tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/geopolitics-4230/articlesGeopolitics – The Conversation2024-03-28T09:58:19Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2267842024-03-28T09:58:19Z2024-03-28T09:58:19ZInvisible lines: how unseen boundaries shape the world around us<p>Our experiences of the world are diverse, often changing as we move across borders from one country to another. They can also vary based on language or subtle shifts in climate. Yet, we rarely consider what causes these differences and divisions. </p>
<p>In this episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a> podcast, we speak to geographer Maxim Samson at De Paul University in the US about the unseen boundaries that can shape our collective and personal perceptions of the world – what he calls “invisible lines”.</p>
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<p>For Samson, invisible lines are: “Boundaries and belts that shape our understanding of and interactions with the planet, even though these boundaries and belts are, to all intents and purposes, unseen.” </p>
<p>While we may not be able to see these lines on a conventional map, people often know that they exist. </p>
<p>One example is the history of redlining in the US. Originating in the 1930s, the practice involved government-backed mortgage lenders colour-coding neighbourhoods. Green denoted the most desirable areas while red marked the highest-risk zones, often inhabited by Black communities.</p>
<p>Although redlining was officially outlawed in 1968 and the lines are no longer marked on any maps, their enduring impact resonates across America today. One example is Detroit’s <a href="https://detroithistorical.org/learn/encyclopedia-of-detroit/eight-mile-road#:%7E:text=Spanning%20more%20than%2020%20miles,east%2Dwest%20throughout%20the%20region.">8 Mile road</a>, which still segregates the city along racial lines – with predominantly African American neighbourhoods to the south, and predominantly white, affluent areas are to the north of 8 Mile.</p>
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<p>But it’s not just in cities that these boundaries exist. One example Samson gives from nature is the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wallace_Line">Wallace line</a>, which runs through parts of Indonesia and marks a sharp transition in flora and fauna between the Asian and Australian regions. On one side, you get what are considered Asian animals such as monkeys; on the other, marsupials associated with Australia.</p>
<p>Another invisible line is the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qinling%E2%80%93Huaihe_Line">Qinling-Huaihe line</a>, which separates China into two distinct regions: the humid and subtropical south and the dry, temperate north.</p>
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<p>In the early 20th century, this was identified as roughly the dividing line between places where the average January temperature would be below zero, and where it wouldn’t fall out that low. So, if you live north of the line, your town probably has a heating system. If you live south of it, it wouldn’t have one. </p>
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<p>This distinction has informed government policy and led to different levels of development in the south versus the north. By recognising the seemingly innocuous Qinling-Huaihe line, it’s possible to discern disparities in economic development, inequality and air pollution between China’s southern and northern regions that might otherwise be obscured.</p>
<p>For Samson, analysing these kinds of boundary can help understand different access to education, employment opportunities and public services, depending on which side of the invisible line someone falls.</p>
<p>Listen to the full interview with Maxim Samson on <a href="https://pod.link/1550643487">The Conversation Weekly podcast</a>. </p>
<p><em>A transcript of this episode will be available shortly.</em></p>
<p><em>This episode of The Conversation Weekly was written by Mend Mariwany and Katie Flood. Gemma Ware is the executive producer. Sound design was by Eloise Stevens, and our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. Stephen Khan is our global executive editor, Alice Mason runs our social media and Soraya Nandy does our transcripts.</em></p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maxim Samson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Maxim Samson speaks to The Conversation Weekly podcast about the hidden lines that explain variations in everything from access to education to animal speciesMend Mariwany, Producer, The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The ConversationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2256232024-03-19T14:07:44Z2024-03-19T14:07:44ZChina: why the country’s economy has hit a wall – and what it plans to do about it<p>China’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-68508868">annual parliamentary meetings</a> in Beijing came to a close on March 11. They were conducted under great pressure: a weak economy and high expectations from both the domestic public and international observers as to what the government can do to get the economy out of the woods.</p>
<p>The country’s leaders did not shy away from mentioning all of the economic problems facing China. But they also attempted to boost the morale of the Chinese public by outlining how the country would march into the next chapter of the Chinese story – mainly by striving to become a global leader in technology.</p>
<p>The government used the meetings to <a href="https://npcobserver.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/2024-Government-Work-Report_EN.pdf">declare</a> that it was targeting GDP growth of 5% in 2024. This is lower than the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-q4-gdp-grows-52-yy-below-market-forecast-2024-01-17/">5.2% growth rate</a> that was achieved in 2023 but higher than the International Monetary Fund’s <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/CHN">forecast</a> of 4.6%. The Chinese government did not detail how this target will be achieved, but the target itself is indicative of the leadership’s confidence about the future.</p>
<p>Over the past four decades, China’s rapid economic growth has been attributed to market incentives, cheap labour, infrastructure investment, exports and foreign direct investment. But at the time of writing, none of these drivers are working effectively. </p>
<p>Market activities are intertwined with <a href="https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/2023/chinas-state-vs-private-company-tracker-which-sector-dominates">greater state intervention</a>. A declining population has weakened the labour supply. And uncertainty surrounding China’s economy and intensified geopolitical tensions have together driven foreign investment <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Foreign-direct-investment-in-China-falls-to-30-yearlow#:%7E:text=But%20FDI%20declined%20for%20the,recorded%20in%20the%20prior%20quarter.">out of China</a>. By January 2024, inward foreign direct investment in China was less than 10% of the US$344 billion (£270 billion) it received in 2021.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-doom-loop-a-dramatically-smaller-and-older-population-could-create-a-devastating-global-slowdown-221554">China's doom loop: a dramatically smaller (and older) population could create a devastating global slowdown</a>
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<h2>Property crisis</h2>
<p>Many of the risks facing China’s economy stem from its ailing real estate sector. For decades, China’s economy was dependent on a <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/02/02/cf-chinas-real-estate-sector-managing-the-medium-term-slowdown#:%7E:text=Real%20estate%20has%20long%20been,the%20buildup%20of%20significant%20risks">booming property market</a> driven by speculative investment returns. However, this growth was largely driven by debt. To maximise their profits, developers even began selling houses before they had been built.</p>
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<img alt="A view of a room full of people in China sat facing a stage." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Delegates attending the closing meeting of the Two Sessions on March 11.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://epaimages.com/search.pp">Wu Hao/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>China’s economy started to slow and, in 2020, Chinese regulators <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-08/what-china-s-three-red-lines-mean-for-property-firms-quicktake">cracked down</a> on reckless borrowing. Beijing imposed widespread lending curbs on property developers, meaning they could not borrow more money to pay back their existing debts. </p>
<p>A crisis followed. In early 2024, Evergrande – the world’s most heavily indebted real estate developer – <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/embattled-china-evergrande-back-court-liquidation-hearing-2024-01-28/">went bust</a>. And other large property developers are in trouble. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-67142093">Country Garden</a> has defaulted and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e1ffbcb4-3222-4a8e-be61-e3a6051567f5">Vanke</a> is struggling to find the new loans it needs to stay alive. </p>
<p>The government confirmed its determination to deflate the property bubble in its annual meeting. It did not highlight how to protect more property developers from defaulting, and only hinted at giving some help to allow developers to complete property projects.</p>
<p>The current weak consumer demand in China’s economy is closely related to the real estate crisis. The value of houses is <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-17/china-home-prices-fall-most-since-2015-as-downturn-persists">much lower</a> today than it was two years ago, creating fear about the future value of personal wealth. This has prompted more precautionary saving and less consumption in the face of weak social protection, leading to a general <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/feb/08/china-consumer-prices-plunge-at-fastest-rate-for-15-years-as-deflation-fears-deepen">decline in the price</a> of goods and services. </p>
<p>Demand for Chinese goods from abroad has also been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-us-pledge-joint-action-over-china-concerns-2023-05-13/">declining</a> due to trade restrictions imposed by the US and the EU, geopolitical concerns and shocks to global supply chains. This explains why throughout its annual meetings the government explicitly emphasised the need to strengthen the self-reliance of the Chinese economy. </p>
<h2>New drivers of growth</h2>
<p>The most eye-catching phrase to come out of the annual meetings was “new quality productive forces”. There are varying interpretations of the term, but they all focus on technology and innovation. </p>
<p>Chinese officials explicitly highlighted the need for China to strive to invent more products related to Artificial Intelligence (AI). The government envisions applications such as AI-powered travel agents and salespeople. </p>
<p>China has, up to this point, been better known for applying AI technologies. Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen are all <a href="https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/chinas-smart-cities-and-future-geopolitics">smart cities</a>, where advanced technologies such as AI, cloud computing and big data are used in various areas including transport, urban planning and public security.</p>
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<img alt="A robot police officer driving down a street in China." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Shanghai’s first robot police officer patrolling the streets in 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/shanghai-china-dec-20-2019-shanghais-1594426684">atiger/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>However, transforming China’s economy from one that is driven by investment and fuelled by debt to one that is driven by innovation and technology will bring some fresh challenges. </p>
<p>First, innovation requires incentives and an institutional guarantee to reward risk-taking. Hence, the private sector needs to grow faster. <a href="https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/2023/chinas-state-vs-private-company-tracker-which-sector-dominates">Research</a> has found that the share of China’s private sector among the 100 largest listed companies in China dropped to 36.8% at the end of 2023 from 55.4% in mid-2021. </p>
<p>Second, innovation requires more highly skilled human capital. A <a href="https://www.oecd.org/future-of-work/reports-and-data/AI-Employment-brief-2021.pdf">report</a> by the OECD in 2021 concluded that the application of AI technology increases the demand for skilled employees, despite replacing low-skilled labour. This will pose a challenge for China as, up to this point, the country’s growth has been spurred by low-skilled labour. </p>
<p>Third, high-tech industries such as AI and digital services are energy intensive. China has already taken steps to diversify its energy supply, but securing energy supply chains will be essential in the longer term. </p>
<p>Heightened geopolitical tensions and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-63883047">revamped global supply chains</a> may well reduce exports of energy and other natural resources to China in the future. Many of these resources come from developing economies that have exchanged their resources for China’s infrastructure investment in the past. This is unlikely to be the case in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225623/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hong Bo previously received funding from the British Academy. </span></em></p>China is facing many economic obstacles, but Beijing remains optimistic about growth.Hong Bo, Professor of Financial Economics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2254132024-03-14T13:28:27Z2024-03-14T13:28:27ZParis 2024: conflict in Ukraine and the Middle East threaten to turn the Olympic Games into a geopolitical battleground<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581622/original/file-20240313-30-xbar5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=30%2C0%2C3935%2C2854&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/paris-france-23-september-2017-olympic-736128922">Keitma/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Summer Olympic Games will return to Paris this July exactly a century after it last took place in France. Paris is the hometown of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Pierre-baron-de-Coubertin">Pierre de Coubertin</a>, the founder of the modern Olympic Games. </p>
<p>When Coubertin first conceived the revival of this ancient Greek tradition in the late 19th century, he imagined a scene where nations celebrated friendly internationalism by playing sports together. His Olympic idealism provides the foundation for the <a href="https://stillmed.olympics.com/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-Olympic-Charter.pdf">Olympic charter</a>, a set of rules and guidelines for the organisation of the Olympic Games that emphasise international fraternity and solidarity. </p>
<p>In 1992, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) moved to uphold Coubertin’s legacy by renewing the tradition of the <a href="https://olympictruce.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/IOTC-2010-Brochure-EN.pdf">sacred truce</a> associated with the ancient Olympics. The Olympic truce calls for the cessation of hostilities between warring nations during the Olympic Games and beyond. </p>
<p>The Olympic truce has contributed to peace before – albeit only fleetingly. During the opening ceremony of the 2018 Winter Olympic Games in Pyeongchang, South Korea, the South and North Korean delegations marched into the stadium <a href="https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/News/2018/2018-01-20-Declaration.pdf">together</a> under the single flag of the Korean peninsula. They also fielded a unified Korean ice hockey team for this competition. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-winter-olympics-and-the-two-koreas-how-sport-diplomacy-could-save-the-world-89769">The Winter Olympics and the two Koreas: how sport diplomacy could save the world</a>
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<p>The IOC <a href="https://stillmed.olympics.com/media/Documents/News/2023/10/14/2023-10-14-IOC-Session-Mumbai-Bach-Opening-speech.pdf">hopes</a> that the forthcoming Olympics will be a moment for world peace. But with the Paris Olympic torch relay starting next month, the world is plagued with conflict and animosity. And tensions in eastern Europe and the Middle East show no sign of easing. </p>
<p>The 2024 Olympics will take place amid geopolitical turmoil. These conflicts will affect the Olympic Games and throw into question the capacity of sport to reduce tension between nations. </p>
<h2>Banned Russian athletes</h2>
<p>Moscow ordered its army to invade Ukraine four days after the end of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing. The IOC considered this aggression a violation of the Olympic truce and subsequently <a href="https://olympics.com/ioc/media/q-a-on-solidarity-with-ukraine-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-and-the-status-of-athletes-from-these-countries">banned</a> Russian athletes from participating in the Paris Olympic Games.</p>
<p>Russia was unhappy with this decision. It <a href="https://www.reuters.com/sports/iocs-ban-russia-cannot-be-compared-with-israel-situation-2023-11-03/">condemned</a> the IOC as being biased towards the west and even appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport against the suspension. But in February 2024, the court eventually <a href="https://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/CAS_Award_10093.pdf">upheld</a> the IOC’s position.</p>
<p>Russian athletes will not be absent from the Olympics. The IOC allows them to take part in the competition not as a state delegation but as neutral individuals. Ukraine finds this situation unacceptable, <a href="https://olympics.com/ioc/media/q-a-on-solidarity-with-ukraine-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-and-the-status-of-athletes-from-these-countries">arguing</a> that neutrality cannot remove Russian identity from the Olympics.</p>
<p>The IOC has denounced the Russian occupation of Ukrainian territories. But it also admits the complexity of this geopolitical conflict, and acknowledges that its best approach would be to keep impartiality on this matter. Ukraine responded by implementing a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-olympics-russia-boycott-paris-569d1c75d5e6c835016dd41f1b10c217">policy</a> for its athletes to boycott any contests involving Russians at Paris 2024, although it later lifted this rule. </p>
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<span class="caption">The Russian assault on the Ukrainian city of Mariupol in 2022 left thousands of civilians dead and injured.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/war-ukraine-huge-damage-cause-by-2156014785">BY MOVIE/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<h2>Unhappy Russians</h2>
<p>The war between Israel and Hamas will further complicate the 2024 Olympics, with Olympic officials poised to face allegations of inconsistency concerning Israeli athletes. </p>
<p>This conflict is no less brutal than the war between Ukraine and Russia. According to the Hamas-run health ministry, more than 30,000 people have been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68430925">killed</a> in Gaza since the start of the war. And there is also <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/10/damning-evidence-of-war-crimes-as-israeli-attacks-wipe-out-entire-families-in-gaza">evidence</a> that Israeli forces have committed war crimes in the Gaza Strip. </p>
<p>However, the resolution for the Olympic truce of Paris 2024 singles out the suspension of Russia and does not contain a single word on the violence in Israel and Palestine. </p>
<p>These two warring parties can participate in the Olympics – though the strict <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/07/gaza-who-lives-there-and-why-it-has-been-blockaded-for-so-long">blockade</a> of the Gaza Strip will make it hard for Palestinians to take part in the games. But the Russian delegation is prevented from taking part in the same competition. Russia considers this discrepancy unfair and again blames Olympic officials for siding with the west.</p>
<p>Israel and its allies are seemingly very vocal within the Olympic circle. In October 2023, the IOC <a href="https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-member-elections-lead-to-increased-female-representation-among-the-membership">offered</a> Yeal Arad, who in 1992 became the first Israeli to win an Olympic medal, their prestigious membership. When accepting this privileged appointment, she <a href="https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1141836/arad-comments-after-elected">urged</a> the Israeli athletes to give inspiration and hope to their fellow citizens suffering from the tragedy. </p>
<p>At the same IOC session, Cassy Wasserman, the chairperson of the 2028 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, also declared himself “proud to be Jewish” before his speech. </p>
<p>The 2024 Olympic Games in Paris will take place amid conflict and contention. The Olympic truce and the neutrality of international sport is the idealism of the IOC. Not only that, it volunteers to be a messenger of world peace.</p>
<p>Can Paris 2024 be a catalyst for this vision? Unfortunately, the capacity of the Olympics to act as a festival of peaceful internationalism will inevitably be curtailed in this period of geopolitical turmoil. </p>
<p>Despite the facade of festivity in Paris, the escalation of hostilities around the world is likely to trouble the Olympic Games in the French capital.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225413/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jung Woo Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Olympic Games have also been highly political events – Paris 2024 will be no different.Jung Woo Lee, Lecturer in Sport and Leisure Policy, The University of EdinburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2244382024-03-04T13:41:42Z2024-03-04T13:41:42ZDemand for computer chips fuelled by AI could reshape global politics and security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578585/original/file-20240228-18-rudxyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=28%2C0%2C6361%2C3592&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/close-silicon-die-being-extracted-semiconductor-2262331365">IM Imagery / Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A global race to build powerful computer chips that are essential for the next generation of artificial intelligence (AI) tools could have a major impact on global politics and security. </p>
<p>The US is currently leading the race in the design of these chips, also known as semiconductors. But most of the manufacturing is carried out in Taiwan. The debate has been fuelled by the call by Sam Altman, CEO of ChatGPT’s developer OpenAI, for <a href="https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/sam-altman-seeks-trillions-of-dollars-to-reshape-business-of-chips-and-ai-89ab3db0">a US$5 trillion to US$7 trillion</a> (£3.9 trillion to £5.5 trillion) global investment to <a href="https://venturebeat.com/ai/sam-altman-wants-up-to-7-trillion-for-ai-chips-the-natural-resources-required-would-be-mind-boggling/">produce more powerful chips</a> for the next generation of AI platforms. </p>
<p>The amount of money Altman called for is more than the chip industry has spent in total since it began. Whatever the facts about those numbers, overall projections for the AI market are mind blowing. The data analytics company GlobalData <a href="https://www.globaldata.com/media/technology/generative-ai-will-go-mainstream-2024-driven-adoption-specialized-custom-models-multimodal-tool-experimentation-says-globaldata/">forecasts that the market will be worth US$909 billion</a> by 2030.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, over the past two years, the US, China, Japan and several European countries have increased their budget allocations and put in place measures to secure or maintain a share of the chip industry for themselves. China is catching up fast and is <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/09/china-boosts-semiconductor-subsidies-as-us-tightens-restrictions/">subsidising chips, including next-generation ones for AI</a>, by hundreds of billions over the next decade to build a manufacturing supply chain. </p>
<p>Subsidies seem to be the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/germany-earmarks-20-bln-eur-chip-industry-coming-years-2023-07-25/">preferred strategy for Germany too</a>. The UK government has announced its <a href="https://www.ukri.org/news/100m-boost-in-ai-research-will-propel-transformative-innovations/#:%7E:text=%C2%A3100m%20boost%20in%20AI%20research%20will%20propel%20transformative%20innovations,-6%20February%202024&text=Nine%20new%20research%20hubs%20located,help%20to%20define%20responsible%20AI.">plans to invest £100 million</a> to support regulators and universities in addressing challenges around artificial intelligence. </p>
<p>The economic historian Chris Miller, the author of the book Chip War, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ai-chip-race-fears-grow-of-huge-financial-bubble/a-68272265">has talked about how powerful chips have become a “strategic commodity”</a> on the global geopolitical stage.</p>
<p>Despite the efforts by several countries to invest in the future of chips, there is currently a shortage of the types currently needed for AI systems. Miller recently explained that 90% of the chips used to train, or improve, AI systems are <a href="https://www.siliconrepublic.com/future-human/chip-war-semiconductors-supply-tech-geopolitics-chris-miller">produced by just one company</a>.</p>
<p>That company is the <a href="https://www.tsmc.com/english">Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC)</a>. Taiwan’s dominance in the chip manufacturing industry is notable because the island is also the focus for tensions between China and the US. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-microchip-industry-would-implode-if-china-invaded-taiwan-and-it-would-affect-everyone-206335">The microchip industry would implode if China invaded Taiwan, and it would affect everyone</a>
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<p>Taiwan has, for the most part, <a href="https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/content_3.php#:%7E:text=The%20ROC%20government%20relocated%20to,rule%20of%20a%20different%20government.">been independent since the middle of the 20th century</a>. However, Beijing believes it should be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-calls-taiwan-president-frontrunner-destroyer-peace-2023-12-31/">reunited with the rest of China</a> and US legislation requires Washington to <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479#:%7E:text=Declares%20that%20in%20furtherance%20of,defense%20capacity%20as%20determined%20by">help defend Taiwan if it is invaded</a>. What would happen to the chip industry under such a scenario is unclear, but it is obviously a focus for global concern.</p>
<p>The disruption of supply chains in chip manufacturing have the potential to bring entire industries to a halt. Access to the raw materials, such as rare earth metals, used in computer chips has also proven to be an important bottleneck. For example, China <a href="https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2024/technology/">controls 60% of the production of gallium metal</a> and 80% of the global production of germanium. These are both critical raw products used in chip manufacturing.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Sam Altman" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">OpenAI CEO Sam Altman has called for a US$5 trillion to $7 trillion investment in chips to support the growth in AI.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/openai-ceo-sam-altman-attends-artificial-2412159621">Photosince / Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>And there are other, lesser known bottlenecks. A process called <a href="https://research.ibm.com/blog/what-is-euv-lithography">extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography</a> is vital for the ability to continue making computer chips smaller and smaller – and therefore more powerful. <a href="https://www.asml.com/en">A single company in the Netherlands, ASML</a>, is the only manufacturer of EUV systems for chip production.</p>
<p>However, chip factories are increasingly being built outside Asia again – something that has the potential to reduce over-reliance on a few supply chains. Plants in the US are being subsidised to the tune of <a href="https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2024/technology/">US$43 billion and in Europe, US$53 billion</a>. </p>
<p>For example, the Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturer TSMC is planning to build a multibillion dollar facility in Arizona. When it opens, that factory <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-microchip-industry-would-implode-if-china-invaded-taiwan-and-it-would-affect-everyone-206335">will not be producing the most advanced chips</a> that it’s possible to currently make, many of which are still produced by Taiwan.</p>
<p>Moving chip production outside Taiwan could reduce the risk to global supplies in the event that manufacturing were somehow disrupted. But this process could take years to have a meaningful impact. It’s perhaps not surprising that, for the first time, this year’s Munich Security Conference <a href="https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2024/technology/">created a chapter devoted to technology</a> as a global security issue, with discussion of the role of computer chips. </p>
<h2>Wider issues</h2>
<p>Of course, the demand for chips to fuel AI’s growth is not the only way that artificial intelligence will make major impact on geopolitics and global security. The growth of disinformation and misinformation online has transformed politics in recent years by inflating prejudices on both sides of debates. </p>
<p>We have seen it <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26675075">during the Brexit campaign</a>, during <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20563051231177943">US presidential elections</a> and, more recently, during the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-gaza-misinformation-fact-check-e58f9ab8696309305c3ea2bfb269258e">conflict in Gaza</a>. AI could be the ultimate amplifier of disinformation. Take, for example, deepfakes – AI-manipulated videos, audio or images of public figures. These could easily fool people into thinking a major <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/feb/26/ai-deepfakes-disinformation-election">political candidate had said something they didn’t</a>.</p>
<p>As a sign of this technology’s growing importance, at the 2024 Munich Security Conference, 20 of the world’s largest tech companies <a href="https://news.microsoft.com/2024/02/16/technology-industry-to-combat-deceptive-use-of-ai-in-2024-elections/">launched something called the “Tech Accord”</a>. In it, they pledged to cooperate to create tools to spot, label and debunk deepfakes. </p>
<p>But should such important issues be left to tech companies to police? Mechanisms such as the EU’s Digital Service Act, the UK’s Online Safety Bill as well as frameworks to regulate AI itself should help. But it remains to be seen what impact they can have on the issue.</p>
<p>The issues raised by the chip industry and the growing demand driven by AI’s growth are just one way that AI is driving change on the global stage. But it remains a vitally important one. National leaders and authorities must not underestimate the influence of AI. Its potential to redefine geopolitics and global security could exceed our ability to both predict and plan for the changes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224438/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alina Vaduva is affiliated with the Labour Party, as a member and elected councillor in Dartford, Kent. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kirk Chang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The effects of AI’s growth on global security could be difficult to predict.Kirk Chang, Professor of Management and Technology, University of East LondonAlina Vaduva, Director of the Business Advice Centre for Post Graduate Students at UEL, Ambassador of the Centre for Innovation, Management and Enterprise, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2200142024-03-01T13:32:30Z2024-03-01T13:32:30ZIs the United States overestimating China’s power?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577660/original/file-20240223-28-5lgbn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C229%2C4144%2C2586&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Made it, Mao! Top of the World?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/illustration/dominate-the-world-royalty-free-illustration/1456554749?phrase=china+power&adppopup=true">DigitalVision Vectors via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Which country is the greatest threat to the United States? The answer, according to a large proportion of Americans, is clear: China. </p>
<p>Half of all Americans responding to a <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/07/27/americans-name-china-as-the-country-posing-the-greatest-threat-to-the-us/">mid-2023 survey</a> from the Pew Research Center cited China as the biggest risk to the U.S., with Russia trailing in second with 17%. Other surveys, such as from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, <a href="https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/americans-feel-more-threat-china-now-past-three-decades">show similar findings</a>.</p>
<p>Senior figures in recent U.S. administrations appear to agree with this assessment. In 2020, John Ratcliffe, director of national intelligence under President Donald Trump, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-is-national-security-threat-no-1-11607019599">wrote that</a> Beijing “intends to dominate the U.S. and the rest of the planet economically, militarily and technologically.”</p>
<p>The White House’s current National Defense Strategy is not so alarmist, <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF">referring to China</a> as the U.S.’s “pacing challenge” – a reference that, <a href="https://www.c-span.org/video/?c5038077/pacing-challenge">in the words</a> of Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, apparently means China has “the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the power to do so.” </p>
<p>As someone who has <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/about/staff/dan-murphy">followed China</a> for over a quarter century, I believe that many observers have overestimated the country’s apparent power. Recent <a href="https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/new-book-details-chinas-economic-rise-and-now-its-fall">challenges to China’s economy</a> have led some people to reevaluate just how powerful China is. But hurdles to the growth of Chinese power extend far beyond the economic sector – and failing to acknowledge this reality may distort how policymakers and the public view the shift of geopolitical gravity in what was once called “<a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/10/27/the-chinese-century-is-well-under-way">the Chinese century</a>.”</p>
<p>In overestimating China’s comprehensive power, the U.S. risks misallocating resources and attention, directing them toward a threat that is not as imminent as one might otherwise assume.</p>
<p>Let me be clear: I’m not suggesting that China is weak or about to collapse. Nor am I making an argument about China’s intentions. But rather, it is time to right-size the American understanding of the country’s comprehensive power. This process includes acknowledging both China’s tremendous accomplishments and its significant challenges. Doing so is, I believe, mission critical as the United States and China seek to put a floor underneath a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/15/opinion/balloon-china-taiwan-biden.html">badly damaged bilateral relationship</a>.</p>
<h2>Headline numbers</h2>
<p>Why have so many people misjudged China’s power? </p>
