tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/jakaya-kikwete-40477/articlesJakaya Kikwete – The Conversation2023-02-16T13:12:04Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1998322023-02-16T13:12:04Z2023-02-16T13:12:04ZTanzania is ruled with impunity – four key issues behind calls for constitutional reform<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510162/original/file-20230214-20-egw7ke.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tanzanian opposition politician Freeman Mbowe (left) flashes a victory sign at a public rally in January 2023.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michael Jamson/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tanzania’s president issued a <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/01/tanzania-president-hassan-lifts-the-blanket-ban-on-political-assemblies/">statement</a> in June 2016 announcing a ban on political rallies outside campaign periods. The ban was unconstitutional. </p>
<p><a href="https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/constitution.pdf#page=17">Article 20 (1)</a> of the constitution of Tanzania allows for public assembly. Other laws, such as the <a href="https://media.tanzlii.org/files/legislation/akn-tz-act-1992-5-eng-2019-11-30.pdf">Political Parties Act</a> and the <a href="https://www.tanzanialaws.com/principal-legislation/parliamentary-immunities-powers-and-privileges-act">Parliamentary Immunities, Powers and Privilege Act</a>, give political parties and politicians the right to conduct rallies. </p>
<p>Despite these laws, it took another <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/09/tanzania-ends-ban-political-rallies">presidential statement</a> in January 2023 to unban rallies. This illustrates the power of the president – even over the constitution. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzania-opposition-rallies-are-finally-unbanned-but-this-doesnt-mean-democratic-reform-is-coming-198436">Tanzania: opposition rallies are finally unbanned – but this doesn't mean democratic reform is coming</a>
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<p>Opposition parties and activists have noted that this great presidential power is a constitutional loophole. The Tanzanian constitution has proved to be weak in protecting itself. </p>
<p>A constitution can protect itself if it has clear checks and balances. With <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/interview-tundu-lissu-discusses-need-constitutional-reform-tanzania">imperial presidential powers</a>, the constitution gives the executive branch of government the upper hand over the two other branches of government: the judiciary and legislature. </p>
<p>Such powers – and their abuse – have led opposition parties and activists to <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzania-must-face-up-to-calls-for-reform-if-it-wants-to-keep-the-peace-172967">call</a> for constitutional reviews. </p>
<p>There are four reasons driving the agitation for constitutional change in Tanzania: unfree and unfair elections; unchecked presidential powers; political impunity; and the skewed political arrangement between Tanzania and Zanzibar.</p>
<h2>Entrenching dominance</h2>
<p>Recent calls for constitutional change in Tanzania <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/109246/tanzania-whats-really-behind-ccms-refusal-to-change-the-constitution/">began in 2010</a>. A constitutional review commission was set up in 2012, headed by former prime minister <a href="https://www.taas-online.or.tz/members/view/hon-joseph-sinde-warioba">Joseph Warioba</a>. The commission drafted a report, and a constitutional review assembly was set up to debate it. </p>
<p>The review assembly was dominated by members of the ruling party, Chama cha Mapinduzi. They altered the Warioba report and proposed a draft constitution similar to the existing one. A coalition of opposition parties boycotted the process and it stalled. </p>
<p>Maintaining the same constitution has been the ruling party’s strategy. The current constitution facilitates <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/news/latest-news/opinion/2022/2022-07/tanzanias-undemocratic-constitution-is-a-template-for-disaster.html">one-party dominance</a> by entrenching the party’s and president’s power. </p>
<p>Further review was stopped by president <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzanias-john-magufuli-a-brilliant-start-but-an-ignominious-end-157092">John Pombe Magufuli</a>, who came into power in 2015. Magufuli rejected any calls for constitutional reforms – and acted in a way that disregarded the existing law.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzanias-john-magufuli-a-brilliant-start-but-an-ignominious-end-157092">Tanzania’s John Magufuli: a brilliant start but an ignominious end</a>
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<h2>Chasing change</h2>
<p>The four triggers for constitutional reform in Tanzania are related.</p>
<p><strong>1. Repeated unfree and unfair elections</strong> </p>
<p>In Tanzania, unfree and unfair elections began after the constitution was amended <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/tan5.htm">in 1992</a> to allow for multi-party elections. Since then, there have been six general elections. Each has been marred by accusations of an <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/jpola5&div=36&id=&page=">unlevel playing field</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/oct/29/tanzania-announces-election-winner-amid-claims-of-vote-rigging">rigging</a> and violence. The <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/11/1077292">2020 general election</a> was especially violent. </p>
<p>Constitutional reform is crucial to realise free and fair elections. This is because the composition of the electoral commission as provided for by the constitution is bound to be biased. The president, who is often the incumbent candidate and the chairperson of the ruling party, is responsible for appointing the executive director and commissioners of the commission. All election returning officers at the constituency level are also presidential appointees. </p>
<p>The consequence is that electoral officials are likely to be loyal to their appointing authority rather than to the ideals of free and fair elections. </p>
<p>Additionally, once the presidential vote has been announced, the constitution <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/1840340-5593992-b0yrsv/index.html">doesn’t allow for it to be challenged in court</a>. </p>
<p><strong>2. Unchecked presidential powers</strong> </p>
