tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/bosnia-10925/articlesBosnia – The Conversation2024-01-25T13:18:18Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2175172024-01-25T13:18:18Z2024-01-25T13:18:18ZA Western-imposed peace deal in Ukraine risks feeding Russia’s hunger for land – as it did with Serbia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562953/original/file-20231201-26-35fbaf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C5%2C3808%2C2529&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman with flowers walks past a building fortified with sandbags in the Podil neighborhood of Kyiv, Ukraine.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIX%20Russia%20Ukraine%20War%20Daily%20Life/36cd7048eb8347298d1f560a490b4bd7?Query=ukraine%20daily%20life&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=988&currentItemNo=125">AP Photo/Jae C. Hong</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The conflict in Ukraine will soon be heading into its third year with no sign of a ceasefire. Yet it is becoming increasingly clear that many in the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-european-officials-broach-topic-peace-negotiations-ukraine-sources-rcna123628">West are growing impatient</a> <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-endgame-analysis-1.6911021">with the emerged stalemate</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/18/world/europe/europe-military-aid-ukraine.html">reluctant to provide</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/18/world/europe/europe-military-aid-ukraine.html">continued military support</a> to Ukraine.</p>
<p>However, wars do come to an end, often with one side making <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/06/how-end-russias-war-ukraine/fallacy-1-settle-now-all-wars-end-negotiating-table">concessions in exchange for peace</a>. And over the course of the Ukraine war, influential voices in the West – be it those of the late <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/24/henry-kissinger-ukraine-russia-territory-davos/">Henry Kissinger</a>, former President <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2023/03/trump-blurts-out-peace-plan-hand-russia-chunks-of-ukraine.html">Donald Trump</a> or high-ranking NATO official <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ukraine-membership-cede-territory-russia/">Stian Jenssen</a>, to name a few – have raised the prospect of Ukraine having to cede land to Russia in exchange for peace.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://baker.utk.edu/overview/faculty-and-staff/">expert on Western military interventions</a> in transnational ethnic conflicts, I have seen how well-intentioned peace agreements offered to the perceived aggressor can inadvertently plant the seeds for renewed conflict. This is because such agreements can deliver in peace what the aggressor pursues in war: territory. </p>
<p>Rather than resolve the root cause of conflicts, this can reward <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/revanchist-seeking-revengeand-not-just-with-territory-11642775416">revanchism</a> – that is, a state’s policy to reclaim territory it once dominated – and embolden an aggressor to use war to achieve its aim. This is especially true when the West rewards aggression with generous peace agreements. </p>
<p>Take the former Yugoslavia. </p>
<p>It has been more than 20 years since the end of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/excerpt-world-and-yugoslavias-wars">the Yugoslav wars</a>, a series of conflicts that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia. During these wars, Serbia sought to unify large swaths of territories populated by Serbs and non-Serbs into a “Greater Serbia.”</p>
<p>The wars ended with <a href="https://study.com/academy/lesson/the-ten-day-war-slovenian-independence.html">military victories for Slovenia</a> <a href="https://peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/Croatia.pdf">and Croatia</a> over Serbia, and <a href="https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1997/970708/infopres/e-bpfy.htm">NATO intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo</a>. In the cases of the latter countries, NATO intervention was followed by numerous Western-imposed peace plans.</p>
<p>But two decades on, the region <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/3/are-kosovo-and-serbia-on-the-brink-of-war">borders on renewed conflict</a> as Serbia insists that its survival is dependent on it ability to solely <a href="https://www.mod.gov.rs/multimedia/file/staticki_sadrzaj/dokumenta/strategije/2021/Prilog2-StrategijaNacionalneBezbednostiRS-ENG.pdf">represent and protect</a> all Serbs, wherever they live.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of men and women hold candles." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Candles for three killed Serbs in the northern Serb-dominated part of the ethnically divided town of Mitrovica, Kosovo, Sept. 26, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/KosovoSerbiaShootout/99c7b994087c4ba7ac7543d03e180b4b/photo?Query=armed%20attack%20serbia&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=33&currentItemNo=4">AP Photo/Bojan Slavkovic</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Of course, each war is different, and the circumstances surrounding the invasion of Ukraine are unique.</p>
<p>But I believe the examples of Bosnia and Kosovo show that Western-sponsored treaties, when they sacrifice land for peace, can store up trouble for later – especially when it comes to revanchist nations.</p>
<h2>Russia and Serbia revanchism</h2>
<p>Russian and Serbian revanchism has been evident ever since the countries they once dominated – the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, respectively – broke up in the early 1990s.</p>
<p>In 1992, Russia <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/08/02/transdniestria-moldova-and-russia-s-war-in-ukraine-pub-87609">seized Transnistria</a>, the Moscow-backed breakaway part of Moldova that borders southwestern Ukraine, under the pretext of securing peace. The same year, Russia <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Georgia2.htm">intervened in Abkhazia and South Ossetia</a>, autonomous regions within Georgia populated by pro-Russia but non-Georgian peoples, to “end the ethnic fighting.” In 2008, Russia expanded further into Georgia. The same scenario recurred in 2014 when Russia sent forces to Crimea and the Donbas to “protect” ethnic Russians from “<a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/9/3/18088560/ukraine-everything-you-need-to-know">Nazi</a>” hordes.</p>
<p>Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbia has similarly sought to reclaim its dominance of that region. It has done this under various pretexts. Serbia’s decadelong wars began in 1991 and included fighting in Slovenia purportedly to “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/06/28/yugoslav-army-attacks-slovenia-meets-resistance-at-border-posts/bdf68be0-2013-4ba5-98b6-9c22c5699d81/">keep Yugoslavia together</a>”; in Croatia, it was to protect ethnic Serbs from the “<a href="https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/23666/Serbsxasxvictimsx-xgenocidexinxthexrhetoricxofxSlobodanxMilosevic.pdf?sequence=1">fascist</a>” regime; in Bosnia, Serbia claimed to be preventing the founding of an “<a href="https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1751&context=ree">Islamic state</a>”; and in Kosovo, the stated aim was to fight “<a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/fear-and-loathing-belgrade-what-serbian-state-media-say-about-kosovars">terrorists</a>.”</p>
<p>Yet, a quarter of a century on – and despite hopes that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/06/yugoslavia-milosevic-revolution-2000">the fall of former Serbian and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic</a> in 2000 might usher in a more peaceful era – political elites in Serbia continue to pursue the unification of all Serb-populated lands, or at minimum gain the West’s acceptance of a “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/24/serbia-balkans-expansionism-russia-montenegro-elections/">Serb world</a>” – that is, a sphere of Serbian influence in Bosnia, Kosovo and Montenegro where Serbia dominates.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in uniform gestures." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Kosovo police officer guards a road near the village of Banjska in northern Kosovo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/KosovoSerbiaTension/c26eccb374754e3db37a3bc2e6a15ce4/photo?Query=serbia%20war&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=6098&currentItemNo=46">AP Photo/Bojan Slavkovic</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Walking the Balkan path</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/bosnia-herzegovina-dayton-accords/">various peace treaties</a> meant to stabilize and bring lasting peace to Bosnia and Kosovo have, to various degrees, failed, due in no small part, I would argue, to the very terms of settlement.</p>
<p>In Bosnia, the U.S.-brokered <a href="https://www.osce.org/bih/126173">Dayton Accords of 1995</a> brought the Bosnian War to an end. But it also reorganized the state into two subnational units: the majority-ethnic Serbian Republic of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.</p>
<p>The accords awarded 49% of the recently independent Bosnia’s territory to the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-republika-srpska/a-64373205">Republic of Srpska</a> despite Serbs constituting 31% of the general population and having <a href="https://hmh.org/library/research/genocide-in-bosnia-guide/">committed genocide and ethnic cleansing</a> in pursuit of crafting a Serb state within Bosnia.</p>
<p>Now, the Republic of Srpska seeks to secede and contravene the Dayton Accords through the establishment of <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/bosnia-and-herzegovina-report-2022_en">parallel institutions</a> and <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2022-05-11/top-global-official-bosnian-serbs-are-trying-to-secede">the withdrawal of its members</a> from Western-brokered institutions.</p>
<p>In Kosovo, with each European Union-sponsored peace agreement to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo, security threats from Serbia escalate, as evidenced by a recent <a href="https://www.state.gov/condemnation-of-violent-attacks-on-kosovo-police/">armed attack</a> led by Milan Radoičiċ, an associate of Serbia’s president. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, what critics see as Western <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/sep/29/the-flare-up-of-violence-in-kosovo-shows-the-folly-of-the-wests-appeasement-of-serbia">appeasement of Serbia’s revanchism</a> has led to further concessions in regard to Kosovo. In contrast to Bosnia, the Kosovo model involves incremental appeasement through various peace agreements – the <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kosovo%20S2007%20168.pdf">Ahtisaari Plan</a>, <a href="https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/2022">Brussels 1</a> and <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovo-and-serbia_en">2 Agreement</a>, <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-implementation-annex-agreement-path-normalisation-relations-between_en">Ohrid Agreement</a>, and the <a href="https://usercontent.one/wp/www.burimramadani.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/www.burimramadani.com_EU-Draft_Statue_October-2023.pdf">Draft-Statute proposal</a>. These plans offer political concessions to Serbia in exchange for the recognition of Kosovo’s independence.</p>
<h2>The same fate for Ukraine?</h2>
<p>To suggest that a similar fate to Bosnia or Kosovo <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/11/27/why-ukraine-should-not-accept-a-dayton-accords-style-peace">may await Ukraine</a> is not beyond the realms of reality.</p>
<p>Any such solution could be an off-ramp to war, but it would hand Vladimir Putin what he wants: control over Russian-speaking people and key strategic territory in Ukraine.</p>
<p>If the West follows either the Bosnia or Kosovo model for peace for Ukraine, the result would likely be the same: First, it would result in the reorganization of Ukraine into two political-administrative units, one under control of a pro-Western government in Kyiv, the other under the influence or direct control of Moscow. Second, it would see the promotion of complex political arrangements, such as ethnic veto powers, dual sovereignty and international representation, that yield institutional dysfunction and political instability. And third, there would be no robust security deployments or guarantees from the U.S. or NATO to deter future Russian aggression.</p>
<h2>From Kosovo to Kyiv</h2>
<p>The current <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts">Western support</a> for Ukraine’s defense will likely lead to its heavy involvement in any peace negotiations. </p>
<p>But ultimately, the implications of a Western-imposed peace in Ukraine may, if the past is any indicator, do little to appease Russian revanchism and may, in fact, encourage Russian elites to pursue a similar policy in Estonia and Latvia – states where Russians make up a quarter of the population. </p>