<p>One key reason for this misconception is that from a distance, China does indeed appear to be an unstoppable juggernaut. The high-level <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/us-china-relations-interview-graham-allison">numbers bedazzle observers</a>: Beijing commands the world’s <a href="https://chinapower.csis.org/tracker/china-gdp/#:%7E:text=China%27s%20nominal%20GDP%20is%20the,States%20by%20a%20considerable%20margin.">largest or second-largest</a> economy depending on the type of measurement; it has a rapidly growing <a href="https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/the-military-balance/2024/editors-introduction/">military budget</a> and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeltnietzel/2021/08/07/us-universities-fall-behind-china-in-production-of-stem-phds/?sh=5d2ae6084606">sky-high numbers</a> of graduates in engineering and math; and oversees huge infrastructure projects – laying down nearly 20,000 miles of <a href="http://eu.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/zywj/CSTNENG/202209/P020220915789898685371.pdf">high-speed rail tracks</a> in less than a dozen years and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-20/beijing-replaces-a-huge-highway-overpass-in-only-43-hours">building bridges at record pace</a>. </p>
<p>But these eye-catching metrics don’t tell a complete story. Look under the hood and you’ll see that China faces a raft of intractable difficulties.</p>
<p>The Chinese economy, which until recently was thought of as unstoppable, is beginning to falter due to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/15/economy/deflation-explainer-us-china-economy/index.html">deflation</a>, a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-17/china-s-debt-to-gdp-ratio-rises-to-fresh-record-of-286-1">growing debt-to-gross domestic product ratio</a> and the impact of a <a href="https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/3253325/restructuring-specialists-boost-hong-kong-staff-china-property-crisis-stokes-demand">real estate crisis</a>. </p>
<h2>China’s other challenges</h2>
<p>And it isn’t only China’s economy that has been overestimated.</p>
<p>While Beijing has put in considerable effort building its soft power and sending its leadership around the world, China enjoys <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/07/27/chinas-approach-to-foreign-policy-gets-largely-negative-reviews-in-24-country-survey/">fewer friends</a> than one might expect, even with its willing trade partners. North Korea, Pakistan, Cambodia and Russia may count China as an important ally, but these relationships are not, I would argue, nearly as strong as those enjoyed by the United States globally. Even in the Asia-Pacific region there is a strong argument to say Washington enjoys greater sway, considering the especially close ties with <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3498451/japan-south-korea-us-strengthen-trilateral-cooperation/">allies Japan, South Korea</a> <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-australia-relationship">and Australia</a>. </p>
<p>Even though Chinese citizens report <a href="https://ash.harvard.edu/news/ash-center-researchers-release-landmark-chinese-public-opinion-study">broad support</a> for the Communist Party, Beijing’s <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/how-beijing-accidentally-ended-the-zero-covid-policy/">capricious COVID-19 policies</a> paired with an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/04/chinas-xi-jinping-unwilling-to-accept-western-covid-vaccines-says-us-intelligence-chief">unwillingness to use foreign-made vaccines</a> have dented perceptions of government effectiveness. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A seated man sits at. desk while another man is seen on a TV screen." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">President Joe Biden participates in a virtual meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-participates-in-a-virtual-meeting-with-news-photo/1353512956?adppopup=true">Alex Wong/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Further, China’s population is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/16/business/china-birth-rate.html">aging and unbalanced</a>. In 2016, the country of 1.4 billion saw about 18 million births; in 2023, that number dropped to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/16/business/china-birth-rate-2023.html">about 9 million</a>. This alarming fall is not only in line with trends toward a shrinking working-age population, but also perhaps <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/02/28/behind-china-collapse-birth-marriage-rates/">indicative of pessimism</a> among Chinese citizens about the country’s future.</p>
<p>And at times, the actions of the Chinese government read like an implicit admission that the domestic situation is not all that rosy. For example, I take it as a sign of concern over systemic risk that China detained a million or more people, as has happened with the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights">Muslim minority in Xinjiang province</a>. Similarly, China’s policing of its internet suggests <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/study-internet-censorship-reveals-deepest-fears-chinas-government">concerns over</a> collective action by its citizens. </p>
<p>The sweeping anti-corruption campaign Beijing has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/health-china-business-covid-economy-6618e65ef6148e0c75fce4dc2a28011f#">embarked on</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/sweeping-chinese-military-purge-exposes-weakness-could-widen-2023-12-30/">purges of the country’s military</a> and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/17/business/bao-fan-china-banker.html">disappearance</a> of leading business figures all hint at a government seeking to manage significant risk. </p>
<p>I hear many stories from contacts in China about people with money or influence hedging their bets by establishing a foothold outside the country. This aligns with research that has shown that <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/programs/growthpolicy/meg-rithmire-china-global-economy">in recent years</a>, on average as much money leaves China via “irregular means” as for foreign direct investment. </p>
<h2>A three-dimensional view</h2>
<p>The perception of China’s inexorable rise is cultivated by the governing Communist Party, which obsessively seeks to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/media-censorship-china">manufacture and control narratives</a> in state media and beyond that show it as all-knowing, farsighted and strategic. And perhaps this argument finds a receptive audience in segments of the United States concerned about its own decline.</p>
<p>It would help explain why a recent <a href="https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/americans-feel-more-threat-china-now-past-three-decades">Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey</a> found that about a third of American respondents see the Chinese and American economies as equal and another third see the Chinese economy as stronger. In reality, per capita GDP in the United States is <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CN-US">six times that of China</a>. </p>
<p>Of course, there is plenty of danger in predicting China’s collapse. Undoubtedly, the country has seen huge accomplishments since the People’s Republic of China’s founding in 1949: Hundreds of millions of people <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/01/17/509521619/whos-lifting-chinese-people-out-of-poverty">brought out of poverty</a>, extraordinary economic development and <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN">impressive GDP growth</a> over several decades, and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/09/21/china-global-influence-takeaways/">growing diplomatic clout</a>. These successes are especially noteworthy given that the People’s Republic of China is less than 75 years old and was in utter turmoil during the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion">disastrous Cultural Revolution</a> from 1966 to 1976, when intellectuals were sent to the countryside, schools stopped functioning and chaos reigned. In many cases, China’s successes merit emulation and include important lessons for developing and developed countries alike.</p>
<p>China may well be the “pacing challenge” that many in the U.S. believe. But it also faces significant internal challenges that often go under-recognized in evaluating the country’s comprehensive power.</p>
<p>And as the United States and China <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/biden-pushes-for-stable-u-s-relationship-with-china-during-summit-with-xi">seek to steady</a> a rocky relationship, it is imperative that the American public and Washington policymakers see China as fully three-dimensional – not some flat caricature that fits the needs of the moment. Otherwise, there is a risk of fanning the flames of xenophobia and neglecting opportunities for partnership that would benefit the United States.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220014/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dan Murphy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most Americans see China as the biggest threat to the US. But away from headline economic figures, China has a slew of challenges.Dan Murphy, Executive Director of the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, Harvard Kennedy SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2235132024-02-21T17:28:02Z2024-02-21T17:28:02ZThe 100-hour war between El Salvador and Honduras is famous for starting with a football match – the truth is more complicated<p>A recent football match in Hong Kong has flared geopolitical tensions. A sell-out crowd was left disappointed when Inter Miami’s Argentinian superstar, Lionel Messi, did not come onto the field. Their disappointment soon turned to anger as, just days later, Messi played in another game in Japan.</p>
<p>Chinese state media, Hong Kong politicians and frustrated fans interpreted the act as a sign of disrespect, suggesting that there were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2024/feb/08/lionel-messi-injury-return-japan-anger-china-benching-unfit">political reasons</a> for Messi’s absence. Two Argentina friendlies that were scheduled to take place in China in March <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/09/sport/china-cancels-argentina-match-messi-backlash-intl-hnk/index.html">have been cancelled</a>. Some Hong Kong officials have demanded an “explanation and apology” from the player, while fans <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/08/china/lionel-messi-china-backlash-hong-kong-japan-miami-intl-hnk/index.html">claimed</a> that Messi should no longer be welcome in China.</p>
<p>Football has flared up tensions before, with lasting political consequences. In 1990, a game between Zagreb’s Dinamo team and Belgrade’s Red Star <a href="https://www.croatiaweek.com/33-years-ago-today-the-most-famous-derby-never-played/">erupted into violence</a> between fans and the police. The violence is believed by some to have sparked the ensuing Croatian war of independence (1991–95). </p>
<p>But one case in particular holds the reputation for a war that was started over a series of football matches. </p>
<p>In 1969, El Salvador and neighbouring Honduras played each other three times in the qualifying stages of the 1970 Fifa World Cup. The two matches that took place in Tegucigalpa (June 8) and San Salvador (June 15) were marred by violence between fans. </p>
<p>On the same day as the third match, in Mexico City on June 29, the Salvadoran government cut diplomatic ties with Honduras. Military action began two weeks later with aerial bombardment and a ground invasion, before coming to an end after a ceasefire was negotiated four days later. For its brevity, the conflict is known as the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27868774">100-hour war</a>.</p>
<p>Of course, it would be silly to look for the causes of war in an ugly tackle, or in questionable decisions by referees. More than silly, to reduce the causes of war to a football match is disrespectful to the memories of the thousands of civilians displaced and killed in the conflict. </p>
<p>For that reason, as pivotal as these matches might have been for that war, it is essential to understand the broader context in which such an escalation of conflict becomes possible.</p>
<h2>The war of the dispossessed</h2>
<p>El Salvador is a fraction of the size of Honduras. But, despite the difference in area, El Salvador has a much larger population. At the start of the 20th century, Salvadoran farmers began migrating to Honduras in large numbers, primarily because of the greater availability of land across the border.</p>
<p>By the 1960s, the issue of land ownership had fuelled social tension in Honduras against the large population of Salvadoran migrants. The National Federation of Farmers and Livestock Farmers of Honduras was created to promote a land reform aimed at <a href="https://html.rincondelvago.com/la-guerra-no-fue-de-futbol_eddy-jimenez-perez.html">expelling Salvadoran peasants</a> from Honduran land. </p>
<p>This allowed large property owners, including foreign companies like the US-based United Fruit Company, to increase their ownership share of arable land. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map of Central America." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Honduras is roughly five times as large as El Salvador.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/central-america-map-150994196">Rainer Lesniewski/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>After a coup in 1963, the then Honduran president, General Oswaldo López Arellano, pursued the interests of these agrarian elites through the suppression of political opposition and systematic institutionalised violence. </p>
<p>Arellano’s brutal repression of peasant movements, with a specific nationalist sentiment mobilised against Salvadorans, <a href="https://catalogosiidca.csuca.org/Record/UCR.000022943/Description">caused the displacement</a> of thousands of rural workers in the years before those football matches. This is why <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/87/3/889/95948?redirectedFrom=fulltext">research</a> on the topic usually refers to the conflict as the “war of the dispossessed”. </p>
<h2>Escalating conflict</h2>
<p>The level of violence against Salvadorans led the government in San Salvador to formally accuse Honduras of genocide. The <a href="https://www.diariocolatino.com/una-guerra-breve-y-amarga/">communication</a> sent by the Salvadoran chancellor to inform Tegucigalpa of the severed diplomatic ties in 1969 clearly frames the conflict in these broader terms.</p>
<p>“In this republic [Honduras] there is still … homicide, humiliation and violation of women, dispossession, persecution, and mass expulsion that have targeted thousands of Salvadorans due simply to their nationality, in events that have no precedents in Central America, nor in America as a whole.”</p>
<p>The football matches simply added a mobilising element that contributed to escalating an already existing conflict. The number of displaced Salvadoran peasants after the conflict reached hundreds of thousands. After the ceasefire, El Salvador had to deal with this large population of refugees. </p>
<p>The conflict also increased the Salvadoran nationalistic sentiment and the political role of the armed forces, setting the stage for the political disputes in the 1970s that would culminate in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/El-Salvador/Civil-war">Salvadoran civil war</a> in 1979.</p>
<p>Many of the Salvadoran refugees already had experience of political organisation from the land disputes in Honduras and ended up joining the <a href="https://prism.librarymanagementcloud.co.uk/port/items/686599?query=el+salvador+civil+war&resultsUri=items%3Fquery%3Del%2Bsalvador%2Bcivil%2Bwar">Farabundo Martí Popular Forces of Liberation</a>. This was a faction of the Salvadoran Communist Party that later became a left-wing military organisation with support from Cuba and the Soviet Union.</p>
<h2>Messi will not start a war in China</h2>
<p>The idea that football started a war is misguided. The violence in those matches in 1969 would not have escalated without the broader sociopolitical context of violent dispossession. Lacking a similar context, the declarations of frustrated fans who expected to see Messi in Hong Kong will not escalate. </p>
<p>This is not to say that football lacks political relevance. The inflamed reaction by fans and Chinese authorities shows the effect that a political statement (or one perceived as such) by a celebrity can have on global politics. Messi himself recently published a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/sports/soccer/messi-sets-record-straight-over-hong-kong-absence-2024-02-19/">statement</a> on Weibo (China’s most popular microblogging site) denying any political motivation for not playing in Hong Kong. </p>
<p>Messi has avoided getting involved with politics, especially during Argentina’s heated general election in 2023. But others have done the opposite. Perhaps former Chelsea striker Didier Drogba <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/52072592">calling</a> for a ceasefire in Ivory Coast in 2007 can serve as an inspiring example of how footballers can use their popularity to influence global politics and even stop wars.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223513/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pedro Dutra Salgado does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Messi will not start a war in China, but this is not to say that football lacks political relevance.Pedro Dutra Salgado, Lecturer in International Relations, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2207862024-01-31T13:35:44Z2024-01-31T13:35:44ZThis course examines how conflicts arise over borders<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571637/original/file-20240126-19-g1hl2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C1718%2C1144&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Border conflicts, spanning different time periods and places, are behind many of the big international disputes today</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/december-2023-israel-an-israeli-tank-driving-along-the-news-photo/1878801578?adppopup=true">picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Text saying: Uncommon Courses, from The Conversation" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/uncommon-courses-130908">Uncommon Courses</a> is an occasional series from The Conversation U.S. highlighting unconventional approaches to teaching.</em> </p>
<h2>Title of course:</h2>
<p>Borders and Battles: The Historical Roots of Geopolitical Conflict</p>
<h2>What prompted the idea for the course?</h2>
<p>I got the idea for the course when I noticed that all of the other history courses I taught – on India, the Middle East and the British Empire – featured major border conflicts. These conflicts arose from a variety of issues, whether the borders were historically <a href="https://www.history.ox.ac.uk/changing-times-and-irish-border">ill-conceived</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/kashmir-the-roads-ahead/">politically disputed</a> or cut across <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/explainer/report-dna-explainer-what-is-the-water-dispute-between-india-and-bangladesh-know-purpose-of-kushiyara-river-pact-2983049">contested resources</a>.</p>
<p>As all of these <a href="https://www.thequint.com/news/world/britain-7-present-day-conflicts-world-communalism-israel-palestine-rohingyas-cyprus-shashi-tharoor-era-of-darkness">borders were drawn by the British</a> in the closing days of the empire, they reflect a critical aspect of decolonization. So I decided to abandon the conventional geographical focus of the history course and instead design a course that examines the theme of embattled borders, across different time periods and places. </p>
<h2>What does the course explore?</h2>
<p>The course encourages students to look at how borders impact people’s everyday lives.</p>
<p>For instance, we discuss how, along the U.S. southern border, the U.S. uses <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/c/view?docid=721845">death as a deterrent</a> to migrant border crossing. In the mid-1990s, the U.S. Border Patrol began <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/homesec/RL33659.pdf">systematically funneling migrants away from urban areas</a> and into the Sonoran Desert in southern Arizona. There, many <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-06-770.pdf">succumb to the harsh elements</a>, including <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/18/magazine/border-crossing.html#:%7E:text=According%20to%20the%20Border%20Patrol,of%20the%20last%2022%20years.">temperatures</a> that routinely hit 120 degrees Fahrenheit (49 degrees Celsius), a scarcity of water, and predatory wildlife. </p>
<p>In Israel-Palestine, we examine how the borders between Israel and the occupied territories evolved, why they are contested or enforced and whether they should be redrawn.</p>
<p>The course also explores the <a href="https://exhibits.stanford.edu/1947-partition/about/1947-partition-of-india-pakistan">1947 Partition of India</a>, which led to the creation of Pakistan. We talk about the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan">many wars</a> fought between these two nuclear-armed nations, as well as the <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/29/the-great-divide-books-dalrymple">interpersonal violence and animosity</a> fueled by Partition. </p>
<p>Finally, students investigate the <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9105/#:%7E:text=The%20Northern%20Ireland%20border%20came,Government%20of%20Ireland%20Act%201920.">1921 separation of Northern Ireland from Ireland</a> and how it led to a cycle of violence. </p>
<p>We discuss both <a href="https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/ira-irish-republican-army-and-changing-tactics-terrorism">IRA terrorism</a> against British civilians and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-foyle-west-47433319">atrocities committed by the British army</a> in Northern Ireland.</p>
<p>For each border conflict, we pay close attention to the imperial and expansionist policies that fueled the formation of borders. Students consider how borders represent historical and imperial legacies. </p>
<h2>Why is this course relevant now?</h2>
<p>Borders and Battles was first offered during the height of the <a href="https://www.americanoversight.org/a-timeline-of-the-trump-administrations-family-separation-policy">Trump administration’s family separation policy</a>. This policy separated families trying to enter at the U.S. southern border. Parents were held in federal prisons or deported, while children were placed under the care of the Department of Health and Human Services.</p>
<p>I am now teaching the course against the backdrop of war in Israel-Palestine. Students come to understand how and why border disputes like these developed, how they were aggravated or resolved, and how they affect both individuals and wider society.</p>
<p>I find that students are eager to discuss these issues; they do not need to be sold on their relevance. Many students actually tell me how the course helped them make sense of contemporary conflicts.</p>
<h2>What’s a critical lesson from the course?</h2>
<p>The most critical takeaway from the course is the dehumanization of the “enemy,” each side by the other. It’s common to all border disputes, no matter where, or when, or why they occur. </p>
<p>This process often involves the politicization of religious, racial and class-based differences. Government officials cast those who defy borders as subhuman, and state policy consistently reflects this bias. Israel’s defense minister, for example, explained that it was necessary to cut off all supplies to Gaza because <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2023/10/358170/israel-defense-minister-calls-palestinians-human-animals-amid-israeli-aggression">Palestinians are “human animals</a>.”</p>
<h2>What materials does the course feature?</h2>
<p>The course material purposefully draws on a variety of formats.</p>
<p>We begin with a book, Jason De Leon’s “<a href="https://search.worldcat.org/title/1368216769">The Land of Open Graves: Living and Dying on the Migrant Trail</a>.” De Leon chronicles the journeys of migrants across the U.S. southern border.</p>
<p>We also play an interactive game, <a href="https://search.worldcat.org/title/1304814039">Defining a Nation: India on the Eve of Independence, 1945</a>. This game requires students to reenact the partition of the subcontinent. The outcome can be – and usually is – different than the actual historical outcome.</p>
<p>The course ends with a film, “<a href="https://search.worldcat.org/title/945634441">In the Name of the Father</a>,” which looks at the IRA bombing of army pubs in Guildford, England, and the wrongful conviction of the “Guildford Four.” </p>
<h2>What will the course prepare students to do?</h2>
<p>Many former students have stated that the course better enabled them to understand news broadcasts and keep up with current events.</p>
<p>The course also prepares students for international travel. Some students took the course before traveling to Israel or the Palestinian territories.</p>
<p>The course material has even inspired students to become involved in causes related to border disputes. As a direct result of knowledge gained from the course, a handful of students have joined organizations assisting refugees at the U.S. southern border.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220786/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nita Prasad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Religious, racial and class-based differences often get politicized.Nita Prasad, Professor of History, Quinnipiac UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2212542024-01-22T14:56:39Z2024-01-22T14:56:39ZA net-zero world will be more peaceful, it’s assumed – but first we have to get there<p>The final text of the latest UN climate summit COP28, now called the <a href="https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2023_L17_adv.pdf">UAE consensus</a>, called for countries to “transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade, so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science”.</p>
<p>Many felt that this “consensus” was more of a compromise, forced by <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-cop28-climate-agreement-is-a-step-backwards-on-fossil-fuels-219753">the fossil fuel industry</a> in the face of an ever more evident climate crisis. </p>
<p>Meteorologists have <a href="https://climate.copernicus.eu/copernicus-2023-hottest-year-record">confirmed</a> that 2023 was the hottest year on record and with the added influence of El Niño, the warm phase of a natural cycle in Earth’s climate, 2024 could be humanity’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/global-heating-may-breach-1-5-c-in-2024-heres-what-that-could-look-like-220877">first year</a> in which warming exceeds 1.5°C above the pre-industrial average – the target of the 2015 Paris agreement.</p>
<p>2024 is already proving volatile for other reasons. There are wars in Ukraine and Gaza, the latter threatening a wider escalation of conflict in the Middle East, with civil war in nearby Sudan and Ethiopia. In Asia, the election of a pro-independence president in Taiwan threatens to heighten tensions with mainland China. And then there is the prospect of a second Trump presidency in the US.</p>
<p>This is just the beginning of a year that will see more than half the world’s population <a href="https://theconversation.com/more-than-4-billion-people-are-eligible-to-vote-in-an-election-in-2024-is-this-democracys-biggest-test-220837">go to the polls</a> in one form or another. </p>
<p>In Europe, including the UK, climate action and net zero have become <a href="https://theconversation.com/rishi-sunak-is-introducing-the-polarised-climate-politics-of-the-us-canada-and-australia-to-the-uk-214897">election issues</a> with right-of-centre parties attempting to court voters by promising to renege on <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/cop28-climate-summit-dubai-unfccc-anti-green-backlash/">national climate commitments</a> . </p>
<p>Meanwhile, investment in green energy continues <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/renewables-2023">to accelerate</a> in those countries that can afford it. By 2030, <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-working-group-3/">scientists say</a> global emissions need to have fallen by 43%.</p>
<p>In six years, will we look back at 2024 as a key inflection point when the world did start to phase out fossil fuels? Or will it be seen as yet another opportunity missed?</p>
<h2>A significant omission</h2>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/overcoming-the-energy-trilemma-secure-and-inclusive-transitions">recent study</a>, the International Energy Agency (IEA) identified the triple challenges of “energy security, climate change and rising geopolitical risks”.</p>
<p>It is unusual for the IEA, which began as an OECD institution to manage energy supply after the 1970s oil crisis, to highlight “geopolitics”. Although it has warned of a “disorderly transition” before, its <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2023">250-page report</a> on the world’s energy outlook in late 2023 only mentioned geopolitics four times. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A gas pipeline." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570620/original/file-20240122-29-28feej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570620/original/file-20240122-29-28feej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570620/original/file-20240122-29-28feej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570620/original/file-20240122-29-28feej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570620/original/file-20240122-29-28feej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570620/original/file-20240122-29-28feej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570620/original/file-20240122-29-28feej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sent oil and gas prices soaring.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/pipeline-photo-close-against-background-green-2139605517">Fotokaleinar/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This is a wider problem within energy research. A <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378023001474">recent analysis</a> revealed that most pathways to net zero emissions do not consider what influence international relations will play. Those that do, see it as a malign influence that reduces cooperation and increases the costs of technology. </p>
<p>In 2019, the IEA’s sister organisation, the International Renewable Energy Agency, published <a href="https://www.irena.org/publications/2019/Jan/A-New-World-The-Geopolitics-of-the-Energy-Transformation">a report</a> which argued that, in a low-carbon future, energy security would not be the challenge it is today because most countries will generate renewable power at home and be less reliant on exporter countries.</p>
<p>A world powered by renewable energy may not be as prone to international competition as ours. But the challenge is getting there from our fossil fuelled system, riven with insecurity and a tinderbox of geopolitical conflict.</p>
<p>Unless managed, the transformation of energy systems is unlikely to be just, orderly or equitable – and this will slow the rate of decarbonisation even as science indicates it must rapidly accelerate.</p>
<h2>Managing the mess</h2>
<p>It’s useful to think about the transformation of an energy system in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/253444667_Seeing_in_Multiple_Horizons_Connecting_Futures_to_Strategy">three phases</a>. Phase one is the present system, phase three is where we want to end up. Phase two, the transition, is the hard bit.</p>
<p>In phase one, the world operates an energy system <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/fossil-fuels#:%7E:text=Fossil%20fuels%20in%20the%20energy%20and%20electricity%20mix&text=Around%20four%2Dfifth%20of%20global,share%20varies%20across%20the%20world.">dominated</a> by fossil fuels supplied by a relatively small number of exporter states that can manipulate fears over secure and affordable supplies in other countries. </p>
<p>In phase three, a net-zero world powered by low-carbon energy, fossil fuels play a marginal role if any and so will not influence international relations to the same extent. </p>
<p>The present energy crisis, with its record heating and electricity bills, is a crisis borne of a system powered by coal, oil and gas. For some, such as the EU, it is a clarion call to accelerate the transition and improve energy efficiency to reduce reliance on these fuels. For others, such as the Gulf states, the answer lies in pumping more oil and gas.</p>
<p>The world is entering phase two, the messy stage in which the world endeavours to phase out fossil fuels while building an energy system powered by solar, wind and other renewable sources in a fair and orderly way – but at a sufficient pace to rapidly decarbonise society. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A concept image of solar panels with two wind turbines and a pylon looming over them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570619/original/file-20240122-15-u8ll36.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570619/original/file-20240122-15-u8ll36.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570619/original/file-20240122-15-u8ll36.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570619/original/file-20240122-15-u8ll36.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570619/original/file-20240122-15-u8ll36.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570619/original/file-20240122-15-u8ll36.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570619/original/file-20240122-15-u8ll36.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Energy grids must change and expand to accommodate new renewable sources.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/solar-panels-wind-turbines-electricity-pylon-397235554">Jaroslava V/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This low-carbon transition is also a source of competition. Access to critical materials for making electric vehicles and other green technologies, and control of these supply chains, is becoming a key issue, with a form of <a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/10/02/green-protectionism-comes-with-big-risks">“green protectionsim”</a> emerging in some countries. For many emerging economies, access to energy of any kind is the most pressing challenge.</p>
<p>While all of this is happening, the world must contend with the effects of climate change accelerating – bigger floods, fires and droughts. </p>
<p>Will self-interest win out, frustrating progress towards a net-zero future? Or will we strengthen and make accountable multilateral institutions, recognising that there are no winners in a rapidly warming world?</p>
<p>The future is likely to be <a href="https://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-2024/sessions/is-geopolitical-coopetition-possible/">somewhere in the middle</a>. For now, events in 2024 will go a long way to determine where we find ourselves in 2030.</p>
<hr>
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<img alt="Imagine weekly climate newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Bradshaw receives funding from the UK Energy System Research Programme and EPSRC in relation to his role as Co-Director for the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC). He also advises the government, thinktanks and companies on energy matters. </span></em></p>Modellers of the energy transition have tended to neglect fractious international relations in their calculations.Michael Bradshaw, Professor of Global Energy, Warwick Business School, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2179782023-11-17T13:59:33Z2023-11-17T13:59:33ZDon’t be fooled by Biden and Xi talks − China and the US are enduring rivals rather than engaged partners<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560070/original/file-20231116-24-lu1i3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C7187%2C4474&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rolling out the red carpet for presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXAPECBidenXI/ad7b12a415724dab8637d4c538ea63af/photo?Query=Xi%20biden&mediaType=photo,video,graphic,audio&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=476&currentItemNo=1">Doug Mills/The New York Times via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>There were <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVnxZGcTXnQ">smiles for the camera, handshakes</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/16/china-praises-warm-xi-biden-meeting-in-change-of-rhetoric">warm words</a> and the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/15/politics/biden-xi-meeting/index.html">unveiling of a couple of agreements</a>.</p>
