tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/jackson-mthembu-32909/articlesJackson Mthembu – The Conversation2021-01-22T17:30:01Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1538032021-01-22T17:30:01Z2021-01-22T17:30:01ZSouth African minister’s COVID-19 death unites friends and rivals in tribute<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380165/original/file-20210122-21-i0shrv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jackson Mthembu is the most prominent South African politician to succumb to COVID-19.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The death of <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/minister-jackson-mthembu%3A-profile">Jackson Mphikwa Mthembu</a>, Minister in the Office of the President of South Africa, has been met with sorrow across the country. Tributes have come from across the political spectrum for the country’s first government minister to succumb to COVID-19. He was 62.</p>
<p>Mthembu’s integrity, dedication to his job and sense of humour explain the response to his death.</p>
<p>President Cyril Ramaphosa <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/statement-president-cyril-ramaphosa-passing-minister-jackson-mthembu">said</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Minister Mthembu was an exemplary leader, an activist and life-long champion of freedom and democracy. He was a much-loved and greatly respected colleague and comrade, whose passing leaves our nation at a loss. I extend my deepest sympathies to the Minister’s family, to his colleagues, comrades and many friends.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The leader of the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance, John Steenhuisen, <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/the-da-mourns-the-passing-of-jackson-mthembu-2021-01-21">said</a> to Mthembu’s family, friends and the governing partty, the African National Congress:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>You have lost a generous man with a big heart and an even greater sense of humour.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Corne Mulder, leader of the right-wing <a href="https://www.vfplus.org.za/">Freedom Front Plus</a>, <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/jackson-mthembu-dies-of-covid-19-related-complications-20210121-2">said</a> “Jackson Mthembu was an excellent chief whip of Parliament. He stood strong on principle when Parliament came under attack during the Zuma years.”</p>
<p>He was referring to the <a href="https://www.loot.co.za/product/richard-calland-the-zuma-years/lwlk-1845-g5a0">tenure of former President Jacob Zuma</a>, from May 2009 to February 2018, characterised by populism and <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-democracy-or-a-kleptocracy-how-south-africa-stacks-up-111101">rampant corruption in government</a>. </p>
<p>Jessie Duarte, the deputy secretary-general of the African National Congress, enthused about how Mthembu had been a dedicated, committed activist with “an unbelievable work ethic” who was meticulous about his work and believed that the democratic project could work.</p>
<p>She <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2021-01-22-in-quotes-jessie-duarte-jackson-mthembu-leaves-behind-a-legacy-of-honesty/">said</a> Mthembu had a great sense of humour and an “amazing” ability to interact with people:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have lost a person who put the country first, at all times. For us who have lost a brother and a friend, this is a very great loss. He leaves a legacy of honesty and integrity.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>His death drives home the seriousness of the <a href="https://mg.co.za/news/2021-01-21-stern-warning-against-covid-greets-mthembus-death/">COVID-19 pandemic in the country</a>.</p>
<h2>The early days</h2>
<p>Mthembu’s life mirrored the daily toils black South Africans had to endure under colonialism and apartheid. His life was also synonymous with the struggle for freedom by the young activists who picked up the baton from leaders like <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/content/page/biography">Nelson Mandela</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/sobukwes-pan-africanist-dream-an-elusive-idea-that-refuses-to-die-52601">Robert Sobukwe</a>, among others, who were either jailed or banned or, like <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/stephen-bantu-biko">Steve Biko</a>, paid the ultimate price at the hands of the apartheid regime.</p>
<p>Mthembu was born in the eastern Transvaal, today’s Mpumalanga province, in the east of the country. He was raised by his grandmother and uncles. From the age of seven, he had to help his grandmother working in the family’s maize fields. He was <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jackson-mthembu">kicked out of school</a> several times because his family could not afford school fees, uniforms or school books.</p>
<p>He was a student leader during <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/june-16-soweto-youth-uprising">the 1976 school revolt</a>, sparked by the imposition of the Afrikaans language as a medium of instruction. The revolt spread throughout the country. The harsh response of the apartheid regime, shooting and killing unarmed children, led to revulsion around the world, further isolating the apartheid government. </p>
