tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/macky-sall-40978/articlesMacky Sall – The Conversation2024-03-28T15:11:09Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2267572024-03-28T15:11:09Z2024-03-28T15:11:09ZBassirou Diomaye Faye: from prison runner-up to president of Senegal<p><a href="https://www.sudquotidien.sn/macky-sall-adresse-ses-felicitations-a-bassirou-diomaye-faye/">Bassirou Diomaye Faye</a> was elected as Senegal’s fifth president <a href="https://theconversation.com/senegal-election-presidentielle-reportee-le-precedent-de-1967-224524">on 25 March 2024</a>. Incumbent president Macky Sall and his candidate, former prime minister Amadou Ba, were <a href="https://www.sudquotidien.sn/macky-sall-adresse-ses-felicitations-a-bassirou-diomaye-faye/">both quick to congratulate the opposition candidate</a> on his victory when the results came out. </p>
<p>This has been a major – and fast – turn of events for Faye (commonly called “Diomaye”), who was in prison just 10 days before the election. Faye was backed by the popular opposition leader Ousmane Sonko, who was deprived of <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/01/05/au-senegal-la-candidature-de-l-opposant-ousmane-sonko-a-la-presidentielle-rejetee-par-le-conseil-constitutionnel_6209256_3212.html">his electoral rights for five years</a> due to a prior conviction. Sonko received a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/senegal-appeals-court-hands-harsher-sentence-opposition-leader-sonko-2023-05-08/">six-month suspended prison sentence</a> for allegedly defaming tourism minister Mame Mbaye Niang.</p>
<p>Faye, who has never held elected office, was a little-known candidate who emerged from Sonko’s shadow. </p>
<p>Having researched <a href="https://www.academia.edu/43952863/Y_EN_A_MARRE_les_options_langagi%C3%A8res_dun_mouvement_contestataire">young Senegalese politicians</a> and <a href="https://www.cihablog.com/resistance-feminine-et-pacifique-en-casamance-alandi-bassene-1913-1940-feminist-non-violent-resistance-casamance-alandi-bassene-1913-1940/">Senegal’s contemporary political scene</a> we wanted to provide some insights into who Faye is, and his unconventional rise to power.</p>
<h2>A native of rural Senegal</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/senegal-election-presidentielle-reportee-le-precedent-de-1967-224524">Born on 25 March 1980</a> in Ndiaganiao, a rural area in west-central Senegal, Faye received his primary education in his village. He continued his middle and secondary education in Mbour, south-east of Dakar, where he earned his bachelor’s degree in 2000. Faye pursued higher education at Dakar’s Cheikh Anta Diop University, and obtained a master’s degree in 2004. </p>
<p>Following this, he took competitive entrance exams for the police officers’ academy, the magistrates’ academy and the École Nationale d'Administration (the elite leadership training school). While he did not pass the exam for the police officers’ academy, he succeeded in the other two exams.</p>
<p>Admitted to the magistrates’ examination, he decided to withdraw, opting instead for the leadership training school. He specialised in taxation and went on to join the Direction Générale des Impôts et Domaines (tax and land administration) in 2007.</p>
<h2>His career</h2>
<p>When Faye joined the tax administration, he was an active member of the newly formed <a href="https://www.nettali.com/2023/04/18/bassirou-diomaye-faye-en-prison-les-agents-des-impots-en-ordre-de-bataille/">Syndicat autonome des agents des impôts et domaines (Autonomous Union of Tax and Domain Agents)</a>. This was led by its founder and secretary general, Ousmane Sonko (from April 2005 to June 2012). Faye was initially the head of claims and later became the secretary general after Sonko’s departure, although Sonko remained at his side as honorary secretary general for two years (2012-2016). </p>
<p>Drawing on their trade union experience, Faye, Sonko and other young civil servants went on to create the African Patriots of Senegal for Work, Ethics and Fraternity (Pastef) party in 2014. </p>
<p>Faye successively held the positions of member of the steering committee, president of the Mouvement national des cadres patriotes et des diasporas (National Movement of Patriot Cadres and Diasporas) and secretary general, becoming the party’s second-in-command, from October 2022. </p>
<h2>Ndingler’s rising star</h2>
<p>While Faye is mostly known for being in Sonko’s shadow, he’s famous in his region for supporting a vulnerable community in a <a href="https://www.sudquotidien.sn/litige-foncier-a-ndingler-amnesty-international-senegal-menace-de-saisir-des-juridictions-internationales/">land dispute</a>. This was between the Ndingler villagers (within the Ndiaganiao area from which Faye hails) and the Senegalese company Sedima, run by businessman and industrialist <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/629718/economie-entreprises/senegal-face-a-face-ameth-amar-et-babacar-ngom-en-cohabitation-patronale/">Babacar Ngom</a>.</p>
<p>Faye had <a href="https://www.dakaractu.com/Litige-foncier-Ce-qui-se-passe-a-Ndengler-est-absolument-injuste-triste-et-ecoeurant-Bassirou-Diomaye-Faye_a183664.html">denounced</a> land grabbing by Sedima, which occurred without any compensation for “peasant populations”.</p>
<h2>The other side of the coin</h2>
<p>The fame he gained from this widely publicised battle didn’t, however, secure him a victory in his stronghold during local elections in January 2022. He lost in Ndiaganiao to the regime’s candidate. </p>
<p>His political ambitions were further thwarted when his nomination to the national candidate list for the July 2022 parliamentary elections was <a href="https://lequotidien.sn/invalidation-des-listes-irregulieres-la-loi-des-juges-yaw-et-benno-meme-combat-pour-la-validite">invalidated</a> due to issues with the candidate lists he belonged to.</p>
<p>These two successive setbacks seemed to seal his fate as an opponent of local and national stature. </p>
<p>Following the <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20240105-la-cour-supr%C3%AAme-s%C3%A9n%C3%A9galaise-confirme-la-condamnation-pour-diffamation-d-ousmane-sonko">law suit</a> brought against Sonko, Faye was imprisoned. He was accused of attacking the judiciary when he criticised the Dakar Court of Appeal’s decision to close Sonko’s case without giving him the chance to appeal. </p>
<p>Faye was also being vocal about a trial that would make Sonko ineligible for the 2024 presidential elections. On <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20230415-s%C3%A9n%C3%A9gal-bassirou-diomaye-faye-bras-droit-d-ousmane-sonko-arr%C3%AAt%C3%A9-et-plac%C3%A9-en-garde-%C3%A0-vue">14 April 2023</a>, he was charged with “contempt of court, defamation and acts likely to compromise public peace”. </p>
<h2>Political manoeuvring at play</h2>
<p>The detention of Faye, the party’s secretary-general, and its president, Sonko, fuelled speculation that the government intended to remove the leadership of the Pastef party. Indeed, in July 2023, Senegal’s interior ministry <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/31/senegal-dissolves-party-of-opposition-leader-sonko">dissolved</a> Pastef. </p>
<p>However, unlike Sonko, Faye was not put on trial. This meant he could retain his civic rights. It was during his jail time that the Pastef party <a href="https://www.sudquotidien.sn/candidat-de-lex-pastef-a-la-presidentielle-2024-sonko-porte-son-devolu-sur-bassirou-diomaye-faye/">developed</a> a plan to facilitate his participation in the upcoming presidential election. </p>
<p>Campaign images bearing the slogan “Diomaye moy Sonko” (“Diomaye is Sonko”) circulated on social media on Sunday, 19 November 2023, just ahead of the sponsorship period for the presidential election in Senegal. </p>
<p>Many were surprised when Sonko relinquished his position to support Faye. And several MPs – Guy Marius Sagna, Birame Souleye Diop, and Abass Fall – who were contenders in the presidential elections, withdrew their candidacies. This made Faye the <a href="https://aps.sn/presidentielle-2024-quatre-personnalites-proches-dousmane-sonko-investissent-bassirou-diomaye-faye/">sole candidate</a> of the party.</p>
<p>Despite Pastef’s dissolution, they successfully initiated a popular sponsorship campaign for Faye. </p>
<h2>The burning questions</h2>
<p>Often described as altruistic, Faye revealed in his <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B9ZICt7F8Zo&embeds_referring_euri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bing.com%2F&embeds_referring_origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bing.com&source_ve_path=Mjg2NjY&feature=emb_logo">first press conference</a> after his release from prison how he used his first scholarship from the leadership training school to provide clean water connections for his family and neighbours. </p>
<p>He vehemently opposes the use of strength by the powerful to <a href="https://senegal7.com/bassirou-diomaye-faye-portrait-de-celui-qui-pourrait-diriger-les-destinees-du-senegal-apres-le-scrutin/">oppress</a> those who are, supposedly, weak.</p>
<p>The man, despite the <a href="https://theconversation.com/senegal-election-presidentielle-reportee-le-precedent-de-1967-224524">tumultuous electoral context</a>, received acclaim from voters, and he appeared quite timid on 25 March during his first presidential address.</p>
<p>It remains to be seen whether he can fill the presidential shoes. The coming weeks should enlighten us.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226757/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mouhamed Abdallah Ly is affiliated with Institut Fondamental d'Afrique noire. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pape Chérif Bertrand Bassène, Senior Lecturer, Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar</span></em></p>Bassirou Diomaye Faye rose to power in the shadow of popular opposition leader Ousmane Sonko.Mouhamed Abdallah Ly, enseignant chercheur, Université Cheikh Anta Diop de DakarPape Chérif Bertrand Bassène, Senior Lecturer, Université Cheikh Anta Diop de DakarLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2262012024-03-25T15:10:00Z2024-03-25T15:10:00ZSenegal: Macky Sall’s reputation is dented, but the former president did a lot at home and abroad<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Macky-Sall">Macky Sall</a>’s legacy as Senegal’s president since 2012 became more complex in his last year in office. The year was so filled with transgressions that they appeared to have tarnished his reputation indelibly. </p>
<p>For some months he gave the impression to his adversaries and critics that he had <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/OXAN-DB278700/full/html">third-term ambitions</a> – not uncommon in contemporary west African politics. </p>
<p>A public outcry followed his <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/3/senegals-macky-sall-postpones-presidential-election">decision</a> on 3 February 2024 to postpone the polls that had originally been scheduled for three weeks later. Then his deputies in the national assembly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/6/senegal-parliament-delays-election-to-december-15-after-chaotic-vote">voted unanimously</a> to postpone the elections and prolong Sall’s term in office until December. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/macky-sall-throws-senegals-democratic-credentials-into-doubt-222923">Macky Sall throws Senegal's democratic credentials into doubt</a>
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<p>On 6 March, the country’s Constitutional Council <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/eye-on-africa/20240215-senegal-constitutional-council-rules-election-delay-unlawful">ruled</a> that the delay was unconstitutional and that the elections would have to be held before 6 April <strong>before April 2 rather</strong>, when Sall’s presidential term expires. </p>
<p>In compliance, Sall slated Senegal’s election for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68497489">24 March</a>. With that decision, the danger of an authoritarian drift in Senegal appears to have been averted. </p>
<p>The time has therefore come for a more reasoned evaluation of his eight years in office.</p>
<p>I’ve been an <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/douglas-yates-1462326">observer</a> of Senegalese politics since the late 1990s, doing democracy building for the US Information Agency’s Africa Regional Bureau, teaching African politics to graduate students in Paris, and commenting in the media on developments in Senegalese politics. </p>
<p>Based on my experience, I would argue that Sall’s presidential terms have made some economic, domestic and international achievements worth remembering now, in these days of suspense and doubt. </p>
<p>In my view the legacy of <a href="https://www.presidence.sn/en/presidency/biography">Macky Sall</a> has been saved. Or at least that is how it appears.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/2024-senegal-election-crisis-points-to-deeper-issues-with-macky-sall-and-his-preferred-successor-223035">2024 Senegal election crisis points to deeper issues with Macky Sall and his preferred successor</a>
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<h2>What he leaves behind</h2>
<p>Among his presidential legacies are major infrastructure projects, including airports, a better rail system and industrial parks. </p>
<p>Senegal’s airports were in a deplorable condition when he came to office. The country had 20 airports, but only nine had paved runways. In their poor state, these airports did not attract the major international business flyers who could set up businesses and hire the country’s educated workforce or collaborate with its innovative entrepreneurs.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nrv-norvia.com/en/projects/blaise-diagne-international-airport">Blaise Diagne International Airport</a>, named after the first black African elected to France’s parliament in 1914, opened in December 2017. The project, which was started in 2007 by his predecessor, Abdoulaye Wade, was completed by Sall. </p>
<p>Located near the capital, Dakar, with easy access via a modern freeway, it has boosted passenger mobility and freight transport. The national airline, <a href="https://flyairsenegal.com/en/home/">Air Senegal</a>, is based here. It reaches more than 20 destinations in 18 countries. </p>
<p>Sall also built the country’s first regional express train, the <a href="https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/dakar-regional-express-train/">Train Express Regional</a>, an airport rail link that connects Dakar with a major new industrial park (also built during Sall’s tenure) and the Blaise Diagne International Airport. </p>
<p>Sall also strengthened the regional airport hubs of the country. He spearheaded the <a href="https://www.transcon.sn/en/project-intro/project-objectives">reconstruction</a> of five regional airports within Senegal. </p>
<p>The Diamniadio Industrial Park, 30km east of Dakar, financed by loans from Eximbank China, was completed in 2023. The park is a flagship industrial project of Sall’s industrialisation strategy for Senegal. </p>
<p>The new park is positioned at the heart of a network of special economic zones, including Diass, Bargny, Sendou and Ndayane. </p>
<p>Enterprises from multiple fields, including pharmaceuticals, electronic appliances and textiles, are setting up offices in the park, which is expected to manufacture high-quality products that meet local needs. </p>
<p>The airports, trains and industrial parks are expected by Sall’s supporters to make a real contribution to Senegal’s transformation from post-colonial peanut exporter to import-substitution manufacturing hub.</p>
<p>In my view, what Sall leaves behind is substantial, particularly when compared with the highly <a href="https://www.npr.org/2010/01/05/122220923/for-many-in-senegal-statue-is-a-monumental-failure">controversial African Renaissance Monument</a> of his predecessor Abdoulaye Wade. The 171-foot-tall bronze statue located on top of a hill towering over Dakar, built by a North Korean firm, has contributed little or no value to the country’s economy.</p>
<p>Sall has also made some contributions to Senegal’s reputation abroad, positioning himself as a respected and influential player on the international stage. As president of the regional economic body Ecowas in <a href="https://www.presidence.sn/en/newsroom/senegals-place-in-ecowas_1122">2015-2016</a>, he made improving economic integration the focus of his term. </p>
<p>He also worked to build closer relations with other international organisations, including the G7, G20 and the African Union. While chairman of the AU from 2022 to 2023 he <a href="https://www.forbesafrica.com/opinion/op-ed/2023/07/30/african-union-must-be-in-the-g20/">lobbied</a> for inclusion of the African Union in the G20, complaining that South Africa was the continent’s only member of any economic forum of international importance. </p>
<p>In his <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20220920/77th-session-united-nations-general-assembly-address-he-macky-sall">address</a> to the United Nations General Assembly, he championed the cause of the continent. There was no excuse, he said, for failing to ensure consistent African representation in the world’s key decision-making bodies. </p>
<p>He emphasised the importance of increased funding from developed countries for climate adaptation initiatives in developing countries, particularly those in Africa.</p>
<p>Sall’s management of the <a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1">COVID crisis</a>, which reached Senegal in March 2020, was his first major test of leadership. Despite its limited resources, Senegal <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/how-senegal-has-set-the-standard-on-covid-19-98266">outperformed</a> many wealthier countries in its COVID pandemic response, thanks to Sall’s leadership.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/senegals-internet-shutdowns-are-another-sign-of-a-democracy-in-peril-207443">Senegal's internet shutdowns are another sign of a democracy in peril</a>
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<h2>Contribution to Senegal’s democratic tradition</h2>
<p>His important legacy will be his participation in the democratic tradition of Senegal. </p>
<p>Firstly, he took on Abdoulaye Wade’s dynastic ambitions to name his son Karim Wade as the heir apparent. Sall then went on to <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/02/23/senegalese-president-macky-sall-promises-to-step-down-but-does-not-set-election-date_6551927_124.html">respect</a> his two-term limit on the presidency. This means he will soon hand power over to a successor, maintaining a unique and <a href="https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/senegal/newsroom/fact-sheets/senegal-democracy-and-governance-fact-sheet">uninterrupted tradition</a> of power transition in one of west Africa’s most stable democracies. </p>
<p>It hasn’t all been plain sailing. In recent years, the temptation of power seemed to have overwhelmed Sall. He started giving out <a href="https://www.africaintelligence.com/west-africa/2023/03/02/paris-and-washington-fret-over-macky-sall-s-third-term-ambitions,109919519-eve">troubling signs</a> of his desire to remain in office beyond his constitutional mandate.</p>
<p>Then, after testing the waters and finding public opinion was strongly opposed to his violating the limits that he himself had imposed while in the opposition to his predecessor, he <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66093983">declined</a> to present himself for elections. Instead, he endorsed the candidacy of his <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20231222-senegalese-pm-amadou-ba-named-as-ruling-party-s-presidential-candidate">then-prime minister Amadou Ba</a>. </p>
<p>But this was followed by a series of arrests of his most vocal opponents, in particular the popular social media celebrity <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68562465">Ousmane Sonko</a>. </p>
<p>More than <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=How+many+dead+in+Senegal+protests&rlz=1C1ONGR_frFR949FR949&oq=How+many+dead+in+Senegal+protests&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIHCAEQIRigATIHCAIQIRigAdIBCDQzNDJqMGo3qAIAsAIA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8">350 protestors</a> were arrested during demonstrations in March 2021 and June 2023. At least 23 died. </p>
<p>Then came his last-minute presidential decree <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/02/05/senegal-president-macky-sall-postpones-election-and-his-departure-from-the-presidency_6494443_124.html">postponing</a> the election earlier scheduled for 25 February. </p>
<p>This was followed by <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/02/10/senegal-student-killed-in-protest-against-election-postponement_6510579_124.html">democracy protests</a> and by violent police repression of urban protests, which resulted in civilian deaths. </p>
<p>After protests, Sall made another extraordinary about-turn. He <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/senegals-president-pledges-to-comply-with-constitutional-councils-ruling-hold-presidential-poll-soon/3139996#">announced</a> that he would respect the Constitutional Court decision, which denied him the right to prolong his presidential mandate and required that elections be held before 6 April. </p>
<p>In doing so he preserved the system of checks and balances in Senegal. In addition, his decision to <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240315-senegal-s-top-opposition-leaders-sonko-faye-released-from-prison-says-lawyer">release</a> Sonko and his other opponents from prison and grant them amnesty has preserved the space for democratic opposition and civil liberties.</p>
<p>Sall’s legacy as a voice of Africa may offer him a lateral promotion from the presidency of Senegal to the seat of some international organisation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226201/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Douglas Yates does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With the conduct of the 24 March elections, Senegal’s President Macky Sall appears to have saved his legacy.Douglas Yates, Professor of Political Science , American Graduate School in Paris (AGS)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2230352024-03-18T10:59:45Z2024-03-18T10:59:45Z2024 Senegal election crisis points to deeper issues with Macky Sall and his preferred successor<p>The botched attempt by Senegalese president <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Macky-Sall">Macky Sall</a> to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/3/senegals-macky-sall-postpones-presidential-election">postpone</a> the presidential election has stirred unnecessary tension in an already strained electoral process. The move reflected deeper governance problems in the country.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/3/senegals-macky-sall-postpones-presidential-election">Sall’s decree</a>, subsequently <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/02/16/constitutional-council-plunges-senegal-into-the-unknown-by-overturning-election-postponement_6531088_124.html">annulled by the Constitutional Council</a>, was the latest in a range of government interventions that exceeded the scope of the executive authority. These have included the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/01/22/sonko-wade-not-listed-among-official-candidates-of-feb25-presidential-election/">disqualification</a> of key opposition candidates, the manipulation of judicial procedures, and the arbitrary detention of dissenting figures.</p>
<p>Sall’s 12-year tenure has been marked by contradictions. His administration boosted investment in transport and urban infrastructure. Notably, he worked on the <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/319731593403262722/text/Senegal-Transport-and-Urban-Mobility-Project.txt">motorway network</a>, the new Diass international airport, the development of major roads and the completion of public transport projects.</p>
<p>But these investments have not translated into improvements in the lives of Senegalese. Thousands of young people still go on <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1072143/politique/tribune-whatshappeninginsenegal-quand-le-drame-des-migrants-passe-au-second-plan/">perilous journeys</a> to Europe having lost hope of fulfilling their potential in their own country.</p>
<p>This is the backdrop to his move to postpone the elections in a last bid to secure a winning strategy for his camp. His anointed successor, <a href="https://www.ecofinagency.com/public-management/1109-44836-senegals-macky-sall-endorses-pm-amadou-ba-as-2024-successor">Amadou Ba</a>, remains a contested figure within the ruling <a href="https://www.senegel.org/en/movements/political-parties/poldetails/2">Alliance for the Republic Party</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Amy-Niang">I have a research interest</a> in state formation in west Africa. As I <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781786606525/The-Postcolonial-African-State-in-Transition-Stateness-and-Modes-of-Sovereignty">have argued</a> in my work, states sustain themselves by producing and alienating internal “others”. This refers to a scenario where governments assert sovereignty not against outside forces but against internal cultural groups and existing logics of governance. Sall’s style of government follows this pattern closely. </p>