<p>But beyond the optics of the first meeting in over a year between the leaders of the world’s two biggest economies, not an awful lot had changed: There was nothing to suggest a “reset” in U.S. and China relations that in recent years have been <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/the-china-threat">rooted in suspicion</a> <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA290-3.html">and competition</a>.</p>
<p>President Joe Biden hinted as much just hours after the face-to-face talks, confirming that he still <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-calls-xi-dictator-after-carefully-planned-summit-2023-11-16/">considered his Chinese counterpart</a>, Xi Jinping, a “dictator.” Beijing hit back, with foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning telling reporters Biden’s remark was “extremely wrong and irresponsible political manipulation.”</p>
<p>As a scholar of U.S.-China relations, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-delusions-detente-rivals">I believe the relationship</a> between the two countries can be best described as an “enduring rivalry” – a <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2600766">term used by political scientists</a> to denote two powers that have singled each other out for intense security competition. Examples from history include <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/1/timeline-india-pakistan-relations">India and Pakistan</a>, <a href="https://www.worldhistory.org/article/1520/the-hundred-years-war-consequences--effects/">France and England</a>, and the West and the Soviet Union. Over the past two centuries, such rivals have accounted for only 1% of the world’s international relationships but <a href="https://scholarworks.iu.edu/dspace/handle/2022/26044">80% of its wars</a>. History suggest these rivalries <a href="https://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/0472111272-08.pdf">last around 40 years</a> and end only when one side loses the ability to compete – or when the two sides ally against a common enemy. Neither scenario looks likely any time soon in regards to China and the U.S.</p>
<h2>How enduring rivalries end</h2>
<p>China “is a communist country … based on a form of government totally different than ours,” <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2023/nov/16/china-responds-to-biden-calling-xi-jinping-a-dictator-video">Biden said after his meeting</a> with Xi.</p>
<p>That comment gets to the heart of why diplomacy alone cannot reset the U.S.-China relationship. Washington and Beijing are not rivals due to any misunderstanding that can be sorted out through talks alone. Rather, they are rivals because of the opposite reason: They understand each other only too well and have come to the conclusion that their respective world outlooks cannot be reconciled.</p>
<p>The same is true for many of the issues that divide the two countries – they are framed as binary win-lose scenarios. Taiwan can be governed from Taipei or Beijing, but not both. Similarly, the East China and South China seas can be international waters or Chinese territory; Russia can be crippled or supported.</p>
<p>For the United States, its Asian alliances are a force for stability; for China, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3231201/china-watching-closely-us-japan-south-korea-aim-de-facto-asian-nato">they’re hostile encirclement</a>. And both countries are right in their respective assessments.</p>
<p>Diplomacy alone is insufficient to resolve a rivalry. At best, it can help manage it. </p>
<h2>When the US calls, who picks up?</h2>
<p>Part of this management of the U.S-China rivalry involves finding areas of agreement that can be committed to. </p>
<p>And on Nov. 15, Biden and Xi announced deals over <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/15/business/economy/biden-xi-fentanyl.html">curbing China’s production of the deadly drug fentanyl</a> and the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/us-china-military-relations-339980a0d494bcde92905411838808a4">restoring of high-level, military-to-military dialogue</a> between the two countries.</p>
<p>But the fentanyl announcement is <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/01/asia/china-us-fentanyl-trump-intl/index.html">very similar to the one</a> Xi gave to then-President Donald Trump in 2019. The U.S. administration <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-fentanyl/trump-accuses-chinas-xi-of-failing-to-halt-fentanyl-exports-to-u-s-idUSKCN1US1WI/">later accused China</a> of reneging on the agreement.</p>
<p>Similarly, committing to restarting high-level dialogue is one thing; following up on it is another. History is dotted with occasions when having an open line between Beijing and Washington hasn’t meant a whole lot in times of crisis. In 2001, when a U.S. surveillance aircraft collided with a Chinese jet over Hainan Island, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/09/01/us-china-military-hotline-508140">Beijing didn’t pick up the phone</a>. Likewise, during the Tiananmen Square massacre, then-President George H.W. Bush urgently tried to call his counterpart Deng Xiaoping but was unable to get through.</p>
<p>Moreover, focusing on what was agreed to in talks also highlights what wasn’t – and is unlikely to ever be – agreed to without a substantial shift in power that forces one side to concede to the other. </p>
<p>For example, China wants the U.S. to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-reports-21-chinese-air-force-planes-entered-its-air-defence-zone-2023-03-02/">stop selling arms to Taiwan</a>. But Washington has no intention of doing this, as it knows that this will make the disputed island more vulnerable to Beijing. Washington would like China to end its military displays of strength over the Taiwan Strait; Beijing knows doing so risks seeing Taiwan drift toward independence.</p>
<p>American policymakers have long said what they want is <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/what-america-wants-china-hass">China to “change</a>” – by which it means to liberalize its system of governance. But the Chinese Communist Party knows that doing so means self-liquidation – every communist regime that has allowed space for alternative political parties has unraveled. Which is why American attempts to engage China are often met with suspicion in China. As former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin commented, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-delusions-detente-rivals">engagement and containment policies have the same aim</a>: to end China’s socialist system.</p>
<p>For similar reasons, Xi has shunned attempts by the U.S. to bring China further into the rules-based international order. The Chinese leader saw what happened when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev <a href="https://time.com/5512665/mikhail-gorbachev-glasnost-perestroika/">tried to integrate the Soviet Union</a> into the Western order in the late 1980s – it only hastened the demise of the socialist entity.</p>
<p>Instead, Xi calls for a massive military buildup, the reassertion of Chinese Communist Party control and an economic policy <a href="https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis//2020/11/china-economic-technological-self-reliance">based on self-reliance</a>.</p>
<h2>Actions speak louder …</h2>
<p>The encouraging words and limited agreements hammered out in the latest meeting between Xi and Biden should also not distract from the actions that continue to push the U.S. and China further apart.</p>
<p>China’s show of force in the Taiwan Strait has been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/13/china-biden-xi-meeting-apec-taiwan/">sustained for three years now</a> and shows no sign of abating. Meanwhile, Beijing’s navy continues to <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-is-the-south-china-sea-such-a-hotly-contested-region-143435">harass other nations in the South China Sea</a>.</p>
<p>Similarly, Biden has continued the U.S. path toward military alliances aimed at countering China’s threat. It recently entered a <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3498451/japan-south-korea-us-strengthen-trilateral-cooperation/">trilateral agreement between the U.S., Japan and South Korea</a>. And that came two years after the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/AUKUS/">establishment of AUKUS</a>, a security partnership between the the U.S., Australia and the U.K. that has similar aims.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the U.S. administration will continue to tighten the screws on China’s economy through <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/president-biden-has-banned-some-us-investment-china-heres-what-know">investment restrictions</a>. Biden is well aware that easy flowing money from Wall Street is helping China weather choppier economic waters of late and is keen to turn off the tap.</p>
<h2>The point of diplomacy</h2>
<p>This isn’t to say that diplomacy and face-to-face talks are pointless. They do, in fact, serve a number of interests.</p>
<p>For both men involved, there is a domestic upside. For Biden, playing nice with China projects the image of a statesman – especially at a time when, due to U.S. positions on Ukraine and the Middle East, he is facing <a href="https://jacobin.com/2021/04/joe-biden-keir-starmer-warmonger-internationalism-foreign-policy">accusations from the political left of being a “warmonger</a>.” And encouraging Beijing to tread softly during the U.S. election year may blunt a potential line of attack from Republicans that the administration’s China policy is not working.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Xi is able to showcase his own diplomatic skills and present China as an alternative superpower to the U.S. and to potentially <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-xi-draws-standing-ovation-from-u-s-business-leadersand-some-doubts-13fc3ad2">cleave the Western business community</a> – and perhaps even major European nations – from what he would see as the U.S. anti-China coalition.</p>
<p>Moreover, summits like the one in San Francisco signal that both the U.S. and China are jointly committed to at least keep talking, helping ensure that a rocky relationship doesn’t descend into anything more belligerent – even it that doesn’t make them any friendlier.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217978/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Beckley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s good to talk − just don’t expect it to result in a reset in relations between Beijing and Washington.Michael Beckley, Associate Professor of Political Science, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2169382023-11-08T16:19:26Z2023-11-08T16:19:26ZInternational reaction to Gaza siege has exposed the growing rift between the West and the Global South<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558336/original/file-20231108-21-w6vjh8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C74%2C4985%2C3248&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dark clouds over the United Nations in New York.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/demonstrator-waves-a-palestinian-flag-outside-of-united-news-photo/1715810273?adppopup=true">Adam Gray/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The lopsidedness was stark: 120 countries voted in favor of a <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1142847">resolution before the United Nations</a> on Oct. 26, 2023, calling for a “humanitarian truce” in the war in Gaza. A mere 14 countries voted against it. </p>
<p>But the numbers tell only half the story; equally significant <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/27/united-nations-votes-overwhelmingly-in-favour-of-humanitarian-truce-in-gaza">was the way the votes fell</a>. Those voting against the resolution included the United States and four members of the European Union. Meanwhile, about 45 members abstained – including 15 members of the EU, plus the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Japan. </p>
<p>Seldom has the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231013-israel-gaza-bloodshed-divides-the-world-isolates-west">isolation of the West</a> been so apparent. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/profile/jorge-heine/">scholar who has written</a> on <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-global-south-is-on-the-rise-but-what-exactly-is-the-global-south-207959">the rise of the Global South</a> – countries mainly, but not exclusively, in the Southern Hemisphere that are sometimes described as “developing,” “less developed” or “underdeveloped” – what strikes me is the degree to which this <a href="https://www.bisa.ac.uk/articles/brandt-line-after-forty-years-more-north-south-relations-change-more-they-stay-same">major fault line between the political North and South</a> has risen again to the fore. It reflects long-in-the-making forces in world affairs.</p>
<p>While the leaders of countries <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/10/10/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-terrorist-attacks-in-israel-2/">like the U.S.</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/14/sunak-promises-israel-unqualified-support-in-face-of-evil-but-fails-to-mention-plight-of-gaza">the U.K.</a> <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/visiting-german-leader-says-nations-only-place-in-hard-times-is-alongside-israel/">and Germany</a> have been among the most strident supporters of Israel during the crisis, the same is not true for non-Western nations.</p>
<p>Key rising powers from the Global South have been among the most adamant nations outside the Arab world in their criticism of this unwavering Western support of Israel. </p>
<p>Indonesia and Turkey – both with large Muslim populations – have <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/11/what-driving-turkeys-erdogan-pro-hamas-fiery-israel-criticism">both been</a> <a href="https://setkab.go.id/en/indonesia-condemns-attacks-in-gaza/">heavily critical</a> of Israel’s bombing campaign in Gaza, a response to 1,400 Israelis being killed by Hamas militants on Oct. 7.</p>
<p>But they have been joined by the leaders of Brazil, South Africa and other Global South nations in taking a firm stand. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil went as far as to <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231027-brazil-slams-israels-war-on-gaza-as-genocide/">label the campaign in Gaza a “genocide</a>” – a comment <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/south-africa-recalls-ambassador-to-israel-and-accuses-country-of-genocide-in-gaza">echoed by South Africa’s government</a> when, on Nov. 6, 2023, it recalled its ambassador to Israel in protest. While the U.S. has used the word genocide in relation to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/12/politics/biden-iowa-genocide/index.html">Russia’s action in Ukraine</a>, the Biden administration has pointedly said the term <a href="https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-november-7-2023/">doesn’t apply to current events in Gaza</a>.</p>
<h2>The Global South’s coming of age</h2>
<p>The international reaction to the war in Gaza reflects a deeper, long-standing trend in world politics that has seen the fracturing of the established <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-does-rules-based-order-mean">U.S.-dominated, rules-based order</a>. The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/09/21/china-global-influence-takeaways/">growing influence of China</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-has-exposed-the-folly-and-unintended-consequences-of-armed-missionaries-197609">fallout of the war in Ukraine</a> – in which many Global South countries have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/23/why-global-south-nations-stay-neutral">remained neutral</a> – has upended international relations.</p>
<p>Many analysts point to an <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/05/usa-china-multipolar-bipolar-unipolar/">emerging multipolar world</a> in which members of the Global South have, as I have written, forged a new <a href="https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/2021/11/16/heine-publishes-el-no-alieamiento-activo-y-aerica-latina/">active nonaligment path</a>.</p>
<p>And 2023 has been the year that has seen the coming of age of this more assertive Global South. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="white blankets with red paint on them lie next to Palestinian flags ons a beach." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558391/original/file-20231108-19-hwjehb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558391/original/file-20231108-19-hwjehb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558391/original/file-20231108-19-hwjehb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558391/original/file-20231108-19-hwjehb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558391/original/file-20231108-19-hwjehb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558391/original/file-20231108-19-hwjehb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558391/original/file-20231108-19-hwjehb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Shrouds stained with red paint line a beach in Rio in protest of Israel’s bombing of Gaza.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-of-some-of-a-total-of-120-shrouds-stained-with-red-news-photo/1760941144?adppopup=true">Carl de Souza/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Some of this is structural. In August, Johannesburg hosted a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/brics-summit-2023-seeking-alternate-world-order">summit of the BRICS group</a> – a bloc that consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – during which 21 countries from across the Global South applied to join. Six were <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/brics-summit-south-africa-six-new-countries-join-alliance">invited to do so</a>: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – and they will formally join in January 2024. </p>
<p>This 11-strong BRICS+ group will <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/brics6-to-control-30-of-global-gdp-46-population-note/articleshow/103181021.cms">represent 46% of the world’s population</a> and 38% of the world’s gross domestic product.</p>
<p>In contrast, the Group of Seven leading economies, or G7, represents <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1372860/g7-country-share-world-population/">less than 10% of the world’s population</a> and <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1372791/g7-combined-gdp-share-world/">30% of the global economy</a>.</p>
<p>On Nov. 7, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with his G7 counterparts in an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/japan-us-g7-blinken-gaza-russia-834aa74998f4c1fa92f2d3326831345a">attempt to forge a consensus</a> on how to deal with the crisis in the Middle East. Speaking in Japan, he urged that the Western-dominated G7 speak with “one clear voice” on the Middle East crisis.</p>
<p>The question is, can the BRICS+ – and more generally the Global South – do likewise given that it includes an array of countries with very different political and economic systems? </p>
<h2>Latin America’s pushback</h2>
<p>The reaction to the Israel-Hamas violence suggests to me that the Global South is able to speak with, if not one voice, at least a chorus that is not discordant.</p>
<p>Historically, <a href="https://theafrican.co.za/world/africa-shares-long-history-of-solidarity-with-palestinian-people-616995a6-3eef-4121-abc9-5fbd46db450a/">many African</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/15/which-countries-have-criticised-israeli-attacks-on-gaza">and Asian nations</a> have tended to support the Palestinian cause – Indonesia <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/why-indonesia-wont-recognize-israel-at-least-for-now/">does not even recognize the state of Israel</a>.</p>
<p>But perhaps more surprising has been the strong <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/latin-america-ramps-up-condemnations-israels-attack-gaza-2023-11-02/">reaction in Latin America</a> to Israel’s actions in Gaza. </p>
<p>In short order, Bolivia <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/bolivia-severs-diplomatic-ties-with-israel-citing-crimes-against-humanity-2023-10-31/">broke diplomatic relations</a> with Israel, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/chile-recalls-israel-ambassador-talks-after-gaza-attacks-2023-11-01">and Chile</a> <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/colombia-recalls-ambassador-to-israel-over-massacre-of-gazans/">and Colombia</a> called their ambassadors from Jerusalem for consultations – an established diplomatic tool to indicate disapproval of a country’s conduct.</p>
<p>Brazil, in its capacity as then chair of the United Nations Security Council, <a href="https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/statement-by-the-permanent-representative-of-brazil-to-the-united-nations-on-the-draft-resolution-s-2023-773">introduced the resolution</a> supporting a cease-fire in Gaza. Mexico’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Alicia Buenrostro, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/latin-america-ramps-up-condemnations-israels-attack-gaza-2023-11-02">called for the “occupying power</a>” of Israel to cease its claim to the Palestinian territories.</p>
<h2>Western denialism</h2>
<p>The question is: If the Global South is speaking this way on the issue, is the West listening? The voting patterns of Western representatives at the U.N. suggest the answer is “no.”</p>
<p>In turn, this only adds to the general discontent across the developing world with the current structure of the U.N. Security Council and its <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2019/09/24/representation-problems-in-the-current-un-security-council">lack of representativeness</a>. </p>
<p>The fact that no country from Africa or Latin America is among the permanent members that enjoy veto power – compared with Western Europe, which is represented by both France and the U.K. – has long been a source of irritation in the Global South. So, too, is the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/02/israel-palestine-hamas-gaza-war-russia-ukraine-occupation-west-hypocrisy/">perceived “double standard</a>” being applied by the West to conflicts around the world. Whereas in Ukraine much is made of the humanitarian suffering being inflicted on the Ukrainian people, the same does not seem to apply to what is happening in Gaza, where Palestinian health authorities report more than <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/6/number-of-palestinians-killed-in-israeli-attacks-on-gaza-tops-10000">10,000 people have been killed</a> in less than a month, 40% of them children.</p>
<p>More generally, there appears to be a degree of denial in the West over the tectonic shift in world order toward a more assertive Global South. </p>
<p>Western commentators and <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/08/15/term-global-south-is-surging.-it-should-be-retired-pub-90376">analysts from think tanks</a> in London and Washington even contend that the very term “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7f2e0026-56be-4f3d-857c-2ae3a297daab">Global South” should not be used</a> – with much of the criticism against the term directed at its alleged imprecision, but also because it would contribute to greater international polarization.</p>
<p>Yet, the term was never meant to be geographical. Rather, it is a geopolitical and geohistorical one – and one that is coming into its own with great verve as the Global South provides an alternative voice to the West, first over the conflict in Ukraine and now over Gaza. And no amount of Western denialism will be able to block it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216938/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jorge Heine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>At the United Nations and elsewhere, the response by the US and Western Europe to events in Israel and Gaza have been out of step with that of governments in Africa, South America and Asia.Jorge Heine, Interim Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2169002023-11-08T04:49:33Z2023-11-08T04:49:33ZWho will write the rules for AI? How nations are racing to regulate artificial intelligence<p>Artificial intelligence (AI) is a label that can cover a huge range of activities related to machines undertaking tasks with or without human intervention. Our understanding of AI technologies is largely shaped by where we encounter them, from facial recognition tools and chatbots to photo editing software and self-driving cars.</p>
<p>If you think of AI you might think of tech companies, from existing giants such as Google, Meta, Alibaba and Baidu, to new players such as OpenAI, Anthropic and others. Less visible are the world’s governments, which are shaping the landscape of rules in which AI systems will operate.</p>
<p>Since 2016, tech-savvy regions and nations across Europe, Asia-Pacific and North America have been establishing <a href="https://unicri.it/topics/ai_robotics">regulations targeting AI technologies</a>. (Australia is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/nov/07/australia-ai-artificial-intelligence-regulations-back-of-pack">lagging behind</a>, still currently investigating the possibility of such rules.)</p>
<p>Currently, there are more than <a href="https://oecd.ai/en/dashboards/overview">1,600 AI policies and strategies</a> globally. The European Union, China, the United States and the United Kingdom have emerged as pivotal figures in shaping the development and governance of AI in the <a href="https://iapp.org/resources/article/global-ai-legislation-tracker/">global landscape</a>. </p>
<h2>Ramping up AI regulations</h2>
<p>AI regulation efforts began to accelerate in April 2021, when the EU proposed an initial framework for regulations called the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20230601STO93804/eu-ai-act-first-regulation-on-artificial-intelligence">AI Act</a>. These rules aim to set obligations for providers and users, based on various risks associated with different AI technologies. </p>
<p>As the EU AI Act was <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2023/10/23/23929273/eu-ai-act-generative-regulation-models">pending</a>, China moved forward with proposing its own AI regulations. In Chinese media, policymakers have discussed a desire to be <a href="https://36kr.com/p/2357903521299721">first movers</a> and offer global leadership in both AI development and governance.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/calls-to-regulate-ai-are-growing-louder-but-how-exactly-do-you-regulate-a-technology-like-this-203050">Calls to regulate AI are growing louder. But how exactly do you regulate a technology like this?</a>
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<p>Where the EU has taken a comprehensive approach, China has been regulating specific aspects of AI one after another. These have ranged from <a href="https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2022-01/04/content_5666429.htm">algorithmic recommendations</a>, to <a href="https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2022-12/12/content_5731431.htm">deep synthesis</a> or “deepfake” technology and <a href="http://www.cac.gov.cn/2023-07/13/c_1690898327029107.htm">generative AI</a>. </p>
<p>China’s full framework for AI governance will be made up of these policies and others yet to come. The iterative process lets regulators build up their <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/07/10/china-s-ai-regulations-and-how-they-get-made-pub-90117">bureaucratic know-how</a> and regulatory capacity, and leaves flexibility to implement new legislation in the face of emerging risks.</p>
<h2>A ‘wake-up call’</h2>
<p>China’s AI regulation may have been a wake-up call to the US. In April, influential lawmaker <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/senate-leader-schumer-pushes-ai-regulatory-regime-after-china-action-2023-04-13/">Chuck Shumer said</a> his country should “not permit China to lead on innovation or write the rules of the road” for AI.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1719420925131526187"}"></div></p>
<p>On October 30 2023, the White House issued an <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/10/30/fact-sheet-president-biden-issues-executive-order-on-safe-secure-and-trustworthy-artificial-intelligence/">executive order</a> on safe, secure and trustworthy AI. The order attempts to address broader issues of equity and civil rights, while also concentrating on specific applications of technology. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-just-issued-the-worlds-strongest-action-yet-on-regulating-ai-heres-what-to-expect-216729">The US just issued the world’s strongest action yet on regulating AI. Here’s what to expect</a>
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<p>Alongside the dominant actors, countries with growing IT sectors including Japan, Taiwan, Brazil, Italy, Sri Lanka and India have also sought to implement defensive strategies to mitigate potential risks associated with the pervasive integration of AI.</p>
<p>AI regulations worldwide reflect a race against foreign influence. At the geopolitical scale, the US competes with China economically and militarily. The EU emphasises establishing its own <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/03/europe-digital-sovereignty/">digital sovereignty</a> and striving for independence from the US.</p>
<p>On a domestic level, these regulations can be seen as favouring large incumbent tech companies over emerging challengers. This is because it is often expensive to comply with legislation, requiring resources smaller companies may lack.</p>
<p>Alphabet, Meta and Tesla have supported calls for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/musk-zuckerberg-gates-join-us-senators-ai-forum-2023-09-13/">AI regulation</a>. At the same time, the Alphabet-owned <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2023/10/27/ais-proxy-war-heats-up-as-google-reportedly-backs-anthropic-with-2b/">Google</a> has joined Amazon in investing billions in OpenAI’s competitor Anthropic, and Tesla boss Elon Musk’s xAI has just launched its first product, <a href="https://mashable.com/article/elon-musk-x-ai-update">a chatbot called Grok</a>.</p>
<h2>Shared vision</h2>
<p>The EU’s AI Act, China’s AI regulations, and the White House executive order show shared interests between the nations involved. Together, they set the stage for last week’s “<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-safety-summit-2023-the-bletchley-declaration/the-bletchley-declaration-by-countries-attending-the-ai-safety-summit-1-2-november-2023">Bletchley declaration</a>”, in which 28 countries including the US, UK, China, Australia and several EU members pledged cooperation on AI safety. </p>
<p>Countries or regions see AI as a contributor to their economic development, national security, and international leadership. Despite the recognised risks, all jurisdictions are trying to support AI development and innovation.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/news-coverage-of-artificial-intelligence-reflects-business-and-government-hype-not-critical-voices-203633">News coverage of artificial intelligence reflects business and government hype — not critical voices</a>
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<p>By 2026, worldwide spending on AI-centric systems may <a href="https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS49670322">pass US$300 billion</a> by one estimate. By 2032, according to a Bloomberg report, the generative AI market alone<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/company/press/generative-ai-to-become-a-1-3-trillion-market-by-2032-research-finds/"> may be worth US$1.3 trillion</a>. </p>
<p>Numbers like these, and talk of perceived benefits from tech companies, national governments, and consultancy firms, tend to dominate media coverage of AI. Critical voices are <a href="https://theconversation.com/news-coverage-of-artificial-intelligence-reflects-business-and-government-hype-not-critical-voices-203633">often sidelined</a>.</p>
<h2>Competing interests</h2>
<p>Beyond economic benefits, countries also look to AI systems for defence, cybersecurity, and military applications. </p>
<p>At the UK’s AI safety summit, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/china-took-part-leaders-ai-meeting-even-though-uk-did-not-acknowledge-2023-11-03/">international tensions were apparent</a>. While China agreed with the Bletchley declaration made on the summit’s first day, it was excluded from public events on the second day.</p>
<p>One point of disagreement is China’s <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/11/22/1063605/china-announced-a-new-social-credit-law-what-does-it-mean/">social credit system</a>, which operates with little transparency. The EU’s AI Act regards social scoring systems of this sort as creating unacceptable risk.</p>
<p>The US perceives China’s investments in AI as <a href="https://www.nscai.gov/2021-final-report/">a threat to US national and economic security</a>, particularly in terms of cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.</p>
<p>These tensions are likely to hinder global collaboration on binding AI regulations.</p>
<h2>The limitations of current rules</h2>
<p>Existing AI regulations also have significant limitations. For instance, there is no clear, common set of definitions of different kinds of AI technology in current regulations across jurisdictions.</p>
<p>Current legal definitions of AI tend to be very broad, raising concern over how practical they are. This broad scope means regulations cover a wide range of systems which present different risks and may deserve different treatments. Many regulations lack clear definitions for risk, safety, transparency, fairness, and non-discrimination, posing challenges for ensuring precise legal compliance. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/do-we-need-a-new-law-for-ai-sure-but-first-we-could-try-enforcing-the-laws-we-already-have-211369">Do we need a new law for AI? Sure – but first we could try enforcing the laws we already have</a>
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<p>We are also seeing local jurisdictions launch their own regulations within the national frameworks. These may address specific concerns and help to balance AI regulation and development.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/state-and-local-updates/pages/california-artificial-intelligence-regs.aspx">California</a> has introduced two bills to regulate AI in employment. <a href="http://english.scio.gov.cn/chinavoices/2022-09/23/content_78435351.htm">Shanghai</a> has proposed a system for grading, management and supervision of AI development at the municipal level.</p>
<p>However, defining AI technologies narrowly, as China has done, poses a risk that companies will find ways to work around the rules. </p>
<h2>Moving forward</h2>
<p>Sets of “best practices” for AI governance are emerging from local and national jurisdictions and transnational organisations, with oversight from groups such as the <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sga2236.doc.htm">UN’s AI advisory board</a> and the US’s National Institute of Standards and Technology. The existing AI governance frameworks from the UK, the US, the EU, and – to a limited extent – China are likely to be seen as guidance.</p>
<p>Global collaboration will be underpinned by both ethical consensus and more importantly national and geopolitical interests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216900/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How can the world regulate AI? Europe’s comprehensive approach, China’s tightly targeted laws, and America’s dramatic executive order hint at three ways forward.Fan Yang, Research fellow at Melbourne Law School, the University of Melbourne and the ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making and Society., The University of MelbourneAusma Bernot, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2162732023-10-29T10:05:40Z2023-10-29T10:05:40ZAgoa trade deal talks: South Africa will need to carefully manage relations with the US and China<p>South Africa must tread carefully in its economic relationships to avoid being caught in the escalating tension between east and west, and more specifically China and the US. The country’s hosting, and the outcome, of the <a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16309-south-africa-confirmed-as-agoa-host-country-for-2023.html">2023 Agoa Summit</a> should strengthen its role in diplomatic relations and contribute towards safeguarding the country’s economic interests. </p>