<p>Under the current constitution, the president of Tanzania has enormous power. He or she appoints senior officials in other branches of government and all heads of public institutions. This includes the chief justice, all other judges and the inspector general of police. The president also appoints the controller audit general, who audits government accounts. </p>
<p>Through loyalty, these appointees are likely to enforce the president’s statements even if they are unconstitutional. </p>
<p>Further, the president cannot be prosecuted as per <a href="https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/constitution.pdf#page=29">Article 46</a> of the constitution. The president is protected during and after their tenure in office. Such provisions promote impunity. </p>
<p><strong>3. Impunity</strong> </p>
<p>Impunity in Tanzania plays out where one group of people can do what they like politically, while another group – in particular opposition politicians – faces excessive exposure to an unjust system. </p>
<p>Trumped up charges against opposition leaders, activists and business people deemed critical of the president are popular tools for keeping critics silent. Such charges, facilitated by undemocratic laws, were used during Magufuli’s regime. Magufuli <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/17/tanzanian-president-john-magufuli-is-dead-vp">died in March 2021</a> and was succeeded by Samia Suluhu Hassan.</p>
<p>In the early days of Hassan’s administration, in July 2021, Freeman Mbowe, the leader of the opposition party Chadema, was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/31/tanzania-opposition-leader-freeman-mbowe-appears-in-court-to-face-charges">arrested and charged</a> with terrorism offences. Due to political pressure – and a failure to find evidence – the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60616800">charges were dropped</a>. Mbowe spent eight months in jail.</p>
<p>After his release in March 2022, Hassan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tanzania-frees-detained-opposition-leader-mbowe-drops-charges-citizen-newspaper-2022-03-04/">expressed her determination</a> to boost the country’s democracy. She has also expressed her resentment of the unjust political system and <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/massive-fraud-at-the-dpp-s-office-as-plea-bargain-money-stashed-away-in-china-4106530">called out corruption</a> at the office of public prosecutions. </p>
<p>But presidential sentiments like these are not adequate as they don’t lead to institutional changes in political structures or norms. </p>
<p><strong>4. The Tanzania-Zanzibar agreement</strong> </p>
<p>This is arguably the most contentious trigger for calls for constitutional reform. </p>
<p>The political relationship between the island of Zanzibar and the mainland, Tanzania, has raised calls for Zanzibari autonomy. The government of the United Republic of Tanzania deals with union matters, as well as all mainland issues. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar deals with the matters of Zanzibar only. </p>
<p>Opposition leaders have argued that the constitution and this current structure increase the ruling party’s influence in Zanzibari politics. Constitutional debate on this issue is often around <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45342101">four proposed structures</a>: one joint government, two governments, three governments (with the union being the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/zanzibar-mourns-the-advocate-of-three-tier-system-of-government--1354218">third tier</a>), or a confederation with a central authority. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>The underlying call for constitutional reform seeks to uproot the one-party state system to allow for accountability and democratic progress in Tanzania. Under the current constitution, any pronouncements of change are cosmetic, with no sustainable effects. </p>
<p>For Tanzania to realise real and sustainable democracy, a new constitution is necessary.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199832/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aikande Clement Kwayu has previous received funding from various academic and research institutions. She has volunteered at CHADEMA. </span></em></p>Tanzania’s six-year ban on political rallies shows how the president’s power can override the constitution.Aikande Clement Kwayu, Independent researcher & Lecturer, Tumaini University MakumiraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1987932023-02-03T12:35:22Z2023-02-03T12:35:22ZSamia Suluhu Hassan is reforming Tanzania – it’s winning her fans but boosting the opposition<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507876/original/file-20230202-7246-ndbz5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tanzania President Samia Suluhu Hassan. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Drew Angerer/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A series of political manoeuvres by Tanzania President Samia Suluhu Hassan have set the east African country on an unfamiliar, yet hopeful, political path. Since her elevation to the presidency two years ago following the death of John Pombe Magufuli, the new president has struck a reformist political tone and led reconciliation with a previously marginalised opposition. None of this would have been possible under Magufuli.</p>
<p>Magufuli not only <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/remembering-not-to-forget-tanzanias-2020-general-elections/">stifled</a> the opposition, but also went as far as threatening to <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/unfinished-business-magufulis-autocratic-rule-tanzania">annihilate</a> it. Hassan has made several reforms, including reconciliation talks between the government and the opposition. Her government also <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/17/tanzania-ends-ban-four-newspapers#:%7E:text=Tanzania's%20Minister%20for%20Information%2C%20Nape,Mwanahalisi%2C%20and%20Tanzania%20Daima%20newspapers">lifted the ban on newspapers</a>. </p>
<p>Hassan has made a significant break from her predecessor. There was little civic and political space under the late president. There was violent crackdown on the opposition and the media. </p>
<p>Hassan has placed strong emphasis on <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/oped/president-samia-s-letter-to-tanzanians-on-30-years-of-multi-party-democracy-3866168">reconciliation, resilience, reform and rebuilding</a>. She has reversed most of her predecessor’s retrogressive policies. For example, she has <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/samia-allows-student-mothers-back-in-class-3630190">ended the ban</a> on pregnant schoolgirls in classrooms. She has also <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/samia-s-key-role-in-tanzania-s-new-positive-outlook-3979584">opened up</a> the country to foreign investments. </p>