<p>He was expelled from <a href="https://www.dpme.gov.za/about/Pages/Minister.aspx">Fort Hare University in 1980</a> owing to his political activities. In 1980 he got a job at Highveld Steel and Vanadium, and became one of the first Africans to be promoted to production foreman. Between 1984 and 1986 he became a senior steward of the Metal and Allied Workers’ Union, which is today called the <a href="https://www.numsa.org.za/">National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa</a>.</p>
<p>During the 1980s struggle years it became almost a norm that unionists also became community leaders. In 1980 Mthembu became chair of the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jackson-mthembu">Witbank Education Crisis Committee</a>. He also served on the eMalahleni Civic Association; the local branch of the <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/cis/omalley/OMalleyWeb/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03188/06lv03208.htm">National Education Crisis Committee</a>, which campaigned for a “people’s education”; and the <a href="http://www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/keywords/detainees-parents-support-committee-dpsc">Detainees’ Parents Support Committee</a>.</p>
<h2>Defiance amid persecution</h2>
<p>The Special Branch (the apartheid political police) repeatedly detained him for months of solitary confinement during the <a href="https://www.saha.org.za/ecc25/ecc_under_a_state_of_emergency.htm">1980s states of emergency</a>, tortured him in police stations, and petrol-bombed his home. Mthembu was prosecuted for sabotage, treason and terrorism with 30 other activists in the <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/presidency/jackson-mthembu-mr">Bethal terrorism trial of 1986-1988</a>. He was acquitted.</p>
<p>After this acquittal, the apartheid security police continued with their harassment and intimidation. This led him to move away from Witbank, to the east of Johannesburg, and find refuge in Soweto and Alexandra in the Gauteng province as an “internal exile”, <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/statement-president-cyril-ramaphosa-passing-minister-jackson-mthembu">seriously disrupting his family life</a>.</p>
<p>He was elected deputy regional secretary for the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging-complex">Pretoria-Witwatersrand- Vereeniging</a> region (today’s Gauteng) of the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/united-democratic-front-udf">United Democratic Front</a>, the above-ground home for supporters of the then-banned African National Congress during the 1980s.</p>
<p>Mthembu worked with the South African Council of Churches, and in 1988 led a convoy of 300 minibuses as the SWAPO Support Group to help them during Namibia’s first democratic elections. <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-west-africa-peoples-organisation-swapo">SWAPO (South West African People’s Organisation)</a> went on to win the elections, and has governed Namibia since independence from South Africa <a href="https://theconversation.com/namibias-democracy-enters-new-era-as-ruling-swapo-continues-to-lose-its-lustre-151238">in 1990</a>. </p>
<h2>Life of public service</h2>
<p>Mthembu’s career was as one of the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2006-08-28-his-legacy-should-not-be-forgotten/">“inziles”, as opposed to the exile generation</a> and the generation jailed on Robben Island. This has a two-fold significance. First, generational. The Robben Island generation, such as Mandela, and the exile generation, such as <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki">Thabo Mbeki</a>, are now almost all retired. Zuma straddles both the Robben Island and exile experiences. Second, the “inziles” of the United Democratic Front had a less authoritarian and more participatory political culture than the islanders and the exiles, and this characterises their subsequent career.</p>
<p>In 1994 Jackson Mthembu was elected to Parliament and participated in the drafting of the South African constitution. Between 1997 and 1999 he was a member of the Mpumalanga Provincial Legislature, and served as Member of the Executive Committee for Transport. </p>
<p>He was elected to the national executive committee in 2007, and worked at the ANC head office, Luthuli House in Johannesburg, where he and then secretary-general Gwede Mantashe defended Zuma over the scandal involving the use of public money for expensive renovations to his private home at <a href="https://cdn.24.co.za/files/Cms/General/d/2718/00b91b2841d64510b9c99ef9b9faa597.pdf">Nkandla</a>. In 2014 he became an MP in the National Assembly, chairing the portfolio committee on environment, becoming ANC Chief Whip in 2016. </p>
<p>As the tide within the ANC was beginning to turn against Zuma,
he worked with the <a href="https://www.da.org.za/">Democratic Alliance</a> to <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/mthembu-slams-anc-mps-accusations-that-he-colluded-with-da-in-state-capture-motion-20171128">schedule a parliamentary debate</a> on <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">“state capture”</a> – large-scale corruption – during Zuma’s presidency. </p>
<p>Mthembu took part in the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-08-26-how-ramaphosas-campaign-spent-r400-million-and-why-it-matters/">CR17 campaign</a> to get Cyril Ramaphosa elected as the successor to Jacob Zuma as president of the ANC. In 2019 Ramaphosa appointed him Minister in the Presidency.</p>