<p>From <a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16309-south-africa-confirmed-as-agoa-host-country-for-2023.html">2-4 November 2023</a>, the US and 35 sub-Saharan African countries will meet in Johannesburg for the 20th Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum (Agoa Forum). It entails strengthening trade and investment ties between the US and sub-Saharan Africa through the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (<a href="https://agoa.info/about-agoa.html">Agoa</a>), US legislation which provides various trade preferences to eligible countries in the region. </p>
<p>Given Russia’s continuing war in Ukraine and its <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_111767.htm">rising tension with Nato</a>, plus the <a href="https://www.piie.com/research/trade-investment/us-china-trade-war">China-US trade war</a>, tensions between east and west are high. South Africa has <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-war-in-ukraine-how-south-africa-blew-its-chance-as-a-credible-mediator-181101">come under attack</a> for its <a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2023/the-state-of-non-alignment-in-south-africas-foreign-policy/">non-alignment role</a> in the Ukraine war. It refused to support UN resolutions condemning Russia. This resulted in some US congressmen pushing for the forum <a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16226-warning-shot-fired-top-us-congressmen-urge-biden-to-move-agoa-forum-away-from-south-africa.html">to be moved out of South Africa</a>.</p>
<p>The country recently hosted the <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/">15th Brics summit</a>, which resolved to expand the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa grouping to 11 member states. The enlargement will bolster Brics’ role as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/brics-expansion-six-more-nations-are-set-to-join-what-theyre-buying-into-212200">geopolitical alternative to the west</a>, which is dominated by the US. Might this be a direct challenge to American hegemony?</p>
<p>I have been <a href="https://www.ufs.ac.za/econ/faculty-of-economic-and-management-sciences-home/general/staff?pid=zIFzQiuvO3o%3d">researching</a> major global economic developments, such as globalisation and the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis, for 20 years. This body of work shows the risks that come with behaviour like South Africa’s. The country could find itself in the middle of a tense situation. </p>
<p>South Africa needs to pull off an exceptional balancing act in managing its international relations in a sensible way that protects and advances its economic interests. </p>
<p>Note that the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-china-relations">geopolitical tensions between China and the US</a> are not just about trade disputes. They also include <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/US-China-tensions/U.S.-China-spy-battle-casts-shadow-over-push-for-Biden-Xi-summit#:%7E:text=WASHINGTON%20%2D%2D%20The%20U.S.%20and,trade%20disputes%20and%20technological%20rivalry.">espionage</a>, China’s <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, climate change and environmental issues, and tensions over <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden">Hong Kong, Taiwan</a> and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea">South China Sea disputes</a>. </p>
<p>As a major source of infrastructure financing to sub-Saharan Africa, China is now the region’s largest bilateral official lender. Its total sub-Saharan African external public debt – what these governments owe to China – rose from less than 2% before 2005 <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/slowing-debt-accumulation-growing-risks-unveiling-complexities-sub-saharan-africas-debt">to over 17% in 2021</a>.</p>
<p>Agoa might present a challenge to China as competition for its own interests in Africa. China would like African countries to untie or loosen their agreements with the US. It is thus a good moment to take stock of the actual benefits South Africa has derived from the Agoa agreement with the US.</p>
<h2>What Agoa is about</h2>
<p>The Agoa agreement was approved as legislation by the US Congress in May 2000 for an initial 15 years. On 29 June 2015 it was extended and <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/04/23/supporting-us-africa-partnership-through-agoa-extension-and-enhancement-act-2015">signed into law</a> by then president Barack Obama for a further 10 years to 2025. </p>
<p>It will come into review again in 2024, hence the importance of the upcoming summit. Recently, Louisiana senator John Kennedy <a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16326-us-senator-wants-agoa-in-place-until-2045-to-deter-china-s-influence.html">introduced a bill</a> to the US Congress to extend Agoa by a further 20 years to 2045. This is a bid to counter China’s <a href="https://blogs.afdb.org/fr/afdb-championing-inclusive-growth-across-africa/post/the-expansion-of-chinese-influence-in-africa-opportunities-and-risks-9612">growing influence in Africa</a>, and to continue to allow sub-Saharan African countries preferential access to US markets. </p>
<h2>Agoa’s benefits to South Africa</h2>
<p>In 2021, the US was the second most significant destination for South Africa’s exports worldwide, mainly thanks to Agoa. China took the top spot; Germany was third. The US ranked third as a source of South Africa’s imports, following China and Germany. In that year, the total trade volume between South Africa and the US reached its zenith at $24.5 billion, with a <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/southern-africa/south-africa">trade imbalance of $9.3 billion in South Africa’s favour</a>. </p>
<p>Agoa offers preferential entry for about 20% of South Africa’s exports to the US, or <a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16248-south-africa-asks-us-for-early-agoa-extension.html#:%7E:text=Agoa%20provides%20preferential%20access%20for,US%20market%E2%80%9D%2C%20Patel%20said.">2% of South Africa’s global exports</a>. The stock of South African investment in the US has more than doubled since 2011, <a href="https://unctad.org/news/investment-flows-africa-reached-record-83-billion-2021">amounting to US$3.5 billion in 2020</a>. American foreign direct investment (FDI) in South Africa increased by over 70% over that period, <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-investment-climate-statements/south-africa/">to US$10 billion</a>. This made the US South Africa’s fifth largest source of FDI in 2019. The US was its third largest destination for outward FDI. </p>
<p>US investment in South Africa is mainly concentrated in manufacturing, finance and insurance, and wholesale trade, <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/southern-africa/south-africa">which is vital for economic growth</a>. American multinationals doing business in South Africa <a href="https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.html#436">employ about 148,000 people</a>.</p>
<p>More specifically, Agoa’s benefits include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>duty-free and quota-free access to the US market for a wide range of South African products. This benefits South Africa’s textile and apparel industry in particular. To sub-Saharan African countries, Agoa provides duty-free access to the US market for <a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/september/joint-statement-us-trade-representative-katherine-tai-and-minister-trade-industry-and-competition#:%7E:text=AGOA%20provides%20eligible%20sub%2DSaharan,Generalized%20System%20of%20Preferences%20program.">over 1,800 products</a>. This is in addition to the more than 5,000 products that are eligible for duty-free access under the US <a href="https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/generalized-system-preference-gsp#:%7E:text=GSP%20promotes%20economic%20growth%20and,products%20from%20least%20developed%20countries.">Generalised System of Preferences programme</a></p></li>
<li><p>export diversification, especially of items such as agricultural products, textiles, and manufactured goods. This is vital for increasing export earnings, which help to improve South Africa’s balance of payments, particularly its trade account.</p></li>
<li><p>capacity building through technical assistance and programmes to help South African businesses meet US standards, thus becoming more competitive in the global marketplace.</p></li>
<li><p>economic development and poverty reduction, which aligns with South Africa’s developmental goals.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Balancing economic interests</h2>
<p>China is the largest consumer of South African commodity exports, and thus a key influencer of the rand exchange rate. In addition, China and Russia’s planned move towards <a href="https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/global-research/currencies/de-dollarization">de-dollarisation</a> (trying to replace the petrodollar system with their own system) <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/10245294221095222">puts American interests under threat</a>. This means South Africa needs to carefully navigate its relations with the US and its Brics partners, China and Russia.</p>
<p>It will want to keep strong ties with the US through Agoa without getting into a difficult position between China and the US. The outcome of the November meeting will have serious economic implications.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216273/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arno J. van Niekerk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Pretoria needs to pull off a balancing act in managing South Africa’s international relations to advance its economic interests.Arno J. van Niekerk, Senior lecturer in Economics, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2157672023-10-18T16:02:48Z2023-10-18T16:02:48ZFour reasons why western companies have been ‘trapped’ in Russia since it invaded Ukraine<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554509/original/file-20231018-23-n4zalj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5991%2C3997&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Public pressure for greater sanctions on Russia also affects western companies that have not yet left the country.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/downing-street-london-uk-202202-ukrainian-2135028235">Sandor Szmutko/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>More than 600 days since Russia invaded Ukraine, <a href="https://kse.ua/about-the-school/news/54th-issue-of-the-regular-digest-on-impact-of-foreign-companies-exit-on-rf-economy/">over 1,400 international companies</a> are still operating in Russia. Only a small percentage of western firms have been able to close down their operations in the country since it invaded Ukraine in February 2022. </p>
<p>As a result, there is now a group of “trapped multinational subsidiaries” operating in Russia – in several cases unwillingly. This includes firms, like Danish brewer <a href="https://www.carlsberggroup.com/newsroom/carlsberg-group-terminates-license-agreements-in-russia/">Carlsberg Group</a>, which struggled to sell its Russian subsidiaries before <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/carlsberg-q2-sales-supported-by-premium-brands-asian-growth-2023-08-16/">the business was seized</a> by the Russian government in August 2023.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s42214-023-00167-y">our recently published research</a> we explored why some multinationals have been trapped in Russia, finding it very difficult, if not impossible, to exit the country. We found that western companies have been exposed to multiple competing forces that have prevented them from winding up their Russian operations. In an increasingly fractured world, the risk of being trapped abroad in such a situation poses a new challenge for corporate executives and policymakers.</p>
<p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4322502">Our original research finding released in January 2023</a> showed that 5-13% of western firms from the EU and G7 nations had fully divested from Russia in the first nine months of the invasion. That is, they had been able to complete the sale or disposal of their Russian subsidiaries by December 2022.</p>
<p>Recent analyses from other initiatives tracking this issue confirm our early findings. The Kyiv School of Economics’ (KSE) <a href="https://kse.ua/about-the-school/news/54th-issue-of-the-regular-digest-on-impact-of-foreign-companies-exit-on-rf-economy/">latest figures</a> suggest only 8.1% of foreign firms operating in Russia have exited the country so far. Since their total also includes non-EU and non-G7 foreign firms, many of which have been doing business in Russia via exporting and thus not necessarily by way of a controlled subsidiary, their percentage is not strictly comparable to ours.</p>
<p>However, when KSE restricts its analysis to foreign-owned Russian affiliates for which it is possible to gather financials, the percentage of completed exits as of October 2023 is still only 19%. This indicates that the vast majority (over 80%) of foreign companies present in Russia prior to the invasion have not yet left the country some 20 months after the war began.</p>
<p>KSE also <a href="https://kse.ua/about-the-school/news/54th-issue-of-the-regular-digest-on-impact-of-foreign-companies-exit-on-rf-economy/">observes that</a> “in the last 13 months the ratio of those who leave or stay is virtually unchanged”. This is a surprise given <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/02/business/companies-pulling-back-russia-ukraine-war-intl-hnk/index.html">high profile media coverage</a> about companies exiting Russia (or not), especially in the <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/03/19/confronting-russia-shows-the-tension-between-free-trade-and-freedom">first and second quarters of 2022</a>. </p>
<p>So why did the initial increase in western company exits tail off? Our <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s42214-023-00167-y">new research</a> identifies four push and pull factors that have had a – mostly negative – effect on the rate at which western companies have left Russia:</p>
<h2>1. Watching and waiting</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-vladimir-putin-business-europe-airlines-b5bc1289b1d6c55d4a9a6a55378d8792">sequential ratcheting up</a> of western sanctions regimes may have led some western firms to “wait and see” rather than going ahead with an exit from Russia. That is, they are waiting to see if the sanctions induce Moscow to leave Ukrainian soil, which has unfortunately not happened.</p>
<p>Moreover, EU, US and G7 sanctions have been “targeted”. That is, they have been selective in terms of commercial activities, types of companies, goods, services and technologies covered. This may have encouraged companies operating in sectors excluded from formal sanctioning to “wait and see” whether the sanctioning regime would change at a later stage.</p>
<h2>2. The Hotel California effect</h2>
<p>A stringent Russian <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-60689279">counter sanctions regime</a> may have either discouraged or impeded the divestment of western subsidiaries operating in Russia. For example, Russia’s October 2022 decree listing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/russia-bans-dealing-capital-45-foreign-owned-banks-or-banking-units-2022-10-26/#:%7E:text=Finance-,Russia%20bans%20dealing%20in%20capital%20of%2045,owned%20banks%20or%20banking%20units&text=MOSCOW%2C%20Oct%2026%20(Reuters),or%20owned%20through%20foreign%20capital.">45 foreign banks</a> prohibited from disposing their assets in the country have clearly made it very difficult to sell up. This has created a Hotel California effect whereby companies <a href="https://www.carlsberggroup.com/newsroom/carlsberg-group-terminates-license-agreements-in-russia/">like Carlsberg</a> can check in (invest) but cannot check out (divest).</p>
<h2>3. Government guarantees</h2>
<p>Pre-invasion guarantees were made by some western governments to protect corporate investments in Russia. For example, by the end of 2022 the German government had offered <a href="https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/EN/Publikationen/Wirtschaft/investment-guarantees-annual-report-2022.html">€7.3 billion</a> (£6.4 billion) in guarantees against certain political risks, including war, to German companies investing in Russia. Again, this may have encouraged corporate boards to wait and see.</p>
<h2>4. Acting responsibly</h2>
<p>Guidance about <a href="https://www.undp.org/publications/heightened-human-rights-due-diligence-business-conflict-affected-contexts-guide">responsible business conduct</a> in conflict-affected areas from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and an expert advisory group to the United Nations recommend against divestment if it could cause significant harm to non-combatants. So, for example, this would dictate that pharma companies should keep selling medicines to sick Russians. Additionally, the UN and OECD guidelines recommend companies contemplating exit to carefully consider whether exiting/suspending activities could exacerbate tensions.</p>
<p>At the time of the invasion, not all of these four factors were known or in play. But six months into the invasion, once the Russian counter sanctions regime came into force, pressure on western firms to divest intensified. This has left corporate decision-makers facing these conflicting pressures.</p>
<h2>What to do about profits</h2>
<p>A complicating factor is that some of these Russian subsidiaries are generating profits – OECD and UN guidelines do not address this issue. So, what guidance should policymakers give corporate management about trapped multinational subsidiaries?</p>
<p>Perhaps a good place to start is to stop subsidiaries selling to state and private organisations engaged in war efforts. This would mean identifying sensitive sectors that directly or indirectly contribute to Russia’s government coffers or its war effort – sales to the Russian military, for example. </p>
<p>Trapped multinationals should also be encouraged to support war victims, regardless of which “side” they are on. And they should certainly continue to supply essential goods such as medicines to people in conflict areas.</p>
<p>A trickier question is what multinationals should do about reinvesting the profits from their trapped subsidiaries. On the one hand, it could be argued that these investments are needed if these companies are to sustain their operations to support victims and continue supplying essential goods. On the other hand, investing this money into the Russian economy would benefit the government and its military.</p>
<p>An open dialogue between business and government in western countries is urgently needed on this subject. After all, these issues may not only continue but could also spread to other countries and regions in this era of elevated geopolitical tensions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215767/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Research aims to provide a better idea about why some multinationals are ‘trapped’ in Russia following its invasion of Ukraine.Simon Evenett, Professor of International Trade and Economic Development, University of St.GallenNiccolò Pisani, Professor of Strategy and International Business, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2128152023-10-03T19:35:52Z2023-10-03T19:35:52ZBook review: African thinkers analyse some of the big issues of our time - race, belonging and identity<p>The subjects of race, identity and belonging are often fraught with contention and uneasiness. Who are you? Who belongs? Who is native, or indigenous to a place? These perennial questions arise around the world.</p>
<p>They are the subject of the book <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/9783031387968">The Paradox(es) of Diasporic Identity, Race and Belonging</a>, edited by <a href="https://scholar.google.co.jp/citations?user=EEyB8sMAAAAJ&hl=en">Benjamin Maiangwa</a>, a political scientist at Lakehead University in Canada. </p>
<p>The contributors are academics, mostly early career scholars and doctoral candidates in African and North American universities. They study genocide, peace and conflict, gender, decolonial practices, identity, race and war. </p>
<p>Unavoidably, questions that defy convenient answers pervade the reflections and analyses in the book. </p>
<p>In my own work as <a href="https://www.mtroyal.ca/ProgramsCourses/FacultiesSchoolsCentres/Arts/Departments/EnglishLanguagesCultures/FacultyStaff/Ademola-Adesola.htm">a scholar</a> of African literature with an interest in the subjects of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10402659.2017.1344526">conflict</a>, childhood and identity, I underscore the relevance of these questions. </p>
<p>The Paradox(es) of Diasporic Identity, Race and Belonging assembles voices that urge us to think more critically about how the politics of race and identity hampers healthy interrelations among people.</p>
<p>In a world increasingly divided by supremacist ideologies, the insights in this collection of essays are highly relevant. </p>
<h2>What the book’s about</h2>
<p>The contributors to the book use a variety of forms of writing. Some of the essays are autobiograpical; some are literary criticism; others scholarly analyses. They re-examine familiar but controversial concepts. </p>
<p>Among them are ideas about naming, indigeneity, land, citizenship, identitarian disparity, diasporic (un)being, immigration and migration, and the political economy of (un)belonging. These are topical ideas that predominate in discourses on nationalism, ethnicity and nation states. Their engagement in this collection helps us to further appreciate how unfixed and complex they are; they are never amenable to any easy analysis. </p>
<p>The volume is structured into three parts: Identity, Coloniality, and Home; Diaspora, Race, and Immigration; and Belonging: Cross-Cutting Issues. Each section has an introduction, a conversation among four of the contributors, an epilogue and an afterword.</p>
<p>This layout attests to the careful editing of the whole. There is an organic flow of engagement with ideas from one chapter to the next. Yet no chapter’s unique argument is overshadowed by another’s. </p>
<h2>Critical probing and analysis</h2>
<p>The chapters inspired by personal experiences do as much critical probing as those framed by hardcore analyses. </p>
<p>The contributions don’t sound jointly rehearsed, but represent a form of dialogue. Readers will find a kaleidoscope of interrelated but distinct compelling arguments on matters of race, identity and belonging, and the violent and paradoxical patterns they take in the <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520204355/on-the-postcolony">postcolony</a>. This is a notion that is concerned with a particular historical course involving societies that have latterly experienced colonialism, as theorised by the Cameroonian historian and political theorist <a href="https://wiser.wits.ac.za/people/achille-mbembe">Achille Mbembe</a>. </p>
<p>As is customary in volumes of this kind, the opening chapter comes from the editor. He welcomes readers with questions that invite them to ruminate on place and identity construction and the way it determines relations. </p>
<p>Such questions, which reverberate throughout the volume, are “What is home? What creates the feeling of belonging or (dis)connection to a place/space or other people? Is home a place, a feeling, other people, or an idea? Is it a destination or a spiritual entity or experience? Who am I in this political space?” </p>
<p>For the reader who has taken their identity for granted thus far, such questions can be jarring and unnerving. They can also provoke deep thoughts. </p>
<h2>The construction of race</h2>
<p>The chapter underlines the fact that identity is constructed and is fluid. It stresses racial signifiers – indigenous, native, white, black – as markers which mask, confuse, distress and misrepresent. </p>
<p>In some people they produce false triumphalism and superiority and in others they activate demeaning nervousness. As the chapter maintains, cultural essentialism, the product of these markers, distorts cultural facts. It also abjures a cultivation of interest in history and critical mindedness. And it is this matter of invented racial/cultural identity that the conversation in chapter 12 of the book foregrounds. </p>
<p>In that conversation, such constructs as “Black”, “African”, “White” and “immigrant” ricochet from one discussant to another. The conversation makes it clear that there is a kind of under-appreciation of the violence that minoritised people within national boundaries and diasporic spaces experience when designated in certain senses. </p>
<h2>Interconnected humanity</h2>
<p>With its other chapters, the volume broadens the frontiers of research in the intersecting areas of race, ethnicity, peace, home(lessness), gender and other forms of identity and diasporic formations. It calls for a spiritual reawakening of our identities. </p>
<p>This volume is a force in the promotion and celebration of the dignity of human differences. One can hear again and again the refrain in Maya Angelou’s timeless poem, Human Family:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://allpoetry.com/Human-Family">We are more alike, my friends,/than we are unalike</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The humanistic ring in this book results from a conviction that the human or spiritual identity trumps all other ones, including institutionalised discriminatory ways of being and exclusionary policies and regulations, all of which enable the questioning of other people’s humanity. </p>
<p>The contributors’ insistence is on interconnected human relations and, to borrow from the Canadian novelist and essayist, Dionne Brand, on life – </p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Map-Door-No-Return-Belonging/dp/0385258925">It is life you must insist on</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Scholars, students and general readers interested in migration studies, peace and conflict studies, political science, literary studies, African studies, international relations, gender studies, sociology and history will find this work an enlightening resource.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212815/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ademola Adesola does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The book makes invaluable contributions to subjects of race, identity and belonging and how they shape human interrelations.Ademola Adesola, Assistant Professor, Mount Royal UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2137392023-09-21T12:43:34Z2023-09-21T12:43:34ZG20 summit proved naysayers wrong – and showed Global South’s potential to address world’s biggest problems<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549372/original/file-20230920-21-8kndta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Indonesian President Joko Widodo, left, presents Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi a tree sapling during the G20 summit in New Delhi.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/joko-widodo-president-of-indonesia-presents-prime-minister-news-photo/1671163483">Dan Kitwood/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Skepticism was running high ahead of the 2023 summit of the Group of 20, or G20, held in New Delhi in early September. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/06/opinions/putin-xi-skip-g20-delhi-opportunity-andelman/index.html">announced that they would not attend</a>. At one moment, it was <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/05/biden-tests-negative-for-covid-19-days-away-from-g20-summit.html">touch and go</a> whether U.S. President Joe Biden – whose wife, Jill, was ill with COVID-19 – would make the trip. The general consensus was the group <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/05/india-geopolitics-g20.html">would fail to come up with a final declaration</a>, largely because of differences over the war in Ukraine. </p>
<p>And yet, the assembled leaders did <a href="https://www.g20.org/content/dam/gtwenty/gtwenty_new/document/G20-New-Delhi-Leaders-Declaration.pdf">release a joint declaration</a> on giving a new impetus to the World Bank, fighting climate change and dealing with infectious diseases, among other issues. One of the main outcomes was the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au-and-g20-membership-will-give-africa-more-say-on-global-issues-if-it-speaks-with-one-voice-213737">admission of the African Union</a> as a full member, much as the European Union has been from the start.</p>
<p>The final G20 statement <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/09/world/asia/g20-biden-russia-ukraine-war.html">has been criticized</a> for not specifically condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But given Moscow’s and Beijing’s stance on that war – and New Delhi’s <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/india-remaining-neutral-russias-invasion-ukraine/story?id=97891228">studiously neutral position</a> on it – that was never much in the cards. </p>
<p>And perhaps that is the point. From its beginning, the G20 was established to <a href="https://www.uschamber.com/international/g20-was-born-out-of-economic-crisis-now-is-g20s-opportunity-to-help-avoid-a-new-one">deal with global economic governance</a> issues. Yet, over time, some members have attempted to hijack it to focus on geopolitics. </p>
<p>Perhaps the time has come for the G20 – which <a href="https://www.g20.org/en/about-g20/">now consists of</a> 19 leading economies, the European Union and the African Union – to go back to basics and deal with what it’s best at: the economic, environmental and developmental challenges facing our troubled world. After all, there are already plenty of international organizations that deal with geopolitics, not least the United Nations.</p>
<h2>India’s leadership of the Global South</h2>
<p>Politics of a domestic kind was certainly in evidence during the G20. Taking place as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/1/indias-opposition-parties-to-jointly-contest-2024-elections-against-modi">India gears up for its 2024 elections</a>, the country was plastered with G20 posters featuring Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The emblem of the gathering was the lotus flower, which happens to be that of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP.</p>
<p>It is estimated that some 100,000 foreign delegates visited India in the year running up to the meeting, and that 15 million Indians participated in G20-related activities. </p>
<p>As Indian diplomat <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/abhaykr/?originalSubdomain=br">Abhay Kumar</a> told me during my visit to New Delhi a week prior to the summit, cultural events were held in all Indian states as part of the official G20 program. New Delhi itself looked as clean and green as I have ever seen it since first setting foot there 20 years ago as Chile’s ambassador to India.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549392/original/file-20230920-23-4aptm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large poster for the G20 summit featuring India Prime Minister Narendra Modi" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549392/original/file-20230920-23-4aptm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549392/original/file-20230920-23-4aptm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549392/original/file-20230920-23-4aptm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549392/original/file-20230920-23-4aptm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549392/original/file-20230920-23-4aptm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549392/original/file-20230920-23-4aptm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549392/original/file-20230920-23-4aptm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">For Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the 2023 summit was a chance to promote his leadership ahead of the 2024 elections.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/indian-security-personnel-stands-guard-next-to-a-g20-news-photo/1651380232">Tauseef Mustafa/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Was all this a bit much? Perhaps. But at a time when some politicians revel in decrying anything that has to do with the outside world, there is something to be said for stressing the significance of a diplomatic summit – and its meaning for the people of what is today the most populated country on Earth. </p>
<p>There is little doubt that the world is undergoing an “<a href="https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/indias-moment-on-the-g-20-summit-outcomes/article67295264.ece">India moment</a>.” The recent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/science/india-moon-landing-photos.html">moon landing</a> of an Indian spaceship, the Indian economy growing at the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/08/indias-massive-expansion-to-be-a-driver-of-global-growth-sp-global.html">fastest clip of any major country</a>, and New Delhi flexing its diplomatic muscles big time during the G20 all burnish its credentials as a leader of what has <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-global-south-is-on-the-rise-but-what-exactly-is-the-global-south-207959">become known as the Global South</a> – and consists of various countries around the globe described as “developing.”</p>
<h2>What’s next for G20</h2>
<p>With G20 summits <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/16/g20-bali-leaders-declaration/">held in Indonesia in 2022</a> and India in 2023 – and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/rio-de-janeiro-host-g20-summit-2024-2023-05-09/">set for Brazil in 2024</a> – rising powers from the Global South have been able to set an agenda, stressing the priorities of the developing nations’ development, debt financing, food security and climate change. This is in contrast to the Group of Seven, or G7, which in recent years has focused on <a href="https://www.globalpolicy.org/en/news/2022-07-09/g7-summit-elmau-2022-intensified-geopolitics-overshadow-development-agenda">geopolitics and the war in Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>But questions about the role, purpose and ultimate effectiveness of the G20 remain.</p>
<p>The group certainly inhabits a world vastly different from the one in which it was originally designed for. The G20 at the leaders’ level got off to a promising start, <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Group-of-Twenty-G20/Cooper-Thakur/p/book/9780415780896">successfully managing the 2007-2008 financial crisis</a>. It served as both a steering committee for the world economy and a crisis committee to deal with threats to the world economy.</p>
<p>Yet, the G20 has struggled to stay relevant. A high point was the summit held in Hangzhou, China, in 2016, which led to a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/03/breakthrough-us-china-agree-ratify-paris-climate-change-deal">joint U.S.-China commitment</a> on lowering carbon emissions in the fight against climate change. </p>
<p>But in 2020, when the world first faced the COVID-19 pandemic, the G20 was <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/covid-19-failure-g20/">deemed to have failed miserably</a>, with very little international coordination to cope with the worst pandemic in a century, and “<a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9519117/">vaccine nationalism</a>” running rampant. </p>
<p>The fact that the host and chair that year was Saudi Arabia, an authoritarian regime with relatively little international credibility, did not help. Also, the inability of the G20 to come up with firmer commitments on what may be the most significant global challenge of our time – to halt the course of climate change – has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/06/world/asia/g20-summit-india.html">elicited skepticism among observers</a>.</p>
<p>From its origins as a steering and crisis committee, the G20 <a href="https://www.globalgovernanceproject.org/reinventing-the-g20/andrew-f-cooper/">has evolved into something else</a> as the world order itself has changed. In 1998-1999, when the G20 was founded at the finance ministers’ level, and in 2008-2009, when it was upped to leaders’ level, countries were, by and large, still in global governance mode: They worked together to deal with common problems. </p>
<p>In 2023, however, <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/global-development-era-great-power-competition">great power competition</a> is the order of the day, and a zero-sum rather than win-win mentality tends to prevail in the games nations play.
