tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/kenya-elections-28570/articlesKenya elections – The Conversation2023-08-02T18:07:16Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2082732023-08-02T18:07:16Z2023-08-02T18:07:16ZCould Trump turn his politics of grievance into a get-out-of-jail card? Neither prosecution nor even jail time has prevented former leaders in Israel, Brazil and Kenya from mounting comebacks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540488/original/file-20230801-15-hfb8gb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3876%2C2831&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Donald Trump enters a political rally while campaigning for the GOP 2024 nomination on July 29, 2023, in Erie, Pa.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/former-u-s-president-donald-trump-enters-erie-insurance-news-photo/1563680624?adppopup=true">Jeff Swensen/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Donald Trump has declared, “<a href="https://www.c-span.org/video/?c5060238/pres-trump-i-justicei-retribution">I am your retribution</a>,” and it appears to be a guiding theme of his 2024 campaign. </p>
<p>He now <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/08/01/us/trump-indictment-jan-6">faces a total of three indictments</a>, following Special Counsel Jack Smith’s announcement on Aug. 1, 2023 that Trump had been charged with four counts in his effort to overturn the 2020 presidential election – the most serious charges so far. There’s likely to be an additional indictment from Fulton County, Georgia, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/07/31/georgia-2020-election-investigation-trump/">prosecutor Fani Willis</a>. </p>
<p>If elected, he promises to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/trump-retribution-indictment-documents-biden-american-democracy-5a8ec37b359fee85d0f0956139d79f51">punish his perceived enemies</a> – everyone from prosecutors at the Justice Department and in New York and Georgia to the Biden family and Republicans in Congress who don’t <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/29/us/politics/trump-pennsylvania-rally.html">help him</a>. </p>
<p>Trump and his allies are ramping up their <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-allies-in-congress-leap-to-defend-former-president-after-federal-indictment">rhetoric</a>, playing the victim card with cries of “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C-vpdWQFcyo">witch hunt</a>” and making promises to <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/trump-vows-appoint-prosecutor-target-171530172.html">use the machinery of government</a> to punish anyone who has attempted to hold Trump accountable. </p>
<p>While appeals to grievance have been used in presidential campaigns, <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/06/09/trump-president-run-criminal-charges-indictment">never before in American history</a> has a leading contender for a major party’s nomination made their personal grievances related to criminal liability and payback the centerpiece of their presidential run. </p>
<p>Is a campaign based on grievance and retribution likely to sway voters? And what are the implications if Trump wins back the White House? </p>
<p>As scholars who study <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/politics-international-relations/political-economy/authoritarianism-and-elite-origins-democracy">democracy</a>, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/politics-international-relations/american-government-politics-and-policy/social-origins-electoral-participation-emerging-democracies">voting behavior</a> and political corruption globally, we note that while the politicization of prosecutions is becoming <a href="https://theconversation.com/prosecuting-a-president-is-divisive-and-sometimes-destabilizing-heres-why-many-countries-do-it-anyway-188565?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=twitterbutton">increasingly common</a> in other democracies, it can be hard to figure out how these dynamics affect elections. </p>
<h2>Political muscle can trounce a prosecution</h2>
<p>Candidates under investigation can leverage their political muscle to run for office – and as a means to avoid prosecution. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28167/chapter-abstract/213005469?redirectedFrom=fulltext">Kenya’s 2007 presidential election</a>, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were two prominent politicians backing opposing coalitions that engaged in post-election clashes after allegations of vote rigging. </p>
<p>Members of both factions were investigated, and Kenyatta and Ruto were personally charged with organizing the violence among their supporters. Their cases were <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16675268">referred to the International Criminal Court</a>, or ICC, after the Kenyan government slow-rolled local prosecutions. </p>
<p>But as the cases dragged on, these erstwhile enemies forged an electoral alliance to win the 2013 contest. Kenyatta ran as president and Ruto his deputy, by – ironically – pushing a “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28167/chapter-abstract/213006037?redirectedFrom=fulltext">peace narrative</a>” during the campaign. </p>
<p>This flexing of political muscle, a crusade questioning the ICC’s legitimacy and grassroots mobilization led to their eventual victory. That essentially ended their legal woes internationally and domestically. The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30347019">ICC dropped</a> <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35965760">charges</a>, and they were reelected in 2017. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540492/original/file-20230801-27-oxqrx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large crowd holding a sign in Hebrew and English that shows a fist and says 'We've just started.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540492/original/file-20230801-27-oxqrx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540492/original/file-20230801-27-oxqrx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540492/original/file-20230801-27-oxqrx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540492/original/file-20230801-27-oxqrx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540492/original/file-20230801-27-oxqrx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540492/original/file-20230801-27-oxqrx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540492/original/file-20230801-27-oxqrx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Israelis protest moves by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government to limit the power of the country’s Supreme Court.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-aerial-view-of-kaplan-street-as-israelis-gather-to-news-photo/1563351079?adppopup=true">Yair Palti/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Undermining accountability</h2>
<p>Should Trump win, he can appoint an attorney general who will follow his bidding and suspend prosecutions brought by the special counsel, or he can simply pardon himself of federal charges. </p>
<p>He can further seek to avoid trial or imprisonment by invoking a <a href="https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/sitting-president%E2%80%99s-amenability-indictment-and-criminal-prosecution">Department of Justice rule</a> that presidents cannot be under federal criminal indictment or in jail while they serve in office, although a candidate can <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-an-indictment-wouldnt-end-trumps-run-for-the-presidency-he-could-even-campaign-or-serve-from-a-jail-cell-194425">run for president and be elected under indictment or from jail</a>. A novel legal strategy for Trump would be to try to apply this also to state jurisdictions like New York and Georgia.</p>
<p>Any attempt to challenge the constitutionality of such actions – pardoning himself, dismissing the special counsel, ending state and local indictments – would no doubt end up at the Supreme Court. The court majority is conservative, suggesting it might rule in Trump’s favor. Additionally, <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/episode-5-john-mulaney/id1548294013?i=1000621655751">precedent and legal scholarship</a> also suggest that the court would deem at least some of these actions constitutional. </p>
<p>Beyond ending immediate prosecutions, victorious candidates can use winning office to further erode democratic institutions and the rule of law. </p>
<p>Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel has served as prime minister <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/03/world/middleeast/netanyahu-corruption-charges-israel.html">during his own corruption trials</a>. After losing office in 2021, he came to power again in 2022 while under indictment. </p>
<p>Netanyahu and his allies in parliament have pursued legislation to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/07/24/1189720508/israel-politics-netanyahu-judiciary">weaken the independence</a> of the Supreme Court, a portion of which was <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-contentious-judicial-reform-becomes-law-in-israel-netanyahu-cements-his-political-legacy-210043">recently passed by the legislature</a>. He and his allies have promised to go after the former attorneys general and other prosecutors overseeing Netanyahu’s <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-netanyahu-corruption-trial-courts-4e18ed8f34e65707bd47e37696da4705">criminal cases</a>. The attempts to diminish the Supreme Court’s power have resulted in months of anti-government protests. </p>
<p>Trump and his campaign view a 2024 win as an opportunity to significantly <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/07/22/trump-2025-radical-plan-second-term">increase the power of the executive branch</a> to go after a “deep state” that has investigated Trump and his allies. That potentially undermines the independence and functioning of everything from the State and Justice departments to local law enforcement.</p>
<h2>Comebacks follow prosecutions</h2>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540498/original/file-20230801-25-6joorn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man standing, gripping a metal rail with one hand, the other hand raised with a fist, in the nighttime." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540498/original/file-20230801-25-6joorn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540498/original/file-20230801-25-6joorn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540498/original/file-20230801-25-6joorn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540498/original/file-20230801-25-6joorn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540498/original/file-20230801-25-6joorn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540498/original/file-20230801-25-6joorn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540498/original/file-20230801-25-6joorn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Former Brazilian president Lula Inácio da Silva was elected once again in 2022 after his conviction and imprisonment.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/brazilian-president-elect-for-the-leftist-workers-party-news-photo/1244370111?adppopup=true">Caio Guatelli / AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Examples from other countries show that prosecution or even jail time does not prevent former leaders from mounting comebacks.</p>
<p>Former Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was elected once again in 2022 <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/23/how-one-companys-deep-web-corruption-took-down-governments-across-latin-america/?itid=lk_inline_manual_54">after his conviction and imprisonment</a>. He argued that a <a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/09/brazil-lula-operation-car-wash-sergio-moro/">judge who was in cahoots with prosecutors</a>, and who became Lula’s predecessor’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/brazils-chief-justice-authorizes-investigation-into-bolsonaro/2020/04/27/54d95f52-88f6-11ea-80df-d24b35a568ae_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_54">justice minister</a>, revealed the politicized nature of Brazil’s justice system. That allowed him to play the victim card successfully at the ballot box.</p>
<p>Trump is innocent until proved guilty. His hard-core “Make America Great Again” supporters <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/31/upshot/poll-trump-republican-primary.html">tell pollsters</a> they believe in his complete innocence. We expect this is not likely to change, regardless of evidence prosecutors show to a jury and what those juries decide. </p>
<p>But if the facts of the cases and evidence presented at trial appear to moderates and independents as nothing burgers, or if swing voters otherwise feel the judicial process has unfairly targeted Trump with prosecutorial overreach, that could conceivably turn Trump’s <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/favorability/donald-trump/">persistent unfavorable ratings</a> into electoral victory.</p>
<p>Recent polling makes clear that while Trump has consolidated support for the Republican nomination among the MAGA crowd, <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/favorability/donald-trump/">nearly half of Republicans surveyed</a> are still considering other options. </p>
<p>In any event, his platform of victimization and retribution shows no signs of abating. Whether enough Republicans will turn out to vote and moderates swing toward Trump, and whether enough Democrats decide to stay home, suggest that this is still a very high-risk strategy for Trump, but if successful, likely to reward him with time away from jail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208273/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Donald Trump has made personal grievances and payback the centerpiece of his presidential run. Will this strategy work? Two experts who study democracy look at others who have used these tactics.James D. Long, Professor of Political Science, Co-founder of the Political Economy Forum, University of WashingtonVictor Menaldo, Professor of Political Science, Co-founder of the Political Economy Forum, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2050052023-05-16T10:59:38Z2023-05-16T10:59:38ZKenya’s political elites switch parties with every election – how this fuels violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524923/original/file-20230508-173480-qsf6ds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters at the launch of the Jubilee Party manifesto in Nairobi, Kenya, in June 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/jubilee-party-supporters-of-kenyas-president-uhuru-kenyatta-news-photo/801424352?adppopup=true">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Barely seven months after leaving office, Kenya’s former president Uhuru Kenyatta <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/kanini-kega-led-jubilee-faction-kicks-out-uhuru-as-party-leader--4220148">is battling</a> to keep together the party that won him a second term and a majority in parliament in 2017. His <a href="https://web.facebook.com/TheJubileeParty/?_rdc=1&_rdr">Jubilee Party</a> performed dismally in the 2022 election. Only 27 out of 290 <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/the-national-assembly/mps">members of the national assembly</a>, four out of 47 <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/the-senate/senators">senators</a> and one county governor out of 47 were elected on its ticket. This isn’t surprising in Kenya where political elites switch parties and coalitions with every election. No political party or coalition has ruled for more than one term since the opposition deposed the independence movement, KANU, in 2002. Gilbert Khadiagala, a political scientist who has researched <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/364268431_Coalition_politics_in_Kenya_Superficial_assemblages_and_momentary_vehicles_to_attain_power">the fluidity of Kenya’s political coalitions</a>, explains the impact of this.</em></p>
<h2>What is the background of Kenya’s fluid political landscape?</h2>
<p>The onset of the multiparty era in the early 1990s <a href="https://www.ohioswallow.com/book/Multi-Party+Politics+in+Kenya">brought</a> a new phase of complex political coalitions and alliances. They were competing against the previously dominant political party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Typical of Africa’s post-colonial dominant parties, KANU governed for more than two decades through authoritarian methods. Under presidents Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) and Daniel Moi (1978-2002), KANU co-opted opposition figures into an elaborate system of patronage and coerced critics who didn’t toe the party line. </p>
<p>The coalitions that emerged were based primarily on ethnic and regional affiliations – they were overwhelmingly elite-based. The first was the Forum for the Restoration Democracy (<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Forum-for-the-Restoration-of-Democracy">FORD</a>). However, barely a year into its existence, FORD broke into two major factions – FORD Kenya and FORD Asili – in August 1992. Further splits followed. </p>
<p>The dominant coalitions that participated in the August 2022 elections – the Kenya Kwanza alliance (led by William Ruto) and the Azimio alliance (led by Raila Odinga) – comprise many smaller parties. They are products of previous failed attempts at alliance building.</p>
<p>In 30 years of competitive politics, coalitions were expected to gradually stabilise into coherent political parties with national reach and resonance. Instead, political coalitions in Kenya have not advanced beyond their narrow bases. They remain fundamentally ethnic and regional machines that are frequently scrambled together on the eve of elections to win power. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.academia.edu/3497247/Political_movements_and_coalition_politics_in_Kenya_entrenching_ethnicity">studied</a> Kenya’s politics for 30 years. It’s my view that Kenyan coalitions that rise and fall with every election do not provide the foundation for steady and enduring party systems. These coalitions postpone the evolution of national parties that would lend some predictability and stability to political competition.</p>
<p>Parties should broadly reflect – and manage – societal differences. In Germany, for instance, parties have come together to overcome certain historical differences by calling on shared interests. Germany’s coalition governments are largely based on well-established political parties, not conglomerations concocted before elections as in Kenya. And <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/nejo.12310">political parties negotiate</a> these governing coalitions after elections, not before.</p>
<p>Throughout Africa, where ethnic and regional divisions are paramount, political mobilisations deepen societal differences. Electoral violence occurs because winning coalitions control all the national resources. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/victors-go-spoils-how-winner-takes-all-politics-undermine-democracy-sierra-leone">winner-takes-all</a> political systems of countries like Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Sierra Leone face a related problem: they have very small independent private sectors. So winners are tempted to use political power to <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ_French/journals_E/Volume-08_Issue-2/nsia-pepra_e.pdf">grab</a> national resources. </p>
<h2>What are the main weaknesses of fluid political coalitions?</h2>
<p>They cause instability in the country. Unstable coalitions contribute to electoral violence as losing coalitions vent their grievances. Following the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/12/kenyan-protests-against-kenyatta-election-victory-turn-deadly">violent aftermath</a> of the 2017 Kenyan elections, Odinga’s coalition at the time, the National Super Alliance (NASA), threatened to agitate for the secession of his support base from Kenya. </p>
<p>In 2002, there was a brief phase of optimism for an enduring coalition. The National Rainbow Alliance (NARC), led by Mwai Kibaki, was a grouping of the leading ethnic groups ranged against Moi’s chosen successor, Kenyatta. But it ended in <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/smart-global-health/background-post-election-crisis-kenya">civil conflict</a> in 2007-2008 after Kibaki marginalised key allies largely on ethnic and regional lines. </p>
<p>The Government of National Unity <a href="https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/g/files/toruqf5601/files/LS_Kenya_Powersharing_FINAL.pdf">crafted</a> by international actors in 2008 became an uneasy and unwieldy coalition. Its members decamped to <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/kenyas-government-of-national-unity-about-to-collapse">new coalitions</a> in the next elections. </p>
<p>Subsequent political alliances have reproduced the conditions for anxiety and chaos after every election. Despite the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010">2010 constitution</a> giving more power to Kenya’s 47 counties, political elites remain fixated on <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/14662043.2015.1089006?needAccess=true&role=button">winning presidential elections</a> to gain power at the centre. </p>
<p>The unstable coalitions also account for widespread corruption. Winning coalitions <a href="https://theconversation.com/want-to-run-for-office-in-kenya-heres-how-much-itll-cost-you-183683">expend enormous resources</a> to fortify their power. To do this they have to loot state resources. </p>
<h2>What are the strengths of these loose coalitions?</h2>
<p>In societies where ethnic groups coincide with regions, coalitions are one of the means of organising competitive politics. The loose coalitions enable leaders who neither share policies nor vision to temporarily accommodate each other. This creates a semblance of national unity. The fluid coalitions are, therefore, essential in such political landscapes until national cohesion and coherence are achieved. </p>
<p>When the search for presidential power ceases to be politically relevant and salient, Kenya’s politics will be normalised. Transforming coalitions into solid parties may take time. But it’s the only way out of the prevailing political stalemate. </p>
<h2>What adjustments should be made?</h2>
<p>Kenyans do share basic bread-and-butter interests. When those interests are highlighted – instead of ethnic and regional affiliations – political parties with national outreach could emerge. </p>
<p>It’s elites who emphasise cultural and ethnic differences between regions. They have a large stake in the stalemate continuing, instead of building institutionalised parties. The puzzle for Kenya is how to transform ethnic diversities and identities into the foundations for predictable and organised politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205005/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gilbert M. Khadiagala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The fluidity of the country’s short-lived coalitions is a major cause of instability in Kenya.Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations and Director of the African Centre for the Study of the United States (ACSUS), University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1844362022-08-07T08:03:59Z2022-08-07T08:03:59ZKenya’s Muslims: a divided community with little political clout<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469210/original/file-20220616-15-lr7hna.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Graffiti in Muslim-dominated Mombasa rallies against the 2017 election with the Kiswahili slogan "Kura ni Haramu" ("voting is haram/prohibitted").
