tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/peace-and-security-34302/articlesPeace and Security – The Conversation2024-03-25T15:09:17Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2262402024-03-25T15:09:17Z2024-03-25T15:09:17ZSouth Africans fighting for Israel in Gaza: what does the law say?<p><em>South Africa’s foreign minister, Naledi Pandor, said the country’s citizens fighting for the Israel Defence Forces in Gaza faced <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/03/14/naledi-pandor-south-africans-fighting-for-israel-will-be-arrested/">prosecution upon their return</a>. This statement followed <a href="https://theconversation.com/un-genocide-ruling-wont-change-israels-behaviour-three-reasons-why-222128">tension</a> between South Africa and Israel amid the <a href="https://www.rescue.org/topic/gaza-crisis">“humanitarian catastrophe”</a> resulting from Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza.</em></p>
<p><em>There is a history of South African citizens of Jewish descent fighting for Israel, but the number fighting for Israel in the current war on Gaza is unknown. The Conversation Africa asked Michelle Nel, an expert in international law and military law, for her legal insights.</em></p>
<h2>Which South African law bars its citizens from fighting in foreign wars or armies?</h2>
<p>South Africa explicitly prohibits citizens from rendering any foreign military assistance without the permission of the <a href="https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/national-conventional-arms-control-committee-ncacc-statement-south-african">National Conventional Arms Control Committee</a>. The committee is appointed by the president and controls all issues related to conventional arms. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng-11.pdf">Section 198(b)</a> of the constitution precludes South African citizens from participating in any foreign armed conflict. The <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/Law/SouthAfrica6.pdf">Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act, 1998</a> effectively criminalises such actions. </p>
<p>In an apparent hardening of the South African government’s position against Israel, Pandor has <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/03/14/naledi-pandor-south-africans-fighting-for-israel-will-be-arrested/">not only threatened</a> to have South African citizens fighting in the Israel Defence Forces prosecuted. The government also <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/joining-foreign-armed-forces-could-lead-prosecution-government-warns">warned in December 2023</a> that naturalised South Africans could have their citizenship revoked for joining foreign armed forces engaged in wars the country didn’t agree with. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/un-genocide-ruling-wont-change-israels-behaviour-three-reasons-why-222128">UN genocide ruling won't change Israel's behaviour: three reasons why</a>
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<p>Citizenship is governed by the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/act88of1995.pdf">South African Citizenship Act of 1995</a>. It can revoke South African citizenship where a citizen</p>
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<p>engages, under the flag of another country, in a war that the Republic does not support.</p>
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<p>However, section 20 of the constitution also determines that</p>
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<p><a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/chapter-2-bill-rights#20">No citizen may be deprived of citizenship</a>.</p>
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<h2>What does the law prohibit?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/pdf.html">constitution</a> creates a wide framework for prohibiting participation by citizens in armed conflict. </p>
<p>South Africans <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/Law/SouthAfrica6.pdf">are prohibited</a> from engaging in any kind of mercenary activity, or taking part in any military action on behalf of a foreign country, without the express authorisation of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee. Legal entities (such as a company), permanent residents and foreign nationals <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/Law/SouthAfrica6.pdf">are also</a> prohibited from rendering such assistance within the borders of the country.</p>
<p>“Foreign military assistance” is widely defined. It includes not only the actual rendering of such assistance, but any attempt to render assistance, any encouragement, incitement or <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/Law/SouthAfrica6.pdf">solicitation thereof</a>.</p>
<p>It criminalises:</p>
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<li><p>providing advice or training any personnel or operational support</p></li>
<li><p>recruitment</p></li>
<li><p>medical services</p></li>
<li><p>procurement of equipment</p></li>
<li><p>security services such as those rendered by private military companies in areas of conflict</p></li>
<li><p>assisting in coups or furthering the military interests of parties to a conflict.</p></li>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-is-the-countrys-proudest-foreign-policy-moment-in-three-decades-221512">South Africa’s genocide case against Israel is the country's proudest foreign policy moment in three decades</a>
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<p>The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act is set to be repealed by the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulations of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a27-06.pdf">Act, 2006</a>, which is yet to be promulgated. This new act goes as far as prohibiting the rendering of humanitarian assistance in a country of armed conflict, unless the organisation involved is duly registered with the arms control committee.</p>
<h2>How has the law been applied in the past?</h2>
<p>In 2009, the <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/pelj/v21n1/23.pdf">Palestinian Solidarity Alliance</a> handed a list of <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/pelj/v21n1/23.pdf">73 South Africans</a> of Jewish descent who had fought for the Israeli military in 2008 and 2009 to the National Prosecuting Authority. <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2014-08-07-gaza-conflict-for-some-war-is-where-the-heart-is/">The authority declined to prosecute</a>. This was followed by a case brought against another South African citizen <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/pelj/v21n1/23.pdf">serving in the Israel military in 2014</a>. A <a href="https://sacsis.org.za/s/story.php?s=2355">docket was opened in the Western Cape</a>, but no information could be found as to whether he was in fact prosecuted.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/arrest-sa-mercenaries-on-boko-haram-mission-mapisa-nqakula-20150128">2015</a>, about 100 former South African soldiers reportedly left to train the Nigerian military to combat Boko Haram. The then defence minister, <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/arrest-sa-mercenaries-on-boko-haram-mission-mapisa-nqakula-20150128">Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, reportedly</a> said that they should be arrested upon their return to South Africa. Information on whether these arrests and prosecutions in fact took place is not readily accessible. </p>
<p>Many South Africans continue to serve in foreign <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/pelj/v21n1/23.pdf">armed forces and private military companies</a>. Yet, the prosecuting authority has not succeeded in prosecuting any. Some cases have been settled by way of plea bargain, with <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2018/4.html">fines and suspended prison sentences</a>.</p>
<p>Ultimately the efficacy of the legislation depends on its consistent enforcement. The history of inconsistent prosecution and accountability in terms of the mercenary activities act raises questions about the prosecuting authority’s ability to successfully prosecute the South Africans fighting for Israel. </p>
<h2>Do other countries have similar laws? Why are they good to have?</h2>
<p>Very few countries have legislation prohibiting their nationals from joining foreign armed forces. The UK prohibits its citizens from joining foreign armed forces. In the US they <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/02/is-it-legal-for-americans-to-fight-in-another-countrys-army/">may forfeit their citizenship</a>. Joining a foreign force fighting against the US is seen as treason.</p>
<p>The Netherlands does not prohibit citizens from joining a foreign armed force as long as the country is not at war with the country concerned. Canadians are prohibited from joining any foreign armed force <a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/foreign-fighters-foreign-volunteers-and-mercenaries-ukrainian-armed-conflict">that is at war with a friendly nation</a>. </p>
<p>There are more countries prohibiting mercenaries. They include <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000006418746/2024-03-22">France</a>, <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__109h.html">Germany</a> and the <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/soldiers-of-fortune-why-u-s-mercenaries-should-not-be-legal/">UK</a>. South Africa is among the few that prohibit any form of engagement in the service of a foreign force.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-and-russia-president-cyril-ramaphosas-foreign-policy-explained-198430">South Africa and Russia: President Cyril Ramaphosa's foreign policy explained</a>
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<p>Since the war between Russia and Ukraine <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-war-in-ukraine-enters-third-year-3-issues-could-decide-its-outcome-supplies-information-and-politics-220581">in February 2022</a>, questions have been raised about the legal status of foreigner volunteers fighting in support of Ukraine <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-troops-operating-on-the-ground-in-ukraine-what-international-law-says-224896">within the wider ambit of international law</a>. </p>
<p>Some of them have been <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/russia-says-it-has-killed-more-than-a-dozen-south-african-mercenaries-in-ukraine-20240315#:%7E:text=Russia%20says%20its%20invasion%20of,Africa%2C%20it%20has%20killed%20103.">killed</a>. What would happen to those captured by the enemy? </p>
<p>The treatment of these foreign nationals could complicate diplomatic relations. It is therefore in the interest of any country to control its citizens’ ability to participate in foreign conflicts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226240/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Nel is affiliated with the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA) from Stellenbosch University.</span></em></p>South Africa is among a few countries that completely prohibit the involvement of citizens in foreign armed conflict.Michelle Nel, Lecturer in Criminal and Military law and the Law of Armed Conflict at the Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2256892024-03-19T13:09:24Z2024-03-19T13:09:24ZSouth Africa’s election management body has done a good job for 30 years: here’s why<p>More than in previous elections, <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/">South Africa’s Electoral Commission</a> (IEC) will be tested to the hilt in this year’s national and provincial elections <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/">on 29 May</a>. For the first time in 30 years, the electoral majority of the ruling <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/">African National Congress</a> (ANC) is <a href="https://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/news/new-survey-shows-voters-punishing-anc-over-governance-and-foreign-policy/">in jeopardy</a>. This makes the upcoming poll the most consequential one <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-general-elections-1994">since 1994</a>, when the country commenced with its democratisation. </p>
<p>The electoral commission’s <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/content/about-us/what-we-do/">tasks</a> are to enforce the rules of the electoral game and the parties’ ethical conduct. It must also be the dispute resolution champion and ensure that the election is free and fair. These are the primary contributions the commission can make towards promoting and consolidating electoral democracy. </p>
<p>The circumstances of this year’s elections will put additional pressure on the IEC to be a fair umpire of this contest. It thus can’t afford to be <a href="https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/parliament-welcomes-dismissal-iec-staff-member-responsible-leaks-12-mar-2024">mired in controversy</a>. </p>
<p>The commission has to implement an amended but <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/elections/whats-new-in-the-2024-elections-electoral-amendment-act">interim electoral system</a> which allows independents to stand for the first time, but which is not yet well understood by the public.</p>
<p>In my view as a political scientist who has <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=oietezsAAAAJ&hl=en">studied</a> South African politics, elections, conflict resolution and comparative democratisation over the past three decades, the IEC’S track record is a sound reason to expect it to perform well in this year’s election.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2023.2269897">recent paper</a>, I set out how the IEC has developed a reputation as an effective electoral management body which maintains a high level of institutional independence and efficiency. The operational quality of elections under its jurisdiction is seldom challenged. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-changed-its-electoral-law-but-a-much-more-serious-overhaul-is-needed-204820">South Africa has changed its electoral law, but a much more serious overhaul is needed</a>
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<p>The electoral commission’s institutional independence is a very important factor. The fact that the elections in South Africa have always been declared free and fair, and by the international community, is another factor. The fact that public opinion in South Africa has been generally satisfied with the management of elections for the past 30 years is a critical condition for the quality of democracy to be strengthened.</p>
<h2>Democracy and institutional independence</h2>
<p>My <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2023.2269897">research article</a> sets out how South Africa’s electoral body has cultivated an institutional independence that is envied by many other election commissions. Its composition contributes much to this independence. The commission’s five members are not allowed to have a prominent party-political profile. This contrasts with other electoral commissions, such as the one in Angola, which <a href="https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2022-08/Final%20Preliminary%20Statement_Angola%20SEOM_26082022.pdf">consist primarily of party representatives</a>.</p>
<p>Candidates for the South African commission positions are interviewed in public by a panel chaired by the <a href="https://www.judiciary.org.za/">chief justice</a>, and consisting of the <a href="https://www.pprotect.org/">public protector</a> and two members of the <a href="https://www.citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/government/iec-chairperson-mashininis-9-march-2022/">six other commissions set up in terms of chapter 9 of the constitution</a>. The National Assembly approves the short list, which is then submitted to the president for final appointment. The National Assembly is also the only body that can <a href="https://www.ecfsadc.org/members/south-africa-independent-electoral-commission/">remove an IEC commissioner from office</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-politicians-must-guard-against-killer-narratives-62562">South Africa's politicians must guard against killer narratives</a>
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<p>As an indication of its independence, the commission <a href="https://www.ecfsadc.org/members/south-africa-independent-electoral-commission/">accounts</a> to the National Assembly (public representatives) for all its actions and responsibilities, not to the cabinet. It must submit an <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/Downloads/Documents-Library-Annual-Reports-IEC">annual report</a> to parliament’s multiparty portfolio committee on home affairs – not to a minister or government institution. Its budget is presented to parliament by the Department of Home Affairs but is ring-fenced for its exclusive use. In this respect the independence of electoral management is entrenched.</p>
<p>The IEC’s public accountability is enhanced by the way international and domestic observer missions scrutinise elections and the commission’s conduct. In the past, the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/sadc-election-observation-mission-releases-its-preliminary-statement-2019-national-and">Southern African Development Community</a> , the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38696-doc-report_of_the_african_union_election_observation_mission_to_the_08_may_2019_national_and_provincial_elections_in_the_republic_of_south_africa.pdf">African Union</a>, the <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/news/commonwealth-releases-observer-report-south-africa-elections">Commonwealth</a>, the <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02128/05lv02130.htm">European Union</a> and even the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00344899438439049">United Nations</a> have deployed <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/Elections-And-Results/Observers">observer teams</a> in South Africa. Their mandate was to observe all the components of an election, including the commission’s performance. Their verdicts determine whether an election is regarded as free and fair. The IEC has opened applications to <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/Elections-And-Results/Observers">observe the 2024 election</a>.</p>
<h2>Free and fair elections as a democratic yardstick</h2>
<p>The IEC can be given credit for institutionalising important mechanisms to ensure that elections are free and fair. One of them is the <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/Parties-And-Candidates/Party-Liaison-Committees">party liaison committees</a> at different levels. They are a novel South African invention which serves as a communication channel between the electoral commission and all participating parties. It’s also a dispute resolution mechanism to identify problems at an early stage and resolve them. Many potentially debilitating problems have been identified and resolved by them over the years. Numerous electoral commissions have visited South Africa to <a href="https://liberia.ec-undp-electoralassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/18/2020/03/3.-NEC_Study-Tour_South-Africa_2-5-Sep-2019.pdf">learn about these committees</a>.</p>
<p>The South African electoral dispensation expects the IEC to create an environment conducive to free and fair elections. At the end of the elections it has the responsibility to declare whether they were <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/content/About-Us/News/Final-results-of-2021-Municipal-Elections-Address-by-Chairperson-Glen-Mashinini/">indeed free and fair</a>.</p>
<p>As major players in elections, electoral management bodies are often compromised in disputes and cannot, therefore, be the referees of whether elections are free and fair. That’s why in many other countries, this judgment is made by their supreme court and not by the commissions themselves. </p>
<h2>The test of public opinion</h2>
<p>The main test of the IEC’s contribution towards democracy is public opinion. The Human Sciences Research Council (<a href="https://hsrc.ac.za/">HSRC</a>) in South Africa conducts <a href="https://hsrc.ac.za/news/general/most-voters-satisfied-following-elections-survey-finds/">surveys</a> before and after every election to determine the public’s opinion on the elections, the IEC and its performance, and their views on some democratic indicators. </p>
<p>The surveys show that, during the period 2013-2018, the highest democratic ideal in the public’s mind was “free and fair elections” followed by “freedom of expression”. Trust in “free and fair elections” showed the greatest decline <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2023.2269897">between 2013 and 2021</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-are-fed-up-with-their-prospects-and-their-democracy-according-to-latest-social-attitudes-survey-204566">South Africans are fed up with their prospects, and their democracy, according to latest social attitudes survey</a>
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<p>The HSRC researchers interpreted these trends as being influenced by declining trust in public institutions and dissatisfaction with democratic performance in general. Trust in the IEC <a href="https://hsrc.ac.za/news/capable-and-ethical-state/hsrc-election-survey-voters-positive-but-turnout-reflects-political-disillusionment/">remained very high</a>.</p>
<h2>An uncontroversial electoral body</h2>
<p>Constitutional institutions like the IEC cannot function in isolation. The social dynamics of democracy inevitably influence its own reputation for better or for worse.</p>
<p>Elections – especially managing the counting of ballots and announcing the results – can be very controversial. They have disrupted the political landscape in many countries. South Africa’s IEC has so far avoided such instability and managed to protect the integrity of the country’s elections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225689/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Independent Electoral Commission cannot afford to put a foot wrong in the country’s most important election since democracy in 1994, on 29 May.Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2247502024-03-18T13:42:37Z2024-03-18T13:42:37ZPress freedom in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda: what journalists have to say about doing their jobs<p>A majority of the world’s population has experienced a decline in press freedom in recent years, according to <a href="https://www.unesco.org/reports/world-media-trends/2021/en">a UN report</a>. In east Africa, the results are mixed and debatable. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/rwanda/freedom-world/2024">Rwanda</a>, both international press freedom rankings and journalists on the ground say press freedom has increased over the past 10 years. In neighbouring <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/uganda/freedom-world/2024">Uganda</a>, both international rankings and local journalists say media freedom has declined. In <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/kenya/freedom-world/2024">Kenya</a>, rankings reflect declining freedom over the past decade, but reporters acknowledge they have more freedom than their counterparts in Uganda and Rwanda.</p>
<p>In our roles as associate professors in journalism and mass communication, we interviewed and surveyed more than 500 journalists in Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya. We learned that the evolution and current state of press freedom in the region is complex. In our book, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/press-freedom-and-the-crooked-path-toward-democracy-9780197634202?cc=us&lang=en&">Press Freedom and the (Crooked) Path Toward Democracy: Lessons from Journalists in East Africa</a>, we provide an updated state of press freedom in these three countries. </p>
<p>We argue that much of the academic research that classifies global media systems has overlooked the world’s most developing nations, and those that have included developing nations have failed to consider their historical contexts. They have worked from a misguided premise that nations develop in a linear fashion – from non-democracy to democracy – and from a restricted press to a free press. In reality, press freedom and democracy ebb and flow. </p>
<p>We examine the impact of social, political, legal and economic factors on media in Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya to help with understanding media systems outside the western world. </p>
<p>We chose to study these three countries because they represent varying stages of development and democracy building. Rwanda, which experienced a genocide in 1994, is in relatively early (though fast paced) stages of reconstruction. Uganda, which experienced a civil war in the 1980s and unrest in the 1990s but arguably not to the extent of Rwanda’s genocide, can be considered in a middle stage of development. Kenya, which has remained largely peaceful, can be understood as being in a more advanced stage of development.</p>
<h2>Rwanda</h2>
<p>In Rwanda, despite 30 years of economic, social and media progress and development, <a href="https://rsf.org/en/country/rwanda">lingering impacts</a> from the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi permeate the country’s media. <a href="https://cpj.org/reports/2014/12/legacy-of-rwanda-genocide-includes-media-restricti/">Multiple laws</a> limit free expression in the name of genocide prevention, and international press freedom rankings indicate the nation is <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/rwanda/freedom-world/2024">not free</a>. </p>
<p>Yet, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/press-freedom-and-the-crooked-path-toward-democracy-9780197634202?cc=us&lang=en&">we found</a> that many Rwandan journalists believe that they have a great deal of freedom and that outsiders don’t consider the country’s history when evaluating the media. Outsiders, for example, hear that Rwandan journalists cannot criticise the president or high-ranking government officials and immediately think there is no press freedom. But local journalists say they don’t feel oppressed. They feel relatively free to choose their story topics. They don’t want to publish critical stories because they want to foster peace. </p>
<p>Journalists believe their role is to act as unifiers and right the wrongs of their predecessors who exacerbated the genocide. Public trust in the media <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/49408/chapter-abstract/418504465?redirectedFrom=fulltext">remains high</a>, according to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1077699021998647">focus groups</a> conducted with members of the general public. In Rwanda, there appears to be a relationship between press freedom and distance from conflict. That is, the more time that passes since the country experienced war, the more press freedom it has. </p>
<p>Prioritising social good over media rights has helped the country unify and develop, but over the long term <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/press-freedom-and-the-crooked-path-toward-democracy-9780197634202?cc=us&lang=en&">we see signs</a> that Rwanda’s linear path towards increasing democracy and press freedom may not continue. Rather, prioritising peace at the cost of press freedom could limit development and reinforce existing <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-paul-kagame-is-a-dictator-who-clings-to-power-but-its-not-just-for-his-own-gain-204834">authoritarian power structures</a>.</p>
<h2>Uganda</h2>
<p>In Uganda, the relationship between press freedom and distance from conflict has been less linear. Some media restrictions have lessened and others have worsened. </p>
<p>Despite a sustained period of peace after conflict with the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/the-lords-resistance-army-violence-in-the-name-of-god/a-18136620">Lord’s Resistance Army</a> in the northern part of the country that began in the 1980s, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/uganda/freedom-world/2024">press freedom is not increasing</a> as time passes. Overall, journalists in the country largely agree with the international perception that they’re restricted and that the situation is worsening the longer President Yoweri Museveni remains in power. Journalists in Uganda perceive their press freedom to be lower than journalists in neighbouring countries. They also have a more pessimistic outlook. </p>
<p>Government interference, some of which stems from the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/05/02/media-minefield/increased-threats-freedom-expression-uganda">conflict</a> and some that’s <a href="https://www.cjr.org/analysis/eron-kiiza-defends-the-press-uganda.php">new</a>, remains pervasive. Worn down by government intimidation and repressive laws, coupled with low pay and lack of necessary equipment, some journalists <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1461670X.2020.1852097">told us</a> they had turned to unethical behaviour, such as acting as spies in the newsroom. </p>
<h2>Kenya</h2>
<p>Kenya is home to the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/kenya/freedom-world/2024">freest media environment</a>. It’s also the only one in our study that has seen changes in presidential leadership in recent years. But just because a nation regularly holds elections doesn’t mean the path to democratisation and media freedom is smooth. </p>
<p>External measures indicate that Kenya has more press freedom than Uganda and Rwanda, and journalists in the country perceive this to be true. However, data show ups and downs of media freedom that have mirrored varying political administrations and events, including spurts of <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2009/10/un-human-rights-team-issues-report-post-election-violence-kenya">post-election violence</a>. These ebbs and flows are largely due to politicians or powerful members of society who share ideological goals or have financial interests like <a href="https://kenyamedia.reboot.org/">owning major media houses</a> and influencing coverage. </p>
<p>Despite the challenges, journalists attribute Kenya’s state of press freedom to the vast international connections the country and its leaders have. An empowered civil society – which stems from both a space for dissent given by public officials, and the culture and spirit of Kenyans – has promoted the growth of human rights, including media freedoms.</p>
<h2>Why it matters</h2>
<p>After a nuanced examination of the factors that affect the media in each of these countries, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/press-freedom-and-the-crooked-path-toward-democracy-9780197634202?cc=us&lang=en&">our book lists</a> a set of factors that affect press freedom and democracy building. </p>
<p>Specifically, we believe each country’s distance from conflict, political benchmarks, international linkages and civil society strength are central to understanding its degree of press freedom, development and democratisation. </p>
<p>While these factors are not the only elements that influence media landscapes, they are a starting point for better understanding and theorising about press freedom environments. </p>
<p>A free and independent press allows the public to hold leaders accountable, make informed decisions and access a diversity of opinions. This makes it important to accurately understand how free varying media landscapes are, and why.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224750/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Important factors, such as conflict, are central to understanding a country’s degree of press freedom, development and democratisation.Karen McIntyre, Assistant Professor, Journalism and Director of Graduate Studies, Richard T. Robertson School of Media and Culture, Virginia Commonwealth UniversityMeghan Sobel Cohen, Associate Professor, Department of Communication and the Master of Development Practice, Regis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2230352024-03-18T10:59:45Z2024-03-18T10:59:45Z2024 Senegal election crisis points to deeper issues with Macky Sall and his preferred successor<p>The botched attempt by Senegalese president <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Macky-Sall">Macky Sall</a> to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/3/senegals-macky-sall-postpones-presidential-election">postpone</a> the presidential election has stirred unnecessary tension in an already strained electoral process. The move reflected deeper governance problems in the country.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/3/senegals-macky-sall-postpones-presidential-election">Sall’s decree</a>, subsequently <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/02/16/constitutional-council-plunges-senegal-into-the-unknown-by-overturning-election-postponement_6531088_124.html">annulled by the Constitutional Council</a>, was the latest in a range of government interventions that exceeded the scope of the executive authority. These have included the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/01/22/sonko-wade-not-listed-among-official-candidates-of-feb25-presidential-election/">disqualification</a> of key opposition candidates, the manipulation of judicial procedures, and the arbitrary detention of dissenting figures.</p>
<p>Sall’s 12-year tenure has been marked by contradictions. His administration boosted investment in transport and urban infrastructure. Notably, he worked on the <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/319731593403262722/text/Senegal-Transport-and-Urban-Mobility-Project.txt">motorway network</a>, the new Diass international airport, the development of major roads and the completion of public transport projects.</p>
<p>But these investments have not translated into improvements in the lives of Senegalese. Thousands of young people still go on <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1072143/politique/tribune-whatshappeninginsenegal-quand-le-drame-des-migrants-passe-au-second-plan/">perilous journeys</a> to Europe having lost hope of fulfilling their potential in their own country.</p>
<p>This is the backdrop to his move to postpone the elections in a last bid to secure a winning strategy for his camp. His anointed successor, <a href="https://www.ecofinagency.com/public-management/1109-44836-senegals-macky-sall-endorses-pm-amadou-ba-as-2024-successor">Amadou Ba</a>, remains a contested figure within the ruling <a href="https://www.senegel.org/en/movements/political-parties/poldetails/2">Alliance for the Republic Party</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Amy-Niang">I have a research interest</a> in state formation in west Africa. As I <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781786606525/The-Postcolonial-African-State-in-Transition-Stateness-and-Modes-of-Sovereignty">have argued</a> in my work, states sustain themselves by producing and alienating internal “others”. This refers to a scenario where governments assert sovereignty not against outside forces but against internal cultural groups and existing logics of governance. Sall’s style of government follows this pattern closely. </p>
<h2>Crisis within his party</h2>
<p>Sall <a href="https://fr.africanews.com/2024/02/10/senegal-macky-sall-se-justifie-sur-le-report-de-la-presidentielle//">said</a> he was postponing elections because of an alleged conflict between parliament and the Constitutional Council. The parliament had approved the creation of a commission of inquiry into the process of validation of presidential candidacies by the Constitutional Council.</p>
<p>Sall in fact latched onto <a href="https://www.bbc.com/afrique/articles/c1vywrx3xx9o">an accusation</a> of corruption levelled by Karim Wade against two Constitutional Council judges following Karim’s disqualification from running in the election due to his dual citizenship.</p>
<p>But the most plausible reason was a crisis within the ruling camp. The Alliance for the Republic is a divided party that is going to the elections in disarray. Sall’s chosen successor, <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/world/senegal-pm-amadou-ba-named-ruling-party-candidate-for-president/">Ba</a>, has generated little enthusiasm among voters. He symbolises the status quo. An affluent candidate, Ba has the difficult task of convincing an impoverished electorate that he is up to the task. </p>
<p>Sall overstepped his constitutional powers. The Senegalese <a href="https://adsdatabase.ohchr.org/IssueLibrary/SENEGAL_Constitution.pdf">constitution’s limitation</a> of the president’s term duration can’t be amended. Further, according to the <a href="https://dge.sn/sites/default/files/2019-01/CODE%20ELECTORAL%202018_0.pdf">electoral code</a>, the decree setting a date for presidential elections must be published no later than 80 days before the scheduled ballot. Sall postponed the poll just 12 hours before the campaigning was due to start, and <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/02/14/senegal-authorities-restrict-internet-access-and-ban-march//">22 days before the ballot</a>.</p>
<p>Sall’s attempt at postponing the elections, which has fostered a climate of distrust in the integrity of the electoral process, has left Senegal embroiled in a serious constitutional crisis. His decree brought forth two important issues:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the government’s commitment to an orderly handover of power</p></li>
<li><p>the integrity of the democratic process.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Erosion of a democratic tradition</h2>
<p>Since 2021, a series of protests and riots have pitted Ousmane Sonko, a key opposition figure facing rape allegations, and his supporters against a government accused of manipulating the judiciary to thwart a serious candidate. As a result, the economy has been severely disrupted. Each day of protests causes an estimated <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/restaurants-water-towers-unrest-dents-senegals-economy-2023-06-09/">$33 million loss</a> in economic output. </p>
<p>Further, Sall has used security and defence forces to establish an order of fear. He has resorted to heavy-handed measures against opposition figures and dissenting voices within civil society through arbitrary detention and prosecution. His government has systematically <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/05/senegal-violent-crackdown-opposition-dissent">restricted</a> the freedom of assembly, banned protests, suppressed independent media and mobilised public resources to bolster the ruling party.</p>
<p>For all these reasons, Senegal has seen an erosion of institutions meant to uphold the rule of law, foster political participation and ensure public accountability.</p>
<p>Sall was elected in <a href="https://fr.allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00016260.html">2012</a> after a tumultuous period under the flamboyant government of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdoulaye-Wade">President Abdoulaye Wade</a>. Sall owes his entire political career to Wade’s patronage. Yet their relationship soured when it became evident that Sall harboured ambitions to challenge Wade’s son, <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/profile/id/254/page/4">Karim</a>, who was being groomed to succeed his father. </p>
<p>Sall pledged to deliver virtuous and frugal governance. But public euphoria soon petered out as scandals involving cabinet ministers and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/06/25/senegal-soupconne-de-corruption-le-frere-du-president-macky-sall-demissionne_5481292_3212.html">close family members</a> laid bare the corruption within the administration.</p>
<p>In 2023, amid much brouhaha over the validity of a third term, Sall <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66093983">yielded</a> to public pressure after <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/senegalese-opposition-rally-against-president-sall-s-possible-third-term-ambition-/7091705.html">violent protests</a>. These resulted in the most serious political crisis since the 1960s, claiming over 60 lives and leading to the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/22/senegal-pre-election-crackdown">arrest</a> of over 1,000 people.</p>
<h2>Where to for Senegal?</h2>
<p>In compliance with the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/senegal-presidentsets-presidential-election-for-march-24-4547872">Constitutional Council ruling</a>, Sall has finally agreed to organise elections before his exit.</p>
<p>As the election day of 24 March draws near, the absence of key contenders, and uncertainties regarding the electoral procedures, inject an element of unpredictability. </p>
<p>Furthermore, the erosion of trust is such that the Senegalese public still doubts Sall’s commitment to fulfil his obligations and facilitate an orderly handover.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223035/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amy Niang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Attempts to postpone Senegal’s election indefinitely reflect deeper governance problems within Macky Sall’s administration, and the shortcomings of his chosen heir, Amadou Ba.Amy Niang, Head of Research Programme, Council for the Development of Social Science Research in AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2241702024-03-13T12:06:02Z2024-03-13T12:06:02ZCorrupt, brutal and unprofessional? Africa-wide survey of police finds diverging patterns<p>Africans generally have a low regard for the quality of policing on the continent. Perceptions of police misconduct, corruption and brutality are widespread, according to a new survey by <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>. The independent research network surveyed 39 countries between 2021 and 2023. </p>
<p>Our survey offers <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/PP90-PAP6-Africans-cite-corruption-and-lack-of-professionalism-among-police-failings-Afrobarometer-26jan24.pdf">new evidence</a> of how Africans experience and assess their police. It shows people often have to contend with demands for bribes from police officers. But assessments varied by country: in some, police were said to be helpful.</p>
<p>Afrobarometer currently surveys 39 of Africa’s <a href="https://au.int/en/member_states/countryprofiles2#">55 countries</a>.</p>
<p>As researchers at Afrobarometer, we have published on <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/pp88-brutality-and-corruption-undermine-trust-in-ugandas-police-can-damage-be-undone/">police professionalism</a> and other <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/pp37-are-africans-willing-pay-higher-taxes-or-user-fees-better-health-care/">government institutions</a> for several years. </p>
<p>Our analysis also reveals that negative perceptions of police professionalism and corruption go hand in hand with low public trust in the police, poor marks on government performance, and citizens’ sense of insecurity.</p>
<h2>Encounters with police</h2>
<p>While some citizens seek assistance from the police (to report a crime, for example), others might only encounter the police in less voluntary situations, such as at a checkpoint or traffic stop or during an investigation. Across the 39-country sample, only 13% of respondents said they had requested police assistance during the previous 12 months. Three times as many (40%) reported encountering the police in other situations.</p>
<p>Among respondents who asked for police assistance, more than half (54%) said it had been easy to get the help they needed. More than three-fourths found it easy in Burkina Faso (77%) and Mauritius (76%), though no more than half as many said the same in Malawi (37%), Madagascar (37%) and Sudan (33%). </p>
<p>Many respondents reported a police practice that was less than helpful: stopping drivers on the road without a valid reason. On average, 39% of Africans said the police “often” or “always” stopped drivers without good reason, in addition to 26% who said they “sometimes” did so (Figure 1). The practice is particularly widespread in Gabon (68% often/always) and Kenya (66%). In contrast, fewer than one in five respondents in Ethiopia (18%), Cabo Verde (16%) and Benin (16%) had this complaint.</p>
<p>Both seeking police assistance and being stopped on the road may be a prelude to being asked for money. Among respondents who said they had asked for police assistance during the previous year, 36% said they had had to pay a bribe, give a gift or do a favour to get the help they needed (Figure 2). This proportion reached astonishing levels in Liberia (78%), Nigeria (75%), Sierra Leone (72%) and Uganda (71%).</p>
<p>Similarly, among citizens who encountered the police in other situations, 37% said they had to pay a bribe to avoid a problem. Liberia (70%) again ranked worst, joined by Guinea (66%), Congo-Brazzaville (65%) and Uganda (64%).