<p>The West may hope that a plan based on land for peace helps Ukraine by stopping the bloodshed, while at the same time appeases Russia and solves a geopolitical problem for the EU and the U.S. </p>
<p>But if the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo are anything to go by, it could on the contrary only whet Russia’s appetite for more territorial claims, and leave Ukraine feeling betrayed.</p>
<p><em>Drita Perezic, a security sector expert with the <a href="https://balkansgroup.org/en/about-us-2/">Balkans Policy Research Group</a>, contributed to this article</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217517/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elis Vllasi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The fragility of peace settlements in the Balkans provides a cautionary tale. US and EU policymakers may inadvertently make matters worse by acceding to the aggressor’s territorial ambitions.Elis Vllasi, Senior Research Associate & Lecturer in National Security & Foreign Affairs, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2194342023-12-11T15:50:13Z2023-12-11T15:50:13ZSerbian election: another win for the Serbian Progressive Party will threaten peace in Europe<p>The outcome of Serbia’s parliamentary elections on December 17 will have profound implications for peace in Europe. Though somewhat obscured by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and more recently the crisis in Gaza, tensions in the Balkans have <a href="https://theconversation.com/kosovo-and-serbia-in-crisis-talks-as-regional-tension-escalates-thanks-to-russian-meddling-215038">risen sharply</a> in recent months. Should Serbs reelect the main party of government, the likelihood of regional conflict will increase. </p>
<p>The Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) has been in government since 2012. Formed in 2008, the SPP was initially seen as a pro-EU-integration party that would lead Serbia towards the west. </p>
<p>The SPP, however, became increasingly authoritarian and Serbia is today widely regarded as an example of <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/captured-states-western-balkans-turkey">state capture</a>. This is where a small number of influential actors in the public and private sectors have colluded to change rules, sponsor legislation and co-opt institutions to further their own narrow interests at the expense of the broader public interest.</p>
<p>The SPP has, according to the US-based advocacy group, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/serbia/freedom-world/2023">Freedom House</a>, “steadily eroded political rights and civil liberties, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition, and civil society organizations”. Press freedom advocates, <a href="https://rsf.org/en/country/serbia">Reporters Without Borders</a>, recently noted that the dominant state-run media perpetuates “rampant fake news and propaganda” where “journalists are threatened by political pressures”. </p>
<p>Corruption has also <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/serbia/corruption-index">increased</a> since 2012 and <a href="https://ocindex.net/country/serbia">the Global Organized Crime Index</a> reported that “criminal networks are widespread”. An in-depth investigation by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/03/magazine/aleksandar-vucic-veljko-belivuk-serbia.html">the New York Times</a> alleged that Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vučić – a founding member of the SPP – and his inner circle were closely linked to these criminal gangs. </p>
<p>Since 2012, Serbia’s government has stoked regional tensions to the extent that many fear 2024 may see <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/the-spectre-of-a-second-war-in-europe-looms-large-with-tensions-extraordinarily-high-in-kosovo-12978280">renewed war</a> with neighbouring Kosovo. </p>
<p>Given Vučić’s past – and that of many of the SPP’s leading figures – this was hardly a surprise. Throughout the 1990s Vučić supported aggressive Serbian nationalism. Just days after the Srebrenica genocide in Bosnia in July 1995, he declared: “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PU6t2XWFQD8">Kill one Serb and we will kill 100 Muslims</a>.” </p>
<p>Between 1998 and 2000, he was Yugoslav president Slobodan Milošević’s “minister for information” during which time the war in Kosovo erupted. During that conflict, roughly 10,000 Kosovo Albanians were killed and over 90% of the population were displaced. </p>
<p>In 2018 Vučić described Milošević as “<a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/vucic-s-great-milosevic-evokes-ghost-of-greater-serbia-/29486327.html">a great Serbian leader who undoubtedly had the best intentions</a>”.</p>
<h2>Destabilising Kosovo and Bosnia</h2>
<p>The SPP has stoked nationalist sentiments among Serbs living outside Serbia. Their attempts to redraw the borders of Yugoslavia’s successor states along demographic lines – to create what they call a “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/24/serbia-balkans-expansionism-russia-montenegro-elections/">Serbian world</a>” – would almost certainly lead to war in Bosnia and Kosovo. </p>
<p>Indeed, Vučić <a href="https://thegeopost.com/en/news/vucic-made-gloomy-predictions-for-2024-next-year-will-bring-conflicts-it-will-be-the-most-difficult-in-the-modern-history-of-serbia/">recently stated</a> that 2024 “will bring us much more conflict and unrest than the previous one” specifically highlighting Bosnia and Kosovo as likely to erupt. </p>
<p>Vučić exercises near complete control over the main Serb parties in Bosnia and Kosovo and has encouraged each to undermine the authority of the central government in both states. </p>
<p>Milorad Dodik – the president of the Serb-majority Republika Srpska federation within Bosnia – now openly talks about <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/bosnian-serb-leader-dodik-charged-over-defying-peace-envoys-decisions-2023-08-11/">seceding from Bosnia</a>. Kosovo Serbs in favour of integration in Kosovo have been <a href="https://www.cins.rs/en/bombs-and-bullets-fear-and-loathing-in-north-kosovo/">bullied into submission</a> or <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/04/20/kosovo-serb-politician-murdered-for-political-reasons-brother-says/">murdered</a>. </p>
<p>In addition to regularly vowing to <a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2023&mm=11&dd=26&nav_id=117128">never recognise Kosovo’s independence</a>, Vučić <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2019/12/06/serbian-president-accused-of-spreading-hate-by-denying-massacre/">has denied</a> that Serb-perpetrated massacres occurred in Kosovo. He has also <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64099388">threatened Nato troops</a> stationed there and branded the prime minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, as “<a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/serbia-boycotts-eu-summit-calls-kosovo-pm-terrorist-scum/">terrorist scum</a>”. </p>
<p>Vučić and the SPP prime minister, Ana Brnabić, have repeatedly claimed – <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/10/23/kosovo-serbs-may-feel-insecure-but-theyre-not-ethnically-cleansed/">without supporting evidence</a> – that the government of Kosovo is engaged in “<a href="https://twitter.com/BalkanInsight/status/1706252062248305143">brutal ethnic cleansing</a>” against Serbs. In September, close Vučić ally Milan Radoičić, the deputy leader of the Belgrade-controlled Serbian List party, was part of a militia group that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kosovo-serb-politician-admits-role-gun-battle-that-killed-four-2023-09-29/">attacked the Kosovo Police</a> – killing one officer – in what many believe was a Belgrade-orchestrated attempt <a href="https://www.helsinki.org.rs/press_t85.html">to spark a war</a>.</p>
<p>Despite the SPP’s record, western leaders have sought to maintain that Serbia is, as the US ambassador to Serbia recently stated, “<a href="https://twitter.com/usambserbia/status/1686405557089869824">headed towards the west</a>”. Many have <a href="https://n1info.rs/english/news/a579353-merkel-and-vucic-discuss-kosovo-taxes-dialogue-coronavirus-via-video-link/">posed with Vučić</a>, <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/03/pec-tusk-letter-vucic/">celebrated his electoral victories</a> and “<a href="https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2018-issue-no-10/the-rise-and-fall-of-balkan-stabilitocracies">turned a blind eye</a>” to his government’s policies at home and abroad. </p>
<p>The logic behind this <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/sep/29/the-flare-up-of-violence-in-kosovo-shows-the-folly-of-the-wests-appeasement-of-serbia">appeasement</a> stems from a determination to coax Serbia away from its traditional ally, Russia. This has evidently failed. </p>
<p>Following the invasion of Ukraine, Serbia <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/serbia-aleksandar-vucic-europe-russia-choice/">refused to join</a> western sanctions against Russia, because – Vučić says – Serbs “<a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/opinion/serbia-must-not-be-putins-accomplice/">love Russia</a>”. The country continues to maintain <a href="https://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/1705272005535183113">close relations</a> with Moscow.</p>
<p>The Serbian government has also cultivated links with other likeminded autocrats throughout Europe – particularly <a href="https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2023/06/26/orbans-alliance-with-vucic-demonstrates-strategic-hungarian-interests-in-the-western-balkans/">Hungary’s Viktor Orbán</a> – who openly reject democratic values. </p>
<h2>Future directions</h2>
<p>There is little to suggest the SPP will change; they have signed an election pact with the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party – led by <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2018/04/11/vojislav-seselj-hague-tribunal-war-crimes-appeal-verdict-04-11-2018/">convicted war criminal</a> Vojislav Šešelj – and are likely to again seek to form a coalition with the Socialist Party of Serbia, led by Ivica Dačić. Known as “little Slobo”, he was Milošević’s spokesman in the 1990s. </p>
<p>There are signs that a more progressive movement – the <a href="https://serbiaelects.europeanwesternbalkans.com/2023/12/02/evolution-of-the-party-scene-since-2012-who-are-the-members-of-the-serbia-against-violence-coalition/">Serbia Against Violence</a> coalition – will <a href="https://serbiaelects.europeanwesternbalkans.com/2023/11/15/first-poll-released-since-the-start-of-the-campaign-finds-sns-at-39-serbia-against-violence-at-26/">increase its share of the vote</a>. It seeks to capitalise on the public anger which boiled over in June when a series of <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/06/22/mass-protests-demand-political-change-in-serbia">mass protests</a> were held against gun violence and corruption. </p>
<p>But the SPP has sought to steer the election campaign away from domestic concerns – especially the high inflation, <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/serbia/inflation-cpi">which stands at 8.5%</a> – towards nationalist issues, such as the plight of Serbs in Bosnia and Kosovo. </p>
<p>In this, it has been successful due to its <a href="https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/elections-in-serbia---vu%C4%8Di%C4%87-s-party-now-controls-the-whole-state-system-/49005478">near monopoly</a> over the media in Serbia and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/nov/28/critics-of-serbias-government-targeted-with-military-grade-spyware?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter">targeted cyberattacks</a> and <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/12/01/belgrade-opposition-candidate-quits-election-campaign-over-private-video-leak/">smear campaigns</a> against critics of the government. The prospects of the SPP being removed thus appear remote and the spectre of regional conflict looms. </p>
<p>However, this could yet be averted. Despite the SPP’s nationalistic and anti-western rhetoric, realistically, Serbia cannot prosper outside the west. Russia’s ability to support its allies since the invasion of Ukraine has decreased, as <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91121">Armenia recently discovered</a> in Nagorno-Karabakh. </p>
