tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/structural-adjustment-programs-31892/articlesstructural adjustment programs – The Conversation2023-11-07T12:07:59Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116352023-11-07T12:07:59Z2023-11-07T12:07:59ZWorld Bank suspension of Uganda funds over anti-homosexuality law: what this says about the struggle over funds and sovereignty<p>The World Bank issued a <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/statement/2023/08/08/world-bank-group-statement-on-uganda">statement</a> on 8 August 2023, announcing that it had effectively suspended all new public financing to Uganda over concerns with the country’s <a href="https://www.parliament.go.ug/news/6737/president-assents-anti-homosexuality-act">anti-homosexuality law</a>, which “fundamentally contradicts the World Bank Group’s values”. </p>
<p>According to Human Rights Watch, the anti-homosexuality act <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/30/ugandas-president-signs-repressive-anti-lgbt-law">violates multiple fundamental rights</a> guaranteed under Uganda’s constitution and a number of international human rights agreements which the government of Uganda has signed. The act was first proposed in March 2023, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/02/uganda-parliament-passes-anti-lgbtq-bill">adopted</a> by the Ugandan parliament in early May. </p>
<p>The World Bank, and the diplomatic and donor community writ large, follow closely what happens in Ugandan politics.</p>
<p>It took three months for the bank to react and issue the statement. This was fairly fast. The World Bank is usually a slow mover because of its due diligence bureaucracy. It takes time to have <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership">members</a> on board behind political statements. So, because it took only three months, one could argue there was an internal push from central people or member states. This says something about the bank’s ambiguous relationship to its client states’ domestic politics and how it deals with political concerns.</p>
<p>The World Bank has an apolitical mandate. Article IV (section 10) of the Bank’s <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/articles-of-agreement/ibrd-articles-of-agreement/article-IV">articles of agreement</a> says</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>On the other hand, its <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/who-we-are">mission statement</a> “to end extreme poverty and promote prosperity in a sustainable way” is not only political but requires political action.</p>
<p>As a social anthropologist, I have <a href="https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?user=vQqMFWQAAAAJ&hl=en">researched</a> international aid in eastern Africa and particularly followed the relationship between the World Bank and Uganda since 2006.</p>
<p>The World Bank’s engagement with Uganda has always <a href="https://www.berghahnbooks.com/title/SandeLieDevelopmentality">filtered through</a> into the country’s domestic affairs. In my view, the recent suspension of funding over the anti-homosexuality law was in keeping with that tradition. The previous interventions in domestic issues involved presidential term limits, market reforms and governance reforms.</p>
<p>I believe the interventions should be viewed in the context of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2015.1024435">informal and indirect</a> means through which the World Bank seeks to control its clients. Despite its insistence on national ownership of its projects, the World Bank uses its lending portfolio to govern and control its clients. </p>
<h2>Presidential term limits</h2>
<p>In 2005/6, the World Bank <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/world-bank-intends-cut-aid-uganda-report">cut its loans</a> to Uganda by 10% due to technical issues referred to as “prior actions” which the government had failed to implement before signing the loan agreement, causing expenditure overruns in the public administration budget. The real reason for cutting aid, in my opinion, was politics. The World Bank was frustrated when President Yoweri Museveni <a href="https://observer.ug/component/content/article?id=18710:how-term-limits-were-kicked-out-in-2005">lifted</a> the presidential term limit to seek re-election again. </p>
<p>The recent reaction to the anti-homosexuality act thus demonstrates a continuity in how the World Bank responds to domestic political affairs. It also shows a change, as the reaction is not rooted in politics or concealed as a form of techno-bureaucracy, but explicitly linked to values. The tone is different. The World Bank always sought to appear neutral on values. It suggests to me that the institution’s most prominent owners and shareholders have weighed in.</p>
<h2>Market reforms</h2>
<p>During the structural adjustment era, lasting until around 2000, World Bank loans to Uganda and other recipients came with strict conditions and ready-made policies baked into them. The bank could make loans conditional on the recipient state privatising state-owned enterprises or liberalising the economy. Those are highly political and ideological measures in the client state’s sovereign domain. For instance, Museveni bought into a lot of the structural reform programmes which included <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/718281468317110673/uganda-policy-participation-people">market reforms</a> and <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/964971555504602614/pdf/Learning-from-Power-Sector-Reform-The-Case-of-Uganda.pdf">power sector development</a>. This is in contrast to Ethiopia, which until very recently has been considered more resistant to World Bank proposed reforms.</p>
<p>A later disbursement tactic was to make concessional lending contingent on the government making its own national poverty reduction strategy. Once that was endorsed by the bank, the bank would provide financial assistance to help the government implement its own strategy. This bypassed questions about external governance and policy imposition.</p>
<h2>Governance reforms</h2>
<p>As the World Bank withdrew from direct control, it aimed to retain power through other means – while respecting national ownership. Whatever is proposed by aid recipients still needs the bank’s endorsement to become effective.</p>
<p>The World Bank’s power and control don’t just lie in the ability to decide what to fund and when to stop funding. It is just as much a result of the bank’s ability to frame partnership and the conditions under which the recipient exercises the freedom it has been granted. </p>
<p>One of these freedoms concerns the formulation of national development policy. National policy needs the bank’s approval to become effective. So the client government should do as the bank wants it to do, but voluntarily.</p>
<p>The bank can govern at a distance. The policies funded by the bank are defined as the state’s own polices. </p>
<p>The World Bank, and indeed donors in general, always emphasise the principle of national ownership, even as their policies undermine it. This gives donors the advantage of placing the responsibility for failure on their clients if aid programmes do not succeed. And indirect governance structures imply that client governments appear both as objects to be shaped by donor policies and as subjects with whom agreements are made.</p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>How the World Bank governs and relates to its clients (not just in Uganda) has changed over time, from direct power and policy imposition to more indirect and tacit dynamics concealed as mutual partnership.</p>
<p>The fact that the Ugandan government went on to adopt the anti-homosexuality bill, despite the bank’s indirect governance and technocratic micromanagement, can thus be read as a failure of the partnership arrangement and the bank’s ability to govern at a distance.</p>
<p>Nor did lobbying and arm-twisting by international donors, the US and the EU among others, persuade the government to kill the bill.</p>
<p>More actors and emerging economies are becoming increasingly active as sources of financing, such as China, the Gulf states, Russia, and private actors. These are potentially replacing traditional western donors, marking a shift to more geopolitical rivalry on the African continent. But few lunches are free, and the new, emerging actors pose new conditions and expectations. The World Bank, given its commitment to transparency and democracy, may after all be preferable.</p>