<p>Her most recent initiative was to <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tanzania-president-lifts-ban-on-opposition-political-rallies-4074510">lift the ban</a> on political rallies and activities. Magufuli <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/magufuli-criticised-as-tanzania-bans-rallies--1351138">banned</a> opposition political rallies and activities in 2016. The unconstitutional move came at a time when the main opposition party – Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema) – was planning nationwide rallies to protest Magufuli’s repressive and authoritarian rule. </p>
<p>A year ago, Hassan <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/samia-holds-face-to-face-talks-with-opposition-leader-tundu-lissu-in-brussels-3719462">met exiled opposition figure Tundu Lissu</a> in Brussels, and he has returned home. She went on to play a role in the release of Chadema chairman Freeman Mbowe, who had been in prison for 18 months facing terrorism charges. </p>
<p>Alongside the reforms, Hassan used her first full year in office to consolidate her political base. She seems to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzania-is-getting-a-political-remake-as-president-hassan-eyes-the-2025-polls-177761#comment_2747653">carefully strategising</a> her reforms with the 2025 elections in mind. All her actions to remake Tanzania’s political landscape <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzania-is-getting-a-political-remake-as-president-hassan-eyes-the-2025-polls-177761">need to be seen in the light of those elections</a>. She will go into the election as a clear favourite. </p>
<p>But the reforms are a double-edged sword for the president. They have endeared her to many, but also breathed new life into the opposition. </p>
<h2>Hassan’s power game</h2>
<p>Hassan moved quickly to consolidate her base after the death of Magufuli in 2021. On the anniversary of her ascent to the top office, she spoke about the difficulties she had endured during the transition. She observed that her “rivals” had already begun plotting for the 2025 elections. </p>
<p>To strengthen her base, she brought back into the fold people who had been sidelined by Magufuli. One was former president Jakaya Kikwete. She also made several changes in her cabinet and the governing structures. </p>
<p>Another part of her 2025 game plan has been the overtures she’s made to the opposition. Having served as Magufuli’s vice-president, she understands the intricate political games needed to win an election. </p>
<h2>Reform agenda</h2>
<p>In December 2021, Hassan set up a <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tanzania-taskforce-supports-lifting-of-political-rallies-ban-3993398">taskforce on political reform</a> and democracy. It met with political stakeholders and drew up a set of key policy proposals: </p>
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<li><p>political parties should be allowed to conduct public rallies and hold internal meetings </p></li>
<li><p>an independent electoral body, free from interference from the executive </p></li>
<li><p>presidential election results should be subject to challenges in court, as the African Court on Human and People’s Rights <a href="https://www.african-court.org/en/images/Cases/Judgment/Appl.%20018%20-%202018%20-%20Jebra%20Kambole%20-%20Judgment.pdf">ruled in July 2020</a> </p></li>
<li><p>the Political Parties Act should be reformed to allow more political participation for women and special groups, such as persons with disabilities. </p></li>
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<h2>Divisions over the constitution</h2>
<p>The next hurdle for Hassan is addressing <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/katiba-is-a-must-says-tanzania-warioba--3471688">discontent over constitutional reform</a> and policy priorities. Her recent taskforce recommended completing the stalled constitution review process initiated eight years ago. After the 2014 review, a <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/vl/item/proposed-constitution-tanzania-sept-2014">proposed constitution</a> was passed, awaiting referendum. </p>
<p>Opposition politicians are opposed to the content of the proposed constitution. They are pushing for an earlier <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzanias-hassan-faces-her-first-political-test-constitutional-reform-165088">draft constitution</a> spearheaded by constitutional reformist judge Joseph Warioba, terming it the people’s constitution.</p>
<p>The ACT-Wazalendo party is also pushing for the creation of an independent electoral commission before a new constitution. Chadema continues to push for a new constitution as the panacea for Tanzania’s development. </p>
<p>Hassan has demonstrated political skill and tact well beyond her two years’ experience as the country’s leader. Her stand on a new constitution remains tepid. She previously stated that her <a href="https://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00078586.html">priority was the economy</a> and the constitution would come later. But it would not be surprising to see her meet the opposition halfway on their demands for a new constitution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198793/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicodemus Minde does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Tanzanian president’s reform drive has endeared her to the populace but will also embolden opposition to her political ambitions.Nicodemus Minde, Adjunct Lecturer, United States International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1650882021-07-29T15:12:27Z2021-07-29T15:12:27ZTanzania’s Hassan faces her first political test: constitutional reform<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/413335/original/file-20210727-13-1q0wsuk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tanzania opposition party leader Freeman Mbowe (centre) after being released from prison in Dar es Salaam in 2020.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Ericky Boniphace/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After the death of Tanzania’s president John Pombe Magufuli in March 2021, his successor Samia Suluhu Hassan began her tenure by departing from his undemocratic style. President Hassan inherited a <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzanias-samia-hassan-has-the-chance-to-heal-a-polarised-nation-157523">divided nation</a>. But in her <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/100-days-of-samia-3452986">first days</a> in office she created a sense of optimism, not just through her calls for reconciliation and national unity but her candour. </p>