<p>Serbia is surrounded by EU and Nato member states and thus vulnerable to western sanctions. As such, a forceful stance by the west would probably compel the SPP to change course and prevent renewed conflict. Whether the west has the unity and will to do so, however, remains to be seen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219434/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aidan Hehir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Serbia’s nationalist government seeks re-election. If it succeeds, Europe may be poised for renewed war in the Balkans.Aidan Hehir, Reader in International Relations, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2193612023-12-11T13:14:52Z2023-12-11T13:14:52ZIsrael’s mass displacement of Gazans fits strategy of using migration as a tool of war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564659/original/file-20231210-17-jqac5a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=24%2C16%2C5439%2C3620&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Palestinians fleeing the northern part of the Gaza Strip on Nov. 10, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinians-leave-from-the-northern-part-of-the-gaza-to-news-photo/1775101923?adppopup=true">Belal Khaled/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As a result of the monthslong Israeli air and ground campaign in northern Gaza Strip, <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/aqaba-process-joint-statement-gaza%E2%80%99s-humanitarian-situation">more than 1.8 million</a> of the strip’s population have been displaced from their homes. And with the operation <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/israel-expands-gaza-invasion-south-forcing-many-to-flee-areas-previously-considered-safe">heading into Gaza’s south</a>, many are now fleeing areas they were told would be safer.</p>
<p>This mass displacement – some <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/aqaba-process-joint-statement-gaza%E2%80%99s-humanitarian-situation">80% of the Gaza population</a> – is a deliberate element of Israel’s military campaign, with complex objectives. In the early stages of the conflict, the Israeli military said it was emptying areas for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/13/israel-orders-1-1-million-people-in-gaza-to-move-south-what-to-know">civilians’ own safety</a> – despite mass evacuation orders being against international law, except in <a href="https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/evacuation-1/">very discrete scenarios</a>.</p>
<p>Since then, other longer-term objectives have been touted by voices in and around the Israeli government. On Oct. 17, 2023, the <a href="https://www.izs.org.il/">Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy</a>, an Israeli think tank with links to the government, published a paper <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231024-israel-think-tank-linked-to-netanyahu-promotes-unique-opportunity-to-ethnically-cleanse-gaza/">arguing that the current military campaign</a> presented “a unique and rare opportunity to evacuate the entire Gaza Strip.” </p>
<p>Meanwhile, a <a href="https://www.972mag.com/intelligence-ministry-gaza-population-transfer/">leaked document</a> from Oct. 13, purportedly from the Israeli intelligence ministry, proposed the permanent relocation of all or a portion of Palestinians in Gaza through three steps: set up tent cities in Egypt, create a humanitarian corridor, and build cities on the Sinai Peninsula. The document concluded that the relocation was “liable to provide positive and long-lasting strategic results.”</p>
<p>Similarly, Israel’s intelligence minister has promoted a plan to <a href="https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-773713">resettle Gazan residents in countries around the world</a>, while a pro-Israeli government news outlet has reported that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is eyeing a <a href="https://www.israelhayom.co.il/magazine/hashavua/article/14889801">plan to “thin” Gaza’s population</a> “to a minimum.”</p>
<p>To be clear, the Israeli government has not publicly confirmed any plan for Gaza’s population after the current conflict. But <a href="https://umaine.edu/polisci/people/nicholas-micinski/">as scholars</a> <a href="https://www.bakerinstitute.org/expert/kelsey-norman">of migration</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=pMlRrUIAAAAJ&hl=en">and war</a>, we understand that displacement in conflict is often strategic – that is, it can serve specific short-term and long-term goals.</p>
<h2>Displacement as a tool of war</h2>
<p>Historically, population displacement has been used for three strategic reasons in conflicts:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>As a means of controlling or expelling a population seen as hostile or undesirable. This occurred during the war in <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/bosnia-herzegovina/1992-1995">Bosnia from 1992 to 1995</a>, when the Serbian army <a href="https://hmh.org/library/research/genocide-in-bosnia-guide/">expelled or killed whole communities</a> of Bosniaks, resulting in the ethnic cleansing of <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=IDMhDgCJCe0C&pg=PA127#v=onepage&q&f=false">82% of the non-Serb population</a>. More recently, nearly the entire <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/ethnic-cleansing-happening-nagorno-karabakh-how-can-world-respond">Armenian population of the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh fled</a> the threat of violence by Azerbaijan forces. In other cases, armed groups uproot civilians in order to subjugate them, rather than remove them en mass. From 1993 to 2002, security forces in Turkey <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/etudesrurales/9241">used systematic village evacuations</a> to control and pacify the Kurdish population as part of counterinsurgency operations against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. </p></li>
<li><p>As a grab for territory and resources. This occurred in the Western Sahara, which Morocco claims as part of its territory. Since 1975, the Moroccan government <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/10/04/western-sahara-beyond-complacency-pub-53214">has sought to repopulate</a> the former Spanish colony by moving Moroccan nationals in and forcing the <a href="https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/journal/rethinking-the-concept-of-a-durable-solution-sahrawi-refugee-camps-four-decades-on">displacement of Sahrawis to refugee camps</a> in Algeria. As a result, the population of Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara is comprised of twice as many Moroccans as Sahrawis, and nearly 200,000 Sahrawis remain refugees. </p></li>
<li><p>As a sorting mechanism to weed out disloyal or disobedient populations. During the Syrian Civil War, President Bashar al-Assad’s government systematically depopulated rebel-held areas. Refugees returning to Syria from neighboring countries like Lebanon and Jordan – along with internally displaced Syrians – were <a href="https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2021_06_EASO_Syria_Situation_returnees_from_abroad.pdf">put through laborious security checks</a> to vet their loyalty and <a href="https://pomeps.org/beyond-ethno-sectarian-cleansing-the-assortative-logic-of-forced-displacement-in-syria">ensure they do not pose a threat to the Assad regime</a>.</p></li>
</ol>
<h2>Permanent displacement</h2>
<p>In the context of the current conflict in Gaza, all three strategies of population displacement – as control, territorial expansion and sorting – have been reportedly suggested by officials or others with Israeli government ties. </p>
<p>Israel has leveraged the threat of mass exodus of Palestinians to the Sinai Peninsula in negotiations with Egypt. Reports suggest that Israel has floated the idea of <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-palestine-war-netanyahu-lobbied-eu-push-egypt-accept-gaza-refugees">paying off Egypt’s massive International Monetary Fund debt</a> in exchange for the country hosting refugees from Gaza, or <a href="https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/hjiyigczt">offering large aid packages</a> in exchange for setting up temporary camps in Sinai.</p>
<p>However, Egypt <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/02/why-egypt-has-not-fully-opened-its-gaza-border-for-fleeing-palestinians">has refused to open its border</a> beyond allowing a few hundred Palestinians with dual citizenship and several dozen critically injured individuals to cross.</p>
<p>The mass displacement of Palestinians from Gaza on a permanent basis – be it to Egypt or throughout the world – is unlikely, as it would require agreement from would-be host countries and the compliance of Palestinians, though the chief of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency recently cautioned that Israel is <a href="https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2023-12-09/israel-gaza-hamas-united-nations-humanitarian-relief">continuing</a> to pursue this strategy. Moreover, the permanent resettlement of Palestinians from Gaza would amount to ethnic cleansing, something the U.N. <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/10/un-expert-warns-new-instance-mass-ethnic-cleansing-palestinians-calls">has already warned of</a>.</p>
<p>Any temporary displacement from Gaza would require a guarantee of the right to return for the displaced, and a commitment from Israel that there would be a rebuilt Gaza to return to – and neither is certain.</p>
<h2>‘Indefinite’ occupation</h2>
<p>One option being discussed by Netanyahu is for Palestinians in Gaza to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-07/netanyahu-plans-security-control-over-gaza-for-indefinite-time">live under Israeli security controls for an “indefinite period</a>,” as they did before Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005. </p>
<p>Such a move would be in line with Israel’s security goal of removing Hamas from its borders. Reoccupation – or even annexation, as some Israeli analysts have <a href="https://www.israelhayom.com/2023/10/17/gaza-the-case-for-annexation/">promoted</a> – of parts of northern Gaza, coupled with the depopulation of these areas, would enable the Israeli military to turn these areas into buffer zones.</p>
<p>But occupation is very resource and labor intensive. Israel will be reluctant to commit to rebuilding Gaza, patrolling the streets and carefully monitoring and governing the population. And an indefinite occupation would put Israeli soldiers at risk and likely become unpopular with the Israeli public and the international community. Already, U.S. President Joe Biden has <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/15/politics/biden-60-minutes-interview-gaza-israel/index.html">warned Israel against the reoccupation</a> of Gaza, calling the option “a big mistake.”</p>
<h2>Filtering for Hamas</h2>
<p>An alternative to a full occupation is for Israel to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/08/1218100645/the-israeli-military-keeps-pushing-into-central-and-southern-gaza">continue to drive the Palestinians in Gaza further south</a>, and only allow those deemed not to pose a threat to Israel back in northern Gaza. Israel has stated its intention is to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/11/05/1210734100/israel-says-its-goal-is-to-remove-hamas-from-power-what-comes-next-is-unclear">eradicate Hamas</a>. To that end, it has pushed civilians into increasingly smaller areas in the south, with the implication being that those who fail to leave are suspect.</p>
<p>Mark Regev, a senior adviser to Netanyahu, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2023/12/05/the-lead-mark-regev-jake-tapper-live.cnn">claimed as much in an interview with CNN</a>: “We … asked all the civilians to leave, and most of them did. … One has to ask: They had ample time to leave, why didn’t they heed the advice to leave the area?”</p>
<p>Of course, the implication that those not fleeing are Hamas fighters or supporters ignores the plight of immobile populations like the elderly, disabled and orphans. It also puts the onus on civilians to know where the evacuation zones are. </p>
<p>After the seven-day pause in fighting, Israel resumed the bombardment and began issuing evacuation orders using a numbered grid of neighborhoods in Gaza, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/02/israeli-grid-system-makes-life-in-gaza-macabre-game-of-battleships-say-aid-workers">splitting the strip into more than 600 areas</a>. The Israeli military said this is to protect civilians; however, it could also serve as a crude method of differentiating civilians from Hamas and other militants – the assumption being that people who stay will be viewed as as potential threat.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A map of the Gaza strip with lots of zones labeled as numbers" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564652/original/file-20231210-21-v28qju.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564652/original/file-20231210-21-v28qju.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564652/original/file-20231210-21-v28qju.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564652/original/file-20231210-21-v28qju.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564652/original/file-20231210-21-v28qju.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564652/original/file-20231210-21-v28qju.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564652/original/file-20231210-21-v28qju.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map shared by an Israeli military official depicting zones in the Gaza Strip.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1733036333352767914/photo/1">@AvichayAdraee/Twitter</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Indeed, images emerged on Dec. 7 of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/08/footage-idf-israel-military-parading-palestinian-men-around-in-underwear">Israeli soldiers detaining seminaked Palestinian men</a> on their knees at gunpoint, allegedly filtering for Hamas fighters.</p>