<h2>Crisis within his party</h2>
<p>Sall <a href="https://fr.africanews.com/2024/02/10/senegal-macky-sall-se-justifie-sur-le-report-de-la-presidentielle//">said</a> he was postponing elections because of an alleged conflict between parliament and the Constitutional Council. The parliament had approved the creation of a commission of inquiry into the process of validation of presidential candidacies by the Constitutional Council.</p>
<p>Sall in fact latched onto <a href="https://www.bbc.com/afrique/articles/c1vywrx3xx9o">an accusation</a> of corruption levelled by Karim Wade against two Constitutional Council judges following Karim’s disqualification from running in the election due to his dual citizenship.</p>
<p>But the most plausible reason was a crisis within the ruling camp. The Alliance for the Republic is a divided party that is going to the elections in disarray. Sall’s chosen successor, <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/world/senegal-pm-amadou-ba-named-ruling-party-candidate-for-president/">Ba</a>, has generated little enthusiasm among voters. He symbolises the status quo. An affluent candidate, Ba has the difficult task of convincing an impoverished electorate that he is up to the task. </p>
<p>Sall overstepped his constitutional powers. The Senegalese <a href="https://adsdatabase.ohchr.org/IssueLibrary/SENEGAL_Constitution.pdf">constitution’s limitation</a> of the president’s term duration can’t be amended. Further, according to the <a href="https://dge.sn/sites/default/files/2019-01/CODE%20ELECTORAL%202018_0.pdf">electoral code</a>, the decree setting a date for presidential elections must be published no later than 80 days before the scheduled ballot. Sall postponed the poll just 12 hours before the campaigning was due to start, and <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/02/14/senegal-authorities-restrict-internet-access-and-ban-march//">22 days before the ballot</a>.</p>
<p>Sall’s attempt at postponing the elections, which has fostered a climate of distrust in the integrity of the electoral process, has left Senegal embroiled in a serious constitutional crisis. His decree brought forth two important issues:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the government’s commitment to an orderly handover of power</p></li>
<li><p>the integrity of the democratic process.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Erosion of a democratic tradition</h2>
<p>Since 2021, a series of protests and riots have pitted Ousmane Sonko, a key opposition figure facing rape allegations, and his supporters against a government accused of manipulating the judiciary to thwart a serious candidate. As a result, the economy has been severely disrupted. Each day of protests causes an estimated <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/restaurants-water-towers-unrest-dents-senegals-economy-2023-06-09/">$33 million loss</a> in economic output. </p>
<p>Further, Sall has used security and defence forces to establish an order of fear. He has resorted to heavy-handed measures against opposition figures and dissenting voices within civil society through arbitrary detention and prosecution. His government has systematically <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/05/senegal-violent-crackdown-opposition-dissent">restricted</a> the freedom of assembly, banned protests, suppressed independent media and mobilised public resources to bolster the ruling party.</p>
<p>For all these reasons, Senegal has seen an erosion of institutions meant to uphold the rule of law, foster political participation and ensure public accountability.</p>
<p>Sall was elected in <a href="https://fr.allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00016260.html">2012</a> after a tumultuous period under the flamboyant government of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdoulaye-Wade">President Abdoulaye Wade</a>. Sall owes his entire political career to Wade’s patronage. Yet their relationship soured when it became evident that Sall harboured ambitions to challenge Wade’s son, <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/profile/id/254/page/4">Karim</a>, who was being groomed to succeed his father. </p>
<p>Sall pledged to deliver virtuous and frugal governance. But public euphoria soon petered out as scandals involving cabinet ministers and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/06/25/senegal-soupconne-de-corruption-le-frere-du-president-macky-sall-demissionne_5481292_3212.html">close family members</a> laid bare the corruption within the administration.</p>
<p>In 2023, amid much brouhaha over the validity of a third term, Sall <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66093983">yielded</a> to public pressure after <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/senegalese-opposition-rally-against-president-sall-s-possible-third-term-ambition-/7091705.html">violent protests</a>. These resulted in the most serious political crisis since the 1960s, claiming over 60 lives and leading to the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/22/senegal-pre-election-crackdown">arrest</a> of over 1,000 people.</p>
<h2>Where to for Senegal?</h2>
<p>In compliance with the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/senegal-presidentsets-presidential-election-for-march-24-4547872">Constitutional Council ruling</a>, Sall has finally agreed to organise elections before his exit.</p>
<p>As the election day of 24 March draws near, the absence of key contenders, and uncertainties regarding the electoral procedures, inject an element of unpredictability. </p>
<p>Furthermore, the erosion of trust is such that the Senegalese public still doubts Sall’s commitment to fulfil his obligations and facilitate an orderly handover.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223035/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amy Niang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Attempts to postpone Senegal’s election indefinitely reflect deeper governance problems within Macky Sall’s administration, and the shortcomings of his chosen heir, Amadou Ba.Amy Niang, Head of Research Programme, Council for the Development of Social Science Research in AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2229232024-02-07T11:27:52Z2024-02-07T11:27:52ZMacky Sall throws Senegal’s democratic credentials into doubt<p>Senegal’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Macky-Sall">President Macky Sall</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/3/senegals-macky-sall-postpones-presidential-election">announced</a> in early February that presidential elections, originally scheduled for 25 February, would be postponed indefinitely. The announcement has raised fears of popular protests, violent repression, a once democratic president transforming into an authoritarian ruler – and possibly even another coup d’état in west Africa. </p>
<p>There has been a flurry of coups in the region since 2020 – Mali in August <a href="https://theconversation.com/mali-celebrates-after-presidents-ouster-but-there-are-few-good-coups-144846">that year</a> followed by <a href="https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/malis-military-coup-within-coup-no-elections-february-2021-journalist-abducted/">a second</a> in 2021. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/05/guinean-soldiers-claim-to-have-seized-power-in-coup-attempt">Guinea</a> also saw a coup that year and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/5/coup-in-burkina-faso-what-you-need-to-know">Burkina Faso</a> a year later. In July 2023 the military took control in <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-coup-west-africa-wagner-bazoum-c233b0d2becf61ebb00c5705941fc168">Niger</a>.</p>
<p>Senegal has never suffered a coup d'etat and has been considered the region’s <a href="https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/senegal/newsroom/fact-sheets/senegal-democracy-and-governance-fact-sheet#:%7E:text=Senegal%20has%20a%20reputation%20of,place%20following%20credible%20democratic%20elections.">most stable democracy</a>. </p>
<p>Since <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/senegal">independence in 1960</a> it has had three peaceful transitions of power. First in 1980, from <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Leopold-Senghor">Leopold Senghor</a> to <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdou-Diouf">Abdou Diouf</a>; then, in 2000, from Diouf to <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdoulaye-Wade">Abdoulaye Wade</a>; and then, in 2012, from <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdoulaye-Wade">Wade to Sall</a>.</p>
<p>In political science terminology, a democracy is considered consolidated only after a “<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/two-turnover-test">double turnover</a>”. This is when an opposition party which came to power through democratic elections (the first turnover) itself hands over power to its opposition after losing democratic elections (the second turnover).</p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://www.ags.edu/international-relations/agsird-faculty/douglas-a-yates">political scientist and researcher</a> with an interest in African politics and democracy building. Based on my experience, I believe Senegal is exceptional in west Africa. </p>
<p>The country has enjoyed a “triple turnover” of power through democratic elections. Yet all three of these peaceful democratic transitions were preceded by a crisis with incumbent presidents attempting to remain in office beyond their constitutional mandate. </p>
<p>Senegal’s democratic credentials seemed to be cemented by the fact that none of the presidents succeeded in staying on unconstitutionally.</p>
<p>This track record should be used to evaluate the prospects of a new president coming to office.</p>
<h2>A model west African democracy</h2>
<p>Over the past four decades Senegal became known for its <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/senegals-internet-shutdowns-are-another-sign-of-a-democracy-in-peril/">relatively independent</a> media and free expression. The presidents of Senegal all managed, eventually, to step down from power. This allowed elections to become the only game in town. </p>
<p>Senegal is rated “<a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/senegal/freedom-world/2023">partly free</a>” by Freedom House in its <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/FIW_World_2023_DigtalPDF.pdf">Freedom in the World 2023</a> report. The think-tank uses a set of criteria such as political rights and civil liberties to categorise countries as free, partly free and not free. Senegal scores well in some areas, like academic freedom and individuals’ right to practise and express their faith or non-belief in public. But it falls down in others, such as restricting people’s right of assembly and violently dispersing some demonstrations. </p>
<p>Although regular elections are held, each one of Senegal’s leaders started off well, then attempted to stay in power longer than the designated time.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.presidence.sn/en/presidency/leopold-sedar-senghor">Leopold Sedar Senghor</a> became Senegal’s first president after independence in 1960. He came to power on the back of his reputation as an intellectual of the “négritude” movement, as a democratic opponent of French colonialism and someone who had fought for freedom. </p>
<p>But, in 1963, 1968, 1973 and 1978, he staged presidential <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/plebiscite">plebiscites</a> so that he could remain in office. </p>
<p>Then, in December 1980, after 22 years in office, he <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/01/01/africas-aging-poet-politician-steps-down-as-president-of-senegal/e09641fe-a024-4942-b9f8-80a7068ab241/">decided</a> to step down and hand over to his designated successor, Abdou Diouf. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.presidence.sn/en/presidency/abdou-diouf">Abdou Diouf</a> had the same temptation. He held on to the presidency until decades of peaceful, principled, democratic opposition led by Abdoulaye Wade forced him to accept his losing bid for re-election in 2000.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.presidence.sn/en/presidency/abdoulaye-wade">Wade</a> served time in prison following a long struggle for power, and was forced into exile in Paris. He went on to lead a popular movement that ousted the long-ruling Socialist Party and Diouf. </p>
<p>He promised to clean up the corruption inherent in single-party rule. But towards the end of his second mandate in 2009, he too began to imitate his predecessors. Wade spent his last years in the presidential palace <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20111223-wade-senegal-seek-third-term-presidential-election-clashes">trying</a> to win a third term. When that did not work he named his son <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/profile/id/254/page/4">Karim Wade</a> as his dynastic successor. But Karim Wade was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32020574">convicted of coruption</a> and his father’s wishes weren’t fulfilled.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.presidence.sn/en/presidency/biography">Macky Sall</a> of the <a href="https://www.senegel.org/en/movements/political-parties/poldetails/2">Alliance for the Republic party</a> came to power in 2012 as an honest, anti-corruption politician. But he too has fallen. </p>
<p>After his re-election in 2019, he named an uncharismatic technocratic prime minister, <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/world/senegal-pm-amadou-ba-named-ruling-party-candidate-for-president/">Amadou Ba</a>, as his number two. This turned his former prime minister <a href="https://www.africaintelligence.com/west-africa/2022/11/23/ex-pm-aminata-toure-talks-2024-presidential-election-with-former-opponents,109867336-art">Aminata “Mimi” Touré</a> into his opponent. (She is now running for president.) It also ensured that he would not face a prime minister becoming more popular than himself.</p>
<p>Sall clearly wanted to run for a third term. Yet <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66093983">he renounced</a> that option in 2023, and endorsed Amadou Ba as his candidate for succession.</p>
<p>The last main opposition candidate left in 2023, after the exclusion of Karim Wade, was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20230602-who-is-ousmane-sonko-senegal-opposition-leader-convicted-of-corrupting-youth">Ousmane Sonko</a>. A social media personality, he is sometimes referred to as the “Trump of Senegal” because of his shocking statements, which have endeared him to young Senegalese.
In <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66086570">one instance</a>, he said “those who have ruled Senegal from the beginning deserve to be shot.” </p>
<p>There is also a more serious side to Sonko, a former tax inspector who investigated corruption in the Sall government. He published a <a href="https://www.fauves-editions.fr/catalogue/couv/aplat/9791030200607.pdf">book</a> about oil and gas corruption in Senegal which implicated the Sall government. </p>
<p>In 2023 sexual assault charges were mounted against him, and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/01/senegal-ousmane-sonko-trial-conviction-protests-macky-sall-election/#:%7E:text=On%20Thursday%2C%20Sonko%20was%20convicted,allowed%20to%20appeal%20the%20decision.">he was imprisoned</a>. This disqualified him from running in the 2024 election. Sonko <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/01/30/ousmane-sonko-chooses-bassirou-diomaye-faye-as-replacement-in-senegals-presidential-race//">endorsed</a> Bassirou Diomaye Faye as his replacement.</p>
<p>His supporters have always maintained that the charges were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/police-fire-tear-gas-supporters-senegal-opposition-leader-sonko-2023-02-16/">trumped up</a> because of his opposition to the Sall government.</p>
<p>Sonko was acquitted on the rape charge but <a href="https://apnews.com/article/senegal-opposition-leader-sonko-rape-verdict-a75472375f6a6d5b8918a5c813c292cd">convicted</a> for “corrupting the youth”. Young people <a href="https://theconversation.com/senegal-behind-the-protests-is-a-fight-for-democratic-freedoms-208612">took to the streets in protest</a>, calling Sall a tyrant. Sall used the repressive apparatus of the state to quell the protests.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/senegal-behind-the-protests-is-a-fight-for-democratic-freedoms-208612">Senegal: behind the protests is a fight for democratic freedoms</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Then, on 4 February, as campaigning was about to begin, in an unprecedented move Sall <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/04/senegal-president-postpones-election-hours-before-official-campaign-start">announced</a> that he was postponing the election indefinitely, citing a dispute over the candidate list.</p>
<p>Protesters and police <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2024/2/5/police-and-protesters-clash-after-senegal-election-postponed#:%7E:text=Senegalese%20police%20clashed%20with%20opposition%20supporters%20protesting%20against%20election%20delay%20in%20Dakar.&text=Police%20made%20arrests%20and%20fired%20tear%20gas%20as%20opposition%20supporters,to%20postpone%20elections%20in%20Senegal.">clashed</a> in Dakar. </p>
<p>Tensions continued to rise. As opposition leaders and supporters launched protests, the government imposed <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/02/05/senegal-cuts-internet-access-as-lawmakers-debate-a-bill-to-possibly-extend-the-presidents-/">restrictions on</a> access to the internet.</p>
<p>On 5 February parliamentarians were asked to vote on postponing the election until 15 December. A long and heated debate ensued. Several opposition lawmakers were forcibly removed from the chamber while the police used tear gas to disperse protesters gathered outside the parliament building.</p>
<p>In the end the decision to postpone the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/senegal-should-hold-presidential-vote-soon-possible-african-union-2024-02-05/">poll until December</a> was passed with opposition MPs missing. A number <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ecowas-urges-politicians-senegal-urgently-re-establish-electoral-calendar-2024-02-06/">were arrested</a>.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>In my view Senegal is a consolidated democracy. It has passed through three peaceful democratic transitions of power from a ruling party to the opposition. </p>
<p>The optics of the present moment are certainly not good. But past experience suggests a new president could still come to office, either from the ruling party or from the opposition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222923/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Douglas Yates does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Senegal is considered west Africa’s most stable democracy because it has never suffered a coup d'etat. But all its former presidents have attempted to extend their tenure of office.Douglas Yates, Professor of Political Science , American Graduate School in Paris (AGS)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2086122023-07-03T14:52:11Z2023-07-03T14:52:11ZSenegal: behind the protests is a fight for democratic freedoms<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534405/original/file-20230627-19-529c19.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Clashes erupted in Senegal following the sentencing of opposition leader Ousmane Sonko to two years in prison for "corrupting the youth" in June 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Annika Hammerschlag/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In a late evening <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/senegal-president-sall-says-he-will-not-seek-third-term-2024-election-2023-07-03/">announcement</a> on 3 July, <a href="https://www.presidence.sn/en/presidency/biography">President Macky Sall</a> put an end to speculations that he would seek a third term in office by contesting in 2024.</p>
<p>Prior to that announcement, Sall’s unwillingness to confirm he would not run for a third term, and the targeting of political opponents, created a political powder keg in Senegal.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/senegals-protest-hit-capital-left-with-looted-shops-debris-2023-06-03/">Protests broke out</a> in many cities across the country on 1 June 2023, following the conviction of leading opposition figure <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/01/senegal-ousmane-sonko-trial-conviction-protests-macky-sall-election/#:%7E:text=On%20Thursday%2C%20Sonko%20was%20convicted,allowed%20to%20appeal%20the%20decision.">Ousmane Sonko</a> for “corruption of the youth”. He was acquitted on charges of rape and death threats.</p>
<p>Sonko’s conviction marked the culmination of a <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/06/01/senegalese-opponent-sonko-sentenced-to-2-years-for-corrupting-youth_6028733_124.html">two-year legal saga</a> that crystallised the attention of a large segment of the Senegalese population against the government. An increasingly autocratic regime continues to curtail civil liberties and violate human rights.</p>
<p>Violence ensued in several towns, particularly in Dakar and Ziguinchor, where Sonko is mayor. </p>
<p>According to government officials, 16 people were <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/06/03/1180013963/senegal-protests-sonko-opposition-leader">killed</a> in clashes between riot police and protesters. Amnesty International and opposition parties reported close to <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/06/senegal-amnesty-international-demande-une-enquete-independante-sur-la-repression-meurtriere-lors-des-manifestations/">two dozen</a> fatalities, most of them with gunshot wounds.</p>
<p>Sonko was sentenced to two years in prison and is <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/06/02/senegal-erupts-in-anger-after-conviction-of-opponent-ousmane-sonko_6028868_4.html">prohibited</a> from running for the presidential elections in February 2024. But the verdict is only the most recent indicator of what’s fuelling political violence in Senegal. </p>
<p>Our expertise is in <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/rachel-beatty-riedl-1376019">institutional development</a> in new democracies, patterns of democratic backsliding, <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/bamba-ndiaye-1376085">social movements and political protests</a> in Africa. We argue that the drivers of political violence in Senegal today are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the previous ambiguity of Sall’s potential third-term bid and what it means for democracy</p></li>
<li><p>perceptions that the justice system is being used as a weapon against opposition</p></li>
<li><p>arbitrary detentions</p></li>
<li><p>a crackdown on journalists.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The Sall administration has dismissed concerns about democratic backsliding. </p>
<p>Our conversations with protesters in Dakar on 2 June showed that the outburst of violence went beyond the Sonko verdict. </p>
<p>Demonstrators were not necessarily Sonko fanatics, <a href="https://www.ouest-france.fr/monde/senegal/senegal-trois-questions-sur-les-affrontements-qui-ont-fait-16-morts-a-dakar-aa0b6c9a-02f6-11ee-9ca8-165c5bcfd065">as many</a> commentators made it seem. Instead, they support a free and impartial justice system and the rule of law. They sought to resist the democratic backsliding of a country that was a model in the region.</p>
<h2>Weaponised justice system</h2>
<p>Concerns over the use of the justice system against opponents of the regime are at the core of Senegalese political tensions. Samira Daoud, director of Amnesty West & Central Africa, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SkIDYJEMkH4">called</a> for the regime to “restore the fundamental principles of the rule of law by safeguarding an independent and impartial justice system.” </p>
<p>The partiality of the Senegalese justice system remains conspicuous in the regime’s efforts to sideline and isolate Sonko through legal prosecutions. </p>
<p>A defamation case <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/05/09/senegal-court-increases-sentence-to-six-months-against-opposition-figure-ousmane-sonko//">ruling</a> against Sonko in May 2023 found him guilty of libel against the former tourism minister, Mame Mbaye Niang. </p>
<p>For many observers, this ruling was further evidence that Sall’s control over the courts was being used to eliminate Sonko from the presidential race. The same pattern was seen in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/senegals-opposition-supporters-bang-pots-pans-noisy-protest-2022-06-22/">2022 legislative election</a>. </p>
<p>It’s also evident in the <a href="https://www.dakarmatin.com/affectation-de-greffiers-luntj-denonce-un-reglement-de-comptes/">systemic rotations</a> of magistrates between courts and the transfer of “disloyal” judicial officials outside the capital city.</p>
<p>An example is the <a href="https://www.pressafrik.com/Me-Ngagne-Demba-Toure-affecte-a-Matam-par-le-ministre-de-la-Justice_a258733.html">recent transfer</a> of court clerk Ngagne Demba Touré, a charismatic and vocal member of <a href="https://pastef.org/">PASTEF</a>, the political party founded by Sonko, from Dakar to Matam, a rural area 500km away. </p>