As the world veers toward a <a href="https://global.upenn.edu/perryworldhouse/fracturing-world-future-globalization-report-and-thought-pieces">fragmented, if not downright fractured, order</a>, the G20 serves as a hub for world leaders to meet and sort out their differences. And there is certainly a need for that – although the absence of the presidents of China and Russia from the 2023 summit puts even that condition into question. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549395/original/file-20230920-25-ytrtws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of world leaders on a stage" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549395/original/file-20230920-25-ytrtws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549395/original/file-20230920-25-ytrtws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549395/original/file-20230920-25-ytrtws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549395/original/file-20230920-25-ytrtws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549395/original/file-20230920-25-ytrtws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549395/original/file-20230920-25-ytrtws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549395/original/file-20230920-25-ytrtws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">BRICS leaders convened in Johannesburg, South Africa, in August 2023 and agreed to invite Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to their bloc.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinese-president-xi-jinping-delivers-an-important-speech-news-photo/1622826269">Xie Huanchi/Xinhua via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Some developed nations might be tempted to retreat from this evolved and enlarged G20 to the comfort zone of the G7 – the group of most-developed nations, where everybody thinks and for the most part dresses alike – and attempt to steer global economic governance from there, as was done in the last quarter of the 20th century.</p>
<p>But that ship has sailed. The G7 today represents just <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/27687/g7-share-of-global-gdp-and-population">10% of humanity</a> and <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/economic-policy/how-brics-countries-have-overtaken-the-g7-in-gdp-based-on-ppps/">30% of the world’s Gross Domestic Product</a>. This is in contrast to the 42% of the world’s population and 36% of the world’s GDP <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/08/what-brics-expansion-means-blocs-founding-members">embodied by the newly expanded BRICS group</a>, consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The North Atlantic countries no longer rule the roost and must come to terms with the geoeconomic and geopolitical realities of the new century. </p>
<p>The very reason the G20 was set up in 1999 was because the <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/paul-blustein/the-chastening/9780786724697/?lens=publicaffairs">G7 could not deal with</a> the Asian financial crisis at the time, and needed a broader entity to cope with it. A quarter of a century later, with Asia <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/05/01/asia-poised-to-drive-global-economic-growth-boosted-by-chinas-reopening#:%7E:text=Growth%20in%20Asia%20and%20the,the%20rest%20of%20the%20world.">representing a much larger share</a> of the world economy than it did then, this is even truer now.</p>
<p>The G20 has its faults, but it still performs a useful function to help the world economy navigate perilous waters, as globalization beats a retreat and the dangers of a fractured international system loom larger. I believe the G20 should be further built up and nurtured, not cavalierly dismissed. The world would be poorer without it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213739/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jorge Heine is a research professor at the Pardee Schoom of Global Studies, Boston University. A past VP of the International Political Science Association ( IPSA) he was previously ambassador of Chile to China, to
India and to South Africa. He has also served as a Cabinet minister in the Chilean government.</span></em></p>The G20 has its critics, but an expert on international politics explains why it still performs a useful function – particularly in this period of great geopolitical divisions.Jorge Heine, Interim Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2100212023-08-18T13:26:16Z2023-08-18T13:26:16ZAs BRICS cooperation accelerates, is it time for the US to develop a BRICS policy?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542982/original/file-20230816-25-afpteq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=21%2C129%2C3573%2C2263&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">BRICS foreign ministers meet in Cape Town, South Africa, in June 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/ministers-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-5-brics-countries-qin-news-photo/1258481879?adppopup=true">Jaco Marais/Die Burger/Gallo Images via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When leaders of the BRICS group of large emerging economies – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/key-facts-about-brics-2023-summit-2023-08-07/">meet in Johannesburg for two days beginning on Aug. 22, 2023</a>, foreign policymakers in Washington will no doubt be listening carefully.</p>
<p>The BRICS group has been <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/brics-rivalry">challenging some key tenets</a> of U.S. global leadership in recent years. On the diplomatic front, it has undermined the
White House’s strategy on Ukraine by <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/ukraine-war-brics-iran-argentina-russia-china-brazil-india/">countering the Western use of sanctions</a> on Russia. Economically, it has sought to chip away at U.S. dominance by <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-brics-currency-is-unlikely-to-dislodge-dollar-any-time-soon-but-it-signifies-growing-challenge-to-established-economic-order-206565">weakening the dollar’s role</a> as the world’s default currency. </p>
<p>And now the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-08-11-extra-brics-members-should-be-about-more-than-the-west-versus-the-rest/">group is looking at expanding</a>, with 23 formal candidates. Such a move – especially if BRICS accepts <a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2022/11/09/the-new-candidate-countries-for-brics-expansion/">Iran, Cuba or Venezuela</a> – would likely strengthen the group’s anti-U.S. positioning.</p>
<p><iframe id="6LQ1c" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/6LQ1c/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>So what can Washington expect next, and how can it respond? </p>
<p>Our research team at Tufts University has been working on a multiyear <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/cierp/rising-power-alliances-project">Rising Power Alliances</a> project that <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13540661231183352">has analyzed</a> the evolution of BRICS and the group’s relationship with the U.S. What we have found is that the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/can-china-achieve-its-brics-ambitions/">common portrayal of BRICS as a China-dominated</a> group primarily pursuing anti-U.S. agendas is misplaced. </p>
<p>Rather, the BRICS countries connect around common development interests and a quest for a multipolar world order in which no single power dominates. Yet BRICS consolidation has turned the group into a potent negotiation force that now challenges Washington’s geopolitical and economic goals. Ignoring BRICS as a major policy force – something the U.S. has been <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40647-014-0022-2">prone to do in the past</a> – is no longer an option. </p>
<h2>Reining in the America bashing</h2>
<p>At the dawn of BRIC cooperation in 2008 – before South Africa joined in 2010, adding an “S” – members were mindful that the group’s existence could lead to tensions with policymakers who viewed the U.S. as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/madeleine-albright-saw-us-as-an-indispensable-nation-and-nato-expansion-eastward-as-essential-179925">world’s “indispensable nation</a>.” </p>
<p>As <a href="https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/what-could-take-brics-forward/">Brazil’s former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim observed</a> at the time, “We should promote a more democratic world order by ensuring the fullest participation of developing countries in decision-making bodies.” He saw BRIC countries “as a bridge between industrialized and developing countries for sustainable development and a more balanced international economic policy.” </p>
<p>While such realignments would certainly dilute U.S. power, BRIC explicitly refrained from anti-U.S. rhetoric. </p>
<p>After the 2009 BRIC summit, the <a href="http://vancouver.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/news/200906/t20090617_4877401.htm">Chinese foreign ministry clarified</a> that BRIC cooperation should not be “directed against a third party.” Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon had already <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/india-reluctant-to-join-de-dollarisation-chorus-at-bric/articleshow/4659464.cms?from=mdr">confirmed that there would be no America bashing</a> at BRIC and directly rejected China’s and Russia’s efforts to weaken the dollar’s dominance.</p>
<p>Rather, the new entity complemented existing efforts toward multipolarity – including <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/234074?ln=en">China-Russia cooperation</a> and the <a href="https://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/">India, Brazil, South Africa trilateral dialogue</a>. Not only was BRIC envisioned as a forum for ideas rather than ideologies, but it also planned to stay <a href="http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/090616-leaders.html">open and transparent</a>. </p>
<h2>BRICS alignment and tensions with the US</h2>
<p>Today, BRICS is a formidable group – <a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202304/14/WS6438c78ba31057c47ebba230.html">it accounts for</a> 41% of the world’s population, 31.5% of global gross domestic product and 16% of global trade. As such, it has a lot of bargaining power if the countries act together – which they increasingly do. During the Ukraine war, Moscow’s BRICS partners have ensured Russia’s economic and diplomatic survival in the face of Western attempts to isolate Moscow. Brazil, India, China and South Africa engaged with Russia in 166 <a href="http://brics2022.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zg2022/EC2022/">BRICS events</a> in 2022. And some members became crucial export markets for Russia. </p>
<p>The group’s political development – through which it has continually added new areas of cooperation and extra “bodies” – is impressive, considering the vast differences among its members.</p>
<p>We designed a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661231183352">BRICS convergence index</a> to measure how BRICS states converged around 47 specific policies between 2009 and 2021, ranging from economics and security to sustainable development. We found deepening convergence and cooperation across these issues and particularly around industrial development and finance.</p>
<p>But BRICS convergence does not necessarily lead to greater tension with the United States. Our data finds limited divergence between the joint policies of BRICS and that of the U.S. on a wide range of issues. Our research also counters the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3231367/why-chinas-dominance-puts-brics-expansion-plans-and-very-existence-jeopardy">argument</a> that BRICS is China-driven. Indeed, China has been unable to advance some key policy proposals. For example, since the 2011 BRICS summit, China has sought to establish a BRICS free trade agreement but could not get support from other states. And despite various trade coordination mechanisms in BRICS, the overall trade among BRICS remains low – <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/china-floats-brics-free-trade-093000443.html">only 6% of the countries’ combined trade</a>.</p>
<p>However, tensions between the United States and BRICS exist, especially when BRICS turns “bloc-like” and when U.S. global interests are at stake. The turning point for this was 2015, when BRICS achieved major institutional growth under Russia’s presidency. This coincided with Moscow enhancing its <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/29/friends-with-benefits-russian-chinese-relations-after-ukraine-crisis-pub-63953">pivot to China</a> and BRICS following Western sanctions over Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia was eager to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/can-brics-dedollarize-the-global-financial-system/0AEF98D2F232072409E9556620AE09B0">develop alternatives</a> to Western-led institutional and market mechanisms it could no longer benefit from.</p>
<p>That said, important champions of BRICS convergence are also close strategic partners to the U.S. For example, India has played a major role in strengthening the security dimension of BRICS cooperation, championing <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/3/801/6226154">a counter-terrorism agenda</a> that has drawn U.S. <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/179207.pdf">opposition</a> due to its vague definition of terrorist actors. </p>
<p>Further constraints on U.S. power may emerge from BRICS <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-14/brics-isn-t-competing-with-any-bloc-south-africa-s-sooklal-says">transitioning to using local currencies</a> over the dollar and encouraging BRICS candidate countries to do the same. Meanwhile, China and Russia’s efforts to engage BRICS on <a href="https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/06/china-russia-space-cooperation-may-2023">outer space governance</a> is another trend for policymakers in Washington to watch.</p>
<h2>Toward a US BRICS Policy?</h2>
<p>So where does a more robust – and potentially larger – BRICS leave the U.S.? </p>
<p>To date, U.S. policy has largely ignored BRICS as an entity. The U.S. foreign and defense policymaking apparatus is regionally oriented. In the past 20 years, it has pivoted from the Middle East <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/">to Asia</a> and most recently to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf">the Indo-Pacific region</a>. </p>
<p>When it comes to the BRICS nations, Washington has focused on developing bilateral relations with Brazil, India and South Africa, while managing tensions with China and isolating Russia. The challenge for the Biden administration is understanding how, as a group, BRICS’ operations and institutions affect U.S. global interests.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, BRICS expansion raises new questions. When asked about U.S. partners such as Algeria and Egypt wanting to join BRICS, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2023/07/24/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-44/">the Biden administration explained</a> that it does not ask partners to choose between the United States and other countries. </p>
<p>But the international demand for joining BRICS calls for a deeper reflection on how Washington pursues foreign policy.</p>
<p>Designing a BRICS-focused foreign policy is an opportunity for the United States to innovate around addressing development needs. Rather than dividing countries into friendly democracies and others, a BRICS-focused policy can see the Biden administration <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/21/united-nations-general-assembly-biden-us-sustainable-development-goals/">lead on universal development issues</a> and build development-focused, close relationships that encourage a better alignment between countries of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-global-south-is-on-the-rise-but-what-exactly-is-the-global-south-207959">the Global South</a> and the United States.</p>
<p>It could also allow the Biden administration to deepen cooperation with India, Brazil, South Africa and some of the new BRICS candidates. Areas of focus could include issues where the BRICS countries <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661231183352">have struggled to coordinate their policy</a>, such as AI development and governance, energy security and global restrictions on chemical and biological weapons. </p>
<p>Developing a BRICS policy could help re-imagine U.S. foreign policy and ensure that the United States is well positioned in a multipolar world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210021/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mihaela Papa previously received funding for BRICS research from Minerva Research Initiative federal grant.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank O'Donnell previously received funding for BRICS research from Minerva Research Initiative federal grant.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zhen Han previously received funding for BRICS research from Minerva Research Initiative federal grant.</span></em></p>BRICS nations – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – compose 41% of the world population and almost a third of global GDP.Mihaela Papa, Senior Fellow, The Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityFrank O'Donnell, Adjunct Lecturer in the International Studies Program, Boston CollegeZhen Han, Assistant Professor of Global Studies, Sacred Heart UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2105072023-08-06T08:47:35Z2023-08-06T08:47:35ZAn expanded BRICS could reset world politics but picking new members isn’t straightforward<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540476/original/file-20230801-18384-y0dg77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=16%2C127%2C2813%2C1757&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Cyril Ramaphosa will host the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Government Communication and Information System</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Eager to <a href="https://lmc.icds.ee/lennart-meri-lecture-by-fiona-hill/">escape perceived western domination</a>, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/more-countries-want-to-join-brics-says-south-africa-/7190526.html#:%7E:text=Argentina%2C%20Iran%2C%20Saudi%20Arabia%20and,nations%20have%20in%20the%20organization.">several countries</a> – mostly in the global south – are looking to join the <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/#">Brics</a> bloc. The five-country bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) is also looking to grow its global partnerships. </p>
<p>What <a href="https://www.gov.za/events/fifth-brics-summit-general-background">began in 2001</a> as an acronym for four of the fastest growing states, BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), is projected to account for 45% of global GDP in purchasing power parity terms by 2030. It has evolved into a political formation as well.</p>
<p>Crucial to this was these countries’ decision to form their own club <a href="http://infobrics.org/page/history-of-brics/">in 2009</a>, instead of joining an expanded G7 as envisioned by former Goldman Sachs CEO <a href="https://www.goldmansachs.com/intelligence/archive/building-better.html">Jim O’Neill</a>, who coined the term “Bric”. <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-97397-1">Internal cohesion</a> on key issues has emerged and continues to be refined, despite challenges.</p>
<p>South Africa joined the group after a Chinese-initiated invitation <a href="https://www.gov.za/events/fifth-brics-summit-general-background">in 2010</a>; a boost for then president Jacob Zuma’s administration, which was eager to pivot further to the east. The bloc also gained by having a key African player and regional leader. </p>
<p>Ever since, the grouping has taken on a more pointedly political tone, particularly on the need to <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/10th-brics-summit-johannesburg-declaration-27-jul-2018-0000#:%7E:text=We%20recommit%20our%20support%20for,democracy%20and%20the%20rule%20of">reform global institutions</a>, in addition to its original economic raison d’etre.</p>
<p>The possibility of its enlargement has dominated headlines in the run up to its 15th summit in Johannesburg <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/about-the-summit/">on 22-24 August</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/when-two-elephants-fight-how-the-global-south-uses-non-alignment-to-avoid-great-power-rivalries-199418">When two elephants fight: how the global south uses non-alignment to avoid great power rivalries</a>
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<p>We are political scientists whose <a href="https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/the-political-economy-of-intra-brics-cooperation-siphamandla-zondi/1140951138">research interests</a> include <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-62765-2">changes</a> to the global order and emerging alternative centres of power. In our view, it won’t be easy to expand the bloc. That’s because the group is still focused on harmonising its vision, and the potential new members do not readily make the cut. </p>
<p>Some may even bring destabilising dynamics for the current composition of the formation. This matters because it tells us that the envisioned change in the global order is likely to be much slower. Simply put, while some states are opposed to western <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230220_11027664.html">hegemony</a>, they do not yet agree among themselves on what the new alternative should be. </p>
<h2>Evolution of BRICS</h2>
<p>BRICS’ overtly political character <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-62765-2_1">partially draws</a> on a long history of non-alignment as far back as the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Bandung-Conference">Bandung Conference of 1955</a>. It was attended mostly by recently decolonised states and independence movements intent on asserting themselves against Cold War superpowers – the Soviet Union and the United States. </p>
<p>BRICS has come to be viewed as <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/13540661231183352">challenging the counter hegemony</a> of the US and its allies, seen as meddling in the internal affairs of other states. </p>
<p>Reuters estimates that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/more-than-40-nations-interested-joining-brics-south-africa-2023-07-20/#:%7E:text=South%20African%20officials%20want%20BRICS,Kazakhstan%20have%20all%20expressed%20interest.">more than 40 states</a> are aspiring to join BRICS. South African diplomat Anil Sooklal says 13 had <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/2023/05/28/how-brics-became-a-real-club-and-why-others-want-in/5caecc7e-fdb7-11ed-9eb0-6c94dcb16fcf_story.html">formally applied</a> by May 2023.</p>
<p>Many, though not all, of the aspiring joiners have this overtly political motivation of countering US hegemony. The other important incentive is access to funds from the BRICS’ <a href="https://www.ndb.int/projects/">New Development Bank</a>. This is especially pronounced in the post-COVID climate in which many economies are <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1136727#:%7E:text=Prospects%20for%20a%20robust%20global,Prospects%20report%2C%20released%20on%20Tuesday.">yet to fully recover</a>. Of course the two can overlap, as in the case of Iran.</p>
<p>The notable applicants have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus-says-it-has-applied-join-brics-club-russian-ria-agency-2023-07-25/">included</a> Saudi Arabia, Belarus, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-wants-to-join-the-brics-group-of-nations-an-expert-unpacks-the-pros-and-cons-209141">Ethiopia</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentina-says-has-chinas-support-join-brics-group-2022-07-07/">Argentina</a>, <a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2022/11/09/the-new-candidate-countries-for-brics-expansion/">Algeria, Iran</a>, Mexico, and <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkiye-obvious-nation-for-expanded-brics-says-leading-economist/2896122">Turkey</a>. </p>
<h2>Expanded BRICS</h2>
<p>A strategically expanded BRICS would be seismic for the world order, principally in economic terms. </p>
<p>Key among the club’s reported priorities is <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/24/brics-currency-end-dollar-dominance-united-states-russia-china/">reduction of reliance</a> on the US dollar (“de-dollarisation” of the global economy). One of the hurdles to this is the lack of buy-in by much of the world. Though some states may disagree with the dollar’s dominance, they still see it as the most reliable.</p>
<p>Given the extent of globalisation, it’s unlikely that there will be attempts to chip away at the west’s access to strategic minerals and trade routes as happened during the <a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/speech-president-nasser-alexandria-july-26-1956-extract">Suez Crisis of 1956</a>, at the height of the Cold War.</p>
<p>Instead, the new joiners would likely use their new BRICS membership to better bargain with their western partners, having more options on hand.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-wants-to-join-the-brics-group-of-nations-an-expert-unpacks-the-pros-and-cons-209141">Ethiopia wants to join the BRICS group of nations: an expert unpacks the pros and cons</a>
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<p>Herein lies the challenge (and the paradox) with BRICS expansion. On one hand, the grouping is not yet offering anything concrete to justify such drastic measures as de-dollarisation. On the other, the current five members also need to be selective about who they admit.</p>
<p>Among the considerations must surely be the track record of the applicants as well as their closeness to the west. The experience of having had a right-wing leader such as former Brazilian president <a href="https://theconversation.com/brazils-jair-bolsonaro-is-devastating-indigenous-lands-with-the-world-distracted-138478">Jair Bolsonaro</a> in its midst must have been a lesson about the need to be circumspect when admitting new members.</p>
<h2>Weighing the likely contenders</h2>
<p>In this regard, aspirants such as Saudi Arabia and Mexico seem the least likely to make the cut in the short term. That’s despite the Saudis’ oil wealth and Mexico’s <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/obrador-mexico-first-leftist-president-in-decades/4463520.html">leftist-progressive</a> leader Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador. Although they might be currently experiencing rocky relations with Washington, they have proven to be capable of rapprochement following previous disagreements with the US, with which they seem inextricably intertwined. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia has a long-term military relationship with the US, while Mexico is the US’s <a href="https://www.dallasfed.org/research/economics/2023/0711#:%7E:text=and%20border%20region-,Mexico%20seeks%20to%20solidify%20rank%20as%20top,partner%2C%20push%20further%20past%20China&text=Mexico%20became%20the%20top%20U.S.,four%20months%20of%20this%20year.">number-one trading partner</a>. </p>
<p>Of equal importance in the evaluation of potential new members is the relationship the aspirants have with the existing BRICS members. This is because another crucial lesson has been the tiff between two of its largest members, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20578911221108800?icid=int.sj-abstract.citing-articles.1">China and India</a>, over their disputed border. As a result of the uneasy relationship between two of its members, the bloc has become alert to the importance of <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1758-5899.13010">direct bilateral relations and dispute resolution</a> among its constituent leaders.</p>
<p>Among the applicants, Saudi Arabia, which has had a fractious relationship with Moscow in the past, seems to face an uphill climb. It also has difficult relations with Iran, another applicant, despite their recent rapprochement.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-role-as-host-of-the-brics-summit-is-fraught-with-dangers-a-guide-to-who-is-in-the-group-and-why-it-exists-206898">South Africa's role as host of the BRICS summit is fraught with dangers. A guide to who is in the group, and why it exists</a>
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<p>The country which seems the most suitable to join BRICS for ideological reasons, and will expand the bloc’s footing in the Caribbean, is Cuba. It enjoys strong ties with the existing members. It also has solid “counter-hegemonic” credentials, having been the bête noire of the US for more than 60 years. </p>
<p>Cuba is also a leader in the Latin American left and enjoys strong ties with many states in Central and South America (particularly with Guatemala, <a href="https://latinarepublic.com/2022/07/20/honduras-and-cuba-sign-a-memorandum-to-strengthen-bilateral-relations/">Honduras</a>, <a href="https://www.plenglish.com/news/2022/07/27/nicaraguan-fm-described-relations-with-cuba-as-endearing/">Nicaragua</a> and <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/venezuela-and-cuba-ties-bind">Venezuela</a>). Membership would boost its influence. </p>
<h2>Character matters</h2>
<p>If an expanded BRICS is to be an agent for change on the world scene, it will need to be capable of action. Having rivals, or states that are at least ambivalent towards each other, seems anathema to that.</p>
<p>Eager to proceed cautiously and expand strategically, the current BRICS states seems likely, at least in the short term, to pursue a <a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2022/11/09/the-new-candidate-countries-for-brics-expansion/">BRICS-plus</a> strategy. In other words, there may emerge different strata of membership, with full membership granted to states that meet the group’s criteria over time. </p>
<p>It is thus not mere expansion, but the character of the expansion which will guide the five principals on whether they grow from that number.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210507/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Siphamandla Zondi is affiliated with the University of Johannesburg. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bhaso Ndzendze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It is not mere expansion, but the character of the expansion which will guide the five Brics countries on whether they admit new members.Bhaso Ndzendze, Associate Professor (International Relations), University of JohannesburgSiphamandla Zondi, Acting Director: Institute for Pan-African Thought & Conversation, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2097182023-07-20T15:59:11Z2023-07-20T15:59:11ZAfrican Union: climate action offers organisation unique chance for revival<p>Much has been written about <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/05/16/six-african-nations-to-send-peace-mission-to-ukraine_6026867_4.html">the decision by certain African countries</a> to send out a peace mission to Ukraine in May. Reporters, however, failed at the time to pick up on one notable point: that the initiative was not taken within the framework of the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/la-guerre-de-l-information-aura-t-elle-lieu--9782100759729-page-252.htm">African Union</a> (AU). This is yet another illustration of the fact that this organisation is struggling to establish itself on the international stage.</p>
<p>The institution, which replaced the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2002 and brings together the continent’s 55 states, is based on the model of the European Union (EU). Headquartered in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, the AU’s main aims are to <a href="https://au.int/fr/appercu">“promote peace, security and stability on the continent”</a>, and to develop “common policies on trade, defence and external relations”. However, it has been grappling with its <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/454759/politique/financement-union-africaine-budjet-bailleurs-fonds-independance/">financial reliance on international partners</a> for a number of years, which <a href="https://issafrica.org/fr/iss-today/lindependance-financiere-de-lua-est-indispensable-au-renforcement-de-ses-partenariats">has called its independence into question</a>.</p>
<p>The AU is facing another difficulty relating to <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2022/01/04/l-union-africaine-manque-de-dirigeants-a-la-vision-reellement-panafricaine_6108185_3212.html">its leadership</a>: absorbed by internal and national problems, its successive chairpersons <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-guerres-mondiales-et-conflits-contemporains-2003-4-page-113.htm">often neglect pan-Africanist initiatives</a>.</p>
<p>The African Union is tasked with representing all the countries of an immense continent. There would be no position more in keeping with its status than putting the fight against global warming – the greatest challenge of our time – at the heart of its policy. Tackling this issue, which <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-africas-unreported-extreme-weather-in-2022-and-climate-change/">particularly affects the African continent</a>, could enable it to position itself at the <a href="https://aiccra.cgiar.org/news/africas-new-climate-change-strategy-gives-continental-roadmap-and-key-recommendations-towards">centre of the international chessboard</a>.</p>
<h2>The African Union, a secondary player in international relations</h2>