<p>A return to more direct, conditionality-based governance, as practised during the structural adjustment era, could be a way to deal with values, but could jeopardise national ownership and mutual partnership.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211635/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jon Harald Sande Lie receives funding from the Research Council of Norway for the research project 'Public-Private Development Interfaces in Ethiopia' (grant no. 315356). </span></em></p>The World Bank’s funding freeze reflects a shift from policy imposition to indirect ways of controlling client nations.Jon Harald Sande Lie, Research Professor, Norwegian Institute of International AffairsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1532012021-01-24T06:07:56Z2021-01-24T06:07:56ZGhana’s unstable building problem is about more than lax regulation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379433/original/file-20210119-13-1qkruhj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Building collapses, like this one in Nairobi, Kenya in late 2019, are unfortunately common in many large African cities.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fred Mutune/Xinhua via Getty</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Collapsed buildings are worryingly common in several large African cities. One <a href="http://ebooks.iospress.nl/publication/38227">study</a> counted 54 building collapse deaths and 122 injuries in Kampala, Uganda between 2004 and 2008. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/284082610_Contemporary_Issues_in_Building_Collapse_and_Its_Implications_for_Sustainable_Development">Another</a> identified 112 cases in Lagos, Nigeria from December 1978 to April 2008. Cities in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Festival_Godwin_Boateng/publication/317291061_The_Collapse_of_Buildings_in_Cities_in_Ghana_Reasoning_Beyond_'Scientism/links/5930aeb245851553b67f297b/The-Collapse-of-Buildings-in-Cities-in-Ghana-Reasoning-Beyond-Scientism.pdf#page=14">Ghana</a> and Kenya, too, have recorded similar fatal <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.871.2870&rep=rep1&type=pdf">incidents</a>. </p>
<p>This isn’t a uniquely African problem, though. It <a href="https://factly.in/more-than-13000-lost-lives-in-structure-collapses-in-the-last-5-years/#:%7E:text=Between%202001%20and%202015%2C%20more,of%20the%20total%20death%20toll.">occurs</a> in Asia’s rapidly urbanising areas, too. Buildings collapse either during construction or when they’re already occupied.</p>
<p>It’s often <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405844020312056">suggested</a> that the problems in African cities stem from authorities’ non-enforcement of building safety regulations. Substandard materials and incompetent builders abound.</p>
<p>This argument has some merits – but it doesn’t adequately explain the problem. Why, in societies that attach a high social status and cultural prestige to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/21/nyregion/american-dream-ghana-home-mark-immigrant-success-folks-back-accra.html">home ownership</a>, would builders constantly disregard safety considerations?</p>
<p>So, I <a href="https://researchrepository.rmit.edu.au/discovery/delivery?vid=61RMIT_INST:ResearchRepository&repId=12248273550001341#13248372790001341">set out</a> to learn more. I focused on Ghana. <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S221242092031414X">The results</a> <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X20302886">go beyond</a> the issues of materials, skills and regulatory enforcement. They reveal more about the institutional history that shaped the practices that create dangerous buildings. </p>
<p>This problem is not going away any time soon. Today around 40% of Africa’s population – about 500 million people – <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/Africa-urbanization-cities-double-population-2050-4%20ways-thrive/">live in cities</a>. This is projected to rise to more than 1.4 billion people in <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/Africa-urbanization-cities-double-population-2050-4%20ways-thrive/">the next few decades</a>. Currently more than half of Ghana’s 30 million residents <a href="https://statsghana.gov.gh/gssmain/fileUpload/pressrelease/Urbanisation%20in%20Ghana.pdf">live in cities</a>.</p>
<p>My research provides a better understanding of the range of agencies, motivations and constraints that incentivise poor building construction. Hopefully it can contribute to helping build safe, resilient cities on the continent.</p>
<h2>Participants’ views</h2>
<p>I interviewed architects, contractors, surveyors, structural and civil engineers and other construction experts with knowledge in Ghana. I also interviewed authorities from Accra and Kumasi, the country’s capital and second largest cities. <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/18-injured-3-dead-as-building-collapses-at-cantonments.html">Media reports</a> and <a href="https://researchrepository.rmit.edu.au/discovery/delivery?vid=61RMIT_INST:ResearchRepository&repId=12248273550001341#13248372790001341">research</a> show that most of Ghana’s building collapses happen in these cities.</p>
<p>My interviewees captured most of the known issues: builders use substandard materials, ignore safety requirements and offer construction jobs to unskilled people. </p>
<p>But it’s clear that other, external factors are also at play. </p>
<h2>Economic turmoil</h2>
<p>When Ghana’s economy <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/pfp/ghana/ghana0.htm">tumbled</a> in April 1983, the then military government approached the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for help. The help came, under the condition of <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/pfp/ghana/ghana0.htm">“structural adjustment”</a> of the economy. Most developing countries that applied for support from the World Bank and IMF were made to sign onto similar programmes. </p>
<p>Structural Adjustment Reform involved a series of economic interventions. But – in Ghana and elsewhere – the underlying idea was to remove governments from the provision of public goods and, instead, install private actors. </p>
<p>For Ghana’s housing sector, this meant the removal of tariffs on imported building materials, the withdrawal of state grants to housing agencies, and the introduction of tax holidays for private real estate companies. These and other similar interventions were designed to attract private companies into the housing sector. The assumption was that private companies would provide more and cheaper houses and, therefore, serve the housing needs of the poor better than the state could. </p>
<p>Sadly, they instead added to existing problems and contributed to new ones.</p>
<p>At that time, Ghana’s post-colonial authorities hadn’t dismantled the planning systems and regulations the British had left behind. In fact they still adhere to these today. It’s a problem because the <a href="https://researchrepository.rmit.edu.au/discovery/delivery?vid=61RMIT_INST:ResearchRepository&repId=12248273550001341#13248372790001341">regulations</a> encourage the use of expensive imported building materials. It is estimated that about 80% of Ghana’s building materials <a href="https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/building-blocks-government-taking-steps-increase-domestic-production-special-materials-and-cement">are imported</a>.</p>
<p>Land prices have increased too, For instance, in the 1980s and 1990s, the price for building plots in prime cities in Ghana increased by more <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1541-0064.2001.tb01500.x">than 1000%</a>. This, as private, often foreign, real estate companies moved in as a result of the structural adjustment deal.</p>
<p>The increasing prices of building materials and urban lands have made housing more and more costly. And private real estate companies get big tax <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S221242092031414X">holidays</a> to provide “affordable housing”. But they aren’t delivering. </p>
<p>Their dollar-priced houses are affordable only to high income earners; staff of foreign embassies and transnational corporations and wealthy Ghanaians residing in the country and abroad. The majority of the population has been excluded from the <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10901-009-9146-0">market</a>. Structural adjustment didn’t cause this: it <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/41626442_Housing_Policy_Changes_in_Ghana_in_the_1990s">hardened</a> the housing scarcity and inequality created by Ghana’s colonial and early post-colonial governments. </p>
<h2>Bad situation worsens</h2>
<p>The failure of formal housing policies to accommodate the majority has sent most Ghanaians to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/accras-informal-settlements-are-easing-the-citys-urban-housing-crisis-104266#:%7E:text=About%2045%25%20of%20Accra%20residents,water%20and%20poor%20sanitation%20facilities.&text=Old%20Fadama%20is%20the%20largest,is%20often%20cast%20as%20dystopian.">informal sector</a>. </p>
