tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/uk-elections-2015-12635/articlesUK elections 2015 – The Conversation2017-06-01T17:11:28Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/787172017-06-01T17:11:28Z2017-06-01T17:11:28ZCorbyn’s curve ball: Election Weekly podcast<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171864/original/file-20170601-25684-1ui0pll.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> </figcaption></figure><p>When Theresa May first called a snap election for June 8, she was brimming with confidence. She was predicted a whopping majority – after all, why would she trigger a vote <a href="https://theconversation.com/crushing-the-opposition-is-victory-guaranteed-for-the-conservatives-election-weekly-podcast-77206">if she wasn’t sure of victory</a>?</p>
<p>Now, with less than a week until polling day, the picture is far less rosy for the incumbent. She has been roundly criticised for failing to engage with citizens in a meaningful way on the campaign trail and continues to struggle to recover from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-theresa-may-cant-escape-the-fallout-from-her-social-care-u-turn-78146">social care policy fiasco</a> that dogged her manifesto launch.</p>
<p>Then came Jeremy Corbyn’s mic drop. Just hours before the BBC was to broadcast its <a href="https://theconversation.com/missing-may-she-was-damned-if-she-did-and-damned-if-she-didnt-join-the-debate-78646">seven-way party debate</a>, the Labour leader agreed to take part. The prime minister, on the other hand, was a no show. This week, we look at the highlights from that debate and ask how serious a mistake it was for May not to take part.</p>
<p>Paul Whiteley, from the University of Essex, is also helping us understand the volatile situation we’re currently seeing in the election polls. Is that forecast about Labour massively narrowing the Conservative lead to be believed? </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/snps-manifesto-for-scotland-is-deliberately-cautious-and-rightly-so-78630">Scottish National Party</a> published its election manifesto this week. Craig McAngus, from the University of Aberdeen, trawled through the document to work out if and when we can expect a second independence referendum, and what that means for Brexit.</p>
<p>But will either of our guests be brave enough to predict the results for general election 2017?</p>
<p>This is the final Election Weekly before polling day but we’ll be back again on June 9 to pore over the results of this snap vote. Join us then to find out who will be at the helm of the good ship United Kingdom as it heads into Brexit … and beyond.</p>
<p>And for some further reading this week, why not join this linguist as he explores the bad language that’s been dropped on the campaign trail by these <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-british-politicians-keep-swearing-on-the-campaign-trail-78124">potty-mouthed politicians</a>.</p>
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<p><em>Music in Election Weekly is Chasin’ It, by Jason Shaw. A big thank you to City University London’s Department of Journalism for letting us use their studios.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78717/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
With Labour closing in on the Conservatives in the polls, we discuss the likely outcome of the UK general election 2017.Laura Hood, Senior Politics Editor, Assistant Editor, The Conversation (UK edition)Annabel Bligh, Business & Economy Editor and Podcast Producer, The Conversation UKLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/785542017-05-31T10:23:10Z2017-05-31T10:23:10ZHow to settle social care funding once and for all<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171503/original/file-20170530-23653-ayxt92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Social care needs taking care of.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Branding it a “dementia tax” was inspired – opponents of the Conservative Party’s election manifesto <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4a2a842e-3ed9-11e7-9d56-25f963e998b2">railed against</a> its fundamentally unfair proposals for dealing with the social care costs of increasing numbers of old people with dementia. Theresa May’s U-turn took less than a long weekend. But there is still massive unfairness in the provision of care for those no longer able to look after themselves.</p>
<p>First, there is the issue of fairness with respect to the illness lottery. If a member of your family gets cancer, the National Health Service will offer the best treatment for as long as it takes to cure them, or provide palliative care in a hospice free of charge. If a member of your family gets dementia, the NHS tends to keep its distance, apart from an occasional visit from the local dementia nurse, to check how the dementia is progressing. </p>
<p>Only if there is also a health problem, such as an ulcer or an infection, does the NHS swing into action. The contrast between “health care” and “social care” is marked. And let’s forget the other option <a href="https://www.continuing-healthcare.co.uk/do-i-have-to-pay-for-care-home-fees?">of “continuing care”</a> funding for long-term illnesses because it is far from clear cut and has complex eligibility criteria.</p>
<p>There is also a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/dec/12/social-care-spending-falling-postcode-lottery">postcode lottery</a> on the provision of care. Help with care for someone living with dementia in their own home comes not via the NHS but via the local authority. If the patient has more than £23,250 in savings, the help comes in one of three forms: either nothing (you’re told to use private care agencies); a limited, fee-paying service; or, if you’re very lucky, a notional lump sum which the patient’s family can choose how best to spend. Which you get depends on which local authority is responsible. </p>
<p>Another lottery depends on whether you are cared for at home or in a home. At the moment, if care is provided at home, the value of the home is not included in the calculation of assets. But if your family member goes into a care home, the local authority can require the sale of the home <a href="http://www.ageuk.org.uk/home-and-care/care-homes/the-means-test-and-your-property/">to pay the fees</a> – when there is not enough income – except in certain special circumstances. Even the ability to negotiate with the local authority <a href="https://www.moneyadviceservice.org.uk/en/articles/deferred-payment-agreements-for-long-term-care#am-i-eligible-to-use-a-deferred-payment-agreement">to defer the sale of the home</a>, for example if someone is still living there, is another postcode lottery.</p>
<h2>A logical solution</h2>
<p>Just as with cancer, it is unfair to penalise someone financially just because they have a degenerative condition. As with cancer, not everyone is affected. So the logical solution is to increase national insurance or income tax, which is paid for by everyone. That, after all, is how the NHS is funded. </p>
<p>And we’re talking small beer here. NHS costs and social security benefits linked to pensioners together account for £133 billion, whereas the total bill for social care for older people <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ec9fa110-3ef9-11e7-82b6-896b95f30f58">is just £7 billion</a>. The savings which May was trying to make on social care were worth around £2 billion; she’s promised an additional £8 billion for the NHS. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.moneyadviceservice.org.uk/en/articles/self-funding-your-long-term-care-your-options#other-options-for-funding-your-long-term-care">absence of affordable insurance products</a> to cover potential care costs of hundreds of thousands of pounds – whether at home or in a care home – the only fair solution is to pay for this small element of care the same way as the NHS, through income tax. If people with more valuable property are expected to pay more towards their care – and this is a political decision – then some form of tax related to wealth or property will increase costs for the asset rich. </p>
<p>But if people needing social care are expected, unlike cancer patients, to contribute to their costs, then the <a href="http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130221130239/https://www.wp.dh.gov.uk/carecommission/files/2011/07/Fairer-Care-Funding-Report.pdf">Dilnot Report</a> offers the solution: a floor and a cap. </p>
<p>The report’s proposal was, like May’s, to have a floor of £100,000 in assets, below which social care for the patient would be provided for free. That is a sensible decision. But, importantly, the Dilnot Report also proposed a cap of £35,000, precisely so as not to penalise unfairly those who will need long-term, full-time care. </p>
<p>So, up to £35,000 might be taken from the patient’s assets, with accommodation costs in a care home or at home being paid for by the patient’s pension income. Such a cap was deemed feasible to fund using part of their housing wealth, either through downsizing, taking out an interest-only loan tied to their house or new mortgage-based solutions. This was <a href="http://www.ageuk.org.uk/home-and-care/care-homes/social-care-funding-changes/care-cap-and-means-test-changes/">later increased</a> to £72,000 by David Cameron’s government and was due to come into force in 2020, as was a cap on accommodation costs of £12,000. </p>
<p>In contrast, May’s <a href="https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto">manifesto commitment</a> was simply to remove the cap. The entire estate of the patient – apart from the last £100,000 – could go toward care costs over which the family had little control. It was fair in one way only: it treated people being cared for at home equally with those in a home. But it was completely unfair for a condition which, like many cancers, has a term and severity which cannot be forecast in advance. </p>
<p>Since U-turning on the idea and saying there will now be a cap on what people must pay towards their own social care costs, May has refused to say what the cap would be. Instead she <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2017-40005257">has emphasised</a> the need for more consultation on the issue.</p>
<p>But there is no need for another green paper, or additional discussion. The best brains have already discussed and evaluated the options. It is only the political will to increase income or wealth taxes that is lacking (as well as any insurance solutions). So, let’s implement the Dilnot Report’s recommendations on social care cost floors and caps and move on, as with cancer, to trying to cure dementia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78554/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Janette Rutterford does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Theresa May’s U-turn on social care funding shows how hard it is to fix. But there is a logical solution.Janette Rutterford, Research Professor, True Potential Centre for the Public Understanding of Finance, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/757572017-05-30T10:55:07Z2017-05-30T10:55:07ZThe UK has its economic focus all wrong – why investment-led growth is needed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171149/original/file-20170526-6367-1wk6ctf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The UK has had a chronic lack of investment. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Scrutiny of the party manifestos has so far been focused on the differences in their <a href="https://theconversation.com/manifesto-check-do-labour-party-tax-and-spending-plans-add-up-77883">“tax and spend” policies</a>. But the approach to investment is just as important. As the economist Marianna Mazzucato <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUsWd2OrEkE">said recently</a> on BBC Newsnight, the UK economy desperately needs investment-led growth.</p>
<p>In fact, dealing with the UK’s chronic lack of investment is as important as getting the Brexit negotiations right – and much more important than balancing the books. Attempts to revive the UK economy since the financial crisis have so far simply inflated the prices of existing assets such as property and shares. Economic growth has been driven solely by an expansion of consumer credit, which builds domestic debt. This only stores up later economic problems. As I argue in the book, <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Public-Policy-beyond-the-Financial-Crisis-An-International-Comparative/Haynes/p/book/9780415674393">Public Policy Beyond the Financial Crisis</a>, the UK needs an investment-led recovery that builds real value.</p>
<p>It is encouraging to see political manifestos for the general election that talk up national investment strategies – as the major parties do. But it is worrying when these ideas appear secondary to balancing the government deficit. Investment should be a bigger priority than a government surplus. UK investment is <a href="http://www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/economic-indicators/Investment_Percentage_of_GDP/">low and below average</a> compared to its competitors.</p>
<h2>New investment needed</h2>
<p>Just before the election was called, the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/treasury-committee/inquiries1/parliament-2015/post-2008-uk-monetary-policy-16-17/publications/">published evidence</a> for its inquiry into monetary policy. Some of the evidence shows that the reason ordinary people have been left behind is because of the failure of policies such as quantitative easing where money was injected into the economy by the Bank of England purchasing financial assets. This is a link even Theresa May made in her <a href="http://www.cityam.com/250794/theresa-may-criticises-bank-england-making-people-poorer">speech</a> at the most recent Conservative Party conference.</p>
<p>The criticism is that such policies help the rich get richer. By causing asset inflation, they increase inequality. Evidence submitted by the <a href="http://neweconomics.org/">New Economics Foundation</a> think tank tells of the need for <a href="http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/treasury-committee/effectiveness-and-impact-of-post2008-uk-monetary-policy/written/48262.html">productive investment</a>. This is investment that creates new assets to strengthen the post-Brexit economy such as new housing, transport, renewable energy and digital technology.</p>
<p>Investment in this kind of new infrastructure is a reliable path to future economic growth and stability. As the UK starts the uncertainty of the Brexit process, a national investment strategy is the best hope for securing future growth.</p>
<h2>What the manifestos say</h2>
<p>The party manifestos take seriously the issue about getting investment to flow to the right productive places. The Conservatives <a href="https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto">promise</a> a £23 billion National Productivity Investment Fund. It will target housing, R&D, skills and digital infrastructure. The policy promises to invest a total of £170 billion by 2022. </p>
<p>Labour <a href="http://www.labour.org.uk/page/-/Images/manifesto-2017/labour-manifesto-2017.pdf">say</a> that borrowing will be used for investment. A National Transformation Fund will invest £250 billion over ten years. There is a commitment to sharing investment across all regions. A major priority is new railways. Low carbon energy generation also gets a mention, as does super fast broadband. The National Transformation Fund will be facilitated by a National Investment Bank. This will have a firm footing in the devolved regions. It will set the priorities for lending.</p>
<p>The Liberal Democrats <a href="http://www.libdems.org.uk/manifesto">commit</a> to a £100 billion package of additional infrastructure investment. House building is a top priority with a target set of 300,000 new units per year. A British Housing and Infrastructure Bank is proposed as the vehicle to allocate this productive credit. Public money will attract private credit. </p>
<p>The Scottish National Party will introduce an <a href="https://www.snp.org/manifesto_plain_text_extended">investment fund</a> for small and medium sized businesses with an overall focus on raising productivity. The Green Party <a href="https://www.greenparty.org.uk/green-guarantee/">wants</a> investment to be targeted at community credit and local green investment.</p>
<h2>Best chance for growth</h2>
<p>It’s clear that investment is the best chance for economic growth. Yet much of the economic debate remains fixated on the size of the country’s budget deficit – with the major parties at pains to show how they will “balance the books”.</p>
<p>But a government surplus cannot even offer stability. In fact, economist <a href="https://stephaniekelton.com/">Stephanie Kelton</a> at the University of Missouri–Kansas City suggests that a surplus can lead to other problems. When the government is in surplus, an excess of credit flows to private investors. For example, the “<a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/how-bill-clintons-balanced-budget-destroyed-the-economy-2012-9?IR=T">Clinton surplus</a>” of the 1990s is blamed for the private credit binge of the following decade. This resulted in the great financial crash.</p>
<p>Economists are closely <a href="http://kommunekredit.com/Files/Filer/KK_dk/nyheder/Nordic%20sovereigns.pdf">watching</a> the growing domestic credit growth in new government surplus countries such as <a href="https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/02/17/2119329/how-will-the-oil-crash-affect-norway/">Norway</a> and <a href="https://www.thelocal.se/20161220/sweden-reports-a-budget-surplus-for-2016-pats-itself-on-back">Sweden</a>. This credit flow does not necessarily feed productive growth. It often just pushes up <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/21/soaring-house-prices-in-sweden-an-unnecessary-reality-analyst.html">house prices</a>.</p>
<p>With parliament dissolved, the monetary policy inquiry is frozen, and the respected chair, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/apr/25/andrew-tyrie-stand-down-conservative-mp">Andrew Tyrie</a> has stood down as an MP. Meanwhile, the prime minister’s election campaign is focused on Brexit and “<a href="https://theconversation.com/strong-and-stable-leadership-inside-the-conservatives-election-slogan-77121">strong and stable leadership</a>”. There is a danger that the importance of changing monetary policy will be forgotten.</p>
<p>The mothballing of the Treasury Select Committee inquiry is disappointing to those who have been campaigning for new approaches to banking, credit allocation and investment. With some recent bad news about inflation overtaking wages, will Theresa May remember the important link between monetary policy and inequality?</p>
<p>The current election debates need to keep the review of monetary policy alive and move beyond a focus on fiscal credibility. The campaign group <a href="http://positivemoney.org/">Positive Money</a> is working hard to keep the issue on the election agenda. They ask the public to challenge candidates about the <a href="http://positivemoney.org/2017/05/election-video/">role of the Bank of England and monetary policy</a>. Productive investment is what the British economy most needs at the present time.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75757/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philip Haynes has received previous funding from the ESRC, government departments and voluntary organisations.</span></em></p>Dealing with the UK’s chronic lack of investment is as important as getting the Brexit negotiations right – and much more important than balancing the books.Philip Haynes, Professor of Public Policy, University of BrightonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/784342017-05-26T21:24:42Z2017-05-26T21:24:42ZAre UK pollsters heading for another embarrassing election?<p>Following the political surprises of 2015 and 2016, there has been <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2016/11/polling-dead">much reflection</a> and debate on the accuracy of the polls in the run-up to the impending snap-election of 2017. It is fair to say that, although perhaps somewhat <a href="http://www.aapor.org/Education-Resources/Reports/An-Evaluation-of-2016-Election-Polls-in-the-U-S.aspx">unfair on the pollsters</a>, the EU referendum and US presidential election have exacerbated – rather than healed – the widespread loss of public faith in the polls induced by the 2015 general election debacle. </p>
<p>So are the pollsters heading for further ignominy on June 8? Given the <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/news/2017/05/25/are-tories-losing-ground-or-regaining-it/">substantial-if-narrowing</a> lead the Conservatives currently hold in the polls, this seems unlikely. </p>
<p>Polls are judged first and foremost on whether they correctly indicate which party will form the next government and, as the chart below shows, were the Conservatives not to win an overall majority on June 8, we would be looking at a polling miss of unprecedented magnitude. The largest polling error on record was in <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/general-election-2015/11532150/Campaign-Calculus-How-wrong-are-the-polls.html">1992</a>, when the Conservative lead over Labour was underestimated by an average of nine percentage points – about the same as the Conservatives’ current polling advantage.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171165/original/file-20170526-6421-1npbiah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171165/original/file-20170526-6421-1npbiah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171165/original/file-20170526-6421-1npbiah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171165/original/file-20170526-6421-1npbiah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171165/original/file-20170526-6421-1npbiah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171165/original/file-20170526-6421-1npbiah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171165/original/file-20170526-6421-1npbiah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171165/original/file-20170526-6421-1npbiah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>But correctly predicting which party will obtain an overall majority in a relatively uncompetitive election isn’t in itself a very impressive feat. It’s still possible that, when judged on the basis of statistical error rather than picking the winner, the pollsters will fare little better in 2017 than they did in 2015 – if not even worse.</p>
<p>If that happens, it won’t be down to complacency. After the 2015 election, the British Polling Council (BPC) and the Market Research Society set up an official inquiry to work out why the polls had failed so badly. The resulting report <a href="http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/3789/1/Report_final_revised.pdf">concluded</a> that the primary reason for the polling errors was the use of unrepresentative samples. </p>
<p>The pollsters’ recruitment methods meant their final samples included too many Labour voters and too few Conservative ones – and the weighting and adjustment procedures applied to the raw data did not mitigate this basic problem to any notable degree. While the inquiry could not rule out a modest late swing towards the Conservatives, initial claims that the polling errors were due to “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/08/election-2015-how-shy-tories-confounded-polls-cameron-victory">shy Tories</a>” (respondents who deliberately misreported their intentions) or “<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/labour/11599365/Lazy-Labour-lost-Ed-Miliband-the-election-says-pollster.html">lazy Labour</a>” (Labour voters who said they’d vote but ultimately didn’t) did not stand up to scrutiny.</p>
<h2>Fixing it</h2>
<p>The inquiry made a number of recommendations for changes in how polls are carried out and how their findings are presented to both media clients and the public. It also proposed amendments to the BPC rules on the disclosure and reporting of polls, most notably that pollsters should provide a clear statement on weighting procedures and should detail any methodological changes made since the previous published poll. </p>
<p>The BPC’s <a href="http://www.britishpollingcouncil.org/bpc-inquiry-report/">official response</a> to these recommendations indicated that it would make procedural changes to its rules either immediately, or during the course of 2017, while it would be up to individual polling organisations to implement recommendations relating to methodological practice, and subjected to a review in 2019. Theresa May’s surprise decision to call an early election means that, understandably, most of the recommendations of the inquiry haven’t yet been implemented.</p>
<p>This is not to say that the pollsters are approaching June 8 with precisely the same methodologies they used in 2015. On the contrary, the polling industry appears to have made a number of changes to its sampling and weighting procedures. Some changes are intended to improve sample composition: recruiting more politically disengaged people into online surveys, extending fieldwork periods, increasing sample sizes and so on. </p>
<p>Other pollsters have introduced new quota-setting and weighting procedures, adjusting samples by self-reported political interest, past vote and education, using modelling to estimate the probability that respondents will actually vote, and <a href="http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/faq-dont-knows">reallocating “don’t knows”</a> differently across parties. </p>
<p>But frustratingly for the pollsters, of course, we will not know if these changes are working until June 9.</p>
<h2>Coming together</h2>
<p>The 2015 polling inquiry also found that the pollsters had “herded” around an inaccurate estimate of the Conservative-Labour margin, and that this consensus contributed to the collective sense of shock at the election result. The situation in 2017, however, is rather different. </p>
<p>There are suggestions this time that the polls are <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/june2017/2017/05/were-easy-target-how-tory-manifesto-pledge-will-tear-families-apart">overstating Labour’s performance</a>, a pattern that has been a consistent feature of UK polling since the general election of 1979. This can be seen in the chart below, which plots the difference between poll estimates and Labour’s eventual vote share by days from the election. </p>
<p>The black line is the average of all polls, while grey lines are poll estimates across individual elections. What the chart shows is that, while previous election polls do converge toward the result over the final three weeks of the campaign, they still tend to overestimate the Labour vote – even on the very eve of the election.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171166/original/file-20170526-6380-594nui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171166/original/file-20170526-6380-594nui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171166/original/file-20170526-6380-594nui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171166/original/file-20170526-6380-594nui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171166/original/file-20170526-6380-594nui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171166/original/file-20170526-6380-594nui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171166/original/file-20170526-6380-594nui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171166/original/file-20170526-6380-594nui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If pollsters continue to adjust their sampling and weighting procedures during the campaign, a belief that Labour will end up under-performing their polling will create implicit incentives to make methodological choices that reduce the Labour share in vote intention estimates. If the received wisdom is correct, this could reduce the polls’ average error – but if recent events have taught us anything it’s that, in politics, received wisdom is often wrong.</p>
<p>In the meantime it’s worth remembering another conclusion of the 2015 polling inquiry: that observers tend to endow opinion polls with greater levels of precision than they are capable of delivering. Polling, after all, is difficult. It involves hitting a moving target by persuading reluctant and reflexive citizens to provide truthful responses to socially loaded questions for little or no return. </p>
<p>Small wonder, then, that the average error on the Conservative-Labour margin between 1945, when political polling in the UK began, and 2015 is in the region of 4-5%. As yet, there’s no particular reason to assume 2017 will represent a radical departure from the historical record.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78434/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Will Jennings has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrick Sturgis receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and the Wellcome Trust </span></em></p>Polling is difficult – and everyone except pollsters overestimates how accurate polls are.Will Jennings, Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, University of SouthamptonPatrick Sturgis, Professor of Research Methodology, Director of National Centre for Research Methods, University of SouthamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/779712017-05-18T15:28:18Z2017-05-18T15:28:18ZLabour and the Conservatives offer two different routes to a ‘living’ wage<p>A competition among political parties to promise a more attractive minimum or “living” wage is new to British elections. The National Minimum Wage (NMW) is now nearly 20 years old, but Labour in power was always cautious about its level. The Conservatives, meanwhile, initially opposed it. </p>