<h2>Arbitrary arrests</h2>
<p>In addition to Sonko, there have been hundreds of arbitrary <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/01/07/1147678892/the-arrest-of-a-prominent-journalist-in-senegal-has-sparked-unrest-and-fears">detentions of journalists</a> (Pape Niang, Serigne Saliou Guèye), activists (Ndèye Fatou Fall, Abdou Karim Guèye, Cheikh Oumar Diagne), <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/senegal-protests-dozens-arrested-in-latest-flare-up-/7029304.html">protesters</a> and <a href="https://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/senegal/">members of opposition parties</a>. Many were jailed for expressing opinions deemed “subversive” by the state.</p>
<p>Detentions of members of Sonko’s political party, such as Bassirou Diomaye Faye and Fadilou Keita, are seen as the result of a <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2023/05/gatsa-gatsa-ousmane-sonko-and-senegals-politics-of-retaliation/">two-faced judicial system</a> – one that favours regime allies and is harsh on opponents.</p>
<h2>A speculated third term bid</h2>
<p>The current political violence in Senegal is also fuelled by Sall’s previously unclear commitment to stand down after two terms in office. Since his infamous “ni oui, ni non” (<a href="https://www.facebook.com/yerimpost/videos/macky-sall-sur-le-3e-mandat-je-ne-r%C3%A9pondrai-ni-par-oui-ni-par-non/2691523460932621/">neither yes nor no</a>) response to whether he would run in 2024, citizens became increasingly concerned. </p>
<p>78 African journalists and press freedom organisations recently <a href="https://www.rsf.org/en/78-african-journalists-and-press-freedom-organisations-urge-senegal-free-reporter-respect-press">called</a> on Sall to free detained reporters, respect press freedom, respect the constitution and preserve the country’s sociopolitical stability. </p>
<p>In 2012 the courts <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/senegals-top-court-allows-incumbent-presidents-run-for-third-term-138237869/151242.html">allowed</a> incumbent president Abdoulaye Wade to run for a “third term” because of a change to the constitution. </p>
<p>Yet the majority of Senegalese voters disagreed and elected Sall. He had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/18/senegal-leader-macky-sall-offers-to-reduce-presidential-term-as-example-to-africa">promised</a> to return to five-year presidential terms from the previous seven-year term. </p>
<p>Sall also said he would ensure that no leader could serve for more than <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17215803">two terms</a>.</p>
<p>Senegalese legal experts agree that <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hDpT4URkWw0">Article 27</a> of the constitution precludes Sall from bidding for the presidency next year. He and his current justice minister, Ismaila Major Fall, repeatedly stated this themselves. </p>
<p>That was until Sall’s <a href="https://aps.sn/la-nouvelle-declaration-de-macky-sall-au-sujet-de-la-presidentielle-de-2024-a-la-une/">recent speech</a> in Paris to supporters seemed to have indicated that he would run in 2024. </p>
<p>In March 2023, he <a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/senegal-dans-un-entretien-lexpress-macky-sall-nexclut-pas-detre-candidat-un-troisieme">declared</a> in an interview with L’Express that the legality of a third term candidacy was a judicial issue that the Constitutional Court had clarified before the 2016 constitutional reform. “Now,” he continued, “should I be a candidate for a third term or not? That is a political debate, <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20230321-s%C3%A9n%C3%A9gal-dans-un-entretien-%C3%A0-l-express-macky-sall-maintient-le-flou-sur-un-3e-mandat">I admit</a>.” </p>
<p>Until he made it clear on 3 July that he would not be standing for re-election in 2024, that political question loomed large for Senegal along with suggested <a href="https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/04/15/questions-of-justice-governance-and-rule-of-law-surround-the-local-elections-in-senegal/">reforms</a> for judicial independence. Senegalese protesters were expressing their commitment to judicial autonomy, and Senegalese voters have previously demonstrated their commitment to two terms.</p>
<h2>Concerns about the future</h2>
<p>Sall’s increasingly <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/19421/senegals-president-uses-political-tools-to-mask-authoritarian-tactics/">authoritarian tactics</a> against opposition and activists raise concerns about human rights, rule of law and civil liberties. </p>
<p>A national dialogue <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/05/31/president-of-senegal-launches-national-dialogue-amid-rising-tensions/">initiated</a> by the government has been boycotted by the majority of opposition parties and civil society organisations. </p>
<p>Eliminating key opposition candidates and journalists makes it increasingly difficult for voters to have their say and defend democracy.</p>
<p>It remains to be seen how reassuring Sall’s move to dispel rumours of a third term bid would be for Senegalese who feared democratic backsliding. </p>
<p><em>This article was updated to reflect President Macky Sall’s announcement that he would not stand for re-election in 2024.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208612/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Macky Sall’s previous ambiguity on a third-term bid, perception of a weaponised justice system and arbitrary detention of opposition are the drivers of political violence in Senegal.Rachel Beatty Riedl, Professor of International Studies, Cornell UniversityBamba Ndiaye, Assistant Professor, Emory UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2081902023-06-26T14:00:35Z2023-06-26T14:00:35ZAfrica needs its own credit rating agency: here’s how it could work<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533431/original/file-20230622-17-t2nl2v.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Credit ratings are important for developing economies in Africa</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The credit rating industry in Africa is dominated by the three international agencies: <a href="https://www.moodys.com/">Moody’s</a>, <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/">S&P</a> and <a href="https://www.fitchratings.com/">Fitch</a>. Together they control an estimated 95% of the credit rating business globally. </p>
<p>Credit rating agencies are institutions that assess a borrower’s creditworthiness in general terms, or with respect to a particular debt or financial obligation. A credit rating can be assigned to any entity that seeks to borrow money – an individual, a corporation, a state or provincial authority, or a sovereign government. Investors use a credit rating to make decisions about risk and return. So the rating is required if an institution wants to raise funds on financial markets.</p>
<p>South Africa was the <a href="https://www.aprm-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/21-International-credit-rating-agencies-in-Africa-perceptions-trends-and-challenges.pdf">first African country</a> to receive a sovereign rating, in 1994. To date, <a href="https://www.aprm-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/21-International-credit-rating-agencies-in-Africa-perceptions-trends-and-challenges.pdf">32 African countries</a> have received a sovereign rating from at least one of the “big three” agencies. </p>
<p>But policy makers are increasingly <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20220208/aprm-denounces-moodys-inaccuracies-ghanas-rating-downgrade">dissatisfied</a> with their approach and methodology. Some of the criticisms are that agencies are <a href="https://myjoyonline.com/akufo-addo-takes-on-global-rating-agencies-describes-their-work-as-reckless">quick to downgrade African</a> countries but slow when upgrades are due; that they <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/21.10.07_Perception-premiums.pdf">fail to accurately account for risk perception</a>; that they don’t <a href="https://aprm.au.int/en/documents/2023-01-30/africa-sovereign-credit-rating-review-6th-edition">consult adequately with stakeholders</a>; and that they <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/article/afjjourn4/v_3a7_3ay_3a2022_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a8-9.htm">lack independence and objectivity</a>. </p>
<p>A recent study by the <a href="https://www.undp.org/africa/publications/lowering-cost-borrowing-africa-role-sovereign-credit-ratings">UN</a> showed that subjective biases in credit ratings had cost African countries a <a href="https://www.undp.org/press-releases/more-objective-credit-ratings-could-save-billions-african-countries-development">combined US$74.5 billion</a>. This was through funding opportunities lost and excess interest paid on public debt.</p>
<p>Conditions are therefore ripe to advance the idea of establishing an African credit rating agency as a partial solution. <a href="https://financefeeds.com/chinas-new-credit-rating-agency/">China</a> has its own state-owned rating agency, Dagong Global Credit Rating Company. The Arab countries are also calling for their <a href="https://www.tradearabia.com/news/BANK_409480.html">own rating agency</a>.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/misheck-mutize-phd-68131a2a/?originalSubdomain=za">lead expert with the African Union</a> on ratings agencies, I can explain the framework this agency would operate in and why it makes business sense.</p>
<h2>African Union official decisions</h2>
<p>In March 2019, African Union (AU) ministers of finance and economy officially adopted <a href="https://au.int/en/documents/20190308/2019-stc-finance-monetary-affairs-economic-planning-and-integration">a declaration that such an institution was needed</a>. The AU also developed a proposal for the legal, financial and structural aspects of the rating agency. What’s not yet agreed is how the sustainability, credibility and independence of the agency will be achieved. But there is a way this could be achieved as I set out below.</p>
<p>The need for an African Rating agency has been <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/05/16/au-chair-wants-pan-african-financial-rating-agency//">reiterated</a> by the current Chair of the AU, President <a href="https://www.uneca.org/stories/eca%E2%80%99s-conference-of-ministers-%28com2022%29-kicks-off-in-dakar%2C-senegal">Macky Sall</a> of Senegal, and the Champion of the AU financial institutions, President <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20220720/ghana-supports-establishment-african-credit-rating-agency">Nana Akufo-Addo</a> of Ghana. They highlighted it as an important step towards intra-continental integration. It would also enable AU member states to access capital and integrate the continent with global financial markets.</p>
<h2>Institutional model</h2>
<p>When the AU establishes a new institution, it can be either:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>an organ of the union funded by its member states’ contributions, or</p></li>
<li><p>a self-funded autonomous specialised agency of the union. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Because the credit rating business requires credibility and independence, the best option is the specialised agency. Examples already in operation are the <a href="https://www.afreximbank.com/">African Export-Import Bank</a> and <a href="https://www.arc.int/">Africa Risk Capacity</a> agency. </p>
<p>As an independent specialised agency of the AU, the agency would have diverse classes of shareholders. African governments could own it either directly or through their designated public institutions. Shareholding could include other smaller African-owned rating agencies, multilateral finance institutions and African national financial institutions.</p>
<p>As a financing structure, the agency would adopt the “issuer-pay” business model. The issuers of debt will pay the agency for rating its entity and products.</p>
<p>It would be fully funded by its shareholders and through loans from pan-African financial institutions. Multilateral development banks would either encourage or make it mandatory for their clients to have a rating from the African rating agency. Once this is done it should be able to sustain itself through revenue generated from its services. </p>
<p>As is the process in the AU, the African rating agency would be established through an agreement, signed by at least 10 member states. </p>
<h2>The business case</h2>
<p>There are still 22 African countries that have no credit ratings from the “big three” agencies. This will be a clear niche for the AU rating agency. </p>
<p>There is also tremendous value in the alternative rating sector, which cannot afford the cost of maintaining a rating from the “big three”. This includes small to medium enterprises, initial bond offerings and initial public offerings. The agency could also provide environmental, social and governance scores and foreign direct investment ratings. These rating services are urgently needed on the continent to complement governments’ efforts to support the development of domestic financial markets.</p>
<p>With the backing that comes from affiliation to the AU, the rating agency could secure substantial business in the ratings of domestic instruments that are aligned with the continent’s goals. </p>
<p>It would have the advantage of understanding the domestic context of Africa. So it could issue more informative and detailed ratings than those issued by the “big three”.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>The African Union is forging ahead with its plans to establish an African rating agency to complement the three dominant international agencies, and support the development of domestic financial markets in Africa. Although it will have to overcome challenges to gain investors’ support, there is a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/04-foresight-capital-market-growth-songwe-1.pdf">huge appetite</a> for an alternative and complementary credit rating institution in Africa. Its success will be in developing a comprehensive methodology adapted to the African context, and resident analysts that understand the continent’s dynamics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208190/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Misheck Mutize is affiliated with the African Union as a Lead Expert on Credit Ratings</span></em></p>African states say a pan-African rating agency will enable them to access capital and integrate the continent with global financial markets.Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1916902022-10-12T07:25:25Z2022-10-12T07:25:25ZPrésidentielle au Sénégal : un scrutin qui s'annonce disputé avec les électeurs comme maîtres du jeu<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489036/original/file-20221010-23-x74aa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Des électeurs sénégalais font la queue pour déposer leur bulletin de vote lors de l'élection présidentielle de 24 février 2019. Photo; EPA-EFE/NIC BOTHMA</span> </figcaption></figure><p>En juillet 2022, les électeurs sénégalais <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/31/senegal-elects-parliament-in-test-for-ruling-partys-influence">se sont rendus</a> aux urnes pour élire les 165 députés qui les représenteront à l’Assemblée nationale.</p>
<p>Malgré une <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20170730-tense-campaign-senegal-votes-legislative-election-test-president-Sall-wade">campagne tendue</a>, <a href="https://dailytimes.com.pk/975300/low-turnout-as-senegal-picks-parliament-in-test-for-presidential-vote/">le faible taux de participation électorale</a> (de 46 %) et les appels de l'opposition pour sécuriser le vote dans certaines localités, le scrutin s'est bien déroulé.</p>
<p>Sur les huit grandes coalitions politiques engagées dans la course électorale, deux sont ressorties victorieuses. Les enjeux étaient de taille : à peine six mois avant le scrutin, la coalition au pouvoir <a href="https://www.facebook.com/BennoBokYaakaar">Benno Bokk Yakaar</a> avait <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/senegals-ruling-party-loses-key-cities-local-elections-2022-01-24/">perdu les principales villes</a> lors des élections municipales et départementales. À l’approche des législatives, certains commentateurs avaient suggéré que la performance de la coalition serait révélatrice de l’appui au Président en exercice, <a href="https://www.presidence.sn/en/presidency/biography">Macky Sall</a>, et à son éventuelle tentative de se présenter pour un troisième mandat en 2024.</p>
<p>Globalement, les législatives avaient valeur de test pour l'oppostion et l'électorat à maintenir la démocratie à flot et à contenir l'ambition prêtée au président Macky Sall de rester au pouvoir.</p>
<h2>L’opposition gagne du terrain</h2>
<p>Voici le message que les élections législatives ont semblé envoyer : l’électorat de Benno Bokk Yakaar s’est encore amenuisé, surtout dans les zones urbaines, tandis que dans les villes et villages, la coalition <a href="https://www.yewwi-askanwi.com/">Yewwi Askan Wi Wallu</a>, composée de deux groupements de l’opposition, a remporté une victoire écrasante.</p>
<p>Au final, Benno Bokk Yakaar a obtenu 82 sièges et Yewwi Askan Wi, 80.</p>
<p>Pour la première fois dans l’histoire politique du Sénégal, un front d’opposition a réussi à mettre en échec la coalition présidentielle et à imposer un parlement divisé sans majorité absolue.</p>
<p>On peut attribuer cette percée de l’opposition à la forte chute de la popularité de Sall et de sa coalition. De plus, l’électorat exprime de plus en plus fortement son désir de transparence, de justice et d’amélioration des conditions socio-économiques.</p>
<p>L’alliance de deux principales coalitions de l’opposition a aussi joué un rôle clé, cette stratégie politique ayant en effet mis en échec le camp présidentiel.</p>
<p>L’alliance a par ailleurs bénéficié de la « Sonkomania », la vague de soutien populaire à <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/profile/id/4030/Ousmane_Sonko">Ousmane Sonko</a>, âgé de 48 ans. Sonko est arrivé sur la scène politique en 2014 lorsqu’il a formé son parti politique, les <a href="https://pastef.org/">Patriotes du Sénégal pour le travail, l'éthique et la fraternité</a>. Il reste populaire malgré une <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/why-senegal-protesters-back-ousmane-sonko-despite-rape-charges/a-56825890">accusation de viol</a> à son encontre toujours pendante devant le tribunal, et qui, selon lui, aurait un motif politique.</p>
<p>Sonko lui-même n’a pas pu se présenter aux législatives : en effet, la liste principale de candidats à laquelle il appartenait a été <a href="https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/senegal-le-rejet-d-une-liste-d-opposition-seme-le-trouble-avant-les-elections-07-06-2022-2478574_3826.php#11">disqualifiée</a>pour avoir inscrit un candidat sur deux listes. Il est toutefois resté (avec <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/profile/id/4856/Barth%26eacute%3Bl%26eacute%3Bmy_Dias">Barthelemy Dias</a>, maire de Dakar), le porte-drapeau de Yewwi Askan Wi. On considère que l’adhésion des électeurs à cette coalition est largement due à la mobilisation autour de Ousmane Sonko en raison de sa popularité et des critiques qu’il formule contre la classe dirigeante.</p>
<p>L’image de Sonko comme ancien fonctionnaire incorruptible et politicien antisystème a attiré davantage d’électeurs vers Yewwi Askan Wi. Sonko a promis de tenir l’exécutif responsable de ces scandales financiers par le biais de mesures parlementaires et il a une forte présence en ligne et sur le terrain pour mobiliser les sympathisants. C’est sur cette image que la coalition Yewwi Askan Wi-Wallu a bâti sa campagne électorale.</p>
<p>Tous les regards sont maintenant tournés vers l'élections présidentielle de 2024. Le revers majeur de la coalition au pouvoir apporte un éclairage nouveau sur ce qui pourrait se passer par la suite. </p>
<p>La présidentielle en vue s'annonce très disputée et représente un enjeu de taille pour les Sénégalais qui resteront les maîtres du jeu.</p>
<h2>Qui est Ousmane Sonko ?</h2>
<p>Après avoir obtenu une maîtrise en droit public en 1999 à l’université Gaston Berger, Sonko a intégré la prestigieuse École nationale d’administration.</p>
<p>En tant qu’inspecteur des impôts, il occupait un poste de haut rang dans la fonction publique sénégalaise <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56323444">avant d’être radié en 2016</a> pour avoir exposé et dénoncé les pratiques malhonnêtes de l’administration nationale.</p>
<p>En 2017, il est élu à l’Assemblée nationale et devient progressivement la voix principale de l’opposition. En mars 2021, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210303-senegal-opposition-leader-sonko-arrested-on-way-to-dakar-court-to-face-rape-charge">il est arrêté</a> pour troubles à l’ordre public, alors qu'il se rendait au tribunal pour l'ouverture des poursuites judiciaires contre lui. Ses partisans <a href="https://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-37225666">avaient suivi son convoi</a> jusqu’au tribunal et avaient manifesté sous la bannière de l'opposition. La situation avait dégénéré tandis que la police tentait de les disperser. Par la suite, Sonko avait été arrêté pour troubles à l’ordre public et participation à une manifestation non autorisée.</p>
<p>Ces faits avaient déclenché un soulèvement sans précédent, et des manifestations avaient paralysé les principales villes. Les manifestants avaient détruit des infrastructures publiques et des commerces français avaient été pillés. Quatorze personnes avaient perdu la vie et plus de 600 autres avaient été gravement blessées. Pour beaucoup, l’arrestation d’une importante figure de l’opposition suite à des manifestations de ses partisans <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/12/senegal-protest-ousmane-sonko-macky-sall/">constituait une attaque contre la démocratie</a>.</p>
<p>Ces événements ont solidifié le soutien populaire à Sonko et renforcé sa stature de sérieux candidat à la présidence et de leader de l’opposition.</p>
<p>Étant donné <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/09/03/senegal-opposition-coalition-led-by-ousmane-sonko-launched-for-local-elections//">son arrivée en troisième place lors l'élection de 2019</a> et l’élargissement de son assise politique, Sonko pourrait certainement s’imposer lors d’un second tour de l'élection en 2024. Son éligibilité sera toutefois déterminée par l’issue du procès pour viol.</p>
<h2>Perspectives pour 2024</h2>
<p>Une grande partie de l’incertitude autour de 2024 découle de la question de savoir si Macky Sall décidera de se présenter pour un troisième mandat. Jusqu’à présent, il a refusé de donner une réponse, ce qui a affecté sa popularité.</p>
<p>Pour l’électorat sénégalais, les présidences longues de <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Leopold-Senghor">Léopold Senghor</a> (20 ans) et d’<a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdou-Diouf">Abdou Diouf</a> (19 ans) appartiennent à une époque révolue.</p>
<p>Le pays a accepté l’idée d’une présidence pour deux mandats et l’état de grâce du Président en exercice ne dure pas plus d’une décennie, comme a pu le découvrir le prédécesseur de Sall, <a href="https://newafricanmagazine.com/3127/">Abdoulaye Wade</a>.</p>
<p>Cependant, si Sall décidait de se présenter pour un troisième mandat, il lui faudra surmonter certaines difficultés.</p>
<p>La première étant la Conseil constitutionnel, qui se prononcera sur la légalité de sa candidature.</p>
<p>Il lui faudra ensuite faire face à plusieurs figures de l’opposition : Sonko bien évidemment, mais aussi éventuellement <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16352470">Barthelemy Dias</a>, et peut-être <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-49873340">Khalifa Sall</a> (ancien maire de Dakar) et <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/profile/id/254/Karim_Wade">Karim Wade</a>.</p>
<p>Aucun des candidats n’est susceptible de recueillir la majorité des voix (50 % plus une) au premier tour. Mais comme Sall le sait bien, en 2000 et 2012, le président en exercice avait perdu les élections lors d’un second tour.</p>
<p>Si Sall ne se représente pas, son parti se trouvera tout de même dans une situation difficile car il n’a pas préparé une figure nationale susceptible de prendre la relève. Or, il est peut-être trop tard pour cela.</p>
<p>Sonko est en bonne position pour l'élections de 2024 – surtout s’il réussit à marquer des points auprès de l’électorat des zones rurales, ce qui renforcerait sa popularité déjà forte au sein de l’électorat urbain.</p>
<h2>Implications pour la démocratie sénégalaise</h2>
<p>D'aucuns pensent que la candidature Sonko représente un nouveau cap pour la démocratie représentative, la redevabilité et la qualité de la démocratie. </p>
<p>En gardant ses distances avec la coalition du Président en exercice, il a su exprimer un point de vue contestataire contre la classe dirigeante et se démarquer de ses rivaux aguéris.</p>
<p>Il doit sa base éléctorale à sa réputation de lanceur d’alerte ansi qu'à l'importance qu'il accorde aux questions liées à la dette, à l’exploitation des ressources naturelles, à la pauvreté, au manque de financement des systèmes de santé et d’éducation et à la corruption.</p>
