tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/xi-jinping-4273/articlesXi Jinping – The Conversation2024-03-20T19:55:20Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2261862024-03-20T19:55:20Z2024-03-20T19:55:20ZWhat Article 23 means for the future of Hong Kong and its once vibrant pro-democracy movement<p><em>Lawmakers in Hong Kong <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/19/hong-kong-article-23-security-law/">passed new security legislation</a> on March 19, 2024, handing authorities in the semi-autonomous city-state further power to clamp down on dissent.</em></p>
<p><em>The law, under <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/19/what-is-article-23-hong-kongs-new-draconian-national-security-law">Article 23</a>, has been decades in the making but was resisted for a long time by protesters who feared the legislation’s effect on civil liberties in Hong Kong, a special administrative region in China that has become increasingly under the thumb of Beijing.</em></p>
<p><em>To explain what the adoption of Article 23, which is set to be signed into law on March 23, 2024, means for the future of Hong Kong, The Conversation turned to Michael C. Davis, a <a href="https://jgu.edu.in/jgls/prof-michael-c-davis/">law professor</a> who taught constitutional law and human rights in Hong Kong for more than 30 years, most recently at the University of Hong Kong, and is the author of “<a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/freedom-undone/9781952636448">Freedom Undone: The Assault on Liberal Values in Hong Kong</a>.”</em></p>
<hr>
<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/what-article-23-means-for-the-future-of-hong-kong-and-its-once-vibrant-pro-democracy-movement-226186&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p><em>You can listen to more articles from The Conversation, narrated by Noa, <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/audio-narrated-99682">here</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<h2>What is the background to Article 23?</h2>
<p>Article 23 has a lengthy backstory. It is an article in the <a href="https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/index/">Basic Law of Hong Kong</a> requiring the Hong Kong government to enact a local ordinance governing national security. The Basic Law itself is effectively the constitution of Hong Kong. Its promulgation by the central government was part of China’s obligation under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 – the treaty providing for Hong Kong’s return to China. Thirteen years later, in 1997, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-40426827">territory was transferred to Chinese rule</a> after more than a century under the British. </p>
<p>The Basic Law established a largely liberal constitutional order for post-handover Hong Kong. This included guarantees of the rule of law and basic freedoms, as well as a promise of ultimate universal suffrage. It was formally adopted by China’s National People’s Congress in 1990.</p>
<p>Basic Law Article 23 requires the Hong Kong government to “on its own” enact certain national security laws relating to treason, secession, sedition, subversion or theft of state secrets, and to regulate foreign organizations.</p>
<p>The Hong Kong government first put forward an Article 23 bill in 2003. But due to concerns over the implications for press and organizational freedoms, as well as expanded police powers, the proposed bill <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-68594448">met with widespread opposition</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A uniformed police officer puts his fingers in his ears in front of a sign that has the number 23 crossed out." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Noisy protests help defeat an earlier version of Article 23 in 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/police-officer-puts-his-fingers-in-his-ears-to-protect-news-photo/1258921548?adppopup=true">Peter Parks/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A group of seven leading lawyers and two legal academics, including myself, challenged the proposed bill in a collection of pamphlets that highlighted its deficiencies under international human rights standards. Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3178339/july-1-2003-500000-take-hong-kongs-streets-protest-against">half a million protesters</a> took to the streets of Hong Kong. </p>
<p>In the face of such opposition and the consequent withdrawal of support by a leading pro-goverment party, the bill was withdrawn. </p>
<p>Rather than come forward with a replacement bill that would address human rights concerns, the government opted to let Article 23 languish for two decades.</p>
<p>Then, in 2020, Beijing <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/hong-kong-national-security-law-10-things-you-need-to-know/">imposed a national security law</a> that gave Hong Kong authorities greater power. It led to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/one-year-hong-kong-arrests-117-people-under-new-security-law-2021-06-30/">arrest and repression of opposition figures</a> in Hong Kong, silencing the once-vibrant democracy movement. </p>
<p>With no effective opposition left and the threat of arrest for anyone who speaks out, the pro-Beijing Hong Kong government decided now was the time to ram through a more extreme version of the bill.</p>
<p>The Hong Kong government, with Beijing’s encouragement, was able to open up a short consultation on the new Article 23 legislative proposal with little or no opposition expressed. </p>
<p>The process was facilitated by a “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/hong-kong-patriots-only-election-falls-flat-with-record-low-turnout-2023-12-11">patriots only” electoral system</a> imposed by Beijing in 2021 that has tightened Beijing’s grip over the Hong Kong legislature, leading to unanimous support for the bill.</p>
<h2>How will it affect civil liberties in Hong Kong?</h2>
<p>In tandem with the 2020 Beijing-imposed national security law, the new Article 23 legislation will have a dramatic effect on civil liberties.</p>
<p>The national security law – with its vague provisions on secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion – has already been used along with a colonial-era sedition law to arrest and silence dissent in Hong Kong. Many opposition figures <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/20/world/asia/hong-kong-democracy-leaders.html">are in prison or have fled into exile</a>. And those with dissenting views who remain have largely gone silent. </p>
<p>The draft bill expands on the national security law in key areas: the stealing of state secrets, insurrection, sabotage and external interference in Hong Kong.</p>
<p>It essentially embraces mainland China’s comprehensive national security regime, which has long focused on suppressing internal opposition, targeting numerous areas of local civil life, impacting organizational, press and academic freedoms.</p>
<p>Included in Article 23 is the adoption of the mainland’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/28/world/asia/china-state-secrets-law.html">broad definition of “state secrets</a>,” which can even include reporting or writing on social and economic development policies. </p>
<p><iframe id="6v2wZ" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/6v2wZ/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The legislation expands the potential use of incarceration with both lengthy sentences upon conviction and longer holding of suspects before trial.</p>
<p>Article 23 also intensifies <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/30/hong-kong-article-23-new-national-security-laws-explained-what-do-they-mean">scrutiny of “foreign influence</a>” – making working with outsiders risky for Hong Kong citizens.</p>
<p>The draft legislation speaks disparagingly of activism under the guises of fighting for or monitoring human rights and is critical of “so-called” nongovernmental organizations.</p>
<p>All of this makes working with or supporting international human rights organizations perilous. </p>
<p>In short, in the space of two decades, Hong Kong’s liberal constitutional order has been transformed into a national security order with weak or no protections for basic freedoms.</p>
<h2>What is the wider context to Article 23?</h2>
<p>To understand this legislation, one must appreciate the Chinese Communist Party’s deep hostility to liberal values and institutions, such as the rule of law, civil liberties, independent courts, a free press and public accountability. Such liberal ideas are viewed as an existential threat to party rule. </p>
<p>This mindset has led to a dramatic expansion of the party’s <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/china-vows-to-safeguard-national-security-with-new-laws-at-conclave-/7520474.html">national security agenda</a> under current leader Xi Jinping. </p>
<p>Beijing has emphasized economic development in recent decades, staking its legitimacy on economic growth – betting that people will care more about their standard of living than about political freedoms. But as <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/15/china-needs-reforms-to-halt-significant-growth-declines-imf-chief.html">growth declines</a>, leaders’ concerns about security and dissent have grown, placing such security even above economic development.</p>
<p>This has led to the comprehensive national security concept now being imposed on Hong Kong. </p>
<p>With Beijing advancing an agenda that casts liberal, democratic ideas as a threat, a liberal Hong Kong on the country’s border became impossible for the Chinese Communist Party to ignore.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of protesters shelter under umbrellas" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protestors in Hong Kong use umbrellas as improvised shields in 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protestors-using-improvise-shield-to-push-toward-police-news-photo/1191713262?adppopup=true">Kwan Wong/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Widespread <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48607723">protests in Hong Kong in 2019</a> both exacerbated this concern and offered an opportunity for Beijing to address the perceived threat under the <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202112/1240540.shtml">claim that protesters were advancing a so-called “color revolution</a>.”</p>
<p>Having long nurtured its loyalist camp to rule Hong Kong, these loyal officials became the instrument of the crackdown.</p>
<h2>What does the lack of protest now say about the pro-democracy movement?</h2>
<p>It tells us that the mainland national security regime imposed on Hong Kong has effectively intimidated the society, especially those with opposition views, into silence. </p>
<p>Hong Kong’s pro-democratic camp had <a href="https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.5563">historically enjoyed majority support, at around 60%</a> of the voters in the direct elections that were allowed for half of the legislative seats.</p>
<p>The introduction of loyalists-only elections led to a dramatically reduced turnout.</p>
<p>This and emigration patterns tend to show that the majority of Hong Kong people do not support this new illiberal order.</p>
<p>Be that as it may, with most of their pro-democratic leaders either in jail or exile, they dare not speak out against the new national security regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226186/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael C. Davis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the space of two decades, Hong Kong’s liberal constitutional order has been transformed into a security regime that grants citizens few civil libertiesMichael C. Davis, Professor of Law and International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2256232024-03-19T14:07:44Z2024-03-19T14:07:44ZChina: why the country’s economy has hit a wall – and what it plans to do about it<p>China’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-68508868">annual parliamentary meetings</a> in Beijing came to a close on March 11. They were conducted under great pressure: a weak economy and high expectations from both the domestic public and international observers as to what the government can do to get the economy out of the woods.</p>
<p>The country’s leaders did not shy away from mentioning all of the economic problems facing China. But they also attempted to boost the morale of the Chinese public by outlining how the country would march into the next chapter of the Chinese story – mainly by striving to become a global leader in technology.</p>
<p>The government used the meetings to <a href="https://npcobserver.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/2024-Government-Work-Report_EN.pdf">declare</a> that it was targeting GDP growth of 5% in 2024. This is lower than the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-q4-gdp-grows-52-yy-below-market-forecast-2024-01-17/">5.2% growth rate</a> that was achieved in 2023 but higher than the International Monetary Fund’s <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/CHN">forecast</a> of 4.6%. The Chinese government did not detail how this target will be achieved, but the target itself is indicative of the leadership’s confidence about the future.</p>
<p>Over the past four decades, China’s rapid economic growth has been attributed to market incentives, cheap labour, infrastructure investment, exports and foreign direct investment. But at the time of writing, none of these drivers are working effectively. </p>
<p>Market activities are intertwined with <a href="https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/2023/chinas-state-vs-private-company-tracker-which-sector-dominates">greater state intervention</a>. A declining population has weakened the labour supply. And uncertainty surrounding China’s economy and intensified geopolitical tensions have together driven foreign investment <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Foreign-direct-investment-in-China-falls-to-30-yearlow#:%7E:text=But%20FDI%20declined%20for%20the,recorded%20in%20the%20prior%20quarter.">out of China</a>. By January 2024, inward foreign direct investment in China was less than 10% of the US$344 billion (£270 billion) it received in 2021.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-doom-loop-a-dramatically-smaller-and-older-population-could-create-a-devastating-global-slowdown-221554">China's doom loop: a dramatically smaller (and older) population could create a devastating global slowdown</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Property crisis</h2>
<p>Many of the risks facing China’s economy stem from its ailing real estate sector. For decades, China’s economy was dependent on a <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/02/02/cf-chinas-real-estate-sector-managing-the-medium-term-slowdown#:%7E:text=Real%20estate%20has%20long%20been,the%20buildup%20of%20significant%20risks">booming property market</a> driven by speculative investment returns. However, this growth was largely driven by debt. To maximise their profits, developers even began selling houses before they had been built.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A view of a room full of people in China sat facing a stage." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582141/original/file-20240315-28-bsptnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Delegates attending the closing meeting of the Two Sessions on March 11.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://epaimages.com/search.pp">Wu Hao/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>China’s economy started to slow and, in 2020, Chinese regulators <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-08/what-china-s-three-red-lines-mean-for-property-firms-quicktake">cracked down</a> on reckless borrowing. Beijing imposed widespread lending curbs on property developers, meaning they could not borrow more money to pay back their existing debts. </p>
<p>A crisis followed. In early 2024, Evergrande – the world’s most heavily indebted real estate developer – <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/embattled-china-evergrande-back-court-liquidation-hearing-2024-01-28/">went bust</a>. And other large property developers are in trouble. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-67142093">Country Garden</a> has defaulted and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e1ffbcb4-3222-4a8e-be61-e3a6051567f5">Vanke</a> is struggling to find the new loans it needs to stay alive. </p>
<p>The government confirmed its determination to deflate the property bubble in its annual meeting. It did not highlight how to protect more property developers from defaulting, and only hinted at giving some help to allow developers to complete property projects.</p>
<p>The current weak consumer demand in China’s economy is closely related to the real estate crisis. The value of houses is <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-17/china-home-prices-fall-most-since-2015-as-downturn-persists">much lower</a> today than it was two years ago, creating fear about the future value of personal wealth. This has prompted more precautionary saving and less consumption in the face of weak social protection, leading to a general <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/feb/08/china-consumer-prices-plunge-at-fastest-rate-for-15-years-as-deflation-fears-deepen">decline in the price</a> of goods and services. </p>
<p>Demand for Chinese goods from abroad has also been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-us-pledge-joint-action-over-china-concerns-2023-05-13/">declining</a> due to trade restrictions imposed by the US and the EU, geopolitical concerns and shocks to global supply chains. This explains why throughout its annual meetings the government explicitly emphasised the need to strengthen the self-reliance of the Chinese economy. </p>
<h2>New drivers of growth</h2>
<p>The most eye-catching phrase to come out of the annual meetings was “new quality productive forces”. There are varying interpretations of the term, but they all focus on technology and innovation. </p>
<p>Chinese officials explicitly highlighted the need for China to strive to invent more products related to Artificial Intelligence (AI). The government envisions applications such as AI-powered travel agents and salespeople. </p>
<p>China has, up to this point, been better known for applying AI technologies. Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen are all <a href="https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/chinas-smart-cities-and-future-geopolitics">smart cities</a>, where advanced technologies such as AI, cloud computing and big data are used in various areas including transport, urban planning and public security.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A robot police officer driving down a street in China." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582143/original/file-20240315-22-k4w6kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Shanghai’s first robot police officer patrolling the streets in 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/shanghai-china-dec-20-2019-shanghais-1594426684">atiger/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, transforming China’s economy from one that is driven by investment and fuelled by debt to one that is driven by innovation and technology will bring some fresh challenges. </p>
<p>First, innovation requires incentives and an institutional guarantee to reward risk-taking. Hence, the private sector needs to grow faster. <a href="https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/2023/chinas-state-vs-private-company-tracker-which-sector-dominates">Research</a> has found that the share of China’s private sector among the 100 largest listed companies in China dropped to 36.8% at the end of 2023 from 55.4% in mid-2021. </p>
<p>Second, innovation requires more highly skilled human capital. A <a href="https://www.oecd.org/future-of-work/reports-and-data/AI-Employment-brief-2021.pdf">report</a> by the OECD in 2021 concluded that the application of AI technology increases the demand for skilled employees, despite replacing low-skilled labour. This will pose a challenge for China as, up to this point, the country’s growth has been spurred by low-skilled labour. </p>
<p>Third, high-tech industries such as AI and digital services are energy intensive. China has already taken steps to diversify its energy supply, but securing energy supply chains will be essential in the longer term. </p>
<p>Heightened geopolitical tensions and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-63883047">revamped global supply chains</a> may well reduce exports of energy and other natural resources to China in the future. Many of these resources come from developing economies that have exchanged their resources for China’s infrastructure investment in the past. This is unlikely to be the case in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225623/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hong Bo previously received funding from the British Academy. </span></em></p>China is facing many economic obstacles, but Beijing remains optimistic about growth.Hong Bo, Professor of Financial Economics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2257492024-03-15T15:15:16Z2024-03-15T15:15:16ZIs TikTok’s parent company an agent of the Chinese state? In China Inc., it’s a little more complicated<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582050/original/file-20240314-28-369bin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C5%2C3553%2C2358&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some U.S. lawmakers have grown concerned about TikTok.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-walk-past-an-advertisement-featuring-the-tiktok-logo-news-photo/2075608549?adppopup=true">Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images.</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Does the Chinese government have officials inside TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, pulling the strings? And does the storing of data from the popular social media app outside of China protect Americans?</p>
<p>These questions appear to dominate the current thinking in the U.S. over <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/13/technology/tiktok-ban-house-vote.html">whether to ban TikTok</a> if its owner, Chinese technology giant ByteDance, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/14/tiktok-ban-china-would-block-sale-of-short-video-app.html">refuses to sell the platform</a>.</p>
<p>But in my opinion – forged through <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=vXeBa0kAAAAJ&hl=en">40 years as a scholar of China, its political economy and business</a> – both questions obscure a more interesting point. What’s more, they suggest a crucial misunderstanding of the relationship between state and private enterprise in China.</p>
<p>Simply put, there’s no clear line between the state and society in China in the same way that there is in democracies. The Chinese Communist Party – which is synonymous with the Chinese state – both owns and is the nation. And that goes for private enterprises, too. They operate like joint ventures in which the government is both a partner and the ultimate boss. Both sides know that – even if that relationship isn’t expressly codified and recognizable to outside onlookers.</p>
<h2>ByteDance under the microscope</h2>
<p>Take ByteDance. The company has become the focus of scrutiny in the U.S. largely due to the outsized influence that its subsidiary <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2024/02/22/how-u-s-adults-use-tiktok/">plays in the lives of young Americans</a>. Some <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-house-vote-force-bytedance-divest-tiktok-or-face-ban-2024-03-13/">170 million Americans</a> are TikTok users, and U.S. politicians fear their data has a direct route back to the Chinese state via ByteDance, which has its head offices in Beijing.</p>
<p>Location aside, concerned voices in the U.S. cite the evidence of former ByteDance employees who suggest <a href="https://apnews.com/article/tiktok-china-bytedance-user-data-d257d98125f69ac80f983e6067a84911">interference from the Chinese government</a>, and reports that the state has quietly <a href="https://www.theinformation.com/articles/beijing-tightens-grip-on-bytedance-by-quietly-taking-stake-china-board-seat">taken a direct stake and a board seat</a> at Beijing ByteDance Technology Co. Ltd., ByteDance’s Chinese subsidiary.</p>
<p>Grilled by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce in March 2023, TikTok’s Singaporean CEO Shou Zi Chew <a href="https://apnews.com/article/tiktok-ban-ceo-congressional-hearing-bytedance-china-44d948c5b0ba18e2a714e0fa62d52779">said unequivocally</a> that ByteDance was not “an agent of China or any other country.”</p>
<p>The history of the Chinese government’s dealings with private companies suggests something more subtle, however.</p>
<h2>The rise of China Inc.</h2>
<p>Over its century-long history, the Chinese Communist Party has sought to exercise control over all aspects of the country, including its economy. In its early days, this control took the form of a heavy-handed <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/command-economy.asp">command economy</a> in which everything was produced and consumed according to government planning.</p>
<p>China took a step in a more capitalist direction in the latter half of the 20th century after the death of Mao Zedong, founder of the People’s Republic of China. But even the <a href="https://www.cato.org/publications/chinas-post-1978-economic-development-entry-global-trading-system">reforms of Deng Xiaoping</a> in the late 1970s and 1980s – credited for opening up China’s economy – were in the service of party goals. Because China’s economy was in ruins, the party’s emphasis was on economic development, and it loosened its grip on power to encourage that. The continuation of party control was still paramount – it just needed to reform the economy to ensure that goal.</p>
<p>That didn’t mean the party wanted pluralism. After decades of economic growth, and with a GDP surpassing that of the U.S. when <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3085501/china-overtakes-us-no-1-buying-power-still-clings-developing">measured by purchasing power parity</a>, the Chinese government once again started to shift its focus to a comprehensive control of China.</p>
<p>In recent years, under the increasingly <a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/Chapter_1--CCP_Decision-Making_and_Xi_Jinpings_Centralization_of_Authority.pdf">centralized control of Xi Jinping</a>, the Chinese government has evidently opted to run the entire country as a <a href="http://doi.org/10.1108/IJOEM-12-2019-1103">giant corporation</a>, with the ruling party as its management.</p>
<h2>A party with unusual power</h2>
<p>Unlike political parties in democracies, which people freely join and leave, the Chinese Communist Party resembles a secret society. <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Constitution_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China.pdf">To join</a>, you need to be introduced by two party members and tested for an extended period, and then pledge to die for the party’s cause. Quitting it also <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2017-02/05/c_1120413145.htm">needs approval by the party</a>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12023">Orders are implicit</a>, and protecting one’s superior is crucial. </p>
<p>People who don’t cooperate face serious consequences. In 2022, an official warned a resident who disobeyed the official’s order in COVID-19 testing that three generations of the resident’s descendants <a href="https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/generation-05122022062839.html">would be adversely affected</a> if he were uncooperative. The same is true of businesses: Ride-sharing company Didi incurred the party’s displeasure by listing its stocks in the U.S., and was harshly punished and forced to delist as a result – <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/china-fines-didi-global-12-bln-violating-data-security-laws-2022-07-21/">losing more than 80% of its value</a>. </p>
<p>Since those who disobey the party are weeded out or are punished and seen to have learned their lessons, all surviving and successful private businesses are <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/jack-ma-makes-ant-offer-to-placate-chinese-regulators-11608479629?page=1">party supporters</a> – either voluntarily or otherwise.</p>
<p>The rapid emergence of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009076210">China Inc.</a> has caught even seasoned Chinese entrepreneurs off guard. Consider the case of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/07/28/1021651586/chinese-billionaire-sun-dawu-is-sentenced-to-18-years-for-provoking-trouble">Sun Dawu</a>, a successful agricultural entrepreneur known for advocating for rural reform and the rights of farmers. That offended the party, and in 2020, authorities confiscated all his assets and sentenced him to 18 years in prison.</p>
<p>As if that weren’t enough, China’s National Intelligence Law granted broad powers to the country’s spy agencies and obligates companies to assist with intelligence efforts. That’s why some American lawmakers are concerned that ByteDance could be <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/will-the-us-crack-down-on-tiktok-six-questions-and-expert-answers-about-the-bill-in-congress/">forced to hand over Americans’ private data</a> to the Chinese state. <a href="https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-au/the-truth-about-tiktok">TikTok denies</a> this is the case. However, recently <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/leaked-hacking-files-show-chinese-spying-on-citizens-and-foreigners-alike">leaked files</a> of I-Soon, a Chinese hacking firm, reveal public-private collusion in data sharing is common in China.</p>
<p>That’s why I’m not convinced by TikTok’s argument that American users’ data is safe because it’s stored <a href="https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/tiktok-facts-how-we-secure-personal-information-and-store-data">outside of China</a>, in the U.S., Malaysia and Singapore. I also don’t think it’s relevant whether the party has members on the ByteDance board or gives explicit orders to TikTok.</p>
<p>Regardless of whether ByteDance has formal ties with the party, there will be the tacit understanding that the management is working for two bosses: the investors of the company and – more importantly – their political overseers that represent the party. But most importantly, when the interests of the two bosses conflict, the party trumps.</p>
<p>As such, as long as ByteDance owns TikTok, I believe ByteDance will use TikTok to support the party – not just for its own business survival, but for the safety of the personnel of ByteDance and TikTok, and their families.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225749/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaomin Li does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In China, ‘private’ businesses aren’t entirely private and the ultimate boss is the CCP, not the CEO.Shaomin Li, Eminent Scholar and Professor of International Business, Old Dominion UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2240362024-03-01T17:24:48Z2024-03-01T17:24:48ZTaiwan’s election was a clear show of defiance in the face of Chinese intimidation and pressure<p>Taiwan’s recent election result highlights voters’ steadfast determination to resist China’s influence on their politics. Despite all Beijing’s efforts to sway popular support towards its preferred party, the <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/01/taiwans-democracy-prevailed-despite-chinas-election-interference">Kuomintang (KMT)</a>, the election was won by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, incumbent vice-president William Lai.</p>
