the-working-class-in-the-united-kingdom-and-the-united-states/">comes predominantly from affluent groups</a>.</p>
<p>Being allowed to claim to speak on behalf of the voiceless is particularly useful at a time of widespread distrust in mainstream politics, so we shouldn’t be surprised that far-right politicians like to be called populists. It allows them to falsely posit themselves as the alternative to the status quo.</p>
<h2>3. It legitimises far-right politics</h2>
<p>By being erroneously tied to “the people” via the word “populism”, far-right demands are mistaken for democratic demands. It is therefore now common to see mainstream parties absorbing the politics of the far right on the flawed assumption that these ideas are “what the people want”.</p>
<p>The rights of minoritised communities such as migrants, asylum seekers, racialised people, LGBTQ+ communities, women and/or disabled people have all been under various levels of threat by mainstream elite actors, whether through policy, political campaigning or news coverage. Often, the people threatening these rights benefit from the pretence that they are simply responding to public opinion. Supposedly <a href="https://www.identitiesjournal.com/blog-collection/rethinking-nativism-the-racist-discourse-of-rishi-sunak-and-giorgia-meloni-and-the-increasingly-blurred-lines-between-the-mainstream-and-the-far-right">“centre-right”</a> governments are, therefore, given carte blanche to adopt draconian immigration policies. After all, it is in the name of “the people”.</p>
<h2>4. It blocks democratic progress by distracting us</h2>
<p>Populist hype is generally accompanied by a rise of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/feb/14/anti-populism-politics-why-champions-of-civility-keep-losing">anti-populist discourse</a>, which portrays “populism” as an existential threat to liberal democracy. Thinly concealed behind this pejorative use of the term “populism” is at best a distrust, if not outright antipathy, towards “the people”. </p>
<p>By blaming “the people” for the problems in our democracies, elites are absolved from having to interrogate their own role in facilitating the crisis. They can also use the very real threat posed by the far right to justify the need to support the status quo by warning “we are bad – but they are worse”.</p>
<h2>What is to be done?</h2>
<p>Reducing the far right to a “populist” threat allows the mainstream off the hook. When combating the far right, we must be honest about the decisions that have led us to this reactionary moment. If the mainstream does not take responsibility, it has no chance of defeating the monster that it has helped to create. This applies particularly to those who have a privileged access to shaping public discourse such as the media, politicians and academics to a lesser extent.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/look-to-the-mainstream-to-explain-the-rise-of-the-far-right-218536">Look to the mainstream to explain the rise of the far right</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The first step on this journey is using terms correctly. Calling the far right “populist” keeps us in our inertia. To activate the appropriate sense of urgency needed to defeat these trends, we must be honest about the kind of politics that we see in front of us. If the far right proudly wears the badge of “populism”, we must ask how it helps them. They know it grants them legitimacy. Why, then, should we play into the hands of extremists whose loathing of democracy has been repeatedly demonstrated?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224488/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alex Yates receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council South West Doctoral Training Partnership. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aurelien Mondon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Extremists benefit when we use euphemisms that confer on them an air of legitimacy.Aurelien Mondon, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of BathAlex Yates, Postgraduate Researcher in Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2219302024-02-07T08:36:12Z2024-02-07T08:36:12ZFive signs that you might be rightwing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573119/original/file-20240202-25-p9hoyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=62%2C152%2C5928%2C3835&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/rear-businessman-front-crossroad-signpost-arrows-1589679016">Shutterstock/StunningArt</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Europe is anticipated to <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/a-sharp-right-turn-a-forecast-for-the-2024-european-parliament-elections/">take a sharp right turn</a> in this year’s European parliament elections. The past decade has already seen a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/23210230231166197">rightward shift in India</a>, and the United States has the greatest gap between left and right <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/03/10/the-polarization-in-todays-congress-has-roots-that-go-back-decades/">for 50 years</a>. In light of these global trends, it’s crucial to understand what being “rightwing” actually means, rather than simply <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/cultural-revolution-9781632864239/">using the term as an insult</a>.</p>
<p>The idea of “the right” <a href="https://time.com/5673239/left-right-politics-origins/">originated</a> in the French National Assembly of 1789. There, it described those who supported giving the king veto powers (who were to gather on the right hand side of the assembly hall). Today, however, “the right” covers a wide range of political positions. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A painting of hundreds of people gathered in a large building." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573126/original/file-20240202-29-1u00lq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573126/original/file-20240202-29-1u00lq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573126/original/file-20240202-29-1u00lq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573126/original/file-20240202-29-1u00lq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573126/original/file-20240202-29-1u00lq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573126/original/file-20240202-29-1u00lq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573126/original/file-20240202-29-1u00lq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The French National Assembly, where the first (literal) swing to the right took place.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/91/Estatesgeneral.jpg">Wikipedia/Bibliothèque nationale de France</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some are mainstream, such as conservatism (focusing on tradition and order), nationalism (promoting national sovereignty and identity), and neoliberalism (supporting free markets and small government). Others are more radical, including the <a href="https://www.maynoothuniversity.ie/sites/default/files/assets/document/Stopfarright%20Final%20Report.pdf">far right</a>, <a href="https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/alt-right">alt-right</a>, and <a href="https://graymirror.substack.com/p/principles-of-the-deep-right">deep right</a>. New variants continue to emerge, like <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Conservatism/Yoram-Hazony/9781684511105">national conservatism</a> and forms of <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/618154/regime-change-by-patrick-j-deneen/">post-liberalism</a>. </p>
<p>Such diversity makes it hard to define what being rightwing entails. Yet, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/19485506221119324">a recent study</a> of over 5,000 people in the US shed new light on the matter. </p>
<h2>The five signs</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/19485506221119324">This study</a>, which used a more robust approach than much previous research, found that the more strongly someone identified as conservative or rightwing, the more likely they were to agree with five specific viewpoints:</p>
<p><strong>1. Belief in hierarchy</strong>. Most indicative of being on the political right was seeing the world as naturally hierarchical. This means believing that everything, from people to animals and objects, can be ranked based on their importance, quality or value. It’s not that people on the right want the world to be this way; they just think it naturally is.</p>
<p><strong>2. Sense that the universe has purpose.</strong> Rightwing people tended to believe there was more to the universe than just the mechanical movement of molecules. They believed it was in some sense alive and felt there was a deeper reason or purpose behind events.</p>
<p><strong>3. Acceptance of the status quo.</strong> Rather than striving to constantly improve the world, those on the right were more inclined to accept things as they were. They didn’t necessarily see the world as something that always needs fixing or changing.</p>
<p><strong>4. Resistance to new experiences.</strong> Being rightwing was linked with a certain reluctance to try new things. This mindset opposes the idea that everything is worth trying or doing at least once.</p>
<p><strong>5. Belief in a just world.</strong> Rightwing people tended to believe that the world is a place where working hard and being nice pays off. In such a world, people get what they deserve.</p>
<p>It is easy to see how common rightwing preferences, such as valuing tradition, religion, authority, personal responsibility, family <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/nana.12924">and country</a>, follow from these five beliefs.</p>
<h2>Why do people become rightwing?</h2>
<p>Contrary to popular opinion, people don’t simply become more conservative as they age. Our political views <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/706889">stay pretty consistent</a> throughout our lives. Instead, many factors influence the development of rightwing beliefs.</p>
<p>Genes gently mould our political views. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.03.012">About 40% of the difference</a> between people’s political beliefs can be linked to their genetic makeup. </p>
<p>Some, but <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2009.11.013">not all</a>, researchers think this is because genes impact aspects of personality, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/tp201596">such as openness to experience</a>, which shape our political views. Genes could also make people <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12230">more sensitive to threats</a> from changing circumstances, encouraging rightwing beliefs.</p>
<p>You may wonder what rightwing adults were like as children. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2005.09.005">One study found that</a> young conservative adults had often been preschoolers who felt “easily victimized, easily offended, indecisive, fearful, rigid, inhibited, and relatively over-controlled and vulnerable”.</p>
<p>This could have been a result of parental upbringing, which can also shape people’s political views. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612440102">Research has found that</a> young rightwing adults were more likely to have had authoritarian parents when they were infants.</p>
<p>All this creates <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0052970">rightwing brains</a>. For example, young rightwing adults tend to have an amygdala – part of the brain linked to fear and uncertainty – that is both <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2011.03.017">larger</a> and more active <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsx133">in the face of threat</a>.</p>
<p>Yet the state of society also influences how common rightwing beliefs are. The more threats a country faces, such as high unemployment, inflation and murder rates, the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12014">more common rightwing beliefs</a> are.</p>
<h2>Living with the right</h2>
<p>Such research could lead you to think that people hold rightwing views simply because they are scared and unadventurous. The right already face the prejudice that their beliefs result from their being “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721413514249">mentally troubled</a>”, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672221089451">stupid, or immoral</a>. </p>
<p>This leaves little space for the alternative idea that people hold rightwing beliefs after careful thought about the nature of humans and the world. Those with different political beliefs may disagree with the right’s conclusions. Yet it is always easier to denigrate the character of rightwing people than to evaluate the validity of rightwing ideas.</p>
<p>In reality, being on the right doesn’t mean poor psychological health. Having rightwing views are not linked to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167213478199">unhappiness, low self-esteem or lower life satisfaction</a>.</p>
<p>Nor can the entire rightwing be dismissed as immoral. The right simply has different <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015141">moral foundations</a> to the left. Leftwing morality <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015141">focuses on preventing harm and being fair</a>. While these issues also matter to the right, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015141">rightwing morality additionally emphasises</a> respect for <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/19485506221119324/suppl_file/sj-docx-1-spp-10.1177_19485506221119324.docx">authority, purity and loyalty</a>.</p>
<p>This leaves us with the left’s perception that people on the right are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672221089451">more stupid than evil</a>. Here things get complicated. People with <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/per.2027">worse thinking skills are more likely to endorse rightwing beliefs</a>. Conservative political beliefs <a href="https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0424">are linked to</a> a lesser ability to hold information in mind, plan and adapt to changing situations.</p>
<p>However, it could be that rightwing people are simply <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.104124">less motivated to do well</a> on such tasks. Furthermore, holding rightwing economic views <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672211046808">may be linked to better thinking skills</a>, while leftwing authoritarianism is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000341">linked to poorer thinking skills</a>. </p>
<p>Crucially, all this tells us precisely nothing about the validity of rightwing ideologies. These must be judged on their merits, not their holders.</p>
<p>As societies become more politically divided, appreciating different viewpoints is essential to fostering dialogue and mutual understanding. When election time arrives we must debate with ideas rather than disparage with labels.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221930/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon McCarthy-Jones receives funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 program via a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions Innovative Training Network.</span></em></p>Being rightwing involves specific beliefs about the world but is also linked to our genes and environment.Simon McCarthy-Jones, Associate Professor in Clinical Psychology and Neuropsychology, Trinity College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2210602024-01-29T16:38:17Z2024-01-29T16:38:17ZThrough Cable Street Beat, music became a potent antifascist weapon against the far right<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569832/original/file-20240117-19-rb5x8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=21%2C2%2C1552%2C1178&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Cable Street Mural by Dave Binnington Savage, Paul Butler, Ray Walker and Desmond Rochfort (1979 – 1983).</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Cable_Street_Mural_(36609425822).jpg">Amanda Slater/Wiki Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the 1980s, Britain’s far right was on the rise. Fascist parties <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Contemporary_British_Fascism.html?id=DvyHDAAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">fielded over 100 candidates</a> in the 1983 general election. And culturally, the far right was also making ground. </p>
<p>“White power” bands like Skrewdriver and Peter and the Wolf began drawing sizeable crowds and selling thousands of records. In 1987, Skrewdriver’s frontman founded Blood & Honour, a music network that soon <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Music_Youth_and_International_Links_in_P.html?id=maU2DwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">gained followers and branches throughout the US and Europe</a>.</p>
<p>Blood & Honour’s emergence caused tremors among the UK antifascist movement. Anti-Fascist Action (AFA), the dominant antifascist group of the time, struck back with their own musical network: Cable Street Beat (CSB). </p>
<p>This is the story of how music became a battleground in the 1980s and 1990s, as antifascists fought fascism with guitars and microphones.</p>
<h2>Cable Street Beat</h2>
<p>Cable Street Beat was named after the antifascists’ celebrated victory over Oswald Mosley’s Blackshirts. Before the second world war, British MP Oswald Mosley had commanded a growing fascist movement that had been fiercely resisted by antifascists.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569834/original/file-20240117-17-9ndz39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Black and white photo of Oswald Mosley" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569834/original/file-20240117-17-9ndz39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569834/original/file-20240117-17-9ndz39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=818&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569834/original/file-20240117-17-9ndz39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=818&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569834/original/file-20240117-17-9ndz39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=818&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569834/original/file-20240117-17-9ndz39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1028&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569834/original/file-20240117-17-9ndz39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1028&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569834/original/file-20240117-17-9ndz39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1028&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">British MP Oswald Mosley commanded a growing fascist movement.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Oswald_mosley_MP.jpg">National Portrait Gallery</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On October 4 1936, Mosley amassed his Blackshirts to march through the East End of London. However, around 100,000 militant antifascists gathered on Cable Street to oppose them, ultimately preventing the fascists’ march. </p>
<p>The first CSB gig was held on October 8 1988 at the Electric Ballroom in London. Newtown Neurotics, The Men They Couldn’t Hang and punk poet Attila the Stockbroker electrified a 1,000-strong crowd.</p>
<p>Crucially, the audience also heard a powerful speech from Solly Kaye, an antifascist veteran of the actual Battle of Cable Street five decades earlier. <a href="https://files.libcom.org/files/cable-street-beat-issue-1.pdf">Kaye warned</a> the assembled concertgoers that fascist “songs” were “poison put into the minds of young people”.</p>
<p>Brendan, an AFA and CSB organiser and horn player with antifascist punk band the Blaggers, described to me how CSB was needed: “Firstly as a way to draw people who might be attracted to the far right into a more progressive type of politics … Secondly it was needed to bring people together from different cultures. Thirdly, just to stick two fingers up to the far right.”</p>
<h2>The power of punk</h2>
<p>CSB drew energy from the UK’s frenetic punk scene. Bands such as the Angelic Upstarts, Snuff and Yr Anhrefn all enthusiastically took up CSB’s cause. They shared the stage with antifascist activists who gave rousing speeches.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569836/original/file-20240117-23-euyf98.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Punk poet Attila holds a microphone in one hand and beer in the other." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569836/original/file-20240117-23-euyf98.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569836/original/file-20240117-23-euyf98.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569836/original/file-20240117-23-euyf98.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569836/original/file-20240117-23-euyf98.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569836/original/file-20240117-23-euyf98.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569836/original/file-20240117-23-euyf98.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569836/original/file-20240117-23-euyf98.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Punk poet Attila the Stockbroker in 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Attila_The_Stockbroker,_Calstock_10.jpg">Madchickenwoman/Wiki Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Punk, and in particular the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/tcbh/article-abstract/24/4/606/1671204">working-class focused, aggressive Oi! subgenre</a> and related skinhead subculture, was an area that the far right had long tried to colonise.</p>
<p>Blood & Honour wanted to believe otherwise, but the skinhead movement (which originated in the 1960s) had roots in <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jsh/article/38/1/157/927064?login=true#no-access-message">Jamaican culture and reggae</a>. Indeed, few skinheads had any interest in white power. </p>
<p>“If far-right politics helped inform the identity of some within the … skinhead subculture,” <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=uV0yDwAAQBAJ&printsec=copyright&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">says historian Matthew Worley</a>, “then the vast majority resisted and rejected the substance of the fascist message.”</p>
<p>CSB gained considerable ground in this battle. High-profile bands like The Specials and The Selecter played benefit gigs. Multiple other bands – including The Oppressed, Knucklehead and Spy Vs Spy – put out AFA fundraising CDs. </p>
<p>Thomas “Mensi” Mensforth, the charismatic lead singer of the Angelic Upstarts’ (who sadly passed away in 2021), even narrated <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O9zvOU3JpV0">an AFA documentary</a> produced for the BBC in 1993.</p>
<h2>Unity Carnivals</h2>
<p>CSB’s most high-profile strategy was its Unity Carnivals. The first, held in Hackney Downs Park in 1991, attracted 10,000 attendees. This made it the <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Beating_the_Fascists.html?id=gnNaKQEACAAJ&redir_esc=y">biggest public antifascist event in a decade</a>. Bands including Gary Clail’s On U Sound System, The 25th of May and The Blaggers kept the vast crowds dancing all day under the banner of antifascism.</p>
<p>But the partying was punctuated with serious political rhetoric. Throughout the day activists gave speeches and handed out flyers. Brendan was part of the team that organised the carnival. </p>
<p>“It’s a cliché,” he told me, “but that carnival really did unite people. It brought a really diverse crowd together in Hackney and really got the political messages across.”</p>
<p>Two more carnivals followed: another in Hackney in 1992 and one in Newcastle in 1993, where The Shamen headlined with their chart-topping song Ebeneezer Goode.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/YFJdUJg4wOk?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Ebeneezer Goode by The Shamen.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Freedom of movement</h2>
<p>CSB was wound down in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, music remained a central element of AFA’s activism. </p>
<p>By the early 1990s, electronic dance music had taken off in the UK. Antifascists immediately saw the potential and in Manchester local DJs and AFA set up the Freedom of Movement campaign in 1993 to mobilise these ravers. AFA’s magazine, Fighting Talk, <a href="https://files.libcom.org/files/FIGHTING%20TALK%2007_0.pdf">declared Freedom of Movement’s aim</a> was to “politicise the previously apathetic dance club scene, raising issues of racism and fascism”.</p>
<p>From 1993 to 1996, AFA put on a series of antifascist club nights in cities from Edinburgh to London. They also released an AFA benefit album, This is Fascism, featuring prominent DJs and producers including Carl Cox, Drum Club and Fun-Da-Mental.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/3dI6faXuvts?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The Blaggers had close links to AFA, playing multiple benefit gigs.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Fascism is on the march again. The far right in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63351655">Italy</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/20/who-is-javier-milei-argentina-new-president-far-right-what-does-he-stand-for">Argentina</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/26/far-right-normalised-mainstream-parties-geert-wilders-dutch#:%7E:text=Geert%20Wilders'%20Party%20for%20Freedom,issues%20of%20immigration%20and%20multiculturalism.">the Netherlands</a> have all recently experienced electoral victories. Many other countries – such as the <a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2023/04/25/quantifying-the-rise-of-americas-far-right">US</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-64299892">Brazil</a> and <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/india-hindu-nationalism-violence/">India</a> – have experienced explosions in far-right activity.</p>
<p>Findings from <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Cumulative_Extremism.html?id=kyEIyQEACAAJ&redir_esc=y">my own research</a> and others’ demonstrate that fascists are adept at using culture to achieve their goals. It enables them to <a href="https://musicandartsinaction.net/index.php/maia/article/view/whitepowermusic">transmit their hateful ideology</a>, <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/White-Riot-Story-Combat-18/dp/1908479795">generate money</a> and <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Music_Youth_and_International_Links_in_P.html?id=maU2DwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">forge networks across countries</a>.</p>
<p>But the successes of CSB and AFA provide us with valuable lessons. Music can send a powerful message and mobilise hundreds of thousands to resist racism. Its emotive nature can change listeners’ worldviews, and help create a shared culture that is antithetical to the far right’s divisive goals.</p>
<p>This is an area where antifascists can make real gains against their foes: uniting antifascism and music is a tried-and-tested method for winning over the hearts and minds of people against hatred.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>Looking for something good? Cut through the noise with a carefully curated selection of the latest releases, live events and exhibitions, straight to your inbox every fortnight, on Fridays. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/something-good-156">Sign up here</a>.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221060/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Carter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>This is the story of how music became a battleground in the 1980s and 1990s, as antifascists fought fascism with guitars and microphones.Alexander Carter, Research Fellow, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2219382024-01-25T22:36:01Z2024-01-25T22:36:01ZIs Argentina’s new president, Javier Milei, a far-right leader? The answer is not simple<p>A shockwave has been rippling through Argentina <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/javier-milei-wins-argentina-presidential-elections-runoff/">since Javier Milei came to power in December</a>, prompting demonstrators to take to the streets in a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/24/argentina-strike-protest-javier-milei">general strike</a> on Wednesday.</p>
<p>With an ideology described as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/12/world/americas/argentina-javier-milei-cuts.html">“anarcho-capitalism,”</a> Milei promises major upheaval in a country with a long tradition of state control, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/argentina-presidential-election-1.7033471">which is now in the throes of a deep economic crisis</a>. </p>
<p>While the radical nature of his proposals won over many Argentines, it also alienated many, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentine-powerful-union-calls-january-strike-action-2023-12-28/">leading to calls for the general strike</a>. </p>
<p>Analysts have tried to understand the ideological links between Milei and the various far-right movements that have emerged over the last 20 years, particularly in Europe and the United States. </p>
<p>As a doctoral student in political science at Laval University, my research focuses on authoritarianism, particularly in Argentina. In the following, I explore the relationship between Milei and the far-right movement. </p>
<h2>Be careful about drawing quick conclusions</h2>
<p>Milei <a href="https://theglobalamericans.org/2023/12/javier-milei-and-the-populist-wave-in-argentina/">can be described as a populist</a>. The description is apt, even natural, if we consider the many references he makes in his speeches to far-right figures such as <a href="https://twitter.com/JMilei/status/1727501082560205296">Donald Trump</a>, Brazil’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/20/trump-bolsonaro-javier-milei-argentina-far-right">Jair Bolsonaro</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/santiago-abascal-who-is-spains-far-right-leader-what-does-he-stand-2023-07-17/">Spain’s Santiago Abascal</a>, president of the Vox formation, <a href="https://thediplomatinspain.com/en/2023/11/milei-invites-abascal-to-his-inauguration-as-argentine-president/">whom he invited to his inauguration</a>.</p>
<p>Milei’s calls to fight “the left,” <a href="https://brusselssignal.eu/2024/01/argentinas-milei-berates-western-neo-marxists-at-world-economic-forum/">his criticism of “cultural Marxism,”</a> and his openly anti-system approach all reinforce this identity.</p>