Seychelles and Cabo Verde performed best on both counts (1%-4%).</p>
<p>Considering how many Africans personally experience having to bribe the police, it may not be surprising that on average across 39 countries, the police were more widely seen as corrupt than civil servants, officials in the presidency, or any other public institutions or leaders the surveys asked about. Almost half (46%) of respondents said that “most” or “all” police officials were corrupt.</p>
<h2>Police brutality</h2>
<p>One of the harshest criticisms levelled against some police officers was that they used excessive force in their interactions with the people they were meant to serve and protect. </p>
<p>As Figure 3 shows, almost four in 10 respondents (38%) said the police “often” or “always” used excessive force in managing protests or demonstrations. Another 27% said they “sometimes” did so. Only 29% said the police were “rarely” or “never” guilty of brutality in their handling of protesters. The perception of frequent police brutality against protesters was most common in Gabon (64% often/always) and was widespread in some countries that are scheduled to have national elections this year, including <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/three-dead-senegal-protests-over-delayed-presidential-election-2024-02-11/">Senegal</a> (60%), Guinea (51%) and Tunisia (45%).</p>
<h2>Police professionalism</h2>
<p>Do these popular perceptions add up to a police force that is seen as professional?</p>
<p>Only one-third (32%) of respondents said the police in their countries “often” or “always” operated in a professional manner and respected the rights of all citizens, while 32% said they “sometimes” and 34% said they “rarely” or “never” did (Figure 4).</p>
<p>In just five countries did more than half of the respondents think their police usually acted professionally: Burkina Faso (58%), Morocco (57%), Niger (55%), Benin (54%) and Mali (54%). Senegal ranked sixth, at just 50%. Fewer than one in five respondents saw police as usually professional in Sierra Leone (19%), Eswatini (19%), Kenya (18%), Congo-Brazzaville (17%) and Nigeria (13%).</p>
<h2>Significance of findings</h2>
<p>These findings raise questions about the quality of policing on the African continent, highlighting notably negative experiences and evaluations of the police in many – but not all – countries. For example, in Burkina Faso, Morocco and Benin, police scored relatively well across multiple performance indicators. </p>
<p>More broadly, our findings point to broad cross-country patterns of how police professionalism, integrity and respectful conduct are correlated with more positive citizen attitudes towards the police. </p>
<p>African governments looking to change the unfavourable public perceptions of the police – and of government performance in the fight against crime – might take a closer look at which dimensions of police performance matter in their country, and which better-performing police forces might have solutions to share.</p>
<p><em>All graphics have been redacted from showing 39 countries to 10 because of space constraints.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224170/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr. Matthias Krönke works for Afrobarometer. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr. Thomas Isbell works in International Development Cooperation. He is affiliated with Afrobarometer. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Makanga Ronald Kakumba is a researcher in the Afrobarometer Analysis Unit. He is affiliated with Uhasselt University. </span></em></p>Negative perceptions of police professionalism and corruption go hand in hand with low public trust in the police, poor marks on government performance, and citizens’ sense of insecurity.Matthias Krönke, Researcher, University of Cape TownThomas Isbell, Consultant, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2253742024-03-08T13:24:16Z2024-03-08T13:24:16ZEdward Webster: South African intellectual, teacher, activist, a man of great energy and integrity, and the life and soul of any party<p>Eddie Webster (82), sociologist and emeritus professor at the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa, who <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/news/latest-news/general-news/2024/2024-03/wits-mourns-the-loss-of-professor-eddie-webster.html">died on 5 March 2024</a>, lived a huge life, applying himself to many different arenas with great energy and insight. </p>
<p>His achievements are quite extraordinary. He was an intellectual, a teacher, a leader, an activist for social change, a builder of institutions, a rugby player and jogger, a man of great energy and integrity, and the life and soul of any party. </p>
<p>As an intellectual and activist he was always independent and critical, and always engaged, whether <a href="https://saftu.org.za/archives/7862">working with trade unions</a> or with South Africa’s new democratic government. It was important to get your hands dirty working for change, he always said, but as important to retain your autonomy and intellectual integrity. This held for the university itself, an institution to which he was wholly committed but at the same time found deeply disappointing when it came to social justice. His life was shaped by these kinds of tensions. </p>
<p>Eddie was one of that <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/news/latest-news/graduations/2017/a-life-servicing-many-generations-.html">pioneering</a> generation of scholar-activists at the university, white academics who identified with and supported the black resistance movement, and who saw the world in new ways and pioneered the production of new knowledge: his close colleague, feminist and environmental sociologist <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/jacklyn-cock-201078">Jacklyn Cock</a>, anthropologist and democratic activist <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/david-joseph-webster#:%7E:text=On%201%20May%201989%2C%20South,Mandela%20was%20released%20from%20prison.">David Webster</a> (assassinated in 1989), and distinguished historian Phil Bonner. </p>
<p>Eddie inspired generations of us with his vision and practice of critically engaged scholarship – not only in South Africa, but <a href="https://bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/critical-engagement-with-public-sociology">across the world</a>.</p>
<h2>Independent streak</h2>
<p>In 1986, believing that the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) was out of touch with the majority of South Africans, he drove an investigation called the <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/news/latest-news/research-news/2022/2022-10/wits-at-a-time-of-national-crisis-then-and-now.html">Perspectives on Wits</a> with his colleagues. They explored the views of trade unionists and community activists about the university. The university had agreed to fund this investigation. But it was unhappy with the results. These revealed that the institution’s own narrative about its liberal opposition to apartheid was not shared by black South Africans, who saw it as serving white and corporate interests.</p>
<p>A few years earlier, at a time of great repression of unions, he and <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/news/sources/alumni-news/2017/distinguished-historian-passes-away.html">Phil Bonner</a> had attempted to set up a worker education programme on campus. But the university refused to let it happen. The university’s main funders, such as <a href="https://www.angloamerican.com/">Anglo American</a>, would have been greatly displeased by such a programme – a nice illustration of the point made in the Perspectives document. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/trade-unions-and-the-new-economy-3-african-case-studies-show-how-workers-are-recasting-their-power-in-the-digital-age-214509">Trade unions and the new economy: 3 African case studies show how workers are recasting their power in the digital age</a>
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<p>A decade later the indomitable Eddie was able to establish a branch of the Global Labour University at Wits, and bring trade unionists into the heart of the institution. He was not someone to give up easily.</p>
<h2>Insatiable curiosity</h2>
<p>Eddie worked closely with South Africa’s emerging trade union movement in the mid-1970s. At the time black workers were a tightly controlled source of cheap labour for South Africa’s booming industrial economy, and the unions were not recognised legally and suffered severe repression by employers and the state together. Eddie believed that a strong trade union movement democratically controlled by workers would be a powerful force for change.</p>
<p>He contributed to educational programmes for trade unionists, advocating for the recognition of the unions whenever he could. He co-founded the <a href="https://www.southafricanlabourbulletin.org.za/">South African Labour Bulletin</a>, which served as a forum for the interaction between academics and trade unionists, and the Industrial Education Institute with his comrade <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/rick-turner">Rick Turner</a> and others. Turner was assassinated by the apartheid government in 1978. </p>
<p>Eddie went on to support the unions, and <a href="https://mediadon.co.za/2024/03/06/cosatu-mourns-the-passing-of-revolutionary-professor-eddie-webster/">conduct research</a> with and for them, his entire life. Generations of union shop stewards and organisers knew him through his support, teaching and research, and he was widely loved and revered as “comrade Prof”.</p>
<p>As an intellectual Eddie was insatiably curious about the world and how it worked and about new possibilities emerging for progressive change. While the sociology classics were a foundation for his thinking, he kept up to date with new literature and ideas. </p>
<p>He founded Industrial Sociology at Wits and established the Sociology of Work Unit (now the Society, Work and Politics Institute <a href="https://www.swop.org.za/">SWOP</a>) as a research unit in the early 1980s as a way of stimulating labour research and deepening his work with unions. The unit organised and financed research, held seminars and workshops, provided a home for students, and increasingly collaborated with colleagues at other universities and overseas. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/worker-organisations-can-survive-the-digital-age-heres-how-194379">Worker organisations can survive the digital age. Here's how</a>
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<p>Eddie loved working with others, whether students or colleagues or trade unionists. He knew that ideas arose from wide reading, discussions and interactions, and frequently said “there is no such thing as an original idea”. For its students, staff, colleagues and associates SWOP stood out as a place of vibrant intellectual exchange and curiosity about each other’s work: it was an intellectual home and a place of comradeship and critique that felt unique in the university.</p>
<h2>Academic and teaching legacy</h2>
<p>Eddie was also a great teacher, bringing all of his passion for ideas and his vivid sense of history and change and struggle into the classroom, exciting students about the life of the intellect and the life of struggle. At SWOP he established the first internship programme for black postgraduate students to support and encourage them in what they often experienced as a hostile environment.</p>
<p>Eddie regularly undertook large-scale research projects and recruited numbers of students to participate in field research. This was another learning opportunity, where students immersed themselves in the collective quest for knowledge and began to see themselves as researchers.</p>
<p>In the midst of a multitude of projects, Eddie remained committed to his academic work, publishing a great volume and range of articles and books, and achieving honours and recognition globally.</p>
<p>His first book, <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Cast_in_a_Racial_Mould.html?id=ewPUAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">Cast in a Racial Mould</a>, based on his PhD, provided the intellectual foundation for the new discipline of industrial sociology in South Africa, developing an analysis of changing workplace technology and its impact on trade unionism – specifically the workings of race and class. This provided a material basis for understanding the emergence of the new black mass unionism. </p>
<p>His co-authored book <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781444303018">Grounding Globalisation</a> provided a new account of globalisation and trade unions through a comparison of South Africa, Korea and Australia. Global scholars were inspired by it and it <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781444303018">won a major prize</a> from the American Sociological Association. </p>
<p>His most recent book, <a href="https://witspress.co.za/page/detail/Recasting-Workers%EF%BF%BD-Power/?k=9781776148820">Recasting Workers’ Power</a>, written with Lynford Dor, returns full cycle to the themes of his first book, exploring the impact of technological change on the nature of work in the gig economy, and drawing lessons from forms of worker organisation and collective action that have been emerging across Africa.</p>
<p>Each of these books extends the boundaries of our knowledge by exploring the cutting edge of social change – in a sense helping us see the future and, indeed, helping to make it.</p>
<h2>A great love for life</h2>
<p>It is impossible to think about Eddie without thinking about <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/luli-callinicos-416446">Luli Callinicos</a>, historian and biographer, and the great love of his life. Indeed, she was the rock on which he built his achievements. I remember with great fondness the Greek Easter feasts shared at their home, and the many other gatherings with family, friends and colleagues.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-racially-divided-south-africans-can-find-their-common-humanity-57136">How racially divided South Africans can find their common humanity</a>
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<p><a href="https://sociology.berkeley.edu/alumni-manager/michael-burawoy">Michael Burawoy</a>, the great American sociologist and lifelong friend of Eddie, once told me that he had never laughed as much as he did when he was with Eddie and his colleagues from SWOP. Eddie enjoyed people and was deeply generous; he was a great raconteur, he loved being alive. Three weeks ago he was celebrated for his <a href="https://www.facebook.com/bezparkrun/">200th Park Run</a> in one of Johannesburg’s large parks. Whatever he did he did fully, heart and soul. He was not bigger than life, he was big with life.</p>
<p>In later years he introduced himself as “a living ancestor”. Now he is simply our ancestor, one who has given us a huge legacy, a living legacy. It is time for us to reflect on his inspiration, burn <a href="http://phytoalchemy.co.za/2018/06/30/imphepho-is-not-a-smudge/">imphepho</a>, slaughter a cow and pour out the wine.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225374/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karl von Holdt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Eddie Webster inspired generations of scholars with his vision and practice of critically engaged scholarship, in South Africa and worldwide.Karl von Holdt, Senior Researcher, Society Work and Politics Institute, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2241912024-03-05T13:14:17Z2024-03-05T13:14:17ZThe African Union is weak because its members want it that way – experts call for action on its powers<p>The <a href="https://au.int/">African Union (AU)</a> comes in for a lot of criticism. Most recently this is from within its own ranks. The AU Commission chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240217/speech-he-moussa-faki-mahamat-chairperson-african-union-commission-thirty">set out his frustrations after an AU summit</a> in February 2024. The commission is the executive organ which runs the AU’s daily activities. Mahamat accused member states of getting in the way of the commission doing its work, and failing to match rhetoric with action:</p>
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<p>Over the last three years, 2021, 2022 and 2023, 93% of African Union decisions have not been implemented.</p>
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<p>We think many of the criticisms of the AU are justified. This is based on more than 15 years of researching its <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/advance-article/doi/10.1093/afraf/adad026/7333637">political</a> and <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-12451-8">legal</a> development.</p>
<p>The AU was formed <a href="https://au.int/en/overview">in 2002</a> to replace the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/organisation-african-unity-oau">Organisation of African Unity</a> (OAU). Its institutions include the <a href="https://au.int/en/commission">AU Commission</a>, the <a href="https://au.int/en/pap">Pan-African Parliament</a> and the <a href="https://www.african-court.org/wpafc/">African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights</a>, but the real power lies in the hands of its assembly, composed of heads of state and government. </p>
<p>The assembly has refused to transfer meaningful powers to any of the AU organs. For example, the Pan-African Parliament does not exercise any binding legislative powers. And the AU Commission cannot compel member states to comply with AU rules. Most member states <a href="https://theconversation.com/successes-of-african-human-rights-court-undermined-by-resistance-from-states-166454">refuse to comply</a> with the decisions of the human rights court. </p>
<p>The AU differs in this regard from the European Union (EU), where supranational, binding powers are exercised by organs such as the European Commission and the European Parliament. </p>
<p>The AU’s aim of deepening continental integration in Africa is not matched by the powers of its organs. As various AU-mandated reports have shown, the organisation is <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20Audit%20of%20the%20AU.pdf">dysfunctional</a> and not <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34915-file-report-20institutional20reform20of20the20au-2.pdf">fit for purpose</a>. </p>
<p>We have previously argued that the <a href="https://unisapressjournals.co.za/index.php/SAPL/article/view/11284">AU has come a long way in its first 20 years</a>. But we believe its <a href="https://theconversation.com/pan-african-integration-has-made-progress-but-needs-a-change-of-mindset-183541">long-standing weakness</a> lies with member states, not its executive, the AU Commission. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/toothless-pan-african-parliament-could-have-meaningful-powers-heres-how-87449">Toothless Pan-African Parliament could have meaningful powers. Here's how</a>
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<p>Fixing the problem requires political willingness by member states to gradually sacrifice their sovereignty for the greater good of continental integration. Also, more innovative and creative ways are needed to see how powers can be transferred to weak AU organs. </p>
<h2>Structural weaknesses</h2>
<p>Member states have little trust in the AU. Since its creation in 2002, there has been more talk about what is needed to make it effective than actually fixing its many problems. The <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">AU Constitutive Act</a> allows the assembly to transfer some of its functions to organs such as Pan-African Parliament and AU Commission. Very little has been done about this, though. </p>
<p>Rather than granting the parliament the ability to make binding laws, the amended <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7806-treaty-0047_-_protocol_to_the_constitutive_act_of_the_african_union_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">PAP Protocol</a> only gave it the powers to make “model laws”. These are no more than recommendations. The same applies to the AU Commission. It can’t compel member states to comply with its decisions. So the AU has no way to exercise supranational powers (binding over its member states). </p>
<p>The AU is only as strong as member states allow it to be. African leaders have a worrying track record of putting narrow domestic gains ahead of transferring higher powers to the AU. </p>
<p>This is unfortunate because African regional integration does not, as is often assumed, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800540">come at the cost of national sovereignty</a>. </p>
<p>In 2016, African leaders mandated Rwandan president Paul Kagame to provide a report on how to reform the AU. The report was submitted to the AU Assembly <a href="https://au.int/en/documents/20170129/report-proposed-recommendations-institutional-reform-african-union">in 2017</a>. It called for better coordination between AU organs and the regional economic communities, and enhancing the capacity of AU organs to achieve continental integration. After eight years, Kagame is <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/337642/frustrated-kagame-hands-au-reform-over-to-ruto/">frustrated with the lack of results</a>. </p>
<p>Though proponents of ambitious AU reforms are disappointed, the reforms suggested by Kagame have produced some tangible progress. They have prompted a welcome rethink of the institutional structures. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/not-yet-uhuru-the-african-union-has-had-a-few-successes-but-remains-weak-187705">Not yet uhuru: the African Union has had a few successes but remains weak</a>
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<p>One example is the decision on self-funding, which has revialised the <a href="https://au.int/es/node/43455">AU Peace Fund</a> and the <a href="https://au.int/es/node/43455">UN peacekeeping budget available</a> for requests to support AU peace support operations. However, <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/43077-EX_CL_Dec_1217-1232_XLIII_E.pdf">61% of the overall AU budget</a> is still financed by the AU’s <a href="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/7216/6074/7083/DP240-Financing-the-African-Union-on-mindsets-and-money.pdf">external partners</a> – including the EU, the US, China, India, Turkey and South Korea. Member states still pay <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/43203-doc-2022_AU_Consolidated_Final_Audit_Report_and_financial_statements_E_Signed-merged-1.pdf">on average only 80%-90%</a> of the contributions they owe. </p>
<h2>Poor leadership and weak empowerment</h2>
<p>The AU’s situation is not helped by some aspects of its leadership. Mahamat’s stewardship of a number of key projects and issues has been controversial. Notably, he largely remained silent about <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/2/14/addis-summit-raises-questions-about-ethiopias-many-conflicts">atrocities</a> committed by Ethiopian forces in Tigray during the two-year Ethiopia war which broke out in November 2020.</p>
<p>More hands-on, principled leadership would have been desirable. At the same time, member states haven’t created an environment in which the chairperson could operate as an effective change-maker. </p>
<p>AU member states and international partners have become <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/exclusive-audit-finds-nepotism-corruption-and-worse-at-the-african-union-commission-99181">frustrated</a> with the AU Commission’s performance, often attributing the AU’s problems to Mahamat’s personal leadership. </p>
<p>But blaming the chairperson is to ignore the deep-rooted structural deficiencies of the organisation. Without addressing these structural problems, whoever is <a href="https://assodesire.com/2024/02/19/outcomes-of-the-african-union-summit-in-7-points/">elected when Mahamat’s term ends in February 2025</a> will fall into the same inefficiency trap.</p>
<h2>Pathways to supranationalism</h2>
<p>The AU’s exercise of binding powers over its member states will require separating personal from institutional politics, ratifying existing legal instruments, and showcasing instances of good pan-African governance.</p>
<p>AU member states should commit to coming up with a feasible plan that shows how, in the short to medium term, they intend to transfer meaningful powers to the AU Commission and the Pan-African Parliament.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-african-union-at-20-a-lot-has-been-achieved-despite-many-flaws-175932">The African Union at 20: a lot has been achieved despite many flaws</a>
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<p>For example, member states that are willing and able to move ahead with endowing the parliament with supranational legislative powers should be encouraged. The amended <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7806-treaty-0047_-_protocol_to_the_constitutive_act_of_the_african_union_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">PAP Protocol</a> does not prevent this as it encourages member states to experiment with direct elections of membership to the parliament. </p>
<p>Also, the AU <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-treaty-protocol_on_free_movement_of_persons_in_africa_e.pdf">Protocol on Free Movement</a> encourages willing member states and regional economic communities to take action. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-african-unions-panel-of-the-wise-an-unfulfilled-promise-184488">The African Union's Panel of the Wise: an unfulfilled promise?</a>
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<p>Nothing prevents such member states from getting into an arrangement with the Pan-African Parliament and AU Commission to provide guidelines and even monitor the way they implement these objectives. Along the example of the <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/agreement-establishing-african-continental-free-trade-area">African Continental Free Trade Area</a>, national ratifications of AU instruments should be public and transparent to speed up action on agreed decisions. </p>
<p>Member states should encourage the inclusion of wider civil society in framing the terms and conditions of moving forward with the AU supranational project. In this way, the sense of popular ownership and legitimacy of the organisation will be guaranteed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224191/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ueli Staeger has received funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Babatunde Fagbayibo receives funding from the National Research Foundation of South Africa. </span></em></p>African leaders have a worrying track record of prioritising narrow domestic gains over transferring supranational, binding powers to the AU.Ueli Staeger, Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of AmsterdamBabatunde Fagbayibo, Professor of International Law, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2243452024-02-29T14:42:22Z2024-02-29T14:42:22ZDRC-Rwanda crisis: what’s needed to prevent a regional war<p>In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), <a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/deployment-sadc-mission-democratic-republic-congo#:%7E:text=The%20Southern%20African%20Development%20Community,by%20the%20resurgence%20of%20armed">South African, Burundian and Tanzanian troops</a> are fighting against the <a href="https://www.state.gov/escalation-of-hostilities-in-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">Rwandan army</a>, which has deployed in support of the rebellion by the March 23 Movement, or M23. </p>
<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/drc-rwanda-crisis-whats-needed-to-prevent-a-regional-war-224345&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>Soldiers from <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/south-african-soldiers-killed-in-dr-congo-return-home-e082c87d">South Africa</a> and <a href="https://apanews.net/m23-rebels-claim-burundian-soldiers-killed-and-captured/">Burundi</a>, as well as from the United Nations peacekeeping <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/pr-monusco-denounces-attack-helicopter-which-wounds-two-un-peacekeepers-north-kivu">mission</a>, have recently suffered casualties. In the crossfire, civilians have fled: <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-least-78000-children-displaced-and-families-ripped-apart-fighting-escalates#:%7E:text=The%20DRC%20has%20long%20suffered,and%20over%20seven%20million%20displaced.">seven million</a> Congolese are now displaced due to this and multiple other crises in the DRC.</p>
<p>Diplomats are concerned: the conflict in the eastern DRC was the subject of a <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15596.doc.htm">special meeting</a> at the United Nations Security Council on 20 February 2024 and a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/mini-summit-discusses-peace-efforts-for-east-democratic-republic-of-congo-/7491551.html">mini-summit</a> on the sidelines of the African Union annual meeting of heads of state on 16 February. </p>
<p>Rwanda, which has denied backing M23, <a href="https://www.minaffet.gov.rw/updates/news-details/rwanda-clarifies-security-posture">says</a> the Rwandan rebel group – Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) – which includes combatants who participated in the 1994 genocide, has been fully integrated into the Congolese army. It also claims that the Congolese government is engaged in “massive combat operations” aimed at expelling Congolese Tutsi civilians.</p>
<p>The Congolese government has mounted a campaign against Rwanda. In December, while he campaigned for re-election, President Félix Tshisekedi <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67669187">compared</a> his Rwandan counterpart to Adolf Hitler and accused him of expansionist aims. </p>
<p>In January, the Burundian president Évariste Ndayishimiye closed his border with Rwanda and <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1531125/politique/entre-paul-kagame-et-evariste-ndayishimiye-chronique-dune-reconciliation-avortee/">accused</a> the country of backing rebels against him. He stopped just short of calling for Kagame’s ouster.</p>
<p>We have been <a href="https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/en/about-us/">working</a> on the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for around 20 years. This wave of violence resembles previous ones, but is also different. <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691194080/the-war-that-doesnt-say-its-name">At the root</a> of the M23 conflict are countries such as Rwanda and Uganda, intent on projecting power and influence into the eastern DRC, while the Congolese government seems incapable and often unwilling to stabilise its own territory. Donors and United Nations peacekeepers provide humanitarian aid, but do little to transform these dynamics. </p>
<p>Resolving this crisis will require less hypocrisy from foreign donors, the end of Rwandan aggression, and a more accountable Congolese government. But the hopes of a grand bargain are far off, for now. The current peace processes – a <a href="https://www.eac.int/nairobiprocess">“Nairobi process”</a> for domestic negotiations and a <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/eastern-drc-peace-processes-miss-the-mark">“Luanda process”</a> for regional talks – are dead or on life support. </p>
<p>The upcoming elections in Rwanda (July 2024) and the US (November 2024) will likely not help cool heads or focus minds. But it is clear that ending the violence will require a new approach, one that places the lives of innocent Congolese civilians at its centre.</p>
<h2>Beginning of regional escalation</h2>
<p>During the early days of his presidency, Tshisekedi’s army <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/l-arm%C3%A9e-rwandaise-op%C3%A8re-bien-en-rdc-selon-des-experts-de-lonu/2102125">collaborated</a> intensely with the Rwandan army, allowing troops to conduct operations against the FDLR on Congolese territory in 2019 and 2020. In late 2019, his government even <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/b150-averting-proxy-wars-eastern-dr-congo-and-great-lakes">recommended</a> dropping charges against the M23 commanders, then in exile. </p>