<p>Lai Ching-te, who is known as William in the west and Lai Qingde in mainland China, won with 40% of the vote. A nationalist who firmly supports Taiwanese independence from China, he scored a convincing victory over KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih, who placed second with 33.5%. In third place was Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je, who received 26.5%.</p>
<p>Lai will succeed the outgoing DPP president, Tsai Ing-wen, when he is <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/five-things-you-need-to-know-about-taiwan-new-president-william-lai-elections-dpp/">inaugurated in May</a>. His election is more than just a victory for Taiwan’s democratic values. It’s an unequivocal rejection by Taiwanese voters of Beijing’s persistent and intrusive meddling in their politics.</p>
<p>Since Taiwan first held direct presidential elections in 1996, Beijing has adeptly employed a dual-faceted strategy towards the island it claims as an inalienable part of its territory. Its “carrot-and-stick approach” is meticulously designed to appeal to voters’ sense of Chinese identity while also trying to steer them way from independence candidates.</p>
<p>This is very much of a piece with China’s <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/01/taiwans-democracy-prevailed-despite-chinas-election-interference">complex relationship</a> with Taiwan. It combines military intimidation and economic incentives, with informal influence operations targeting media organisations and civil society groups.</p>
<p>Beijing reacted to Lai’s election by restating its commitment to unification: “This election cannot change the basic pattern and direction of development of cross-strait relations … that the motherland will eventually be reunified.” </p>
<h2>International reactions</h2>
<p>Beijing also reacted angrily to messages of congratulations received by Lai from an array of world leaders including the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, and the British foreign secretary, David Cameron, who <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/14/taiwan-election-global-leaders-draw-beijings-ire-for-congratulating-new-president">said that</a> the result was “testament to Taiwan’s vibrant democracy”.</p>
<p>Western involvement with Taiwan has been complicated by the fact that <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-that-recognize-taiwan">no major western power recognises Taiwan</a> as an independent country. Instead, most countries pay at least official lip-service to Beijing’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-38285354">“one China” policy</a>. </p>
<p>This holds that Taiwan is the same country as the People’s Republic (mainland China). At the same time, Taiwan’s western allies <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-67909120">supply it with arms</a> to defend itself against any forced assimilation into China.</p>
<p>In reporting the election result, the international media focused squarely on what it suggested about Taiwan’s relations with the mainland. The message was clear in headlines such as “Taiwan voters rebuff China, ruling party gets third presidential term,” (<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/polls-open-taiwans-critical-elections-watched-closely-by-china-2024-01-13/">Reuters’</a>) or “Taiwan Elects US-Friendly President, Defying China Warnings” (<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-13/taiwan-set-to-elect-president-reviled-by-china-in-setback-for-xi">Bloomberg</a>). Throughout the west the election was billed as a defiant Taiwan refusing to back down to Beijing.</p>
<p>It was against this tense backdrop that a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-68346855">five-member US congressional delegation</a> led by the House China committee chairman, Mike Gallagher, arrived in Taipei to pay their respects to the president-elect. Gallagher, a known China hawk, assured Lai of his country’s continuing support. </p>
<p>He said: “I’m confident regardless of how the presidential election goes, we will maintain our support not only for Taiwan but also a posture of internationalism and engagement.”</p>
<p>Gallagher’s trip angered Beijing, which demanded that the US <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/china-demands-us-stop-official-contact-taiwan-congressional-107459161">cease any official contact with Taiwan</a>. “China opposes any form of official interaction between the US and Taiwan authorities and rejects US interference in Taiwan affairs in whatever form or under whatever pretext,” a foreign ministry spokeswoman said, urging Washington to be “mindful of the extreme complexity and sensitivity” of the situation.</p>
<p>Taiwanese foreign minister, Jaushieh Joseph Wu, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R0wuZR0fnmc">welcomed the visit</a>: “Taiwan has been under tremendous military, economic, and also hybrid coercion by the PRC and under these circumstances, the visit of US congressmen has been of tremendous support to Taiwan.”</p>
<h2>China ups the ante</h2>
<p>Most recently, the response from the Chinese Communist party has taken a more strident tone. Wang Huning – a key figure overseeing Taiwanese affairs in China – <a href="https://www.zytzb.gov.cn/zytzb/2024-02/23/article_2024022317133791028.shtml">urged the annual Taiwan Work Conference</a> held in Beijing on February 23 to “resolutely combat ‘Taiwan independence’ separatism, curb interference from external forces, firmly support the patriotic unification forces on the island, broadly unite Taiwan compatriots, and maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait”.</p>
<p>Communist party rhetoric has also <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/28172cc1-b3b7-4a72-88b0-5a963d0ce823">ramped up</a> towards advocates of Taiwanese independence since the election. Where previously party officials had used the term “oppose” (fandui 反对), this year it has shifted to “kill” or “combat” (daji 打击) against “Taiwan separatists.” </p>
<p>It’s a notable change in tone compared to previous conferences. This more aggressive stance would appear to affirm widespread expectations that Beijing will <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/27/taiwan-china-lai-ccp-unification-election-invasion-disinformation/">intensify its attempts</a> to push Taiwan towards unification.</p>
<p>China tried a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/09/taiwan-presidential-election-china-influence">range of gambits</a> to interfere with the recent election. These ranged from hosting visits from hundreds of pro-Beijing Taiwanese local officials in the hope that they could use their influence to sway voters (carrot) to threatening to cancel trade concessions for Taiwanese businesses (stick). </p>
<p>There was deep-fake content pushing Beijing’s message and a blizzard of other misleading online content promoting conspiracy theories about DPP candidates. Chinese aircraft and spy balloons violated Taiwan’s airspace regularly during the campaign.</p>
<p>None of this worked. Turnout for the recent election <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/taiwans-2024-elections-results-and-implications">was 71.86%</a> – significantly higher than in the most recent elections in the US and UK. And there was clear distance between Lai’s 40% of the vote and the other candidates. Clearly the Taiwanese people value their democracy and wanted to send their own message to Beijing through the best medium there is: the ballot box.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224036/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Yukteshwar Kumar is affiliated with the Conservative Party. </span></em></p>Global reaction to the recent Taiwan election, which was won by a pro-independence candidate, contrasts sharply with that of Beijing.Yukteshwar Kumar, Course Director, Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2217082024-02-12T16:31:39Z2024-02-12T16:31:39ZAs US-China tensions mount, the UK will need to work closer with Europe in the Indo-Pacific<p>US-China rivalry – already a growing concern of global leaders, policymakers, pundits and business elites – is set to heat up further as we head into a US election year. </p>
<p>The UK’s strategy for the Indo-Pacific region is built around its alliance with the US. This was formalised in September 2021 with the announcement of Aukus, a military alliance <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-aukus-partnership-15-september-2021">with the US and Australia</a>. Yet its major interests there – in security, economy, diplomacy and human rights – appear more closely aligned with Brussels than Washington. </p>
<p>The imperative to coordinate, if not align, with Europe will become stronger still if Donald Trump returns to the US presidency in 2024. The Trump campaign’s blustery, social media-driven China policy and scepticism of the US’s alliances is the worst of all worlds for allies such as the UK, raising the risks of both <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706792">abandonment and entrapment</a>. </p>
<p>Facing the increased uncertainty from Washington, the UK and Europe may have to band together to protect their interests in the world’s most economically vibrant region.</p>
<p>After leaving the EU, the former UK prime minister Boris Johnson announced an <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-james-cleverlys-speech-on-the-indo-pacific-tilt-september-2022">“Indo-Pacific tilt”</a> that has expanded the UK’s engagement in the region – for example, through the dispatch of a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-carrier-strike-group-flagship-hms-queen-elizabeth-to-arrive-in-japan">UK carrier strike group to Japan in 2021</a>. </p>
<p>Ironically, Britain’s pivot away from the European bloc and towards the Indo-Pacific calls for greater policy coordination with Europe.</p>
<p>One area where such coordination is necessary is maritime security in the contested waters of the South China Sea. European states are natural naval partners for the UK in asserting the rules of UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) – which the US has not ratified – against People’s Republic of China encroachments such as artificial <a href="https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/">island-building</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/the-coral-triangle/2015/jul/15/preventing-ecocide-in-south-china-sea">environmental destruction</a>.</p>
<p>Recent passages by French, German and Dutch ships through the South China Sea have generally <a href="https://www.factsasia.org/blog/europe-in-the-indo-pacific-trade-and-troubled-waters">not triggered</a> public shows of anger from the PRC party-state. For Britain, this suggests that partnering with smaller European navies to balance China’s increasing naval power would carry less risk of reprisal or escalation from Beijing than sailing with the US Navy.</p>
<p>The UK could use the opportunity to encourage European navies to do more in the field of maritime security. This could start with increased ship dispatches, port visits, cooperative exchanges with regional navies and “freedom of navigation” operations. When carried out by countries other than the US, such patrols underscore that the provisions of Unclos are principled rules, rather than political tools.</p>
<h2>Global trade</h2>
<p>On global trade in general, the UK and US are moving in opposite directions. There remains <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/rishi-sunak-kills-talk-of-us-uk-trade-deal-as-digital-hopes-grow/">little sign</a> of the promised US-UK free trade agreement. In its absence, Britain is placing trade at the centre of its Indo-Pacific tilt, joining the region’s most ambitious free trade deal, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership.</p>
<p>There are real risks to opening up greater trade in the Indo-Pacific. Whitehall <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-takes-action-to-boost-supply-chain-resilience-for-critical-goods-and-back-businesses">is rightly concerned</a> about the security of internationalised supply chains. Meanwhile, western nations are “friend-shoring” production – moving supply chain networks to allies and friends. Sheer geographical proximity means Europe will likely be central in any plan to ensure resiliency in UK supply chains, while expanding trade links in the Indo-Pacific.</p>
<p>Then there is economic coercion, which Xi Jinping’s PRC has increasingly deployed against a <a href="https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/chinas-use-of-coercive-economic-measures">wide range</a> of targets from Japan to Lithuania over political disputes. Here, again, there’s more the UK can do with Europe. </p>
<p>The EU last year legislated an <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/10/23/trade-council-adopts-a-regulation-to-protect-the-eu-from-third-country-economic-coercion/">anti-coercion instrument</a> designed to enable rapid and coordinated pushback and assistance when member states are targeted by economic coercion. The UK should seek to <a href="https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/enforcement-and-protection/protecting-against-coercion/qa-political-agreement-anti-coercion-instrument_en">join up</a> or at least align with the EU’s approach to economic coercion. </p>
<p>In light of the UK’s considerable economic size, it would be in the EU’s own interest to work with Britain in building out and implementing this scheme.</p>
<h2>Diplomatic moves</h2>
<p>Last year’s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/integrated-review-refresh-2023-responding-to-a-more-contested-and-volatile-world">Integrated Review Refresh</a>, the latest update to the UK’s foreign policy priorities, described climate change and biodiversity loss as existential threats. And it committed the UK to pushing back against <a href="https://fpc.org.uk/meeting-the-challenge-of-transnational-human-rights-violations-in-the-uk-the-case-for-a-transnational-rights-protection-office/">human rights violations</a> in China by aligning with the UK’s allies and partners. </p>
<p>A second Trump administration is unlikely to be a reliable partner on these issues, nor on the threat of China using force against self-governing, democratic Taiwan. Trump withdrew the US from the Paris Accords in 2017 and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/63f156933a5520d157dea25ab764af09">praised</a> Xi’s policy of mass internment of ethnic Uyghurs. He also recently <a href="https://twitter.com/highbrow_nobrow/status/1748871427850166429">refused</a> to say if he would help Taiwan if the PRC attacked, responding instead with broadsides against Taiwan’s chip industry for “taking our business”.</p>
<p>When part of the EU, British diplomats were well known as effective contributors to the EU’s diplomatic service. The UK will need to draw on this experience if it wishes to see progress on the threat of climate change and human rights abuses in Xinjiang and elsewhere.</p>
<h2>A win for Europe</h2>
<p>The UK has been struggling to advance a coherent definition of its relations with China, and a strategy articulating what it wants from the relationship. The European Council’s <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2019-03/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf">description</a> of the EU-China relationship -– partner on global challenges, competitor on technology, rival on governance –- has provided a stable framework since 2019. </p>
<p>There is also a win for Europe in all this. For its part, the EU wants Beijing to acknowledge it as a “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d4fd8f5f-be0e-417e-bce6-f9219557e4a7">geopolitical power</a>” – a third pole in global affairs distinct from the US. </p>
<p>Expanding maritime security, supply chain resiliency, countercoercion, human rights and other diplomatic engagement with the UK – and indeed facilitating its ambitions in the Indo-Pacific – would offer a way for Brussels to show it is a serious player in the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221708/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Chubb consults for the Great Britain-China Centre and the Ministry of Defence. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marco Wyss receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council and consults for the Ministry of Defence. </span></em></p>A second Donald Trump presidency would require the UK and Europe to work closer together.Andrew Chubb, Senior Lecturer in Chinese Politics and International Relations, Lancaster UniversityMarco Wyss, Professor of International History and Security, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2219872024-01-30T23:33:26Z2024-01-30T23:33:26ZChina wanted to become a football powerhouse to inspire the nation. Instead, its team has been an embarrassment<p>China’s football dreams have again suffered a huge blow, with the men’s national team exiting <a href="https://uk.sports.yahoo.com/news/problems-run-deep-chinese-football-115309839.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAABZpEQDxPGxcHxTUi_wt5iaqobktGmyaw1cYC07aT0uQWihtceDe_o39c_D_f7KIGa6MDTqhPFDf-nM6mZ5SZZHY084SDUUwkS2qSVzWq7KFVRq0Nm2zc6s5ZqqSFeU3kr9SL8lL6UU-YfLxZPPeh-jSS1trUOPBE7hBINR0jf_0">the 2024 Asian Cup</a> in the group stage without scoring a goal. </p>
<p>It’s just the latest embarrassment on the international stage for a team that last qualified for the World Cup more than 20 years ago. </p>
<p>After China’s top leader Xi Jinping declared a decade ago that he wanted the country to become a football superpower, billions of dollars were <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/07/china/xi-jinping-china-football-dream-fail-intl-hnk-dst/index.html#:%7E:text=Yet%20few%20could%20have%20doubted,and%20fans%20around%20the%20world.">spent</a> to lure top talent from abroad to China’s domestic football league and to build schools and football fields around the country.</p>
<p>But the journey since then has been tumultuous. <a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/sports/2012-04/24/content_15122514.htm">Once-prominent Chinese players and top-level officials</a> became entangled in corruption, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/sport/football/article/3249497/afc-asian-cup-chinese-football-fans-slam-their-teams-efforts-weibo-suggest-hong-kong-would-represent">eroding public trust</a> in the sport. The foreign stars in China’s Super League all departed and prominent teams were <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/07/china/xi-jinping-china-football-dream-fail-intl-hnk-dst/index.html#:%7E:text=Yet%20few%20could%20have%20doubted,and%20fans%20around%20the%20world.">unable to pay their players</a>. The progress of the national men’s team has sputtered. </p>
<p>How did the Chinese men’s football team reach this dismal state, and where does it go from here?</p>
<h2>Economic short-termism leads to mismanagement and corruption</h2>
<p>In response to former leader Deng Xiaoping’s famous <a href="https://thechinaproject.com/2021/01/20/deng-xiaopings-secret-southern-tour-and-its-enduring-legacy/">1992 “Southern Tour”</a>, which reinvigorated the country’s economic reform agenda, the Chinese Football Association (CFA) decided to detach from the National Sports Committee and embrace market forces. </p>
<p>Before that, Chinese football operated under the so-called “<a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8645188/How-Chinas-whole-nation-system-works.html">whole nation system</a>”, relying on the government to allocate resources to teams, including athlete training and funding. Although player salaries weren’t high, the system helped produce the the so-called “<a href="https://www.chinanews.com.cn/ty/2022/03-30/9715492.shtml">golden generation</a>” of Chinese football stars and made China a major contender in Asia. </p>
<p>The establishment of the Chinese Professional Football League in 1994 led local football associations and teams to break away from the central government administration and source their own funding.</p>
<p>This, in turn, ignited the passions of Chinese football fans, who rallied behind local clubs. Football players became celebrities overnight. For instance, among fans of the team Sichuan Quanxing, a saying about two players became popular: “Girls should aspire to marry a hero like <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wei_Qun">Wei Qun</a> and aim to raise a son who follows in the footsteps of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yao_Xia">Yao Xia</a>.” (嫁人要嫁魏大侠,生儿要生小姚夏).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571392/original/file-20240125-15-rywupe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571392/original/file-20240125-15-rywupe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571392/original/file-20240125-15-rywupe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571392/original/file-20240125-15-rywupe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571392/original/file-20240125-15-rywupe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571392/original/file-20240125-15-rywupe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571392/original/file-20240125-15-rywupe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Chinese football crowd in Sichuan province in the late 1990s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ye Xue</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Generous investments and sponsorships led to a significant increase in players’ incomes. By 1998, top-division players were earning a minimum annual income of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/714004853">100,000 yuan</a> (A$18,000), a staggering 20 times more than the average citizen. Some star players earned more than 1 million yuan (A$180,000). </p>
<p>Amid this flourishing environment, from 1996 to 2000, the number of registered youth football players in China surged beyond <a href="https://m.sohu.com/n/323315001/">600,000</a>. Chinese fans believed the dynamic domestic football scene would propel their national team to greater heights internationally.</p>
<p>However, beneath the surface, the relationship between capital and clubs was unhealthy, as the teams became heavily reliant on funding from parent companies. This laid the groundwork for the eventual downfall of Chinese professional football. </p>
<p>The focus on short-term gains led to much mismanagement and corruption. By the early 2000s, the Super League faced issues such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003%E2%80%932009_Chinese_football_match-fixing_scandals">match-fixing</a>, <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Jan/25779.htm">biased refereeing</a>, waning public interest and a constant reshuffling of club ownership. This pushed some clubs to the brink of dissolution and left players grappling with unemployment.</p>
<p>The aftermath was swift – registered youth football players in China reportedly dropped to a mere <a href="https://m.sohu.com/n/323315001/">180,000</a> in 2005 and reached just 7,000 by 2010. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/beijing-olympics-may-get-points-for-boosting-chinas-international-reputation-but-games-are-definitely-gold-for-xi-jinpings-standing-at-home-176120">Beijing Olympics may get points for boosting China's international reputation, but Games are definitely gold for Xi Jinping's standing at home</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Political opportunism foils another reform attempt</h2>
<p>After the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/sport/football/article/3148508/big-spending-csl-giants-guangzhou-evergrande-seek-government-aid">Evergrande Group</a>, a massive real estate company, took over the Guangzhou Football Club in 2010, numerous companies entered the football market and <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-super-league-transfer-window-spending-2016-2">spent lavishly</a> on internationally renowned players.</p>
<p>This renewed enthusiasm was believed to be fuelled by the eagerness of local governments and businesses to align with Xi’s personal interest in the sport and his aspirations for the advancement of Chinese football. </p>
<p>In 2015, a key agenda-setting commission in the Communist Party sanctioned a central reform plan to boost the development of football in China. This approval underscored the belief that the “Chinese dream” of achieving the <a href="http://www.china.com.cn/opinion/theory/2015-02/28/content_34912052.htm">great rejuvenation of the nation</a> was closely tied to the development of football.</p>
<p>This new government attention on football encouraged financial investment (again) to revitalise the Chinese football industry, resulting in a significant surge in salaries and benefits for players. </p>
<p>In 2018, the average annual income for men’s football players reached more than <a href="https://www.scmp.com/sport/football/article/3032839/chinese-super-leagues-millionaires-live-it-while-league-two-players">US$1 million per year</a> (A$1.5 million), exceeding the average wage in China by more than <a href="https://www.scmp.com/sport/football/article/3032839/chinese-super-leagues-millionaires-live-it-while-league-two-players">160 times</a>.</p>
<p>While the professional league’s revival didn’t immediately elevate the men’s national team’s performance, it improved the perception of the sport among parents. In 2016, the number of registered youth players under the CFA surged to more than <a href="https://www.codoon.com/iec/article/UQdNBVU9Mi8=">40,000</a>. The organisation <a href="http://images.sport.org.cn/File/2017/03/24/1514562403.pdf">set a target</a> of reaching one million young players by 2020.</p>
<p>However, this prosperity, rooted in political opportunism, proved to be delicate and unsustainable. The economic downturn in China, the introduction of <a href="https://www.thestar.com/sports/soccer/china-to-impose-100-tax-on-overseas-football-transfers/article_15c080f3-fbe0-5550-a309-3fd3e9b76194.html">transfer cap</a>, the COVID pandemic and the CFA’s decision to <a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202012/07/WS5fcd9917a31024ad0ba9a438.html">remove corporate references from club names</a> significantly subdued investors’ enthusiasm for football.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/will-the-evergrande-crisis-doom-chinas-grandiose-big-spending-football-dreams-169830">Will the Evergrande crisis doom China's grandiose, big-spending football dreams?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Consequently, the Chinese professional league once again faces intractable obstacles. Since 2020, professional clubs have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-the-evergrande-crisis-doom-chinas-grandiose-big-spending-football-dreams-169830">disbanding annually</a> as investors have withdrawn their funding. The former CFA chairman, Chen Xuyuan, has been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/sports/former-chairman-chinese-football-association-charged-with-bribery-state-tv-2023-09-26/">charged with bribery</a>, while former national team coach Li Tie has <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/sport/china-football-coach-li-tie-paid-bribes-confession-job-4037346#:%7E:text=Li%20Tie%2C%20a%20former%20Everton,serious%20violations%20of%20the%20law%22.">admitted</a> to paying bribes and match-fixing.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1751777625507561653"}"></div></p>
<p>All of this will only further undermine the public’s confidence in Chinese football. Parents are again questioning whether to encourage their children to play the sport. There are many signs that youth participation has <a href="https://www.wutiyu.com/zuqiu/zqss/11376.html">declined</a> sharply over the past three years.</p>
<p>Chinese football authorities should know now what doesn’t work. The marketisation of football and rampant financial investment driven by political opportunism didn’t work. Flooding the league with foreign stars didn’t work, either. </p>
<p>Perhaps it’s time for the state to take a more prominent role again, possibly even revisiting the “whole-nation system”. Transforming football into a stable and visible career pathway could, at the very least, inspire more Chinese youth to actively engage in the sport. </p>
<p>And this, in turn, could one day create a winning men’s national team, as well.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221987/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Chinese football has been through many ups and downs over the past three decades. Is a return to a top-down government approach the right answer?Ye Xue, Research Fellow, International Relations, China Institute, University of AlbertaMinran Liu, Lecturer in International Relations, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2204502024-01-10T18:30:35Z2024-01-10T18:30:35ZWhy domestic politics will prevent a thaw in China-Canada tensions in 2024<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/why-domestic-politics-will-prevent-a-thaw-in-china-canada-tensions-in-2024" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>China-Canada relations appear caught in a well-charted downward spiral in recent years amid tensions on various fronts that encompass human rights concerns, cybersecurity issues and, of course, disputes related to the arrests of Meng Wanzhou and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/11/21/from-friends-to-foes-the-canadian-tale-of-two-michaels-accused-of-spying-in-china_6275957_4.html">the “two Michaels.”</a> </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/meng-for-the-two-michaels-lessons-for-the-world-from-the-china-canada-prisoner-swap-168737">Meng for the two Michaels: Lessons for the world from the China-Canada prisoner swap</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/canada-expels-chinese-diplomat-accused-targeting-lawmaker-2023-05-08/">Expelling each other’s diplomats in May 2023</a> further strained already deteriorating relations. </p>
<p>As both countries faced numerous challenges in domestic and international affairs, Beijing and Ottawa, coincidentally, sent signals of <a href="https://english.news.cn/20230527/aa62e479292646fc9f95916d2dbc3958/c.html">what’s known as “de-risking”</a> their foreign policy later in 2023.</p>
<p>China was apparently intent to ease tensions with its key trading partners. This was evident in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/nov/07/anthony-albanese-china-trip-is-historic-but-for-canberra-not-for-beijing">Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to Beijing</a>, and President Xi Jinping’s meeting with United States President Joe Biden and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/japan-pm-kishida-hold-talks-with-chinas-xi-nov-16-nikkei-2023-11-16/">Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida</a> during the APEC Summit in San Francisco.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-joe-bidens-meeting-with-xi-jinping-means-for-geopolitical-tensions-217754">What Joe Biden's meeting with Xi Jinping means for geopolitical tensions</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Chinese, Canadian woes</h2>