<p>Careful not to upset the hardliners in her party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi, she was calculating in achieving her boldest reversal – the country’s <a href="https://qz.com/africa/2006013/tanzania-president-samia-hassan-issues-new-covid-19-restrictions/">COVID-19 ambivalence</a>. An advisory expert committee helped <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/06/25/tanzania-expert-committee-recommends-covid-19-figures-re-publication//">pave the way</a> for Tanzania to join the COVAX programme and begin vaccinating its citizens – with the president <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/president-samia-suluhu-becomes-first-tanzanian-to-officially-get-covid-19-jab-3489668">taking the lead</a>.</p>
<p>The new president also spoke against suppressing <a href="https://ipi.media/new-tanzania-president-to-lift-ban-on-media-organizations/">media freedom</a>. She <a href="https://apnews.com/article/africa-tanzania-0dd64ce8844163886f1b997461bd0441">released</a> dissidents and pledged to meet the opposition.</p>
<p>But now her leadership is under scrutiny over her handling of demands led by opposition leaders for a new constitution. On 21 July, Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo party leader Freeman Mbowe was arrested as he prepared to address a constitutional forum arranged by his party. He was slapped with <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/22/tanzanian-opposition-leader-to-face-terrorism-charges-party">terrorism</a> charges.</p>
<p>The continued harassment of the opposition, arbitrary arrest and trumped up charges are a reminder of the inadequacies of the current constitution and the need for constitutional reforms.</p>
<h2>How Tanzania got here</h2>
<p>One of the promises that Hassan made as she assumed office was her willingness to meet the opposition. Previously, opposition party leaders and members were harassed and brutalised and political party activity was unlawfully banned in July 2016. But the clamour for constitutional reform has set her and the opposition on a <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/-you-ve-still-not-met-with-us-mbowe-reminds-samia-3431964">collision course</a>. </p>
<p>Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo has <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/chadema-will-not-participate-in-the-2025-polls-without-a-new-constitution-says-mbowe-3416198">vowed</a> not to participate in another election under the current constitution. It has called for reforms to the management of elections, which can often be <a href="https://tanzaniaelectionswatch.org/download/tanzania-elections-watch-final-report/">shambolic</a>. </p>
<p>There have also been demands for an independent electoral commission as well as the restructuring of the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. These two make up the United Republic of Tanzania. </p>
<p>One of the defining features of Tanzania’s current constitution is the imperial powers vested on the head of state. Founding leader Julius Nyerere once <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/consolidating-democracy-tanzania-presidential-powers-under-proposed-constitution">remarked</a> that the constitution gave him the status of a god. Together with the need to curtail the powers of the president, there has been a <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/chadema-s-mbowe-adds-voice-to-demand-for-new-constitution--3247724">demand</a> for a progressive law that is anchored by the principles of human rights, freedoms and institutional accountability.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tanzania_1995?lang=en">current constitution</a> came into effect in 1977 during single-party rule. By design, this constitution consolidated one-party dominant rule, which has been the defining feature of Tanzania’s politics. </p>
<p>Recent constitutional reforms in Tanzania began in 1991 with the setting up of the <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/-nyalali-commission-recommends-restoration-of-multi-party-politics-2708724">Nyalali Presidential Commission</a> to advise on the transition from single-party rule to multiparty democracy. This commission made a host of recommendations which led to other reform demands such as the restructuring of the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar.</p>
<p>In 2010, Tanzania’s fourth president, Jakaya Kikwete, initiated a process to comprehensively review the 1977 constitution. Led by Judge Joseph Warioba, it culminated in a draft constitution that was presented to a Constituent Assembly for debate. One of the changes proposed was a three-tier union structure. But political intrigue stifled this. </p>
<p>A new draft constitution was produced in October 2014. The proposed new constitution was to be subjected to a referendum in 2015, but this failed to happen. When Magufuli became president in 2015, he <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/tanzanian-president-indicates-constitutional-reform-not-priority">said</a> a new constitution was not part of his agenda.</p>
<h2>Why a new constitution?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/clamour-for-new-katiba-tanzania-3461544">clamour</a> for a new constitutional dispensation in Tanzania is not new. However, the country’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/12/2/magfulis-growing-authoritarianism-is-not-an-exception">slide to authoritarian</a> and repressive rule in the past few years has reignited the hunger for change.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-magufuli-has-steered-tanzania-down-the-road-of-an-authoritarian-one-party-state-149760">How Magufuli has steered Tanzania down the road of an authoritarian one-party state</a>
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<p>Constitution making through popular participation is crucial in strengthening national unity and empowering public support for nation building. Countries such as South Africa and Kenya have demonstrated that such reforms are possible.</p>
<p>Tanzania has enjoyed relative political stability over the years. But, it needs a new constitution to address contemporary challenges such as poverty, inequality and corruption. A constitution could strengthen public institutions through good governance and accountability. </p>