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Janer Murikira/picture alliance via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenyan <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt22727nc">Muslims</a> played a part in the push to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/12/03/kenyan-leader-opts-for-multi-party-rule/4e0fb998-a0d7-434c-bc75-efa43c626c0c/">repeal</a> repressive political laws in the country in the early 1990s. But Muslims, who account for <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-report-on-international-religious-freedom/kenya/">11% of the population</a>, have yet to enjoy the fruits of their activist labour. </p>
<p>This is because they remain divided. Their division – due both to internal and external factors – means they aren’t a political power bloc big enough for the elites who run the country to seek their support as a community. In Kenya, political and economic power <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2077-49072016000100010">rests with the large ethnic groups</a>. </p>
<p>There have been attempts before to organise Kenya’s Muslims, but these have <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/90017586">failed</a>. One reason is opposition by the country’s political leadership to using religion as the basis for political mobilisation. Leaders fear that mobilisation along religious lines risks being abused by extremists who seek to impose an Islamic state governed by sharia. </p>
<p>Yet, Islam in Kenya has become increasingly politicised. As I have <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42636190?seq=1">argued</a> before, this process, beginning in the early 1990s, can be traced to the policies of post-independence regimes that have left the Muslim minority behind. </p>
<p>Muslims have felt increasingly <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/iafr/12/2/article-p240_004.xml">marginalised</a> economically and politically in Kenya. The majority of Muslims are <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/095624780001200111">jobless, low-income earners, and generally poor</a>. This is not to suggest that Muslims are economically worse off than other minority groups in Kenya. But regions dominated by Muslims record a high percentage of the population in poverty and illiteracy.</p>
<p>Furthermore, in the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304721380_Kenyan_Muslims_the_Aftermath_of_911_and_the_War_On_Terror">global war on terror</a>, Kenya’s pursuit of violent extremists has led to increasing human rights violations while <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/africatoday.57.4.3">intensifying</a> historical frictions between the state and the Muslim community.</p>
<p>Unlike previous terrorist threats, such as the embassy bombing in 1998, attacks by the Somali terrorist group Al-Shabaab and its Kenyan supporters such as <a href="https://igadssp.org/index.php/documentation/4-igad-report-al-shabaab-as-a-transnational-security-threat/file#page=22">Jeshi Ayman</a> have targeted the country’s institutions. The upshot is a backlash by the state <a href="https://www.kerenweitzberg.com/post/id-troubles-in-nairobi-vetting-double-registration-and-the-marketing-of-reputational-identities">against its Muslim population</a>. There have been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38239138">targeted</a> kidnappings and extrajudicial killings. The backlash bolsters the narrative of government mistreatment of the community. </p>
<p>In an election year, this could be used as a rallying call to mobilise Muslims to vote in a certain way. However, there is no common Muslim position on which of the two main coalitions to support. This can be traced to age-old ethnic and racial rivalries within the Muslim community. </p>
<p>These disputes extend beyond internal religious rivalries. They have implications for how the state relates to the community.</p>
<h2>Internal rivalry and elusive unity</h2>
<p>Divisions among Muslims are numerous. There is a small but relatively wealthy minority of Arab and Asian descended Muslims. Then there are coastal and up-country Muslims. Coastal Muslims are mainly descendants of the <a href="https://su-plus.strathmore.edu/bitstream/handle/11071/3619/the%20growth%20of%20Islam%20among%20the%20Mijikenda%20of%20the%20Kenya%20coast.pdf?isAllowed=y&sequence=1">local communities</a> that first adopted Islam no later than 500 years ago. By the 16th century there were several Muslim communities dotted along the Kenya coast.</p>
<p>The so-called upcountry Muslims are considered more recent converts – from around the mid-20th century. Coastal Muslims tend to question the “Muslimness” of upcountry Muslims. </p>
<p>The government capitalises on these divisions. When the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1581839">Islamic Party of Kenya</a> began to gain influence in the early 1990s, government <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt22727nc.9.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A77cd68a8a6ad49ba15d6a41628eab95a&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1">sponsored</a> the United Muslim of Africa party as a counter. The new party, founded and supported by African Muslims, became critical of the so-called Arab Muslims, stressing its African identity before Islamic solidarity.</p>
<p>During the colonial period, the British administration had varied policies towards different groups of Muslims in Kenya. Arab Muslims were higher up in the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/islamicafrica.4.2.135">pecking order</a>. Indigenous Muslims were classed together with other Africans at the bottom of the racial hierarchy. The colonial legacy of this divide between Muslims lives on today in ethnic and racial rivalries and divergent aspirations.</p>
<p>In the years leading up to Kenya’s independence in 1963, some Muslims at the coast and the northern region of Kenya wanted secession. The secession agenda was driven by the fear of Muslim marginalisation in a postcolonial state presided over by Christian politicians. At the coast, they sought to form a separate state or reunite with Zanzibar under the leadership of the sultan. In northern Kenya they sought to be part of the larger <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt22727nc.7.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A5c41c70b596cbbd48e5c107f8edb533f&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1">Pan Somalia state</a>. </p>
<p>The Mwambao movement that championed the secession agenda at the coast attracted minimal support. It was seen as an effort by Arabs to retain their political and economic dominance. Pwani (the coast) became part of Kenya. </p>
<p>In the northern region, though the secession movement was popular among the Somalis, the minority communities were reluctant to support this agenda, fearing Somali political ascendancy. </p>
<p>Consequently, in postcolonial Kenya, Muslims have been viewed as “foreigners” because of their history of seeking separation.</p>
<p>The political aspirations of a separate state for the coastal community re-emerged in the 1990s. Under the rallying call “Pwani si Kenya” (the coast is not part of Kenya), the outlawed Mombasa Republican Council <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/112/446/48/10197">argued</a> that the former Coast Province had never been part of Kenya and had a legal right to a separate status. </p>
<p>Unlike the Mwambao, the new movement was secular and attracted supporters across different religions. After about 10 years it fizzled out. Government cracked down against its leadership and most coastal residents were put off by the movement’s support for violence.</p>
<p>Due to this history of fissures, there have been <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/iafr/12/2/article-p240_004.xml">disputes</a> about who has the right to speak for Muslims in Kenya. These find <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ramadhan-special/article/2001409563/why-muslims-are-divided-on-when-to-start-ramadhan">expression</a> over pronouncements about the sighting of the new moon to mark the beginning and ending of fasting during the month of Ramadan. </p>
<h2>The war on terror and extrajudicial killings</h2>
<p>A growing population of unemployed Muslim youth is <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26489068">easily attracted</a> to radical preachers who allege systematic discrimination of Muslims by the state. Many have been recruited to join Somalia-based Al-Shabaab, which was responsible for <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/19392206.2019.1587142?casa_token=Fee_S0v4j1IAAAAA:mqfocyj6qee3zR1ccULpBuJ4kRceX4dvp64fJxn8AWHbM_EnobekCpnYzTT63C5vYM4jHrfKoCIIiudmUQ">at least 409 attacks on Kenya</a> between 2005 and 2017.</p>
<p>The government response to the terrorist attacks and increased radicalisation has heightened feelings of marginalisation and discrimination. Between 2012 and 2014, more than 10 radical Muslim clerics were <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2014/07/28/gunned-down-mombasa-clerics-have-died">assassinated</a> by security agents. </p>
<p>At the core of recent Muslim political activism against the state are those influenced by the Saudi-Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. Its leadership <a href="https://www.academia.edu/35022483/The_Rise_of_Jihad_Killing_of_Apostate_Imams_and_Non_Combatant_Christian_Civilians_in_Kenya_Al_Shabaab_s_Re_definition_of_the_Enemy_on_Religious_Lines">condemns</a> collaboration with the state.</p>
<p>The appearance of numerous factions within the community is an indication that narrower interests have always succeeded over larger abstract goals, such as that of Muslim unity in the country. Arguably, the country’s Muslims have made their marginalisation a reality because of their failure to achieve unity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184436/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hassan Juma Ndzovu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The increase in terror attacks has complicated the Kenyan government’s relationship with the country’s Muslim community.Hassan Juma Ndzovu, Associate Professor of Religious Studies, Moi University Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1880202022-08-01T13:53:44Z2022-08-01T13:53:44ZThe role of media in a Kenyan election: what you should know<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476903/original/file-20220801-62374-oyl9td.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Traditionally, political debates have been shaped by mainstream media. Kenya’s mainstream media, however, remain strongly wedded to factional ethnic and class interests. This has undermined their capacity to facilitate fair and open debate, most evidently during elections.</p>
<p>Social media platforms have exploited this trust deficit, acting as important alternative sites for political deliberation. But they have also become powerful tools for disinformation and misinformation.</p>
<p>Platforms like Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp are reframing democracy and the way citizens engage and organise in digital space. Through these platforms, politicians can engage directly with voters, which is especially important for independent candidates, who may not have the backing of a major party.</p>
<p>Reflecting the growth in the power of the internet, many governments have moved to regulate it – or even shut it down. Ethiopia, Cameroon, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Chad, Sudan and Zimbabwe have all used internet shutdowns to try to limit free expression. </p>
<p>Kenya, which will hold a hotly contested election on 9 August 2022, has yet to order an internet shutdown. The government has <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2022/08/kenya-says-social-media-wont-be-blocked-after-warning-to-facebook/">issued assurances</a> that it will not do so. </p>
<p>Kenya’s media landscape is an important field of research and analysis – highlighted in this selection of previously published articles.</p>
<h2>Media risk and reward</h2>
<p>As Kenya heads towards elections, concerns about the outbreak of electoral violence tend to rise. Research has explored the question of how, when and why political elites encourage ordinary citizens to engage in violent conflict.</p>
<p>Newspapers, television, radio, and online platforms can inform perceptions of what’s at stake in elections. Media narratives, in other words, can offer an early sign of the risk of violence.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-message-to-violence-what-to-watch-for-in-the-media-ahead-of-kenyas-elections-177459">From message to violence: what to watch for in the media ahead of Kenya's elections</a>
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<p>There is no evidence that disinformation and misinformation practices can on their own influence the outcome of elections. Still, they pose a danger to democratic processes.</p>
<p>In politically charged environments, such as Kenya’s, they have the capacity to exploit long-held divisions with the potential to trigger violence.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/social-media-is-being-misused-in-kenyas-political-arena-why-its-hard-to-stop-it-177586">Social media is being misused in Kenya's political arena. Why it's hard to stop it</a>
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<p>African political parties are spending huge sums hiring consultants with expertise in digital campaigning and even manipulation of social media content. It is evident that those with political power and money can easily hire automated systems, like bots, to influence the flow of political content across social media. They can also distort information.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/algorithms-bots-and-elections-in-africa-how-social-media-influences-political-choices-179121">Algorithms, bots and elections in Africa: how social media influences political choices</a>
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<p>Social media has the potential to allow for more direct communication between politicians and citizens. But an analysis of candidates’ tweets in the 2017 election does not suggest that Twitter democratised political discourse in Kenya. While candidates in the upcoming election will continue to expand their reach and visibility through social media, Twitter may not yet replace patronage networks and traditional campaigning.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/twitter-in-kenyas-last-poll-a-great-way-to-reach-voters-but-not-a-game-changer-175739">Twitter in Kenya's last poll: a great way to reach voters, but not a game-changer</a>
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<h2>Value of TV debate</h2>
<p>Political debates have become part of the election calendar. Their stated intention is to give citizens the information they need to decide whom to elect. But debates are held at the end of an election season. They cannot replace the electorate’s need for the granular, mundane, day-to-day information about candidates and what they stand for.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/political-debates-in-kenya-are-they-useful-or-empty-media-spectacles-183262">Political debates in Kenya: are they useful or empty media spectacles?</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188020/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Platforms like Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp are reframing democracy and the way citizens engage and organise in the digital space.Julius Maina, Regional Editor East AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1852172022-06-23T12:48:15Z2022-06-23T12:48:15ZHow Kenya’s degree requirement for top political posts turned into a fiasco<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469997/original/file-20220621-3417-u8d2ba.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP/GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The rush for academic credentials is nothing new ahead of a Kenyan election. Candidates are <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o06Hnd0Wmxo">challenged</a> about the existence or <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/entertainment/city-news/2000175252/did-bishop-margret-wanjiru-get-a-phd-before-her-bachelors-degree">validity</a> of their university degrees, and <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/degrees-on-sale-politicians-fight-fake-academic-papers-allegations--3847722">controversy</a> is common.</p>
<p>This is because, under Kenya’s <a href="https://www.iebc.or.ke/uploads/resources/kqI5cmgeyB.pdf">elections act</a>, contestants for president, senator and, governor seats must show proof of a degree from a university recognised in Kenya. Members of parliament <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/politics/article/2001438538/senators-pass-bill-scrapping-degree-requirement-for-mps">resisted attempts</a> to extend this requirement to them, and the Kenyan High Court ruled in their <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-04-13-high-court-rules-out-degree-requirement-for-mp-aspirants/">favour</a>. </p>
<p>It’s not just politicians that are under pressure to produce qualifications. <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-06-13-many-public-servants-have-fake-degrees-sossion/">Many public servants</a> have used fake degrees in pursuit of job opportunities or promotions. One case <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/entertainment/the-standard/2001371007/the-story-joshua-waiganjo-mystery-man-who-called-the-shots-in-the-police-force">involved a man</a> who posed as a high-ranking police officer for over 10 years. He hired and fired officers, attended top security meetings and, at least once, flew in a police helicopter to a crime scene.</p>
<p>Even the vice-chancellor of a public university has been questioned over the <a href="https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/72520-govt-demotes-university-vc-over-questionable-degree">validity of his PhD</a> and the awarding university.</p>
<p>As the 2022 elections approach, Kenyans have <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/degrees-on-sale-politicians-fight-fake-academic-papers-allegations--3847722">witnessed a circus of politicians</a> waving certificates from nondescript institutions or obtained through dubious means. Institutions may produce quality degrees but the problem arises when politicians <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/thenairobian/politics/2001447271/iebc-to-crack-down-on-integrity-fake-academic-certificates">falsely claim to have earned them legitimately</a>.</p>
<p>The doubt around academic credentials of politicians who seek leadership positions undermines the integrity clause in Kenya’s <a href="https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ke/ke019en.pdf">2010 constitution</a>. What counts in a politician is not necessarily their level of education but their morals and ethics. </p>
<h2>What we can learn from the circus</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/KE/kenya-handbook-on-kenyas-electoral-laws-and-system">degree requirement</a> was intended to <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/news/mps-divided-on-need-to-amend-law-on-degree-requirement-112362/">enhance debate in the house</a> and to have leaders who would balance the roles of oversight, legislation and representation.</p>
<p>The high court <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-04-13-high-court-rules-out-degree-requirement-for-mp-aspirants/">decided</a> that members of parliament need not have a degree, but it’s mandatory for governor and presidential aspirants. </p>
<p>More than 10 years after it was enacted, it is questionable whether the requirement achieved what was intended. In early June, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission had to <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/politics/article/2001447317/presidency-iebc-revokes-clearance-certificate-of-walter-mongare">revoke</a> the presidential nomination papers of a candidate it had previously cleared. It turned out he had not met the academic requirements. </p>
<p>That this had escaped the commission’s scrutiny is in itself worrying. The importance of a reliable electoral commission is demonstrated by the fact that the 2017 presidential elections were annulled by the Supreme Court largely because of the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/9/2/why-did-kenyas-supreme-court-annul-the-elections">electoral commission’s bungling of key processes</a>. </p>
<p>There are several points to remember ahead of the elections in August 2022. </p>
<p>One, the fixation on academic credentials is misplaced. The level of education of the political class is not the key to progress. Leadership has never been defined by academic excellence. If this were the case, the 12th Kenyan parliament (2017-2022) – which boasted <a href="https://ke.opera.news/ke/en/education/4539453893e0e1104742f8f0e1ac0c59">15 PhD holders and more than 130 MPs with master’s degrees</a> – would have been the best the country had witnessed. But that was not the case.</p>
<p>The 12th parliament largely kowtowed to the political expediency of the executive and it was one where <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/politics/article/2001447740/house-of-disgrace-12th-parliaments-ignoble-surrender-to-executive">political partisanship reigned supreme</a>. For example, the parliament failed to enact gender laws, which led to the <a href="https://www.humanrightspulse.com/mastercontentblog/chief-justice-calls-on-the-kenyan-president-to-dissolve-parliament">chief justice recommending to the president</a> that he dissolves parliament for failing to implement its constitutional mandate of gender parity. </p>
<p>Having said this, political actors who use dubious means to secure academic papers they did not work for must face the law. And academic and regulatory institutions must face up to their responsibilities, show their independence and not be used as doormats and ladders by the political class. </p>
<p>Two, the justice system must deal with forgery unambiguously. As the <a href="https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/28595/115477/F-857725769/KEN28595.pdf#page=106">Penal Code</a> states, forging a document or electronic record is an offence punishable by three years in prison.</p>
<p>Many cases, including those of politicians’ <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/counties/mombasa/high-court-throws-out-case-challenging-hassan-joho-degree-1033900">questionable academic qualifications</a>, have not been dealt with conclusively. </p>
<h2>Fake leadership</h2>
<p>The relationship between degrees and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JlbTvCvSN84">quality leadership</a> is one Kenyans should debate as they head to the elections in August. <a href="https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/40966-best-and-worst-performing-mps-listed-new-report">The ranking of legislators</a> is mostly based on the contributions of parliamentarians on the floor of the House. But the accomplishment of a development agenda in their respective constituencies should be factored in too when determining the quality of leadership. </p>
<p>Whereas integrity, in terms of presenting academic credentials should be overemphasised, Kenyans should be more worried about a political culture whose consequence is fake leadership that overpromises and under-delivers. What should matter most is the capability of the politician to offer quality leadership and not academic excellence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185217/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maina wa Mutonya does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The level of education of the political class is not the key to progress.Maina wa Mutonya, Researcher, African and African Diaspora Studies, National School of Anthropology and HistoryLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1836832022-06-21T14:13:54Z2022-06-21T14:13:54ZWant to run for office in Kenya? Here’s how much it’ll cost you<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464816/original/file-20220523-12-mixc6o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Candidates are always willing to outspend each other to boost their visibility during the campaigns amid fierce competition for the elective posts.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-of-kenyan-presidential-candidate-raila-odinga-news-photo/826021938?adppopup=true">Fredrik Lerneryd/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Kenya’s constitution provides for election of the president and 47 governors to head the executive organs at national and county levels, respectively. Also to be elected are legislators: 47 senators, 290 MPs and 1,450 members of county assemblies. There is fierce competition for these posts, not just between parties but between individuals within a party; and the more a candidate spends, the higher the chances of winning a seat. Karuti Kanyinga is a governance and development expert. We asked him how much it costs to run for office, and what the high cost signals for Kenya’s participatory democracy.</em></p>
<h2>How much does it cost to win a legislative seat?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.iebc.or.ke/uploads/resources/SrIlWeBWMH.pdf">Election Campaigns Financing Act</a> recognises a number of campaign-related expenses that may arise, from party primaries to general elections. These include venue hiring, publicity material, advertising, campaign personnel and transportation. Candidates may also incur social costs, like contributing medical assistance and school fees to communities. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://nimd.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/WFD_NIMD_2021_The-cost-of-politics-in-Kenya-1.pdf">study</a> – based on discussions and interviews with key informants from across the country – estimates that a candidate will this year spend about 39 million Kenya shillings (roughly US$390,000) on average to win a senate seat in the 9 August polls. The amount does not include support that a candidate may get from the sponsoring political party. </p>
<p>It took an average of US$350,000 to win a similar seat in the 2017. The 12.3% cost difference between 2017 and 2022 is attributed to the increasing cost of living, and inflation in general. </p>
<p>Kenya has 47 counties, implying successful senators will spend a total of 1.8 billion shillings (US$18 million) to win their seats.</p>
<p>To successfully run for the Woman Representative seat, an aspirant needs US$240,000 this year – 4.8% higher than the US$228,000 that a successful candidate spent five years ago. Kenya’s parliament has 47 such representatives, implying total spending in excess of US$11 million by the successful candidates.</p>
<p>An MP will require an average of US$222,000 to win in the August polls, up from $182,000 in 2017. The parliament has 290 elected MPs, implying a collective US$64.4 million (KSh6.4 billion) to fill the seats.</p>
<p>The least expensive political seat in Kenya is that of Member of County Assembly, at US$31,000 this year, or a total of US$45 million (KSh4.5bn) for the 1,450 electable seats. </p>
<p>Candidates interviewed for this study said voters generally viewed them as moneybags every time they organised meetings in their constituencies. The demands for money increased in tandem with approaching elections.</p>
<p>For Ghana, which returned to multiparty elections in 1992 – the same year as Kenya – the <a href="https://www.wfd.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/Cost_Of_Politics_Ghana.pdf">cost of election</a> increased by 59% between 2012 and 2016. But the US$85,000 that a candidate required to win a parliamentary seat in the 2016 general election was only 46.7% of what a Kenyan counterpart would spend a year later, in 2017, to clinch a similar seat.</p>
<p>Within East Africa, a 2020 <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348732689_PRE-CAMPAIGN_SPENDING_FOR_UGANDA_ELECTIONS_2021_Ballot_Paper_or_Bank_Note">study</a> in Uganda found that candidates spent between US$43,000 and US$143,000 to be elected to parliament in the 2016 general election. </p>
<h2>What drives these costs?</h2>
<p>The first driver is the allure of elective office. Kenya pays an MP a monthly package of at least US$10,000 – including basic allowances. <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_KEN.pdf">Over 36%</a> of Kenya’s population live below the poverty line, earning less than US$1.9 per day or US$57 monthly.</p>
<p>The second driver is <a href="https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5766&context=masters_theses">patronage and connections</a>, that have also been linked to theft of public resources. Upon winning election, a patron-client network chain ensues that connects the politician to higher levels of the state and senior politicians to the grassroots. This enables the politician to draw development resources and also provides an opportunity for self-enrichment through contracts with public institutions. </p>
<p>Third, pressure from voters demanding handouts also drives up the cost of politics in Kenya. In many of the interviews, respondents pointed out that voters openly demand money from candidates before agreeing to attend their meetings. Voters demand payment because some of those elected rarely engage with voters after elections. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/vote-buying-is-a-big-problem-in-kenya-how-to-curb-it-before-the-2022-elections-171630">Vote buying is a big problem in Kenya. How to curb it before the 2022 elections</a>
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<p>The fourth driver of cost has to do with wrong perceptions of roles. In the past, voters judged elected leaders on the basis of the development projects initiated or number of people helped to access government jobs. The current <a href="http://www.kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010">constitution</a> casts the roles of elected leaders as oversight of the executive; making laws; and representation of the people. But voters still demand the “development record” of aspiring MPs. To prove their worth, the aspirant is compelled to contribute to projects and assistance funds.</p>
<p>Fifth, some candidates are willing to outspend others during the primaries of dominant parties or coalitions in order to secure a ticket. Getting a ticket of dominant party reduces the chances of losing the election.</p>
<p>Lastly, there is limited oversight of election financing. The Election Campaign Financing Act restricts the sources of campaign funds but doesn’t place caps on them. Last year, MPs <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/national-assembly-rejects-iebc-cap-polls-spending-3508264">rejected</a> an attempt by the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission to <a href="https://www.iebc.or.ke/uploads/resources/iGNrE6ZL95.pdf">change</a> the law and introduce spending caps.</p>
<h2>What’s the impact of high costs?</h2>
<p>Capable candidates who lack access to sizeable resources get excluded from politics. Our study shows Woman Representative candidates who won their race spent almost three times as much as those who were unsuccessful. Similarly, victorious senators spent more than double what losers spent. In the race for National Assembly, successful candidates spent 50% more than those who did not win.</p>
<p>High costs have also led to a non-functioning representative democracy. Political seats mostly go to those who lead in contributions to development projects, donations to groups, and raising funds for individuals in need. The transactional nature of politics reduces opportunities for debate and dialogue between elected officials and their constituents.</p>
<p>Once the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281451951_MONETARY_CLOUT_AND_ELECTORAL_POLITICS_IN_KENYA_-_Presidential_Elections_in_Focus">heavy spenders</a> win elections, they turn to the executive and to the public sector institutions for contracts and rent-seeking opportunities. The use of an electoral seat as a source of patronage in the constituency is linked to national level patronage networks, which in turn is the basis for corruption in the public sector. These networks help to entrench abuse of office, especially because political actors have to continue amassing resources for their support bases. </p>
<p>High costs also lead politicians to neglect their functions. Re-election bids begin almost immediately after elections as leaders, without seeking opinions of their constituents, initiate “development projects” aimed at boosting their visibility at campaign time.</p>
<p>A final impact of money politics is that elected officials do not always provide effective oversight of the use of resources by the executive at the national and county level. This would be an exercise in futility, given that some intend to access those resources for personal or political gain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183683/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karuti Kanyinga does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The transactional nature of politics reduces opportunities for debate and dialogue between elected officials and their constituents.Karuti Kanyinga, Research Professor, Institute for Development Studies (IDS), University of NairobiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1832622022-05-31T13:32:54Z2022-05-31T13:32:54ZPolitical debates in Kenya: are they useful or empty media spectacles?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463922/original/file-20220518-23-xadjx7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Eight presidential candidates on stage during Kenya's first presidential debate in 2013.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Joan Pereruan/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It is a few months to Kenya’s <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/editions/kenya-election-2022/">August 2022 general election</a>. That means it is time for the theatrical, skeleton-revealing spectacle also known as the political debate.</p>
<p>Televised political debates in Kenya started in 2013 and have had a chequered history.</p>
<p>In the first debates, eight presidential aspirants met over two sessions that were broadcast on multiple television and radio stations. The sessions <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/2/26/sparks-fly-in-kenyan-presidential-debate">drew in</a> millions of listeners and viewers. </p>
<p>However, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2013.869929">one study</a> argued that the debates were more a performance that failed to provide the electorate with enough information on which candidate to elect. </p>
<p>In 2017, there was a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_iCGy5NYkqo">televised</a> debate between the eight candidates for governor of Kenya’s capital city, Nairobi. They traded barbs, accusing each other of corruption, shady business deals, crime and weak leadership. </p>
<p>The live audience loved it, laughing at the particularly potent allegations. </p>
<p>Nairobi voters eventually elected <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2017/08/07/the-sonkonization-of-nairobi-how-mike-sonko-is-reshaping-city-politics/">Mike Sonko</a>, a controversial, flashy politician whose popularity can partly be traced to his <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2021-08-13-the-rise-and-fall-of-mike-sonko-nairobis-matatu-king/">public displays of generosity</a>. These include providing free public services, such as garbage collection, that are otherwise the role of local government.</p>
<p>During the televised debate, Sonko was accused of having a criminal record. Over the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56269628">course of his five-year term</a>, he was charged with gross misconduct and faced several corruption allegations. He eventually <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2020/03/sonko-defends-move-to-handover-key-functions-to-national-govt/">handed over</a> the running of key functions in the county to the national government. </p>
<p>Political debates have become part of the election calendar. They are organised, moderated and broadcast mostly by <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/kenyan-media-launches-presidential-debate-2022-n293607">commercial news media</a>. These platforms have played a leading role in proposing, organising and broadcasting them.</p>
<p>Their stated intention is to enable citizens to access comprehensive information that will help them decide whom to elect.</p>
<p>As the 2017 Nairobi gubernatorial race showed, a political debate is helpful in presenting candidates to the citizens, and allows some exposure of their backgrounds, plans, possible strengths and weaknesses. </p>
<p>But, useful as the political debate was in subjecting the Nairobi gubernatorial candidates to citizen scrutiny, it was not enough to change residents’ minds about Sonko potentially being a bad bet. </p>
<p>If a debate is the citizen’s primary source of information about the candidates running for a particular seat, that is too much weight for a two-hour event to carry. </p>
<p>Debates are culminating events, held as an election season comes to an end. They cannot replace the electorate’s need for the granular, mundane, day-to-day information about candidates and what they stand for. </p>
<h2>What can go wrong</h2>
<p>Election cycles around the world are seen as tangible evidence of democracy. They allow citizens to elect leaders whose policies, views and experience will enable accountable and useful representation. </p>
<p>In principle, the political debate is a forum to showcase these aspiring leaders’ visions.</p>
<p>It is a lofty goal, however, given that in every general election, the Kenyan voter elects <a href="https://theconversation.com/money-influence-and-heroism-the-allure-of-political-power-in-kenya-177171">six representatives</a>. These are the president, governor, senator, women’s representative, member of parliament and ward representative.</p>
<p>In 2013, the political debates focused on presidential and deputy presidential candidates. The presidential debate was organised and broadcast by leading commercial media houses. The debate between deputy presidential candidates was <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/02/deputy-presidential-debate-thursday-night/">co-organised</a> by a coalition of churches and a private university. </p>
<p>In 2017, more political debates were planned as independent players got involved. </p>
<p>The Kenya Alliance of Resident Associations, for instance, partnered with other organisations to organise a <a href="http://www.kara.or.ke/index.php/2015-01-22-08-51-09/kara-news/261-service-delivery-kara-accredited-as-an-election-observer">series of debates</a> among aspirants for seven county governor seats. </p>
<p>This year, attempts were made to assess the ability of community and local language media to get involved in carrying out debates. The idea was that these forums would focus on bringing together aspiring governors, senators and women’s representatives from more of Kenya’s 47 counties. </p>
<p>Community and local language media platforms tend to provide information for particular geographic or ethno-cultural zones. Their regional reach works for the seats for which they are being assessed. </p>
<p>But the idea has run into trouble, provoking a <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001442764/media-groups-split-on-mucherus-debate-taskforce">spat</a> between sections of Kenya’s mainstream media and the cabinet secretary in charge of information and communication, Joe Mucheru. </p>
<p>The issue revolved around the government’s appointment by <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kenya_gazette/gazette/volume/MjU4MA--/Vol.CXXIV-No.61/">gazette notice</a> of a working group. They were given the job of assessing the ability of community and local language media to hold political debates. </p>
<p>Beyond the differences of opinion over the setting up of the working group, a number of issues arise. </p>
<p>First, who will accommodate the need for information about MP aspirants in Kenya’s 290 constituencies? Or the thousands who will vie for the 1,450 ward representative seats, particularly just months to the elections? </p>
<p>Second, as dramatic and exciting as the debates are, candidates don’t always participate. In 2017, there were <a href="https://hivisasa.com/posts/video-buzeki-speaks-after-mandago-failed-to-show-up-for-gubernatorial-debate">gubernatorial candidates</a> in several counties – among them incumbent holders of the seat – who <a href="https://karakenya.wordpress.com/2017/07/28/omar-shahbal-face-off-in-mombasa-gubernatorial-debate/">didn’t show up</a>. </p>
<p>That same year, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/7/6/kenyas-uhuru-kenyatta-pulls-out-of-election-debates">incumbent president and his main opponent</a> declined to attend their debates, citing event format concerns. This denied citizens the opportunity to ask questions or hear aspirants’ plans. </p>
<p>Third, debates are usually held at the end of the political campaign season. The number of political candidates and the format of debates don’t usually allow citizens to gain sufficient understanding of each aspirant’s agenda. </p>
<h2>Making it right</h2>
<p>As governance researcher John Ahere <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpos.2020.630684/full">observed</a>, democracy in East Africa is nuanced. The appearance of democracy is not always the same as its lived reality. </p>
<p>Citizens are often treated as bystanders in democratic governance – valuable once every five years when aspiring leaders seek their votes.