<p>Controlling Gaza’s population through the use of zones, formal occupation or resettlement elsewhere are strategies that have been repeatedly suggested during the course of the conflict. Which of them, if any, comes to fruition will depend not just on the actions of Israelis and Palestinians, but also on other states and international organizations – namely Egypt, the United States and the United Nations.</p>
<p>And to greater or lesser degrees, all three entities have <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231128-us-warns-israel-over-southern-gaza-displacements">warned Israel against the strategic use</a> of forced displacement to serve its political and military ends. After all, “forcible transfer” is in itself a <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule129">crime under international law</a>. The question now is whether such factors will influence how Israeli officials use strategic displacement – and what it will mean for the future of the Palestinians in Gaza.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219361/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mass forced movement of people has been used in conflicts to serve three goals: population control, territorial expansion and as a sorting mechanism. All three could be in play in Gaza.Nicholas R. Micinski, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, University of MaineAdam G. Lichtenheld, Executive Director of the Immigration Policy Lab, Stanford UniversityKelsey Norman, Fellow for the Middle East, Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2192962023-12-08T13:36:18Z2023-12-08T13:36:18ZThe landmark Genocide Convention has had mixed results since the UN approved it 75 years ago<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564027/original/file-20231206-17-lncvwh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman prays in front of skulls at a memorial in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, marking the genocide that happened under the Khmer Rouge regime in the 1970s.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/woman-prays-in-front-of-skulls-at-the-choeung-ek-memorial-news-photo/960278782?adppopup=true">Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Seventy-five years ago, in the wake of Nazi atrocities, the world made a vow. </p>
<p>Countries pledged to liberate humanity from the “odious scourge” of genocide when, at the United Nations, they established a new convention on <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">preventing and punishing genocide</a> on Dec. 9, 1948. </p>
<p>Has the international community lived up to this promise? </p>
<p>Amid genocide accusations and mass violence in the Middle East, Ukraine, Sudan, Yemen, Ethiopia, China and elsewhere, the answer would seem to be obvious: “No!” </p>
<p>But the reality is more complicated. It also offers a glimmer of light at a very dark moment. </p>
<p>As someone who has studied genocide for years and <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501765698/anthropological-witness/">testified on the topic</a> at an international tribunal, I view the legacy of the U.N. Genocide Convention – including its effectiveness in preventing genocide and holding perpetrators accountable – as a mixed bag with some good but also some ugly. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A black woman wearing a gray outfit that looks like a sari holds her hand to her chest and stands in front of shelves filled with old looking clothing." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A survivor of the Rwandan genocide looks at clothes of genocide victims who were killed by Hutu militants in 1994.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/juliet-mukakabanda-a-survivor-that-will-testify-in-france-news-photo/1240477849?adppopup=true">Simon Wohlfahrt/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The story of the Genocide Convention</h2>
<p>It is a minor miracle that there is a U.N. Genocide Convention, a treaty that over 150 countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Russia and Israel, <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide-convention.shtml">have ratified</a>. </p>
<p>Countries are obsessed with protecting their sovereignty and power. They gave up a bit of both by passing this convention. </p>
<p>The word genocide had been coined only four years earlier by a Polish lawyer, <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/coining-a-word-and-championing-a-cause-the-story-of-raphael-lemkin">Raphael Lemkin</a>. Why, he wondered, was it a crime to kill one person but not an entire group? </p>
<p>In 1946, at the newly formed U.N., Lemkin began lobbying diplomats. Two years of grinding U.N. debate ensued before the convention was finally – and barely – passed. </p>
<p>The convention <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml">defines genocide</a> as “acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” These acts range from killing to the forced transfer of children from one group to another group. </p>
<p>But the convention’s shortcomings quickly became apparent. </p>
<h2>The bad − a convention rigged for the powerful</h2>
<p>The Genocide Convention was the product of political bargaining, compromise and pressure from some of the world’s great powers. As a result, the convention also has <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/problems-of-genocide/1C48C9BAE4A2CA4EA6727F19771651A6">major weaknesses</a>. </p>
<p>First, it does not protect everyone from genocide. It shields racial, ethnic, national and religious groups, but leaves others, such as <a href="https://www.rutgersuniversitypress.org/bucknell/the-politics-of-genocide/9781978821507/">political groups</a> and economic groups, unprotected. </p>
<p>As a result, the mass targeting of people from particular political groups or economic classes – which has happened in communist <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/cambodia">Cambodia</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/03/giving-historys-greatest-mass-murderer-his-due/">China</a> and the <a href="https://news.stanford.edu/2010/09/23/naimark-stalin-genocide-092310/">former Soviet Union</a> – isn’t technically considered genocide. </p>
<p>This limitation was intentional. The <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/5556.htm">Soviet Union</a>, for example, made sure such groups weren’t included in the convention, since it worried about possible future prosecution. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781351214100-3/historical-perspective-jeffrey-bachman?context=ubx&refId=c6169777-cd53-4e19-bb34-c359a761e515">Cultural genocide</a> was also dropped from the convention’s final draft, since imperial powers like France and the United Kingdom worried about being culpable for acts of cultural destruction in their colonies.</p>
<p>These shortcomings created more problems, including letting culprits off the hook. Perhaps, worst of all, these omissions suggest that enslavement, the use of atomic weapons, apartheid and the targeting of political groups are somehow less serious, since they don’t fall under the convention’s genocide umbrella. </p>
<p>And then there was the problem of enforcement. While the convention was legally binding for those who ratified it, there was no international police force holding people or governments to account for violations – and countries were left to determine whether they wanted to include the convention in their own national laws. </p>
<h2>The ugly − a convention without teeth</h2>
<p>Lacking enforcement powers, the new convention proved largely ineffective during the Cold War that began intensifying in the late 1940s.</p>
<p>This predicament helped lay the ground for a lot of ugly – <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003185291/genocide-adam-jones">tens of millions dead</a> and mass suffering.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/cambodia">Cambodia</a>, for example, the Khmer Rouge enacted policies that resulted in the death of up to 2 million of its 8 million inhabitants. Some groups, including intellectuals and ethnic and religious minorities, were singled out for execution from April 1975 to January 1979.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/blog/new-details-emerge-about-atrocities-in-guatemala">Guatemalan military targeted</a> and killed thousands in indigenous Mayan communities, with the violence peaking in the early 1980s. </p>
<p>Genocidal violence continued after the Cold War ended in the late 1980s.</p>
<p>The 1990s started with extremists from the dominant <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/rwanda">Hutu ethnic group in Rwanda</a> slaughtering about 800,000 Hutu moderates and Tutsi people, an ethnic minority. Ethnic Serbs also killed an <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/bosnia-herzegovina">estimated 100,000 civilians</a> in <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/bosnia-herzegovina">Bosnia</a> as the former Yugoslavia imploded. </p>
<p>The 2000s <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/burma">were riddled</a> with other <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/china">infamous failures</a>, including government-backed militias in Sudan killing 400,000 civilians in <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/darfur">Darfur</a> from 2003 through 2005 and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sudan-darfur-fighting-war-crimes-705bdb1ac90fc7b2903f68e6f666c3ca">again today</a>. </p>
<p>More recently, Russia’s military perpetuated atrocities against Ukrainian civilians during its 2022 invasion and war with <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/ukraine">Ukraine</a> – another instance of likely genocide. And supporters of <a href="https://theconversation.com/both-israel-and-palestinian-supporters-accuse-the-other-side-of-genocide-heres-what-the-term-actually-means-217150">Israel and the Palestinians</a> are now both making accusations of genocide. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Three people wearing dark clothing, including one man with an army vest, stand in the snow. The woman and one man cover their mouths and look away, one man looks forward." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People gather close to a mass grave in Bucha, Ukraine, on April 3, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-react-as-they-gather-close-to-a-mass-grave-in-the-news-photo/1239718685?adppopup=true">Sergei Supinsky/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The good − baby steps and halting successes</h2>
<p>Amid these repeated failures, it may seem difficult to find reasons to mark the convention’s 75th anniversary. </p>
<p>But there are positives. </p>
<p>First, compared with 75 years ago, there is now a <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int">broad network</a> of international <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1502&context=gsp#:%7E:text=National%20Mechanisms%20are%20vehicles%20through,atrocity%20crimes%20as%20parties%20to">and domestic</a> organizations and individuals working to <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/">prevent genocide</a>. </p>
<p>These groups <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/myanmar-ffm/index">conduct investigations</a>, <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org">issue alerts</a> and use <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1093&context=gsp">behind-the-scenes diplomacy</a> to keep peace.</p>
<p>Many governments also are prioritizing prevention. This includes the U.S., which passed the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ441/PLAW-115publ441.pdf">Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act</a> in 2018, formalizing prevention as a U.S. national interest and mandating <a href="https://www.state.gov/atrocity-prevention/">annual reports</a> on U.S. government progress in mainstreaming prevention.</p>
<p>Third, there has been progress in terms of <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003185291/genocide-adam-jones">accountability</a>. Different international courts have used the Genocide Convention to convict perpetrators for genocidal acts committed in places such as <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/rwanda-the-first-conviction-for-genocide">Rwanda</a> and <a href="https://www.icty.org/en/press/radislav-krstic-becomes-first-person-be-convicted-genocide-icty-and-sentenced-46-years">Bosnia</a> in the 1990s. </p>
<p>And, critically, there is an International Criminal Court that can hold political leaders accountable for genocide. This <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/ICCAtAGlanceEng.pdf">Netherlands-based court</a>, set up in 2002, has not yet convicted anyone of genocide, though. </p>
<p>Finally, prevention efforts have had full or partial successes. They have curtailed budding genocidal crimes in places like <a href="http://peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/dpe/modern_conflicts/burundi.pdf">Burundi</a>, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2020/10/19/cote-d-ivoire-election-tensions-erupt-in-fatal-ethnic-clashes//">Cote D’Ivoire</a>, <a href="https://newint.org/features/web-exclusive/2018/03/21/division-threatens-gambia">Gambia</a> and <a href="https://www.c-r.org/programme/horn-africa/kenya-conflict-">Kenya</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://kroc.nd.edu/research/books/responding-to-genocide-the-politics-of-international-action-2013/">Early warnings, diplomacy and political will</a> have often been key to these successes – such as when, with U.N. backing, an Australian-led force brought a stop to escalating violence in <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691150178/if-you-leave-us-here-we-will-die">East Timor</a> in 1999. </p>