<p>This sector lacks finance schemes, so low-income informal home builders are forced to cut corners. They also build as and when they can afford to. Buildings may take years to complete – long enough to develop structural problems even before work is completed, partly because materials and incomplete sections are exposed to the weather.</p>
<p>Not only are buildings poorly constructed, but some are done with great haste. Additions are made to old structures and some are converted to uses not intended in the original designs.</p>
<p>One architect I interviewed said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The reason (collapses happen) in the urban areas is that there is high demand (for buildings) and there is pressure. So, the wrong thing is done hurriedly – at lightning speed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Problems such as corruption and political interference further undermine the authorities’ already under-resourced capacity to bring things <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S221242092031414X">under control</a>. The result is an atmosphere where inappropriate construction practices thrive in ways that undermine public safety. </p>
<h2>Way out of the problem</h2>
<p>It is often suggested that all would be solved if the authorities just <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-buildings-keep-collapsing-in-lagos-and-what-can-be-done-about-it-113928">enforced</a> building regulations. But it seems that won’t go far enough.</p>
<p>Ghana’s building safety challenge is largely about the inefficient allocation of public resources (through housing policy and the organisation of the economy generally) for the private gain of a privileged few. The low-income majority are left to fend for themselves.</p>
<p>Unless policy is changed to meet the needs of the majority, the creation of unstable buildings in African cities cannot be prevented.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153201/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Festival Godwin Boateng does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ghana has a long institutional history that’s shaped the practices which create dangerous buildings.Festival Godwin Boateng, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Centre for Sustainable Urban Development, The Earth Institute, Columbia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1434642020-07-29T10:53:40Z2020-07-29T10:53:40ZTanzania’s Benjamin Mkapa: the peace maker, true East African and Pan-Africanist<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349574/original/file-20200727-37-1198ai3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Benjamin Mkapa at the end of his tenure in December 2005.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mwanzo Millinga/AFP via Getty Images)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The former Tanzanian president Benjamin William Mkapa, who died on July 24, was the country’s third president. He was in office from 1995 to 2005. </p>
<p>Born in 1938 in Masasi south-eastern Tanzania, Mkapa was a staunch supporter of the Tanzania African National Union, which won independence from Britain in 1961 under Mwalimu Julius Nyerere. His star rose steadily under Nyerere’s <a href="https://www.juliusnyerere.org/about">long reign</a> – from 1961 to 1985 – as leader of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Tanzania/Local-government#ref419167">renamed</a> party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi.</p>
<p>In addition to being editor of the party newspaper and establishing the national news agency Shihata, he served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Information and Culture and Science, Technology and Education.</p>
<p>Mkapa was thus an experienced communicator, politician and administrator when he entered the presidency.</p>
<p>Mkapa’s presidency is particularly significant since it represents the first phase of Tanzanian multi-party democracy. It was Nyerere who in 1991 opened debate on a multi-party democratic system for Tanzania. He saw it coming in the wake of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4187014?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents">developments in neighbouring Kenya</a>, where multi-party democracy was promoted at an early stage by church leaders, civil society and the population at large.</p>
<p>His reported response in Kiswahili loosely translates to, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>When you see your neighbour being shaved, you’re best advised to wet
your beard otherwise you will have a rough shave.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Nyerere was a firm supporter of Mkapa and was instrumental in Mkapa’s party nomination to stand for the first multi-party election in 1995.</p>
<p>Mkapa’s government initially faced a gloomy economic position. This was partly based on global economic stagnation. It was also partly due to the previous government’s lack of economic and institutional discipline. His predecessor <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ali-Hassan-Mwinyi">Ali Hassan Mwinyi (1985-1995)</a> had lost the trust of the international financial institutions which provided substantial assistance and loans.</p>
<p>The first main challenge for Mkapa was to enhance the discipline in state finances and stabilise the economy. The second was restoring confidence among donors by pursuing western-backed neo-liberal market policies. Having agreed to implement <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4501280?seq=4#metadata_info_tab_contents">proposals</a> endorsed by donors, Mkapa quickly won international trust. </p>
<h2>Growth amid old challenges</h2>
<p>The resumption of external development assistance was not enough to immediately spur the economy. During the 1990s the average annual real per capita GDP <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp0535.pdf">shrank</a> slightly.</p>
<p>But during his second term it grew markedly. The main drivers included gold and gemstones, tourism and construction. </p>
<p>Mkapa also oversaw a period in which poverty levels <a href="http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/WP207%20Mashindano%20Maro.pdf">declined</a>, however slightly. Hunger statistics from 2005 showed that rural people were worse off than those of the urban population. His attention to rural areas, so important for Nyerere, grew only towards the end of his presidency. </p>
<p>However, instead of strengthening village and women land rights which the land laws of 1999 tried to do, he went for a top-down formalisation of individual land rights <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20455012?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">championed</a> by the Peruvian economist deSoto.</p>
<p>Mkapa came to see <a href="https://www.questia.com/magazine/1G1-126393367/title-deeds-could-unlock-trapped-wealth-millions">“property and business formalisation”</a> as a major priority of his government well aligned to international financiers who supported his government handsomely. </p>
<p>These transitions were unable, for the time being, to challenge village and smallholder production and land management systems. But they did create an opening for future administrations to attract foreign investors pushing large scale mechanised agriculture which demand land (mostly village) but provide limited employment. </p>
<p>Coupled with a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/L2C_WP22_Wangwe-et-al-1.pdf">decline in manufacturing</a>, a <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/can-tanzania-afford-100-million-citizens-in-2035">rapidly growing rural population</a> was left with limited exit options. </p>
<p>Thus, at the end of Mkapa’s term the challenge of a structural transformation of the economy that could redistribute growth and create sustainable production systems that could absorb labour and importantly rural youth, remained unresolved.</p>
<h2>Anti-corruption crusade</h2>
<p>At an early stage, Mkapa sought to enhance the legitimacy of his government both domestically and externally by fighting corruption. His anti-corruption strategy – laid out by the <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/documents/report-on-the-presidential-commission-on-corruption-1996-tanzania/">Warioba Report</a> – started in 1996. </p>
<p>But his crusade didn’t result in significant change. Petty corruption linked to foreign business and investment appeared to decline. But graft linked to household service delivery such as health and water did not. In fact, the <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajps/article/view/27322">evidence</a> is that corruption showed an increase during his second presidential term and beyond.</p>
<p>One area where Mkapa’s term saw important institutional, policy and legal development was the forestry sector. This is saw 8 000 registered villages and community groups managing 70-80 % of the national land on behalf of the state.