<p>Domestic socioeconomic issues have largely fuelled China’s recent diplomatic activism. A lack of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/11/business/china-consumer-spending.html">consumer and capital market confidence</a> in China’s <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/09/china-investors-will-be-asking-these-3-questions-in-2024.html">economic outlook</a> has slowed its economy, causing <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/root-chinas-growing-youth-unemployment-crisis">high unemployment</a> as well as a series of social problems that have put pressure on the government.</p>
<p>For Canada, meantime, diplomatic achievements in 2023 were few and far between. Apart from increasingly tumultuous relations with China, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/25/india-canada-rift-trudeau-modi-sikh-separatists-diplomats/">Canada and India</a> are also embroiled in a significant diplomatic crisis. It’s not ideal for Ottawa to find itself at odds with Asia’s two great powers.</p>
<p>That’s likely why Ottawa is also attempting to chart a new path for Canada’s international engagement. In October 2023, Foreign Affairs Minister <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2023/11/address-by-minister-joly-on-canadian-diplomacy-amidst-geopolitical-uncertainty.html">Mélanie Joly</a> provided details about Canada’s goal to practise “pragmatic diplomacy, to engage countries of different perspectives in order to prevent an international conflict.” </p>
<p>But even though both countries are now embracing more pro-active foreign policy, it’s unlikely there will be a noticeable détente between China and Canada in 2024. </p>
<h2>Canada isn’t Beijing’s priority</h2>
<p>In a recent article in <em>Ottawa Life</em> magazine, Chinese Ambassador <a href="https://www.ottawalife.com/article/jointly-build-a-community-with-a-shared-future-for-mankind/">Cong Peiwu</a> wrote:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“For the road ahead, it is hoped that Canada will work in the same direction with China, uphold the principle of mutual respect, seeking common ground while shelving differences, and win-win co-operation, to bring our bilateral relationship back on track at an early date.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, Beijing’s aspirations may prove challenging.</p>
<p>Canada’s insubstantial position on China’s strategic chessboard means Beijing isn’t likely to either prioritize the Canadian-Chinese relationship or have a dedicated strategy to achieve a bilateral détente. </p>
<p>China classifies the major targets of its diplomacy into <a href="http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0912/c40531-31350174.html">four categories</a>: great powers, neighbouring states, developing countries and multilateral platforms. However, as a traditional western middle power, Canada doesn’t fit into any of these categories. </p>
<p>China <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/fundamental-misunderstandings-in-the-australia-china-relationship/">has developed partnerships</a> with other nations that range from friendly and co-operative to comprehensive strategic ties at a higher level, depending on the level of importance Beijing attaches to that specific state. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canada-and-china-sign-strategic-partnership-discuss-human-rights-1.546781">China and Canada established a strategic partnership in 2005</a>, a relationship that ranks lower than the “comprehensive strategic partnerships” China has with western countries like the United Kingdom, Australia, France and Germany.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1721406168218693704"}"></div></p>
<p><a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/economist-economiste/analysis-analyse/china-canada-2020-commerce-chine.aspx?lang=eng">Canada is also ranked only 18th on China’s list of top trade partners</a>, which also stops Beijing from expending more diplomatic resources to solve its dispute with Ottawa. </p>
<p>That means that even though China may talk about repairing relations with Canada, it’s unlikely to have a dedicated plan to do so. Instead, China’s policies on Canada will likely depend on Canada’s attitude towards Chinese priorities. In particular, Canada’s approach to Indo-Pacific regional affairs in 2024 could significantly influence the Canada-China relationship.</p>
<h2>On the horizon</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/taiwan-prepares-for-contentious-presidential-election/7430650.html">A victory in Taiwan by its ruling party, DPP, in the country’s upcoming presidential election</a> will undoubtedly heighten tensions with China, potentially leading to an increase in economic and military pressure against the Taiwanese.</p>
<p><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/01/navigating-south-china-sea-security-in-2024/">The South China Sea</a> remains a significant flashpoint in the region and will probably be the site of sustained tensions between China and other countries, including the U.S. and its allies. </p>
<p>Since Canada regards itself as a <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique/index.aspx?lang=eng">stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific region</a>, its support of the liberal rules-based regional order inevitably puts it at odds with China’s claims in the region, which could deepen Chinese distrust of Canada in 2024.</p>
<p>While Canada’s lack of engagement with China makes it an outlier among western nations, Canadian domestic politics provides little incentive for the government to improve its relations with China. </p>
<p>Canadians currently have a negative view of China, with a <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/07/27/chinas-approach-to-foreign-policy-gets-largely-negative-reviews-in-24-country-survey/">Pew Research poll</a> conducted last summer indicating only 14 per cent have a favourable opinion of China. Much of this negativity is the result of <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/real-concerns-around-foreign-interference-impeding-improvement-of-canada-china-relations-trudeau-1.6551196">several foreign interference scandals involving China</a>.</p>
<p>The Liberal Party and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau have had a difficult time on the China file. Accusations of <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-china-foreign-interference-canada-guide/">ignored intelligence reports</a> and concerns over <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-foundation-donation-fournier-1.6825761">financial connections</a> to China have led the government to continually backtrack on engagement with the Chinese. <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cbc-ca-news-politics-appeals-rejected-hogue-1.7068082">Public hearings into election interference are beginning soon</a>.</p>
<p>In 2024, the Liberals face an unstable supply-and-confidence agreement with the NDP and the opposition Conservatives are polling well ahead of them. The Conservatives <a href="https://www.conservative.ca/minister-guilbeaults-baffling-trip-to-beijing/">even criticized the Liberals</a> for sending the federal environment minister to China last year.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/will-the-supply-and-confidence-deal-between-the-liberals-and-ndp-survive-in-2024-219478">Will the supply-and-confidence deal between the Liberals and NDP survive in 2024?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Trade numbers remain strong</h2>
<p>Poor relations have yet to significantly impact recent trade between Canada and China. There were record bilateral trade numbers <a href="https://www.ualberta.ca/china-institute/research/analysis-briefs/2023/2022-yearinreview.html">in 2022</a>, and while data for 2023 indicates a <a href="https://www.ualberta.ca/china-institute/research/analysis-briefs/2023/2023-q2.html">reduction in imports</a>, exports are up. </p>
<p>As long as exports to China continue unimpeded, the Liberals have minimal incentive to re-engage with the Chinese. A lack of engagement won’t improve the relationship, but it also avoids the chance of another diplomatic spat that could put key export industries at risk. </p>
<p>While China is Canada’s second-largest trading partner, it only represents 3.9 per cent of exports and 11.9 per cent of imports, according to the most <a href="https://www.ic.gc.ca/app/scr/tdst/tdo/crtr.html?grouped=GROUPED&searchType=All&areaCodes=553&naArea=9999&countryList=specific&toFromCountry=CDN&reportType=TB&timePeriod=2%7CYear+To+Date&currency=CDN&productType=NAICS&runReport=true">recent data</a>. That means outside of key export industries, concerns about China likely outweigh the trade benefits in the eyes of many Canadians.</p>
<p>Even Canadians who buy Chinese imports, like cellphones and computers, are probably willing to get them from somewhere else. China is therefore low on the federal government’s priority list. </p>
<p>A shift in Canadian public opinion about China is likely a prerequisite for re-engagement by both current and future governments. This shift in opinion can’t happen overnight and must be genuine; otherwise the government will look soft on China to wary Canadian citizens. </p>
<p>With the foreign interference inquiry soon to begin featuring public testimony in the weeks ahead, China may feature prominently in the Canadian news cycle in 2024 — meaning a genuine thaw in Canada-China relations isn’t yet in the cards.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220450/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With a public inquiry into Chinese interference about to begin, China may feature prominently in the Canadian news cycle in 2024 — meaning a genuine thaw in Canada-China relations isn’t in the cards.Ye Xue, Research Fellow, International Relations, China Institute, University of AlbertaKarel Brandenbarg, Policy Researcher, Political Science, China Institute, University of AlbertaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2206852024-01-09T17:02:27Z2024-01-09T17:02:27ZChina: Xi’s new year’s address wasn’t a threat against Taiwan – it was a strategic move for legitimacy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568260/original/file-20240108-19-vqrmp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3738%2C2678&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/moscow-russia-march-23-chinese-president-132906761">Kaliva/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In his <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202312/t20231231_11215608.html">new year address</a>, Chinese president Xi Jinping claimed that Taiwan would “surely be reunified” with China. Against the backdrop of increased Chinese military posturing in the Taiwan Strait, some western journalists are framing Xi’s remarks as an <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fc1dfe48-a390-48c3-b27c-7e405978c166">overt and direct threat against Taiwan</a>. They argue that Xi’s rhetoric validates concerns about a potential invasion.</p>
<p>This framing misses the point and overlooks the domestic political context of Xi’s speech. Xi also celebrated the successes of the Chinese nation and economy, while acknowledging the economic struggles of the Chinese people. Rather than threatening Taiwan, this rhetoric is intended to protect Xi’s regime.</p>
<p>Western governments draw their legitimacy from a popular mandate, which is established through elections. The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to govern China is also premised on a mandate. But instead of through elections, this mandate is established through the party’s record on ensuring continued economic prosperity and national success.</p>
<p>In this context, Xi’s emphasis on economic growth and the nation should be considered performative – an example of political theatre portraying the CCP in a carefully curated way for a Chinese audience.</p>
<p>Following the Cultural Revolution (which had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion">disastrous consequences</a> for China’s people and economy) and Mao’s death in 1976, the CCP re-established its legitimacy on <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/chinas-new-remembering-of-the-antijapanese-war-of-resistance-19371945/84F3184AF89EBA79F54561774379EAC6">twin pillars of economic prosperity and nationalism</a>. </p>
<p>Former leader Deng Xiaoping secured the economic pillar in the 1980s through reforms that <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview">raised 800 million people out of poverty</a>. The nationalist pillar involved retelling Chinese history. The regime emphasised historical achievements, commemorated national struggles and portrayed the CCP as the vanguard of the Chinese nation. </p>
<p>Under Mao, Japan’s invasion of China in the second Sino-Japanese war (the Chinese theatre of the second world war) was presented as an ideological class struggle. According to this narrative, both Chinese and Japanese workers were exploited by militaristic bourgeois elites. Nowadays, China’s nationalist narrative presents Japan as a foreign oppressor that China heroically resisted and overcame under the CCP’s leadership.</p>
<p>Such narratives of Chinese history have resulted in a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2004.44.2.276">contemporary Chinese nationalism</a> sensitive to what it considers renewed victimisation of the Chinese nation. This includes international opposition to reunification with Taiwan, a historic province of China.</p>
<h2>Relying on nationalism</h2>
<p>As China’s economy slows, the CCP has become increasingly reliant on the nationalist pillar to retain its legitimacy. This limits the CCP’s options in nationalistic disputes as it must act in such a way that upholds its nationalist credentials. </p>
<p>In 2005, China saw large anti-Japanese protests triggered by Japan’s downplaying of the atrocities it committed during its invasion of China. Within the context of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN">11.4% economic growth</a>, the CCP shut down public transport to block protesters from arriving in the largest cities and officials condemned the protests.</p>
<p>But, by 2012, China’s <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN">economic growth had slowed to 7.9%</a>. And the CCP was notably silent during similarly large anti-Japanese protests over the Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China) – a <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/98119">territorial dispute in the East China Sea</a> associated with the second Sino-Japanese war.</p>
<p>China’s nationalist movement <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-japan-politics-idUSBRE88I0AU20120919/">criticised the CCP</a> for being too soft on Japan, prompting then vice-president Xi to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/19/china-japan-senkaku-diaoyu-islands">publicly renounce</a> Japan’s territorial claim. This constitutes a performative acquiescence to nationalist pressure, with Xi acting to secure the nationalist pillar while the economic pillar faltered.</p>
<h2>Understanding Xi’s performance</h2>
<p>Xi’s mention of national reunification with Taiwan in his new year address is in keeping with the CCP’s increased reliance on nationalism to secure legitimacy as China’s economy slows.</p>
<p>This can also explain China’s posturing in the Taiwan Strait. China experienced <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN">3% economic growth in 2022</a>, the lowest growth rate since Deng’s reforms (excluding the height of the COVID pandemic). So to deflect scrutiny, the CCP is intensifying its embrace of brinkmanship in the Taiwan Strait.</p>
<p>Ultimately, this brinkmanship is unlikely to culminate in a war considering how an invasion could backfire on the CCP. In the event of an unsuccessful invasion, the CCP would suffer significant damage to its reputation. Even a successful but <a href="https://theconversation.com/taiwan-how-the-porcupine-doctrine-might-help-deter-armed-conflict-with-china-169488">prolonged conflict with heavy losses</a> would have a similar effect.</p>
<p>Either way, the near-certain economic consequences, such as sanctions and embargoes, would topple the party’s economic pillar.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/taiwan-how-the-porcupine-doctrine-might-help-deter-armed-conflict-with-china-169488">Taiwan: how the 'porcupine doctrine' might help deter armed conflict with China</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Acknowledging economic shortcomings</h2>
<p>More interesting than Xi’s talk of reunification is his admission of the economic struggles of the Chinese people. In his address, Xi explained that “some people had difficulty finding jobs and meeting basic needs”. </p>
<p>There is very little precedent for acknowledging the shortcomings of the CCP’s delivery of economic prosperity. Doing so contradicts the economic pillar. It is particularly odd given that the CCP has recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/29/china-cracks-down-on-negativity-over-economy-in-bid-to-boost-confidence">suppressed negative commentaries</a> on China’s economy to avoid damaging public confidence in its economic stewardship.</p>
<p>As brinkmanship in the Taiwan Strait reaches its limits, it seems the CCP is shifting away from an over-dependence on the nationalist pillar. Instead, it may be pursuing a less immediately risky strategy, acknowledging current economic issues while emphasising the potential for economic growth under the CCP. This approach would be a safer way to maintain the party’s legitimacy than escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait.</p>
<p>Xi’s speech indicates a changing nuance in CCP discourse – one that may become increasingly apparent over the course of the coming year.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220685/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lewis Eves does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Xi’s New Year address wasn’t about threatening Taiwan – there’s more going on than we think.Lewis Eves, Teaching Associate in Politics and International Relations, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2203092024-01-02T16:50:02Z2024-01-02T16:50:02ZWhy David Cameron’s past and present relations with China could be Rishi Sunak’s first big political headache of 2024<p>Almost immediately after being appointed as foreign secretary, David Cameron’s ties with China generated difficult headlines for Rishi Sunak’s government. </p>
<p>Cameron’s warmth towards China during his own time as prime minister prompted Luke de Pulford, the director of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, to argue that Sunak had scored an own goal in appointing him. </p>
<p>Cameron’s time in office has been described as a “golden era” for UK-China relations. But now, in a very different political climate, de Pulford has accused the new foreign secretary of “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/nov/15/concerns-as-china-welcomes-david-camerons-return-as-foreign-secretary">shilling for the UK’s biggest security threat</a>”. Catherine West, Labour’s shadow minister for Asia and the Pacific, has also said Cameron has questions to answer over what role he has played since leaving office in a Chinese <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/david-cameron-uk-faces-fresh-scrutiny-over-chinese-built-sri-lankan-city/">infrastructure project in Sri Lanka</a>.</p>
<p>Cameron’s position on China during his tenure as prime minister evolved from ambivalence to active embrace. Looking back, 2015-16 in particular was an active period in UK-China relations. A state visit by President Xi Jinping in 2015 not only provided Cameron with a chance to take him to his <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O0aLemrUtSo">local pub</a> but gave a clear signal of just how valued China was as a partner for the UK.</p>
<p>The implications of this for the UK now, in an era of considerably cooled relations, will be complex for the government and others to navigate. As foreign secretary, Cameron is in a position of considerable formal power when it comes to foreign policy, yet his party takes a very different view on China than it did during his time in office. </p>
<p>Sunak has leant into that position, for example, by removing China’s role in the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a9a34ea3-649f-4a47-a4c8-ee269e07eccc">Sizewell C nuclear power station</a>, which is to be constructed in Suffolk. </p>
<h2>The ups and downs of UK-China relations</h2>
<p>When the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition came to power in 2010, its opening offer on foreign policy, the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a78da21ed915d0422065d95/strategic-defence-security-review.pdf">strategic defence and security review</a>, and <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-national-security-strategy-a-strong-britain-in-an-age-of-uncertainty">national security strategy</a>, did not spend all that much time dwelling on China. The policies merely noted China’s continuing economic rise and argued that the UK should engage with it to resolve common problems. </p>
<p>China was bundled into a broad, rather vague category of “rising powers” that the UK would aim to engage with more closely. It was important, but not so important as to warrant its own category.</p>
<p>This “bundling in” may also go some way to explain the first seminal moment of Cameron’s relationship with China – <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-18084223">his 2012 meeting with the Dalai Lama</a> in London. </p>
<p>By hosting the Tibetan leader, Cameron triggered great upset in Beijing, which placed relations with the UK in a “deep freeze” for nearly 18 months. Cameron would ultimately relent, shifting his position on Tibet to more closely align with Beijing’s. He publicly rejected the idea of Tibetan independence and <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2013-05-08/debates/13050835000003/DebateOnTheAddress?highlight=chinese%20government%20aware%20policy%20tibet%20recognise%20tibet%20part%20china%20not%20support%20tibetan%20independence%20respect%20china%27s%20sovereignty">acknowledged China’s sovereignty</a>.</p>
<h2>Warming up</h2>
<p>By November 2013, relations between China and the UK had opened up again and a rapid convergence between the two countries was in evidence. This peaked in the autumn of 2015 when Xi made his state visit to the UK. </p>
<p>At a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/joint-press-conference-david-cameron-and-president-xi-jinping">joint press conference</a>, Cameron declared that China and the UK shared strong economic, diplomatic, and “people-to-people” links. He advocated for deeper cooperation on areas such as health, climate change and extremism and opened formal ties with China on infrastructure spending. He declared that the UK and China “share an interest in a stable and ordered rule” in international affairs.</p>
<p>Within a month, the Cameron government had published an <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-and-strategic-defence-and-security-review-2015">updated strategic defence review</a>, which was much more expansive than the 2010 document had been on UK-China relations. It declared that it was the government’s “ambition for the UK to be China’s leading partner in the West”. </p>
<p>This would be achieved through a close economic relationship in particular, but also deeper diplomatic and security ties between the two countries. </p>
<h2>Cooling down</h2>
<p>Ultimately, this developing relationship would be derailed by the EU referendum of June 2016, and Cameron’s exit from office. Subsequent governments led by Theresa May and Boris Johnson were focused on handling Brexit, but were also seemingly more sceptical of relations with China than Cameron had been.</p>
<p>Several issues, including the question of democracy in Hong Kong, human rights abuses in Xinjiang, and Chinese espionage activity in the UK, have caused Conservative MPs to increasingly embrace a hawkish perspective on China. While Liz Truss was more clearly China-sceptic than Sunak, none of the prime ministers who have followed Cameron in office have been close to his level of dovishness on the topic.</p>
<p>The risks to the UK government, then, are twofold. Cameron’s ties with China have the potential to aggravate tensions with backbench MPs who are already restive. His party is currently divided over any number of other issues and primed to fall out over any number of others. The possibility of a dispute over the new foreign secretary’s position on China adding further inflaming tensions in the Conservative party are high.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, a noticeable gap in intentions between senior members of the government risks sending confusing signals to China. This is a problem for slower burning issues such as the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/19427786211045404">debt burden</a> being incurred by countries that have accepted Chinese investment via the belt and road initiative. </p>
<p>Cameron’s own advocacy for projects in countries like Sri Lanka, now dealing with the legacy of the initiative, may muddle messages. There is also the possibility of confusing messaging if a major crisis erupts – over the upcoming Taiwanese election, for example. </p>
<p>Beijing may now expect a softer approach where none is on offer. Cameron may appear to signal a less assertive response to a crisis where it was not intended. Miscalculation is always a risk in international crises and if Beijing perceives its western backers as internally divided, it may seek to capitalise for its own geopolitical gain. </p>
<p>Together, then, the legacy of Cameron’s relationship with China in office poses significant risks for both the Conservative Party, and for UK-China relations. Navigating these risks will be a challenge for all concerned. </p>
<p>For his part, greater clarity from Cameron on what he thinks UK-China relations should look like may provide some breathing space – but that may also simply serve to highlight these divisions. Ultimately, it will be up to Cameron’s current boss, Rishi Sunak, to try and resolve these tensions – ideally, before a major crisis breaks.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220309/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy Oliver does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The foreign secretary wanted to embrace Beijing when he was prime minister but times have changed.Timothy Oliver, Lecturer in British Politics and Public Policy, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2187212023-12-12T19:17:01Z2023-12-12T19:17:01ZChina-Africa relations in 2023: key moments and events to remember<p>In a year when headlines have been dominated by conflict in Europe and the Middle East, and geo-economic tensions between China and the West, China-Africa relations were, in comparison, a steady and stable norm. </p>
<p>Having followed China-Africa relations for two decades, I wanted to flag a few key moments from this year. These reveal that the relations between China and the continent have focused on building momentum and deepening ties, especially when it comes to trade and the promotion of African exports. </p>
<p>They also highlight China’s growing commitment to supporting the development of African countries. </p>
<h2>China-Africa trade and the expo</h2>
<p>In June, the third <a href="https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/326222.html">China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo</a> was held in Changsha, Hunan province. </p>
<p>It’s the most intensive China-Africa trade event in the calendar because of its scale and focus. It’s also a chance for small and medium enterprises to be involved. </p>
<p>This year’s expo <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3226366/deals-down-hunans-china-africa-trade-expo-reaps-us10-billion">reportedly recorded</a> some 100,000 visitors and agreed some 120 projects worth a total of US$10.3 billion.</p>
<p>The expo allows face-to-face interaction to happen in the hope of developing commercial partnerships and sales. There were deals <a href="http://www.focac.org/zfzs/202306/t20230630_11106280.htm">around essential oils from Madagascar, gems from Zambia, wood carvings from Zimbabwe</a>, and flowers from Kenya. One Chinese food group <a href="https://english.news.cn/20230627/9efd6c4d936b415598b0632ce4e6d2b4/c.html">displayed</a> its first imported batch of Kenyan anchovies to seafood distributors. This helped catapult demand – on one day in September, <a href="http://www.news.cn/fortune/2023-09/07/c_1129848863.htm">52 tons</a> of dried wild Kenyan anchovies landed in Hunan for distribution across China.</p>
<p>There were a few important take-aways from the event: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>It flagged the emerging role of <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-africa-strategy-is-shifting-from-extraction-to-investment-driven-from-the-industry-rich-hunan-region-209044">Hunan</a> in China-Africa relations. Hunan is the source of a sizeable share of China’s own food supply. It’s also home to advanced agricultural processing and heavy industry capabilities. </p></li>
<li><p>There were high-level <a href="https://venturesafrica.com/a-slice-of-opportunity-benin-joins-chinas-fruit-export-market/">“green lanes” dialogues</a> where issues in clearing more African fruits, vegetables, and other African products for export to China were discussed. The aim of these dialogues was to support agricultural modernisation in Africa and increase export revenue. </p></li>
<li><p>The emerging Hunan-based <a href="http://www.enghunan.gov.cn/hneng/Government/Bulletin/202306/t20230608_29370776.html">“Africa Brand Warehouse”</a> project used the event to support the entry of more (106 specificially) African brands into major Chinese shopping malls</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The China-Africa Leaders’ Dialogue</h2>
<p>In August President Xi Jinping visited South Africa for a <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/">summit</a> of the five-country bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), Brics. </p>
<p>Parallel to the Brics summit the <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/south-africa-co-chair-china-africa-leaders-round-table-dialogue">China-Africa Leaders’ Dialogue</a> – a dialogue initiated by China and co-chaired by Presidents Xi and Cyril Ramaphosa – was held. </p>
<p>A couple of things stood out from the dialogue.</p>
<p>First, its emphasis on promoting <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/south-africa-co-chair-china-africa-leaders-round-table-dialogue">African integration</a> and <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/south-africa-co-chair-china-africa-leaders-round-table-dialogue">the participation</a> of African regional organisations that play key roles in fostering intra-African trade. Discussions focused on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and trade-related infrastructure and policy.</p>
<p>Second, Xi <a href="https://www.kzaobao.com/shiju/20230826/145524.html">announced</a> three new plans for Africa relating to agriculture, industrialisation and talent development. The plans aim to address challenges in China-Africa economic relations, such as laggard agricultural productivity, lack of manufacturing and economic diversification, insufficient job creation and educational opportunities. They also aim to address hurdles in Africa’s development. </p>