The rest of the time, citizens have little say over why poverty is widespread, for instance, or why <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/-kenyans-worse-off-under-uhuruto-report--3772824">theft of public resources</a> remains pervasive. </p>
<p>The performance of elected officials, therefore, needs sustained coverage beyond the election. This needs to be done by the media. Once the election is over, there is an opportunity for all media – commercial, community and public – to commit to extensively covering the work of all legislative and executive leaders during their five-year terms of service. </p>
<p>By doing this, news media would be showing its value as an institution within Kenyan democracy, as described by journalism scholar <a href="https://academicjournals.org/journal/JMCS/article-full-text/343D5DF61867">Mwangi Michael Kamau</a>. </p>
<p>Under this scenario, future political debates could cement the electorate’s knowledge of whom to elect. </p>
<p>This would be based on a grounded understanding that as citizens, they are central actors – rather than peripheral observers – in the evolution of their democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183262/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wambui Wamunyu is affiliated with the Kenya Editors' Guild. </span></em></p>In principle, political debates should showcase an aspiring leader’s vision. It’s a lofty goal given their current format in Kenya.Wambui Wamunyu, Senior Lecturer in Media Studies, Daystar UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1827102022-05-16T14:32:48Z2022-05-16T14:32:48ZHow Kenya’s judiciary can break the cycle of electoral violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462506/original/file-20220511-12-e2bw4y.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Supreme Court of Kenya in Nairobi.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">John Ochieng/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya is no stranger to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/8/10/why-are-kenyas-elections-so-bitterly-contested">highly contested elections</a>, including those pervaded by political and ethnic violence.</p>
<p>When there is no finality to elections, or if some parties refuse to accept the official results, the process cannot support democracy. It does not produce a legitimate government with a right to exercise power and the ability to meet the needs of all citizens.</p>
<p>As Kenya heads to the polls in August 2022, it’s important to consider what role the judiciary will play in ensuring that the elections are free, fair and credible. </p>
<p>As a legal expert and economist who studies the rule of law in Africa, I <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/09/06/kenya-presidential-elections-and-the-rule-of-law/">argue</a> that Kenyans need to work towards ensuring both individual and institutional judicial independence. </p>
<p>The former implies that individual judges can decide cases without interference. The latter means that courts are independent from the executive and legislative branches of government.</p>
<p>For the courts to perform their job effectively, including resolving elections-related conflicts, they must be independent. Additionally, Kenyans must have trust, confidence and faith in their judgements. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/drivers-of-electoral-violence-in-kenya-red-flags-to-watch-out-for-180703">Drivers of electoral violence in Kenya: red flags to watch out for</a>
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<p>Unlike the executive, the judiciary cannot send soldiers out to enforce its orders, nor can it deny development aid to a community to gain support for its decisions. The court’s power is derived from its legitimacy. </p>
<p>This comes from a general belief and understanding that adhering to the court’s rulings is the right thing to do. To safeguard this legitimacy, judges must function and be seen as officials of the judiciary, and not as representatives of the ethnic group to which they belong. </p>
<h2>Judicial wins</h2>
<p>Kenya is a <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/kenya">young democracy</a> and so is its judiciary. However, the country’s courts have exhibited a significant level of maturity and independence in recent years. </p>
<p>This was evidenced by the supreme court’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-election-court/kenyan-court-scraps-presidential-vote-kenyatta-calls-for-calm-idUSKCN1BC4A5">unprecedented decision</a> in the aftermath of the disputed 2017 presidential election results. A six-judge bench annulled the incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta’s win. The court ordered a new election in 60 days, which Kenyatta won.</p>
<p>In 2021, the high court intervened in a push fronted by the government to amend the constitution. It declared the process <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/08/19/is-the-bbi-ruling-a-sign-of-judicial-independence-in-kenya/">unconstitutional</a>. </p>
<p>Reflective of a country with increasingly strong democratic institutions and an independent judiciary, Kenyatta accepted the court’s ruling. The government, nevertheless, decided to move to the appeals court and the supreme court, as required by the constitution. The two courts <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenya-s-supreme-court-declares-bbi-unconstitutional-3766868">upheld</a> the initial ruling.</p>
<p>Kenya’s judiciary, however, needs to continue to <a href="https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/kenya-has-made-progress-towards-judicial-independence-new-constitution-promises">expand its own infrastructure and build professional capacities</a>. This includes setting up an effective system to finance the judiciary so that it isn’t <a href="https://www.judiciary.go.ke/statement-by-chief-justice-david-maraga-on-judiciary-budget-cuts/">held hostage</a> to changes in the country’s politics. Opportunistic politicians shouldn’t be able to punish the courts for legally sound but unpopular decisions. </p>
<p>An efficient, equitable and accessible <a href="https://www.idlo.int/what-we-do/peace-and-democracy/building-judicial-capacity">justice system</a> is the foundation of a democracy based on the rule of law.</p>
<h2>The courts and elections-related conflicts</h2>
<p><a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=398">Kenya’s 2010 constitution</a> was designed to help “reconcile a deeply divided nation”. It provided mechanisms for citizens to peacefully resolve elections-related conflicts and bring finality to them. </p>
<p>The constitution grants citizens <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/130-chapter-nine-the-executive/part-2-the-president-and-deputy-president/308-140-questions-as-to-validity-of-presidential-election">the power</a> to challenge the election of a president in the supreme court. </p>
<p>This court also determines the validity of the presidential election. Its capacity to do so has been successfully tested. <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/kenyas-uhuru-kenyatta-wins-second-term-with-54-27-official/">Official results</a> from the August 2017 elections showed Kenyatta had been re-elected president with 54.27% of the votes. This was against opposition leader Raila Odinga’s 44.74%. </p>
<p>The top election official at the time, Wafula Chebukati, and several international observers argued that the election was free, fair and credible. The <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/09/06/kenya-presidential-elections-and-the-rule-of-law/">opposition cried foul</a> and said the election had been marred by irregularities. </p>
<p>There were <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/kenya-uncertainty-over-election-fuels-fears-of-clashes/a-41094351">fears</a> of a repeat of the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/3/3/kenya-what-went-wrong-in-2007">ethnic-induced violence</a> that accompanied the 2007 elections. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-has-its-first-female-chief-justice-why-this-matters-160108">Kenya has its first female chief justice: why this matters</a>
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<p>Kenyatta encouraged the opposition to take their concerns to the courts. It did, and on 1 September 2017, the court made its historic ruling, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/world/africa/kenya-election-kenyatta-odinga.html?mcubz=0">annulling the presidential election results</a>. </p>
<p>The real lesson from the 2017 supreme court decision was not that it granted the opposition another chance to capture the presidency or deprived the incumbent of his electoral win. It was that it reaffirmed the country’s move towards constitutionalism, peaceful resolution of conflict and the rule of law. </p>
<p>Although Kenya’s judiciary has proven itself capable of serving as an effective arbiter of elections-related conflicts and bringing finality to elections, there remain many challenges to the country’s democracy. </p>
<p>These include the politicisation of ethnicity. This is evidenced by the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/ethnic-bias-in-judicial-decision-making-evidence-from-criminal-appeals-in-kenya/3C03C616D2578E7DEA16E30F73394C56">pressure imposed</a> on judicial and other officials to act in favour of one ethnic group or another.</p>
<h2>Ethnicity and Kenya’s struggle for peace</h2>
<p>Kenya is a state that was founded by bringing together distinct groups. Each had its own customs, cultures and traditions, as well as laws and institutions. </p>
<p>The challenge the country faces today is how to make this forced marriage work to achieve peaceful coexistence, wealth creation and inclusive development. </p>
<p>Citizens continue to vote largely for people from their own <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-elections-ethnicity/kenyan-politicians-struggle-to-break-ethnic-voting-patterns-idUSKBN1AL049">ethnic group</a>. This politicisation of ethnicity has created many challenges to Kenya’s efforts to deepen, entrench and institutionalise democracy. </p>
<p>First, it allows members of the country’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/in-kenya-politics-split-on-ethnic-divide/a-37442394">five largest ethnic groups</a> to dominate national governance. </p>
<p>Second, it forces political elites to seek consent from their ethnic bases instead of developing more broadly appealing programmes.</p>
<p>Third, it puts pressure on civil servants and elected officials to act as ethnic, rather than country, representatives.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-kenya-could-move-away-from-the-politics-of-ethnicity-77980">How Kenya could move away from the politics of ethnicity</a>
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<p>Kenya’s democracy cannot function effectively if its public officials, including its judges, serve as representatives of their ethnic groups. In performing their jobs, civil servants and politicians must be accountable to the constitution and the people of Kenya. </p>
<p>It is only through such an approach to public service that citizens can have trust in their institutions and leaders, including the decisions that they make.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182710/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Mukum Mbaku, J.D. (law), Ph,D. (economics), is affiliated with Weber State University (Ogden, Utah, USA), where he is Brady Presidential Distinguished Professor of Economics; The Brookings Institution (Washington, D.C.), where he is a Nonresident Senior Fellow; and the African Economic Research Consortium (Nairobi, Kenya), where he is a Resource Person.</span></em></p>The country’s courts have already exhibited a significant level of maturity in rulings touching on the executive.John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1810822022-04-20T14:06:32Z2022-04-20T14:06:32ZLatest approach to Kenya election hate speech raises more questions than answers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457954/original/file-20220413-26-ixl6gt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Kenyan policeman stands next to a painted sign reading "keep peace stop violence" during protests in Nairobi in 2008.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Roberto Schmidt/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The election campaign period in Kenya is typically hectic for the <a href="https://cohesion.or.ke/">statutory body</a> that keeps tabs on inflammatory speech on political platforms and the media. This is hardly surprising for a public watchdog formed in response to the 2007 post-election violence in which <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/smart-global-health/post-election-violence-kenya-and-its-aftermath">more than 1,100 people were killed</a>. Both sides stood <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2010/03/331232">accused </a>of inflaming ethnic tensions that had been building up for years. </p>
<p>The National Cohesion and Integration Commission was <a href="https://cohesion.or.ke/index.php/about-us/ncic-at-a-glance">formed</a> at the end of the violence in 2008 to promote national identity and values. It was charged with mitigating ethno-political competition and ethnically motivated violence, eliminating discrimination on an ethnic, racial or religious basis and promoting national reconciliation and healing.</p>
<p>Every election since 2007 has been marked by <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/hate-speech-heats-local-radio-kenya">fear of violence, and inflammatory speech has always featured</a>. Ahead of the 2022 election on August 9, the independent watchdog <a href="https://cohesion.or.ke/Election2022/index.php">warns</a> of </p>
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<p>existing concern that the 2022 General Elections draw several parallels to the 2007 one. Moreover, most of the underlying causes of <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/smart-global-health/background-post-election-crisis-kenya">conflict</a> largely remain unresolved.</p>
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<p>In previous campaigns, the watchdog <a href="https://cohesion.or.ke/Election2022/index.php/elections-2022">says</a> on its website, people shared negative ethnic messages to discredit political opponents and drive voters to more readily accept campaign claims. These negative messages were sent out by political leaders, musicians, political analysts, journalists and bloggers, among others. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2021-03-01-ncic-raises-concern-over-hate-speech-incitement-by-politicians/">latest</a> clampdown on hate messaging, the commission has published a list of words and phrases it deems likely to foment ethnic hatred as Kenya heads to general elections in August 2022. Some of the <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/ncic-blacklists-sipangwingwi-in-war-on-hate-speech-3775900">blacklisted words</a>, it says, have been “regularly used in Kenya’s political landscape with the intent to provoke violence among communities of diverse political viewpoints” especially during the current political campaign period.</p>
<p>There are a few weaknesses.</p>
<p>The first is that the commission lacks legal mechanisms to act against perpetrators and can only make recommendations to relevant authorities. The implications are that politicians, musicians, media practitioners etc are likely to get away with supposed hate speech charges. </p>
<p>A high profile case in 2012 against three musicians couldn’t hold, because the charges were based on a “criminal interpretation to artistic works” and that the prosecution “did not present enough evidence to link the singers to hate speech as alleged”. </p>
<p>Secondly, by clamping down on hate speech at political campaign rallies only, the commission overlooks the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02560054.2011.545568">media’s contribution</a> to the problem. </p>
<p>Thirdly, Kenyans’ everyday talk is full of <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781793612366/Media-Ethnicity-and-Electoral-Conflicts-in-Kenya">ethnic</a> bile, <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-election-sexist-language-shows-that-patriarchy-refuses-to-give-way-178066">misogynistic</a> utterances and words that are outright <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/kenya-spreading-word-hate">dehumanising</a>. There’s no hope that the commission will make an impact on this if it only takes action during an election campaign. It should be finding relevance at all times, not just during polling season. </p>
<h2>Stoking hatred</h2>
<p>Every five years at election time, underlying ethnic rivalries are rekindled through songs, words, euphemisms, epithets and slurs. Ordinary words and catchphrases can assume a different meaning altogether when used during campaigns and depending on the context. </p>
<p>On the list of the blacklisted phrases, for example, is “Linda Kura”, which in its ordinary Kiswahili sense is a call to “protect the vote and ensure that all votes cast are duly counted”. It should be a welcome phrase about civic duty especially in a country where claims of election rigging are rampant. </p>
<p>Popular music catchphrases can be exploited to galvanise support. The speech watchdog has blacklisted the song Sipangwingwi by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1VvpDe2W7RU">Exray Taniua</a>. The title is street slang derived from the Kiswahili word “sipangwi” (I am not told what to do). The lyrics of the song, as well as its banned plural form <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-04-08-ruto-releases-hatupangwingwi-song-after-ncic-banned-term/">“hatupagwingwi”</a>, appear harmless and innocent, and relate to everyday life struggles. </p>
<p>It is probable that the word was flagged because it has been adopted as a political slogan by one of the political formations. But as political commentator <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/opinion/ncic-ban-bark-of-toothless-dog--3779178">Macharia Gaitho</a> argues, “political sloganeering will always be about competition, rivalries and staking out turf. It will indicate rivalries and antagonism …but it can hardly be deemed as hate speech”.</p>
<p>In blacklisting words that emanate from a song, the public watchdog appears to be contravening the same constitution that guarantees the freedom of expression. In its attempt to ostensibly tackle hate speech that might provoke ethnic tensions, the commission’s choice of blacklisted words falls short as explained below. This does little to mend its current image as a <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/opinion/columnists/2020-10-07-toothless-biased-ncic-team-should-be-kicked-out/">toothless bulldog</a>.</p>
<h2>What the commission can do</h2>
<p>This is not to say that the watchdog should stop discouraging hate speech. But it should fully understand the contexts of how some words are used.</p>
<p>According to linguist and cultural scholar <a href="https://twitter.com/kimaniwanjogu">Kimani Njogu</a>, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>words derive meaning from the context in which they are used. In tracking hate speech, the words identified would need to meet additional criteria … such as context of use, intentionality, place in which they are used, who is using them etc.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The current blacklist, for instance, doesn’t include those words that continually denigrate women politicians. Ethnic jibes are always thrown at women politicians married across communities.</p>
<p>The blacklist also misses a good number of words and phrases that could easily spread ethnic hate and political violence. It’s not clear why some relatively innocent words are included and more potent ones are left out.</p>
<p>Perhaps the commission should focus more on the barrage of misinformation and disinformation that is most likely to cause serious political discord. It includes alleged <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2022/02/livondo-records-statement-over-assassination-claims/">assassination</a> plots and <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/-ruto-offered-raila-half-of-government-to-kick-out-uhuru--3766156">political conspiracies</a> – serious claims that could polarise communities and stoke ethnic violence. </p>
<p>In its failure to comprehensively address the issues that could lead to ethnic disharmony, the commission fails in its core mandate of promoting national unity, equity and the elimination of all forms of ethnic discrimination by facilitating equality of opportunities, peaceful resolution of conflicts and respect for diversity among Kenyan communities. Publishing a few lexical items without extensive research is definitely not a step in the right direction.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181082/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maina wa Mutonya does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Every five years, underlying ethnic rivalries are rekindled through songs, words, euphemisms, epithets and slurs.Maina wa Mutonya, Researcher, African and African Diaspora Studies, National School of Anthropology and HistoryLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1806052022-04-07T14:14:18Z2022-04-07T14:14:18ZOdinga is running his fifth presidential race. Why the outcome means so much for Kenya<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456359/original/file-20220405-14425-cpyy05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Veteran Kenyan politician Raila Odinga is making his fifth stab at the presidency.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Leo ni leo. Inawezekana</em> (Today is the day. It is possible). These are the Kiswahili lyrics of Raila Odinga’s presidential <a href="https://www.k24tv.co.ke/news/leo-ni-leo-raila-releases-his-first-ever-campaign-song-57762/">campaign anthem</a>. The 77-year-old veteran Kenyan politician has not lost optimism even though he’s contesting the election for the fifth time. He was in the race in 1997, 2007, 2013 and 2017. </p>
<p>This time around he looks like the front runner. This is because of the strategic alliances he has built as well as the fact that the incumbent president, Uhuru Kenyatta, has mobilised state machinery to support him in the August 2022 poll.</p>
<p>He has come close to victory twice before. The 2007 poll result was hotly disputed and ended with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/africa/31kenya.html">tragic consequences</a>. Widespread violence led to the death of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/report/electoral-violence-kenya">over 1100 people and 600 000</a> were displaced.</p>
<p>It was an election he and his supporters believed he had won against the incumbent Mwai Kibaki. This could well have been the case. An independent commission set up to investigate the poll found widespread malpractices. It <a href="https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=d8aa1729-8a9e-7226-acee-8193fd67a21a&groupId=252038">concluded </a> that it was impossible to determine who won.</p>
<p>Then ten years later Odinga succeeded <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/kenya-elections-petition/kenyas-odinga-challenges-election-defeat-in-top-court-idINDEE92F04520130316">in annulling</a> Uhuru Kenyatta’s first round victory in the Kenya’s Supreme Court. It <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41123329">ruled</a> that the electoral commission had failed to conduct the presidential elections in a way that was compliant with the dictates of the constitution. </p>
<p>Kenyatta won the rerun, which Odinga <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/10/kenya-raila-odinga-withdraws-election">boycotted</a>. His reason was that not enough reforms had been put in place to safeguard the ballot against the practices that had led to the previous election being nullified.</p>
<p>This time round Odinga represents an alliance, <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2021/12/raila-unveils-odm-led-azimio-la-umoja-alliance-for-2022-race/">Azimio la Umoja</a> (Kiswahili for “pledge of unity”). This has brought together 26 parties, dominated by Odinga’s own Orange Democratic Movement and the outgoing president Kenyatta’s Jubilee party. With <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2021/12/20-governors-6-cabinet-secretaries-among-azimio-la-umoja-delegates/">20 governors</a> and over 100 National Constituency members, the alliance represents a potentially sizeable national electoral spread.</p>
<p>Long seen as an anti-establishment candidate, Odinga has a common touch that resonates with Kenyans who have felt locked out of the power matrix controlled by two ethnic groups since <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/kenya-granted-independence">independence in 1963</a> – the Kikuyu and Kalenjin. </p>
<p>This time, though, he is the establishment candidate.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/william-ruto-how-kenyas-new-president-took-on-powerful-political-dynasties-178787">William Ruto: how Kenya's new president took on powerful political dynasties</a>
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<h2>Odinga the strategist</h2>
<p>Odinga comes from a <a href="https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198815693.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198815693-e-43">political family</a>. He is the son of post-independence Kenya’s first vice-president, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. Much has been made of his family background, and his opponents suggest he is driven by a sense of entitlement.</p>
<p>But he has built credibility in his own right too. First as a <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0105/010549.html">political prisoner</a> between 1982 and 1988, then as a member of parliament as well as <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna24094517">prime minister</a> (2008-2013). He has also established himself as a veteran <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/east-africa-news/why-raila-odinga-is-kenya-s-diehard-presidential-hopeful-3651178">opposition leader</a> and perennial presidential contender. </p>
<p>He is considered a master strategist, sometimes populist and excellent mobiliser with a fervent following among his Luo kinsmen.</p>
<p>Recently, Odinga has been <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/africa/uhuru-kenyatta-endorses-raila-odinga-for-presidency-3745608">officially endorsed</a> by outgoing president Uhuru Kenyatta, his rival in the last election. Their families have, historically, been rivals. But in 2018 after the bitterly disputed 2017 poll the two protagonists agreed to a national reform framework marked by a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/59339450-d555-11e9-8d46-8def889b4137">symbolic handshake</a>. </p>
<p>This resulted in the <a href="https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3.sourceafrica.net/documents/119369/Building-Bridges-Initiative-Technical-Committee.pdf">Building Bridges Initiative</a>. The stated aim was to try and counter the ‘winner-takes-all’ nature of Kenyan elections, and to ensure that the country never experienced electoral violence again. The reform package didn’t have a long shelf life. It was subsequently <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60941860">ruled unconstitutional</a>.</p>
<p>The 2018 rapprochement marked the end of the alliance between president Kenyatta and his deputy president, William Ruto. Together they had won elections against Odinga.</p>
<p>The ‘handshake’ moment was the point at which Odinga began to position himself to challenge for the presidency against Ruto. And with the help of the incumbent president Kenyatta, he appears to have a real chance. </p>
<p>In the absence of credible opinion polls, the belief is that this is a <a href="https://www.eiu.com/n/competition-intensifies-ahead-of-kenyas-election/">tight two horse race</a> between Odinga and William Ruto of the Kenya Kwanza coalition. The outcome, I believe, will be dictated by the collective mobilisation capacity and support of the coalition blocs. At present there are no consequential contenders beyond the two and their allies in the Azimio and Kenya Kwanza voting blocs. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/latest-approach-to-kenya-election-hate-speech-raises-more-questions-than-answers-181082">Latest approach to Kenya election hate speech raises more questions than answers</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>Potential kingmakers</h2>
<p>Largely, Kenyan politics is not so much about ideological positions or even distinct policy differences but the ability to craft strategic coalitions – <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-elections-ethnicity-idUSKBN1AL049">largely built along ethnic lines</a> – to deliver the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/137727/kenya-politicians-up-ethnic-rhetoric-ahead-of-2022-polls-fuelling-worries/">spoils of power</a> to contenders.</p>
<p>Consequently, no presidential candidate in Kenya has run on the same party (coalition) platform as in the previous elections. There is significant horse-trading prior to any electoral cycle. For the 2022 election, over 180 members of the senate and national assembly have shifted allegiance from the party that sponsored them in 2017. </p>
<p>Odinga’s new platform has been built with these factors in mind.</p>
<p>Beyond Kenyatta, Odinga has built a formidable alliance composed of veteran politicians and political heavyweights. These stalwarts of ethnic constituencies are expected to mobilise communal support for the Azimio candidate. </p>
<p>Kenya’s politics is still characterised by ethnic interests. To date, Uhuru’s <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2021-01-27-kikuyu-kalenjins-grossly-overrepresented-in-civil-service/">Kikuyu and Ruto’s Kalenjin</a> have <a href="https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/kenya-stuck-tribalism-and-calls-national-unity-are-all-too-often-manipulative">dominated</a> the Kenyan presidency and civil service. In their candidate Odinga, the Luos have, for the first time, a realistic chance. </p>
<p>Their triumph would signal a seismic shift in the power symmetry given that no Luo has held the presidency before.</p>
<p>To achieve this feat, Odinga has brought on board:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Kalonzo Musyoka of the Wiper party, representing the Kamba ethnic constituency</p></li>
<li><p>Gideon Moi of the Kenya National African Union party, a current senator and son of former president late Daniel Arap Moi</p></li>
<li><p>Charity Ngilu, of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) and one of the few women who have served in various governments</p></li>
<li><p>Martha Karua, of NARC-Kenya and a former government minister and unsuccessful presidential candidate in 2013.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Baba or the Hustler?</h2>
<p>Kenyatta has <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001438417/uhuru-kenyatta-hits-at-dp-ruto-over-source-of-funds">asked</a> Kenyans to </p>
<blockquote>
<p>support this old man (Odinga) and help him protect our interests and legacy. When this young man (Ruto) toes the line in future, we … will consider him.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This indicates a generational contest, one between Kenya’s old political family, seen as steady and assured, and the “<a href="https://theconversation.com/william-ruto-the-presidential-candidate-taking-on-kenyas-political-dynasties-178787">youthful hustler</a>” vice-president, painted as impetuous, unyielding and cunning.</p>
<p>Kenya has come a long way from the orgies of the 2007 electoral violence. Yet its political trajectory is still filled with nervy uncertainty. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/drivers-of-electoral-violence-in-kenya-red-flags-to-watch-out-for-180703">Drivers of electoral violence in Kenya: red flags to watch out for</a>
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<h2>Odinga’s agenda</h2>