<p>Sa réputation de lanceur d’alerte continue de motiver les appuis électoraux, notamment grâce à l’attention qu’il accorde aux questions comme la dette, l’exploitation des ressources naturelles, la pauvreté, le manque de financement des systèmes de santé et d’éducation et la corruption.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191690/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>La présidentielle de 2024 s'annonce très disputée et représente un enjeu de taille pour les Sénégalais qui resteront les maîtres du jeu.Rachel Beatty Riedl, Professor of International Studies , Cornell UniversityBamba Ndiaye, Assistant Professor, Emory UniversityOumar Ba, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Cornell UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1898482022-09-14T14:27:34Z2022-09-14T14:27:34ZSenegal’s presidential poll is shaping up as a real contest, with voters in the driver’s seat<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489312/original/file-20221012-12-cymzj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People wait in line outside their voting station in the popular neighbourhood of Ngor in Dakar on July 31, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by JOHN WESSELS/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In July 2022 Senegalese voters <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/31/senegal-elects-parliament-in-test-for-ruling-partys-influence">converged</a> at polling stations to elect 165 members of parliament (MPs) to represent them in the National Assembly. </p>
<p>Despite a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20170730-tense-campaign-senegal-votes-legislative-election-test-president-Sall-wade">tense campaign</a> period, <a href="https://dailytimes.com.pk/975300/low-turnout-as-senegal-picks-parliament-in-test-for-presidential-vote/">low voter turnout</a> (46%), and the opposition’s calls to secure the votes in certain localities, election day remained peaceful and highly competitive. </p>
<p>From the eight major political coalitions that entered the electoral race, two emerged at the top. The stakes were high: just six months before the poll, the ruling coalition <a href="https://www.facebook.com/BennoBokYaakaar">Benno Bokk Yakkaar</a> had <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/senegals-ruling-party-loses-key-cities-local-elections-2022-01-24/">lost the major cities</a> in municipal, regional and mayoral elections. In the run-up to the elections, some commentators suggested the coalition’s performance would indicate what support there was for the incumbent, <a href="https://www.presidence.sn/en/presidency/biography">President Macky Sall</a>, and his potential attempt to run for a third term in 2024.</p>
<p>In broad terms, these legislative elections were seen to reflect the ability of the opposition and the electorate to buoy democracy and check presidential ambitions to overstay.</p>
<h2>Opposition gains ground</h2>
<p>That’s the message they seemed to send: Benno Bokk Yakkaar’s electorate dwindled again, especially in urban areas. In cities and towns the <a href="https://www.yewwi-askanwi.com/">Yewwi Askan Wi Wallu</a> coalition, made up of two opposition groupings, won by a landslide. </p>
<p>In the end, Benno Bokk Yakkaar obtained 82 MPs and Yewwi Askan Wi earned 80. </p>
<p>For the first time in Senegal’s political history, an opposition front managed to dog the presidential coalition and impose a split parliament with no absolute majority.</p>
<p>The opposition’s breakthrough can be attributed to the dramatic fall in the popularity of Sall and his coalition. The electorate had become increasingly vocal in its demands for more accountability, justice and better socio-economic conditions. </p>
<p>Another contributory factor was the alliance of two major opposition coalitions. This political strategy derailed the presidential camp.</p>
<p>The alliance also benefited from “Sonkomania”, the popular support for <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/profile/id/4030/Ousmane_Sonko">Ousmane Sonko</a>, aged 48. Sonko entered the political scene in 2014 when he formed his political party <a href="https://pastef.org/">Senegalese Patriots for Work and Ethics</a>. He remains popular despite a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/why-senegal-protesters-back-ousmane-sonko-despite-rape-charges/a-56825890">rape allegation</a> case against him still pending in court, which he claims is politically motivated. </p>
<p>Sonko himself wasn’t able to run in the legislative election contest: the list of primary candidates to which he belonged was disqualified due to the presence of another contender’s name on both the primary and alternate roster of candidates. Nevertheless, he remained (along with <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/profile/id/4856/Barth%26eacute%3Bl%26eacute%3Bmy_Dias">Barthelemy Dias</a>, the mayor of Dakar) the flagbearer of Yewwi Askan Wi. Voter support for this coalition was widely interpreted as being mobilised by Sonko’s popularity and the critique he has rallied against establishment incumbents.</p>
<p>Sonko’s image as an incorruptible former civil servant and an anti-system politician drew more voters to Yewwi Askan Wi. He promised to hold the executive accountable for financial scandals through parliamentary actions. He also had a strong presence online and on the ground to mobilise supporters. The Yewwi Askan Wi-Wallu coalition built its electoral campaign around his image. </p>
<p>All eyes are now on the 2024 presidential elections. The ruling coalition’s major setback casts new light on what could happen. The contest is shaping up to give the Senegalese a significant and competitive election, leaving voters in the driver’s seat. </p>
<h2>Who is Ousmane Sonko?</h2>
<p>After earning a master’s degree in public law in 1999 at Université Gaston Berger, Sonko joined the prestigious National School of Administration. </p>
<p>As a tax inspector, he occupied a high-ranking position in the Senegalese civil service <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56323444">before being fired in 2016</a> for exposing and denouncing unethical practices in the national administration.</p>
<p>In 2017, he was elected to the National Assembly. He increasingly became the leading voice of the opposition. In March 2021, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210303-senegal-opposition-leader-sonko-arrested-on-way-to-dakar-court-to-face-rape-charge">he was arrested</a> on disorderly conduct charges on his way to the court in Dakar to begin the legal proceedings on the rape charges. His adherents <a href="https://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-37225666">followed his motorcade</a> to court, protesting as a brigade of opposition. The situation escalated as the police attempted to disperse them. Subsequently, Sonko was arrested for public order disturbance and participating in an unauthorised demonstration. </p>
<p>This sparked an unprecedented uprising, with protests shutting down the major cities. Violence destroyed public infrastructure and French businesses were looted. Fourteen people died and more than 600 were seriously injured. For many, the arrest of a leading opposition figure over political protests by his supporters <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/12/senegal-protest-ousmane-sonko-macky-sall/">was viewed as an attack on democracy</a>.</p>
<p>These events solidified Sonko’s popular support and consolidated his stature as a serious contender for the presidency, and opposition leader.</p>
<p>Given <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/09/03/senegal-opposition-coalition-led-by-ousmane-sonko-launched-for-local-elections//">his third-place standing in the 2019 election</a> and the growth of his political base, he can certainly force a runoff election in 2024. His eligibility to run, however, will be determined by the outcome of the rape charge he faces.</p>
<h2>Chances for 2024</h2>
<p>Much of the uncertainty about 2024 hinges on whether Macky Sall decides to seek a third term. He has so far refused to answer that question, which has cost him in terms of popularity. </p>
<p>For the Senegalese electorate, the long presidencies of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Leopold-Senghor">Léopold Senghor</a> (20 years) and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdou-Diouf">Abdou Diouf</a> (19 years) are a bygone era. </p>
<p>The country has embraced the idea of two-term presidencies, and the incumbent’s honeymoon won’t last more than a decade, as Sall’s predecessor <a href="https://newafricanmagazine.com/3127/">Abdoulaye Wade </a> found out.</p>
<p>Still, should Sall decide to seek a third term, he would have to clear a number of hurdles.</p>
<p>The first one is the Constitutional Court, which would rule on the legality of his candidacy. </p>
<p>Then he would face a number of opposition figures: Sonko, of course, but also potentially <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16352470">Barthelemy Dias</a>, and possibly <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-49873340">Khalifa Sall</a> (a former mayor of Dakar) and <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/profile/id/254/Karim_Wade">Karim Wade</a>. </p>
<p>None of the candidates is likely to earn a majority of the votes (50% plus one) in the first round. But, as Sall well knows, in 2000 and 2012 the incumbent lost the presidential elections when forced to a second round.</p>
<p>Should Sall not seek another term, his party is still in dire straits as it has not cultivated a national figure that would take over the party’s leadership. And it might be too late for such a figure to emerge.</p>
<p>Sonko is well positioned for the 2024 elections – especially if he manages to make inroads with the electorate in rural areas. That would build on his solid popularity with urban voters. </p>
<h2>Implications for Senegalese democracy</h2>
<p>For some, Sonko’s candidacy represents a new course for representation, accountability and quality of governance in Senegal. </p>
<p>By not aligning with the incumbent coalition, he offers an anti-establishment view and a contrast to veteran rivals. </p>
<p>His reputation as a whistleblower continues to drive electoral support, along with his attention to issues of debt, exploitation of natural resources, poverty, underfunded health and education systems and corruption.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189848/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The 2024 presidential election is shaping up to give Senegalese a significant and competitive election, leaving voters in the driver’s seat.Rachel Beatty Riedl, Professor of International Studies , Cornell UniversityBamba Ndiaye, Assistant Professor, Emory UniversityOumar Ba, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Cornell UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1896052022-08-30T11:49:43Z2022-08-30T11:49:43ZLe Sénégal a réussi un nouveau scrutin pacifique: les résultats augurent, cette fois, d'un grand bouleversement politique<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481792/original/file-20220830-29386-sz8052.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Le Président Macky Sall salue ses partisans après avoir été investi comme candidat à l'élection présidentielle de 2012.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Seyllou/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>S'inscrivant dans une tradition de compétition multipartite vigoureuse, les électeurs sénégalais se sont rendus aux urnes <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/31/senegal-elects-parliament-in-test-for-ruling-partys-influence">en juillet 2022</a>. Le Sénégal fait partie des rares pays africains à n’avoir jamais connu de <a href="https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/senegal-one-few-african-countries-have-never-experienced-military-coup">coup d'État militaire</a>. </p>
<p>Le processus électoral en lui-même n'avait rien d'extraordinaire pour les Sénégalais, cependant les résultats de l'élection – et leurs conséquences pour le contrôle démocratique – sont sans précédent.</p>
<p>Pour la première fois dans l'histoire contemporaine du pays, aucune coalition n'a obtenu la majorité absolue au parlement. </p>
<p>Depuis l'annonce des résultats, la coalition au pouvoir a <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20220811-s%C3%A9n%C3%A9gal-le-d%C3%A9put%C3%A9-pape-diop-rallie-la-coalition-pr%C3%A9sidentielle-et-lui-donne-la-majorit%C3%A9">obtenu une promesse de soutien</a> de la part de Pape Diop, homme politique dont la coalition n’a remporté qu’un seul siège parlementaire. Grâce à son soutien, la coalition au pouvoir a réussi à former tant bien que mal une majorité.</p>
<p>Le Sénégal se retrouve donc en terrain inconnu. De sérieuses négociations pourraient être nécessaires pour permettre à la coalition de conserver sa très faible majorité législative et faire en sorte que les membres de son groupe parlementaire votent de manière disciplinée.</p>
<p>La coalition au pouvoir, en outre, ne dispose plus de la majorité des trois cinquièmes, requise pour modifier la constitution. Cela pourrait peser sur la course à l'élection présidentielle sénégalaise de 2024, étant donné que le président Macky Sall n'est pas disposé à renoncer publiquement à l'idée de briguer un troisième mandat illégal.</p>
<p>Les camps du pouvoir et de l'opposition devront faire preuve de diplomatie et d'habileté politique pour gouverner dans ce contexte. Les enjeux ne pouvaient pas être plus importants. La jeunesse sénégalaise, toujours plus nombreuse, a déjà <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202105080196.html">protesté</a> contre les conditions socioéconomiques et le sentiment que les tribunaux sont utilisés contre des figures populaires de l'opposition. Certaines de ces protestations ont été violemment réprimées avec <a href="https://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00077879.html">violence</a>. </p>
<p>L'inclusion des jeunes et leur engagement politique pacifique constituront un facteur clé pour la stabilité du pays.</p>
<h2>Que s'est-il passé ?</h2>
<p>Le 31 juillet, 46 % des <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/senegal-heads-to-polls-for-parliamentary-elections/2650021">7 millions d'électeurs éligibles</a> du Sénégal se sont rendus aux urnes pour choisir entre huit coalitions de partis politiques. </p>
<p>L'élection s'est déroulée dans un contexte relativement tendu. Le Conseil constitutionnel sénégalais avait <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/7/16/senegal-protests-poke-holes-in-itslongstanding-image-of-stability">rejeté</a> la liste des candidats titulaires d'une des coalitions de l'opposition ainsi que la liste des candidats suppléants de la coalition au pouvoir sur une partie du scrutin.</p>
<p>Les deux décisions ont été prises au regard des erreurs techniques dans les documents de candidature.</p>
<p>La coalition <a href="https://www.facebook.com/BennoBokYaakaar">Benno Bokk Yakaar</a> (Unis dans l'espoir), dirigée par <a href="https://www.presidence.sn/en/presidency/biography">Macky Sall</a>, et qui disposait auparavant d'une majorité législative qualifiée, a vu sa représentation être <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/senegal-ruling-coalition-loses-parliamentary-majority-electoral-commission-2022-08-04/">réduite</a> de 125 à 82 sièges sur 125. </p>
<p>Les deux coalitions d'opposition les plus populaires ont remporté 80 sièges ensemble. Elles sont composées de <a href="https://www.yewwi-askanwi.com/">Yewwi Askan Wi</a> (Libérer le peuple), affiliée au militant populiste anti-corruption <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210305-ousmane-sonko-sharp-tongued-figure-at-heart-of-senegal-crisis">Ousmane Sonko</a> ainsi qu'aux ancien et actuel maires de Dakar, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-49873340">Khalifa Sall</a> et <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16352470">Barthélémy Dias</a>, d’une part, et de <a href="http://dge.sn/fr/node/460">Wallu Sénégal</a> (Sauver le Sénégal), comprenant des figures de l'ancien parti au pouvoir, le <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Senegalese-Democratic-Party">Parti démocratique sénégalais</a>, d’autre part. </p>
<p>Les trois sièges parlementaires restants sont contrôlés par les leaders de coalitions plus petites :</p>
<ul>
<li><p>un siège pour l'ancien maire de Dakar, <a href="https://www.dakaractu.com/14e-legislature-Le-message-de-Pape-Diop-tete-de-liste-nationale-de-Bokk-Gis-Gis-Ligeey_a222692.html">Pape Diop</a> de Bokk Gis-Gis ;</p></li>
<li><p>un pour <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20220725-l%C3%A9gislatives-au-s%C3%A9n%C3%A9gal-des-%C3%A9lections-test-pour-la-coalition-aar-de-thierno-alassane-sall">Thierno Alassane Sall</a>, ancien ministre et membre de la coalition Aar Senegal</p></li>
<li><p>un pour <a href="https://www.sudquotidien.sn/presentation-a-tour-de-role-des-tetes-de-listes-aux-legislatives-pape-djibril-fall-un-novice-qui-reve-grand/">Pape Djibril Fall</a>, un journaliste lié à l'empire médiatique du chanteur mondialement connu <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Youssou-NDour">Youssou N'Dour</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Ces trois Chefs de file de petites coalitions sont des faiseurs de roi.</p>
<p>Après la publication des premiers résultats, pour pouvoir constituer une majorité parlementaire, il fallait pour la coalition Benno Bokk Yakaar qu’au moins un autre collègue vote avec elle et (et dans le cas de Yewwi-Wallu, <a href="https://www.pressafrik.com/Legislatives-2022-Wallu-Senegal-appelle-Pape-Diop-Thierno-Alassane-Sall-et-Pape-Djibril-Fall-a-rejoindre-la-grande_a251256.html">les trois</a>), même si ces députés rejoignaient pas leur groupe parlementaire. </p>
<p>Diop a récemment <a href="https://senegal.detailzero.com/news/28689/Senegal-the-presidential-camp-regains-the-majority-in-the-Assembly-with-the-rallying-of-Pape-Diop.html">annoncé</a> qu'il allait rejoindre le groupe parlementaire de la coalition au pouvoir à l'Assemblée nationale. Cela permettrait à la coalition Benno Bokk Yakaar d’obtenir les 83 voix dont elle a besoin pour faire passer des lois, mais cette faible majorité la met dans une situation précaire. Elle ne perdurera que si les 83 votent systématiquement en leur faveur en s'alignant sur la position du groupe parlementaire.</p>
<p>Ce qui n’est pas garanti. À l'approche de l'élection présidentielle de 2024, de nombreux politiciens des coalitions Benno Bokk Yakaar et Yewwi-Wallu pourraient envisager d’être candidats. Les deux coalitions pourraient par conséquent fragiliser leur cohésion au fil du temps. </p>
<h2>Pourquoi c'est important</h2>
<p>Jusqu'à présent, l'Assemblée nationale sénégalaise a toujours été dirigée par un parti ou une coalition disposant d'une <a href="https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/supermajority">majorité qualifiée</a>.</p>
<p>Puisque désormais la coalition au pouvoir atteint à peine la majorité absolue, elle devra se livrer à plus de marchandages politiques pour pouvoir gouverner avec efficacité. Néanmoins, le président détient toujours un pouvoir considérable. Reste donc à savoir dans quelle mesure cette fragile configuration favorise les compromis et la négociation.</p>
<p>Les résultats des élections pourraient influer sur un domaine précis, à savoir l'approche du président Sall en matière de limitation des mandats: la consitution sénégalaise les limite à deux.</p>
<p>Sall arrivera au terme de son deuxième mandat présidentiel en 2024, mais ses détracteurs craignent qu'il se sert de la constitution issue du <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/03/heres-everything-you-need-to-know-about-senegals-recent-referendum/">référendum de 2016</a> pour justifier une nouvelle candidature.</p>
<p>Le référendum de 2016 a raccourci les mandats présidentiels, les portant de sept à cinq ans. Comme il a été adopté pendant le premier mandat de Sall, celui-ci pourrait tenter de <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/29/senegal-sall-democratic-backsliding-african-democracy/">soutenir</a> que ce changement lui permet de remettre le compteur à zéro. </p>
<p>Sall subit des <a href="https://www.pressafrik.com/Macky-Sall-sur-la-question-du-3e-mandat-Je-repondrai-a-cette-question-apres-les-legislatives_a248608.html">pressions</a> de plus en plus fortes de l'opinion publique pour qu’il réaffirme son <a href="https://www.senenews.com/actualites/polemiques-autour-dun-3e-mandat-macky-sall-sexprime-enfin_207748.html">engagement</a> en faveur des règles constitutionnelles. Toutefois, jusqu'à présent, il a évité de se se prononcer de manière définitive.</p>
<p>Il pourrait être affaibli sur le plan politique par les résultats des élections <a href="https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/04/15/questions-of-justice-governance-and-rule-of-law-surround-the-local-elections-in-senegal/">municipales de 2022</a> et législatives, qui ont démontré la popularité de l'opposition. </p>
<p>Mais sans la majorité parlementaire des trois cinquièmes, il est peu probable que d’autres réformes constitutionnelles qui pourraient encourager la poursuite d'un troisième mandat soient adoptées. </p>
<p>Il serait par ailleurs risqué de persister à briguer un troisième mandat dans le contexte actuel de <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/2/10/celebrations-unlikely-to-last-long-in-macky-salls-senegal">tensions politiques</a> liées aux demandes des citoyens pour une gouvernance plus transparente, l'état de droit et le respect des libertés civiques.</p>
<p>La configuration du Parlement permettra au président de faire voter de nouvelles lois, mais avec peut-être plus de difficultés. Les politiciens de l'opposition ont tout intérêt à former des coalitions de circonstance qui leur permet de puiser des voix au sein de cette majorité précaire.</p>
<p>Si, par exemple, l’opposition pouvait travailler avec les deux faiseurs de roi qui ne se sont pas ralliés à Benno Bokk Yakaar et convaincre un autre parlementaire, elle pourrait proposer une législation affectant l'équilibre des pouvoirs. On peut citer à titre d'exemple, <a href="https://www.seneplus.com/politique/la-cohabitation-un-moyen-damelioration-du-fonctionnement-des">une diminution</a> de l'influence du président sur les nominations des membres du Conseil constitutionnel serait un bon exemple.</p>
<p>Cependant, le président a toujours le <a href="https://www.dakaractu.com/A-propos-de-la-nomination-d-un-Premier-Ministre-Par-Dr-Papa-Makha-DIAO_a216616.html">pouvoir de nommer les ministres</a>. Même si la majorité parlementaire devait se fissurer et que l'Assemblée nationale fait passer une motion de <a href="https://fr.allafrica.com/stories/202112120004.html">censure</a> contre le premier ministre choisi par le président, il ne pourrait y avoir qu'une seule motion de censure par session annuelle. Ainsi, les <a href="https://www.seneplus.com/opinions/de-limpossibilite-structurelle-de-la-cohabitation-au-senegal">choix du président</a> pour la composition du gouvernement l'emportent finalement par rapport à un système semi-présidentiel où le gouvernement ne répond qu'au Parlement.</p>
<p>Le président sénégalais peut également dissoudre le Parlement, mais seulement après ses deux premières années de session. Sall ne pourra pas exercer ce pouvoir avant les élections présidentielles de 2024, si celles-ci ont lieu comme prévu.</p>
<p>Si ces conditions dissuadent Sall de briguer un troisième mandat, le Sénégal pourrait assister à ce qu'un expert appelle « <a href="https://afriquexxi.info/article5021.html">l'élection présidentielle la plus ouverte de l'histoire</a> ».</p>
<h2>Les perspectives</h2>
<p>Les dirigeants sénégalais des deux camps doivent accomplir la tâche délicate de gérer une majorité parlementaire fragile.</p>
<p>D'un côté, si celle-ci devient une justification rhétorique pour une troisième candidature inconstitutionnelle de Sall, cela pourrait porter péjudice à la démocratie sénégalaise et exacerber les divisions. Cela nuirait aux progrès de l'administration Sall en matière de <a href="https://www.presidence.sn/en/pse/emerging-senegal">développement économique et d'infrastructures</a> et diminuerait, en outre, l'influence bien connue du Sénégal en matière de soft power en Afrique, actuellement amplifiée par la présidence de Sall à la Commission de l'Union africaine.</p>
<p>En revanche, il existe une possibilité de créer des passerelles entre les camps politiques. Chercher à collaborer sur une base programmatique pourrait atténuer la polarisation politique et renforcer la démocratie sénégalaise bien au-delà de l'élection présidentielle de 2024, pour laquelle les récents résultats des législatives constituent un baromètre utile.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189605/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Lena Kelly does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Le Sénégal entre en territoire inconnu car, pour la première dans son histoire contemporaine, aucune coalition n'a obtenu la majorité absolue au Parlement.Catherine Lena Kelly, Associate Dean and Professor, National Defense UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1886062022-08-17T10:48:18Z2022-08-17T10:48:18ZSenegal pulled off another peaceful poll. Why this time the results herald a big political shift<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478984/original/file-20220812-22-vow7ie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Macky Sall salutes supporters after he was named candidate for the 2012 presidential elections. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Seyllou/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Senegalese voters went to the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/31/senegal-elects-parliament-in-test-for-ruling-partys-influence">polls in July 2022</a>, continuing a tradition of robust multiparty competition in the country. It is one of a handful of African countries that have never experienced a <a href="https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/senegal-one-few-african-countries-have-never-experienced-military-coup">military coup</a>. </p>