<p>It is hard to feel hopeful at this difficult moment as violence in the Middle East and Ukraine rages on. But I think it’s important to recognize the halting progress that has been made during the 75 years since the Genocide Convention was passed – even as much work remains to fulfill the promise that genocide will never again happen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219296/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Hinton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While the Genocide Convention has helped raise awareness and prevent ethnic violence from escalating, it has not stopped many accusations of genocides, including violence in Darfur and in Ukraine.Alexander Hinton, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology; Director, Center for the Study of Genocide and Human Rights, Rutgers University - NewarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2150382023-10-20T12:17:39Z2023-10-20T12:17:39ZKosovo and Serbia in crisis talks as regional tension escalates thanks to Russian meddling<p>Kosovo’s prime minister, Albin Kurti, and Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vučić, are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/17/kosovo-serbia-leaders-talks-diplomacy?CMP=share_btn_tw%20%22%22">scheduled to meet this weekend</a> for the first time since Nato decided to send about 600 more <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-reinforcements-arrive-in-kosovo-for-nato-peacekeeping-mission">peacekeeping troops</a> into the Balkans early in October to mitigate some of the region’s growing tensions.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/29/kosovo-serbian-troops-buildup-us-uk">US has already urged Serbia</a> to withdraw its military presence along the border with Kosovo to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/29/us/politics/white-house-serbia-kosovo.html">de-escalate tensions</a>. On October 18 <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2023-0437_EN.html">the EU parliament</a> passed a resolution that also condemned the Serbian army’s military build-up at the border with Kosovo and urged Vučić to avoid any further action.</p>
<p>The meeting follows a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/62382069">deadly attack on Kosovo’s</a> police and security force by a paramilitary group of more than 30 heavily armed nationalist <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/serbia-releases-kosovo-serb-politician-detained-over-kosovo-shootout-/7296196.html">militants</a> on September 24.</p>
<p>The attack in <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/kosovo-serbia-police-attack-albin-kurti-banjska-vjosa-osmani/">Banjska</a> in northern Kosovo, was led by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kosovo-serb-politician-admits-role-gun-battle-that-killed-four-2023-09-29/">Milan Radoicic</a> of the Serbian List, an ethnic Serbian minority political party in Kosovo with close ties to Vučić. The attack raised tensions in the <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/the-spectre-of-a-second-war-in-europe-looms-large-with-tensions-extraordinarily-high-in-kosovo-12978280">western Balkans</a> to an unprecedented level.</p>
<p>Fearing that the latest tensions could lead to complete destabilisation of the region, EU and Nato officials have put together a meeting on October 21 hoping to get Serbia and Kosovo to agree a deal.</p>
<p>Vučić met with Russian president <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/vucic-has-friendly-meeting-with-putin-in-china/">Vladimir Putin</a> on the margins of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">China’s Belt and Road Initiative</a> forum in Beijing on October 18, when he also signed a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/serbia-and-china-sign-free-trade-deal/">free trade agreement</a> with Chinese president Xi Jinping.</p>
<p>Vučić’s meetings with <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/vucic-has-friendly-meeting-with-putin-in-china/">Putin</a> and <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/serbia-signs-free-trade-deal-with-china/">Xi</a> have sparked further concerns that Serbia is moving away from seeking EU membership and closer to <a href="https://chinaobservers.eu/why-serbia-refuses-to-stick-to-the-eus-line-on-china/">China</a> and Russia. </p>
<h2>Putin’s influence in the western Balkans</h2>
<p>Vučić has not imposed <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/03/10/vucic-cant-swear-serbia-will-not-join-sanctions-on-russia/">sanctions on Russia</a> following Putin’s invasion of Ukraine – something that all other countries in the Balkans have done. Meanwhile, Putin has courted support in the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/89600#:%7E:text=Russia's%20invasion%20of%20Ukraine%20has,to%20join%20anti%2DRussian%20sanctions.">region</a> to counterbalance the influence of the EU and Nato, particularly since its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.</p>
<p>Shortly after <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kosovo-serb-politician-admits-role-gun-battle-that-killed-four-2023-09-29/">Radoicic</a> took responsibility for carrying out the deadly attack in north Kosovo, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-kosovo-troops-buildup-russia-ukraine/32619334.html">Russian broadcasters</a> reported on the event saying that Serbia was “taking back” its land and comparing Serbian paramilitary actions with Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine. In addition, some <a href="https://x.com/RussianEmbassyC/status/1707865742413009369?s=20">Russian embassy officials</a> said on their X/Twitter accounts that “Kosovo is Serbia”.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of western Balkans" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tension: the western Balkans region.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">StringerAL/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin’s close political allies in the western Balkans, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/14/europe/serbia-vucic-kosovo-balkans-west-intl-cmd/index.html">Vučić</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-meets-bosnian-serb-leader-dodik-hails-rise-trade-2023-05-23/">Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik</a> appear to have encouraged the regional friction.</p>
<p>In July 2023, the US treasury department announced it was imposing sanctions on Aleksandar Vulin, the head of Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency (BIA). The treasury’s announcement alleged that Vulin was using his official position as the country’s top spy and links with <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Serbian-Paramilitaries-and-the-Breakup-of-Yugoslavia-State-Connections/Vukusic/p/book/9781032044453">paramilitary groups</a> and nationalist militants to carry out <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/07/11/treasury-sanctions-serbia-spy-chief-00105637">destabilisation efforts</a> on behalf of Russia</p>
<p>Meanwhile, it has recently been reported that Russia is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/18/russia-recruits-serbs-in-drive-to-replenish-military-forces-in-ukraine#:%7E:text=Based%20on%20accounts%20provided%20by,nationals%20to%20bolster%20the%20army.">recruiting</a> ethnic Serbs and their <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Serbian-Paramilitaries-and-the-Breakup-of-Yugoslavia-State-Connections/Vukusic/p/book/9781032044453">paramilitary groups</a> to join its military in Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Rocky road to agreement</h2>
<p>In March, Vučić and Kurti agreed to implement an <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-eu-proposal-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovo-and-serbia_en">agreement on a pathway to normalisation of relations</a> between the two countries at a meeting in Ohrid, North Macedonia, set up by the EU. But <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbia-wants-normalise-ties-with-kosovo-will-not-sign-any-agreement-2023-03-19/">Vučić subsequently refused to sign it</a>, saying that: “I don’t want to sign any international legally binding documents with Kosovo because Serbia does not recognise its independence.”</p>
<p><a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-politics-of-dialogue-how-the-eu-can-change-the-conversation-in-kosovo-and-serbia/">Vučić’s</a> public narrative about Kosovo since March has increasingly used military terminology. Across Serbia, increasing numbers of murals have appeared bearing the Russian and Serbian flag colours have been painted with the phrases “<a href="https://x.com/fbieber/status/1709842190820856045?s=20">When the army returns to Kosovo</a>” and with “<a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-ethnic-serbs-z-symbol-russia/32437410.html">Z</a>” symbol, which have come to represent Russia’s war in Ukraine</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/Normalisation-between-Serbia-and-Kosovo-must-come-from-within%7E527b3c">Ohrid agreement</a>, endorsed by the EU and the US, which they hope Serbia and Kosovo will finally sign this weekend, falls short of what either country seeks. For example, the agreement makes no reference to when Serbia will be able to join the EU. Similarly, it makes no reference of when the five <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2023C17/">EU member states</a> (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) who have yet to recognise Kosovo’s independence, will do so and open the path for Kosovo to integrate into the EU and Nato.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-politics-of-dialogue-how-the-eu-can-change-the-conversation-in-kosovo-and-serbia/">agreement</a> essentially throws a lot of money at Kosovo and Serbia to persuade them to end their conflict by offering substantial investments from the EU and US in both countries. Given Serbia’s recent free-trade agreement with China, there are fewer incentives for Vučić to sign the agreement in its current form.</p>
<p>To stop these recurring crises between Serbia and Kosovo, the current version of the <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-politics-of-dialogue-how-the-eu-can-change-the-conversation-in-kosovo-and-serbia/">agreement</a> must be redrafted. First and foremost, the EU must state when Serbia and Kosovo might join the EU. Membership is a powerful incentive for a peace deal. Secondly, to be regarded as a reliable ally in the western Balkans, the EU needs to come up with a common position on Kosovo. </p>
<p>The refusal of the five EU countries <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-European-Union-and-Everyday-Statebuilding-The-Case-of-Kosovo/Ilazi/p/book/9781032360621">to recognise Kosovo</a> indirectly advances both the <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/violence-in-north-kosovo-how-the-eu-and-the-us-can-break-the-cycle/">cycle of violence</a> and Putin’s goal of destabilising the western Balkans.</p>
<p>This weekend’s meeting could not be more important in trying to settle the long-standing tension between Kosovo and Serbia, but the likelihood of success presently remains distant.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215038/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andi Hoxhaj OBE does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A key meeting is being held in the Balkans as the EU and US seek to resolve regional tension, partly stoked by pro-Russian forces.Andi Hoxhaj OBE, Lecturer in Law, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2133302023-09-20T12:47:01Z2023-09-20T12:47:01ZAmericans do talk about peace − just not the same way people do in other countries<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549141/original/file-20230919-29-46yjz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Children wave peace doves at a concert for peace in Bogota, Colombia, in August 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/choir-made-up-of-more-than-10000-children-wave-peace-doves-news-photo/1419832116?adppopup=true">Chepa Beltran/Long Visual Press/Universal Images Group via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Americans don’t talk much about peace. But <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/lsi.2022.94">it turns out</a> they care about it a lot – they just don’t talk about it the way people who have experienced war or civil conflict do. </p>
<p>When public opinion polls in the U.S. ask people about peace, it’s either in the context of <a href="https://www.thearda.com/data-archive?fid=GSSPANEL2">religion</a> or <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/245705/americans-higher-hopes-prosperity-peace-2019.aspx">world peace</a>.</p>
<p>Instead of using the word peace, Americans are more likely to say that they care deeply about safety and security and issues like <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/02/06/economy-remains-the-publics-top-policy-priority-covid-19-concerns-decline-again/">terrorism, crime, illegal drugs and immigration</a>. </p>