<p>These actions speak to Xi’s <a href="https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/735319/the-gravity-of-chinas-african-export-promise">promise</a> to create a “new type of China-Africa strategic partnership”. </p>
<p>This involved the growth of trade, especially with respect to African exports to China. </p>
<p>It would also see a change in the structure of trade. A long-standing <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/twec.12229">pattern</a> is that Africa sells raw materials and buys manufactured goods, which entrenches the continent’s under-development. China is trying to move past this by buying more processed goods, and fostering services like tourism and finance. </p>
<h2>China’s foreign minister comes to Africa</h2>
<p>As has happened every year for at least the past 30 years, China’s foreign minister visited Africa. Qin Gang’s trip in January included visits to Ethiopia, Gabon, Angola, Benin and Egypt.</p>
<p>From my lens, Qin’s visit was conservative in its announcements and continued to demonstrate China’s commitment to the continent. </p>
<p>He cemented important bilateral and multilateral ties, for instance with the African Union and China-Arab relations. </p>
<p>One moment that stood out was the launch of the Horn of Africa Peaceful Development Concept, which aims to bring lasting peace and economic stability to countries of the conflict-afflicted region. This stands out because China has a
<a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2023/05/11/what-to-make-of-chinas-non-interference-policy-in-africa/">long-held foreign policy doctrine of non-interference</a>, and a much shorter history of US or European-style proactive roles in seeking to foster cross-country peace.</p>
<h2>Infrastructure changes around Lagos</h2>
<p>Various infrastructural developments around Lagos, Nigeria were a milestone in China-Africa relations this year. These will gradually change the scale with which Nigeria can trade with the world. </p>
<p>In April, Lekki Deep Sea Port – Nigeria’s first deep sea port – launched its commercial operations. It’s <a href="https://lekkiport.com/project-overview-structure/">administered</a> by Lekki Port LFTZ Enterprise Limited, a joint venture enterprise owned by a group of investors (comprising China Harbour Engineering Company Ltd and Singapore’s Tolaram Group), the Lagos state government and the federal government of Nigeria through the Nigerian Ports Authority.</p>
<p>The port, one of the largest in Africa, will eventually connect to Lagos’ Rail Mass Transit system. <a href="https://africa.cgtn.com/lagos-set-to-increase-train-trips-on-chinese-built-metro-rail/">The first phase of the rail system, the Blue Line, was opened in September</a>. </p>
<p>The Blue Line was <a href="https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/00L77SUF.html">built by</a> China’s Civil Engineering and Construction Corporation. Its corridor spans 13km and covers five stations. It’s the first rail infrastructure traversing Okokomaiko, a densely populated area of western Lagos, and the Marina district, notable for high-rise commercial offices. </p>
<h2>Into 2024</h2>
<p>Relations look set to keep evolving and growing into the new year. </p>
<p>Later in the year, a Forum on China-Africa Cooperation summit is due to be hosted by China. Typically the forum leads to announcements of new directions in China-Africa ties by both sides, and commercial deals being agreed. </p>
<p>Otherwise, there are some key bilateral anniversaries to be marked, such as the 60th anniversary of China-Tanzania and China-Zambia relations. In addition, China and Tanzania are expected to launch the flagship <a href="https://dailynews.co.tz/tz-sees-investment-fortunes/#google_vignette">East Africa Commercial and Logistics Centre project</a>. This is expected to expand trade and investment ties between China and other landlocked economies within the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218721/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lauren Johnston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Several key events highlighted the growing ties between China and Africa.Lauren Johnston, Associate Professor, China Studies Centre, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2183032023-12-06T18:31:45Z2023-12-06T18:31:45ZThe Sunnylands Statement sets a positive signal: World leaders gathered for COP28 must build off of it<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/the-sunnylands-statement-sets-a-positive-signal-world-leaders-gathered-for-cop28-must-build-off-of-it" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>In a politically turbulent world, it is rare to witness major global actors set aside their disagreements to address the existential threats posed by climate change. On Nov. 14, the United States and China did just this by issuing the <a href="https://www.state.gov/sunnylands-statement-on-enhancing-cooperation-to-address-the-climate-crisis/">Sunnylands Statement on Enhancing Cooperation to Address the Climate Crisis.</a> </p>
<p>Issued prior to the pivotal Biden-Xi meeting on Nov. 15 at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in San Francisco, the statement not only establishes a spirit of co-operation but also sustains the progress made in recent climate dialogues between <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/271748/the-largest-emitters-of-co2-in-the-world/">the world’s two largest greenhouse gases (GHG) emitters</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-renewed-china-us-cooperation-bodes-well-for-climate-action-218394">Why renewed China-US cooperation bodes well for climate action</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Climate organizations and analysts <a href="https://www.csis.org/podcasts/audio-briefs/what-sunnylands-statement-means-us-china-climate-cooperation-audio-brief">have welcomed the statement</a>. <em>China Dialogue</em> stated that it shows that even with <a href="https://chinadialogue.net/en/climate/wind-in-the-sails-us-china-climate-agreement-can-boost-global-action/">their complex relationship, both nations are committed to prioritizing climate issues</a>. While the Asia Society Policy Institute characterized <a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/analysis-us-china-sunnylands-statement">the bilateral alignment of the statement as an “insurance” to the ongoing 28th United Nations Climate Change Conference</a> (COP28).</p>
<p>As a scholar closely monitoring <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-chinas-plans-to-decarbonize-its-economy-mean-for-canadas-energy-exports-172349">the global implications of China’s climate policy</a>, the statement is particularly intriguing for how it describes China’s approach to energy transition. China’s determination to “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/14/climate/us-china-climate-agreement.html">ramp up renewable energy with the goal of displacing fossil fuels</a>” should be taken seriously by Canadian, and global, policymakers when planning energy futures.</p>
<h2>Accelerating renewable energy transition</h2>
<p>There are <a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/analysis-us-china-sunnylands-statement">two significant developments within the statement which are worth highlighting</a>. The first is China’s commitment to setting comprehensive climate targets by 2035 that encompass all greenhouse gases (GHG) and the second is its unprecedented consideration of absolute emission reductions in its (<a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/02/1160441919/china-is-building-six-times-more-new-coal-plants-than-other-countries-report-fin">primarily coal-fuelled</a>) power sector within this decade. </p>
<p>Such policy language is crucial for figuring out <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-16-november-sunnylands-statement-china-methane-plan-coal-capacity-payments/">China’s future energy import prospects</a>.</p>
<p>The Sunnylands Statement indicates that the U.S. and China recognize climate change mitigation as one of the limited domains in which <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/14/climate/us-china-climate-agreement.html">they appear willing to cultivate stability in their bilateral relations</a>. This isn’t entirely surprising, given <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/china-invests-546-billion-in-clean-energy-far-surpassing-the-u-s/">the rapid transition towards renewable energy sources</a> that both countries have undertaken. This trend gained momentum during the pandemic and is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2021.118205">anticipated to continue as their economic activities recover, and become more dependent upon renewable energy</a>.</p>
<p>This has been confirmed by BloombergNEF’s <a href="https://about.bnef.com/blog/new-study-clean-energy-transition-now-hard-wired-into-the-u-s-economy/">2023 Sustainable Energy in America Factbook</a>, which reported that in 2022, U.S. energy transition investments rose 11 per cent year-on-year to $141 billion — a clear indication that clean energy is now an integral part of the American economy. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, despite the present obstacles, estimations for China’s greenhouse gas emissions indicate <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-07283-4">a probability exceeding 80 per cent that the country will reach its carbon peak between 2021 and 2026</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cop28-how-7-policies-could-help-save-a-billion-lives-by-2100-212953">COP28: How 7 policies could help save a billion lives by 2100</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The journey towards decarbonization is not without obstacles. As highlighted in a recent review paper published by <em>Applied Energy</em>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2021.118205">about half of the announced economic stimulus plans worldwide continue to be dominated by fossil fuel investments</a>. In countries like Canada, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-023-01515-2">the allocation of subsidies to the oil and gas industry has generated public controversy</a>.</p>
<p>Beyond investments, fundamental changes in how people travel and work — borne of the pandemic — may lead to enduring long-term reductions in the use of fossil fuels for transportation. As evidenced by <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2304099120">a recent study published by <em>PNAS</em></a>, the growth in remote and hybrid work alone could reduce individual carbon footprints by as much as 58 per cent.</p>
<h2>All eyes on COP28</h2>
<p>The Sunnylands Statement, signifying the world’s two largest economies’ pledge to “<a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-16-november-sunnylands-statement-china-methane-plan-coal-capacity-payments/">pursue efforts to triple renewable energy capacity globally by 2030</a>,” can thus steer discussions at COP28 towards meaningful fossil fuel phase-out strategies. Yet, concerns emerge when we consider Canada’s lack of determination in phasing out its oil and gas industry.</p>
<p>Reports on <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/oilsands-executives-cop-28-carbon-capture-1.7044163">Canada’s fossil fuel industry’s role at COP28</a> have stoked fears of “greenwashing” over carbon capture proposals in Alberta. These proposals are intended to tackle GHG emissions during oil sands production but do not address the emissions from the consumption of fossil fuels.</p>
<p>This brings us to a crucial question looming over COP28: what does “net zero” actually entail? In her book <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/en-ca/products/2735-ending-fossil-fuels"><em>Ending Fossil Fuels</em></a>, environmental scholar Holly Jean Buck warns against a potentially perilous narrative that envisions a “cleaner fossil world” in which carbon storage and other forms of carbon capture continue to obscure the dominance of fossil fuels, thereby failing to address systemic problems caused by contemporary society’s addiction to carbon-intensive modes of economic growth. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/05/record-number-of-fossil-fuel-lobbyists-get-access-to-cop28-climate-talks">If the unprecedented numbers of lobbyists</a> — <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/04/cop28-president-says-no-science-for-fossil-fuel-phase-out-claim-was-misinterpreted">and perhaps even the COP28 president</a> — have their say in preventing firm policy language concerning the end of the expansion of fossil fuels then a <em>cleaner fossil-fuel world</em> is likely to become our future. A future we should all be wary of.</p>
<h2>Charting a new course</h2>
<p>Although the Sunnylands Statement is undoubtedly a step in the right direction, it must be accompanied by a focused dialogue on the true meaning of <em>net zero</em>. Will a country lean towards net zero achieved primarily by renewables, or one achieved by carbon capture and storage? </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cop28-why-we-need-to-break-our-addiction-to-combustion-218019">COP28: Why we need to break our addiction to combustion</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>How major economies (the U.S., China, Canada, etc.) approach these issues carries significant national and international consequences. The Sunnylands Statement paved the way for energy talks at COP28, and the world is eagerly watching such talks’ outcomes. </p>
<p>As said by the UN Secretary-General António Guterres, “<a href="https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2023-06-15/secretary-generals-press-conference-climate">The world is watching, and the planet can’t wait</a>.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218303/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sibo Chen receives funding from Toronto Metropolitan University and Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. He is affiliated with the International Environmental Communication Association.</span></em></p>The Sunnylands Statement has set a powerful signal for COP28, however, it also highlights that more must be done in Dubai to define what it means to achieve ‘net zero.’Sibo Chen, Assistant Professor, School of Professional Communication, Toronto Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2181152023-11-20T02:39:04Z2023-11-20T02:39:04ZView from The Hill: Albanese should come clean about what he did or didn’t say to Xi Jinping about sonar incident<p>The incident last Tuesday in which Australian sailors suffered minor injuries from sonar pulses from a Chinese destroyer couldn’t have come at a worse time for Anthony Albanese. </p>
<p>He’d just finished a very successful trip to Beijing. He was about to again meet President Xi Jinping at APEC in the United States late in the week. The incident was potentially serious in terms of unsettled a much improved relationship. </p>
<p>The HMAS Toowoomba’s sailors had been undertaking the harmless task of unravelling fishing nets from around the ship’s propellers. The vessel was in international waters inside Japan’s exclusive economic zone on its way to a port. It had been supporting United Nations sanctions against North Korea. </p>
<p>The Chinese destroyer had been warned about the divers, but acted anyway. </p>
<p>There were two issues for Albanese: whether to raise the matter with Xi (assuming the President didn’t bring it up) and whether to indicate publicly he had done so. </p>
<p>We don’t know whether he raised it, because his office and ministerial colleagues won’t answer this question. There has been no opportunity to question him since his return at the weekend. </p>
<p>It seems obvious he should have discussed the matter with Xi. He has repeated endlessly that “we will disagree when we must” with China. </p>
<p>Not to canvass the incident would be a cop-out from this formula. It would carry the message that Australia, having established more positive relations with China – to the great benefit of our trade – was now unwilling to be forthright because it did not want to risk setting things back. </p>
<p>The Australian government was careful not to announce the incident until after Albanese was on his way home. The timing was diplomatic. </p>
<p>Then-Acting Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles said in a statement on Saturday the government had expressed “serious concerns” to the Chinese government, and described the Chinese vessel’s conduct as “unsafe and unprofessional”. </p>
<p>If Albanese did raise the incident, why not say so? Again, only to avoid offending the Chinese and that’s unacceptable. </p>
<p>The government points to Marles’s statement and claims that meant the matter was dealt with at the appropriate level. </p>
<p>This might be convincing if it hadn’t been for the fact Albanese was actually meeting Xi. </p>
<p>The silence is also being defended on the basis of this being a private meeting. This won’t wash either. When the PM and President met in Beijing Albanese gave a very detailed read-out of the encounter, even down to the jokes. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1726382463315054685"}"></div></p>
<p>On Monday morning Albanese tweeted a picture showing he was back working with the team. Members of that team appearing in the media have been left intoning the unconvincing talking points. </p>
<p>Albanese should clarify whether he or not he talked about the incident – not just in the name of transparency but to demonstrate that the government’s China policy is as robust as he says. Not to mention that it would be of passing interest to know what the President said, if the matter was in fact one of the topics of their discussion. </p>
<h2>UPDATE Albanese says he’s ‘very concerned’ by incident but remains mum about Xi meeting</h2>
<p>The Prime Minister went on Sky on Monday afternoon to criticise the Chinese action but remained silent about whether it had been discussed in the Xi meeting.</p>
<p>He said the action by the Chinese ship was dangerous, unsafe and unprofessional, and one Australian sailor had been injured. It was a regrettable incident. He said this was one of those times when Australia disagreed with China; the event damaged the relationship.</p>
<p>Australia had raised its strong objections to China “very clearly, very directly, through all of the appropriate channels in all the forums that are available”. </p>
<p>But he declined to confirm or deny raising it with Xi, on the grounds he does not divulge private conversations that take place on the sidelines of a conference.</p>
<p>“We’ve raised it very clearly through all of the normal channels”. </p>
<p>“When I was in San Francisco, there was no bilateral meeting with President Xi where you give a readout […] I don’t talk about private meetings on the sidelines, discussions I have with any world leader. That’s how you keep communications open. But I can assure you that we raised these issues in the appropriate way and very clearly, unequivocally. And China – there’s no misunderstanding as to Australia’s view on this.” </p>
<p>Albanese said he always spoke up for Australia’s national interest. “I do so directly,” he said, stressing he did so respectfully, not talking about private conversations. </p>
<p>At a news conference while at APEC Albanese said of the meeting with Xi: “I reiterated to him that it was a very positive visit [to Beijing] that was well received in Australia. And I reiterated to him that the signal that the impediments to trade between our two nations were reducing and being removed, was received positively in Australia.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218115/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many are asking whether Prime Minister Anthony Albanese raised with Chinese President Xi Jinping that Australian sailors have been injured by sonar pulses from a Chinese destroyer.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2179782023-11-17T13:59:33Z2023-11-17T13:59:33ZDon’t be fooled by Biden and Xi talks − China and the US are enduring rivals rather than engaged partners<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560070/original/file-20231116-24-lu1i3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C7187%2C4474&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rolling out the red carpet for presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXAPECBidenXI/ad7b12a415724dab8637d4c538ea63af/photo?Query=Xi%20biden&mediaType=photo,video,graphic,audio&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=476&currentItemNo=1">Doug Mills/The New York Times via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>There were <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVnxZGcTXnQ">smiles for the camera, handshakes</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/16/china-praises-warm-xi-biden-meeting-in-change-of-rhetoric">warm words</a> and the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/15/politics/biden-xi-meeting/index.html">unveiling of a couple of agreements</a>.</p>
<p>But beyond the optics of the first meeting in over a year between the leaders of the world’s two biggest economies, not an awful lot had changed: There was nothing to suggest a “reset” in U.S. and China relations that in recent years have been <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/the-china-threat">rooted in suspicion</a> <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA290-3.html">and competition</a>.</p>
<p>President Joe Biden hinted as much just hours after the face-to-face talks, confirming that he still <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-calls-xi-dictator-after-carefully-planned-summit-2023-11-16/">considered his Chinese counterpart</a>, Xi Jinping, a “dictator.” Beijing hit back, with foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning telling reporters Biden’s remark was “extremely wrong and irresponsible political manipulation.”</p>
<p>As a scholar of U.S.-China relations, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-delusions-detente-rivals">I believe the relationship</a> between the two countries can be best described as an “enduring rivalry” – a <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2600766">term used by political scientists</a> to denote two powers that have singled each other out for intense security competition. Examples from history include <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/1/timeline-india-pakistan-relations">India and Pakistan</a>, <a href="https://www.worldhistory.org/article/1520/the-hundred-years-war-consequences--effects/">France and England</a>, and the West and the Soviet Union. Over the past two centuries, such rivals have accounted for only 1% of the world’s international relationships but <a href="https://scholarworks.iu.edu/dspace/handle/2022/26044">80% of its wars</a>. History suggest these rivalries <a href="https://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/0472111272-08.pdf">last around 40 years</a> and end only when one side loses the ability to compete – or when the two sides ally against a common enemy. Neither scenario looks likely any time soon in regards to China and the U.S.</p>
<h2>How enduring rivalries end</h2>
<p>China “is a communist country … based on a form of government totally different than ours,” <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2023/nov/16/china-responds-to-biden-calling-xi-jinping-a-dictator-video">Biden said after his meeting</a> with Xi.</p>
<p>That comment gets to the heart of why diplomacy alone cannot reset the U.S.-China relationship. Washington and Beijing are not rivals due to any misunderstanding that can be sorted out through talks alone. Rather, they are rivals because of the opposite reason: They understand each other only too well and have come to the conclusion that their respective world outlooks cannot be reconciled.</p>
<p>The same is true for many of the issues that divide the two countries – they are framed as binary win-lose scenarios. Taiwan can be governed from Taipei or Beijing, but not both. Similarly, the East China and South China seas can be international waters or Chinese territory; Russia can be crippled or supported.</p>
<p>For the United States, its Asian alliances are a force for stability; for China, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3231201/china-watching-closely-us-japan-south-korea-aim-de-facto-asian-nato">they’re hostile encirclement</a>. And both countries are right in their respective assessments.</p>
<p>Diplomacy alone is insufficient to resolve a rivalry. At best, it can help manage it. </p>
<h2>When the US calls, who picks up?</h2>
<p>Part of this management of the U.S-China rivalry involves finding areas of agreement that can be committed to. </p>
<p>And on Nov. 15, Biden and Xi announced deals over <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/15/business/economy/biden-xi-fentanyl.html">curbing China’s production of the deadly drug fentanyl</a> and the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/us-china-military-relations-339980a0d494bcde92905411838808a4">restoring of high-level, military-to-military dialogue</a> between the two countries.</p>
<p>But the fentanyl announcement is <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/01/asia/china-us-fentanyl-trump-intl/index.html">very similar to the one</a> Xi gave to then-President Donald Trump in 2019. The U.S. administration <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-fentanyl/trump-accuses-chinas-xi-of-failing-to-halt-fentanyl-exports-to-u-s-idUSKCN1US1WI/">later accused China</a> of reneging on the agreement.</p>
<p>Similarly, committing to restarting high-level dialogue is one thing; following up on it is another. History is dotted with occasions when having an open line between Beijing and Washington hasn’t meant a whole lot in times of crisis. In 2001, when a U.S. surveillance aircraft collided with a Chinese jet over Hainan Island, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/09/01/us-china-military-hotline-508140">Beijing didn’t pick up the phone</a>. Likewise, during the Tiananmen Square massacre, then-President George H.W. Bush urgently tried to call his counterpart Deng Xiaoping but was unable to get through.</p>
<p>Moreover, focusing on what was agreed to in talks also highlights what wasn’t – and is unlikely to ever be – agreed to without a substantial shift in power that forces one side to concede to the other. </p>
<p>For example, China wants the U.S. to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-reports-21-chinese-air-force-planes-entered-its-air-defence-zone-2023-03-02/">stop selling arms to Taiwan</a>. But Washington has no intention of doing this, as it knows that this will make the disputed island more vulnerable to Beijing. Washington would like China to end its military displays of strength over the Taiwan Strait; Beijing knows doing so risks seeing Taiwan drift toward independence.</p>
<p>American policymakers have long said what they want is <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/what-america-wants-china-hass">China to “change</a>” – by which it means to liberalize its system of governance. But the Chinese Communist Party knows that doing so means self-liquidation – every communist regime that has allowed space for alternative political parties has unraveled. Which is why American attempts to engage China are often met with suspicion in China. As former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin commented, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-delusions-detente-rivals">engagement and containment policies have the same aim</a>: to end China’s socialist system.</p>
<p>For similar reasons, Xi has shunned attempts by the U.S. to bring China further into the rules-based international order. The Chinese leader saw what happened when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev <a href="https://time.com/5512665/mikhail-gorbachev-glasnost-perestroika/">tried to integrate the Soviet Union</a> into the Western order in the late 1980s – it only hastened the demise of the socialist entity.</p>
<p>Instead, Xi calls for a massive military buildup, the reassertion of Chinese Communist Party control and an economic policy <a href="https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis//2020/11/china-economic-technological-self-reliance">based on self-reliance</a>.</p>
<h2>Actions speak louder …</h2>
<p>The encouraging words and limited agreements hammered out in the latest meeting between Xi and Biden should also not distract from the actions that continue to push the U.S. and China further apart.</p>
<p>China’s show of force in the Taiwan Strait has been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/13/china-biden-xi-meeting-apec-taiwan/">sustained for three years now</a> and shows no sign of abating. Meanwhile, Beijing’s navy continues to <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-is-the-south-china-sea-such-a-hotly-contested-region-143435">harass other nations in the South China Sea</a>.</p>
<p>Similarly, Biden has continued the U.S. path toward military alliances aimed at countering China’s threat. It recently entered a <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3498451/japan-south-korea-us-strengthen-trilateral-cooperation/">trilateral agreement between the U.S., Japan and South Korea</a>. And that came two years after the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/AUKUS/">establishment of AUKUS</a>, a security partnership between the the U.S., Australia and the U.K. that has similar aims.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the U.S. administration will continue to tighten the screws on China’s economy through <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/president-biden-has-banned-some-us-investment-china-heres-what-know">investment restrictions</a>. Biden is well aware that easy flowing money from Wall Street is helping China weather choppier economic waters of late and is keen to turn off the tap.</p>
<h2>The point of diplomacy</h2>
<p>This isn’t to say that diplomacy and face-to-face talks are pointless. They do, in fact, serve a number of interests.</p>
<p>For both men involved, there is a domestic upside. For Biden, playing nice with China projects the image of a statesman – especially at a time when, due to U.S. positions on Ukraine and the Middle East, he is facing <a href="https://jacobin.com/2021/04/joe-biden-keir-starmer-warmonger-internationalism-foreign-policy">accusations from the political left of being a “warmonger</a>.” And encouraging Beijing to tread softly during the U.S. election year may blunt a potential line of attack from Republicans that the administration’s China policy is not working.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Xi is able to showcase his own diplomatic skills and present China as an alternative superpower to the U.S. and to potentially <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-xi-draws-standing-ovation-from-u-s-business-leadersand-some-doubts-13fc3ad2">cleave the Western business community</a> – and perhaps even major European nations – from what he would see as the U.S. anti-China coalition.</p>