<p>But a burgeoning living wage movement and a perceived “living standards crisis” help explain a new bidding war. In the 2015 election, Labour promised to raise the NMW to <a href="http://www.labour.org.uk/page/-/BritainCanBeBetter-TheLabourPartyManifesto2015.pdf">£8 an hour</a> by 2020; trumped by the Conservatives’ £9 in <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/summer-budget-2015-key-announcements">the subsequent budget</a>, and now Labour’s £10 <a href="http://www.labour.org.uk/page/-/Images/manifesto-2017/Labour%20Manifesto%202017.pdf">manifesto pledge</a>. </p>
<p>Since the minimum wage was £6.50 just two years ago, all these promises, if followed through, will have a substantial impact in changing Britain’s low pay culture. But what is the difference between the two main party promises now on offer? And as policies, are they sustainable or reckless?</p>
<p>The most obvious difference in the manifesto pledges is that Labour promises £10 by 2020 (a 33% increase from 2017) and <a href="https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto">the Conservatives</a> promise 60% of median pay which is <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/604442/A_rising_floor_-_the_latest_evidence_on_the_National_Living_Wage_and_youth_rates_of_the_minimum_wage.pdf">projected</a> to be £8.75 by 2020. This is a 17% increase, and less than the £9 pledged in 2015, because median pay is forecast to grow more slowly than previously expected. </p>
<p>But two crucial factors beyond the crude rate promised will influence how the “living wage” debate plays out in the next few years: the basis for setting and raising it, and the ages of workers to whom it applies.</p>
<h2>How it’s set</h2>
<p>In setting the rate, the Conservatives have opted to peg the National Living Wage (NLW – a rebranded NMW for over-25s) to average pay. On the one hand, this belies its branding as a “living” wage. Unlike the voluntary, accredited <a href="https://www.livingwage.org.uk/">Living Wage</a> which is derived from <a href="http://www.minimumincomestandard.org/">our research</a> at Loughborough University and based on what people actually need for a minimum living standard, the Conservatives’ NLW has no reference to living costs. </p>
<p>But the commitment to raise the minimum from <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/571631/LPC_spring_report_2016.pdf">52% to 60% of median pay</a> – and to keep it there – does mark a bold departure in sharing the fruits of future growth. Indeed, pegging incomes (such as pensions or benefits) to rising earnings has often been a more favourable formula than pegging them to living costs, since earnings rose steadily in real terms.</p>
<p>However, times have changed. In the past few years, living costs have sometimes risen faster than earnings, making an earnings link less beneficial than it once was. Moreover, the “real” living wage espoused by Labour can also rise if the government cuts the help it gives working families, for example through tax credits. This is what George Osborne did when announcing the Conservative Party’s NLW in its 2015 budget, which would have caused families <a href="https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/will-2015-summer-budget-improve-living-standards-2020#jl_downloads_0">a net loss</a>. So a real living wage requires employers to make good on any cuts in state support.</p>
<p>But what will be the effect of much higher minimum wages on employment? In my <a href="http://agendapub.com/index.php/books/political-economy?view=title&id=18">new book</a> with Laura Valadez on the living wage, I show that evidence from the UK and US overwhelmingly contradicts the economic prediction that higher minimum wages automatically mean fewer jobs. Yet we also point out that both countries have been highly cautious in setting the minimum wage, and are about to become much less so – New York and California are <a href="http://www.npr.org/2016/04/01/472716122/california-new-york-to-raise-minimum-wages-to-15-an-hour">planning phased increases to US$15</a>, over twice the federal minimum. In the UK, a statutory minimum of £9 or £10 will have a vastly different impact on labour markets from the voluntary adoption of a real living wage by the 3,000 employers who have so far felt able to do so. </p>
<h2>Whether it’s tied to age</h2>
<p>The most radical aspect of the Labour version, and potentially the most risky in terms of employment, is that it would apply from age 18, unlike the Conservatives’ from age 25. Someone who is 20, who in 2017 can be paid £5.60 per hour, would be guaranteed £10 three years later – if they were still being offered jobs. </p>
<p>Our book shows how in Portugal, ending minimum wage youth rates was followed by a substantial “displacement” effect, with fewer jobs going to less experienced workers. This effect is also <a href="http://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2014/08/Beyond_the_Bottom_Line_-_FINAL.pdf">predicted</a> in the UK. On the other hand, under Conservative plans, a growing gap between the minimum for 24- and 25-year-olds could damage job prospects for the latter, as employers in casual industries such as restaurants and hospitality dump low-paid workers on their 25th birthdays. (<a href="http://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2016/07/NLW-first-100-days.pdf">Early evidence</a> shows some employers already favouring younger workers.)</p>
<p>In adopting greater ambitions for tackling low pay in Britain, therefore, politicians should not throw all their former caution to the winds, but look carefully at how their policies are affecting the labour market as they unfold. </p>
<p>Producing a formula that can contribute to higher living standards without destroying people’s job prospects requires a delicate balance. After the election, the simplicity of the manifesto promise will have to be followed by careful, evidence-based delivery if a living wage is to be sustainable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77971/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Donald Hirsch is a member of the Labour Party.</span></em></p>Crucially, they differ in how they are calculated and the ages of workers that they apply to.Donald Hirsch, Professor of Social Policy, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/778012017-05-16T11:39:11Z2017-05-16T11:39:11ZLabour’s manifesto shows it is the true party of workers’ rights<p>It cannot be an accident that Jeremy Corbyn launched what may be his one and only general election manifesto in the city of Bradford. One of the forerunners of today’s Corbyn-led Labour Party was the Independent Labour Party (ILP). It was a full-blooded left wing party, <a href="http://www.independentlabour.org.uk/main/2011/11/03/ilp-history-beginnings-in-bradford/">founded in 1893 in Bradford</a>. And, Keir Hardie, the ILP’s first leader and founder of the Labour Party, has frequently been cited by Corbyn <a href="http://jeremycorbyn.org.uk/articles/jeremy-corbyn-keir-hardie-memorial-lecture/">as one of his inspirations</a>. </p>
<p>Both Hardie and the ILP were very strong advocates of workers’ rights, having emerged from the then nascent union movement. Corbyn, a former full-time officer of one of the forerunner’s of the biggest union in Britain, <a href="https://www.unison.org.uk/">UNISON</a>, is equally a very strong advocate of workers’ rights. This shows up in the publication today of Labour’s general election manifesto.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169519/original/file-20170516-11945-9i8v2k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169519/original/file-20170516-11945-9i8v2k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=792&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169519/original/file-20170516-11945-9i8v2k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=792&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169519/original/file-20170516-11945-9i8v2k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=792&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169519/original/file-20170516-11945-9i8v2k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=996&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169519/original/file-20170516-11945-9i8v2k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=996&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169519/original/file-20170516-11945-9i8v2k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=996&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Keir Hardie.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AKeir_Hardie_LOC_ggbain_01224.jpg">US Library of Congress</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>With the Conservatives trying to muscle in on traditional Labour territory by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/may/15/are-tories-workers-party-labour-polling-figures-suggest-they-are">painting themselves as the party of workers</a>, it’s worth taking a closer look to see which party truly represents workers. </p>
<p>Among the most significant of the pledges in the <a href="http://www.labour.org.uk/index.php/manifesto2017/fair-deal-at-work">manifesto on rights at work</a> are:</p>
<ul>
<li>All workers equal rights from day one, whether part-time or full-time<br></li>
<li>Banning zero hours contracts so that every worker gets a guaranteed number of hours each week<br></li>
<li>Ending the use of overseas labour to undercut domestic wages and conditions</li>
<li>Repealing the Trade Union Act 2016 and rolling out collective bargaining by sector<br></li>
<li>Guaranteeing unions a right to access workplaces to represent members<br></li>
<li>Raising the minimum wage to the level of the living wage<br></li>
<li>Ending the public sector pay cap<br></li>
<li>Instituting a maximum pay ratio of 20:1 in the public sector and companies bidding for public contracts<br></li>
<li>Banning unpaid internships<br></li>
<li>Abolishing employment tribunal fees<br></li>
<li>Giving self-employed workers the status of workers<br></li>
<li>Setting up a commission to modernise the law around employment status<br></li>
<li>Creating a Ministry of Labour with the resources to enforce workers’ rights<br></li>
</ul>
<p>These pledges are essentially a replication of A Manifesto for Labour Law <a href="https://issuu.com/instituteofemploymentrights/docs/preview_a_manifesto_for_labour_law">by the Institute of Employment Rights</a> in June 2016, devised in conjunction with labour law academics to promote healthy policy for workers.</p>
<h2>Labour’s worker problem</h2>
<p>The socialist left <a href="https://socialistworker.co.uk/art/40491/Labours+betrayals+let+Tories+back+in">has often argued</a> that Labour has failed to inspire the loyalty of workers, and union members especially, by being insufficiently radical. Consequently, the argument goes, there was less than a compelling reason to vote for Labour. Along with pledges to bring the water industry, railways, Royal Mail and some energy companies back into public ownership (which should reduce pressure on workers’ wages and conditions), this cannot be said to be the case this time round. </p>
<p>Some have criticised Corbyn’s Labour for giving into the allegedly vested and backward interest of unions. As Martin Kettle of the Guardian <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/11/labour-manifesto-ideas-right-state-role">argued</a>, “union power is not the same as workers’ rights”.</p>
<p>At one level, this is a valid point. With only around a quarter of workers <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/525938/Trade_Union_Membership_2015_-_Statistical_Bulletin.pdf">now holding union membership</a>, workers cannot rely on unions any time soon to be able to effectively defend their rights and interests. </p>
<p>But when one recognises that the implementation of workers’ rights has <a href="https://books.google.es/books/about/Union_Organizing.html?id=R8E2E-NxvfcC&redir_esc=y">always needed the help of unions</a> because they are the only sizeable independent organisations with the resources to do so, this point loses its force. Unions inform workers of their rights and help them apply them. Plus, unions have always helped more than just their members because employers apply the gains of union negotiated deals to all employees. </p>
<h2>Wider significance</h2>
<p>But focusing on the union aspect blinds critics to the actual significance of Labour’s manifesto. This is that, compared to what the Tories are proposing, Labour prioritises collective rights over individual rights so that workers can act together to advance their interests. Labour’s manifesto recognises that the workers are stronger together, echoing a fundamental belief of Karl Marx that the condition of the freedom of the individual is the <a href="https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2004/Kim.pdf">condition of the freedom of all</a>.</p>
<p>Indeed, without collective rights in law, especially with regard to the right to strike, any collective bargaining can easily end up being <a href="http://www.tradeunionfreedom.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Kill-the-Bill-Final.pdf">merely collective begging</a>.</p>
<p>The most obvious case in point concerns the right to sectoral collective bargaining, which Labour has emphasised in its manifesto. In Britain, companies in the same sector compete primarily against each other on the basis of their labour costs. Hence, there is a competitive advantage to cut wages and conditions as the principle route to profitability. </p>
<p>But by providing a statutory basis to sectoral collective bargaining, all companies in a sector would be compelled to furnish workers with the same minimum terms and conditions. No longer would they compete on labour costs in a “race to the bottom”. And, their attention would turn to improving productivity through investment in technology and training. </p>
<p>With stronger collective rights, applied and enforced with the help of unions, both unions and workers’ rights would be immeasurably strengthened. Time will shortly tell whether Labour’s manifesto will help it regain the support of working class voters. Or whether Theresa May’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/may/15/are-tories-workers-party-labour-polling-figures-suggest-they-are">pitch</a> to be the workers’ friend will gain sufficient traction. </p>
<p>If Corbyn is successful, it will be a fitting tribute to the heritage of Bradford. It was here that an almighty 19-week strike at the city’s Manningham Mills textile factory by some 5,000 workers over wage cuts in 1891 gave a big spur <a href="http://www.socialistparty.org.uk/articles/11928">to the founding of the ILP</a>. It will also have been fitting that Labour launched the manifesto at the University of Bradford given that it started out life in 1832 as the <a href="http://www.bradford.ac.uk/news/university-in-profile/history-and-the-university/">Bradford Mechanics Institute</a>, an organisation designed to help working class people gain the necessary skills for the ever changing world of work.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77801/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregor Gall is editor of the Scottish Left Review magazine and director of the Jimmy Reid Foundation.</span></em></p>With the Conservatives trying to muscle in on traditional Labour territory by painting themselves as the party of workers, it’s worth taking a closer look at their promises.Gregor Gall, Professor of Industrial Relations, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/775222017-05-10T15:53:21Z2017-05-10T15:53:21ZNo charges in Conservative party election spending affair – here’s why<p>The Crown Prosecution Service <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/tory-election-spending-rules-latest-no-charges-cps-conservatives-candidates-electoral-law-crown-a7727711.html">has ruled</a> that no charges will be brought against Conservative Party candidates following an investigation into how 2015 campaign spending was reported. </p>
<p>The ruling came around ten years after several of Tony Blair’s close colleagues were arrested in the so-called <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2007/oct/11/partyfunding.uk">“cash-for-honours”</a> inquiry – an investigation into loans to the Labour Party and subsequent receipt of life peerages that shook the political landscape. Although the CPS brought no charges then, that episode served to throw certain loopholes and discrepancies into sharper focus.</p>
<p>When questioned about the utility of the police investigation into the Labour party case, then Met Assistant Commissioner John Yates offered words that seem particularly apt following this latest CPS decision:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>These types of cases are very, very difficult to prove because they are bargains made in secret. Both parties have an absolute vested interest in those secrets not coming out.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is the very challenge that faced the CPS in the Conservative election expenses probe.</p>
<h2>Going back to the start</h2>
<p>The accusation in the Conservative case was that the party incorrectly reported spending on a number of things – including expenses for a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-conservative-election-expenses-saga-explained-59484">Battle Bus</a> and hotel rooms for activists – as local spending when they might actually have been national expenditure. In electoral law there are (seemingly) strict rules and limits on what qualifies in each category.</p>
<p>In March, the Electoral Commission levied a <a href="https://theconversation.com/q-a-how-the-conservatives-landed-a-70-000-fine-after-an-expenses-scandal-74711">£70,000 fine</a> to the Conservative Party – the largest ever amount – for these discrepancies. The Electoral Commission found that three parliamentary by-elections in 2014 “understated the value” of the party’s spending. It also ruled that some payments “were not party campaign spending” and others “omitted other party campaign payments”.</p>
<p>That there was wrongdoing is beyond doubt. The Conservative Party did misreport some local spending as national spending – that was the specific remit of the Electoral Commission investigation. But the question for the CPS was whether that spending had been deliberately misreported and whether a mistake had been made.</p>
<h2>The burden of proof</h2>
<p>The specific offence which the CPS was investigating was section 82(6) of the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/2">Representation of the People Act</a> (RPA). This states that “if a candidate or election agent knowingly makes the declaration required by this section falsely, he shall be guilty of a corrupt practice”. The CPS must prove that any suspects knew spending returns were inaccurate, and therefore acted dishonestly in signing the declaration.</p>
<p>In this case the CPS found that although there was evidence to suggest the returns were indeed inaccurate (essentially the findings of the Electoral Commission) there was “insufficient evidence to prove to the criminal standard that any candidate or agent was dishonest”.</p>
<h2>Whitewash?</h2>
<p>Within minutes of the decision being announced #toryelectionfraud was trending on Twitter, alongside accusations that both the Electoral Commission and the CPS had effectively sold democracy down the river. But this is no whitewash. The legal bar in this case was simply too high. The CPS had to effectively prove intent to mislead. That proof was not found.</p>
<p>The distinction between local and national expense can lead to a rather sticky wicket for the Electoral Commission to play on. Party expenditure law is, to say the least, rather complex. There can be quite legitimate disagreements around what classifies as local and national spend. These distinctions can often be quite confusing.</p>
<p>A perfect example from this election is the number of <a href="https://www.buzzfeed.com/jimwaterson/how-the-conservatives-are-using-local-adverts-to-get-around?utm_term=.qabMWp03z#.fu3kKazvn">“wraparound” adverts</a> that the Conservative Party has placed in local newspapers. At a glance this might look like a classic example of local expenditure. These are (presumably) aimed at a number of Conservative target seats around the country. However, because they mention only Theresa May and the Conservative Party, rather than specific constituency candidates and local issues, they classify as national spend. Like a national billboard, wrapped around a local paper.</p>
<p>Again, there can be legitimate arguments about whether that situation is right or fair, but there can be no arguments that it is not (legally) legitimate.</p>
<p>What is often forgotten when discussing the professionalisation of politics, slick campaigning machines and the potential of shadowy electoral conspiracies, is that much of the donkey work on campaigns is done by volunteers. In recommending regulation, there has to be a fine line between catching genuine dishonest intent and discouraging civic engagement. There’s no point in prosecuting poor Doris or Derek from the local constituency party because they offered to be the treasurer that year (when no-one else volunteered) for not fully grasping the ins and outs of the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/41/contents">Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act</a> or the RPA.</p>
<h2>What now?</h2>
<p>An <a href="http://www.kentlive.news/prosecutors-will-announce-whether-south-thanet-mp-craig-mackinlay-faces-charges-today/story-30323927-detail/story.html">investigation in Thanet</a> is ongoing, but in all other respects: case closed. But while the Conservative funding is not – and should not – be considered a whitewash, it should be cause for concern. There seems to be a genuine case to (re)investigate whether electoral law is fit for purpose.</p>
<p>In its summary decision in March, the Electoral Commission noted the risk that “political parties might come to view the payment of these fines as a cost of doing business”. Indeed, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/pa/article/68/suppl_1/133/1403322/Party-Finance-The-Death-of-the-National-Campaign">academic work</a> analysing the 2015 election suggests that national campaign spending is now a highly targeted effort which largely supported constituency campaigns. That, to all intents and purposes, the difference was cosmetic.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/tory-expenses-scandal-mp-threatens-to-help-abolish-electoral-commission-for-witch-hunt_uk_5913079be4b05e1ca2036999">Karl McCartney</a>, one of the MPs cleared in this case, suggested that the Electoral Commission should be abolished. A more sensible solution would be for all parties to get around the table, with the Electoral Commission and others, and understand where the weaknesses in the current regulation is and work at updating and improving legislation which today is unfit for purpose.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77522/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Power receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. This article does not reflect the views of the research councils. </span></em></p>The decision not to take action against a number of election candidates is not a whitewash, but it shows that the law needs a rethink.Sam Power, Doctoral researcher, Sussex Centre for the Study of Corruption, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/773342017-05-08T12:44:32Z2017-05-08T12:44:32ZNicola Sturgeon is overestimating the toxicity of Tories in Scotland – and could pay for it<p>When it comes to Westminster elections, Scotland usually stages a one-horse race. This time, however, second place is attracting more attention than usual. Having already achieved the unthinkable and edged ahead of Labour to become the official opposition after the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2016/scotland/results">2016 Scottish election</a>, the Conservatives are on the march. </p>
<p>First came a <a href="http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-would-you-be-likely-to-vote-in-a-uk-general-election#line">spate of opinion polls</a> predicting a handful of Tory MPs for the first time since the 1990s. Then the party <a href="https://www.holyrood.com/articles/news/conservatives-make-huge-gains-scottish-council-elections-while-snp-becomes-largest">more than doubled</a> its share of councillors in Scotland in council elections on May 4, winning even in hitherto no-go areas in and around Glasgow. No wonder all the talk is about “<a href="http://blog.whatscotlandthinks.org/2017/04/a-tory-revival-and-a-yet-more-polarised-scotland/">revival</a>” and even “<a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/june2017/2017/04/two-referendums-have-revived-tories-and-undone-labour">rebirth</a>”. </p>
<p>Commentators rightly identify the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/scotland-decides/results">2014 referendum</a> as the trigger. Scottish politics realigned around the constitutional question after that polarising campaign, and the Tories – the most unambiguous opponents of independence – have become the party of choice for No voters. It looks a classic case of the “enemy of my enemy is my friend”. </p>
<p>The puzzle is that almost everybody used to think this was impossible. For years, the Tory polling graph in Scotland was the flattest line in British politics. Whatever the ups and downs of other parties, the Tories were reliably anchored in the mid-teens. And a large majority of voters were convinced the party was opposed to Scottish interests, dating back to the ugly Thatcher years of poll tax riots and seemingly endless industrial closures. </p>
<p>The brand had been toxic for so long by 2011 that senior MSP Murdo Fraser contested that year’s leadership election <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/scottish-politics/8739927/Scottish-Conservative-Party-set-to-disband.html">promising</a> to disband the party altogether – and only narrowly lost to current leader Ruth Davidson. So has there been a swift detoxification, or was the brand never quite as polluted as previously thought? </p>
<h2>The toxicity tracker</h2>
<p>One way to explore this is to use polls that ask how much people like parties on a scale from zero to ten. I’ve used this to calculate a simple “toxicity index” tracking the proportion of voters who gave the Tories a zero (“strongly dislike”) per the graph below. I’ve broken this into Yes and No referendum voters, and have been able to go back to pre-2014 as pollsters thankfully track voting histories.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168332/original/file-20170508-20753-wl3hfa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168332/original/file-20170508-20753-wl3hfa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168332/original/file-20170508-20753-wl3hfa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168332/original/file-20170508-20753-wl3hfa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168332/original/file-20170508-20753-wl3hfa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168332/original/file-20170508-20753-wl3hfa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168332/original/file-20170508-20753-wl3hfa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168332/original/file-20170508-20753-wl3hfa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rob Johns</span></span>
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<p>Of those who would go on to vote No in 2014, 31% expressed maximum dislike for the Tories in 2011. This was hardly a ringing endorsement but it did mean that seven in ten of these voters – some of them Conservatives, but many not – could find at least some small thing on the credit side of the ledger. </p>
<p>The effect of the referendum on No voters is clearly visible, however. By polling day in September 2014, the Conservatives were a long way to detoxification among this group, even while despised by an unprecedented proportion of Yes voters. </p>
<p>This polarising effect has much to do with the role of the Tories in the campaign arguments themselves. The Yes message equated the Union with Conservative governments and policies held to be at odds with Scottish values and interests. This clearly found its most receptive audience among those for whom the Tories were already toxic, and here the converts to independence were to be found. </p>
<p>By contrast, those voting No were effectively indicating that their dislike for independence trumped any strong feelings about the Conservatives. Those voters form the pool in which the Conservatives are now fishing quite successfully. It is not so much that the Tory brand is detoxified – even if there have been steps in that direction. Rather, the party is winning over more of those voters for whom it was never so toxic. </p>
<h2>It’s Corbyn, stupid</h2>