<p>Odinga will have a full in-tray if he wins. Kenya’s <a href="https://www.cadtm.org/Kenyan-activists-raise-questions-about-debt">national debt</a> portfolio has risen to US$54.3 billion. The World Bank has <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/world-bank-warns-kenya-over-85-7b-debt-ceiling-1429262">warned</a> the country about its ability to meet its loan repayment obligations. Odinga has promised to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-16/kenya-presidential-hopeful-odinga-to-negotiate-debt-if-wins-vote">address this</a>, partly by renegotiating short-term commercial loans that carry punitive interest rates.</p>
<p>Economic reinvigoration and <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/politics/article/2001426118/raila-odingas-pledge-to-tackle-poverty-to-cost-sh137b">tackling persistently</a> high poverty levels are also his stated priorities. He also <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-01-22-raila-promises-to-seal-corruption-loopholes-if-elected-president/">claims</a> to be concerned about <a href="https://www.kbc.co.ke/raila-promises-to-free-kenya-from-corruption-high-cost-of-living/">endemic corruption</a> and justice reforms. </p>
<p>Kenya’s <a href="https://theexchange.africa/health/will-cuban-doctors-help-cure-kenyas-ailing-healthcare-system/">ailing healthcare system</a> is not fit for purpose and Odinga speaks of “<a href="https://www.mwakilishi.com/article/kenya-news/2021-12-19/baba-care-raila-pledges-health-insurance-cover-for-all-kenyans">Babacare</a>” a programme to ensure universal healthcare with well equipped facilities.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/news/raila-promises-to-take-youth-to-china-for-skills-development-when-he-takes-over-power-next-year-85989/">Skills development</a> and technical training is another of his priority concerns given the very high rates of youth unemployment. It currently stands at approximately <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/census-39pc-of-kenya-youth-are-unemployed-2281430">39%</a>.</p>
<p>Lastly, Odinga envisages a <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/one-sub-county-one-product-raila-promises-to-build-factories-as-he-woos-kisumu-n294335">social security system</a> known as Azimio la Umoja, a kind of welfare state with a monthly stipend of US$60 for poor Kenyans.</p>
<p>But all these policy areas are largely the same concerns of previous elections and of both the <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/politics/article/2001440144/ruto-cleared-to-run-for-top-seat-say-raila-backers-after-positions">Kwanza</a> (Ruto) and Azimio (Odinga) Alliances.</p>
<p>The August 2022 elections represents an epochal moment, one that will either define its future or mirror its past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180605/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David E Kiwuwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Odinga is considered a master strategist, sometimes populist and excellent mobiliser.David E Kiwuwa, Associate Professor of International Studies, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1787872022-03-24T14:30:52Z2022-03-24T14:30:52ZWilliam Ruto: how Kenya’s new president took on powerful political dynasties<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453888/original/file-20220323-19-1gouv9q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">William Ruto </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">YASUYOSHI CHIBA/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>William Samoei Ruto, 55, has been <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/william-ruto-named-president-elect-3914858">declared</a> the winner of Kenya’s presidential election. He is the leader of the United Democratic Alliance party under the Kenya Kwanza (Kenya First) coalition. Ruto defeated his main rival in the election Raila Odinga, 77, who was <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/politics/article/2001440113/i-accept-azimio-nomination-says-raila-as-kalonzo-formally-joins-movement">running</a> under the rival Azimio la Umoja (Unity Declaration) coalition. </p>
<p>He becomes Kenya’s first sitting deputy president to succeed the incumbent following competitive elections and first candidate to win the presidency at first attempt.</p>
<p>The declaration of the results was temporarily disrupted amid chaotic scenes by the losing candidate’s supporters alleging irregularities. The situation was thrown into further disarray when four commissioners broke ranks, held a separate press conference and denounced the results as <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/four-iebc-commissioners-disown-chebukati-presidential-results-3915420">“opaque”</a>.</p>
<p>Ruto won the polls in spite of a <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/president-kenyatta-sustains-attack-on-dp-ruto-team-over-politicking-n292078">sustained pushback</a> by the incumbent, Uhuru Kenyatta, his former ally who chose instead <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-03-19-uhuru-campaigns-for-raila-in-nairobi/">to back</a> his former archrival and longtime opposition leader Raila Odinga. </p>
<p>Kenyatta and Ruto are former allies: Ruto campaigned for Kenyatta during his first presidential attempt in 2002, which he lost. Both were <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya">indicted</a> by the International Criminal Court (ICC) as the suspected masterminds of the mass atrocities that followed the disputed 2007 elections. They then <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/09/kenyatta-declared-victor-in-kenyan-elections">teamed up to contest in 2013</a>. They prevailed in 2017 as well, but not before the Supreme Court <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/8/11/uhuru-kenyatta-wins-kenya-presidential-election">annulled</a> the first round.</p>
<p>After their falling out, however, Ruto characterised Kenyatta and Odinga as the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58246207">embodiments</a> of dynastic politics and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/political-power-and-tribalism-in-kenya-by-westen-k-shilaho-cham-palgrave-macmillan-2018-pp-xvii-186-5499-hbk/EC0139B1008E6D2A562833E5D46CA6B3">entitlement</a>. The two are sons of Jomo Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga, Kenya’s first president and first vice president respectively. In a way, Ruto prevailed against the state, powerful elites, a biased media, the intelligentsia, civil society and jaundiced polling firms. His victory is historic and phenomenal.</p>
<p>As an outlier in Kenya’s political power matrix, which is dominated by a tiny clique related by familial and economic ties and adept at manipulating tribalism to capture the state, Ruto was elbowed out by the establishment. But he has somersaulted back by appealing directly to the masses, his original constituency.</p>
<h2>Ruto versus status quo</h2>
<p>For almost six decades, political and economic power has been confined within a group around Kenya’s first two presidents – Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi. Raila Odinga joined this group in the sunset years of Moi’s tenure and counted on it to propel him to power in the just concluded elections. The group has leverage over state agencies and the security apparatus. It exploits state power to advance commercial interests spread across the entire gamut of Kenya’s economy.</p>
<p>Kenyatta’s family, for instance, has vast business <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/op-eds/2018/07/07/crony-capitalism-and-state-capture-the-kenyatta-family-story/">interests</a>. The Mois are also fabulously <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2020-02-04-inside-mzee-mois-business-empire/">wealthy</a> . Ruto has accused these families of state capture – exploiting their control of the state to enrich themselves primitively.</p>
<p>Ruto is also certainly <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/entertainment/city-news/2000224690/william-ruto-how-he-rose-from-roadside-kuku-seller-to-multi-billionaire">a man of means</a>. According to his opponents in the government he too has extensive <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202109020465.html">business interests</a>. It’s for this reason that Ruto has <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2021-09-04-how-the-state-plans-to-puncture-rutos-hustler-narrative/">been accused of hypocrisy</a> for championing the downtrodden, or ordinary Kenyans whom he refers to as <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/politics/article/2001422559/ruto-i-have-shown-hustlers-they-can-also-be-rich">“hustlers”</a>. </p>
<p>Pivotal to Ruto’s campaign was his <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2021-07-29-dp-ruto-this-is-what-bottom-up-economic-model-means/">bottom-up economic model</a>. Its pillars are the dispersal of economic and political opportunities, and dignifying the poor. It invokes equity, inclusivity, social justice and fair play. </p>
<p>His “hustler nation” movement was buoyed by <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/news/blame-the-government-for-unemployment-dp-ruto-96287/">mass unemployment</a>, <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ken-opalo/article/2001434385/jubilees-legacy-of-poverty-amid-huge-infrastructure-bill">poverty</a>, <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/kenya-extreme-inequality-numbers">inequalities</a> and state excesses such as <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/kenya">extrajudicial executions</a> and runaway corruption.</p>
<p>Ruto successfully reinvented himself as the agent of class consciousness hitherto absent in Kenya’s political discourse and competition. By rebranding himself as the antithesis of the status quo and personification of the hopes of the poor, his messaging resonated with a cross spectrum of the marginalised.</p>
<p>As the victor, his work is cut out for him. He will have to overhaul Kenya’s socioeconomic and political edifice to assuage the restless and disenchanted populace. He has to provide leadership that will disabuse the Kenyan society of tribal consciousness, embed civic values and national identity. If he does not, he risks becoming a casualty of his success.</p>
<h2>The making of a winner</h2>
<p>Following disputed elections in 2017, Kenyatta and his close allies embarked on a campaign of vilification against Ruto. He was soon edged out of the government and remained as Kenyatta’s principal assistant in law only. Kenyatta <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/politics/article/2001373923/has-president-uhurus-executive-order-abolished-joint-presidency">transferred</a> his official responsibilities as deputy president to a loyal cabinet minister in an attempt to whittle down the office and clip Ruto’s political wings.</p>
<p>The aim was to delegitimise and frustrate him into resigning, thus knocking him out of the succession race. Ruto exhibited resilience despite the frustrations.</p>
<p>In Kenya’s media, including social media, Ruto was the villain; the bogeyman. Through newspaper headlines, hashtags, prime time news and talk shows, he was cynically <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/08/24/ruto-says-poll-that-ranked-him-most-corrupt-kenyan-politician-is-fake-news/">depicted</a> as the skunk of Kenya’s politics solely associated with vices such as corruption, land grabs, impunity, unbridled ambition, insolence, warlord politics, and ethnic cleansing. He exploited this sense victimhood to his advantage.</p>
<p>These vices, however, pervade Kenya’s political landscape and the depiction was more information by partisanship than moral rectitude. His accusers are no better.</p>
<p>Ruto cut his political teeth under the mentorship of the long-serving autocrat Daniel arap Moi in the early 1990s. Facing presidential opponents for the first time in 1992, Moi mobilised the youth vote with the help of young politicians, under an outfit known as <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202010070108.html">Youth for KANU ‘92</a>. Ruto was one of the youthful politicians who crafted the successful – but equally <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/life-and-style/dn2/money-and-youth-schemes-kanu-crafted-to-keep-power-901298">infamous</a> – re-election strategy in 1992. This involved Moi sanctioning the <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/financial-standard/article/2001419844/taxpayers-still-paying-for-states-90s-money-printing-debacle">printing of money</a> used to bribe voters, among other things. </p>
<p>Ruto’s entry into parliament in 1997 was in defiance of his mentor. Moi, a fellow Kalenjin from the Rift Valley, had tried to prevail on Ruto not to run. Moi exited in 2002 and Ruto astutely won over the Kalenjin voting bloc and used it as a launching pad into national politics. Moi had wanted to bequeath it to his son, Gideon. Hence the fallout between Moi and Ruto.</p>
<p>The Kenyatta-Moi-Odinga axis, which Ruto has propped up in the past, turned against him, fearful that he would end their economic and political stranglehold. They perceived Ruto – relatively young, astute, ambitious, prescient and gallant – as a threat to their dubious privileges. Now that Ruto, has won the presidency, time will tell whether their fears were exaggerated.</p>
<p>In 2010, Ruto stood out from this coterie and mobilised against the passage of the current constitution. He later defended his stand on the grounds that he did not approve of some parts of the constitution – but <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eJSf-coUoOI">embraced</a> it once it was passed.</p>
<p>He faulted Kenyatta for violating the same constitution through blatant defiance of numerous court orders and weaponising oversight bodies and state agencies against Ruto and his allies. Ruto also accused Kenyatta and Odinga of a conspiracy to illegally amend the constitution to consolidate their power, and entrench ethnicity through the Building Bridges Initiative. The attempt was quashed as unconstitutional by the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57094387">high court</a>, <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/appeal-court-upholds-ruling-against-bbi-3519108">appeals court</a> and finally the <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/eyes-on-supreme-court-as-bbi-ruling-draws-near--3719972">supreme court</a>.</p>
<h2>Political traction</h2>
<p>Despite his rhetoric, Ruto is a creature of Kenya’s political culture, notorious for a lack of scruples. Its elite is anglophile in outlook, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/charles-njonjo-and-the-genesis-of-kenyas-fixation-with-security-178547">disdainful of the poor</a>. It is also mired in <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/2402/truth-justice-and-the-unbroken-line-of-kenyas-elites/">impunity and tribalism</a>.</p>
<p>What is significant is that Ruto’s reframing of the political discourse into <a href="https://globalchallenges.ch/issue/9/hustlers-versus-dynasty-kenyas-new-class-politics/">hustlers versus dynasties</a> has accorded him traction, helped him win the presidency and set the tempo of this election despite the outgoing government’s abysmal scorecard. He made the election about the rule of law, constitutionalism, equalisation of economic opportunities for the poor and marginalised and political competition based on cross cutting social economic interests.</p>
<p>This contrasted with Odinga, who publicly <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/raila-uhuru-adviser-in-my-government-3750736">defined</a> himself as the status quo candidate, an extension of Kenyatta tenure and therefore out to preserve the exclusive political and economic arrangement that dates to colonialism. It was a move that cost him the presidency on the fifth attempt.</p>
<p>The stakes are high for Kenyans. The Ruto victory has broken the back of dynastic dominance of Kenya’s politics and economy. Peripheral actors will emerge as he reorganises Kenya’s state and politics. As to whether Ruto will live to his lofty promises and prise open the economy for the benefit of all, that remains an open question.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178787/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Westen K Shilaho does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As an outlier in Kenya’s political power matrix, Ruto was elbowed out by the establishment. But he has somersaulted back by appealing directly to the masses.Westen K Shilaho, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for PanAfrican Thought and Conversation (IPATC), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1774592022-03-21T15:17:51Z2022-03-21T15:17:51ZFrom message to violence: what to watch for in the media ahead of Kenya’s elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447776/original/file-20220222-17-1tvos5p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya’s first ever face-to-face presidential debate screened ahead of elections in 2013 won by Uhuru Kenyatta (on screen).
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Kenya heads towards elections, concerns about the outbreak of electoral violence tend to <a href="https://horninstitute.org/kenyas-2022-elections-managing-the-risk-of-violence/">rise</a>. </p>
<p>Existing research has offered several explanations for the violence. These include <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531050802058302?casa_token=hItTAByyJWsAAAAA%3Aidu3x-SvpxOIDXVynQZBw-fhn1L3TGzEoyZ71wF5D9FdcD9tnp9SlFmo2AtJM5duMSEh1QTBAFY%22%22">weak political parties</a>, perceptions that elections are <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589001.2011.537056?casa_token=HKf3YTgRh8YAAAAA%3AfG40z-Uf9ujTirT31u1M57mkWMhMK88LX0sL4dHv50f4v94EbKmPHyNdR5eMJKjdbR4qvT0gPI0">high stakes</a> for different communities, and <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Political-Violence-Kenya-Elections-Claim-Making/dp/1108488501/ref=sr_1_1?crid=AQUWTQOKH45&keywords=land+kathleen+klaus&qid=1645133880&sprefix=land+kathleen+klaus%2Caps%2C55&sr=8-1%22%22">land grievances</a>.</p>
<p>The evidence for these explanations is compelling. For example, the weakness of parties has meant that political <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531050802058302?casa_token=kv8RGQK84NEAAAAA%3AiOoL5q8VZG71wsQI0ty6h35h3nOcZ1W-c1BbLuSOo-gT3fl-GyyTiYH8X2BKu2NobeyKjmIwg_Q">patronage has usually trumped policy proposals</a> in Kenya. In a related vein, grievances over the distribution of <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0010414011407465?casa_token=BP1wZLWEe18AAAAA%3ABm_1XcHHTu3Yo_488piUr4ljUJbYJWabiMAkdkXrGR-Alv--U_fk4qYDwSnmtNAMAP7fVvt5Shg">land</a> have provided politicians with a powerful means to organise violence.</p>
<p>But researchers are yet to fully understand how, when and why political elites succeed in encouraging ordinary citizens to engage in violent conflict. To better examine this issue, we conducted interviews with vernacular radio listeners in the Central, Nyanza and Rift Valley regions. We also interviewed political elites in Nairobi, Coast province and the Rift Valley. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589001.2020.1801991">work</a> helped us to uncover three important narratives disseminated via vernacular radio. These informed participation in violence during Kenya’s 2007-2008 post-election crisis. These were:</p>
<p><strong>Political marginalisation:</strong> This narrative emphasised economic deprivation and political alienation of some groups. (An example is the Luo.)</p>
<p><strong>Victimisation:</strong> This exploited deep-rooted land grievances to cast some communities (the Kikuyu, for example) as the primary beneficiaries of policies after independence. </p>
<p><strong>Foreign occupation:</strong> This narrative capitalised on fragile inter-community relations in areas such as Rift Valley. It cast Kikuyus as “foreign occupiers” of Kalenjin and Maasai ancestral lands.</p>
<p>Drawing on this work, we suggest that the media – newspaper, television, radio, and online platforms – can inform perceptions of what’s at stake in elections. Media narratives, in other words, can offer an early sign of the risk of violence. </p>
<h2>August 2022 elections</h2>
<p>In August, Kenyans will vote in presidential, legislative, and county-level elections. These contests will be the third since the country got a new constitution in 2010. </p>
<p>In the era of multi-party politics, several Kenyan contests – especially presidential ones – have given way to violence. As the Kenyan writer Patrick Gathara has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/12/30/for-kenyans-2022-brings-hope-and-fear">observed</a>, presidential contests in which the incumbent is seeking re-election have been particularly prone to conflict. </p>
<p>Constitutional changes implemented since 2010 were partly designed to weaken the presidency and reduce the stakes of national contests. But <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2019.1594072">recent research</a> has found that the political logic of Kenyan elections remains largely unchanged. Scholars have also shown that <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14662043.2017.1421036?casa_token=snb9il01NP0AAAAA:QKWbD2zZ1IRLbguu4ER4hfP3s3ujcEs74TeIZsN9utByWX-g0qwXiiEndxutFqm00jWAs7BY38U">elites’ incentives</a> to foment violence are strong in many parts of the country.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-history-explains-election-violence-kenya-and-zambia-tell-the-story-131405">How history explains election violence: Kenya and Zambia tell the story</a>
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<p>The latest changes in elite-level groupings and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57666911">alliances</a> are now generating <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/stop-fighting-catholic-bishops-plead-with-uhuru-and-ruto-13099963/">concerns</a> that electoral violence could return to Kenya in 2022. </p>
<p>This is primarily because President Kenyatta and Deputy President Ruto have turned into <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/29540/fallout-with-kenyatta-door-closed-on-succession-for-ruto/">adversaries</a>. The former allies were leaders of an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2013.844438">unlikely electoral coalition</a> which won national elections in 2013. </p>
<p>A related worry is that <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/countries/kenya-0">many citizens</a> are reporting <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001417743/iebc-suffers-low-public-trust-cecilia-ngoyoni-tells-panel">low levels of trust</a> in the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission.</p>
<h2>Traditional media’s role</h2>
<p>We focused on studying radio messaging in our work because radio is the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b3ce5274a31e0000a5c/Radio_and_Development_in_Africa_concept_paper.pdf">primary form of mass media</a>. It is a dominant source of social and political information in Kenya. In studying the 2007-2008 post-election crisis, we found that <a href="https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/intellect/jams/2011/00000003/00000001/art00008">vernacular radio stations</a> played an important role in spreading messages of hatred and division in the country.</p>
<p>We found that narratives of marginalisation, victimisation and foreign occupation informed the stakes of the election. This was true for Luo, Maasai and Kalenjin voters. Their interests were cast as opposed to those of Kikuyus. </p>
<p>The country’s political environment has evolved since 2007-2008. Even so, the media still play a part in shaping perceptions of electoral stakes. We argue that some of the frameworks discussed above could re-emerge in the coming months.</p>
<p>To begin with, Ruto is no longer Kenyatta’s apparent successor. Narratives about <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-03-13-ruto-my-4-years-of-hell-under-uhuru/">victimisation (and betrayal)</a> could become prominent. In meeting with constituents, the deputy president has already used such <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/politics/article/2001430010/ruto-uhuru-betrayed-me-8-million-kenyans">language</a> to describe the president’s actions. </p>
<p>Beyond victimisation, we observe that three newer narratives are gaining some traction in electoral politics. They are also appearing in the media’s coverage of the upcoming elections. </p>
<p>First, the deputy president has cast the polls in populist terms as a “<a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/siasa/2021-02-05-hustlers-vs-dynasties-rhetoric-getting-out-of-hand/">dynasties versus hustlers</a>” contest. Here, Kenyatta and former prime minister Raila Odinga are cast in the dynasty category and Ruto as a hustler.</p>
<p>Second, the deputy president’s right-hand man and the former majority leader in the National Assembly, Aden Duale, has portrayed Odinga as a “<a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/opinion/article/2001435207/raila-state-project-or-change-in-strategy">state project</a>”. This frame suggests that members of the ruling Jubilee Party and other <a href="https://swalanyeti.co.ke/news/2264/mount-kenya-foundation-endorses-raila-odingas-bid-for-presidency-and-pledge-their-backing">influential actors</a> are grooming the former prime minister for the presidency. </p>
<p>Such representations have not gone down well in Odinga’s camp. As a counter-narrative, the Kenyatta-Odinga “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43656971">handshake</a>” team and the newly formed <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/politics/article/2001435756/azimio-to-be-registered-next-week-raila-says-as-he-receives-anc-defectors">“Azimio la Umoja”</a> (Unity Declaration) movement have cast Ruto as a thief who cannot be trusted with public coffers.</p>
<p>Third, the rift over constitutional amendments through the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2020.1832898">Building Bridges Initiative</a> is emerging as a relevant element in the August elections. The <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001421326/court-of-appeal-throws-out-bbi">thwarted</a> initiative has increased political intolerance between rival political elites and their potential voters.</p>
<p>We caution that these newer narratives, combined with prior frames about marginalisation, victimisation and foreign occupation, could inflame tensions.</p>
<h2>Social media’s role</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Digital-Democracy-Analogue-Politics-Transforming/dp/1786994313/ref=sr_1_2?keywords=nanjala+nyabola&qid=1644538852&sprefix=Nanjala+Nya%2Caps%2C119&sr=8-2">rapid proliferation</a> of social media platforms in competitive electoral settings such as Kenya also comes with some risks. There is limited policy related to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/23738871.2021.1916974">online content regulation</a>. This makes it difficult to contain messages of political intolerance in these spaces. </p>
<p>There is already <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-targets-whatsapp-administrators-in-its-fight-against-hate-speech-82767">evidence</a> to suggest that many of the conversations conducted over WhatsApp in Kenya are inflammatory. </p>
<p>Different forms of media will need to balance the polarising narratives that are emerging from the major electoral camps to keep violence at bay.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177459/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aditi Malik received funding from the Graduate School, the Program of African Studies, and the Dispute Resolution Research Center at Northwestern University to conduct data-collection for this project. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philip Onguny has previously received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. </span></em></p>Elites have strong incentives to foment violence. The way they speak about election issues in the media can inflame tensions.Aditi Malik, Assistant Professor, Political Science, College of the Holy CrossPhilip Onguny, Associate Professor, Université Saint-Paul / Saint Paul UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1771712022-03-13T06:33:29Z2022-03-13T06:33:29ZMoney, influence and heroism: the allure of political power in Kenya<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448102/original/file-20220223-21-b6i9qx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A crowd witnesses Uhuru Kenyatta's swearing-in as Kenya's president after his re-election in 2017.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Andrew Wasike/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In recent years, the start of Kenya’s electioneering period has often been marked by a wave of resignations by men and women seeking high office as <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/civil-servants-seeking-political-seats-to-resign-3694100">required by law</a>. It’s <a href="https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/72942-live-blog-css-civil-servants-quit-govt">no different</a> this year as the country prepares for another election in August 2022. Four Cabinet secretaries and at least 13 of their assistants have so far resigned. Ambassadors, as well as board members and chief executives of state organisations have also quit their jobs to seek elective posts.</p>
<p>Kenyan <a href="https://www.iebc.or.ke/uploads/resources/stsPzf9498.pdf">law</a> requires public officials seeking political seats to resign at least six months before a general election. In the private sector, there is no time limit. However, many aspirants are forced to leave their jobs alongside their public sector peers if they hope to keep up with them on the campaign trail. </p>
<p>Kenyans will enter the ballot box to elect six representatives at once. They will be able to mark a cross for: the president (jointly with his deputy), the governor of their county, a senator, a woman representative, a member of parliament (MP) and a member of a county assembly (MCA). </p>
<p>Before devolution in 2010, the ballot paper included only three elective posts: president, MP and councillor. </p>
<p>In total, the country elects one president, 47 governors for each of the 47 counties, 47 senators, 47 woman representatives, 290 MPs and 1,450 MCAs. More senators, MPs and MCAs are nominated depending on political party strength in the country’s senate, parliament and county assemblies. </p>
<p>Why would ministers, or Cabinet secretaries, seek elective posts? Have Kenyans suddenly fallen in love with serving citizens? What is the attraction in political office when national leaders have such complex problems to solve, including rising debt, high unemployment and the aftermath of COVID-19? </p>
<p>Using an economic lens and collating academic research on this theme, it seems the factors pulling people into politics are diverse. However, there are some common threads. </p>
<p>Professor of political psychology Joanne M Miller’s <a href="https://csis.psych.umn.edu/projects/why-do-people-participate-politics">research</a> has found that:</p>
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<p>people higher in socioeconomic status are most likely to become active in the political process because they have the time, money, and/or civic skills necessary for participation.</p>
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<p>That explains the resignations to some extent. Slowly and surely, Kenyan politics is becoming a preserve of the few elites – the rest are spectators. This is perhaps one of the signs that Kenya has come of age; it is behaving more like a developed country. </p>
<p>These countries tend to have a well-crystallised elite that controls power and wealth. As a result of elite schools, intergenerational wealth transfers and capitalism, a few people are in charge despite all the praises heaped on democracy. </p>
<p>Over more than 20 years while working in Kenya and the US, I have <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/author/xn-iraki">analysed politics </a> in Kenya through an economic lens and witnessed these shifts. Most Kenyans aren’t aware of the unintended consequences of the patterns of power that favour a few. That includes the impact it has on democracy.</p>