<p>Less than three years after winning power, however, Tshisekedi changed his approach, breaking his coalition with his predecessor, Joseph Kabila, and moving to cement his position in power. He declared a state of siege in two eastern provinces, shuffled generals around in the army, and sidelined key securocrats. He also shifted gears in his regional relations. </p>
<p>By mid-2021, Tshisekedi had begun to <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/70232-museveni-tshisekedi-commission-construction-of-drc-roads">privilege</a> relations with Uganda, then a bitter rival of Rwanda. Notably, Tshisekedi gave <a href="https://s42831.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/report-crg-ebuteli-uganda-operation-shujaa-drc-adf-securing-economic-interests-1.pdf">permission</a> to the Ugandan army to deploy somewhere between 2,000 and 4,000 troops to hunt down Allied Democratic Forces rebels, an Islamist Ugandan rebellion based in the eastern DRC. Shortly after that, he did the same for the Burundian army, which had its sights on RED-Tabara, rebels based in the DRC seeking to overthrow the government of Ndayishimiye.</p>
<p>Rwanda suddenly felt isolated, even vulnerable, surrounded by hostile neighbours. <a href="https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=s/2022/967&Lang=E">According to United Nations investigators</a>, it probably resumed throwing its weight behind the M23 in November 2021. It is above all these regional tensions, coupled with its goal of maintaining influence in the Congo, that pushed it to move. </p>
<p>Since then, the regional fault lines have shifted. Rwanda has patched up relations with Uganda, and the East African Community intervention force – Kenyan, South Sudanese, Burundian and Ugandan troops – that deployed in 2022 to help quell the violence was asked to leave just a year later. This is because their hosts saw them as dragging their feet, if not complicit with the M23. Tshisekedi, who came into office seeing east African countries as allies, has now turned southwards. </p>
<h2>Military changes in eastern DRC</h2>
<p>Beginning in late 2023, a new force from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) began <a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/deployment-sadc-mission-democratic-republic-congo">deploying</a> troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi to take the fight to the M23, alongside the Burundian army.</p>
<p>Already, these forces have begun to take casualties. Two South African soldiers were <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/south-african-soldiers-killed-in-dr-congo-return-home-e082c87d">killed</a> on 14 February by a mortar strike; two others were <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/diplomacy-a-peace/south-africa-commits-2-900-sandf-personnel-to-samidrc/">injured</a> when their helicopter took fire. Some sources indicate that Burundian soldiers have taken <a href="https://www.sosmediasburundi.org/2023/11/16/bujumbura-larmee-burundaise-reste-muette-sur-la-mort-de-ses-militaires-en-rdc-mais-les-enterre/">heavy losses</a>. </p>
<p>The rising degree of military sophistication also raises eyebrows. The US government has <a href="https://www.state.gov/escalation-of-hostilities-in-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">accused</a> Rwanda of deploying surface-to-air missiles, UN officials have reported armed drones striking their bases, while Tanzania has <a href="https://chimpreports.com/tanzania-army-employs-saba-saba-guns-against-m23-rebels/">sent</a> Soviet-era BM-21 Grad rocket launchers. The DRC has <a href="https://www.military.africa/2023/06/drc-receives-ch-4-drones-from-china/">bought</a> nine Chinese CH-4 combat drones (three of which have reportedly been shot down already). </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Congolese army has partnered with <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/dr-congo-conflict-pulls-in-more-players-to-tackle-rebels/a-68304390">private security contractors</a> as well as with an array of local militia, collectively dubbed Wazalendo (patriots), who are poorly trained and disciplined. There are credible <a href="https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=s/2023/990&Lang=E">reports</a> from late 2023 that, as in the <a href="https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=s/2022/967&Lang=E">previous year</a>, they are also partnering with the Rwandan FDLR rebels.</p>
<p>And yet, the Congolese government has been unable to make much headway. In early February, M23 forces surrounded the lakeside town of Sake, just 30km west of the provincial capital Goma. This most recent push has displaced another 135,000 people toward Goma; there are around <a href="https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-north-kivu-flash-update-1-new-surge-violence-masisi-forced-displacement-goma-08-february-2024">half a million</a> displaced people around the town now.</p>
<h2>Mixed signals</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/85966/a-decade-ago-the-obama-administration-acted-when-the-m23-terrorized-eastern-drc-will-biden-do-the-same/">Unlike</a> the previous M23 crisis, influential foreign actors have sent mixed signals. At the <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15596.doc.htm">UN Security Council on 20 February</a>, the <a href="https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-the-situation-concerning-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-3/">US</a> and <a href="https://onu.delegfrance.org/france-condemns-the-m23-offensive-launched-on-february-7-against-the-town-of">France</a> called on Rwanda to withdraw their troops from the DRC. The US has gone the furthest of all of Rwanda’s donors, <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1703">sanctioning</a> a Rwandan general, suspending all military aid, and attempting to broker a <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/01/biden-congo-war-00129620">ceasefire</a> in December 2023. </p>
<p>And yet, the US remains, by far, the <a href="https://public.tableau.com/views/OECDDACAidataglancebyrecipient_new/Recipients?:embed=y&:display_count=yes&:showTabs=y&:toolbar=no?&:showVizHome=no">largest donor</a> to Rwanda, which receives the equivalent of around a third of its budget in aid. Other countries have pushed much less or not at all. While the M23 rebellion was going on, the British Commonwealth held its big biannual meeting in Kigali in 2022 and the UK struck a controversial <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/10/uk-abandon-rwanda-asylum-transfer-plan?gad_source=1&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIy-Gol_PBhAMVwCWtBh2uhg8nEAAYAiAAEgKsSPD_BwE">asylum deal</a> with Rwanda.</p>
<p>The EU <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/01/european-peace-facility-council-adopts-assistance-measures-in-support-of-the-armed-forces-of-five-countries/#:%7E:text=and%20medical%20equipment.-,Support%20to%20the%20deployment%20of%20the%20Rwanda%20Defence%20Force%20in,Force%20in%20Cabo%20Delgado%20province.">gave</a> US$22 million to support the deployment of the Rwanda Defence Force in Mozambique. On 19 February, the EU announced a <a href="https://www.innovationnewsnetwork.com/eu-and-rwanda-strike-deal-for-sustainable-raw-materials-value-chains/44015/">deal</a> to boost mineral exports from Rwanda.</p>
<p>This last piece of news caused an uproar in the DRC, touching on the popular belief that minerals are the root of the crisis. While the causes of the violence are far more complex than that, they have a point: the <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/country/uga">largest export</a> from Uganda (56% in 2021), Rwanda (23%), and Burundi (29%) in recent years has been gold, almost all of which is <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-12-28/where-does-gold-come-from-in-africa-suspected-smuggling-to-dubai-rings-alarms?embedded-checkout=true">smuggled</a> to their countries from the DRC.</p>
<p>In the long term, the DRC government will need to undertake a host of reforms to quell these cycles of conflict. They include reforming the Congolese army, a new demobilisation programme for armed groups, an economic development programme that would allow Congolese to benefit from their resources, a plan for communal reconciliation, and an end to discrimination against Kinyarwanda speakers. But none of that can happen as long as Congo’s neighbours continue to destabilise it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224345/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jason Stearns has received funding, through his work for the Congo Research Group, from the Swedish government, the European Union, the Schmidt Family Foundation, the United States Agency for International Development, and Bridgeway Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Z. Walker has received funding, in his role at the Congo Research Group, from the Swedish government, Dutch government, the European Union, the Schmidt Family Foundation, the United States Agency for International Development, and the Bridgeway Foundation.</span></em></p>Regional countries are embroiled in a geopolitical struggle over influence and survival.Jason Stearns, Assistant Professor, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser UniversityJoshua Z. Walker, Director of Programs, Congo Research Group, Center on International Cooperation, New York UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2243772024-02-28T13:16:42Z2024-02-28T13:16:42ZRed Sea politics: why Turkey is helping Somalia defend its waters<p><em>Somalia and Turkey recently announced that they would <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-provide-maritime-security-support-somalia-official-2024-02-22/#:%7E:text=The%20agreement%20aims%20to%20enhance,against%20terrorism%2C%22%20he%20said.">expand</a> the terms of a defence agreement first signed on <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/turkiye-somalia-sign-agreement-on-defense-economic-cooperation/3132095">8 February 2024</a> to include the maritime sector. This came as tensions rose between Somalia and landlocked Ethiopia. Ethiopia is seeking access to the Red Sea <a href="https://theconversation.com/somaliland-ethiopia-port-deal-international-opposition-flags-complex-red-sea-politics-221131">through Somaliland</a>, a breakaway state of Somalia. Federico Donelli, an international relations professor <a href="https://scholar.google.com.tr/citations?hl=it&user=lH6U_44AAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">whose research</a> covers Red Sea security and politics, puts this defence agreement into context.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the scope of the relationship between Turkey and Somalia?</h2>
<p>Turkey’s entry into Somalia in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/8/19/turkish-pm-visits-famine-hit-somalia">2011</a> started out as a humanitarian partnership but soon turned into a strategic one. Its support since has been economic and infrastructural and has increasingly included the military. </p>
<p>The Turkish government saw Somalia’s <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2872980">failed statehood</a> and the lack of other major international stakeholders as an opportunity to increase its popularity <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/au/turkey-in-africa-9780755636976/">across Africa</a>.</p>
<p>Turkey aimed to: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>gain international visibility</p></li>
<li><p>test its ability to intervene in conflict and post-conflict scenarios</p></li>
<li><p>increase market diversification into east Africa </p></li>
<li><p>cultivate its image as a benevolent Muslim middle power by promoting Islamic solidarity. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Several Turkish faith-based associations and NGOs already active in Africa became <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/189390/turkish-aid-agencies-in-somalia.pdf">directly involved</a> in development and relief projects. Major national brands, such as <a href="https://www.talpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/AID-CAMPAIGN-FOR-SOMALIA.pdf">Turkish Airlines</a>, promoted campaigns to raise funds for Somalia. </p>
<p>Within a few years, Turkey’s involvement in Somalia was portrayed by the government and perceived by the Turkish public as a domestic issue. </p>
<p>Turkey’s early efforts to bring Somalia back to the table of the international community were successful. </p>
<p>With the reopening of Mogadishu’s port and airport in <a href="https://jp.reuters.com/article/idUSL6N0SA47N/">2014</a>, both managed by Turkish companies, the economic situation in Somalia improved compared to the previous decade. Turkish political elites began to present their involvement in Somalia as a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/97/4/1105/6307685?redirectedFrom=fulltext">success story</a>. This is despite some remaining critical problems, including failing to root out the terrorist organisation <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-drives-al-shabaab-in-somalia-foreign-forces-out-sharia-law-in-and-overthrow-the-government-191366">Al-Shabaab</a>. </p>
<p>Turkey took responsibility for training the Somali National Army in partnership with other stakeholders, including the European Union and the United States. It <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1C50J9/#:%7E:text=MOGADISHU%2FANKARA%20(Reuters)%20%2D,a%20presence%20in%20East%20Africa.">opened a military base</a> in Mogadishu in 2017. The base trains one of the army’s elite units, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-military-rebuilding-shows-signs-of-improvement/6856894.html">the Gorgor Brigades</a>, and serves as a Turkish military outpost in the region. </p>
<p>Al-Shabaab’s persistence has <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315557083-11/hybrid-actor-horn-africa-federico-donelli?context=ubx&refId=88b5c3af-4bc2-4a09-af0b-c8d3df34534e">convinced Turkey</a> that it needs to provide more active military support for Somalia’s development. Ankara also wants to protect its economic and political investments in Somalia. </p>
<p>Finally, behind the Turkish deal with Somalia is the politics around the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato). </p>
<p>Over the past 12 months, Turkey has <a href="https://www.africaintelligence.com/north-africa/2023/10/20/washington-accepts-continuing-turkish-military-presence-in-libya,110078869-art">moved closer</a> to the United States. It’s positioned itself as an effective ally in Africa to counteract the negative effects of <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/rest-of-africa/last-french-troops-bow-out-of-africa-s-sahel-4472268">France’s withdrawal</a> – such as the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">increasing influence of Russia</a>. Turkey’s commitment to Somalia follows its <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.tr/bilateral-relations-between-turkiye-and-libya.en.mfa">efforts in Libya</a>. </p>
<p>In both cases, Turkey has proven willing to take on the security burden that other <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm">Nato members</a>, particularly Italy, have refused to meet. </p>
<p>Turkey’s engagement in Somalia is, therefore, part of a broader foreign policy strategy to gain more autonomy in global politics. Increased relevance within Nato would help achieve this. </p>
<h2>What’s the context of the maritime defence pact between Turkey and Somalia?</h2>
<p>Turkey and Somalia began working on an agreement between November 2023 and January 2024. Turkey agreed to <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/somalia-authorises-turkey-defend-its-sea-waters-deal">train and equip</a> Somalia’s naval force and help patrol the country’s 3,333km coastline. </p>
<p>Turkey’s defence sector has had increasing influence in Ankara’s foreign policy decisions. Turkey sees itself as an exporter of defence industry products, and as a partner in training special forces and police. African countries are among the main targets for the Turkish defence sector. </p>
<p>Somalia, therefore, provides an opportunity to spread more Turkish production and items.</p>
<p>In 2022, Turkey became, along with the United States, the main backer of a <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/can-somalias-new-offensive-defeat-al-shabaab/">new offensive against Al-Shabaab</a>. It provided logistical support to the Gorgor forces and air cover to the national army. This cooperation has led to the 10-year defence agreement, including maritime security, signed in February 2024. </p>
<p>Turkey and Somalia have been working on the accord for some time, but recent regional events have undoubtedly affected the announcement’s timing. </p>
<p>An <a href="https://theconversation.com/somaliland-ethiopia-port-deal-international-opposition-flags-complex-red-sea-politics-221131">Ethiopia-Somaliland memorandum of understanding</a> in January 2024 is one such event. Turkey has good relations with Somaliland, but considers the territorial integrity of Somalia to be essential for its stability. </p>
<p>At the same time, the Horn of Africa’s political dynamics are shifting. <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/oped/comment/somalia-ethiopia-tensions-only-serve-to-embolden-al-shabaab-4512492">Mounting tensions</a> between Ethiopia and Somalia have led to new coalitions involving regional and extra-regional players. </p>
<p>It’s important not to oversimplify, but two factions are emerging. On one side are Ethiopia, Somaliland and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). On the other are Somalia, Egypt, Eritrea and Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>At first, Turkey sought to mediate between the factions to defuse tensions. </p>
<p>But its agreement with Somalia reduces Turkey’s room for manoeuvre. Although the relationship with Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed appears to be unaffected, there could be negative repercussions, especially for the many <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkiye-and-ethiopia.en.mfa#:%7E:text=While%20the%20number%20of%20Turkish,with%20approximately%20200%20Turkish%20companies.">Turkish economic interests in Ethiopia</a>.</p>
<h2>What is the UAE factor?</h2>
<p>When it comes to the Horn of Africa, the UAE plays a pivotal role. Turkey and Somalia each have a relationship with the Emirates. </p>
<p>From 2014 to 2020, Turkey engaged in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2021.1976573?src=recsys">bitter rivalry</a> with the Emirates in the wider Red Sea area. This was driven by the two countries’ different visions for the region’s future. </p>
<p>Relations improved from 2020. During the 2020-2022 war in Tigray, <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/why-rival-powers-are-backing-ethiopias-government">both Turkey and the UAE supported the Ethiopian government</a>. </p>
<p>But recent developments in the Horn of Africa, such as the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/1/4/ambiguous-ethiopia-port-deal-fuels-uncertainty-over-somaliland-statehood">UAE-backed Ethiopia-Somaliland deal</a>, threaten to create new friction between Turkey and the Emirates. Turkey doesn’t have the political will or material capacity to sustain this. In the past three years, the UAE has supported the Turkish economy with <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/1976546/middle-east">direct investment</a>, changing the balance of the relationship. </p>
<p>The situation is similar for Somalia. </p>
<p>From a commercial and security perspective, the Emirates is important in Somalia. The UAE <a href="https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/after-djibouti-failure-dp-world-heads-up-somalia-for-controversial-port-projects">manages two key Somali ports</a> – Berbera and Bosaso. It’s also moving to take over Kismayo. And the Emirates has been one of Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/new-president-somalia-new-opportunity-reconciliation">principal backers</a>. It would be risky for the Somali president to break ties with Abu Dhabi.</p>
<h2>What happens next?</h2>
<p>There is still much uncertainty about how the Ethiopia-Somaliland memorandum of understanding and the Turkey-Somalia defence cooperation agreements will be put into practice. What’s clear is that both the UAE and Turkey are becoming more active and influential in the region. And that African dynamics within and between states are closely intertwined with regional and global trends.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224377/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Federico Donelli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The persistence of the Al-Shabaab terror group has convinced Turkey it needs to provide more active military support in Somalia.Federico Donelli, Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of TriesteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2231452024-02-22T14:37:14Z2024-02-22T14:37:14ZTraditional weather forecasts: expert shares 5 ways Africa’s coastal residents predict floods<p>In the Lapai Gwari community of Niger state, north central Nigeria, elders predict the weather by observing a large stone in the Chachanga River. The LapanGwagwan stone serves as a tool to determine the frequency of flooding and gauge the severity of rainfall. </p>
<p>When the colour of the stone changes to brown, it signifies an imminent heavy downpour, while a grey colour indicates either light or moderate rainfall. </p>
<p>This traditional knowledge helps the community to prepare for potential flooding.</p>
<p>This is just one example of the indigenous knowledge established in the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26269399?seq=1">literature</a> as important in mitigating the effects of climate change. The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Assessment <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/srccl/chapter/chapter-7/">report</a> also affirms that indigenous knowledge should be integrated into research.</p>
<p>Transferring this knowledge doesn’t always happen, however. Scientists and policymakers don’t all recognise its value.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, for coastal communities like Lapai Gwari, frequent flooding poses a <a href="https://ehs.unu.edu/news/news/frequent-flooding-in-african-coastal-cities-demand-holistic-recovery-pathways.html#:%7E:text=Frequent%20flooding%20in%20African%20coastal%20cities%20demand%20holistic%20recovery%20pathways,-News&text=Coastal%20cities%20across%20Africa%20experience,and%20oftentimes%20extreme%E2%80%93%20flood%20events.">major threat and risk</a> to long-term development. </p>
<p><a href="https://wires.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/wcc.253">Studies</a> suggest that by 2100, sea levels could rise by as much as 100cm, presenting even more hazards to coastal communities around Africa.</p>
<p>I have been <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=c5aWJIsAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">researching</a> the adaptation and resilience of African coastal cities to climate change for over a decade. I believe that identifying and integrating indigenous knowledge has a lot to offer.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-27280-6_10">recent book chapter</a>, I identified five unique indigenous knowledge strategies practised in four coastal communities of Africa. These are: change in water colour; lunar observation; participatory mapping; yearly sacrifice to the gods; and extensive knowledge of local plants and animals.</p>
<p>I argue that drawing on local wisdom and expertise can enhance policies and mechanisms to protect people from the effects of frequent flooding in African coastal cities. </p>
<h2>Research aims and methods</h2>
<p>To identify the indigenous knowledge within these communities, I reviewed relevant literature, newspaper articles and social media outlets, and interviewed local residents of coastal communities. These were in Lagos and Delta States in Nigeria, Durban in South Africa, and Accra in Ghana. </p>
<p>I aimed to understand practices in these communities that related to flood resilience and adaptation.</p>
<p>I discovered that people had useful indigenous knowledge about predicting and mapping flood risks. But this knowledge was fragmented and there wasn’t a cohesive framework to put it into practice.</p>
<p>People said that knowledge wasn’t being documented and shared. Also, religion and education influenced perceptions about the value of the knowledge. </p>
<h2>Five indigenous knowledge strategies</h2>
<p><strong>Change in water colour:</strong> Local residents in Delta State, Nigeria told me how they knew that a flood was about to occur: there was a sudden change in the colour of the water from clear to deep brown. The flood usually followed the change in water colour after 24 to 48 hours. This warning sign gave the community time to take precautions, such as evacuating low-lying areas and securing belongings.</p>
<p><strong>Lunar observation:</strong> People in the Anlo coastal community in Ghana’s Volta Region study the moon and use it to predict flood years. They said an approaching full moon during the peak of rainfall indicated that flood was imminent. They understand the moon’s influence on tidal patterns and its correlation with flood events, empowering them to act in advance.</p>
<p><strong>Participatory mapping approach:</strong> In Accra and Durban, some residents have developed a participatory mapping approach which helps them prepare for floods. They map their surroundings, including vulnerable areas and natural resources. This enables them to identify areas prone to flooding and assess the effectiveness of existing nature-based solutions such as mangroves or wetlands. They can also find ways to reduce flood risks.</p>
<p><strong>Yearly sacrifice to the gods:</strong> The chief priest of the Isheri community in Lagos described an annual sacrifice performed to appease the gods and cope with flooding. This indigenous practice reflects the cultural and spiritual beliefs of the community.</p>
<p><strong>Knowledge of local flora and fauna:</strong> The coastal communities I studied had a deep knowledge of local plants and animals and their ecological significance. They knew about the impact of climate change on these species. Through their close interactions with the environment, people had observed changes in the behaviour, distribution and abundance of species, providing valuable insights into the effects of climate change.</p>
<h2>From practice to policy</h2>
<p>These unique indigenous knowledge practices offer opportunities to build resilient coastal communities. So it is disheartening that their recognition and integration into mainstream efforts remains limited. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-27280-6_10">study</a> proposes that the new models and innovations for resilience practice should draw on indigenous knowledge.</p>
<p>The starting point is for policymakers to acknowledge its value. Ways must be found to work together, creating and sharing knowledge. Such platforms should bring together scientists, experts, policymakers and indigenous communities to foster mutual learning, respect and understanding.</p>
<p>Communities also need help to build their capacity and strengthen their role in resilience initiatives. This includes supporting initiatives that document and preserve indigenous knowledge, recognising its cultural and historical significance. </p>
<p>Investments should be made in education and training that promotes the transmission of indigenous knowledge to younger generations, ensuring its continuity and relevance in the face of evolving environmental challenges.</p>
<p>By embracing the authentic integration of scientific and indigenous knowledge, we can pave the way for more comprehensive, context-specific and sustainable approaches to flood resilience in African coastal cities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223145/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olasunkanmi Habeeb Okunola is a Visiting Scientist at the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security. </span></em></p>In African coastal communities, traditional knowledge helps residents to anticipate and prepare for potential flooding events.Olasunkanmi Habeeb Okunola, Visiting Scientist, United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), United Nations UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2239822024-02-22T07:45:37Z2024-02-22T07:45:37ZAfrica’s debt crisis needs a bold new approach: expert outlines a way forward<p>It hasn’t been easy for African states to finance their developmental and environmental policy objectives over the past few years.</p>
<p>Recent events suggest that the situation may be improving. For the first time in two years, three African states have been able <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/02/15/african-governments-return-to-international-bond-markets">to access international financial markets, albeit at high interest rates.</a> Kenya, for example, is <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-12/kenya-said-to-tap-eurobond-market-at-exorbitant-rate-for-buyback?sref=UnSQjRxb">now paying over 10%</a> compared to about 7% in 2014. </p>
<p>Many African countries continue to face challenging sovereign debt situations.</p>
<p>Total external debts as a share of Africa’s export earnings increased from <a href="https://unctad.org/publication/world-of-debt/regional-stories">74.5% in 2010 to 140% in 2022</a>. In 2022, African governments had to <a href="https://data.one.org/topics/african-debt/">allocate about 12% of their revenues to servicing their debt</a>. Between 2019 and 2022, <a href="https://unctad.org/publication/world-of-debt/regional-stories">25 African governments</a> allocated more resources to servicing their total debts than to the health of their citizens. And in late 2023 the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/09/26/cf-how-to-avoid-a-debt-crisis-in-sub-saharan-africa">International Monetary Fund estimated</a> that over half the low income African countries were either potentially or actually experiencing difficulties paying their debts. </p>
<p>This suggests that it will be very difficult for Africa to raise the US$1.6 trillion that <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/3269532b-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/3269532b-en#:%7E:text=Africa's%20sustainable%20financing%20gap%20until,Sustainable%20Development%20Goals%20by%202030">the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development estimates</a> it needs to reach the sustainable development goals by 2030.</p>
<p>One of the lessons of the COVID pandemic and the climate negotiations is that Africa can’t count on the global community to provide it with sufficient new funds or with debt relief to deal with either its development needs or the consequences of crises such as pandemics or extreme weather events. </p>
<p>Its official bilateral creditors appear more focused on their own needs and on other parts of the world than on Africa. Commercial creditors are happy to provide financing when conditions are favourable and African debt can help them satisfy their investment mandates. But they are less forthcoming when the going gets tough and the risks associated with the transaction – and for which they have been compensated – actually materialise.</p>
<p>This suggests that Africa needs to advocate more aggressively for its own interests. </p>
<p>This year offers some good opportunities to promote a more effective approach to African debt. </p>
<h2>Careful planning needed</h2>
<p>There are two <a href="https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/financing-for-development/">international</a> <a href="https://www.un.org/en/summit-of-the-future#:%7E:text=22%2D23%20September%202024,Solutions%20for%20a%20Better%20Tomorrow">conferences</a> where global economic governance will be on the agenda. This is also the first year that the African Union participates as a full member in the G20. In addition, South Africa, the G20 chair in 2025, currently serves on the troika that manages the G20 process. </p>