Policies such as this opened a space for rural and village involvement. </p>
<p>Thus people could use existing institutions from below for the purpose of managing community and joint forest management for villagers’ own benefits. In a significant way, this was Mkapa trying to instil a democratic and participatory spirit in Tanzania.</p>
<h2>Legacy</h2>
<p>After his presidency Mkapa was much sought after for his spirit of cooperation, participation and peace. He became an important mediator in conflicts across Africa and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235410628_Forty_Days_and_Nights_of_Peacemaking_in_Kenya">including the Kenyan post-election conflict</a> in 2007 and the 2011 referendum in South-Sudan.</p>
<p>The graduate of Makerere and Columbia is rightly <a href="https://africa.cgtn.com/2020/07/24/mkapa-played-pivotal-role-in-ending-kenyas-2008-post-election-chaos-kenyatta/">hailed</a> by Kenyan and others as a peace maker and true East African and Pan Africanist. </p>
<p>For his people in south eastern and coastal Tanzania he will most certainly be remembered as the president who made real their desire for better transport, communication and cooperation in their part of the country. In 2003 the construction of the long awaited bridge – the Mkapa Bridge - across the Rufiji river – was finalised. </p>
<p>For Tanzanians – maybe as a whole – he will also be remembered as a president who continued and secured the path of peace and cooperation between – and for – his peoples. He was 81.</p>
<p><em>Kjell Havnevik and Aida Isinika jointly edited <strong>Tanzania in transition - from Nyerere to Mkapa</strong>. Published in 2010 by the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala and Mkuki na Nyota, Dar es Salaam.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143464/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kjell Johannes Havnevik does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mkapa’s presidency is particularly significant since it represents the first phase of Tanzanian multi-party democracy.Kjell Johannes Havnevik, Professor Emeritus, University of AgderLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1081032019-09-06T05:39:36Z2019-09-06T05:39:36ZRobert Mugabe: as divisive in death as he was in life<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291235/original/file-20190906-175663-u64qs1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Robert Mugabe during his swearing-in ceremony in Harare, 2008. The former Zimbabwean president has died aged 95.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Robert Mugabe, the former president of Zimbabwe, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/09/06/377714687/robert-mugabe-veteran-president-of-zimbabwe-dead-at-95">has died</a>. Mugabe was 95, and had been struggling with ill health for some time. The country’s current President Emmerson Mnangagwa announced Mugabe’s death on Twitter on September 6:</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1169839308406054912"}"></div></p>
<p>The responses to Mnangagwa’s announcement were immediate and widely varied. Some hailed Mugabe as a liberation hero. Others dismissed him as a “monster”. This suggests that Mugabe will be as divisive a figure in death as he was in life.</p>
<p>The official mantra of the Zimbabwe government and its Zimbabwe African National Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) will emphasise his leadership of the struggle to overthrow <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ian-Smith">Ian Smith’s</a> racist settler regime in what was then Rhodesia. It will also extol his subsequent championing of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358530500082916">seizure of white-owned farms</a> and the return of land into African hands.</p>
<p>In contrast, critics will highlight how – after initially <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24hd4n.7?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">preaching racial reconciliation</a> after the liberation war in <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Rhodesian_Bush_War">December 1979 </a> – Mugabe threw away the promise of the early independence years. He did this in several ways, among them a <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">brutal clampdown</a> on political opposition in <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Matabeleland in the 1980s</a>, and Zanu-PF’s systematic <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-are-elections-really-rigged-mr-trump-consult-robert-mugabe-68440">rigging of elections</a> to keep he and his cronies in power. </p>
<p>They’ll also mention the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321704136_The_Curse_Of_Corruption_In_Zimbabwe">massive corruption</a> over which he presided, and the <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/publication/costs-and-causes-zimbabwes-crisis">economy’s disastrous downward plunge</a> during his presidency.</p>
<p>Inevitably, the focus will primarily be on his domestic record. Yet many of those who will sing his praises as a <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201709220815.html">hero of African nationalism</a> will be from elsewhere on the continent. So where should we place Mugabe among the pantheon of African nationalists who led their countries to independence?</p>
<h2>Slide into despotism</h2>
<p>Most African countries have been independent of colonial rule for <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2010/weighing-half-century-independence">half a century or more</a>.</p>
<p>The early African nationalist leaders were often regarded as gods at independence. Yet they very quickly came to be perceived as having feet of very heavy clay.</p>
<p>Nationalist leaders symbolised African freedom and liberation. But few were to prove genuinely tolerant of democracy and diversity. One party rule, nominally in the name of “the people”, became widespread. In some cases, it was linked to interesting experiments in one-party democracy, as seen in Tanzania under Julius Nyerere and Zambia under Kenneth Kaunda. </p>
<p>Even in these cases, intolerance and authoritarianism <a href="https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/doorenspleet/opd/">eventually encroached</a>.