<p>Moreover, summits like the one in San Francisco signal that both the U.S. and China are jointly committed to at least keep talking, helping ensure that a rocky relationship doesn’t descend into anything more belligerent – even it that doesn’t make them any friendlier.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217978/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Beckley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s good to talk − just don’t expect it to result in a reset in relations between Beijing and Washington.Michael Beckley, Associate Professor of Political Science, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2173732023-11-16T02:22:26Z2023-11-16T02:22:26ZBiden-Xi meeting at APEC a reminder of the importance of global summits in dangerous times<p>For three decades, the leaders of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum have met to advance their shared interests in improving trade and investment across the region. </p>
<p>This year’s meeting in San Francisco has a particular prominence. US President Joe Biden and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping have met for the first time since last year’s G20 summit in Bali, amid efforts by the two great powers to improve their fraught relationship. APEC is normally held alongside the annual ASEAN and East Asia summits, but those jamborees were held a little earlier this year, giving the trans-Pacific grouping some much-needed clear air.</p>
<p>Established in 1989, APEC was intended to drive trade liberalisation in the Asia-Pacific at a time when global efforts had stalled. US President Bill Clinton was the inaugural host of the leaders’ meeting in 1993. In the 1990s, the grouping launched ambitious goals about free trade and took on what now seems like a curious mix of members. </p>
<p>APEC is one of the few international bodies in which Taiwan participates, alongside Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China. The grouping manages this by having member economies, rather than states. It also includes Canada, Mexico, Peru and Chile, but not India. While many countries use the “Indo-Pacific” label to describe the region, APEC is a reminder that not so long ago the region’s future was imagined in rather different terms.</p>
<p>By the early 2000s, political interest in advancing free trade had ebbed and APEC’s influence began to wane. This was exacerbated by ASEAN’s offshoots, such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, appearing better placed to advance a cooperative agenda. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-xi-meeting-6-essential-reads-on-what-to-look-out-for-as-us-chinese-leaders-hold-face-to-face-talks-217611">Biden-Xi meeting: 6 essential reads on what to look out for as US, Chinese leaders hold face-to-face talks</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But the grouping remained valuable to its members less for the specific policy benefits it could provide, and more for the annual opportunity to gather and occasionally manage crises. </p>
<p>In 2001, the APEC summit in Shanghai allowed then US President George Bush and Chinese leader Jiang Zemin to meet and reset their relations following <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/gall/0,8542,468363,00.html">an incident in April that year</a> in which a US EP3 reconnaissance aircraft was forced to crash land on Hainan Island. China held 24 crew members and the craft for ten days. </p>
<p>US-China relations were badly damaged, and APEC created the space for a high-level reset. Then, as now, the forum provides a useful pretext for the leaders to meet without either side feeling they were signalling weakness by travelling to the other’s territory.</p>
<p>Two decades later, and US-China relations have been in their most difficult phase since the normalisation of relations in the 1970s. The much-anticipated meeting between Xi and Biden appears to have been a success. </p>
<p>In the lead-up, both sides sought to manage expectations, making clear that neither anticipated any major breakthrough in relations. However, the four-hour discussion seems to have produced several important achievements. Perhaps the most important, at least in terms of managing risk, is the reopening of communication channels between the countries’ militaries, which had been shut down by Beijing in response to the then US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August last year. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/K_8tlhAlHqc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>China has also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/14/biden-china-fentanyl-deal">agreed to crack down</a> on exporters who manufacture chemicals used in fentanyl production, and have agreed to establish a forum to maintain separation between AI and nuclear weapons systems. </p>
<p>Reportedly, the two leaders also discussed the <a href="https://apnews.com/live/apec-summit-live-updates">question of Taiwan</a>. The island has long been a regional flashpoint, but in recent years it has become a lighting rod for hawks on both sides of the Pacific. Both would benefit from a less heated environment. </p>
<p>More broadly, Biden and Xi appear to have succeeded in putting a floor under the relationship, and while they’re still some way from an agreed set of “rules of the road” in managing their regional competition, Asia can take some comfort that communication between the two is now better and the trajectory of the relationship is more positive than it has been.</p>
<p>Beijing and Washington have incentives for improving their relations. China’s economy is its worst shape since the reform era began. Biden faces wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and has surprisingly poor domestic political stocks less than a year out from the presidential election. </p>
<p>While the summit has improved things, the expectation bar was set low. The contest between the world’s two biggest economies remains heated, largely without guardrails and of immense risk.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1724891363047591946"}"></div></p>
<p>APEC is more than just the US and China bilateral meeting. The group is about economic cooperation, and in the coming days the US will also try to deliver more on the so-far meagre offerings of its “<a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/organisations/wto-g20-oecd-apec/indo-pacific-economic-framework">Indo-Pacific Economic Framework</a>”. </p>
<p>While its efforts to advance things like infrastructure standards and supply chain resilience will be appreciated, the real prize – improved access to the US market – remains politically off the table. This will limit what Washington can achieve.</p>
<p>The members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership">Trans-Pacific Partnership</a> (CPTPP), a trade agreement established after the US withdrew from its predecessor the TPP, will also gather to consider new applicants. Taiwan and China are prominent among these, but it is unlikely either will be allowed to join in the short term.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-drums-of-war-are-receding-but-anthony-albanese-still-faces-many-uncertainties-on-his-trip-to-china-216727">The 'drums of war' are receding, but Anthony Albanese still faces many uncertainties on his trip to China</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>APEC 2023 is a reminder of how important multilateral gatherings are in times of geopolitical crisis. Without the excuse that the summit provided, there can be no doubt Xi and Biden would have found it much harder to meet and achieve what are, in the context of their parlous relations, some important positive steps to stabilise regional geopolitics. </p>
<p>Yet it is also a salutary reminder of the real limits of multilateralism in the region. The summit normally concludes with an agreed joint statement, but differences in views about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Gaza conflict and myriad other issues mean that even the veneer of concord is unlikely. The old expansive institutions seem not to be well suited to the current period of heightened geopolitical tension.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217373/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Bisley has received funding from the Commonwealth government for research on regional multilateralism.</span></em></p>Despite a positive meeting, the contest between the world’s two biggest economies remains heated, largely without guardrails and of immense risk.Nick Bisley, Dean of Humanities and Social Sciences and Professor of International Relations at La Trobe University., La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2177542023-11-16T01:35:59Z2023-11-16T01:35:59ZWhat Joe Biden’s meeting with Xi Jinping means for geopolitical tensions<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/what-joe-bidens-meeting-with-xi-jinping-means-for-geopolitical-tensions" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>U.S. President Joe Biden has engaged in a crucial <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/joe-biden-has-points-to-prove-as-he-meets-xi-jinping-on-wednesday/articleshow/105217280.cms">face-to-face meeting</a> with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in San Francisco.</p>
<p>This high-stakes diplomatic encounter was <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/15/politics/biden-xi-meeting/index.html">aimed at alleviating tensions between the world’s two superpowers</a>. The meeting carried immense significance as leaders of the world’s largest economies seek to establish a sense of stability following a challenging year in U.S.-China relations.</p>
<p>Even though both leaders have said they want <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-xi-apec-san-francisco-58d11e7e3902955302182c2bc41430e0">to stabilize their relationship</a>, the meeting is unlikely to bring about transformative changes between the two countries that are inherently antagonistic due to deeper structural reasons. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1724877218818510956"}"></div></p>
<h2>New Cold War?</h2>
<p>The U.S. and China are enmeshed in a grand power competition in which <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-long-game-chinas-grand-strategy-to-displace-american-order/">China aspires to supplant the United States as a superpower</a> while the U.S. aims to maintain its position. </p>
<p>This rivalry spans various facets of global politics, encompassing military, economic and technological domains. However, the contours of this new Cold War differ markedly <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/cold-war">from the previous one</a>, with three key distinctions:</p>
<ol>
<li>In contrast to the Soviet Union, China is intricately woven into the American-built economic order. <a href="https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2021/09/28/how-the-liberal-international-order-shaped-chinas-challenge-to-global-economic-governance/">Beijing’s integration</a> into the global economic framework has been instrumental in its substantial economic development. Unlike the Soviet Union, which existed outside this economic order, China’s active participation has transformed the dynamics of the current geopolitical landscape.</li>
<li>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/14/business/us-china-economy-trade.html">economic interdependence</a> between the U.S. and China sets this rivalry apart. Unlike the relatively self-contained economies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, China relies on the American market for its product sales, while the U.S. depends on China for financial transactions.</li>
<li>People-to-people contact between the U.S. and China surpasses the ties between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. With a 5.4 million-strong <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/chinese-immigrants-united-states/">Chinese diaspora</a> in the U.S. and 300,000 Chinese students studying in American universities, the connections between both countries make outright hostilities less likely.</li>
</ol>
<h2>Stabilizing relations</h2>
<p>In this context, the term coined by American political scientist Joseph Nye — “<a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/joe-biden-us-china-relations-cooperative-rivalry-by-joseph-s-nye-2021-05">co-operative rivalry</a>” — aptly characterizes Chinese-American relations. </p>
<p>The challenges of our globalized world — including climate change, pandemics, artificial intelligence, economic volatility and human security — necessitate active Chinese participation. These challenges make it particularly important that the U.S. and China stabilize relations. </p>
<p>The current emphasis on competition over co-operation needs to be shelved. Both nations should seek equilibrium by fostering co-operation in areas of mutual interest while navigating competition in areas of divergence.</p>
<p>Already complex relations between the U.S. and China have been tense in recent years. China was miffed when former U.S. House Speaker <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/pelosi-taiwan-china-us-1.6538434">Nancy Pelosi visited</a> Taiwan in August 2022. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nancy-pelosis-visit-to-taiwan-causes-an-ongoing-chinese-tantrum-in-the-taiwan-strait-188205">Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan causes an ongoing Chinese tantrum in the Taiwan Strait</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Because China asserts territorial claims over Taiwan, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/29/asia/tsai-ing-wen-taiwan-president-us-stopover-central-america-trip-intl-hnk/index.html">a stopover</a> in the U.S. by Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen added to the list of contentious issues. </p>
<p>Beijing also expressed displeasure over new <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/oct/07/biden-administration-tech-restrictions-china">U.S. exports restrictions</a> on advanced technology, and Biden’s directive to shoot down a Chinese <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/09/politics/spy-balloon-technology/index.html">spy balloon</a> in February 2023.</p>
<h2>Spats intensified</h2>
<p>Tensions escalated to the point that China severed military-to-military communications with the U.S. after Pelosi’s Taiwan visit, despite <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3224794/why-china-still-refusing-resume-military-dialogue-us-despite-antony-blinkens-latest-appeal">repeated American appeals for China to reopen these lines of communication</a> to prevent any misconceptions or accidental escalations of conflict in the South China region and Taiwan. </p>
<p>When the U.S. downed the Chinese spy balloon, China’s foreign ministry contended that it was conducting meteorological research. American authorities, however, insisted it carried surveillance equipment inconsistent with a weather balloon.</p>
<p>In response to the balloon incident, Secretary of State Antony Blinken <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/03/politics/china-us-balloon-intl/index.html">cancelled his planned visit to Beijing</a> in protest. </p>
<p>Subsequently, China declined to reschedule the visit for several months. This communications void at both military and political levels between China and the U.S. <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/amid-tensions-biden-xi-discuss-restoring-us-china/story?id=104916838">posed a significant risk of potentially dangerous consequences</a>. One of the outcomes of the Biden-Xi meeting is that military-to-military discussions will resume.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1623537171595661313"}"></div></p>
<h2>The Xi-Biden meeting</h2>
<p>Prior to the meeting, U.S. National Security Adviser <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/national-security-adviser-jake-sullivan-face-the-nation-transcript-11-12-2023/">Jake Sullivan emphasized</a> the importance of addressing fundamental aspects of the U.S.-China relationship, highlighting the need to strengthen open lines of communication and responsibly manage competition to prevent it from escalating into conflict.</p>
<p>Sullivan acknowledged the necessity of “intense diplomacy” to clarify misconceptions and avert surprises.</p>
<p>China’s economy is currently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/why-is-chinas-economy-slowing-down-could-it-get-worse-2023-09-01/">experiencing a slowdown</a>, marked by falling prices due to subdued demand from both consumers and businesses. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/economists-stick-to-2024-china-outlook-while-assessing-stimulus-1.1991680">With a projected economic growth of five per cent this year and an expected dip to 4.5 per cent in 2024</a>, these economic challenges have adversely affected Xi’s domestic political standing. That may be behind any motivation to improve relations with the U.S. to address these domestic issues.</p>
<p>Biden, too, is keen on stabilizing relations with China. Confronted with escalating conflicts in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/14/israel-hamas-war-list-of-key-events-day-39">Middle East</a> and the ongoing <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/russia-ukraine-war-live-zelenskiy-says-russian-frontline-attacks-rising-germany-says-eu-won-t-meet-1m-pieces-of-ammo-target/ar-AA1jTjAI">war in Ukraine</a>, Biden is eager to avert the emergence of another global crisis during his tenure. </p>
<p>Restoring a semblance of stability to the Washington-Beijing relationship <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/14/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/">has been among the top priorities in his foreign policy agenda.</a> </p>
<h2>What the meeting might accomplish</h2>
<p>One summit alone cannot resolve the extensive list of grievances between the two superpowers. Those challenges include issues like espionage, intellectual property theft, human rights abuses, foreign interference and trade penalties, as well as the sensitive matter of Taiwan. </p>
<p>The meeting addressed another point of contention between the two countries: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/biden-xi-talk-fentanyl-city-gripped-by-opioid-crisis-2023-11-15/">fentanyl shipments</a>. The leaders announced an agreement intended to stop China’s illicit exports of chemicals that can be used to make the drug that has led to the overdose deaths of hundreds of thousands of Americans.</p>
<p>The agreement on re-opening communication channels at both military and civilian levels could be a crucial step in improving China-U.S. relations. It might serve as a foundation to prevent relations from spiralling out of control, and lay the groundwork for addressing broader challenges in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217754/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Saira Bano does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Relations between the U.S. and China have been particularly tense for the last few years. Can one summit between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping significantly improve relations?Saira Bano, Assistant Professor in Political Science, Thompson Rivers UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2176112023-11-14T17:12:37Z2023-11-14T17:12:37ZBiden-Xi meeting: 6 essential reads on what to look out for as US, Chinese leaders hold face-to-face talks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559360/original/file-20231114-25-d2sfpr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4480%2C2984&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Joe Biden and Xi Jinping are set to meet for the first time in a year.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-and-chinas-president-xi-jinping-meet-on-news-photo/1244770358?adppopup=true">Saul Loeb/AFP cia Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>U.S. President Joe Biden sits down with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on Nov. 15, 2023, in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/13/business/dealbook/biden-xi-china-trade.html">first head-to-head talks between the leaders</a> of the world’s two biggest economies in over a year.</p>
<p>During that time, relations between the two countries have not been their best – a spat over a <a href="https://theconversation.com/spy-balloon-drama-elevates-public-attention-pressure-for-the-us-to-confront-china-199484">purported spy balloon over American airspace</a> in February only added to a list of grievances that includes <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-on-taiwan-did-he-really-commit-us-forces-to-stopping-any-invasion-by-china-an-expert-explains-why-on-balance-probably-not-176765">Biden’s comments over Taiwan</a>, Beijing’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-view-from-moscow-and-beijing-what-peace-in-ukraine-and-a-post-conflict-world-look-like-to-xi-and-putin-202323">support of Russia</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-is-about-to-blow-up-a-fake-warship-in-the-south-china-sea-but-naval-rivalry-with-beijing-is-very-real-and-growing-198651">confrontations in the South China Sea</a> and more generally a competition for influence and trade around the world.</p>
<p>Yet, going into the meeting – which takes place on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in the San Francisco Bay Area – there has been talk of trying to put the U.S.-China relationship on a better track. The White House has indicated that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-chinas-xi-will-discuss-communication-competition-apec-summit-2023-11-13/">strengthening communication and managing competition</a> will be the key thing to watch; Xi <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231009-top-diplomat-wang-hopes-us-china-can-rationally-manage-differences">recently commented</a> that there were “a thousand reasons to improve China-U.S. relations, but not one reason to ruin them.”</p>
<p>But how much is achievable? Recent articles from The Conversation’s archive provide insight and background over what is likely to be on the agenda – and the obstacles to improving ties.</p>
<h2>1. Engagement, decoupling or derisking?</h2>
<p>The meeting comes after a hardening stance against China in Washington – and with a general election just a year away, political rhetoric on China is likely to remain robust.</p>
<p>Michael Beckley, an <a href="https://facultyprofiles.tufts.edu/michael-beckley">expert on U.S.-China relations at Tufts University</a>, saw evidence of a more hawkish China policy on display in March when a bipartisan House committee on China held its inaugural meeting.</p>
<p>“What was abundantly clear from the lawmakers was the message that the era of engagement with China is long past its sell-by date,” <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-more-hawkish-china-policy-5-takeaways-from-house-committees-inaugural-hearing-on-confronting-beijing-200953">wrote Beckley, adding</a>: “Engagement had been the policy of successive government from Nixon’s landmark visit to China in 1972 onward. But there was a general acceptance among committee members that the policy is outdated and that it is time to adopt if not outright containment then certainly a more competitive policy.”</p>
<p>A key part of that new policy would involve a more robust stance on confronting China’s military posturing in East Asia. </p>
<p>It also included what Beckley described as “selective decoupling,” or the disentangling of certain technology and economic interests. The buzzword being thrown around in foreign policy circles lately is “derisking,” but it alludes to the same thing: U.S. entities limiting their exposure to China.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-more-hawkish-china-policy-5-takeaways-from-house-committees-inaugural-hearing-on-confronting-beijing-200953">A more hawkish China policy? 5 takeaways from House committee's inaugural hearing on confronting Beijing</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>2. War (of words) over Taiwan</h2>
<p>So what has prompted the worsening relations between China and the U.S.? For starters, there is the ongoing tension over Taiwan.</p>
<p>For the best part of 40 years, U.S. diplomatic relations with the island have been governed by the “one China policy” – through which Washington recognizes the People’s Republic of China and acknowledges that Beijing’s position remains that Taiwan is part of China. Prior to 1979, the U.S. recognized the government of Taiwan as “China.”</p>
<p>But in recent years, Beijing has caught wind of subtle changes in the U.S. over the issue. In May 2022, Biden suggested he would intervene “militarily” should China ever invade Taiwan. This would break a long-standing policy of ambiguity over what the U.S. would do in such an event. The White House later walked back the comments, suggesting that it didn’t represent a change. But it <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-on-taiwan-did-he-really-commit-us-forces-to-stopping-any-invasion-by-china-an-expert-explains-why-on-balance-probably-not-176765">wasn’t the first time</a> that Biden has made such a remark, noted Meredith Oyen, an <a href="https://history.umbc.edu/facultystaff/full-time/meredith-oyen/">expert on U.S. Taiwan relations</a> at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County.</p>
<p>“I think it is clear at this point that Biden’s interpretation of the Taiwan Relations Act – which since 1979 has set out the parameters of U.S. policy on the island – is that it allows for a U.S. military response should China invade. And despite White House claims to the contrary, I believe that does represent a departure from the long-standing policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ on Taiwan,” she wrote.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-on-taiwan-did-he-really-commit-us-forces-to-stopping-any-invasion-by-china-an-expert-explains-why-on-balance-probably-not-176765">Biden on Taiwan: Did he really commit US forces to stopping any invasion by China? An expert explains why, on balance, probably not</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>3. Navigating the South China Sea</h2>
<p>Most experts are of a mind that an invasion of Taiwan isn’t on Beijing’s immediate agenda – or in its interests. But that <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-is-about-to-blow-up-a-fake-warship-in-the-south-china-sea-but-naval-rivalry-with-beijing-is-very-real-and-growing-198651">doesn’t mean that a military confrontation isn’t possible</a>.</p>
<p>“If a war between China and the U.S. is going to happen, I believe the South China Sea is likely to be a major theater, with Chinese aggression toward Taiwan the spark,” wrote Krista Wiegand, a <a href="http://www.kristawiegand.com/">scholar of East Asian security and maritime disputes</a> at the University of Tennessee.</p>
<p>The South China Sea – which is home to large reserves of oil and gas as well as billions of dollars’ worth of fisheries – has become a constant cause of tension between Beijing and a host of East and Southeast Asian nations, including U.S. allies the Philippines and Japan.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An infographic shows a map of South China Sea and surrounding countries with their claims to the waters represented by dotted lines." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559366/original/file-20231114-23-c4cy8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559366/original/file-20231114-23-c4cy8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559366/original/file-20231114-23-c4cy8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559366/original/file-20231114-23-c4cy8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559366/original/file-20231114-23-c4cy8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559366/original/file-20231114-23-c4cy8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559366/original/file-20231114-23-c4cy8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-infographic-titled-south-china-sea-a-hotbed-of-news-photo/1246032083?adppopup=true">Omar Zaghloul/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In April, the U.S. Navy in conjunction with counterparts in the Philippines sunk a mock warship off the archipelago country’s coast.</p>
<p>Washington stressed that it was not in response to increased tension over Taiwan, but it was nonetheless met by Beijing staging its own military exercise around the disputed island.</p>
<p>More generally, China has consistently engaged in so-called “gray zone tactics” in the waters – such as deploying Chinese Coast Guard boats in disputed areas, harassing other nations’ ships and building up artificial islands.</p>
<p>“With China playing by a different set of rules than the U.S. and its allies in the region, the risk of clashes at sea is very real. It could even lead to conflict between the two most powerful countries in the world today,” wrote Wiegand.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-is-about-to-blow-up-a-fake-warship-in-the-south-china-sea-but-naval-rivalry-with-beijing-is-very-real-and-growing-198651">The US is about to blow up a fake warship in the South China Sea – but naval rivalry with Beijing is very real and growing</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>4. Trading blows</h2>
<p>The South China Seas is also a major trade route – and simmering trade competition underpins a lot of the tension between the U.S and China.</p>
<p>City, University of London’s <a href="https://www.bayes.city.ac.uk/faculties-and-research/experts/manmohan-s-sodhi">ManMohan S. Sodhi</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Kk-QbksAAAAJ&hl=en">Christopher S. Tang</a> at the University of California, Los Angeles, explained how economic ties between the two countries flourished in the 1980s only to <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-us-tensions-how-global-trade-began-splitting-into-two-blocs-188380">become more hostile of late</a> – and how that is affecting global trade.</p>
<p>“As U.S.-China relations have moved from building bridges in 1972 to building walls in 2022, countries will increasingly be forced to choose sides and companies will have to plan supply chains accordingly. Those seeking to trade in both blocs will need to ‘divisionalise,’ running parallel operations,” the scholars wrote.</p>
<p>A bipolar trading world is already emerging, with U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen calling for “friend-shoring” with trusted partners – in other words, splitting countries into friends or foes and rewarding the former. Such a tactic is aimed at countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which has seen Beijing pump billions of dollars into developing countries over the last decade.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-us-tensions-how-global-trade-began-splitting-into-two-blocs-188380">China-US tensions: how global trade began splitting into two blocs</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>5. War in Ukraine …</h2>
<p>Biden and Xi have plenty of bilateral issues to talk though. But the meeting takes place with a backdrop of two major conflagrations that continue to occupy the thoughts of foreign policy advisors in both Beijing and Washington.</p>
<p>China’s support of Russia has been a continued source of tension between Beijing and the West since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Meanwhile the escalation of violence between Israel and Hamas puts in jeopardy China’s policy of “balanced diplomacy” in the region.</p>