<p>Debt and development finance will be an important topic in all these forums. African representatives can use their participation to advocate for a new approach to sovereign debt that is more responsive to African needs and concerns. They can also lobby other participating states and non-state actors for their support.</p>
<p>But African states will need to plan carefully. Their starting point should be the well recognised fact that the current sovereign debt restructuring process is not working for anyone. The G20 agreed a <a href="https://clubdeparis.org/sites/default/files/annex_common_framework_for_debt_treatments_beyond_the_dssi.pdf">Common Framework</a> that was supposed to help resolve the sovereign debt crises in low income countries. <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/africas-debt-priorities-a-sustainability-perspective-required-support-from-the-g20/#:%7E:text=The%20Common%20Framework%20was%20established,applied%20include%20Ethiopia%20and%20Ghana.">Four African countries</a> applied to have their debts restructured through the framework. Despite years of negotiations, it has failed to fully resolve the debt crisis in three of them. </p>
<p>Countries outside the Common Framework, such as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/sri-lanka-bondholders-raise-concerns-over-debt-deal-transparency-2023-12-01/">Sri Lanka</a>, have not managed to fully resolve their debt crises either. This is costly for both debtors and creditors. It is therefore in everyone’s interest to look for a new approach.</p>
<p>This requires all parties to be willing to entertain new ideas and to experiment with new approaches to old problems. African states should offer their own innovative proposals. They should also state that they are willing to take on new responsibilities if their creditors are willing to do the same.</p>
<p>They can remind their creditors that these experiments would not be taking place in a vacuum. They can be guided by the many existing, but underutilised, international norms and standards applicable to responsible sovereign debt transactions, for example the Unctad principles on <a href="https://unctad.org/publication/principles-promoting-responsible-sovereign-lending-and-borrowing#:%7E:text=Sovereign%20lending%20and%20borrowing%20conducted,neighbors%20and%20its%20trading%20partners.">responsible sovereign debt transactions</a>. Some of these relate to the conduct of sovereign borrowers. Others focus on responsible lending behaviour and are often cited by creditors in their own policies dealing with environmental and social issues, social responsibility or human rights. </p>
<p>By basing any new approach on these international norms and standards, both debtors and creditors will merely be agreeing to implement principles that they have already accepted. </p>
<p>Working from this starting point, African states should make three specific proposals. </p>
<h2>Concrete proposals</h2>
<p>First, they should commit to making both the process for incurring debts and the terms of all their public debt transactions transparent. </p>
<p>This will ensure that their own citizens understand what obligations their governments are assuming on their behalf. It will encourage governments to adopt responsible borrowing and debt management practices. They should also agree that they can be held accountable for their failure to comply with these transparent and responsible sovereign debt practices and procedures.</p>
<p>Second, African states should point out that there is a fundamental problem with a sovereign debt restructuring process that only focuses on the contractual obligations that the debtor state owes its creditors. This focus means, in effect, that servicing its debt obligations will trump the debtor state’s efforts to deal with the country’s vulnerability to climate change and the loss of biodiversity, and with its poverty, inequality and unemployment challenges. This follows from the fact that their creditors can use the restructuring process to force sovereign borrowers in difficulty, unlike corporations in bankruptcy, to pay those who lend them money without regard, for example, to the impact on their obligations to pensioners, public sector employees or the welfare of their citizens. </p>
<p>This exclusive focus on debt contracts is inconsistent with the international community’s interest in addressing global challenges like climate and inequality. </p>
<p>This problem can be resolved if both creditors and debtors agree that they will adopt an approach to debt negotiations that incorporates the financial, economic, social, environmental, human rights and governance dimensions of sovereign debt crises.</p>
<p>Third, African states should propose that their creditors publicly commit to base the new approach to sovereign debt on an agreed list of international norms and standards relevant to responsible international financial practices. These will include those dealing with transparency, climate and environmental issues, and social matters, including human rights.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223982/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Danny Bradlow previously had a grant from ther Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa to work on issues relating to sovereign debt. </span></em></p>Africa needs to advocate more aggressively for its own interests when it comes to negotiating debt terms.Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2228262024-02-21T12:29:46Z2024-02-21T12:29:46ZFree movement in west Africa: three countries leaving Ecowas could face migration hurdles<p>For Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, a recent decision to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947">withdraw</a> from the <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States</a> (Ecowas) has thrown up questions about how they will navigate regional mobility in future. </p>
<p>Ecowas covers a variety of sectors, but migration is a major one. The bloc’s protocols since 1979 have long been seen as a <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-97322-3_2">shining example</a> of free movement on the continent. They gave citizens the right to move between countries in the region without a visa, and a prospective right of residence and setting up businesses.</p>
<p>As multidisciplinary scholars we have previously researched <a href="https://www.arnold-bergstraesser.de/en/political-economy-west-african-migration-governance-wamig-2">migration governance in west Africa</a>, at the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2022.2084452">regional level</a>, and in particular contexts like <a href="https://ecdpm.org/work/what-does-regime-change-niger-mean-migration-cooperation-eu">Niger</a>. </p>
<p>We argue that Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have much to lose if their departure from Ecowas curtails mobility. But it is likely that informal mobility will continue anyway. </p>
<h2>Why free movement matters</h2>
<p>In September 2023, the three countries created a <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-have-a-new-defence-alliance-an-expert-view-of-its-chances-of-success-215863">mutual defence pact</a>, named <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sahel-coups-niger-tchiani-mali-burkina-faso-insecurity-e96627c700aa4fcf8d060dd9d2d16667">the Alliance of Sahel States</a>. This indicated their solidarity in dealing with insecurity. </p>
<p>Yet they also depend on neighbouring countries in the region, which puts these three countries in a difficult position.</p>
<p>The three countries that announced their withdrawal from Ecowas are connected in a web of mobility. Notably, Niger, seen as a key transit country for refugees and other migrants on their way to Europe, received <a href="https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/migration-and-society/3/1/arms030107.xml">major funds and support</a> from the European Union to prevent onward migration to Libya and beyond. </p>
<p>One central measure was <a href="https://www.refworld.org/legal/legislation/natlegbod/2015/fr/123771">Loi 2015-36</a>, a law which punished people transporting migrants with fines and prison sentences. The law was <a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/european-dominance-of-migration-policy-in-niger-31383/">mostly developed</a> by external actors and had detrimental effects on the <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/multilateral-damage.pdf">local economy</a>. It also made migration journeys across the Sahara desert even <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc4138add1-visit-niger-report-special-rapporteur-human-rights-migrants">more dangerous</a>. </p>
<p>In November 2023, the law, which <a href="https://www.arnold-bergstraesser.de/sites/default/files/medam_niger_jegen.pdf">arguably violated</a> the principles of free movement under Ecowas, was repealed by the Nigerien coup leaders. </p>
<p>Mali is another major transit country in the region, as well as a country of origin for regional migration. It has a complicated history of <a href="https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/72355">migration cooperation</a> with Europe. </p>
<p>Of less relevance to Europe, but more for regional dynamics, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-39814-8_11">Burkina Faso</a> is at the centre for <a href="https://www.mideq.org/en/migration-corridors/burkina-faso-cote-divoire/">regional migration</a>, often seasonal. Labour migration supports Côte d'Ivoire’s cocoa industry. After withdrawal from Ecowas, such labour migration may be difficult unless people resort more to informal migration. </p>
<p>As we have shown in our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2022.2084452">previous research</a>, informal mobility has always existed along with formal mobility governance. Official border crossing points are often not used, despite the legal requirement to do so. </p>
<p>Hence, leaving Ecowas may increase corruption and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/imig.12766">problems of harassment</a> at formal border crossings as well as <a href="https://mixedmigration.org/resource/human-rights-migrants-smuggling-mali-niger/">increased use of mobility facilitators</a>, or “passeurs”. These are people who negotiate passage through formal border crossings and organise journeys through other routes. </p>
<p>The legal gaps that the current situation creates could be very expensive for businesses and individuals. People may in the near future require visas. And for those who have migrated regionally, the right to stay in a country of residency may soon be under threat. </p>
<h2>An immediate exit</h2>
<p>Days after they <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947">announced</a> their withdrawal from <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/">Ecowas</a>, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger <a href="https://www.ewn.co.za/2024/02/08/burkina-mali-and-niger-reject-one-year-period-to-quit-ecowas">insisted</a> they were not bound by <a href="https://ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Revised-treaty-1.pdf#page=53">rules stipulating</a> a one year notice period before their final exit. </p>
<p>The announcement about leaving Ecowas outside the normal regulations was dramatic, but not unexpected. Military governments that took power in a series of coups in August 2020 and May 2021 in <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/mali-un-coup-dans-le-coup">Mali</a>, September 2022 in <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-burkina-faso-latest-coup/">Burkina Faso</a> and July 2023 in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/armed-troops-blockade-presidential-palace-in-niger-mohamed-bazoum">Niger</a> rule the three countries.</p>
<p>Ecowas has exerted political and economic pressure on the three countries to return to constitutional rule, through sanctions and the <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/policy-briefs/military-intervention-niger-imperatives-and-caveats">threat</a> of military intervention. </p>
<p>In Niger, for example, Ecowas <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-bazoum-coup-sanctions-ecowas-c7bdfd06559f1cfbfb856bea5b11a55f">closed</a> official border crossings, cut off more than <a href="https://punchng.com/niger-nigeria-cuts-power-supply-ecowas-vows-to-confront-junta/">70% </a> of electricity, and suspended financial transactions with other countries in the region. </p>
<p>International assets <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/31/nigers-planned-51-mln-bond-issuance-cancelled-due-to-sanctions">were frozen</a> and international aid halted. Even before the coup, <a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/thousands-children-niger-risk-severe-nutritional-crisis-border-closures-leave-trucks-stranded#:%7E:text=Furthermore%2C%20prior%20to%20the%20political,least%20one%20form%20of%20malnutrition.">3.3 million people</a> in Niger experienced acute food insecurity. </p>
<p>The Ecowas sanctions made daily life even worse and in all likelihood added to the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate">popularity</a> of the coup leaders. </p>
<p>Similar sanctions were applied in Mali. The population has suffered as a result and the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-arent-sanctions-preventing-coups-in-africa">effectiveness</a> of the sanctions is questionable. </p>
<p>Sanctions in Burkina Faso included <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-arent-sanctions-preventing-coups-in-africa">travel bans</a> against members of the military government.</p>
<h2>Potential ways ahead</h2>
<p>For Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, there are several considerations when it comes to regional mobility in their post-Ecowas era. These may include exploring the provisions of the <a href="https://www.uemoa.int/en">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a>; a return to bilateral agreements with individual neighbours; or relying on the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">African Union Protocol on Free Movement</a>. </p>
<p><strong>Monetary union:</strong> The three countries are still part of the <a href="https://www.uemoa.int/en">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a> (Waemu), a union around the common currency, the CFA franc.</p>
<p>The regional monetary union also has provisions for free movement of people and goods across its member countries. With this option, access to seaports, a major issue for all three landlocked countries, is ensured through other members of the monetary union, including, for example, Senegal. </p>
<p>On the downside is the fact that a major argument for leaving Ecowas was the perceived role of external influence over the regional bloc. The strong anti-imperialist discourse of the military governments does not bode well for the regional monetary union either. The union is the institutional framework for regional monetary policy over which France <a href="https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745341798/africas-last-colonial-currency/">continues</a> to exert significant influence. </p>
<p>Burkina Faso has already <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-may-quit-west-african-currency-union-not-mali-2024-01-31/">announced</a> its intention to leave the monetary union too. </p>
<p>The West Africa Economic and Monetary Union also excludes major trading partners like Nigeria – of major importance to landlocked <a href="https://www.inter-reseaux.org/en/publication/51-special-issue-nigeria/nigerias-role-in-nigers-food-security/">Niger</a> for food supplies. Trade and commerce between Nigeria and Niger provides a lifeline and is among the most intense areas of cross-border activity in west Africa. </p>
<p>For these reasons, the regional monetary union option seems an unlikely alternative.</p>
<p><strong>Bilateral agreements:</strong> Another option for the three countries could be a return to bilateral agreements with individual countries to facilitate free movement. This can be likened to what former Ecowas member <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00083968.2014.936696">Mauritania</a>, which left in <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2000/12/28/mauritania-pulls-out-ecowas">2000</a>, did. </p>
<p>However, at the moment, given the sanctions, this option is off the cards, and could take many years to work out. </p>
<p><strong>African Union protocol:</strong> At a continental level the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">African Union Protocol on Free Movement</a> may offer a distant way forward. So far only <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-sl-PROTOCOL_TO_THE_TREATY_ESTABLISHING_THE_AFRICAN_ECONOMIC_COMMUNITY_RELATING_TO_FREE_MOVEMENT_OF_PERSONS-1.pdf">32 countries</a> have signed it and four have ratified it, among them Mali and Niger (Burkina Faso is a signatory). </p>
<p>One way to move forward would be for countries to ramp up ratifications of this document, to ensure that cooperation on free movement can continue whatever happens to Ecowas. </p>
<p>Of course, other countries within Ecowas could also unilaterally open up for visa-free entry like <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/11/03/rwanda-announces-visa-free-travel-for-all-africans//">Rwanda</a> or Kenya have done, though the process has had its <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/01/09/kenya-backlash-over-new-visa-free-entry-policy-many-describe-as-hectic//">hiccups</a>. </p>
<p>Such visa arrangements are also unlikely to include the rights of residence and establishment guaranteed under the Ecowas framework.</p>
<p>Given the current political context, an institutionalised option seems unlikely in the near future. The most likely option would be that migration will simply continue – informally.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222826/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Franzisca Zanker received funding from the Mercator Stiftung for a research project "The Political Economy of West African Migration Governace" in 2019 which provided relevant background for this piece.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amanda Bisong is a policy officer at the ECDPM, Maastricht, The Netherlands.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leonie Jegen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have much to lose if they cannot migrate to and from neighbouring countries in Ecowas.Franzisca Zanker, Senior research fellow, Arnold Bergstraesser InstituteAmanda Bisong, PhD candidate, Vrije Universiteit AmsterdamLeonie Jegen, PhD Candidate, University of AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2225192024-02-20T13:12:43Z2024-02-20T13:12:43ZSouth Sudan: some spoilers want peace to fail, putting 2024 elections at risk<p>South Sudan is expected to hold its first general election in <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-south-sudan-meet-its-election-deadline-this-time">December 2024</a>. It became an independent state in <a href="https://www.usip.org/programs/independence-south-sudan">2011</a>. </p>
<p>The long overdue election is one of the pillars of a <a href="https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/02/South-Sudan-Peace-Agreement-September-2018.pdf">peace agreement</a> signed in 2018. It helped end the 2013-2018 civil war that killed <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IN10975.pdf#page=1">nearly 400,000 people and displaced millions</a>. </p>
<p>Since then, the country has progressed in relative peace, with fewer incidences of conflict reported between 2018 and 2023. However, UN experts have <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/12/1144822">voiced concerns</a> about the likelihood of elections being held within agreed timelines. </p>
<p>The election has been slated for December 2024, provided a number of <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/s-sudan-risks-delayed-2024-elections-due-to-the-stuck-deal-4472812">issues</a> listed in the peace agreement are addressed. These include the making of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-sudans-constitution-making-process-is-on-shaky-ground-how-to-firm-it-up-177107">permanent constitution</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-in-south-sudan-hinges-on-forging-a-unified-military-force-but-its-proving-hard-181547">unifying command of the military</a>.</p>
<p>But there have been major hurdles in the way of implementing the agreement. One of them is the <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jolte/article/view/248083">presence of spoilers</a> within the South Sudanese political landscape. </p>
<p>Spoilers, as I define them, are detractors who attempt to undermine the successful implementation of peace agreements. </p>
<p>I have researched <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jolte/article/view/248083">South Sudan’s peace process</a> for eight years. I have studied the evolution of the country’s conflict since 2013, and the <a href="https://erepo.usiu.ac.ke/handle/11732/6971">various hurdles</a> that warring parties face in their quest for peace.</p>
<p>In my view, spoilers comprise leaders and parties who view peace as a major threat to their interests and power. They willingly risk using any means, including violence, to derail peace agreements due to feelings of exclusion or betrayal. </p>
<p>South Sudan’s elections were initially planned for <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/counting-down-to-south-sudans-elections">2022, and then pushed to 2023 and now 2024</a>. These delays have been as a result of the lack of real peace. Instead, there’s negative peace: a peace deal exists but there are simmering tensions between warring factions and those left out of negotiations. </p>
<p>This exclusion has led to the proliferation of spoilers. As I warn in <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jolte/article/view/248083">my research</a>, in this context, a more inclusive process needs to be prioritised to save the country’s fragile peace and get the elections on track.</p>
<h2>What happened to negotiate peace in South Sudan</h2>
<p>A protracted <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan#:%7E:text=In%20December%202013%2C%20following%20a,ethnic%20groups%20in%20South%20Sudan.">political power struggle</a> between South Sudan’s president, Salva Kiir, and his deputy, Riek Machar, to lead the main political party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, sparked a civil war in 2013.</p>
<p>Violence first broke out after a <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/interview-kiir-has-deliberately-destroyed-splm-and-is-not-interested-in-bringing-genuine-peace-pagan-amum">volatile meeting</a> in July 2013 to decide who – between Kiir, Machar and Pagan Amum, then the secretary-general of the party – would be its flagbearer in elections scheduled for 2015. In <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/23/south-sudan-state-that-fell-apart-in-a-week">December 2013</a>, fighting between military forces loyal to either Kiir or Machar – who are from the country’s two largest ethnic groups – escalated. </p>
<p>The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement splintered into two factions in 2014. One is led by Kiir, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Government; the other by Machar, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.usip.org/south-sudan-peace-process-key-facts#:%7E:text=The%20South%20Sudan%20peace%20process,a%20post%2Dconflict%20political%20transition.">International and regional interventions</a> led to a long peace process that resulted in the signing of several peace agreements. Between 2013 and 2018, six main agreements and five addenda were signed to help resolve the South Sudan conflict. </p>
<p>The key sticking points in these deals were around how power would be shared between the warring parties, military integration of armed forces, addressing the root causes of the conflict, and healing the nation through a truth, justice and reconciliation process. </p>
<p>The last peace agreement was <a href="https://horninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/No.-17.-The-Revitalized-Agreement-for-Resolution-of-Conflict-in-South-Sudan-R-ARCSS-1.pdf#page=1">signed</a> in September 2018 by five key actors and a group of smaller opposition parties, signalling an end to the five-year conflict. </p>
<p>Elections were originally slated for <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/counting-down-to-south-sudans-elections">December 2022</a>. They were later postponed due to delays in implementing the peace agreement. </p>
<h2>Who are the spoilers?</h2>
<p>Spoilers can destroy peace agreements. There are two main types of spoilers: <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jolte/article/view/248083">insiders and outsiders</a>. </p>
<p>Insider spoilers participate in the peace process, sign the peace agreement and even signal support for its implementation. However, they fail to follow through. Their motives for this include the need to achieve their goals by maintaining the guise of supporting the peace process. They are especially sensitive to decisions that would weaken them militarily. </p>
<p>In South Sudan, insider spoilers include <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kiir-puts-south-sudan-on-edge-4154634">the two breakaway parties</a> of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. They are the main signatories of the 2018 peace agreement. Their spoiling role has been exhibited by a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/is-south-sudan-s-peace-deal-holding-/7004434.html">lack of political goodwill</a> in upholding the spirit and letter of the agreement on various issues. A good example of this is a recent <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/30/s-sudan-president-appoints-defence-minister-breaching-peace-deal">breach</a> when Kiir unilaterally appointed a defence minister from his own faction in total disregard of the peace agreement. </p>
<p>Outsider spoilers exclude themselves from the peace process because they feel their demands won’t be addressed. They openly declare their hostility to the process. They eventually use any means, including open violence, to disrupt and upset the process.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/south-sudan-s-holdout-rebel-groups-resume-talks/7016828.html">New negotiations</a> were held in 2023 to include outsider spoilers like <a href="https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/gen-cirillo-we-were-right-not-to-sign-the-peace-agreement">General Thomas Swaka</a> of the National Salvation Front and <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/q-a-nss-gen-akol-koor-cannot-convince-me-to-return-to-juba-gen-paul-malong">General Paul Malong</a>, a leader of the South Sudan United Front. These two parties are new entrants into the South Sudan political space and generally accommodate former Kiir allies. The negotiations didn’t bear fruit.</p>
<p>In my view, insider spoilers are more likely to disrupt the South Sudan peace process. They span both the political and military landscape and are very influential. Insider spoilers tend to have a large support base within the population. </p>
<h2>What happens now?</h2>
<p>New threats continue to emerge in the South Sudanese landscape, particularly as December 2024 draws closer. There have been <a href="https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/jonglei-two-spla-io-generals-defect-in-major-blow-to-machar">major defections</a> of influential generals from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition. They have expressed dissatisfaction with the progress of reforms and implementation of the current peace agreement. </p>
<p>This strains the delicate balance of power that has existed between the warring factions since 2018. These generals have a substantive following among the public and pose a serious risk to the South Sudan peace agenda. Failure to accommodate these generals could result in insecurity in the regions where they have influence, affecting the chances of holding peaceful elections.</p>
<p>South Sudan needs to reassess its commitment to peace. It can do this by including all aggrieved parties in the political peace process. This will help ensure that the country returns to normalcy under a government that’s legitimately in power after credible polls.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222519/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edgar Githua does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A major hurdle in South Sudan is the presence of detractors who could undermine the successful implementation of peace agreements.Edgar Githua, Lecturer in International Studies, Strathmore UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2234902024-02-20T10:25:22Z2024-02-20T10:25:22ZEthiopia’s peace pacts with the Oromo Liberation Front have failed: here’s what was missing<p>Two attempts have been made over the past six years to broker peace between the Ethiopian government and the armed rebel group Oromo Liberation Front. The armed group was formed half a century ago with the goal of carving out an independent state for Oromia, the country’s largest regional state.</p>
<p>Both attempts at brokering peace – in <a href="https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/6133/">2018</a> and again in <a href="https://addisstandard.com/newsalert-govt-ola-second-talks-in-tanzania-end-without-agreement-again/#:%7E:text=The%20OLA%20in%20its%20part,insurmountable%20security%20and%20political%20challenges.%E2%80%9D">2023</a> – ended in failure and a <a href="https://borkena.com/2018/09/16/oromo-ethno-nationalists-massacred-at-least-60-ethiopians/">return to violence</a>.</p>
<p>Oromia is Ethiopia’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oromo">largest and most populous</a> region. The Oromo Liberation Front has sought autonomy for the region since the group <a href="https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20230602085350/https://www.refworld.org/docid/5696030f4.html">emerged</a> in 1973. It was briefly part of a transitional government led by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front coalition in 1991. Since then, the Oromo Liberation Front has continued to wage a low-level armed struggle against the government. </p>
<p>Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed rose to power in 2018 following the abrupt <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/15/ethiopia-prime-minister-hailemariam-desalegn-resigns-after-mass-protests">resignation</a> of his predecessor, Hailemariam Desalegn. At the time the country was reeling from widespread unrest, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/20/ethiopia-mass-protests-rooted-in-countrys-history">particularly in the Oromia and Amhara</a> regions. Among Abiy’s surprise reforms was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/7/5/ethiopia-removes-olf-onlf-and-ginbot-7-from-terror-list">amnesty</a> for numerous outlawed rebel groups harboured by Eritrea that were waging war on government. </p>
<p>The most prominent of these was the Oromo Liberation Front, which had been based in neighbouring Eritrea. Subsequently, the Oromo Liberation Front announced a ceasefire, made a peace agreement with the Ethiopian government in the Eritrean capital, Asmara, and later entered Ethiopia. </p>
<p>However, the details of the peace agreement were not made public and there was no clarity on its legal grounds. The peace agreement soon failed to deliver the expected outcome of peace, amid <a href="https://borkena.com/2018/09/16/oromo-ethno-nationalists-massacred-at-least-60-ethiopians/">renewed violence</a>. </p>
<p>I am a political scholar of Ethiopia with an interest in the country’s federal governance and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361708000_The_extra_constitutionality_of_election_postponement_in_Ethiopia_amidst_COVID-19_pandemic">constitution</a>. My 2022 <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370692256_The_causes_and_consequences_of_the_2018_failed_peace_agreement_between_the_Oromo_Liberation_Front_and_the_Ethiopian_government">research paper</a> examined the main reasons for the failure of the 2018 peace agreement. </p>
<p>I found that the most notable reasons were:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>there was no signed pact, which meant that there was no clear plan</p></li>
<li><p>the presence of competing factions within the Oromo Liberation Front </p></li>
<li><p>a lack of political will from both sides</p></li>