<p>However, this rather simplistic comparison ignores significant differences in Milei’s program, particularly where his economic and migration policies are concerned. Despite similarities, there are significant differences, particularly in the way each movement understands the role of the state and its relationship to society as a whole. </p>
<p>Specifically, I would like to draw attention to a central difference, namely the role of nationalism, and to the innovations Milei has introduced in the context of the global rise of the right.</p>
<h2>Nativist nationalism at the heart of the far right</h2>
<p>In an article summarizing the far-right political parties in Europe, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-042814-012441">Matt Golder</a>, professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University, analyzes the scientific literature on them. He finds three elements that are increasingly characteristic of this movement: “nationalism,” “populism,” and “radicalism.”</p>
<p>The nationalism expounded by far-right parties can be described as “nativism.” According to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492037">Cas Mudde</a>, professor of political science at the University of Georgia, “nativism” is understood as “nationalism plus xenophobia.” It is based on the idea of the existence of an imaginary “native” population <a href="https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-042814-012441">built on cultural or ethnic features</a>, whose homogeneity must be protected from any element that is foreign and external to it. </p>
<p>With its conception of a homogeneous community, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492037">nativism is then added to nationalism, which is articulated as the congruence between state and nation</a>. This contributes the element of xenophobia mentioned by Mudde. In so doing, extreme right-wing movements put forward a radicalized preference for anything that can be defined as belonging to the “national community.”</p>
<p>This version of nationalism is well known, and it is easy to find European and American examples of it: <a href="https://gnet-research.org/2023/01/27/mainstreaming-far-right-conspiracies-eric-zemmours-discourse-as-a-case-study/">Éric Zemmour’s calls against the “Great Replacement,”</a> <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/the-snake-song-lyrics-trump-b2464914.html">Trump’s warnings about the danger of immigration</a>, or the Islamophobia of <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/interview-with-frauke-petry-of-the-alternative-for-germany-a-1084493.html">the Alternative for Germany party</a>, are some examples. </p>
<p>This nativism on the part of far-right parties is becoming the foundation of their political projects, including their economic policies.</p>
<p>It is on this basis that the contemporary far right is putting forward clear protectionist projects. A large proportion of far-right movements share Euro-scepticism, nationalization and anti-globalization rhetoric. The root of their projects is a belief in a national community, defined either in ethnic or cultural terms, which must be protected from the influence of outside elements. </p>
<h2>Liberalizing the economy, Milei’s priority</h2>
<p>Although the list of promises of Milei’s party may come as a surprise due to their radical nature and breadth, the element of nativism is absent from his rhetoric.</p>
<p>Rather, the plans and platform of his party, La Libertad Avanza (LLA), represent a clear opposition to nativism, which is widespread in Argentina and represented by the Peronist movement. Accusations of his alleged anti-immigration ideology are also unfounded, at least so far.</p>
<p>Milei’s program mentions immigration only marginally. This is evident in LLA’s <a href="https://www.electoral.gob.ar/nuevo/paginas/pdf/plataformas/2023/PASO/JUJUY%2079%20PARTIDO%20RENOVADOR%20FEDERAL%20-PLATAFORMA%20LA%20LIBERTAD%20AVANZA.pdf">electoral platform</a>, where the subjects of “nation” and immigration are relatively absent. </p>
<p>Argentina has in fact received proportionally <a href="https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMTendanceStatPays?langue=fr&codePays=ARG&codeTheme=1&codeStat=SM.POP.NETM">fewer immigrants than most European or North American countries in recent years</a>. The debate over immigration is more about the universality of the health and education services, thanks to which everyone, regardless of their migratory status, <a href="https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/uploads/res/document/ley-de-migraciones-25871-english_html/Ley_de_Migraciones_25871_English.pdf">can benefit from the public health system (even tourists) and free education</a>. Milei is not exactly opposed to immigration (he has <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xfNnAKnHxGo">even expressed support for</a> certain types of state spending associated with it).</p>
<p>On the other hand, liberalization has been, and continues to be the pillar of Milei’s program, which is perfectly embodied in the proposal to eliminate the central bank and introduce free monetary competition. <a href="https://www.electoral.gob.ar/nuevo/paginas/pdf/plataformas/2023/PASO/CABA%20501%20LA%20LIBERTAD%20AVANZA%20ADHIERE%20PLATAFORMA%20ON.pdf">His program</a> also includes dollarization, optimizing and reducing the size of the state, opening up to international trade, reforming the labour code, mental health laws and regulations on medical services.</p>
<h2>Wait before judging Milei’s political project</h2>
<p>In other words, in spite of his populist style and the radical nature of his proposals, Milei’s approach makes it difficult to immediately identify him with the European and American far right without further qualification.</p>
<p>This does not necessarily mean that the Milei phenomenon should not be considered part of the extended family of the far right. As <a href="https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c983y398v0do">Cristóbal Rovira, Professor at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile states,</a> not all members of the far-right “family” embrace all its elements. However, it does force us to think twice before making quick and what could be simplistic associations. The fact that Milei has spoken in favour of Trump does not make him, by definition, “Trumpist.”</p>
<p>There are certainly individuals within his political party who are closer to the political projects of Trump or <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/santiago-abascal-who-is-spains-far-right-leader-what-does-he-stand-2023-07-17/">Santiago Abascal</a>. However, Milei’s personal positions largely define what we can expect from his government and the political project he is putting forward.</p>
<p>Although Milei, himself, affirms his ideological kinship with leaders often included in the large family of the contemporary far right, certain elements of his program and the core of his ideology show some distance from this movement. More broadly, in order to understand what is new about a political phenomenon and what this implies, it is important to put it into context.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221938/count.gif" alt="La Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Federico Chaves Correa ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Some aspects of Argentine President Javier Milei’s programme resemble the far right, but others do not. Without excluding him from this movement, we should recognize there are differences.Federico Chaves Correa, Doctorant en science politique, Université LavalLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2217882024-01-25T12:21:00Z2024-01-25T12:21:00ZIreland’s asylum debate has turned violent thanks to the spread of misinformation and disinformation<p>The issue of asylum in Ireland has become increasingly contentious and fraught over the past year. Taoiseach Leo Varadkar has said arrests will be made after a spate of arson attacks against <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/politics/2024/01/18/varadkar-says-there-will-be-arrests-over-recent-arson-attacks-on-asylum-seeker-accommodation/#:%7E:text=Taoiseach%20Leo%20Varadkar%20has%20said,them%20having%20occurred%20in%202023.">properties linked to housing asylum seekers</a>. </p>
<p>Protests have been held outside hotels and shelters across the country. And, notoriously, the riots that took place in Dublin in November 2023 were sparked by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/nov/27/dublin-riots-far-right-ireland-anti-immigrant">claims spread on social media</a> that several violent stabbings in the city centre were carried out by an immigrant – who turned out to be a naturalised citizen. </p>
<p>A perfect storm has unfolded in Ireland in recent years. The number of asylum seekers has increased sharply <a href="https://ipo.gov.ie/en/IPO/20240109%20IPO%20Website%20Statistics%20Report%20Dec%202023%20FINAL.pdf/Files/20240109%20IPO%20Website%20Statistics%20Report%20Dec%202023%20FINAL.pdf">(to over 13,000 per year in the past two years)</a> and many Ukrainians have sought temporary protection <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?oldid=594548">(about 100,000 since the war began)</a>. All the while, Ireland has been experiencing a housing crisis. Record numbers of Irish people are in emergency accommodation and there has been a surge in <a href="https://homelessnessinireland.ie/homelessness-in-ireland/">rough sleeping</a>. </p>
<p>This creates the impression that asylum seekers may somehow be responsible for the housing crisis or competing with Irish people for scarce resources. That’s certainly an impression that has been cleverly seized on by the far right, which has been spreading damaging tropes and seeking to capitalise on protests by local communities against the opening of <a href="https://tippfm.com/news/community/far-right-protestors-told-leave-roscrea-ipa-protest/">new asylum reception centres</a>. This is therefore a good moment to dispel some of the leading myths.</p>
<h2>‘The inn is full’</h2>
<p>When a County Galway hotel that was due to accommodate asylum seekers was set on fire in December, a local Fianna Fáil councillor <a href="https://www.irishmirror.ie/news/irish-news/politics/fianna-fil-councillor-states-inn-31696793">said</a> that “the inn is full”. The councillor has been reported to his party over the comments but not before he’d already given the impression that Ireland is inundated with asylum seekers.</p>
<p>There has been a marked increase in the number of people claiming asylum in Ireland over the past two years, placing Ireland for the first time in the top half of EU member states as an asylum destination. However, Ireland received just 1.4% of the almost 1 million people applying for asylum in EU countries in 2022. By contrast, Germany, France, Spain, Austria and Italy received, between them, almost <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00191/default/table?lang=en&category=t_migr.t_migr_asy">75% of asylum applications</a>. When further compared with impoverished <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/countries/bangladesh">asylum-hosting countries</a>, any suggestion that Ireland is overburdened does not hold up.</p>
<h2>‘Asylum seekers are causing the housing crisis’</h2>
<p>Given the accommodation crisis in Ireland, it is understandable that some people think asylum seekers are competing with Irish citizens for scarce resources. However, the two problems – the accommodation crisis facing Irish people and the accommodation crisis facing asylum seekers – are distinct from one another, even if they overlap. </p>
<p>The former problem is linked to successive government policies relating to homelessness, housing delivery, planning laws, house and rent prices and support for buyers and renters. The latter problem is a product of direct provision.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/moving-country/asylum-seekers-and-refugees/services-for-asylum-seekers-in-ireland/direct-provision/#1cebfb">Direct provision</a> is the Irish system of asylum accommodation that has existed since 2000, whereby private contractors profit enormously from providing bed and board to asylum seekers. </p>
<p>The accommodation is often overcrowded, the environment unsafe for children, the food unnourishing and the general conditions a risk to <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/i-live-in-direct-provision-it-s-a-devastating-system-and-it-has-thrown-away-millions-1.4291670">mental health</a>. Direct provision has been the subject of numerous critical domestic and <a href="https://www.ihrec.ie/app/uploads/2020/01/Submission-to-the-UN-Committee-against-Torture-on-the-List-of-Issues-for-the-Third-Examination-of-Ireland.pdf">international reports</a>, not one but two major <a href="https://www.gov.ie/pdf/?file=https://assets.gov.ie/93410/d5f81351-2c06-4d50-bfe7-beaa74203a80.pdf#page=null">government reviews</a> and a government <a href="https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/7aad0-minister-ogorman-publishes-the-white-paper-on-ending-direct-provision/">white paper</a>. </p>
<p>The weekly allowance paid to asylum seekers places them below the poverty line (€38.80 per week per adult, €29.80 per child). Since the government relies on the private market for supply, it cannot guarantee that enough people will be able to get direct provision places. As a result, asylum seekers are also placed in emergency accommodation or, increasingly, have to sleep rough <a href="https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/e202e-statistics-on-international-protection-applicants-not-offered-accommodation/">(more than 600 asylum seekers are currently on the streets)</a>.</p>
<p>And yet nothing has been done to dismantle direct provision and replace it with something else. Indeed, only since the issue has gained prominence in recent weeks have tangible alternatives been advanced by government ministers. </p>
<p>The idea of a number (perhaps six) state-owned reception centres has been mooted. While this would be an improvement on private service providers, questions remain about how a public system would work, particularly in light of Ireland’s history of institutional care, such as in <a href="https://theconversation.com/mother-and-baby-homes-inquiry-now-reveal-the-secrets-of-irelands-psychiatric-hospitals-153608">Magdalene laundries</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23724481">industrial schools</a>.</p>
<h2>‘Asylum seekers are dangerous’</h2>
<p>Asylum seekers, and particularly single young men, are often perceived as a <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/2023/02/04/jennifer-oconnell-why-is-the-government-perpetuating-tropes-about-single-male-asylum-seekers/">dangerous group</a>. Their undocumented status and gender make them highly suspect.</p>
<p>Many asylum seekers are indeed undocumented – but not by choice. They end up that way because EU countries including Ireland place asylum-producing countries on visa blacklists, so people coming from those countries will probably be denied a visa.</p>
<p>It is no surprise, then, that asylum seekers have to enter the state on false or fraudulent documentation or via clandestine means, on boats and in shipping containers. Nonetheless, once they claim asylum, extensive checks are done, including cross-checking fingerprints with various EU databases. </p>
<p>Nor is the gender of asylum seekers relevant. In fact, because of conditions in their country of origin and during the perilous journey to get here, many asylum-seeking men are likely to have been victims of criminality and human rights abuses. </p>
<p>The main criminal acts linked to asylum are the trespass and public order offences associated with the protests against new asylum centres, the arson attacks, the intimidation of asylum seekers and the spreading of lies about this vulnerable group.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221788/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ciara Smyth does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Tension has boiled over into threats of violence and suspicious fires at hotels accommodating asylum seekers.Ciara Smyth, Assistant Professor, School of Law, University of GalwayLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2212392024-01-18T14:42:19Z2024-01-18T14:42:19ZFemale lifestyle influencers are changing the face of the far right – podcast<p>When you think about the far right, you probably picture groups of young, white men carrying images of swastikas or torches like those seen at the <a href="https://time.com/charlottesville-white-nationalist-rally-clashes/">Unite the Right rally</a> in Charlottesville, Virginia in 2017. </p>
<p>But the face of the far right is changing, at least on social media. In this episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a> podcast, we hear about new research into a cohort of women influencers peddling far-right ideology on mainstream platforms such as Instagram and YouTube. </p>
<iframe src="https://embed.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/65a8f4d23676130016e104c3" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="190px"></iframe>
<p></p>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-561" class="tc-infographic" height="100" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/561/4fbbd099d631750693d02bac632430b71b37cd5f/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Eviane Leidig is a postdoctoral research fellow at Tilburg University in the Netherlands, focusing on far-right ideology, gender and the internet. She spent countless hours following the accounts and posts of female far-right influencers to research <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-women-of-the-far-right/9780231558303">her new book</a> on the issue.</p>
<p>Some of these influencers, she found, are sharing what you’d expect on social media: beauty tutorials, curated photos of a beautiful home, and product recommendations. But interspersed with these may be antisemitic conspiracy theories, anti-feminist messages, and white nationalist sentiments. </p>
<p>“They are merging both their political ideology and their personal brands into one,” Leidig says.</p>
<p>While much of the technology is relatively new, Leidig says the trends she observed have roots in right-wing political history.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The messaging is rather consistent with the history of conservative thinking, in terms of notions about traditional gender roles for women and for men.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Leidig says that women are playing a key role in recruitment for, and legitimisation of, far-right movements. By using the tools of social media influencing, they are making extremist ideology “seem acceptable”. </p>
<p>As one former follower she interviewed put it: “A movement without women is doomed to fail.”</p>
<p>To find out more about Leidig’s research into women influencers, listen to the full episode of <a href="https://podfollow.com/the-conversation-weekly/view">The Conversation Weekly</a> podcast. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/3054/Far_Right_Women_Influencers_Transcript.docx.pdf?1707745526">transcript of this episode</a> is now available. </p>
<p><em>This episode of The Conversation Weekly was written and produced by Mend Mariwany, with assistance from Katie Flood. Sound design was by Eloise Stevens, and our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. Gemma Ware is the executive producer.</em></p>
<p><em>You can find us on X, formerly known as Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a>, on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/">theconversationdotcom</a> or <a href="mailto:podcast@theconversation.com">via email</a>. You can also subscribe to The Conversation’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter">free daily email here</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a> or find out <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">how else to listen here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221239/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eviane Leidig has received funding from the European Commission and the Research Council of Norway. She is affiliated to Center for Research on Extremism at the University of Oslo, is an associate fellow in current and emerging threats at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism and a fellow at the Far Right Analysis Network.</span></em></p>Eviane Leidig talks about her research into women of the far right who have become online influencers. Listen to The Conversation Weekly podcast.Avery Anapol, Commissioning Editor, Politics + Society, The Conversation Weekly PodcastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2190002023-12-20T19:06:53Z2023-12-20T19:06:53ZFar-right ‘tradwives’ see feminism as evil. Their lifestyles push back against ‘the lie of equality’<p>There is a seductive simplicity to the “tradwife” trend, with its filtered representations of domestic bliss – from homesteading to homeschooling, home baking to homemaking. </p>
<p>Tradwife is internet shorthand for “traditional wife”. While tradwives emerge across the political spectrum, a small subculture use their platforms to promote the dark ideas of the far right. They operate across social media platforms, prominent on X (formerly Twitter), TikTok and Instagram. For some, the lifestyle seems driven by social media, but for others, it’s a way of living.</p>
<p>The number of tradwives aligned with the far right may be small, but their popularity on social media platforms suggests their cohort is growing. And we know from our research that far-right tradwives are active in Australia, on places such as X and Tik Tok, Instagram and YouTube.</p>
<p>In 2020, UK-based <a href="https://primer.com.au/toad-wives-julie-ebner/">extremism researcher Julia Ebner suggested</a> 30,000 women identified as tradwives or Red Pill Women: <a href="https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2020/09/07/take-the-redpill-understanding-the-allure-of-conspiratorial-thinking-among-proud-boys/">women aligned with the far-right male online community Red Pill</a>, who claim to be “awakened” to “male subjugation by feminism”. </p>
<p>Journalist Sian Norris, who has investigated the British far right, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/may/31/white-supremacy-trad-wives-far-right-feminist-politics">wrote this year</a> that while most of these women are in the US, “due to the networked nature of the modern far right”, trends that start there spread around the world. </p>
<p><a href="https://gnet-research.org/2023/07/07/tradwives-the-housewives-commodifying-right-wing-ideology/">Far-right tradwives</a> believe contemporary society is beset by decadence and consumerism, sexual depravity and promiscuity, and “unnatural” ways of living. This is all supposedly engineered to weaken the white race. Becoming a tradwife is one way far-right women push back against these supposed threats. </p>
<p>Ebner believes “the search for love is what radicalises most Trad Wives”: they adopt the rhetoric of men’s rights activists who want “a return to traditional power roles and exaggerated notions of masculinity and femininity”.</p>
<p>Our research shows far-right tradwives believe their roles as mothers and wives guarantee the survival of the white race, while actively weakening enemies. In an effort to encourage men to the cause, some tradwives claim they embraced their “true” femininity only after they were protected by a “real man” who embodies the (toxic) masculine ideals of the far right.</p>
<p>The exploitation of “traditional” gender identities to promote far-right ideas is dangerous. It makes women’s subordination to men seem legitimate – and even natural – and justifies violence when this natural order is disrupted.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/right-wing-extremism-has-a-long-history-in-australia-113842">Right-wing extremism has a long history in Australia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>‘Submitting’</h2>
<p>The tradwife is not a new phenomenon. In recent years, the identity has been adopted by women preferring domestic duties over the modern workforce. The tradwife aesthetic is soft, feminine and sometimes political. Not all tradwives are far-right – and of course, women have every right to choose the lifestyle that best suits them. </p>
<p>Tradwives across the political spectrum believe the place of women is in the home: as wives and mothers. They justify this through political or religious beliefs, or their own personal choices. Many argue they are returning to a traditional way of living that has become unconventional in a society that expects women to be part of the workforce. </p>
<p>For example, tradwife influencer Estee Williams, who has more than 134,000 followers on TikTok, includes submitting to her husband, no opposite-sex friendships and letting her husband have the final say on their finances in her <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@esteecwilliams/video/7193858884636020014">advice for a successful marriage</a>.</p>
<p>One Australian tradwife influencer with a substantial TikTok following (also active on X) similarly exalts submitting to her husband.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ps7g6uB94LQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Estee Williams’ advice for a successful marriage includes submitting to her husband.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Tradwives and the far right</h2>
<p>The far right has long had a girl problem. Far-right men (and women) discuss the <a href="https://news.csu.edu.au/opinion/women-of-the-far-right-not-just-homemakers-and-home-bakers">ideal roles and behaviours</a> of women almost to excess. </p>
<p>For instance, they describe the “<a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/9/9/149">good woman</a>” as demure, well-behaved, quietly intelligent – and although incapable of leadership, key to the future of white people. These women are “wounded by the lie of equality, but not broken by it”.</p>
<p>The tradwife is one celebrated form of women’s identity in the far right, weaponised to promote <a href="https://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/177/132">racially focused ideas</a>.</p>
<p>The far right centralises women’s value as one of service. This means serving as a wife by caring for – and bearing children for – their husband, and serving children by being a mother. Through those two efforts, they serve – and indeed continue – their imagined racial and cultural heritage. </p>
<p>Far-right ideology has emotional appeal beyond racial concerns, too. Its ideology and structure provides certainty in times of chaos, order in times of disorder, and meaning in times of existential struggle.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566541/original/file-20231219-17-pbfcsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566541/original/file-20231219-17-pbfcsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566541/original/file-20231219-17-pbfcsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566541/original/file-20231219-17-pbfcsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566541/original/file-20231219-17-pbfcsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566541/original/file-20231219-17-pbfcsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566541/original/file-20231219-17-pbfcsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566541/original/file-20231219-17-pbfcsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The far right centralises women’s value as one of service.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Elina Fairytale/Pexels</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For far-right tradwives, ideology provides gendered clarity by mandating how they should behave, dress, live and interact with others. Their roles as wives and mothers are celebrated as a pure, authentic form of white womanhood. The far-right believe tradwives should be the norm – not an exception. </p>
<p>In an era of #girlboss and hustle culture, tradwives feel judged for their lifestyle choices. Ironically, though, many manage carefully curated, sometimes monetised social media followings. (Some even sell social media advice to followers.)</p>
<p>Far-right tradwives argue the insatiable demands of the capitalism system and <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-08-22/tradwife-movement-personal-pleasures-or-extreme-right-ideologies/100356514">feminism</a> are complicit in an all-out war on womanhood. </p>
<p>One prominent far-right tradwife claims feminist domination has resulted in the repression of men who are tired of being <a href="https://impakter.com/from-incels-to-tradwives-understanding-the-spectrum-of-gender-and-online-extremism/">shamed</a> for their masculinity.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/toxic-masculinity-what-does-it-mean-where-did-it-come-from-and-is-the-term-useful-or-harmful-189298">'Toxic masculinity': what does it mean, where did it come from – and is the term useful or harmful?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Those who do not conform to the feminine ideal are seen as unnatural, racial traitors or enemies. Some far-right tradwives use their social media platforms to <a href="https://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/177/132">attack the LGBTQIA+</a> community for not adhering to heterosexual norms, as well as feminists and victims of domestic violence. </p>
<p>For instance, in response to the claimed fall in white births, which she attributes to female “traitors”, one tradwife infamously called for the “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/opinion/sunday/tradwives-women-alt-right.html">white baby challenge</a>”. “I’ve made six!” she wrote. “Match or beat me!” She is not an exception. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566542/original/file-20231219-29-pbfcsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566542/original/file-20231219-29-pbfcsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566542/original/file-20231219-29-pbfcsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566542/original/file-20231219-29-pbfcsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566542/original/file-20231219-29-pbfcsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566542/original/file-20231219-29-pbfcsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566542/original/file-20231219-29-pbfcsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566542/original/file-20231219-29-pbfcsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">One tradwife infamously called for ‘the white baby challenge’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rene Asmussen/Pexels</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://ojs.deakin.edu.au/index.php/ps/article/view/1645/1512">Others use their platforms</a> to denounce measures that aim to promote equality – one made a widely viewed video in which she said “I blame feminism” for welcoming attitudes to refugees.</p>