<p>At the same time, the recent downturn in the party’s toxicity index among even Yes voters signals that this is about more than vocal Tory opposition to Scottish independence. One of the points easily lost amid the constitutional debate is that, for many voters, elections remain primarily about choosing a government, and they are not particularly partisan about it. </p>
<p>In the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2015/results/scotland">UK election</a> of 2015, with a hung parliament and strong Scottish nationalist presence widely expected, voting SNP was seen by many such voters as the best way to influence the Westminster government as part of a winning coalition. Given that 45% of people voted for independence in 2014 but <a href="http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/if-the-snp-have-more-influence-in-westminster-do-you-think-that-would-be-a-goo-1">69% of voters</a> agreed in April 2015 that the SNP having more influence in Westminster would be a good thing, that party clearly succeeded in reaching out to No voters to some extent. It duly won an incredible 56 of Scotland’s 59 seats. </p>
<p>This time around, with little prospect of a hung parliament, this question of separate Scottish influence is less relevant. The swing No voters (and maybe even some Yes voters) are therefore choosing between the UK parties. And the <a href="http://whatscotlandthinks.org/opinion-polls">polls place</a> the Scottish electorate in line with the rest of Britain in regarding Theresa May’s Tories as a more competent option than Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party. </p>
<p>This raises interesting questions about SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon’s strategy in <a href="http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/15241464.Nicola_Sturgeon_calls_for_backing_of_voters_in__two_horse_race__with_Tories/">presenting this</a> as a “two-horse race” between the SNP and the Conservatives in which only an SNP vote can hold the Tories to account at Westminster. On the one hand, it should play well with Yes voters among whom the Tories remain widely reviled. On the other hand, it probably overestimates how toxic the Conservatives are – or indeed ever were – among No voters. </p>
<p>The SNP’s best hope of another near clean sweep is a divided opposition, not one increasingly unified around the staunchest opponents of independence. It might therefore be a preferable strategy for the party to focus on those left-right issues that divide Labour and Liberal Democrat from Conservative supporters. </p>
<p>Otherwise, with some of her party’s smallest majorities in seats where the Conservatives already look the likeliest challenger, Sturgeon could well be in for a more mixed night than in 2015. In determining the size of the Scottish Tory contingent sent to Westminster after June 8, tactics rather than toxins might win the day.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77334/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rob Johns does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Those who voted No in the indyref were never as anti-blue as is often believed.Rob Johns, Professor of Politics, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/772062017-05-04T21:04:13Z2017-05-04T21:04:13ZCrushing the opposition: is victory guaranteed for the Conservatives? Election Weekly podcast<p>In a brand new podcast we bring you expert analysis of the 2017 UK general election campaign. We’ll be with you right up until polling day on June 8, helping to cut through the noise to make this snap election as painless as possible. </p>
<p>This episode takes a broad look at the parties and the options on the table for voters at this early stage in the campaign. The Conversation’s politics editor, Laura Hood, runs through the important issues of the week with Andy Price, head of politics at Sheffield Hallam University, and Matthew Cole, teaching fellow at the University of Birmingham. </p>
<p>Do the Conservatives have the election all wrapped up? Andy and Matt compare the party’s lead in the polls with historical examples and caution against hubris. While the polling continues to look good, we consider whether the PM has taken her <a href="https://theconversation.com/strong-and-stable-leadership-inside-the-conservatives-election-slogan-77121">“strong and stable leadership”</a> message into the realms of “aggressive and presumptous” in her dealings with Brussels. </p>
<p>Tactical voting and the prospect of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-progressive-alliance-is-a-once-in-a-generation-chance-that-must-be-taken-in-election-2017-76604">progressive alliance</a> of parties opposed to the Conservatives is also up for discussion, with some mixed opinions about whether a pact is possible and how it would be achieved.</p>
<p>And how serious was Diane Abbott’s media wobble at the beginning of the week? The Labour front bencher was roundly mocked for fluffing her numbers on the radio, but we hear that voters might not remember the incident for long. Though the same might not necessarily be true for Labour party insiders. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Music in Election Weekly is Chasin’ It, by Jason Shaw. A big thank you to City University London’s Department of Journalism for letting us use their studios.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77206/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Expert analysis of that infamous Brexit spat, tactical voting and Diane Abbott's media meltdown.Laura Hood, Senior Politics Editor, Assistant Editor, The Conversation (UK edition)Annabel Bligh, Business & Economy Editor and Podcast Producer, The Conversation UKLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/768162017-04-28T09:29:00Z2017-04-28T09:29:00ZWhy the pensions ‘triple lock’ has become a key general election issue<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/167147/original/file-20170428-25340-kgcntn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hands off my pension.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the last Prime Minister’s Questions before the 2017 general election, Theresa May <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-39723837/snp-pensions-triple-lock-yes-or-no">refused to guarantee</a> the “triple lock” policy that guarantees pensions will rise in line with inflation, earnings or 2.5% – whichever is highest. It’s a contentious issue, as pensions make up a the biggest portion of the nation’s <a href="http://visual.ons.gov.uk/welfare-spending/">welfare budget</a>. </p>
<p>It’s also a highly important issue for older voters, the section of the electorate that is <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/news/2017/04/25/demographics-dividing-britain/">most likely to turn out and vote</a>. The fact that the Labour Party has committed to keeping the triple lock puts the Conservatives in a tricky position.</p>
<p>Yet the triple lock has faced criticism from a <a href="https://www.ftadviser.com/pensions/2017/03/23/cridland-s-call-to-scrap-triple-lock-gets-industry-support/">number of pensions experts</a>. Critics say that the way these increases have been calculated is beginning to look overly generous and needs to change. To understand this fully, it’s necessary to consider why it was brought in and how much it costs. </p>
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<p>Most people in the UK qualify for a state pension in later life. If you reached your state pension age before April 6 2016, your pension may have two parts: a basic pension (maximum £122.30 a week in 2017-18) and an additional pension linked to your previous earnings. If you reach state pension age on or after that date, you get the new <a href="https://www.gov.uk/new-state-pension/what-youll-get">“flat-rate” state pension</a> (maximum £159.55 a week). This is higher than the old basic pension but the additional pension is abolished for these newer pensioners. However, under transitional rules, you might get extra – called a “protected payment” – reflecting some additional pension you had built up before April 6 2016 under the old system.</p>
<p>The additional pension and any protected payment are increased each year in line with price inflation to protect their buying power. But, since 2011, the basic state pension and the new state pension have been increased each year by whatever is highest out of price inflation, earnings inflation or 2.5% (the triple lock).</p>
<h2>A see-saw of policies</h2>
<p>The three strands of the triple lock have been around for a long time, but it was the 2010 coalition government that united them, following a commitment in the <a href="http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/ge10/man/parties/libdem_manifesto_2010.pdf">Liberal Democrat manifesto</a>. </p>
<p>The chart shows the basic state pension and, from 2016, the new state pension as a proportion of the average earnings of the working population. The different colours indicate the basis used to increase pensions each year. The chart shows how policy see-saws between protecting pensioner incomes and containing cost.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166969/original/file-20170427-15121-sjohrw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166969/original/file-20170427-15121-sjohrw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=262&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166969/original/file-20170427-15121-sjohrw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=262&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166969/original/file-20170427-15121-sjohrw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=262&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166969/original/file-20170427-15121-sjohrw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166969/original/file-20170427-15121-sjohrw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166969/original/file-20170427-15121-sjohrw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Basic and new State Pension as a percentage of average earnings, 1975 to 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jonquil Lowe | Office for National Statistics, Department of Work and Pensions</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Back in the 1970s, when the basic pension was worth around a third of average earnings, it was increased each year by the greater of the change in prices or earnings. The earnings link ensured that pensioners’ living standards would not fall behind those of the working population, given that historically earnings have tended to rise faster than prices. </p>
<p>The earnings-link was deemed unaffordable and <a href="http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/109497">scrapped in 1979 by Margaret Thatcher’s government</a>. Even though the basic pension increased with prices over the next couple of decades, as the chart shows, its value fell consistently relative to workers’ incomes and, by the early 2000s, was worth only around a fifth of average earnings. Although the principle of maintaining the buying power of the state pension was met, by this time the UK was in a low inflation era, so the pounds-and-pence increases seemed meagre. This caused outrage in 2000 when the basic pension rose <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/511811.stm">by just 75p a week</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/167150/original/file-20170428-25334-14y5bq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/167150/original/file-20170428-25334-14y5bq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=312&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/167150/original/file-20170428-25334-14y5bq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=312&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/167150/original/file-20170428-25334-14y5bq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=312&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/167150/original/file-20170428-25334-14y5bq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/167150/original/file-20170428-25334-14y5bq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/167150/original/file-20170428-25334-14y5bq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Triple see-saw.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>In response, the then Labour government introduced a new guarantee that, from 2003, the basic pension would increase each year by at least 2.5%, even if inflation were lower. Subsequently, Labour committed to reintroducing the link to earnings at a future date, expected to be 2012. Events overtook Labour, but the coalition government not only restored the link to earnings – it also retained the 2.5% minimum annual increase, creating the triple lock.</p>
<p>The triple lock applies to both the basic pension that pre-April-2016 pensioners are getting (the yellow line) and the higher flat-rate pension that more recent pensioners receive (the blue line).</p>
<h2>All change again?</h2>
<p>As the chart shows, the 2.5% minimum guarantee and the triple lock have together started to reverse the decline in the basic state pension relative to earnings, though it remains historically low. However, the new flat-rate pension is worth more than 30% of average earnings, restoring the level of the 1970s. If the triple lock were to continue indefinitely, the State Pension would over time tend to increase further relative to earnings.</p>
<p>This makes the triple lock policy controversial. Pensioners are being guaranteed increases that at least match and may exceed inflation, while state benefits for people of working age <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-33429390">are frozen</a> and earnings have, until recently, <a href="https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/Presentations/Understanding%20the%20recession_230915/SMachin.pdf">been stagnant</a>. Meanwhile, OBR <a href="http://cdn.budgetresponsibility.org.uk/March2017EFO-231.pdf">forecasts show</a> the cost of the triple lock rising over time and experts, such as former pensions minister, Baroness Altmann, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36935281">claim</a> it will become unaffordable.</p>
<p>The triple lock has never been written into legislation. The current statutory commitment is to increase both the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1992/5">basic state pension</a> and the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/19/notes/division/6/1/1">new flat-rate pension</a> at least in line with earnings, but even that could be up for change. There is a range of proposals on the table – for example, removing the 2.5% guarantee to leave a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/apr/26/theresa-may-considering-scrapping-triple-lock-on-pensions">double-lock</a>, linking only to earnings (possibly averaged over several years to smooth out ups and downs) or reverting just to price indexation. For pensioners, the see-saw may be on a down-stroke once again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76816/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonquil Lowe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The pensions ‘triple lock’ explained.Jonquil Lowe, Senior Lecturer in Economics and Personal Finance, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/679502016-11-03T08:04:44Z2016-11-03T08:04:44ZWhy many people don’t ‘like’ politics on Facebook – they’re worried what their friends will think<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/143956/original/image-20161031-15816-1uvb1n8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-390130231/stock-photo-saint-louis-mo-usa-march-11-2016-donald-trump-shows-the-thumbs-up-to-supporters-at-the-peabody-opera-house-in-downtown-saint-louis.html?src=PkTjoNumrrToXj2s_3qr9w-1-1">Gino Santa Maria / Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>From “disappointing corgis” to favourite football teams, social media users seem to “like” or follow just about anything to receive online updates on their favourite topics. You might find out your best friend is a cat person, has turned vegan or is the founding member of a running club via social media. All pretty normal, even if you don’t feel the same yourself. </p>
<p>But what if you found out that they had “liked” Jeremy Corbyn on Facebook, or joined a page supporting Donald Trump – what would you think then?</p>
<p>Our research has found that users are <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0747563216302187">worried about others’ perceptions of their political views</a> and voting choices – so much so that they are reluctant to “like” a political party on Facebook. Even if they have voted for their preferred party on many occasions, publicly “liking” it seems to be one step too far.</p>
<p>We surveyed more than 200 UK voters in the run up to the 2015 general election, and found that voters’ concerns about their Facebook friends’ opinions <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0747563216302187">hindered their engagement</a> with political parties on social media. This is not just a UK problem: early results from our study of around 1,000 US voters in the run up to the November 8 elections show they have similar concerns.</p>
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<h2>Social revelations</h2>
<p>Around 60% <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/271349/facebook-users-in-the-united-kingdom-uk/">of the UK</a> and <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/247614/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/">US populations</a> are active Facebook users. There has been <a href="http://www.cio.com/article/3125120/social-networking/how-social-media-is-shaping-the-2016-presidential-election.html">a lot of hype</a> that social media is having a huge influence over the US electorate in particular, but the figures tell a different story. As of July 2016, 4.9m people had “liked” Hillary Clinton’s Facebook page while 9.9m had “liked” Donald Trump’s page – representing just 1.5% and 3.1% of the overall US population respectively.</p>
<p>In 2015, the UK Conservative Party secured 11.3m votes but had just <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0747563216302187">450,000 “likes” on Facebook</a>. Similarly, the Labour Party secured 9.3m votes but only <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0747563216302187">had 300,000 “likes”</a>. Without going into too much detail on the <a href="http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/news/social-media-and-2015-general-election">parties’ social media strategies here</a>, we found that less liberal individuals showed a greater intention to “like” the Conservatives’ Facebook page, and more liberal individuals an increased intention to “like” Labour’s Facebook page.</p>
<p>Evidently, regardless of any possible benefits of getting automatic updates and information from one’s preferred political parties on Facebook, people shy away from doing so for fear of what their network will think of them. But information is paramount when deciding who to vote for – and social media can play a vital part in helping voters make their decision. </p>
<p>Unlike in face-to-face interactions, where people have more control over who they reveal their political inclination to, on Facebook actions are largely visible to a person’s whole list of friends at once. Any social media user will tell you of a time they “unfriended” another because of their annoying, confusing or confrontational posts, whether politically motivated or not. And most users will have friends from other points of the political spectrum – so it is nearly impossible to avoid appearing negative to at least some friends when showing your political preferences.</p>
<h2>Political anxiety</h2>
<p>Our research also found that the more a person felt that “liking” a political party or candidate appeared negative to their Facebook friends, the greater the anxiety that was linked to this action.</p>
<figure>
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</figure>
<p>The results showed that “liking” more right-wing political entities – for example the Conservative Party and Donald Trump – caused approximately 20% more anxiety than “liking” more liberal rivals such as the Labour Party or Hillary Clinton. This was so even when the participants’ own political stance was accounted for. In general, this suggests that no matter what your personal beliefs are, appearing more right-wing on Facebook is perceived as being more socially undesirable. Though certainly both Trump and the Conservatives overall garnered more likes, this could be due to other engagement work.</p>
<p>So what to do? Voters can’t be forced to “like” pages just so they can receive automatic information updates via their favoured candidate’s post. Neither should they go uninformed. Although people want to “like” political entities as a gateway to receive information from them, as the situation stands many will choose not to. </p>
<p>However, we found that if people were given the option to “like” political pages secretly then they would be more likely to do so. At present, voters can follow pages secretly <a href="https://www.cnet.com/how-to/how-to-follow-facebook-pages-anonymously/">via RSS feeds</a>, but not many people are aware of this option. </p>
<p>Voters could also search for a page whenever they feel like it, but this limits their engagement. That is why we propose that social media designers should start thinking about an easy mechanism to quietly “like” – or follow – a page without it being publicly announced to their network. However, whether the parties, or indeed Facebook, would agree to get involved in a political matter is another matter entirely.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67950/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>I like you, but won’t ‘like’ you.Emma Slade, Lecturer in Digital Marketing, Swansea UniversityBen Marder, Lecturer in Marketing, The University of EdinburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/606952016-06-16T00:40:29Z2016-06-16T00:40:29ZFattened pigs, dog whistles and dead cats: the menagerie of a Lynton Crosby campaign<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126457/original/image-20160614-18068-fglgd0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Campaign strategist Lynton Crosby has become something of a folk-devil for sections of the British and Australian media.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Stefan Wermuth</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Is <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-01-24/lynton-crosby-named-uk-australian-of-the-year/7110070">Lynton Crosby</a>, election guru and favoured strategist for right-wing political candidates from Wentworth to Witney, up to his old tricks again? </p>
<p>As the Australian election race enters its final stages, and with many polls predicting a <a href="https://theconversation.com/polls-effectively-tied-with-others-up-60378">very tight finish</a>, some parallels with the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/election-2015-32633099">Conservative victory</a> in the 2015 UK general election that <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/12/27/lynton-crosby-knighthood_n_8880666.html">Crosby masterminded</a> can be seen – particularly in relation to the “risk” of a power-sharing government.</p>
<p>Crosby has become something of a folk-devil for sections of the British and Australian media. He is the manipulator with the Midas touch, who has a reputation for tapping into those ideas and prejudices that coarsen public life but are seemingly widely held and a ballot-box boon. </p>
<p>In an age of economic insecurity, linking immigration to threats to personal welfare is a key means by which Crosby reaches those parts of the electorate who can be attracted to populist conservative platforms.</p>
<p>In many ways Crosby’s oeuvre is one that melds well-understood elements of political campaigning (messaging – and for Crosby message matters most – triangulation and targeting) with a relentless focus on those who will decide the outcome, and finding the hot issues and emotive appeals that will mobilise those target voters to come out and vote. </p>
<p>But how does this work in practice?</p>
<h2>Fattened pigs</h2>
<p>The era of the constant campaign means that the groundwork to secure core voters and attract potential swing voters starts well before the official election campaign. </p>
<p>This is about long-term political strategy and positioning. The portfolio of politicos Crosby has worked for reflects his personal affinity with right-wing candidates and causes. This is the essence of what Crosby believes in, and it animates his campaigning strategy.</p>
<p>Establishing in the public mind that conservative parties are most trustworthy <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-idea-that-conservatives-are-better-economic-managers-simply-does-not-stand-up-56678">in terms of managing the economy</a> is a favoured theme, but one that needs to be cultivated over the long term.</p>
<p>The conventional <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2007-11-16/38942">political wisdom that you can’t fatten a pig on market day</a> captures the necessity of laying the political foundations for an election campaign over the medium-to-long term. It simply cannot be done reactively or retrospectively during the campaign.</p>
<h2>Dog whistles</h2>
<p>An election campaign hinges on the choices offered to the electorate. Crosby <a href="https://youtu.be/H_YareK6WKk?t=27m14s">is clear</a> that the job of campaign strategists and spin doctors is to frame the choice for the public, to “help” the public think and understand that their vote “buys” something in an election. </p>
<p>This includes developing a compelling narrative about one’s own campaign – but, equally, it is about opponents and their policy platforms. Reinforcing peoples’ perceptions seems to be Crosby’s particular speciality. Emotional and resonant messaging is a most effective tactic which recurs in Crosby-designed campaigns.</p>
<p>One means of achieving this is by using dog whistles – language that is likely heard by particular target groups in specific ways and producing largely predictable results. Most concern has been expressed in relation to Crosby’s willingness to <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/politics/2012/11/lynton-crosby-david-cameron-and-old-dog-whistle-test">use immigration</a> as a political weapon.</p>
<p>Crosby’s strategy is to differentiate between broadcast and narrowcast messages. The former is the overarching narrative and broad campaign theme. The latter resembles dog-whistle appeals, messages cast and framed to be audible – or speak to – target voters in particular segments, sectors or demographics.</p>
<p>Because of Crosby’s focus on swing voters, it is unsurprising that commentators have picked up on the dog-whistle features of his campaigns.</p>
<h2>Dead cats</h2>
<p>Crosby <a href="https://youtu.be/H_YareK6WKk?t=30m30s">professes a preference</a> for positive electioneering, but recognises there is a place for negative campaigning – by which he means holding your opponent to account. </p>
<p>It is important that presidential or prime ministerial candidates don’t carry key negative messages – that is the job of others in the campaign team or selected surrogates. </p>
<p>So, think of Peter Dutton’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/duttons-refugee-claims-are-out-of-step-with-evidence-and-thinking-at-home-and-abroad-59626">comments on refugees</a> in the Australian campaign, or previously Michael Fallon (then-UK defence secretary) suggesting Ed Miliband would <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/generalelection/general-election-2015-are-the-tories-getting-desperate-ed-miliband-stabbed-his-brother-in-the-back-10164087.html">stab Britain in the back</a> on nuclear deterrence in the same way he stabbed his brother in the back during the Labour leadership contest.</p>
<p>While the content of Fallon’s attack was in essence nonsensical, it served a useful purpose in deflecting the media agenda away from the emerging focus on <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2016/04/tories-say-one-thing-and-do-another-tax-avoidance">tax avoidance</a> and the social consequences of <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/04/george-osborne-s-cunning-plan-how-chancellors-austerity-narrative-has-harmed">austerity</a>, from which Labour had managed to make notable political gains.</p>
<p>The dead-cat ploy, according to Conservative MP Boris Johnson’s <a href="http://www.politics.co.uk/blogs/2013/11/24/the-dead-cat-strategy-how-the-tories-hope-to-win-the-next-el">insight into Crosby’s modus operandi</a>, is to get everybody talking about something that is shocking, disgusting or deplorable – something that is defined by its quality of being talk-worthy and attention-grabbing (the dead cat that has just been thrown onto the dinner-party table – guests may be repulsed and outraged, but they are compelled to talk about it).</p>
<p>Tone is apparently very important when a campaign goes negative – it must be neither personal nor hysterical. </p>