<li><p>the absence of a democratic ethos among both parties. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Many peace agreements between the Oromo Liberation Front and Ethiopia had been concluded since the early <a href="https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/irbc/1993/en/93314">1990s</a> but did not bring the required stability. They were not durable because they did not address the factors at the core of their dispute. It is my view that these reasons also played a big part in the failure of the subsequent rounds of peace talks in 2018 and 2023. </p>
<p>A lasting peace can only be achieved when conflicting parties are willing to address the fundamental problems that trigger Ethiopia’s political challenges. </p>
<h2>A failed peace pact</h2>
<p>The first signs of failure came in September 2018, when more than 60 non-Oromo civilians were <a href="https://borkena.com/2018/09/16/oromo-ethno-nationalists-massacred-at-least-60-ethiopians/">killed</a> in Oromia region on the outskirts of western Addis Ababa. This alarmed many Ethiopians because it occurred shortly after the agreement was made.</p>
<p>Later, <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2020/10/07/charges-state-that-hachalus-assassins-were-part-of-olf-shane-anti-government-plot/">Hachalu Hundessa, a popular Oromo singer, was assassinated</a> in Addis Ababa. The government claimed that the assassination was part of the Oromo Liberation Front’s anti-government plot. This heightened the tension between the front and the Ethiopian government. On 23 June 2018, there was also an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45678760">assassination attempt targeting Abiy</a>.</p>
<p>From here on mutual suspicions overshadowed the peace agreement. It eventually collapsed for the following reasons.</p>
<p><strong>No signed document:</strong> A clear roadmap is central to post-conflict recovery and a pillar of any peace agreement. The 2018 Asmara peace agreement was reached without a written signed accord. </p>
<p>In August 2018, the Oromo Liberation Front leadership declared a unilateral ceasefire in response to Abiy’s request for dialogue with armed groups. This led to the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/8/7/ethiopia-signs-deal-with-oromo-rebels-to-end-hostilities">7 August 2018</a> peace agreement to halt hostilities and restore peace and stability.</p>
<p>The deal was short-lived. Conflicting reports about what was agreed were traded between government and the Oromo Liberation Front. The absence of a signed peace agreement made the environment more volatile. </p>
<p><strong>Competing factions within the Oromo Liberation Front:</strong> The emergence of new factions has historically been the party’s weak point. Less than eight months after returning to Ethiopia, one Oromo Liberation Front faction and the army wing released a statement stating that the Oromo Liberation Army had separated from the front. </p>
<p>Over time, the Oromo Liberation Front has splintered into at least eight different groups. These include the Oromo Liberation Army, the Oromo Liberation Front, a secret grouping known as Abba Torbe and Oromo Democratic Front, which denounces the use of violence. </p>
<p>The extent to which the Oromo Liberation Front controls its armed wing is <a href="https://docslib.org/doc/984072/report-of-a-home-office-fact-finding-mission-ethiopia-the-political-situation">unclear</a>. <a href="https://docslib.org/doc/984072/report-of-a-home-office-fact-finding-mission-ethiopia-the-political-situation">According</a> to the Life and Peace Institute, an international peacebuilding lobby, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>it is difficult for the government to identify OLF combatants…there is no clear definition between members, fighters and supporters.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The divisions within the Oromo political elite and the history of competition among the Oromo opposition forces point to the failed peace effort.</p>
<p><strong>Lack of political goodwill:</strong> It appears that although the moment might have appeared ripe for a peace agreement in 2018, neither party was ready for such an agreement. The government tried to exercise strong control from the centre and was reluctant to manage conflict peacefully with the Oromo Liberation Front.</p>
<p>The peace agreement was short-lived largely due to the absence of open and genuine commitments by both sides. The absence of a democratic ethos on both sides also weakened the agreement.</p>
<p><strong>Unclear demands:</strong> The Oromo Liberation Front’s political options have not been clear and consistent. It’s <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/3360-exploring-new-political-alternatives-for-the-oromo">not clear at any given time</a> whether their demand is substantial autonomy for the Oromo people within an Ethiopian federation or an independent sovereign Oromo state. The strategy swings wildly between a political solution and an armed struggle.</p>
<h2>Difficult environment to pursue peace</h2>
<p>Following the 2018 Asmara peace agreement, the internal political intricacies of Ethiopia drastically deteriorated. The democratic reform and euphoria brought by Abiy Ahmed, which included him winning the 2019 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/15/world/africa/ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-nobel-war.html">Nobel peace prize</a>, soon faded.</p>
<p>One of the factors that made Ethiopia less stable after the peace agreement was the postponement of elections, partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The government’s decision to delay the election was considered a power grab and an unconstitutional term extension. It was rejected by most opposition parties and it led to the war with the Tigray regional government. </p>
<p>Ethiopia has since descended into civil war with ethnically motivated killings, religious conflict and displacement throughout the country. These constraints weaken the Ethiopian government’s ability to implement any peace agreement. It’s the setting in which a new round of peace talks in Tanzania was also doomed to fail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223490/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marew Abebe Salemot does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The peace agreement was short-lived largely due to the absence of open and genuine commitments by both sides.Marew Abebe Salemot, Lecturer of Federalism, Debark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2234872024-02-19T13:35:33Z2024-02-19T13:35:33ZSudan Armed Forces are on a path to self-destruction – risking state collapse<p>It is now 10 months since the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/27/sudan-conflict-why-is-there-fighting-what-is-at-stake">outbreak</a> of civil war in Sudan in April 2023, pitting the Sudan Armed Forces against the Rapid Support Forces, a powerful paramilitary group. The war, which erupted after relations between the two wings of Sudan’s security apparatus broke down, rapidly spread beyond the capital, Khartoum. </p>
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<p>More recently, the Sudan Armed Forces have <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/sudans-calamitous-civil-war-chance-draw-back-abyss">suffered</a> numerous setbacks at the hands of the Rapid Support Forces. For months, army units have struggled to break their grip on much of the capital. The Rapid Support Forces and their allied militias have overrun most of Darfur and swathes of South Kordofan in western Sudan. </p>
<p>Since December 2023, Rapid Support Forces columns have also advanced into central and eastern Sudan. This followed the collapse of army defences in Wad Medani, one of the country’s biggest cities. This was a landmark humiliation for the Sudan Armed Forces. </p>
<p>In the eyes of decision-makers across the region, the prospect of Rapid Support Forces supremo Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">“Hemedti”</a> becoming Sudan’s new strongman is <a href="https://thearabweekly.com/sudans-rsf-chief-boosts-legitimacy-he-links-civilians-tours-africa">a distinct possibility</a>.</p>
<p>This success owes much to the Rapid Support Forces outperforming expectations. Their management of logistics over immense distances, local commanders tactically outwitting their opponents, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/29/world/africa/sudan-war-united-arab-emirates-chad.html">Emirati support via neighbouring Chad</a> have all played a part. </p>
<p>But at least as important is the Sudan Armed Forces’ under-performance, militarily as well as politically. </p>
<p>I have studied Sudan’s tempestuous political transition from war to peace and back to the present crisis. My <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/surviving-revolution-and-democratisation-the-sudan-armed-forces-state-fragility-and-security-competition/795745EFAB65FE4AE422AA192F5EBA7E#:%7E:text=Institutionalised%20cooperation%20and%20competition%20between,revolutionary%20projects%20and%20clamours%20for">recent paper</a> details the strategies used by the Sudan Armed Forces in managing revolution and democratisation efforts, today as well as in past transitions.</p>
<p>It is my conclusion that the once mighty Sudan Armed Forces have made military and political errors that have increased the possibility of their disintegration and the collapse of the Sudanese state. The ongoing civil war could be the trigger of this implosion, but not the underlying cause.</p>
<h2>Storied history</h2>
<p>The Sudan Armed Forces should be thought of as <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/795745EFAB65FE4AE422AA192F5EBA7E/S0022278X23000174a.pdf/div-class-title-surviving-revolution-and-democratisation-the-sudan-armed-forces-state-fragility-and-security-competition-div.pdf">a complex institution</a>. They are not just an amalgamation of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/29/sudan-economy-dominated-by-military-interests-report">caricaturised generals</a> preoccupied with furthering their personal interests or ethnic agendas. </p>
<p>The institution itself is <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-entire-history-has-been-dominated-by-soldiers-and-the-violence-and-corruption-they-bring-204928">older</a> than independent Sudan and has always guarded its autonomy from the state and society. It has history, a corporate ethos and enduring interests that go above those of individual commanders or interest groups. This insistence on autonomy and desire to protect what they perceive to be their legitimate institutional prerogatives fuelled competition with Sudan’s other security organs. These include the intelligence services and paramilitary militia. </p>
<p>Officially, all groups exist to defend Sudanese sovereignty and the constitution. In practice, intense rivalries fanned by Sudan’s political rulers have always existed alongside cooperation. This has shaped the rise and fall of regimes. The desire to re-establish the Sudan Armed Forces as pre-eminent among the security organisations after the previous regime’s collapse in 2019 helps explain why war erupted with the Rapid Support Forces in April 2023.</p>
<p>The Sudan Armed Forces had <a href="https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/70-republic-of-sudan-1956-present/">overthrown three civilian governments</a> before they launched their latest coup, in October 2021. The first was in 1958 at the request of the sitting prime minister. The second was in 1969 with the hope of constructing socialism with the Sudanese Communist Party. The third followed in 1989 in league with Islamist revolutionaries. </p>
<p>The circumstances surrounding these coups differed, as did the level of support within the army itself. But each time a Sudan Armed Forces officer became president. </p>
<h2>History repeats itself</h2>
<p>After the consolidation of each regime, disappointment resurfaced as the military strongman at the apex began to mistrust the comrades who put him in power. Other state security providers were <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/795745EFAB65FE4AE422AA192F5EBA7E/S0022278X23000174a.pdf/div-class-title-surviving-revolution-and-democratisation-the-sudan-armed-forces-state-fragility-and-security-competition-div.pdf%20CT%20HV%22%22">increasingly empowered</a>, deepening the fixation of army officers with security competition.</p>
<p>This is precisely what happened in the final years of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/water-civilisation-and-power-in-sudan/CBD2A3FD5224741D981860C7218124D8">the military-Islamist regime that ruled Sudan between 1989 and 2019</a>. Omar Al-Bashir cultivated his image of the soldier-president by spending hours at army messes with his comrades and approving exuberant spending on the army’s headquarters. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the state and army were weakened after the independence of South Sudan in 2011. Much of the population blamed the loss of one-third of the territory on the military-Islamist government’s mismanagement of diversity and the economy. </p>
<p>After that, Al-Bashir’s survival as head of state increasingly relied on the National Intelligence and Security Service and the battle-hardened Darfurian militias that were rebranded as Rapid Support Forces. Al-Bashir bolstered the intelligence service and Rapid Support Forces to counterbalance the Sudan Armed Forces. This was also meant to prevent a coup or an alliance between the army and re-emerging civilian opposition. </p>
<p>At the president’s invitation, the Rapid Support Forces <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a0d6be54.html">participated in the Yemen War</a> and captured much of Sudan’s <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR508-Darfur-after-Bashir.pdf">lucrative gold exports</a>. These filled the Rapid Support Forces treasury and gave Hemedti invaluable international networks. </p>
<p>In response, the Sudan Armed Forces increasingly charted their own course. They moved into commercial industries – meat processing, telecoms, sesame production and much else – at a heightened pace. This enriched the commanders personally and gave the army extra finances amid intensifying security competition.</p>
<p>During the 2019 revolution propelled by civilians, the Sudan Armed Forces abandoned Al-Bashir as their commander-in-chief and chose Abdelfatah El-Burhan as the next supremo. It was vital for much of the Sudan Armed Forces’ officer corps that their new leader was not an Islamist. Islamism was seen as politically toxic after a decade of economic crisis and corruption scandals. It was also vital that Burhan was not a charismatic general with privileged ties to any other institutions or political parties. </p>
<p>But events didn’t unfold according to plan.</p>
<h2>Incoherent calculations</h2>
<p>Burhan appeared to be sufficiently weak, compelling him to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/795745EFAB65FE4AE422AA192F5EBA7E/S0022278X23000174a.pdf/div-class-title-surviving-revolution-and-democratisation-the-sudan-armed-forces-state-fragility-and-security-competition-div.pdf">rely on his fellow Sudan Armed Forces bigwigs to govern</a>. He struggled to position the military as an indispensable partner for civilian politicians and protesters and to <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR508-Darfur-after-Bashir.pdf">pit them against Rapid Support Forces</a>. Such an outcome could have affirmed the army as the primary security institution and put Sudan on a firmer track towards civilian-dominated politics. </p>
<p>Instead, Burhan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/general-who-led-sudanese-coup-2021-10-26/">instigated</a> the October 2021 coup against the transitional civilian-military government he served. He was hoping it would ensure the Sudan Armed Forces’ dominance over the Rapid Support Forces or lead to a slimmed down cabinet of trusted civilian partners. This would have enabled him to rule with greater effectiveness. </p>
<p>Neither of these things happened. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-entire-history-has-been-dominated-by-soldiers-and-the-violence-and-corruption-they-bring-204928">Sudan's entire history has been dominated by soldiers and the violence and corruption they bring</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Since April 2023 and the outbreak of the civil war, Burhan’s incoherent military strategy and diplomatic tactics have continued, with disastrous results. Because the battlefield situation is so dire and no external force appears to be rushing to its side, the Sudan Armed Forces have <a href="https://sudantribune.com/article277802/">re-embraced the Islamist networks</a> around former ministers Ali Karti and Usama Abdallah. These men have the money and motivated infantry. They also possess talent for organising. However, this partnership comes at a high cost. </p>
<p>Many in the army, including Burhan himself, distrust Sudan’s Islamic Movement and have mixed feelings about the decades of partnership with Islamists during the previous regime. This ambivalence about cooperation is a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=shared&v=zrOM61XHTPk">sentiment reciprocated by Islamists</a>. Moreover, the Sudan Armed Forces’ embrace of the Islamic movement and other hardliners is not only anathema to Sudan’s civilian parties. It also damages Burhan’s attempts to portray the army as embodying the Sudanese state and middle-of-the-road nationalism.</p>
<p>In contrast, Hemedti has been <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/rest-of-africa/igad-says-sudan-belongs-to-the-people-after-junta-cuts-ties-4496968">successfully touring east Africa</a> and has issued a <a href="https://sudantransparency.org/addis-ababa-declaration-between-the-coordination-body-of-the-democratic-civil-forces-taqaddum-and-the-rapid-support-forces-rsf/">“road map” for peace</a> with former prime minister Hamdok and other civilians. This explicitly excludes former regime constituencies.</p>
<p>The Sudan Armed Forces bet on Burhan steering them away from the contradictions of the past. Unfortunately for the institution, however, that choice appears to have been instrumental in bringing Sudan to the edge of an abyss. It threatens to take the army with it.</p>
<p><em>A version of this <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2024/01/25/can-the-sudan-armed-forces-save-themselves-from-themselves/">article</a> was first published by the LSE blog.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223487/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Harry Verhoeven does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sudan Armed Forces have made a series of military and political blunders that could hasten the collapse of the state.Harry Verhoeven, Senior Research Scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2238272024-02-19T11:00:44Z2024-02-19T11:00:44ZDRC protests: expert explains why Congolese anger against the west is justified – and useful to the government<p>Since early February, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s capital, Kinshasa, has been rocked by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68273900">protests directed against western embassies</a>. Protests took place in front of the British and French embassies, and in front of United Nations buildings. Throughout the city, American and Belgian flags were burned. </p>
<p>The protesters are denouncing what they believed to be western complicity in the war in the east of the DRC. These protests were triggered by <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/m23-rebels-continue-battle-in-drc/7487566.html">the renewed advance of the rebel movement M23</a>. </p>
<p>M23 is led by Congolese Tutsi, and is the latest in a history of Congolese rebel groups supported by Rwanda. It emerged in April 2012, took control of the eastern city of Goma in November 2012, and was defeated in 2013. In late 2021, the group reemerged, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/why-congos-m23-crisis-lingers">fuelled</a> by longstanding geopolitical tensions between the DRC and Rwanda. It has since gained control over large parts of territory.</p>
<p>The movement <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/02/13/dans-l-est-de-la-rdc-l-etau-du-m23-se-resserre-autour-de-goma-faisant-craindre-une-deflagration-regionale_6216376_3212.html">now controls access to Goma</a>. The city of an estimated 2 million people is symbolically and strategically important as the biggest city of the northern Kivu province, bordering Rwanda. </p>
<p>The rebel group has now effectively surrounded the city, allowing it to cut off supplies or conquer the city. The possibility of this happening – as it did in 2012 – has led to widespread panic and more displacement.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://kristoftiteca.be/research">studied</a> the DRC and its geopolitics for close to two decades. In this article, I’ll explain the reasons for, as well as the ambiguity of, the protests. </p>
<p>First, it is striking how <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/feb/14/why-us-and-uk-fund-rwanda-while-atrocities-mount-up-in-drc-vava-tampa">silent the international community remains towards Rwanda</a>. Multiple recent United Nations reports have <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/12/23/un-report-shows-rwandan-army-intervened-in-drcs-troubled-east/">extensively documented direct Rwandan military support for the M23 rebellion</a> – support that Kigali itself denies. </p>
<p>A number of countries, such as Belgium and France, have called on Rwanda to end its involvement. Most recently, on 17 February, the United States released a strong statement <a href="https://www.state.gov/escalation-of-hostilities-in-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">condemning Rwanda’s support</a> for M23. Yet, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2022/12/16/drc-we-know-the-m23-is-backed-by-rwanda-but-france-has-looked-the-other-way_6007956_23.html">not much concrete action</a> has been taken: Rwanda remains a w<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/feb/14/why-us-and-uk-fund-rwanda-while-atrocities-mount-up-in-drc-vava-tampa">estern donor darling</a>.</p>
<p>Second, the current protests are an indictment of the lack of global attention to the Congolese crisis. The comparison with both Ukraine and Israel/Palestine is frequently made in the country: where is the attention to the Congolese crisis? </p>
<p>For Felix Tshisekedi, who recently began a second term as president of the DRC, the protests are convenient. They’re allowing the government to shift the blame to western countries. This is after five years of at best limited progress in resolving the crisis in the eastern part of the country.</p>
<h2>Failed policies</h2>
<p>The Congolese government has failed to solve the armed crisis in the east. The region continues to be plagued by a range of armed groups, including the M23 rebellion. </p>
<p>Since the <a href="https://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict/">Second Congo War (1998-2003)</a>, conflict has kept brewing in eastern Congo, driven by interests and grievances at local, national and regional levels. This has spawned a multitude of armed groups, estimated to be over 100 at the moment. Access to natural resources – which are plentiful in eastern Congo – is one, <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/conflict-minerals-inc/">but not necessarily the most important</a>, driver of conflict. At the regional level, neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Rwanda have continued to protect their economic, political and security interests in eastern Congo. </p>
<p>When Tshisekedi first became president in 2019 he took measures to restore stability in the east.</p>
<p>But these had limited results. </p>
<p>First, he allowed some neighbouring countries, such as Uganda and Burundi, to once again operate militarily in the east. This was controversial for many Congolese, given the involvement of Uganda in the looting of Congolese natural resources during the Second Congo War. </p>
<p>This policy, and particularly the presence of Ugandan military on Congolese soil, has been <a href="https://www.ebuteli.org/publications/rapports/https-lh6-googleusercontent-com-b-wr-fq4j-bw-o-yap-fc-pyp4p1uv9-uc-6-rusd27hl6v-f-oo-p-wdls75l-z-umwgv-la-wn-cju-gd-ji-l-mj-bswu-9-y5-mzm-1-llz-azq7fvjtv-hxm-bg7y-rrs-43-j-dd-wa-e-aqr-xt5-q-i-i-ee3-v1c-f-poim-tuj4-mu-ua-n-qi">blamed</a> by the Congolese research group Ebuteli for rekindling the M23 rebellion in 2022. The presence of these foreign troops in the DRC was seen to threaten Rwandan interests.</p>
<p>Second, Tshisekedi declared “martial law” in the conflict-ridden provinces of North Kivu and Ituri, in which the military took over civilian authority. But this too was ineffective. Violence escalated. And, as <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-stop-using-prolonged-state-siege-excuse-crush-protests">as shown by Amnesty International</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/22/dr-congo-martial-law-brings-crackdown-east">Human Rights Watch</a>, the military misused the martial law powers to deepen repression by targeting the opposition in these provinces. </p>
<p>Third was a series of other military interventions. But these too have had limited success. </p>
<p>They included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the deployment of <a href="https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2023/01/06/foreign-private-military-contractors-flood-into-north-kivu,109879278-eve">1,000 Romanian mercenaries</a>, led by a <a href="https://osintteam.blog/meet-the-romanian-ex-legionnaire-turned-businessman-part-1-3a5fd1f28726">Romanian ex-legionnaire</a> running his own private military company. They were specifically contracted to fight M23. </p></li>
<li><p>a collaboration with local vigilante groups and existing armed groups, many of which had been fought by the Congolese army. These fighters are referred to as <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/12/19/the-wazalendo-patriots-at-war-in-eastern-drc_6356363_4.html">Wazalendo</a> (patriots in Kiswahili). This too was specifically aimed at defeating M23.</p></li>
<li><p>the deployment of a force from the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In mid-February 2024 it was announced that <a href="http://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-africa-deploy-2900-troops-fight-armed-groups-eastern-congo-2024-02-12/">South Africa would send another 2,900 soldiers to the country</a>. This is the latest of a range of regional organisations which have became involved in trying to resolve the conflict since Tshisekedi came to power. Others include the East African Community, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the African Union. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>On the whole, these initiatives and agreements have yielded limited results, and done little to change the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the country. </p>
<p>Since October last year, the number of internally displaced people in the country has risen to <a href="https://www.iom.int/news/record-high-displacement-drc-nearly-7-million">6.9 million</a> – the highest number recorded yet.</p>
<h2>The role of the west</h2>
<p>The recent protests are to some extent convenient for the Tshisekedi government, allowing it to shift the blame to the west.</p>
<p>It has not escaped notice that the government remained relatively tolerant towards the protests. Anti-west protests were allowed to continue for several days, with public mobilisation on social media. This is markedly different from the response to other recent public protests. Opposition demonstrations against the <a href="https://www.egmontinstitute.be/a-quoi-servent-les-elections-en-rdc/">disputed election results</a> in December <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231226-dr-congo-s-government-bans-protests-against-election-irregularities">were banned</a> or rapidly stopped.</p>
<p>At the same time, there is merit in people’s anger over the west’s role in the region – both its protective attitude towards Rwanda and its apparent indifference to what’s happening in the DRC. </p>
<p>First, the protests build on longstanding frustrations with the United Nations peacekeeping force in the country, better known by its acronym Monusco. Monusco has historically had a major <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2022/08/23/MONUSCO-Rwanda-Congo-M23">credibility problem</a> in the DRC due to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/30/congo-un-peacekeepers-problem">its appalling record</a> in protecting the civilian population. This frustration has on a number of occasions <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2022/08/23/MONUSCO-Rwanda-Congo-M23">led to violent protests</a> against the UN in the country.</p>
<p>Second, a number of western diplomatic initiatives helped to entrench the idea that western policy in the region did not have the interests of the Congolese at heart. In December 2022, the European Union <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/01/european-peace-facility-council-adopts-assistance-measures-in-support-of-the-armed-forces-of-five-countries/">announced its decision to give €20 million</a> (about US$21.6 million) to the Rwandan army for its military operations in Mozambique. By this time, there had been much evidence documenting Rwandan support to M23. The initiative was therefore understood by Congolese public opinion as direct European endorsement of M23. </p>
<p>Subsequent diplomatic initiatives to repair the damage, such as the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/01/european-peace-facility-council-adopts-assistance-measures-in-support-of-the-armed-forces-of-five-countries/">same amount in European aid to the Congolese army</a>, did little to change this perception.</p>
<p>It is also true that there has been a lack of global – including western – attention to the Congolese crisis. A direct reason for the protests was that during the recent Africa Cup of Nations semi-final (which the DRC played against Côte d'Ivoire), anti-war <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/sports/football/dr-congo-protest-censorship-during-afcon-semi-final-4520850">protests by Congolese supporters in the stadium were not broadcast</a>. Although it’s up to the Confederation of African Football to sanction such broadcasts, in the DRC the decision was understood to have been made by the French TV broadcasting channel Canal+. It was seen as another illustration of the western attitude to the Congo conflict. </p>
<p>This led to attacks on Canal+ distribution points and protests against the French embassy. </p>
<p>Similar to other crises in sub-Saharan Africa, such as those in Sudan or Ethiopia, the crisis in the DRC is particularly low in the hierarchy of global attention politics, particularly in the west. The protests against western symbols in Kinshasa can therefore also be seen as distress signals: “we’re here too”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223827/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristof Titeca does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Protests in Kinshasa are an indictment of the lack of attention to the Congolese crisis.Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2229282024-02-18T07:07:33Z2024-02-18T07:07:33ZOromia makes up a third of Ethiopia’s landmass and is key to its fortunes: expert unpacks its significance<p><em>Ethiopia’s largest and most populous region, Oromia, has been in the news following reports of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/jan/23/im-scared-to-leave-addis-ababa-ethiopias-oromia-region-gripped-by-kidnapping-pandemic">a rise in kidnappings for ransom</a>. The region is <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-other-conflict-whats-driving-the-violence-in-oromia-187035">no stranger to war and strife</a>. Its people have long fought against political marginalisation. But the region is more than just the site of conflict.</em></p>