<h2>The pull factors</h2>
<p>Becoming a politician in Kenya is <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/siasa/2019-05-11-new-house-allowance-puts-mps-salary-way-above-world-super-powers/">financially very attractive</a>. The salary paid to politicians, plus other fringe benefits like car, house and travel allowances, offices and lifetime pension, are often too good to pass up. </p>
<p>Add allowances for membership to committees, and the perks that go with that. There are also club memberships, security details and the prestige of being called ‘mheshimiwa’ (Swahili for honourable, or your excellency). </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-why-elite-cohesion-is-more-important-than-ethnicity-to-political-stability-131937">Kenya: why elite cohesion is more important than ethnicity to political stability</a>
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<p>There’s another factor that could be driving the interest in political power. It is likely that the money going to counties from the national government will increase from <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/147-chapter-twelve-public-finance/part-1-principles-and-framework-of-public-finance/372-203-equitable-share-and-other-financial-laws">15% of the country’s total revenue</a> to 35%. In the July 2021 to June 2022 financial year, counties were allocated Ksh370 billion ($3.3 billion). This amount will more than double if the disbursement to counties is increased.</p>
<p>For some, this is a good enough reason to get into politics – to follow the money where it can be found, ostensibly to serve society. The truth is often different. </p>
<p>What is the other attraction beyond financial perks? Kenya has few alternatives to heroism beyond politics. The country rarely honours doctors, engineers and other professions. Politicians, however, are always in the headlines. They are a reference point in major decisions in the country. </p>
<p>Additionally, Kenya has few adrenaline-filled events, such as exploring the moon and the solar system. Politics remains the only arena where we can size each other up. </p>
<p>It’s also possible that those shifting to politics believe they have nothing to lose. They have reached the apex of their careers and trying something new that is more exciting is the next step. </p>
<p>Politics is like an addiction; rarely can you stop someone from joining. Politicians and potential politicians see only possibilities. They create their own reality that’s hard to change. </p>
<p>Lots of politicians will burn their fingers after failing to get the title ‘mheshimiwa’. But from this, Kenyans can hope a new generation of politicians will emerge, driven by altruism, love for humankind and intergenerational thinking.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177171/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>XN Iraki does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Politics is turning into a playground for the country’s elite in the absence of other avenues through which to rise to fame – and fortune.XN Iraki, Associate Professor, Faculty of Business and Management Sciences, University of NairobiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1780662022-03-03T15:33:00Z2022-03-03T15:33:00ZKenya election: sexist language shows that patriarchy refuses to give way<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449016/original/file-20220228-13-qdq7jh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyan women at a past demonstration wear white headscarves to call for peaceful elections.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Luis Tato/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In December 2020, a leading Kenyan political party official, Edwin Sifuna, made <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/odm-secretary-general-sifuna-apologises-for-insulting-mp-aisha-jumwa-2685606">vulgar remarks</a> against a woman member of parliament. While campaigning for their political allies in a by-election, Sifuna said the woman is “not attractive enough to rape”.</p>
<p>In January this year, controversial bishop David Gakuyo, who is seeking election as a member of parliament, made <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/counties/central/2022-01-12-mps-thika-women-protest-against-gakuyos-derogatory-remarks/">demeaning remarks</a> about two women politicians. He accused them of seeking votes while “swinging bare behinds”.</p>
<p>Sifuna and Gakuyo later made half-hearted apologies through the police after complaints were lodged about the language they used. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission, a government agency tasked with taming the excesses of politicians, was <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/news/cohesion-commission-on-the-spot-over-failure-to-tame-hate-speech-109274/">largely silent</a>.</p>
<p>In the run-up to Kenya’s general elections in August 2022, the use of aggressive language is likely to persist. Based on <a href="http://www.saber.ula.ve/handle/123456789/47009">my research</a>, I believe this is the reality of Kenyan society – a reality that increasingly gets in the way of women’s participation in politics. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.saber.ula.ve/handle/123456789/47009">my research</a>, I set out to understand the grammar of patriarchy that stands in the way of women’s participation and engagement with elections. </p>
<p>Drawing on examples from recent events, I identify a range of factors that perpetuate patriarchal attitudes. These range from the language used in the media to attendant stereotypes and cultural traditions. </p>
<p>The 2017 Kenyan general elections marked an improvement from the 2013 poll in the number of women elected to serve in different capacities. The elections saw the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/history-as-kenya-set-to-have-first-women-elected-governors-senators-1371276">first ever women</a> governors and senators – six in total – emerge victorious from positions that were previously held by men in 2013. Kenyans elect 47 governors and 47 senators in a general election.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-kenya-courted-a-constitutional-crisis-over-parliaments-failure-to-meet-gender-quotas-147145">How Kenya courted a constitutional crisis over parliament's failure to meet gender quotas</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Despite efforts to improve the involvement of women in politics, the electoral platform in Kenya is still largely dominated by men. Overall, women took just 9% of the total <a href="https://www.iebc.or.ke/uploads/resources/siEABKREDq.pdf">elected posts in 2017</a>.</p>
<p>Women face a host of obstacles: inadequate political support from their parties, particularly in the primaries; a lack of financial resources; gender-based violence; gender stereotyping; and patriarchal structures across society. </p>
<p>There are many ways in which elections are gendered in Kenya. In my paper I explore, in particular, the use of language and grammar.</p>
<h2>The language used</h2>
<p>My research considers the grammar of patriarchy by looking at examples in the Kenyan context and finds that gendered language permeates the landscape. </p>
<p>Candidates and the dominant voices in media are mostly men. Elections are <a href="https://www.abebooks.com/9781933220833/Gendered-Worlds-Aulette-Judy-Wittner-193322083X/plp">described in analogies </a> drawn mainly from traditionally masculine domains of war and sports. Headlines often speak of <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/politics/article/2001435165/do-or-die-race-battlegrounds-to-watch-in-the-august-9-polls">‘do-or-die’</a> contests and <a href="https://twitter.com/ntvkenya/status/1409453163699224577">battleground</a> regions.</p>
<p>Kenyan politics is also laden with linguistic sexism. In the run-up to the 2017 elections, the former Kiambu County governor William Kabogo directed unsavoury remarks towards former Thika MP Alice Ng’ang’a, a single mother. He said unmarried women were <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26049787">“causing problems”</a>, and implored young women to find husbands. He added:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Now we’ll start the practice where if you want to get elected, you declare your intention with your wife or husband by your side.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The former Nairobi governor Evans Kidero dismissed one of his female competitors by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t81LDyBDD0c">saying</a>: “Nairobi is a serious city … you can’t elect a cougar”. ‘Cougar’ is the term used to describe an older woman who preys on younger men for sex.</p>
<p>Married female politicians also face their share of derision. When the issue of their spouses is floated, it often comes with nuances of tribalism.</p>
<p>Joyce Laboso, one of Kenya’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/kenya-elections-three-women-make-political-history/a-40047054">first three women</a> to be elected governor in the 2017 elections, faced sexist attacks from supporters of her competitor. She was called an outsider because her husband comes from a different ethnic community than her own. She was told that she no longer belongs to her community, and she should seek election in the area her husband comes from. </p>
<p>In the contest for the Embu County senate seat, aspirant Lenny Kivuti urged residents not to vote for one of his female opponents because she would export resources to her husband’s area, which is in a different county. </p>
<p>Kenya’s electoral process has often highlighted the fact that male politicians don’t shy away from aggressive confrontations in campaigns against a woman. </p>
<p>A TV interview in 2017 that was meant to give aspirants for the Nairobi County governor seat a chance to sell their agenda illustrated the depths of this negative campaigning.</p>
<p>Miguna Miguna, a man, tore into a female opponent for the seat, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38105030">saying</a> she is “so beautiful, everybody wants to rape her. You are chasing men all over, nobody wants you. You think you’re beautiful, you are not.”</p>
<p>In another incident, President Uhuru Kenyatta, in an altercation with the governor of Mombasa County, sarcastically reminded the latter that <a href="https://nairobiwire.com/2017/03/mimi-sio-bibi-yako-uhuru-tells-joho-to-stop-following-him-around-video.html">“mimi sio bibi yake” (I am not his wife)</a>. He was telling the governor off for ‘following him around’.</p>
<h2>Male bias</h2>
<p>In political competition, patriarchy favours the male candidate. This is because, culturally, epithets that are anti-woman are widely used, and to a certain extent, normalised. </p>
<p>There are proverbs, oral narratives and traditional songs that cast the image of the woman in leadership in negative light. The woman <a href="https://www.abebooks.com/Gikuyu-Oral-Literature-Kabira-Wanjiku-Mukabi/10691440914/bd">has been portrayed</a> as “unreliable, disobedient, irresponsible, disloyal, disagreeable, adulterous, cunning, senseless, easily cheated, forgetful, not dependable, evil, trickster, lazy, etc.” </p>
<p>This negative portrayal <a href="https://www.abebooks.com/Gikuyu-Oral-Literature-Kabira-Wanjiku-Mukabi/10691440914/bd">contributes</a> to “social gender constructs that call for control of women in society and legitimise male dominance”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/violence-against-women-in-kenya-data-provides-a-glimpse-into-a-grim-situation-170109">Violence against women in Kenya: data provides a glimpse into a grim situation</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Based on these cultural obstacles, women who venture into politics are largely judged on femininity rather than on substance. Due to this, the woman candidate has been forced to endear herself to the voters on the basis of appearance, rather than issues. </p>
<p>Words like ‘manzi’, ‘supuu’ and ‘mrembo’, common slang words that mean a beautiful woman, are bandied around a woman’s political campaign. </p>
<p>Those women who have succeeded in holding high office have often been perceived as exceptional women who ‘act like men’. Yet, they often face criticism for being unfeminine and unlikeable. </p>
<p>Martha Karua, a former presidential candidate and Cabinet minister, was described as the ‘<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/2/28/profile-martha-karua">only man</a> in (former President Mwai) Kibaki’s cabinet’ in Kenya’s 2008 coalition government. </p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>Patriarchy stubbornly refuses to give way in Kenya. Nevertheless, the rise of the woman politicians is gaining pace. Rural constituencies are producing more and more women leaders, signalling a positive step towards deepening Kenya’s democracy. </p>
<p>But a lot remains to be done – both in terms of legislation and from a human rights perspective – to improve gender equity in Kenyan electoral politics.</p>
<p>The 2010 Kenyan constitution guarantees representation that should reflect the face of the nation, especially in terms of gender equality. It <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/112-chapter-four-the-bill-of-rights/part-2-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms/193-27-equality-and-freedom-from-discrimination">requires that</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the state shall take legislative and other measures to implement the principle that not more than two-thirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies shall be of the same gender. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The two-thirds gender rule, however, has yet to be fully enforced. It would be a major boon for women if it was. But society’s mindset should also complement issues that the constitution seeks to protect.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178066/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maina wa Mutonya does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The country’s political landscape is muddied by sexist language that glorifies the belittling of women in leadership.Maina wa Mutonya, Researcher, African and African Diaspora Studies, National School of Anthropology and HistoryLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1757392022-02-16T15:13:19Z2022-02-16T15:13:19ZTwitter in Kenya’s last poll: a great way to reach voters, but not a game-changer<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442662/original/file-20220126-17-10003yg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nairobi senator Johnson Sakaja's impromptu address in the streets of Nairobi is captured on smart phones. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenyans will head to the polls in August this year for what is expected to be a hotly contested presidential election. Opposition leader Raila Odinga is running for the fifth time, but on this occasion with the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/13/why-are-kenyans-protesting-their-government/">support</a> of his former rival, President Uhuru Kenyatta, who is ineligible to stand again. Significantly, Kenyatta has <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-02-07-im-no-push-over-uhuru-warns-ruto-vows-jubilee-return/">overlooked</a> his deputy, William Ruto. </p>
<p>Ruto and Odinga will be the candidates to watch in the 2022 presidential elections. But there will also be hundreds of politicians campaigning for positions in Kenya’s parliament and in local government. In addition to drawing on patronage networks and holding mass campaign events, Kenyan politicians will use social media to broadcast their policy messages, rally support and position themselves against their opponents.</p>
<p>Social media’s role in <a href="https://theconversation.com/analysis-across-africa-shows-how-social-media-is-changing-politics-121577">politics</a> and elections has grown significantly in the last decade. The most obvious examples are negative, like <a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-twitter-propaganda-predicted-2016-us-election-polls-119444">Russian Twitter propaganda</a> during the 2016 US elections. There were also <a href="https://theconversation.com/whatsapp-skewed-brazilian-election-showing-social-medias-danger-to-democracy-106476">misinformation</a> campaigns via WhatsApp in Brazil’s 2018 presidential election, and the Cambridge Analytica and Facebook <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html">scandal</a>.</p>
<p>Platforms like Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp are –- as Kenyan writer and political analyst Nanjala Nyabola <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/digital-democracy-analogue-politics-9781786994318/">writes</a> –- reframing democracy and the way citizens engage and organise in digital space. Through these platforms, politicians can engage directly with voters, which is especially important for independent candidates, who may not have the backing of a major party. </p>
<p>But how do politicians use digital media? To answer that question, we looked to Twitter, which is popular in Kenya. The platform allows users to broadcast messages of up to 280 characters.</p>
<p>In our <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/africatoday.68.2.02?refreqid=excelsior%3Ad760942d714d4390d735015559d55c1f">research</a>, we analysed 15,691 tweets by 86 Kenyan politicians during the 2017 elections. We evaluated the extent to which Twitter can “democratise” political communication by disrupting the hold that political parties have on the electoral market. </p>
<p>We found that social media has the potential to allow for more direct communication between politicians and citizens. But our analysis of candidates’ tweets in the 2017 election does not suggest that Twitter democratised political discourse and politics in Kenya. While we expect candidates in the upcoming election to continue to expand their reach and visibility through social media, Twitter may not yet replace patronage networks and traditional campaigning. </p>
<h2>Candidates who used Twitter</h2>
<p>Our analysis of the 2017 tweets sought to answer three questions:</p>
<ul>
<li>Which candidates use Twitter?</li>
<li>What do candidates say on Twitter?</li>
<li>Do candidates use Twitter to engage with potential voters, or just to broadcast at them? </li>
</ul>
<p>Here’s what we learned.</p>
<p>Not all candidates who ran for office in Kenya in 2017 had Twitter accounts. Only 147 (45%) of the 327 candidates running for president, governor, senator, or <a href="https://afrocave.com/role-of-women-representatives-in-kenya/">women representative</a> had Twitter profiles. </p>
<p>We found greater use of Twitter among aspirants for higher offices. Seven of the eight candidates running for president in 2017 had Twitter accounts, while only 28% of senate candidates did.</p>
<p>Ruling Jubilee party candidates and male candidates were more likely to have Twitter accounts.</p>
<p>Even among those Kenyan candidates who had Twitter accounts, not all posted to Twitter during their campaign. We found only 26% of the official candidates running for president, governor, senator, or women representative tweeted during the campaign period.</p>
<h2>What politicians said</h2>
<p>Like <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/digital-democracy-analogue-politics-9781786994318/">most tweets</a> (page 89), the majority of the tweets posted by the candidates in our study were in English. Some were in Kiswahili, and some were in a mixture of these two languages.</p>
<p>The politicians often mentioned their county in tweets. The word “county” was the most frequent term in the thousands of tweets in our dataset. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442660/original/file-20220126-21-msl2sa.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442660/original/file-20220126-21-msl2sa.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442660/original/file-20220126-21-msl2sa.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442660/original/file-20220126-21-msl2sa.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442660/original/file-20220126-21-msl2sa.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442660/original/file-20220126-21-msl2sa.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442660/original/file-20220126-21-msl2sa.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Examples of tweets by candidates in dataset that included the word county.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For example, Lenny Kivuti, an opposition party candidate for governor in Embu County, posted multiple tweets during his 2017 campaign about various local influencers he met. This includes the <a href="https://twitter.com/HonLennyKivuti/status/872852226141814784">tweet</a> above about meeting the county <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/opinion-analysis/ideas-debate/changing-boda-boda-menace-to-opportunity-3496268">bodaboda</a> chairmen, as well as tweets about meeting local <a href="https://twitter.com/HonLennyKivuti/status/853189530333085696">taxi owners and drivers</a> and even Nairobi-based <a href="https://twitter.com/HonLennyKivuti/status/850029697622847493">professionals</a> originally from Embu County. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-2017-elections-how-new-media-stole-the-mainstreams-thunder-88613">Kenya's 2017 elections: how new media stole the mainstream's thunder</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Engaging or broadcasting</h2>
<p>Our data show whether candidates used Twitter to broadcast messages or interact with potential voters. Candidates can use Twitter to broadcast their values or strengths to potential voters. For example, former Nairobi governor Evans Kidero (who ran unsuccessfully for reelection in 2017) <a href="https://twitter.com/KideroEvans/status/874265397045886976">tweeted</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We invest in our children’s future because education validates their dreams. #KideroNaElimu #KideroMueke-5Tena. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This tweet elicited 25 replies, but Kidero replied to none of them.</p>
<p>Looking at our data capturing Twitter replies, we saw Kenya’s ruling party candidates rarely “engaged” with other users. Independent candidates were much more engaged and interactive with others on Twitter.</p>
<p>Joseph Nyagah was an independent presidential candidate who tried to appeal to a diverse audience and actively engaged in conversations with everyday Twitter users. His many replies to Twitter users – totalling 394 across the 62 days of our study – suggest it may be interesting and important for researchers to study more closely how independent candidates use Twitter less as a broadcasting platform and more as an avenue to engage with citizens.</p>
<p>The candidate in our dataset with the most replies (1,754) was also an independent: Miguna Miguna, an unsuccessful candidate for governor of Nairobi.</p>
<p>Without major party backing, photojournalist and activist Boniface Mwangi campaigned as an independent MP candidate for Starehe constituency in Nairobi. He raised significant funds and organised youth to register to vote <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1054500/kenyas-boniface-mwangi-helped-lead-the-political-class-to-engage-citizens-with-social-media/?utm_source%20=yPL&yptr=yahoo">via Twitter</a>.</p>
<p>We did not examine election outcome data alongside our Twitter data to see if there was a correlation between candidates’ engagement and electoral success. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-social-media-are-levelling-kenyas-political-field-and-lessons-learnt-144697">How social media are levelling Kenya's political field -- and lessons learnt</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Old and new resources</h2>
<p>Traditional <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/multiethnic-democracy-9780198852735?view=Grid&facet_narrowbyprice_facet=50to100&facet_narrowbybinding_facet=Hardcover&lang=en&cc=us">campaigns</a>, major party support, and ethnic dynamics and <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-why-elite-cohesion-is-more-important-than-ethnicity-to-political-stability-131937">inequality</a> remain strong influences in contemporary Kenyan politics. Add to that the increasing role of <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2017/08/02/why-independent-candidates-dominate-kenyas-local-elections-electionske-2017/">county-level competition</a> in shaping national-level politics.</p>
<p>Twitter will be part of many Kenyan candidates’ campaign activities ahead of the August 2022 elections. It is not yet clear that it will truly level the political playing field between independent candidates and candidates backed by political parties with significant resources. But the surge of independent candidates and their social media innovations suggest change is coming.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175739/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Twitter will be part of many Kenyan candidates’ campaign activities ahead of the August 2022 elections.Kim Yi Dionne, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, RiversideJennifer De Maio, Professor of Political Science, College of Behavioral Sciences, California State University, NorthridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1673782021-09-28T14:36:50Z2021-09-28T14:36:50ZKenya’s next election is in view: the struggle between elites and rule of law is intensifying<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422152/original/file-20210920-15-1030lol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Law Society of Kenya official Mercy Wambua holds a placard at the Supreme Court in Nairobi after a protest over government disobedience of court orders.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/20/kenyan-court-rejects-disputed-bid-to-change-constitution">failed attempt</a> to overhaul Kenya’s <a href="https://law.strathmore.edu/the-constitution-of-kenya-2010-panacea-or-nostrum/">progressive</a> constitution less than a year before elections illustrates continuing struggles between the rule of law and the crude tribal instincts of Kenya’s political elite. </p>
<p>The bid to amend 74 clauses of the 2010 constitution was backed by President Uhuru Kenyatta and his allies. It was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57094387">invalidated</a> by Kenya’s High Court in May, 2021. The decision was later affirmed by a majority of the court of appeal, declaring the Constitutional Amendment Bill 2020 <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/appeal-court-upholds-ruling-against-bbi-3519108">unconstitutional</a>.</p>
<p>The courts ruled that Kenyatta could not purport to assume the role of an ordinary citizen to initiate constitutional amendments. The constitution provides for two avenues of amending it. These are a popular initiative by the citizenry or through a parliamentary initiative. </p>
<p>The appeal court further faulted the process and ruled that the proposed amendments had been pushed through using unlawful conduct. This included <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2021-08-20-judge-kiage-affirms-high-court-ruling-on-basic-structure-says-uhuru-was-bbi-initiator/">bribery</a>, intimidation, coercion, and abuse of state agencies and security apparatus. In addition, the electoral body, tasked with overseeing the process, was not properly constituted.</p>
<p>The bill is better known as the <a href="https://www.bbi.go.ke/">Building Bridges Initiative</a>. Among the retrogressive changes it contained were increased presidential powers and an expanded executive. Just as alarming was a plot by the incumbent to remove the separation of powers. This involved granting the president <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2020/12/proposed-judiciary-ombudsperson-under-bbi-will-entrench-executive-control-maraga/">oversight over the judiciary</a>. The amendments would also have <a href="https://citizentv.co.ke/news/bbi-proposes-the-creation-of-the-office-of-prime-minister-and-two-deputies-348704/">blurred</a> the line between the executive and parliament.</p>
<p>The proposed new positions of prime minister and two deputies were aimed, ostensibly, at redressing the historical regional inequities entrenched by personality politics. Kenyatta and his rival turned ally, Raila Odinga, past masters in ethno-regional political mobilisation, fantastically <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2019/11/no-winner-takes-it-all-kenya-should-have-an-official-leader-of-opposition-bbi/">held that</a> an expanded executive would neuter the dominance of Kenya’s politics and economy by ethno-regional cabals. </p>
<p>They claimed further, <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2020-10-27-dp-ruto-my-case-against-bbi-report/">unconvincingly</a>, that more executive seats, not social justice, were the answer to Kenya’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/11/30/kenyas-bbi-is-the-political-elites-attempt-to-rewrite-history">adversarial and often violent elections</a>.</p>
<p>Kenya’s economic and political exclusion dates back to the colonial period. Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya’s first president, escalated rather than demobilised this politics. He did this through grand corruption, land grabs, ethnicisation of the state, crackdown on dissent, political assassinations and inequitable distribution of national resources. He excluded opponents and the communities from which they hailed. </p>
<p>This explains the country’s lingering per capita and regional economic disparities. And the fact that Kenya’s former presidents, their families and close allies rank <a href="https://ecocnn.com/richest-people-kenya-forbes/">among the wealthiest</a> in the country . </p>
<p>It therefore <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2020/11/20/why-bbi-will-not-promote-peace-or-prevent-violence/">beggars belief</a> that a political elite pact would have addressed economic and political exclusion. After all, this is not the first time that Kenyans have witnessed <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/publication/mediating-to-governments-of-national-unity/">power-sharing between political foes</a>. </p>
<h2>The political falling out</h2>
<p>The Kenyatta-Odinga pact is a form of power sharing that has <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2021/09/catholic-bishops-offer-to-mediate-uhuru-ruto-talks-to-avert-chaos/">exacerbated societal divisions and elite fragmentation</a>. It has done so by <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202108040026.html">isolating</a> Kenyatta’s deputy, William Ruto, and his supporters. Ruto’s support was decisive in Kenyatta’s rise to power.</p>
<p>Kenyatta and Ruto <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2021-01-18-explainer-genesis-of-uhuru-ruto-fallout/">fell out</a> shortly after winning a second five-year term following the 2017 elections. The acrimonious falling out has provided further evidence of the enduring personality driven politics of deceit and betrayal that has often driven Kenya to the precipice since independence. It mirrors the <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/security/article/2000096439/witness-recalls-the-1969-kisumu-massacre-that-marked-jomo-kenyattas-visit">infamous falling out</a> between Jomo Kenyatta and the man who fought hardest to clear his path as Kenya’s founding president – vice president, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga.</p>
<p>Fast forward to the 2021 for another episode of Kenya’s <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2020/10/uhuru-takes-kisumu-by-a-storm-accompanied-by-raila/">tragi-comical political drama</a> starring the offspring of senior Kenyatta and Odinga. Odinga’s scion, Raila Odinga, who had previously accused Uhuru Kenyatta of rigging him out at the ballot, is now his de facto deputy. Apparently Kenyatta now prefers Odinga as his successor and has endorsed his fifth presidential bid. </p>