<p>And yet, there is potential for common ground here between Biden and Xi. Both will be keen that war doesn’t cause more destabilization. As <a href="https://lsa.umich.edu/history/people/emeritus/rgsuny.html">Ronald Suny of the University of Michigan</a> wrote <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-view-from-moscow-and-beijing-what-peace-in-ukraine-and-a-post-conflict-world-look-like-to-xi-and-putin-202323">in regards to the Ukraine conflict</a>: “Stability, both domestically and internationally, works to China’s economic advantage as a major producer and exporter of industrial goods. And Beijing is mindful that a slump in foreign demand and investment is hitting the country’s economic prospects.” </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-view-from-moscow-and-beijing-what-peace-in-ukraine-and-a-post-conflict-world-look-like-to-xi-and-putin-202323">The view from Moscow and Beijing: What peace in Ukraine and a post-conflict world look like to Xi and Putin</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>6. … and now the Middle East</h2>
<p>Yet Beijing is also at pains to promote its vision of a multipolar world, edging away from U.S. dominance. For similar reasons, Beijing is keen to develop its role as friend to all in the Middle East – a position that will become <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-war-puts-chinas-strategy-of-balanced-diplomacy-in-the-middle-east-at-risk-216246">harder to maintain as war goes on</a>, as Andrew Latham, who <a href="https://www.macalester.edu/politicalscience/facultystaff/andrewlatham/">teaches China foreign policy</a> at Macalester College, explained.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-war-puts-chinas-strategy-of-balanced-diplomacy-in-the-middle-east-at-risk-216246">Israel-Hamas war puts China's strategy of 'balanced diplomacy' in the Middle East at risk</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217611/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Scholars writing for The Conversation take a deeper look at some of the issues expected to be on the agenda when the leaders of the world’s two biggest economies meet.Matt Williams, Senior International EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2163922023-11-09T20:01:18Z2023-11-09T20:01:18ZThe war in Gaza opens up new opportunities for China in the Middle East<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/the-war-in-gaza-opens-up-new-opportunities-for-china-in-the-middle-east" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>The western world’s <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/19/1207028384/western-leaders-are-showing-unified-support-for-israel-in-its-war-against-hamas#:%7E:text=Hourly%20News-,Western%20leaders%20are%20showing%20unified%20support%20for%20Israel%20in%20its,Sunak%20on%20Thursday%20visits%20Israel.">support for Israel</a> as it attacks Gaza has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/oct/22/gaza-bombed-starved-arab-world-watching-angry">provoked fury</a> <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/10/14/23914904/arab-world-israel-palestine-conflict-middle-east">across the Arab world</a> and much of the <a href="https://time.com/6330746/global-south-ukraine-israel-gaza/">Global South</a>. </p>
<p>This situation undermines the West’s international standing and offers opportunities for China to enhance its regional and global diplomatic influence. Whether and how it will seize them remains to be seen.</p>
<p>Led by the United States, the West has presented itself as following a <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/maintaining-the-rules-based-international-order-is-in-everyones-best-interests/">“rules-based liberal international order” that ostensibly protects human rights and international norms.</a> </p>
<p>On this basis, the West <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/02/israel-palestine-hamas-gaza-war-russia-ukraine-occupation-west-hypocrisy/">has opposed Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine</a>. However, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/amnesty-international-rights-report-ukraine-russia-war-double-standards/32337265.html">it isn’t applying these rules to Israel and Palestinians.</a></p>
<p>U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the U.S. supports <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/israel-hamas-war-live-updates-blinken-travels-jordan-talks-ambulances-rcna123650">a humanitarian pause but not a ceasefire</a>. The White House says Israel has now agreed to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/09/politics/israel-pauses-gaza-white-house/index.html">four-hour daily pauses</a> in military operations in Gaza.</p>
<h2>Children’s ‘graveyard’</h2>
<p>Most western governments have thrown their support behind Israel as it launches a devastating attack on Gaza. In response to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/11/05/1210641727/israel-war-hamas-latest-updates">Hamas’s brutal attack and hostage-takings on Oct. 7</a>, Israel has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/least-6-people-killed-israeli-air-strike-unrwa-school-gaza-2023-10-17/">bombed schools</a>, <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/at-least-8-dead-after-israeli-bombs-hit-gazas-al-rantisi-pediatric-hospital-reports-say">hospitals</a>, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/03/middleeast/casualties-gazas-shifa-hospital-idf/index.html#:%7E:text=Israel%20has%20claimed%20responsibility%20for,run%20health%20authorities%20said%20Friday.">ambulances</a>, <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/news/gaza-refugee-camp">refugee camps</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/11/2/gaza-bakeries-destroyed-by-israeli-strikes#:%7E:text=Five%20bakeries%20in%20the%20Gaza,been%20rendered%20out%20of%20service.">bakeries</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/22/world/middleeast/israel-west-bank-air-strike-mosque.html#:%7E:text=The%20Israeli%20military%20carried%20out%20a%20rare%20airstrike%20on%20a,in%20the%20northern%20West%20Bank.">mosques</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/20/war-crime-israel-bombs-gaza-church-sheltering-displaced-people">churches</a>, <a href="https://time.com/6322514/israel-strikes-gaza-cities-destroyed/">flattened neighbourhoods</a> and killed <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-strip-palestinian-civilian-deaths-displaced-after-1-month/">thousands of people, possibly 40 per cent of them children</a>.</p>
<p>UN Secretary General António Guterres has said <a href="https://turkiye.un.org/en/251952-guterres-%E2%80%9Cgaza-becoming-graveyard-children%E2%80%9D#:%7E:text=Mr.-,Guterres%20highlighted%20how%20%E2%80%9Cthe%20unfolding%20catastrophe%20in%20Gaza%20makes%20the,becoming%20a%20graveyard%20for%20children.">“Gaza is becoming a graveyard for children.</a>” About <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-strip-palestinian-civilian-deaths-displaced-after-1-month/">1,300 children are believed buried</a> under rubble. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/11/6/israel-hamas-live-news-communications-blackout-across-gaza">Hospitals</a> are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/06/world/middleeast/gaza-hospitals-israel-war.html">collapsing</a>. The perception in the <a href="https://time.com/6330746/global-south-ukraine-israel-gaza/">Global South</a> is that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/nov/07/palestinians-human-rights-israel-gaza">Palestinian lives are virtually worthless to the West</a>.</p>
<p>Some western governments’ <a href="https://time.com/6326360/europe-palestine-protests-free-speech/">efforts to censor and criminalize public demonstrations supporting Palestinians</a> adds another perceived dimension of hypocrisy to the West’s actions. </p>
<p>Even <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/22/web-summit-ceo-paddy-cosgrave-resigns-over-israel-war-crimes-post">mild statements of support</a> for <a href="https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2023-10-29/israel-gaza-hamas-palestinian-war-free-speech">Palestinians can be enough to endanger peoples’ careers</a>, especially in the U.S.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-wests-double-standards-are-once-again-on-display-in-israel-and-palestine-215759">The West's double standards are once again on display in Israel and Palestine</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>A boon to China?</h2>
<p>In this environment, the <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/10/26/how-china-sees-gaza">war in Gaza provides China with diplomatic and political opportunities</a>. </p>
<p>From the Chinese perspective, one political benefit is that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/6/10/china-is-exploiting-western-hypocrisy-in-the-middle-east">the U.S. has lost any credibility in its criticism of China’s treatment of the Uyghur people</a>. </p>
<p>The U.S. argues that Israel has <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20231103-us-blinken-says-israel-has-right-and-obligation-to-defend-itself">the right to protect itself from terrorism</a>. China has <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/09/09/china-hijacked-war-on-terror-511032">claimed the same right in its oppression of the Uyghurs of Xinjiang</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/08/china-anniversary-of-uns-damning-xinjiang-report-must-be-wake-up-call-to-action/">China’s actions against the Uyghurs</a> are certainly disturbing, but they aren’t as devastating as what Israel is doing to Palestinians. And unlike Israel’s illegal occupation of Palestine, Xinjiang is China’s sovereign territory.</p>
<p>China also has a strong interest in promoting peace in the Middle East given about <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/11/business/china-oil-saudi-arabia-iran.html#:%7E:text=Half%20of%20China's%20oil%20imports,an%20analysis%20firm%20in%20Vienna.">half of its imported oil comes from the region</a>. China <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/21/china-brokered-saudi-iran-deal-driving-wave-of-reconciliation-says-wang">helped Saudi Arabia and Iran</a> normalize their relations. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/brics-summit-2023-seeking-alternate-world-order#:%7E:text=The%20highlight%20of%20the%20fifteenth,the%20group%20in%20January%202024.">Four Middle Eastern countries have joined BRICS</a>, the international forum representing the world’s rising powers founded by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-considers-accepting-yuan-instead-of-dollars-for-chinese-oil-sales-11647351541">Saudi Arabia is also considering selling China oil in its own currency</a>, the yuan. </p>
<h2>Bypassing Palestinians</h2>
<p>Ongoing American efforts under President Joe Biden to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/4/9/the-us-should-not-worry-about-china-gulf-relations">were partly motivated by fear of China’s diplomatic and economic progress in the Middle East</a>. </p>
<p>Some have argued this American attempt to bypass the Palestinians <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-attack-aimed-disrupt-saudi-israel-normalization-biden-2023-10-20/#:%7E:text=WASHINGTON%2C%20Oct%2020%20(Reuters),Joe%20Biden%20said%20on%20Friday.">may have played a role in Hamas’s attack on Israel</a>. The U.S. has fomented conflict in the Middle East to keep the Islamic world divided and empower Israel, in contrast to China’s imperative for regional stability.</p>
<p>The U.S. has promoted the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/history-repeats-new-old-economic-corridor-emerges">India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor</a> to enhance its presence in the Middle East, more fully integrate Israel into the regional economy and counteract <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/U.S.-distractions-have-opened-door-for-China-s-Arab-romance">China’s growing regional influence</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1720057346809119045"}"></div></p>
<p><a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-geopolitics-of-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor/">But Arab states don’t share the American desire to contain China</a>. They prefer a multi-polar world where they can leverage several larger powers against each other and increase their own global geopolitical influence.</p>
<p><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/is-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-dead-on-arrival/">The longer Israel’s assault on Gaza continues,</a> the higher the civilian death toll climbs and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2023/11/01/arab-regimes-destabilized-by-war-between-israel-and-hamas_6217628_23.html">the more politically difficult it will be for the Arab world to co-operate with Israel or the U.S</a>. That will push the Gulf states even closer to China.</p>
<p>In the current Gaza conflict, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/6/china-takes-cautious-approach-to-diplomacy-over-israel-gaza-war">China has emphasized the need to avoid civilian casualties while rejecting Israel’s demand that it specifically condemn Hamas</a>. China’s position reflects the consensus of the Global South, which considers the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1eBfVSyzsfI">recent historical context of the conflict</a> and Israel’s occupation of Palestine. </p>
<h2>Americans distracted</h2>
<p>The Israel-Gaza war <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/mideast-ukraine-wars-could-distract-us-attention-from-china-20231030-p5eg2h.html">is also distracting the U.S. from the Indo-Pacific region</a>, further working to China’s advantage. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/can-biden-pivot-to-normalcy-in-the-middle-east/">The U.S. is mired in the Middle East</a>. <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/4275138-biden-future-two-state-solution-israel-palestinians/#:%7E:text=President%20Biden%20on%20Wednesday%20called,Palestinians%20in%20the%20Gaza%20Strip.">Biden’s administration supports the two-state solution</a> to the conflict, but <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/war-gaza-and-death-two-state-solution">that solution</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/01/world/middleeast/israel-palestine-two-state-solution.html">may no longer be viable</a>.</p>
<p>The U.S. appears unprepared to use its leverage over Israel to force it to accept a two-state solution. Any Israeli government that tried to move huge numbers of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/7/23/an-israeli-civil-war">illegal settlers out of their settlements would face massive domestic criticism, even a potential civil war</a>.</p>
<p>China’s <a href="https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/06/23/saudi-iran-deal-a-test-case-of-chinas-role-as-an-international-mediator/#:%7E:text=China's%20Saudi%2DIran%20Deal,the%20Islamic%20Republic%20of%20Iran.">diplomatic successes in the Middle East have involved reconciling states that were already inching towards restoring relations</a>. Nonetheless, China could position itself as the superpower that champions the interests of the Arab world and the perspective of the Global South in future negotiations. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/202310/t20231024_11166957.html">China will therefore likely be much more even-handed in its approach to the conflict than the U.S</a>. </p>
<p>Is China willing to play a more active role in the Israel-Palestine dispute? It may be tempted to let the U.S. stew in a problem of its own making, but regional peace and stability benefits China’s economic development.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-in-israel-how-u-s-foreign-policy-has-played-a-big-role-in-the-israel-hamas-war-215384">Biden in Israel: How U.S. foreign policy has played a big role in the Israel-Hamas war</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>While some scholars are <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/6/china-takes-cautious-approach-to-diplomacy-over-israel-gaza-war">skeptical of China’s potential role in any ceasefire or peace negotiations</a>, the Chinese have <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/21/middleeast/china-surpasses-us-mideast-survey-mime-intl/index.html">more credibility in the region than the Americans do</a>. </p>
<p>The U.S. has mismanaged and damaged the Middle East for decades. It would benefit the region if a superpower more inclined towards diplomacy than violence played a balancing role.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216392/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaun Narine contributes to Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East and Jewish Voice for Peace.
</span></em></p>The Israeli attack on Gaza is undermining the West’s international standing, offering opportunities for China to enhance its regional and global diplomatic influence.Shaun Narine, Professor of International Relations and Political Science, St. Thomas University (Canada)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2165682023-11-09T18:04:53Z2023-11-09T18:04:53ZWhen Marx met Confucius: Xi Jinping’s attempt to influence China’s intellectual loyalties has met with a mixed reception at home and abroad<p>A new film series produced in China, <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/11/02/xi-jinping-is-trying-to-fuse-the-ideologies-of-marx-and-confucius">When Marx met Confucius</a>, was viewed more than 8 million times in the first two weeks after it was released online in October. But this is not another blockbuster drama of the sort China has been adept at producing in recent years, but a propaganda film aimed at popularising the latest version of what is known as “<a href="https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/7872">Xi Jinping thought</a>”.</p>
<p>Ever since Xi took power in March 2013, his regime has focused on introducing stricter ideological controls and banishing what it calls “false ideological trends, positions and activities”. The Chinese Communist Party has published regular communiques pushing Xi’s ideological line and When Marx met Confucius is the latest version of this propaganda drive. Its aim is to reconcile the regime’s official Marxist underpinnings with an appeal to a more specifically Chinese cultural heritage.</p>
<p>But 8 million views does not represent great box office in a market as large as China and its reception has been anything but positive with audiences and critics either in China or around the world.</p>
<p>The series primarily <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tcO7HSCXR9M">consists of dialogues</a> between Confucius and Marx in question-and-answer sessions. These comprise questions raised by a group of young Chinese students and elaborations on these conversations by official scholars and propagandists. The content, structure and aims of the films are unmistakably geared towards popularising Xi’s ideas, with a particular focus on the youth sector.</p>
<p>The films are distinctive in several ways. They combine some of the tropes and techniques of popular entertainment, including the employment of sophisticated AI and digital technologies, while mixing traditional cultural genres such as Chinese shadow play with modern genres such as rap music. </p>
<p>But perhaps they are most distinctive because of the unlikely idea of conversations between historical figures who lived more than 2,000 years apart: Confucius (551-479BC) and Marx (1818-1883). Comment in the west has <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/marx-meets-confucius-in-xis-confused-cheese-fest-80bkqskfc">tended to focus</a> on what is seen as the rather laughable nature of this device. But there is more at stake than the artistic shortcomings of the production.</p>
<p>The central theme of the series revolves around the notion of “<a href="https://english.news.cn/20230702/073894ef71c0431aabc2976bd07cdd82/c.html">second integration</a>”. This idea was introduced by Xi in July 2021, to mark the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. It emphasises the integration of the basic principles of Marxism with China’s specific realities and its rich traditional culture. </p>
<p>While Marxism has been the official party ideology since Mao’s era, Confucianism has been more recently invoked to build national cohesion. But this film elevates the significance of Confucius to the level of Marx. It’s a shift that would have been unlikely without the approval of Xi himself.</p>
<p>Some analysts view Xi’s propaganda efforts through the lens of his steady encouragement of a <a href="https://time.com/6287699/xi-jinping-personality-cult/">cult of personality</a> in China. But this perspective overlooks the deeper challenges faced by China’s one-party state.</p>
<h2>Challenges of legitimacy</h2>
<p>The political philosopher <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674238183">Ci Jiwei</a>, professor of philosophy at the University of Hong Kong, has argued that China’s propaganda campaigns and ideological repression can be seen as reactions to the party’s challenge of legitimacy. As Ci observes, the CCP “can have no other publicly avowable source of legitimacy than the one tied to its communist revolutionary past”. </p>
<p>But this legitimacy was significantly weakened after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. Since then, the party has depended on public acquiescence to its control in exchange for economic development and improvements in people’s living standards.</p>
<p>But this performance legitimacy, relying heavily as it does on economic success, contains inherent vulnerabilities that could undermine the regime. Chinese society has undergone significant and comprehensive shifts. </p>
<p>These have involved the emergence of different <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1478929915609475j">economic classes</a>, the development of pluralistic <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0920203X18759789?journalCode=cina">intellectual thought</a>, a revival of pluralistic <a href="https://ian-johnson.com/the-souls-of-china/">religious beliefs</a>, and awareness of <a href="https://www.thechinastory.org/yearbooks/yearbook-2014/forum-the-rights-and-wrongs-of-the-law/xu-zhiyong-and-the-new-citizens-movement/">citizen’s rights</a>. Meanwhile, for all its efforts at propaganda, China’s overall <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/07/27/chinas-approach-to-foreign-policy-gets-largely-negative-reviews-in-24-country-survey/">international image</a> is increasingly negative. </p>
<p>This prompts fear among the CCP leadership and explains the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/25/china-jails-liu-xiaobo">intensifying crackdown</a> on liberal values and ideological control that was taking place even before Xi took over in 2012. To some extent, the supercharging of this ideological offensive as represented in “Xi Jinping thought” is a consequence of this trend. It has earned him the popular nickname, the “<a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/space/%E6%80%BB%E5%8A%A0%E9%80%9F%E5%B8%88">chief accelerator</a>”. </p>
<p>But this has led to a vicious spiral in which government by diktat – as exemplified in the zero-COVID policy – has led to a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/chinas-economic-slowdown-was-inevitable">slowdown</a> in the Chinese economy and soaring rates of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-66506132">youth unemployment</a>. As Ci warns, without embracing democracy and opening up to dissenting views, the party’s legitimacy will continue to weaken due to the deep contradictions and flaws inherent in the CCP’s monopoly of power.</p>
<h2>Lukewarm public response</h2>
<p>These fissures have, if anything, been made more apparent by the project to recuperate Confucianism via When Marx Met Confucius. Outside of <a href="https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_14898451">official endorsements</a>, the film seems to have received few positive comments within China. Significantly, initial responses from two main ideological camps – the Maoists and the Confucianists – have diverged dramatically.</p>
<p>On two of the most popular hardline Maoist and Chinese Marxist websites, <a href="http://m.wyzxwk.com/content.php?classid=13&id=481970">Wuyouzhixiang</a> and <a href="https://m.szhgh.com/Article/opinion/xuezhe/2023-10-14/337946.html">Red Songs Association</a>, commentaries have strongly maintained Mao’s condemnation of Confucius and ridiculed the film’s perceived departure from Marxist principles. These commentaries emphatically reject the idea of recognising Confucianism as the root of the national culture and of equating the importance of Confucius with Marx. </p>
<p>On the two main Confucian websites, the <a href="http://www.kongzixuehui.org/front/xscg/20230605/358.html">Chinese Confucius Academy</a> and <a href="https://www.rujiazg.com/">Confucian Network</a> there has been a conspicuous absence of discussion of the widely circulated film.</p>
<p>Among the Chinese diaspora overseas, two prominent bloggers – <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SYoYeB-uz0k">Teacher Li</a> and <a href="https://www.ftvnews.com.tw/news/detail/2023A16W0033">Mr Shen</a> – each found the film both bizarre and cringeworthy in its conception and incoherent in its doctrine.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, China’s propaganda campaign, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-concerning-new-strategy-on-human-rights-unite-the-world-behind-a-selective-approach-212007">global civilisation initiative</a> is meeting with intense scepticism in the west. So this attempt to promote “Xi Jingping thought” to the Chinese public appears to be a hard sell.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216568/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tao Zhang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new series attempts to integrate traditional Chinese cultural ideas with the Communist Party’s official Marxist ideology, with mixed results.Tao Zhang, Senior Lecturer, School of Arts & Humanities, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2172702023-11-08T07:56:15Z2023-11-08T07:56:15Z‘Clear change in Australia’s attitude’: what mattered most to China about Anthony Albanese’s visit<p>As Prime Minister Anthony Albanese concluded his four-day visit to China, both countries agreed it was important to keep up the momentum in their steadily warming relations, while also expanding their areas of cooperation.</p>
<p>Both sides emphasised the complementary nature of their economic ties and sounded optimistic about exploring new areas of cooperation in climate change, renewable energy and agriculture. They also committed to maintaining their recently resumed high-level dialogues. These include annual prime minister meetings and other diplomatic, strategic and economic talks.</p>
<p>While Australian media coverage focused on the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-11-07/the-key-takeaways-from-albanese-s-visit-to-china/103073390">historic nature</a> of the trip, as well as the importance from a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/programs/the-business/2023-11-06/where-to-next-for-the-australia-china-trade/103071680">trade perspective</a>, what mattered most to China? And how was the visit covered by the media there?</p>
<p>Beijing certainly views the visit as a major milestone in bilateral relations. Official media coverage emphasised that the two countries have no historical issues with one another, and have previously demonstrated how a stable bilateral relationship can be mutually beneficial. </p>
<p>President Xi Jinping praised Albanese’s efforts in getting their relations back to this level, calling the visit “a new starting point”. </p>
<p>The Chinese media and some of China’s Australia watchers also noted Albanese’s attendance at the China International Import Exhibition in Shanghai as symbolising the importance of the Chinese market for Australia. They saw this as an indication Australia “will not comply with US attempts to decouple from China”.</p>
<h2>The main takeaways from the Chinese side</h2>
<p>There are several important takeaways from Albanese’s trip on the Chinese side. </p>
<p>Overall, China saw the visit as an opportunity to re-engage Australia, a key US ally in the region and an important economic partner. </p>
<p>Recognising its economic coercion against the Morrison government did not achieve its objectives – and facing <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/06/22/blinken-sullivan-korea-japan-china/">ongoing US-led efforts</a> to constrain its rise – Beijing has been making foreign policy adjustments. </p>
<p>It has been <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/04/05/europe-and-china-at-critical-juncture-as-beijing-floats-ukraine-peace-plan.html">reaching out</a> to some US allies and partners, including key European Union member states, and inviting them to multi-pronged diplomatic initiatives organised by China. It has also been holding bilateral talks on important economic and political issues with high-ranking officials from these countries.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-drums-of-war-are-receding-but-anthony-albanese-still-faces-many-uncertainties-on-his-trip-to-china-216727">The 'drums of war' are receding, but Anthony Albanese still faces many uncertainties on his trip to China</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Chinese leaders recognised the Australian Labor Party’s traditional approach to foreign policy emphasises cooperation with international organisations, such as the United Nations and regional institutions. As such, they focused on the shared interests between China and Australia (commerce, climate change), as well as their shared identities (Asia-Pacific countries). </p>
<p>At the same time, they also subtly (or bluntly, depending which side you look at it) reminded Canberra that its alliance commitments with the US and membership in security arrangements like AUKUS and the Quad should not be at the expense of Australia-China relations – and certainly not Chinese interests.</p>
<p>The Global Times <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202311/1301345.shtml">made no secret</a> of the fact Australia can set an example for other US allies in an opinion piece:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Australia is the first US ally to make a clear change in its attitude toward China after a fierce conflict with China since the US defined China as its No. 1 strategic competitor. […] Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and even US allies in Europe will think about themselves given the ups and downs of China-Australia relations. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The economic agenda was equally important to Beijing, given the difficulties China is currently facing. </p>
<p>Given the nature of Australia-China trade, there is a limit to the punitive measures China can impose on Australia. In fact, despite the tensions that existed with Australia under the Morrison government, overall bilateral trade has continued to grow, reaching <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/04/14/china-australia-trade-minister-don-farrell-on-barley-wine-tariffs.html">nearly $300 billion in 2022</a>. This shows how complementary the two economies actually are, as well as the resilience of these economic ties. </p>
<p>This is what Chinese leaders and the media emphasised during Albanese’s visit and why they were highly critical of the idea of “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/06/22/what-is-us-china-decoupling-and-how-is-it-happening/dc16bc76-10d9-11ee-8d22-5f65b2e2f6ad_story.html">decoupling</a>” or “de-risking” from China’s economy. </p>