<p><em>We asked <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/gov/yimeni-bizuneh-getachew.aspx">Bizuneh Yimenu</a>, who’s researched the region for over a decade and studied its significance in the context of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-federalism-why-ethiopia-uses-this-system-of-government-and-why-its-not-perfect-217217">Ethiopian federalism</a>, to explain Oromia, its people and its economic and political importance.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the general overview of Oromia?</h2>
<p>Situated in the heart of Ethiopia, Oromia isn’t just a geographical entity but a cultural, economic and political powerhouse. It significantly shapes Ethiopia’s identity and trajectory. </p>
<p>It is the largest of Ethiopia’s 12 regions and covers a vast area. At over <a href="http://www.ethiodemographyandhealth.org/oromia.html">350,000 square kilometres</a>, it’s larger than Côte d'Ivoire or Italy. </p>
<p>The region spans Ethiopia’s central, western and southern parts. Oromia makes up <a href="https://epo.acleddata.com/oromia/">34% of Ethiopia’s landmass</a>. It shares borders with all other Ethiopian regions except Tigray, in the country’s north. It shares international boundary lines with Sudan, South Sudan and Kenya. </p>
<p>Its capital is Finfinne, also known as Addis Ababa – which is additionally Ethiopia’s capital and the headquarters of the African Union. </p>
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<p>Oromia’s diverse geography includes highlands, lowlands, forests and fertile plains. This contributes to its agricultural richness.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.ethiopianreview.com/pdf/001/Cen2007_firstdraft(1).pdf#page=91">the last census</a>, over 60 ethnic groups live in the region. </p>
<p>Oromia has a population of about <a href="https://www.citypopulation.de/en/ethiopia/cities/">40 million</a> people, about 38% of Ethiopia’s population of <a href="https://www.citypopulation.de/en/ethiopia/cities/">105 million</a>. There are also Oromo communities in Kenya and Somalia.</p>
<h2>What is Oromia’s cultural and economic significance?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oromo">Oromo</a>, the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, speak Afaan Oromo, one of the <a href="https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-languages-are-spoken-in-africa.html">five most spoken African languages</a>. Oromo traditions and customary practices have endured for centuries. </p>
<p>Oromia is known for its traditional democratic governance system, <a href="https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=utk_socopubs">the Geda system</a>, in which power is transferred peacefully every eight years. It regulates the community’s political, economic, social and religious activities. In 2016, Unesco recognised the system as an <a href="https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/gada-system-an-indigenous-democratic-socio-political-system-of-the-oromo-01164">intangible cultural heritage</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-federalism-why-ethiopia-uses-this-system-of-government-and-why-its-not-perfect-217217">What is federalism? Why Ethiopia uses this system of government and why it’s not perfect</a>
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<p>Economically, Oromia is one of Ethiopia’s breadbaskets. The region’s crop production accounts for about <a href="https://www.unicef.org/ethiopia/media/6511/file/Oromia%20regional%20brief.pdf#page=1">50% of total national production</a>. A <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/cea/5991#tocto1n5">majority</a> of residents work in the agricultural sector.</p>
<p>The region’s fertile soil supports crops like coffee, teff, maize and barley, which are popular for domestic consumption and export. </p>
<p>Outside agriculture, the region has many factories and industries that produce textile and garments, leather products, chemicals, construction materials and pharmaceuticals. </p>
<p>Oromia is additionally a <a href="https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/37159/">source</a> of export minerals, <a href="https://oromiatours.com/Nature-and-Map.html#:%7E:text=Oromia%20hosts%20many%20of%20Ethiopia%27s%20more%20alluring%20natural,gold%20and%20platinum%20to%20iron%20ore%20and%20limestone.">ranging from gold and platinum to iron ore and limestone</a>. In the 2021-2022 financial year, Oromia generated <a href="https://www.2merkato.com/news/alerts/6686-ethiopia-oromia-earns-usd-324-million-from-mining">US$324 million</a> from mining. </p>
<p>The capital, Addis Ababa, is a hub for domestic and international travel, and connected to economically essential cities in other regions, like Diredawa and Hawassa.</p>
<p>International highways, such as the Ethio-Djibouti road, the main route for Ethiopia’s foreign trade, intersect Oromia. This road is the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/07/20/addis-djibouti-corridor-to-get-major-upgrade-that-is-key-to-unlocking-connectivity-and-trade-for-ethiopia-afe-hoa">lifeblood of the country’s economy</a>. It enables the movement of goods to and from the port of Djibouti, connecting <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-quest-for-access-to-the-sea-success-rests-on-good-relations-with-its-neighbours-219621">landlocked Ethiopia</a> to global markets.</p>
<h2>What role has Oromia played in Ethiopia’s political development?</h2>
<p>Oromia holds substantial political importance within Ethiopia. As the largest and most populous region, it often sets the tone for national discourse and policymaking.</p>
<p>Its political influence in Ethiopia can be traced to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/29790544">the 1960s when Oromo nationalism</a> emerged due to subjugation and a lack of autonomy. This movement pushed Ethiopia’s transition from <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-federalism-why-ethiopia-uses-this-system-of-government-and-why-its-not-perfect-217217">a centralised unitary system to a federal one</a>. </p>
<p>In 2015, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">protests in the region</a> to push for greater autonomy and political representation helped drive political change. In 2018, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/12/13/2018-for-ethiopias-oromos-power-pain-protests-review/">Abiy Ahmed</a>, an Oromo, became Ethiopia’s prime minister. </p>
<p>Before Abiy’s entry, Ethiopia had been governed by a Tigray-dominated government for <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ethiopias-new-leader-could-be-a-game-changer-94424">27 years</a>. Tigrayans make up about <a href="https://www.atlasofhumanity.com/tigray">6%</a> of the population.</p>
<p>Abiy’s appointment symbolised a significant step towards addressing the grievances of the Oromo people. </p>
<p>Overall, the political dynamics within Oromia have consistently been at the forefront of discussions surrounding federalism, identity and governance in Ethiopia. </p>
<h2>What are some of the challenges specific to the region?</h2>
<p>Despite its cultural richness and economic importance, Oromia faces challenges that have hindered its development and stability. </p>
<p>One challenge is the prevalence of conflict and tension. This includes <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/oromo-rebels-accuse-ethiopian-forces-attacks-following-peace-talks-2023-05-17/">the war between</a> the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/11/08/ethiopia-oromo-liberation-army-ola-the-other-group-fighting-federal-forces/">Oromo Liberation Army</a>, a rebel group, and the Ethiopian government. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-other-conflict-whats-driving-the-violence-in-oromia-187035">'Ethiopia's other conflict': what's driving the violence in Oromia?</a>
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<p>Oromia has also suffered from <a href="https://addisstandard.com/news-tragic-ambush-by-armed-men-claims-13-lives-in-horo-guduru-wollega-oromia-region/">cross-border attacks launched by the Fano militia</a>, a rebel group operating in neighbouring Amhara. The attack is part of the militia’s agenda of expanding Amhara territory.</p>
<p>Additionally, the regional government has faced <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/ethiopia">allegations of human rights abuses</a>. It has been accused of extrajudicial killings and the unlawful detention of opposition leaders.</p>
<p>In recent months, there has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/jan/23/im-scared-to-leave-addis-ababa-ethiopias-oromia-region-gripped-by-kidnapping-pandemic">a rise in kidnappings blamed on Oromo Liberation Army rebels</a>. This has exacerbated grievances and contributed to a climate of fear and uncertainty.</p>
<p>The underlying causes of conflict in Oromia are deeply rooted and complex. They stem from a combination of:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>historical injustices</p></li>
<li><p>marginalisation under previous regimes</p></li>
<li><p>ethnic tensions</p></li>
<li><p>competition over resources. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Resolving these issues requires a comprehensive approach emphasising dialogue, reconciliation and inclusive governance.</p>
<h2>What needs to happen?</h2>
<p>Two things are needed to address Oromia’s challenges effectively. </p>
<p>First, immediate attention should be given to the region’s security. This can be ensured through a peace deal with the Oromo Liberation Army. Previous rounds of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/22/ethiopia-talks-with-rebel-group-ola-end-without-deal">peace talks held in Tanzania between the rebel group and the national government</a> have ended without agreement. </p>
<p>Both the government and the Oromo Liberation Army have <a href="https://x.com/OdaaTarbiiWBO/status/1650255474502008832?s=20">expressed a readiness</a> to resolve their differences through dialogue.</p>
<p>Second, it’s essential that regional and national stakeholders, and the international community collaborate. Initiatives focused on promoting peace and reconciliation should be prioritised to foster a more inclusive future for all residents of the region. Considering Oromia’s significance to Ethiopia, its stability should be a priority.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222928/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bizuneh Yimenu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Oromia is a cultural, economic and political powerhouse. It significantly shapes Ethiopia’s identity and trajectory.Bizuneh Yimenu, Teaching Fellow, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2229542024-02-18T07:07:22Z2024-02-18T07:07:22ZHIV among older South Africans in rural areas: big study shows there’s a problem that’s being neglected<p>South Africa continues to have a high prevalence of HIV among all age groups. About 8.2 million people or <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10461-023-04222-w">13.7%</a> of the population live with HIV, one of the highest rates in the world. </p>
<p>The country also has one of the world’s most impressive antiretroviral therapy programmes. Over <a href="https://www.phc.ox.ac.uk/blog/the-importance-of-primary-care-in-south-africa2019s-hiv-treatment-programme">5 million people</a> living with HIV are currently on chronic treatment. Widespread access to antiretroviral therapies since 2008 has led to millions of people <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9851406/#:%7E:text=The%20widespread%20roll%2Dout%20of,aging%20in%20the%20ART%20era.">ageing with chronic HIV infection</a>. Consequently, people with HIV are older on average than they were just a decade ago. </p>
<p>Most HIV prevention and treatment programmes and policies in South Africa remain focused on adolescents and young adults. A growing group of middle-aged and older adults with HIV, or at high risk, are being left behind. </p>
<p>To date, there has been little research about sexual behaviour, risk of HIV transmission, HIV stigma and HIV prevention for adults over 40 years old. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://haalsi.org/">Health and Aging in Africa: Longitudinal Studies in South Africa</a> study – or Haalsa as it is commonly known – is an exception to this trend. It seeks to better understand both the risk of getting HIV and the health of ageing adults with HIV in South Africa. </p>
<p>This project, a collaboration between the University of the Witwatersrand and Harvard University, has followed a cohort of over 5,000 adults older than 40 in the Agincourt region in north-east South Africa for more than 10 years. </p>
<p>Throughout this decade of research, the team has been gaining a deeper understanding of this “greying” HIV epidemic. Numerous important insights about HIV in older populations have already been achieved. Here we present some of the findings. </p>
<h2>Sexual activity is common</h2>
<p>Research conducted in 2017 uncovered a <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27926667/">high</a> prevalence of HIV in this older population. Nearly 1 in 4 people over 40 years old were living with HIV. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27926667/">study</a> found that 56% of respondents, across all HIV status categories, had had sexual activity in the past 24 months. Condom use was low among HIV-negative adults (15%), higher among HIV-positive adults who were unaware of their HIV status (27%), and dramatically higher among HIV-positive adults who were aware of their status (75%).</p>
<p>In another <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32516151/">investigation</a> in this cohort, the team found that over the period from 2010 to 2016 the incidence rate of HIV for women was <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32516151/">double</a> that of men.</p>
<h2>Feeling the stigma</h2>
<p>There are relatively few studies of HIV-related stigma among older adults, despite the <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanhl/article/PIIS2666-7568(22)00041-1/fulltext">increasing number</a> of older adults living with HIV.</p>
<p>The majority of research excludes, or ignores, age as a variable. Understanding HIV-related stigma in older adults remains crucial and can inform interventions to support their mental health and overall well-being. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38286975/">research</a> suggests that social stigma poses a significant barrier to testing behaviour among older adults. A quarter of our respondents reported social stigma related to HIV infection.</p>
<p>This stigma was found to have important implications for HIV care: those experiencing high social stigma were <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38286975/">less likely</a> to engage in HIV testing and less likely to be linked to treatment.</p>
<p>A recent pilot study examined home-based HIV testing options for older adults and showed a preference for <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/37696252/">self-testing</a>. More privacy may encourage more adults to establish their HIV status.</p>
<h2>Treatment targets</h2>
<p><a href="https://haalsi.org">Haalsa</a> is uniquely positioned to understand how older adults with HIV are faring in terms of achieving HIV treatment targets, including viral <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31243144">suppression</a>. </p>
<p>In 2014-2015, 63% of older adults with HIV in the study were taking antiretroviral therapy and 72% of those on therapy were virally suppressed. More recent updates have suggested that as of 2018-2019, many more older adults with HIV were virally suppressed. </p>
<p>To further highlight the critical importance of viral suppression for healthy ageing, the Haalsa team explored the impact of viral suppression on <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36179754/">life expectancy</a> in older adults. </p>
<p>Here, they found large gaps in life expectancy based on viral suppression <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36179754/">status</a>: a 45-year-old man without HIV could expect to live about another 27 years; a man with virally suppressed HIV could expect to live 24 years. One with unsuppressed HIV could expect to live 17 years.</p>
<p>Similarly, a woman aged 45 without HIV could expect to live another 33.2 years compared with 31.6 years longer for a woman with virally suppressed HIV. A woman with unsuppressed HIV could expect to live a further 26.4 years. </p>
<h2>Looking to the future</h2>
<p>Taken together, these new insights are critically important to inform the design of interventions and policies to ensure healthy ageing in South African society, and particularly among those with or at high risk of HIV. </p>
<p>Tailored strategies to prevent new HIV infections, awareness programmes and support to ensure that more people living with HIV in older age groups achieve and maintain viral suppression are urgently needed to reduce HIV risk in this and similar communities in sub-Saharan Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222954/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jen Manne-Goehler receives funding from the US National Institutes of Health. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julia Rohr receives funding from National Institute on Aging of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Till Bärnighausen for this work my institution has received a grant from the National Institutes of Health/National Institute of Aging (NIH/NIA), which is the HIV component NIH/NIA of the overarching NIH/NIA HAALSI
Unrelated to this work, I also receive funding from a wide range of public science funders, including the NIH (other institutes), the German National Research Foundation , the European Union (within the Horizon science funding programme, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Volkswagen Foundation, the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, the German Federal Ministry of the Environment, Wellcome (the British Medical Research Foundation), and the Else Kröner Fresenius Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Francesco Xavier Gomez-Olive Casas, Kathleen Kahn, and Nomsa Mahlalela do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A significant number of older adults in rural South Africa are HIV-positive. Awareness programmes and self-testing would reduce cases.Jen Manne-Goehler, Physician-scientist, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public HealthFrancesco Xavier Gomez-Olive Casas, Research Manager at MRC/Wits Agincourt Research Unit, University of the WitwatersrandJulia Rohr, Research Scientist, Harvard UniversityKathleen Kahn, Professor: Health and Population Division, School of Public Health, University of the WitwatersrandNomsa Mahlalela, Researcher, University of the WitwatersrandTill Bärnighausen, Professor, University of HeidelbergLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2235602024-02-15T12:48:21Z2024-02-15T12:48:21ZIsrael-Egypt peace treaty has stood the test of time over 45 years: expert explains its significance<p><em>The peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, signed in 1979 to end hostilities and normalise relations between them, turns 45 on 26 March. The Conversation Africa asked Ofir Winter, a senior researcher at the <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/">Institute for National Security Studies</a>, who studies Egyptian politics and the Arab-Israeli conflict, for his insights on the peace deal and the key challenging moments since it was signed.</em></p>
<h2>When and why did the peace treaty come into force?</h2>
<p>After <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Israeli-wars">five wars</a> over three decades, Egypt and Israel <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Camp-David-Accords">signed a historic peace agreement</a> in March 1979. It marked the first treaty of its kind between an Arab country and Israel. Since then, five more Arab countries – <a href="https://icds.ee/en/new-peace-treaties-in-the-middle-east/">Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/18/where-do-morocco-and-sudan-relations-stand-with-israel">Morocco and Sudan</a> – have made peace with Israel.</p>
<p>The peace deal, and its consequences, are viewed as having reshaped the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict for <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/publication/egypt-israel-peace-leaders-armies-peace-peoples">the better</a>.</p>
<p>Jerusalem and Cairo had various motivations to choose peace over conflict. Israel wanted to secure its southern border and neutralise the region’s largest and most powerful Arab country.</p>
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<p>Egypt wanted to restore its sovereignty over the Sinai Peninsula, which it lost in the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-1967-six-day-war">1967 Six-Day War</a>. It also wanted to redirect resources from military spending to strengthen its economy. And it wanted to <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-u-s-egypt-relationship/#:%7E:text=Egypt%20is%20a%20valued%20U.S.,a%20pillar%20for%20regional%20stability">strengthen its ties with the United States</a>, by being at peace with its ally, Israel.</p>
<p>Peace with Israel contributes to Egypt’s regional and international standing. It positions it as a positive stabilising actor in Middle Eastern politics, and as a mediator between Israel and the Palestinians.</p>
<p>The Israel-Egypt agreement, although labelled “<a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-981-16-2717-0_74-1">cold peace</a>”, grants both countries diplomatic and military cooperation. It also boosts tourism between them (mainly from Israel to southern Sinai), and allows modest mutual trade. </p>
<p>In 2018, the countries signed a deal for Israeli gas exports to Egypt for 10 years, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1G31BK/">worth US$15 billion</a>. This was followed by the establishment of the <a href="https://emgf.org/">Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum</a> in Cairo with other regional partners. Israel’s gas exports are crucial for Egypt’s economy. They also support its aspiration to become a regional energy hub.</p>
<h2>What challenges has the treaty faced?</h2>
<p>During the era of President Hosni Mubarak (<a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hosni-Mubarak">1981-2011</a>), both countries experienced several crises, such as the recalls of Egyptian ambassadors in protest against Israeli policies following the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1981-1988/lebanon">First Lebanon War</a> (1982-1986) and amid the <a href="https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/220/378">second Palestinian intifada (uprising) (2000-2005)</a>.</p>
<p>The attack on the Israeli embassy in Cairo by Egyptian protesters <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/egypt-cracks-down-after-israeli-embassy-attack/2011/09/10/gIQA78JIIK_story.html">in September 2011</a>, following a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/03/world/middleeast/israel-egypt-border-shootings.html">terrorist incident</a> at the Egyptian-Israeli border resulting in the death of eight Israelis and three Egyptians, also left a lasting negative impact on their relations. Since then, the Israeli embassy has left its previous permanent residence and operates on a reduced scale and with a lower profile.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/hamas-israeli-conflict-whats-at-stake-for-egypt-215710">Hamas-Israeli conflict: what's at stake for Egypt</a>
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<p>However, past crises did not escalate to the point of suspending the peace agreement. Cairo still considers peace an important asset that serves its core interests. These include its strategic relationship with the United States. This provides it annual military and economic aid of <a href="https://pomed.org/publication/fact-sheet-u-s-military-assistance-to-egypt-separating-fact-from-fiction/">over US$1 billion</a>. Egypt also benefits from intelligence cooperation with Israel in the fight against terrorism in Sinai. In addition, the two countries have various economic collaborations worth billions. </p>
<h2>Gaza conflict and the peace treaty</h2>
<p>Since the outbreak of the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/2/15/israels-war-on-gaza-live-four-dead-as-israel-hits-city-in-lebanons-south">war in Gaza</a> following the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel on <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-israels-intelligence-chiefs-failed-to-listen-to-october-7-warnings-and-the-lessons-to-be-learned-219346">7 October 2023</a>, Egypt has consistently stated that the temporary or permanent displacement of Gaza residents to its territory, whether intentional or unintentional, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/jordan-egypt-reject-any-palestinian-displacement-into-their-countries/7329543.html">is not up for discussion</a>. </p>
<p>The only exceptions are limited humanitarian cases, such as admitting injured individuals for medical treatment in Egypt.</p>
<p>Hosting Gaza refugees could strain the Egyptian economy. It could also facilitate Islamist and jihadist infiltration to the country, and provoke internal security issues, further complicating the Israel-Egypt border situation.</p>
<p>Even before the current war, Egypt had long been concerned about alleged Israeli plots to <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/palestinians-slam-israeli-minister-over-sinai-homeland/982790">resolve the Gaza issue at its expense</a>. These concerns have been heightened by <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/egypt-expert-warns-israel-cannot-afford-to-take-cairos-cooperation-for-granted/">recent statements</a> from Israeli right-wing politicians that were wrongly interpreted as reflecting Israeli official policy. And Egypt fears that Hamas and other Islamist groups may challenge its sovereignty in pursuit of their own agenda.</p>
<p>Another Egyptian concern relates to possible Israeli violation of their demilitarisation agreements. According to the <a href="https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/General/israel-egypt-peace-treaty">military appendix of the 1979 peace agreement</a>, areas C and D near the Egyptian-Israeli border are subject to demilitarisation. Any temporary or permanent changes require mutual coordination.</p>
<p>Should Israel undertake military operations <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/14/erdogan-egypt-visit-talks-continue-gaza-ceasefire-deal-israel">in Rafah</a> involving more than the four battalions allowed under the appendix, Egypt may assert a breach of the agreement. A mechanism of military coordination between the Israeli and Egyptian defence forces monitors the parties’ commitments in the peace agreement. They work to solve disputes and to prevent escalations.</p>
<p>The current tensions coincide with an <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/4/egypts-economy-will-be-its-biggest-challenge-during-el-sisis-third-term">economic crisis in Egypt</a> and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-tel-aviv-rally-protesters-denounce-government-call-for-new-elections/">political protests in Israel</a>. They undermine the legitimacy of both governments. </p>
<p>This situation pushes both sides to take a more populist approach towards each other. This could divert attention from domestic criticism to external threats. Also, Egypt is cautious not to be perceived by domestic and Arab audiences as collaborating with Israel against the Palestinians. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/un-genocide-ruling-wont-change-israels-behaviour-three-reasons-why-222128">UN genocide ruling won't change Israel's behaviour: three reasons why</a>
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<p>Such an atmosphere, where politicians prioritise short-term public opinion considerations over long-term interests, could escalate the problem.</p>
<p>Even amid the tensions stemming from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-war-in-gaza-is-wiping-out-palestines-education-and-knowledge-systems-222055">war in Gaza</a>, Egypt has no intention of abrogating its peace treaty with Israel. The Egyptian foreign minister has <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/egypt-says-peace-treaty-with-israel-safe-despite-jitters-over-rafah-offensive/">reaffirmed Cairo’s commitment to the agreement</a>.</p>
<p>However, Egypt may still take additional steps to express its protest towards Israel. These include recalling the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv, before resorting to more severe actions like suspending the peace treaty or some of its aspects, which could be harmful for both sides.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hamas-assault-echoes-1973-arab-israeli-war-a-shock-attack-and-questions-of-political-intelligence-culpability-215228">Hamas assault echoes 1973 Arab-Israeli war – a shock attack and questions of political, intelligence culpability</a>
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<p>Finally, the 7 October Hamas attack has already stalled the process of normalising relations <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67922238">between Israel and Saudi Arabia</a>. Undermining the delicate relations between Israel and Egypt could potentially grant Hamas another strategic political achievement. It is in the interest of both Israel and Egypt, as well as the wider international community, to prevent such an outcome and ensure another 45 years of stable peace between the two nations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223560/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ofir Winter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Undermining the delicate relations between Israel and Egypt could potentially grant Hamas a strategic political achievement.Ofir Winter, Senior Researcher, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2232532024-02-14T14:26:07Z2024-02-14T14:26:07ZWagner Group is now Africa Corps. What this means for Russia’s operations on the continent<p><em>In August 2023, Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin died after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/05/hand-grenade-explosion-caused-plane-crash-that-killed-wagner-boss-says-putin">his private jet crashed</a> about an hour after taking off in Moscow. He had been Russia’s pointman in Africa since the Wagner Group <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">began operating on the continent in 2017</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>The group is known for <a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-in-africa-russias-presence-on-the-continent-increasingly-relies-on-mercenaries-198600">deploying paramilitary forces, running disinformation campaigns and propping up influential political leaders</a>. It has had a destabilising effect. Prigozhin’s death – and his <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/24/timeline-how-wagner-groups-revolt-against-russia-unfolded">aborted mutiny</a> against Russian military commanders two months earlier – has led to a shift in Wagner Group’s activities.</em></p>
<p><em>What does this mean for Africa? <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=fvXhZxQAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">Alessandro Arduino’s research</a> includes mapping the evolution of <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538170311/Money-for-Mayhem-Mercenaries-Private-Military-Companies-Drones-and-the-Future-of-War">mercenaries</a> and private military companies across Africa. He provides some answers.</em></p>
<h2>What is the current status of the Wagner Group?</h2>
<p>Following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death, the Russian ministries of foreign affairs and defence quickly reassured Middle Eastern and African states that it would be <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/the-wagner-group-evolves-after-the-death-of-prigozhin/">business as usual</a> – meaning unofficial Russian boots on the ground would keep operating in these regions.</p>
<p><a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2024/01/with-new-name-same-russian-mercenaries-plague-africa/">Recent reports</a> on the Wagner Group suggest a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/12/russias-wagner-group-expands-into-africas-sahel-with-a-new-brand.html#:%7E:text=Wagner%20Group%20has%20been%20replaced,its%20new%20leader%20has%20confirmed.">transformation</a> is underway. </p>