<p>But they still care about the same things people in places that have faced war are focused on. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549142/original/file-20230919-15-3xgj0l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People wear face masks and hold large yellow and white peace signs on a city street." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549142/original/file-20230919-15-3xgj0l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549142/original/file-20230919-15-3xgj0l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549142/original/file-20230919-15-3xgj0l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549142/original/file-20230919-15-3xgj0l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549142/original/file-20230919-15-3xgj0l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549142/original/file-20230919-15-3xgj0l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549142/original/file-20230919-15-3xgj0l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protestors hold peace signs in support of Black Lives Matter in July 2020 in Oakland, Calif.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protesters-hold-peace-signs-in-support-of-black-lives-news-photo/1258684586?adppopup=true">Natasha Moustache/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What is peace?</h2>
<p><a href="https://sps.columbia.edu/faculty-staff/peter-dixon-phd">We are</a> <a href="https://www.scu.edu/cas/political-science/faculty--staff/fiorella-vera-adrianzen/">social scientists</a> who are part of a <a href="https://www.everydaypeaceindicators.org/team">network of peace and conflict</a> <a href="https://www.scu.edu/cas/political-science/faculty--staff/naomi-levy/">researchers </a> and <a href="https://possibilitylab.berkeley.edu/">community-engaged</a> <a href="https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/faculty/amy-e-lerman">scholars</a> at several universities. We and our other colleagues have spent a lot of time talking with different communities that have experienced war, including in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jhuman/huac030">Colombia</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2020.1812893">Afghanistan</a> and <a href="https://www.everydaypeaceindicators.org/_files/ugd/849039_a2d4c66b63cc4e67815a6b736cc42cd5.pdf">Bosnia and Herzegovina</a>, about what <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-photography-can-build-peace-and-justice-in-war-torn-communities-166143">peace looks like</a> to them.</p>
<p>Peace is hard to define. In the dictionary, it’s equated with tranquility or the absence of war. We see it as broader. Peace is the ability for people to live in harmony with themselves and with each other. In practice, however, that can mean <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395715622967">many different things</a> to different people. </p>
<p><a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/everyday-peace-9780197563397?cc=us&lang=en&">We know</a> that <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/reclaiming-everyday-peace/BEB6532292D692933AABC68EFFF9ACB3">people who directly experience conflict</a> and violence tend to have very broad, but also nuanced, definitions of peace. </p>
<p>In Colombia, for example, many communities told us they felt at peace when they had the infrastructure necessary to supply basic needs, like clean water, or when they could actively participate in regular social gatherings. In Bosnia, residents highlighted the ability to use public spaces, including rebuilt ruins from the war, as well as the presence of more day-to-day amenities like streetlights and parking.</p>
<p>But until a recent project in Oakland, California, we weren’t thinking about our work in America as also being about peace. </p>
<p>Since 2021, we’ve been working with six community organizations in Oakland to understand how people define and experience safety and well-being in their everyday lives. As it turns out, these concepts helped us get at how Americans, who have not experienced war like the people in other regions we’ve worked with, might also understand peace.</p>
<h2>Re-imagining safety</h2>
<p>Our research’s focus on safety was inspired by a number of <a href="https://www.nlc.org/post/2021/02/16/nlc-assembles-task-force-of-local-leaders-to-reimagine-public-safety-in-communities-across-the-u-s/">cities and towns</a>, like <a href="https://www.columbus.gov/reimaginesafety/">Columbus, Ohio</a>, and <a href="https://www.austintexas.gov/publicsafety">Austin, Texas</a>, that have launched projects to reform how public safety is conceived of and protected following the widespread <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html">Black Lives Matter protests</a> in 2020. </p>
<p>Oakland has undergone a similar process of asking residents to help their local government <a href="https://www.oaklandca.gov/topics/reimagining-public-safety">rethink what safety</a> means. And, like <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-voters-rejected-plans-to-replace-the-minneapolis-police-department-and-whats-next-for-policing-reform-171183">other cities</a>, Oakland residents have had an intense <a href="https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/The-Oakland-Police-Department-claims-it-is-16386039.php">debate over the police department</a> and how the government should reform its approach to crime. </p>
<p>We spoke to over 500 residents across parts of Oakland that have been especially hard hit by crime and violence and who live in areas that have historically been both overpoliced and underserved with public resources. </p>
<p>We asked questions like, “What does safety or the lack of safety look like here,” and “What are some signs that the community is doing well or not doing well?”</p>
<p>These conversations covered a lot of ground – ground that was similar to other conversations we’ve had about peace with people who live in conflict zones or countries with long histories of war.</p>
<p>Some Oakland residents spoke about how kids are desensitized to gunshots and violence or are arrested or kicked out of their homes. We heard that these kids and teenagers ultimately lose sight of how their lives – and the lives of others – have value.</p>
<p>High school students also reflected on the prevalence of guns, shootings and gangs in their lives. As one told us, “I want to go back” to a more innocent time, when “I didn’t know nothing about any of this.”</p>
<p>But just as we know that violence and security are only two aspects of people’s understandings of peace, the same is true of safety. The police – and even crime – are just two aspects of how communities think about safety in their everyday lives. They also think about economic opportunities, public space and social connections.</p>
<p>We heard about how, when kids have basic life skills and job skills training, or have mentors and role models, this can give them choices that are alternatives to criminal activity and help them invest back in their communities.</p>
<p>We heard about block parties and <a href="https://www.townnights.org/">town nights</a>, which inspire people of different races and ethnicities to look out for each other and build trust with their neighbors. “By us, for us,” as one resident put it.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549145/original/file-20230919-25-r870wu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The back of a man flashing two peace signs with his hands is seen on a city street, with many other people walking past him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549145/original/file-20230919-25-r870wu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549145/original/file-20230919-25-r870wu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549145/original/file-20230919-25-r870wu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549145/original/file-20230919-25-r870wu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549145/original/file-20230919-25-r870wu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549145/original/file-20230919-25-r870wu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549145/original/file-20230919-25-r870wu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A man flashes the peace sign as protesters march during an Occupy Oakland protest in November 2011 in Oakland, Calif.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/man-flashes-the-peace-sign-as-thousands-of-protestors-march-news-photo/131201340?adppopup=true">Justin Sullivan/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>From safety to peace</h2>
<p>The United Nations marks the annual <a href="https://www.un.org/en/observances/international-day-peace">International Day of Peace</a> on Sept. 21, 2023. </p>
<p>In general, the U.S. does not widely recognize or celebrate global holidays like these, including <a href="https://medium.com/age-of-awareness/america-started-international-womens-day-so-why-don-t-we-celebrate-it-50b10ec7829e">International Women’s Day</a> or <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/04/30/1095729592/what-is-may-day-history">International Labor Day </a>. </p>
<p>But, like peace, safety is about far more than reducing violence. It’s being able to trust that police <a href="https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/whats-next-policing">have communities’ interests in mind</a> and knowing that residents will receive fair treatment in the courts. </p>
<p>It’s also being able to breathe clean air and access work and educational opportunities. It’s about being able to openly share past trauma, feel loved and connected, and so much more.</p>
<p>This all has important implications for what Americans want – and what they actually get – from their local governments. When policymakers define safety as the absence of violence and benchmark it primarily against metrics like <a href="https://theconversation.com/republicans-say-crime-is-on-the-rise-what-is-the-crime-rate-and-what-does-it-mean-192900">crime statistics</a>, they limit the kinds of policies that cities and their residents can look to. </p>
<p>Typically, the main policy responses in the U.S. to crime and violence have centered on policing and incarceration.</p>
<p>In contrast, our conversations across Oakland suggest that communities are already using different frameworks and language to assess safety. These in turn offer up a more holistic set of potential interventions. What, we might ask, would city leaders focus on if they were evaluating the success of public safety reforms by whether children are playing outside in the park, or whether people know the names of their neighbors?</p>
<p>Building safety in the U.S. is more akin to building peace internationally than many Americans may think. As we celebrate world peace, we think people should remember that these conversations matter here at home, too.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213330/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Dixon received funding for this project from Santa Clara University. He is a Board Member of Everyday Peace Indicators. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amy E Lerman received funding for this project from the California Community Foundation / California 100 Initiative.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fiorella Vera-Adrianzen received funding for this project from California Community Foundation / California 100 Initiative through Santa Clara University. She is a research associate at Everyday Peace Indicators.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Naomi Levy received funding for this project from the California Community Foundation / California 100 Initiative. She is a member of the Everyday Peace Indicators Board of Directors. </span></em></p>While Americans tend not to use the word “peace,” and instead opt for terms like “safety and security,” their desires and fears are not so different from what people in war-torn places express.Peter Dixon, Associate Professor of Practice, Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, Columbia UniversityAmy E Lerman, Professor of Political Science & Public Policy and Executive Director, Possibility Lab, University of California, BerkeleyFiorella Vera-Adrianzén, Political science lecturer, Santa Clara UniversityNaomi Levy, Associate Professor of Political Science, Santa Clara UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1806562022-04-07T12:25:31Z2022-04-07T12:25:31ZRape by Russian soldiers in Ukraine is the latest example of a despicable wartime crime that spans the globe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456675/original/file-20220406-26-qvkrg7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=64%2C12%2C8562%2C5691&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rapes, torture and killings have all been reported from Bucha, Ukraine, where soldiers and investigators look at charred bodies lying on the ground.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaUkraineWar/47a0d9425a2a4982a010bbb8f06bb1a2/photo?Query=bucha%20bodies&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=109&currentItemNo=22">AP Photo/Rodrigo Abd</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Shocking <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/picture-gallery/news/world/2022/04/04/bucha-ukraine-killing/7267827001/">images from Bucha and elsewhere in Ukraine</a> revealed what many suspected, that Russian soldiers were apparently committing war crimes. An image of <a href="https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1510333131320090633?s=20&t=ivnlLSGbI_nw_Ccu-yI37g">dead naked women under a blanket on the road</a> photographed by <a href="https://twitter.com/mpalinchak">Mikhail Palinchak</a> 12½ miles (20 kilometers) outside of Kyiv was tweeted by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on April 2. A <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/03/ukraine-apparent-war-crimes-russia-controlled-areas#">Human Rights Watch report</a> released the next day and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/03/all-wars-are-like-this-used-as-a-weapon-of-war-in-ukraine">a Guardian story by Bethan McKernan the day after that</a> asserted that Russian soldiers used rape as a deliberate tactic of war. </p>