<p>Despite basking in the afterglow of successful election campaigns, it would be remiss to ignore that hysteria and personalisation were qualities that could easily be attributed to the Crosby-inspired attacks on Ed Miliband during the 2015 UK election, and the manufactured threat of a left-leaning Scottish National Party (SNP) <a href="https://www.buzzfeed.com/emilyashton/inside-the-tory-battle-to-stop-nigel-farage-becoming-an-mp?utm_term=.uvkrNyvqY#.uxE6vqDn7">holding the balance of power</a> in a hung House of Commons.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126473/original/image-20160614-18068-8mnyp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126473/original/image-20160614-18068-8mnyp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=686&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126473/original/image-20160614-18068-8mnyp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=686&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126473/original/image-20160614-18068-8mnyp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=686&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126473/original/image-20160614-18068-8mnyp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=862&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126473/original/image-20160614-18068-8mnyp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=862&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126473/original/image-20160614-18068-8mnyp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=862&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The UK Conservatives ran a scare campaign on the possibility of coalition government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Buzzfeed/UK Conservatives</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What for Australia’s 2016 campaign?</h2>
<p>Perhaps the key parallel is to look at how the Liberals are framing the possibility of a power-sharing government. </p>
<p>The Tories successfully planted doubt in the minds of English voters that a left-leaning SNP might hold sway over a Labour government. It used pretty crude billboards, campaign broadcasts and supporting media appearances by party spokespersons to suggest the potential risks of coalition government might be something the electorate should consider before casting their vote.</p>
<p>It would also be healthy to adopt Crosby’s scepticism about media-driven opinion polls. For Crosby, these polls are <a href="https://youtu.be/H_YareK6WKk?t=18m30s">too simplistic</a> to be useful for campaign strategy. Polls are at best navigational tools, and campaigns should not be too swayed by the vicissitudes of media reporting of public opinion. </p>
<p>Campaigns boil down to finding out who will decide the outcome (swing and uncommitted voters, not the media commentariat), where they are located, what matters to them and how they can be reached using emotive messaging to help them make the right choices in the ballot box.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60695/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Will Dinan is a founder and editorial board member of Spinwatch (<a href="http://www.spinwatch.org">http://www.spinwatch.org</a>), a non-profit organisation investigating and reporting on spin and lobbying</span></em></p>Lynton Crosby is the manipulator with the Midas touch, who has a reputation for tapping into those ideas and prejudices that coarsen public life but are seemingly widely held and a ballot-box boon.Will Dinan, Lecturer, Communications, Media and Culture, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/594842016-05-17T09:46:00Z2016-05-17T09:46:00ZThe Conservative election expenses saga explained<p>Since late January, a story about political party finance and spending in the 2015 UK election (and three by-elections) has been simmering. Now it seems to be boiling over.</p>
<p>For brevity, it’s probably best to concentrate on the allegations related to the 2015 general election, rather than delving into the 2014 by-elections.</p>
<p>This story begins with the dogged, excellent, investigative journalism of Michael Crick and <a href="http://www.channel4.com/news/election-expenses-exposed">Channel 4 News</a>. </p>
<h2>Two types of spending</h2>
<p>The crux of the matter is the distinction between two types of <a href="http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/_media/guidance/party-campaigners/to-campaign-spend-rp.pdf">spending in British elections</a> – local and national – each of which has different limits.</p>
<p>Local or <a href="http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/political-parties-campaigning-and-donations/candidate-spending-and-donations-at-elections">“candidate spending”</a> is money spent on a specific parliamentary constituency to campaign for a specific candidate. Local spending limits are not uniform but are often around £15,000.</p>
<p>National spend, or <a href="http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/political-parties-campaigning-and-donations/political-party-spending-at-elections">“party campaign spending”</a>, is spending that promotes the party more generally across the country. </p>
<p>The national spending limits have never been met at a general election and, in truth, it’s not even very close. The limit at the last general election was £19.5m and the Conservatives came closest, spending £15.6m. </p>
<p>That leaves quite a shortfall. Consequently, there is widespread suspicion, among all parties, that local spend potentially is misreported as national spend, where there is more budgetary room for manoeuvre. </p>
<p>There are entirely legitimate ways to push at these boundaries. Big billboard advertising campaigns, for example, are often targeted at marginal constituencies. Even if they don’t mention the constituency specifically, they can be positioned in places where they will be seen by lots of voters from the area.</p>
<h2>What happened here?</h2>
<p>The allegations being levelled at the Conservatives concern 33 constituencies (five of which did not go over the constituency spending limit) in which 29 winning Tory MPs are implicated. They mainly centre around whether spending on the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/general-election-2015/11504188/On-the-buses-General-election-campaign-battle-buses-in-pictures.html?frame=3257513">Conservative battle bus</a> and hotel rooms for activists have been inaccurately reported.</p>
<p>First, Channel 4 has identified thousands of pounds of hotel bills that have simply not been reported – neither as national nor local spend. This has been accepted by the Conservative party as an <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36094111">“administrative error”</a>.</p>
<p>Second, and more contested, is the battle bus, which transported activists around the country to campaign for the Conservatives ahead of the election.</p>
<p>Channel 4 has uncovered evidence – from canvassing scripts to Facebook posts – which suggests that these activists were campaigning for specific candidates in constituencies, not the Conservative party more generally. Despite this, the battle bus is recorded as national spend.</p>
<p>The Conservatives have faced this allegation <a href="http://www.channel4.com/news/battlebus-conservatives-admit-election-expenses">head on</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The party always took the view that our national battle bus, a highly-publicised campaign activity, was part of our national return – and we would have no reason not to declare it as such …Other political parties ran similar vehicles which visited different parliamentary constituencies as part of their national campaign.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Liberal Democrat commentator Mark Pack <a href="http://www.markpack.org.uk/139980/how-tory-hq-advice-to-marginal-seat-agents-contradicted-official-electoral-commission-advice/">argues</a> that the Conservatives have contradicted themselves on this matter by telling local candidates that all hotel and transport “is accounted for out of central campaign spend” but then that “transport costs for you or your campaigners” are included in local spending.</p>
<p>I’m less convinced by this charge. One can make a distinction between a nationally touring bus and local constituency vehicles – and, of course, “your” local campaigners and “our” national campaigners.</p>
<p>This does serve to demonstrate how fiddly the details are though. And, in truth, how serious you consider the transgression to be probably depends on where you sit on the political spectrum. </p>
<p>With at least ten different police forces, the Electoral Commission and now the <a href="http://www.channel4.com/news/high-court-challenge-over-conservative-election-expenses">High Court</a> involved in these allegations, one must tread very carefully around commenting too much on specifics.</p>
<p>Guilt or innocence (and, indeed, the severity of any charges) will rely on two factors. Whether those in charge of the investigation accept that these buses should, in some circumstances, be classified as local spend and, second, whether there was any conspiracy – i.e. people deliberately omitting, or deliberately misreporting certain spending.</p>
<h2>Why haven’t I heard more about this?</h2>
<p>There have been allegations from some quarters that certain media outlets (often the BBC) have shied away from reporting these allegations. First, this is simply inaccurate. Though Channel 4 has very much spearheaded this investigation, both the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/13/tory-election-expenses?CMP=twt_a-politics_b-gdnukpolitics">Guardian</a> and the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36271515">BBC</a> have covered the allegations in detail.</p>
<p>And really, accounting just isn’t very sexy. Party funding is a <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17457289.2011.609296#.VzX-zPmDGko">“process-issue”</a> and you don’t tend to hear about it unless something goes seriously wrong – and that hasn’t yet been proven here.</p>
<h2>What happens next?</h2>
<p>Legally, a long process awaits. It is a criminal offence to fail to declare election spending during a campaign. Charges range from a fine (most likely) to a year in jail (fairly unlikely).</p>
<p>On a wider level though, this episode might change the way elections are run. During my research, I have heard mention of local spending limits largely being disregarded on numerous occasions. If this is the case – and if this story does indeed run and run – the Conservative Battle Bus might only be the beginning.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"732174738601193478"}"></div></p>
<p>All kinds of interesting <a href="http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2016/01/trying-to-analysis-the-election-spending-data-follow-deep-throats-advice/">questions</a> arise when you try to separate national and local spend. How do you classify Facebook adverts targeted at marginal constituencies, for example? </p>
<p>It’s worth noting how little scrutiny the Conservatives have faced in parliament over these allegations – aside from a question from the SNP’s <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2016/may/prime-ministers-questions-11-may-2016/">Angus Robertson</a>. One might wonder whether the silence from the other parties is indicative of a fight that, frankly, they have little interest in getting involved in. </p>
<p>Indeed, <a href="http://order-order.com/2016/05/16/labour-battle-bus-not-declared-in-local-spending/">allegations surrounding</a> Labour’s battle bus surfaced just yesterday. This is unlikely to remain a Conservative only issue.</p>
<p>Will those of us who spend an inordinate amount of time poring over party accounts on the <a href="http://search.electoralcommission.org.uk/?currentPage=0&rows=10&sort=AcceptedDate&order=desc&tab=1&et=pp&et=ppm&et=tp&et=perpar&et=rd&prePoll=false&postPoll=true&optCols=AccountingUnitsAsCentralParty&optCols=IsSponsorship&optCols=RegulatedDoneeType&optCols=CompanyRegistrationNumber&optCols=Postcode&optCols=NatureOfDonation&optCols=PurposeOfVisit&optCols=DonationAction&optCols=ReportedDate&optCols=IsReportedPrePoll&optCols=ReportingPeriodName&optCols=IsBequest&optCols=IsAggregation">Electoral Commission</a> website finally be recognised for doing incisive, sexy, cutting-edge research? Are we about to get the respect we so clearly deserve?</p>
<p>Sadly, I fear, the wait goes on.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/59484/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Power receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p>Bringing you up to speed on the political hot potato that may have passed you by.Sam Power, Doctoral researcher, Sussex Centre for the Study of Corruption, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/531382016-01-14T06:12:37Z2016-01-14T06:12:37ZRevealed: why the polls got it so wrong in the British general election<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108054/original/image-20160113-10414-1wij2eg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Absolutely definitely Labour? Ok thanks bye!</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the surprise result of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/britains-election-is-over-so-what-does-it-all-mean-41261">British election</a> in May 2015, there has been plenty of speculation about why the opinion polls ahead of the vote were so wrong. On average, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-32751993">they put the Conservatives and Labour neck and neck</a>, when in fact the Conservatives were seven points ahead. </p>
<p>Hard evidence on the reasons for their failure, however has so far been less plentiful. But a new report published today provides important evidence on what really happened.</p>
<p>The report presents the results obtained by the latest instalment of NatCen’s annual <a href="http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/">British Social Attitudes survey</a>, which was conducted face to face between the beginning of July and the beginning of November last year. All 4,328 respondents to the survey were asked whether or not they voted in the May election and, if so, for which party.</p>
<p>What we found suggests that the main reason for the disparity between the polls and the actual election outcome is unlikely to have been failure by voters to be honest about how they planned to vote. Instead it is more likely that the problem lay in the failure of the pollsters to interview the right mix of voters in the first place.</p>
<h2>A different approach</h2>
<p>The British Social Attitudes survey is conducted in a very different way from the polls. Not only does interviewing take place over an extended period of four months, but during that time repeated efforts are made, as necessary, to make contact with those who have been selected for interview.</p>
<p>At the same time, potential respondents are selected using random probability sampling. This means that more or less anyone in Britain can be selected for interview, while their chances of being selected can also be calculated.</p>
<p>Political opinion polls, by contrast, are typically conducted over just two or three days. That means they are more likely to represent the views of people who are easily contactable. True, polls that are conducted by phone select the numbers they ring at random, but once the phone is answered, the person at the other end of the line who is selected for interview is not selected in that way. Pollsters often find their calls go unanswered or that the person on the other end of the line does not want to talk.</p>
<p>At the same time, polls conducted over the internet are typically done by drawing interviewees from a panel of people who have either previously volunteered to take part in internet surveys or have been successfully recruited into membership. They are certainly not drawn from the population at random. So in both methods there is bound to be a degree of self selection. And this appears to favour Labour.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, not only did the 2015 polls underestimate Conservative support and overestimate Labour’s before election day, they also came up with much the same result when they <a href="https://twitter.com/YouGov/status/596427188645326848">went back</a> to interview the same people after the result was in – that is Conservative and Labour more or less neck and neck with each other.</p>
<p>In other words, the polls were still wrong even when the election was over. That means we cannot simply lay the blame for their difficulties on such possibilities as “late swing” or a failure by those who said they would vote for Labour to make it to the polling station. Instead it points to the likelihood that the polls were simply interviewing too many Labour voters in the first place.</p>
<h2>How it happened</h2>
<p>The British Social Attitudes survey helps shed some light on this. If, in contrast to the polls, it did manage more or less to replicate the election result, that would add considerably to the evidence that the polls were led astray because their samples were not fully representative. </p>
<p>Indeed, the survey did replicate the result, relatively successfully. At 6.1 points, its Conservative lead of 6.1 points matches the actual Conservative lead over Labour of 6.6 points almost exactly.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108031/original/image-20160113-10417-hew95u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108031/original/image-20160113-10417-hew95u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108031/original/image-20160113-10417-hew95u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108031/original/image-20160113-10417-hew95u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108031/original/image-20160113-10417-hew95u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108031/original/image-20160113-10417-hew95u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108031/original/image-20160113-10417-hew95u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108031/original/image-20160113-10417-hew95u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Reported vote in the 2015 British Social Attitudes survey compared with the actual election result.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">NatCen</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Moreover, this is not the only survey to have found plenty more Conservative voters in the election than Labour ones. Face-to-face interviews conducted for the <a href="http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/">British Election Study</a> (also undertaken using random probability sampling) put the Conservatives as much as eight points ahead of Labour.</p>
<p>That two random probability samples have both succeeded where the polls largely failed strongly suggests that the problems that beset the polls did indeed lie in the character of the samples they obtained.</p>
<h2>Lessons for the future</h2>
<p>The British Social Attitudes data also provide some clues as to why those interviewed by the polls were not necessarily representative of Britain as a whole.</p>
<p>First, those who participated in polls were much more interested in the election than voters in general. The polls pointed to as much as a 90% turnout, far above the 66% that eventually did vote.</p>
<p>By contrast, just 70% of those who participated in the British Social Attitudes survey in 2015 said that they made it to the polling station. More detailed analysis suggests that many a poll overestimated how many younger people, in particular, would vote. And because younger voters were more Labour inclined than older ones, this created a risk that Labour’s strength would be overestimated among those who were actually going to vote.</p>
<p>Second, those who are contacted most easily by polls and survey researchers appear to be more likely to have voted Labour than those who are more difficult to find. In the British Social Attitudes survey, no less than 41% of those who gave an interview the first time an interviewer knocked on their door said that they voted Labour, while just 35% said that they voted Conservative.</p>
<p>Only among those where a second or (especially) a third call had to be made are Conservative voters more plentiful than Labour ones. Meanwhile, Labour’s lead among first-call interviewees cannot be accounted for by their demographic profile, which perhaps helps explain why the pollsters’ attempts to weight their data to match Britain’s known demographic profile failed to eliminate the pro-Labour bias in their samples.</p>
<p>Of course nobody is ever going to suggest that a poll should be conducted over a period of four months, though maybe taking a little longer would prove to be in the pollsters’ own best interests, even when their role is to generate tomorrow’s newspaper headline.</p>
<p>But if the objective is to conduct serious, long-term and in-depth research to enhance our understanding of the public mood in Britain, the lesson is clear. Time-consuming and expensive though it may be, random probability sampling is still the most robust way of measuring public opinion. Hopefully it is a lesson that will now be appreciated by those who fund opinion research.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53138/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Curtice is a Senior Research Fellow at NatCen Social Research and is a co-editor of the British Social Attitudes report series. He is also President of the British Polling Council, a representative organisation of polling companies that aims to uphold standards of transparency in the industry and has co-sponsored the inquiry into the performance of the polls in the 2015 general election.</span></em></p>New survey information puts paid to ‘shy Tories’ theory.John Curtice, Senior Research Fellow, National Centre for Social ResearchLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/516422016-01-01T10:19:48Z2016-01-01T10:19:48Z2015: the year in elections<p><em>It’s been a dramatic year in elections around the world: old leaders were toppled, upstarts and novices seized the helm, and embattled governments somehow managed to cling on. Here, the experts who covered them take stock of what’s happened – and look at what’s in store for 2016.</em></p>
<hr>
<h2>Zambia: praying for rain</h2>
<p><strong>Stephen Chan, SOAS</strong></p>
<p>Zambia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-a-stormy-election-dark-clouds-still-loom-over-zambia-36705">2015 election</a> was triggered when the incumbent president, Michael Sata, died in office. Constitutionally, after a period of acting presidency by the vice-president, Dr Guy Scott – who, for a short time, had the distinction of being a <a href="https://theconversation.com/guy-scotts-whiteness-is-not-the-issue-in-zambia-33690">white president of a black country</a> – any chosen successor had to face the polls. Edgar Lungu was picked after a fractious process and ultimately beat off a strong challenge from opposition leader, Hakainde Hichilema. </p>
<p>Lungu’s time in office may be brief, since he was elected only to fill out the term until full elections in September 2016. He has had to preside over a grave economic downturn and has <a href="http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-10-16-divine-intervention-lungu-calls-for-a-day-of-prayer-and-fasting-to-save-the-kwacha">called days of prayer</a> instead of coming up with technocratic solutions. A catastrophic shortage of rain exacerbated power shortages as hydroelectric production literally dried up and the country’s brief economic bubble has burst. </p>
<p>He is dogged by rumours of ill health and Zambians now joke about whether he will join the country’s roster of presidents who have died in office. Whoever wins the 2016 elections may come up with an economic plan to overcome the curse of plunging international copper prices – but may yet be reduced to praying for rain.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Israel: zero sum game</h2>
<p><strong>Yoav Galai, University of St Andrews</strong></p>
<p>This year’s election was framed by identity politics as a zero-sum game. That much was clear from the decision of four different (mostly) Arab parties to run together as the “Joint List”, a banner under which they became the third-largest party in parliament.</p>
<p>Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party trounced the Labour opposition – and Netanyahu is now set to become the longest running prime minister in Israeli history. Unlike his previous coalition government, he had no need to cross ideological lines to compose a coalition – and this government is his most right-wing yet.</p>
<p>This was a big surprise; even on the day of the elections the polls predicted a draw with Labour. Netanyahu then delivered a warning that “the Arabs are coming to the polling stations in droves”. The false and racist statement painted the participation of Israel’s Arab minority in the national elections as illegitimate, but it worked wonders.</p>
<p>Some of the racist inclinations of the other side became visible too. At an anti-Netanyahu rally in March, prominent left-wing intellectual Yair Garbuz <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/.premium-1.646038">drew a direct line</a> between criminality, anti-Arab racism and Mizrahi Jews, the majority of Israel’s Jewish population who have roots in Arab countries – and, looking back at the election, Labour leader Shelly Yechimovich <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/.premium-1.648196">conceded</a> that Garbuz’s statements may have been partly to blame for her party’s loss.</p>
<p>With a fragile majority of one, the coalition can easily be pushed into extremism by the Nationalist Religious Jewish Home party and by the Likud’s more right-wing ministers. With no clear plan regarding Palestinians except the normalisation of settlement activity, attention has returned to zero sum identity politics, with the general categories of Arabs and left as the targets of legislation and policy.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Nigeria: matters of urgency <a id="nigeria"></a></h2>
<p><strong>Catherine Gegout, University of Nottingham</strong></p>
<p>When Muhammadu Buhari was <a href="https://theconversation.com/buhari-wins-but-the-new-president-of-nigeria-faces-an-enormous-challenge-39291">elected president of Nigeria</a> in March, he certainly had his work cut out. Nigeria’s economy badly needs to be diversified; petroleum exports revenue represents <a href="http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm">more than 90% of total export revenue</a>, even as only half of all Nigerians <a href="http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2015/10/20/the-way-forward-for-electricity-supply-in-nigeria/">have access to electricity</a>. Education is in a dismal state, especially in the north, where <a href="https://theconversation.com/buhari-wins-but-the-new-president-of-nigeria-faces-an-enormous-challenge-39291">only 6% of children have primary education</a>. </p>
<p>There have already been some promising moves. Buhari has renewed Nigeria’s beleagured fight against corruption, including <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-34580862">oil corruption</a> and both he and his deputy <a href="http://www.africareview.com/Special-Reports/What-African-presidents-are-paid-and-why-it-matters/-/979182/2802868/-/c59muuz/-/index.html">took a symbolic pay cut</a>. He must now start honouring his promise to improve <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/16/president-buhari-nigeria-women-politics">gender representation</a> in politics. Currently, only 16% of cabinet members are women, and only 6% of senators and members of the House of Representatives. </p>
<p>Then there’s the fight against Boko Haram. Approximately <a href="http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/11/26/nigeria-boko-haram-cannot-be-crushed-by-december">1,500 people have been killed since June 2015</a>, there is the serious prospect of <a href="http://www.jeuneafrique.com/284717/politique/jean-yves-le-diran-ministre-francais-de-la-defense-le-rapprochement-entre-daesh-et-boko-haram-est-un-risque-majeur/">true co-operation between the group and Islamic State</a> and the group is still <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/report/102274/is-education-boko-haram-s-biggest-victim">targeting the north’s few schools</a>.</p>
<hr>
<h2>United Kingdom: political carnage</h2>
<p><strong>Louise Thompson, University of Surrey</strong></p>
<p>Almost every poll of the British electorate failed to predict the result on the night, which was ultimately heralded by a <a href="https://theconversation.com/john-curtice-how-we-called-the-election-right-on-polling-night-more-or-less-41556">shocking exit poll</a> that turned out to be correct. </p>
<p>The election ultimately <a href="https://theconversation.com/britains-election-is-over-so-what-does-it-all-mean-41261">returned a familiar face</a> to Downing Street in the form of David Cameron, but the turmoil of the losing parties had huge implications for the British political system. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/lib-dem-wipeout-prompts-clegg-to-hint-he-will-step-down-41512">Liberal Democrats</a> went from a party of government to a party of the (very) backbenches, while Labour’s loss (and near-wipeout in Scotland) was followed by a messy post-election leadership battle and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-corbyn-wins-the-class-of-1983-looks-set-to-reshape-labour-once-again-47291">surprise ascendancy of left-winger Jeremy Corbyn</a>. The result is an opposition more divided than any party in recent memory. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aftershocks-of-the-snps-success-will-be-felt-throughout-the-next-parliament-41127">Scottish National Party</a> took almost all the Scottish seats. It has so far maintained this momentum at Westminster, marking itself out as the party to watch. </p>