<p>The group’s activities in Africa are now under the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-the-fallout-of-russias-wagner-rebellion/">direct supervision</a> of the Russian ministry of defence. </p>
<p>Wagner commands an estimated force of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa#:%7E:text=Rather%20than%20a%20single%20entity%2C%20Wagner%20is%20a,of%20former%20Russian%20soldiers%2C%20convicts%2C%20and%20foreign%20nationals.">5,000 operatives</a> deployed throughout Africa, from Libya to Sudan. As part of the transformation, the defence ministry has renamed it the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-01-30/russia-raises-the-stakes-in-tussle-over-africa">Africa Corps</a>. </p>
<p>The choice of <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/new-russian-military-unit-recruiting-former-wagner-fighters-ukraine-veterans-2023-12?r=US&IR=T">name</a> could be an attempt to add a layer of obfuscation to cover what has been in plain sight for a long time. That Russian mercenaries in Africa <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-canadian-owned-mine-seized-by-russian-mercenaries-in-africa-is-helping/">serve one master</a> – the Kremlin. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the direct link to Russia’s ministry of defence will make it difficult for Russia to argue that a foreign government has requested the services of a Russian private military company without the Kremlin’s involvement. The head of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-asked-private-russian-military-firm-help-against-insurgents-ifx-2021-09-25/">attempted to use this defence in Mali</a>.</p>
<p>The notion of transforming the group into the Africa Corps may have been inspired by World War II German field marshal <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/afrika-korps">Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps</a>. Nazi Germany wove myths around his <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/115/4/1243/35179?redirectedFrom=fulltext">strategic and tactical successes in north Africa</a>.</p>
<p>But will the Wagner Group under new leadership uphold the <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/wagner-group-africa-where-rubber-meets-road-206202">distinctive modus operandi</a> that propelled it to infamy during Prigozhin’s reign? This included the intertwining of boots on the ground with propaganda and disinformation. It also leveraged technologies and a sophisticated network of financing to enhance combat capabilities.</p>
<h2>What will happen to Wagner’s modus operandi now?</h2>
<p>In my recent book, <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538170311/Money-for-Mayhem-Mercenaries-Private-Military-Companies-Drones-and-the-Future-of-War">Money for Mayhem: Mercenaries, Private Military Companies, Drones and the Future of War</a>, I record Prigozhin’s adept weaving of disinformation and misinformation. </p>
<p>Numerous meticulously orchestrated campaigns flooded Africa’s online social platforms <a href="https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/yevgeniy-prigozhins-africa-wide-disinformation-campaign/">promoting</a> the removal of French and western influence across the Sahel. </p>
<p>Prigozhin oversaw the creation of the Internet Research Agency, which operated as the propaganda arm of the group. It supported Russian disinformation campaigns and was sanctioned in 2018 by the US government for meddling in American elections. Prigozhin <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/14/europe/russia-yevgeny-prigozhin-internet-research-agency-intl/index.html">admitted</a> to founding the so-called troll farm: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I’ve never just been the financier of the Internet Research Agency. I invented it, I created it, I managed it for a long time.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>From a financial perspective, Prigozhin’s approach involved establishing a <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1581">convoluted network of lucrative natural resources mining operations</a>. These spanned gold mines in the Central African Republic to diamond mines in Sudan. </p>
<p>This strategy was complemented by significant cash infusions from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/09/how-russia-recruiting-wagner-fighters-continue-war-ukraine">Russian state</a> to support the Wagner Group’s direct involvement in hostilities. This extended from Syria to Ukraine, and across north and west Africa.</p>
<p>My research shows Prigozhin networks are solid enough to last. But only as long as the golden rule of the mercenary remains intact: guns for hire are getting paid.</p>
<p>In Libya and Mali, Russia is unlikely to yield ground due to enduring geopolitical objectives. These include generating revenue from oil fields, securing access to ports for its navy and securing its position as a kingmaker in the region. However, the Central African Republic may see less attention from Moscow. The Wagner Group’s involvement here was <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/07/africa-corps-wagner-group-russia-africa-burkina-faso/">primarily linked</a> to Prigozhin’s personal interests in goldmine revenues.</p>
<p>The Russian ministry of defence will no doubt seek to create a unified and loyal force dedicated to military action. But with the enduring legacy of Soviet-style bureaucracy, marked by excessive paperwork and procrastination in today’s Russian officials, one might surmise that greater allegiance to Moscow will likely come at the cost of reduced flexibility.</p>
<p>History has shown that Africa serves as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-mercenaries-in-africa-why-there-hasnt-been-any-effective-opposition-to-drive-them-out-207318">lucrative arena for mercenaries</a> due to various factors. These include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the prevalence of low-intensity conflicts reduces the risks to mercenaries’ lives compared to full-scale wars like in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/13/russia-ukraine-war-list-of-key-events-day-720">Ukraine</a></p></li>
<li><p>the continent’s abundant natural resources are prone to exploitation</p></li>
<li><p>pervasive instability allows mercenaries to operate with relative impunity.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>As it is, countries in Africa once considered allies of the west are looking for alternatives. Russia is increasingly looking like a <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-essential-reads-on-russia-africa-relations-187568">viable candidate</a>. In January 2024, Chad’s junta leader, Mahamat Idriss Deby, met with Russian president Vladimir Putin in Moscow to “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/putin-meets-chad-junta-leader-russia-competes-with-france-africa-2024-01-24/">develop bilateral ties</a>”. Chad previously had taken a pro-western policy.</p>
<p>A month earlier, Russia’s deputy defence minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, who’s been tasked with overseeing Wagner’s activities in the Middle East and north Africa, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/12/04/russian-officials-visit-niger-to-strengthen-military-ties/">visited Niger</a>. The two countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">agreed to strengthen military ties</a>. Niger is currently led by the military after a <a href="https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic-comments/2023/the-coup-in-niger/">coup in July 2023</a>.</p>
<h2>Where does it go from here?</h2>
<p>There are a number of paths that the newly named Africa Corps could take.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>It gets deployed by Moscow to fight in conflicts meeting Russia’s geopolitical ends. </p></li>
<li><p>It morphs into paramilitary units under the guise of Russian foreign military intelligence agencies.</p></li>
<li><p>It splinters into factions, acting as heavily armed personal guards for local warlords. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The propaganda machinery built by Prigozhin may falter during the transition. But this won’t signal the immediate disappearance of the Russian disinformation ecosystem. </p>
<p>Russian diplomatic efforts are already mobilising to preserve the status quo. This is clear from Moscows’s <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/brief-russia-deepens-counter-terrorism-ties-to-sahelian-post-coup-regimes/">backing</a> of the recent Alliance of Sahelian States encompassing Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. All three nations are led by military rulers who overthrew civilian governments a recently announced <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-mali-burkina-faso-say-they-are-leaving-ecowas-regional-block-2024-01-28/">plans to exit</a> from the 15-member Economic Community of West African States.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223253/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alessandro Arduino is a member of the International Code of Conduct Advisory Group.</span></em></p>Will the Wagner Group under new leadership uphold the ruthless modus operandi that propelled it to the spotlight in Africa?Alessandro Arduino, Affiliate Lecturer, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2230982024-02-14T14:25:52Z2024-02-14T14:25:52ZWest Africa trade will take a hit as Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso leave Ecowas<p>The membership of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) has been whittled down from 15 to 12 following the unilateral withdrawal of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso in <a href="https://apnews.com/article/mali-niger-burkina-faso-ecowas-west-africa-5a5dc2180e39223c91b1820067db4011">February</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">Founded</a> in 1975, Ecowas is one of eight regional economic communities recognised by the African Union to foster regional integration on the continent. Its main objective is to <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">create</a> a single, large trading bloc through economic cooperation.</p>
<p>Since 1975, Ecowas and its sister organisation the West African Economic and Monetary Union (known by its French acronym, Uemoa) have implemented numerous policies aimed at improving how west African countries trade with each other and how they are connected to the world.</p>
<p>Yet, progress towards regional integration has been <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315712482-21/regional-integration-1-olivier-walther">slow</a>. Intra-regional trade remains well below the levels of other regions and the west African economies still rely a lot on informal activities. The limited results achieved in regional integration mean that there is a mismatch between <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Regionalism-in-Africa-Genealogies-institutions-and-trans-state-networks/Bach/p/book/9781138091054">regionalism</a> as it should be on paper and as it is experienced on a daily basis. Despite the many agreements signed between west African countries to foster integration, west Africa is one of the world’s most expensive <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0966692319302182">regions in which to do business</a>.</p>
<p>Political elites bear a great part of the blame for this. In a political system that relies on interpersonal relations, regional integration goes against the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/boundaries-communities-and-statemaking-in-west-africa/0A31250856228556B68B91639E3120A9">informal arrangements</a> that politicians have established with wealthy traders. These networks have encouraged the development of informal trade between west African countries and prevented the <a href="https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/incentives-and-constraints-of-informal-trade-between-nigeria-and-its-neighbours_7aa64379-en#page21">implementation of trade facilitation initiatives</a>. Much of the trade between Benin, Niger and Nigeria, for example, relies on <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2015.1010152">informal networks</a> that connect traders in border regions to state elites in the capital cities.</p>
<p>Why three landlocked countries, among the poorest in the world, would leave an organisation established to foster free movement of people, goods and capital across the region is a puzzling question, considering the potential consequences.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ecowas-why-withdrawal-of-mali-niger-and-burkina-faso-signals-fresh-trouble-for-the-sahel-222720">Ecowas: why withdrawal of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso signals fresh trouble for the Sahel</a>
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<p>While the decision appears to have been made for political reasons, the economic consequences will be far-reaching. In the past, border closures between Sahelian and coastal countries have had devastating consequences on the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-effects-of-nigerias-closed-borders-on-informal-trade-with-benin/">regional economy</a>. They have also affected the livelihoods of millions of farmers, herders and city dwellers who depend on regional trade perhaps more than anywhere in the world. </p>
<p>It was precisely to foster these complementary relationships between the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea that Ecowas was established in Abuja nearly 50 years ago.</p>
<h2>The integration conundrum</h2>
<p>The Sahel is a large semi-arid region that stretches from Senegal in the west to Chad in the east. Subject to constant climatic uncertainties, it includes some of the poorest and <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI">least developed countries</a> in the world.</p>
<p>Sahelian countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger depend more on regional trade than coastal countries, such as Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana or Nigeria. This is because they are far less urbanised and industrialised than their neighbours. They tend to produce identical agricultural commodities, which they typically trade with other countries located on the Gulf of Guinea.</p>
<p>Livestock trade between the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea is also highly dependent on free movement between west African countries. Close to two thirds of the <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0232681">livestock movements</a> recorded in west Africa cross an international border. This is usually from the Sahel to big southern markets such as Abidjan in Côte d’Ivoire. </p>
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<p>A purely Sahelian bloc, like the recently <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/16/mali-niger-and-burkina-faso-establish-sahel-security-alliance">created</a> Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), would never be able to replace Ecowas. This is simply because of the regional nature of human and economic flows in west Africa. The new bloc was established in 2023 by the military juntas that took power in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, in reaction to the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/2/8/economic-hardship-insecurity-spirals-in-mali-as-ecowas-exit-looms">sanctions</a> imposed by Ecowas.</p>
<p>Because Sahelian countries have hardly any industries, they <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2015.1010152">import</a> much of what they consume from the west African and global market, particularly from China. Much of the cement, petroleum products, cars, textiles, wheat, rice and plastics sold on the markets of Niamey, Ouagadougou and Bamako were produced elsewhere. They depend on the ports of the Gulf of Guinea to import them. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/mali-burkina-faso-and-niger-want-to-leave-ecowas-a-political-scientist-explains-the-fallout-222388">Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger want to leave Ecowas. A political scientist explains the fallout</a>
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<p>Coastal countries are far from being self-sufficient too. They import large quantities of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/9/8/a-coup-happened-in-niger-onion-prices-doubled-in-ghana-and-its-neighbours">onions</a> from the Sahel, for example. They also benefit enormously from import-export trade with the landlocked countries of the Sahel. </p>
<p>Some of them have transformed into “entrepot economies”. These are trading ports where goods from the world markets can be imported and stored before being re-exported with no customs duties imposed. Benin, for example, is specialised in importing goods that will eventually be <a href="https://www.karthala.com/economie-et-developpement/53-letat-entrepot-au-benin-commerce-informel-ou-solution-a-la-crise--9782865373604.html">re-exported illegally</a> to neighbouring countries where they are banned or subject to heavy taxes, such as Nigeria and Niger. </p>
<h2>The consequences</h2>
<p>Withdrawing from Ecowas is likely to have major consequences on the regional economy as a whole. Because of their landlocked situation, however, Sahelian countries will be more affected than the rest of the region by the reintroduction of tariff barriers. Without free access to the ports of Cotonou, Lomé, Abidjan or Tema, Sahelian imports will be far more expensive. </p>
<p>Informal trade is already the dominant form of economic exchange in the region. This will probably experience an unprecedented boom, particularly along the borders between <a href="https://anl.geog.ufl.edu/hausaland/">Niger and Nigeria</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, leaving Ecowas and its free movement protocol could have catastrophic consequences for millions of Sahelians who live in – or wish to migrate to – coastal cities. Migration is mostly intra-regional in west Africa. <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/identifying-the-factors-driving-west-african-migration_eb3b2806-en">Sahelians mostly tend to migrate</a> to the Gulf of Guinea. Migrants from coastal countries go to Europe through the Sahara and, increasingly, to the US.</p>
<p>Sahelian traders have also developed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2015.1010152">extensive trade networks</a> across west Africa. They take advantage of the liberalisation of trade that has characterised the region since the 1980s. </p>
<p>From Abidjan to Lagos, trade networks that rely on well-established diasporas would be particularly affected by trade restrictions and immigration policies.</p>
<h2>Political motivations</h2>
<p>The decision to leave Ecowas has little to do with economic considerations. It is primarily motivated by the fact that the bloc’s approach to region-building is not confined to economic integration. Ecowas is also well-known for its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Protocol-Relating-to-the-Mechanism-for-Conflict-Prevention-Management-Resolution-Peace-Keeping-and-Security-1999.pdf">robust involvement</a> in peacekeeping and security operations to end conflict in the region.</p>
<p>The bloc’s <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/ecowasprot.htm">protocol</a> on democracy and good governance, adopted in 2001, prescribes a zero tolerance policy “for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means”. Furthermore, its 1999 protocol <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Protocol-Relating-to-the-Mechanism-for-Conflict-Prevention-Management-Resolution-Peace-Keeping-and-Security-1999.pdf#page=11">authorises</a> external interventions without state consent under certain conditions, including “the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government”. </p>
<p>This, rather than trade liberalisation, is the main reason why the putschists in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have decided to leave Ecowas.</p>
<p><em>An <a href="https://anl.geog.ufl.edu/ecowas/?">earlier version</a> of this article was first published on the University of Florida blog.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223098/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olivier Walther receives funding from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. </span></em></p>Border closures between Sahelian and coastal countries have had devastating consequences for the regional economy.Olivier Walther, Associate Professor in Geography, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2217912024-02-11T08:06:15Z2024-02-11T08:06:15ZMungiki, Kenya’s violent youth gang, serves many purposes: how identity, politics and crime keep it alive<p><em>Kenya has <a href="https://www.crimeresearch.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Organized-Criminal-Gangs-in-Kenya-Report.pdf">scores</a> of youth gangs known for their violence and links to the politically powerful. None is more infamous than the Mungiki movement, with a past <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1462685">membership</a> estimated to be at least a million. Though banned, it’s constantly in the <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2024/01/gachaguawe-will-not-allow-attempts-to-revive-mungiki/">news</a> as a tool or target of big political players. Bodil Folke Frederiksen, who has studied Mungiki as part of her field-based <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2010.01670.x">research</a> on youth culture in Kenya, traces the origins, growth and persistence of the group.</em></p>
<h2>What gave rise to Mungiki?</h2>
<p>Mungiki emerged in the late 1980s in what was then Kenya’s Rift Valley Province. The province was the site of <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137444134_9">simmering conflicts</a> over land ownership and rights between the indigenous majority (mainly the Kalenjin) and more recently arrived settlers (mostly Kikuyu). </p>
<p>The early 1990s witnessed the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Akiwumi.Rift%20Valley.pdf">first bout of politically instigated inter-ethnic conflict</a> intended to diminish Kikuyu influence in local politics. Mungiki emerged as a Kikuyu youth movement, defending the dispossessed: women, migrants and landless youth. </p>
<p>At this time the grouping also opposed the autocratic and corrupt government of Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin. Later, Mungiki groups were co-opted by Moi and used in election politics. He was the first of a series of high-ranking politicians to do so.</p>
<p>The politics of ethnicity laid the groundwork for Mungiki. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/kenya/Kenya0502-06.htm">1997</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/dec/27/kenya.jamesastill">2002</a> and <a href="https://jp.reuters.com/article/idUSL4508248/">2007</a> parliamentary and presidential elections, leading politicians mobilised violent youth militia in support of their campaigns.</p>
<p>After the <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/smart-global-health/background-post-election-crisis-kenya">disastrous</a> 2007 presidential elections, Mwai Kibaki’s victorious Kikuyu-dominated Party of National Unity mobilised Kikuyu youth militia in retaliation against the gangs deployed by the opposition party, Orange Democratic Movement. Mungiki was <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/kenyan-president-uhuru-kenyatta-funded-and-orchestrated-violence-of-feared-mungiki-militia-after-2007-election-9991224.html">central</a> in the resulting violence. </p>
<p>By the turn of the millennium, Mungiki had become a <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/news/mungiki-gang-on-the-prowl-claim-central-leaders-211431/">mostly urban phenomenon</a>. Poverty, youth unemployment and political disillusionment created fertile ground for the group. Young men in particular regarded themselves as a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2010.01670.x">“no future” generation</a>, seeing that they had few opportunities to establish themselves as successful adults with the economic means to sustain a family.</p>
<p>Urban informal settlements were neglected by the state and local authorities. Youth-based groups filled the void. In Nairobi’s shantytowns, Mungiki activists and militia competed with other militias like Kamjesh, and the Taliban in Mathare Valley. Like Mungiki they were involved in the war over public transport, provision of basic services like electricity and demanding protection money from businesses. But they also had a role in welfare, job creation and security. </p>
<p>Mungiki leaders have <a href="https://ssrn.com/abstract=1462685">assessed</a> membership to be between 1.5 million and 4 million. These figures are likely exaggerated. Active membership is more likely to be in the thousands. </p>
<h2>What are the group’s practices and beliefs?</h2>
<p>Mungiki is based on the intersection between generation, ethnicity, religion and class. Its members are young, poor and predominantly Kikuyu, the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1199555/share-of-ethnic-groups-in-kenya/">largest</a> ethnic group in Kenya. Mungiki operates primarily in urban neighbourhoods where it combines vigilante, welfare, cultural and criminal activities. It uses violence to achieve and maintain control. Over time it has had close but unstable links with political parties and leaders, and has sought, won and lost registration as a political party, National Youth Alliance. </p>
<p>Mungiki can be understood as a neo-traditional social movement. It reaches back into Kenya’s pre-colonial and colonial history for the origins of its beliefs and practices. It bases its values on Kikuyu religion and cosmology. </p>
<p>One central Kikuyu practice was the transfer of power from one generation of men to the next, a ritual known as “ituika”, every 30th or 40th year. Another was ritual circumcision of men and women on the threshold of adolescence, an initiation into maturity. A third was taking the oath of loyalty to bind members of the group together in secrecy for ever. </p>
<p>The values underlying these practices continued during <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-at-60-the-shameful-truth-about-british-colonial-abuse-and-how-it-was-covered-up-218608">Kenya’s anti-colonial struggle</a> in the 1940s and 1950s, in the liberation movement known as Mau Mau, which was predominantly Kikuyu.</p>
<p>These values, although modified and expanded, still form the core of Mungiki’s practices and beliefs. The objectives of Mungiki are, broadly, the empowerment of youth; the reintroduction of traditional values, key among them clear gender roles; the fight against corruption; and reforms towards an egalitarian society whose members aid each other. </p>
<p>Mungiki has many shapes. It is a youth organisation, which has been called a sect, a gang, a militia. It has attempted to become a recognised political party. Its many faces and resilience have kept it afloat for more than 30 years.</p>
<h2>Why was it banned?</h2>
<p>Mungiki is the child of Kenya’s violent <a href="https://theconversation.com/humiliation-and-violence-in-kenyas-colonial-days-when-old-men-were-called-boy-and-africans-were-publicly-beaten-218261">colonial</a> and post-colonial history. Throughout its existence, the organisation has resorted to violence to recruit and keep members. </p>
<p>In the early 2000s it stepped up its violence and in many instances made use of terror: murders of defectors, fatal punishment of those who refused to pay protection money, brutal warfare against other militia-like organisations. Large parts of its activities are criminal, like extorting money from households and shops, bribing and threatening to make inroads into the informal commuter transport industry, and killing and mutilating to achieve its goals.</p>
<p>At the political level, national and local leaders may see the popularity and persistence of the movement as a threat to stability and their own hold on power.</p>
<h2>Though banned, it hasn’t really gone away, has it?</h2>
<p>The movement has undergone a number of transformations. After it was banned in the early 2000s, its leader, Maina Njenga, was imprisoned. He made public his <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/200911170573.html">conversion to Christianity</a> in 2006, and on his release in 2009 he declared the movement finished. Nevertheless, it still resurfaces, although much less strongly than in its heyday. </p>
<p>Many of its members have been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/es/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/afr320082007en.pdf">killed or imprisoned</a>. </p>
<p>Mungiki refuses to die because, on the positive side, it rests on the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2010.01670.x">cultural and religious traditions</a> that are still alive in Kenya. It has a moral appeal to young men and women for stressing “clean living”, without loose sex and alcohol. It expresses young people’s efforts to be political actors.</p>
<p>On the negative side, the basic living conditions have not changed for the majority of young Kenyans. There has not been a transfer of power to the young generation. Salaried jobs are few and far between; poverty is widespread. Kenyan politics are still violent, the domain of elderly, entitled men, and ridden with mistrust and corruption.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221791/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bodil Folke Frederiksen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The politics of ethnicity laid the groundwork for Mungiki.Bodil Folke Frederiksen, Associate Professor Emerita, Roskilde UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2218842024-02-08T14:00:04Z2024-02-08T14:00:04ZTanzania’s elections are vulnerable to state abuse – urgent law reforms are needed<p>Tanzania’s electoral law reform is overdue for an overhaul. This was <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/remembering-not-to-forget-tanzanias-2020-general-elections/">made most apparent</a> by the 2019 local elections and the 2020 general elections. The <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/remembering-not-to-forget-tanzanias-2020-general-elections/">results</a> were big wins for the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM): 99% of local authorities, 98.9% of parliamentary seats and 84% of the presidential vote. </p>
<p>These margins of victory were contested. The <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/11/1077292">United Nations</a>, research <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/tanzania-2020-elections-were-neither-free-nor-fair-says-redet-3637456">think-tanks</a> and various media noted these elections as the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/30/magufuli-wins-re-election-in-tanzania-says-electoral-commission">most</a> unfree and unfair since the return of the multiparty system in 1992. </p>
<p>The 2019 and 2020 elections, <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/tanzania-2020-elections-were-neither-free-nor-fair-says-redet-3637456">more</a> than the previous ones, <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/editoriaux-de-lifri/tanzanias-2020-general-elections-between-repression-and">underscored</a> the extent to which the electoral law could be abused by the state. Under the administration of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzanias-john-magufuli-a-brilliant-start-but-an-ignominious-end-157092">late President John Magufuli</a>, the state used the electoral machinery to deprive the opposition of seats in local government authorities and in parliament.</p>
<p>Opposition parties and civil rights activists have been <a href="https://kenyanforeignpolicy.com/tanzanias-chadema-party-pushes-for-2025-election-reforms/">demanding</a> a level playing field. The changes on their list include constitutional reforms, an independent electoral commission, independent election returning officers, provision for independent candidates, the ability to contest election results in court, and review of the first-past-the-post system.</p>
<p>I have researched <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13540688211041039?icid=int.sj-full-text.citing-articles.73">party politics</a> in Tanzania and it is my view that electoral reforms are urgent, given that local elections are scheduled for December 2024. The general election will follow in October 2025. </p>