<p>President Hassan still enjoys public goodwill early in her term. She, therefore, has a historic chance to peacefully steer Tanzania towards a new constitution. She can draw on this goodwill, her collegial approach and her experience as the vice chair of the 2014 Constituent Assembly to take control. If not, today’s political demands could evolve into tomorrow’s political crisis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165088/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicodemus Minde does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite the relative political stability over the years, Tanzania needs a new constitution to address contemporary challenges and strengthen institutions.Nicodemus Minde, PhD Fellow, United States International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1576022021-03-23T14:53:35Z2021-03-23T14:53:35ZIn Magufuli’s shadow: the stark choices facing Tanzania’s new president<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390901/original/file-20210322-21-so6k79.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">New Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan during her swearing-in.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by STR/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The sudden <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56437852">death</a> of Tanzania’s President John Pombe Magufuli has thrown the East African nation into a period of political uncertainty. </p>
<p>Vice-president, Samia Suluhu Hassan, has been sworn in as his successor, making her Tanzania’s first woman president.</p>
<p>The transition is all the more challenging given the major rupture - both political and economic - caused by Magufuli’s presidency. Magufuli, who won a second term in October 2020, dramatically centralised power and pursued an interventionist economic policy agenda. He courted controversy on a number of fronts, most recently, by <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzanias-covid-19-response-puts-magufulis-leadership-style-in-sharp-relief-139417">claiming</a> that Tanzania - contrary to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL4N2KN2Y7">mounting evidence</a> - was Covid-free.</p>
<p>Hassan has called for unity and <a href="https://twitter.com/zittokabwe/status/1373196342667919364">counselled</a> that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>now is not the time to look at what has passed but rather to look at what is to come.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Despite the 61-year-old leader’s forward-looking stance, questions remain about how Magufuli’s legacy will shape her time in office.</p>
<h2>The authoritarian turn</h2>
<p>Magufuli oversaw the marginalisation of opposition parties and a decline in civil liberties. His first term was defined by <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/tanzania-shrinking-space-and-opposition-protest/">heightened</a> intimidation and violence against opposition leaders, including disappearances and physical attacks.</p>
<p>Thanks to five years of repression, the October 2020 general elections saw the opposition all but <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/tanzanias-2020-election-return-one-party-state">wiped out of</a> elected office. The ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi now controls all local government councils. It also holds 97% of directly elected legislative seats, up from 73% in 2015.</p>
<p>In addition, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/press-freedom/press-freedom-groups-accuse-tanzania-squeezing-media-ahead-elections">media freedom</a> and civil liberties were also restricted. A law <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-worldbank-idUSKCN1MD17P">passed</a> in 2018 imposed jail terms for questioning the accuracy of official statistics.</p>
<p>But Magufuli’s authoritarian tendencies were not unprecedented in Tanzania. For instance, the rule of his predecessor <a href="https://www.who.int/topics/millennium_development_goals/accountability_commission/kikwete/en/">Jakaya Kikwete</a> was also <a href="http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/01/anti-poaching-operation-spread-terror-tanzania/">marred</a> by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-strike-doctors-idUSBRE8610F620120702">human rights abuses</a> as well <a href="https://www.bmj.com/content/345/bmj.e4698.full">civil society</a> and <a href="http://cbldf.org/2015/02/tanzania-bans-newspaper-over-disrespectful-cartoon/">media</a> repression. Kikwete also <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-34656934">cancelled</a> Zanzibar’s 2015 election due to a likely opposition victory.</p>
<p>It remains to be seen whether Hassan will adopt a more liberal approach, loosening restrictions on opposition parties, the media and civil society. Even if she does, the damage will take time to repair. Opposition parties, for instance, may well struggle to regain their strength. Among other setbacks, they have lost almost all local elected representatives - a core element of their organisational infrastructure <a href="https://www.danpaget.com/recent-publication">built up painstakingly</a> over decades.</p>
<h2>Centralising power in the party</h2>
<p>Another key pillar to Magufuli’s legacy is the centralisation of power within the Chama Cha Mapinduzi. </p>
<p>In the early years under founding president Julius Nyerere, Tanzania’s ruling party was dominated by the president and a hierarchy of appointed state and party officials. But, following economic liberalisation in the 1980s and Nyerere’s retirement from politics, the party became steeped in factional rivalries. These were spurred by new political alliances and an emerging private sector business elite.</p>
<p>This factionalism reached its height under Kikwete amid accusations of widespread <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/114/456/382/24510?login=true">corruption</a>. Magufuli’s nomination as party presidential candidate only occurred because the rivalry among these factions left him as the <a href="https://presidential-power.net/?p=3607">unexpected compromise candidate</a>.</p>
<p>Once in office, though, Magufuli quickly signalled he would be nobody’s puppet. He used his position as ruling party chairman to <a href="https://presidential-power.net/?p=8655">create a “new” Chama Cha Mapinduzi</a>. This involved breaking with party heavyweights, including Kikwete, <a href="https://presidential-power.net/?p=9953">suppressing factional</a> organising, and consolidating his own support base. </p>