<p>Mthembu, sometimes affectionately referred to by his clan name, Mvelase, is survived by his wife Thembi Mthembu and five children. His first wife, Pinkie, and one of his daughters predeceased him. His death was greeted with ringing tributes across the floor in parliament.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153803/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is a member of the ANC, but writes this in his professional capacity as a political scientist and historian.</span></em></p>Jackson Mthembu’s death drives home the seriousness of the COVID-19 pandemic in the country.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/823992017-08-13T09:17:59Z2017-08-13T09:17:59ZWhat’s happening inside the ANC, not parliament, is key to why Zuma prevails<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181812/original/file-20170811-13511-8ns7li.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of President Jacob Zuma reacting to the vote of no confidence proceedings in parliament.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Rogan Ward</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>What matters inside the African National Congress, the party that governs South Africa, is not necessarily what matters outside it. This obvious point is missed by much of the commentary on the latest unsuccessful <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/08/08/zuma-survives-no-confidence-vote">motion of no confidence </a> in President Jacob Zuma – and in much discussion of South African politics.</p>
<p>One result of ignoring this reality is the claim that the vote seriously <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-08-09-analysis-even-as-he-wins-his-8th-no-confidence-vote-zuma-appears-weak/">weakened Zuma</a> because several dozen ANC members of parliament supported the motion or abstained.</p>
<p>This was the first time some ANC MPs supported a motion of no confidence in an ANC president. But, while Zuma came <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/08/08/zuma-survives-no-confidence-vote">within 21 votes of losing</a> in parliament, he was probably backed by 80% or more of the ANC caucus. Most of the votes against him were cast by opposition MPs, who do not have a say in who is ANC president, not ANC members, who do. </p>
<p>Unless parliament passes a motion of no confidence in him, which is not on the cards any time soon, his future depends on whether he was weakened in the ANC, not parliament.</p>
<p>Within the ANC, Zuma’s future is not the absorbing fixation it is outside it.</p>
<h2>Loyalty amid factionalism</h2>
<p>For many outside the ANC, politicians are defined by whether they want Zuma to go. Inside it, the key reality is a battle between two factions: Zuma’s is accused by its opponents, whose likeliest presidential candidate is deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa, of using public office to advance private interests. While Zuma is supported by one and opposed by the other, both know he does not shape what the ANC and government do on his own – he acts as part of a faction. If he goes and the faction wins, nothing changes and so for both sides, winning the factional battle is far more important than Zuma’s fate.</p>
<p>The contest is centred on winning the leadership elections at the ANC’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/54th-national-conference">December national elective conference</a>. What both sides do, they do with that in mind – Zuma’s fate is a product of this battle.</p>
<p>Key figures in the factions also want to run an ANC in good shape to win the next election and so they worry about splitting or damaging the organisation. If doing what matters to people outside the ANC risks harming it, they will not do it.</p>
<p>There is no evidence yet that the vote weakened Zuma’s faction. Because the vote was secret, we don’t know which MPs voted for him to go. But common sense suggests that they are not pro-Zuma faction members who changed sides but staunch members of the group which wants him gone. So the anti-Zuma group has not grown because some of its members expressed themselves more forcefully.</p>
<p>Nor does it show that the tide within the ANC is moving against Zuma. What matters inside the ANC, but not outside it, is loyalty to the organisation. For many years it was banned and under constant attack – this produced a culture in which the default position is to close ranks in the face of what it sees as outside attack. This made the dissent by ANC MPs a huge step for them. But there is no reason why their view should be shared by others – given the premium on loyalty, their decision could help the pro-Zuma faction by discrediting its opposition.</p>
<p>This misfit between the logic of ANC politics and that outside it explains other aspects of the no confidence vote which have caused confusion. One is that figures such as secretary-general Gwede Mantashe and chief whip Jackson Mthembu <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/News/no-confidence-vote-not-about-zuma-but-about-anc-mantashe-20170808">worked to get ANC MPs to defeat the motion</a> although they oppose Zuma’s faction; the SA Communist Party, which has <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zuma-must-go-sacp-20170331">called on Zuma to go</a>, did not ask its members to support the motion.</p>
<p>They did this not because they have switched sides but because they believed Zuma’s defeat in a no confidence vote was unlikely – and would not help them if it happened. The opposing faction would still be there, as strong as before. They might be strong enough to replace Zuma with another member of the faction, changing nothing. Or, more likely, the deadlock between the factions would tear the ANC apart and might allow the opposition to elect a president by default. So they preferred to feign loyalty and to work to take over the ANC in December.</p>