<p>The political actions of these far-right women <a href="https://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/177/132">are carefully positioned</a> as “protective and instinctual”, rather than “power-seeking”.</p>
<p>Through the tradwife ethos, the far right projects a range of ideas harmful to women. They oppose divorce, birth control and women in the workforce, and support “<a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/quiverfull-movement-facts_n_7444604">quiverfull</a>” notions of procreation: a conservative Christian movement that rejects contraception and views large families as a blessing. </p>
<p>Our research shows some even argue rape does not exist in marriage. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-extremists-have-used-the-covid-pandemic-to-further-their-own-ends-often-with-chaotic-results-174400">How extremists have used the COVID pandemic to further their own ends, often with chaotic results</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The feminist agenda</h2>
<p>A favourite topic among far-right tradwives is feminism as an evil, dominating force. The liberal feminist agenda to integrate women into the workforce is seen as the catalyst to the downfall of white men and women – while sexual liberation has destroyed, and in some cases “diluted”, the family unit. </p>
<p>They believe women “forced” to work are robbed of a happy family and strong male provider, while men have been stripped of their “right” to work, marry and bear children. Feminism is seen to erode “traditional” gender norms by undermining the roles women and men are biologically destined to fulfil.</p>
<p>Of course, there’s no problem with women valuing “traditional” roles as mothers and wives. What’s dangerous is when these roles are weaponised to advance the far right’s racially focused agenda – or when women are coerced into conforming, and punished when they transgress its narrow construction of a “good” woman.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566532/original/file-20231219-17-rhodbm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C4%2C1422%2C1050&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566532/original/file-20231219-17-rhodbm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C4%2C1422%2C1050&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566532/original/file-20231219-17-rhodbm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566532/original/file-20231219-17-rhodbm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566532/original/file-20231219-17-rhodbm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566532/original/file-20231219-17-rhodbm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=633&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566532/original/file-20231219-17-rhodbm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=633&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566532/original/file-20231219-17-rhodbm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=633&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">There’s no problem with valuing ‘traditional’ roles as wives or mothers – the danger is when these roles are weaponised.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">James Vaughan/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A fantasy twist on history</h2>
<p>Tradwives believe they are returning to a “traditional” gender order. </p>
<p>But in fact, they are living a modern version of a very short period in history during which women were largely excluded from the workforce. </p>
<p>Women have worked outside domestic demands <a href="https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/blog/complicated-history-women-working-home/">throughout history</a>, including in textile production and managing crops and livestock. Women were employed in factories during the Industrial Revolution, and in munitions and other forms of military service and production in the 1940s. </p>
<p>This regressed in the 1950s, when women were largely denied genuine access to the workforce – or the ability to choose. The male breadwinner, female homemaker “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_family">nuclear family</a>” ideal of this specific window in time is what tradwives glamorise as “traditional”.</p>
<p>While women’s roles as mothers and wives should be valued, this has been exploited by the far right for their own purpose. </p>
<p>It’s ironic that women who choose to become far-right tradwives are romantically reimagining a time when women couldn’t choose their own conditions – while condemning the feminism that has allowed them to make those choices today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219000/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While tradwives emerge across the political spectrum, a small subculture use their platforms to promote the dark ideas of the far-right – including in Australia.Kristy Campion, Senior Lecturer in Terrorism Studies, Charles Sturt UniversityKiriloi M. Ingram, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2197892023-12-13T18:06:06Z2023-12-13T18:06:06ZWhy did a far-right MP take a fire extinguisher to a Jewish menorah just as Poland’s new government was being voted into power?<p>In an attack caught on video, a member of the Polish parliament (Sejm) used a fire extinguisher to put out the Hanukkah candles on a menorah positioned in a public area of the building, filling the room with mist and covering bystanders with foam. Grzegorz Braun, an MP for the far-right alliance Konfederacja, then stated that “those who take part in acts of Satanic worship should be ashamed”. He was subsequently excluded from the sitting of parliament. Konfederacja <a href="https://twitter.com/KONFEDERACJA_/status/1734629552930885831">condemned</a> his actions on X (formerly Twitter).</p>
<p>Konfederacja was established in 2018 as an alliance of five far-right Polish parties, including Braun’s Konfederacja Korony Polskiej (Confederation of the Polish Crown). The alliance <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-election-results-opposition-donald-tusk-wins-final-count-civic-platform-pis/">won</a> 7.2% of the vote in this year’s election. </p>
<p>Braun himself has been an MP since 2019, and has been outspoken with his antisemitic, anti-LGBTQ+, and anti-EU views and conspiracy theories. He infamously <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/anti-semitism-polish-protests-against-restitution">refers</a> to “the war which the Jews have waged against the Polish nation”, for example. </p>
<p>This isn’t his first publicity stunt. In June 2023, he <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/polish-radical-right-wing-mp-disrupts-lecture-on-holocaust/a-65795483">interrupted</a> a lecture on “Poland’s problems with the history of the Holocaust” by shouting “enough” and forcibly taking the microphone away from the speaker. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1734602565223174308"}"></div></p>
<p>Braun’s latest actions may have been a response to the results of the latest Polish election, which saw <a href="https://theconversation.com/poland-votes-for-change-after-nearly-a-decade-spent-sliding-towards-autocracy-but-tricky-coalition-talks-lie-ahead-for-donald-tusk-215618">Donald Tusk’s centrist Civic Coalition (KO)</a> receiving enough votes to form a coalition government with the Left and the centre-right Third Way. Braun’s antisemitic act came just as parliament was preparing for a vote of confidence in the new government. The vote went ahead and the motion passed, despite the disruption.</p>
<h2>Contextualising antisemitism in Poland</h2>
<p>The sight of Braun brandishing the fire extinguisher may have been depressing, but perhaps not surprising, to many Polish people. There is comparatively less stigma around overt antisemitism in Poland than in some other European nations. </p>
<p>It is true that countries such as France and Germany have also struggled with the phenomenon of historical competitive victimhood, feeling that the suffering of their non-Jewish populations during the second world war has been overlooked due to a focus on the Holocaust – but Poland is a particularly <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17504902.2023.2245284?src=">prevalent example</a> of the problem.</p>
<p>Non-Jewish Poles suffered a huge amount under the Soviet and Nazi occupations. The Soviet Union did not recognise the Polish state and the Nazis considered all Poles to be subhuman. It is estimated that between <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/2000926-Poles.pdf">1.8 and 1.9 million non-Jewish Poles</a> died under the Nazis.</p>
<p>Accepting Jewish victimhood (<a href="https://holocausteducation.org.uk/teacher-resources/post-it-online-courses/jewish-life-warsaw/">90% of Polish Jews</a> were killed in the Holocaust) and considering the possible <a href="https://iupress.org/9780253010742/hunt-for-the-jews/">complicity</a> of non-Jewish Poles in the occupation is often felt to take focus away from the latter’s experience. Some consider that events such as the Katyn massacre of 1940 are overlooked and the hardship of non-Jewish Polish forced labourers forgotten. </p>
<p>In a recent poll by the Anti-Defamation League, 57% of respondents in Poland said that Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust, and scholars have <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43783763">demonstrated</a> that feelings of victimisation correlate with antisemitic beliefs in Poland. This is compounded by the legacy of the communist regime in Poland as part of the Soviet Bloc. During that period, Jewish suffering in the Holocaust was generalised as part of the wider victimhood from fascism, rather than marked as something specific to the Jewish community.</p>
<p>The effects of this are still felt. As recently as 2018, the Law and Justice party (PiS), in government at the time, <a href="https://theconversation.com/poland-is-trying-to-rewrite-history-with-this-controversial-new-holocaust-law-91774">passed a law</a> making it illegal to accuse the Polish nation or state of complicity in the Nazi Holocaust. This was subsequently changed to make it a civil, rather than a criminal, offence.</p>
<p>Catholicism has also played a role in Polish antisemitism since before the Holocaust. This is now visible through religious media outlets such as Radio Maryja, which <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/radio-maryja-25-years-anti-semitism">broadcasts</a> antisemitic conspiracy theories, such as alleged Jewish infiltration in liberal politics, and fears of Jews reclaiming property stolen during the Holocaust. The latter is a particularly contentious issue in Poland, as it is the only EU country not to have passed any legislation to restore stolen property to the descendants of their Jewish owners.</p>
<p>Braun’s reference to “acts of Satanic worship” is also telling. It implies a belief in the <a href="https://www.ncronline.org/news/world/indelible-stain-hate">blood libel claim</a> – the idea that forms a key part of historical anti-Jewish hatred and alleges that Jews use Christian blood in their acts of worship. </p>
<p>Throughout its administration, PiS sought to present itself as the defender of Christian values. And, while not as overtly antisemitic as Konfederacja, PiS has arguably normalised antisemitism while in power due to its exclusionary narratives. The party has drawn on its Christian image to argue that it is defending Poland against Muslims, to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/stories-54191344">ostracise members of the LGBTQ+ community</a> and to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/02/06/poland-womens-rights-activists-targeted">target</a> women’s rights activists protesting against abortion restrictions. The notion that the Polish in-group is comprised of traditional Catholics and no one else is detrimental to Poland’s Jews.</p>
<h2>The far right in western Europe</h2>
<p>While antisemitism is far from unique to Poland, the far-right parties that have seen electoral success in western Europe are more implicit in their expressions of antisemitism. Parties like Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) have learned the gains to be made by refuting accusations of prejudice towards Jews. Braun’s Konfederacja is perhaps ideologically more akin to extreme parties such as Die Heimat (formerly the NPD) in Germany – which are electorally irrelevant now.</p>
<p>Electorally successful parties, such as the AfD, Rassemblement National in France, or the Freedom Party of Austria, are known for engaging in Holocaust relativism and occasionally using antisemitic code words, such as “globalists”. But as these parties have also constructed an image for themselves as pro-Jewish, predominantly through the narrative of wanting to “protect” Jews from Muslim antisemitism, it would be unlikely for these parties to engage in a stunt such as Braun’s, publicly attacking Jews for being Jews.</p>
<p>It is at least comforting that Braun’s stunt received such a backlash and that his alliance remains on the fringes of Polish politics. Meanwhile, Tusk’s new premiership hopefully heralds a time of greater inclusion in Polish society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219789/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Claire Burchett receives funding from the London Arts & Humanities Doctoral Training Partnership. </span></em></p>Grzegorz Braun’s act was a reminder of how antisemitism has been normalised by the outgoing administration.Claire Burchett, PhD candidate in European Politics, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2187002023-11-30T17:21:21Z2023-11-30T17:21:21ZWhy are school-aged boys so attracted to hateful ideologies?<iframe height="200px" width="100%" frameborder="no" scrolling="no" seamless="" src="https://player.simplecast.com/a0e5db7e-fb55-4a8a-880e-00f8d5a0f2dc?dark=true"></iframe>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-572" class="tc-infographic" height="100" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/572/661898416fdc21fc4fdef6a5379efd7cac19d9d5/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p><em>In this episode of<a href="https://dont-call-me-resilient.simplecast.com/episodes/why-are-school-aged-boys-so-attracted-to-hateful-ideologies"> Don’t Call Me Resilient</a>, we look at the current rise of white supremacy and how that rise has filtered down into the attitudes of school-aged boys.</em> </p>
<p>Anecdotally, and in polls conducted by <a href="https://angusreid.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/2021.10.19_canada_school_kids_racism_diversity-1.pdf">Angus Reid</a> and the <a href="https://www.girlguides.ca/WEB/Documents/GGC/media/media-releases/Gender_Equality_Press_Release_Oct_2018.pdf">Girl Guides of Canada,</a> school-aged children are expressing concern about the sexist, homophobic and racist attitudes they are experiencing in their classrooms. And the research supports them: experts say <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-misogyny-influencers-cater-to-young-mens-anxieties-201498">the rise in far-right ideologies globally has impacted school-age students</a>. </p>
<p>Many experts point to Andrew Tate, the far-right social media influencer as one of the culprits. <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/online-misogyny-harrasment-school-children-b2314451.html">Teachers say he has a big presence in the classroom</a>. </p>
<p>On top of that, there’s been an exponential rise in antisemitism and Islamophobia in Canada that have also impacted the classroom.</p>
<p>Why are boys especially attracted to these hateful ideologies? As we near <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-continuum-of-unabated-violence-remembering-the-massacre-at-ecole-polytechnique-88572"> the National Day of Remembrance and Action on Violence Against Women on Dec. 6,</a> we spoke with to two experts who have been thinking a lot about this question.</p>
<p>Teresa Fowler is an assistant professor in the Faculty of Education at Concordia University of Edmonton whose research focuses on critical white masculinities. </p>
<p>Lance McCready is an associate professor in the Department of Leadership, Higher and Adult Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto. His research explores education, health and the well-being of Black men, boys and queer youth, especially in urban communities and schools. </p>
<h2>Read more in The Conversation</h2>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-misogyny-influencers-cater-to-young-mens-anxieties-201498">How 'misogyny influencers' cater to young men's anxieties</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/act-tough-and-hide-weakness-research-reveals-pressure-young-men-are-under-74898">Act tough and hide weakness: research reveals pressure young men are under</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-schools-can-foster-civic-discussion-in-an-age-of-incivility-106136">How schools can foster civic discussion in an age of incivility</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/less-talk-more-action-national-day-of-remembrance-on-violence-against-women-108139">Less talk, more action: National Day of Remembrance on Violence Against Women</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/too-busy-for-the-pta-but-working-class-parents-care-104386">Too busy for the PTA, but working-class parents care</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-critical-race-theory-should-inform-schools-185169">Why critical race theory should inform schools</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Resources</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/aug/06/andrew-tate-violent-misogynistic-world-of-tiktok-new-star">Inside the violent, misogynistic world of TikTok’s new star, Andrew Tate</a> </p>
<p><a href="https://www.boyhoodinitiative.org">The Boyhood Initiative</a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.gegi.ca">How to Advocate at School for Yourself or Someone You Love</a>, the first bilingual self-advocacy resource for K-12 students experiencing gender identity discrimination at school.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/667368/rebels-with-a-cause-by-niobe-way/"><em>Rebels with a Cause: Reimagining Boys, Ourselves and Our Culture</em></a> by Niobe Way</p>
<p><a href="https://therepproject.org/films/the-mask-you-live-in/">The Mask You Live In</a></p>
<p><a href="https://www.zinnedproject.org/materials/pedagogy-of-the-oppressed/"><em>Pedagogy of the Oppressed</em></a> by Paulo Freire</p>
<h2>Listen and follow</h2>
<p>You can listen to or follow <em>Don’t Call Me Resilient</em> on <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/dont-call-me-resilient/id1549798876">Apple Podcasts</a>, <a href="https://open.spotify.com/show/37tK4zmjWvq2Sh6jLIpzp7">Spotify</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL_mJBLBznANz6ID9rBCUk7gv_ZRC4Og9-">YouTube</a> or wherever you listen to your favourite podcasts. </p>
<p><a href="mailto:DCMR@theconversation.com">We’d love to hear from you</a>, including any ideas for future episodes. </p>
<p><strong>Please fill out our <a href="https://dontcallmeresilient.com">listener survey</a>.</strong></p>
<p>Join the Conversation on <a href="https://twitter.com/ConversationCA">Twitter</a>, <a href="https://www.instagram.com/dontcallmeresilientpodcast/">Instagram</a> and <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@theconversation">TikTok</a> and use #DontCallMeResilient.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218700/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Host Vinita Srivastava explores why racist, homophobic and sexist attitudes are increasingly showing up in school-age boys – and what we can do about it.Vinita Srivastava, Host + Producer, Don't Call Me ResilientAteqah Khaki, Associate Producer, Don't Call Me ResilientJennifer Moroz, Consulting Producer, Don't Call Me ResilientKikachi Memeh, Assistant Producer/Student Journalist, Don't Call Me ResilientLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2161972023-10-24T09:41:38Z2023-10-24T09:41:38ZGiorgia Meloni: how the realities of office trumped the Italian prime minister’s radicalism<p>A year ago many pundits feared that Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni’s government would turn out to be a radical one. This was not just because of her party’s roots in the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/10/22/europe/giorgia-meloni-italy-new-prime-minister-intl-cmd/index.html">extreme right</a> but also because she came to office promising big change.</p>
<p>A year in, Meloni has certainly not refrained from igniting culture wars. The bitter row over <a href="https://theconversation.com/lgbtq-parents-are-being-removed-from-their-childrens-birth-certificates-in-italy-heres-whats-behind-this-disturbing-trend-208241">adoption rights for same-sex couples</a> is a case in point. However, in other respects this government’s term has so far been much less eventful than expected. The need to project a certain image to international partners and the lack of fiscal wriggle room at home have seen her attempt to move away from her image as an extreme right-winger.</p>
<p>As far as foreign affairs and security matters are concerned, Meloni’s government has been treading the same path as its predecessor – the administration led by Mario Draghi. Meloni has stuck to a firmly pro-US and pro-Nato line, whether concerning <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-meloni-ready-risk-unpopularity-over-support-ukraine-2023-03-21/">Ukraine</a> or the conflict between <a href="https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-meloni-s-telephone-conversation-prime-minister-state-israel/23829">Israel and Hamas</a>.</p>
<p>Sooner or later (and generally sooner), every post-war Italian government has reached the same conclusion that the country’s interests are best served by keeping close to the US and Nato, as well as remaining <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/draghi-says-italy-must-remain-heart-eu-international-alliances-2022-08-24/">“at the heart of Europe”</a>. In this sense, Meloni’s executive is no exception.</p>
<p>Meloni has worked to reassure her American allies of her credentials as a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/07/27/joint-statement-from-president-biden-and-prime-minister-meloni/">“moderate”</a>. And, closer to home, she has cultivated a friendly relationship with Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the EU Commission. It’s a position that makes good financial sense since Italy is the recipient of the largest share of the EU’s post-pandemic recovery fund <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/eu-borrower-investor-relations/nextgenerationeu_en#:%7E:text=NextGenerationEU%20is%20the%20EU's%20%E2%82%AC,digital%20and%20more%20resilient%20future.">NextGenerationEU</a>.</p>
<p>Politically, Meloni also needs to keep the commission onside if there is ever to be any hope that the EU will take on a greater role in managing migration and asylum-seeking at its southern border. In other words, Italy simply cannot afford a conflictual relationship with EU institutions right now, and Meloni understands this.</p>
<p>And then there are the international financial markets. Being seen as an irresponsible and extremist leader carries with it real risks for the prime minister of a country that relies heavily on foreign investors to help service an overall debt burden of over 140% of GDP. Memories of a previous right-wing government losing its parliamentary majority in 2011 due to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2011/11/08/world/europe/italy-economy/index.html">considerable financial turmoil</a> are still fresh in Italy. Meloni’s first experience of an executive role (as youth minister) was as a member of that government – which was led by one Silvio Berlusconi – so she is not likely to have forgotten either.</p>
<h2>On a collision course?</h2>
<p>However, Meloni’s apparent prudence and restraint are at odds with the promises she made to voters ahead of her election, potentially putting her on a collision course with her own supporter base. </p>
<p>She had pledged, for example, to set up a “naval blockade” to repel the boats carrying would-be migrants and asylum seekers who <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/23/europe/meloni-italy-migrants-politics-intl/index.html">travel to Italy from northern Africa</a>. This was replaced with a deal committing the EU to effectively paying Tunisia to tighten its border to prevent departures in the first place. Now even this deal is <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/tunisia-hands-back-60-m-eu-funding-migration-deal">no longer on the cards</a>. Meanwhile, Meloni’s Ministry of the Interior reports that the number of arrivals by sea has almost doubled since 2022, <a href="https://www.interno.gov.it/it/stampa-e-comunicazione/dati-e-statistiche/sbarchi-e-accoglienza-dei-migranti-tutti-i-dati">and almost tripled since 2021</a>.</p>
<p>Nor do things look any easier for Meloni on the economic front. Many of her voters were led to believe that her government was going to reverse a reform of the pension system implemented in 2011, and that they would be able to retire earlier. But Giancarlo Giorgetti, the finance minister, now says there will be no comprehensive reform of the pension system <a href="https://www.fiscoetasse.com/approfondimenti/14178-riforma-pensioni-2024-giorgetti-frena.html">after all</a>. On the contrary, he has warned that with overall expenditure on pensions predicted to rise by almost 8% in 2023, strict control of public spending has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/imperative-italy-control-public-spending-economy-minister-says-2023-10-10/">become essential</a> instead.</p>
<p>Populist radical-right parties are increasingly parties of government across Europe. However, they are subject to the same external constraints as any other administration. In Italy’s case, the country’s government needs to show fiscal restraint in order to keep the financial markets happy, and it knows that a good relationship with the EU Commission is essential to its success.</p>
<p>However, given the extent and speed at which the promises made during the 2022 electoral campaign are now being shelved, Meloni’s government risks giving right-wing voters the impression of being all talk and no action. This poses a conundrum for Meloni. Given the levels of electoral volatility in Italy, the last thing she can afford to do is take her recently acquired supporters for granted.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216197/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniele Albertazzi has received funding from The British Academy, Leverhulme Trust, Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) and Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).</span></em></p>Even the most firebrand politicians find they need allies when they reach office, and Meloni’s predicaments make that even more true.Daniele Albertazzi, Professor of Politics and Co-Director of the Centre for Britain and Europe, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2156472023-10-18T15:54:56Z2023-10-18T15:54:56ZFar-right AfD makes unprecedented election gains in west Germany, worrying national government<p>Germany’s governing three-party coalition under Olaf Scholz has <a href="https://theconversation.com/germanys-far-right-afd-makes-key-political-gains-as-olaf-scholzs-governing-coalition-wobbles-209544">already had a difficult time this year</a>. But things just got significantly worse with recent state elections in Hesse and Bavaria, two of the country’s most prosperous states. </p>
<p>These elections really do matter. State governments control significant areas of policy and are represented in the upper house of Germany’s parliament (the Bundesrat), which has a <a href="https://www.bundesrat.de/DE/dokumente/statistik/statistik-node.html">veto on nearly 40% of legislation</a>. </p>
<p>They are also a test of the political mood. It’s not uncommon for mid-term elections to go badly for incumbent governments, but these ones were especially noteworthy because of the sheer scale of the losses for Germany’s ruling parties. </p>
<p>The gains made by the far right are also a marker of troubling instability in a country to which many would look for clear leadership, at a time of such substantial challenges in Europe and globally, including conflict and a cost of living crisis.</p>
<p>The defeat for the coalition parties was comprehensive. Scholz’s Social Democrats (SPD) achieved the worst results in post-war German history in both states. </p>
<p>In Hesse, a state which historically had been one of its strongest, the SPD took just <a href="https://europeanconservative.com/articles/news/weidel-after-election-afd-is-an-all-german-peoples-party/">15.1% of the vote</a>. In Bavaria, it won just 8.4%. Scholz’ Green coalition partners lost ground in both states, and the third party, the liberal FDP, lost support in both. </p>
<p>This unpopularity is also reflected in dire national poll ratings. The most recent national <a href="https://www.infratest-dimap.de/fileadmin/user_upload/DT2310_Report.pdf">Deutschlandtrend</a> survey showed 79% of Germans were dissatisfied with their government.</p>
<p>The AfD took 14.67% of the vote in Bavaria and 18.4% in Hesse. This is significant because support for the AfD has historically been <a href="https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/gps/40/2/gps400206.xml">far weaker on average</a> in these and other western states. It is more commonly known as an east German phenomenon so these latest gains are a blow to anyone who hoped the AfD was being contained there. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, elections will be held in the <a href="https://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/landtage/">eastern states</a> of Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia in September 2024, with polls suggesting impressive vote shares for the AfD. </p>
<p>It is unlikely to win a majority of seats, but “anyone but the AfD” coalitions encompassing all parties from far left to Christian Democrat would be hard to form, hard to keep together and risk <a href="https://www.bpb.de/themen/parteien/rechtspopulismus/284482/dialog-oder-ausgrenzung-ist-die-afd-eine-rechtsextreme-partei/">reinforcing the view the AfD puts about</a> that mainstream parties will stop at nothing to keep it out of government.</p>
<h2>No longer just a protest vote</h2>
<p>As in previous state elections, the AfD made gains in Bavaria and Hesse by mobilising people who don’t usually vote. It also gained new supporters mostly from the centre right, taking votes from the Christian democratic incumbents CDU in <a href="https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/waehlerwanderung-hessen-106.html">Hesse</a> and CSU in <a href="https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/waehlerwanderung-bayern-104.html">Bavaria</a>, as well as from the liberal FDP.</p>