<p>One thing is certain: there will be even more division and discord at Westminster in 2016, as Labour infighting continues and the parties prepare for the impending EU referendum campaign.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Poland: right turn</h2>
<p><strong>Simona Guerra, University of Leicester, and Fernando Casal Bértoa, University of Nottingham</strong></p>
<p>Even though Poland has low levels of unemployment and inflation and an overall positive macro-economic outlook, its people still <a href="https://theconversation.com/surprise-election-loss-for-polish-president-spells-trouble-for-governing-party-42367">threw out</a> the incumbent Civic Platform party president in favour of the opposition Law and Justice (PiS) candidate. A socially conservative party, PiS doubled down on its success in <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-polands-political-landscape-was-redrawn-overnight-49697">October’s legislative polls</a>, when it <a href="http://www.the-plot.org/2015/12/09/polish-politics-in-2015-all-the-power-to-the-right/">won in almost all regions</a> and across different demographics.</p>
<p>Since then, PiS has been on a tear, not least with some rather sobering appointments. Controversial nationalist <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/10/polish-defence-minister-condemned-over-jewish-conspiracy-theory">Antoni Macierewicz</a> is still minister of defence despite allegations of explicit anti-semitism, while Zbigniew Ziobro became minister of justice despite having already been in the spotlight after a number of <a href="https://polishpoliticsblog.wordpress.com/2015/11/30/how-will-polands-law-and-justice-party-govern/">politicised prosecutions</a>.</p>
<p>The party also holds serious sway over the Polish Constitutional Court, which has sole authority to declare laws unconstitutional – and because of impending retirements and amendments, PiS is moving forward the controversial debates on the court’s future. As Poland becomes more Eurosceptic, more protective of Polish interests and more disinclined to accept refugees, PiS now has a chance to implement its own distinctive version of law and justice.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Denmark: holding together (just)</h2>
<p><strong>Martin Vinæs Larsen, University of Copenhagen</strong></p>
<p>Denmark’s parliamentary election ended with a <a href="https://theconversation.com/danish-government-voted-out-but-who-moves-in-depends-on-a-battle-of-wills-on-the-right-43417">victory for the Liberal-Conservative bloc</a>, which ousted the Social Democratic prime minister, Helle Thorning-Schmidt.</p>
<p>But her successor at the helm, the Liberals’ <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17930161">Lars Løkke Rasmussen</a>, saw his own party severely weakened at the election. Instead, he had to rely on the right-wing populist party, the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/19/danish-peoples-party-dahl-border-controls-election">Danish People’s Party</a>, to gain a majority. The People’s Party had an outstanding election, becoming the second largest party in the new parliament.</p>
<p>The outlook was therefore somewhat bleak for the new prime minister, who now leads one of the smallest minority governments in the country’s history. In spite of this, he has managed to manoeuvre through the difficult parliamentary situation, shepherding through several important reforms of the labour market and new laws dealing with the refugee crises. But it remains to be seen how long he can hold his right-wing coalition together.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Sri Lanka: end of an era</h2>
<p><strong>Oliver Walton, University of Bath</strong></p>
<p>Mahinda Rajapaksa’s nine years in power <a href="https://theconversation.com/sri-lanka-stunned-as-rajapaksa-election-gamble-fails-to-pay-off-35971">came to an abrupt end</a> in January, when the former president suffered an unexpected defeat at the hands of his one-time ally Maithripala Sirisena. </p>
<p>Sirisena’s victory was widely seen as marking a revival of democratic governance in Sri Lanka, and was consolidated with another victory in <a href="https://theconversation.com/sri-lankas-election-thwarts-rajapaksa-and-sets-the-scene-for-deeper-reform-46059">August’s parliamentary elections</a>. </p>
<p>The new government has begun a constitutional reform process and cooperated with a UN-mandated mechanism for investigating war crimes, but concerns persist over the continued heavy military in the north and continuing <a href="http://www.freedomfromtorture.org/feature/out_of_the_silence/5979">evidence</a> of arbitrary detention and torture. </p>
<hr>
<h2>Guatemala: all change</h2>
<p><strong>Neil Pyper, Coventry University</strong></p>
<p>Guatemala’s presidential race produced a surprise outcome, while also <a href="https://theconversation.com/latin-american-leaders-wobble-and-topple-as-patience-with-corruption-runs-out-48778">shaking up the rest of Central America</a>. Until almost the eve of September’s first round, it seemed inevitable that Manuel Baldizon of the Renewed Democratic Freedom (Libre) party would win relatively comfortably. </p>
<p>But mass protests about a corruption scandal that eventually brought down the outgoing president, Otto Perez Molina – as well as his vice president and numerous ministers – drastically eroded support for Baldizon, as questions about wrongdoing within his party mounted. They also led to the rapid rise of political outsider Jimmy Morales, a well-known television personality. Morales topped the poll in the first round and won the subsequent run-off by a landslide. </p>
<p>He takes office in January, but faces the unenviable task of satisfying the public appetite for fundamental overhaul of the political system.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Greece: accepting austerity</h2>
<p><strong>Sotirios Zartaloudis, Birmingham</strong></p>
<p>Alexis Tsipras’ decision to <a href="https://theconversation.com/greek-election-tsipras-trounces-his-opponents-but-at-what-cost-47790">call snap elections in September</a> turned out to be a masterstroke of Machiavellian political ingenuity. </p>
<p>On one hand, the Syriza prime minister managed a very efficient manoeuvre to get rid of his anti-Euro internal opposition; on the other, he saved face for his anti-austerity U-turn, and now has the legitimacy he needs to implement the three extra years of harsh measures he agreed to before the elections. </p>
<p>It remains to be seen how his transformation from a hard-left radical to a pro-austerity premier will turn out, but so far, he has escaped punishment from the electorate despite reneging on almost all of his pre-2015 promises.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Singapore: marching on</h2>
<p><strong>Afif Pasuni, University of Warwick</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/singapores-ruling-party-heads-off-dissent-with-media-blitz-47332">Singapore’s election</a> was expected to trouble the country’s one-party system. It ultimately failed to change much – and the People’s Action Party (PAP) is still going strong after more than half a century of rule. Thanks to consistent economic progress, the party’s critics failed to gain much of a foothold.</p>
<p>But even though it won the election, the party is at a crossroads. Strict media controls and persistent socio-economic interventions are still the norm, but there are also signs that the government’s tight grip is relaxing. Still, while the state is not blithely ignoring to the demands of its critics, 2015 reminded us that surprises are still an alien concept in Singaporean politics.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Canada: a new generation rises</h2>
<p><strong>Steve Hewitt, University of Birmingham</strong></p>
<p>Led by three-term prime minister Stephen Harper, Canada’s Conservatives <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-canadas-conservative-party-is-brazenly-playing-the-terrorism-card-45916">waged an election campaign based on fear</a>, focusing on the threat posed by Syrian refugees specifically and Muslims more generally. The party duly held on to its base vote, but they were not able to go beyond it – while optimism helped Justin Trudeau’s Liberals increase their vote by over 4m. </p>
<p>Justin Trudeau’s election represents a generational change in terms of attitudes toward drugs. Whereas no other national leader in a Western democracy has both admitted using drugs and then promised to legalise them nationally, after Trudeau admitted in 2010 that he had smoked pot, he not only refused to apologise but also pledged to legalise marijuana if his Liberal Party won the election. That promise was <a href="http://news.liftcannabis.ca/2015/12/04/22122/">reiterated</a> in this year’s <a href="http://speech.gc.ca/">throne speech</a>. </p>
<p>Trudeau is a sign of things to come as a new generation takes power around the world. As in the 2015 UK result and recent US presidential elections, most major Canadian cities – often increasingly diverse with citizens drawn from around the world along with youth and dynamism – voted for left-of-centre parties, while older and more homogenous suburban and rural voters opt for right-of-centre parties. The divide is growing, and it won’t start to close anytime soon. </p>
<p>This is the politics of the 21st century – and Justin Trudeau has harnessed it capably. </p>
<hr>
<h2>Turkey: deep trouble</h2>
<p><strong>Bahar Baser, Coventry University</strong></p>
<p>Turkey’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-your-guide-to-turkeys-general-election-42438">June election</a> was ripe with possibility, both good and bad. The pro-Kurdish leftist party, the HDP, was taking a major risk by participating in the elections for the first time, and the results of the elections were expected to determine whether the country would start moving towards a more authoritarian presidential system. </p>
<p>In the end, the HDP <a href="https://theconversation.com/where-next-for-the-kurds-after-turkish-election-success-of-hdp-42979">passed the 10% threshold</a> needed to enter parliament and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its absolute majority – but the country’s various parties could not agree on a coalition government, and a snap second election was called for November. </p>
<p>Between the two polls, the Kurdish peace process stalled completely and the Turkish army and police forces began cracking down on Kurdish majority areas, causing numerous civilian casualties in the process. Then there was a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ankara-bombing-kills-dozens-calling-for-peace-in-turkey-48942">massive bombing in Ankara</a>, the worst in Turkey’s recent history. </p>
<p>But instead of haemorrhaging votes as some predicted, the AKP <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-election-erdogan-and-the-akp-get-majority-back-amid-climate-of-violence-and-fear-49963">won an outright majority in November</a> by charming nationalist voters, paving the way for a transition to a more authoritarian system under one-party rule. The HDP once again cleared the 10% threshold, but with fewer votes.</p>
<p>All this bodes ill for 2016. The PKK and the Turkish state will be forced to find a way forward, while a crackdown on freedom of speech and human rights is already underway. And all the while, Turkey must struggle to manage its increasingly complex position in the Syrian crisis. </p>
<hr>
<h2>Myanmar: a new dawn?</h2>
<p><strong>Andrew Fagan, University of Essex</strong></p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/aung-san-suu-kyi-victory-will-test-commitment-to-human-rights-in-myanmar-50041">first credible general elections</a> to be held in Myanmar for more than 50 years took place this November. Everyone predicted that Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) would win, but few expected the landslide scale of the victory. Crucially, the large number of votes the NLD secured from Myanmar’s multitude of ethnic minorities, who this time around have placed their hopes for real change in the NLD rather than their own ethnicity-based political parties. </p>
<p>Still, despite voting for the NLD, many remain unconvinced by its commitment to genuinely ending the discrimination and persecution of Myanmar’s minorities . This is especially the case with respect to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-persecution-of-rohingya-muslims-is-producing-a-ready-supply-of-slaves-46108">Rohingya</a>, who are classified by the UN as one of the most persecuted minorities in the world. The NLD’s commitment to human rights will ultimately be measured by its ability to confront and overcome ethnic and religious conflict. </p>
<hr>
<h2>Argentina: let’s change</h2>
<p><strong>Juan Pablo Ferrero, University of Bath</strong></p>
<p>Mauricio Macri won Argentina’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/argentina-departs-from-the-kirchner-model-but-mauricio-macri-now-has-to-govern-a-divided-nation-51060">first ever presidential run-off</a> by a narrow margin, making him the first ever democratic president to come from a third party. His coalition, Let’s Change, ran on a minimalist platform that targeted middle-class concerns, emphasising meritocracy and difference over equality and social rights. </p>
<p>Macri’s win matters for the whole region because it is the first presidential election lost by a coalition of the centre-left – playing into the narrative that Latin America’s leftist political era is <a href="https://theconversation.com/latin-americas-leftism-looks-paler-than-ever-as-trailblazers-stumble-and-fall-51528">coming to a close</a>. </p>
<p>Still, any hopes Macri will dismantle Argentina’s post-neoliberal consensus are premature – any such attempt will face organised resistance from social movements and opposition parliamentarians. The country is divided in two opposing cultural blocs roughly equal in political heft and with roughly equivalent representation throughout the system, so making policy without resorting to presidential decrees will be tough. </p>
<p>The government’s main challenge will be to turn its electoral victory into a broader political consensus that can keep Argentina governable – and the opposition must reflect about why the same sectors of the middle class that supported its ascent have now brought it down. </p>
<hr>
<h2>Venezuela: the dream is over</h2>
<p><strong>Marco Aponte-Moreno, University College London</strong></p>
<p>Venezuela’s congressional election marked <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-this-the-end-of-the-socialist-dream-in-venezuela-49859">the end of 16 years of hegemony</a> for the late Hugo Chávez’s socialist party. </p>
<p>In a historic vote with a turnout of almost 75%, the opposition obtained a supermajority of two-thirds of the legislature. These results will allow the opposition to call a referendum to remove the country’s unpopular president, Nicolás Maduro, from office once his term reaches its midpoint in mid April 2016.</p>
<p>The opposition will also try to pass an amnesty to release jailed opposition leaders and remove judges installed by court-packing. Meanwhile, for many voters, the decisive issue was Venezuela’s dire economic performance. Addressing <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/venezuelas-food-shortage-keeps-getting-worse-2015-8?IR=T">desperate shortages</a> of food and basic goods will be a challenge for the opposition and the “chavistas” alike. </p>
<hr>
<h2>Spain: ¡sí, se puede!</h2>
<p><strong>Paul Kennedy, University of Bath</strong></p>
<p>Spain’s political system had shown signs of fracturing for some time, but on December 15 the country’s two-party system was <a href="https://theconversation.com/spain-votes-for-change-but-has-no-idea-what-government-itll-end-up-with-52583">finally consigned to the history books</a>. The ruling People’s Party remained the largest in parliament but came up well short of a majority; the once-governing Socialists were very nearly one-upped by leftist insurgents Podemos.</p>
<p>The upshot is that no obvious political partners have the seats to assemble a parliamentary majority – and given the Catalan nationalists’ wholehearted push for independence, bringing them into a coalition will be more politically tricky than ever before. Whoever gets to do it, governing Spain for the four years until the next scheduled election will be a fraught business indeed.</p>
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<p><em>Stay with The Conversation in 2016 for our coverage of elections in the US, Peru, the Philippines, and many more.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51642/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Gegout has received funding from the British Academy and the European Union. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oliver Walton receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steve Hewitt has in the past received funding from the British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Afif Pasuni, Andrew Fagan, Bahar Baser, Fernando Casal Bértoa, Juan Pablo Ferrero, Louise Thompson, Marco Aponte-Moreno, Martin Vinæs Larsen, Neil Pyper, Paul Kennedy, Simona Guerra, Sotirios Zartaloudis, Stephen Chan, and Yoav Galai do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For better or for worse, various countries around the world charted a new course last year. What lies ahead for 2016?Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonAfif Pasuni, PhD Candidate, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of WarwickAndrew Fagan, Co-Director of Postgraduate Studies, Human Rights Centre, University of EssexBahar Baser, Research Fellow, Coventry UniversityCatherine Gegout, Lecturer in International Relations, University of NottinghamFernando Casal Bértoa, Nottingham Research Fellow (politics), University of NottinghamJuan Pablo Ferrero, Lecturer in Latin American Studies, University of BathLouise Thompson, Lecturer in British Politics, University of SurreyMarco Aponte-Moreno, Senior teaching fellow in leadership, UCLMartin Vinæs Larsen, PhD Student, Department of Political Science, University of CopenhagenNeil Pyper, Associate Head of School, Coventry UniversityOliver Walton, Lecturer in International Development, University of BathPaul Kennedy, Lecturer in Spanish and European Studies, University of BathSimona Guerra, Lecturer in Politics, University of LeicesterSotirios Zartaloudis, Lecturer in Politics, University of BirminghamSteve Hewitt, Senior Lecturer in the Department of History , University of BirminghamYoav Galai, PhD candidate in the School of International Relations, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/490762015-10-15T05:33:00Z2015-10-15T05:33:00ZLessons from the student vote in UK election for the EU referendum<p>Students did not hold as much sway in the 2015 UK general election as was predicted, according to a new report from the <a href="http://www.hepi.ac.uk/">Higher Education Policy Institute</a> (HEPI) think tank. It argues that while the student vote was still important, it was swallowed up by wider national swings – towards the Conservatives and away from the Liberal Democrats. </p>
<p>While <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/public-leaders-network/2015/feb/05/missing-voters-individual-electoral-registration-disaster">changes to the electoral registration</a> for students did not have as negative an impact as some feared on voter turnout, HEPI warns that there are still challenges ahead for campaigners looking to get young people to vote in the upcoming EU referendum and the London mayoral race. </p>
<p>HEPI found that of 14 constituencies it <a href="http://www.hepi.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Do-students-swing-elections.pdf">had predicted</a> would be affected by the student vote, eight changed hands. For example, Kingston & Surbiton went from Liberal Democrat to Conservative, and Cambridge and Bristol West went Liberal Democrat to Labour. But the student effect didn’t always have an impact on results. Nicky Morgan, the Conservative education minister <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-32224818">was seen as vulnerable</a> in her Loughborough seat, but actually won with a 7.9% increase in the vote share. </p>
<h2>Pro EU? Plan your action now</h2>
<p><a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/8/8b/Students_in_tertiary_education%2C_2012_%28%C2%B9%29_YB15.png">According to Eurostat</a>, the UK is home to around 2.5m students in tertiary education, more than any other EU country except Germany. Our students are numerous and <a href="http://www.icmunlimited.com/media-centre/media-centre/in-a-eu-referendum-two-fifths-of-18-to-24-year-olds-likely-to-vote-to-stay-in">far more likely to support EU membership</a> than older age groups. The EU has done a <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/eu-referendum-britains-students-are-stronger-in-europe-a6689056.html">particularly good job winning over students</a> with programmes such as Erasmus, to the extent that <a href="http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/michaelheaver/100225031/eurosceptics-face-a-demographic-timebomb-young-people-want-to-stay-in-the-eu-can-we-change-their-minds/">one UKIP campaigner</a> called young people a timebomb for Eurosceptics.</p>
<p>If the student bomb doesn’t go off, it is likely to be because of low registration and low turnout. For Eurosceptics, young people staying home is good news. If you want out of the EU, the message is simple: your best strategy is to hope for a referendum held during the holidays, preferably after a major sporting fixture, and for student registration to stay as low as possible. </p>
<p>For the “in” camp, students must be targeted and must be targeted now. Perhaps counter-intuitively, it would be a good strategy not to campaign for young votes with young issues. HEPI is correct to point out that young people <a href="http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Tune_in_-_web.pdf?1419813387">want the same things everyone else does</a>: a job with a reliable wage to live on, an affordable home, happiness and an equal opportunity. </p>
<p>The pro-EU camp should argue that the EU is a source of economic opportunity after students graduate. They should keep the vote simple. The referendum will, after all, be a well-publicised, clear yes/no choice, less mediated by the political elites young people distrust - it is a vote on a decision, not a vote for a politician.</p>
<p>They must also help students get registered. The rules on electoral registration do not suit students, who move house frequently, and who – until recent changes – could be registered by their university or college. Before the 2015 election <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/feb/24/million-voters-missing-roll-electoral-commission-students-block-individual-registration">the fear that students would fall off the register was well publicised</a> and HEPI identified a surge in last minute registrations, thanks in part to active Students Unions, the Election Commission, and pressure groups like <a href="http://bitetheballot.co.uk/">Bite the Ballot</a>. </p>
<p>If you’re pro-EU, plan now for registration drives. Don’t be put off by low registration: many students will register at the last minute, so push right up to the deadline. It will be especially interesting to see if the major graduate employers who support EU membership are ready to put effort into mobilising students to vote. </p>
<h2>Students and the London mayoral election</h2>
<p>According to HESA, <a href="https://www.hesa.ac.uk/stats">about 360,000, or 4% of the population of London, are students</a>, and the message for supporters of any candidate in the election must be clear: plan now for how you will drive for student registration, right up until election day on May 5. </p>
<p>HEPI’s pre-2015 election analysis indicated that students would swing constituencies, towards Labour or (in Brighton) towards the Greens. But although HEPI considered there was enough red among students to keep the Conservative majority down, they were struck – as many pollsters were – by the ability of the Conservative Party to win in the face of stiff predicted opposition. As for the Liberal Democrats, the party that celebrated a smashing victory among the young in 2010 was left for dead in 2015, falling behind the Greens, UKIP and the SNP among 18-to-24-year-olds.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98266/original/image-20151013-31126-1gwt9rc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98266/original/image-20151013-31126-1gwt9rc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98266/original/image-20151013-31126-1gwt9rc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98266/original/image-20151013-31126-1gwt9rc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98266/original/image-20151013-31126-1gwt9rc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98266/original/image-20151013-31126-1gwt9rc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98266/original/image-20151013-31126-1gwt9rc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98266/original/image-20151013-31126-1gwt9rc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">IPSOS Mori.</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>All candidates must realise that students, like young people generally, are disillusioned with public policy. Young people were the <a href="https://theconversation.com/www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/young-people-were-hit-worst-by-the-great-recession-10101672.html">worst hit by the recession</a>, and they have <a href="http://www.electionanalysis.uk/uk-election-analysis-2015/section-2-voters/bringing-out-the-youth-vote-young-people-and-the-2015-general-election/">borne the brunt of cuts in spending</a>, from the hike in tuition fees to the denial of housing benefit to young people. Students have suffered the same double whammy, but as HEPI indicates, they are focused on their transition to employment and to stable, independent adulthood. </p>
<p>This means candidates who want to court the student vote would be well advised to campaign on affordable housing and stable, well-paid work. Young people are <a href="https://theconversation.com/www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/lmac/contracts-with-no-guaranteed-hours/zero-hour-contracts--2014/analysis-of-employee-contracts-that-do-not-guarantee-a-minimum-number-of-hours.html">three times more likely to work on a zero hours contract</a> and their income <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/young-adults-income-has-suffered-the-most-from-the-uk-recession-latest-report-shows-9605971.html">fell further than any other age group during the recession</a>. </p>
<p>The mayoral race has already featured running battles on affordable housing and this will <a href="http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Tune_in_-_web.pdf?1419813387">pique the interest of students</a>. NHS funding and improved mental healthcare provision are also <a href="https://theconversation.com/hate-the-players-love-the-game-why-young-people-arent-voting-40921">both potential votewinners</a> among the young.</p>
<p>For both polls – the EU referendum and the London mayoral race – the message is clear. Students are a potentially powerful voting bloc, but campaigners need to make sure they are registered, and campaign on economic issues. That’s the golden ticket.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49076/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Bowman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Students didn’t hold that much sway at the election.Benjamin Bowman, PhD candidate in Politics, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/451202015-07-23T14:22:53Z2015-07-23T14:22:53ZWhy is Jeremy Corbyn stealing the show? Because he’s the only Labour candidate saying anything at all<p>Tom Lehrer, the American satirical lyricist, sang of the Spanish republican struggle against Franco: “He may have won all the battles, but we had all the good songs”.</p>
<p>Jeremy Corbyn seems to have all the good songs and is winning too. I say “seems” as the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-corbyn-set-to-win-labour-leadership-contest-poll-finds-10406172.html">polls</a> are always wrong, and yet, with the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jul/22/yvette-cooper-rejects-leadership-poll-predicting-victory-jeremy-corbyn">exception</a> of Yvette Cooper, we go on believing every single one of them. And that belief has dramatic political effects. Whatever the truth, Corbyn is turning the contest to become the next leader of the Labour party upside down.</p>
<p>The election was already in terrible disarray, even before the polling caused such a stir. There was uproar in the party and confusion between the candidates over George Osborne’s benefit cuts, refracted equally confusedly through Harriet Harman, the acting leader.</p>
<p>None of the <a href="http://www.labour.org.uk/leadership">three mainstream candidates</a> for the job – Cooper, Andy Burnham and Liz Kendall – is really proposing anything, only reacting. And as regards their own leadership status, all took a falsely modest position when asked who they might have in their shadow cabinet in the event of a win, each refusing to answer the question. Then Cooper and Kendall said they would not serve under Corbyn if they lost, and Burnham said he might.</p>