<p>Such tactics have been called “<a href="https://networks.h-net.org/node/3180/reviews/6275/hiebert-jones-gendercide-and-genocide">gendercide</a>” by scholars who study gender and war.</p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=pdQoqX4AAAAJ&hl=en">As an expert</a> <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/death-becomes-her-women-occupation-and-terrorist-mobilization/88E5F303BFA930FFE263B682EA37217E">on rape during ethnic conflict</a>, I know that – like so many other conflicts – wartime gender-based violence has a <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/failures-of-intervention-the-unintended-consequences-of-mixed-messages-and-the-exacerbation-of-ethnic-conflict/oclc/43659339">variety of motivations</a>. They include punishment, torture, extraction of information and the intent to destroy the morale of the other side. </p>
<p>Atrocities appear to be more prevalent in wars when the goal is to terrorize the population and demobilize people so that they will <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14823.doc.htm">flee</a> in great numbers. In the type of conflict known as an ethnic war, the goal of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539045">acquiring and securing territory</a> leads to the most barbarous tactics being used, aimed at reducing the other side’s willingness to fight by using excessive cruelty, torture, terror, displacement and even genocide. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/03/all-wars-are-like-this-used-as-a-weapon-of-war-in-ukraine">Wartime rape functions</a> as part of this strategy. </p>
<p>When wartime rape is a deliberate strategy, as it was in <a href="https://genderandsecurity.org/projects-resources/research/rape-terror-case-bosnia">Bosnia</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2000/03/01/kosovo-rape-weapon-ethnic-cleansing">Kosovo</a> or <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/nov/05/bangladesh-1970s-camp-survivors-speak-out">Bangladesh</a>, even the most horrifying acts and atrocities committed during war were supported at the highest <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501705274/rape-during-civil-war/#bookTabs=1">levels of decision-making</a>. As U.S. <a href="https://twitter.com/jimsciutto/status/1511339885155733517?s=20&t=xZ_lLwQJqHd6E3WTZDZ7rg">Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on April 5, 2022</a>, “What we’ve seen in Bucha is not the random act of a rogue unit, this is a deliberate campaign to kill, to torture, to rape, to commit atrocities.”</p>
<p>Wartime rape does not only target women and girls. It might also <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/03/men-can-experience-sexual-violence-war-too">target boys and men</a> – something the victims are extremely hesitant to report because of societal norms.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/report/rape-as-a-practice-of-war-toward-a-typology-of-political-violence/wood-PS-2018-rape-as-a-practice-of-war.pdf">not every war</a> features the deliberate use of wartime sexual violence. The mere existence of variation means that what can be unleashed by the dogs of war can also be controlled or prohibited. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456672/original/file-20220406-5501-o0vh3x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A middle-aged man with gray hair in a dark coat, talking to reporters as he boards a plane." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456672/original/file-20220406-5501-o0vh3x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456672/original/file-20220406-5501-o0vh3x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456672/original/file-20220406-5501-o0vh3x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456672/original/file-20220406-5501-o0vh3x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456672/original/file-20220406-5501-o0vh3x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456672/original/file-20220406-5501-o0vh3x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456672/original/file-20220406-5501-o0vh3x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken told reporters on April 5, 2022, that killings of Ukrainians in Bucha were part of a deliberate Russian campaign ‘to kill, to torture, to rape.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/secretary-of-state-antony-blinken-speaks-to-members-of-the-news-photo/1239761707?adppopup=true">Evelyn Hockstein/POOL/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Not random violence</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0032329206290426">variation</a> in whether or not rape occurs in war means that these acts are not random. They don’t happen because men are individually unable to control their urges.</p>
<p>Descriptions are beginning to emerge about what happened in Ukraine. McKernan’s story in The Guardian reported that in the wake of Russian troop withdrawal from areas surrounding Kyiv, “women and girls have come forward to tell the police, media and human rights organisations of atrocities they have suffered at the hands of Russian soldiers.” “Gang-rapes, assaults taking place at gunpoint, and rapes committed in front of children are among the grim testimonies collected by investigators,” McKernan wrote.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2002/4/10/researcher-says-rape-can-be-a/">I have studied the subject of rape during ethnic conflict for over 20 years</a>. Rape as a strategy of war has the effect of undermining the cohesiveness of a community by attacking its very foundation – the women. This is because in many societies <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghan-women-face-increasing-violence-and-repression-under-the-taliban-after-international-spotlight-fades-176008">rape victims are re-victimized by their own communities</a>, where they are blamed for having been raped. </p>
<p>I believe that the Ukraine conflict is an ethnic war. One of the <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/ethnic-cleansing-war-crimes-and-destruction-of-cultural-heritage-no/">primary goals of ethnic war</a> is the destruction or deconstruction of culture, and not necessarily just the military defeat of the enemy’s army. The deconstruction of culture is achieved through injuring and destroying human beings. For feminist scholars Elaine Scarry and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-5395(95)00078-X">Ruth Seifert</a>, women are the standard bearers of the society who perpetuate the culture and, therefore, are among war’s <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/blog/womens-experiences-of-genocide">first targets</a>. </p>
<p>Historically wartime rape was misconceived as an <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/women/docs/rapeinwar.htm">unintended and unavoidable</a> consequence of war, following from the fact that soldiers were violent, and women – perceived as chattel and property for centuries – were part of the <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2015/03/08/seizing-women-as-the-spoils-of-war.html">rewards of victory</a>. </p>
<p>Even during the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">Rwandan genocide</a>, rape was perceived as an unintentional consequence of war: “Rape has long been characterized and dismissed by the military and political leaders as a private crime or the unfortunate behavior of a renegade soldier,” according to a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm">1996 Human Rights Watch report</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1504177208277020676"}"></div></p>
<h2>Delay in acknowledging rape’s role</h2>
<p>With the prevailing attitude that rape is a natural part of war, it’s not surprising that the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide-convention.shtml">Genocide Convention of 1948</a>, which criminalized certain violations after World War II, failed to include <a href="https://womensmediacenter.com/women-under-siege/when-rape-became-a-war-crime-hint-its-not-when-you-think1">rape as a war crime</a>, even though both the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals referred to it. </p>
<p>It wasn’t until <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CAC%20S%20RES%201820.pdf">2008 that the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1820</a>, stating that rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, or one of the contributing factors when determining whether genocide has been committed.</p>
<p>[<em><a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=politics&source=inline-politics-important">Get The Conversation’s most important politics headlines, in our Politics Weekly newsletter</a>.</em>]</p>
<p>Part of what led to such a long delay in acknowledging rape’s role in war was the “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/women/docs/rapeinwar.htm">mischaracterization of rape as a crime against honor</a>, and not as a crime against the physical integrity of the victim,” as Human Rights Watch staffers Dorothy Q. Thomas and Regan E. Ralph have written. </p>
<p>The use of rape during war might [reconfigure identities], changing how people and communities see themselves and especially whether they reject the children <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/torture-and-sexual-violence-in-war-and-conflict-the-unmaking-and-remaking-of-subjects-of-violence/36D70FCD2992EE35B8D4CC9D15453E38">born of rape</a> or embrace them as members of their community. </p>
<h2>‘I’m not a beauty for you’</h2>
<p>As a tactic to subdue and control a population in Ukraine, rape may be less likely to achieve the intended results and have Ukrainians flee and never return.</p>
<p>There are several explanations for why this is the case. First, Ukrainians have been able to fend off <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/live-news/ukraine-russia-live-updates-04-02-2022">Russian military advances</a>, and the war has not lasted for months or years – so far. Second, women have been crucial to the Ukrainian resistance and play <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraines-women-fighters-reflect-a-cultural-tradition-of-feminist-independence-179529">key roles</a> in Ukrainian military and government. And third, because of the evolution of international law to designate rape as a potential war crime, there is now precedent in the prosecutions of <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20210608-butcher-of-bosnia-ratko-mladic-faces-final-genocide-verdict">Ratko Mladic</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/mar/11/warcrimes.milosevictrial">Slobodan Milosevic</a>, <a href="https://www.svri.org/blog/bemba-judgement-and-%E2%80%98justice%E2%80%99-survivors-rape-and-sexual-violence">Jean-Pierre Bemba</a> and <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/vaw/landmark-cases/a-z-of-cases/jean-paul-akayesu-case/">Jean-Paul Akayesu</a> for war crimes and rape that may serve as a deterrent.</p>
<p>Putin <a href="https://twitter.com/militaryhistori/status/1511277842813927425?s=20&t=_oXM1yZwoj2lENMXisoBCg">described Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in sexual terms</a>, quoting a Soviet-era punk group’s <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/putin-macron-meeting-quote-obscene-lyrics-show-russia-ukraine-demands-2022-2">lyrics about rape and necrophilia</a>: “You sleep my beauty, you’re going to have to put up with it anyway.” </p>
<p>The answer to that shocking statement, <a href="https://www.economist.com/1843/2022/04/04/what-vladimir-putin-misunderstood-about-ukrainians">The Economist reports</a>, has shown up in Lviv, Ukraine. That’s where you can “see posters of a woman in Ukrainian folk costumes pushing a gun into Putin’s mouth.” </p>
<p>“I’m not a beauty for you,” the woman says.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180656/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mia Bloom receives funding from the Minerva Research Initiative and the Office of Naval Research, any opinions, findings, or recommendations expressed are those of the author alone and do not reflect the views of the Office of Naval Research, the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense. Bloom is also the International Security Fellow at New America and members of the Women's Alliance for Security Leadership (WASL) network .