<p>Kenyatta is determined to stop Ruto from succeeding him. This is despite the fact that they were directly elected on a joint ticket. He reassigned Ruto’s responsibilities to a loyal cabinet minister. Ruto’s associates were also <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/29540/fallout-with-kenyatta-door-closed-on-succession-for-ruto/">purged</a> from leadership positions in parliament and replaced by Kenyatta-Odinga loyalists. </p>
<p>More recently, the elite security team assigned to Ruto was <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/politics/article/2001421864/dp-william-rutos-gsu-security-withdrawn-replaced-by-ap-officers">replaced</a> with the regular police. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, Odinga, Kenyatta and Ruto are ideologically indistinguishable. They are reactionary, opportunistic, disdainful of institutions and adept at tribal mobilisation. </p>
<p>Even though the falling out between Kenyatta and Ruto is not surprising, their incessant public outbursts bode ill for Kenya’s stability. In the event that the results of the presidential elections in 2022 are fraudulent, Kenya could plunge into violence once again. </p>
<h2>A game of musical chairs</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/08/19/is-the-bbi-ruling-a-sign-of-judicial-independence-in-kenya/">proposed changes</a> to the constitution was a bold attempt to entrench in law deal-making among the political elite. These changes would have undermined competitive multiparty politics. They would also have elevated the ethnic barons, whose legitimacy stems from tribal mobilisation, and precariously tied the destiny of Kenya to their whims. </p>
<p>As I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316230908_THE_PARADOX_OF_KENYA'S_CONSTITUTIONAL_REFORM_PROCESS_WHAT_FUTURE_FOR_CONSTITUTIONALISM">argued</a> before, it is credulous to expect Kenya’s incestuous plutocracy to safeguard and implement the constitution. This is because it has a vested interest in state dysfunction. </p>
<p>In a manner akin to feudalism, the ruling class reincarnates through political office and wealth inheritance. With political power, they have entrenched themselves economically. It is my view that this kleptocracy is the biggest stumbling block to competitive plural politics and Kenya’s transformation.</p>
<p>The Kenyan judiciary is not itself beyond reproach. It is still weighed down by <a href="https://su-plus.strathmore.edu/handle/11071/5278">corruption and bribery</a>. And it delivers justice slowly. In addition, it suffers from a <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/236359816.pdf">legacy of executive interference</a> and appointments and promotions <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2021-05-05-judge-ouko-faults-jsc-supreme-court-over-tribalism-language-use/">tainted by ethnicity</a>. </p>
<p>But the courts have <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41123329">increasingly asserted themselves</a> against an unruly executive. The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41123329">annulment</a> of the presidential elections in 2017 over fraud and the recent quashing of the constitutional changes affirm this. Through these landmark rulings, Kenya’s judiciary has distinguished itself as the guard rail of its democracy and rule of law.</p>
<h2>Political script</h2>
<p>The political script of Kenya’s post-colonial period repeats itself. The first-generation politicians shredded the independence constitution to suit their personal goals. This set forth social, economic, and political problems that the country is yet to shake off. These include corruption, inequalities and impunity. State and political violence and the brazen disregard of the rule of law are symptoms of this legacy. </p>
<p>The president is constitutionally a symbol of national unity. However, since independence, Kenya’s successive presidents have been <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/op-eds/2018/07/07/crony-capitalism-and-state-capture-the-kenyatta-family-story/">incubators</a> of divisiveness. They have acted as the fulcrum of tribalism propelled by impunity and grand corruption. All were steeped in insular politics and struggled to tower above the smallness of self-interest. Kenyatta is no different.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167378/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Westen K Shilaho does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Constitutional amendments sought to make it easy for Kenyatta and Odinga to craft a broad tribal coalition against the deputy president.Westen K Shilaho, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for PanAfrican Thought and Conversation (IPATC), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1493682020-11-23T15:23:02Z2020-11-23T15:23:02ZYoung Kenyans have their say about politics, corruption and their sense of belonging<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/370275/original/file-20201119-15-19wxsbt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Students of St. George's Girls' Secondary School in Nairobi. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Reflecting on the divisions and conflict that arose during Kenya’s contested 2017 elections, President Uhuru Kenyatta recently said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-50603137">We were not in a good place as a country</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Uhuru and his main opponent in that election, Raila Odinga, closed ranks after the contest with a symbolic handshake and a pledge to reform the political landscape. And so was born the Building Bridges Initiative and a taskforce charged with examining the <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2019-11-26-nine-key-issues-bbi-report-addresses/">nine key challenges</a> facing Kenya since independence. </p>
<p>Just recently released, the taskforce’s recommendations for constitutional change are being hotly debated. Among the issues somewhat buried in the 204-page <a href="https://www.bbi.go.ke/ethnic-antagonism-competition">report</a> is a section on “inclusivity”. It calls for the meaningful involvement of youth in the country’s future. This includes taking up youth issues, like jobs, and putting young people in elected and appointed leadership positions.</p>
<p>This is hardly surprising. Young Kenyans – those aged 18-34 – now comprise more than <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/02/africa/kenya-election-youth-vote/index.html">half of the electorate</a>. In fact, young people 34 and below constitute <a href="https://metropoltv.co.ke/2020/02/24/75-percent-of-kenyas-population-is-aged-below-35-years/">75%</a> of the country’s population. This demographic profile is often represented as a problem. For example, young people are reported to have made up <a href="https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/full_report_-_kenya_youth_and_conflict_study.pdf">70% of the participants in the 2007/8 post-election violence</a>. There are also <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/kenya/2013-01-10/jihad-comes-kenya">concerns</a> about youth radicalisation leading to militancy and terrorist activity.</p>
<p>Our recently published <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2020.1831846">research</a> sought to document the views of young Kenyans about politics, the state and the future. Our study was based on a survey of more than 4,750 students in the final year of secondary school in Nairobi, which is home to <a href="http://housingfinanceafrica.org/app/uploads/VOLUME-I-KPHC-2019.pdf">10%</a> of the national population. </p>
<p>The young people we surveyed in May and June 2017 were perceptive about the challenges facing the country, civically engaged, and hopeful about the future. Our data presents important insights on many of the high-stakes issues currently up for debate. </p>
<p>Our findings suggest that it is time to take youth seriously as politically important actors.</p>
<h2>What they said</h2>
<p>The survey sample covered girls (52%) and boys (46%); Christians (88%) and Muslims (10%). The diversity of ethnic groups included Kikuyu 28%, Luo 21%, Luhya 16%, Kamba 10%, Kisii 5%, Somali 4% and others. Participants came from diverse economic backgrounds too.</p>
<p>Below we summarise findings as they relate to the main themes of the Building Bridges Initiative report.</p>
<p><strong>On corruption, shared prosperity, and safety and security</strong></p>
<p>Nairobi secondary school students identify corruption and trust in national institutions among top issues of concern. Most strongly agreed that “there is too much corruption in Kenya”. Likewise, most youth strongly agreed with the statement that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>there is too much inequality between rich Kenyans and poor Kenyans.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>On that same scale, respondents overall were neutral when asked about their “trust in the Kenyan national government”. </p>
<p>Across ethnic groups, we found that Kikuyus reported the highest levels of trust in the national government and Luos reported the lowest levels. </p>
<p>Referring to the April 2015 <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/publication/al-shabaab-attack-garissa-university-kenya">attack by al-Shabaab at Garissa University</a> in northeast Kenya, which left 147 people dead, we asked how often students had “worried about another attack like Garissa”. Nearly two thirds (60%) had worried about an attack at least once in the month prior to our survey. More than a quarter had worried about it four or more times in that period. </p>
<p><strong>On divisive elections</strong></p>
<p>Just over 20% of the young people involved in our survey reported that they had received money to participate in a political event in the previous 12 months. Male respondents, and those from the two lowest socio-economic quartiles, were most likely to report this practice in their communities. </p>
<p><strong>On ethnic antagonism and competition</strong></p>
<p>Kenya has more than 40 ethnic groups and inter-group friction and conflict has been pervasive. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14678800903553936">Inequalities along ethnic lines</a> are an important factor and ethnic antagonism and competition have been particularly acute surrounding <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rjea20/2/2?nav=tocList">elections</a>.</p>
<p>Did our respondents “think that the government treats people from your ethnic group fairly”? The average score across survey participants was neutral. Respondents agreed only very slightly more with the question of whether “people from your ethnic group are fairly included in opportunities to get a good education”. </p>
<p>In contrast, respondents tended towards agreeing when asked whether they “feel like people from a different ethnic group are given unfair advantages”. This highlights some feeling of unfairness. There were statistically significant differences among respondents of different ethnic groups. Kikuyu participants consistently responded with higher ratings on the fairness of government than respondents who self-identified as belonging to other groups. </p>
<p>Respondents reported very positive personal interactions between people of different ethnic groups. An overwhelming majority expressed willingness to accept someone of a different ethnic group as a friend (96.12%) and accept marrying someone of a different ethnic group (86.92%). </p>
<p><strong>On lack of a national ethos</strong></p>
<p>The young Kenyans who completed our survey expressed a very strong sense of belonging to Kenya – an average score of 4.23 on our 5-point scale. But the responses differed according to socio-economic background. Respondents from the two lowest socio-economic quartiles reported stronger belonging to Kenya than wealthier Kenyans. </p>
<p>In contrast, respondents felt a lesser, but still important, belonging to their ethnic group and a similar level of belonging to people who spoke their mother tongue. </p>
<p><strong>On responsibilities and rights</strong></p>
<p>Many of the respondents appeared to take their responsibilities seriously, alongside their rights. Most reported that in the past year they had “volunteered without pay on a community service project” (60.33%) and more than half were “a member of a community group or youth organisation” (54.53%). </p>
<p>Some had taken more difficult actions, such as reporting corruption to an official (10.13%). And 17.13% of respondents reported that they had “supported an organisation that fights for something they believe in even though it broke the law” while 7.34% confirmed that they had “attacked police that they saw beating someone unfairly”. Also 5.17% “continued to attend a demonstration that turned violent”. </p>
<h2>Our most remarkable findings</h2>
<p>Collectively, these findings echo the diagnosis of some of the main challenges facing Kenya as set out in the Building Bridges Initiative report. Other findings from our survey, though, challenge it and add nuance. </p>
<p>It is important to emphasise that, although “youth” are often referred to as a single category, not all young Kenyans are the same. Even among the group participating in our research, we saw patterns emerge between youth of different ethnic groups, genders, and socio-economic backgrounds. </p>
<p>These differences are critical in understanding both the challenges facing youth and how to engage them politically.</p>
<p>We argue that any effort to move Kenya forward to a positive future must take the power and promise of youth seriously and meaningfully include a diverse set of youth views and empower young people to act on them. It is not clear that the key recommendations of the Building Bridges Initiative, focusing largely on political elites, are sufficient to make this happen. </p>
<p>One of our most remarkable findings is that despite the disillusionment, sense of injustice, and insecurity that youth reported, our respondents still perceived that they hold a relatively high ability to effect change. Kenya needs them to do so. </p>
<p><em>Project director Simon Grinsted co-authored the research on which this article was based.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149368/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elisabeth King receives funding from the Spencer Foundation and the Folke Bernadotte Academy. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dana Burde receives funding from Spencer Foundation, Porticus Foundation, LEGO Foundation, Open Society Foundation, World Bank/UK FCDO. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daphna Harel receives funding from the Spencer Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Hill receives funding from the Spencer Foundation, Joyce Foundation, Arnold Ventures, National Institutes of Health, Office of Naval Research, Institute of Education Sciences, and the Vera Institute of Justice.</span></em></p>Our findings suggest that it is time to take Kenyan youth seriously as politically important actors.Elisabeth King, Associate Professor of International Education and Politics, New York UniversityDana Burde, Associate Professor and Director of International Education, New York UniversityDaphna Harel, Associate Professor of Applied Statistics, New York UniversityJennifer Hill, Director of PRIISM; Professor of Applied Statistics, New York UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1456282020-09-09T15:26:13Z2020-09-09T15:26:13ZHow to hold elections safely and uphold democracy during the COVID-19 pandemic<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356972/original/file-20200908-16-13dpl0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A campaign poster of John Magufuli of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party who is seeking re-election as president in October. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ericky Boniphace/AFP via Getty Images)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Free and fair elections face a new kind of threat. In addition to scheming leaders and compromised electoral commissions, there is now the impact of the coronavirus pandemic.</p>
<p>In response, a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343787629_How_to_hold_elections_safely_and_democratically_during_the_COVID-19_pandemic">new report</a> published by the British Academy sets out how elections can be held safely and democratically amid COVID-19. Edited by renowned political scientist Sarah Birch, it covers a range of topics, including how to establish health protocols and manage the risk of election violence. The report sets out the options for international election observers.</p>
<p>This is critically important because despite the health crisis, there will be no letup in controversial elections – starting with Tanzania in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/tanzania-presidential-election-held-october-28-200721100331444.html">October</a> and the United States in <a href="https://ig.ft.com/us-election-2020/">November</a>. International observation will not insulate these polls from malpractice, but it will make it less likely and allow it to be exposed. </p>
<p>Yet the kind of observation carried out by the <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/index.html">Carter Centre</a>, <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/election-observation-missions-eueoms_en">European Union </a>, <a href="http://www.oas.org/EOMDatabase/default.aspx?Lang=En">Organisation of American States</a>, and other international organisations requires flying large numbers of people between countries. It is therefore one of the election activities threatened by the pandemic. </p>
<p>The report looks at how the observation industry can best adapt. It concludes that, instead of simply introducing short-term COVID-19 guidelines and protocols to get through the crisis, <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/press-release-how-to-hold-elections-democratically-and-safely-during-covid19/">observers should</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>look for new ways to harness technology and build stronger partnerships between domestic and international groups. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>By doing this they will be able to both respond to the COVID-19 challenge and more effectively counter new forms of electoral manipulation. </p>
<h2>Importance of election observation</h2>
<p>International observation has come in <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2017/09/21/see-no-evil-how-international-election-observers-lost-credibility-during-the-august-elections/">for criticism</a> in recent years – sometimes unfairly – for failing to call out electoral manipulation that was later condemned by the courts. But it nonetheless remains a vital weapon in the fight against election rigging. The verdicts of foreign observers <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000140">carry more weight</a> than those of their domestic counterparts, and are more likely to prompt international intervention.</p>
<p>Simply not observing elections would be the easiest way to manage health risks. But it would significantly increase a variety of important political risks. In Burundi, for example, a late requirement that international monitors <a href="https://africa.cgtn.com/2020/05/10/burundi-warns-eac-observers-will-be-quarantined-for-14-days/">would be quarantined</a> made observation impossible. In its absence, there was no significant attempt by ruling party leaders to stop the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/widespread-violence-rises-ahead-burundis-2020-election">intimidation of the opposition</a>.</p>
<p>Even when observers do not condemn every electoral abuse, they can highlight and hence dissuade such explicit human rights violations. </p>
<p>So what options do observers have to respond to COVID-19? The report finds that they have a menu of three options to choose from: they can carry on regardless, observe through expats or work virtually and through partnerships.</p>
<h2>Carry on as normal - carefully</h2>
<p>The most obvious strategy is simply to observe “traditionally” while adopting strict social distancing protocols. This would involve dispatching teams of foreign nationals – usually between 15 and 140 people – earlier than usual in case they must quarantine. It would also mean holding fewer socially distanced meetings with key groups and individuals in the capital, and taking greater care when dispersing to polling stations. </p>
<p>Although this option represents the path of least resistance, it is problematic on health grounds and could mean <a href="https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/managing-elections-during-covid-19-pandemic.pdf">no international observation</a> in countries where the disease is spiking. It also represents a missed opportunity.</p>
<p>The health risk of flying in international observers is obvious. The missed opportunity is that the sector needs to adapt to the changing nature of electoral manipulation. More <a href="https://books.google.mw/books/about/How_to_Rig_an_Election.html?id=jaNUDwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">subtle strategies of rigging</a> and the increasing <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2018.1470165">digitisation</a> of electoral processes mean that the traditional model of international observation looks outdated.</p>
<p>By responding effectively to the pandemic, when constraints on public campaigning mean that there will be an even greater focus on digital politics, observers can also build a more effective model for the post-pandemic world.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-concerns-mount-over-integrity-of-us-elections-so-does-support-for-international-poll-monitors-144305">As concerns mount over integrity of US elections, so does support for international poll monitors</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Observe through expats</h2>
<p>If observers are to evolve new ways of working to deal with changing electoral realities it is essential that they do not simply look for stop-gap responses to COVID-19 such as working through foreign nationals already resident in the country.</p>
<p>This may at first appear to be a tempting option as it would enable observation groups to tap into a pool of people who would not need to travel, and would have greater knowledge of the context.</p>
<p>But it would also generate new problems. Most obviously, people who have spent a long time in a country may have developed political attachments that mean they are not seen as being independent. This undermines the fundamental point of international observation, which is to build teams around people who have no personal interest in the elections, and so are seen to be neutral.</p>
<p>It would also encourage observers to continue with business as usual just when they should be innovating.</p>
<h2>Observe virtually and through partnership</h2>
<p>A more radical alternative is for international observers to reduce the significance that they place on deploying their own staff on the ground, and to instead observe “virtually” and through partnerships with domestic organisations. While international donors already funding domestic civil society groups, and international observers do engage with their domestic counterparts, this rarely takes the form of a true partnership. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two local men and a woman wearing jackets idenifying them as election observers watch as a woman reads out results of the 2017 presidential election in Liberia" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">International and local election observers monitor the tallying of votes in Liberia recently.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Ahmed Jallanzo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Adopting three new ways of working could make observation more effective, both now and in the future:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Partnership</strong>. Working with domestic monitors and civil society groups, helping to fund their activities and then sharing the data collected, would reduce the need to deploy large numbers of international observers. Given that domestic groups deploy many more individuals to many more polling stations, working in this way would enhance both the geographical coverage of international missions and the resource base of domestic groups. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Virtual monitoring</strong>. With an increasing proportion of electoral activity taking place digitally and online, it makes sense for international observers to place greater emphasis on monitoring digital processes and online spaces such as Twitter and Facebook.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Crowd sourcing</strong>. Crowd sourcing (and then verifying) data from individuals on the ground can be a cost effective way of mapping the extent of electoral manipulation. A good example is how the <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/factsreports/4316">Ushahidi</a> platform famously tracked the violence in Kenya’s 2007/8 general elections.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>By allowing domestic and international groups to focus on areas in which they have particular strengths, this option would be more efficient and effective.</p>
<h2>Looking to the future</h2>
<p>Of course, observing virtually and through partnership would generate new logistical challenges and require international observers to recruit new kinds of skills and experience. Observers would also need to be careful not to distort the priorities of domestic groups by adopting a rigid funding regime. But while global intergovernmental organisations don’t tend to do this at present, NGOs such as the <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/index.html">Carter Centre</a> and the <a href="https://www.ndi.org/pvt">National Democratic Institute</a> have been using elements of this strategy for many years. There is no reason these programmes can’t be deepened and extended.</p>
<p>This approach would also yield other benefits, such as boosting suitability. One of the aims of the international observation should surely be to make itself redundant by helping to build the capacity and authority of domestic observers. This may be a very long-term goal, but it is an important one. In addition to giving ownership of the process to the citizens concerned, it would also help to show that criticisms of poor quality electoral processes are not the result of foreign <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-hits-back-at-germany-over-election-interference-criticism/a-40162026">“meddling”</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>International observation will not insulate controversial polls – such as Tanzania’s in October – from malpractices, but will make them less likely and allow them to be exposed.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1316822020-02-23T07:15:05Z2020-02-23T07:15:05ZDiscrediting elections: why the opposition playbook carries risks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/315276/original/file-20200213-10976-1s6kkvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya's Supreme Court upholds President Uhuru Kenyatta's election victory following a re-run in 2017.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Daniel Irungu</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Malawi recently held its breath as the Constitutional Court took ten hours to painstakingly <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-bold-landmark-election-ruling-improve-malawian-democracy-131494">read out its verdict</a> on the highly controversial 2019 presidential elections. When it finally became clear that the judgment would nullify the election of President Peter Mutharika, jubilant opposition supporters took to the streets to celebrate.</p>
<p>Malawi became only the second country in Africa, after Kenya in 2017, and the <a href="https://metropoltv.co.ke/2020/02/04/malawi-joins-list-of-5-countries-to-annul-presidential-elections-globally/">fifth in the world</a>, to see a president’s victory overturned in the courts. What is striking about the two African cases is that the opposition did not conclusively prove that it had won the most votes. Instead, the judges <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/09/kenya-supreme-court-annul-elections-170902115641244.html">concluded</a> that widespread breaches of electoral regulations could also be interpreted as undermining key legal and constitutional principles.</p>
<p>The willingness of the judges to evaluate election petitions in this different way was partly shaped by effective opposition and civil society campaigns. These efforts combined <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/01/30/year-mass-malawi-protests-election-ruling/">public protests</a> with <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-08-17-00-analysis-across-africa-shows-how-social-media-is-changing-politics/">social media messaging</a> to highlight malpractices and discredit the electoral process.</p>
<p>Kenya and Malawi are not isolated cases. From <a href="https://apnews.com/6baa920e98ff4aafb3bfc23f1ace5508">Albania</a> to <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/zimbabwe-election-latest-mnangagwa-chamisa-zanu-pf-mdc-protests-violence-win-a8475276.html">Zimbabwe</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-election/bangladesh-police-break-up-opposition-protest-as-election-nears-idUSKCN1NJ1ER">Bangladesh</a> to <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/uganda-bobi-wine-threatens-musevenis-three-decades-rule/a-48551669">Uganda</a>, opposition leaders have lost faith in the electoral process and observers. They are adopting increasingly combative approaches.</p>
<p>By pushing their – often valid – complaints onto the streets as much as in the courts, opposition leaders have learnt how to deprive governments of the popular goodwill and international credibility they need to govern effectively. But there is a danger. In doing so, they risk triggering a repressive backlash from governments desperate to retain power at any cost.</p>
<h2>The opposition playbook</h2>
<p>Opposition parties in most of the world’s newest and least established democracies enter elections knowing that they have little chance of winning. </p>
<p>Over half of elections in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and post-communist Europe saw significant irregularities <a href="https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/105146/azerbaijan-opposition-parties-protest-in-baku-march-31-update-2">between 2012 and 2016</a>. Worse still, few of these elections have seen decisive interventions by either the international community or the judiciary to protect democratic principles.</p>