<p>Magufuli’s new base was a cohort of freshly appointed <a href="https://presidential-power.net/?p=8241">party officials</a> as well as civil servants and cabinet ministers. His loyalists likened these <a href="http://www.rai.co.tz/dk-bashiru-ally-anamuenzi-mwalimu-nyerere-kwa-vitendo/">changes</a> to a revival of Nyerere’s Chama Cha Mapinduzi. But, in our view, the comparison is <a href="https://medium.com/@adoshaibu/rais-magufuli-ni-karume-bila-babu-b6748a181b0b">misleading</a>. </p>
<p>Like Magufuli before her, Hassan will be taking office – and party leadership – without her own political base. She will also have to contend with revived factional manoeuvring as sidelined groups try to regain an upper hand.</p>
<p>Hassan could align with a loyal Magufuli faction, which includes influential figures within the party. But, early indications suggest she intends to follow the advice of “party elders”, notably Kikwete. The former president <a href="https://twitter.com/Hakingowi/status/1373321743406878724?s=20">reportedly</a> attended the party’s most recent central committee meeting on Hassan’s invitation.</p>
<p>Aligning herself with Kikwete will likely lead to the reemergence of the internal factional rivalries that characterised the former president’s tenure. </p>
<h2>Implications for economic policy</h2>
<p>If president Hassan does continue to take a political steer from Kikwete, one likely outcome is that there will be a change in economic policy. In particular, a return to growth that’s led by a more <a href="https://www.whyafrica.co.za/tanzania-poised-for-a-u-turn/">business-friendly</a> approach to the private sector.</p>
<p>Calls are already being made <a href="https://twitter.com/kigogo2014/status/1373394443680759811?s=20">for such a course of action.</a>.</p>
<p>The danger for Hassan, however, is that under Kikwete this model was associated with high levels of <a href="https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/39947205">corruption</a> and unproductive <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08ad8e5274a27b20007d3/20130724-public-goods-rents-and-business-in-tanzania.pdf">rent-seeking</a>.</p>
<p>A careful reassessment of the Magufuli era is needed to guide future policymaking.</p>
<p>Magufuli used his control over the ruling party to pursue an ambitious policy agenda. This was also <a href="https://presidential-power.net/?p=7222">linked</a> to his political project of centralising power. </p>
<p>Although this trend actually began under Kikwete, Magufuli <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2019/05/drawing-the-wrong-lessons-from-the-magufuli-experience-in-tanzania">accelelrated</a> a move towards more state-led investment. Under his leadership, both state-owned and, increasingly, <a href="https://www.mwananchi.co.tz/habari/1597578-4656014-cvox2az/index.html">military-owned</a> enterprises were offered strategic <a href="https://www.mwananchi.co.tz/habari/Kitaifa/Rais--Jeshi-lipewe-zabuni/1597296-5063192-iaagvs/index.html">contracts</a>.</p>
<p>This ambitious programme initially won him <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/whatwouldmagufulido-tanzanian-president-becomes-a-twitter-star/a-18903350">praise</a>. But over time, his authoritarian <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-46180098">decision-making</a>, mismanagement, and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/open-data-from-authoritarian-regimes-new-opportunities-new-challenges/ABE1166B45E371C92E415333868E52E4?utm_source=hootsuite&utm_medium=twitter&utm_term=&utm_content=FirstView&utm_campaign=PPS_Jun20">lack of transparency</a> prompted a more critical response.</p>
<p>Many state enterprises remained cash-starved, relied on government financial support, and registered <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/Why-public-entities-continue-losing-billions--CAG/1840340-5517710-view-asAMP-nm5ux9/index.html?__twitter_impression=true">losses</a>. </p>
<p>When the government’s controller and auditor general <a href="https://presidential-power.net/?p=9503">called</a> for more scrutiny of public finances, his budget was slashed. And he was ultimately forced to retire and replaced by a <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/government-given-fourteen-days-to-respond-on-zitto-s-case-against-cag-removal-2702334">Magufuli loyalist</a>.</p>
<p>Alongside state investment, the president also sought to discipline private sector actors. Some <a href="https://ace.soas.ac.uk/publication/novel-approach-to-analysing-diversified-business-groups-in-tanzania/">observers</a> <a href="https://ace.soas.ac.uk/working-paper-1/">suggest</a> that this led to more productive investment, notably by domestic investors. But others <a href="https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/collord_tanzania_2020_election_2021.pdf">point</a> to renewed crony capitalist ties.</p>
<p>Magufuli’s most high profile corporate battle was against Canadian-owned Barrick Gold and its former subsidiary, Acacia Mining. From the two, he demanded <a href="https://theconversation.com/all-bets-are-off-as-magufulis-resource-nationalism-moves-up-a-gear-in-tanzania-81632?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=twitterbutton">USD$190</a> billion in tax arrears and a renegotiation of operating terms. </p>
<p>Many saw this resource-nationalist approach as an inspiration and a model for African countries seeking to take greater control of their mineral wealth. But in the end - partly due to <a href="http://www.udadisi.org/2020/09/watanzania-kizimbani-jinsi-kampuni-za.html?q=sabatho+nyamsenda">externally imposed</a> legal and economic constraints - Magufuli walked back on some of his demands. Instead he opted for cooperation rather than confrontation. </p>
<p>He negotiated a <a href="https://www.barrick.com/English/news/news-details/2020/Barrick-Back-in-Business-in-Tanzania/default.aspx">joint venture</a> in which Barrick took a majority stake of 84% and Tanzania the remaining 16%. Key elements of the nationalistic mining legislation passed in 2017 were also reversed.</p>
<p>On the plus side <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-15/barrick-deal-smuggling-crackdown-revive-tanzania-gold-industry">gold overtook tourism</a> as Tanzania’s biggest foreign-exchange earner. In addition, some small-scale miners saw their livelihoods improve. Results were more mixed elsewhere, especially for Tanzanite miners in the country’s north.</p>
<p>Ultimately, Magufuli leaves behind a mixed economic legacy. It combines misdirected <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-15/barrick-deal-smuggling-crackdown-revive-tanzania-gold-industry">authoritarian decision-making</a> with positive efforts to pursue an active industrial policy. Reining in unproductive domestic investors and renegotiating adverse contracts with foreign investors were part of this agenda. </p>