Often, party rule was <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/159875?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">succeeded by military coups</a>.</p>
<p>In Zimbabwe’s case, Mugabe proved unable to shift the country, as he had wished, to one-partyism. However, this did not prevent Zanu-PF becoming increasingly intolerant over the years in response to both economic crisis and rising opposition. Successive elections were shamelessly perverted. </p>
<p>When, despite this, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-10-00-zim-2008-election-taken-by-a-gun-not-a-pen">Zanu-PF lost control of parliament</a> in 2008, it responded by rigging the presidential election in a campaign of unforgivable brutality. Under Mugabe, the potential for democracy was snuffed out by a brutal despotism.</p>
<h2>A wasted inheritance</h2>
<p>Whether the economic policies they pursued were ostensibly capitalist or socialist, the early African nationalist leaders presided over <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/78">rapid economic decline</a>, following an initial period of relative prosperity after independence. </p>
<p>In retrospect, it’s widely recognised that the challenges they faced were immense. Most post-colonial economies were underdeveloped and depended upon the export of a small number of agricultural or mineral commodities. From the 1970s, growth was crowded out by the International Monetary Fund demanding that mounting debts be surmounted through the pursuit of <a href="https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/glossary/structural-adjustment/">structural adjustment programmes</a>. This hindered spending on infrastructure as well as <a href="http://www.globalissues.org/article/3/structural-adjustment-a-major-cause-of-poverty">social services and education</a> and swelled political discontent.</p>
<p>In contrast, Mugabe inherited a viable, relatively broad-based economy that included substantial industrial and prosperous commercial agricultural sectors. Even though these were largely white controlled, there was far greater potential for development than in most other post-colonial African countries. </p>
<p>But, through massive corruption and mismanagement, his government threw that potential away. He also presided over a disastrous downward spiral of the economy, which saw both industry and <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/a-seized-zimbabwe-farm-is-returned-but-uncertainty-reigns-20180301">commercial agriculture collapse</a>. The economy has never recovered and remains in a state of acute and persistent crisis today.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-economy-is-collapsing-why-mnangagwa-doesnt-have-the-answers-104960">Zimbabwe's economy is collapsing: why Mnangagwa doesn't have the answers</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Reputation</h2>
<p>On the political front, the rule of some leaders – like <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/milton-obotes-lasting-legacy-to-uganda/a-19191275">Milton Obote in Uganda</a> and <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/somalia-fall-of-siad-barre-civil-war/">Siad Barre in Somalia</a> – created so much conflict that coups and crises drove their countries into civil war. Zimbabwe under Mugabe was spared this fate – but perhaps only because the political opposition in Matabeleland in the 1980s was so brutalised after up to <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-policy-towards-zimbabwe-during-matabeleland-massacre-licence-to-kill-81574">30 000 people were killed</a>, that they shrank from more conflict. Peace, then, was merely the absence of outright war.</p>
<p>Some leaders, notably Ghana’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Kwame-Nkrumah">Kwame Nkrumah</a> and <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/former-tanzanian-president-julius-nyerere-dies">Julius Nyerere</a> in Tanzania, are still revered for their commitments to national independence and African unity. This is despite the fact that, domestically, their records were marked by failure. By 1966, when Nkrumah was <a href="https://www.eaumf.org/ejm-blog/2018/2/23/february-24-1966-dr-kwame-nkrumah-overthrown-as-president-of-the-republic-of-ghana">displaced by a military coup</a>, his one-party rule had become politically corrupt and repressive. </p>
<p>Despite this, Nyerere always retained his reputation for personal integrity and commitment to African development. Both Nkrumah’s and Nyerere’s ideas continue to inspire younger generations of political activists, while other post-independence leaders’ names are largely forgotten.</p>
<p>Will Mugabe be similarly feted by later generations? Will the enormous flaws of his rule be forgotten amid celebrations of his unique role in the liberation of southern Africa as a whole? </p>
<h2>A Greek tragedy</h2>
<p>The problem for pan-Africanist historians who rush to praise Mugabe is that they will need to repudiate the contrary view of the millions of Zimbabweans who have suffered under his rule or have fled the country to escape it. He contributed no political ideas that have lasted. He inherited the benefits as well as the costs of settler rule but reduced his country to penury. He destroyed the best of its institutional inheritance, notably an efficient civil service, which could have been put to good use for all.</p>
<p>The cynics would say that the reputation of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/patrice-emery-lumumba">Patrice Lumumba</a>, as an African revolutionary and fighter for Congolese unity has lasted because he was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jan/17/patrice-lumumba-50th-anniversary-assassination">assassinated in 1961</a>. In other words, he had the historical good fortune to die young, without the burden of having made major and grievous mistakes.</p>
<p>In contrast, there are many who would say that Mugabe simply lived too long, and his life was one of Greek tragedy: his early promise and virtue marked him out as popular hero, but he died a monster whom history will condemn.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108103/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation </span></em></p>Where should we place Mugabe among the pantheon of African nationalists who led their countries to independence?Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1201052019-07-17T13:43:48Z2019-07-17T13:43:48ZIMF says it cares about inequality. But will it change its ways?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/283718/original/file-20190711-173370-ksyq99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The IMF headquarters in Washington DC.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has become increasingly infatuated by the negative <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdn1513.pdf">consequences</a> of excessive <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2016/06/ostry.htm">inequality</a>. This new-found mission is laudable, but neglects the manifold ways its own policy advice contributed to growing income inequality.</p>
<p>As lender of last resort, the IMF provides countries in economic turmoil with financial support. In return, borrowing countries must often commit to far-reaching policy reforms. While some view this so-called ‘conditionality’ as a necessary instrument to address the root causes of economic crisis, others point to its adverse <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2016.1174953">social implications</a>.</p>
<p>We <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2019.01.001">examined</a> how policy reforms prescribed in IMF lending programmes affected income inequality for developing countries between 1980 and 2014. We <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2019.01.001">found</a> increases in income inequality by on average 6.5% a year once the programme commenced. These effects persisted for three years.</p>
<p>Our measure of income inequality was the Gini coefficient. A score of 0 means income is equal for everyone in the country; 1 indicates one person earns all the income. For example, the US had an income Gini of 0.379 in 2014. During the period we <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2019.01.001">studied</a>, the <a href="https://fsolt.org/swiid/">Gini coefficient</a> for developing countries with IMF programmes ranged from 0.228 (Belarus, in 1996) to 0.571 (Papua New Guinea in 1996).</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2019.01.001">research</a> advances our understanding of the causes of income inequality, one of the most pressing issues of our time. In particular, we highlight an important yet insufficiently understood international-level determinant of inequality in the developing world: structural adjustment programmes by the IMF.</p>
<h2>The impact of IMF programmes</h2>
<p>In our <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2019.01.001">work</a>, we detail how IMF lending arrangements affect the income distribution in borrowing countries.</p>