<p>Dissatisfaction with other parties does not entirely explain the successes of the AfD, which now draws an increasing number of voters who back the party out of “conviction”. Its supporters perceive the party as competent in the area of asylum and refugee policy in particular. In Hesse, <a href="https://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Aktuelles/Wahlanalyse_Hessen/Newsl_Hess_231009.pdf">17%</a> of all voters took this view. </p>
<p>The success of the AfD is also evidence of a further “normalisation” of the German far right. In Bavaria, <a href="https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/germansplaining-germanys-lurch-to-the-right/">85%</a> of AfD supporters state they do not mind that the party is considered “extreme” in parts as long as it focuses on issues that matter to them. The post-war West German taboo against voting for the far right is an increasingly distant memory.</p>
<p>With its electoral successes, the AfD leadership does not appear to have felt the need to give the party a more “moderate” image, in contrast to manoeuvres (however tactical or insincere) by far-right parties in Italy and France.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/italys-election-is-a-case-study-in-a-new-phase-for-the-radical-right-92198">Italy's election is a case study in a new phase for the radical right</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In fact, since being founded in 2013, it has steadily moved from its origins as a liberal-conservative “anti-Euro” party to the radical right. Some AfD candidates for next year’s European elections have <a href="https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/europawahl-2025-afd-spitzenkandidaten-krah-verfassungsschutz-1.6083761">publicly defended</a> the extreme-right “identitarian movement” and some members spread tropes associated with <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-afd-far-right-conspiracy-theories/a-66396943">conspiracy theories</a> such as the “great replacement”. Certain party representatives are even monitored by the German internal intelligence services.</p>
<h2>Scholz shaken</h2>
<p>The relative strength of eastern state parties in the AfD’s national organisation (notably the Thuringian branch, led by the outlandish Björn Höcke) makes any course of moderation even less likely. This may keep the AfD from national or state government, but the strong showing in Hesse and Bavaria is evidence of a further entrenchment of the far right in German politics.</p>
<p>The immediate consequences of these recent state elections are already in evidence. Scholz and his government are looking to <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/scholz-calls-for-cross-party-cooperation-on-german-migration-policy/ar-AA1i3GlZ">tighten</a> immigration policy, currently <a href="https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/deutschlandtrend/deutschlandtrend-moma-102.html">considered</a> by 44% of German voters to be the country’s “biggest political problem”, way ahead of environmental and climate issues (18%) and the cost of living (13%). This has the <a href="https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/partei-vor-der-zerreissprobe-wie-die-asyldebatte-die-grunen-spaltet-10633984.html">potential to be a political headache</a> for Green party government ministers, going against the instincts of many party members.</p>
<p>And with European elections coming next June, the prospect of another mauling will only heighten the sense of chaos and bickering amongst the national government’s coalition parties. Members of each will demand leaderships differentiate themselves from their coalition allies even more clearly in the hope of fending off the challengers. </p>
<p>This vicious circle could lead the AfD to even stronger results in the European election (they took 11% of the vote last time) – and future elections beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215647/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ed Turner receives funding from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julian Hoerner receives funding from the British Academy (BA) and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)</span></em></p>Gains in Bavaria and Hesse mark new territory for a radical-right party that once only really enjoyed support in one region.Ed Turner, Reader in Politics, Co-Director, Aston Centre for Europe, Aston UniversityJulian Hoerner, Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2125142023-08-31T17:21:47Z2023-08-31T17:21:47ZHow this summer’s hit ‘Rich Men North of Richmond’ was appropriated by both the right and left<p>This summer two American country singers, Jason Aldean and Oliver Anthony, came out of nowhere with unexpected hits. In both cases, their songs were <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/08/17/rich-men-north-of-richmond-song/">politically appropriated</a>. </p>
<p><em>Rich Men North of Richmond</em> by Oliver Anthony, which appeared on YouTube just a few weeks ago, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/21/arts/music/rich-men-north-of-richmond-billboard-chart.html?smtyp=cur&smid=tw-nytimes">is the No. 1 song in the U.S. this week</a>, surpassing even Taylor Swift. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/sqSA-SY5Hro?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">“Rich Men North of Richmond” is now the No. 1 song on the U.S. Billboard Top 100.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Sociologically speaking, although its content is essentially libertarian, the song <a href="https://www.bbc.com/culture/article/20230818-rich-men-north-of-richmond-the-hit-song-that-has-divided-the-us">muddies the waters</a> between the American populist left and the right. It is celebrated by both the Trumpist wing of the Republican Party and some Democrats. </p>
<p>Anthony’s song was featured at the first 2024 Republican presidential primary debate. The singer has said he hates to “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/25/entertainment/oliver-anthony-song-response/index.html">to see that song being weaponized</a>. I see the right trying to characterize me as one of their own, and I see the left trying to discredit me.”</p>
<p>While Anthony has avoided partisan politics, the singer of <em>Try that in a Small Town</em>, Jason Aldean, is an avowed Trump supporter. His hit is clearly on the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2023/07/jason-aldean-donald-trump/674842/">right of the political spectrum</a> and lauded by Republicans.</p>
<p>Oliver Anthony presents himself as “pretty dead centre on politics.” But that didn’t prevent him from reading verses of the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X6J9AVlI0ZQ">Psalms, evoking God’s enemies</a>, during a recent performance of his hit song. The song’s lyrics fit the ideology of the American libertarian universe well. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/b1_RKu-ESCY?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">‘Try that in a Small Town’ is clearly on the right of the political spectrum.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As researchers working in the field of political sociology, we are interested in representations of those within nationalist and populist movements. </p>
<h2>Two visions of the “people”</h2>
<p>But before analyzing the songs, let’s recall what populists on both the left and the right have in common.</p>
<p>Each sees the political field as divided between the people (seen as organic, authentic and moral) and elites (which are considered disconnected, strategic, inauthentic and above all, immoral). The left tends to see the people as a <em>demos</em> — the bedrock of democracy — while the right views them as an <em>ethnos</em> or <em>heartland</em> — guardians of the nation’s authenticity. </p>
<p>Right-wing populists see the community as distinct from the state. In their view it is characterized by its high capital of autochthony, of “local people,” as opposed to immigrants or elites. The evocation of the <em>small town</em> in Aldean’s hit is typical of this representation.</p>
<h2>Work valued, work despised</h2>
<p>The American populist right is characterized by its adherence to both the ideologies of producerism and libertarianism. </p>
<p>Producerism is an attachment to a rigorous work ethic in both senses of the word — rigorous in the Protestant sense of a disciplined, vocational and meritorious relationship to work, but also in the valorization of manual and physical labour, or what sociologist Everett Hughes describes as <a href="https://psychology.iresearchnet.com/industrial-organizational-psychology/recruitment/dirty-work/">“dirty work.”</a></p>
<p>Recent research on the social identity of “dirty” occupations explains how its artisans reconstruct their self-perception in order to create a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/259134">positive image</a>. From this perspective, Anthony’s evocation of the situation of miners activates solidarity among the people who do this kind of work. In this way, they reconfigure their identity by responding to the contempt in which their occupation is held. </p>
<p>Finally, assiduous religious practice is often associated with adherence to a populist conception of politics. In <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-flag-and-the-cross-9780197618684?cc=us&lang=en&"><em>The Flag and the Cross</em></a>, sociologists Philip S. Gorsky and Samuel L. Perry demonstrate that white people who identify as evangelical Christians are much more likely to adhere to Christian and white nationalism than are non-believers. </p>
<h2>A class discourse with a libertarian dimension</h2>
<p>However, what sets Anthony’s song apart from the usual populist right-wing discourse is that it formulates a class opposition based on socioeconomic income. This goes further than the vague evocation of an opposition between common people and elites. And this explains why the song also appeals to some on the left. </p>
<p>Yet there’s nothing specifically “left-wing” about the moral denunciation of the rich. Above all, it has deep roots in the Christian tradition. </p>
<p>Conversely, for the social-democratic tradition, it’s not the fact of being rich that’s evil in itself, but rather the absence of labour law, of freedom of association and of mechanisms and institutions that ensure redistributive justice. </p>
<p>So, as singer Billy Bragg points out in a song responding to <a href="https://genius.com/Billy-bragg-rich-men-earning-north-of-a-million-lyrics">Anthony’s hit</a>, unions are conspicuously absent in Anthony’s worldview, as they are in that of libertarians. </p>
<p>To counter the very real difficulties brought about by the transformation of the working world, contemporary social democrats suggest establishing major continuing education programs and investing in adult education. This type of occupational retraining will attenuate the anxiety generated by the “New World” Anthony evokes in his song. </p>
<h2>Inflation and ‘peripheral regions’</h2>
<p>On the right, several factors explain the success of Anthony’s anthem.</p>
<p>Firstly, there’s the widespread perception that the left has abandoned the blue-collar workers to whom <em>Rich Men</em> is de facto addressed. Part of this segment of the population feels scorned by “elites” who monopolize symbolic, educational and cultural capital. The fact that they are considered privileged on the basis of their “race” and their “gender,” according to some rather mechanical analyses, does little to help us understand the stigma these workers actually face, nor the social issues confronting post-industrial regions. </p>
<p>This first dynamic is amplified by what is also perceived as a lack of understanding of the day-to-day reality of people who live far from major urban centres.</p>
<p>Inhabitants of the rural areas <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10371656.2019.1645429?needAccess=true">tend not to feel represented</a> by elected representatives and the media. Even if this dynamic persists year after year, it is rare for the left to question the importance of including the point of view of rural inhabitants within “good” diversity. </p>
<p>On the other hand, inflationary times favour the spread of libertarian “solutions.” When citizens see their purchasing power melt away and the price of their mortgage soar, they are faced with difficult choices, or even seeing their life project at risk. If they don’t see the positive impact of the taxes they pay, they are likely to see the social state and redistributive justice as mechanisms that don’t work for them. </p>
<h2>Polarization benefits populists</h2>
<p>There is no magic bullet to stop the rise of the populist right. But there are some sociological lessons to be learned about polarization.</p>
<p>The social identity of groups is largely constructed through framing, rituals and interactions. To defuse the polarization that feeds the populist right, its opponents must stop appealing to them as a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/2021/08/31/deplorables-basket-hillary-clinton/">“basket of deplorables,”</a> to cite Hilary Clinton’s elitist phrase. Opponents of the populist right must also stop pathologizing them, as is often the case in psychological approaches to political radicalization. Rather than defusing the framing and polarization that benefit populist politicians, these approaches reinforce them.</p>
<p>The main effect of excluding groups from participating in legitimate political interactions is to reinforce their solidarity. Mocking their rituals has the same effect. A legal framework must prevent incitement to violence and defamation and protect the right to one’s reputation and privacy. Ultimately, however, allowing participation can enable members of groups to reframe their discourse. It can also bring about changes that defuse or alter the social identity of people who identify with the groups. </p>
<p>Members of the populist right are generally able to supply cognitive or moral reasons to justify their actions. No one is obliged to share them, nor to find them “good.” However, we must seek to understand them, and to reconstruct the perceptions of justice and injustice that they fuel, or on which they are based. It’s an avenue as unpopular as it is difficult, but the alternatives are not clear.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212514/count.gif" alt="La Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Although its content is essentially libertarian, the No. 1 song of the summer in the U.S. resonates with both some Democratic supporters and those on the Trumpist right.Frédérick Guillaume Dufour, Professeur en sociologie politique, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)Alexis Harton, Étudiant à la maîtrise en sociologie, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2114652023-08-14T15:40:07Z2023-08-14T15:40:07ZContested memory in Giorgia Meloni’s Italy: how her far-right party is waging a subtle campaign to commemorate fascist figures<p>Since coming to power, Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni and her party Brothers of Italy have repeatedly raised the question of who and what is remembered in Italy. They have paid particular attention to how the experience of Italian fascism is told.</p>
<p>Writing on the front page of newspaper <a href="https://www.governo.it/it/node/22468">Corriere della Sera,</a> Meloni questioned the way the nation marks April 25 – the day Italy remembers its liberation from Nazi-fascism and honours the victory of the Italian resistance. She implied that those with rightwing political views are effectively locked out of the commemoration. She suggested that “the category of fascism” is used as a “weapon of mass exclusion” so that certain groups or people are not included on the “list” of those allowed to celebrate the anniversary. </p>
<p>The implication was that people associated with fascism should also be recognised for their contribution to the democratic republic. Referring to the Italian Social Movement, founded in 1946 by people who wanted to revive fascism and fight communism, Meloni wrote: “those who were excluded from the constitutional process for obvious historical reasons undertook to lead millions of Italians into the new parliamentary republic, shaping the democratic right wing”. Several Brothers of Italy leaders cut their teeth in the party’s youth group, including Meloni.</p>
<p>Meloni’s letter, published on a day intended to mark freedom from fascism, was remarkable for its failure to mention “antifascism” once.</p>
<p>Since its foundation a decade ago, Brothers of Italy has made the memory of the Italian far right and commemoration of its victims a priority. The party advocates for a broad national memory culture that even honours former fascists, dissolving the fascist-antifascist binary upon which the democratic republic was built. </p>
<p>It is behind <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20160523/jewish-community-angered-by-rome-mayor-hopefuls-vow-to-name-road-after-fascist">longstanding calls</a> to dedicate a road in Italy’s capital to Giorgio Almirante, founder and leader of the Italian Social Movement. Almirante was a minister in the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-23893-4_8">Italian Social Republic</a> – the second incarnation of the fascist state between 1943 and 1945 – and an editor of <a href="https://museoebraico.roma.it/en/rivista-la-difesa-della-razza/">The Defence of the Race</a> magazine, which promoted biological racism. </p>
<p>Most recently, Brothers of Italy co-founder Ignazio La Russa, <a href="http://ttps//www.liberoquotidiano.it/video/liberotv/35369883/terraverso-ignazio-la-russa-immigrazione-arma-puntata-contro-italia.html.">president of the Italian Senate, asserted</a> that the partisans involved in the 1944 Via Rasella attack – an attack by the Italian resistance in Nazi-occupied Rome – had killed a “semi-retired band” of musicians. The real victims were Nazis. Casting partisans as villains, these historical inaccuracies poke at the moral foundations of the antifascist republic, distorting and confusing the past.</p>
<h2>The original contested memory</h2>
<p>Fascists recognised the significance of gaining control of commemoration as early as 1924. This is when Benito Mussolini introduced a series of restrictions designed to banish the memory of antifascist victims. His move came in response to antifascists leaving red carnations in memory of socialist leader Giacomo Matteotti at the site in Rome where he was kidnapped in 1924. Matteotti was a staunch and vocal opponent of Mussolini and was murdered by Mussolini’s henchmen. His body was found on August 16 1924 just outside the city. </p>
<p>In the six weeks between his disappearance and the recovery of his body, tributes were laid, removed and replaced at the kidnap site, creating a grassroots site of memory. A cross was drawn on an embankment wall and red wreaths and carnations laid – material symbols of an emerging antifascist memory culture.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A black and white photo of a man bending down to take a close look at a huge pile of flowers placed in memorial." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542590/original/file-20230814-27-7vutg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542590/original/file-20230814-27-7vutg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542590/original/file-20230814-27-7vutg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542590/original/file-20230814-27-7vutg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542590/original/file-20230814-27-7vutg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542590/original/file-20230814-27-7vutg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542590/original/file-20230814-27-7vutg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A makeshift memorial emerges at the site of Matteotti’s kidnap.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Giacomo_Matteotti#/media/File:1924_13_giugno_-_Roma,_lungotevere_Arnaldo_da_Brescia_-_on._Bruno_Buozzi_reca_l'omaggio_della_CGdL_a_Giacomo_Matteotti.jpg">Wikipedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mussolini responded with a ban on flowers, commemorative ribbons and gatherings within ten metres of the site. He even tried to force Matteotti’s family to adopt a new name. In January 1925, he accepted “political, moral and historical responsibility” for Matteotti’s murder in a <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/benito-mussolini-declares-himself-dictator-of-italy">pivotal speech</a>. He then introduced a series of laws that banned opposition parties, curtailed press freedoms, introduced a secret police force and made the head of government accountable only to the King. It was the cementing of a dictatorship.</p>
<p>Mussolini’s ban pushed memory into private space in Italy. But commemoration of Matteotti abroad was public, persistent and popular. It occurred as far away as Australia, the United States and Venezuela and closer to home in Paris, London and Vienna.</p>
<p>Monuments to Matteotti went up as far away as Buenos Aires, where a statue of him is dedicated to all workers and emigrants. His name was visible in urban space: the social housing complex in Vienna named <a href="https://www.pinterest.com/pin/matteotti-hof-vienna--345651340122558362/">Matteotti Hof still stands today</a>, and there are several streets named after him in France. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An illustration of Mussolini and other fascists murdering people with bodies floating through a river of blood." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542375/original/file-20230811-35944-ygvzgi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542375/original/file-20230811-35944-ygvzgi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542375/original/file-20230811-35944-ygvzgi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542375/original/file-20230811-35944-ygvzgi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542375/original/file-20230811-35944-ygvzgi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=581&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542375/original/file-20230811-35944-ygvzgi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=581&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542375/original/file-20230811-35944-ygvzgi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=581&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Swiss anarchist publication illustrated the violence of the fascist regime after Matteotti’s murder.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Giacomo_Matteotti#/media/File:Guerre_et_Fascisme_%E2%80%93_Rome_1924.jpg">Wikipedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>When Mussolini resigned in July 1943, Matteotti’s name returned to Italian public space. As Allied forces and Italian partisans fought to free the country from fascism city by city, streets dedicated to fascist heroes were renamed. Matteotti’s name became more visible – a marker of the progress of Italy’s liberation. Today, more than 3,200 sites bear Matteotti’s name in Italy.</p>
<p>Far from being the decision of a few gatekeepers, this overwriting of fascist heroes was official policy in the new, democratic republic. With Brothers of Italy in power, the names of far-right figures could return to public space. Earlier this year, the centre-right city council in Grosseto laid out its plans for a new district of the city. Its main road – National Pacification Street – will fork with a road dedicated to Enrico Berlinguer on the left, honouring the longstanding leader of the Italian Communist Party, and another honouring Giorgio Almirante on the right. </p>
<p>There is more at stake than just political wins. This is a dangerous attempt to undermine the values on which the republic was founded by reframing the way Italy remembers its past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211465/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amy King does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Brothers of Italy want streets named after fascist figures and the far-right’s ‘contribution’ to democracy recognised on national days of memory.Amy King, Lecturer in Modern European History, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2082412023-06-28T14:57:12Z2023-06-28T14:57:12ZLGBTQ+ parents are being removed from their children’s birth certificates in Italy – here’s what’s behind this disturbing trend<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534033/original/file-20230626-15-gxzlyi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C7%2C2485%2C1654&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Demonstration in Piazza Della Scala, in Milan (Italy) for the rights of children of same-sex parent couples.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/es/image-photo/milano-lombardy-italy-march-18-2023-2276836109">Shutterstock/Federico Fermeglia</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A public prosecutor in the Italian city of Padova is attempting to <a href="https://espresso.repubblica.it/politica/2023/06/20/news/famiglie_arcobaleno_guerra_diritti-405159363/">challenge</a> the legitimacy of 33 birth certificates of children born to same-sex couples <a href="https://www.ilpost.it/2023/06/20/padova-impugnati-atti-nascita-coppie-omogenitoriali/">via insemination</a> by a donor. The prosecutor, Valeria Sanzani, also seeks to remove the names of the mothers considered “non-genetic” from the birth certificates.</p>
<p>This motion is one of the broadest within more widespread, though still patchwork, efforts in Italy that have emerged in the past six months to annul the birth certificates of children conceived through the use of reproductive technologies abroad, particularly in cases concerning “rainbow families” – families with same-sex parents. </p>
<p>This includes another <a href="https://milano.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/23_giugno_23/tribunale-di-milano-trascrizioni-padri-mamme-f9b18bcb-c9a4-4679-8617-e93bd8983xlk.shtml">case</a> in Milan, in which the birth certificate of a child born abroad via surrogacy to two men was annulled. </p>
<p>Such action should be seen in light of the Meloni government’s policy aims, which are being interpreted and enacted in a way that particularly targets rainbow families. </p>
<h2>Going back a few months</h2>
<p>In January, Meloni’s Minister of the Interior issued a <a href="https://associazionelucacoscioni.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/circ-dait-003-servdemo-19-01-2023.pdf">circular</a> ordering all Italian Mayors to stop automatically registering the births of children born or conceived abroad via assisted reproductive technologies. </p>
<p>The circular cited a case from Italy’s Court of Cassation, which ruled on December 30 2022, that the birth certificate of a child of a gay couple who used a surrogate abroad to conceive should not be automatically recognised and transcribed in Italy.</p>
<p>Although the court case and circular related to surrogacy, a practice which is illegal in Italy for both heterosexual and same-sex couples as well as single people, in its interpretation and enactment by Prefectures and Municipalities, it has specifically targeted rainbow families, including those who don’t use surrogacy.</p>
<p>In April, the Milan prefecture <a href="https://www.ilpost.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/30/905x2560/1680186579-prefetto-milano.jpg?x57999&x82864&x82864">extended the logic</a> of the circular to same-sex couples who conceived abroad via insemination by a donor. This cited Italian law, which states that insemination by a donor is only legal for heterosexual couples, and specifically argued that birth certificates of children born to same-sex parents should be targeted. </p>
<p>At the time, the Mayor of Milan agreed that he would not automatically transcribe birth certificates moving forward, but <a href="https://www.ilpost.it/2023/04/12/famiglie-omogenitoriali-annullamento-tribunale/">declined</a> to retroactively revise the ones he had already signed. Also in April, the birth certificate of one child born to two mothers was annulled in the city of Bergamo. </p>
<p>The events in Padova are noteworthy as they suggest a growing, and worrisome trend. The prosecutor has challenged the legitimacy of many more birth certificates, and going as far back as 2017 (the year after civil unions for same-sex couples were legalised in Italy). </p>
<p>Such a move would have consequences for both children and parents. The children, some as old as six, would have their names and parental status <a href="https://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/701563/la-procura-di-padova-dice-stop-ai-figli-con-due-mamme-intervista-a-nicola-fratoianni">forcibly changed</a> by an act of the state. The non-genetic parent would <a href="https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2023/06/19/news/coppie_gay_due_mamme_padova_atti_di_nascita_cancellazione-405074842/">lose parental rights</a>. They wouldn’t be able to pick up their children from school, take them to the doctor or leave the country without an official note from the legally-recognised parent.</p>
<p>Within Italy, motions like the ones enacted in Padova, Milan, and Bergamo are being seen as acts that <a href="https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2023/06/19/news/coppie_gay_due_mamme_padova_atti_di_nascita_cancellazione-405074842/">punish</a> LGBTQ+ individuals and their children. </p>
<p>In an <a href="https://www.lastampa.it/editoriali/lettere-e-idee/2023/06/17/news/gestazione_per_altri-12862736/">opinion piece</a> for La Stampa, lawyer Filomena Gallo writes, “Children will be estranged (<em>allontanati</em>) from their legitimate families just to satisfy the ideological whims of the proponents (of these efforts).”</p>
<h2>Moves from the Meloni government</h2>
<p>While campaigning, Meloni made clear the stance that her government could be expected to have regarding LGBTQ+ rights. In a 2022 rally in Spain, Meloni <a href="https://video.corriere.it/politica/meloni-andalusia-sostenere-vox-palco-arringa-folla-spagnolo/8ce5509e-eb15-11ec-b89b-6b199698064a">exclaimed</a>: “Yes to the natural family! No to the LGBT lobby!”</p>
<p>The January circular marked the beginnings of the Meloni government’s actions to make good on such positions. Currently, her party, the Brothers of Italy, is pursuing legislation that could result in an almost total ban on state recognition of rainbow families. These actions focus on surrogacy – making surrogacy abroad illegal, which would affect heterosexual couples and singles as well. However, the behaviour of public officials, together with the rights of same-sex couples under current Italian law, mean that the consequences for LGBTQ+ individuals hoping to start families would be drastic. </p>