<p>Global players have always <a href="https://www.persee.fr/doc/rint_0294-3069_2009_num_85_1_1136">taken a great interest in Africa</a>, from the slave trade through colonisation to the present day. Since the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed a <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/03/07/the-new-scramble-for-africa">“new scramble for Africa”</a>, with the world’s powers expressing a growing interest in the continent. The number of Turkish diplomatic representations has more than tripled in just 20 years, and China is now the <a href="https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/china-ranks-ahead-of-america-as-the-largest-investor-in-africa-since-2010/62532rh">leading investor in Africa</a>. Despite all this, Africa’s role on the international stage has not fundamentally changed since the 19th century. In the eyes of the outside world, the African continent remains largely a passive subject, a mere supplier of raw materials.</p>
<p>[<em>More than 85,000 readers look to The Conversation France’s newsletter for expert insights into the world’s most pressing issues</em>. <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=france&region=fr">Sign up now</a>]</p>
<p>Yet in the 21st century, some claim that <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/africa-is-worlds-future-for-touring-us-vice-president-harris-20230324">Africa is the future of the world</a>. Large-scale conferences and summits are being organised by the United States, China, the EU, Russia, Turkey, Japan and many others. But let there be no mistake: this attention is mainly focused on certain African countries that are useful for their strategic resources or their particular geographical location. The AU, as an organisation, often takes a back seat.</p>
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<p>For example, at three recent high-profile conferences – the <a href="http://www.focac.org/eng/">Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</a> in November 2021, the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2022/02/17-18/">African Union–European Union Summit</a> in February 2022 and the <a href="https://www.state.gov/africasummit/photos/">US–Africa Leaders Summit</a> in December 2022 – the vast majority of African personalities invited represented states, while the AU was represented only by its chairperson and/or the chairperson of its commission.</p>
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<p>In a <a href="https://publicpolicyafrica.org/publications/policy-recommendation-will-the-african-union-become-irrelevant-on-the-international-stage">recent publication</a>, we pointed out that this configuration observed at forums that present themselves as platforms for dialogue between two entities demonstrates unambiguously that, today, the AU’s voice counts for no more than that of an African head of state.</p>
<p>The divisions within the intergovernmental organisation, which is often perceived as a <a href="https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/prif2211.pdf">union of heads of state</a>, reduce the scope of its decisions and prevent the emergence of a common pan-African voice.</p>
<h2>Reforming the African Union and identifying its key objectives</h2>
<p>To mobilise the resources it needs to function and regain the status it should have on the world stage, the AU urgently needs to propose priorities for action that are likely to massively attract external partners as well as member states.</p>
<p>In this respect, two documents dating from several years ago, whose recommendations have been insufficiently implemented, contain some interesting ideas. They are the 2017 <a href="https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/9024/Assembly%20AU%202%20XXIX_F.pdf">“Report on the Implementation of the Decision on the Institutional Reform of the African Union”</a>, drafted under the supervision of Rwandan President Paul Kagamé, then Chairperson of the AU, and aimed at turning around the AU as a whole, its modus operandi and its finances, and the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36204-doc-agenda2063_popular_version_fr.pdf">“Agenda 2063: the Africa We Want”</a>, published on 31 January 2015, aiming to make Africa a major and essential player on the international scene, through 20 fundamental objectives. Objective 7 seems the most likely to generate the massive global support that the pan-African institution really needs.</p>
<p>It reads as follows: “Economies and communities are environmentally sustainable and climate resilient”. To achieve this, the Agenda recommends insisting in particular on the sustainable management of natural resources and the conservation of biodiversity, developing sustainable consumption and production patterns, improving the security of water supplies and resilience to climate change, and working on prevention and preparedness in the face of natural disasters.</p>
<p>As global warming is a <a href="https://www.livescience.com/climate-change-humans-extinct.html">threat to the entire human race</a>, and <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4-wg2-chapter9-1.pdf">particularly to Africans</a>, this objective is naturally the one on which the AU should focus its efforts.</p>
<h2>Great Green Wall and Congo Basin as continental priorities</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.unccd.int/our-work/ggwi">Great Green Wall</a> for the Sahara and Sahel (GGW) has the vision to “sow the seeds of prosperity, peace and stability in the dry zones of Africa” by combating climate change. A key part of the GGW initiative is planting trees and restoring degraded land in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/la-grande-muraille-verte-enfin-en-passe-daccelerer-198900">dozen Sahelian countries</a>, from Mauritania to Djibouti.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://2100.org/wp-content/uploads/Prix-de-theses-francophones-prospective-2022-synthese-K.-Nsah.pdf">Congo Basin</a>, on the other hand, directly covers six Central African countries and is reputed to be home to around 10% of the world’s biodiversity and to <a href="https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/critical-ecosystems-congo-basin-peatlands">tropical rainforests and peatlands</a> that absorb huge quantities of greenhouse gases.</p>
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À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/literature-from-the-congo-basin-offers-ways-to-address-the-climate-crisis-182357">Literature from the Congo Basin offers ways to address the climate crisis</a>
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<p>Both are major areas for climate action for the AU, Africa and the world. We recently suggested <a href="https://lejournaldelafrique.com/en/the-role-of-english-and-local-languages-%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8Bin-communication-and-public-diplomacy-in-the-congo-basin/">stepping up climate communication and public diplomacy</a> on the Congo Basin.</p>
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<p>Bodies such as the <a href="https://www.fondsbleu.africa/">Congo Basin Blue Fund</a>, the <a href="https://pfbc-cbfp.org/home.html">Congo Basin Forest Partnership</a> (CBFP), the <a href="https://www.comifac.org/">Central African Forest Commission</a> (COMIFAC), and the <a href="https://pafc-certification.org/linitiative-pafc-bassin-du-congo/">PAFC Congo Basin Initiative</a> (CBI) are, from this point of view, large-scale environmental initiatives that have already prompted the AU’s main partners to commit themselves wholeheartedly.</p>
<h2>Climate action and the African Union</h2>
<p>In light of the above, we believe that climate action and diplomacy, particularly through the GGW initiative and the Congo Basin, could help the AU to restore its international image.</p>
<p>The GGW covers an area of 8,000 kilometres across the continent, where the fight against armed violence and extreme poverty are daily challenges. By <a href="https://unfccc.int/fr/news/la-grande-muraille-verte-pour-le-sahara-et-le-sahel-restauration-de-la-productivite-et-la-vitalite-de-la-region-du-sahel">restoring the productivity and vitality</a> of the Sahel region, the GGW would make it possible to achieve two thirds of the United Nations’ <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/fr/goals">Sustainable Development Goals</a> (SDG), although it is difficult to estimate how long it will take for the region’s populations to enjoy the benefits of this vegetation structure.</p>
<p>The fact that the AU has not included the GGW among its <a href="https://au.int/fr/agenda2063/projets-phares">flagship projects</a> could mean that the organisation has not yet grasped the enormous potential that such an initiative can generate in terms of financial and political resources. Through climate action alone, the GGW could considerably reduce <a href="https://www.banquemondiale.org/fr/region/afr/publication/climate-migration-in-africa-how-to-turn-the-tide">climate migration</a> and <a href="https://www.senat.fr/lc/lc209/lc209.html">illegal immigration</a> from Africa, on the one hand, by increasing the number of jobs in the various beneficiary countries and trade between these countries, and, on the other hand, by raising the level of food and human security.</p>
<p>In short, as <a href="https://www.publicpolicyafrica.org/publications/policy-recommendation-will-the-african-union-become-irrelevant-on-the-international-stage">we have demonstrated</a>, if the GGM is successfully implemented, it can gradually alleviate, or even resolve, a number of problems that concern not only Africa but also the West. Should it achieve the desired results, it will serve as an example for the restoration of certain desert areas on other continents.</p>
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À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/grande-muraille-verte-au-sahel-les-defis-de-la-prochaine-decennie-169177">Grande muraille verte au Sahel : les défis de la prochaine décennie</a>
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<p>Climate action backed by the Congo Basin could yet add more weight to the AU’s diplomacy. Unfortunately, the Congo Basin is not one of the AU’s flagship projects either. The continental institution has been almost invisible in climate negotiations such as the <a href="https://oneplanetsummit.fr/en/events-16/one-forest-summit-245">One Forest Summit</a> held in Gabon in March 2023 and is nowhere to be found in the <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/leplandelibreville30.03.23_cle4181e5.pdf">Libreville Plan</a> adopted at the summit. The time has come to wake up.</p>
<p>It is essential that the African Union plays a central role in climate diplomacy. To this end, we recommend that it immediately include the GGW and the Congo Basin among its priorities and flagship projects, for example by appointing special ambassadors responsible for these two initiatives. The GGW, on the one hand, and the Congo Basin, on the other, are valuable opportunities for which the AU must be the standard-bearer across the globe.</p>
<p>Better management of climate change and reduced food insecurity could have a significant impact on extreme violence in the Sahel and on illegal immigration, among other things. The industrialised countries will be among the first beneficiaries of successful action on the GGW and the Congo Basin. The AU could also boost regional trade and integration between some of the 11 GGW target countries and the six Congo Basin countries, thereby further strengthening its international position.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The emergence of a pan-African voice in the fight against global warming, a global issue, could enable the African Union to regain ground on the international stage.Kenneth Nsah, Expert in Comparative Literature and Environmental Humanities, Université de LilleEric Tevoedjre, Lecturer International Relations, African Politics, Regional Integration in Africa, and International Economics, Institut catholique de Lille (ICL)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2093742023-07-10T17:26:03Z2023-07-10T17:26:03ZWhat’s on the agenda as Biden heads to NATO summit: 5 essential reads as Western alliance talks expansion, Ukraine<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536635/original/file-20230710-12553-71np5b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=32%2C16%2C5442%2C3812&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A flagging alliance? Far from it.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-photograph-taken-on-july-10-shows-the-turkish-nato-and-news-photo/1518683648?adppopup=true">Yves Herman/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Leaders of the nations comprising NATO will meet for a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/whats-table-nato-vilnius-summit-2023-07-07/">two-day summit</a> beginning on July 11, 2023.</p>
<p>The gathering in the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius, comes at a pivotal moment for the Western security alliance – it is <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/07/10/1186712386/biden-is-in-europe-to-focus-on-u-s-alliances-and-nato-expansion">seeking to expand membership</a> and confront challenges ranging from the ongoing <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/ukraine-invasion-2022-117045">war in Ukraine</a> to a <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/chinas-military-aggression-in-the-indo-pacific-region/">perceived growing military threat</a> from China.</p>
<p>No doubt NATO members will want to present a united front at the meeting. But on a number of key issues, not everyone is in agreement. Here are some of the issues likely to be discussed and debated during the leaders’ summit.</p>
<h2>1. A pathway to Ukraine membership?</h2>
<p>With war in Europe the obvious backdrop to the summit, much talk will be about Ukraine. NATO members have been aiding Kyiv individually, through the supply of arms and aid. And the military alliance has been assisting through nonlethal support, such as medical supplies and training. But, as noted by <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/gov/webber-mark.aspx">Mark Webber</a>, professor of international politics at the U.K.’s University of Birmingham, what many in Kyiv <a href="https://theconversation.com/nato-vilnius-summit-will-reflect-fresh-sense-of-purpose-over-ukraine-war-but-hard-questions-remain-over-membership-issues-208293">really want is full membership</a>: “The bigger prize for Ukraine, however, is NATO membership. That would bring the country within the collective defense provisions of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and, in effect, extend U.S. – and U.K. – nuclear guarantees to Ukrainian territory.”</p>
<p>Webber noted that accommodating Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s request for “expedited” membership of the alliance will be difficult. “No one in NATO is arguing in favor of granting membership while Ukraine remains at war. Beyond that, the allies are divided.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nato-vilnius-summit-will-reflect-fresh-sense-of-purpose-over-ukraine-war-but-hard-questions-remain-over-membership-issues-208293">Nato: Vilnius summit will reflect fresh sense of purpose over Ukraine war – but hard questions remain over membership issues</a>
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<h2>2. What about Sweden?</h2>
<p>The NATO leaders’ summit will be the first at which the members present will include Finland, which joined in April. Fellow Nordic state Sweden is hoping to be next, perhaps even officially becoming the group’s 32nd member at the Vilnius meetup. </p>
<p>Sweden’s ascension had been held up by NATO member Turkey. Turkey’s recently reelected leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, had previous blocked the bid due to what he saw as the Swedish government’s reluctance to crack down on Kurdish “terrorists” being “harbored” in Sweden. But on the eve of the Vilnius summit, it was announced that Erdoğan had agreed to forward Sweden’s bid to the Turkish parliament for ratification.</p>
<p><a href="https://ii.umich.edu/ii/people/all/r/rgsuny.html">Ronald Suny</a>, a historian at University of Michigan, noted that Erdoğan’s reluctance to allow Sweden and Finland entry represented domestic concerns – international pressure on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, fits his agenda of suppressing Kurdish rights in Turkey. But it also highlights an <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-turkey-isnt-on-board-with-finland-sweden-joining-nato-and-why-that-matters-183277">underlying problem the alliance is facing</a>:</p>
<p>“NATO is supposed to be an alliance of democratic countries. Yet several of its members – notably Turkey and Hungary – have moved steadily away from liberal democracy toward ethnonational populist authoritarianism,” Suny wrote. “Finland and Sweden, on the other hand, fulfill the parameters of NATO membership more clearly than several of the alliance’s current members. As the United States proclaims that the war in Ukraine is a struggle between democracy and autocracy, Turkey’s opposition to the Nordics who have protested its drift to illiberalism are testing the unity and the ideological coherence of NATO.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-turkey-isnt-on-board-with-finland-sweden-joining-nato-and-why-that-matters-183277">Why Turkey isn't on board with Finland, Sweden joining NATO – and why that matters</a>
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<h2>3. The benefit of being a NATO member</h2>
<p>But why would Finland, Sweden, Ukraine and any other country look to join NATO? John Deni at American University School of International Service explained that Article 5 of the alliance’s treaty <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-poland-demand-nato-act-in-event-of-russian-attack-an-expert-explains-article-4-and-5-commitments-following-missile-blast-194714">calls for collective action</a> should any member be attacked.</p>
<p>“Article 5 really is the heart and soul of the NATO alliance. It is the part of the treaty that says that if one member is attacked, then all of the other members will treat it as an attack on them all. In effect, it calls for a collective response once requested by any of the current 30 members of NATO and invoked by the entire alliance,” he wrote.</p>
<p>But that doesn’t necessarily mean that the U.S. would have to mount a military response should an ally be attacked. “Article 5 was written in such a way that it allows each ally to decide for itself the best course of action to take – there is no prescribed response once the article is invoked,” Deni added.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/could-poland-demand-nato-act-in-event-of-russian-attack-an-expert-explains-article-4-and-5-commitments-following-missile-blast-194714">Could Poland demand NATO act in event of Russian attack? An expert explains Article 4 and 5 commitments following missile blast</a>
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<h2>4. The end of the neutral option?</h2>
<p>As Finland’s and Sweden’s desire to join NATO shows, smaller nations traditionally seen as aspiring to neutrality are, in the words of University of Michigan’s Ronald Suny, “recalculating how they fit into this renewed division of the world.”</p>
<p>Suny noted that, with Finland’s entry into NATO and the now high chance of once-neutral Sweden joining it, <a href="https://theconversation.com/finland-nato-and-the-evolving-new-world-order-what-small-nations-know-203278">other states are questioning</a> “the efficacy of nonalignment in a polarized world.” </p>
<p>“In its place, we have the ‘NATOfication’ of Eastern Europe – something that Putin unwittingly accelerated and which leaves Putin’s Russia with less accommodating neighbors,” Suny wrote.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/finland-nato-and-the-evolving-new-world-order-what-small-nations-know-203278">Finland, NATO and the evolving new world order – what small nations know</a>
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<h2>5. A cluster bomb controversy</h2>
<p>A last-minute area of controversy emerged as NATO leaders prepared to gather in Vilnius: cluster bombs.</p>
<p>On July 7, 2023, the Biden administration announced that it would supply Ukraine with the controversial munition, which scatters bomblets across a wide area. The problem is not all NATO countries are in agreement with the U.S. move. Germany, the U.K. and Canada – which are among the 120-plus countries that have signed an international treaty banning the use of cluster bombs – have all already expressed their misgivings.</p>
<p>Robert Goldman, a laws of war expert at American University, explained that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/there-is-no-legal-reason-the-us-cant-supply-cluster-bombs-to-ukraine-but-that-doesnt-make-biden-decision-to-do-so-morally-right-207717">White House had previously shown hesitancy</a> over selling cluster bombs to Ukraine in part because of the “optics” and over concerns that “it may introducing a wedge between the U.S. and other NATO countries.”</p>
<p>Goldman explained that there is no law preventing the U.S. from providing cluster bombs to the Ukraine or any other country. “Nonetheless, providing Ukraine with cluster weapons could serve to destigmatize them and runs counter to international efforts to end their use. And that, in turn, could encourage – or excuse – their use by other states that may be less responsible,” he argued.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/there-is-no-legal-reason-the-us-cant-supply-cluster-bombs-to-ukraine-but-that-doesnt-justify-bidens-decision-to-do-so-207717">There is no legal reason the US can’t supply cluster bombs to Ukraine – but that doesn’t justify Biden's decision to do so</a>
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<p><em>Editor’s note: This article was updated on July 10, 2023 in light of Turkey agreeing to forward Sweden’s NATO bid for ratification.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209374/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Leaders of the Western military alliance meet in Lithuania with the ongoing war in Ukraine as a backdrop.Matt Williams, Senior International EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2079592023-07-03T11:51:47Z2023-07-03T11:51:47ZThe Global South is on the rise – but what exactly is the Global South?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534689/original/file-20230628-19-ibxriy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=49%2C0%2C5472%2C3637&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The world turned upside down</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/illustration/global-south-royalty-free-illustration/1456945486?phrase=%22global+south%22&adppopup=true">iStock / Getty Images Plus</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The unwillingness of many leading countries <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/beijing-new-york-city-billionaires-comparison-2021-4#:%7E:text=new%20billionaire%20capital.-,For%20the%20first%20time%20ever%2C%20Beijing%20is%20home%20to%20more,City's%2099%20billionaires%2C%20per%20Forbes.">in Africa</a>, <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/india-remaining-neutral-russias-invasion-ukraine/story?id=97891228">Asia</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/12/world/americas/brazil-ukraine-weapons.html">and Latin America</a> to stand with NATO over the war in Ukraine has brought to the fore once again the term “Global South.”</p>
<p>“Why does so much of the Global South support Russia?” <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/03/29/why-does-so-much-of-the-global-south-support-russia-not-ukraine">inquired one recent headline</a>; “Ukraine courts ‘Global South’ in push to challenge Russia,” <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/23/ukraine-courts-global-south-in-push-to-challenge-russia">declared another</a>.</p>
<p>But what is meant by that term, and why has it gained currency in recent years?</p>
<p>The Global South refers to various countries around the world that are <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2015/01/04/372684438/if-you-shouldnt-call-it-the-third-world-what-should-you-call-it">sometimes described as “developing</a>,” “less developed” or “underdeveloped.” Many of these countries – although by no means all – are in the Southern Hemisphere, largely in Africa, Asia and Latin America.</p>
<p>In general, they are poorer, have higher levels of income inequality and suffer lower life expectancy and harsher living conditions <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/global-south-countries">than countries in the “Global North</a>” — that is, richer nations that are located mostly in North America and Europe, with some additions in Oceania and elsewhere.</p>
<h2>Going beyond the ‘Third World’</h2>
<p>The term Global South appears to have been first used in 1969 by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/14/us/carl-oglesby-antiwar-leader-in-1960s-dies-at-76.html">political activist Carl Oglesby</a>. Writing in the <a href="https://aesop-planning.eu/images/uploads/special_issue_final-theories-gloabl-south.pdf">liberal Catholic magazine Commonweal</a>, Oglesby argued that the war in Vietnam was the culmination of a history of northern “dominance over the global south.”</p>
<p>But it was only after the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/collapse-soviet-union#:%7E:text=On%20December%2025%2C%201991%2C%20the,the%20newly%20independent%20Russian%20state.">1991 breakup of the Soviet Union</a> – which marked the <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/second-world-countries">end of the so-called “Second World</a>” – that the term gained momentum.</p>
<p>Until then, the more common term for developing nations – countries that had yet to industrialize fully – was “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3180660">Third World</a>.”</p>
<p>That term was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/01/obituaries/alfred-sauvy-expert-on-demographics-92.html">coined by Alfred Sauvy</a> in 1952, in an analogy with France’s historical three estates: the nobility, the clergy and the bourgeoisie. The term “First World” referred to the advanced capitalist nations; the “Second World,” to the socialist nations led by the Soviet Union; and the “Third World,” to developing nations, many at the time still under the colonial yoke.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/education/2013/mar/28/peter-worsley">Sociologist Peter Worsley</a>’s 1964 book, “<a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/T/bo4432964.html">The Third World: A Vital New Force in International Affairs</a>,” further popularized the term. The book also made note of the “Third World” forming the backbone of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-the-non-aligned-movement-in-the-21st-century-66057">Non-Aligned Movement</a>, which had been founded just three years earlier as a riposte to bipolar Cold War alignment.</p>
<p>Though Worsley’s view of this “Third World” was positive, the term became associated with countries plagued by poverty, squalor and instability. “Third World” became a synonym for banana republics ruled by tinpot dictators – a <a href="https://cyber.harvard.edu/digitaldemocracy/mezzana.htm">caricature spread by Western media</a>.</p>
<p>The fall of the Soviet Union – and with it the end of the so-called Second World – gave a convenient pretext for the term “Third World” to disappear, too. Usage of the term fell rapidly in the 1990s.</p>
<p>Meanwhile “developed,” “developing” and “underdeveloped” <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2015/01/04/372684438/if-you-shouldnt-call-it-the-third-world-what-should-you-call-it">also faced criticism</a> for holding up Western countries as the ideal, while portraying those outside that club as backwards.</p>
<p>Increasingly the term that was being used to replace them was the more neutral-sounding “Global South.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Graph shows a line depicting usage of the term 'Third World' which bulges in the mid 1980s." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534696/original/file-20230628-21-vgi7ot.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534696/original/file-20230628-21-vgi7ot.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=223&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534696/original/file-20230628-21-vgi7ot.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=223&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534696/original/file-20230628-21-vgi7ot.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=223&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534696/original/file-20230628-21-vgi7ot.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=281&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534696/original/file-20230628-21-vgi7ot.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=281&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534696/original/file-20230628-21-vgi7ot.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=281&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Chart shows the usage over time of ‘Global South,’ Third World,‘ and 'Developing countries’ in English language sources.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=Global+South%2CThird+World%2CDeveloping+countries&year_start=1945&year_end=2019&corpus=en-2019&smoothing=3">Google Books Ngram Viewer</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<h2>Geopolitical, not geographical</h2>
<p>The term “Global South” is not geographical. In fact, the Global South’s two largest countries – China and India – lie entirely in the Northern Hemisphere. </p>
<p>Rather, its usage denotes a mix of political, geopolitical and economic commonalities between nations.</p>
<p>Countries in the Global South were mostly at the receiving end of imperialism and colonial rule, with African countries as perhaps the most visible example of this. It gives them a very different outlook on what <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2016/11/23/dependency-theory-a-useful-tool-for-analyzing-global-inequalities-today/">dependency theorists</a> have described as the relationship between the center and periphery in the world political economy – or, to put it in simple terms, the relationship between “the West and the rest.” </p>
<p>Given the imbalanced past relationship between many of the countries of the Global South and the Global North – both during the age of empire and the Cold War – it is little wonder that today many opt <a href="https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2023/02/27/non-alignment-is-back-in-the-global-south-albeit-in-a-different-incarnation/">not to be aligned with any one great power</a>.</p>
<p>And whereas the terms “Third World” and “underdeveloped” convey images of economic powerlessness, that isn’t true of the “Global South.”</p>
<p>Since the turn of the 21st century, a “<a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/shaping-the-asia-pacific-economic-order-2/">shift in wealth</a>,” as<a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/554911468179972438/pdf/96467-PUB-PUBLIC-Box391437B-9781464803550-EMBARGOED-19May2015-930am.pdf"> the World Bank has referred</a> to it, from the North Atlantic to Asia Pacific has upended much of the conventional wisdom on where the world’s riches are being generated.</p>
<p>By 2030 <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/us-economy-to-fall-behind-china-within-a-year-standard-chartered-says-2019-1">it is projected</a> that three of the four largest economies will be from the Global South – with the order being China, India, the United States and Indonesia. Already the GDP in terms of purchasing power of the the Global South-dominated BRICS nations – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – <a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2023/03/27/the-brics-has-overtaken-the-g7-in-global-gdp/">surpasses that of the Global North’s G7 club</a>. And there are now <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/beijing-new-york-city-billionaires-comparison-2021-4#:%7E:text=new%20billionaire%20capital.-,For%20the%20first%20time%20ever%2C%20Beijing%20is%20home%20to%20more,City's%2099%20billionaires%2C%20per%20Forbes.">more billionaires in Beijing</a> than in New York City. </p>
<h2>Global South on the march</h2>
<p>This economic shift has gone hand in hand with enhanced political visibility. Countries in the Global South are increasingly asserting themselves on the global scene – be it <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-longterm-partnership-with-us-fades-saudi-arabia-seeks-to-diversify-its-diplomacy-and-recent-deals-with-china-iran-and-russia-fit-this-strategy-202211">China’s brokering of Iran and Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement</a> or Brazil’s <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/24/americas/brazil-lula-ukraine-peace-coalition-intl-latam/index.html">attempt to push a peace plan</a> to end the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>This shift in economic and political power has led experts in geopolitics like <a href="https://www.paragkhanna.com/">Parag Khanna</a> and <a href="https://mahbubani.net/">Kishore Mahbubani</a> to write about the <a href="https://www.paragkhanna.com/book/the-future-is-asian-commerce-conflict-and-culture-in-the-21st-century/">coming of an “Asian Century</a>.” Others, like political scientist <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/experts/2031">Oliver Stuenkel</a>, have began <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2017/04/29/making-the-most-of-a-post-western-world">talking about a “post-Western world</a>.”</p>