<h2>Balance of power</h2>
<p>This means that the overwhelming ANC caucus vote against the motion does not tell us that the faction to which Zuma belongs is winning and will control the ANC after December. Many MPs who voted against the anti-Zuma motion may be part of the faction which wants him gone: they may have voted as they did because the leaders of their faction told them that strategy made this necessary. So the balance of power in the ANC, which decided who will lead it next year, may not have been affected either way by the no confidence vote.</p>
<p>What is happening inside the ANC may not be morally uplifting. But nor is it about foolishness or hypocrisy. It stems from decisions which are entirely logical if what matters inside the ANC matters to you. If everyone outside the ANC wants to grasp what is happening and where it might lead, they need to understand what matters inside the ANC.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82399/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Unless parliament passes a motion of no confidence in him, which is not on the cards any time soon, Zuma’s future depends on whether he’s weakened in the African National Congress, not parliament.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/822732017-08-09T14:12:33Z2017-08-09T14:12:33ZWar of attrition against South Africa’s President ‘Zupta’ is in full swing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181514/original/file-20170809-23494-13lwmyt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters march ahead of a vote of a no confidence against President Jacob Zuma. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The first big surprise was that <a href="http://www.gov.za/about-government/leaders/profile/1044">Baleka Mbete</a>, the speaker of the National Assembly, ruled in favour of the opposition parties’ request for a <a href="http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2017/08/08/this-is-not-setting-a-precedent---speaker-mbete-on-zuma-secret-ballot">secret ballot</a> in the eighth vote of no confidence against the president of South Africa.</p>
<p>Writing from memory, this is the first time that this speaker’s rulings have ever gone against Luthuli House, the headquarters of the governing African National Congress <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/">(ANC)</a>, or the preference of the party’s chief whip, Jackson Mthembu. The significance is that a vote of no confidence is a three-line whip: where the caucus decision is binding on all MPs of a particular party. A secret ballot enables dissenting MPs to sidestep threats of party disciplinary action.</p>
<p>Her ruling will also recall memories that President Jacob Zuma dumped her to back <a href="http://www.enca.com/south-africa/president-publicly-endorses-nkosazana-dlamini-zuma-for-anc-leader">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma </a> as his preferred successor. In short Mbete apparently perceives her career, as chairperson of the ANC, has nothing more to gain from remaining beholden to Zuma.</p>
<p>This is another interesting example of how Zuma’s power is unravelling.</p>
<p>Her ruling gave rise to intense media speculation about how many MPs from the ANC would vote with their conscience, as ANC MPs Pravin Gordhan and Makhosi Khoza <a href="https://www.africanewshub.com/news/7082087-pravin-gordhan-makhosi-khoza-pull-no-punches-on-zuma">had publicly urged</a>. The Economic Freedom Fighters and others in opposition claimed that they had a list of <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-07-21-malema-more-than-60-anc-mps-will-turn-on-zuma-if-there-is-a-secret-ballot/">60 ANC MPs</a> who would vote for the motion of no confidence. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/08/jacob-zuma-survives-no-confidence-vote-south-african-president">result</a> proved that they were kidding themselves.</p>
<p>The huge build-up in media hype made the result anti-climactic. Nonetheless, that there was only a margin of 21 to defeat the eighth no-confidence motion is unprecedented. It also shows the biggest erosion yet of Zuma’s support in the ANC caucus. At least 30 ANC MPs must have voted to remove Zuma from his presidency.</p>
<p>It’s not the parliamentary caucus, but the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/venue-anc-54th-national-conference">ANC’s elective conference</a> which will elect Zuma’s successor in four months’ time, and its composition will be subject to fierce tussling. Still, the <a href="http://caucus.anc.org.za/">caucus</a> contains a weighty cross-section of ANC players. The shift is therefore significant in terms of the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2017-05-19-ramaphosa-vs-dlamini-zuma-the-state-of-play-in-a-graphic/">Cyril Ramaphosa versus Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a> contest to replace Zuma.</p>
<h2>The power of the party</h2>
<p>Does the vote imply that a majority of ANC MPs would vote for Dlamini-Zuma as opposed to Ramaphosa? This is not clear: many ANC MPs would agree with the <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/we-still-wont-vote-against-zuma-anc-caucus-on-secret-ballot-ruling-20170622">caucus argument</a> – you cannot vote with the opposition for an opposition motion.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://thoughtundermined.com/2013/06/30/the-westminster-system-of-parliamentary-government/">Westminster-style democracies</a> a no-confidence debate is an annual fixture in the parliamentary calendar. But for a united front of opposition parties and civil society associations like Corruption Watch to organise mass <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/jonas-march-is-about-civil-society-holding-politicians-accountable-10681095">marches and demonstrations</a> outside parliament and across the country is certainly not routine. The smaller religious groups and pro-Zuma factions of the ANC who organised demonstrations <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-08-08-live-sa-braces-for-noconfidence-marches-and-vote/">against the no-confidence motion</a> show mobilisation of their groupings as well.</p>