<p>While a total ban on surrogacy would affect heterosexual couples seeking to conceive as well, these couples have a right to adopt or to use artificial insemination through a donor that same-sex couples do not have in Italy. </p>
<h2>Problems with citizenship</h2>
<p>A serious concern is the impact that such policies could have on the citizenship status of the concerned children. Should Sanzari’s challenge be successful in court, the question will become: what to make of the children whose Italian citizenship derives from the non-genetic/gestational parent? </p>
<p>Though same-sex unions have been <a href="https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2016/05/21/16G00082/sg">legal</a> through civil partnership since 2016, these unions don’t provide the same rights as official marriage in Italy, notably the right to adopt as a couple. In current cases, adoption rights for the non-genetic parent are not guaranteed, only result from a long and arduous process, and are only considered when circumstances have been deemed exceptional.</p>
<p>As such, for bi-national, same-sex couples in Italy, recognised partnership in Italy does not necessarily mean that their children will have Italian citizenship. With the removal of non-genetic same-sex partners on birth certificates, there is a potential loss of citizenship for the children. Some are already into their primary school education and have not necessarily known any other country as home.</p>
<h2>‘Protecting the children’</h2>
<p>In mobilizing public sentiment against LGBTQ+ people, opponents often invoke the need to protect “the child”. From <a href="https://www.dragstoryhour.org/">drag queen story hour</a> to gay marriage, many elements of LGBTQ+ inclusion have been framed as a threat to children. </p>
<p>Meloni’s government ran on a platform of protecting the family, attempting to connect conservative policies on LGBTQ+ inclusion and migration through the frame of defending a homeland and family. One of her campaign slogans was “God, homeland, family.” An unfortunate irony, then, that this policy is proving so destructive to families.</p>
<p>With these moves, the Meloni government further establishes itself as a new force for anti-LGBTQ+ politics in Europe, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/lgbt-rights-eastern-europe-backsliding/31622890.html">alongside the governments of Poland and Hungary</a>. </p>
<p>The Hungarian government has passed a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/15/lgbt-rights-under-renewed-pressure-hungary">series of anti-LGBTQ+ legislation</a> over the past few years, banning LGBTQ+ content in schools as well as in books and television programmes geared toward young people, ending gender recognition by the state and embedding a ban on gay marriage and adoption in the constitution. </p>
<p>Poland has also recently passed a <a href="https://www.thepinknews.com/2022/02/10/poland-lgbt-propaganda-bill-andrzej-duda/">ban</a> on LGBTQ+ content in schools and denied <a href="https://www.ilga-europe.org/news/rainbow-families-have-the-right-to-move-and-reside-freely-eu-court-reiterates/">recognition</a> to rainbow families. Since 2020, the government has supported local initiatives to establish <a href="https://gcn.ie/eu-legal-case-poland-anti-lgbtq-zones/">“LGBT-free zones”</a> in municipalities throughout the country. </p>
<p>Concerned by this alliance, the European parliament passed an <a href="https://www.unionesarda.it/en/world/lgbt-the-european-parliament-condemns-italy-with-poland-and-hungary-quot-too-much-anti-rights-rhetoricquot-qnai6hcq?amp=1">amendment</a>, strongly condemning “the spread of anti-rights, anti-gender and anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric by some influential political leaders and governments in the EU, as in the case of Hungary, Poland and Italy.”</p>
<p>If successful in Italy, then it is possible that we could see these efforts adopted elsewhere in Europe. As we’ve seen, anti-rights legislation is proliferating in certain parts of Europe. Should other governments follow in the footsteps of what they perceive as a successful effort in Italy, then even more children in Europe will be at risk of denaturalisation just for having same-sex parents.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208241/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Las personas firmantes no son asalariadas, ni consultoras, ni poseen acciones, ni reciben financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y han declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado anteriormente.</span></em></p>The Prosecutor’s Office of Padova (Italy) has asked a local court to remove any same-sex non-biological parent on birth certificates, denying same-sex families the right to State recognition.Samuel Ritholtz, Max Weber Fellow in the Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University InstituteMargaret Neil, PhD candidate in International Development, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2062602023-06-08T15:39:57Z2023-06-08T15:39:57ZListen: Indian PM Modi is expected to get a rockstar welcome in the U.S. How much is the diaspora fuelling him?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530495/original/file-20230607-25-vz3xkq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=245%2C204%2C4299%2C2800&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi delivers a speech during an event in Sydney, Australia on May 23, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Mark Baker)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe height="200px" width="100%" frameborder="no" scrolling="no" seamless="" src="https://player.simplecast.com/eefdb202-7c47-4a14-9122-455e228d6c6a?dark=true"></iframe>
<p>On June 22, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/10/us/politics/biden-modi-state-dinner.html?searchResultPosition=4">will make his first official state visit to the United States</a>. And if his visits to Australia last month, to Canada in 2015 and to <a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/09/25/howdy-modi-trump-hindu-nationalism/">Texas in 2019</a> are any indication, he’ll be given a rockstar welcome.</p>
<p>U.S. President Joe Biden has already <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/us-president-joe-biden-asked-pm-modi-for-an-autograph-what-report-claimed-101684638531088.html">joked that he wants Modi’s autograph</a> because so many people want to see the Indian PM while he’s in the United States.</p>
<p>Of course, Modi has his critics too, who point to the populist leader’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/new-laws-weaponize-citizenship-in-india-129027">far-right policies</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/us-report-lists-significant-human-rights-abuses-india-2023-03-20/">human rights abuses</a>.</p>
<p>Yet, as the prime minister of the world’s largest democracy, Modi remains one of the world’s most popular leaders - not just at home, but among the tens of millions who make up the global South Asian diaspora. </p>
<p>Last week, perhaps in an acknowledgement of the power of the South Asian diaspora on Indian elections, the former leader of the opposition, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-65785138">Rahul Gandhi, also visited the United States</a>. </p>
<p>In the latest episode of <em>Don’t Call Me Resilient</em>, we are asking how important is that diaspora? With India having <a href="https://www.financialexpress.com/economy/remittances-to-india-cross-100-billion-in-2022-first-country-to-hit-the-mark/3057688/">one of the highest remittance rates in the world</a>, how much does overseas support contribute to Modi’s popularity and success? And what kind of an impact could a progressive element of that diaspora have on Indian politics? </p>
<p>Anjali Arondekar joins the podcast to sift through all this. She is a professor of feminist studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. She is also the founding co-director of the university’s Center for South Asian Studies which hosted a discussion last week with Rajiv Gandhi.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/u2VARtV6Unk?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Anjali Arondekar was in Conversation with Rahul Gandhi last week at the Center for South Asian Studies, UCSC.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Resources</h2>
<p><a href="https://thewire.in/diplomacy/narendra-modis-first-state-visit-to-the-us-has-both-national-and-global-implications">Narendra Modi’s First State Visit to the US Has Both National and Global Implications</a> (<em>The Wire</em>)</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0dkb144">The Modi Question (<em>BBC</em>)
</a>
<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/13/world/asia/india-modi-elections.html?searchResultPosition=2">A Defeat for Modi’s Party in South India Heartens His Rivals
</a></p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/24/indian-politician-boasts-about-getting-muslims-killed-on-camera">Indian politician boasts about getting Muslims killed – on camera
</a> (<em>Al Jazeera</em>)</p>
<p><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/09/25/howdy-modi-trump-hindu-nationalism/">The Network of Hindu Nationalists Behind Modi’s Diaspora Diplomacy in the U.S.
</a> (<em>The Intercept</em>)</p>
<h2>From the archives - in The Conversation</h2>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indias-new-citizenship-act-legalizes-a-hindu-nation-129024">India's new citizenship act legalizes a Hindu nation</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-and-modi-birds-of-the-same-feather-but-with-different-world-views-69090">Trump and Modi: birds of the same feather, but with different world views</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/just-who-is-narendra-modi-indias-man-of-the-moment-26898">Just who is Narendra Modi, India's man of the moment?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-conservative-right-hijacks-religion-109218">How the conservative right hijacks religion</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/narendra-modi-has-won-the-largest-election-in-the-world-what-will-this-mean-for-india-116598">Narendra Modi has won the largest election in the world. What will this mean for India?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Listen and Follow</h2>
<p>You can listen to or follow <em>Don’t Call Me Resilient</em> on <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/dont-call-me-resilient/id1549798876">Apple Podcasts</a>, <a href="https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9mZWVkcy5zaW1wbGVjYXN0LmNvbS9qZFg0Ql9DOA">Google Podcasts</a>, <a href="https://open.spotify.com/show/37tK4zmjWvq2Sh6jLIpzp7">Spotify</a> or <a href="https://dont-call-me-resilient.simplecast.com">wherever you listen to your favourite podcasts</a>. </p>
<p><a href="mailto:DCMR@theconversation.com">We’d love to hear from you</a>, including any ideas for future episodes. Join The Conversation on <a href="https://twitter.com/ConversationCA">Twitter</a>, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/TheConversationCanada">Facebook</a>, <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/">Instagram</a> and <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@theconversation">TikTok</a> and use #DontCallMeResilient.</p>
<p><em>Thank you to Sanjay Ruparelia, Jarislowsky Democracy Chair at TMU and Kalpana Jain, Senior Religion Editor at TCUS who contributed to this episode.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206260/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and opposition politicians are courting the diaspora in the run-up to next year’s elections in India. What role does the diaspora play in Indian politics?Vinita Srivastava, Host + Producer, Don't Call Me ResilientLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2059222023-05-25T21:24:04Z2023-05-25T21:24:04ZAnti-government protesters are reclaiming the Israeli flag from the far-right<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527861/original/file-20230523-20169-2671gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C33%2C5599%2C3699&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Israeli flag has become a contested symbol recently as both anti-government and far-right demonstrators use it to bolster their message.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Tsafrir Abayov)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/anti-government-protesters-are-reclaiming-the-israeli-flag-from-the-far-right" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Thousands of people recently took to the streets of the Old City in Jerusalem <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-05-18/ty-article-live/.premium/hundreds-of-jews-visit-temple-mount-thousands-more-expected-to-attend-flag-march-in-jlem/00000188-2db9-df65-abfc-edb9ad300000">for the annual far-right Flag March</a>. </p>
<p>Every year, on <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israel-police-jerusalem-march-palestinians-rcna85018">Jerusalem Day</a>, marchers descend on Jerusalem with Israeli flags in hand and terrorize the city’s non-Jewish population. As they make their way to the Western Wall at the heart of the Old City, they chant racist slogans, vandalize storefronts and homes and beat up anyone in their path.</p>
<p>As with previous flag marches, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/flower-march-spreads-love-inclusion-to-counter-contentious-jerusalem-flag-march/">counter-protests also took place</a>. But this year, Israeli pro-democracy organisation <em>Tikva</em> called on its supporters to participate in a counter-march in an unusual way. <a href="https://twitter.com/YallaTikva/status/1659097148745564160">The group tweeted</a>: “After we took back the flag and the Declaration of Independence, it’s time we take back Jerusalem Day as well!” The statement was accompanied by an Israeli flag emoji.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527860/original/file-20230523-20-ouh2r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People at a march wave Israeli flags in front of an old wall with a gate." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527860/original/file-20230523-20-ouh2r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527860/original/file-20230523-20-ouh2r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527860/original/file-20230523-20-ouh2r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527860/original/file-20230523-20-ouh2r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527860/original/file-20230523-20-ouh2r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527860/original/file-20230523-20-ouh2r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527860/original/file-20230523-20-ouh2r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators wave Israeli flags during a march marking Jerusalem Day in front of the Damascus Gate of Jerusalem’s Old City. The event marks the day in 1967 when Israeli forces captured East Jerusalem.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ohad Zwigenberg)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The tweet referred to the rapid transformation the Israeli flag has undergone recently. The flag has long been associated with the political right. As evidenced by the Flag March, the right often uses national symbols centred around the flag. </p>
<p>But in just a few short weeks of protest, Israeli pro-democracy activists managed to make the flag switch sides. What was previously staunchly seen as the property of the right is now a contested political battleground. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israels-domestic-turmoil-raises-serious-questions-about-its-long-term-survival-204009">Israel's domestic turmoil raises serious questions about its long-term survival</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Claiming the flag</h2>
<p>Since late 2022, Israel has been swept by an intense wave of protests against the government’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-65086871">proposed judicial reforms</a>. Critics say the reforms are anti-democratic and will undermine the county’s judiciary and weaken the separation of powers. </p>
<p>The government’s efforts to enact the reforms have been met by <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/strike-called-flights-grounded-in-israel-over-netanyahus-judicial-overhaul-plan-e8c95930">massive demonstrations across the country</a>.</p>
<p>The most striking visual element of the protests is the overwhelming presence of Israel’s national flag, practically drowning out all other symbols. </p>
<p>Given that anti-government protesters are generally associated with Israel’s centre-left, this is quite unusual. Israeli left-of-centre politics has <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/on-israels-75th-birthday-the-flag-takes-on-new-meaning-as-a-symbol-of-protest/">tended to downplay national symbols, and particularly the flag</a>, in recent decades for various reasons, leaving the right to lay claim to them mostly uncontested. </p>
<p>Yet the national flag is now taking centre stage at anti-government protests. This shift has dramatically changed attitudes towards the flag across the Israeli political spectrum. Protesters report <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-03-06/ty-article-magazine/.premium/how-the-pro-democracy-camp-reclaimed-the-israeli-flag-from-right-wingers-and-settlers/00000186-b6c4-d7ce-a5b6-fee6c9200000">they no longer feel alienated by the flag and fly it proudly</a>, while right-wing figures are <a href="https://www.makorrishon.co.il/opinion/605807/">calling on their supporters to not give up on the flag</a>.</p>
<p>The association between the flag and anti-reform dissent had grown so strong that police refused to grant a licence to protesters on Independence Day <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/police-bar-zichron-independence-day-march-with-israeli-flags-other-signs-of-protest/">unless they promised not to fly the flag</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527858/original/file-20230523-29-aky8pp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People at a protest wave blue and white Israeli flags featuring the Star of David. They also hold placards in Hebrew." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527858/original/file-20230523-29-aky8pp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527858/original/file-20230523-29-aky8pp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527858/original/file-20230523-29-aky8pp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527858/original/file-20230523-29-aky8pp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527858/original/file-20230523-29-aky8pp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527858/original/file-20230523-29-aky8pp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527858/original/file-20230523-29-aky8pp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Israelis protest in Jerusalem against the government’s plans to overhaul the country’s judicial system on May 23, 2023. The Israeli national flag has become a symbol of the protests.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Mahmoud Illean)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Flags as protest symbols</h2>
<p>Throughout Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s many years in power, opposition groups have used different symbols to mobilize popular dissent, with varying degrees of success. The 2020-2021 protests that briefly ousted Netanyahu used the <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/10/israel-benjamin-netanyahu-benny-gantz-gillon-black-flag.html">Black Flag</a> as its primary symbol, imagery taken from a well-known Israeli proverb.</p>
<p>Using the national flag this time around didn’t happen by chance. Movement leaders <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-03-06/ty-article-magazine/.premium/how-the-pro-democracy-camp-reclaimed-the-israeli-flag-from-right-wingers-and-settlers/00000186-b6c4-d7ce-a5b6-fee6c9200000">organized to make Israeli flags available to demonstrators at major protest sites</a>. </p>
<p>Shikma Schwartzman-Bressler, one of the protest movement’s leaders, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-03-17/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/how-a-particle-physicist-became-the-reluctant-face-of-israels-protest-movement/00000186-f139-df90-a19e-f9bf0c940000">told Israeli newspaper <em>Haaretz</em></a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Our activity is having an effect. We have already reclaimed the national flag, the national anthem, the Declaration of Independence – symbols that until not long ago were [seen as] assets of the nondemocratic camp. Today it is clear to the public that the flag is us and democracy is us.” </p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/on-its-75th-birthday-israel-still-cant-agree-on-what-it-means-to-be-a-jewish-state-and-a-democracy-204770">On its 75th birthday, Israel still can't agree on what it means to be a Jewish state and a democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Symbols are able to convey complex cultural meanings quickly, and activists use them to capture fleeting public and media attention and as powerful aids for mobilization. </p>
<p>It’s no surprise that when we think of social movements, often the first thing that comes to mind are the symbols most strongly associated with them. </p>
<p>Think of the rainbow flag, for instance, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/story/how-did-the-rainbow-flag-become-a-symbol-of-lgbt-pride">originally designed as a protest symbol in the 1970s</a> and now often the first thing that comes to mind when we think of the LGBTQ2S+ community. These symbols are imbued with meaning by social movements during times of protest and continue to resonate long after the protest has subsided.</p>
<p>By reclaiming the Israeli flag, protesters are denying their opponents one of their most powerful symbols. But more importantly, flying the flag allows activists to frame their protest as a popular uprising and deny the right the opportunity to label any type of dissent as anti-patriotic and treasonous. Pictures of the protests frequently show a sea of Israeli flags stretching out as far as the eye can see in every direction. How can this kind of protest be unpatriotic?</p>
<p>Centering the Israeli flag has benefited the protest in some ways, but it has also <a href="https://www.972mag.com/palestinian-citizens-israel-government-protests/">alienated Israel’s Palestinian population</a>. As the Israeli flag’s prominence grew, Arab and Jewish anti-occupation activists found that <a href="https://www.972mag.com/radical-bloc-israel-protests-tel-aviv/">tolerance towards the Palestinian flag diminished</a>, prompting some to ask <a href="https://www.972mag.com/palestinian-citizens-anti-government-protests/">whether Palestinians are even welcome</a> and <a href="https://www.972mag.com/problem-israeli-flag-protests/">what kind of democracy</a> protesters are advocating for. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528074/original/file-20230524-29-dese1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People in a field waving Palestinian flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528074/original/file-20230524-29-dese1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528074/original/file-20230524-29-dese1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528074/original/file-20230524-29-dese1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528074/original/file-20230524-29-dese1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528074/original/file-20230524-29-dese1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528074/original/file-20230524-29-dese1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528074/original/file-20230524-29-dese1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Palestinians in Gaza wave their national flag during a protest against an Israeli march through Jerusalem’s Old City on May 18, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Fatima Shbair)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Israel is experiencing an open public debate over who gets to claim national symbols, which national symbols are represented, who gets to speak for the Israeli public and who is included in that public.</p>
<p>This debate might ring a bell for Canadians as they recall the Freedom Convoy protests. Truckers and their supporters <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/01/world/canada/canada-day-flag-freedom-convoy.html">adopted the Canadian flag as a symbol of their movement</a> which served as a major element in their messaging. </p>
<p>For many Canadians, seeing the flag used that way — particularly, seeing it flying next to hate symbols like swastikas and Confederate flags — <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/after-freedom-convoy-canadian-flag-has-taken-on-new-meaning-for-some-this-year-1.5969503">sparked uneasiness with the flag and what it represents</a>. That led <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/flag-convoy-canada-1.6505885">to a debate</a> about what the flag represents, what it should represent and the history of the flag.</p>
<p>Protests are social arenas in which meanings are made and fought over. The Israeli and Canadian cases demonstrate how battles over meaning aren’t limited to new or obscure symbols. Israeli activists’ swift rewriting of the political meaning surrounding their national flag, and Canadian trucker’s co-opting the Canadian flag, show how even very established symbols can be dramatically reinterpreted.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205922/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Einhorn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Israeli flag has long been associated with the country’s far-right, but anti-government protesters have recently begun using the flag to bolster and legitimize their movement.Tom Einhorn, PhD Candidate, Sociology, University of British ColumbiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2057612023-05-17T23:07:34Z2023-05-17T23:07:34ZIn Meloni’s Italy, young Black men are particularly at risk of ending up on the street<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526920/original/file-20230517-9960-anjh1k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C11%2C3816%2C2752&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Groups of refugees from war-torn regions gather in Milan's Central Station. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/fr/image-photo/milan-italy-november-10th-2016-groups-514008019">Alexandre Rotenberg/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Italy is in the grip of a housing crisis, and has been for years. It’s not as if the problem had gone unnoticed. There has been no shortage of articles in the <a href="https://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2023/05/04/news/ilaria_lamera_tenda_politecnico_protesta_caro_affitti_milano-398739819/">national</a> – or even <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/12/italy-students-protest-over-cost-housing-high-rents">international</a> – media over students’ struggle to access affordable accommodation. Over the past days, they have taken to pitching tents outside university buildings, as part of a growing protest movement against high rents. Begun by Ilaria Lamera, an engineering student at Milan Polytechnic who found it impossible to find a room under 600 euros, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/12/italy-students-protest-over-cost-housing-high-rents">the demonstration has since spread to Milan, Rome, Florence, Bologna, Padua and Cagliari</a>.</p>
<p>In Bologna, where I am writing from, rising student numbers and Airbnb rentals have snatched away the prospect of a home for many. But young adults are also grappling with another, less publicised issue: that of the ongoing racism toward those construed as “foreign” or “other”. The phrase “no foreigners” is a common refrain when looking for rental accommodation in Bologna. This racial discrimination is normalised by estate agents. It is <a href="http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/9218/">presented as if it were a form of “eligibility” criteria for landlords</a>, like a requirement for an employment contract and references. As if it were totally normal and acceptable for landlords not to want to rent to “foreigners”, by which they mean those who are racialised, and not me, as a white British woman – also a “foreigner”. Sometimes, this is made even clearer. For example, when a housing volunteer at a <a href="https://www.centroastalli.it/rete-territoriale/centro-astalli-bologna/">local charity assisting migrants</a> arrived at a flat viewing together with a young Black African man, they were told by an estate agent: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Madam! You should have told me you were asking on behalf of an African! We don’t rent to Blacks here.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Launched in 2022 and funded by the <a href="https://www.leverhulme.ac.uk/">Leverhulme Trust</a>, my current research at the University of Bologna examines the longer-term fate of young men from West Africa who arrived in Italy as children seeking asylum, and hence are bureaucratically labelled as “unaccompanied minors”. While much ink has been spilled over the experiences of unaccompanied minors as <em>children</em>, less is known about what happens after they turn 18. Yet, it is at this moment that the rights they are accorded as children, including accommodation, may be lost. In my <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1440783321993918">latest paper</a>, drawing on my PhD research undertaken between 2017-2018, I analyse what happens after they become adults and must leave the reception centre that hosted them as children in a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/anti.12873">socio-political landscape that is increasingly anti-migrant</a>.</p>
<p>This is based on ethnographic participant/observation in a reception centre for unaccompanied minors in Bologna while working as a volunteer keyworker for eight months between May 2017 and December 2018. In-depth and repeat interviews were conducted with 12 young African young men (six Gambians, four Nigerians, a Ghanaian and a Somalian), aged between 16 and 21. My current research involves a return to my fieldwork site after four years and involves interviews with five of the young men (two Nigerians and three Gambians) to assess their longer-term outcomes as adults.</p>
<h2>On the record</h2>