<p>They characterised “decoupling” as going against free trade and protectionism, but in reality, Beijing is deeply concerned over any specific measures that restrict trade in the high-tech sector, such as with semiconductors. The US and its allies have been increasingly <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/18/tech/us-china-chip-export-curbs-intl-hnk/index.html">adopting</a> such restrictions in recent years.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1721899831558590971"}"></div></p>
<h2>The importance of what wasn’t said</h2>
<p>What wasn’t discussed much in the Chinese media was the gap between what Beijing presented as a successful visit and what was actually achieved. </p>
<p>One could argue both sides talked about the obvious – for example, that bilateral relations have more or less stabilised, compared to how they were 18 months ago. As China expert Richard McGregor <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/asia/a-smiling-xi-is-a-wolf-warrior-in-sheep-s-clothing-20231106-p5ehzz">astutely observed</a>, Albanese was “pushing on an open door”. </p>
<p>This is not to belittle the progress made so far. The intentions of both governments to resume and strengthen the many dialogues between officials from their countries is important – even critical – in “resetting” the relationship. These channels of communication are incredibly important during times of crisis as a way of managing disputes and avoiding conflicts from spiralling out of control.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ping-pong-diplomacy-australian-table-tennis-players-return-to-china-five-decades-after-historic-tour-215537">Ping-pong diplomacy: Australian table tennis players return to China, five decades after historic tour</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Though resetting the relationship was a definite aim in the long term, there were also significant takeaways in the short term. This can be seen in how the state media coverage downplayed AUKUS and conflicts in the South Pacific, where <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/new-report-by-aiddata-shows-full-extent-of-china-loans-and-grants-in-pacific-with-papua-new-guinea-marshall-islands-top-recipients/news-story/f11bdc62f0ee7ce5fddb3b6a889f6721">China’s influence</a> has raised alarm bells in Canberra and Washington. </p>
<p>China has signalled its displeasure over AUKUS and continues to consider it <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202311/1301371.shtml">a major impediment</a> to further improvement of bilateral relations. But Xi <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231106-china-s-xi-to-welcome-australian-pm-albanese-in-beijing">told</a> Albanese they could work together on regional security challenges. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Where there are efforts to cause disturbances in the Asia-Pacific region, we must firstly stay vigilant, and secondly oppose them. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>And in the Pacific, the Chinese side is seeing an opportunity for the two countries in terms of regional economic development – how Australia and China can both contribute.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217270/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jingdong Yuan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Beijing focused on the shared interests and identities between China and Australia, emphasising the enduring importance of the bilateral economic relationship.Jingdong Yuan, Associate Professor, Asia-Pacific security, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2162462023-11-03T16:00:49Z2023-11-03T16:00:49ZIsrael-Hamas war puts China’s strategy of ‘balanced diplomacy’ in the Middle East at risk<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557344/original/file-20231102-25-h92iq1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=53%2C152%2C6000%2C3817&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">China's President Xi Jinping meets Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas in Beijing on June 14, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinas-president-xi-jinping-shakes-hands-with-palestinian-news-photo/1258685965?adppopup=true">Jade Gao/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Oct. 30, 2023, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-10-31/ty-article/in-the-chinese-digital-world-israel-is-no-longer-on-the-map/0000018b-8643-d805-a98f-b6db4e2f0000">reports began to circulate</a> that <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-10-31/ty-article/in-the-chinese-digital-world-israel-is-no-longer-on-the-map/0000018b-8643-d805-a98f-b6db4e2f0000">Israel was missing from from the mapping services</a> provided by Chinese tech companies Baidu and Alibaba, effectively signaling – or so some believed – that Beijing was siding with Hamas over Israel in the ongoing war.</p>
<p>Within hours, Chinese officials <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/china-map-israel-gaza-conflict-denial-1839849">began to push back</a> on that narrative, pointing out that the names do appear on the country’s official maps and that the maps offered by China’s tech companies had not changed at all since the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas. Indeed, the <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/topic/china-foreign-policy">Chinese Foreign Ministry</a> took the opportunity to go further, emphasizing that China was not taking sides in the conflict. Rather, Beijing said it respected both Israel’s right to self defense and the rights of the Palestinian people under international humanitarian law.</p>
<p>This assertion of balance and even-handedness should have come as a surprise to no one. It has been the bedrock of <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3210855/china-pulls-balancing-act-middle-east-ties-how-long">China’s strategic approach to the Middle East</a> for more than a decade, during which time Beijing has sought to portray itself as a friend to all in the region and the enemy of none. </p>
<p>But the map episode underscores a problem Beijing faces over the current crisis. The <a href="https://www.eurasiareview.com/26102023-new-power-polarization-in-israel-hamas-crisis-analysis/">polarization that has set in</a> over this conflict – in both the Middle East itself <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2023/10/26/israel-hamas-war-the-danger-of-political-polarization-in-france_6205255_23.html">and around</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/29/gaza-protest-demonstration-ceasefire-israel-hamas-offensive/">the world</a> – is making Beijing’s strategic approach to the Middle East increasingly difficult to sustain. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.macalester.edu/politicalscience/facultystaff/andrewlatham/">scholar who teaches classes on China’s foreign policy</a>, I believe that the Israel-Hamas war is posing the sternest test yet <strong>of</strong> President Xi Jinping’s Middle East strategy – that to date has been centered around the <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2023/01/no-china-hasnt-shifted-its-approach-to-iran/">concept of “balanced diplomacy</a>.” Growing <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/china-weibo-social-media-israel-palestine-support-blame-war-gaza-2023-10">pro-Palestinian sentiment</a> in China – and the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/chinas-response-to-the-israel-hamas-conflict-reflects-its-longstanding-support-for-palestine">country’s historic sympathies</a> in the region – suggest that if Xi is forced off the impartiality road, he will side with the Palestinians over the Israelis.</p>
<p>But it is a choice Beijing would rather not make – and for wise economic and foreign policy reasons. Making such a choice would, I believe, effectively mark the end of China’s decade-long effort to positioning itself as an <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/01/xi-jinping-has-transformed-chinas-middle-east-policy/">influential “helpful fixer” in the region</a> – an outside power that seeks to broker peace deals and create a truly inclusive regional economic and security order.</p>
<h2>Beijing’s objectives and strategies</h2>
<p>Whereas in decades past the conventional wisdom in diplomatic circles was that China was not that invested in the Middle East, this has not been true since about 2012. From that time onward, China has <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/01/xi-jinping-has-transformed-chinas-middle-east-policy/">invested considerable diplomatic energy</a> building its influence in the region.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two men in suits shake hands in front of Chinese and Israeli flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557348/original/file-20231102-15-ujguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557348/original/file-20231102-15-ujguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557348/original/file-20231102-15-ujguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557348/original/file-20231102-15-ujguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557348/original/file-20231102-15-ujguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557348/original/file-20231102-15-ujguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557348/original/file-20231102-15-ujguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu shakes hands with China’s President Xi Jinping in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinas-president-xi-jinping-and-israels-prime-minister-news-photo/655959948?adppopup=true">Etienne Oliveau/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Beijing’s overall strategic vision for the Middle East is one in which U.S. influence is significantly reduced while China’s is significantly enhanced.</p>
<p>On the one hand, this is merely a regional manifestation of a global vision – as set out in a series of Chinese foreign policy initiatives such as the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/the-community-of-common-destiny-in-xi-jinpings-new-era/">Community of Common Destiny</a>, <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/theres-more-to-chinas-new-global-development-initiative-than-meets-the-eye/">Global Development Initiative</a>, <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/how-beijings-newest-global-initiatives-seek-to-remake-the-world-order/">Global Security Initiative</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/19/xi-china-global-civilization-cultural-history-rebrand/">Global Civilization Initiative</a> – all of which are designed, in part at least, to appeal to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-global-south-is-on-the-rise-but-what-exactly-is-the-global-south-207959">countries in the Global South</a> that feel increasingly alienated from the U.S.-led rules-based international order.</p>
<p>It is a vision grounded in fears that a continuation of United States dominance in the Middle East would threaten China’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/11/business/china-oil-saudi-arabia-iran.html">access to the region’s oil and gas</a> exports.</p>
<p>That isn’t to say that Beijing is seeking to displace the United States as the dominant power in the region. That is infeasible given the power of the dollar and the U.S.’s longstanding relations with some of the region’s biggest economies.</p>
<p>Rather, China’s stated plan is to <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/multialigned-middle-east-china-influence">promote multi-alignment</a> among countries in the region – that is to encourage individual nations to engage with China in areas such as infrastructure and trade. Doing so not only creates relationships between China and players in the region, it also weakens any incentives to join exclusive U.S.-led blocs.</p>
<p>Beijing seeks to promote multi-alignment through what is described in Chinese government documents as “<a href="https://www.sinification.com/p/chinas-middle-east-policy-by-peking">balanced diplomacy</a>” and “<a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/10/26/how-china-sees-gaza">positive balancing</a>.”</p>
<p>Balanced diplomacy entails not taking sides in various conflicts – including the Israeli-Palestinian one – and not making any enemies. Positive balancing centers on pursuing closer cooperation with one regional power, say Iran in the belief that this will incentivize others – for example, Arab Gulf countries – to follow suit.</p>
<h2>China’s Middle East success</h2>
<p>Prior to to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel, Beijing’s strategy was beginning to pay considerable dividends. </p>
<p>In 2016, China entered <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cesa/eng/zt/2/t1335502.htm">a comprehensive strategic partnership</a> with Saudi Arabia and in 2020 signed a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/11/world/asia/china-iran-trade-military-deal.html">25-year cooperation</a> agreement with Iran. Over that same timespan, Beijing has expanded economic ties with a host of other Gulf countries including <a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-01-11/Chinese-FM-holds-talks-with-Bahrain-counterpart-16JAOaORhJu/index.html">Bahrain</a>, <a href="http://www.news.cn/english/2021-10/27/c_1310271095.htm">Qatar</a>, the <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/como/eng/news/t1579379.htm">United Arab Emirates</a>, <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1219137.shtml">Kuwait</a> and <a href="http://arabic.news.cn/2022-04/29/c_1310578844.htm">Oman</a>.</p>
<p>Beyond the Gulf, China has also deepened its economic ties with Egypt, to the point where it is now the <a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-03/23/content_28648386.htm">largest investor</a> in the Suez Canal Area Development Project. It has also invested in <a href="https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/china-s-iraq-investments-and-its-growing-foothold-in-the-middle-east-56150">reconstruction projects in Iraq</a> and <a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2022/01/16/syria-joins-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/">Syria</a>.</p>
<p>Earlier this year, China brokered a deal to re-establish diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran – a major breakthrough and one that <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-longterm-partnership-with-us-fades-saudi-arabia-seeks-to-diversify-its-diplomacy-and-recent-deals-with-china-iran-and-russia-fit-this-strategy-202211">set China up as a major mediator</a> in the region. </p>
<p>In fact, following that success, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/netanyahu-says-hes-invited-china-emphasises-us-israels-key-ally-2023-06-27/">Beijing began to position itself</a> as a potential broker of peace between Israel and the Palestinians.</p>
<h2>The impact of the Israel-Hamas War</h2>
<p>The Israel-Hamas war, however, has complicated China’s approach to the Middle East.</p>
<p>Beijing’s initial response to the conflict was to continue with its balanced diplomacy. In the aftermath of the Oct. 7 attack, China’s leaders <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/israel-china-conflict-neutrality-socialmedia-middleeast-1833150">did not condemn Hamas</a>, instead they urged both sides to “exercise restraint” and to embrace a “two-state solution.”</p>
<p>This is consistent with Beijing’s long-standing policy of “<a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-09/02/c_139336538.htm">non-interference</a>” in other countries’ internal affairs and its fundamental strategic approach to the region. </p>
<p>But the neutral stance jarred with the approach adopted by the United States and some European nations – which pushed China for a firmer line. </p>
<p>Under pressure from <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/26/politics/blinken-wang-yi-meeting/index.html">U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken</a>, among others, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated China’s view that <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/202310/t20231031_11171195.html">every country has the right to self-defense</a>. But he qualified this by stating that Israel “should abide by international humanitarian law and protect the safety of civilians.” </p>
<p>And that qualification reflects a shift in the tone from Beijing, which has moved progressively toward making statements that are sympathetic to the Palestinians and critical of Israel. On Oct. 25, China <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-china-veto-us-push-un-action-israel-gaza-2023-10-25/">used it veto power at the United Nations</a> to block a U.S. resolution calling for a humanitarian pause on the grounds that it failed to call on Israel to lift is siege on Gaza.</p>
<p>China’s U.N. ambassador, Zhang Jun, explained the decision <a href="http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/hyyfy/202310/t20231026_11168489.htm">was based on</a> the “strong appeals of the entire world, in particular the Arab countries.”</p>
<h2>Championing the Global South</h2>
<p>Such a shift is unsurprising given Beijing’s economic concerns and its geopolitical ambitions.</p>
<p>China is much more heavily dependent on <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/03/20/potential-inroads-and-pitfalls-of-china-s-foray-into-middle-east-diplomacy-pub-89316">trade with the numerous states across the Middle East and North Africa</a> it has established economic ties <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/isr">than it is with Israel</a>. </p>
<p>Should geopolitical pressures push China to the point where it must decide between Israel and the Arab world, Beijing has powerful economic incentives to side with the latter.</p>
<p>But China has another powerful incentive to side with the Palestinians. Beijing <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=33516">harbors a desire to be seen as a champion</a> of the Global South. And siding with Israel risks alienating that <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-global-south-is-on-the-rise-but-what-exactly-is-the-global-south-207959">increasingly important constituency</a>. </p>
<p>In countries across Africa, Latin America and beyond, the Palestinians’ struggle against Israel is seen as akin to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/10/27/israel-palestinians-race-colonialism-black-people/">fighting colonization</a> or <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114702">resisting “apartheid</a>.” Siding with Israel would, under that lens, put China on the side of the colonial oppressor. And that, in turn, risks undermining the diplomatic and economic work China has undertaken through its infrastructure development program, the <a href="https://www.ft.com/video/bc00595a-1198-4417-88cc-ea4bd07bf583">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, and effort to encourage more Global South countries to join what is now the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/24/world/europe/brics-expansion-xi-lula.html">BRICS economic bloc</a>.</p>
<p>And while China may not have altered its maps of the Middle East, its diplomats may well be looking at them and wondering if there is still room for balanced diplomacy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216246/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Latham does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Beijing’s tone on the Middle East crisis has shifted since Hamas’s initial attack, becoming increasingly pro-Palestinian.Andrew Latham, Professor of Political Science, Macalester CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2167272023-11-02T19:13:43Z2023-11-02T19:13:43ZThe ‘drums of war’ are receding, but Anthony Albanese still faces many uncertainties on his trip to China<p>Fifty years ago this week, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam visited the People’s Republic of China, establishing a relationship that has become mutually beneficial in terms of economic growth and development to both China and Australia. </p>
<p>It was in many ways a bold step into the unknown. While the two economies are clearly complementary, their political systems are very different, as today’s prime minister, Anthony Albanese, repeatedly points out. </p>
<p>Prior to Labor’s election victory in 2022, the Coalition government struggled to manage the necessary ambiguity in Australia-China relations, determining that politics (and in some cases ideology) had to be more important than economics. </p>
<p>Albanese’s visit to Beijing, starting this weekend, should be welcomed as it signals an alternative approach to the outright hostility that characterised much of Australia-China relations after 2017.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ping-pong-diplomacy-australian-table-tennis-players-return-to-china-five-decades-after-historic-tour-215537">Ping-pong diplomacy: Australian table tennis players return to China, five decades after historic tour</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>From ‘drums of war’ to ‘stable relations’</h2>
<p>In an Anzac Day 2021 message to his staff, later published to some fanfare in The Australian, the then-Home Affairs secretary, Mike Pezzullo, <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/the-drums-of-war-are-growing-louder/news-story/bf29fb3cf94b89f84eaeb22fd32d9724">warned</a> the “drums of war” were beating. It was a clear reference to Australia’s tensions with China. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1395257486215581697"}"></div></p>
<p>Peter Dutton, the minister of defence, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/25/australian-defence-minister-says-conflict-over-taiwan-involving-china-should-not-be-discounted#:%7E:text=2%20years%20old-,Australian%20defence%20minister%20says%20conflict%20over,China%20%27should%20not%20be%20discounted%27&text=The%20Australian%20defence%20minister%2C%20Peter,%22good%20relations%22%20with%20Beijing.">agreed</a> that war with China over Taiwan “should not be discounted”. In an <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/dutton-vows-to-call-out-beijing-and-declares-everyday-australians-are-with-the-government-20210501-p57o14.html">interview days later</a>, he said the Australian Defence Force was “prepared for action”:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] protection for our borders and our waters to the north and west remains a clear priority.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Echoing the spirit of Winston Churchill’s <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780191826719.001.0001/q-oro-ed4-00002969">1954 comments</a> at the White House that “jaw-jaw is always better than war-war”, the Albanese government has rejected this perspective of the Morrison government.</p>
<p>The new government’s <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/albanese-to-head-to-china-within-months-after-accepting-xi-jinping-s-invitation-20230907-p5e2n1.html">formula</a> is to “work towards productive and stable relations with China based on mutual benefit and respect”. Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong have both emphasised that Australia will cooperate where it can and differ where it must.</p>
<p>Given the government’s commitment to the US alliance, this difference with its predecessor may seem little more than rhetorical. But rhetoric in international political relations can carry substantial weight. This is especially true during periods of geopolitical instability, such as the world is experiencing now.</p>
<h2>Room for cooperation</h2>
<p>This wider context puts necessary limits around what the government might hope to achieve – and what Australia should expect – from Albanese’s trip to Beijing. </p>
<p>The emergence of an explicit “strategic competition” between the US and China, and the role of Australia in that competition through AUKUS, means the days of a more open and easy-going relationship are unlikely to return soon. </p>
<p>But the Australia-US alliance is only one part of the Australia-China relationship, even if it has dominated headlines of late. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/view-from-the-hill-china-australia-relations-head-back-to-room-temperature-with-albaneses-november-visit-216151">View from The Hill: China-Australia relations head back to room temperature, with Albanese's November visit</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Australia and China also have differing priorities and ambitions in the Pacific. And both countries continue to have very complementary economies. These links require a more nuanced management of the relationship, and could certainly be the subject of discussion during Albanese’s visit.</p>
<p>Australian governments have long regarded the Pacific islands as holding great geopolitical and economic importance. Until recently, however, this has not been matched by attention to the concerns and development priorities of these nations, namely the consequences of climate change and the need for basic infrastructure. </p>
<p>This gap has been filled by China through its Belt and Road Initiative. When the Chinese government <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/asia/china-s-wang-yi-seeks-support-for-pacific-security-deal-20220530-p5apjk">attempted to reach</a> security agreements with some of the Pacific islands, the Australian government reacted with a series of official visits, additional economic assistance and the promise of initiatives to develop economic and cultural relationships.</p>
<p>There is certainly room for cooperation between China and Australia in this area. Despite its continued use of fossil fuels, China has developed a sizeable renewable energy industry, far greater than Australia as a proportion of energy production. </p>
<p>The two countries could also cooperate in the provision of development assistance to the Pacific.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1719107257638764755"}"></div></p>
<h2>Why the trade relationship matters to both sides</h2>
<p>The bilateral trade relationship will definitely be on the table for discussion in Beijing. China is Australia’s largest trading partner, <a href="https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/AUS">accounting for</a> 34% of all exports and 28% of imports. </p>
<p>More importantly, Australia is one of few countries that has a major <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/28/australias-exports-to-china-are-jumping-despite-their-trade-fight.html">trade surplus</a> with China. In 2022-23, Australia’s surplus on the trade of goods with China was around <a href="https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/international-trade/international-trade-goods/aug-2023#">A$87 billion</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/bring-on-the-year-of-the-rabbit-why-theres-new-hope-and-prosperity-tipped-for-australia-china-relations-197892">Bring on the Year of the Rabbit: why there's new hope and prosperity tipped for Australia-China relations</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Despite the rhetoric of the Morrison government portraying China as a threat to Australia, the disappearance of this economic relationship would pose an equally significant challenge. This has only been reinforced by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/oct/30/australia-eu-free-trade-deal-collapses-g7-fta-european-union">collapse of talks</a> to establish a free-trade agreement between Australia and the European Union in recent days.</p>
<p>For the moment, trade is one aspect of the relationship that is equally important for the Chinese leadership, despite the imbalance in the size of the two economies. While the import of Australian resources is clearly significant – and there is some evidence the tariffs China imposed proved harmful to its own economy – the reason for China’s attention on trade lies elsewhere. </p>
<p>The Chinese government is currently seeking to join the <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership">Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement</a>. This is the successor free trade association to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which then-US President Donald Trump withdrew from in 2017. To that end, China needs the support of member states, including Australia.</p>
<p>In a series of meetings between Australian and Chinese officials this year, which led to the first <a href="https://apnews.com/article/australia-china-resume-dialogue-relationship-6f0f3e763eadfcb734c1b55aabff2ea5">high-level dialogue</a> between the countries since 2020, there’s been hope that a bilateral basis for renewed stability is now emerging. </p>
<p>Without these indications, Albanese would presumably not be visiting Beijing now. It may not be as dramatic a move as Whitlam’s visit in 1973, but inevitably there is an element of a step into the unknown.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216727/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David S G Goodman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are limits around what Australia might hope to achieve and what it should expect in Beijing, but there is room for cooperation.David S G Goodman, Director, China Studies Centre, Professor of Chinese Politics, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2160142023-10-26T11:42:59Z2023-10-26T11:42:59ZChina’s Belt and Road Initiative turns 10: Xi announces 8 new priorities, continues push for global influence<p>China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which now includes <a href="https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/?cookie-state-change=1698234725172">44 African countries</a>, got under way 10 years ago. President Xi Jinping launched it in 2013 with a <a href="https://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2013-09/08/content_2483565.htm">first speech</a> in Kazakhstan and a <a href="https://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2013-10/03/content_2500118.htm">second one</a> in Indonesia. The initiative is something of a trial-by-doing development policy enigma: it keeps China watchers chasing Xi’s next move to help define just what it is.</p>
<p>The two speeches, however, give some lasting guidance. The Kazakhstan speech <a href="https://www.sydney.edu.au/content/dam/corporate/documents/china-studies-centre/working-paper/lauren_johnston_may_2022.pdf">outlined</a> five elements of the “Belt”: strengthening policy communication; road connectivity; currency circulation; people-to-people ties; and promoting unimpeded trade. In Indonesia, the five points were more abstract and diplomacy-oriented. They were framed as pursuing win-win cooperation, mutual assistance and affinity, and remaining open and inclusive. </p>
<p>So, what’s happened since then? As an economist with a keen interest in the political economy of <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Jz1DgSsAAAAJ&hl=en">China-Africa</a> relations, I have <a href="https://blogs.deakin.edu.au/maritime-order-conference/wp-content/uploads/sites/281/2018/05/Lauren-Johnston-update.pdf">studied</a> the Belt and Road Initiative since its inception.</p>
<p>Among the more tangible achievements so far is fostering “road connectivity”. China has helped to <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0965856419307001">finance and construct</a> highways, rail and energy projects in various countries. People, goods and commodities flow more smoothly in many places than before, within and between countries. But <a href="https://www.aiddata.org/how-china-lends">at a cost</a>. Most of these projects have been funded by loans from Chinese banks, including the China Export Import Bank and China Development Bank.</p>