<p>The election process itself was nothing out of the ordinary in Senegal. But the results of the election – and their implications for democratic oversight – are unprecedented.</p>
<p>For the first time in the country’s contemporary history, no single coalition won an outright majority in parliament. </p>
<p>Since the announcement of the results, the ruling coalition has <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20220811-s%C3%A9n%C3%A9gal-le-d%C3%A9put%C3%A9-pape-diop-rallie-la-coalition-pr%C3%A9sidentielle-et-lui-donne-la-majorit%C3%A9">gained a promise of support</a> from the politician Pape Diop, whose coalition won a single parliamentary seat. With Diop’s support, the ruling coalition has cobbled together a majority.</p>
<p>This places Senegal in uncharted territory. Serious negotiation may be required for the coalition to maintain its razor-thin legislative majority and ensure that members of its parliamentary group vote along disciplined lines.</p>
<p>In addition, the ruling coalition no longer commands the three-fifths majority required to change the constitution. This could matter in the run-up to Senegal’s 2024 presidential elections, given President Macky Sall’s unwillingness to publicly eschew the idea of pursuing an illegal third term.</p>
<p>Democratic statesmanship and political skill will be required for ruling and opposition camps to navigate this context. The stakes could not be higher. Senegal’s increasing youth demographic has previously <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202105080196.html">protested</a> about socioeconomic conditions and the perception that the courts are being used against popular opposition figures. Some of these protests were met with <a href="https://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00077879.html">violence</a>. </p>
<p>Youth inclusion and peaceful engagement in politics will be key to a stable future. </p>
<h2>What happened?</h2>
<p>On 31 July, 46% of Senegal’s <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/senegal-heads-to-polls-for-parliamentary-elections/2650021">7 million eligible voters</a> went to the polls to choose between eight coalitions of political parties. </p>
<p>The election took place in a relatively tense context. Senegal’s Constitutional Council had <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/7/16/senegal-protests-poke-holes-in-itslongstanding-image-of-stability">rejected</a> one of the primary opposition coalitions’ list of first-choice nominees as well as the ruling coalition’s list of alternate nominees on part of the ballot. </p>
<p>Both decisions were made on the basis of technical errors in nomination paperwork.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.facebook.com/BennoBokYaakaar">Benno Bokk Yakaar</a> (United in Hope) coalition, headed by <a href="https://www.presidence.sn/en/presidency/biography">Macky Sall</a> and previously in control of a legislative supermajority, saw its representation <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/senegal-ruling-coalition-loses-parliamentary-majority-electoral-commission-2022-08-04/">reduced</a> from 125 to 82 of 165 seats. </p>
<p>The two most popular opposition coalitions won 80 seats together. They were made up of <a href="https://www.yewwi-askanwi.com/">Yewwi Askan Wi</a> (Liberate the People), which is affiliated with the populist anti-corruption crusader <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210305-ousmane-sonko-sharp-tongued-figure-at-heart-of-senegal-crisis">Ousmane Sonko</a> along with the former and current mayors of Dakar, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-49873340">Khalifa Sall</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16352470">Barthelemy Dias</a>, and <a href="http://dge.sn/fr/node/460">Wallu Senegal</a> (Save Senegal), which is linked to figures from the ex-ruling <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Senegalese-Democratic-Party">Senegalese Democratic Party</a>. </p>
<p>The three remaining parliamentary seats are controlled by the leaders of smaller coalitions:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>one by the former mayor of Dakar, <a href="https://www.dakaractu.com/14e-legislature-Le-message-de-Pape-Diop-tete-de-liste-nationale-de-Bokk-Gis-Gis-Ligeey_a222692.html">Pape Diop</a> of Bokk Gis-Gis</p></li>
<li><p>one by <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20220725-l%C3%A9gislatives-au-s%C3%A9n%C3%A9gal-des-%C3%A9lections-test-pour-la-coalition-aar-de-thierno-alassane-sall">Thierno Alassane Sall</a>, a former minister in the Aar Senegal coalition </p></li>
<li><p>one by <a href="https://www.sudquotidien.sn/presentation-a-tour-de-role-des-tetes-de-listes-aux-legislatives-pape-djibril-fall-un-novice-qui-reve-grand/">Pape Djibril Fall</a>, a journalist linked to the media empire of the world-famous singer <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Youssou-NDour">Youssou N'Dour</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The three small coalition leaders are kingmakers.</p>
<p>After learning these initial results, for either the Benno Bokk Yakaar or the Yewwi-Wallu coalitions to control a parliamentary majority, they needed at least one other colleague (and in Yewwi-Wallu’s case, <a href="https://www.pressafrik.com/Legislatives-2022-Wallu-Senegal-appelle-Pape-Diop-Thierno-Alassane-Sall-et-Pape-Djibril-Fall-a-rejoindre-la-grande_a251256.html">all three</a>) voting with them, even if those colleagues do not join their parliamentary group. </p>
<p>Diop recently <a href="https://senegal.detailzero.com/news/28689/Senegal-the-presidential-camp-regains-the-majority-in-the-Assembly-with-the-rallying-of-Pape-Diop.html">announced</a> that he would join the ruling coalition’s parliamentary group in the National Assembly. This would give Benno Bokk Yakaar the 83 votes it needs to pass legislation. But the small majority makes it fragile. It only holds if all 83 consistently vote the parliamentary group’s position.</p>
<p>There are no guarantees of that. With the 2024 presidential election approaching, there are multiple politicians in both the Benno Bokk Yakaar and Yewwi-Wallu coalitions who might consider candidacy. Both coalitions may accordingly weaken in their cohesion as time goes on. </p>
<h2>Why it matters</h2>
<p>Until now, the Senegalese National Assembly has always had a ruling party or coalition with <a href="https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/supermajority">supermajority</a> control.</p>
<p>The fact that the ruling coalition now barely controls an absolute majority will increase the political bargaining required for effective governance. Nevertheless, the president still wields considerable power. So it remains to be seen how much the fragile configuration fosters compromise and negotiation.</p>
<p>One domain in which the election results could have influence is President Sall’s approach to term limits. The Senegalese constitution currently limits them to two. </p>
<p>Sall is approaching the end of his second presidential term in 2024. But his detractors worry that he will use the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/03/heres-everything-you-need-to-know-about-senegals-recent-referendum/">2016 constitutional referendum </a> to justify running again.</p>
<p>The 2016 referendum shortened presidential terms from seven years to five. Because it was passed during Sall’s first term, he could attempt to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/29/senegal-sall-democratic-backsliding-african-democracy/">argue</a> that the change allows his term count to restart. </p>
<p>Sall faces <a href="https://www.pressafrik.com/Macky-Sall-sur-la-question-du-3e-mandat-Je-repondrai-a-cette-question-apres-les-legislatives_a248608.html">mounting public pressure</a> to reiterate his <a href="https://www.senenews.com/actualites/polemiques-autour-dun-3e-mandat-macky-sall-sexprime-enfin_207748.html">commitment</a> to constitutional rules. But so far he’s avoided making a definitive statement.</p>
<p>He may be politically limited by outcomes of the <a href="https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/04/15/questions-of-justice-governance-and-rule-of-law-surround-the-local-elections-in-senegal/">2022 municipal</a> and legislative races, which revealed popular demand for the opposition. </p>
<p>But without a three-fifths parliamentary majority, additional constitutional reforms that could aid the pursuit of a third term are unlikely. </p>
<p>Insisting on a third term bid would also be risky amid current <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/2/10/celebrations-unlikely-to-last-long-in-macky-salls-senegal">political tensions </a> related to citizens’ demands for more transparent governance, rule of law and respect for civic freedoms.</p>
<p>The configuration of parliament will make it possible but potentially more difficult for the president to pass new laws. Opposition politicians have incentives to build ad hoc coalitions by poaching votes from the fragile majority.</p>
<p>For example, if it could work with the two kingmakers who have not rallied with Benno Bokk Yakaar and convince one other parliamentarian, the opposition could propose legislation affecting the balance of powers. An example would be a <a href="https://www.seneplus.com/politique/la-cohabitation-un-moyen-damelioration-du-fonctionnement-des">reduction in presidential influence over appointments to the Constitutional Council</a>.</p>
<p>However, the president still has the <a href="https://www.dakaractu.com/A-propos-de-la-nomination-d-un-Premier-Ministre-Par-Dr-Papa-Makha-DIAO_a216616.html">power to nominate ministers</a>. Even if the parliamentary majority were to fracture and the legislature <a href="https://fr.allafrica.com/stories/202112120004.html">censured</a> the president’s choice of prime minister, there could be only one censure per annual session. This means the <a href="https://www.seneplus.com/opinions/de-limpossibilite-structurelle-de-la-cohabitation-au-senegal">president’s choices</a> about the government’s composition ultimately prevail more than in a semi-presidential system where the government answers only to parliament.</p>
<p>The Senegalese president can also dissolve the parliament, but only after its first two years in session. Sall will not be able to exercise this power before the 2024 presidential elections if they are held as scheduled.</p>
<p>If these conditions deter Sall from a third term bid, Senegal could witness what one pundit calls “the <a href="https://afriquexxi.info/article5021.html">most open presidential election in history</a>”.</p>
<h2>Moving forward</h2>
<p>Senegalese leaders on both sides of the aisle are faced with the delicate task of navigating the fragile parliamentary majority.</p>
<p>On one hand, if the fragile majority becomes a rhetorical justification for Sall’s pursuit of an unconstitutional third term, it could damage Senegal’s democracy and intensify division. It would detract from the Sall administration’s progress on <a href="https://www.presidence.sn/en/pse/emerging-senegal">economic development and infrastructure</a>. It would also diminish Senegal’s well-known soft power influence in Africa, currently amplified by Sall’s chairmanship of the African Union Commission.</p>
<p>On the other hand, there is an opportunity to build bridges between political camps. Pursuing collaborative agendas could reduce political polarisation. This could strengthen Senegalese democracy well beyond the 2024 presidential elections, for which the recent legislative results are a useful barometer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188606/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Lena Kelly does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Senegal enters uncharted territory as for the first time in contemporary history, no single coalition won an outright majority in parliament.Catherine Lena Kelly, Associate Dean and Professor, National Defense UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1860702022-07-06T13:32:50Z2022-07-06T13:32:50ZHow Africans can assess the value of the latest G7 summit<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472339/original/file-20220704-22-uatq44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">G7 leaders convene at Schloss Elmau, Germany.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Thomas Lohnes</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Leaders of the world’s seven advanced economies have once again pledged economic support for Africa and other developing countries. But the realisation of these commitments depends on political developments in the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/where-g7-headed">Group of Seven (G7)</a> countries, specifically the United States, the outcome of Russia’s war with Ukraine, and whether Russian president Vladimir Putin retains his grip on power.</p>
<p>How each of these political developments will pan out is difficult to tell. But each has an important bearing on the decisions African leaders must make in terms of which power blocs, if any, they align with.</p>
<p>The G7 is an informal group of advanced democracies that has been meeting annually since 1975. The impetus then was a global recession caused by an <a href="https://time.com/5657375/what-is-g7/">energy crisis</a>. There was also the desire among the US, UK, Germany and France to have Japan as full partner in meeting that crisis. Italy and Canada were quickly added. The president of the European Commission also attends. </p>
<p>Topping this year’s agenda were the many pressing economic issues arising from war in Ukraine, notably the scope and effects of western sanctions against Russia. </p>
<p>US politics was also a backdrop to this year’s summit, amid fears that Donald Trump might return to office in 2024. Trump’s administration was seen as an admirer of Putin and <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/23/donald-trump-g7-summit-america-first-1473385">questioned the need for a G7</a>. President Joe Biden is, by contrast, an enthusiastic supporter. But Biden faces domestic political insecurities, raising the prospect of Trump’s return or the election in 2024 of someone with his nationalist <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-24/biden-limps-to-g-7-as-allies-fret-over-his-troubles-at-home">outlook</a>. </p>
<p>This was the context for <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2022/06/26-28/">this year’s G7 summit</a>, to which South African president Cyril Ramaphosa and the current chair of the African Union, Senegal’s Macky Sall, were invited to make presentations. So were the leaders of India, Indonesia and Argentina. Each one is a democracy with extensive ties to members of the G7. But they are also what Brookings scholar Bruce Jones describes as <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-06-15/strategy-fence-sitters">“fence sitters”</a> regarding the isolation of Russia.</p>
<p>African governments especially face many challenges, amid escalating tensions between western democracies, Russia and China. Africa’s interests would be best served if its leaders were to avoid being drawn into the <a href="https://theconversation.com/g7-and-nato-summits-lay-bare-deep-and-hostile-divide-between-russia-and-china-and-the-west-185964?utm_medium=email&utm_...">hostile divide between Russia and China and the west</a>. But it may not be possible to avoid taking sides while trying to maximise advantageous partnerships.</p>
<p>Political uncertainties among the major powers abound, including the course of the Ukrainian war, US domestic politics, and even Putin’s hold on power. The Russian leader has been in office since 2000 and has amended Russia’s constitution to extend his term to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/07/01/886440694/referendum-in-russia-passes-allowing-putin-to-remain-president-until-2036">2036</a>. Biden faces restive voters in 2024, with current polling data showing his support <a href="https://morningconsult.com/2022/06/08/biden-approval-rating-new-low/">below 40%</a>. </p>
<p>Germany, the summit host, succeeded in having western economic issues of the Ukraine war discussed on the first day. The second day addressed challenges facing African and other developing nations. Climate change, global health, gender equity and digital infrastructure were included. </p>
<p>Currently, the Ukraine war affects all these issues. Its <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/02/25/what-does-the-war-in-ukraine-mean-for-africa/">terrible effects</a> on Africa should not be ignored. </p>
<h2>Assessing the value of the G7 summit</h2>
<p>The G7 summit offered the most recent insights for Africa into how the western advanced nations are considering their stakes in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the impact that could have on developing nations. Sorting substance from rhetoric will take time. African scepticism as to whether the west will deliver <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-06-21/hollow-order-international-system">has merit</a>. </p>
<p>As African governments assess the significance of the G7’s promises of support in areas of vital concern to Africans, four key political possibilities could advance or derail them. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>If Putin remains in power and Biden wins a second four-year term, then the prospects for a second Cold War in Africa will escalate. This would likely differ from the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Cold-War">first one</a> in being less of a military confrontation, and without the competing ideologies of communism and capitalism. Rather, it would be about variations of democracy and authoritarianism, presenting difficult choices for African governments and citizens.</p></li>
<li><p>If Putin remains but Biden loses to the still dominant Trump faction Republicans in the 2022 congressional and 2024 presidential elections, then America’s pledge to the G7 package could be abandoned in 2025. Trump cancelled the US pledge to support the special fund to mitigate the effects of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-energy-idUSKBN16Z1L6">climate change</a> in 2017.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Other cuts in multilateral programmes, including to the World Health Organisation and African peacekeeping, that Biden restored, would likely be reinstated. And if Trump allies gain greater power in Congress, their role in protecting programmes in health, agriculture and development that Trump failed to slash in his <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Donald-Trump-Presidency-International-Perspectives/dp/1637237170">first Trump presidency</a> would be vulnerable. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>If Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity survive, and Putin is deposed or politically weakened, and Biden wins, then risks of a new Cold War in Africa should decline, and possibilities for collective African agency improve.</p></li>
<li><p>If Biden and Putin both lose power at home, then risks of a new Cold War in Africa also diminish. The focus will turn more towards China and whether the G7 can function as an equally important partner in Africa’s collective efforts to improve the daunting prospects of its myriad challenges without America’s leadership.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Timely reminder</h2>
<p>On 27 June 2022 the G7 leaders and guests issued a issued a <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57544/2022-06-27-g7-resilient-democracies-statement-data.pdf">“resilient democracies” statement</a>. </p>
<p>In it the leaders describe democracies globally as reliable partners, willing and able to defend open, pluralistic debate. They also reaffirm their commitments to inclusion, equality and the promotion of equal representation. </p>
<p>It is an important indicator of the democratic commitments embedded in the founding documents of the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">African Union</a>, as well as the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter">UN Charter</a> and institutions. Russia’s disregard for these rules might even open fresh opportunities for reforming the <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/">UN Security Council</a> and other multilateral forums to Africa’s advantage. </p>
<p>The statement, endorsed by the chair of the African Union, is a timely reminder that Africans – for their own reasons – aspire to entrench basic freedoms and rights, different from authoritarian alternatives. That fact alone makes Africa’s participation in this year’s G7 a timely signal of its aspiration to achieve national and regional integration by democratic means.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186070/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The G7 summit offered the most recent insights for Africa into how western nations are considering their stakes in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the impact that could have on developing nations.John J Stremlau, Honorary Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1807992022-04-08T11:04:22Z2022-04-08T11:04:22ZAfrican countries showed disunity in UN votes on Russia: South Africa’s role was pivotal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456834/original/file-20220407-22-fnto70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky addresses a Security Council meeting on Russia's invasion via a video link. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Peter Foley</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The preamble of the founding Act of the African Union (AU) <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf#page=3">calls for </a> “collective action in Africa and in our relations with the rest of the world”.</p>
<p>The credibility of this pan-African commitment has been damaged by the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/3/unga-resolution-against-ukraine-invasion-full-text">unwillingness of African governments to forge a unified position on the Russia-Ukraine war</a>.</p>
<p>They could not agree on the merits of two non-binding resolutions. Half of the AU’s members abstained from the vote demanding that Russia abide by this principle, in the <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152">first resolution</a>. And on <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114632">the second resolution</a> three weeks later demanding an end to the humanitarian crisis, the show of African disunity was the same. </p>
<p>Most recently, the General Assembly <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782">voted overwhelmingly to suspend Russia</a> from the UN Human Rights Council. By my count, of the 24 “No” votes, nine were African. South Africa was among the 23 African abstentions, with another 11 not voting, despite human rights being a key objective of the AU and South Africa. </p>
<p>Given this pattern, how will African countries ever agree to act collectively to achieve the ambitious goals on the AU’s <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/33126-doc-01_background_note.pdf">Agenda 2063</a> for Africa’s growth and development?</p>
<p>The issue at stake is not trivial. The core principle of respect for territorial integrity and sovereign equality has been at the heart of postcolonial African international relations since the founding of the Organisation of African Unity <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf">in 1963</a>. As soon as the war began, the AU chair Macky Sall and chairperson of the AU Commission Moussa Faki Mahamat called on Russia to </p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20220224/african-union-statement-situation-ukraine">respect the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of Ukraine. </a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>What has been particularly surprising in all three votes is that South Africa, normally a champion of greater African unity and human rights, has chosen either to actively <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202203250047.html">pursue a pro-Russian stance</a>, or to stand on the sidelines.</p>
<p>In my view this will imperil the country’s claim to be a leading human rights advocate, and a leader of an emerging and more potent African voice in world affairs. </p>
<h2>The South African factor</h2>
<p>This article does not address the pros and cons of maintaining friendly relations with Russia. </p>
<p>It poses a different question: Could African states that abstained on the two UN resolutions have voted with the majority, thus preserving a semblance of African unity, without jeopardising the interests they stated to justify abstaining?</p>
<p>And what about defending core AU values, such as <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">human rights</a>?</p>