<p>Corbyn’s rivals have made it clear that they can already picture him at the dispatch box. All they are doing is enhancing his leadership status and diminishing their own even further. And he is already naming his cabinet – Ed Miliband will have the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-corbyn-says-hed-bring-ed-miliband-back-into-the-shadow-cabinet-as-energy-secretary-10409202.html">energy portfolio</a>!</p>
<p>So what began as a spectacularly ill-judged scramble for Ed’s fallen crown (and reliable rumour has it they were manoeuvring even before it slid from his head) has now become a mission to stop the “<a href="https://theconversation.com/are-you-ready-for-a-new-kind-of-left-wing-politics-33511">Syriza-Podemos</a> candidate”. No Pasaran.</p>
<p>The standoff is playing out across a series of television debates (that everyone is now watching). These started off with the three front runners patronising the radical warhorse from the 1960s but now he is riding a rhetorical coach and horses through their platitudes.</p>
<p>How did this happen? Let us get one thing clear; it has absolutely nothing to do with being left wing or right wing. Corbyn is making such a strong media showing because of his style and language. And the others are coming across as mediocre because of theirs.</p>
<p>They have the rhetorically disadvantaged position (which they themselves chose) of talking about nothing in particular. Did we overspend in the last Labour government? Yes we did (Burnham). No we didn’t (Cooper). This was when much of Labour’s <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/may/13/labour-party-record-surge-membership">post-May 2015 recruits</a> were seven or eight years old.</p>
<p>What is Corbyn talking about? Everything. More importantly, he embodies a wide and deep tradition in the UK left that we can all recognise and engage with. And, more importantly still, he does it with elegance, conviction, modesty and intellectual coherence.</p>
<p>The mainstream candidates are all extremely clever, but what do they embody? What image of them do we retain after a performance? What have they told us about themselves as a political persona and potential leader?</p>
<p>We know that Kendall <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/15/liz-kendall-labour-leadership-interview">urges realism</a>, but we don’t really know what that means apart from not what Ed was doing. You can’t “see” realism.</p>
<p>As regards Cooper, the media snapped up <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-33428043">remarks from one of her supporters</a> about being a working mother and (almost) turned it into a spat between the two woman candidates. This sexist trivia gets media mileage because none of the mainstream candidates embodies a vision of a Labour Britain.</p>
<p>Burnham is apparently true Labour because he has a Northern accent – his flat As are getting flatter by the week. At weekends he goes back to where he was brought up and still meets up with the people he used to play football with.</p>
<p>This is dire stuff. Corbyn wants to talk about all the things that make people want to vote Labour or not, or join Labour or not, or consider joining Labour, and so on.</p>
<p>He is giving us all a lesson in politics: you have to represent something, you have to embody a political view or tradition, and you have to perform it to rhetorical effect. And you have to be – or at least seem to be – authentic and sincere while you do it.</p>
<p>All four of the candidates are all of these things. Corbyn is just doing it much better than the others. The poll may indeed be wrong, but he is doing everything right. I suspect Corbyn’s bedtime reading is not Marx’s <a href="https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/">Grundrisse</a> but Aristotle’s <a href="http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/rhetoric.html">Rhetoric</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/45120/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Gaffney received funding from the Leverhulme Trust for his research on the Labour Party</span></em></p>All four leadership hopefuls have a political position — but only one is actually saying what it is.John Gaffney, Professor of Politics & Co-Director, Aston Centre for Europe and Visiting Professor, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/444332015-07-13T05:25:07Z2015-07-13T05:25:07ZFor those seeking to boost voter turnout, Scotland is a false friend<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/87792/original/image-20150708-31560-jzxmic.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Did the indyref make a permanent difference to voter apathy?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/marccharbonne/15570380488/in/photolist-pHUgE1-p4vdr7-oVLNkc-pHXwjN-oX2qEa-oqFDjJ-p1JbtA-psTudx-9BCTw4-oZ1Vvh-p1GkQC-p1Eckp-p1FkTW-phV7rc-pi9246-pg8txJ-p1Ddgp-pi9i9c-p1EswY-pg91Bs-pi8upY-p1GmoQ-p1FoJ5-p1Exqx-pg9rn9-pibzXt-p1EZJX-phSkTt-p1G9Ly-phT2YP-p1EUth-pi8gAm-p1E4Tw-p1Ep9n-pga6Th-p1FSpH-pg7TUG-pg9zGW-p1G796-p1F3Dp-pg8KAL-p1GwnM-pg7Pth-piaCkB-phTNdF-p1D91k-pg9Kp1-pi8dHh-p1FY6x-pg83rS">Marc Charbonne</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A huge and well known problem for democracy across the developed world <a href="http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/fall2012/democracy-decline">is that</a> voter turnout has been falling in elections for a number of years. It is <a href="http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN01467/SN01467.pdf">particularly noticeable</a> in towns and cities, which reflects the fact the problem is worst with the less well-off sections of the electorate.</p>
<p>The UK <a href="http://www.ippr.org/files/images/media/files/publication/2013/11/divided-democracy_Nov2013_11420.pdf?noredirect=1">is no exception</a> – but last September’s Scottish referendum made the world sit up and take notice. The referendum strongly bucked the downward trend, producing an <a href="http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/home-news/its-no-go-scotland-rejects-independence.1411101075">84.6% turnout</a>, well above the 66% of voters <a href="http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=77">who voted</a> in the previous two UK elections. It was heralded as a great example of <a href="https://theconversation.com/my-fellow-catholics-are-the-lapsed-unionists-behind-snp-surge-in-the-polls-35343">democratic engagement</a>, with strong impetus at grassroots level that saw activists on almost every street corner and lively debates in church halls and community centres the length of the country. <a href="http://www.optionsforscotland.com/2015/05/14/what-future-for-labour-after-the-collapse/">According to</a> former Scottish Nationalist deputy leader Jim Sillars, it was “a unique civic exercise in self-political education on a massive scale”. </p>
<p>Scotland still appeared to be feeling this “referendum effect” at the time of this May’s UK election. The 71.1% <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2015-32624405">turnout</a> was an increase of 7.3 points on 2010, compared to a one-point increase elsewhere in the UK. And it is worth noting that Scotland was particularly disengaged from politics in the years before the referendum – this was the first time Scotland recorded a turnout higher than the rest of the UK in an election since 1979. </p>
<p>For politicians and political scientists looking to revitalise long-term declines in voter turnout across the board, a view has developed that Scotland <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/9/16/in-scotland-streetpoliticsisbackwhatevertheoutcome.html">might point to</a> an answer – particularly for deprived communities. So we decided to look more closely at voter behaviour in Scotland during different recent elections to see if this interpretation was correct. </p>
<h2>Glasgow under the microscope</h2>
<p>We focused on Glasgow, since nowhere in Scotland has voter disengagement been more evident than in its biggest city. Despite Glasgow’s historic reputation of <a href="http://sites.scran.ac.uk/redclyde/redclyde/rceve5.htm">Red Clydeside</a>, rent strikes and social movements, it has become politically disengaged, lagging Scottish turnout in every vote since 1945 (see figure below). </p>
<p><strong>Glasgow turnout deficit 1945-2015</strong></p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/87934/original/image-20150709-10869-bs5m0h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/87934/original/image-20150709-10869-bs5m0h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/87934/original/image-20150709-10869-bs5m0h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87934/original/image-20150709-10869-bs5m0h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87934/original/image-20150709-10869-bs5m0h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87934/original/image-20150709-10869-bs5m0h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87934/original/image-20150709-10869-bs5m0h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87934/original/image-20150709-10869-bs5m0h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>This low political engagement along with Glasgow’s other woes tends to be linked to poverty. The Scottish deprivation statistics <a href="http://www.sns.gov.uk/Simd/Simd.aspx">show that</a> despite the city’s <a href="https://peoplemakeglasgow.com">brand image</a> as a modern post-industrial city, it houses the lion’s share of Scotland’s poverty. Glasgow has 11.4% of the Scottish population, but three times that share of the country’s most deprived neighbourhoods (see figure below). </p>
<p><strong>Most deprived Scottish neighbourhoods by council area</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/87779/original/image-20150708-31595-bf2ov7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/87779/original/image-20150708-31595-bf2ov7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/87779/original/image-20150708-31595-bf2ov7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87779/original/image-20150708-31595-bf2ov7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87779/original/image-20150708-31595-bf2ov7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87779/original/image-20150708-31595-bf2ov7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87779/original/image-20150708-31595-bf2ov7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87779/original/image-20150708-31595-bf2ov7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation 2012</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the years since the decline of shipbuilding and other heavy industry, Glasgow’s population became gradually less inclined to vote than the rest of Scotland. Since the mid-1990s, the gap has grown markedly. In the elections for the Scottish parliament, the first of which was in 1999, Glasgow turnout has been eight to ten percentage points lower than the Scottish average. Even in the referendum, Glasgow’s 75% turnout was the lowest in Scotland. </p>
<h2>Deprivation, turnout and the referendum legacy</h2>
<p>To get around these problems, we obtained detailed voting information for Glasgow City Council’s 240 polling districts for the 2011 Scottish election, the referendum and this year’s UK election. For each polling district, we used the <a href="http://www.sns.gov.uk/Simd/Simd.aspx">Scottish deprivation statistics</a> to give them a score for average deprivation.</p>
<p>What we found was very interesting. At the 2011 Scottish election, a district’s deprivation score made a big difference to voter turnout. In the way that we political scientists describe these things, deprivation explained 54% of the variation in voting across Glasgow between different districts. </p>
<p>At the 2014 referendum the relationship with deprivation became much weaker, explaining only 27% of the variation. In other words, the usual link between turnout and deprivation was strongly undermined by the referendum. The turnout in nine polling districts remained below 55% at the referendum, but only one of them was among the city’s most deprived districts. Two of the nine were among the city’s least deprived areas. </p>
<p>Yet in the general election, Glasgow reverted to type. Deprivation became a very good predictor of turnout once again, explaining 50% of the voting variation between districts. This suggests that the turnout drives in Glasgow’s deprived communities during the referendum by the likes of the <a href="http://radicalindependence.org">Radical Independence Campaign</a> were successful. But this “referendum effect” looks to have been temporary. When voters from deprived communities were asked at this year’s election to vote again for politicians and parties, as opposed to the question of independence, they were no more likely to do so than they had been in 2011. </p>
<p>We can only speculate about why more deprived voters were more inclined to vote in 2014. Undoubtedly it suggests they turned out to address a meaningful substantive issue rather than the election of politicians. Possibly there was an element of “what have we got to lose?” among them. As a <a href="http://centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Scottish%20Referendum%20Study%2027%20March%202015.pdf">leading analysis</a> of the Scottish referendum vote has highlighted, those more inclined to vote to Yes were in the lowest income quartile (56.4%), working class (53.6%) and in social rented housing (61.9%) (the overall vote in favour <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-29270441">was 45%</a>). </p>
<p>Yes Scotland undoubtedly tapped into – and, to a degree fueled – disenchantment with Westminster rule and austerity policies. Independence was projected as an opportunity to break the mould of “normal” British politics and create a more social-democratic style of polity. Perhaps for the same reasons, last week’s Greek referendum <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/ng-interactive/2015/jul/09/greek-referendum-how-athens-voted-interactive-map">highlighted</a> that the Athens poor were far more inclined to take a chance with their political future than the more affluent communities in the Greek capital.</p>
<p>But our Scottish analysis suggests that such mould-breaking decisions don’t re-engage more deprived voters permanently. Contrary to what the initial headline figures for Scottish turnout at the 2015 UK election suggested, in deprived areas the legacy of the referendum appears to have evaporated very quickly. Those looking for ways to replicate Scotland’s referendum turnout boost for deprived communities in their neck of the woods seem to be relying on a false friend. It would appear that the “referendum effect” was a fleeting one, rather than a durable legacy. Sorry to be the bearers of bad news.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/44433/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is a widespread belief that the independence referendum stumbled across the elixir for dispelling longstanding voter apathy. In the areas where it matters most, it is just not true.Neil McGarvey, Senior fellow, University of Strathclyde Heinz Brandenburg, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of Strathclyde Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/427922015-06-03T19:20:32Z2015-06-03T19:20:32ZIf it is sensible, Labour won’t erase Ed Miliband from its collective memory<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/83848/original/image-20150603-2963-16sg6lb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Call me, guys. Any time.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PA/Yui Mok</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It is normal that for politicians to engage in angry finger-pointing after a humiliating electoral defeat. Playing the blame game has a therapeutic effect and helps a party make sense of its defeat.</p>
<p>It is going to take the forensic eye of a Sherlock Holmes to understand what happened to the Labour Party on May 7 and the story-telling talents of a Scheherazade to come up with an agenda to woo a highly fragmented British electorate.</p>
<p>But in the rush to find a quick fix for its electoral problems, Labour is in danger of learning the wrong lessons from the electoral defeat. The temptation to condemn the whole of Miliband’s agenda to the dustbin of history is big. But that would be a mistake. Parts of Milibandism were right and will endure in the coming years.</p>
<p>It is true that Labour’s devastating defeat was mostly the result of political mistakes made by Ed Miliband. He failed to develop an enticing and credible programme of government and wrongly believed that image and personality do not matter much in British politics. Above all, he failed to challenge the public perception that the global financial crisis had been caused by overspending by the previous Labour government.</p>
<p>But this latter failure is mostly a demonstration of the strength of the austerity narrative that centre-right parties across Europe (that are mostly in government) have weaved so successfully. Since 2008, all European social democratic leaders (including Miliband) have tried and failed to counter the argument that rising public deficits were caused by profligate governments. To believe that a more centrist leader would be able to succeed in this task is a dangerous fantasy that Labour should avoid pursuing.</p>
<h2>What Miliband got right</h2>
<p>Despite his flaws as a leader, Miliband got a few things right. As Tony Blair <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/09/tony-blair-what-labour-must-do-next-election-ed-miliband">recognised</a>, he was “absolutely right to raise the issue of inequality”. The problem was that Miliband’s approach was simultaneously too minimalist (raising the minimum wage to £8 an hour over the period of five years was hardly going to redress inequalities) and was presented in an angry and divisive language that was bound to be badly received by the right-wing press.</p>
<p>But the fact remains that the UK <a href="http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef1510en.pd">tops the list</a> of the most unequal countries in the EU and this has an impact on <a href="http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/Focus-Inequality-and-Growth-2014.pdf">economic performance</a>.</p>
<p>Moreover, it’s an agenda that actually resonates with voters. So much so that the Conservatives are quickly moving to occupy this territory and even use some of Miliband’s language. David Cameron’s focus on <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-minister-david-camerons-speech-at-tetley-stockton-on-tees">blue-collar Tories</a> with commitments on free childcare, apprenticeships, tax cuts for minimum wage earners suggests that the Tories will try to neutralise Labour in this particular area.</p>
<p>Miliband was equally right about the economy. Contrary to what is quickly becoming the official version of Milibandism (and promoted by some of the contenders to Labour’s leadership) he developed a strategy for economic growth that timidly started to address Britain’s long-term problems of low productivity.</p>
<p>Together with Andrew Adonis, Ed Balls, and Chuka Umunna, Miliband developed <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/labour-is-proposing-a-sensible-restructure-of-british-capitalism-10034855.html">plans</a> to rebalance the economy and increase productivity. This included an active industrial policy, investing in apprenticeships, devolving economic powers to English cities and towns, and public investment in infrastructure.</p>
<p>But all this was obfuscated by Labour’s convoluted stances on the deficit. It is also true that a deficit-obsessed media was not the least bit interested in hearing Labour’s plans to rebalance the economy, especially because stressing Miliband’s supposed anti-business rhetoric resulted in much better headlines.</p>
<p>Miliband’s response to these key issues was timid. But his timidity was not only a product of his legendary indecision. The Labour Party, including many members of the shadow cabinet, were divided on these (and more) issues and the result was an electoral manifesto that lacked bite.</p>
<p>Judging by the programme of the Conservative government, these issues will dominate the political agenda in the next five years and Labour should have something to say about them. Rather than starting from scratch, it should pick up and develop where Miliband left off.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42792/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
It is normal that for politicians to engage in angry finger-pointing after a humiliating electoral defeat. Playing the blame game has a therapeutic effect and helps a party make sense of its defeat. It…Eunice Goes, Associate Professor of Politics, Richmond American International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/423692015-06-03T04:26:16Z2015-06-03T04:26:16ZEuropean movements could mark the end of ‘representative’ politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/83198/original/image-20150528-26028-1qucm4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C269%2C4096%2C2697&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The success of Nicola Sturgeon's Scottish National Party has profoundly disrupted the tedious pendulum movement between Left and Right.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Robert Perry</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/shortcodes/images-videos/articles-democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>In the wake of an extraordinary climax to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/uk-general-election-2015">UK general election</a>, it might seem strange to be posing the question of the health of representative politics. The <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/generalelection/general-election-2015-highest-turnout-since-1997-10235076.html">turnout</a> for the election was 66.1%, the highest recorded in the UK for 18 years.</p>
<p>The tedious pendulum movement between Left and Right – which many believe to be at the root of the current malaise – was profoundly disrupted by the explosion in support for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-snp-has-blown-british-politics-apart-and-the-uk-must-now-change-if-it-is-to-survive-41507">Scottish National Party</a> (SNP) and by the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32633719">13% of the vote</a> gained by the UK Independence Party (UKIP).</p>
<p>Crisis? What crisis? But despite the interest generated by the UK election, signs of change – even transformation – in Western democracies are not far from hand.</p>
<h2>‘Strong’ and ‘stable’ government</h2>
<p>Much of the media crowed with news of the Conservatives’ clear mandate to govern. The markets <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2015/may/08/pound-jumps-shares-surge-general-election-live">went up</a>; the pound strengthened. “Strong” and “stable” government was restored after a temporary hiatus brought about by a hung parliament and the need for a coalition government.</p>
<p>While the Conservatives <a href="https://theconversation.com/voting-system-gives-tories-a-result-most-uk-voters-didnt-want-41595">polled</a> 37% of the popular vote, it ended up with 51% of the seats and a clear majority in the House of Commons. By contrast, the Greens and UKIP combined polled 16.5% of the popular vote but ended up with two seats between them. Such disproportionality makes a mockery of the “one person, one vote” notion that underpins democracy. </p>
<p>So, the government claims to represent the British people – but the maths suggests otherwise.</p>
<p>None of this is of concern for the markets and much of the mainstream media. We are collectively cajoled to accept this as democratic legitimacy in the face of evidence that suggests it is anything but.</p>
<p>We have, as Lord Hailsham famously put it, <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/elective-dictatorship-democratic-mandate/">“elective dictatorship”</a> – the imposition of state power in a manner that meets with the approval of a small minority. But that doesn’t matter, because that small minority includes all those who “count”.</p>
<h2>Weak parties as organisational totems</h2>
<p>The issues concerning the health of representative politics are by no means exhausted simply by looking at the outcome. Whereas Labour and the Conservatives could draw on the support of millions of members in the 1960s, they are now left with <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/sep/29/labour-conservatvies-uk-party-membership-is-tiny">rapidly declining memberships</a> in the 100,000s each. </p>
<p>Their memberships are not merely declining – they are ageing. This means they need to turn to other sources of support. In the case of the Conservatives, this pulls them toward corporate Britain, banks and “high net worth” individuals whose wealth and power ensures much greater “representation” than the ordinary party member – let alone the voter.</p>
<p>The Labour Party, once the flagship for organised labour, looks even worse. The declining memberships of trade unions are creating a financial crisis for the party. This is not to say that the trade unions exercise no influence. Ed Miliband’s <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/26/unions-decisive-role-labour-leadership-vote-despite-reform">election</a> to the leadership in 2010 is testimony to the over-preponderance of union influence in the party. Labour’s credentials as a mobiliser and representer of “ordinary people” looks flimsy.</p>
<p>With a steady hollowing out of membership, the cosying up to vested interests with pockets deep enough to maintain party bureaucracies in the manner to which they have been accustomed and the televisual display of forced smiles, today’s political parties barely “represent”. They are rather organisational totems: expressions of certain values, vaguely defined to appeal to as many as possible.</p>
<p>But how then to interpret the SNP’s extraordinary rise from relative obscurity to a position of near monopoly in Scotland?</p>
<p>The SNP’s emergence can be read as a pragmatic response to this crisis. It is part of that more general phenomenon spreading across Europe and elsewhere: a generalised discontent with the state of democracy, resulting in support for parties that draw their support from the promise to highlight the iniquities and failures of the present system.</p>
<h2>A new cycle?</h2>
<p>The current cycle started with Beppe Grillo’s <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/25/beppe-grillo-italy-election-success">Five Star Movement</a> winning the largest vote of any single party in the 2013 Italian election. It gathered pace with the emergence of <a href="https://theconversation.com/syriza-sweeps-to-victory-in-greek-election-promising-an-end-to-humiliation-36680">Syriza</a> in Greece and <a href="https://theconversation.com/meet-podemos-the-party-revolutionising-spanish-politics-33802">Podemos</a> in Spain.</p>
<p>The emergence of the SNP should not be read as a source of comfort for those thinking that the 2015 UK election represents a re-enchantment with representative politics. The signs are clear, warning us of the exhaustion of this manner of doing politics – and thus a deepening of the crisis, now accentuated by the rejection of “Westminster” by a large portion of the Scottish electorate.</p>
<p>Why does any of this matter?</p>
<p>We are reaching a tipping point in the public’s perception of the democratic content of representative democracies. The emergence of “something has to change” parties, movements and tropes in the UK and elsewhere is a symptom of this feeling. In Spain, a plethora of new parties have emerged since the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/15/spain-15-m-movement-activism">15-M movement</a> of 2011 to challenge the dominance of the two main parties. </p>
<p>What unites many of these initiatives is the desire to generate a “second transition” for the Spanish constitution: a constituent process of re-founding Spanish democracy to make it more capacious, representative, connective and ethical. </p>
<p>Ada Colau, a leading figure of the new movements and the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/25/spains-indignados-ada-colau-elections-mayor-barcelona">newly elected mayor</a> of Barcelona, is an emblematic figure of the new politics and the new thinking. Colau emerged not out of the trade union movement nor out of the traditional parties, but out of the direct action “street” politics that for so long in Spain as elsewhere turned its nose up at involvement in electoral and mainstream politics.</p>
<p>Colau represents a programme that promises greater transparency and engagement, ethical governance and direct participation in the key decisions that face Barcelona’s citizens: unemployment, lack of opportunity, austerity, loss of power to influence and participate in collective life. She is in favour of “connective governance”, which seeks to develop partnerships, coalitions and alliances, and engages individual citizens as well as existing interest groups and elites.</p>
<p>Others are urging something more radical. They seek a transition to direct democratic governance using peer-to-peer technologies. Many of these new initiatives have themselves been created on the back of the greatly increased mobilising capability brought about by technological developments.</p>