<p>South Africa is a Westminster-derived democracy, so this situation brings precedents to mind. While votes of no confidence have not directly removed any British Prime Minister from office, one such narrow vote did lead to Tory caucus leaders telling <a href="http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/reference/the-british-parliamentary-system-in-the-age-of-churchill">Neville Chamberlain to step down</a> in 1940 before he was voted out. Similarly, it was Tory leaders withdrawing their support from Margaret Thatcher which <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/22/newsid_2549000/2549189.stm">compelled her to resign</a> in 1990.</p>
<p>In South Africa, the national leadership structure of major political parties such as the ANC and main opposition Democratic Alliance dominate and control their parliamentary caucuses more than in the UK or other Commonwealth countries. Their national conferences also have greater significance.</p>
<p>In view of the media coverage, it is important to emphasise that the <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/who-are-the-guptas-2080935">Gupta family conglomerate</a>, which is at the heart of <a href="http://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">state capture allegations</a>, is merely the wealthiest example of networks of <a href="http://www.gov.za/tenderpreneurship-stuff-crooked-cadres-fighters">“tenderpreneurs”</a> – businessmen who enrich themselves through government tenders, often dubiously. They are found across national government, the provinces and municipalities. There are many others and the work of <a href="http://ewn.co.za/Topic/Gupta-leaks">investigative journalists</a> will no doubt uncover them. </p>
<p>But the Gupta web of influence is certainly the one that’s received the greatest attention. Malema’s coining of the name <a href="http://www.news24.com/Video/SouthAfrica/News/watch-live-malema-declares-war-on-the-gupta-family-20160204">“Zupta”</a> aptly and pithily captures the fusion of the Zuma and Gupta families, the <a href="http://www.e-ir.info/2010/01/24/to-what-extent-can-neopatrimonialism-be-considered-significant-in-contemporary-african-politics/">neo-patrimonialism</a> which sucks out public funds for private enrichment.</p>
<h2>Crumbling empire</h2>
<p>This eighth vote of no confidence shows that civil society has organised a war of attrition against both Zuma and his system of subverting the procurement mechanisms in the public sector. This push back against corruption to defend the institutions of state will continue until Zuma is no longer in office. It is pivotal. The Auditor General has already <a href="http://m.fin24.com/fin24/Economy/there-must-be-bite-at-the-end-of-an-audit-ag-20170614-2">expressed concern</a> that there haven’t been any consequences to his reporting on fraud and corruption in public sector accounts.</p>
<p>The good news is that the Gupta empire <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-07/backlash-over-south-africa-graft-claims-threatens-gupta-empire">seems to be crumbling</a>. For one thing they can no longer laugh all the way to the bank – in an unprecedented move in the country <a href="http://www.biznews.com/undictated/2017/07/27/bank-of-baroda-gupta-outa/">all the banks</a> have, one by one, dropped this particular lucrative corporate client.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82273/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is a member of the ANC, but writes this analysis in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>The huge hype ahead of the vote of no confidence in President Zuma made the result anti-climactic. However, the fact that the motion was defeated by only a 21 vote margin is unprecedented.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/822442017-08-08T23:17:18Z2017-08-08T23:17:18ZNo confidence vote: a victory for Zuma, but a defeat for the ANC<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181472/original/file-20170808-26039-17fxqav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's President Jacob Zuma celebrates with his supporters after surviving a no-confidence motion in parliament</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Jacob Zuma is a natural born political survivor. Yesterday South Africa’s president <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/08/jacob-zuma-survives-no-confidence-vote-south-african-president">overcame</a> an eighth no confidence vote, despite the mountain of evidence of corrupt conduct that has emerged in recent months. </p>
<p>But it may prove to be a Pyrrhic victory – for him and most certainly for his party, the African National Congress (ANC). <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-08-08-zuma-supporters-celebrate-his-win-outa-considers-legal-action/">“Hollow”</a> was the word that one opposition leader, Bantu Holomisa, used afterwards, while the Economic Freedom Fighter’s leader Julius Malema employed a well-known Africa proverb: “When you want to eat an elephant you do it bit by bit”. </p>