<p>The local council has launched the <a href="http://www.comune.bologna.it/centrozonarelli/spad-sportello-antidiscriminazioni/">SPAD Anti-discrimination Help Centre</a> to deal with racial discrimination, but this is in its infancy and under-reporting remains an issue. The first <a href="https://www.comune.bologna.it/notizie/giornata-mondiale-contro-discriminazioni-razziali-2023">SPAD report</a> documents reports of discrimination, and housing is found to be the second most prevalent area in which discrimination occurs. The young men in my study present a weary resignation to the continuing racism they face in the housing sector (and elsewhere).</p>
<p>Innocent*, who is now 22 and arrived in Italy as a twelve year old from Nigeria tells me he has been looking for a place to rent for months. Frequently, he is told by estate agents things such as “the owner is elderly, they don’t want any foreigners”, or “They are afraid because you are Black”.</p>
<p>Innocent goes on to tell me he is regularly stopped for no reason by the police around the station when getting the train to work. They ask him for his residence permit. I ask him how this makes him feel:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Really upset, also because of the housing situation. Us Blacks, we’re nothing here.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Edrisa, a young Gambian who is now 22 came to Italy when he was sixteen, reflects on the difficulties of finding a place to live once outside the reception system. Playing on the Italian name for a residence permit (<em>permesso di soggiorno</em>, meaning a permit to stay), he tells me that many migrants, including him, have “a permit to stay but no place to stay, it doesn’t make sense. It is not right”. This seemingly <a href="https://www.ilpost.it/2023/02/18/senzatetto-lavoratori-bologna/">contradictory situation</a>, of migrants who are employed, paying taxes, and have the legal right to stay, but cannot find a house, is widespread.</p>
<p>Edrisa explains that despite having regular work on construction sites, as a qualified builder, he was homeless for nearly four months, crashing with friends, sometimes even sleeping in his work van.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“It is really difficult for a foreigner to find a house here, actually, not all foreigners but if you are Black… Italians don’t want to rent to Black migrants. It is so difficult.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For Edrisa this is due to a combination of the housing crisis and the racism he faces as a young Black man in Italy. He maintains racism is due to the stereotyping of Africans as backwards and threat, compounded by the constant negative imagery of Black and Brown bodies arriving via sea. The <a href="https://series.francoangeli.it/index.php/oa/catalog/book/791">public discourse</a> on immigration in Italy is characterized by the stigmatization of racialised migrants who are framed as inferior and threat.</p>
<h2>Beyond landlords, racism has long tainted Italy</h2>
<p>Clearly, however, it is not feasible to suggest that racism merely pertains to landlords <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1354066119858388">as an individual mentality or exception from the norm</a>. Rather, we must dig deeper into the ongoing colonial legacies of racism that become visible in the act of renting. As the anthropologist Bruno Riccio observed over ten years ago, “culturalist” readings of difference have led to <a href="https://www.editions-ulb.be/en/book/?GCOI=74530100426670#h2tabtableContents">residential segregation and discrimination in the Italian housing market</a>. This “rental racism” builds upon the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-51391-7_3">“fertile soil”</a> of racism rooted in Italian colonialism and fascism and is then embedded within a historically rooted racial landscape. Rent should be understood not solely as an economic transaction, but a <a href="https://radicalhousingjournal.org/2019/editorial/">social relation embedded in emplaced social, cultural, political and material conditions</a>. </p>
<p>This is starkly evident in the recent declaration by Italy’s Agriculture and Food Sovereignty Minister Francesco Lollobrigida that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65324319">Italy’s low birth rate meant Italians are facing “ethnic replacement”</a>. Italy’s Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, also a member of the far-right Brothers of Italy political party, has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65324319">made similar remarks in the past</a>. According to the OHCHR’s (2019) <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IT/ItalyMissionReport.pdf">“Report of mission to Italy on racial discrimination”</a>, the worst years for racially motivated attacks were 2009 and 2018; both periods in which the public discourse was particularly anti-migrant. During the far-right Lega’s election campaign in 2017-18, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/28/italys-intelligence-agency-warns-of-rise-in-racist-attacks">racially motivated attacks in Italy tripled</a>. The leader of the Lega, Matteo Salvini, is now a Minister in the coalition government.</p>
<p>The coalition government recently introduced a new immigration law, the Cutro Decree (decreto Cutro), named after the Calabrian town close to where <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/09/protests-as-meloni-cabinet-meets-near-scene-of-deadly-shipwreck-cutro-italy">at least 72 people died in a shipwreck in February this year</a>. The new law is controversial and has received widespread criticism from <a href="https://ecre.org/mediterranean-controversial-cutro-decree-approved-by-parliament-as-italy-sees-continued-increase-of-arrivals-death-toll-of-2023-breaks-1000-as-ngo-struggle-to-save-lives-under-dramatic/">human-rights organisations, concerned about the increased precarity and irregularity that would be created</a>. </p>
<p>Naming a law which brings in increasingly restrictive immigration practices after a shipwreck that some <a href="https://www.hrw.org/the-day-in-human-rights/2023/02/27">rights organisations</a> argue resulted from the very same government’s harsher laws, together with wider EU policies, is deeply problematic. While the law does not directly affect the young men in my study, its effects are pervasive and increase the ongoing hostility toward racialised migrants, just like <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/ill-wind-weathering-impact-far-right-government-italy/">previous immigration legislation brought in under a far right party</a>. The divide between “us”
(white Italians) and “them” (racialised migrants) keeps on widening.</p>
<p>In Bologna, like other gentrifying global cities in the Global North, the mobility of elites stand in stark contrast to those who are racialised, unable to access the city, which increasingly risks <a href="https://www.scielo.br/j/ts/a/wv4Pj5n9HJqNv7J7R3RpyWP/">becoming a spectacle of elite privilege and tourist consumption</a>. The local council recently launched a <a href="https://www.comune.bologna.it/notizie/giornata-mondiale-contro-discriminazioni-razziali-2023">“local action plan for an anti-racist and intercultural city”</a>, and has made attempts to regulate Airbnb; <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13683500.2018.1504899">recognised as a challenging</a> feat. However, for Bologna to become a city in which more than the porticoes are ‘open’ to young racialised migrants, what is really needed is a deeper conversation on racism in Italy, particularly as manifested at the political level.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>All names are pseudonyms.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205761/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Walker ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>As student protests against high rents unfurl across Italy, one academic points out one of the groups most likely to end up on the streets under a far-right government: young black men.Sarah Walker, Visiting postdoctoral researcher and adjunct professor, Università di BolognaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2048052023-05-04T21:32:15Z2023-05-04T21:32:15ZWe must all speak out to stop anti-LGBTQ legislation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524190/original/file-20230503-1198-6blxj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=46%2C57%2C7670%2C5078&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People gathered at West Texas A&M University in Canyon, Tex. on March 21, 2023 to protest the university president's decision to cancel a drag show on campus.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Michael Cuviello/Amarillo Globe-News via AP)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/we-must-all-speak-out-to-stop-anti-lgbtq-legislation" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Anti-LGBTQ sentiments have become increasingly toxic and more prevalent around the world. From the United States to Europe and East Africa, right-wing state and federal governments are introducing legislation and social policies targeting LGBTQ people.</p>
<p>The backlash against LGBTQ communities and <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/human-rights-are-under-attack-who-will-protect-them/">human rights</a> is global in scale and appears to be gaining momentum. There are <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamiewareham/2023/04/07/new-maps-show-where-its-illegal-to-be-lgbtq-in-2023/?sh=66998e677eaa">64 countries</a> in the world where being LGBTQ is considered a crime, including six countries where it is punishable by death. </p>
<p>Canada is not immune to the rise in anti-LGBTQ sentiment in other parts of the world. In the coming years, we will need to be even more vigilant in protecting and advancing LGBTQ rights in our own country.</p>
<h2>Rights under attack</h2>
<p>Far-right governments and populist movements are becoming more emboldened across the world. There is a direct correlation between the erosion of human rights and increasing hate crimes and violence targeting the LGBTQ community. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/trans-rights-and-political-backlash-five-key-moments-in-history-187476">Trans rights and political backlash: five key moments in history</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In the U.S., there are now more than 650 <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2023/03/31/650-anti-lgbtq-bills-introduced-us/11552357002/">anti-LGBTQ bills</a> that have been introduced in state legislatures designed to roll back the human and civil rights of LGBTQ communities. </p>
<p>In Florida, at least <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/education/3939606-advocates-plan-for-battle-as-desantis-preps-dont-say-gay-expansion/">10 anti-LGBTQ bills</a> are under consideration. Many of these backwards measures seek to block children from accessing <a href="https://theconversation.com/transgender-youth-on-puberty-blockers-and-gender-affirming-hormones-have-lower-rates-of-depression-and-suicidal-thoughts-a-new-study-finds-177812">life-saving gender-affirming care</a>, criminalize parents for supporting their transgender and non-binary children, censor LGBTQ-inclusive books and prohibit teaching about sexual and gender diversity.</p>
<p>Other bills have sought to protect <a href="https://nebraskaexaminer.com/2023/02/10/nebraska-lawmaker-renews-bill-to-protect-physicians-right-of-conscience/">conscience rights</a>, which allow discrimination against LGBTQ people seeking services. Several U.S. states have also introduced laws prohibiting <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/transgender-athletes-ban-kansas-states-b2315626.html">transgender athletes</a> from participating in female sports. A new <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/02/14/drag-shows-republican-bills-bans/">slate of bills</a> are now targeting public drag performances as a form of child endangerment in more than a dozen states.</p>
<p>Anti-LGBTQ rhetoric is often couched within <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/06/how-targeting-lgbtq-rights-are-part-authoritarian-playbook">tropes of protecting children</a>, promoting parental rights, and defending religious freedoms as the basis for attacking minority rights and liberal values.</p>
<p>Recently, with losses mounting in the Ukraine war, Russian President Vladimir Putin intensified his attacks on LGBTQ people by approving <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/05/europe/russia-lgbtq-propaganda-law-signed-by-putin-intl/index.html">new legislation</a> making it illegal to spread so-called propaganda concerning “non-traditional sexual relations.” This essentially outlaws any public events, performances or communication about LGBTQ identities or communities.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/uganda-parliament-passes-mostly-unchanged-version-anti-lgbtq-bill-2023-05-02/">Ugandan parliament</a> has introduced some of the most regressive anti-LGBTQ legislation in the world. It proposes the death penalty for “aggravated homosexuality” and a life sentence for promoting and funding of same-sex activities.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ugandas-anti-homosexuality-bill-wants-to-rehabilitate-lgbtiq-people-african-psychologists-warn-of-its-dangers-204431">Uganda's anti-homosexuality bill wants to 'rehabilitate' LGBTIQ+ people – African psychologists warn of its dangers</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Other African nations such as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/23/why-are-kenya-and-uganda-cracking-down-on-lgbtq-rights">Kenya</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/29/africa/ghana-softens-lgbtq-stance-intl/index.html">Ghana</a> are now drafting similar laws. This offensive against African LGBTQ communities has largely been fuelled by <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/19/africa-uganda-evangelicals-homophobia-antigay-bill/">American evangelicals</a> who have spent years radicalizing local citizens to reject Western influences and protect so-called family values.</p>
<p>This growing anti-LGBTQ backlash has also been witnessed in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/lgbt-rights-under-attack-in-brazil-under-new-far-right-president/2019/02/17/b24e1dcc-1b28-11e9-b8e6-567190c2fd08_story.html">Brazil</a>, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/anti-lgbt-ideology-zones-are-being-enacted-in-polish-towns">Poland</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2022/7/12/photos-thousands-march-in-romania-as-law-censoring-lgbtq-looms">Romania</a>. Recently, Italy’s new right-wing government moved to <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/italian-government-limits-parental-rights-of-gay-couples-1.6312851">restrict adoption rights for same-sex parents</a>, citing the need to protect “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/18/protests-in-italy-as-government-restricts-same-sex-parent-rights">natural families</a>.”</p>
<h2>Backlash in Canada</h2>
<p>Given this rising tide of global hate, we should not be complacent in believing anti-LGBTQ backlash will not happen in Canada. On the contrary, it has already started. <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9393280/canada-lgbtq-hate-trans-west-block/">Police-reported hate crimes</a> targeting people based on sexual orientation have <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/230322/dq230322a-eng.htm">grown significantly</a> over the past three years, increasing by nearly 60 per cent between 2019-2021. </p>
<p>Attacks against drag queen storytime events have swept across the country, with <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-anti-gay-activists-target-childrens-libraries-and-drag-queen-story/">protests</a> in more than a dozen cities. Some community organizers have cancelled events based on fears for the safety of parents and the already-vulnerable LGBTQ children these events are trying to support.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1623364860506476554"}"></div></p>
<p>With rising LGBTQ visibility comes increased hate. <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/social-media-platforms-fail-to-stop-lgbtq-hate-speech-according-to-glaad-report">Social media</a> has become a toxic breeding ground for discrimination with old and tired stereotypes now being recycled to new and eager audiences. </p>
<p>The odious term “<a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/05/11/1096623939/accusations-grooming-political-attack-homophobic-origins">groomer</a>” is now utilized as a shorthand linking LGBTQ communities to pedophilia; gay-straight alliances are labelled as ideological <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/ideological-sexual-clubs-alberta-gay-straight-alliance-law-faces-court-challenge-1.4712581">sex clubs</a> in schools; <a href="https://www.aclu.org/news/lgbtq-rights/four-myths-about-trans-athletes-debunked">transgender athletes</a> are viewed as the ruin of competitive sports; teaching about sexual and gender diversity is positioned as a form of <a href="https://www.edweek.org/leadership/whats-driving-the-push-to-restrict-schools-on-lgbtq-issues/2022/04">indoctrination</a>; and drag queen storytime is equated with sexualizing vulnerable children.</p>
<h2>Countering hate</h2>
<p>We get the communities we are willing to build. Now is the time for community, corporate and political leaders to speak out and denounce anti-LGBTQ actions and rhetoric. </p>
<p>Ask your elected officials to enact legislation that protects the safety, health and well-being of LGBTQ communities. Calgary’s new <a href="https://www.calgary.ca/content/www/en/home/bylaws/safe-and-inclusive-access-bylaw.html">Safe & Inclusive Access Bylaw</a> provides an excellent example of how to balance freedom of speech and the right of assembly with community safety and civic participation. </p>
<p>Similarly, Ontario MPPs have introduced a new <a href="https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/bills/parliament-43/session-1/bill-94">private members’ bill</a> to prohibit acts of intimidation within 100 meters of identified 2SLGBTQI+ community safety zones. The bill also calls for the creation of a provincial 2SLGBTQI+ Safety Advisory Committee to help improve community safety and prevent hate crimes.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1643253543262990336"}"></div></p>
<p><a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/05/un-experts-urge-religious-leaders-show-respect-and-compassion-lgbt-persons">Religious leaders</a> also need to speak out and demonstrate how faith can be welcoming, affirming and supportive of LGBTQ identities. Religion should not be allowed to become <a href="https://www.pfaw.org/report/who-is-weaponizing-religious-liberty/">weaponized</a> by far-right extremists as a conduit for hate and bigotry.</p>
<p>Collectively, all of us need to unite and prevent vulnerable communities from being silenced and intimidated by hate. We must loudly communicate that hate can have no place on our streets and in our communities.</p>
<p>If there are protests against drag queen storytime in your community, host more drag queen storytime events by partnering with your public library, <a href="https://united-church.ca/sites/default/files/why-become-an-affirming-ministry.pdf">affirming congregations</a> and local LGBTQ community groups.</p>
<p>As community members, we also need to question and ask where our elected representatives stand on the issue of defending LGBTQ human rights. Do not accept silence as an answer. Get your elected leaders on the public record and hold them accountable for their words and actions.</p>
<p>Another crucial step is for each of us to speak out, become more actively involved and get out and vote. If you are a member of the LGBTQ community, consider running in the next election for your local school board, municipal, provincial or federal government.</p>
<p>We must become part of the democratic process if we are to change it. It is harder to discriminate against the LGBTQ community when you are sitting across from us at the decision-making table.</p>
<p>Visibility and representation matter. Hate flourishes in the vacuum of silence. If we are to truly build an inclusive democracy, we can’t be afraid to actively protect and defend it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204805/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristopher Wells holds the Canada Research Chair for the Public Understanding of Sexual and Gender Minority Youth, which is funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. </span></em></p>Anti-LGBT sentiments are on the rise around the world, and Canada is not immune to the tide. Now is the time for us to speak out and denounce anti-LGBTQ actions and rhetoric.Kristopher Wells, Associate Professor, Faculty of Health and Community Studies, MacEwan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2006642023-03-02T15:15:06Z2023-03-02T15:15:06ZPrevent review: why we need a new – and clearer – definition of Islamist extremism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512682/original/file-20230228-18-9x6pqz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/blur-movement-city-people-worker-shopping-162803969">Alice-Photo/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>An independent review of the UK counter-terrorism strategy, Prevent, has recommended that the government increase its efforts to tackle Islamist extremism. </p>
<p>Prevent was launched nearly two decades ago to divert vulnerable people away from radicalisation and terrorism. It has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-both-sides-are-wrong-in-the-counter-extremism-debate-55714">controversial</a> from the outset, criticised by <a href="https://blogs.canterbury.ac.uk/expertcomment/the-prevent-strategy-is-fuelling-islamophobia-in-britain/">experts</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/jan/30/home-office-threatened-with-libel-action-over-prevent-strategy-review">campaigners</a> alike for its tight focus on Islamist extremism in particular and the alleged targeting of Muslim communities in Britain this results in.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An aerial view of a mosque in a city centre." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512686/original/file-20230228-1260-ij47fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512686/original/file-20230228-1260-ij47fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512686/original/file-20230228-1260-ij47fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512686/original/file-20230228-1260-ij47fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512686/original/file-20230228-1260-ij47fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512686/original/file-20230228-1260-ij47fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512686/original/file-20230228-1260-ij47fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A clearer definition of extremism would ensure better protection for Britain’s 4 million Muslims.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/peterborough-uk-september-10-2021-aerial-2041435607">Clare Louise Jackson/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>William Shawcross, a British journalist and current commissioner for public appointments, has conducted an independent review. In his 200-page report, he outlines how Prevent is not doing enough to counter non-violent Islamist extremism or to tackle organisations operating within the law and below the threshold of terrorism. </p>
<p>He also criticises “a double standard when dealing with the extreme right-wing and Islamism”. Prevent’s view of Islamist extremism, he says, is often too narrowly focused on banned terrorist organisations. Its view of extreme right wing, by contrast, is often too broadly focused on “mildly controversial” mainstream rightwing-leaning commentary. </p>
<p>One fundamental question this review poses is what exactly “Islamist extremism” is. This matters because many professionals (including teachers, lecturers, social workers, health workers and prison guards) are now legally obliged to watch out for it. <a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/how-define-and-tackle-islamist-extremism-uk">Research</a> I have recently published with Maaha Elahi, a pupil barrister, shows that a clearer definition is possible.</p>
<h2>A new definition of “Islamist extremism”</h2>
<p>The UK government defines “extremism” as “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs”. This general definition has <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-does-extremism-mean-the-british-public-arent-sure-120858">done little</a> to improve the public’s understanding or to clarify what might distinguish Islamist extremism from other forms.</p>
<p>According to Prevent: “Islamist extremists regard Western intervention in Muslim-majority countries as a ‘war with Islam’, creating a narrative of ‘them’ and ‘us’.” This ideology, the definition says, includes the uncompromising belief that people cannot be both Muslim and British. “Islamist extremists specifically attack the principles of civic participation and social cohesion,” it says. “These extremists purport to identify grievances to which terrorist organisations then claim to have a solution.”</p>
<p>The problem is that Prevent’s definition is rooted in the government’s favoured concept of “British values”. It says little about how extreme Islam differs from more mainstream forms of the religion. And it offers little practical guidance for the professionals now under a legal duty to be aware of terrorist risks. </p>
<p>To explore how this might be improved, we revisited the 2013 libel case brought by a London imam, Shakeel Begg, against the BBC. In a televised interview conducted by journalist Andrew Neil with the Muslim Council of Britain, Begg was described as an “extremist speaker” holding “extremist positions”. He subsequently sued the BBC. </p>
<p>In deciding Begg’s case, Lord Justice Haddon-Cave distinguished between extreme and mainstream forms of Islam. Among other expert sources, he relied on philosopher and sociologist of religion Matthew Wilkinson and his 2018 book, <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315514451">The Genealogy of Terror</a>, to set out ten indicators of what he termed “extremist Islamic positions”: </p>
<ol>
<li>Having a Manichean view of the world – a strict divide between “us” and “them” – including between the “right” and “wrong” kind of Muslim.</li>
<li>Reducing the idea of <em>jihad</em> to armed combat (or <em>qital</em>); the term can, in fact, also be translated simply as “striving”.</li>
<li>Ignoring the established Islamic doctrinal conditions for the declaration of <em>qital</em>, including support for terrorism.</li>
<li>Ignoring the Islamic regulations governing armed <em>jihad</em>, including attacks on civilians.</li>
<li>Advocating <em>qital</em> as a universal, individual religious obligation.</li>
<li>Interpreting sharia law to require breaking domestic (in our case, UK) law.</li>
<li>Classifying all non-Muslims as unbelievers (or <em>kuffar</em>).</li>
<li>Adhering to the extreme Salafist position that the Muslim faith negates and supersedes family, kinship and nation.</li>
<li>Citing or approving legal opinions (or <em>fatwa</em>) from Islamic scholars with extremist views.</li>
<li>Delivering or following teaching which encourages Muslims to engage in or support terrorism or violence in the name of Allah.</li>
</ol>
<p>This is helpful because it roots “Islamist extremism” in Islamic concepts, not British values. It reduces the risk of the British state implying that Islam stands apart from British society. According to UK <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/bulletins/religionenglandandwales/census2021">census</a> data from 2021, 6.5% of those living in England and Wales – nearly 4 million people – are Muslim. Following Haddon-Cave’s lead would enable the government to play a more active role in protecting mainstream Islamic values for these Muslim communities. </p>
<p>Further, Haddon-Cave’s checklist approach offers a more practical solution to some of the uncertainty people feel. It helps to communicate more clearly what is meant – and what is not – by the term “Islamist extremism”. </p>
<p>This will contribute towards more positive relations between, for example, the police and Muslim communities. <a href="http://atulgawande.com/book/the-checklist-manifesto/">Checklists</a> have a long history in both the engineering and medical professions. They are easy to use and, as our understanding develops, easy to adapt over time. Although not strictly a checklist, the most widely used definition of “<a href="https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitions-charters/working-definition-antisemitism">antisemitism</a>”, for instance,
employs a working definition with a list of examples to help its users.</p>
<p>This checklist approach could also be easily adapted to other forms of extremism, from the far right to far left. The various properties of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569317.2018.1451227">rightwing</a> extremism that criminologist Elisabeth Carter identified in 2018 include authoritarianism, nationalism, racism, xenophobia and anti-democratic values. </p>
<p>Early definitions, for instance, of “rightwing extremism” often excluded populism because it was mainly considered a speech-writing style. As our understanding of it as a political ideology developed, later definitions included it. Carter’s study shows how a checklist could be adapted in line with such developments in our thinking. </p>
<p>There are differences of opinion over which is the more serious issue, Islamist or far-right extremism. Some point to the MI5’s annual threat update, in which Director General Ken McCallum <a href="https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/director-general-ken-mccallum-gives-annual-threat-update">stated</a> that Islamist terrorism represent three-quarters of its terrorist caseload. Others highlight recent data – from <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2021-to-march-2022/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2021-to-march-2022">Prevent</a> itself – that shows that extreme rightwing cases (between April 2021 and March 2022) in fact outnumbered Islamist cases for the second year running.</p>
<p>Home Secretary Suella Braverman <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/independent-review-of-prevents-report-and-government-response/the-response-to-the-independent-review-of-prevent-accessible">has pledged</a> to fully implement the review’s recommendations. Campaigners, meanwhile, have <a href="https://www.preventwatch.org/shawcross-review-muslim-organisations-call-for-prevent-to-be-scrapped/">called</a> for Prevent to be scrapped. Either way, accurately defining and identifying extremism, in all its guises, remains crucial.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200664/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The research study reported here was not funded by a specific research grant. Maaha Elahi and Dr Julian Hargreaves are grateful for support from the Woolf Institute.