<p>One thing is for sure: The Global South is flexing political and economic muscles that the “developing countries” and the “Third World” never had.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207959/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jorge Heine is a Wilson Center Global Fellow and a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for China and Globalization and a former Chilean ambassador to China, to India and to South Africa.</span></em></p>Terms like ‘Third World’ and ‘developing nations’ have long fallen out of fashion.Jorge Heine, Interim Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2070782023-06-16T12:36:59Z2023-06-16T12:36:59ZThe Global South is forging a new foreign policy in the face of war in Ukraine, China-US tensions: Active nonalignment<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532264/original/file-20230615-16608-dw7p4b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=365%2C455%2C3502%2C2143&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lula and Modi walking a new diplomatic path.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/vietnams-prime-minister-pham-minh-chinh-japans-prime-news-photo/1256611319?adppopup=true">Takashi Aoyama/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>What does the Ukraine war have to do with Brazil? On the face of it, perhaps not much.</p>
<p>Yet, in his <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/01/01/1146518711/leftist-lula-brazil-sworn-in-president">first six months in office</a>, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva – now in his third nonconsecutive term – has expended much effort <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/24/americas/brazil-lula-ukraine-peace-coalition-intl-latam/index.html">trying to bring peace</a> to the conflict in Eastern Europe. This has included <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/02/10/joint-statement-following-the-meeting-between-president-biden-and-president-lula/">conversations with U.S. President Joe Biden</a> in Washington, <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202304/t20230414_11059515.html">Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing</a> and in a teleconference call with <a href="https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/lula-speaks-via-videoconference-with-the-president-of-ukraine-volodymyr-zelensky">Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy</a>. It has also seen “shuttle diplomacy” by Lula’s chief foreign policy adviser – and former foreign minister – Celso Amorim, who has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/brazil-envoy-met-putin-push-ukraine-peace-talks-cnn-brasil-2023-04-03/">visited Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/04/18/brazil-russia-ukraine-kirby-blowback-00092485">welcomed his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov</a>, in Brasília.</p>
<p>One reason Brazil has been in a position to meet with such an array of parties involved in the conflict is because the nation <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/brazil-wont-take-sides-over-russias-invasion-ukraine-foreign-minister-2022-03-08/">has made a point of not taking sides</a> in the war. In so doing, Brazil is engaging in what my colleagues <a href="https://www.ids.ac.uk/people/carlos-fortin/">Carlos Fortin</a> and <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/carlos-ominami">Carlos Ominami</a> <a href="https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/profile/jorge-heine/">and I</a> have called “<a href="https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/2022/08/15/heine-outlines-the-doctrine-of-active-non-alignment/">active nonalignment</a>.” By this we mean a foreign policy approach in which countries from the Global South – Africa, Asia and Latin America – refuse to take sides in conflicts between the great powers and focus strictly on their own interests. It is an approach that The Economist has <a href="https://www.economist.com/international/2023/04/11/how-to-survive-a-superpower-split">characterized as</a> “how to survive a superpower split.”</p>
<p>The difference between this new “nonalignment” and a similar approach <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-the-non-aligned-movement-in-the-21st-century-66057">adopted by nations in decades past</a> is that it is happening in an era in which developing nations are in a much stronger position than they once were, with rising powers emerging among them. For example, the gross domestic product in regard to purchasing power of the five BRICS countries - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – has <a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2023/03/27/the-brics-has-overtaken-the-g7-in-global-gdp/">overtaken that of the G7</a> group of advanced economic nations. This growing economic power gives active nonaligned nations more international clout, allowing them to forge new initiatives and diplomatic coalition-building in a manner that would have been unthinkable before. Would, for example, João Goulart, who served as <a href="https://library.brown.edu/create/fivecenturiesofchange/chapters/chapter-6/presidents/joao-goulart/">Brazil’s president from 1961 to 1964</a>, have attempted to mediate in the Vietnam War, in the same way that Lula is doing with Ukraine? I believe to ask the question is to answer it.</p>
<h2>Neither neutral nor disinterested</h2>
<p>The growth of active nonalignment has been fueled by the increased competition and what I see as a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/16/u.s.-china-trade-war-has-become-cold-war-pub-85352">budding second Cold War</a> between the United States and China. For many countries in the Global South, maintaining good relations with both Washington and Beijing has been crucial for economic development, as well as trade and investment flows.</p>
<p>It is simply not in their interest to take sides in this growing conflict. At the same time, active nonalignment is not to be confused with neutrality – <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/law8_final.pdf">a legal position under international law</a> that entails certain duties and obligations. Being neutral means not taking a stance, which is not the case in active nonalignment.</p>
<p>Nor is active nonalignment about remaining equidistant, politically, from the great powers. On some issues – say, on democracy and human rights – it is perfectly possible for an active nonaligned policy to take a position closer to the United States. While on others – say, international trade – the country may side more with China.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Men in suits stand by the coast." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=909&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=909&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=909&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1142&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1142&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1142&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Yugoslavian President Marshal Tito at the Non-Aligned Movement conference in 1956.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/from-left-to-right-egyptian-president-gamal-abdel-nasser-news-photo/1365178535?adppopup=true">Archive Photos/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This form of nonalignment requires a highly fine-tuned diplomacy, one that examines each issue on its merits and makes choices steeped in statecraft. </p>
<h2>Opting out across the world</h2>
<p>As far as the war in Ukraine is concerned, it means not supporting either Russia or NATO. And Brazil isn’t the only country in the Global South taking that position, although it was the first to attempt to broker a peace agreement. </p>
<p>Across <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/05/western-allies-pressure-african-countries-to-condemn-russia/">Africa</a>, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/indonesia-jokowi-walks-tightrope-balancing-ties-with-russia-west/a-62396110">Asia</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fc8d51c8-5202-4862-a653-87d1603deded">Latin America</a>, several key countries have <a href="https://theconversation.com/when-two-elephants-fight-how-the-global-south-uses-non-alignment-to-avoid-great-power-rivalries-199418">refused to side with NATO</a>. Most prominent among them has been India, which despite its closer ties with the United States in recent years and its joining the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-present-and-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue">Quadrilateral Security Dialogue</a> – or the “Quad,” a group sometimes described as an “Asian NATO” – with the U.S., Japan and Australia, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/2023/03/16/explainer-why-india-walks-a-tightrope-between-us-and-russia/8bbe579c-c3fa-11ed-82a7-6a87555c1878_story.html">refused to condemn Russia’s invasion</a> of Ukraine and has significantly <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-01-16/india-now-buying-33-times-more-russian-oil-than-a-year-earlier">increased its imports of Russian oil</a>.</p>
<p>India’s nonalignment will presumably be on the agenda during <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-modi-india-state-visit-white-house-c969d6e4e9770c105ca7affe7c190714">Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s talks with Biden</a> in his upcoming visit to Washington.</p>
<p>Indeed, the position of India, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12557384">world’s largest democracy</a>, shows how the war in Ukraine, far from reflecting that the main geopolitical cleavage in the world today is between democracy and autocracy, <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/democracy-vs-autocracy-biden-s-inflection-point">as Biden has argued</a>, reveals that the real divide is between the Global North and the Global South.</p>
<p>Some of the most populous democracies in the world in addition to India – countries like <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/indonesia-jokowi-walks-tightrope-balancing-ties-with-russia-west/a-62396110">Indonesia</a>, <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/pakistan-plays-on-both-sides-of-ukraine-war/articleshow/98496174.cms?from=mdr">Pakistan</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/6/2/a-russian-love-affair-why-south-africa-stays-neutral-on-war">South Africa</a>, Brazil, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/collection/blog-mexico-and-war-ukraine">Mexico</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/24/argentina-fernandez-russia-ukraine-war-brazil-lula-nonalignment/">Argentina</a> – have refused to side with NATO. Almost no country in Africa, Asia and Latin America has supported <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/countries-have-sanctioned-russia">the diplomatic and economic sanctions</a> against Russia. </p>
<p>Although many of these nations have voted to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the United Nations General Assembly, where <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/13/un-condemns-russias-annexations-in-ukraine-how-countries-voted">140-plus member states have repeatedly done so</a>, none wants to make what they consider to be a European war into a global one.</p>
<h2>How the ‘great powers’ are reacting</h2>
<p>Washington has seemingly been <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/10/nonalignment-superpowers-developing-world-us-west-russia-china-india-geopolitics-ukraine-war-sanctions/">caught by surprise</a> by this reaction, having portrayed the war in Ukraine as a choice between good and evil – one where the future of the “rules-based international order” is at stake. Similarly, during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/27/taking-nonalignment-seriously/">referred to nonalignment as “immoral</a>.”</p>
<p>Russia has seen the new nonaligned movement as an opening to bolster its own position, with Foreign Minister Lavrov <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/lavrov-returns-to-africa/">crisscrossing Africa, Asia and Latin America</a> to buttress Moscow’s opposition to sanctions. China, in turn, has ramped up its campaign to enhance the <a href="https://theconversation.com/war-in-ukraine-might-give-the-chinese-yuan-the-boost-it-needs-to-become-a-major-global-currency-and-be-a-serious-contender-against-the-us-dollar-205519">international role of the yuan</a>, arguing that the weaponization of the U.S. dollar against Russia only confirms the dangers of relying on it as the main world currency.</p>
<p>But I would argue that active nonalignment depends as much on regional multilateralism and cooperation as it does on these high-profile meetings. A recent <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/south-americas-presidents-meet-in-brazil-for-the-first-regional-summit-in-9-years">South American diplomatic summit</a> in Brasília called by Lula – the first such meeting held in 10 years – reflects Brazil’s awareness of the need to work with neighbors to deploy its international initiatives. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Three men sit at a bench the one in the center has a plaque saying 'Brazil' on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brazil President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva speaks during a meeting with fellow South American leaders on May 30, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/brazils-president-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-speaks-during-a-news-photo/1258293847?adppopup=true">Mateus Bonomi/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Think local, act global</h2>
<p>This need to act jointly is also driven by the <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/latin-america-crisis-economy-castillo-peru-lula-brazil-chile-boric/">region’s economic crisis</a>. In 2020, Latin America was hit by its worst economic downturn in 120 years, with regional GDP <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---americas/---ro-lima/---sro-port_of_spain/documents/genericdocument/wcms_819029.pdf">falling by an average of 6.6%</a>. The region also suffered the highest COVID-19 death rate anywhere in the world, accounting <a href="https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/47923/1/S2200158_en.pdf">for close to 30% of global fatalities</a> from the pandemic despite comprising just over 8% of the world’s population. In this context, to be caught in the middle of a great power battle is unappealing, and active nonalignment has resonated.</p>
<p>Beyond the incipient U.S.-China Cold War and the war in Ukraine, the resurrection of nonalignment in its new “active” incarnation reflects a widespread disenchantment in the Global South with what has been <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/liberal-international-order-free-world-trump-authoritarianism/569881/">known as the “Liberal International Order”</a> in existence since World War II. </p>
<p>This order is seen as increasingly frayed and unresponsive to the needs of developing countries on issues ranging from <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/international-debt-time-global-restructuring-framework">international indebtedness</a> and <a href="https://time.com/6246278/david-beasley-global-hunger-interview/">food security</a> to <a href="https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/migration-myths-and-the-global-south/">migration</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/5/11/climate-change-is-devastating-the-global-south">and climate change</a>. To many nations in the Global South, calls to uphold the “rules-based order” appear to serve only the foreign policy interests of the great powers, rather than the global public good. In such a context, it is perhaps not surprising that so many nations are actively refusing to be caught in an “us versus them” dynamic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207078/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jorge Heine is a Wilson Center Global Fellow and a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for China and Globalization and a former Chilean ambassador to China, to India and to South Africa.</span></em></p>Brazil and India are among the countries pointedly not taking sides over the war in Ukraine. But this is not the nonaligned movement of yesteryear.Jorge Heine, Interim Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2062792023-05-31T12:38:36Z2023-05-31T12:38:36ZAmid fears of Chinese influence, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States has grown more powerful<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528124/original/file-20230524-29-gqrmoj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=21%2C0%2C4824%2C3094&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Business deals by foreign countries in the U.S. can be reviewed by the government for national security risks.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/SAYzxuS1O3M">Jason Leung for Unsplash</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A Chinese private equity firm, <a href="https://www.primavera-capital.com/">Primavera Capital Group</a>, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/princeton-review-and-tutor-com-are-now-owned-by-a-chinese-company-58ebea38">acquired</a> the well-known test preparation company <a href="https://www.princetonreview.com/">Princeton Review</a> and an online learning platform, <a href="https://www.tutor.com/">Tutor.com</a>, in May 2023. </p>
<p>The move, like other Chinese investments in tech and those that deal with personal information, is increasingly drawing the attention of <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/republican-demands-china-american-education">politicians,</a> the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/princeton-review-and-tutor-com-are-now-owned-by-a-chinese-company-58ebea38">U.S. government and national security experts</a> – especially as tensions rise between the U.S. and China.</p>
<p>What remains unclear, however, is if this seemingly routine business acquisition was reviewed by the <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius">Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S.</a>, which has authority to examine transactions involving foreign investment. The committee is largely prohibited from publicly <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius">disclosing any information filed with it</a>, including if it is reviewing a transaction or if one was referred for review. </p>
<p>While the committee is hardly a household name, its mission and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-happens-when-foreign-investment-becomes-security-risk">expanding oversight</a> have important implications for the U.S. economy and national security. </p>
<h2>Government oversight</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528130/original/file-20230524-27-rcavor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The dark grey dome of the U.S. Capitol Building against a light grey sky." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528130/original/file-20230524-27-rcavor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528130/original/file-20230524-27-rcavor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528130/original/file-20230524-27-rcavor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528130/original/file-20230524-27-rcavor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528130/original/file-20230524-27-rcavor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528130/original/file-20230524-27-rcavor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528130/original/file-20230524-27-rcavor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Congress strengthened the Committee on Foreign Investment’s powers, allowing it to scrutinize foreign investments in areas including cybersecurity, microelectronics and artificial intelligence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/SYHi8oX0JC8">joshua sukoff for Unsplash.com</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/11858.html">The Committee on Foreign Investment</a>, a U.S. government interagency committee established in 1975 by <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/gerald-r-ford/">President Gerald Ford</a>, is tasked with studying and <a href="https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33388.html">coordinating the implementation of policy</a> on foreign investment in America.</p>
<p>Investment by foreign countries <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-happens-when-foreign-investment-becomes-security-risk">greatly benefits</a> the U.S., supporting <a href="https://www.trade.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/IndirectJobsSelectUSABrief.pdf">10.1%</a> of the total labor force in 2019. Yet beginning in the 1980s, the federal government grew increasingly concerned about potentially harmful effects of foreign investment in the U.S. For example, if a foreign firm gets control of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-happens-when-foreign-investment-becomes-security-risk">sensitive technologies</a>, it could hurt national competitive advantages or even threaten national security.</p>
<p>The primary objective of the committee is to review selected foreign investments and some real estate transactions by foreigners in the U.S. for their national security implications. Real estate transactions are generally scrutinized only when a transaction involves land that is either close to a <a href="https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2022/08/revisiting-cfius-jurisdiction-over-real-estate-transactions">military base or near an airport or seaport</a>. </p>
<h2>Vetting foreign investments</h2>
<p>In the 1980s, political concern grew about <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/nsiad-91-140.pdf">Japanese investment</a> and, specifically, the proposed purchase by Japanese computer giant <a href="https://www.fujitsu.com/global/products/computing/pc/notebooks/">Fujitsu</a> of chipmaker <a href="https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160919005796/en/Semiconductor-Successfully-Completes-Acquisition-Fairchild-Semiconductor-2.4">Fairchild Semiconductor</a>. The purchase of Fairfield Semiconductor was considered a sensitive industry, with potential defense applications, and prompted Congress in 1988 to pass the <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-06-135t#:%7E:text=The%201988%20Exon%2DFlorio%20amendment,President%20has%20taken%20only%20once.">Exon-Florio amendment</a> to the <a href="https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-03/Defense_Production_Act_2018.pdf">Defense Production Act of 1950</a>. </p>
<p>This amendment empowered the committee to not just review foreign investment deals but also to recommend rejecting them. Acting on its recommendation, a U.S. president could <a href="https://www.cooley.com/services/practice/export-controls-economic-sanctions/cfius-overview">block a foreign transaction</a> on “national security” grounds. For instance, in 1990, President George H. W. Bush <a href="https://nuke.fas.org/guide/china/contractor/90020112.html">voided the sale</a> of MAMCO Manufacturing, which made metal parts for airplanes, to a Chinese agency, ordering the China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation to <a href="http://www.usa.com/frs/mamco-manufacturing-inc.html">divest itself of the Seattle-based company</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528134/original/file-20230524-21-znbif1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A teal-green schematic on a black background computer screen." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528134/original/file-20230524-21-znbif1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528134/original/file-20230524-21-znbif1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528134/original/file-20230524-21-znbif1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528134/original/file-20230524-21-znbif1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528134/original/file-20230524-21-znbif1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528134/original/file-20230524-21-znbif1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528134/original/file-20230524-21-znbif1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Foreign investments scrutinized by the U.S. can range from agricultural supply chains to biotechnology and quantum computing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/EUsVwEOsblE">adi goldstein for Unsplash.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the context of a committee review, the term <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-happens-when-foreign-investment-becomes-security-risk">national security</a> typically refers to foreign transactions that could cause significant outsourcing of jobs, a loss of control over agricultural supply chains, the sharing of sensitive technologies, control of a firm that satisfies <a href="https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/publications/West-NatlSecImplicationsOfForeignInvestment.pdf">defense needs</a>, or the impairment of critical infrastructure.</p>
<h2>Strengthening the committee</h2>
<p>In 2006, <a href="https://www.dpworld.com/">Dubai Ports World</a>, owned by the United Arab Emirates government, was about to gain managerial control of six U.S. ports in a major deal. Because of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2006/02/22/5228645/new-york-senator-wants-to-halt-ports-deal">terrorism-related concerns</a>, <a href="https://www.schumer.senate.gov/">Sen. Chuck Schumer</a> led a <a href="https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/pdin_monitor_article/dubai-ports-controversy-uproar-heard-round-world">campaign against this proposal</a> and the transaction was eventually called off, even though it had initially been approved by both the committee and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/george-w-bush/">President George W. Bush</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528129/original/file-20230524-25-gch40s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="White sand beach in the foreground with Abu Dhabi skyscrapers in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528129/original/file-20230524-25-gch40s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528129/original/file-20230524-25-gch40s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528129/original/file-20230524-25-gch40s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528129/original/file-20230524-25-gch40s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528129/original/file-20230524-25-gch40s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528129/original/file-20230524-25-gch40s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528129/original/file-20230524-25-gch40s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Political concern scuttled a United Arab Emirates deal to manage U.S. ports and triggered greater power for the Committee on Foreign Investment.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/DDMFhAPS19Y">Damian Kamp for Unsplash.com</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/10/politics/under-pressure-dubai-company-drops-port-deal.html">the aftermath of this controversy</a>, lawmakers passed the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/110/plaws/publ49/PLAW-110publ49.pdf">Foreign Investment and National Security Act</a> in 2007, giving Congress greater oversight of the committee to ensure that potential acquisitions were adequately reviewed. In addition, it required the committee to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-happens-when-foreign-investment-becomes-security-risk">scrutinize all foreign investment deals</a> in which the pertinent overseas entity is either owned or controlled by a foreign power. </p>
<h2>National security concerns</h2>
<p>Over time, the Committee on Foreign Investment has been given more power to reflect and act on the political and economic concerns of the U.S.</p>
<p>China, for example, appears to have <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/essay/the-long-game-chinas-grand-strategy-to-displace-american-order/">global ambitions</a> to replace the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/why-american-power-endures-us-led-order-isnt-in-decline-g-john-ikenberry">U.S.-led world order</a>. As it gains geopolitical power, China has come under <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/04/12/americans-are-critical-of-chinas-global-role-as-well-as-its-relationship-with-russia/">increased scrutiny</a> by the U.S., with public support to <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/03/04/most-americans-support-tough-stance-toward-china-on-human-rights-economic-issues/">get tough with China on economic issues</a>. In response to these concerns, concrete steps have been taken by U.S. lawmakers to increase the scope of what the committee is able to do. </p>
<p>In 2018, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/donald-j-trump/">President Donald Trump</a> signed the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5841/text">Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act</a>, giving the committee new powers over certain types of foreign investment that affect many <a href="https://illinoislawreview.org/print/vol-2023-no-2/superpower-rivalry-and-the-modernization-of-foreign-investment-risk-review/">Chinese investors</a>. In the two-year period after the passage of the act, transaction registrations from Chinese investors <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-happens-when-foreign-investment-becomes-security-risk">fell by 43%</a>.</p>
<p>In 2022, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/president-biden/">President Joe Biden</a> signed an executive order directing the committee to sharpen its <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/biden-tells-foreign-investment-panel-screen-deals-data-cyber-risks-2022-09-15/">investigation of foreign investment deals</a> that could negatively affect cybersecurity, quantum computing, biotechnology and sensitive data. The Committee on Foreign Investment is now <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/harrybroadman/2022/09/30/cfius-under-biden-just-got-tougher/?sh=78e4d4931a49">more powerful</a> than it has ever been, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/business/what-is-cfius.html">it is a gatekeeper</a> on major foreign investment deals. </p>
<p>The U.S. is not alone in examining foreign investment deals for national security implications. In recent times, the United Kingdom, the European Union and Australia have either created or strengthened existing regulations to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-happens-when-foreign-investment-becomes-security-risk">more carefully police</a> foreign investment deals, particularly those <a href="https://www.industryweek.com/the-economy/article/22026697/eu-set-to-tighten-rules-on-foreign-investment-to-fend-off-china">originating in China</a>. </p>
<p>It remains to be seen what the long-term implications of these expanding powers of the Committee on Foreign Investments in the U.S. will be.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206279/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amitrajeet A. Batabyal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Joe Biden signed an executive order in 2022 tightening the rules for foreign investment in the US.Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, Distinguished Professor, Arthur J. Gosnell Professor of Economics, & Interim Head, Department of Sustainability, Rochester Institute of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2050012023-05-25T12:28:02Z2023-05-25T12:28:02ZLula’s diplomatic dance is nothing new for Brazil or its leader – what has changed is the world around him<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528069/original/file-20230524-27-e2ybqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C47%2C3982%2C2610&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Is Lula pursuing divisiveness or diplomatic pragmatism on the world stage?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/JapanG7Summit/e94fe64a66a64a7d8b08be562dc0845d/photo?Query=G7%20Lula&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=33&currentItemNo=2">AP Photo/Louise Delmotte</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva is a man currently very much <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/members-event/lula-part-two-brazils-role-international-stage">in demand in international circles</a>.</p>
<p>In April, the leftist leader was being courted by China during a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/brazil-china-lula-xi-trip-216ace0e80e6f0882571125c673f6964">high-profile visit to Beijing</a>. That was followed a month later with <a href="https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/g7-summit-intense-schedule-of-bilateral-meetings-awaits-lula-in-japan">an invite to the G7 summit</a> in Japan, where Lula rubbed shoulders with leaders of the largest economies of the so-called Global North. In recent weeks Brazil’s president has also been busy <a href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/15678">restoring regional ties</a> in Latin America and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/24/americas/brazil-lula-ukraine-peace-coalition-intl-latam/index.html">pushing a proposed path to peace</a> in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Lula’s diplomatic whirlwind has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/brazil-lula-foreign-policy-us-venezuela-iran-2ca10d070df6177a33e909c20acbe030">confounded his critics</a>. He has been accused of “<a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/lula-cozies-up-to-americas-enemies-brazil-kremlin-beijing-ukraine-catholic-church-bishop-alvarez-socialist-human-rights-nicaragua-iran-c7705711">cozying up” with the United States’ enemies</a> or “<a href="https://unherd.com/thepost/dont-blame-lula-for-playing-both-sides/">playing both sides</a>” over Ukraine.</p>