<p>Opposition parties have the right to a level playing field. That is not likely under the existing legal set-up. The proposed bills are largely maintaining the status quo. The incumbent president, who chairs the ruling party and is the presidential candidate, appoints members of the electoral commission as well as the returning officers. Change is needed in the selection process to ensure their independence. </p>
<h2>History</h2>
<p>To understand the influence of the ruling party’s control of the electoral framework in Tanzania it is important to look back at the history of the multiparty system. In 1965, four years after independence, the first president, Julius Nyerere, introduced a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/160081">one-party system</a>. This was later enshrined in the constitution of 1977, blurring the line between the ruling party and the state. </p>
<p>The party-state institutional entrenchment restricted pressure groups, trade unions and any other citizen-based groups for decades. The 1992 amendment of the 1977 constitution to allow for a multiparty system arrived in this context. Most political parties registered were the vehicles of a few individuals rather than growing out of citizen-based movements. </p>
<p>In this context, the state, rather than citizens, had space to determine the political and electoral laws that were introduced to facilitate the multiparty state. All important political decision making, including the elections, remained with the president.</p>
<p>The country became a <a href="https://books.google.co.tz/books?hl=en&lr=&id=NZDI05p1PDgC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&ots=isImyFKo3I&sig=gWFkaKkq3SnuQF5hss25mpT-8B4&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">competitive authoritarian state</a>. This explains why the American political scientist Göran Hydén described Tanzania as <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/top-down-democratization-in-tanzania/">a top-down democracy</a>.</p>
<p>It comes as no surprise that all elections since the re-introduction of the multiparty system have <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzania-is-ruled-with-impunity-four-key-issues-behind-calls-for-constitutional-reform-199832">delivered victory</a> to the ruling party. </p>
<h2>Reform package falls short</h2>
<p>Under President Samia Suluhu Hassan, Tanzania sensed a golden opportunity to reform the election landscape. Soon after assuming power in 2021, the new president opened <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/313347/tanzania-reconciliation-talks-a-slow-process-says-chadema/">reconciliation talks</a> with the main opposition party, Chadema. Top of the agenda was electoral law reform. This also featured strongly in submissions to a special <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tanzania-taskforce-supports-lifting-of-political-rallies-ban-3993398">task force</a> formed by the government to collect opinions on political reforms. </p>
<p>In 2022, in an open letter marking 30 years of multipartyism, Suluhu <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/oped/president-samia-s-letter-to-tanzanians-on-30-years-of-multi-party-democracy-3866168">vowed</a> to pursue with vigour four key tenets: reconciliation, resilience, reforms and rebuilding. </p>
<p>The government <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/katiba-president-samia-pulls-a-fast-one-on-tanzania-opposition-4233500">promised</a> to start the review process and subsequently <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/three-bills-set-for-parliament-as-government-eyes-political-electoral-reforms-4367598">tabled</a> the electoral law reforms bills in the parliament. These are the National Electoral Commission Bill, 2023, the Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Government Elections Bill, 2023, and the Political Parties Affairs Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2023.</p>
<p>The bills <a href="https://www.idu.org/idu-statement-on-democratic-and-electoral-reform-in-tanzania/">were not a reflection</a> of the demands for change, however. For example, the presidential power to appoint the members of the electoral commission was retained. All the bills maintained the status quo and none of the above concerns were taken into consideration. </p>
<p>Opposition parties, activists and <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/bishop-shoo-wants-citizens-views-on-election-laws-respected-4484808">faith leaders</a> demanded the withdrawal of the bills from the parliament, which was to discuss them in February 2024. Since 99% of members of parliament are from the ruling party and given <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2019/06/tanzania-authorities-rushing-to-pass-bill-to-further-repress-human-rights/">the recent history of bill passing</a>, critics are worried that the parliament will pass all the bills as they are. </p>
<p>Despite the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/24/thousands-protest-in-tanzania-as-opposition-seeks-amended-electoral-reforms">demonstrations</a> by Chadema on 24 January 2024 demanding the withdrawal of the bills, <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/tanzania-lawmakers-debate-electoral-reforms-despite-opposition-23769d74">discussion</a> went ahead in parliament on 30 January. Continuing with the debates in parliament shows that the bills will pass. This indicates that the 2024 and 2025 elections are unlikely to be fair and free. In reaction to this, Chadema has called for <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/chadema-announces-dates-for-demonstrations-in-mwanza-arusha-and-mbeya--4511680">more</a> demonstrations in three other big cities from 13 February.</p>
<p>For change to occur, the opposition must put pressure on the government through peaceful but continuous countrywide demonstrations, public rallies and international support to demand true political reforms before the next elections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221884/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aikande Clement Kwayu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Electoral reforms are urgent for Tanzania because local elections are scheduled for December 2024.Aikande Clement Kwayu, Independent researcher & Lecturer, Tumaini University MakumiraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2229232024-02-07T11:27:52Z2024-02-07T11:27:52ZMacky Sall throws Senegal’s democratic credentials into doubt<p>Senegal’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Macky-Sall">President Macky Sall</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/3/senegals-macky-sall-postpones-presidential-election">announced</a> in early February that presidential elections, originally scheduled for 25 February, would be postponed indefinitely. The announcement has raised fears of popular protests, violent repression, a once democratic president transforming into an authoritarian ruler – and possibly even another coup d’état in west Africa. </p>
<p>There has been a flurry of coups in the region since 2020 – Mali in August <a href="https://theconversation.com/mali-celebrates-after-presidents-ouster-but-there-are-few-good-coups-144846">that year</a> followed by <a href="https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/malis-military-coup-within-coup-no-elections-february-2021-journalist-abducted/">a second</a> in 2021. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/05/guinean-soldiers-claim-to-have-seized-power-in-coup-attempt">Guinea</a> also saw a coup that year and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/5/coup-in-burkina-faso-what-you-need-to-know">Burkina Faso</a> a year later. In July 2023 the military took control in <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-coup-west-africa-wagner-bazoum-c233b0d2becf61ebb00c5705941fc168">Niger</a>.</p>
<p>Senegal has never suffered a coup d'etat and has been considered the region’s <a href="https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/senegal/newsroom/fact-sheets/senegal-democracy-and-governance-fact-sheet#:%7E:text=Senegal%20has%20a%20reputation%20of,place%20following%20credible%20democratic%20elections.">most stable democracy</a>. </p>
<p>Since <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/senegal">independence in 1960</a> it has had three peaceful transitions of power. First in 1980, from <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Leopold-Senghor">Leopold Senghor</a> to <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdou-Diouf">Abdou Diouf</a>; then, in 2000, from Diouf to <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdoulaye-Wade">Abdoulaye Wade</a>; and then, in 2012, from <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdoulaye-Wade">Wade to Sall</a>.</p>
<p>In political science terminology, a democracy is considered consolidated only after a “<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/two-turnover-test">double turnover</a>”. This is when an opposition party which came to power through democratic elections (the first turnover) itself hands over power to its opposition after losing democratic elections (the second turnover).</p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://www.ags.edu/international-relations/agsird-faculty/douglas-a-yates">political scientist and researcher</a> with an interest in African politics and democracy building. Based on my experience, I believe Senegal is exceptional in west Africa. </p>
<p>The country has enjoyed a “triple turnover” of power through democratic elections. Yet all three of these peaceful democratic transitions were preceded by a crisis with incumbent presidents attempting to remain in office beyond their constitutional mandate. </p>
<p>Senegal’s democratic credentials seemed to be cemented by the fact that none of the presidents succeeded in staying on unconstitutionally.</p>
<p>This track record should be used to evaluate the prospects of a new president coming to office.</p>
<h2>A model west African democracy</h2>
<p>Over the past four decades Senegal became known for its <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/senegals-internet-shutdowns-are-another-sign-of-a-democracy-in-peril/">relatively independent</a> media and free expression. The presidents of Senegal all managed, eventually, to step down from power. This allowed elections to become the only game in town. </p>
<p>Senegal is rated “<a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/senegal/freedom-world/2023">partly free</a>” by Freedom House in its <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/FIW_World_2023_DigtalPDF.pdf">Freedom in the World 2023</a> report. The think-tank uses a set of criteria such as political rights and civil liberties to categorise countries as free, partly free and not free. Senegal scores well in some areas, like academic freedom and individuals’ right to practise and express their faith or non-belief in public. But it falls down in others, such as restricting people’s right of assembly and violently dispersing some demonstrations. </p>
<p>Although regular elections are held, each one of Senegal’s leaders started off well, then attempted to stay in power longer than the designated time.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.presidence.sn/en/presidency/leopold-sedar-senghor">Leopold Sedar Senghor</a> became Senegal’s first president after independence in 1960. He came to power on the back of his reputation as an intellectual of the “négritude” movement, as a democratic opponent of French colonialism and someone who had fought for freedom. </p>
<p>But, in 1963, 1968, 1973 and 1978, he staged presidential <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/plebiscite">plebiscites</a> so that he could remain in office. </p>
<p>Then, in December 1980, after 22 years in office, he <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/01/01/africas-aging-poet-politician-steps-down-as-president-of-senegal/e09641fe-a024-4942-b9f8-80a7068ab241/">decided</a> to step down and hand over to his designated successor, Abdou Diouf. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.presidence.sn/en/presidency/abdou-diouf">Abdou Diouf</a> had the same temptation. He held on to the presidency until decades of peaceful, principled, democratic opposition led by Abdoulaye Wade forced him to accept his losing bid for re-election in 2000.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.presidence.sn/en/presidency/abdoulaye-wade">Wade</a> served time in prison following a long struggle for power, and was forced into exile in Paris. He went on to lead a popular movement that ousted the long-ruling Socialist Party and Diouf. </p>
<p>He promised to clean up the corruption inherent in single-party rule. But towards the end of his second mandate in 2009, he too began to imitate his predecessors. Wade spent his last years in the presidential palace <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20111223-wade-senegal-seek-third-term-presidential-election-clashes">trying</a> to win a third term. When that did not work he named his son <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/profile/id/254/page/4">Karim Wade</a> as his dynastic successor. But Karim Wade was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32020574">convicted of coruption</a> and his father’s wishes weren’t fulfilled.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.presidence.sn/en/presidency/biography">Macky Sall</a> of the <a href="https://www.senegel.org/en/movements/political-parties/poldetails/2">Alliance for the Republic party</a> came to power in 2012 as an honest, anti-corruption politician. But he too has fallen. </p>
<p>After his re-election in 2019, he named an uncharismatic technocratic prime minister, <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/world/senegal-pm-amadou-ba-named-ruling-party-candidate-for-president/">Amadou Ba</a>, as his number two. This turned his former prime minister <a href="https://www.africaintelligence.com/west-africa/2022/11/23/ex-pm-aminata-toure-talks-2024-presidential-election-with-former-opponents,109867336-art">Aminata “Mimi” Touré</a> into his opponent. (She is now running for president.) It also ensured that he would not face a prime minister becoming more popular than himself.</p>
<p>Sall clearly wanted to run for a third term. Yet <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66093983">he renounced</a> that option in 2023, and endorsed Amadou Ba as his candidate for succession.</p>
<p>The last main opposition candidate left in 2023, after the exclusion of Karim Wade, was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20230602-who-is-ousmane-sonko-senegal-opposition-leader-convicted-of-corrupting-youth">Ousmane Sonko</a>. A social media personality, he is sometimes referred to as the “Trump of Senegal” because of his shocking statements, which have endeared him to young Senegalese.
In <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66086570">one instance</a>, he said “those who have ruled Senegal from the beginning deserve to be shot.” </p>
<p>There is also a more serious side to Sonko, a former tax inspector who investigated corruption in the Sall government. He published a <a href="https://www.fauves-editions.fr/catalogue/couv/aplat/9791030200607.pdf">book</a> about oil and gas corruption in Senegal which implicated the Sall government. </p>
<p>In 2023 sexual assault charges were mounted against him, and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/01/senegal-ousmane-sonko-trial-conviction-protests-macky-sall-election/#:%7E:text=On%20Thursday%2C%20Sonko%20was%20convicted,allowed%20to%20appeal%20the%20decision.">he was imprisoned</a>. This disqualified him from running in the 2024 election. Sonko <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/01/30/ousmane-sonko-chooses-bassirou-diomaye-faye-as-replacement-in-senegals-presidential-race//">endorsed</a> Bassirou Diomaye Faye as his replacement.</p>
<p>His supporters have always maintained that the charges were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/police-fire-tear-gas-supporters-senegal-opposition-leader-sonko-2023-02-16/">trumped up</a> because of his opposition to the Sall government.</p>
<p>Sonko was acquitted on the rape charge but <a href="https://apnews.com/article/senegal-opposition-leader-sonko-rape-verdict-a75472375f6a6d5b8918a5c813c292cd">convicted</a> for “corrupting the youth”. Young people <a href="https://theconversation.com/senegal-behind-the-protests-is-a-fight-for-democratic-freedoms-208612">took to the streets in protest</a>, calling Sall a tyrant. Sall used the repressive apparatus of the state to quell the protests.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/senegal-behind-the-protests-is-a-fight-for-democratic-freedoms-208612">Senegal: behind the protests is a fight for democratic freedoms</a>
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<p>Then, on 4 February, as campaigning was about to begin, in an unprecedented move Sall <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/04/senegal-president-postpones-election-hours-before-official-campaign-start">announced</a> that he was postponing the election indefinitely, citing a dispute over the candidate list.</p>
<p>Protesters and police <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2024/2/5/police-and-protesters-clash-after-senegal-election-postponed#:%7E:text=Senegalese%20police%20clashed%20with%20opposition%20supporters%20protesting%20against%20election%20delay%20in%20Dakar.&text=Police%20made%20arrests%20and%20fired%20tear%20gas%20as%20opposition%20supporters,to%20postpone%20elections%20in%20Senegal.">clashed</a> in Dakar. </p>
<p>Tensions continued to rise. As opposition leaders and supporters launched protests, the government imposed <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/02/05/senegal-cuts-internet-access-as-lawmakers-debate-a-bill-to-possibly-extend-the-presidents-/">restrictions on</a> access to the internet.</p>
<p>On 5 February parliamentarians were asked to vote on postponing the election until 15 December. A long and heated debate ensued. Several opposition lawmakers were forcibly removed from the chamber while the police used tear gas to disperse protesters gathered outside the parliament building.</p>
<p>In the end the decision to postpone the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/senegal-should-hold-presidential-vote-soon-possible-african-union-2024-02-05/">poll until December</a> was passed with opposition MPs missing. A number <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ecowas-urges-politicians-senegal-urgently-re-establish-electoral-calendar-2024-02-06/">were arrested</a>.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>In my view Senegal is a consolidated democracy. It has passed through three peaceful democratic transitions of power from a ruling party to the opposition. </p>
<p>The optics of the present moment are certainly not good. But past experience suggests a new president could still come to office, either from the ruling party or from the opposition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222923/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Douglas Yates does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Senegal is considered west Africa’s most stable democracy because it has never suffered a coup d'etat. But all its former presidents have attempted to extend their tenure of office.Douglas Yates, Professor of Political Science , American Graduate School in Paris (AGS)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2221652024-02-05T14:19:18Z2024-02-05T14:19:18ZSurveillance and the state: South Africa’s proposed new spying law is open for comment – an expert points out its flaws<p>In early 2021, the South African Constitutional Court <a href="https://collections.concourt.org.za/bitstream/handle/20.500.12144/36631/%5bJudgment%5d%20CCT%20278%20of%2019%20and%20279%20of%2019%20AmaBhungane%20Centre%20for%20Investigative%20Journalism%20v%20Minister%20of%20Justice%20and%20Others.pdf?sequence=42&isAllowed=y">found</a> that the country’s <a href="https://www.ssa.gov.za/">State Security Agency</a>, through its signals intelligence agency, the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2013-06-21-00-spy-wars-south-africa-is-not-innocent/">National Communication Centre</a>, was conducting <a href="https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/827/how-bulk-interception-works">bulk interception of electronic signals</a> unlawfully. </p>
<p>Bulk interception <a href="https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/827/how-bulk-interception-works">involves</a> the surveillance of electronic signals, including communication signals and internet traffic, on a very large scale, and often on an untargeted basis. If intelligence agents misuse this capability, it can have a massive, negative impact on the privacy of innocent people. </p>
<p>The court found that there was no law authorising the practice of bulk surveillance and limiting its potential abuse. It ordered that the agency cease such surveillance until there was. </p>
<p>In November 2023, the South African presidency responded to the ruling by tabling a bill to, among other things, plug the gaps identified by the country’s highest court. The <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/B40-2023_General_Intelligence_Laws.pdf">General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill</a> sets out how the surveillance centre, based in Pretoria, the capital city, should be regulated.</p>
<p>I have researched intelligence and surveillance for over a decade and also served on the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">2018 High Level Review Panel on the State Security Agency</a>. <a href="https://intelwatch.org.za/2023/11/17/briefing-note-general-intelligence-laws-amendment-bill-gilab/">In my view</a>, the bill lacks basic controls over how this highly invasive form of surveillance should be used. This compromises citizens’ privacy and increases the potential for the state to repeat previous abuses. I discuss some of these abuses below. </p>
<h2>The dangers</h2>
<p>Intelligence agencies use bulk interception to put large numbers of people, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/03/everyone-is-under-surveillance-now-says-whistleblower-edward-snowden">even whole populations</a>, under surveillance. This is regardless of whether they are suspected of serious crimes or threats to national security. Their intention is to obtain strategic intelligence about <a href="https://www.nsa.gov/Signals-Intelligence/Overview/">longer term external threats</a> to a country’s security, and that may be difficult to obtain by other means. </p>
<p>Former United States National Security Agency contractor <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance">Edward Snowden’s</a> leaks of classified intelligence documents showed how these capabilities had been used to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN25T3CJ/">spy on US citizens</a>. The leaks also showed that British intelligence <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/12/08/british-spying-tentacles-reach-across-africa-s-heads-of-states-and-business-leaders_5045668_3212.html">spied on African</a> trade negotiators, politicians and business people to give the UK government and its partners unfair trade advantages.</p>
<p>In the case of South Africa, around 2005, rogue agents in the erstwhile <a href="https://irp.fas.org/world/rsa/index.html">National Intelligence Agency</a> misused bulk interception to <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/igreport0.pdf">spy on</a> senior members of the ruling African National Congress, the opposition, business people and civil servants. This was despite the agency’s mandate being to focus on foreign threats. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-new-intelligence-bill-is-meant-to-stem-abuses-whats-good-and-bad-about-it-220473">South Africa's new intelligence bill is meant to stem abuses – what's good and bad about it</a>
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<p>These rogue agents were able to abuse bulk interception because there was no law controlling and limiting how these capabilities were to be used. A 2008 commission of inquiry, appointed by then-minister of intelligence <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/ronald-ronnie-kasrils">Ronnie Kasrils</a>, <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-background-papers/Intelligence-In-a-Constitutional-Democracy.pdf">called</a> for this law to be enacted. The government refused to do so until it was forced to act by the Constitutional Court ruling. </p>
<p>The government <a href="https://www.anchoredinlaw.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Answering-Affidavit-DG-State-Security-Agency.pdf">justified</a> its refusal to act by claiming that the National Communication Centre was regulated adequately through the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/act39of1994.pdf">National Strategic Intelligence Act</a>. The court rejected this argument because the act failed to address the regulation of bulk interception directly. </p>
<h2>What the Constitutional Court said</h2>
<p>The 2021 Constitutional Court <a href="https://collections.concourt.org.za/bitstream/handle/20.500.12144/36631/%5bJudgment%5d%20CCT%20278%20of%2019%20and%20279%20of%2019%20AmaBhungane%20Centre%20for%20Investigative%20Journalism%20v%20Minister%20of%20Justice%20and%20Others.pdf?sequence=42&isAllowed=y">judgment</a> did not address whether bulk interception should ever be acceptable as a surveillance practice. However, it appeared to accept the <a href="https://www.anchoredinlaw.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Answering-Affidavit-DG-State-Security-Agency.pdf">agency’s argument</a> that it was an internationally accepted method of monitoring transnational signals. But the legitimacy of this practice is <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3115985-APPLICANTS-REPLY-to-GOVT-OBSERVATIONS-PDF.html">highly contested internationally</a>. That’s because this form of surveillance usually extends far beyond what is needed to protect national security.</p>
<p>The court <a href="https://collections.concourt.org.za/bitstream/handle/20.500.12144/36631/%5bJudgment%5d%20CCT%20278%20of%2019%20and%20279%20of%2019%20AmaBhungane%20Centre%20for%20Investigative%20Journalism%20v%20Minister%20of%20Justice%20and%20Others.pdf?sequence=42&isAllow">indicated</a> that it would want to see a law authorising bulk surveillance that sets out “the nuts and bolts of the Centre’s functions”. The law would also need to spell out in</p>
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<p>clear, precise terms the manner, circumstances or duration of the collection, gathering, evaluation and analysis of domestic and foreign intelligence.</p>
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<p>The court would also be looking for detail on</p>
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<p>how these various types of intelligence must be captured, copied, stored, or distributed.</p>
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<h2>What the amendment bill says</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/B40-2023_General_Intelligence_Laws.pdf">amendment bill</a> provides for the proper establishment of the National Communication Centre and its functions. This includes the collection and analysis of intelligence from electronic signals, and information security or cryptography. A parliamentary <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee/335/">ad hoc committee</a> has set a <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/media-statement-ad-hoc-committee-general-intelligence-laws-amendment-bill-extends-deadline-written-submissions#:%7E:text=Unfortunately%2C%20the%20timeline%20to%20process,over%206%20000%20written%20submissions.">deadline</a> of 15 February 2024 for public comment.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-intelligence-agency-needs-speedy-reform-or-it-must-be-shut-down-200386">South Africa's intelligence agency needs speedy reform - or it must be shut down</a>
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<p>The bill says, in vague terms, that the centre shall gather, correlate, evaluate and analyse relevant intelligence to identify any threat or potential threat to national security. But it doesn’t provide any of the details the court said it would be looking for. This is a major weakness.</p>
<p>The bill has one strength, though. It states that the surveillance centre needs to seek the permission of a retired judge, assisted by two interception experts, before conducting bulk interception. The judge will be appointed by the president, and the experts by the minister in charge of intelligence. The position is <a href="https://www.ssa.gov.za/AboutUs">located in the presidency</a>.</p>
<p>However, it does not spell out the bases on which the judge will take decisions. The fact that the judge would be an executive appointment also raises doubts about his or her independence.</p>
<h2>Inadequate benchmarking</h2>
<p>The bill fails to incorporate international benchmarks on the regulation of strategic intelligence and bulk interception in a democracy. These require that a domestic legal framework provide what the European Court of Human Rights <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22001-210077%22%5D%7D">has referred to</a> as “end-to-end” safeguards covering all stages of bulk interception.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-intelligence-watchdog-is-failing-civil-society-how-to-restore-its-credibility-195121">South Africa's intelligence watchdog is failing civil society. How to restore its credibility</a>
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<p>The European Court <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22001-210077%22%5D%7D">has stated</a> that a domestic legal framework should define</p>
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<li><p>the grounds on which bulk interception may be authorised</p></li>
<li><p>the circumstances</p></li>
<li><p>the procedures to be followed for granting authorisation </p></li>
<li><p>procedures for selecting, examining and using material obtained from intercepts</p></li>
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<p>The framework <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22001-210077%22%5D%7D">should also set out</a> </p>
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<li><p>the precautions to be taken when communicating the material to other parties</p></li>
<li><p>limits on the duration of interception </p></li>
<li><p>procedures for the storage of intercepted material</p></li>
<li><p>the circumstances in which such material must be erased and destroyed </p></li>
<li><p>supervision procedures by an independent authority</p></li>
<li><p>compliance procedures for review of surveillance once it has been completed.</p></li>
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<p>The bill does not meet these requirements. </p>
<p>Incorporating these details in regulations would not be adequate on its own, as the bill gives the intelligence minister too much power to set the ground rules for bulk interception. These rules are also unlikely to be subjected to the same level of public scrutiny as the bill. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/zondo-commissions-report-on-south-africas-intelligence-agency-is-important-but-flawed-186582">Zondo Commission's report on South Africa's intelligence agency is important but flawed</a>
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<p>The fact that the presidency is attempting to get away with the most minimal regulation of bulk interception raises doubt about its <a href="https://www.stateofthenation.gov.za/assets/downloads/State%20Capture%20Commission%20Response.pdf">stated commitment</a> to intelligence reform to limit the scope for abuse, and parliament needs correct the bill’s clear deficiencies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222165/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Duncan receives funding from the British Academy and is a director of the non-governmental organisation Intelwatch. </span></em></p>The fact that the presidency is attempting to get away with minimal regulation of bulk interception raises doubt about its commitment to ending intelligence abuse.Jane Duncan, Professor of Digital Society, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.