Dr Julian Hargreaves had an advisory role for the Commission for Countering Extremism and has offered academic advice to Counter Terrorism Policing.</span></em></p>Rooting the definition of ‘Islamist extremism’ in Islamic concepts, not British values, reduces the risk of the British state implying that Islam stands apart from British society.Julian Hargreaves, Director of Research at the Woolf Institute and Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Islamic Studies, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2004342023-02-23T13:14:29Z2023-02-23T13:14:29ZViolent extremists are not lone wolves – dispelling this myth could help reduce violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511766/original/file-20230222-630-7sfjgw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vice President Kamala Harris and her husband, Doug Emhoff, view a memorial at Tops Friendly Market in Buffalo, New York, in May 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1240962615/photo/vice-president-kamala-harris-travels-to-buffalo-new-york-for-funeral-of-ruth-whitfield.jpg?s=612x612&w=gi&k=20&c=wPyMpzGbR30i8XLeheSMQ1J7JkOHpZ3iTjsG-WiOr68=">Kent Nishimura/Los Angeles Times via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Feb. 15, 2023, a judge informed <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/15/nyregion/buffalo-shooting-gunman-sentencing.html">Payton Gendron</a> – a white 19-year-old who killed 10 Black people at a Buffalo Tops market in 2022 – that “You will never see the light of day as a free man ever again.”</p>
<p>The week before, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/texas-man-pleads-guilty-90-federal-hate-crimes-and-firearms-violations-august-2019-mass">Patrick Crusius</a> – a white 24-year-old who gunned down 23 people at an El Paso Walmart in 2019 – received 90 consecutive life sentences.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/peters-investigative-report-shows-dhs-and-fbi-are-not-adequately-addressing-domestic-terrorism-threat/">threat of domestic terrorism</a> remains high in the United States – especially the danger posed by white power extremists, many of whom believe white people are <a href="https://theconversation.com/replacement-theory-isnt-new-3-things-to-know-about-how-this-once-fringe-conspiracy-has-become-more-mainstream-183492">being “replaced”</a> by people of color. </p>
<p>I <a href="https://sasn.rutgers.edu/about-us/faculty-staff/alex-hinton">am a scholar</a> of political violence and extremism and wrote about these beliefs in a 2021 book, <a href="https://nyupress.org/9781479808014/it-can-happen-here/">“It Can Happen Here: White Power and the Rising Threat of Genocide in the US</a>.” I think it’s important to understand the lessons that can be learned from events like the Buffalo and El Paso mass shootings. </p>
<p>After decades of research on numerous attacks that have left scores dead, we have learned that extremists are almost always part of a pack, not lone wolves. But the <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/ideas/2022/05/buffalo-shooting-and-rise-of-lone-wolf-attack">myth of the lone wolf</a> shooter remains tenacious, reappearing in media coverage after almost every mass shooting or act of far-right extremist violence. Because this myth misdirects people from the actual causes of extremist violence, it impedes society’s ability to prevent attacks. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511776/original/file-20230222-14-zmha9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A white man in an orange prison suit wears a white face mask and has his hands folded together. Two police officers walk on either side of him, holding his arms." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511776/original/file-20230222-14-zmha9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511776/original/file-20230222-14-zmha9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511776/original/file-20230222-14-zmha9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511776/original/file-20230222-14-zmha9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511776/original/file-20230222-14-zmha9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511776/original/file-20230222-14-zmha9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511776/original/file-20230222-14-zmha9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Buffalo mass shooter Payton Gendron was sentenced to life in prison in February 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1398122416/photo/buffalo-supermarket-shooter-payton-gendron-indicted-by-grand-jury-in-court.jpg?s=612x612&w=gi&k=20&c=v_OojYPTGEGErfwMgVH1z3XqkQpyYyVFRSvIEq5frR0=">Scott Olson/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The lone wolf extremist myth is dangerous</h2>
<p>FBI Director Christopher Wray said in August 2022 <a href="https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony%20-%20Wray%20-%202022-08-04.pdf">that the nation’s top threat</a> comes from far-right extremist <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/oversight-of-the-federal-bureau-of-investigation-the-january-6-insurrection-domestic-terrorism-and-other-threats">“lone actors”</a> – who, he explained, work alone, instead of “<a href="https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/fbi-director-christopher-wray-testifies-on-capitol-attack-domestic-terrorism-full-hearing-transcript-march-2">as part of a large group</a>.”</p>
<p>Wray is wrong, and the myth of the lone wolf extremist – the mistaken idea that violent extremists largely act alone – continues to directly inform <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=727224">research</a>, <a href="https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/nulr/vol112/iss5/6/">law enforcement</a> and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/mar/30/myth-lone-wolf-terrorist">popular imagination</a>.</p>
<p>I think that Wray’s focus on extremism is much needed and long overdue. However, his line of thinking is dangerous and misleading. By focusing on individuals or small groups, it overlooks broader networks and long-term dangers and so can impede efforts to combat far-right extremist violence – which Wray has singled out as the country’s most lethal domestic threat. </p>
<h2>Not a new trend</h2>
<p>Far-right extremists may physically carry out an attack alone or as part of a small group of people, but they are almost always networked and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/19/opinion/us-white-supremacy-violence.html">identify with larger groups and causes</a>. </p>
<p>This was true long before the social media age. <a href="https://origins.osu.edu/review/bring-the-war-home-kathleen-belew?language_content_entity=en">Take Timothy McVeigh.</a> He is often depicted as the archetypal lone wolf madman who blew up the Oklahoma City Federal Building in 1995. </p>
<p>In fact, McVeigh was <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/04/22/604319422/bring-the-war-home-shows-lone-wolf-terrorists-are-really-part-of-a-pack">part of a pack</a>. He had accomplices and was connected across the far-right extremist landscape.</p>
<p>The same is <a href="https://www.wfla.com/news/pinellas-county/experts-tell-how-to-spot-a-lone-wolf-after-buffalo-shooting/">true of Gendron</a> and <a href="https://cupblog.org/2019/08/14/understanding-the-el-paso-massacre/">Crusius</a>, who were also characterized in media coverage as lone wolves. </p>
<p>“He talked about how he didn’t like school because he didn’t have friends. He would say he was lonely,” <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/new-york/articles/2022-05-17/buffalo-suspect-lonely-isolated-and-a-sign-of-trouble">a classmate of Gendron</a> said shortly after Gendron carried out the mass shooting. </p>
<p>Both <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/tops-massacre-suspect-payton-gendron-may-have-spewed-hate-online">were active</a> on <a href="https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/patrick-crusius">far-right extremist</a> social media platforms and posted manifestos before their attacks. Gendron’s manifesto discusses how he was radicalized on the dark web and inspired to attack after watching videos of <a href="https://christchurchattack.royalcommission.nz/the-report/executive-summary-2/executive-summary/">Brenton Tarrant’s 2019 massacre</a> of 51 people at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand.</p>
<p>Almost a quarter of <a href="https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/buffaloshooting-onlineplatformsreport.pdf">Gendron’s manifesto</a> is directly taken from Tarrant’s, which was titled “The Great Replacement.” This <a href="https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2022/05/17/racist-great-replacement-conspiracy-theory-explained">fear of white replacement</a>, centered around perceived <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/08/22/1029609786/2020-census-data-results-white-population-shrinking-decline-non-hispanic-race">white demographic decline</a>, was also a motive for <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/08/04/whats-inside-hate-filled-manifesto-linked-el-paso-shooter/">Crusius</a>. His manifesto pays homage to Tarrant, before explaining his attack was “a response to the Hispanic invasion of Texas.”</p>
<p>The lone wolf myth also suggests that extremists are abnormal deviants with anti-social personalities.</p>
<p>After Gendron’s rampage, for example, New York Attorney General Letitia James called him a “<a href="https://news.sky.com/story/buffalo-shooting-carried-out-by-sick-demented-individual-fuelled-by-diet-of-hate-who-is-now-on-suicide-watch-12613911">sick, demented individual</a>.” Crusius, in turn, was described by the White House and news articles as “<a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-mass-shootings-texas-ohio/">evil</a>,” “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/14/us/el-paso-shooter-psychotic-state/index.html">psychotic</a>” and an “<a href="https://www.wfaa.com/article/news/el-paso-shooter-was-an-social-loner-former-classmate-says/287-010d60d7-f21b-4620-a4d4-062710f8e448">anti-social loner</a>.”</p>
<p>The vast majority of far-right extremists are, in fact, otherwise <a href="https://www.topic.com/the-secret-weapons-of-the-far-right">ordinary men and women</a>. They live in rural areas, suburbs and cities. They are students and working professionals. And they believe their extremist cause is justified. This point was illustrated by the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/02/the-capitol-rioters-arent-like-other-extremists/617895/%22%22">spectrum of participants</a> in the Jan. 6, 2021, Capitol insurrection. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511778/original/file-20230222-20-7apa5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two people face towards a large red brick building and a small pile of flowers, balloons and an American flag." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511778/original/file-20230222-20-7apa5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511778/original/file-20230222-20-7apa5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511778/original/file-20230222-20-7apa5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511778/original/file-20230222-20-7apa5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511778/original/file-20230222-20-7apa5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511778/original/file-20230222-20-7apa5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511778/original/file-20230222-20-7apa5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People hug at a memorial outside the Walmart in El Paso, Texas, where a shooter killed 23 people in 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1159706226/photo/us-crime-shooting-toll.jpg?s=612x612&w=gi&k=20&c=i7q3sEZDNSxZO8GM7hCi0tKeILmSGtSCk3S6MhnEadU=">Mark Ralston/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Tracing the lone wolf mythology</h2>
<p>How did the lone-wolf metaphor come to misinform the public’s view of extremists, and why is it so tenacious?</p>
<p>Part of the answer is linked to white supremacist <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/26/us/louis-beam-white-supremacy-internet.html">Louis Beam</a>, who wrote the essay “Leaderless Resistance” in 1983. In it, he called for far-right extremists to act individually or in small groups that couldn’t be traced up a chain of command. According to his lawyer, McVeigh was one of those influenced by Beam’s call. </p>
<p>After Beam formulated this idea, both far-right extremists and law enforcement increasingly used the lone wolf term. In 1998, the FBI even mounted an “<a href="https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/sandiego/about-us/history/operation-lone-wolf">Operation Lone Wolf</a>” to investigate a West Coast white supremacist cell.</p>
<p>The 9/11 terrorist attacks further turned U.S. attention to Islamic militant “lone wolves.” A decade later, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/mar/30/myth-lone-wolf-terrorist">the term became mainstream</a>.</p>
<p>And so it was not a surprise when, after the Buffalo shooting, New York State Senator James Sanders said, “Although this is probably a lone-wolf incident, this is not the first mass shooting we have seen, and sadly it will not be the last.” </p>
<p>The tenacity of the lone wolf myth has several sources. It’s convenient – evocative and powerful enough to draw and keep people’s attention. </p>
<p>By using this term, which individualizes extremism, law enforcement officials may also depoliticize their work. Instead of focusing on movements like white nationalism that have sympathizers in the various levels of government, <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/white-supremacy-returned-mainstream-politics/">from sheriffs to senators</a>, they focus on individuals.</p>
<p>The lone wolf extremist myth diverts from what should be the focus of deterrence efforts: understanding how far-right extremists network, organize and, as the Jan. 6 insurrection showed, build coalitions across diverse groups, especially through the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/01/26/1151360750/social-medias-role-in-jan-6-was-left-out-of-the-final-report">use of social media</a>. </p>
<p>Such understanding provides a basis for developing long-term strategies to prevent extremists like Gendron and Crusius from carrying out more violent attacks.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200434/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Hinton receives funding from "The Center for Politics and Race in America at Rutgers University-Newark.”
</span></em></p>The lone wolf metaphor used to describe mass shooters misinforms views of extremists – and law enforcement efforts to deter the violence.Alexander Hinton, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology; Director, Center for the Study of Genocide and Human Rights, Rutgers University - NewarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1985802023-02-14T18:00:25Z2023-02-14T18:00:25ZFear and loathing in New Zealand: an overdue examination of our ‘underworld of extremists’ is valuable but flawed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509922/original/file-20230213-16-b2dsap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=16%2C0%2C5375%2C3589&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters in New Zealand's parliament grounds in early 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the horrific attacks in Christchurch in 2019 there has been substantial and growing attention paid to the extreme right in New Zealand. The pandemic – and the conspiracy theories and anti-government sentiment that developed in response – increased that scrutiny, and the sense of unease or alarm many felt about it.</p>
<p>Yet until now we have relied on just a handful of academic articles and media reports to gauge the extent and nature of the contemporary far right in New Zealand. Byron Clark’s new work is the first book to provide an overview of the multitude of groups and individuals loosely categorised as “alt-right”.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Fear: New Zealand’s hostile underworld of extremists – Byron C Clark (HarperCollins)</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Clark is an independent researcher who has done invaluable work in exposing the ideologies, behaviour and online and offline presence of a range of fringe political groups and individuals. He has an unparalleled knowledge of this network, their YouTube and Telegram channels, and the connections between them.</p>
<p>The book (like Clark’s Twitter account) is a crucial starting point for anyone seeking to understand the alt-right in New Zealand. It is beautifully written and contains excellent insights that can inform the study of contemporary extremism.</p>
<p>As one example, he discusses how, as the traditional markers of adulthood like home ownership and a stable career became increasingly unattainable, many young men found sanctuary in gaming and other online pursuits. For some, feminism came to be seen as threatening even that refuge.</p>
<p>In short, this is an excellent and useful book. For those of us who research (and teach about) extremism, it will serve as an important reference point. Nor is it confined to New Zealand; it serves as a study of how quite disparate, even opposed, groups can begin to orbit one another during a time of crisis.</p>
<h2>Defining our terms</h2>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509927/original/file-20230214-28-sq25sj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509927/original/file-20230214-28-sq25sj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509927/original/file-20230214-28-sq25sj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509927/original/file-20230214-28-sq25sj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509927/original/file-20230214-28-sq25sj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509927/original/file-20230214-28-sq25sj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509927/original/file-20230214-28-sq25sj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some aspects of the book might have been stronger, however. In particular, there was a need for clearer definitions of key terms, and much more evidence needed for many of its claims.</p>
<p>The author uses three important terms – alt-right, far right and extremism – in the title and throughout the book. The various groups, ideologies and individuals discussed – including Action Zealandia, Voices for Freedom, Counterspin, QAnon, Groundswell and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindutva">Hindutva</a> – are presented as manifestations of these phenomena in New Zealand.</p>
<p>But the author never defines these terms, and uses them interchangeably. Given the contention of the book that these groups should be understood as “far right”, it was crucial the author explain why this is the case.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-extremism-visible-at-the-parliament-protest-has-been-growing-in-nz-for-years-is-enough-being-done-177831">The extremism visible at the parliament protest has been growing in NZ for years – is enough being done?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>When used by the leading scholars in the field, the term “far right” is normally reserved for highly nationalistic and racist movements. These seek a strong, even authoritarian, leader and government, a punitive focus on law and order, the punishment of social deviancy, and are “nativist” (anti-immigration). These goals may not come at the expense of democracy but always come at the cost of <em>liberal</em> democracy.</p>
<p>The alt-right refers to a more contemporary iteration of this white nationalism, characterised by intensive use of social media. <a href="https://www.adl.org/">ADL</a> (formerly the Anti-Defamation League) <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/alt-right-primer-new-white-supremacy">defines</a> the movement as “a repackaging of white supremacy by extremists seeking to mainstream their ideology”.</p>
<p>The category spans an eclectic network of misogynists, white supremacists, neo-Nazis and fascists, all united in their focus on white identity and seeking to provide an alternative (hence the label) to the mainstream conservative right.</p>
<h2>What is extremism?</h2>
<p>The author also provides no definition of “extremism”, a word used both in the book and its promotion. Government <a href="https://safeguarding.network/content/safeguarding-resources/radicalisation/">definitions</a> refer to extremist movements as those seen as “objectionable”, “holding views outside the mainstream” or “seeking radical changes to society”.</p>
<p>But liberal democracy is predicated on the tolerance of views outside the mainstream and so such broad definitions are unhelpful, even damaging. The key feature of extremism, then, is the use or legitimisation of violence in pursuit of the movement’s ideology or goals.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509929/original/file-20230214-20-8wn940.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509929/original/file-20230214-20-8wn940.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509929/original/file-20230214-20-8wn940.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509929/original/file-20230214-20-8wn940.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509929/original/file-20230214-20-8wn940.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509929/original/file-20230214-20-8wn940.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509929/original/file-20230214-20-8wn940.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Author Byron C Clark.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If definitions had been provided, it might have stimulated a more nuanced consideration of the motley network of groups and movements that emerged in New Zealand during the pandemic.</p>
<p>Some groups covered in the book – Action Zealandia and Counterspin, for example – clearly fall within the normal definitions of these terms. But for others, their inclusion is puzzling and unconvincing. Many do not seek a society based on law and order and centralised authoritarian leadership, oppose immigration or seek to protect the “white race”.</p>
<p>And most have not legitimated violence. Opposing vaccinations or spreading disinformation does not qualify a group as far right – many on the left and in between also do that.</p>
<p>The book discusses groups as diverse as Action Zealandia and Groundswell, and individuals such as neo-Nazi Philip Arps and former knitting club member and Voices for Freedom founder Alia Bland, as if they are manifestations of the same movement. At one point, the Wellington <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-parliament-occupation-is-over-now-new-zealand-needs-new-laws-to-protect-the-epicentre-of-its-democracy-179751">anti-mandate protests</a> are explained together with the Christchurch terrorist attack as being due to “people no longer knowing what to believe anymore”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-nz-anti-vax-movements-exploitation-of-holocaust-imagery-is-part-of-a-long-and-sorry-history-177710">The NZ anti-vax movement’s exploitation of Holocaust imagery is part of a long and sorry history</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Need for evidence</h2>
<p>This lack of definition and conflation of different groups, ideologies and goals is connected to my second concern: a lack of evidence. </p>
<p>Many chapters focus on particular movements, parties or forms of “extremism” identified by the author as present or important in New Zealand. Unfortunately, the book fails either to show the movement is present in New Zealand or to provide a compelling case that it is far right, alt-right or extremist.</p>
<p>In part, this is because much of the discussion relies on the claims and reports of New Zealand-based commentators that are themselves not based on evidence.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/citizens-social-media-like-mastodon-can-provide-an-antidote-to-propaganda-and-disinformation-192491">Citizens' social media, like Mastodon, can provide an antidote to propaganda and disinformation</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The chapter on Voices for Freedom starts by stating “no comprehensive study of New Zealand’s far right can ignore them”. But clearly that depends on how we define the far right: as far as I am aware, the group has expressed none of the views listed at the start of this review (and none are provided in the chapter).</p>
<p>Whatever we think of the group’s opposition to vaccination, lockdowns and other measures to control the spread of COVID-19, this does not make it far right. And as much as we might find the group’s views reprehensible and damaging, it does not seek violence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509930/original/file-20230214-28-oczc6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509930/original/file-20230214-28-oczc6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509930/original/file-20230214-28-oczc6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509930/original/file-20230214-28-oczc6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509930/original/file-20230214-28-oczc6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509930/original/file-20230214-28-oczc6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509930/original/file-20230214-28-oczc6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Aftermath of the parliament protests in 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Careful coverage needed</h2>
<p>There is even less evidence provided in the following chapters on the anti-mandate Outdoors Party, the farmers movement Groundswell, and the apparent presence in New Zealand of a racist Rhodesian pride movement. Even the chapter on disinformation provides no data or evidence to support the claims made.</p>
<p>There is a tendency to focus on fragmented evidence of a New Zealand-based individual or group, and buffer a lack of activity or presence in this country with discussion of an affiliate group from the past or from overseas.</p>
<p>For example, Hindutva is presented as present and threatening in New Zealand, but with little to no evidence. Because of a lack of demonstrable activity or presence here, the author uses the fact that the New Zealand Hindu Council is affiliated to the India-based nationalist organisation <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vishva_Hindu_Parishad">VHP</a>, to discuss in much greater length the VHP’s extremist activity in India, even including a discussion of the riots in Gujarat in 2002.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-almost-like-grooming-how-anti-vaxxers-conspiracy-theorists-and-the-far-right-came-together-over-covid-168383">'It's almost like grooming': how anti-vaxxers, conspiracy theorists, and the far-right came together over COVID</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This history of violence and extremism in India will give many readers the impression that something similar is present in New Zealand, when no evidence has been provided for this inference.</p>
<p>Other important statements also required supporting evidence. The back cover states: “New Zealand has one of the highest concentrations of alt-right groups compared with other nations.” As a marketing tool this is understandable: it will shock browsers in bookstores and be repeated as fact at parties around the country. But no evidence is provided for the claim.</p>
<p>For all that, Byron Clark’s work provides an exceptional service to researchers and all those who want to understand the often bizarre and counterintuitive features of the far right, conspiracy theory and anti-government movements in contemporary New Zealand.</p>
<p>But when we write about these groups we need to take care how we describe them, and not to exaggerate their size, intentions and organisational links. Otherwise, we risk adding to their appeal among the disaffected, pushing together otherwise antithetical groups, generating misplaced fear and contributing to rising polarisation. The topic is too important not to warrant very careful coverage.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198580/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Wilson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new book examining New Zealand’s extreme and alt-right movements tackles an important issue. But it could have defined its terms better and provided more evidence for its claims.Chris Wilson, Programme Director, Master of Conflict and Terrorism Studies, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata RauLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1984612023-01-25T11:33:22Z2023-01-25T11:33:22ZDante was the founder of Italy’s right wing, claims culture minister – an expert explains why he’s wrong<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506123/original/file-20230124-25-hsg7ow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=40%2C31%2C1851%2C1592&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dante in Verona, by Antonio Cotti (1879).</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.bonhams.com/auctions/17089/lot/149/">Bonhams</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>“Dante was the founder of right-wing thinking in our country,” proclaimed Italy’s culture minister, <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/italys-culture-minister-says-dante-was-father-of-italys-right-wing-nt2bghzlf">Gennaro Sangiuliano</a>, at an electoral meeting of the prime minister Giorgia Meloni’s party, Fratelli d’Italia, in January.</p>
<p>He <a href="https://video.repubblica.it/politica/cultura-il-ministro-sangiuliano-dante-e-il-fondatore-del-pensiero-della-destra-italiana/435962/436928">went on to say</a> that “Dante’s vision of mankind and relationships, as well as his political construction, are deeply right-wing.”</p>
<p>The statement caused uproar in Italy. Among leftwing politicians and literary critics, the collective mood feels ready to shout, with one voice: <em>Giù le mani da Dante</em> (hands off Dante). </p>
<p>The reality is there are many interpretations of Dante. Sangiuliano’s reading is not particularly sophisticated, but it requires attention because of his allusion to Dante as a <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/354/oa_edited_volume/chapter/2778767">totem of Italian nationalism</a>.</p>
<h2>‘The most Italian of all Italians’</h2>