<p>But as a <a href="https://liberalarts.du.edu/about/people/rafael-r-ioris">scholar of Brazil and its position in the world</a>, I believe Lula’s actions reflect two main elements: one relating to global geopolitical developments, the other tied to the Brazilian leader’s long-held vision.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.csis.org/executive-education/courses/dynamics-and-implications-chinas-rise">rise of China</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-invasion-2022-117045">the war in Ukraine</a> have underscored that the <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/end-unipolar-moment-opinion-1687036">unipolar reality of the 1990s</a> – under which the U.S. was the predominant power – is being seriously challenged. In its place appears to be <a href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/bipolarity-is-back-why-it-matters">emerging a bipolar dynamic</a> in which Beijing and Washington battle for influence – or a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-has-exposed-the-folly-and-unintended-consequences-of-armed-missionaries-197609">multipolar world</a> in which regional powers compete for hegemony.</p>
<p>Anticipating this new world ordering, nations that have historically aligned with the European-U.S. center of power – particularly those in places like Latin America – are <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-has-exposed-the-folly-and-unintended-consequences-of-armed-missionaries-197609">repositioning themselves</a>. This seems to be the case for Brazil, the largest nation and economy in South America. </p>
<h2>Waning US influence in Latin America</h2>
<p>During much of the 20th century, Brazil developed <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-brazil/">in close economic cooperation with the U.S.</a> while managing to sustain a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/brazils-global-ambitions">largely autonomous foreign policy</a>.</p>
<p>But since 2001, U.S. influence in Brazil has diminished as Washington has pivoted its attentions away from the region to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/09/07/reflections-on-the-long-term-repercussions-of-september-11-for-us-policy-in-the-middle-east/">first the Middle East</a> <a href="https://www.cfr.org/project/us-pivot-asia-and-american-grand-strategy">and then Asia</a>. In the same period, China replaced the United States as Brazil’s most important economic partner. <a href="https://santandertrade.com/en/portal/analyse-markets/brazil/foreign-trade-in-figures">Figures from 2021 show</a> China received 31% of Brazilian exports compared with the United States’ 11.2%, and supplied 22.8% of its imports, compared with the United States’ 17.7%.</p>
<h2>Reviving Lula-ism, strenghening the BRICS</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, Lula’s <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/01/americas/brazil-lula-da-silva-inauguration-intl/index.html#:%7E:text=Brazil's%20new%20President%20Luiz%20Inacio,Brazil%2C%20January%201%2C%202023.&text=The%20Senate%20president%20opened%20the,with%20a%20minute%20of%20silence.">return to the presidency</a> in January 2023 has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/lula-brazil-politics-100-hundred-days-bolsonaro-government-ada128391d4f855a5146192a50bc49a0">paved the way for a revival</a> of an ambitious and assertive foreign policy set out by the leader during his first term in office between 2003 and 2010.</p>
<p>During this earlier period, the metalworker-turned-president managed to sustain <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/03/20070331-3.html">good relations with both the Bush</a> <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-lula-da-silva-brazil">and Obama administrations</a> while also seeking to diversify Brazil’s economic and geopolitical partners, especially in the Global South.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two men in suits shake hands" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528091/original/file-20230524-45026-eqan30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528091/original/file-20230524-45026-eqan30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528091/original/file-20230524-45026-eqan30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528091/original/file-20230524-45026-eqan30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528091/original/file-20230524-45026-eqan30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=635&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528091/original/file-20230524-45026-eqan30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=635&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528091/original/file-20230524-45026-eqan30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=635&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva with U.S. President George W. Bush in 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/brazilian-president-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-is-welcomed-news-photo/1243423329?adppopup=true">Manny Ceneta/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>He also played a central role in the <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2019/08/brics-was-created-as-a-tool-of-attack-lula/">creation of the BRICS</a>, a loosely defined multilateral bloc consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The bloc has <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26455170">helped reshape</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/09749101211067096">the economic</a> <a href="https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/The-BRICS-Reshape-the-Global-Geopolitical-Map-20230428-0012.html">and geopolitical balance</a> of the world over the past two decades.</p>
<p>Since returning to power, Lula sought to <a href="https://tvbrics.com/en/news/lula-da-silva-advocates-brics-currency-security-council-reform-and-new-world-order/">strengthen the BRICS bank</a> – a funding agency for developmental projects in the Global South that offers a financial alternative to the World Bank. In a show of intent, Lula <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/former-brazilian-president-named-as-head-of-china-based-new-development-bank/">pushed for the appointment</a> of ex-Brazilian president – and his former chief of staff – <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/former-brazilian-president-dilma-rousseff-is-new-brics-bank-chief-101679666146344.html">Dilma Rousseff to head the agency</a>. </p>
<p>Much as with his domestic agenda of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/lula-back-what-does-mean-brazil">rebuilding social programs</a>, undermined by his predecessor Jair Bolsonaro, in the international arena Lula is looking to restart his project of strengthening Brazil’s ties with a variety of partners. In his first month in office, Lula <a href="https://theglobalamericans.org/2023/01/lula-and-the-revival-of-unasur-and-celac/">attended a meeting</a> of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean nations (CELAC) in Argentina, where he outlined a desire to strengthen Brazil’s relations in the region. </p>
<p>Soon after, he visited President Joe Biden in Washington, where both leaders <a href="https://www.braziloffice.org/en/articles/lula-and-biden-common-challenges-and-potential-shared-efforts-to-come">professed their mutual desire</a> to promote democracy and push for a more environmentally sound developmental path, particularly in the Amazon region.</p>
<p>Once that trip was concluded, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/04/13/1169648748/brazils-president-lula-travels-to-china-to-find-support-to-help-end-war-in-ukrai">Lula visited China</a> to deepen trade relations and to try to lead a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/11/americas/lula-brazil-china-visit-intl-latam/index.html">peace effort for the war in Ukraine</a>. He then went to Europe to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/lula-portugal-visit-brazil-ukraine-39a6bf8c84f2ac20669cd9ee8e09252d">meet with traditional allies</a>, like Spain and Portugal. </p>
<h2>Divisive or dynamic diplomacy?</h2>
<p>All things considered, this “many friends” approach isn’t so different from Lula’s experiences of 20 years ago. Then, Brazil was largely welcomed as a <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/obama-says-most-popular-title-belongs-to-lula/articleshow/4352514.cms?from=mdr">rising diplomatic force</a> in the developing world. President Barack Obama, during a 2009 meeting, <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-lula-da-silva-brazil">made special note</a> of Lula’s “forward-looking leadership … throughout Latin America and throughout the world.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two men in coats walk side by side in front of a parade of military men." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528092/original/file-20230524-19-1c3zr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528092/original/file-20230524-19-1c3zr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528092/original/file-20230524-19-1c3zr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528092/original/file-20230524-19-1c3zr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528092/original/file-20230524-19-1c3zr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528092/original/file-20230524-19-1c3zr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528092/original/file-20230524-19-1c3zr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Lula inspects an honor guard with Chinese President Xi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/brazilian-president-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-inspects-an-news-photo/1251815692?adppopup=true">Ken Ishii/Pool/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>What has changed since are the domestic and global contexts in which Lula now operates. And what was once seen as a progressive pursuit of an autonomous and assertive foreign policy is now being interpreted by many in <a href="https://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2023/04/17/para-casa-branca-brasil-papagueia-propaganda-russa-e-chinesa-sobre-a-ucrania.ghtml">Brazil</a> <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/entertainment/foreign-policy-brazil-lula-takes-141942941.html">and the West</a> as divisive, inappropriate or <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/lula-cozies-up-to-americas-enemies-brazil-kremlin-beijing-ukraine-catholic-church-bishop-alvarez-socialist-human-rights-nicaragua-iran-c7705711">even a betrayal</a> of Brazil’s traditional alignments. </p>
<p>Such a view, I believe, ignores not only Lula’s earlier international record but also a wider historical perspective. For more than a century, Brazil’s diplomatic efforts have <a href="http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/548-A_diplomacia_multilateral_do_Brasil_Um_tributo_a_Rui_Barbosa.pdf">focused on promoting multilateralism</a> and on <a href="http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/relacoes-internacionais-politica-externa-diplomacia-brasileira-volume-2.pdf">pushing for the peaceful</a> resolution of conflicts. </p>
<p>And while it drew closer to Western allies during World War II and the Cold War, successive governments in Brazil – be they progressive or conservative, <a href="https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=5627535">democratic or authoritarian</a> – pursued a policy of self-determination. Shaped by those dynamics, Brazil’s foreign policy has served the country well as an instrument of its own development. </p>
<h2>The need for a neutral peacemaker</h2>
<p>As such, Lula’s overtures to both traditional and new trading partners is not surprising. Nor is his plan to find a solution to the war in Ukraine through the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/24/americas/brazil-lula-ukraine-peace-coalition-intl-latam/index.html">creation of a neutral bloc of mediating countries</a>.</p>
<p>While attending the G7 meeting at Hiroshima, Lula <a href="https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/speech-by-president-lula-at-session-8-of-g7">stressed the need for peace talks</a> not only to end the tragedy in itself, but also because it was distracting the global community from focusing on other matters, such as global warming and hunger. </p>
<p>Perhaps some of his <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/24/americas/brazil-lula-ukraine-peace-coalition-intl-latam/index.html">statements about the war</a> could have made it clearer that he held Russia primarily responsible for the conflict – something that may have played a role in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/brazils-lula-says-meeting-fell-through-because-ukraines-zelenskiy-was-late-2023-05-22/">the falling through of a planned meeting</a> with Ukraine leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the G7. But it should be remembered the contention that countries perceived as neutral, like Brazil, may have a better chance of bringing Russia to the negotiating table is a valid position.</p>
<h2>Not in Brazil’s interest to pick a side</h2>
<p>It is unclear at this early stage of his new presidency whether Lula can revive the international balancing act that he pulled off during his first period of governance. The world has changed since then, and economic and geopolitical disputes appear ever more prone to include a military dimension, as the war in Ukraine shows. And although Brazil could indeed play a peacemaking role, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/kyiv-moscow-to-separately-host-african-leaders-to-discuss-grain-fertilizer-exports-amid-war">neither side</a> in the conflict seems ready to negotiate yet. Similarly, the growing rivalry between the U.S. and China will be difficult to navigate – and given the historic and current economic ties, Brazil cannot afford to pick a side. </p>
<p>In fact, not picking a side could work to Brazil’s advantage. It was only after Lula’s visit to China that the Biden administration announced an increase by tenfold of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/20/americas/us-biden-amazon-fund-petro-intl-latam/index.html">its contribution to the Amazon Fund</a>. It is clear thus that in an increasingly divided world, Brazil’s nonaligned position could be the best path.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205001/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rafael R. Ioris does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Lula’s courting of – or by – China and Western powers has confounded critics. But in reality, it is a continuation of the foreign policy he pursued during his earlier term in power.Rafael R. Ioris, Professor of Modern Latin America History, University of DenverLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2040522023-05-11T14:28:45Z2023-05-11T14:28:45ZSouth Africa walks a tightrope of international alliances - it needs Russia, China and the west<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524899/original/file-20230508-20523-doks87.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">China's President Xi Jinping, left, and Russian President Vladimir Putin cement bonds at the Kremlin in March. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Vladimir Astapkovich/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images.</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Relations between the People’s Republic of China and Russia on one hand and the west, specifically the US, on the other have become increasingly tense in recent times. For the US, China and Russia <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf#page=7">represent authoritarian regimes</a>. For China, the US is the <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230220_11027664.html">source</a> of global insecurity. </p>
<p>With a few exceptions like <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-china-america-pressure-interview/">France</a> and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-65382211">UK</a>, the west sees the presence of Russia and China in the BRICS bloc (which also includes Brazil, India and South Africa) as contaminating the entire bloc as well as their relations with the individual BRICS member countries. This is especially so for the US.</p>
<p>This view reflects the <a href="https://theconversation.com/united-states-the-end-of-an-illusion-of-omnipotence-186421">weakening global power</a> of the US, especially its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jul/29/putin-ruble-west-sanctions-russia-europe">inability to isolate Russia in Europe</a> and to contain the influence of China in Asia and the developing world. </p>
<p>The growing tensions pose a political and economic challenge for South Africa. This is especially so for US-South Africa relations. Part of my <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/84257">doctoral thesis</a> focused on BRICS and its efforts to democratise the post-Cold War international order, which, by US admission, has <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf">come to an end</a>. This is an important admission because the US is <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/04/27/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-renewing-american-economic-leadership-at-the-brookings-institution/?s=09">aware</a> that the unilateral power it used to interact with the rest of the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 is now subject to competition by many forces, both economic and political. </p>
<p>I argue that South Africa should not choose between its BRICS or EU and US partnerships. It should keep its relations with the west while remaining within BRICS because of its economic prospects. The west remains economically significant for South Africa, but the BRICS bloc is important for South Africa’s economic adaptability. </p>
<h2>The BRICS bloc</h2>
<p>BRICS is effectively a forum for cooperation among regional powers that seek to democratise the international political economy. The bloc has used the (<a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/organisations/g20">G20</a>) platform – the group of 19 industrialised countries plus the European Union – to establish cohesion on issues such as international financial stability, climate change mitigation and sustainable development. </p>
<p>At its 2011 summit, the bloc called for an end to the long reign of the US dollar as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-other-developing-brics-nations%20seek-change-in-global-economic-order/2011/04/14/AFarMgdD_story.html">the world’s reserve currency</a> (de-dollarisation). The <a href="https://www.thebalancemoney.com/2008-financial-crisis-3305679">2008 credit crisis</a> had illustrated the inadequacy of the world monetary system, with <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/brics-seek-lower-dependence-on-dollar-higher-scrutiny-of-commodity-futures/articleshow/7986576.cms?from=mdr">the US dollar at the centre</a>. But it was the Russia-Ukraine war, when <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/20/sanctions-war-russia-ukraine-year-on-vladimir-putin">US sanctions against Russia backfired</a>, which quickened efforts at de-dollarisation. </p>
<p>The emergence of BRICS not only strengthens south-south relations, it weakens the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/brandt-line-after-forty-years-the-more-northsouth-relations-change-the-more-they-stay-the-same/8646CE553D2F986BD33B67352FFC5814">inequality</a> that characterises north-south relations. Much of the global south is developing fast enough for it to not only demand a more equitable world order, but also to finance it. </p>
<p>This brings us to international governance.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-and-russia-president-cyril-ramaphosas-foreign-policy-explained-198430">South Africa and Russia: President Cyril Ramaphosa's foreign policy explained</a>
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<p>The BRICS bloc serves as a counterweight to some of the excesses of US unilateralism that’s been a feature of global governance since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-fall-of-the-berlin-wall-30-years-ago-resonated-across-africa-126521">end of the Soviet Union in 1989</a>. For instance, although the 2001 NATO invasion of Afghanistan was illegal under <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2013/11/06/was-the-nato-invasion-of-afghanistan-legal/">international law</a> and the 2003 invasion of Iraq was equally <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq">unlawful</a>, neither the US nor NATO have been prosecuted. Thus, the US has for some time undermined global governance. </p>
<p>The BRICS bloc’s efforts to democratise global governance will support international accountability.</p>
<p>Democratising financial and governance institutions is important in addressing many of the issues that concern the developing world.</p>
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<img alt="Two men shake hands in from of Chinese and South African flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524903/original/file-20230508-247781-sxlgnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524903/original/file-20230508-247781-sxlgnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524903/original/file-20230508-247781-sxlgnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524903/original/file-20230508-247781-sxlgnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524903/original/file-20230508-247781-sxlgnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524903/original/file-20230508-247781-sxlgnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524903/original/file-20230508-247781-sxlgnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">South African president Cyril Ramaphosa with President Xi Jinping.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span>
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<p>The emergence of the BRICS bloc has overshadowed the G7+ meetings while centralising the G20 as an international platform for political and economic coordination. So South Africa’s <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/japan-invites-african-union-to-g7-excludes-south-africa-20230417">exclusion</a> from May 2023’s G7+ meeting in Japan doesn’t count for much. </p>
<h2>South Africa and the west</h2>
<p>Pretoria’s biggest trading partners are the EU and the US. South Africa is the largest US and EU trading partner in Africa, with the US totalling R289 billion (about US$16 billion in 2021) and the EU totalling a trade of <a href="https://www.tralac.org/documents/publications/trade-data-analysis/4471-south-africa-global-trade-update-2021/file.html">R699 billion (about US$ 38 billion in 2021</a>. </p>
<p>South Africa also benefits from the preferential access to US markets for some of its exports in terms of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (<a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16131-agoa-time-as-2025-approaches-opportunities-for-improvements-eyed.html#:%7E:text=AGOA%20is%20set%20to%20expire,how%20it%20should%20be%20extended.">AGOA</a>.</p>
<p>But the country is politically tied to the emergent multipolar world led by China, and broadly BRICS.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-foreign-policy-new-paper-sets-the-scene-but-falls-short-on-specifics-188253">South Africa's foreign policy: new paper sets the scene, but falls short on specifics</a>
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<p>Even France and the UK have begun to understand the need to balance their own interests with China against their interests with their traditional ally, the US. </p>
<p>So South Africa’s national interests demand that it carefully navigate western anxieties caused by its BRICS ties. It needs to show that its membership of the bloc doesn’t make it anti-west.</p>
<h2>BRICS’ growing economic importance</h2>
<p>Immediately after South Africa joined BRICS in 2010, China invested in several projects, including expanding Durban’s <a href="https://orcasia.org/2022/07/china-in-the-indian-ocean-region-ports-and-bases/#:%7E:text=Port%20of%20Durban%2D%20The%20Durban,by%20Shanghai%20Zhenhua%20Heavy%20Industries.">port</a>. This is the largest and busiest shipping terminal in sub-Saharan Africa. </p>
<p>Trade and investment links between South Africa and China have improved too. By the end of 2021, South Africa’s exports to China reached over US$33 billion and China’s investment into South Africa <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/202204/t20220416_10668699.html">totalled</a> over US$25 billion, creating over 400,000 local jobs since 2008. </p>
<p>Investments from South Africa into BRICS countries have surged since it became a bloc member. BRICS total trade amounted to <a href="https://www.tralac.org/documents/publications/trade-data-analysis/4471-south-africa-global-trade-update-2021/file.html">R666 billion</a> (about US$36 billion] in 2021. And China is an important trading partner for South Africa standing at R479 billion (about US$26 billion), above the US. </p>
<p>Trade between South Africa and BRICS has yet to reach the level of trade with the EU and the US, but the BRICS bloc gives the country an opportunity to diversity its investment portfolio and destination. </p>
<p>China has <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CN">1.4 billion people</a> and the US has just over <a href="https://www.census.gov/popclock/">300 million</a>, so market access to China is important to any emerging economy. BRICS countries are currently responsible for roughly 31.5% of the global <a href="https://thenewscrypto.com/economic-power-shift-brics-nations-outpace-g7-in-global-gdp/">GDP</a> while the G7 have come down to roughly 30%. </p>
<h2>Navitaging anxieties</h2>
<p>Of course, the problem of South Africa’s strained relations with the west is not South Africa’s. The problem is that the west, specifically the unilateral power that the US represents, approaches the global order as if it’s a process that flows from its benevolence. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-values-interests-and-power-must-shape-south-africas-foreign-policy-150478">How values, interests and power must shape South Africa's foreign policy</a>
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<p>For its own interests, South Africa must carefully navigate western anxieties about BRICS, and demonstrate that there is a common future for both the west and others in a multipolar world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204052/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thapelo Tselapedi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US’s negative attitude towards BRICS reflects its own weakening global power, especially its inability to isolate Russia in Europe and to contain China’s growing influence.Thapelo Tselapedi, Politics lecturer, Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2051492023-05-11T11:36:26Z2023-05-11T11:36:26ZEurovision 2023: why the stage itself is the silent star of the contest<p>This week, Liverpool stages one of the <a href="https://eurovision.tv/mediacentre/release/183-million-viewers">world’s largest live televised events</a>, the Eurovision Song Contest. I grew up watching it as an annual family get-together. </p>
<p>Now, as a lecturer in theatre and scenography – the study and practice of how set, sound, light and costume work together in an event – I have come to appreciate the immense logistical effort this entertainment behemoth requires. </p>
<p>More fascinatingly though, it is an extraordinary example of media and performance history, providing a yearly snapshot of pan-European <a href="https://theconversation.com/eurovision-even-before-the-singing-starts-the-contest-is-a-fascinating-reflection-of-international-rules-and-politics-204934">national identities and politics</a>.</p>
<p>While the contest’s rules state that <a href="https://eurovision.tv/about/rules">it is a non-political event</a>, it undeniably puts international relations on display. But while looking at different countries’ acts and voting patterns offers interesting insights, there is a silent star of the event that often goes unnoticed – the stage.</p>
<h2>Staging a nation</h2>
<p>Since the contest’s inception in 1956, there has been no serious discussion about the way Eurovision is an exercise in staging nation, nationality and nationalism in the literal sense – namely how these ideas inform the scenography.</p>
<p>2023 marks the first time Eurovision will be hosted in the runner-up’s country due to war, with the UK hosting on behalf of Ukraine. </p>
<p>The host’s stage set-up must be everything and nothing at the same time. It needs to provide a flexible, adaptable canvas for the wide-ranging individual acts of up to 44 countries. At the same time, it must offer a memorable and distinct experience to measure up to previous iterations of the competition. </p>
<p>The stage also needs to embody that year’s chosen theme, while meeting the extensive requirements of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), which organises the event, in order to allow the competition to run efficiently.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/kDPBB09eiXs?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Inside Liverpool Arena as the Eurovision 2023 build got underway.</span></figcaption>
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<p>2023’s theme is “united by music”. After the UK’s difficult departure from the EU, it now faces the challenge of staging itself as part of a united European community. Meanwhile, it also needs to give space to Ukraine to do the same. </p>
<p>The Liverpool stage’s designer, Julio Himede, has repeatedly offered the <a href="https://recessed.space/00097-Julio-Himede-Eurovision">image of a hug</a> – of open arms welcoming Ukraine and the world – as central to the stage’s spatial configuration.</p>
<p>The early days of Eurovision were a much smaller affair than nowadays. When the UK first hosted in 1960 at the Royal Festival Hall in London, it seated just 2,500 people. That’s less than a quarter of this year’s 11,000 at the Liverpool arena.</p>
<p>And if you have been watching the semi-finals, you’ll already have a good sense of the sheer scale of this year’s stage. At 450m², it is almost as big as a basketball court. With an integrated lighting design through video-capable floor and ceiling tiling and huge LED screens, the only apt descriptor is “spectacular”.</p>
<p>For Eurovision, the concepts, symbols and metaphors underpinning the design have to work in tandem with the creative vision of each delegation, as well as the 45 second turnover between acts in the live show.</p>
<p>The design concept also has to be one that acknowledges the particular situation of this year’s contest and simultaneously unites the identities of Ukraine and the UK. </p>
<p>Ultimately, the image of the hug that underpins the sweeping curve of the main stage space aims to offer a more universal theme, rather than one which is culturally specific. Viewers will notice the “open arms” of the stage are echoed in the arrangement of the “green room”, where the national delegations are located during the show.</p>
<p>In this sense, Eurovision is a prime example of a “soft power” approach to international relations, which works by persuasion or influence, rather than the “hard power” of economic sanctions or military intervention. </p>
<h2>The UK after Brexit</h2>
<p>This year, it will be fascinating to see how much space the UK will give to Ukraine, not only last year’s winner but a nation in need of international recognition and support. And to what extent the UK will use this event, post-Brexit, to stage itself as a welcoming part of Europe.</p>
<p>The UK does have a history of highly successful <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/stage/theatreblog/2012/jul/31/olympic-opening-ceremony-agitprop-theatre">agit-prop</a> events, which have engaged audiences emotionally to shape public opinion. Think back to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/stage/theatreblog/2012/jul/31/olympic-opening-ceremony-agitprop-theatre">2012 London Olympics opening ceremony</a>, which strove to inspire <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13642529.2014.909674">a sense of national identity</a>. </p>
<p>In 2023, the UK sees itself in the middle of global instability and national tension over <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/mar/16/hostile-authoritarian-uk-downgraded-in-civic-freedoms-index">mounting authoritarianism</a> and <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/society/articles-reports/2023/02/07/yougov-cost-living-segmentation">widening social divisions</a>. Once again, it has the chance to use an international stage to put forward an idealised narrative.</p>
<p>In any such example, the stage underpins the entire event. It is essential to the atmosphere for the live audience and fundamental to its appearance on television. </p>
<p>There is no doubt that Eurovision 2023 is a staging extravaganza and will test the UK’s capability to shake off its <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/britain-is-the-sick-man-of-europe-again/">“sick man of Europe”</a> image. It is a stage which offers the UK the opportunity to adjust its global image in line with the contest’s welcoming theme. </p>
<p>It will be interesting to see whether the image of open arms for the world is sincere or cynical.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205149/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lara Maleen Kipp does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>2023 sees the UK host the Eurovision Song Contest on behalf of Ukraine. But what role does the stage itself have to play in the musical spectacle?Lara Maleen Kipp, Lecturer in Theatre and Scenography, Aberystwyth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.