<p>I draw primarily from the rationale for abstentions offered by South Africa for three reasons: Firstly, it is among Africa’s most prominent and influential countries. Secondly, since the end of apartheid, it has been an <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2020-africa-day-25-may-2020-0000">outspoken proponent of African unity </a> and the catalyst for several practical initiatives to advance collective self-reliance. Lastly, I live amid South Africa’s public debates about these issues.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-war-decoding-how-african-countries-voted-at-the-un-178663">Russia-Ukraine war: decoding how African countries voted at the UN</a>
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</p>
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<p>I assume that had South Africa chosen to make defending the principle of territorial integrity and sovereign equality a priority, and lobbied other African governments to support it, there would have been a much better show of African solidarity in voting for the resolution. </p>
<p>Consider three prominent and broad reasons that South Africans offer to justify abstaining: The war is foremost a proxy struggle between Russia and the US; For South Africa to play a mediating role it should not take sides; and, The need for continued Russian trade and security assistance.</p>
<h2>Unpacking South Africa’s reasoning</h2>
<p>Consider the proxy war between Russia and US argument. In a recent <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ojA1u430eEg">University of the Witwatersrand webinar</a> a senior government official described the war as a proxy one, between Russia and the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). He said it was not in South Africa’s interest, which is primarily the cause of peace, to choose sides. He went on to accuse the US of similar aggression in <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/sas-opposition-to-the-us-invasion-of-iraq-ten-year">the 2003 invasion of Iraq</a>.</p>
<p>In response, <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/gilbert-m-khadiagala-173180">Gilbert Khadiagala</a>, a Professor of International Relations and Director of the African Centre for the Study of the United States, noted that “two wrongs don’t make a right”. He also recalled that South Africa immediately criticised the US invasion and <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2003-03-20-south-africa-reacts-to-war-in-iraq/">its specious justification</a>. That criticism did not seriously affect South Africa-United States cooperation when in the best interests of both. And, if even-handedness is a valid concern, then voting and pressing for African unity in support of respect for core UN/AU principles should not affect South Africa-Russia relations, or perceptions of Pretoria’s SA non-alignment.</p>
<p>Now to the role of mediator. There were expectations in some quarters that there might be a useful role for South Africa in actively supporting a peaceful end to the current war. This was because of the country’s relatively peaceful transition to full democracy in the early 1990s, a process in which President Cyril Ramaphosa’s played a critical role. And his contribution to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ringside-seat-at-irish-theater-of-war-ira-sinn-fein-irish-politics/">a negotiated end to the war in Northern Ireland</a> between 2000-05.</p>
<p>But to be acceptable as mediator in any conflict, one has to be acceptable to both sides. This is not the case. The only current host acceptable to both sides is Turkey. The country has maintained good relations with Moscow, despite being a NATO member and reportedly selling Ukraine dozens of deadly drones since 2019. It also <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/11/turkey-drones-use-ukraine">voted for both UN resolutions</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-war-with-ukraine-five-reasons-why-many-african-countries-choose-to-be-neutral-180135">Russia’s war with Ukraine: Five reasons why many African countries choose to be ‘neutral’</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In addition, South Africa, presumably, is far away from the conflict. Nor does it have sufficient influence to act alone. Prospects for leveraging its membership of the <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/brics-brazil-russia-india-china-south-africa-1">Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) bloc</a> have dimmed. </p>
<p>Had South Africa led an effort to forge a united African position on the UN resolutions, I believe, this would have had no bearing on its prospects for helping mediate an end to the war.</p>
<p>Lastly, the trade imperative. It is true that there is <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russia-ukraine-conflict-could-influence-africas-food-supplies-177843">significant agricultural trade between countries on the continent and Russia and Ukraine</a>. Major importing countries are Egypt, which accounted for nearly half, followed by Sudan, Nigeria, Tanzania, Algeria, Kenya and South Africa.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russia-ukraine-conflict-could-influence-africas-food-supplies-177843">How Russia-Ukraine conflict could influence Africa's food supplies</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Sanctions against Russia will also <a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-russia-will-affect-arms-sales-to-africa-the-risks-and-opportunities-180038">affect arms sales</a>. Africa needs military hardware, especially in the Sahel region, and pays for private military <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/08/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">assistance from Russians employed by the Wagner Group</a>, regardless of politics.</p>
<p>In my view, however, none of this justifies South Africa’s chosen path.</p>
<h2>Imperatives for collective action</h2>
<p>Looking ahead, the failure to forge common cause in mostly symbolic UN votes on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will fade amid Africa’s real hardships resulting from that war. Already, spikes in the costs of food are having dire consequences <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/conflict-humanitarian-crisis-ukraine-threatening-future-global-food-security-prices">on many poor African families</a>.</p>
<p>Issues vital to human security for Africa are certain to accelerate as with the imperatives for African unity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180799/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The unwillingness of African governments to forge a unified position on the Russian invasion has damaged the credibility of their pan-African commitments.John J Stremlau, Honorary Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1766032022-02-22T14:21:06Z2022-02-22T14:21:06ZHow the migration and mobility pact has helped to reset AU-EU relations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447521/original/file-20220221-26-y3xj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Representatives at the AU-EU Summit in Brussels</span> </figcaption></figure><p>At the recent <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2022/02/17-18/">6th AU-EU summit</a>, the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) unveiled five partnerships highlighting their Joint Vision till 2030.</p>
<p>The five partnerships are: green transition and energy access, digital transformation, sustainable growth and jobs, peace and governance and migration and mobility.</p>
<p>The genesis of their partnership on migration and mobility goes back to the Joint-Valletta Action Plan that was signed in November 2015 in the wake of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21599165.2015.1129946?journalCode=fjcs21">refugee crisis</a>. That autumn hundreds of thousands of Syrian, Afghan and Eritrean asylum seekers crossed into Greece from Turkey, and into Italy from Libya. The EU called an emergency meeting with African countries to try and find a long lasting solution. </p>
<p>The meeting was attended by countless heads of government, NGOs, international organisations, AU and EU officials. </p>
<p>My colleague Eileen Lamptey and I, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/imig.12953">analysed</a> the content of the Joint Valletta Action Plan and evaluated its implementation until 2021. </p>
<p>We found that the phrase that emerged from the meeting was “shared responsibility”. This highlighted the parties´ recognition of their interdependence. While each party held onto its interests (territorial integrity for the Europeans and economic development for the Africans), there was a new sense, especially on the part of the more powerful Europeans, that both parties needed each other’s help and co-operation to advance these interests.</p>
<p>This policy shift was evident in the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21839/action_plan_en.pdf"> domains of action</a> that were agreed around migration. </p>
<p>We found only a limited gap in policy implementation. The policies on the paper were put in place and their results so far have been mostly positive. We concluded that they constituted a break with the past and progress in the EU-AU migration dialogue.</p>
<h2>The implementation score card</h2>
<p>The domains of action around migration were:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>migration and development</p></li>
<li><p>legal migration and mobility</p></li>
<li><p>protection and asylum</p></li>
<li><p>prevention of and fight against irregular migration</p></li>
<li><p>return, readmission, and reintegration.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The first two domains were “African domains” while the last two were “European domains.” The third domain was of equal importance to both parties but advantageous for the Africans. </p>
<p>A funding instrument worth Euro 3,6 billion was <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/index_en">created</a> - the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa.</p>
<p>Africa’s primary domain – migration and development – benefited from sufficient funding from the fund. The 2019 <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/default/files/eutf_report_2019_eng_digital_edition.pdf">Annual Report of the Trust Fund</a> disclosed that its implementation had been “swift and effective” , and less than 2% of the sums disbursed were ineligible. </p>
<p>The main European domain – the prevention of and fight against irregular migration – saw the disruption of illegal immigration networks and a sharp decline in clandestine immigration. According to the <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5205">UNHCR</a>, the United Nations’ refugee agency, the numbers dropped from 153,842 in 2016 to 10,565 in 2019 before the COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
<p>In the domain of protection and asylum, more than more than 48 000 asylum seekers were repatriated. This was done under the <a href="https://www.iom.int/news/joint-press-release-meeting-joint-au-eu-un-taskforce-address-migrant-and-refugee-situation-libya">AU–EU–UN Tripartite Taskforce</a> on the Situation of Stranded Migrant and Refugees in Libya which was launched in 2017. </p>
<p>Some areas fell short of expectations. These included regular migration and mobility – an African domain. And the return, readmission and integration – a European domain.</p>
<p>This shows that bolder action is needed. </p>
<h2>A broader paradigm shift?</h2>
<p>In my view the deliberations at the 6th AU-EU summit looked very much like those of the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12/">2015 Valletta summit</a>. EU leaders laid the same emphasis on interdependence, concrete immediate actions and a reset of their relationship with the AU.</p>
<p>The tone of the summit suggests that Europeans want to cooperate with Africans with a new mindset based on pragmatism and not pompous announcements. They also want agreement on concrete action based on Africans inputs. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/media-galleries/international-summit/2022-02-17-18-eu-africa/?slide=0">At the opening ceremony</a> of the AU-EU summit, Emmanuel Macron, the president of France and the EU rotating presidency spoke of forging “a new alliance”. </p>
<p>Charles Michel, the EU council president, declared that the summit was not “business as usual” but “the step that cements the renewal of [EU-AU] strategic relation. The example he used was the use, for the first time, of <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54412/final_declaration-en.pdf">roundtable sessions</a> at the summit. These were designed to foster frank discussion as well as fast and concrete decisions. </p>
<p>And talking about the partnership on peace and governance he said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>security in Africa and in Europe are interdependent. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The EU Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen announced an investment budget worth 150 billion until 2021 drawn from the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6433">Global Gateway initiative</a>, EU’s response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. </p>
<p>In his reply, Macky Sall, Senegal president and the current AU chairman requested, as a concrete measure, the use of the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/what-we-do/european-peace-facility_en">European Peace Facility</a>, an off-budget instrument that allows the EU to swiftly support military initiatives in favour of global peace. </p>
<p>Moussa Faki, the AU Commission chairman underscored the need for new monitoring and evaluation procedures, arguing that "the partnership needs visible and tangible results” for Africa cannot content itself anymore with the fashionable label of “being the continent of the future”. </p>
<p>On this point too, the Joint-Valletta Action Plan introduced an <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/default/files/eutf_report_2019_eng_digital_edition.pdf">innovative system of evaluation</a> based on the new EU Evaluation Framework and consisting of regular monitoring on the ground, quarterly or yearly evaluations at regional level (Sahel and Lake Chad, Horn of Africa and North Africa) and timely evaluation of the Trust Fund as a whole.</p>
<p>If the implementation of the other four partnerships follows the same playbook as that of the Joint-Valletta Action Plan, by the time they meet again, AU and EU member states could be talking of the first fruits of their renewed partnership. The EU and AU would do well to use the plan as a template for all the agreements they have struck.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176603/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahama Tawat does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Bolder action is needed if the African Union and the European Union are to find common ground on migration.Mahama Tawat, Research fellow, Université de MontpellierLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1602692021-05-18T14:47:38Z2021-05-18T14:47:38ZWhy few women in Senegal speak out about their rapists<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399949/original/file-20210511-23-1mon2wv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Violent protests in Dakar, Senegal, after opposition leader Ousmane Sonko is arrested on a rape charge. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by SEYLLOU/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Senegal has a robust history of women’s activism against sexual violence, which led to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-senegal-rape/senegal-rape-law-offers-hope-after-years-of-silence-idUSKBN1ZF1NY">landmark legislation</a> making rape a criminal offence last year. However, survivors of alleged sexual assault rarely denounce men by name. </p>
<p>This pattern was broken recently by a young woman, Adji Sarr who publicly accused opposition leader Ousmane Sonko of raping her. He was arrested and accused of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/03/19/senegal-womens-bodies-have-become-political-battleground/">rape</a>.</p>
<p>But, in a political twist to events, many people <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/senegal-protests-sonko-macky-sall-rape-charge/2021/03/07/eed02176-7dca-11eb-8c5e-32e47b42b51b_story.html">turned against Sarr</a> and defended Sonko. This was partly on the grounds that <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_POcRGmwcXU&list=PLODYI-J_CGqJMww2a8ToDZcv_t-_gSnng&index=69">Sonko claimed</a> President Macky Sall had a hand in fabricating the charges against him in a bid to eliminate his competition and run for an unconstitutional third term.</p>
<p>For her part Sarr was ridiculed <a href="https://womensenews.org/2021/04/its-time-to-prioritize-womens-rights-in-senegal/">as a liar</a> on social media and national television. Some women’s organisations have spoken out <a href="https://twitter.com/dafadoy/status/1382325078222856192">against stigmatising Sarr</a>. But several prominent organisations have not yet made public statements.</p>
<p>Rape remains a social problem that is widely recognised <a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/terriennes/viols-et-feminicides-au-senegal-dafa-doy-plus-jamais-ca-302922">but rarely discussed explicitly</a>. Our research on <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781351141963-14/moral-agency-paradox-positionality-beth-packer">sexuality</a>, <a href="https://benjamins.com/catalog/jls.19006.fri">media, and communication practices</a> in Senegal explains the prevalence of a Senegalese culture of discretion, called “sutura”. This often inhibits survivors from publicly denouncing perpetrators and can be an obstacle to fighting gender-based violence.</p>
<h2>Culture of silence?</h2>
<p>Sutura is a hybrid of Muslim ethical traditions and pre-Islamic social norms. We see similar cultural practices in places like Morocco where <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/136910500422232">modesty</a> shapes public opinion surrounding women’s sexuality. These <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=dJdErRqoBeQC&pg=PA196&lpg=PA196&dq=african+cultures+of+discretion&source=bl&ots=Px-DqHiTge&sig=ACfU3U3lJ4iZTA2te5vTK1buixhT43_PwQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj1vK7b2MTwAhXSIjQIHVCjCzgQ6AEwB3oECBQQAw#v=onepage&q=african%20cultures%20of%20discretion&f=false">African cultures of discretion</a> are not limited to Muslim majority countries. </p>
<p>In Senegal, women <a href="https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7x37t9qs">are seen as the guardians of sutura</a>. Whether this refers to covering their bodies in modest clothing, or by shielding domestic affairs from public view, it is up to women to maintain balance in Senegalese social life.</p>
<p>Sutura is the social contract between members of the Senegalese community. By keeping private life private, others in their family and broader community will protect and care for them. This is why it is so difficult for women to name their accuser; they drag the private into the public realm and <a href="https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7x37t9qs">break communal bonds</a>.</p>
<p>Severing community ties can have serious ramifications on women’s lives. Sutura is not a legal concept, but it shapes the way that law in Senegal is applied. Senegalese <a href="https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2534&context=lawreview">family law</a> officially recognises <a href="https://ordredesavocats.sn/senegal-code-de-famille/">men as heads of household</a>; a woman must legally reside with her husband unless deemed a danger to herself or her children. A married woman sanctioned for breaking sutura may be classified as an “unfit mother” and jeopardise <a href="https://www.genderindex.org/wp-content/uploads/files/datasheets/SN.pdf">her legal rights as a parent</a>.</p>
<p>For many Senegalese, Sarr violated sutura’s social contract when she publicly denounced Sonko. Then she gave a “tell all” interview, widely viewed on national television and social media. In a digital age when social media “over-sharing” <a href="https://benjamins.com/catalog/jls.19006.fri">can itself be viewed as transgressing sutura’s</a> culture of discretion, Sarr’s confession exacerbated her position.</p>
<p>Sarr also transgressed sutura through her work at a massage parlour, an industry widely seen <a href="https://video-streaming.orange.fr/comedie-humour/le-myste-re-des-salons-de-massage-au-se-ne-gal-une-prostitution-de-guise-e-CNT000001aoTRs.html">as disguised prostituiton</a>. Sexual promiscuity has stood as the antithesis to sutura since colonialism. The <a href="https://www.academia.edu/40156692/Chapter_Three_Breaking_the_Rules_Politics_Piety_and_Resistance_in_Senegalese_Womens_Soccer">French exerted control</a> over subjects by invoking sutura to control women’s sexuality. </p>
<p>This practice continued after independence. Women’s morality became a <a href="https://www.academia.edu/4103167/_Filles_de_la_nuit_aventuri%C3%A8res_de_la_cit%C3%A9_Arts_de_la_citadinit%C3%A9_et_d%C3%A9sirs_dAilleurs_%C3%A0_Dakar_Thesis_Full_Text_">cornerstone for nation-building</a>; “loose women” compromised the image of an independent nation.</p>
<h2>When sutura protects</h2>
<p>There’s another side to sutura which is why it’s upheld by women. Sutura <a href="https://www.academia.edu/40164685/HORS_JEU_DANS_LE_FOOTBALL_FEMININ_AU_SENEGAL_GENRE_ISLAM_ET_POLITIQUE_DU_CORPS">also means</a> protection. Like <a href="https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/facts-and-figures#:%7E:text=Globally%2C%20an%20estimated%20736%20million,women%20aged%2015%20and%20older">in many other countries</a>, <a href="https://evaw-global-database.unwomen.org/fr/countries/africa/senegal">Senegalese women often face threats of sexual violence</a>. Sutura may not shield women from the threat of sexual assault but it does solidify their social support. Survivors’ family may shield them from having further contact with their rapist or provide lodging and access to medical care. </p>
<p>Marginalised Senegalese perceived to have broken sutura may create <a href="https://www.academia.edu/40164685/HORS_JEU_DANS_LE_FOOTBALL_FEMININ_AU_SENEGAL_GENRE_ISLAM_ET_POLITIQUE_DU_CORPS">alternative communities of protection</a>. For example, people who have been rejected from their families for being immodest or breaking gender norms may <a href="https://benjamins.com/catalog/jls.19006.fri">turn to other communities of support</a>, using online pseudonyms to find peers and shield each other from further exposure and violence.<br>
Even Senegal’s #MeToo-inspired movement was careful to maintain sutura by avoiding public denunciations of individual men. After the #MeToo hashtag went viral in 2018, two Senegalese women <a href="https://twitter.com/nopiwouma">invited others</a> to fill out an anonymous Google form with stories of sexual assault. They <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/19/africa/senegal-as-equals-intl/index.html">received over 100 anonymous reports</a> of sexual misconduct. However, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/19/africa/senegal-as-equals-intl/index.html">they did not name the accused.</a></p>
<p>The Sarr/Sonko case broke this pattern. Sarr forfeited the social protection afforded by sutura when she publicly denounced Sonko. This is one reason why many Senegalese did not rally around her as a survivor.</p>
<h2>Supporting survivors</h2>
<p>Sutura creates obstacles for holding perpetrators of sexual violence accountable. As seen in Sarr’s rejection by Senegalese society, public denunciation of individuals runs the risk of isolating survivors from their community at a time when they need support the most. </p>
<p>There are already diverse strategies in Senegal that fight sexual violence without isolating women from their networks of support. Several Senegalese movements <a href="https://twitter.com/dafadoy?lang=en">publicly advocate</a> for protecting survivors’ rights and ending sexual violence, but without compromising the protective aspect of sutura. One such strategy involves denouncing acts of sexual violence but not the individuals committing them. This avoids isolating women from their communities. </p>
<p>We see this with local legal clinics called <a href="https://femmesjuristes.org/?tag=boutique-de-droit"><em>boutiques de droit</em></a> (Law Shops) that launch awareness-raising campaigns and also offer legal support to individual survivors. Also, at <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Centre-conseil-adolescents-de-Kolda-107298627282408/">youth centres</a> across the country, sexual assault survivors train to become advocates who educate their communities about sexual violence prevention.</p>
<p>The treatment of Sarr shows us how sutura can work against survivors. These feminist movements illustrate that sutura can also be a force for change – if it protects survivors, not perpetrators, of sexual violence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160269/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Juliana Friend receives funding from The Institute for Citizens & Scholars, formerly known as the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Beth D. Packer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Senegalese culture of discretion, called “sutura”, inhibits survivors of sexual violence from publicly denouncing perpetrators.Beth D. Packer, Lecturer in Sociology, Tufts UniversityJuliana Friend, PhD Candidate in Sociocultural anthropology, University of California, BerkeleyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1229522019-09-05T12:56:43Z2019-09-05T12:56:43ZSenegal: is the Socialist Party set for a leadership battle?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290937/original/file-20190904-175673-jwmy79.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ousmane Tanor Dieng</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/LUCAS DOLEGA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The secretary general of Senegal’s Socialist Party, <a href="https://www.seneplus.com/politique/ousmane-tanor-dieng-est-decede">Ousmane Tanor Dieng</a>, died in July this year. There are concerns that his death will intensify divides in the Party’s leadership. This threatens the future of a party that has shaped Senegalese politics since 1948, before independence. </p>