<p>Zuma’s political death is proving to be a protracted affair. There was an air of expectation yesterday that recent allegations of “state capture” – attested to by a welter of evidence from the so-called <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/06/01/the-new-gupta-emails-are-a-lot-heres-what-they-say-in-5-quick_a_22120706/">#guptaleaks</a> – would be enough to persuade a sufficient number of the members of the ruling ANC to support an opposition-sponsored no confidence vote. </p>
<p>In the event, after a fractious two-hour debate scarred by ugly banter across the floor of the National Assembly, the motion fell short of the 201 votes required to remove Zuma and his cabinet. But yesterday was remarkably different. On the previous seven occasions that the opposition have tabled no confidence votes since Zuma’s power began in 2009, the ANC has remained steadfast in its support for its beleaguered president. Yesterday’s vote was a watershed for the liberation movement that brought an end to apartheid in 1994: around 30 of the 223 ANC MPs who voted yesterday sided with the opposition.</p>
<p>As the ANC’s chief whip, Jackson Mthembu, ruefully observed afterwards, this is true pause for reflection for the ruling party. Never before has such a significant number of the parliamentary caucus rebelled and defied the party whip. </p>
<p>Zuma’s streetwise political skills are well-known. So too is his adeptness at using executive patronage to secure the loyalty of party members as has been made clear in the revelations <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">arising from his links to the Gupta family</a>. </p>
<h2>The secret ballot saga</h2>
<p>But the back story to the unprecedented rebellion within his own party was the method of voting as much as Zuma’s political skullduggery. For the first time, parliament was compelled to allow MPs <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-08-07-mbete-allows-secret-ballot/">to vote in secret</a>. This followed a <a href="http://www.702.co.za/articles/251722/bantu-holomisa-explains-parly-rules-on-secret-ballot">legal challenge</a> to the rules by Holomisa’s United Democratic Movement. </p>
<p>In its 22 June <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-06-22-read-in-full-concourt-ruling-on-secret-ballot/">judgment</a>, the Constitutional Court – an institutional beacon of excellence and integrity in the context of the “capture” of other state bodies – had held that the speaker of the National Assembly had the discretion to order a secret ballot in exceptional circumstances. </p>
<p>Since the ruling, a number of ANC MPs have gone public with testimony of intimidation and even <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/07/12/makhosi-khoza-s-daughter-receives-death-threats">death threats</a> in the case of Makhosi Khoza. In turn, the ANC shot itself in the foot when one region of Zuma’s home province, KwaZulu-Natal, demanded that disciplinary proceedings be brought against Khoza after she had called for Zuma to go. The intervention served to underline the need to depart from the generally established principle of open voting. </p>
<p>Accordingly, speaker Baleka Mbete had little legal choice but to opt for a secret ballot, even though it would encourage dissenting voices among the ranks of the ANC caucus. Politically, she had probably done the political mathematics and, as the national chairperson of the ANC, was confident that regardless of the shield that she said was necessary to protect ANC MPs so that they could vote with their conscience, the numbers would still work out in Zuma’s favour.</p>
<p>And so it proved: 177 MPs voted for the motion, and 198 against (with 9 abstentions). Since the opposition has 151 MPs, at least three of whom were absent through illness, it means that that at least 29 and possibly as many as 35 ANC MPs jumped ship. </p>
<h2>Win-win for the opposition</h2>
<p>But it was a win-win situation for the opposition. Afterwards, in the unseasonably balmy winter’s evening outside the parliament in Cape Town, one after another of the leaders of the opposition spoke cheerfully about the political future and of the health of South Africa’s democracy. </p>
<p>They may have lost the battle, but they feel confident that they will win the war. After all, it is clear that Zuma is now their greatest electoral asset, with <a href="http://www.biznews.com/leadership/2017/05/31/ipsos-poll-zuma-unpopular/">several polls </a>(including the respected <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-05-19-afrobarometer-trio-of-polls-show-shifting-attitudes-but-voters-would-still-opt-for-anc/#.WYo8na17Gi4">Afrobarometer</a>), showing that across race and class, trust in Zuma has collapsed since he was returned to power for a second term in 2014. </p>
<p>Last year, the ANC suffered its first major electoral setbacks since the advent of democracy in 1994 when it <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-revolt-of-south-africas-metropoles-a-revolution-of-rising-expectations-64617">lost control</a> of three major city governments in Pretoria, Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth. Now, its political management skills appear to be in disarray as factionalism and deep, painful divisions dominate internal party politics. This is all unfolding in the run-up to what is likely to be a bloody five-yearly <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/venue-anc-54th-national-conference">national elective conference</a> in December, at which the ANC will elect a new President of the party to succeed Zuma. </p>