<p>First, the IMF set expenditure reduction targets for borrowing countries. These so-called austerity measures were meant to balance the budget. But cuts in government spending can widen income inequalities because low-income households often depend on government transfers. For example, a lending programme with Togo mandated such reforms between 2008 and 2011. Over this period, income inequality rose by <a href="https://fsolt.org/swiid/">3.7%</a> (from 0.379 in 2007 to 0.393 in 2012).</p>
<p>Second, the IMF repeatedly mandated the removal of restrictions to trade and financial flows. Policies promoting international economic openness can increase demand for skilled labour in developing countries. But low-skilled labour typically loses out, and income inequality increases. Financial development and capital account liberalisation also favours individuals with access to financial capital and services. </p>
<p>In developing countries, these tend to be people with high incomes. For instance, Sri Lanka had to establish a flexible exchange rate regime
to qualify for financial assistance in 2001 (which lasted until 2005). Under the tutelage of the IMF, the Gini coefficient of disposable income increased by <a href="https://fsolt.org/swiid/">5.6%</a> between 2000 and 2006.</p>
<p>Third, the IMF typically called for reforms on monetary policy, initiated the privatisation of financial institutions, and specified targets for the inflation rate. These measures can increase investor confidence, the benefits of which are mostly felt by individuals with high incomes. For example, in 1982, a lending arrangement with Guatemala included restrictions on the growth of bank lending to the private sector, domestic credit, and credit to the public sector. One year after the programme ended, in 1985, the income Gini was 0.482. This was <a href="https://fsolt.org/swiid/">0.8%</a> higher than when Guatemala negotiated lending terms with the IMF in 1981.</p>
<p>Finally, IMF targets limiting the provision of new external debt can force governments to reduce social spending since they are unable to fund it. These lower the income share of poor populations who depend disproportionately on government transfers. For instance, IMF-designed reforms for Indonesia in 1998 included criteria to limit external debt. In 2004, after the programme terminated, income inequality had increased by <a href="https://fsolt.org/swiid/">1.6%</a> .</p>
<p>These findings show that the policy reforms prescribed in lending programmes affect income inequality in multiple ways. Indeed, the Fund appears to have heard the <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2016/06/ostry.htm">criticism</a> of its policy prescriptions and now devotes considerable <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/inequality/">attention</a> to inequalities.</p>
<p>But an <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/great-expectations-imf-turning-words-action-inequality">Oxfam report</a> evaluated IMF pilot projects that were supposed to incorporate inequality analyses and failed to find evidence of policies promoting lower inequality. </p>
<h2>More work to be done</h2>
<p>At their most recent annual Spring meeting in April, the IMF and World Bank hosted a seminar <a href="https://meetings.imf.org/en/2019/Spring/Schedule/2019/04/13/imf-three-chief-economists?src=JointHP">‘Income Inequality Matters’</a>, discussing ways to achieve inclusive growth. </p>
<p>If the IMF is serious about reducing inequality, then it needs to carefully consider the types of conditions included in lending programmes. The 2030 <a href="https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300">Sustainable Development Goals</a> (SDGs), to which the Bretton Woods institutions remain <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/04/13/communique-of-the-thirty-ninth-meeting-of-the-imfc">committed</a>, offer a window of opportunity to address what is one of the most pressing issues of the day.</p>
<p>With just over a decade left to achieve the SDGs, it’s high time the IMF put words into practice regarding tackling inequality to right its wrongs of the past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120105/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The IMF has increasingly turned its focus to growing inequality worldwide. Ironically, research shows that policy reforms it mandated exacerbated income inequalities.Timon Forster, Doctoral candidate in International Relations, Freie Universität BerlinBernhard Reinsberg, Lecturer in International Relations, University of GlasgowThomas Stubbs, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1184652019-07-16T09:11:22Z2019-07-16T09:11:22ZA review of Kenya’s universities: what formed them, what’s wrong with them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/283839/original/file-20190712-173360-17eqwwm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In many African countries, the demand for higher education has increased <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/01/10/figures-of-the-week-higher-education-enrollment-grows-in-sub-saharan-africa-along-with-disparities-in-enrollment-by-income/">tremendously</a> in recent years. In Kenya for instance, universities have expanded more <a href="https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20160509141752529">than six-fold</a> in the past 20 years. </p>
<p>This massive expansion has created a crisis with university facilities. As a result lecture halls, laboratories and workshops have become stretched beyond their limits. In addition, expanding without adequate financing has led to universities neglecting programmes that require substantial capital investment. These include the health sciences, science and technology as well as engineering. </p>
<p>In addition, little attention has been paid to critical curriculum reforms that would make education relevant to a changing and competitive labour market. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.unisa.ac.za/sites/corporate/default/Research-&-Innovation/Unisa-Press/Books/History-and-Political-Africa/The-State-and-the-University-Experience-in-East-Africa">book</a>, “The State and the University Experience in East Africa: Colonial Foundations and Postcolonial Transformations in Kenya”, explores the dynamics that have influenced higher education in Kenya and the East African region during the colonial and post-colonial period. </p>
<p>Broadly, the book notes how the expansion of private and public universities in the last few decades has helped to increase access. Yet, less than 15% of students who complete high schools in Kenya can join universities. Last year <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2019-04-16-top-2018-kcse-students-pick-medicine-and-engineering/">only</a>, 90,755 out of 660,204 students who completed high school qualified to join universities. </p>
<p>In addition, the politically driven expansion of public universities has undermined vocational and technical colleges. Many were converted to universities. This had a detrimental affect on poorer Kenyans who were less likely to gain university admission. </p>
<p>Also, the sector expanded without adequate support for research. Without knowledge production through research, universities have failed to provide solutions to the country’s myriad challenges.</p>
<p>I show that university policies were a product of political, economic and social forces in Kenya and the region. And I look at what needs to be done to improve the sector.</p>
<h2>Findings</h2>
<p>I identified three major policy trends that have shaped university education since its inception in Kenya and East Africa. </p>
<p>First was the elitist inter-territorial concept that characterised university policy between 1949 and 1970. During this period Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania shared a single university. As a result, only a tiny elite of East Africans could access university. </p>
<p>Second was the transitional period of 1970 to 1978. This followed the breakup of the regional university arrangement. During this period there were fierce debates in Kenya that centred around access. </p>
<p>On the one hand, there was increased demand for university access by people from within the University of Nairobi (mainly administrators), and some politicians. On the other, elitist and conservative bureaucrats preferred limiting access. </p>
<p>Lastly, from 1978 to 2002, the foundation was laid for university liberalisation. This included the establishment of new public universities and the emergence of private universities. Rapid expansion followed. </p>
<p>Throughout this period, universities were also affected by various social and political changes. These included the rise of African nationalism, independence and East African regional integration. </p>
<p>Other major events included the succession of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jomo-kenyatta">President Jomo Kenyatta</a> by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Daniel-arap-Moi">Daniel arap Moi</a> . Unlike Kenyatta, Moi sought to use university policy to consolidate his power-base. He embarked on reforms aimed at addressing the colonial and Kenyatta-era policies of restricted access. These had limited the size and the nature of the national elite. They also had an adverse affect on the marginalised nomadic communities that he came from. </p>