<p>Although the Socialist Party is well structured and established nationally, it’s now facing a serious test. Can it survive this test, overcome its numerous internal struggles, and reestablish itself on the Senegalese political stage?</p>
<p>To answer these questions, it is useful to look to both Senegal’s and the party’s history.</p>
<h2>Historical perspectives</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.seneplus.com/article/le-parti-socialiste-66-ans-d%E2%80%99histoire">The origins</a> of the Senegalese Socialist Party can be traced back to October 1948 when its founding father, <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/206942/politique/s-n-gal-senghor-1906-2001-une-vie-un-si-cle/">Léopold Sédar Senghor</a>, established the Senegalese Democratic Block (Bloc démocratique sénégalais). This was a break away from the French Section of the Worker’s International (Section française de l’internationale ouvrière). </p>
<p>The party evolved, merging with other parties to become the Popular Senegalese Block. It then became the Senegalese Progressive Union (Union progressiste sénégalaise) in 1958, before emerging as the Socialist Party in December 1976 as part of <a href="https://www.internationalesocialiste.org/">Socialist International</a> – a worldwide organisation of social democratic, socialist and labour parties.</p>
<p>These changes reflected an uneasy relationship between the political leaders involved in the day-to-day operation and organisation of the Senegalese political landscape before and after the country’s independence. Leaders such as Senghor, <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/146855/archives-thematique/mamadou-dia-un-monument-de-l-histoire-politique-du-s-n-gal/">Mamadou Dia</a> and Lamine Gueye (who was elected along with Senghor in 1945 to represent Senegal at the French National Assembly) all had widely diverging outlooks.</p>
<p>The party had tremendous influence first under the leadership of the country’s first president, Senghor, and later President Abdou Diouf. Diouf, who succeeded Senghor in 1980, brought his diplomatic advisor and close ally, Ousmane Tanor Dieng into the mix. Dieng became a minister of the state and a cabinet secretary.</p>
<p>During the 1996 leadership convention, also known as “the convention without debate”, Tanor Dieng took over the Socialist Party, becoming its secretary general. He was catapulted to this position because of President Diouf, who wanted to step back from the party.</p>
<p>This presidential support garnered a mixed reception from party bigwigs. This accelerated the party’s collapse and Diouf’s eventual <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2000/03/21/alternance-tranquille-au-senegal-le-president-sortant-abdou-diouf-a-reconnu-sa-defaite_319592">loss to Abdoulaye Wade in the 2000 presidential election</a>.</p>
<p>Yet Tanor Dieng fought to retain leadership of the party and continue the work of Senghor and Diouf.</p>
<h2>Successive failures</h2>
<p>Politically, those close to Khalifa Sall (the former mayor of Dakar, now in prison, deposed by Macky Sall’s Presidential decree), accuse Ousmane Tanor Dieng of ruling the Socialist Party with an iron fist. </p>
<p>The lack of internal democracy exacerbated opposition and provoked harsh criticism, particularly from younger leaders. Dissenters <a href="https://apanews.net/news/senegal-khalifa-sall-exclu-du-parti-socialiste">were sidelined</a> as the party struggled to adapt to its loss of power. </p>
<p>The popularity of the party’s secretary general took a blow, and the 2007 and 2012 presidential elections resulted in losses. In the first round of the 2007 election Tanor Dieng received just 13.56% of the vote, putting him in third place.</p>
<p>In 2012 he tried again with disappointing results, finishing in fourth place with just 11.38%. A fierce opponent of <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/133124/archives-thematique/wade-s-explique/">Abdoulaye Wade</a>, Tanor Dieng decided to support <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20190129-presidentielle-senegal-macky-sall-sortant">Macky Sall</a> for the second round of voting, once more sparking opposition within his own party.</p>
<h2>Alliance</h2>
<p>The party became a de facto member of the ruling coalition, Benno Bokk Yakaar (United in Hope). In 2014, Tanor Dieng was again made head of the Socialist Party, defeating Aissata Tall Sall, who then created her own movement, Osez l’avenir (Bank on the future).</p>
<p>As a reward for joining “Macky 2012”, Tanor Dieng was appointed President of the High Commission of Local Governments (Haut Conseil des collectivités territoriales). Two of his entourage were also granted government jobs: Aminata Mbengue Ndiaye (Minister of Livestock Farming, and then Minister of Fisheries) and Sérigne Mbaye Thiam (Minister of Education, and then Minister of Water and Sanitation).</p>
<p>This new stance <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/289486/politique/senegal-a-quoi-joue-ousmane-tanor-dieng/">widened the gulf</a> between those who distanced themselves from the regime, in particular supporters of Khalifa Sall, and those who defended a closer relationship with the President.</p>
<p>Things got even worse when the Socialist Party doubled down on its decision to refrain from presenting a candidate in the presidential elections of 2019. Party leaders said the decision was due to its continuing alliance with the majority. It was against the backdrop of this internal tension that Tanor Dieng suddenly passed away.</p>
<h2>A crucial turning point</h2>
<p>Various statements released about Tanor’s death and succession expose the scale of conflict threatening to break out between the two camps within the Socialist Party. </p>
<p>For Serigne Mbaye Thiam –- a Tanor protégé and current Minister of Water and Sanitation –- the top job should unquestionably go to Aminata Mbengue Ndiaye, given her position as First Vice-Secretary General, according to the Party’s by-laws. Other party leaders disagree.</p>
<p>Aside from wrangles over leadership, there’s now a face-off between two movements. There are those who support the idea of maintaining ties with the majority and holding onto gains made through this alliance. </p>
<p>Those opposing this approach say it reduces the Socialist Party to one without an identity, simply supporting other political groups. They are convinced that the party will be able to reshape itself and regain power.</p>
<p>In spite of his <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/804569/societe/senegal-fin-du-combat-judiciaire-pour-khalifa-sall/">legal troubles</a>, Khalifa Sall is the icon of this second movement. He’s supported by other rising stars, such as mayors Barthélémy Dias and Bamba Fall, both of whom are close to him and are currently outside the party.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the Socialists’ main challenge will be the differences between some of its leaders. These must be put aside so that a secretary general can be chosen by consensus, following internal discussion and debate.</p>
<p>This will depend on the will of current leaders and “outsiders”, who have to work towards reconciliation, with the aim of reviving a political party whose adherents are still inspired by the ideas of its founding father, Léopold Sédar Senghor, and his desire for profound transformation in Senegalese society.</p>
<p><em>Translated from the French by Alice Heathwood for <a href="http://www.fastforword.fr/en/">Fast ForWord</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122952/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Moussa Diaw does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Aside from wrangles over leadership, there’s now a face-off between two movements within one of Senegal’s most influential political partiesMoussa Diaw, Professeur de sciences politiques, Université Gaston BergerLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1131982019-03-14T13:18:43Z2019-03-14T13:18:43ZThe exception: behind Senegal’s history of stability<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262868/original/file-20190308-150680-1muoxjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Senegal developed a diplomatic tradition after gaining independence from France.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">A.RICARDO/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Senegal’s elections have been peaceful and the incumbent president, Macky Sall, has <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Senegal-Sall-in-sweeping-election-victory/1066-5003934-6q2mu1/index.html">been reelected</a>. For many this comes as no surprise. Senegal has long been a stable democracy in a region plagued by military coups, civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It’s been considered an <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/the-senegalese-exception/7FB40DEFB568CF98A9B25C3861B0F8B1">“exception”</a> in West Africa. </p>
<p>Markers of this stability have been visible since Senegal’s independence from France in 1960. There was a peaceful and democratic transition of power from colonial rule and Leopold Sedar Senghor, Senegal’s first president, established a solid <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40241060?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">democratic foundation</a>. He voluntarily resigned after 20 years in power.</p>
<p>Since then Senegal has had free elections, peaceful transitions of power, and civilian rule. </p>
<p>One of the foundations of Senegal’s stability is the strong influence of Sufi Islam. Senegal is <a href="http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/senegal-population/">94% Muslim</a> and Sufi Islam dominates culturally, economically, and sometimes politically.</p>
<p>Sufis – Islamic mystics – <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-the-sufis-and-why-does-is-see-them-as-threatening-73431">seek</a> divine love and knowledge through self-discipline. Senegal’s Sufis fall under one of the Sunni Muslim schools of jurisprudence. </p>
<p>My insights about the interplay between various Islamic groups, religion and the state is based on <a href="http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/product_info.php?products_id=807558">my research</a> in the country over the past 20 years. I examined minority Shi'i Islamic communities in Senegal, a majority Sunni Muslim country that has long celebrated religious freedom. The coexistence of various religious groups in Senegal is just <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">one factor</a> that has contributed to peace in the country. </p>
<p>Aside from its religious dynamics, Senegal also has a long history of fostering global intellectual, diplomatic, and financial connections. These have all led to its “exceptional” stability. </p>
<h2>Sufi Islam</h2>
<p>To explain the foundation of Senegalese stability, the late Irish political scientist Donal Cruise O’Brien put forward a <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781403963697">“social contract” theory</a>. The contract, he argued, was between marabout (Sufi Islamic leader) and talibe (disciple), as well as between the marabouts and the state. </p>
<p>Senegalese historian Mamadou Diouf <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/tolerance-democracy-and-sufis-in-senegal/9780231162623">revisited</a> this thesis in 2013. He touted Sufi Islam as an “antidote to political Islam”. This was particularly true, Diouf argued, of the Senegalese model of pluralism, cooperation, coexistence, and tolerance.</p>
<p>But there have been other factors that have contributed to Senegal’s stability.</p>
<h2>Diplomatic tradition</h2>
<p>French colonialism positioned Senegal as a port of entry into West Africa. And while Senegal continues to maintain strong ties to Europe and the US it has fostered important relations with the Middle East and Asia. </p>
<p>Senegal is officially a Francophone country. In addition to speaking various African languages, many Senegalese are also <a href="http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/product_info.php?products_id=808100">Arabophone</a> – intellectually as well as linguistically. </p>
<p>The country developed a diplomatic tradition after gaining independence from France. It joined the <a href="https://www.un.int/senegal/content/permanent-mission-republic-senegal-united-nations-0">United Nations</a> in 1960, the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/organisation-african-unity-oau">Organisation of African Unity</a> (now the African Union) in 1963 and the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Non-Aligned-Movement">Non-Aligned Movement</a> in 1964. </p>
<p>Significantly, Senegal is the only African country to have hosted the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (renamed the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) Summit twice – in [1991]and<a href="https://www.oic-oci.org/confdetail/?cID=6&lan=en">2008</a>.</p>
<p>Senegal smartly used the opportunity of hosting these Islamic summits to attract significant Arab funding for infrastructural development. For example, it <a href="https://www.kuwait-fund.org/en/web/kfund/home">receives</a> the largest amount of loans given by the Kuwait Fund to any African country. Today, Gulf aid has displaced Western development funds in Senegal.</p>
<p>Senegal is also a West African financial centre. It has taken leadership roles in the Islamic Development Bank and was <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/2531/islamic-finance-sukuk-for-senegal/">the first</a> African country to embrace Islamic finance. </p>
<p>While these global religious, intellectual, diplomatic, and financial connections have contributed to Senegal’s stability, it has experienced periods of instability too. </p>
<h2>Not all plain sailing</h2>
<p>The relationship between the state and Sufi Islamic leaders has <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.14321/jwestafrihist.2.1.0165?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">sometimes</a> been controversial. And the state has also had conflicts with the young people who <a href="https://www.indexmundi.com/senegal/demographics_profile.html">make up</a> roughly 60% of the population. </p>
<p>One example of instability was before Senegal’s contentious 2012 presidential elections. The incumbent President Abdoulaye Wade wanted to secure a third term by changing the constitution. The movement <a href="https://www.unric.org/en/right-to-participation/28099-the-movement-yen-a-marre-weve-had-enough">“Y’en a Marre”</a> (Enough is Enough) mobilised the youth vote and organised political protests, which disrupted the country for weeks. </p>
<p>Policy commentators first suggested the events might insinuate that Senegal’s record of democracy had been weakened. But Wade eventually <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-senegal-election-idUSBRE82P06420120326">conceded peacefully</a> to Macky Sall after a run-off election. </p>
<p>Some are concerned that more instability might be looming. </p>
<p>Last month Sall won re-election. Some <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-22/senegal-s-sall-likely-to-win-new-term-in-presidential-vote">analyists</a> credit his victory to economic growth (<a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/senegal/overview">7.2%</a> in 2018), infrastructural projects and the recent discovery of offshore oil and gas. </p>
<p>But he has strong critics. His crackdown on corruption has been used politically to eliminate his biggest competitors. And he has been criticised <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190114-senegal-opposition-leaders-khalifa-sall-karim-wade-barred-presidential-election">for exiling</a> Karim Wade, son of Abdoulaye Wade, from Senegal and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20180830-senegal-court-upholds-five-year-jail-term-dakar-mayor-khalifa-sall">imprisoning</a> Dakar’s former mayor Khalifa Sall.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, Senegal looks good in relation to other African countries. Think of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47265993">recent elections in Nigeria</a>; Kenya’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/world/africa/kenya-election-uhuru-kenyatta-raila-odinga.html">repeated 2017 elections</a>; the 2016 Gambian elections, when President Adama Barrow had to be <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38675741">sworn in from Senegal</a>; or the violent <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11916590">post-election conflict</a> in Ivory Coast in 2010 and 2011. </p>
<h2>Lessons</h2>
<p>Senegal is important for Africa because it provides an example of a country that can help shift the narrative of the continent as an <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11004.doc.htm">“arc of instability.”</a>. </p>
<p>For example, while Sufi Islam is the dominant religious practice in Senegal, religious minorities have long been accepted and given the freedom to practice their religion. </p>
<p>But I am concerned by recent reports in Western media that portray the African continent as another sphere for the Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry to play out by disseminating Sunni-Shi‘i sectarianism in <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-senegal-saudi-iran-insight-idUSKBN1880JY">Senegal</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-03-08/as-trump-makes-threats-iran-makes-friends">Nigeria</a>. </p>
<p>There are tensions between the minority Salafi and Shi‘i movements. But it is inaccurate to suggest that West Africa has fallen victim to Gulf power politics and has no religious agency of its own. </p>
<p>So far Senegalese have pushed back against suggestions that the country is becoming more radicalised by promoting Sufi Islam as an Islam of peace. Despite the growth of minority Islamic movements, the majority of Senegalese are likely to adamantly remain proud Sufis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113198/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mara Leichtman's research in Senegal has received funding over the years from Fulbright, Population Council, National Science Foundation, West African Research Association, Council of American Overseas Research Centers, and Michigan State University.</span></em></p>Senegal is important for Africa because it’s a country that shifts the narrative of the continent as an “arc of instability.”Mara Leichtman, Associate Professor of Anthropology and Muslim Studies, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/972032018-06-11T10:41:38Z2018-06-11T10:41:38ZSenegal is counting on its World Cup football stars to lift its political gloom<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221969/original/file-20180606-137312-xpsrhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Senegal's starting 11 before a recent friendly against Luxembourg.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Julian Warnand/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>With next year’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/senegal-set-vote-parliamentary-elections-170730034644334.html">presidential elections</a> on the horizon, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14093674">Senegal</a> is gripped by political and economic unrest. The recent <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/senegal-student-dies-in-clashes-with-police-over-grants-20180516">killing of a student</a> by a police officer during university protests over unpaid bursaries is just one tragic indicator of the upheaval, discontent and uncertainty which characterises the current climate. </p>
<p>Amid the turmoil, the Senegalese football team’s forthcoming participation at the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia presents a beacon of hope. Street vendors have begun to sell replica shirts in the national team’s white and green, and a mood of cautious optimism is unfolding. </p>
<p>In a country where the passion for sport is ubiquitous, a successful performance by the Lions de la Teranga at the world’s most prestigious tournament has the potential to bring momentary joy to a beleaguered population. This is precisely what happened during Senegal’s previous, and to date only, appearance at the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/jonathanstevenson/2010/06/the_story_of_the_2002_world_cu.html">World Cup finals in 2002</a>. </p>
<p>Entering the tournament as rank outsiders, a team of relative unknowns proceeded to sensationally beat the reigning champions and overwhelming favourites France in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2002/may/31/minutebyminute.worldcupfootball2002">opening match</a>. They then managed to advance to the quarter finals – as one of only three African teams to do so in the history of the competition.</p>
<p>Many of the stars of the 2002 generation went on to become household names in European club football. The likes of <a href="https://www.transfermarkt.co.uk/el-hadji-diouf/profil/spieler/3604">El Hadji Diouf</a>, <a href="http://www.lfchistory.net/players/player/profile/288">Salif Diao</a> and <a href="https://www.transfermarkt.co.uk/papa-bouba-diop/profil/spieler/5485">Papa Bouba Diop</a> forged successful careers in England. The events of 2002 – and in particular the hugely symbolic victory over their former colonisers – announced Senegal’s arrival as a force to be reckoned with in the global game.</p>
<h2>Wrestling has overtaken football</h2>
<p>However, over the next decade and a half, Senegalese football stagnated somewhat. The national team failed to qualify for any of the subsequent three World Cups, and their performance at the African Cup of Nations was largely dismal. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, there is widespread agreement that the hugely popular sport of traditional wrestling has overtaken football as the nation’s favoured pastime. Combats between wrestling superstars sell out vast arenas and saturate the media. The <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/01/30/el-hadji-diouf-cherishes-senegal-s-2002-golden-generation//">Génération 2002</a>, as they would enter into lore, became a mythical emblem of past glories rather than the beginning of a new era of dominance.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/senegalese-wrestle-with-ethnicity-while-reaching-for-dreams-of-success-66073">Senegalese wrestle with ethnicity while reaching for dreams of success</a>
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<p>It is only now, after several false starts, that the team – coached by the 2002 captain <a href="https://mg.co.za/tag/aliou-cisse">Aliou Cissé</a> – promise to recapture the glory of that famous outing in Japan and Korea. In contrast to the 2002 squad, most of whom played for lesser teams in the French championship, the current crop are far from unknown. </p>
<p>Led by the mercurial talents of Liverpool winger <a href="https://www.anfield-online.co.uk/squad/sadio-mane-profile.html">Sadio Mané</a>, the 2018 Lions boast a wealth of elite players from Europe’s leading football clubs. <a href="https://www.transfermarkt.co.uk/kalidou-koulibaly/profil/spieler/93128">Kalidou Koulibaly</a> of SSC Napoli is one of the game’s most in-demand defenders and <a href="https://www.transfermarkt.co.uk/keita-balde/profil/spieler/238752">Keita Baldé Diao</a> is a star of the future at AS Monaco. </p>
<p>Midfielders Idrissa Gueye, Cheikhou Kouyaté and Badou Ndiaye are all established at English Premier League clubs. There is a genuine sense that this team can achieve something special at the World Cup, perhaps even emulating their illustrious predecessors. </p>
<h2>Opiate of the masses</h2>
<p>It’s often suggested, misquoting Karl Marx, that sport (and football in particular) has replaced religion as the “opiate of the masses”. It provides illusory moments of happiness while distracting from problems or hardships. Indeed, it is often proposed that sporting success can be translated into political capital, allowing a regime to appear in a positive light, or glossing over its failings. </p>
<p>Following this logic, it is indeed possible that a successful World Cup in Russia might be welcomed by the incumbent president <a href="http://www.presidence.sn/en/presidency/biography">Macky Sall</a>, currently facing much opposition in his bid for reelection. Seen from a different angle, however, sports can also expose a society’s fissures and tensions.</p>
<p>When Cissé <a href="https://africanfootball.com/news/744470/Aliou-Cisse-defends-his-Senegal-team-selection">announced</a> the 23 players who would form the squad in Russia, he was not only listing the names of the elite athletes who would represent the country – he was revealing much about the relationship between football and Senegalese society. </p>