<p>That may or may not mark the start of a new era of renewal for the ANC. But Zuma’s term as President of the country is only due to end in 2019. A lot more damage could be done to the country’s economy and its prospects for growth. </p>
<p>The consequence of that, however, is that the ANC will face the prospect of losing its majority at the national polls for the first time since Nelson Mandela’s historic victory in 1994. </p>
<p>Yesterday may have been a victory for Zuma. But in the longer term it is likely to come to be seen as a major defeat for the ANC.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82244/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Calland is a founding partner of the political consultancy, The Paternoster Group, serves as a member of the executive committee and advisory council of the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution, and is a member of the Board of the Open Democracy Advice Centre. </span></em></p>The political death of President Jacob Zuma is proving to be a protracted affair. Though he lives to fight another day, the ANC faces the prospect of losing its majority at the polls next year.Richard Calland, Associate Professor in Public Law, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/680842016-11-03T15:26:29Z2016-11-03T15:26:29ZThe death knell of Zuma’s rule echoes transitions elsewhere in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144375/original/image-20161103-25319-1osxm4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa and Ethiopia are part of a wave of protests sweeping across parts of Africa that are known as Africa Uprising. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Tiksa Negeri</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sometime after the next South African president is sworn in, the country will look back on the Jacob Zuma years and reflect on the two defining moments of this period of degeneration: the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/marikana-massacre-16-august-2012">Marikana massacre</a> in 2012, and the release of the Public Protector’s <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/download-the-full-state-of-capture-pdf-20161102">State of Capture</a> report after the <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zuma-withdraws-application-for-state-capture-report-interdict-20161102">court humiliation</a> of Zuma and a cabal of his supporters. </p>
<p>The Marikana massacre was the most dramatic symbol of popular resistance to state failure, although it was by no means an isolated event. The state capture report represents the victory of a broad front of political elites drawn from all parties, key business networks and several civil society coalitions who gathered in 1980s-style <a href="http://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/da-eff-and-save-south-africa-march-against-state-capture/">“united frontism”</a> in the country’s capital Pretoria. This may just be a prelude to a rearrangement of power positions at the apex after Zuma falls - or gets pushed - onto his sword. Or it foreshadows deeper regime change. </p>
<p>Either way, South Africa has become part of a much wider pan-African dynamic commonly referred to now as <a href="http://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/africa-uprising-popular-protest-political-change/">Africa Uprising</a> – the third wave of major popular uprisings since the 1950s. These uprisings are led mainly by urban youth and, although diverse, they essentially express aspirations that most regimes cannot currently address. In particular demands for democratic decision-making, an end to state capture and greater redistribution. </p>
<p>The first wave took place in the 1950s/1960s which led to the end of colonialism. The second was in the 1980s/1990s which got rid of dictatorships that followed the growth years of the 1960s, reinforced by <a href="https://www2.gwu.edu/%7Eerpapers/teachinger/glossary/cold-war.cfm">Cold War dynamics</a>. The third wave has affected over 40 countries over the <a href="http://www.crasc.dz/arb/index.php/fr/accueil/36-mars-2016/303-africa%E2%80%99s-third-wave-of-protests">past decade</a>, and the outcome is as yet unclear.</p>
<h2>Opponents gather strength</h2>
<p>If Zuma had proceeded with his court action to <a href="http://www.news24.com/Video/SouthAfrica/News/watch-live-zuma-withdraws-state-capture-report-interdict-20161102">stop publication</a> of the report, he would have directly taken on his own party and the people of South Africa. This remarkable eventuality was a step too far, even for him. </p>
<p>For the leadership of the African National Congress, it must have been comforting seeing him engineer his own almost total political isolation, thus saving them from finding the courage to recall him like they did former <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2008-09-20-anc-recalls-mbeki">President Thabo Mbeki in 2008</a>. </p>
<p>There has been growing evidence over the past few weeks that the tide has begun to turn against Zuma in the the party’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/officials/national-executive-committee-0">National Executive Committee</a>. This became very apparent when its chief whip Jackson Mthembu kept his job after leading the public <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2016/10/23/Mthembu-calls-for-entire-ANC-leadership-to-step-down">charge against Zuma </a> from his parliamentary base two weeks earlier. Mthembu didn’t suffer the same fate as Paul Mashatile, another ANC stalwart and then leader of the country’s economic powerhouse Gauteng, who paid the price for coming out publicly <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-11-02-paul-mashatile-joins-savesouthafrica-there-was-nothing-we-could-do-before-now">against Zuma </a> before the local government elections in August. </p>