<p>Another important factor was the World Bank’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1242398?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">structural adjustment programmes</a> that lead to funding cuts. </p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>I identified a number of areas where urgent action is needed.</p>
<p>Firstly, Kenya’s university curriculum is aimed at pushing students into defined occupations. Most university students complete their education with very limited exposure to liberal education. </p>
<p>For example, students pursuing degrees in engineering or scientific fields aren’t exposed to humanities and the social sciences. And those studying for degrees in business, humanities or the social sciences aren’t exposed to the sciences or mathematics. </p>
<p>The remedy to this narrow specialisation is to introduce a <a href="https://www.aacu.org/leap/what-is-liberal-education">liberal education curriculum model</a>. This has worked well in developed countries such as the US. Liberal education helps to broaden and enrich students’ perspectives. It also equips them with critical and problem solving skills. </p>
<p>Secondly, there’s an urgent need for a more robust but sensible university regulatory regime. As the former Minister for Education, Jacob Kaimenyi <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000164645/lecturers-told-to-uphold-high-moral-values/">noted</a>, universities are suffering from low academic and ethical standards. Many lecturers don’t show up for classes. There’s a reliance on outdated teaching material and students’ transcripts often get misplaced. </p>
<p>Intervention by administrators, policymakers and other stakeholders is required to restore the academic integrity of Kenyan universities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118465/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Mwenda Kithinji does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Factors behind the hits and misses of the higher education sector in Kenya and East Africa. What needs to be done to address the problems.Michael Mwenda Kithinji, Associate Professor, University of Central ArkansasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/740492017-03-07T07:44:17Z2017-03-07T07:44:17ZGhana is 60: An African success story with tough challenges ahead<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/159652/original/image-20170306-20749-zmeu5s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A member of Ghana's navy attends celebrations in Accra to mark the country's 60th independence anniversary. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Christian Thompson</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Black Africa’s first independent nation <a href="http://pulse.com.gh/news/ghana-60-planning-committee-ghana-to-mark-modest-60th-independence-day-id6322394.html">celebrated</a> its 60th independence anniversary this week. A pioneer in many ways, Ghana was the first country in sub Saharan Africa to secure independence from Britain on March 6, 1957.</p>
<p>Ghana’s post-independence experience is also in many ways the African post-colonial story. President Kwame Nkrumah was a founding member of the Organisation of African Unity, the precursor to the African Union. He was also the most influential voice in the Pan-African movement in the early years of independence. </p>
<p>The Pan-Africanist flame burnt brightest at the height of agitation for independence, drawing in the likes of Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Hastings Kamuzu Banda of Malawi and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. But the Pan-Africanist rhetoric was soon extinguished as its leaders secured independence for their countries. </p>
<p>Ghana’s anniversary is well worth celebrating. Over the last six decades Ghana has transitioned from military dictatorships to a well functioning democracy while it’s economy has seen both boom and near bust. Its story offers both lessons and hope that Africa can fashion its own dignified path to peace and democracy. </p>
<h2>The early decades</h2>
<p>Nkrumah’s vision for Ghana was founded on the nationalist demands that drove agitation against colonialism. He sought to steer his young country to significant progress in health and education. Also on the new leader’s agenda were other social and economic issues confronting the country. </p>
<p>This vision was embedded in his <a href="http://nkrumahinfobank.org/article.php?id=355&c=51">seven-year development plan</a> presented to parliament on March 11, 1964. In his view, the 1963-1970 plan would ultimately, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>bring Ghana to the threshold of a modern state based on a highly organised and efficient agricultural and industrial programme. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Nkrumah believed he could completely obliterate the dependency-driven colonial economy he inherited which reduced Ghana to an importer of finished goods sold at exorbitant prices and exporter of raw materials bought cheaply. In its place would be an industrialised economy modelled along a socialist production and distribution system which would make Ghana self-sufficient and self-reliant.</p>
<p>But we will never know what all his success would have looked like. Nkrumah’s vision was cut short by a pro-western military coup in 1966. The planning of it was <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/d251">known to the US</a> which considered Nkrumah a <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/d260">significant threat </a>to its interests in Africa. </p>
<p>The acting special assistant for National Security Affairs R.W. Komer praised the coup as </p>
<blockquote>
<p>…another example of a fortuitous windfall. Nkrumah was doing more to undermine our interests than any other black African. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Some 50 years after his overthrow, however, Nkrumah remains a household name in Ghana because of his investments in education, health and energy. Many of his contributions to other important sectors, such as the building of the Akosombo Dam, the Accra-Tema Motorway, the Komfo Anokye Teaching Hospital, University of Cape Coast, continue to support the economy today.</p>
<p>Nkrumah’s overthrow in 1966 was followed by four military takeovers in 1972, 1978, 1979 and 1981. Two democratically elected governments established in 1969 and 1979 were overthrown by the military. Eventually, the current succession of democratic elections was established in 1993. </p>
<p>In its early years Ghana’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/ghana-lessons-from-nkrumahs-fallout-with-his-economic-adviser-53233">flirtation with socialism</a> dominated its politics. However, the civilian governments that followed steered the country onto a capitalist economic path in which the Bretton Woods institutions often dictated the pace. </p>
<p>But the country has been unable to achieve the envisioned self-reliant and self-sufficient economic policies. But it’s not all gloom and doom.</p>
<h2>Democracy success story</h2>
<p>Ghana has made remarkable progress as one of the success stories in Africa’s democratic project over the past 25 years. Political power has changed three times – all important milestones; </p>
<ul>
<li><p>from the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) to the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in 2001; </p></li>
<li><p>from the ruling NPP to the NDC in 2009; and</p></li>
<li><p>from the ruling NDC back to the NPP in January, 2017. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>With these three turnovers under the belt, Ghana’s democracy has met and exceeded Huntington’s <a href="http://www.e-ir.info/2010/09/23/review-a-second-look-at-huntingtons-third-wave-thesis/">“two turnover tests”</a> thesis making Ghana a satisfactorily <a href="http://www.e-ir.info/2010/09/23/review-a-second-look-at-huntingtons-third-wave-thesis/">consolidated democracy</a>.</p>
<p>Ghanaians have cast aside the authoritarian politics of the past. In its place is expanded political space which has helped to shape and broaden the frontiers of rights. Free speech and association is guaranteed, civil society organisations have greater influence over policy making and media is free to perform its gate-keeping. </p>
<p>It’s no coincidence that Ghana has emerged as one of the most peaceful nations on the globe. According to the <a href="http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/GPI-2016-Report_2.pdf">2016 Global Peace Index</a>, Ghana – ranked 44th – is more peaceful than France – ranked 46th – and the United Kingdom – ranked 47th positions. </p>
<h2>A nation in good health</h2>
<p>Ghana has also made progress in numerous measures of well-being, especially poverty reduction and the provision of health and education is exemplary. It’s among the few countries around the world that have recorded <a href="http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Multidimensional-Poverty-Index-2013-Alkire-Roche-and-Seth.pdf">significant reduction</a> in poverty.</p>