<p>It is striking to note, for instance, that not one single member of the squad plays his club football in Senegal. Among the 32 nations participating at this year’s tournament, only Sweden are in the same position of having their entire squad playing abroad. </p>
<p>The squads of the other African qualifiers – Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and Tunisia – each include at least some players from their respective domestic leagues. Certainly, this points towards the relative weakness of the Senegalese league. It is chronically underfunded, does not usually attract large numbers of supporters and pays low wages.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-african-fans-love-european-football-a-senegalese-perspective-79856">Why African fans love European football - a Senegalese perspective</a>
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<h2>Football conveyor belts</h2>
<p>A flourishing domestic championship does not appear to be the primary aim of professional football in Senegal. It is perhaps no coincidence that two of the more successful teams in recent years have been the 2013 champions <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/07/football/senegal-football-school-diambars/index.html">Diambars</a>, and <a href="http://www.futbol24.com/team/Senegal/AS-Generation-Foot/">Génération Foot</a>, victorious in 2017. </p>
<p>These clubs, set up with external assistance from sportswear giant Adidas and French club, <a href="http://www.fcmetz.com/club/projet-de-club/academie-generation-foot">FC Metz</a> respectively, are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-38402698/senegal-football-academy-we-teach-players-to-think-for-themselves">academies</a> dedicated to producing a conveyor belt of footballing talent for export to European leagues, while also pursuing educational and developmental goals. </p>
<p>Cissé’s selection includes a combined total of seven players who moved to Europe from these two academies, including the superstar Mané. With the increasing globalisation of football, the development and sale of talent has emerged as a lucrative industry – albeit one which has yet to contribute significantly to the development of Senegalese football at a domestic level. </p>
<p>Instead, there has been a proliferation of football schools and academies determined to cash in on the boom. With it, a wave of young men desperate to forge careers in European football. </p>
<p>While conducting a year’s fieldwork on sport aspirations in Dakar, I met countless young men who professed dreams of playing in Europe. In some cases, their families were counting on their success to lift them out of poverty, and enlisted the support of dubious agents to engineer trials and transfers. These often turned out to be scams. </p>
<p>This is a common story in African football – yet it reflects the economic situation within which the sport is embedded. Youth unemployment is at consistently high levels and irregular work in the informal economy often the only realistic prospect. Therefore becoming a well-paid footballer or a wrestler can seem like a worthwhile pursuit to thousands of young Senegalese men. </p>
<p>Many Senegalese migrate to Europe – by acquiring a visa, or by risky Mediterranean crossings. Indeed, Senegal’s long history of migration is reflected in the World Cup squad, with 10 squad members having been born in Europe, mostly in France. </p>
<p>Football, then, can be viewed as a prism through which to understand social phenomena. In the case of Senegal, even the announcement of the World Cup squad allows us to reflect about historical migration patterns, youth unemployment, and risks and inequalities in the global sports industries. </p>
<p>However, football can also bring about cohesion and togetherness. When the Lions de la Teranga face Poland in their first match in Russia, the whole Senegalese nation will be united in roaring them on to victory – and perhaps the beginning of another magical World Cup. </p>
<p><em>This article is based on research conducted as part of the GLOBALSPORT project based at the University of Amsterdam and funded by the European Research Council.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97203/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Hann received funding from the European Research Council. (2013-2017) </span></em></p>When Senegal face Poland in their first World Cup match in Russia, the whole nation will be roaring them on to victory.Mark Hann, Doctoral student in Anthropology, University of AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/912632018-02-12T15:17:35Z2018-02-12T15:17:35ZSenegal’s rappers continue to ‘cry from the heart’ for a more just society<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204849/original/file-20180205-19944-dgactk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Keur Gui - Thiat, left, and Kilifeu, right.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/53925096450/photos/a.383263196450.166626.53925096450/383263816450/?type=3&theater">Facebook</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>American musicians were once integral to political activism. The 1963 <a href="http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/march-on-washington">March</a> on Washington for Jobs and Freedom is recognised as a seminal moment in American history and a triumph for nonviolent resistance. Harry Belafonte, then a 36-year-old superstar of music, television and film, was at the forefront, serving as a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/11/martin-luther-king-speech-harry-belafonte">confidant</a> to Martin Luther King and helping to bankroll the Black Freedom Movement. Today few American artists seem willing to take such an active role in political struggles.</p>
<p>But across the Atlantic musicians in many African countries are in the vanguard of popular struggles, not only providing a symbolic soundtrack but marching on the frontlines and leading social movements. </p>
<p>Take Nigeria, where Seun Kuti carries on the <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/africa/la-fg-nigeria-fela-kuti-2017-story.html">legacy</a> of his father Fela by <a href="http://dailypost.ng/2017/09/04/seun-kuti-blasts-buharis-govt-politicians/">confronting</a> the country’s venal political elite. In Burkina Faso rappers <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2016/1/28/burkina-faso-a-rappers-role-in-revolution.html">helped overthrow</a> Blaise Compaore.</p>
<p>In Africa’s newest country, South Sudan, a new collective of musicians and artists, <a href="https://www.anataban.org/">Ana Taban</a>, has emerged as some of the few critics of the country’s kleptocratic rulers. And in Tanzania, the legendary father of Swahili hip hop and opposition member of parliament sits in jail, <a href="https://hiphopafrican.com/tag/sugu/">Sugu</a>, <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201801220737.html">accused</a> of insulting the country’s increasingly autocratic president, John Magufuli.</p>
<p>One of the most notable examples of artists in the Belafonte mould is the musical collective <a href="https://hiphopafrican.com/2017/02/09/keur-gui/">Keur Gui</a> in Dakar, Senegal. Already among the most popular within Senegal’s lively hip hop scene, their profile grew exponentially in 2011 during the massive protests against President Abdoulaye Wade’s attempt to steal a third presidential term.</p>
<h2>Activism on a truck</h2>
<p>In 2011 Keur Gui’s lead rappers Thiat and Kilifeu joined other musicians and journalists to form the <a href="https://www.unric.org/en/right-to-participation/28099-the-movement-yen-a-marre-weve-had-enough">Y'en a Marre</a> (Fed Up) movement to mobilise youth against Wade. During their campaign, Keur Gi recorded songs that became the <em>cri de coeur</em> (cry from the heart) of the broader movement. </p>
<p>Along with other musician-activists, the group toured the country in a flatbed truck with a built-in soundsystem playing in small towns and rural villages bringing their message to distant communities. This was essential in a country where the average age is just over 18 and 70% live in rural areas. </p>
<p>Thiat was <a href="http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2087614,00.html">arrested</a> and detained following a rally in Dakar’s Obélisque Square for allegedly calling the President a “liar” and saying that the then 85-year-old was too old to govern. Y'en a Marre’s actions were crucial in ensuring Wade’s defeat and his replacement by Macky Sall.</p>
<p>Rather than rest on their laurels, Keur Gui, especially the charismatic Thiat, have continued their activism. In Senegal where politicians have historically sought to legitimatise their governments by co-opting popular musicians, Keur Gui was offered a share of the spoils of the new regime. They refused, insisting that their vision was never simply to change elected leaders. </p>
<p>Rather, their movement Y'en a Marre pushes for a vision of democratic transformation beyond the ballot box.</p>
<p>Inspired by legendary pan-Africanists like <a href="https://afrolegends.com/2012/01/20/amilcar-cabral-tell-no-lies-claim-no-easy-victories/">Amilcar Cabral</a>, Thiat, who wears a simple woollen hat reminiscent of the one made famous by Cabral, has worked to organise and support other artist-led social movements in Africa including <a href="http://africasacountry.com/2014/10/the-citizens-of-burkina-faso/">Balai Citoyen</a> in Burkina Faso.</p>
<p>In 2014, the group released a follow up album featuring the single <em>Diogoufi</em> (“Nothing has changed”). </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Gq2cVl9t37k?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Keur Gi.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Shot with the aesthetic sensibility of a film by the Senegalese director <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2007/jun/12/guardianobituaries.obituaries">Ousmane Sembene</a>, the video begins with Thiat sitting outside a store as ordinary Senegalese try and fail to purchase basic goods. Over a mournful piano loop, Thiat offers a frustrated <a href="http://africasacountry.com/2014/11/as-far-as-rappers-keur-gui-are-concerned-nothing-has-changed-in-senegal/">commentary</a> (translations of the original Wolof and French lyrics were provided to me by Thiat) on the failure of the new political leadership to bring about change: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Same electoral promises</p>
<p>Same selling of our lands</p>
<p>The country’s in total chaos</p>
<p>Its only two years and we’re already fed up.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Through the 1980s Senegal once boasted a robust and diverse economy that posted impressive growth. But decades of austerity programmes have left the government indebted to foreign donors and largely incapable of providing much in the way of social services.</p>
<p>While cognisant of the role the international community has played in Senegal’s impoverishment, Thiat’s lens always remains sharply focused on the failings of the country’s political elite:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A government pushed into power by accident</p>
<p>They fail in their duty</p>
<p>Lazy regime</p>
<p>No vision</p>
<p>Permanent mess</p>
<p>No solutions</p>
<p>Get out of here!</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Kilifeu, whose gritty melodic cadence balances Thiat’s straight delivery, echoes his calls for a new vision and new political leaders in his lacerating solo verses:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The leaders hang on to the power</p>
<p>In spite of the opposition of the population.</p>
<p>Politicians are all the same, no difference.</p>
<p>Only broken promises and lies.</p>
<p>We are fed up of your nonsense,</p>
<p>We really need change.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Cynical manoeuvres</h2>
<p>The international community remains committed to a vision of democratic reform for Africa that centres on electoral competition over empowering ordinary people. Political elites circulate between political parties while engaging in cynical institutional manoeuvres that further entrench their power.</p>
<p>Even where regimes blatantly violate any notion of democratic process as in Rwanda, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo currently, diplomats insist that elections equate democracy going as far as telling protesters to “stand down” as a leading Congolese activist recently told me. </p>
<p>“There are no other options but elections,” they <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2018/01/15/kabila-must-go-the-congolese-see-this-why-cant-the-west/">suggest</a>. The truth is that we’ve failed to recognise the new political visions being articulated by young musicians and activists across the continent. Instead of lecturing them on how things should be, perhaps it is time for us to just listen.</p>
<p><em>This article is part of a series featuring Songs of Protest from across the world, genres and generations.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91263/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zachariah Mampilly does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The international community has failed to recognise the new political visions being articulated by young musicians and activists across Africa.Zachariah Mampilly, Professor of Political Science and Africana Studies, Vassar CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/813412017-07-20T17:58:18Z2017-07-20T17:58:18ZThe Demba Diop stadium football crush: Is this Senegal’s Hillsborough?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179047/original/file-20170720-23983-10iy7pf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Survivors of a stampede at Demba Diop stadium, Senegal. Eight people were killed when a wall collapsed after fighting started between fans. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s the evening of Saturday July 15: Stade de Mbour meeting Union Sportive (US) Ouakam in the Senegalese League Cup final at the Demba Diop stadium in Dakar. With the score evenly poised at 1-1 and the match having entered extra time, the team from Mbour, 80 kilometres south of the capital, scored what would prove to be the decisive goal.</p>
<p>The fans of Ouakam – a suburb of Dakar – started turning on their rivals, charging towards the fans in the Mbour section of the stadium and throwing rocks. As the Mbour fans sought refuge in one corner of the stand, part of a supporting wall gave way, plunging them into the ditch which surrounds the pitch. In the fall and ensuing panic, eight people lost their lives and around a 100 more were injured. </p>
<p>In the aftermath of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14093674">Senegal</a>’s worst ever <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40621982">sporting disaster</a>, some difficult questions had to be asked. How could this be allowed to happen? Who was to blame? And what would be the consequences? </p>
<p>An immediate scapegoat was found in the shape of US Ouakam. Their fans were reported to have initiated the violence which triggered the incident. The team was swiftly <a href="http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/40634432">suspended</a> indefinitely from all official competitions. The disorderly behaviour of sport fans in general was widely condemned. Indeed, this has been a recurring theme in Senegal’s sporting landscape for some time. It might be considered surprising, however, that the violence should reach its apex at a football match.</p>
<h2>Warnings about the stadium</h2>
<p>While living in Dakar and conducting ethnographic <a href="http://global-sport.eu/research-team">fieldwork</a> on the trajectories of aspiring athletes, I regularly attended both football matches and wrestling fights at stadia and arenas across the city. It included Demba Diop stadium, where most of the biggest wrestling events are held. </p>
<p>I was frequently warned by friends to avoid certain areas outside the stadium prior to or after the event. They warned me to leave the stadium early, or to stay away entirely and watch it on TV instead. On more than one occasion, I did get caught up in violent skirmishes where blows were exchanged, objects including chairs and bottles were thrown, and crowds were crushed into small areas as they tried to escape the violence. Senegalese sport fans are a passionate bunch. A trip to the stadium can turn into a volatile experience in the event of an unpopular outcome.</p>
<p>But all of these incidents and security warnings took place in the context of <em>lutte avec frappe</em> – <a href="https://theconversation.com/senegalese-wrestle-with-ethnicity-while-reaching-for-dreams-of-success-66073">wrestling with punches</a> – Senegal’s national sport, which has a reputation for being steeped in occult activities and violence. Football, by comparison, is considered relatively peaceful, in part due to the significantly lower interest in domestic competition. </p>
<p>When I went to the Demba Diop stadium to watch the semifinal of the football League Cup in 2015, there were only a handful of fans in an otherwise deserted stadium. Indeed, the matches of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-african-fans-love-european-football-a-senegalese-perspective-79856">inter-district navétanes championships</a> are often <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-african-fans-love-european-football-a-senegalese-perspective-79856">better attended</a> than the main league and cup formats, due to their important role in fostering community togetherness and local pride. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179023/original/file-20170720-23983-1ay2oyi.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179023/original/file-20170720-23983-1ay2oyi.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179023/original/file-20170720-23983-1ay2oyi.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179023/original/file-20170720-23983-1ay2oyi.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179023/original/file-20170720-23983-1ay2oyi.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179023/original/file-20170720-23983-1ay2oyi.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179023/original/file-20170720-23983-1ay2oyi.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Normally very few fans attend football matches at Demba Diop, like this game in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mark Hann</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While there is no excuse for the unacceptable behaviour of a small minority of fans, the situation at Demba Diop was compounded by a glaring lack of security. One source told me that there was a cordon of only 10 police officers separating the two groups of fans, and that they left the scene once they realised that they could not control the escalating violence. </p>
<p>Other eyewitnesses <a href="http://www.jeuneafrique.com/458070/societe/senegal-alpha-raconte-nuit-de-violences-de-panique-stade-demba-diop/">suggested</a> that there was simply not enough security in the ground – and that those who were there simply observed proceedings without trying to intervene. An investigation has been launched to answer some of the pressing questions which arise from this tragedy: how many fans were allowed into the stadium? How could they bring in rocks and other projectiles? Was there sufficient security present? And was their response – which included the deployment of teargas to counter the crowd violence – appropriate?</p>
<h2>Complacency of political authorities</h2>
<p>For many Senegalese, the Demba Diop disaster is just the latest in a series of incidents which have demonstrated the negligence and complacency of political authorities in guaranteeing the safety of citizens. In recent months, <a href="http://www.dakaractu.com/Incendie-meurtrier-aux-Parcelles-Assainies-Ousseynou-Diaz-a-enterre-ses-cinq-enfants_a131427.html">fires</a> in the Dakar suburb of Parcelles Assainies and at a <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/04/13/20-killed-in-fire-at-muslim-spiritual-retreat-in-senegal.html">religious festival</a> in Medina Gounass, as well as mass traffic accidents in <a href="https://www.nst.com.my/news/2017/03/218210/18-killed-senegal-truck-bus-crash">Saint-Louis</a> and <a href="http://www.lesoleil.sn/2016-03-22-23-37-00/item/60581-kaffrine-16-morts-et-18-blesses-dans-un-accident.html">Kaffrine</a> have claimed many lives. </p>
<p>Some commentators have been dismayed by the lack of official response and accountability. Both President Macky Sall and Sports Minister Matar Ba have <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/dead-senegal-football-stadium-stampede-170715213844314.html">declared</a> that the events at the stadium will be examined in a full inquiry. But, it remains to be seen whether these are anything more than hollow promises. </p>
<p>Demba Diop stadium was <a href="http://openbuildings.com/buildings/stade-demba-diop-profile-36814?_show_description=1">constructed</a> in 1963, and some minor repairs have been carried out since. However, its crumbling walls and dilapidated stands bear testimony to its age. Senior officials have been calling for the refurbishment and modernisation of the stadium for several years. Until now, almost nothing has been done, despite the fact that the venue also plays host to official international matches. </p>
<p>In the aftermath of Saturday’s events, the former Chelsea and Senegal striker Demba Ba <a href="https://twitter.com/dembabafoot/status/886536065464635393">tweeted</a> his discontent with the lack of funding for the country’s football venues. It seems that it has taken the deaths of eight innocent people to provoke the authorities into taking action. With tensions in Senegal already riding high due to the <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/senegals-ex-president-returns-for-legislative-elections-20170711">legislative elections</a> at the end of July, all major sporting events have been <a href="http://kwese.espn.com/football/senegal/story/3159293/senegal-suspend-sports-events-after-tragedy">suspended</a> until then. </p>
<p>What happened at the Demba Diop stadium is sadly not an isolated event in the global context. A combination of decrepit stadia, poor security, and a failure to control crowd violence have led to similar disasters in <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/killed-stadium-stampede-malawi-48471155">Malawi</a>, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38939723">Angola</a> and <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/international/at-least-four-dead-and-more-injured-after-stampede-at-honduran-football-match-a7761386.html">Honduras</a> this year alone. And while stadium safety has improved immeasurably in Europe thanks to safety measures including the introduction of all-seater football grounds, the horrors of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-merseyside-32898612">Heysel</a>, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-merseyside-32898612">Bradford</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/apr/26/hillsborough-disaster-deadly-mistakes-and-lies-that-lasted-decades">Hillsborough</a> live on in the memories of football fans.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179026/original/file-20170720-24021-ah61gk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179026/original/file-20170720-24021-ah61gk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179026/original/file-20170720-24021-ah61gk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179026/original/file-20170720-24021-ah61gk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179026/original/file-20170720-24021-ah61gk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179026/original/file-20170720-24021-ah61gk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179026/original/file-20170720-24021-ah61gk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thousands gathered last year in remembrance of those who died at the Hillsborough disaster, that claimed the lives of 96 people in 1989.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Powell/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Indeed, it was only last month (June 2017) that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/28/hillsborough-six-people-including-two-senior-police-officers-charged">charges</a> were brought against those responsible for the Hillsborough disaster of 1989, in which 96 Liverpool fans lost their lives. The scale of negligence and the ensuing police cover-up which reached the upper echelons of British politics, have been gradually pieced together over the course of a lengthy campaign and multiple inquests and inquiries. </p>
<p>There are parallels to be drawn to the Demba Diop disaster: an initial focus on blaming fans, inadequate stadium design and maintenance, and insufficient or negligent security. As Senegal mourns the victims and searches for answers, it is to be hoped that lessons are learned, and consequences are swift. </p>
<p><em>This article is based partly on research conducted as part of the <a href="http://global-sport.eu/">GLOBALSPORT</a> project based at the University of Amsterdam and funded by the European Research Council.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81341/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Hann receives funding from the European Research Council.</span></em></p>As Senegal mourns the victims of the Demba Diop football stadium crush and searches for answers, it is to be hoped that lessons are learned, and consequences are swift.Mark Hann, Doctoral student in Anthropology, University of AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.