<p>And there have been the first indications that the usually fearful and limp-wristed business community has had enough. There could be no clearer evidence of this than the standing ovation that AngloGold Ashanti chairman Sipho Pityana got at a mining conference. This was followed by CEOs coming out against <a href="http://m.news24.com/news24/Columnists/GuestColumn/pityana-south-africans-have-had-enough-20161102">charges being brought against</a> the Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan.</p>
<p>A rapid series of events over the past few weeks suggest that the tide has turned against Zuma. After the head of the country’s National Prosecuting Authority Shaun Abrahams dropped the <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/npa-drops-charges-against-gordhan-2085233">charges against Gordhan</a> thus further weakening Zuma, rumours circulated within the ANC, parliamentary and well-connected business circles that “No. 1 (a colloquial reference to Zuma) was planning a major strike that will change the game”. Most assumed this would be a scorched-earth cabinet reshuffle to get Gordhan out. After the publication of the Public Protector’s damning report this seems unlikely.</p>
<p>It would, nevertheless, be a mistake to underestimate Zuma.</p>
<h2>Dangerous times ahead</h2>
<p>The issue is no longer whether Zuma will leave or not. The challenge now is a power vacuum without a clear political project to fill it. This is the new contestation, a dangerous time when the moves are opaque. ANC factions are out in the open, but none seem able to lead decisively. Populist forces would be keen to fill this vacuum.</p>
<p>One of the country’s largest unions, <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2016/11/01/Zumas-position-now-untenable-and-he-must-resign-Nehawu">the National Education, Health and Allied Workers’ Union</a>, has made a commendable intervention calling on Zuma to resign and for the deputy President <a href="http://whoswho.co.za/cyril-ramaphosa-1113">Cyril Ramaphosa</a> to take over. But, given the myriad divisions in the ANC, it’s a safe bet that Ramaphosa is not about to step into the breach with a coherent coalition of forces behind him. </p>
<p>By contrast, if a downgrade triggers a recession and protests mount, mass mobilisation may well be triggered. South Africans should not underestimate what happens as politicised students head home into their communities across the country for the holidays. As in Ethiopia recently, this could turn a student moment into people’s movement.</p>
<h2>Africa’s third wave of uprisings</h2>
<p>So is South Africa part of the third wave of African uprisings? It’s important to recognise that these have not unfolded uniformly with a shared platform. What is common is action against ruling elites, but this has played out differently in different countries, with some victories for democracy and some setbacks.</p>
<p>The most recent have been protests in Ethiopia that started with student demonstrations and spread out into a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">people’s movement</a>, with significant support from the Ethiopian diaspora. The governing party has admitted that changes are needed. There has been a cabinet reshuffle and <a href="http://www.zeethiop.com/mobile/watch.php?vid=4bcb977a6">20 cabinet ministers</a> have been fired.</p>
<p>There are similar stories across the continent, with different results. In some power positions have been rearranged at the apex, as in Ethiopia. But in Tanzania President John Magufuli is completely <a href="http://www.enca.com/africa/tanzanias-magufuli-most-un-african-leader?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook&utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_term=Autofeed#link_time=1449142617">changing the ballgame</a>.</p>
<p>The North African chapters of the Arab Spring have decomposed into dictatorships largely because middle class-led movements did not translate into real organisational power capable of resisting re-militarisation.</p>
<p>In August 2016, 272 activists from movements across Africa met in Arusha and issued the <a href="http://africacsi.org/2016/08/24/the-kilimanjaro-declaration/">Kilimanjaro Declaration</a>. A key sentence read:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[t]hat the wealth belongs to all our people, not to a narrow political and economic elite. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>State capture is not just a South African phenomenon. Nor are the country’s movements unique. But I believe that South Africa is part of Africa Uprising, and like the previous waves, the country can assume that things will change fundamentally. What it should not do is allow the current political vacuum to be filled by those who only want to rearrange power positions in the apex or alternatively impose a populist solution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68084/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Swilling receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>The growing revolt against South Africa’s president, amid state capture allegations, is not an isolated event, but part of a much wider pan-African uprising led by the continent’s disaffected youth.Mark Swilling, Distinguished Professor of Sustainable Development, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.