<p>So it shouldn’t come as a surprise that more opposition parties are attempting to shift the battleground to the court of public opinion. As well as increasing the pressure on judges and ambassadors to act, effectively discrediting an election can harm the government’s reputation. This is true even if the official result is ultimately allowed to stand.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/315281/original/file-20200213-11044-1p2xby.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/315281/original/file-20200213-11044-1p2xby.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315281/original/file-20200213-11044-1p2xby.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315281/original/file-20200213-11044-1p2xby.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315281/original/file-20200213-11044-1p2xby.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315281/original/file-20200213-11044-1p2xby.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315281/original/file-20200213-11044-1p2xby.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Opposition supporters shout anti-government slogans during a protest in Tirana, Albania in July 2019, after boycotting the local election.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The complete version of this opposition playbook involves five main steps. But, in practice opposition parties tend to use only some, depending on the situation:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Lay the foundations</strong>. In recent elections in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-48763803">Albania</a> and <a href="https://www.yjc.ir/en/news/33506/many-opposition-candidates-pull-out-of-bangladesh-elections-citing-electoral-fraud">Bangladesh</a>, opposition leaders alleged that the process was being manipulated well ahead of the voting day. This encouraged journalists to look for evidence of irregularities, and generated popular expectations that the process would be problematic. One of the most effective ways to achieve this is to consistently challenge electoral preparations. Examples include alleging bias in the <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2018/07/20/four-reasons-many-zimbabwe-dont-trust-electoral-commission-zec/">voter registration process</a>, and corruption in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-election-idUSKBN19S2G7">procurement of ballot papers</a>.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Direct the blame</strong>. Allegations of wrongdoing are most effective when they are personalised. So, opposition parties typically seek to demonise prominent members of the electoral commission. For example, social media platforms are used to circulate rumours that senior electoral officials had been seen at the homes of ruling party officials, and were <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/01/texts-lies-and-videotape-kenya-election-fake-news/">known to have received bribes</a>. In countries like Kenya and Nigeria these rumours often go unsubstantiated, but are nonetheless widely believed by opposition supporters.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Claim victory</strong>. An election can only be discredited if it is plausible that the opposition actually won. Thus, canny opposition leaders spend a lot of time during the campaign and the counting of the votes claiming they have the <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/12/30/bangladesh-goes-polls-tight-security/">momentum and are destined to win</a>. This is usually followed by a press conference shortly after the ruling party’s victory has been declared to denounce the results, and claim that the opposition has evidence of systematic wrongdoing. This happened in Bangladesh, where a losing opposition leader slammed the process as <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/12/30/bangladesh-goes-polls-tight-security/">“farcical”</a>. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Protest early, protest often</strong>. Opposition parties often have a strong support base in capital cities. The greater access to information and more densely packed voters makes it easier for them to mobilise support. This makes it possible to hold large protests, especially if civil society groups are also active and influential. In Malawi, the Human Rights Defenders Coalition made it <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/01/30/year-mass-malawi-protests-election-ruling/">“the year of mass protests”</a> in the run-up to the Constitutional Court’s judgment. This kept the pressure on the judges to make sure they would not be tempted to brush complaints under the carpet.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Demand action</strong>. Having seen many dubious election results allowed to stand, opposition leaders are increasingly willing to call out judges and the international community. This often includes refusing to recognise the legitimacy of the president, explicitly criticising <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-02-04-observers-played-a-shameful-role-in-malawis-tippex-election/">international observers</a> who fail to condemn the elections, and insisting that foreign ambassadors intervene to promote democracy. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Risk of backlash</h2>
<p>Publicly discrediting elections can help to uncover and deter electoral incompetence and manipulation. But, it is a dangerous strategy. </p>
<p>In more authoritarian countries the outcome can be greater repression. For example, presidents and prime ministers have responded to post-electoral unrest by citing it as evidence that the opposition is a <a href="https://www.nyasatimes.com/mutharika-says-malawi-opposition-recruit-al-shabab-to-overthrow-government-by-force/">threat to national unity and political stability</a>. This claim may then be used to legitimise censorship and repression.</p>
<p>In Zimbabwe, more than 20 people died as a result of the government’s <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/zimbabwe-brutal-crackdown-continues-protesters-killed-raped-and-tortured-security">violent response to opposition and civil society protests</a> in the two years since the 2018 general elections. Similarly, in nearby Zambia, opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema’s refusal to recognise the legitimacy of President Edgar Lungu led to his <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/hakainde-hichilema-pleads-guilty-treason-charges-170814175023908.html">arrest him on treason charges</a>.</p>
<p>Given the risks involved, it’s striking that discrediting an election very rarely means winning one. Even in Kenya, where Kenyatta’s initial victory in 2017 was nullified by the Supreme Court, the ruling party won after the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41757612">opposition boycotted the re-run</a>. It claimed that insufficient changes had been made to ensure it would be free and fair. </p>
<p>Showing that the process was flawed can hurt the government, but does not usually lead to its defeat – at least in the short-term.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131682/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By pushing their usually valid complaints onto the streets and the courts, opposition leaders deny governments the popular goodwill and international credibility they need to govern effectively.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1319372020-02-20T13:24:47Z2020-02-20T13:24:47ZKenya: why elite cohesion is more important than ethnicity to political stability<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316133/original/file-20200219-10985-uyrefr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya's President Uhuru Kenyatta (left) shakes hands with the opposition coalition leader Raila Odinga to symbolise a truce in March 2018. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenyan politics is often depicted as a battle between different ethnic “<a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=BWSwDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT63&lpg=PT63&dq=big+men+cheeseman+dictionary&source=bl&ots=k77TdO0CjU&sig=ACfU3U3YUa-b2AJSq_G5OTIX-qK90Og2vw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi-wNfI59PnAhWGSxUIHfCJB_sQ6AEwCXoECAsQAQ#v=onepage&q=big%20men%20cheeseman%20dictionary&f=false">Big Men</a>” who can mobilise their supporters with a click of their fingers. The ability of successive generations of the Kenyatta family to rally the support of the Kikuyu community, and of Odingas to command the loyalty of Luos, means that it is also seen to be dominated by a small number of dynasties – a <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-elections-are-much-more-than-just-a-ruthless-game-of-thrones-81957">Game of Thrones</a>, if you will. </p>
<p>But this is a gross over simplification. Our new <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Oxford-Handbook-Kenyan-Politics-Handbooks/dp/0198815697/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=handbook+kenyan+politics&qid=1581777297&sr=8-1">Handbook of Kenyan Politics</a> – which features 50 chapters on different aspects of political life – tells a very different story. Ethnic leaders often fail to carry the support of their own group, either because they are not seen to have the <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Who-should-lead-the-Kenyan-opposition/440808-3873434-12ql970z/index.html">community’s interest at heart</a>, or because a rival appears to have a more credible chance of winning power. </p>
<p>And while the role of ethnicity is overstated, class is much more important than is commonly thought. Class here might more accurately be called elite cohesion, given the lack of clearly demarcated social classes. </p>
<p>This finding might surprise some readers, but while ethnicity clearly shapes how people think and vote it is the degree of elite cohesion that determines whether the country is politically stable or not. </p>
<p>The long period of relative stability in the country from the 1970s to the early 1990s was founded on the willingness of members of the elite from different ethnic groups to put aside their differences and use their influence to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228276928_Democratization_Sequencing_and_State_Failure_in_Africa_Lessons_from_Kenya">demobilise movements and militias</a> that might otherwise have threatened the status quo. </p>
<p>They did so to protect the highly unequal political and economic system on which their own privileged positions depend. It is when this elite pact ruptures, as it did around the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228276928_Democratization_Sequencing_and_State_Failure_in_Africa_Lessons_from_Kenya">2007 general elections</a>, that violence and unrest come to the fore. </p>
<p>Kenya is not alone. In general, we are far too quick to jump to “ethnic” explanations, and far too slow to recognise the way that elites collude to preserve their privileges. Our book sheds light on how this happened in Kenya.</p>
<h2>How ethnicity matters</h2>
<p>The classic view of Kenyan politics as an ethnic census runs something like this. First, power is secured by, and used to the advantage of, the president’s own ethnic group. This generate a “<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/255669297_The_Political_Economy_of_Kenya's_Crisis">winner-takes-all</a>” logic. </p>
<p>Second, the knowledge that losing power means losing access to resources increases the stakes of political competition and hence the purported drive to stick together along ethnic lines.</p>
<p>Third, heated and controversial elections increase the divisions within Kenyan society, further strengthening ethnic identities. </p>
<p>Parts of this story are certainly true. Successive governments have tended to favour their own. Voting patterns, too, reveal clear ethnic patterns, and the last three elections have been <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331943100_Kenya's_2017_elections_winner-takes-all_politics_as_usual">extremely divisive</a>. But the reality is more complicated. </p>
<p>Politicians can’t simply rely on the support of co-ethnics. Many ethnic groups actually split their vote between two or more candidates. This means that politicians must persuade voters to support them. In doing this, they often face stiff competition both from within and without their own ethnic group. As a result, they have to demonstrate that they are willing to fight for their community, have a good <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Development-Elections-Leadership-Politics-Government/440808-2631464-format-xhtml-9wv3coz/index.html">track record on development</a>, and can be trusted. </p>
<p>An example of what can happen if leaders don’t pay attention to these rules is the fate of Luhya leader <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-21581017/musalia-mudavadi-why-i-want-kenya-s-top-job">Musalia Mudavadi</a> in the 2013 presidential election. Having left Raila Odinga’s opposition alliance in the hope of being picked as the presidential candidate with the support of the then president Mwai Kibaki, Mudavadi was humiliated when key Kibaki allies changed their minds at the last minute and formed the new Jubilee Alliance. </p>
<p>In the end Mudavadi stood on his own. But his reputation was fatally tarnished because he was not seen to be a credible candidate, or to have been true to his own ethnic group. As a result, his own community <a href="https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=69187">turned its back on him</a>, with more Luhyas voting for Odinga – a Luo – than for their “own man”. </p>
<h2>Mutual economic interests</h2>
<p>The chapters in the book also highlight the fact that ethnic differences have not prevented the emergence of a self-conscious political and economic elite that is capable of coordinating its actions to maintain the system on which its privileges depend. </p>
<p>As Kenyan political scientist <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/kenya-class-ethnicity-kenyattaodinga-deal/">Nicholas Nyangira</a> argued in the 1980s, the route to power in Kenya involves first establishing control over an ethnic group – and then bargaining with other members of the elite for acceptance, using one’s support base as leverage. </p>
<p>Once part of the elite, leaders have typically used their influence over their own communities to demobilise and co-opt protest movements and militias. Even after some of the most heated periods of inter-elite struggle, such as the ultimately unsuccessful efforts of some Kikuyu leaders to <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/1056-817696-il6m7dz/index.html">prevent Daniel arap Moi</a> – a Kalenjin – from replacing Jomo Kenyatta as president after his death in 1978, members of the elite came back together to stabilise the system. </p>
<p>Whenever this elite pact has ruptured, the consequence has been major political instability. In 2007, for example, the controversy over who had won flawed presidential elections resulted in leaders who had previously controlled their communities instead calling on them to take to the streets. Along with a heavy handed state response, this resulted in the death of <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/un-600000-displaced-in-kenya-unrest/">over 1,000 people and the displacement of almost 700,000 more</a>. </p>
<p>Yet even in these most tense and dangerous of moments, the elite found a way to come back together. The violence in 2007 was ended by a power-sharing agreement that brought all major leaders into the government. </p>
<p>Another dangerous political stand-off following controversial elections in 2017 was resolved when, to the surprise of many, the two main candidates – Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta – publicly <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/kenya-class-ethnicity-kenyattaodinga-deal/">shook hands</a> and announced that they had buried the hatchet. </p>
<h2>The role of inequality</h2>
<p>It is clear from these events that Kenya will remain politically stable so long as the mutual economic interests of the elite outweigh their ethnic differences.</p>
<p>What’s equally true is that the country will simultaneously remain incredibly unequal. </p>
<p>According <a href="https://kenyanwallstreet.com/higher-taxes-kenyas-rich-can-lower-extreme-inequality-oxfam/">to Oxfam</a> less than 0.1% of the population – just 8,300 people – owned more wealth than the bottom 99.9% in 2018. While a dynamic economy is projected to create around 7,500 millionaires over the next 10 years, Kenya currently features the <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/economy/Kenya-8th-on-extreme-poverty-list/3946234-4635310-79pa9rz/index.html">eighth highest number of people living in extreme poverty</a> in the world.</p>
<p>In addition to paying themselves some of the <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/siasa/2019-05-11-new-house-allowance-puts-mps-salary-way-above-world-super-powers/">highest salaries</a> earned by any politicians in the world, Kenyan leaders use their control over the legislature to set low taxes – the highest rate of income tax <a href="https://www.taxkenya.com/income-tax-rates-in-kenya/">is just 30%</a> – and to give tax exemptions to politically connected companies. </p>
<p>Because it determines whether ethnic tensions are contained or exacerbated, and keeps millions in poverty, elite cohesion, much like ethnicity, is a matter of life and death.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131937/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman co-edited the Handbook of Kenyan Politics, published by OUP in 2020.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabrielle Lynch co-edited the Oxford Handbook of Kenyan Politics, published by OUP in 2020. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karuti Kanyinga co-edited the Handbook of Kenyan Politics, published by OUP in 2020.</span></em></p>Even in the most tense and dangerous of moments, the elite has found a way to come back together.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamGabrielle Lynch, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of WarwickKaruti Kanyinga, Associate Director, Institute for Development Studies (IDS), University of NairobiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1314052020-02-17T13:23:26Z2020-02-17T13:23:26ZHow history explains election violence: Kenya and Zambia tell the story<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/315230/original/file-20200213-11040-rgd0oz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Zambia's president-elect Edgar Lungu in 2016. The country is known for peaceful polls, but this one was marked by clashes.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Dawood Salim/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Why do the first multiparty elections after authoritarian rule turn violent in some countries but not in others?</p>
<p>That’s the question we set out to anwer in our <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343319884983">research</a> on electoral violence and the legacy of authoritarian rule in Kenya and Zambia.</p>
<p>We compared Zambia’s founding elections in 1991, which were largely peaceful, and Kenya’s in 1992. During these polls there was large-scale state-instigated electoral violence along ethnic lines. </p>
<p>What explains the divergent outcomes in electoral violence? One answer is that political legacies generated during authoritarian rule have a tendency to transcend into the multiparty era. </p>
<p>Our analysis suggests that violence was a more viable electoral strategy in Kenya than in Zambia because of the type of authoritarian rule that existed in Kenya before the polls. This created political legacies that underpinned political competition and mobilisation during the first multiparty elections. </p>
<p>We concluded from this that, to understand why some countries are more prone to experience electoral violence, the impact of history and the longer-term processes of institutional development need to be considered.</p>
<h2>A comparison</h2>
<p>Most analysis on election-related violence is focused on factors that concern the immediate conditions of election. These include how fiercely contested a given election is, what formal electoral rules are in place, whether monitors and peacekeepers oversee the process, and how electoral management bodies work.</p>
<p>Our research sought to dig deeper into history. <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343319884983">It showed</a> how dynamics of governance during authoritarian eras have lasting effects on whether multi-party elections turn violent or not. </p>
<p>A historical lens on Kenya’s and Zambia’s transitions from single-party rule to multi-party democracy in the early 1990s helped us understand how pervasive the informal institutions that underpin electoral conduct can be. And how they carry over from an authoritarian period to a multi-party setting. </p>
<p>In both countries, the incumbents at the time of transition – <a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?id=32WYDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA147&lpg=PA147&dq=moi+warns+multi-partyism+strife&source=bl&ots=m1CRl7upG_&sig=ACfU3U0L1bFOxDgKlNBwVM4AITpu5ncm0A&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjXnoqzsc7nAhV8A2MBHZGCCs8Q6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=moi%20warns%20multi-partyism%20strife&f=false">Daniel arap Moi</a> in Kenya and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40396331?seq=1">Kenneth Kaunda</a> in Zambia – warned that a turn to multi-party election would usher in chaos, violence and inter-ethnic strife. </p>
<p>Yet, Zambia’s 1991 founding election remained largely <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/05/world/zambia-s-democratic-shock-to-africa.html">free from violence</a>. Kaunda stepped down after 27 years at the helm and the presidency transferred to the opposition candidate Frederick Chiluba.</p>
<p>But in Kenya’s 1992 election state-instigated <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-political-violence-colonialism-vigilantes-and-militias-83888">electoral violence</a> along ethnic lines resulted in 1,500 people people being killed. A further 300,000 were displaced. And Moi and his ruling party, the Kenya African National Union remained in.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-political-violence-colonialism-vigilantes-and-militias-83888">Kenya’s history of political violence: colonialism, vigilantes and militias</a>
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<h2>Authoritarian regimes</h2>
<p>How rulers secure popular support – and who is included in governing coalitions – varies significantly across authoritarian regimes. So does the level of repression by which dictators control the majority excluded from power. These features are important for explaining electoral violence. The reason for this is that in ethnically divided societies more exclusionary governance strategies under authoritarian rule over time cultivate perceptions of politics as a zero-sum game that last into the multi-party era.</p>
<p>In Kenya single-party rule rested on a relatively exclusive approach to maintain a ruling coalition. This was based on a narrow support base and active suppression of those who were not included in power. </p>
<p>In Zambia, single-party rule was more inclusive. It was based on a broader ethnic support base and with deliberate efforts to counter ethnic divisions. When comparing post independence countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya was not at the extreme end of the exclusionary spectrum. But it was significantly more exclusionary than Zambia.</p>
<p>The political legacies from authoritarian rule worked through two main pathways. First, political legacies structure the options for building cross-ethnic coalitions and for cooperation. They thereby make electoral violence more or less likely. For instance, by emphasising ethnicity over other political cleavages, coalitions are built on an exclusionary basis. This engenders inter-ethnic relations that are fragmented and competitive. </p>
<p>In Zambia, the opposition in the first multiparty elections could draw support from all ethnic groups. But in Kenya the opposition was fragmented and polarised along ethnic lines. In addition, in Zambia, the legacy of more cooperative inter-ethnic elite relations reduced the perceived risks associated with the transition. This enabled bargaining between competing elites. For example, a series of meetings were held where the contenders solved contentious issues around the electoral process.</p>
<p>Political legacies also place constraints on how politicians go about mobilising support. For example, ruling coalitions that are more exclusionary use rhetoric to exploit ethnic cleavages. In Kenya, electoral rhetoric played on historical injustices and ethnic divisions. The violence served to solidify the incumbent’s support base and to punish opposition voters. </p>
<p>In Zambia, the use of an ethnically-hostile rhetoric was simply out of the question.</p>
<h2>Implications</h2>
<p>Varying historical experiences, thus, offer countries different baseline risks of facing large-scale electoral violence. </p>
<p>But we concluded in our paper that it’s possible to change the pattern. Kenya’s experience illustrates this. The level of violence has differed significantly in post-1992 elections. For instance there was <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/smart-global-health/background-post-election-crisis-kenya">large scale post-election violence</a> after the 2007/8 poll. But elections in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/30/world/kenya-s-ruling-party-is-defeated-after-39-years.html">2002</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21723488">2013</a> were significantly more peaceful. </p>
<p>This suggests that specific circumstances tied to the immediate electoral contest can prevent violence from happening. We argue that policy efforts need to engage in a two-pronged approach. In the first instance measures need to be designed to address pervasive forms of mobilisation. The second part of the approach is that there needs to be an assessment of the risk tied to an impending election.</p>
<p>In Zambia, elections were largely free from violence after 1991 and until 2015. Yet, Zambian politics has become increasingly volatile, with <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/zambia-suspends-election-campaigning-violence-160710141136702.html">instances of electoral violence</a> in 2016. </p>
<p>There has been a definite shift towards more authoritarianism. This is evident in the centralisation of political power in the hands of the president. There is also more intimidation of the opposition, and a breakdown of inter-party deliberation. As a result there are growing fears that the 2021 election will usher in violence. </p>
<p>Zambia seems to be treading a thin line. A turn to more violent electoral practices is a cause of great concern. Outbreaks of violence have profound and lasting effects that shape future electoral politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131405/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Swedish Research Council (grant 348-2013-5408 and 2016-05833) and Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (grant P16-0124:1) funded this research.</span></em></p>Political legacies generated during authoritarian rule have a tendency to transcend into the multiparty era.Johan Brosché, Associate Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityHanne Fjelde, Associate Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityKristine Höglund, Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1314832020-02-10T13:28:25Z2020-02-10T13:28:25ZA great judgment, but court victories won’t deliver democracy in Malawi<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314471/original/file-20200210-109912-gx92e1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Malawi's President elect Peter Mutharika waves to supporters during the swearing in ceremony in Blantyre in May last year after the contentious poll.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AMOS Gumulira/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In a landmark ruling last week, the constitutional court in Malawi <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malawi-election-court/malawi-court-annuls-president-mutharikas-2019-election-victory-idUSKBN1ZX2F2">annulled the 2019 elections</a> citing massive irregularities during the process. The judges ordered new elections within five months. They also highlighted fundamental challenges that have long plagued Malawi’s <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/02/04/malawi-court-orders-fresh-elections-what-now/">first-past-the-post electoral system</a>. </p>
<p>The lengthy, meticulously detailed and unanimous ruling by a five-judge panel has attracted widespread acclaim within Malawi and abroad. With the exception of one case in Kenya, it is not normal for courts in Africa to annul election results even when there is evidence of massive irregularities. Once results are announced it is often taken for granted that no court would overturn them.</p>
<p>The constitutional court in Malawi observed that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Given the gravity of … irregularities, the conduct of the Electoral Commission in managing these elections was severely lacking and demonstrated incompetence for failing in multiple dimensions to follow clearly laid out legal processes for such elections.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The court challenge followed numerous protests organised throughout Malawi after the May 2019 election. These played a crucial part in the overall scheme of things. <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/01/30/year-mass-malawi-protests-election-ruling/">Mass demonstrations</a> held in the past nine months signalled to the judiciary and the international community that Malawi had changed. The clear message was that Malawians were no longer willing to simply accept a fate handed out to them.</p>
<p>Malawi’s judiciary deserves to be praised. But the power, agency and influence of the Malawian people cannot be underestimated.</p>
<p>What will be the effect on democracy in Malawi? Relying on the courts alone to resolve political disputes is not a viable alternative to democratic consolidation. President Peter Mutharika and the Malawi Election Commission have unsurprisingly wasted little time in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51383984">appealing the ruling</a>. The supreme court, to which they have appealed, has the power to overturn decisions of lower courts – including the constitutional court.</p>
<p>The judges of the supreme court will, however, be under great pressure to not quash the detailed legal arguments put forth by the constitutional court. </p>
<h2>New round</h2>
<p>As the country gears up for new elections, there are reasons to be concerned. The outcome of future elections will not be viewed as more legitimate if the electoral rules remain unchanged. One significant <a href="https://t.co/YxOWtk8Cc5?amp=1">flaw</a> is that the laws do not require a 50+1 majority for victory.</p>
<p>A new round of elections offers an opportunity to strengthen civil and political freedoms. It also promises to ensure greater accountability for those in power in relation to their performance and promises. Ultimately, this could lead to increased responsiveness of the state in delivering public services. </p>
<p>But is there adequate administrative capacity to undertake radical changes at such short notice? What will the Malawi Election Commission do differently now? </p>
<p>The most urgent change that’s needed is to ensure that elections don’t result in narrow mandates for the winning candidate. Zambia amended its electoral laws a few years ago to ensure that only a candidate who gets <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37086365">more that 50% of the votes is declared winner</a>. Alternatively, a second round is conducted for the top two candidates if none failed to secure more than 50% in the first round.</p>
<p>A similar amendment was submitted to Malawi’s parliament but was <a href="https://malawi24.com/2017/12/15/501-bill-rejected/">rejected</a> due to internal party politics. The proposed amendment was derived from a <a href="http://constitutionnet.org/news/presidential-elections-malawi-towards-majoritarian-501-electoral-system">report</a> by the Malawi Special Law Commission on the Review of Electoral Law in 2017. </p>
<p>Other challenges include financing yet another expensive round of elections and ensuring a successful election process without irregularities. This will be difficult to do at such short notice.</p>
<p>All these are reasons to be cautious. Experience elsewhere points to the fact that court judgments, however favourable, don’t deliver great democratic outcomes.</p>
<p>The lessons from the re-run of the presidential elections in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2019.1594072">Kenya in 2017</a> serve as an illustrative example. After the initial euphoria, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41773919">boycott</a> of the subsequent re-run by the opposition proved to be a huge disappointment. </p>
<h2>Democratic consolidation</h2>
<p>The process of consolidating democracy in Malawi has been fragile. </p>
<p>The capacity to organise successful elections is a key indicator of democracy consolidation. The country held its first democratic poll in 1994. The introduction of democracy resulted in numerous changes in electoral legislation, statutes allowing registration and competition of parties, frequency of national elections, and the freedom of the press. </p>
<p>But Malawi has underperformed in a number of areas. </p>