<p>The health care scorecard is one of the most <a href="https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9539.pdf">impressive</a> in sub-Saharan Africa too. Ghana is one of the few countries with a <a href="http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnaec715.pdf">universal</a> health insurance scheme. And there’s a great deal to show from investments in the health sector. The country ranked 7th out of 153 countries on measles immunisation between 1990 and 2008, and while the regional average of measles vaccination rate stood at 75%, Ghana <a href="https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9539.pdf">recorded 91%</a>. </p>
<p>But many challenges remain. </p>
<h2>Yo-yo economic growth</h2>
<p>Economic growth has been <a href="http://www.peacefmonline.com/tools/pdfviewer/jmp/?file=http://media.peacefmonline.com/docs/201609/950108752_265651.pdf">swinging</a> like a pendulum. Over a decade ago the country’s economy was growing at 7%, then roaring ahead with a growth rate of over 14% in 2011. Since then growth has declined considerably. In 2015 it expanded by just 4%. </p>
<p>Currently, Ghana is under an IMF bail-out programme because of its inability to contain its huge budget deficit, rising inflation and falling currency.</p>
<p>The jury is still out on whether the country can turn its economic fortunes around again. Unemployment rates are alarmingly high – at an estimated <a href="http://media.peacefmonline.com/docs/201609/950108752_265651.pdf">48%</a> – and the country faces a power crisis, high depreciation of the currency and high interest rates.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, Ghana is still very much the rising star in some spheres – just struggling in others like many of its African peers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74049/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdul-Jalilu Ateku receives funding from the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the United Kingdom. </span></em></p>Ghana is very much the African rising star 60 years after independence with an exemplary record in health and education. But it’s struggling like many of its peers to meet social and economic targets.Abdul-Jalilu Ateku, PhD Candidate in International Relations, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/662812016-10-04T19:14:38Z2016-10-04T19:14:38ZBetter livestock policies in Africa offer a pathway out of poverty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140264/original/image-20161004-20239-1nrh6j9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Boran cattle are a popular a local breed in eastern Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/am724e/am724e00.pdf">majority</a> of rural households in Africa keep different livestock species. But only a small proportion can afford to keep good quality livestock. This is mainly due to a combination of low government funding and the poor policies of external funders. </p>
<p>Those that do have livestock are faced with the challenges of infectious disease and ill-conceived breeding programmes. This means that they rarely achieve optimum production to meet their household’s economic and nutritional needs.</p>
<p>Households that <a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0120761">keep</a> livestock earn higher incomes, accumulate more wealth and consume more animal-sourced foods. They are also more able to pay for healthcare than households without animals. </p>
<p>I grew up on a small farm in rural Kenya. Although my parents earned government salaries working as civil servants, my education was largely paid for by my father’s livestock herd. </p>
<p>My story is not unique. Many families in sub-Saharan Africa sell off chickens to pay for minor health care costs and larger livestock, such as cattle, to meet major financial demands such as schooling for their children. My cattle-funded education allowed me to become a research veterinarian and study the economic and health benefits of livestock ownership. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/public-health-nutrition/article/child-height-gain-is-associated-with-consumption-of-animal-source-foods-in-livestock-owning-households-in-western-kenya/2280D58216FA4834DB293A7E78F8ECD0">studies show</a> that children who regularly eat eggs grow on average 5% taller than those who do not. Children who consume milk regularly show a 10% higher monthly height gain compared with children without access. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.who.int/nutgrowthdb/jme_brochure2015.pdf?ua=1">One third</a> of children in sub-Saharan Africa are stunted and 5% under five years old suffer from acute malnutrition. Considering all these factors, there is a clear need for good policies that would allow households to own livestock.</p>
<p>Yet <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/africa-agriculture-investment-growth-idUKL8N1BH2V9">less</a> than 10% of most national budgets go to agriculture. And a tiny proportion of that meagre investment is <a href="http://kenyanewsagency.go.ke/en/increase-budget-allocation-for-livestock-sector/">directed</a> to the livestock sector. </p>
<p>With many African governments failing to take the issue seriously, donors end up directing policy through the projects they fund, with often ineffective and wasteful results. There are solutions to this problem. This includes policies that increase investments in veterinary services so they reach populations that cannot afford to pay for them. Or investments in breed improvement of livestock species adapted to local environments. </p>
<h2>Bad policies</h2>
<p>An example of a bad intervention was the <a href="http://fpif.org/structural_adjustment_programs/">Structural Adjustments Programs</a> of the 1980-90’s. These were imposed on governments in developing countries in exchange for funding from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. </p>
<p>One impact they had on livestock was that veterinary services were moved from the public to the private sector. This meant farmers had to meet the full cost of these services. While this seemed to work in areas such as the highlands of East Africa, where the dairy industry and entrepreneurship were well established, small-scale farmers in other rural areas were hit hard. </p>
<p>Around the same period, major crossbreeding programmes were introduced by African governments with funding from partners. The programme mixed genes from temperate climate exotic breeds with indigenous animals. A classic example is the cross between the European Holstein Friesian and the African Zebu cattle. </p>
<p>The cross-bred animals produced more milk but were also more prone to falling sick from tropical diseases because they lacked natural resistance. These programmes performed better in settings where farmers could invest in disease control. But where this was not possible, they were a disaster. </p>
<p>Our previous studies suggested that over time breeding programmes in Western Kenya failed because of <a href="http://www.nature.com/hdy/journal/v113/n4/full/hdy201431a.html">the pressure of disease</a>. As soon as donor-funded programmes ended and disease control measures lapsed, natural selection kicked in. The animal populations reverted back to indigenous cattle as the exotic animals succumbed to disease.</p>
<p>Today, similar initiatives give rural families <a href="https://sendacowgifts.org">cows as gifts</a> to start them off in livestock farming. But many of these donated animals are breeds originally from temperate regions with low immunity to local diseases. The programme’s successes are often measured by the number of cows donated and immediate access to milk, which are great short-term measures. But they are rarely successful in the long-term. In the absence of sustained disease control, the end result is almost always the deaths of animals and continued poverty.</p>
<p>A more sustainable solution would be to use well-adapted African cattle to improve the indigenous gene pool. It would certainly help rural areas where progress towards poverty and hunger alleviation is slowest. But this would take much longer than quick fix cross-breeding or cow donations. </p>
<p>There’s an example of this working well. The production of the Boran cattle found in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia was significantly improved after the best performers were selected and the genes propagated. To date, the <a href="http://www.fao.org/Ag/againfo/programmes/documents/genetics/story/story1.html">improved Boran</a> cattle is a favourite beef breed for ranchers in many countries in Eastern and southern Africa. It is prized for its relatively high disease resistance, growth rates and production.</p>
<p>There is no one-size-fits all solution to address low income levels, malnutrition and disease that affect many communities in rural Africa. But for some at least, owning livestock with optimal production offers a pathway out of poverty.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66281/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thumbi Mwangi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Using well-adapted African cattle to improve the gene pool is more sustainable than quick fix crossbreeding or cow donationsThumbi Mwangi, Clinical assistant professor, Washington State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.