<p>There is a risk, given this complex mix, that Tanzania’s policymakers may learn the <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2019/05/drawing-the-wrong-lessons-from-the-magufuli-experience-in-tanzania">wrong lessons</a> from his presidency, leading back to the flawed model existing before. </p>
<p>Significantly, neither Magufuli nor his predecessors managed to achieve more <a href="http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/803171614697018449/pdf/Tanzania-Economic-Update-Raising-the-Bar-Achieving-Tanzania-s-Development-Vision.pdf">inclusive growth</a>. For this reason poverty levels have <a href="http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/803171614697018449/pdf/Tanzania-Economic-Update-Raising-the-Bar-Achieving-Tanzania-s-Development-Vision.pdf#page=14">remained stubbornly high</a>.</p>
<h2>The pandemic and beyond</h2>
<p>One immediate concern is what steps Hassan will take on the pandemic, and whether she will change <a href="https://www.whyafrica.co.za/tanzania-poised-for-a-u-turn/">direction</a>. </p>
<p>Whatever she does, the health emergency and associated economic crisis will likely define her presidency. It could indeed define the <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/13300/More_debt_to_tread_water">economic</a> trajectory of the African region in years to come.</p>
<p>Both Kikwete and Magufuli ruled through an economic boom period. Commodity prices were <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214790X17301090?casa_token=6fHK1C2_v4QAAAAA:QtW-0lX3xxYz3ycvM0KWdqG7inMVt4XBvwdtn1g2Qd_6ME_x6SuhWGFEmOc6YCavLZ0TPBriUg">high</a> and access to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/25589487-78ba-4892-9fcf-cfe8556861b7">international finance</a> was fairly easy. This gave them latitude to choose between various development approaches.</p>
<p>If Tanzania reverts to the status quo of the Kikwete years, the risk is a reemergence of rent-seeking but without the same highly favourable economic growth conditions. Indeed, as <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/13228/Governments_face_a_multi-speed_rebound">external conditions</a> worsen, Hassan may find her options far more limited.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157602/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michaela Collord has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thabit Jacob receives funding from Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DANIDA) </span></em></p>Hassan, like Magufuli before her, has taken office without her own political base and will also have to contend with revived factional manoeuvring.Michaela Collord, Junior Research Fellow in Politics, University of OxfordThabit Jacob, Postdoctoral researcher, Institute for Society and Globalisation, Roskilde UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/888122017-12-10T11:27:10Z2017-12-10T11:27:10ZTanzania at 56: echoes of the best and worst of Nyerere under Magufuli<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198290/original/file-20171208-27677-lh0kxh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Julius Nyerere (second right), his successor Ali Hassan Mwinyi (right) and Mwinyi's successor Benjamin Mkapa (left) host South Africa's Walter Sisulu in January 1990. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/File</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Tanzanian mainland is marking the 56th anniversary of independence from British rule. The mainland unified with Zanzibar in 1964 to create the current nation-state under Mwalimu Julius Nyerere who is often invoked as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-nyerere-factbox/factbox-facts-on-tanzanias-father-of-nation-nyerere-idUSL0245500920070302">“the father of the nation”</a>. </p>
<p>The new nation-state’s economic, social and political path was paved in 1967, when Nyerere proclaimed the <a href="https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/nyerere/1967/arusha-declaration.htm">Arusha Declaration</a>. This led to the nationalisation of key industries and the total reorganisation of rural life. Communal farming and forced resettlement were applied, justified on the basis of attempting to bring about self-reliance.</p>
<p>Referred to as <em>ujamaa</em>, the socialist-inspired policies dominated the politics, society, and economy of Tanzania until Nyerere’s retirement in 1985. </p>
<p>Ujamaa policies are much debated. Generally, they are seen as something of a <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/162030?casa_token=uQZJYRqt6XMAAAAA:duwdyhJrm6qORVJ-E4jX0hhqEHvHPR4Q0gF1qUbFwpXftproRXdG1SITpo-KgRlY4UxSdjCKv0NCYwDhJxHIjnQY7Aqu5H8MvXAsi7VQyI3Je3kp44NT">social success but as economically ruinous</a>. By emphasising <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/race-nation-and-citizenship-in-postcolonial-africa/5DC910F8042E6AC41BAD0726563A7409">Tanzanian citizenship</a>, ujamaa created a sense of unity and effectively <a href="https://www.abebooks.com/book-search/isbn/1555875300/">removed the kind of ethnic politics</a> that dominates Kenya, for example. But it short-circuited the economy and saw <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-7679.1975.tb00439.x/pdf">food production collapse</a>.</p>
<p>Nyerere’s handpicked successor Ali Hassan Mwinyi Tanzania practically reversed all the <a href="li%20Hassan%20Mwinyi%20Tanzania%20practically%20reversed%20all%20the%20earlier%20policies">earlier policies</a>. His government moved from one of the most influential and vehement defenders of African Socialism to one of the most neoliberal regimes on the continent. As Pitcher and Askew thoughtfully assert, this really put the <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/40026154?casa_token=Rvqwjbb0vegAAAAA:odeFh-CEYl9OC_sHgndal1IkKwjqmFDGLlf83aAOGVW3Y9g5n9E3vtmziLyPoDpZPBvKm7o7tTT62tKswbrVYbLCxSfHoiar1ziq0Ypu4bImIcZcj85L">“self” in “self-reliance”</a>.</p>
<p>This openness to investment and trade was further enhanced with the introduction of multipartyism in 1995. Under both Presidents Mkapa and Kikwete, the country generally remained economically liberal. It also remained investment friendly with significant levels of foreign investment when compared to the socialist period.</p>
<p>But sweeping change has come under the current President John Pombe Magufuli, who has just entered the third year of a five-year term. Magufuli has taken a different approach to that of his recent predecessors and is harking back to policies advocated by Nyerere. Comparisons between the two are commonplace, both <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2017/07/17/tanzania-magufulis-mining-reforms-are-a-masterclass-in-political-manoeuvring/">positive</a> and <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21730424-african-socialism-did-not-work-tanzania-last-time-either-john-magufuli">negative</a>. This is particularly so when it comes to natural resources.</p>