<p>For example, a survey conducted by Afrobarometer – a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts surveys on democracy, governance and economic conditions – shows that <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/ad341-malawians-see-declining-quality-elections-express-little-trust-electoral">trust in the electoral management body</a> fell from 49% in 1999 to 34% in 2019. Public support for elections as a means of choosing leaders has also significantly fallen, from 78% in 2003 to 55% in 2017. </p>
<h2>Reliance on courts</h2>
<p>The findings of a more recent <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad340-most-malawians-see-legal-challenge-election-results-justified-courts-impartial">survey</a> provide useful insights into how Malawians perceive their courts. A large majority of the respondents considered the courts as impartial and trustworthy. They were also of the view that the president must always obey court rulings, even when they believe these are incorrect. </p>
<p>But Malawians were split on whether the losing side in an election should always enjoy the right to challenge its defeat in court.</p>
<p>When the courts are conceived to be the ultimate defenders of democracy, the judicial system risks being burdened with an overload of expectations and trying to satisfy a large number of political interests. The regression of electoral governance over a long period requires constant observation, monitoring and commitment by all stakeholders. These include voters, political parties, media, civil society organisations and international agencies. </p>
<p>When key stakeholders slacken in their duties, they put additional pressure on the courts. Multiple actors – not just the judiciary – must step in to ensure that a young democracy matures and consolidates. </p>
<p>In Malawi, the need right now is to overhaul the model of electoral governance. Reforms should focus on a system that relies less on the judiciary and more on other national and local institutions that can function responsibly and effectively.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131483/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dan Banik receives funding from the Research Council of Norway and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Happy Kayuni receives funding from the Research Council of Norway and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad).</span></em></p>A new round of elections offers an opportunity to strengthen civil and political freedoms.Dan Banik, Professor of political science and Director of the Oslo SDG Initiative, University of OsloHappy Kayuni, Professor, University of MalawiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1284732020-01-09T17:09:54Z2020-01-09T17:09:54ZHow the Nigerian and Kenyan media handled Cambridge Analytica<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307645/original/file-20191218-11909-qdrzct.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There's a growing awareness that Cambridge Analytica harnessed social media and personal data to influence elections. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta recently <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201911180439.html">signed</a> into law the Data Protection Bill. Passed after several years of debate and delay, the new law places restrictions on the collection and use of digital data by governments and private corporations. The restrictions are similar to those included in a new <a href="https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2019/04/05/nigeria-issues-new-data-protection-regulation/">data protection regulation</a> passed by Nigeria this year.</p>
<p>These protection laws are welcome advancements in the light of investigations that revealed that British political consulting firm <a href="https://twitter.com/camanalytica?lang=en">Cambridge Analytica</a>
had worked on presidential <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/03/africa/nigeria-kenya-cambridge-analytica-elections-intl/index.html">campaigns</a> in both countries. </p>
<p>It’s been widely known for some time that the firm <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/23/leaked-cambridge-analyticas-blueprint-for-trump-victory">helped elect</a> Donald Trump in the US and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/jul/30/cambridge-analytica-did-work-for-leave-eu-emails-confirm">worked on</a> the Brexit referendum in the UK. But in March 2018 a number of startling exposés were published by The Guardian, The New York Times and Channel 4 showing the firm’s dubious campaign practices in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/21/cambridge-analyticas-ruthless-bid-to-sway-the-vote-in-nigeria">Nigeria</a> and <a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/cambridge-analytica-revealed-trumps-election-consultants-filmed-saying-they-use-bribes-and-sex-workers-to-entrap-politicians-investigation">Kenya</a>. An <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/jan/04/cambridge-analytica-data-leak-global-election-manipulation">ongoing leak</a> of tens of thousands of internal documents is set to show in great detail Cambridge Analytica’s work in 68 countries around the world.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Q91nvbJSmS4?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">What is the Cambridge Analytica scandal?</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The legal responses to the revelations suggest a growing awareness that social media and personal data are being harnessed by outside actors to influence elections around the world. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23743670.2019.1679208">recent article</a> we analysed press coverage of Cambridge Analytica in Nigeria and Kenya. We wanted to see if local coverage reflected international media coverage of the scandal. To do this we focused on three key themes: data privacy and protection, unethical political campaigning on social media, and foreign involvement in African elections.</p>
<p>We found that most newspaper articles focused on data privacy and social media campaigning. The Nigerian and Kenyan press focused on Facebook and data. But very few stories wrestled with the role of foreign actors in national elections. Important questions about campaigning and election interference received less attention.</p>
<p>This could mean that the door has been left open to ongoing foreign involvement in future elections, given that Cambridge Analytica used African elections as a testing ground for campaign tactics it later exported into more lucrative markets. It did this with little regard for the negative consequences on the emerging democracies. </p>
<h2>Cambridge Analytica in Africa</h2>
<p>It is easy to <a href="http://theconversation.com/claims-about-cambridge-analyticas-role-in-africa-should-be-taken-with-a-pinch-of-salt-93864">overstate the impact</a> of Cambridge Analytica in Nigeria and Kenya. So let’s review what the March 2018 exposés revealed.</p>
<p>According to a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/21/cambridge-analyticas-ruthless-bid-to-sway-the-vote-in-nigeria">detailed report</a>, Cambridge Analytica was hired by a wealthy Nigerian to support the 2015 reelection campaign of then-president Goodluck Jonathan. During the campaign, the firm worked with the Israeli intelligence firm Black Cube to acquire hacked medical and financial information about Jonathan’s opponent Muhammadu Buhari.</p>
<p>Cambridge Analytica also promoted a graphic anti-Buhari <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/apr/04/cambridge-analytica-used-violent-video-to-try-to-influence-nigerian-election">video</a>. It suggested Buhari would support the terrorist group Boko Haram and end women’s rights. </p>
<p>Jonathan eventually lost the 2015 election to Buhari. Earlier this year Buhari was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47380663">reelected</a> to a second term.</p>
<p>In Kenya, the firm worked on both Uhuru Kenyatta’s 2013 presidential campaign and his 2017 reelection campaign. To date, it is unclear exactly what it did during either campaign. One bit of evidence emerged in an undercover <a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/cambridge-analytica-revealed-trumps-election-consultants-filmed-saying-they-use-bribes-and-sex-workers-to-entrap-politicians-investigation">video</a> of executive Mark Turnbull in which he made a number of claims. These included claims that the firm had rebranded Kenyatta’s party twice, had written their manifesto and had done two rounds of 50,000 surveys.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/mpbeOCKZFfQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Cambridge Analytica Uncovered: Secret filming reveals election tricks.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Covering Cambridge Analytica</h2>
<p>To gather articles for our study, we searched the archives of two Nigerian newspapers — <a href="https://punchng.com/">Punch</a> and <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/">Vanguard</a> — and two Kenyan newspapers — <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/">Daily Nation</a> and <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/">East African Standard</a>. We looked for mentions of Cambridge Analytica in relation to Nigeria or Kenya. </p>
<p>We found 31 articles in the Nigerian newspapers and 74 articles in the Kenyan newspapers published prior to December 2018.</p>
<p>All 31 articles in Nigerian newspapers were published after March 2018. In the case of Kenya, 17 of the 74 articles were published prior to this. Cambridge Analytica was little known at the time of the 2015 elections in Nigeria. But the firm had garnered significant public attention in 2016 because of its connection to Trump and Brexit. As a result the Kenyan media was paying attention when the firm joined the Kenyatta campaign in 2017.</p>
<p>After March 2018, national newspapers in <a href="https://punchng.com/alleged-hacking-of-buharis-records-fg-investigates-cambridge-analytica-pdp/">Nigeria</a> and <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Cambridge-Analytica-and-Kenya-elections/1056-4349392-204vmx/index.html">Kenya</a> published several articles that summarised what Cambridge Analytica did in their respective countries.</p>
<p>But none of the articles we examined provided any further details on specific activities by Cambridge Analytica. They simply repeated what had already been reported in the international media.</p>
<p>Nigerian newspapers quickly framed the Cambridge Analytica scandal as a <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/03/961728/">partisan issue between two competing political parties</a>.</p>
<p>Kenyan newspaper coverage, on the other hand, was more comprehensive in quantity and quality. For one, the Kenyan press was covering Cambridge Analytica prior to March 2018; the first story appeared in <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Row-as-state-moves-to-cut-foreign-funds-for-Nasa-campaign/1064-3926074-4qbx87/index.html">May 2017</a>.</p>
<p>Because Cambridge Analytica had become known for its work with Trump and Brexit, Kenyan journalists and writers were discussing the <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001244727/cyber-warfare-as-politicians-turn-to-internet-propaganda-to-woo-voters">implications</a> of the firm working in their country early on. They <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/blogs/dot9/walubengo/2274560-4349730-ldnsrp/index.html">cautioned readers</a> that the firm might be involved in targeting sensational messages and misinformation on social media. They also considered the ramifications of foreign actors interfering in local political campaigns.</p>
<p>After the March 2018 revelations, Kenyan newspapers responded with more news and opinion pieces. These wrestled with the implications for data privacy, political campaigning on social media, and Kenya’s democratic institutions. For example, a <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Cambridge-Analytica-manipulate-elections/440808-4357302-qrmahuz/index.html">column</a> asked plainly whether the firm undermined democracy and made a mockery of elections by manipulating people’s emotions. The column also questioned whether the firm deepened ethnic division in society.</p>
<h2>Digital colonialism?</h2>
<p>Recently, the Kenyan writer, political analyst and activist <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/nanjala-nyabola-digital-colonialism-transforming-kenyas-political-discourse">Nanjala Nyabola</a> asked whether Africa was entering a new era of digital colonialism. By this she means a form of exploitation in which foreign actors use African nations for their own benefit without regard for the safety of citizens and the stability of institutions.</p>
<p>In the context of Cambridge Analytica’s work in Nigeria and Kenya, the answer may be yes. It’s important that African countries update their data privacy and protection laws. But as the ongoing document leak <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Mystery-men-behind-Uhuru-poll-strategy/1064-5407174-u76bnq/">demonstrates</a>, the Cambridge Analytic scandal runs deeper than access to Facebook data.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128473/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What role do foreign actors play in African elections? Cambridge Analytica’s case sheds some light.Brian Ekdale, Associate Professor of Journalism & Mass Communication, University of IowaMelissa Tully, Associate Professor Director of Undergraduate Studies School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of IowaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/962832018-05-09T14:11:05Z2018-05-09T14:11:05ZRapprochement between two leaders isn’t enough to fix Kenya’s deep divisions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218243/original/file-20180509-185500-1g2gjj6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta (left) with opposition leader Raila Odinga in March.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In his latest <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Uhuru-full-state-of-the-nation-address/1064-4541100-gqbp50z/index.html">state of the nation address</a> Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta called for opening a new chapter of national unity and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/kenyatta-and-odinga-call-reconciliation-kenya">reconciliation</a>.</p>
<p>This was Kenyatta’s first state of the nation address after last year’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/africa/2017/08/kenya-elections-bitterly-contested-170810154141394.html">disputed national elections</a> which went into a re-run. Kenyatta reemerged victorious. But it was a <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-5010873/Uhuru-Kenyatta-president-facing-Pyrrhic-election-victory.html">pyrrhic victory</a> as his main challenger Raila Odinga had boycotted the rerun.</p>
<p>With both men at the head of their <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/08/kenyan-elections-ethnicity-factor-170806081143385.html">ethnically aligned</a> coalitions, Jubilee and National Super Alliance, the 2017 electoral season was highly charged and polarising. Odinga refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of Kenyatta’s victory and threatened disruption. One of his actions was being <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/kenya-tv-networks-gagged-odinga-inauguration-180130081747894.html">sworn in as the people’s president</a>. The mock swearing-in ceremony escalated tensions, culminating in threats of arrests, arraignment and deportation of opposition leaders. The <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/08/government-crackdown-threatens-rights-kenya">press and civil society</a> were also targeted.</p>
<p>Kenya’s politics has <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyatta-or-odinga-why-dynastic-politics-is-alive-and-well-in-kenya-80732">broadly been dominated by two families</a>, the Kenyattas from the Kikuyu and the Odingas from the Luo ethic groups. Uhuru, son of the founding president Jomo Kenyatta, has gone head to head with Raila for the presidential vote twice – in 2013 and 2017. Both elections were marked by ethnic coalition building in which Kenyatta led the most demographically dominant coalition, <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/kenya-jubilee-party-uniting-or-dividing-kenyans/a-19540503">Jubilee</a>. </p>
<p>On both occasions, the outcome was a kind of ethnic census because <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-elections-ethnicity/kenyan-politicians-struggle-to-break-ethnic-voting-patterns-idUSKBN1AL049">Kenyan politics</a> is highly charged along ethnic lines. </p>
<p>Since last year’s tensions, there’s been a visible rapprochement between the two men. Does this signal a broader bottom-up reconciliation process? </p>
<p>Perhaps the reality is that the momentum has started from the top but will take time to get to the bottom. Kenyan politics is notoriously <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/08/kenyan-elections-ethnicity-factor-170806081143385.html">tribal</a>, in part because the system is built for zero sum gains in that it <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/books/review/Hammer-t.html">creates winners and losers</a>. As long as this remains the case, Kenya will always remain susceptible to ethnic entrepreneurs as politicians seek to play the ethnic tramp card.</p>
<h2>The rapprochement</h2>
<p>The first sign of rapprochement between the two men took the country by some surprise. A staged <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-12/opposition-alliance-in-kenya-seen-dead-as-odinga-breaks-ranks">handshake</a> in March 2018 signalled a dramatic change of tone and de-escalation of tensions. </p>
<p>Government immediately mellowed its tone towards the opposition, signalling a willingness to engage in constructive dialogue. Within days, Odinga was serving as <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Raila-attended-Winnie-Mandela-funeral-as--official-Kenyan-envoy-/1056-4394164-1205di2/index.html">official</a> government emissary to South Africa to attend Winnie Mandela’s funeral. And a joint team to oversee dialogue was announced.</p>
<p>But what does all this rapprochement mean? The <a href="http://www.president.go.ke/2018/03/09/building-bridges-to-a-new-kenyan-nation/">joint statement</a> following the first meeting sought to strike a new political tone. On the surface, it signalled the willingness of both men to draw a line under the acrimony that had emerged from the electoral crisis. </p>
<p>This perhaps points to Kenya’s politics as not only complex but also unpredictable. The country has been here before – after the 2008 elections of Mwai Kibaki thousands died <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/africa/31kenya.html">in inter communal post electoral violence</a>. Undertakings were given and efforts were made to build national unity. Yet a decade later, Kenyans are witness to more of the same, albeit on a lesser scale. </p>
<p>Questions are therefore being asked if there is any depth to the Kenyatta-Raila “handshake” beyond portraying both leaders as magnanimous and willing to compromise for the national interests. Their joint statement sought to heal divisions and open a new chapter of inclusiveness and security for all. </p>
<p>For now it is too early to deduce tangible evidence of political inclusivity though tensions have been greatly dialled down. Kenyatta’s <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/I-am-sorry--says-Uhuru-Kenyatta--in-new-unity-plea-/1064-4541806-xiq0ajz/index.html">public apology</a> to those he “offended” was meant to portray him as a conciliatory statesman. </p>
<p>On the other hand Odinga had more political capital to gain by seeking compromise as a way out of the impasse. His <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1de27bbf-5abc-3e53-ad33-6c56f38d295c">defiance campaign</a> was always deemed more disruptive and a political nuisance than strategically meaningful as the <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20171120-kenya-supreme-court-upholds-kenyatta-election-win">Supreme Court</a> had validated the elections.</p>
<h2>Much more is needed</h2>
<p>What Kenya needs is transformative change, including constitutional reforms. This should include strengthening structures in which everyone feels represented. And the country needs to design a formula to provide a competitive but an embracing political framework that can deliver enduring peace and prosperity for all Kenyans.</p>
<p>Many <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/548e1080-7f88-11e7-a4ce-15b2513cb3ff">lives were lost</a> in the post electoral violence. The two leaders bear special responsibility and should therefore lead efforts to help heal and bridge communal divisions. The recent warming of relations between the two protagonists point to this effort. </p>
<p>But they are not the only players. Others that would be equally important in bringing their communities on board in the broader effort of reconciliation. they include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://www.kenya-today.com/politics/meet-ruto-the-king-maker">William Ruto</a>, current deputy president and an ethnic Kalenjin, </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Kalonzo-Musyoka-Skips-Raila-Odinga-Oath-Event/1064-4285500-7pd502z/index.html">Kalonzo Musyoka</a>, former vice president, wider democratic movement leader, co-principle of NASA and an ethnic kamba, and </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Musalia-differs-with-Raila-on-fresh-elections/1064-4316288-egr9n4/index.html">Musalia Mudavadi</a> a co-principal of NASA, former vice president and deputy prime minister, leader of Amani National congress and an ethnic Luhya would
The role of civil society and religious leaders is also indispensable as partners in reconciliation and rebuilding inter-communal and institutional trust. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>In the short and medium term, it’s overly optimistic to expect ethnic politics to dissipate in Kenya. This requires institutional change as well as a shift in attitude, values and culture like belief in collective prosperity, non-violent settlement of disputes and inter communal trust. For this Kenyan communities and their political leaders still have a great deal to do.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96283/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David E Kiwuwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Questions are being raised about the Kenyatta and Odinga relationship.David E Kiwuwa, Associate Professor of International Studies, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/961482018-05-07T13:51:26Z2018-05-07T13:51:26ZKenyatta-Raila pact will only herald real change if promises are followed by action<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217790/original/file-20180504-166903-18s5nga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta (left) and opposition leader Raila Odinga.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>In his state of the nation address to parliament last week Uhuru Kenyatta made a rare <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/I-am-sorry--says-Uhuru-Kenyatta--in-new-unity-plea-/1064-4541806-xiq0ajz/index.html">personal apology</a> for Kenya’s roughneck election campaign. Cheered by both sides of the House, he urged support for the national reconciliation he and opposition rival Raila Odinga have championed since a <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Uhuru-Kenyatta-and-Raila-Odinga-handshake/1064-4379964-os1fhtz/index.html">pubic show of unity</a> in March. Julius Maina asks Gabrielle Lynch about the hotly debated questions.</em></p>
<p><strong>What is the context in which Kenyatta and Raila closed ranks?</strong></p>
<p>Kenyatta and Odinga’s handshake on 9 March 2018 came in the wake of a protracted dispute over Kenya’s 2017 elections. Following the polls last August, opposition leader, Odinga, and the National Super Alliance (NASA) <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Key-lessons-for-election-team-as-Kenyans-return-to-ballot-/440808-4079934-roelpv/index.html">successfully petitioned</a> Kenyatta’s re-election. But they then boycotted a fresh election in October on the basis that the election would simply be stolen once again. This decision was understandable, but it left Kenyatta to win in October with 98.3% of the votes cast.</p>
<p>But the fact that turnout fell from 79.5% of registered voters in August <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4587b91e-bd82-11e7-9836-b25f8adaa111">to 38.8 %</a> ensured that the October polls failed to resolve the dispute. The turnout didn’t entirely discredit Kenyatta, but it was too low to give him the legitimacy he sought. And it reinforced a conviction among opposition supporters that - as in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531050802058286">2007</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2013.871182">2013</a> - the 2017 presidential election had been stolen from Odinga. </p>
<p>In this context, NASA rejected Kenyatta’s re-election and announced the formation of a <a href="https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/24219-nasa-makes-another-move-after-forming-resistance-movement">National Resistance Movement</a>, <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Nasa-announces-boycott-of-some-products-/1056-4171976-36pbpmz/index.html">an economic boycott</a> and plans to <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Kenya-opposition-to-form-Peoples-Assembly/2558-4163812-3jg792/index.html">form People’s Assemblies</a>. At the end of January 2018, Odinga was unofficially <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/thousands-of-kenyan-opposition-supporters-gather-to-swear-in-their-candidate/2018/01/30/fb7dfc62-05ba-11e8-8777-2a059f168dd2_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e35bcec4c3e2">sworn-in</a> as the “People’s President”. </p>
<p>At the same time, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/kenya-economy/update-2-kenya-economy-seen-rebounding-after-election-slowdown-idUSL8N1S22GO">economy took a hit</a> with many struggling even more than usual to buy food and pay bills and fees. </p>
<p>*<em>What are their declared goals and to what extent do they enjoy public support?
*</em></p>
<p>Amid this ongoing crisis, Kenyatta and Odinga held a meeting on 9 March, shook hands and issued <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Uhuru--Raila-joint-statement-in-full/1056-4335082-kjgc8u/index.html">a statement</a> on </p>
<blockquote>
<p>building bridges to a new Kenyan nation. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This statement set out a number of issues they said needed to be addressed. These included ethnic antagonism and competition, the need to include all communities in governance and development, security and the problem of divisive elections. The stated objective was to build a strong and united nation. But there was very little detail on how this would be achieved.</p>
<p>Since then, Odinga was invited to speak at the country’s annual <a href="https://www.kenya-today.com/devolution/h-e-raila-odinga-speech-at-the-fifth-devolution-conference-in-kakamega">devolution conference</a> and a team of 14 advisors was announced <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001278633/14-advisors-to-lead-uhuru-raila-building-bridges-initiative">to steer national dialogue </a>. </p>
<p>Most recently, Kenyatta used his <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Uhuru-full-state-of-the-nation-address/1064-4541100-gqbp50z/index.html">state of the nation address</a> to apologise to any Kenyans he had hurt and to call for reconciliation. Critically, he clarified that, by reconciliation, he did not mean agreement on all matters, but constructive and respectful disagreement and debate.</p>
<p>The vast majority of Kenyans appear to support these goals: stability, security, inclusive development and an ability to speak and be heard are the very things that most people crave. But many are sceptical. This is <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/03/15/dont-believe-the-kenyatta-odinga-handshake-hype-kenyans-are-still-on-their-own/?utm_term=.43ddb8bf1988">not the first time</a> that an election crisis in Kenya has ended with a handshake and people are waiting to see what “building bridges” means in practice. </p>
<p>While the majority appear to be happy that the immediate crisis has come to an end and the economy can begin to recover, many fear that this is an elite pact that has more to do with coalition politics ahead of 2022 than it does with ordinary Kenyans.</p>
<p>A significant number of opposition supporters also clearly feel betrayed. In reaching this deal, Odinga seems to have gone behind the backs of his NASA partners. NASA’s commitment to fight injustice also raised hopes that change would be forced through. For some, this hope has turned to <a href="https://www.theeastafricanreview.info/op-eds/2018/04/14/this-is-what-its-cost-us/">frustration and anger</a>, which currently has no obvious outlet. </p>
<p><strong>Who is to blame for Kenya’s recurring dance with death?</strong></p>
<p>The blame for Kenya’s divisive ethnic politics is often placed squarely at the door of the country’s political elite. This is not without reason. Politicians tend to mobilise support among their own ethnic groups and against the assumed spokesmen of other ethnic groups. They have also sometimes incited hatred and <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Reports/Commission_of_Inquiry_into_Post_Election_Violence.pdf">organised violence</a>. </p>
<p>But it’s too simplistic to just blame the country’s political elite. </p>
<p>Discussions of blame should start with a history in which a <a href="https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/tjrc/">violent and unpredictable colonial state</a> was inherited largely unchanged by a post-colonial elite until a new constitution was passed in 2010. It is a history that has encouraged the emergence of ethnic strongmen and fostered a sense that one is more likely to gain if <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17531055.2013.844438">one of “your own”</a> is elected. </p>
<p>The flip side is to fear exclusion and marginalisation if a collective quest for political power is unsuccessful.</p>
<p><strong>What are the chances of Kenyatta and Raila achieving success?</strong> </p>
<p>It depends on what you mean by success and for whom. The pact between them has helped to dampen a confrontational political mood. It has paved the way for other <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001279034/mps-in-mass-handshakes-as-uhuru-apologises">displays of reconciliation</a>. It may also lead to a more concerted commitment to devolution, and to some more investment in opposition areas, as Kenyatta becomes increasingly concerned with his legacy. But it’s too early to tell what this means for political realignments ahead of 2022. </p>
<p>More importantly, such an elite pact can’t change Kenya’s political culture, further strengthen the country’s institutions, or address the deep rooted sense of injustice and marginalisation that many Kenyans share. Success on those fronts requires time and a complex mix of concerted political will, substantive political and economic change, and new popular expectations of the political elite.</p>
<p>On the other hand, failure to address a sense of marginalisation will ensure that the memories of 2017 fuel a sense of a biased and violent state, and of injustice for many. It is thus understandable that many are sceptical. It’s also important that pressure is brought to bear to ensure that promising words are followed by action.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96148/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabrielle Lynch received funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council under grant ES.L002345.1.</span></em></p>The majority of Kenyans appear to be happy as President Uhuru Kenyatta and opposition leader Raila Odinga’s pledge to “build bridges.”Gabrielle Lynch, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.