<p>In Spain, close to 400 new parties have emerged since 15-M. Many have been created on the basis of interactions facilitated through technology. Some started out as a Facebook initiative, a Reddit platform or alliances generated by activists involved in the occupation of the towns and squares in 2011 – and combinations of the above.</p>
<p>The new political parties indicate this <a href="https://theconversation.com/connective-action-the-publics-answer-to-democratic-dysfunction-33089">connective logic</a>. They do not articulate any particular ideology that would be familiar to an observer of 20th-century politics. The activists behind them see themselves as deploying political tools to generate the momentum necessary to reboot the system in favour of a connective logic rather than to capture power in the manner of the traditional parties.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/83203/original/image-20150528-26041-1rmd5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/83203/original/image-20150528-26041-1rmd5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/83203/original/image-20150528-26041-1rmd5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/83203/original/image-20150528-26041-1rmd5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/83203/original/image-20150528-26041-1rmd5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/83203/original/image-20150528-26041-1rmd5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/83203/original/image-20150528-26041-1rmd5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Millions have taken to the streets in Spain to demand political change.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Chema Moya</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Something has to change</h2>
<p>All these initiatives are united by the idea that “something has to change”. That “something” is the very idea at the heart of our contemporary practices of democracy: governance is something practised by a professional caste of politicians acting in our interests and in our name on the basis of a single gesture. That is, we mark our ballot papers once every few years to deliver “strong” and “stable” government whether it has the backing of a numerical majority or not.</p>
<p>Such an antique conception of “self-governance” has now become the very substance of political contestation. For example, it is noticeable in Spain that the tumultuous political climate in 2011 later took on a more optimistic and engaging flavour. “Street” protestors began to think of ways they could engage in mainstream as well as street politics.</p>
<p>Podemos’ emergence in the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/26/spain-peoples-party-win-european-elections">2014 European elections</a>, when it captured five seats after only a few weeks in existence, offered hope to those who had previously thought that change could only be effected from “without” – by occupations and protests. Podemos created a hubbub of a kind that should enthuse democrats of whatever stripe. </p>
<p>But far from channelling energies in a single direction and to a single party, Podemos’ rise has led to all manner of other initiatives, parties, groups emerging – so much so that it has created a kind of political laboratory, where citizens seek out others in gestures of pragmatic co-operation and experimentation.</p>
<p>The challenge presented by the crisis of representative politics is to find an institutional expression for the connective energies and desire to participate articulated in the “something has to change” gestures that we see in the emergence of the SNP, Podemos and their ilk.</p>
<p>The alternative is to allow the mantra of “strong” and “stable” government peddled so emphatically by much of the media, corporations, financial markets, currency traders and politicians to stave off the necessary process of change needed to make the leap from 18th- to 21st-century governance.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Simon Tormey’s new book <a href="https://www.polity.co.uk/book.asp?ref=9780745681955">The End of Representative Politics</a> is available from <a href="https://www.polity.co.uk/book.asp?ref=9780745681955">Polity</a> and <a href="http://au.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0745681964,subjectCd-PO17.html">Wiley</a>. You can read John Keane’s review <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-end-of-representative-politics-41997">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42369/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Tormey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With a steady hollowing out of membership, the cosying up to vested interests with pockets deep enough to maintain party, today’s political parties barely “represent”.Simon Tormey, Professor of Political Theory and Head of the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/422022015-05-22T05:25:06Z2015-05-22T05:25:06ZThe latest proposals for fixing the UK are on the back foot and 40 years too late<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82567/original/image-20150521-985-1v57kkm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">'It might take more than the king's horses and the king's men, your Highness'</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Denslow's_Humpty_Dumpty_pg_5.jpg#/media/File:Denslow%27s_Humpty_Dumpty_pg_5.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the aftermath of the Scottish <a href="https://www.scotreferendum.com">independence referendum</a> and in light of the forthcoming <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/11617592/David-Cameron-will-hold-EU-referendum-before-2017-Europe-minister-David-Lidington-suggests.html">European Union vote</a>, there can be little doubt that Britain is on the move. While this flux and uncertainty is a positive for the SNP and critics of the British status quo, for many elites and experts it produces anxieties. None more so than benign liberal opinion – which believes that for every problem there should be a solution, and often an overarching British constitutional solution at that.</p>
<p>This is the spirit of A Constitutional Crossroads: Ways Forward for the United Kingdom, <a href="http://www.biicl.org/documents/593_bingham_report_constitutional_crossroads.pdf">the new report</a> by the Lord Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law. It brings together an impressive array of the great and good, from <a href="http://www.johnkay.com">John Kay</a> to <a href="http://www.princeton.edu/history/people/display_person.xml?netid=lcolley">Linda Colley</a>, <a href="http://www.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/Experts/profile.aspx?KeyValue=a.travers%40lse.ac.uk">Tony Travers</a> and <a href="http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/law/staff/adamtomkins/">Adam Tomkins</a>. At the outset it invokes the late <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/sep/11/lord-bingham-of-cornhill-obituary">Lord Bingham</a>, who observed that “constitutionally speaking, we now find ourselves in a trackless desert without any map or compass”. </p>
<h2>Your charter for ten</h2>
<p>The report’s solution is to codify, formalise and make explicit the arrangements and relationships of Britain’s union state. This would be done via a charter of the union, setting out the powers between the four nations as a first step on the road to a formal constitution. Along the way, it would institute a proper needs-based formula for funding and address <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-29281818">the English question</a>. </p>
<p>One of the recommendations which has <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/20/urgent-action-needed-to-preserve-united-kingdom-thinktank-says">garnered attention</a> has been the call to restrict a Scottish independence referendum to “once in a generation”, words used by <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-29196661">Alex Salmond</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24147303">Nicola Sturgeon</a> pre-referendum. The report looks at the <a href="https://prezi.com/djlgz8m7innt/quebec-1980-and1995-quebec-sovereignty-referendum/">experience of Quebec</a>, where 15 years elapsed between its two independence votes, and the over 40 years that will have passed between the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/6/newsid_2499000/2499297.stm">first UK-wide European vote</a> and the forthcoming one to be held in 2016-17. It hence suggests that at least 15 years should elapse between any independence votes.</p>
<p>This might sound like good common sense and practice. The problem is in the language and context. For one, the report continually refers to an independence vote as a “secession referendum”. Despite being stacked with legal experts and top brass, this isn’t strictly accurate. But it is telling. </p>
<h2>The missing centre</h2>
<p>More importantly, the whole tenor is that a few gentle tweaks and bits of fine-tuning will get the UK project back working. Across the 80 pages, several factors in Britain’s constitutional crisis are missing and just passed over. The first is the character of the British state. The report focuses on the relationships between the four nations, but is not explicit on what all this means for the centre. </p>
<p>Thus “<a href="http://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/wider-political-news/gove-promoted-as-cameron-plans-english-votes-for-english-laws-push.125638801?">English votes for English laws</a>” is seen as appropriate in the absence of a “demand-led” sentiment for English regionalism, locating the solution to English governance as nearly entirely within Westminster. But any new constitutionalism has to remake the British political centre. It must recognise that as the UK has devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, it has centralised and become an embodiment of neo-liberalism and a dogmatic interpretation of Britain plc focused on global winners and the corporate class. </p>
<p>Also missing is any discussion of the wider factors which have driven this constitutional debate, namely the economic and social imbalances of the UK, the kind of society and capitalism we live under, the winners and losers, and what if anything can be done to change this. Whether you look at devolution in Scotland, Northern Ireland and to a lesser extent Wales, constitutional reform has occurred in recent decades when two factors have been at play: a palpable feeling of a democratic deficit, and a belief that reform could contribute to a wider reinvention of the social compact. </p>
<p>In short, the report critically lacks a sense of political intelligence and understanding of the dynamics and forces at work in the United Kingdom, Scotland and elsewhere. This sort of enlightened reform would have been possible 40 years ago, when the constitutional debate was at an earlier stage, and when people were prepared to be more trusting and deferential towards elites and experts. In the current era, however, it feels out of time. </p>
<h2>The solidarity question</h2>
<p>Over the next decade or so there will be a lot of reports by groups such as this. They are undoubtedly not harmful, and will bring together the great, the good and the civic-minded, thinking and believing they are contributing to the great affairs of state. Actually they are responding to a crisis, making a call for retreat from the onward march of democracy. If the report started by acknowledging the contributors’ own self-interests and understandable human fears and emotions, they might seem more human. </p>
<p>Such constitutional reports also have to raise their gaze and address the strange state of Britain beyond the narrow legal definition. This isn’t just a constitutional moment, but a time when a growing part of the British population realise that the existing state of Britain – economically, socially, culturally and democratically – increasingly doesn’t work for the vast majority. The report regularly invokes the principle of “solidarity” across the UK, but nowhere is this fleshed out or examined in practice. Instead it is left hanging as constitutional grand rhetoric.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82568/original/image-20150521-985-73kciy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82568/original/image-20150521-985-73kciy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82568/original/image-20150521-985-73kciy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82568/original/image-20150521-985-73kciy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82568/original/image-20150521-985-73kciy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82568/original/image-20150521-985-73kciy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82568/original/image-20150521-985-73kciy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82568/original/image-20150521-985-73kciy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">How to take care of the cracks?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/cat.mhtml?lang=en&language=en&ref_site=photo&search_source=search_form&version=llv1&anyorall=all&safesearch=1&use_local_boost=1&search_tracking_id=3f2K02nfdOG46S4zmP4Nqw&searchterm=united%20kingdom%20division&show_color_wheel=1&orient=&commercial_ok=&media_type=images&search_cat=&searchtermx=&photographer_name=&people_gender=&people_age=&people_ethnicity=&people_number=&color=&page=1&inline=228071173">Photoprofl30</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This is about power, legitimacy and the nature of society. The UK social compact which bound together elites and citizens has been repeatedly trashed by those with power in recent decades. That is what drives much of the constitutional debate, no matter how much worthy exercises like this try to put the Humpty-Dumpty nature of the UK back together in a tidy, rational manner. What kind of Britain do we collectively want? What does economic and social solidarity mean in the disunited kingdom? Is the UK still a union state with all its looseness and hybrid nature, or could it become a union of states, where Scottish independence sits within some kind of pan-British confederation?</p>
<p>The project of the Conservatives is towards a regressive “back to the future” world of a minimal, punitive state far away from solidarity and which decouples itself from Europe – another thing this report is completely silent on. Challenging and defeating that political vision is one the great tasks on these isles, and the sheer ambition and ideological nature of that fantasy-land Britain is something liberal opinion has consistently underestimated and not understood for 40 years. This has cost Britain and British politics dear.</p>
<p>One question you will not find examined here, which matters for all of us is whether it is too late to imagine a pan-British progressive vision which challenges the Osborne/Conservative economic and social project. That is what think tanks, expert opinion and even the current British and Scottish Labour leadership contests need to begin addressing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42202/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gerry Hassan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Bingham report on how to stabilise the UK is well meaning but out of step with the reality of the situation.Gerry Hassan, Research Fellow - School of Creative and Cultural Industries, University of the West of ScotlandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/420912015-05-21T05:19:44Z2015-05-21T05:19:44ZUKIP didn’t invent English nationalism – it’s been brewing for years<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82281/original/image-20150519-30538-183u003.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nationalism: it's a more complex picture than you think.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/128012202@N05/16423688899/in/photolist-gvdNmx-8gFS8J-rn3FkN-ecFV1g-ecFVpn-sdMyee-9Chyxm-grMAGt-4LLYik-b9GZDT-4LR9Z3-4LAxxt-r2iGvZ-7kgBGg-nnFF3U-npLBrm-ceWpy9-htsFY-b9GYpe-e3Bqv6-7EiNUJ-5oMEkL-4wbr8K-6Nfagq-4Hma76-4jqFZc-62rozo-7VdbxJ-56m9fD-4Hmbre-ejS6n8-5zGiS5-jRZ6Y6-nkhh7S-6NaYs6-6cND6a-7psQdt-6xPHU8-bNN4GP-6kAqXz-3yc4L7-7KvNqS-5nU3SP-2cvW8-9dvUoX-tUnZg">Travel Junction</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of the most striking consequences of the recent election has been the sudden shift of attention onto the spectre of a burgeoning English nationalism. Various talking heads have seen intimations of it in the strength of UKIP’s performance in England, the apparent impact of the Conservatives’ relentless focus upon the prospect of SNP involvement in a putative government on southern voters and the Tory focus on English votes for English laws. </p>
<p>It has even been suggested that “shy English nationalists” are the explanation for why the polling companies <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-shy-english-nationalists-who-won-it-for-the-tories-and-flummoxed-the-pollsters/">got the election so badly wrong</a>.</p>
<p>So the notion of an English nationalism – one of the great bogeymen of British politics – is once again the topic of the day. But there is a real danger that simplistic and misleading characterisations of its genesis and character take hold. This is a phenomenon that seems to lend itself, almost without exception, to the twin perils of overstatement and underestimation. </p>
<p>Senior Labour figures were quick to <a href="http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4904&title=Labours-35-per-cent-strategy-lost-it-the-election">blame the party’s defeat</a> on the way it was supposedly squeezed between Scottish and English nationalism. And it has been widely suggested that a mood of English resentment was orchestrated by David Cameron in the aftermath of the Scottish Referendum result, signalling the Conservatives’ readiness to “play politics with the Union”, putting the party’s electoral prospects before the integrity of the UK.</p>
<p>These judgements run the risk of overstating the coherence of English nationalism. They also reflect a misapprehension of the shift in national mood that has happened among many English people over the past two decades, and rest upon crude assumptions about what motivates voters. In fact, if you want to understand Labour’s <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/05/09/three-more-years-of-cameron-but-it-will-be-a-rocky-road-ahead-2/">electoral disaster</a>, you need an appreciation of perceptions of economic competence and leadership capability, along with ideas about national decline, cultural anxiety and a growing sense of shared English interests. </p>
<p>The inability of the Labour Party to grasp the importance of various questions of identity, democracy and constitution reflects one of the root sources of its inadequate response to new currents of national sentiment in Scotland and England.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82271/original/image-20150519-30533-1btjx7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82271/original/image-20150519-30533-1btjx7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=798&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82271/original/image-20150519-30533-1btjx7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=798&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82271/original/image-20150519-30533-1btjx7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=798&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82271/original/image-20150519-30533-1btjx7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1003&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82271/original/image-20150519-30533-1btjx7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1003&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82271/original/image-20150519-30533-1btjx7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1003&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Labour just doesn’t get it.</span>
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</figure>
<h2>Labour was no victim to nationalism</h2>
<p>The Conservatives’ attack on Labour’s relationship with the SNP actually played upon long-established concerns among significant parts of the English electorate about Labour’s approach to fiscal policy. The party responded with repeated, implausible denials that it would come to some kind of arrangement with the SNP. </p>
<p>This defensive stance carried echoes of Labour’s inability to muster a credible response to the posing of the English question by the Conservatives after the referendum. Indeed, rather than blaming these different nationalisms as causes for its defeat, Labour would do better to consider the strategic errors it made in both of these contexts. </p>
<p>It may well be that nationalism was diminishing in significance in both England and Scotland before and during the election. Research in Scotland certainly <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/there-was-no-rise-in-scottish-nationalism-understanding-the-snp-victory/">suggests this was the case</a>. And in England, while there does appear to have been an intensification of nationalism among some parts of the electorate in the <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/there-was-no-rise-in-scottish-nationalism-understanding-the-snp-victory/">run-up to the Scottish referendum</a>, a combination of the rise of UKIP and the prospect of Scotland leaving the UK may well have shifted some away from nationalist positions. </p>
<p>Polling during the referendum suggests that support for the UK grew over time, and the number of those in England supporting the UK’s membership of the EU <a href="http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/wgc/files/2014/10/Taking-England-Seriously_The-New-English-Politics.pdf">has also risen of late</a>.</p>
<h2>Long-brewing nationalism</h2>
<p>But the notion that the Tories sparked a nationalist surge among the English also ignores the considerable body of evidence pointing to the rising political significance of this vein of national sentiment over a much longer period – and this is where the dangers of under-estimation become relevant. </p>
<p>The Conservatives did not conjure up or politicise English nationalism. They were simply more astute in reading the changing national mood than their political opponents – and swift to sense Labour’s fundamental difficulties in this area. The notion that the Tories <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-political-party-is-threatening-the-union-and-its-not-the-snp-40507">illegitimately mobilised Englishness</a> grossly overstates the impact that politicians have upon public attitudes and perceptions of national interest. </p>
<p>The endlessly repeated accusation that Ed Miliband would be unable to stop the SNP from using its position to win significant, unfair benefits for the Scots worked because of already existing currents of sentiment and resentment, and their intimate connection with an emerging sense of collective English interest. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82278/original/image-20150519-30561-vrvfyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82278/original/image-20150519-30561-vrvfyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82278/original/image-20150519-30561-vrvfyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82278/original/image-20150519-30561-vrvfyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82278/original/image-20150519-30561-vrvfyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82278/original/image-20150519-30561-vrvfyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82278/original/image-20150519-30561-vrvfyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This only worked because Labour allowed it to.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Conservative Party HQ</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>English nationalism was invented neither by UKIP or the Conservatives. It is in fact a longer-range, multifaceted trend, which in all probability began during the 1990s. Some researchers see the mid-late 2000s as a key moment when political forms of English identity became apparent. The British Social Attitudes Survey, for instance, tracks a <a href="http://www.ippr.org/publications/is-an-english-backlash-emerging-reactions-to-devolution-ten-years-on">growing sense of irritation and unease</a> among the majority of English adults about how England fares within the post-devolved constitution in those years. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/wgc/files/2014/10/Taking-England-Seriously_The-New-English-Politics.pdf">Future of England survey</a>, conducted during 2014, highlights a strengthening relationship between English identification and political allegiance, but found that English nationalism was much more notable among UKIP supporters than those favouring the Conservatives, whose commitment to Englishness was not much higher than that exhibited by Labour supporters. </p>
<p>The most marked cleavage in terms of attitudes towards an English sense of identification is between those who live outside London – who are much more inclined to see themselves as English — and those who live in the capital and the south-east, for whom Britain remains a stronger point of national orientation. The markedly different feelings about national identity of many ethnic minority communities, with a large and growing black and minority ethnic population in London, is also a significant factor here, as many from minority backgrounds remain wary of an English nationalism. </p>
<p>Differences in class are also important; an English identity is most strongly felt, according to some surveys, by anxious and aspirational voters in the “squeezed middle” whom Labour notably failed to win to their side at the election. </p>
<h2>What is English nationalism?</h2>
<p>But it is an overstatement to characterise the English majority as “nationalist” in its orientation. About <a href="http://www.ippr.org/publications/is-an-english-backlash-emerging-reactions-to-devolution-ten-years-on">one in five consistently hold beliefs</a> which could reasonably be characterised in this way – and this is a pool of opinion and sentiment in which UKIP swims ever more confidently. </p>
<p>The majority continue to see themselves as both English and British, are in favour of the continuation of the Union and are also increasingly likely to think that the English are not treated fairly within the current settlement, and ought to be given more opportunity to celebrate their own nationhood. </p>
<p>While there are undoubtedly streaks of grievance and resentment in this worldview, there are very few indications that it corresponds to the kind of little Englandism that rejects all entanglements with the wider world, or craves a sundering of the Union.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82286/original/image-20150519-30561-c8mt8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82286/original/image-20150519-30561-c8mt8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82286/original/image-20150519-30561-c8mt8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82286/original/image-20150519-30561-c8mt8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82286/original/image-20150519-30561-c8mt8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82286/original/image-20150519-30561-c8mt8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82286/original/image-20150519-30561-c8mt8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82286/original/image-20150519-30561-c8mt8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/hobler/11910787005/in/photolist-j9vU1D-dQ8G37-dTbik6-3K7vqJ-dYGhMi-iHXksP-6Gak6k-hc4Mjv-gy41fY-Ji7m8-p4Pdug-3iGHTB-a6sb76-6PPcxc-evuBh2-8vaTBS-6Q6zKy-6rHXGf-4j1VJb-6c3mio-6stzV9-8jeZwc-6QrrqG-6gWZ8m-7ZWR9N-6rs5GJ-dAZqD7-cvhKt5-7AhRHA-duKLC4-HvSLr-8MeyT9-6EWkG4-2xHMWh-8xKPAS-7B3MZo-6yVinB-7ZTuUR-pYfhbR-nTaNns-6cgytV-a6QKP-8dgbV9-nM8iNc-a37Vz8-7ZTt8n-7ZTDdg-hY9Ef-7ZTAex-7ZTxy4">Romano</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Blanket characterisations of English nationalism are misleading in two additional respects. First they sustain the fear that any such expression is inherently illiberal and regressive – the imagined opposite to a constitutional Britishness. Yet there is very little evidence to suggest a consistent or entrenched relationship between right-wing political beliefs and an <a href="http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199608614.do">inclination to identity as English</a>. </p>
<p>There are, however, myriad examples from the world of the arts, popular culture and public discourse of England being depicted in all sorts of ideological colours. Jez Butterworth’s hit play <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/stage/theatreblog/2011/oct/25/why-i-love-butterworths-jerusalem">Jerusalem</a>, P.J.Harvey’s award winning album <a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/Let-England-Shake-PJ-Harvey/dp/B004IXJEWK">Let England Shake</a> and Graham Swift’s collection <a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/England-Other-Stories-Graham-Swift/dp/1471137392">England and Other Stories</a> can hardly be dismissed as exercises in conservatism or nostalgia. They are among numerous texts that offer different kinds of <a href="http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199579389.do">representative claim</a> upon England.</p>