<p>Perhaps the most contentious area today is the mining sector and the role of the contemporary government in seeking better returns from mining companies. This move has the hallmarks of a policy of <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-africas-resource-nationalism-just-big-business-as-usual-41647">resource nationalism</a>. This is a sign of a shift in policy as well as rhetoric. </p>
<h2>Opening a closed economy</h2>
<p>Tanzania was close to bankrupt after the economic collapse of the 1970s and the conflict with Idi Amin’s Uganda in the late-1970s. The latter years of Nyerere’s presidency were marked by his <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056240500467054?journalCode=crea20">continual attempts to resist IMF assistance</a> which involved signing up to a structural adjustment package. This was mainly down to his concerns over dramatic cuts to social provision.</p>
<p>The first programme was finally <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/111081468778229178/pdf/multi0page.pdf">implemented in 1986</a> under Mwinyi whose presidency was marked by Tanzania’s economy opening up and dramatic reductions in social expenditure.</p>
<p>Multi partyism also arrived in Tanzania. The first multiparty elections in 1995 were won by Benjamin Mkapa who remained in power for the next 10 years. Another 10 years followed under Jakaya Kikwete until 2015.</p>
<p>During this period foreign investment has come in many sectors, but especially in tourism and mining. A significant part of the <a href="http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/product_info.php?products_id=806480">financial inflows came from post-apartheid South Africa</a>. </p>
<h2>“The Bulldozer” approach</h2>
<p>“The Bulldozer” Magufuli is Tanzania’s fifth president, and the fourth since multiparty elections. As he enters his third year,
there are strains of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-legacy-of-autocratic-rule-in-tanzania-from-nyerere-to-life-under-magufuli-73881">authoritarianism</a> in Magufuli’s approach which bear the hallmarks of Nyerere. For example, he seems to have centralised power within the executive branch of government.</p>
<p>At the same time, <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/543426">he seems to be placing himself</a> more closely to the socialist era of Tanzanian politics than anything since Nyerere. </p>
<p>Both approaches seem politically acceptable to Tanzanians – as long as they generate results. Nevertheless, Magufuli’s approval <a href="https://www.twaweza.org/uploads/files/PeoplesPresident-EN-FINAL-A4.pdf">ratings fell to 71% in June</a> from a high of 96% last year.</p>
<p>It’s still unclear what effect his recent attempts to claw back revenues from multinational mining giants will have on his rating. </p>
<h2>New regime for mining</h2>
<p>In the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere describes natural resources as <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201710130100.html">owned by all citizens and held in trust for their descendants</a>. When the new mining laws were passed in July, <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-mining/tanzanias-president-signs-new-mining-bills-into-law-idUSKBN19V23P">Magufuli said</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We [Tanzanians] must benefit from our God given minerals and that is why we must safeguard our natural resource wealth to ensure we do not end up with empty mining pits.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The new laws raise royalties on tax for gold, copper, silver and platinum exports from 4% to 6%. This is a nominal increase perhaps but an indication of a different direction of travel. Expectations are that such changes will soon be introduced for <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201710230184.html">tanzanite and diamonds</a>.</p>
<p>Following the new laws the government agreed a 50-50 profit sharing arrangement with Barrack Gold as well as a minimum government of stake 16% in all mining activities. Gold generates around <a href="https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/tza/#Exports">a third of the country’s export revenues</a>.</p>
<p>The new mining laws aren’t <a href="http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Govt--No-plan-to-nationalise-mines/1840340-4126130-8d98lw/index.html">akin to the nationalisation of 50 years ago</a>. But Magufuli has described the agreement with foreign investors as groundbreaking and a <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201710230183.html">model to be adopted elsewhere across the continent</a>.</p>
<p>The long term impact of mining reforms are yet to be felt. Claims from multinational corporations that the new laws <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-mining/investors-wary-as-tanzania-moves-to-assert-more-control-over-mines-idUSKCN1BZ066">threaten future investment</a> may well prove to be overblown. As might the opinion pieces in <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21730424-african-socialism-did-not-work-tanzania-last-time-either-john-magufuli">The Economist</a> suggesting Armageddon for the sector in Tanzania. But, certainly from some quarters, the view is that Magufuli <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2017/07/17/tanzania-magufulis-mining-reforms-are-a-masterclass-in-political-manoeuvring/">has managed the process well</a>.</p>
<p>On the other hand, his bulldozing style has seen his popularity decrease. It has also seen critics <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201712050224.html">express their views</a> over his presidency more forcefully. </p>
<p>A balance sheet of positives and negatives is perhaps the most striking similarity with the legacy of Nyerere as Tanzania marks yet another independence anniversary.</p>
<p><em>I would like to thank Alessia De Vito for her blog as part of our African Politics course at the University of East London. It certainly informed my ideas for this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88812/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rob Ahearne does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A balance sheet of positives and negatives for Tanzania’s president Magufuli is perhaps the most striking similarity with the legacy of Nyerere as the country marks another independence anniversary.Rob Ahearne, Senior Lecturer in International Development, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.