<p>Poet and philosopher <a href="https://theconversation.com/guide-to-the-classics-dantes-divine-comedy-84603">Dante Alighieri</a> (1265-1321) – whose work includes the <a href="https://headofzeus.com/books/9781786690791">Divine Comedy</a>, one of the landmarks of western literature – is considered a source of national pride in Italy. As the celebrations for the <a href="https://indiplomacy.it/en/dante-in-the-world-anniversary/">seventh centenary</a> of his death in 2021 demonstrated, Dante’s memory and Italian identity are deeply intertwined.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506129/original/file-20230124-11-oq1c2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Portrait of Dante in side profile, wearing red robes." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506129/original/file-20230124-11-oq1c2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506129/original/file-20230124-11-oq1c2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=911&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506129/original/file-20230124-11-oq1c2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=911&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506129/original/file-20230124-11-oq1c2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=911&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506129/original/file-20230124-11-oq1c2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1145&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506129/original/file-20230124-11-oq1c2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1145&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506129/original/file-20230124-11-oq1c2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1145&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Posthumous portrait of Dante by Sandro Botticelli (1495).</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The identification between Dante and Italy dates back to the process of unification of Italy (the <em>Risorgimento</em>). At that time, Dante <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/11560/chapter-abstract/160372107?redirectedFrom=fulltext">was proclaimed</a> <em>padre della patria</em> (father of the country) by many, including two of the most influential Italian intellectual leaders – writer <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199584628.003.0002">Ugo Foscolo</a> (1778-1827) and politician <a href="https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197264317.003.0010">Giuseppe Mazzini</a> (1805-1872).</p>
<p>The historian Cesare Balbo (1789-1853) called Dante <a href="https://www.liberliber.it/online/autori/autori-c/carlo-cattaneo/vita-di-dante-di-cesare-balbo/">“the most Italian of all Italians”</a>. Philosopher Giovanni Gentile (1875-1944) who was later minister of education under Mussolini’s government and a member of the Italian Fascist Party, asserted that, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40166133#metadata_info_tab_contents">“with Dante the idea of Italy began to take hold”</a>.</p>
<p>In recent times, Dante has been equated with an abstract idea of Italy by leftwing politicians too, like former Minister of Culture Dario Franceschini, who in 2021 <a href="https://www.beniculturali.it/comunicato/20241">stated</a> that “Dante is the very idea of Italy.” In the same year, President Sergio Mattarella <a href="https://www.quirinale.it/elementi/50535">argued</a> that “Dante is actually the great prophet of Italy.”</p>
<h2>The many appropriations of Dante</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.ici-berlin.org/publications/metamorphosing-dante/">Appropriations of Dante</a> are typical of many different cultural environments, but rightwing speakers tend to add a dash of nationalism in order to generate populist ideologies.</p>
<p>There have been – predictably – Catholic appropriations, with three official papal documents published on Dante: Benedetto XV’s encyclical <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40166133#metadata_info_tab_contents">In Praeclara Summorum</a> (1921), Paul VI’s apostolic letter <a href="https://www.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/la/motu_proprio/documents/hf_p-vi_motu-proprio_19651207_altissimi-cantus.html">Altissimi Cantus</a> (1965) and Francis I’s apostolic letter, <a href="https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_letters/documents/papa-francesco-lettera-ap_20210325_centenario-dante.html">Candor Lucis Aeternae</a> (2021).</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506139/original/file-20230124-12-ukeqa7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Black and white photograph of Engels with side parted hair and long beard." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506139/original/file-20230124-12-ukeqa7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506139/original/file-20230124-12-ukeqa7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=737&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506139/original/file-20230124-12-ukeqa7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=737&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506139/original/file-20230124-12-ukeqa7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=737&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506139/original/file-20230124-12-ukeqa7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=926&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506139/original/file-20230124-12-ukeqa7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=926&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506139/original/file-20230124-12-ukeqa7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=926&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Friedrich Engels (pictured in 1868) dubbed Dante ‘both the last poet of the Middle Ages and the first poet of modern times’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Engels_1856.jpg">George Lester</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There have been communist appropriations. In the preface to the Italian edition (1893) of Marx and Engels’s Manifesto of the Communist Party, Dante is <a href="https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/preface.htm#preface-1893">defined</a> as “both the last poet of the Middle Ages and the first poet of modern times”.</p>
<p>And there have also been fascist appropriations. During Mussolini’s regime (1922-1945), two books were published associating Dante and Mussolini: <a href="https://archive.org/details/VenturiniDanteEMussolini">Dante Alighieri e Benito Mussolini</a> (1927) by historian Domenico Venturini and Dante e Mussolini (1934) by critic Tommaso Vitti.</p>
<p>The fascist militant Pietro Jacopini, captain of the Royal Guardia di Finanza, in <a href="https://opac.bncf.firenze.sbn.it/bncf-prod/resource?uri=CUB0339450&v=l">a 1928 essay</a> dedicated to a political reading of canto six of Purgatorio, went to the extent of proclaiming that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Dante is a forerunner of Fascism and, if he had lived today, he would certainly have honoured us with his company, holding his truncheon against all the socialists and communists.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The dangers of evoking Dante</h2>
<p>Sangiuliano is free to take inspiration from whatever sources he wishes but as these antecedents demonstrate, his words lean dangerously towards fascist interpretations.</p>
<p>For many readers of Dante, there is in fact no connection between Dante and rightwing thinking. </p>
<p>If rightwing thinking implies individualism, Dante was <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Dante-the-Lyric-and-Ethical-Poet-Dante-Lirico-E-Etico/Baranski/p/book/9780367602390">communitarian</a> (believing that we are moulded by our communities). If typical rightwing values are aggression, competition and authoritarianism, Dante’s message is fraternity, solidarity and free-will. If identity and nationalism mark rightwing policies, the Divine Comedy is all universalism, based as it is on a series of meetings that explore the variety of human nature.</p>
<p>As an expert in Dante’s writing, I would urge Sangiuliano to read and reread Dante. What we need to <a href="https://www.fourcourtspress.ie/books/2015/war-and-peace-in-dante/">learn from him</a> in our time of enduring conflicts and ideological divides is his curiosity about human nature, nurtured with intellectual challenges and moral questions, rather than making him fit within any political system.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198461/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefano Jossa is Honorary Research Fellow at Royal Holloway University of London. He has received a British Academy / Leverhulme SRG for research on the Ridolfi collection at the Archives of Royal Holloway. He also works for the Universita` degli Studi di Palermo. </span></em></p>For many readers of Dante, there is in fact no connection between his writing and rightwing thinking.Stefano Jossa, Honorary Research Fellow in Italian Studies, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1981432023-01-20T00:56:04Z2023-01-20T00:56:04ZWould a law banning the Nazi salute be effective – or enforceable?<p>Amid the <a href="https://theconversation.com/does-australia-need-new-laws-to-combat-right-wing-extremism-196219">growing threat of far-right extremism</a> in Australia, Victoria recently became the first state to ban the Nazi swastika, (known as the Hakenkreuz). Publicly displaying the symbol is now a <a href="https://www.vic.gov.au/fact-sheet-nazi-symbol-prohibition">criminal offence</a> and carries a penalty of up to $22,000, or 12 months of imprisonment.</p>
<p>Other states and territories, including <a href="https://www.nsw.gov.au/media-releases/public-display-of-nazi-symbols-banned-nsw">NSW</a>, <a href="https://statements.qld.gov.au/statements/95214">Queensland</a>, <a href="https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7992767/act-to-outlaw-the-public-display-of-nazi-symbols/">the ACT</a>, <a href="https://www.premier.tas.gov.au/site_resources_2015/additional_releases/prohibiting-the-display-of-nazi-symbols">Tasmania</a> and most recently, <a href="https://www.mediastatements.wa.gov.au/Pages/McGowan/2023/01/Government-to-ban-display-and-possession-of-Nazi-symbols.aspx">Western Australia</a>, are now taking similar steps.</p>
<p>These moves have been praised as a critical step toward depriving far-right extremists the use of a potent symbol associated with hatred, racism and the horrors of the Holocaust to intimidate and spread fear. </p>
<p>Far-right groups in Australia have also sought to leverage the swastika as a recruitment tool, pulling in young men (in particular) who are attracted to its association with hatred and violence. </p>
<p>But these laws banning Nazi symbols do not (yet) cover the other way far-right extremists espouse their hateful ideology in public spaces and online: the Nazi or “fascist” salute. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/does-australia-need-new-laws-to-combat-right-wing-extremism-196219">Does Australia need new laws to combat right-wing extremism?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The Nazi salute as a symbol and recruitment tool</h2>
<p>The act of raising an arm in salute dates to the Roman Empire where it was used to display respect or allegiance. This was altered in artwork and culture over time in different contexts, including in France and the United States. </p>
<p>More recently, it was appropriated and altered by propagandists among the National Socialists in Germany and fascists in Italy in the early 20th century as a way to both demonstrate commitment to these groups and unity of purpose.</p>
<p>Today, the salute is used to identify oneself as a white nationalist or “Nazi”. It’s also used in public spaces to intimidate and spread fear. There are many instances of this in Australia, <a href="https://www.news.com.au/national/victoria/news/neonazi-group-performs-hitler-salute-in-disturbing-photo-at-melbourne-lookout/news-story/8dc5e8a50e4e40c5d4a45cde362a7a4e">most recently </a> by a group of men in the Melbourne suburb of Elwood (a suburb with a high proportion of Jewish residents) and by <a href="https://www.news.com.au/national/victoria/courts-law/neonazi-thomas-sewells-vile-act-outside-court-after-sentence-for-assault-on-nine-network-security-guard/news-story/ca6ea5e575a9a4c05623468af77d1fc2">a far-right extremist leader</a> after his conviction for assault against a Black security officer.</p>
<p>Importantly, the use of the gesture functions as a recruitment device in the same way the swastika is used. </p>
<p>To the often alienated and angry young men attracted to far-right ideologies, photos of groups of men making the Nazi salute offer a sense of a collective and belonging. Far-right extremists groups know this and their online materials feature many photos of members making salutes. </p>
<h2>International efforts to ban the Nazi salute</h2>
<p>Some countries have <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/queen-nazi-salute-countries-where-gesture-is-illegal-10401630.html">specifically banned the salute</a>, such as Germany and others occupied by the Nazi regime during the second world war (Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland). </p>
<p>Others, such as Switzerland and Sweden, have broader statutes that capture the salute. Authorities in the United Kingdom have more recently <a href="https://www.cps.gov.uk/north-east/news/newcastle-fan-pleads-guilty-nazi-salute">used provisions</a> related to causing racially aggravated harassment, harm and distress to prosecute offenders. </p>
<p>Penalties in these jurisdictions range from up to three years imprisonment in Germany to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60092306">low-level fines</a>. Arguably as important as the punishment is the recording of a conviction, building a track record of participation in far-right extremist movements. </p>
<h2>Challenges of enforcement</h2>
<p>The Nazi salute is instantly recognisable and the <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/hate-symbol/hitler-salute-hand-sign">most common far-right extremist hand sign globally</a>. We know it when we see it and debates about interpretation are arguably moot. </p>
<p>However, a successful prosecution depends on a number of factors, including the wording of the particular laws and the evidence available. If a statute is not precise, or is not able to be readily applied by law enforcement, it can allow offenders to escape conviction. This happened <a href="https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/nazi-gestures_it-s-the-law--hitler-salute-is-not-always-a-crime/38682072">in Switzerland in 2014</a>.</p>
<p>It is also important to consider the way far-right extremists respond to these laws. They can change their tactics to evade prosecution, including <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/this-australian-state-could-ban-the-nazi-salute-experts-say-it-wont-be-easy/nr4ttcbf6">using the OK symbol</a> instead of a Nazi salute. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/09/18/ok-sign-white-power-symbol-or-just-right-wing-troll">This gesture</a>, made by connecting the thumb and index finger to create a circle and spreading the other three fingers apart, can be interpreted as the letters “W” and “P”, standing for white power. But because it’s a common hand gesture, it also offers some form of deniability to those using it.</p>
<p>There’s been a similar debate in <a href="https://www.vox.com/2015/1/14/7548289/quenelle-dieudonne-antisemitism-france">France</a> and <a href="https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/society/anti-semitic-actions_court-judges-quenelle-gesture-to-be-racist/43386002">Switzerland</a> over the use of the “quenelle” hand gesture, which resembles the Nazi salute but has been used in attempts to circumvent hate laws.</p>
<p>And crucially, a successful prosecution requires evidence, such a video or photograph, that a suspected offender actually made the salute. This is why many far-right extremists making the salute cover their faces in online posts. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-dieudonnes-quenelle-gesture-poses-challenges-for-britain-and-france-22731">Why Dieudonné's quenelle gesture poses challenges for Britain and France</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>What would a ban in Australia look like?</h2>
<p>Any laws targeting the Nazi salute are likely to focus on the public use of the salute to intimidate and threaten members of the community, falling under existing or new legislation combating hate or “<a href="https://www.police.vic.gov.au/prejudice-motivated-crime">prejudice motived</a>” crimes. </p>
<p>Such legislation would likely take a similar approach to the new Victorian law banning Nazi symbols, which requires that a symbol is both intentionally used in a public space and that the person ought to have reasonably known making the salute is aligned with Nazi ideology. </p>
<p>In fact, the Victorian government is now <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/this-australian-state-could-ban-the-nazi-salute-experts-say-it-wont-be-easy/nr4ttcbf6">reportedly exploring the possibility</a> of expanding its law to include the salute. </p>
<p>Any new law banning the salute would also likely allow for limited exceptions, for example, in the case of artistic parody. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/far-right-groups-have-used-covid-to-expand-their-footprint-in-australia-here-are-the-ones-you-need-to-know-about-151203">Far-right groups have used COVID to expand their footprint in Australia. Here are the ones you need to know about</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>A logical next step</h2>
<p>The Nazi salute, as with the swastika, is inextricably linked with the horrors of the Holocaust and grounded in extreme hatred and violence. It is a symbol that has maintained its power over many decades and is currently weaponised by far-right extremists in our streets (and online) to both inspire fear and recruit.</p>
<p>Enacting new laws to ban the salute would be both logical and an important step in protecting the Australian community, particularly those specifically targeted by far-right extremist ideologies. There would certainly be challenges to overcome, however, requiring such laws to be written carefully and, critically, the will to enforce them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198143/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Josh Roose receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>Australian states and territories are moving to ban Nazi symbols. But can such laws cover a Nazi salute? Here are the difficulties in drafting and enforcing such legislation.Josh Roose, Associate Professor of Politics, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1962332022-12-08T15:29:20Z2022-12-08T15:29:20ZWhat is the Reichsbürger movement accused of trying to overthrow the German government?<p>Police have <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-police-arrest-25-suspects-over-plot-to-overthrow-state/a-64011136">arrested</a> 25 people accused of planning to overthrow the German government in a series of raids across the country.</p>
<hr>
<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-reichsburger-movement-accused-of-trying-to-overthrow-the-german-government-196233&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p><em>You can listen to more articles from The Conversation, narrated by Noa, <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/audio-narrated-99682">here</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>The group is accused of trying to instate Heinrich XIII – a descendant of German royalty – as their leader. Among those arrested were members of the Reichsbürger (which translates as citizens of the Reich), a disparate movement of groups and individuals, including some with extreme-right views.</p>
<p>Reichsbürger adherents have been stopped from attempting violent action before, but this latest incident and its alleged members have caused greater concern. </p>
<p>A former member of the German parliament, who was also a judge until shortly after her arrest, was <a href="https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article242553091/Birgit-Malsack-Winkemann-Ex-AfD-Abgeordnete-scheidet-nach-Razzia-als-Richterin-aus.html">among the group</a>. Birgit Malsack-Winkemann was a parliamentary deputy for the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), but left the party in 2021.</p>
<p>Several former soldiers were also <a href="https://www.swr.de/swraktuell/baden-wuerttemberg/polizeiaktion-reichsbuerger-razzia-bw-100.html">arrested</a> in connection with the coup plot. This is a cause for great concern for law enforcement, as such ties give possibly dangerous extremists access to weapons and trained individuals.</p>
<p>Earlier in 2022, Heinrich XIII was <a href="https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/thueringen/ost-thueringen/saale-orla/bad-lobenstein-prinz-heinrich-reuss-xiii-distanziert-100.html">reported</a> in the German press as being close to the Reichsbürger scene and a believer of conspiracy theories, prompting his family, the House of Reuss, to publicly distance themselves from him. </p>
<p>He does not, however, have a high profile, apart from a 2019 speech at the WorldWebForum conference in Switzerland, which contained an antisemitic and historical revisionist message. The involvement of an aristocrat speaks to the monarchist motivations of some Reichsbürger, who wish to reinstate a Kaiser as head of state. </p>
<h2>What do the Reichsbürger believe?</h2>
<p>The Reichsbürger do not have a centralised structure but are <a href="https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/reichsburger-szene-wachst-auf-mindestens-21000-menschen-8020021.html">estimated</a> to have at least 21,000 supporters. Their key belief is that the current German state (the Bundesrepublik or Federal Republic), its institutions and democratically elected representatives are not legitimate.</p>
<p>Supporters of the movement refuse to adhere to state authority, such as by paying taxes. They became notorious in the early years of the pandemic for <a href="https://www.aspeninstitute.de/wp-content/uploads/COVID-19-Pandemic-Conspiracy-Theories-Are-Taking-Over-German-Democracy.pdf">refusing to comply with COVID-19 restrictions</a>.</p>
<p>Some adherents to the movement consider that official German passports and ID cards are illegitimate. While some <a href="https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/topthemen/DE/topthema-reichsbuerger/topthema-reichsbuerger.html#:%7E:text=Vielfach%20wird%20von%20Angeh%C3%B6rigen%20der,Besitz%20der%20deutschen%20Staatsangeh%C3%B6rigkeit%20akzeptieren">prefer</a> to use an official certificate of citizenship (called a gelber Schein or yellow certificate), others manufacture their own illegal passports and driver’s licenses. These will often include former German states as places of birth, such as the kingdoms of Bavaria or Prussia. In 2021, a German civil servant was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germanys-reichsbuerger-searching-an-emperor-fascinated-by-guns-2022-12-07/">removed</a> from office after he applied for a passport with the Kingdom of Bavaria listed as his birth state. </p>
<p>Members of the group generally believe that some previous version of the German state is in fact the legitimate form – though there is some <a href="https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/EN/reichsbuerger-and-selbstverwalter/2018-12-reichsbuerger-und-selbstverwalter-enemies-of-the-state-profiteers-conspiracytheorists.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5">inconsistency</a> as to which.</p>
<p>Some supporters believe Germany’s true form existed between 1871 and 1918, when the German Reich was established following <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Germany/Germany-from-1871-to-1918">unification</a> and before the first world war. Others cite the constitution of the interwar Weimar Republic as that of the true Germany. And others still focus on 1937 to demonstrate what they perceive as the legitimate <a href="https://www.ww2online.org/image/map-1937-germany-published-1945">boundaries of German territory</a>, which then included the former Kingdom of Prussia, now Poland and Russia, but not Austria, which was annexed in 1938.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A map of the German Reich, 1871-1918" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499781/original/file-20221208-7486-krmmcp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499781/original/file-20221208-7486-krmmcp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499781/original/file-20221208-7486-krmmcp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499781/original/file-20221208-7486-krmmcp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499781/original/file-20221208-7486-krmmcp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499781/original/file-20221208-7486-krmmcp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499781/original/file-20221208-7486-krmmcp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">One vision of the ‘true’ Germany amongst this extremist group dates back to before the first world war.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unification_of_Germany#/media/File:Deutsches_Reich_(1871-1918)-en.png">Wikipedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A uniting belief among the Reichsbürger is that the current German state lacks sovereignty. They think the western allies (France, the UK and US) supposedly retained control after their occupation of West Germany ended in 1955. Therefore, some <a href="https://www.bige.bayern.de/infos_zu_extremismus/aktuelle_meldungen/deutsches-reich-und-brd-gmbh-verschworungstheorien-in-der-reichsburger-und-selbstverwalter-ideologie/">believe</a> that the current German state is a puppet regime which does not support the interests of the German people. </p>
<p>They sometimes refer to it as Deutschland GmbH (Limited), implying it has no power over itself and exists only to enrich its controllers. The name BRD GmbH is also used, referring to the abbreviated name for post-war West Germany.</p>
<h2>Revisionist history and antisemitism</h2>
<p>The focus on historical revisionism and erasure of German sovereignty can encourage a conception of Germany as a blameless country with uncomplicated pride. By focusing on pre-war borders and overlooking post-war history, the Reichsbürger can ignore Germany’s defeat in the second world war, as well as its process of coming to terms with its Nazi and colonial past, notably the Holocaust and the 1904 <a href="https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9789047401629/B9789047401629_s014.xml">Herero and Nama genocide in Namibia</a>. The removal of these dark moments in German history enables the movement’s supporters to focus on their own perceived victimisation as subjects of a German state which they do not recognise.</p>
<p>A similar revisionism is common in the wider German far right, notably some members of the populist <a href="https://rub-europadialog.eu/the-afd-and-the-commemoration-of-the-holocaust-the-power-of-the-past-to-shape-the-present">AfD</a> party. Repudiation of the Holocaust’s importance and an emphasis on “positive” moments in German history encourages Holocaust relativisation and antisemitism.</p>
<p>However, unlike the AfD, which has adapted its rhetoric to fit into the political mainstream, some Reichsbürger followers entirely disregard current German laws banning Holocaust denial and the dissemination of Nazi propaganda. The group is linked to overt antisemitism and the spread of <a href="https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/EN/reichsbuerger-and-selbstverwalter/2018-12-reichsbuerger-und-selbstverwalter-enemies-of-the-state-profiteers-conspiracytheorists.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5">antisemitic conspiracy theories</a> about the power of “high finance” as well as outright Holocaust denial. In March 2020, German police <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-51961069">seized</a> neo-Nazi propaganda during raids on the homes of some Reichsbürger members.</p>
<p>However, the historical revisionism can confuse the picture. Although many of its adherents are antisemitic and glorify the colonial past, the Reichsbürger is not specifically defined as a group of right-wing extremists. In truth, only a <a href="https://www.kas.de/en/web/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/reichsbuerger">small</a> portion of the movement can be defined as such.</p>
<p>At its core, right-wing extremism is largely <a href="https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/groups/compendium/what-is-right-wing-extremism.html">defined</a> as anti-democratic. While many Reichsbürger refuse to endorse the legitimacy of Germany’s current democratic state, the lack of unified vision within the movement makes it unclear which system would be preferable, the constitutional monarchy of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the democratic experiment of Weimar Germany or the dictatorship of Nazi Germany. However, in the case of the most recent plot, the key role of Heinrich XIII implies that the goal was the restitution of a constitutional monarchy in the style of Kaiser Wilhelm II’s regime. </p>
<h2>Growing threat?</h2>
<p>Some Reichsbürger followers are evidently beginning to engage in political violence. The latest arrests follow multiple other incidents. In 2016, a police officer was killed during a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-germanys-reichsb%25C3%25BCrger-movement/a-36094740">raid</a> on a member of the movement’s illegal collection of weapons. In August 2020, members of the Reichsbürger attempted to <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-leaders-slam-extremists-who-rushed-reichstag-steps/a-54758246">enter</a> the German parliament as part of a protest against COVID-19 restrictions.</p>
<p>The presence of former military figures and a former parliamentarian among the most recently arrested group suggest the Reichsbürger are not without potential influence. The AfD has long <a href="https://www.rbb-online.de/kontraste/ueber_den_tag_hinaus/demokratie/Reichsbuerger-Gedankengut_in_der_AfD.html">denied</a> any links to the movement, but has been shifting further and further to the right in recent years. In 2019, the German interior ministry reported that it had <a href="https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/rechtsextremismus-bundesinnenministerium-sieht-reichsbuerger-bezuege-zur-afd/24006262.html">identified</a> some isolated connections between the Reichsbürger and the AfD. </p>
<p>The Reichsbürger could be viewed as a fringe group but their ideas clearly appeal to some enough to convince them a coup is a worthwhile undertaking. And links to more influential organisations would make them more dangerous – which is why this matter has been taken so seriously by the authorities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196233/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Claire Burchett receives funding from the London Arts & Humanities Partnership. </span></em></p>A group touting revisionist visions of German history wanted to install minor aristocrat Heinrich XIII as German leader.Claire Burchett, PhD candidate in European Politics, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.