<p>Marking the 10th anniversary at a forum in October, Xi <a href="https://english.news.cn/20231018/7bfc16ac51d443c6a7a00ce25c972104/c.html#:%7E:text=China%20can%20only%20do%20well,heights%20in%20their%20opening%2Dup.">outlined</a> the progress of the initiative. He also made a commitment to raise the quality of development cooperation, and provided more details on people-to-people ties and on areas of policy dialogue especially.</p>
<p>Much is made of a fall in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/rise-and-fall-bri">spending</a> on the Belt and Road Initiative. But if these promises take shape, the early big spending years may come to reflect a down payment. That down payment was made in times of <a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/series/china-update/chinas-new-sources-economic-growth-vol-1">low interest rates</a> and kick-started some <a href="https://www.sc.com/en/feature/landmark-achievements-of-the-belt-and-road/">important and highly visible</a> infrastructural projects. </p>
<p>Xi’s announcement at this year’s forum offered old and new news for the Belt and Road Initiative and its signatories. For African signatories (and their regional organisations and development banks) to make the most of what China is now offering, they need to understand the origins of the Belt and Road Initiative and also what has and has not changed since. </p>
<p>In addition, Xi’s announcement comes at a time when China’s relationship with the African continent is changing, as I outlined in a recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-africa-strategy-is-shifting-from-extraction-to-investment-driven-from-the-industry-rich-hunan-region-209044">article</a>. The change sees the China-Africa relationship move beyond a focus on oil, extractive commodities and large infrastructure projects. It shifts attention to industrial production, job creation and investments that lead to African exports, and productivity-enhancing agricultural and digital technology opportunities. This model, called the “Hunan model”, is named after the province in southern China that is leading the push. This also helps to explain why China’s lending is moving from bilateral development finance to include more commercial and trade finance lending. </p>
<h2>Comparing promises 10 years on</h2>
<p>Xi made eight major commitments at the October 2023 forum. More than half of these draw directly from the policy focus areas announced a decade ago.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Xi promised to build a multidimensional Belt and Road connectivity. He referred to roads, rail, port and air transport and related logistics and trade corridors. </p></li>
<li><p>He promised to open China’s economy more to the world. Higher trade levels would be one way. Alongside a new emphasis on the digital economy, Xi added that China would establish pilot zones for e-commerce-based cooperation. In Africa, a guide to those may be provided by the two existing digital commerce hubs set up by Alibaba in Ethiopia and Rwanda under its <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/794498/summary">electronic World Trade Platform Initiative</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>He spoke of “practical cooperation”. This seems to refer to financing for expensive infrastructure projects, smaller livelihood projects and technical and vocational training. This has an <a href="https://www.sydney.edu.au/content/dam/corporate/documents/china-studies-centre/working-paper/lauren_johnston_may_2022.pdf">aspect</a> of crossover with currency circulation, people-to-people ties, unimpeded trade and more. </p></li>
<li><p>Xi’s recent speech also promised to support people-to-people exchanges. This is a <a href="https://www.sydney.edu.au/content/dam/corporate/documents/china-studies-centre/working-paper/lauren_johnston_may_2022.pdf">direct take</a> from the first launch speech of 2013. But he added detail about establishing arts and culture alliances. Also that China would host a “Liangzhu Forum” to enhance dialogue on civilisation.</p></li>
<li><p>Finally, in line with the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/app5.265">earlier commitment</a> to elevated policy dialogue, Xi promised to strengthen institutional building for international Belt and Road Initiative cooperation. This relates to building platforms for cooperation in energy, taxation, finance, green development, disaster reduction, anti-corruption, think-tanks, media, culture, and other fields. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Where extending sovereign lending may present a challenge at the moment while the legacy of debt sustainability issues is addressed, Chinese policy banks are continuing to lend to institutions of the global south. For example, in the lead up to the forum the <a href="https://www.afreximbank.com/afreximbank-and-china-development-bank-sign-us400-million-loan-to-support-africa-smes/">China Development Bank agreed a US$400mn loan to Afreximbank</a> to support small and medium enterprise trade efforts, with an eye on the goal of “unimpeded trade” and Africa’s own regional integration efforts under the African Continental Free Trade Area.</p>
<p>Beyond the promises made in Xi’s speech to this year’s forum, <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/10/18/china-announces-billions-in-investments-in-developing-countries-and-pledges-market-opening">elevated funding for China’s policy banks was announced</a>. Further, agreements made between participants also signal commitment to the original principles of the Belt and Road Initiative. For example, Xi’s speech in Kazakhstan in 2013 called for elevated currency circulation. China has not only developed its mobile payments ecosystem, but is now <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/06/beijing-s-global-ambitions-for-central-bank-digital-currencies-are-growing-clearer-pub-85503">testing</a> its emerging central bank digital currency, the eCNY, at home and abroad. </p>
<h2>New promises</h2>
<p>There are three new policy promises added to those of a decade ago. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>China will promote green development, including green infrastructure, green energy, and green transportation. It will hold a Belt and Road Initiative Green Innovation Conference and establish a network of experts. China also promised to provide 100,000 training opportunities in areas of green development.</p></li>
<li><p>China will continue to advance scientific and technological innovation. It will hold a conference on Science and Technology Exchange, and increase the number of joint laboratories that support exchange and training for young scientists. Xi also promised that China would propose a Global Initiative for Artificial Intelligence Governance, and promote secure artificial intelligence development.</p></li>
<li><p>China will promote integrity-based cooperation. This would include publishing details of Belt and Road achievements and prospects, and establishing a system of evaluating compliance. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>These new areas are of <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8462.12325">increasing economic importance to China, amid rapid population ageing</a> especially, and competition with high-income countries. </p>
<h2>The future</h2>
<p>Where the <a href="https://www.sydney.edu.au/content/dam/corporate/documents/china-studies-centre/working-paper/lauren_johnston_may_2022.pdf">twin launch speeches of the Belt and Road Initiative</a> had very broad agendas, Xi’s speech at the 10-year anniversary revealed progress on earlier themes and a push to elevate the quality of development. There was more detail especially on people-to-people ties and on areas of policy dialogue to be fostered.</p>
<p>He added some new areas such as artificial intelligence governance, green development, e-commerce, and greater emphasis on scientific and tech cooperation. These new areas are becoming more economically important to China.</p>
<p>Comparing the new policy signals with the earlier ones implies that the initiative is by design adaptable. Further, since the COVID pandemic, some countries that had benefited from China’s new level of Belt and Road lending have run into debt problems and interest rates have risen. This signals China’s increased interest in lending to regional and locally present multilateral development and commercial banks that are relatively well positioned to target local entrepreneurs and development. In Africa, this offers a new chance to evolve strategies that can sustainably tap Chinese resources towards fostering the independent advance of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement and local socioeconomic development.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216014/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lauren Johnston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Areas such as artificial intelligence, green development, e-commerce, and tech cooperation have been added.Lauren Johnston, Associate Professor, China Studies Centre, University of Sydney; Affiliate Researcher, South African Institute of International AffairsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2164412023-10-26T09:40:46Z2023-10-26T09:40:46ZGrattan on Friday: Cost-of-living crisis is the dragon the government can’t slay<p>At a White House briefing early this week, Joe Biden’s press secretary, Karine Jean-Pierre, was asked whether there’d been any thought of postponing Anthony Albanese’s state visit because of the Middle East conflict. </p>
<p>No, she said, highlighting the importance of alliances and reassuring that the president could handle more than one thing at a time. </p>
<p>From Albanese’s vantage point it’s extraordinary that, in the space of a fortnight, he’s breaking bread with the two most powerful men in the world, Biden and China’s Xi Jinping. </p>
<p>Of course, when an Australian prime minister is invited to Washington, he or she has to go. This trip, partly a consolation prize for Biden having to pull out the Quad meeting earlier this year, has been particularly important as Australia tries to push along the implementation of the AUKUS agreement.</p>
<p>But, domestically, the timing is not great for Albanese. As pictures came in of the glamorous black-tie White House state dinner (later overshadowed by another dreadful shooting in America), many Australian families were facing a fresh bout of anxiety about their mortgage payments. </p>
<p>Wednesday’s September-quarter figures, showing inflation is still uncomfortably high, set off speculation about whether the Reserve Bank will increase interest rates again, either after its meeting on Tuesday week, Melbourne Cup Day, or in December. </p>
<p>The bank is usually Delphic about its intentions, and new governor Michele Bullock is showing herself a master at that game. </p>
<p>In her first major speech as governor, delivered before the inflation figures, Bullock said the bank’s “focus remains on bringing inflation back to target within a reasonable timeframe, while keeping employment growing”.</p>
<p>It was possible this could be done without changing the cash rate, she said. But there were risks and the bank’s board “will not hesitate to raise the cash rate further if there is a material upward revision to the outlook for inflation”. The board would receive more information before its meeting that would be important for this assessment, she said. </p>
<p>She left similar uncertainty when she appeared before a Senate estimates hearing on Thursday, saying the inflation number “was pretty much where we thought it would come out”. As for whether it made a rate rise more or less likely, “I wouldn’t like to say more or less likely – we’re still looking at it.”</p>
<p>Bullock has her standing on the line with this decision. As her predecessor, Philip Lowe, found, misjudgments can bring both reputational damage and public odium for the bank’s governor, who is much more an exposed public figure these days. </p>
<p>Treasurer Jim Chalmers had multiple messages after the inflation number. The annual figure was in line with expectations, he said, but inflation was too high and would be so for too long. These figures didn’t take in the fallout from the Middle East conflict – that’s an unknown still to come. He emphasised (drawing on the Australian Bureau of Statistics data) that the government’s various measures (energy relief, child care and the like) are “taking some of the edge off these pressures that Australians are feeling”.</p>
<p>The point is, however, that whatever the government has done is for the average household only at the margin. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/politics-with-michelle-grattan-treasurer-jim-chalmers-on-michele-bullocks-appointment-as-reserve-bank-governor-209793">Politics with Michelle Grattan: Treasurer Jim Chalmers on Michele Bullock's appointment as Reserve Bank Governor</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Many people have already moved from fixed low-interest loans to higher rate loans. But many are still facing that cliff. According to Reserve Bank data, about 520,000 loans are estimated to roll over in the second half of 2023 and another 450,000 loans will roll onto higher rates in 2024.</p>
<p>The government hopes Bullock will hold the line on rates in the next two months. A pre-Christmas rise would really put pressure on it. It mightn’t be responsible for the trouble but it rode to power promising to relieve cost-of-living pressures. Since then those pressures have become a great deal worse. </p>
<p>If this issue were to take a serious toll on Labor’s popularity over coming months, that would be likely to restrict the government’s scope to pursue its broader objectives. </p>
<p>Maybe Chalmers had this in mind when he spoke on Wednesday at the Political Book of the Year function (where the winner was Niki Savva for Bulldozed, her account of Scott Morrison’s demise). Chalmers reflected that the mood was rather more sombre than on the previous such occasion. </p>
<p>“Part of that, of course, is the recognition that people are under pressure, in some cases very serious pressure, we saw that again in today’s inflation numbers and addressing this challenge is our highest priority,” he told the audience.</p>
<p>“But also because, on top of this, we’ve had the Voice knocked back. There’s a new and escalating conflict in the Middle East, risking innocent lives and putting pressure on communities here at home. And we just lost one of the finest Australians, a wonderful Queenslander, Bill Hayden.”</p>
<p>Chalmers went on to observe that “political writing is writing about power”, and said: “The best speech delivered off the cuff in this room [at the National Press Club] was about power and purpose.</p>
<p>"When Paul Keating stood up here at the end of 1990, surrounded by journalists, he was mourning the loss of Chris Higgins [treasury secretary who had just died], and he spoke of our generational responsibilities to lead. Marrying-up power and purpose, in the service of something important.”</p>
<p>Chalmers recalled “the first time I met Paul, when interviewing him for my thesis. He gave me some free advice that went something like ‘why don’t you stop thinking about power and start exercising it?’”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-treasurer-bill-hayden-set-labor-on-the-path-to-economic-rationalism-216150">As treasurer, Bill Hayden set Labor on the path to economic rationalism</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Both Hayden and Keating have been role models for Chalmers. As the final treasurer in the Whitlam government, Hayden pursued budgetary rigour (in his case in the most difficult circumstances). Keating was the driver (with PM Bob Hawke) of an impressive agenda of economic reforms. </p>
<p>These days the public appetite for change is not what it was in the 1980s, when Keating was pushing through his measures. If the cost-of-living crisis persists for a long time, the opportunity for reforms will be further constrained. The political cost, however, could extend well beyond that. </p>
<p>So far, the public haven’t turned their wrath onto the government. The cost-of-living dragon has wreaked its havoc on families. If it starts to consume the government’s support, it could eat a lot of political capital very quickly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216441/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Wednesday’s September-quarter figures, showing inflation is still uncomfortably high, set off speculation about whether the Reserve Bank will increase interest rates againMichelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2161872023-10-24T12:27:10Z2023-10-24T12:27:10ZPutin and Xi: Beijing Belt and Road meeting highlighted Russia’s role as China’s junior partner<p>The third <a href="https://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/201705ydylforum/index.htm">Belt and Road Forum</a> held in Beijing recently <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/which-world-leaders-came-to-chinas-3rd-belt-and-road-forum/">attracted fewer heads of state</a> or senior officials than the previous forums in 2017 and 2019. There were 11 European presidents and prime ministers at the 2019 forum. But last week’s forum attracted only three. </p>
<p>This is understandable, given that the two-day meeting took place against the backdrop of high tension in the Middle East caused by the conflict between Israel and Hamas as well as the war in Ukraine – both wars which have highlighted differences in views on regional and global order between the west and a number of non-western countries.</p>
<p>One enthusiastic participant was the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. For Putin, the forum provided an opportunity to meet other leaders without fear of arrest, given his indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes which had kept him away from September’s Brics summit in South Africa. </p>
<p>While Putin was just one among 20 or so world leaders at the Forum, he was photographed at Xi Jinping’s right hand and given a prominent place in proceedings. Delivering a speech at the forum immediately after the Chinese president and staging a press conference for the Russian media before boarding the plane to Moscow, Putin attempted to convey the message of tight cooperation with China.</p>
<p>He was keen to remind his audience of Russia’s credentials as a UN security council member, together with China, responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. He also noted that he and Xi had discussed both the situation in Gaza and the events in Ukraine, describing these situations as “common threats” which strengthen Sino-Russian “interaction”. </p>
<p>Putin drew particular attention to the high bilateral trade volume between Russia and China, which has reached nearly US$200 billion (£163 billion). This sounds impressive until you remember that the bulk of this trade consists of export of Russian hydrocarbons and other raw materials to China. This is nothing new – in fact trade in hydrocarbons between Russia and China have been boosted by western sanctions.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1714126930625384957"}"></div></p>
<p>Perhaps the most instructive aspect of the visit was Putin’s explicit acknowledgement of the different roles played by Moscow and Beijing in international politics. Putin described the Russia-dominated Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) – a concept Moscow has promoted as a response to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that would fuse the Eurasian Economic Union with the BRI – as a regional or “local” project. Meanwhile he happily described the BRI as “global” in scale. </p>
<p>For the past decade, Russian policymakers and experts have consistently held up the GEP as symbolising Russia’s equality with China. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has described it as “the creation of a continent-wide architecture”.</p>
<p>Putin’s words, coupled with the lack of any meaningful results of the meeting (bar a contract on food and agricultural products which has yet to be confirmed by Beijing), illustrate the extent to which Russia’s war against Ukraine has deepened the asymmetry between the two powers.</p>
<h2>Holding back?</h2>
<p>The lack of genuine progress on the issue of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-finalising-power-siberia-2-gas-pipeline-route-china-novak-2023-09-06/">Power of Siberia-2 pipeline</a>, which will transport gas from Russia’s Yamal gas fields, which used to supply Europe, via Mongolia to China, was further evidence of this asymmetry. Xi was kind enough to express hope that the project could proceed quickly. But he did not outline any concrete steps in that direction. </p>
<p>China’s agreement, if confirmed by a contract, would have been the most clear signal of Beijing’s strategic support for Russia, especially given Gazprom’s shrinking European market. By prolonging negotiations, China seems to be trying to extract specific concessions from Russia, related to the price of gas, possible Chinese ownership of gas fields in Russia, or Beijing’s acquisition of shares in Gazprom. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in May 2023, China revived the prospect of building the so-called <a href="https://thepeoplesmap.net/project/central-asia-china-gas-pipeline-line-d/">section “D”</a>, enlarging the capacity of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline system, which will bring gas from Turkmenistan via Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to China, emphasising China’s other sources of energy supplies.</p>
<p>While continuing to offer Moscow political support and not interfering with Chinese companies’ attempts to take advantage of the exodus of western companies to increase their presence in the Russian market, Beijing has clearly attempted to prevent any embarrassment related to Russia. A gas contract would have overshadowed the BRI summit and generated a strong reaction in the US and Europe, potentially strengthening China hawks in the west. </p>
<h2>Beijing making its move</h2>
<p>Putin’s delegation was full of ministers and CEOs of key Russian enterprises, from Rosneft and Gazprom to Novatek, so the conclusion of commercial agreements can’t be ruled out, but the probability is low. It is clear that Beijing does not want to be seen to be openly supporting Russia in resisting and bypassing western sanctions.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1714552334489923959"}"></div></p>
<p>In the 1990s, Russian officials regularly warned of the dangers of becoming a “<a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/why-putin-turning-russia-chinese-client-state-and-how-stop-it">raw materials appendage</a>” to China. Today the economic benefits that Russian elites gain from hydrocarbons mean this danger has now <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2023/04/13/russias-kowtowing-to-china-energy-and-beyond/">become a reality</a>. Russia has locked itself into an economic partnership in which it is the supplicant, a role that Moscow seems happy to play.</p>
<p>But the BRI is not just about economics. It is also a key part of Beijing’s bid to project itself as a “global responsible power”. Beijing has recently outlined what it calls its “<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230221_11028348.html">Global Security Initiative</a>” which explicitly rejects the Western rules-based order. This comes alongside a “<a href="http://ws.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202306/P020230627414336020074.pdf">Global Development Initiative</a>” and, nested within these, a “<a href="http://mv.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgsd/202305/t20230520_11080670.htm">Global Civilisation initiative</a>”. <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/chinas-new-global-initiatives-mask-an-intrusive-agenda/articleshow/104360749.cms">Taken together</a> these question western universalist ideas about human rights and democracy. </p>
<p>China’s thinking has gained traction among many countries of the global south, providing a developmental path without lectures on human rights. China speaks to these countries using its dual identity as both a rapidly developing power and a member of the UN security council. By comparison, notwithstanding its security council position, Russia has few tangible benefits to offer these countries. Last week’s BRI forum has driven this point home.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216187/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The forum made it clear that Russia is increasingly becoming a client state for China.Marcin Kaczmarski, Lecturer in Security Studies, University of GlasgowNatasha Kuhrt, Senior Lecturer in International Peace & Security, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2134712023-09-13T08:37:21Z2023-09-13T08:37:21ZPolitics with Michelle Grattan: Asia expert Richard McGregor on Anthony Albanese’s coming visit to China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548011/original/file-20230913-17-ou8076.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1%2C1100%2C714&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Integrity20.org</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Anthony Albanese has now confirmed he’ll be heading to China before the end of the year. He is the first Australian prime minister to visit since 2016, and it is the culmination of an improvement in China-Australia relations since the change of government.</p>
<p>In this podcast, we’re joined by Richard McGregor, an expert on China and senior fellow at the Lowy Institute. He was at the high level dialogue attended by Australian and Chinese retired government officials and others in Beijing on September 6-7.</p>
<p>McGregor says the Albanese trip will be particularly important, given the hiatus between prime ministerial visits.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We haven’t had a prime minister in China for six, seven years. We all know why that’s the case, it’s not just COVID. It’s also because Australia’s relationship with China went downhill slowly, then quickly to the point where we didn’t have any political dialogue at all for about two to three years.</p>
<p>Our position in South East Asia, our position in the Pacific and our alliance with the United States all are affected by the China relationship. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>While the government has trodden carefully in rebuilding the relationship, McGregor acknowledges there will be risks in the trip. “There are risks, undoubtedly, we’re going up to another level in what the Chinese call a ‘reset’ [and] we studiously call ‘stabilisation’.” </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Chinese see value in stabilising relations with Australia inasmuch as it sort of turns off a very bad signal that the bilateral fight was sending to the rest of the world. Australia and China had deep divisions [and] we made a lot of noise about it. </p>
<p>Many countries which normally wouldn’t really take much notice of Australian foreign policy, particularly in Europe and to some extent in a different way in South East Asia, in Japan and South Korea, have all watched Australia closely for lessons about how to manage the downside of the relationship. And I think that for China, it wasn’t working for them as well for all sorts of reasons. </p>
<p>So the election allowed the beginning of the stabilisation and I think the Chinese are taking advantage of that.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Australia and China have been embroiled in a bitter trade dispute since former Prime Minister Scott Morrison pressed for an investigation into the origin of COVID-19 in 2020. Up to $20 billion worth of Australian exports were targeted by the Chinese government. Recently Trade Minister Don Farrell estimated that has come down to $2.5 billion. On the remaining sanctions McGregor sees a mixed picture. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>On the commodities or sectors which are still affected, wine I think is running on its own track – that’s the subject of a World Trade Organisation complaint by Australia. Until we get a draft report with a resolution to that or a decision – Australia seems to expect it will be in our favour – but until we get that we’ll see no movement from China I think. </p>
<p>In the other areas we might get some sort of flashy opening or partial reopening of the punitive trade measures on areas like lobster, around the time Mr. Albanese is to visit. I think that’s a time honoured Chinese technique, to sort of ‘sweeten the tea before it’s drunk’ But no big change I think. </p>
<p>The bulk of [Australian] trade with China, which is dominated by iron ore, LNG and the like, the bulk of that was not affected. That was the fascinating thing about our trade dispute because during that period both sides tried to diversify, and both sides really failed. We still have complementary economies, we sell them stuff that they still need, and China won’t self harm.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While Albanese has flagged there are no concessions in place for the visit, McGregor says if he doesn’t make any progress regarding imprisoned Chinese-Australians Cheng Lei and Yang Hengjun, it will be “embarrassing and damaging” for his reputation: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>This is where the risks of the Albanese trip comes in - Australia has constantly said that we would go to China without any preconditions and I think that’s fair enough. But if six months or so after the trip […] there’s been no movement on the two high-profile detainees Cheng Lei and Yang Hengjun, then I think that would be very embarrassing and damaging for Mr Albanese. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Chinese President Xi Jinping and Albanese have a lot of talking points to cover, and McGregor believes Chinese foreign investment in Australia and climate change will be of particular focus: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>China is a big, complicated country, but it’s a clean energy superpower. 90% of solar panels in the world are manufactured in China. […] Yes, they are struggling to get their emissions down because their economy is still growing. Just one figure, the share of coal-fired power in the Chinese economy has gone down from about the mid 70’s to 50% in recent years. </p>
<p>Foreign investment is a point of conflict. […] I think Australia’s going to be very restrictive in the area of lithium and rare earths. And I think the Chinese will be raising that quite vociferously. I expect the Australian response at the top table will be vague, but we’ve already made it pretty clear that we’re not going to allow, potentially, a country which has been unfriendly and which we we have not a great deal of trust in investing in there and potentially dominating that industry in Australia. </p>
<p>Other than that, both leaders will be laying out, I think, their view of the world, their view of the region, their concerns about instability in the region and the possibility of conflict. There are all sorts of things that Mr. Albanese will have to raise.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213471/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In this podcast, senior fellow from the Lowy Institute and expert on Asia Richard McGregor joins The Conversation to canvass the prime minister's coming trip to China.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.