<p>Some of these speak the language of democracy, rights and popular sovereignty – for instance those campaigners for a renewal of a radical English constitutionalism that harks back to the spirit of Magna Carta. Others are advanced in more exclusivist, angry and populist ways, including some of the arguments advanced by UKIP. It is ultimately in the contest between these different kinds of claim that the political character of English nationhood will be determined. </p>
<p>In a situation where the idea of creating a more devolved UK has become mainstream, the question of how English identity is political expressed and imagined is one that liberal political parties can no longer afford to ignore.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42091/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Kenny does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Conservative political parties did not conjure up English nationalism, they capitalised on a growing trend.Michael Kenny, Director of the Mile End Institute, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/420652015-05-20T13:39:21Z2015-05-20T13:39:21ZHow looking at bad polls can show Labour how to win the next election<p>We have all now heard a multitude of theories to explain how and why the Conservative Party secured a surprise overall majority in the UK election, winning almost a hundred more seats than Labour. These theories are often centred around the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/general-election-2015/11592230/Election-2015-How-David-Camerons-Conservatives-won.html">ideas of leadership</a>, economic competence and the ability to <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/09/alan-johnson-labour-aspirational-voters-tony-blair">attract the “aspirational” voters</a> of “middle England”. This conclusion would tell the Labour Party something very important about the ground their next leader will need to fight on, and indeed who that leader should be. But is this the whole picture? </p>
<p>Much mockery has been directed at pollsters following the election (<a href="http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21650937-favoured-incumbent-comes-second-and-ex-rock-star-seen-fringe-candidate-draws-21-another">and not only in the UK</a>), but this question is where the opinion polls can in fact tell us something important. <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-polls-got-it-so-wrong-in-the-british-election-41530">Discussion has been vigorous</a> about weaknesses in survey design, but that in itself does not seem sufficient to explain the huge disparity in what actually happened at the polling stations (Tories ahead of Labour by 6.5%) and what happened in the polls (essentially tied). </p>
<p>We have heard about the <a href="http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/faq-dont-knows">phenomenon of the “shy Tory”</a>, but I would argue that a big part of the reason for this disparity is what I term the “lethargic Labour” effect; the differential tendency of Labour supporters to stay at home compared to Tory supporters. “Lethargic” is a term I choose carefully for its association with apathy and general passivity, and it is a factor which I believe has huge implications for political strategy in the years ahead.</p>
<h2>Lethal lethargy</h2>
<p>To understand this, it is instructive to look to the now famous exit poll, which was conducted at polling stations with people who had actually voted. This was much more accurate than the other published polls, including those conducted on election day over the telephone or online, and showed a much lower Labour share of the vote. A dominant explanation for this disparity is that there was a significant difference in the number of those who declared they had voted Labour or that they would vote Labour and those who actually did vote. </p>
<p>This “lethargic Labour” effect is quite different to that of the “shy Tory” which was first advanced to help explain the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/vote_2005/basics/4393317.stm">polling meltdown of the 1992 general election</a>, when the Conservative Party were similarly under-estimated in the opinion polls. The idea is that Tories in particular are shy of revealing their voting intention to pollsters. Yet in 2015 we would expect, if this were a real effect, to have seen it displayed in under-performance by the Tories in telephone polls compared to the relatively more anonymous setting of online polls. There is no such evidence, if anything the reverse being the case for much of the polling cycle. </p>
<p>Now, clearly, the idea of “lethargic Labour” supporters does not offer the whole explanation for the Tory victory. There is also a historically well-established tendency for a late swing on the day to incumbents, which cannot be blamed on the raw polls, but is sometimes built into poll-based forecasting models which can account for some of the differential. There is additionally late tactical switching to consider, where a voter, when face to face with an actual ballot paper, chooses to hinder their least preferred candidate.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82382/original/image-20150520-11456-1vtfry6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82382/original/image-20150520-11456-1vtfry6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82382/original/image-20150520-11456-1vtfry6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82382/original/image-20150520-11456-1vtfry6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82382/original/image-20150520-11456-1vtfry6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82382/original/image-20150520-11456-1vtfry6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82382/original/image-20150520-11456-1vtfry6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82382/original/image-20150520-11456-1vtfry6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Calling the odds, and calling the shots?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/rorycellan/4502027805/in/photolist-7ZnhPj-7RQ524">cellanr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-polls-got-it-so-wrong-in-the-british-election-41530">As I have noted elsewhere</a>, the betting markets significantly out-performed the polls and also a <a href="http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-our-uk-election-forecasting-model-works/">sophisticated model based on those polls</a> which allowed for late swing, but they beat the latter somewhat less comprehensively, at least at constituency level. At national aggregated level, the betting markets beat both very convincingly, though the swing-adjusted polls performed rather better than the published polls. </p>
<h2>Future-proofing the polls</h2>
<p>So what does this tell us? It suggests that there was indeed a late swing to the Tories, which was picked up in the betting markets in advance of the actual poll. But the scale of the victory (at least compared to general expectations) was not fully anticipated by any established forecasting methodology. This suggests that there was an extra variable, which was not properly factored in by any forecasting methodology. This extra variable, I suggest, is the “lethargic Labour” supporter, who existed in far greater numbers than was generally supposed.</p>
<p>To the extent that this explanation of the Tory majority prevails, it has profound implications for the strategy of the Labour Party over the next few years in seeking to win office. </p>
<p>It tells us that if Labour is to win the next election, a strategy will have to be devised which motivates their own supporters to actually turn out and vote. If the party can’t do that, it doesn’t really matter how effective the leader is, how economically competent they are seen to be, how well they appeal to the “aspirational” voter. It is very unlikely that they will be able to win.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42065/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leighton Vaughan Williams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>‘Shy Tories’ doesn’t cut it. There is another anomaly in the election poll data which offers a more useful angle on what went wrong.Leighton Vaughan Williams, Professor of Economics and Finance & Director, Political Forecasting Unit, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/419252015-05-19T17:19:42Z2015-05-19T17:19:42ZLessons for Labour: how to be an effective opposition<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82251/original/image-20150519-30575-fuhvn7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Looks like we're always stuck in opposition</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/uk_parliament/2700549757/sizes/l">'UK Parliament/flickr'</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Labour suffered an enormous electoral defeat on <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2015/results">May 7</a>, and senior figures have warned that the party faces the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/16/labour-great-crisis-ever">worst crisis</a> in its history, with little chance of Labour regaining power in 2020. So far, attention has been focused on the race for the new Labour party leader. </p>
<p>Alongside this, difficult questions are being asked about the purpose and future direction of the party. Closer analysis of their performance in <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/08/general-election-uk-marginal-seats-swung-wrong-way-labour-bolton-west">marginal seats</a> in 2015 is only likely to deepen the gloom. </p>
<p>In the meantime, it should be remembered that Labour has an important constitutional role to fill, as Her Majesty’s Opposition. For Labour, any effort to regain power will crucially depend on being able to carry out this role effectively. </p>
<h2>Taking advantage of luck</h2>
<p>It is often remarked that “oppositions don’t win elections, governments lose them”. For instance, when Labour suffered a shattering fourth successive election defeat in <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/exclusive-how-did-labour-lose-in-92-the-most-authoritative-study-of-the-last-general-election-is-published-tomorrow-here-its-authors-present-their-conclusions-and-explode-the-myths-about-the-greatest-upset-since-1945-1439286.html">1992</a>, it prompted many to doubt that the party could ever win again. </p>
<p>Yet only four months later, Britain was forced to exit the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/sep/13/black-wednesday-20-years-pound-erm">European Exchange Rate Mechanism</a>, costing the UK billions of pounds. This hugely damaged the Conservatives reputation for economic competence, and gave Labour an opportunity to assert itself as the more economically trustworthy party in later years. </p>
<p>For Labour to climb the electoral mountain ahead of them, they may need a divided Conservative party and policy disasters. But such events can only benefit oppositions electorally if they position themselves effectively. Former heavyweight boxing champion, <a href="http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2001-04-23/sports/0104230284_1_hasim-rahman-lewis-throwing-punches">Hasim Rahman</a> defined luck as “being prepared when opportunity presents itself”. </p>
<p>In this sense Labour has to portray itself both as competent and as a potential government in waiting. If it struggles to do both – as arguably it did under Neil Kinnock – even monumental political mistakes such as Margaret Thatcher’s <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/margaret-thatcher/9980361/Margaret-Thatcher-Refusal-to-back-down-on-poll-tax-that-cost-the-leader-dear.html">poll tax</a> may not help it regain office.</p>
<h2>Choosing your battles</h2>
<p>The official opposition’s task is to oppose government policy, and Labour will seek to channel popular discontent with the Conservative’s approach to austerity. This may be made easier if they can be seen to voice the concerns of civil society about the likely impact of cuts. However, in the race to tackle the economic deficit, Labour has also committed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/manifesto-check-stacking-up-labours-economic-plans-40176">large cuts</a>, and will now need to be careful about how and where it attacks the government’s approach. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82265/original/image-20150519-30494-h20z6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82265/original/image-20150519-30494-h20z6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82265/original/image-20150519-30494-h20z6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82265/original/image-20150519-30494-h20z6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82265/original/image-20150519-30494-h20z6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82265/original/image-20150519-30494-h20z6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82265/original/image-20150519-30494-h20z6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Channeling the popular mood.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/ajehals/5565705463/sizes/l">'ajehals/Flickr'</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A primary danger for opposition parties is appearing to leap opportunistically on every problem for government. In opposition, William Hague became nicknamed “Billy Bandwagon” for attaching himself to various populist criticisms of the Blair government. So while Labour may continue to cause David Cameron discomfort on issues such as the NHS, any attacks should be attached to a wider Labour narrative about areas that should be prioritised and protected, and they may advance further if they manage to damage the Conservative’s image as the pro-business party.</p>
<p>And it is possible that the referendum on EU membership may provide such an opportunity, if Labour can present itself as protecting business interests by campaigning for the UK to remain part of the EU. Any splits within the Conservatives could be exploited as placing jobs and investment in jeopardy. This worked before in the 1990s, when New Labour capitalised on Tory divisions on Europe, using votes in the House of Commons to embarrass the then prime minister, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21148283">John Major</a>. </p>
<p>Disunity is electorally damaging, and David Cameron’s small majority makes him vulnerable to party rebellions. The prime minister’s commitment to scrap the Human Rights Act may be Labour’s first opportunity to draw blood, particularly should Conservative backbenchers such as <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/may/15/eurosceptic-david-davis-could-oppose-government-on-human-rights-reform">David Davis</a> decide to rebel. In this context, by-elections also assume a greater political significance. Labour can generate a sense that the authority of the government is ebbing away, if its majority dwindles. </p>
<h2>Asserting leadership</h2>
<p>Recent history suggests that it is important for a new leader of the opposition to hit the ground running. The period shortly after their election is important in defining their leadership. Arguably, in his five years, <a href="http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doifinder/10.1057/9780230369009">Ed Miliband struggled</a> to provide a clear sense of purpose, too often letting opponents define it for him. Given that the new leader will not be elected until September this year, it will also be important for prominent candidates to establish and enhance their national profile during the leadership campaign.</p>
<p>Already, two of the frontrunners for the Labour leadership have <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3085021/Burnham-ditches-Labour-s-opposition-EU-referendum-says-vote-happen-year.html">expressed a belief</a> that the party must reverse its stance on holding an EU referendum. This could work in Labour’s favour, to re-focus attention on the Conservative’s difficulties on the issue of UK membership. </p>
<p>If the new leader can establish momentum quickly, it can be easier to present the unified front needed to establish competence and develop their status as an alternative prime minister. <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1412241/Tory-leader-defied-over-gay-adoption.html">Iain Duncan Smith</a> didn’t manage this for the Conservatives, and his attempt to whip a vote on gay adoption backfired, exposing internal splits between “modernisers” and “traditionalists”. </p>
<p>In contrast, David Cameron asserted himself as opposition leader as a <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/7332707/Moderniser-David-Cameron-Im-not-for-turning.html">moderniser</a>. He made life more difficult for dissenters, who knew vocal criticism of policy shifts could harm a leader who looked like he could be an election winner. The lesson for the current Labour leadership candidates is that avoiding difficult internal questions may not pay-off in the long term. </p>
<p>However, if the new leader can establish themselves positively in the public mind in the next two to three years, they may accrue another advantage. David Cameron has said he <a href="https://theconversation.com/whatever-cameron-meant-by-his-two-term-pledge-it-wont-help-the-tories-win-39267">will not run</a> for a third term, so Labour will eventually be facing a new and untested Conservative leader. Labour will be able to question the legitimacy of a leader who has not yet won a general election, just as the Conservatives questioned Gordon Brown after Tony Blair resigned.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41925/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stuart McAnulla does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Labour needs to make three big improvements, if it’s to improve its performance in 2020.Stuart McAnulla, Lecturer in British Politics, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/419822015-05-19T08:19:07Z2015-05-19T08:19:07ZA bonfire of the economists as Britain loses faith<p>If <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-polls-got-it-so-wrong-in-the-british-election-41530">opinion pollsters are still sore</a> from their election-night embarrassment, they can be consoled by the thought that economists fared even worse. High-profile members of that profession ejected from their Commons seats on May 7 included business secretary Vince Cable, pensions minister <a href="http://www.professionaladviser.com/professional-adviser/news/2407818/steve-webb-it-has-been-a-privilege">Steve Webb</a>, schools minister David Laws and – in a small-hour moment that signalled the turning tide – <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-does-it-hurt-when-big-political-beasts-lose-their-seats-41551">shadow chancellor Ed Balls</a>. </p>
<p>It was a far cry from 2010, when economists-turned-political-high-fliers such as Ruth Kelly and Kitty Ussher could quit the House of Commons while ahead, for top City and consultancy posts, even as the Labour Party slid from power. Although this year’s election saw some other well-known economists, including Rachel Reeves and Alex Salmond, safely returned to the House of Commons, this has been an unusually dark time for the <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/12/why-economics-is-really-called-the-dismal-science/282454/">traditionally dismal science</a>.</p>
<h2>Cost-of-living without them</h2>
<p>The cull of coalition-era economists should not have been unexpected, given politicians’ growing reluctance to accept economic advice. Cameron’s Conservatives owe their victory in no small part to an economic recovery forged on principles which most economists had dismissed.</p>
<p>George Osborne staked his first term as chancellor on an immediate reduction of public expenditure, aimed at eliminating – within five years – a fiscal deficit that was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-25944653">close to 7% of GDP in 2010</a>. That was more than a tall order. The monetary theory that best stood up to the global financial crisis suggests it is fundamentally impossible to close a fiscal deficit when the private sector is <a href="http://mmtwiki.org/wiki/National_accounting_identities_and_the_sectoral_balance_approach">paying down debts and the current account is in deficit</a>, which was the UK situation for most of 2010-2015. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82110/original/image-20150518-25415-mf3by6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82110/original/image-20150518-25415-mf3by6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82110/original/image-20150518-25415-mf3by6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82110/original/image-20150518-25415-mf3by6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82110/original/image-20150518-25415-mf3by6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82110/original/image-20150518-25415-mf3by6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82110/original/image-20150518-25415-mf3by6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82110/original/image-20150518-25415-mf3by6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Trading up. Osborne.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/cafodphotolibrary/8571801826/in/photolist-e4sJ3E-9sFuSy-9sFXwb-9sFuXS-e4n7uZ-9sFuRS-9sCYqp-9sCXSi-9sFvbj-9sFVnL-ifv9r7-ifuB4N-9sG1xs-9sCLh4-gJrgCf-8N4SeG-ifvZy2-ifvzu1-ifv9BX-ifvobQ-ifvf6y-ifuSTU-ifu3Fk-ifvMxE-ifvJcw-ifvxKm-ifvunC-ifvBKn-ifv8Q5-ifuzvK-h5LwdS-h5MF16-h5LjwK-h5LAkC-h5LkjY-h5Lhys-h5LeX5-h5LpYf-h5LmY7-h5L6p3-h5Hvtj-dhxaCW-dhx8cr-dhNFDo-dhNEBN-dhNEdU-dhNDsB-dhNDar-dhNCQ2-dhNBzf">CAFOD Photo Library</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The possibility of “expansionary fiscal contraction” – basically GDP growth in the midst of cuts – did get some <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w15438">empirical support from a 2009 paper</a> by US-based economists Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna. But their evidence (and a complementary public debt analysis by Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart) were quickly challenged by <a href="http://www.voxeu.org/debates/commentaries/revisiting-evidence-expansionary-fiscal-austerity-alesina-s-hour">most economists who re-examined it</a>, with Paul Krugman throwing a last stick of <a href="http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/20/other-austerity-bloopers/?_r=0">Nobel dynamite onto the pyre</a>. </p>
<p>Some small European states such as Latvia, Estonia and Ireland did manage to re-start their economic growth while imposing austerity budgets – but only by ratcheting down their wages and prices, via a big dose of unemployment, until their much-reduced costs sparked an export revival. Osborne has defied economic consensus by presiding over the recovery of a large economy without imposing a severe real wage reduction, while the external trade balance was <a href="http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/bop/balance-of-payments/q3-2014/sty-current-account--income-balance-and-net-international-investment-position.html">deteriorating rather than improving</a>. </p>
<p>Although tentative to start with, the upturn was strong enough in its final year for the chancellor to turn the electoral tide against his opposite number, who had predicted austerity would permanently “flatline” the economy.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/-ijrpo853A0?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Ed Balls offers taunts to the ‘flatline’ kid.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Economists protest that the UK recovery took hold because the government <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-george-osborne-built-a-power-base-from-pragmatism-41704">diluted its austerity commitment</a>. Osborne’s cuts choked off the recovery that was underway in 2010, as Balls and others had predicted, and growth only resumed when the chancellor <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/mar/22/george-osborne-straight-from-flatline-to-rollercoaster">retreated from his deficit reduction target in 2012</a>. “Automatic stabilisers” – the fall in revenue and rise in obligatory spending after the double-dip into recession – ensured an extension of the fiscal stimulus, with the deficit only halved and not eliminated in the coalition’s five-year term. It’s not uncommon to hear the recovery ascribed to the <a href="http://mainlymacro.blogspot.co.uk/2015/04/mediamacro-myth-5-long-term-plan.htm">quiet abandonment of the “long term plan”</a>, rather than its enforcement.</p>
<h2>A plague on all their houses</h2>
<p>These protests from economists in the <a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/KeynesianEconomics.html">John Maynard Keynes camp</a> aren’t, however, the only ones to have fallen on deaf electoral ears. The Conservatives’ success has also hardened their attitude to economic advice from the free-market think tanks that once expected a hotline to Number 11. Cameron’s return in a majority government should usher in a new golden era for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-free-market-ideology-of-iea-has-gained-political-ground-27152">Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)</a>, which drafted much of Margaret Thatcher‘s and John Major’s agendas. </p>
<p>But the <a href="http://www.iea.org.uk/multimedia/video/six-questions-the-next-government-must-answer">IEA’s new priorities</a> – aggressively paying down public debt, cutting taxes on the better-off, leaving the EU, relaxing planning laws to promote housebuilding, paving over the railways and tackling the “cost of living crisis” through lower excise duties – can expect a more lukewarm response from the re-installed treasury team. </p>
<p>Already three years into an economic recovery, Osborne’s priority will now be to fend off the cyclical downturn which traditionally hits the UK after five – the experience of <a href="http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/qb100403.pdf">every postwar two-term prime minister except Tony Blair</a>. Having prospered rather than perished from his deficit-reduction delay, the chancellor is unlikely to fret about public debt – especially when its virtual costlessness, <a href="http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2014/12/in-graphs-george-osborne-fought-the-debt-and-the-debt-won/">courtesy of the free-flowing money from quantitative easing</a>, has let him run up more of it than almost any chancellor before. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82116/original/image-20150518-25412-qk6owd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82116/original/image-20150518-25412-qk6owd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82116/original/image-20150518-25412-qk6owd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82116/original/image-20150518-25412-qk6owd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82116/original/image-20150518-25412-qk6owd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82116/original/image-20150518-25412-qk6owd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82116/original/image-20150518-25412-qk6owd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82116/original/image-20150518-25412-qk6owd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Heading out?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/thewendyhouse/718833595/in/photolist-26wdbF-nwxVpX-9nfGMd-d9ARFf-qwYd7p-rc3Epc-aMux6x-ec6C9Y-dKuy2o-dV3hwj-ozMuuv-amHwyq-3c4cHJ-cdLvkd-8pWtvF-cUBtoy-ioJfJ-aC6wTn-sAuQHK-9GUKmo-9ko55g-sAm8mo-a4z75r-6cKjCV-scWVtM-sAm4DU-ejyZoH-6jBUC8-9DoYF3-9Za52Y-c6Rqs3-fe3cvN-r3BLQa-fiAzHu-c3AysU-c6gfYU-eGzSzm-aewKtj-aetWf8-fimjir-9DUbp4-c7Ap8b-fj2ihR-9DhGcC-bTJHQr-9DhExN-a8vsS5-9BVq9Q-nJENxX-fjgtyE">Wendy House</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And while headlining its reduction in the top rate of tax (on incomes over £150,000) and increases in the tax-free personal allowance, the last government achieved a significant revenue increase by letting <a href="http://www.open.ac.uk/business-school-research/pufin/blog/income-tax-clear-case-fiscal-drag">people on middle incomes rise into the 40% tax band</a>. That’s a convenient “fiscal drag” it won’t be hurrying to address. </p>
<p>The general failure of economists to anticipate the 2008 financial crisis might explain their current cold reception in the corridors of power. A functionalist reading of the election result could supply another reason for the culling of their Commons contingent. The UK is now committed to renegotiating and re-voting on its EU membership. </p>
<p>This will inevitably restore political demand for lawyers, a Commons bedrock <a href="http://heresycorner.blogspot.com/2011/11/where-have-all-lawyers-gone.html">whose ranks had curiously dwindled before 2015</a>. Economists’ inability to explain, in a single soundbite, whether Brexit would be a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/14/brexit-what-would-happen-if-britain-left-eu-european-union-referendum-uk">catapult or a catastrophe</a> may be another reason voters decided they were better out than in.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41982/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Shipman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The dismal science has had a dismal verdict from the UK electorate, and the new government isn’t coming to the rescue either.Alan Shipman, Lecturer in Economics, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.