</span></em></p>An expert on rape during war examines the emerging evidence from Ukraine that Russian soldiers raped Ukrainian women and explains the role rape plays in conflicts.Mia M. Bloom, Professor and International Security Fellow at New America, Georgia State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1786612022-03-07T17:21:09Z2022-03-07T17:21:09ZUkraine: the UN’s ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine is a hollow promise for civilians under fire<p>Images of gaunt, exhausted faces of people fleeing bombardment and death once again dominate global news. From <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/merciless-vladimir-putin-shells-ukrainian-evacuees-s98r0j50x">Mariupol</a> to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/06/world/europe/ukraine-irpin-civilian-death.html">Irpin</a>, Russian artillery attacks on Ukrainian civilians have kept them trapped in hell.</p>
<p>Every day, the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/03/05/zelensky-call-senators/">pleads for help</a>. He begs for military support to save his people from Russian aggression. Every day, world leaders find new ways to say <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/03/01/boris-johnson-pledges-support-for-ukraine-but-insists-uk-will-not-fight-russian-forces">that they will not intervene militarily</a>. The line is drawn at warm words and humanitarian aid.</p>
<p>So, what has happened to the UN’s much-vaunted “<a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml">responsibility to protect</a>” – or “R2P” – doctrine? That willingness to use force to protect populations from genocide, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. United States secretary of state Antony Blinken <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/us-has-credible-reports-russian-war-crimes-ukraine-blinken-says-1685296">has already claimed</a> “very credible” reports of Russian war crimes. The Ukraine invasion shows R2P to be the hollow promise it has always been.</p>
<h2>What is R2P?</h2>
<p><a href="https://una.org.uk/r2p-detail">Responsibility to Protect (R2P)</a> was affirmed at the 2005 UN World Summit. World leaders agreed to protect civilians from the kind of atrocities that are now unfolding in Ukraine. R2P would be “an emerging international security and <a href="https://una.org.uk/r2p-detail">human rights norm</a>”. </p>
<p>The then secretary-general of the UN, Kofi. Annan <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sgsm10090.doc.htm">announced</a> that the world had taken “collective responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”. A new era in international cooperation had apparently arrived.</p>
<p>R2P emerged as a response to the atrocities in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s. Its aims were humanitarian, well-intended and optimistic. In 1999, Tony Blair captured the zeitgeist when <a href="https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20080909041753/http:/www.number10.gov.uk/Page1297">he declared</a>: “We are all internationalists now.” </p>
<p>Blair suggested five principles for military intervention to protect civilians on humanitarian grounds:</p>
<ul>
<li>The case must be proven</li>
<li>All diplomatic options must have been exhausted</li>
<li>There must be sensible and prudent military operations to be undertaken</li>
<li>It’s a long-term commitment</li>
<li>Do we have national interests involved?</li>
</ul>
<p>In 2000, prompted by events in Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda, the Canadian government stepped forward. It established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). It reported on the so-called “<a href="https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/18432/IDL-18432.pdf?sequence=6&isAllowed=y">right of humanitarian intervention</a>”. That is, the right to use military force to protect people at risk in other states.</p>
<h2>The problem with R2P</h2>
<p>Since affirming R2P in 2005, the UN has failed to prevent atrocities in Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Myanmar and elsewhere. Now it is failing to protect civilians in Ukraine.</p>
<p>The problem is, R2P was set up to fail. At the heart of the principle exists an unresolvable geopolitical tension. There are five permanent members of the UN Security Council: the US, Russia, China, UK and France. Each can veto UN military or R2P action. Everyone protects their allies and their own interests, so the track record is damning.</p>
<p>After all the optimistic talk in 2005, by 2009 there had been little progress in implementing R2P. The then UN secretary general, <a href="https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/SG_reportA_63_677_en.pdf">Ban Ki-moon, reported</a> that the UN and member states were “underprepared to meet their most fundamental prevention and protection responsibilities”.</p>
<p>By 2018, fighting in Syria had been underway for eight years, and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/AboutCoI.aspx">the UN reported</a> the conflict had led to 400,000 dead, 5.6 million refugees and 6.6 million internally displaced people. Yet Russia and China still refused to invoke R2P. Russia and China <a href="http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7180.pdf">also vetoed</a> UN attempts to refer Syria and the perpetrators of war crimes to the International Criminal Court.</p>
<p>If such levels of human suffering could not prompt a UN-sanctioned R2P-based military intervention, what will?</p>
<h2>The optimists</h2>
<p>Despite mounting evidence against it ever being used when it is needed most, R2P has its supporters. In November 2020, Gareth Evans from the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/r2p-the-dream-and-the-reality/">set out a positive case for R2P</a>. A former Australian foreign minister, Evans helped conceive R2P, and described it as a new norm of international behaviour which “overwhelmingly, <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/r2p-the-dream-and-the-reality/">states feel ashamed to violate</a>, compelled to observe, or at least embarrassed to ignore”.</p>
<p>But such optimism seems misplaced in light of the harsh realities on the ground in Ukraine. The current UN secretary-general, António Guterres, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/02/1112662">has stated</a> that protecting civilians “must be priority number one”. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1500694699291598850"}"></div></p>
<p>But the real priority is not protecting Ukrainian civilians but to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/fight-ukraine-russia-world-war-risk-real/">avoid a third world war</a> by preventing a clash between Russia and the west. Plus, protecting Ukrainian civilians by intervening with massive military power would be costly – politically, financially and in terms of military lives lost.</p>
<p>There is little evidence that electorates in western liberal democratic states want their leaders to deploy such military force. UK polling in early March indicated only <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-uk/polling-ukraine-support-for-sanctions-and-governments-handling-grows">28% support for military intervention</a> in Ukraine. Similar polling in the US showed <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/28/politics/cnn-poll-russia-ukraine-us-aid/index.html">42% support for military intervention</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.raf.mod.uk/what-we-do/centre-for-air-and-space-power-studies/documents1/air-power-review-vol-17-no-3/">political limits</a> of R2P have been reached. The possibility of military intervention on humanitarian grounds has, in practice, already be consigned to the history books. It would be kinder, and more honest, to stop offering desperate Ukrainians false hope. We should admit R2P was a principled idea whose time never came.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178661/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In 2005 the world decided it must take action to protect civilians from being targeted in war. In Ukraine frightened civilians are still waiting.Peter Lee, Professor of Applied Ethics and Director, Security and Risk Research, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1730512021-12-09T13:36:14Z2021-12-09T13:36:14ZBosnia’s endless crisis could be solved by letting it break apart peacefully<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436208/original/file-20211207-25-drqkj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1022%2C158%2C4265%2C2854&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik, president of the Serb-run entity in Bosnia, answers questions during an interview on April 18, 2018. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-of-the-serb-run-entity-in-bosnia-bosnian-serb-news-photo/949699498?adppopup=true">Elvis Barukcic/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Bosnia is lurching toward crisis, once again. Milorad Dodik, the Serb member of Bosnia’s tripartite presidency, is threatening to withdraw the Serb-majority half of the country from statewide institutions. <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/78703/peace-is-threatened-again-in-bosnia-a-quarter-century-after-dayton/">His goal is secession</a>. It’s a dangerous moment for Bosnia. But it’s not the first, and unless the United States changes its own policy toward Bosnia, it won’t be the last. America helped create Bosnia, and is uniquely positioned to intervene. But secession is a symptom; the sickness is Bosnia. </p>
<h2>Creating Bosnia’s permanent crisis</h2>
<p>After World War II, Bosnia was a republic inside communist Yugoslavia, and the only one with no ethnic majority. Three groups – Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats – lived in a complex, intermingled society. When Yugoslavia collapsed in the early 1990s, Bosniaks and Croats voted to break away, but Serbs resisted, and a three-way war broke out. Serb forces committed the most war crimes, and their attack on Srebrenica killed about 8,000 Bosniaks and was declared a genocide by two <a href="https://www.icty.org/en/outreach/documentaries/srebrenica-genocide-no-room-for-denial">international</a> <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/91/091-20070226-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf">courts</a>. By war’s end, all three territories were ethnically homogeneous.</p>
<p>The Clinton administration intervened militarily and forced all three sides into negotiations. Unsurprisingly, given the deep divisions created by the war, the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords created a highly decentralized state with two large self-governing “entities”: Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation. The three communities’ representatives in Bosnia’s parliament and presidency hold effective vetoes over the actions of central institutions and changes to the constitution.</p>
<p>The original design of what is often called “Dayton Bosnia” included very minimal central powers, but it also gave the U.S. and other states considerable power to intervene in governance. In the decade after Dayton, the U.S. engineered a centralized army, taxation and customs – the very institutions from which Dodik now wants to withdraw. To this day, the U.S. and other states have continued oversight authority, including an effective veto over changes to the constitution. An internationally appointed high representative can impose legislation, a power rarely used after the first decade (although in <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2021/10/13/bosnian-serb-decree-rejecting-genocide-denial-law-sparks-uncertainty/">July a law criminalizing genocide denial was adopted</a>). </p>
<p>From an <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/decision-to-intervene-how-the-war-in-bosnia-ended/">initial U.S. and NATO presence of 60,000 troops</a>, only a few hundred European peacekeepers and a small NATO headquarters remain. Recent U.S. policy has relied on the promise of <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/168/the-western-balkans">Bosnia’s eventual European Union membership</a> to encourage cooperation among the ethnic groups, but <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/dayton-agreement-bosnia-eu-us-western-balkans-milorad-dodik/">Bosnians know the EU won’t admit them</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Former President Bill Clinton stands behind a lectern surrounded by leaders of several countries." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436195/original/file-20211207-137612-1aqaps0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436195/original/file-20211207-137612-1aqaps0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436195/original/file-20211207-137612-1aqaps0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436195/original/file-20211207-137612-1aqaps0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436195/original/file-20211207-137612-1aqaps0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436195/original/file-20211207-137612-1aqaps0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436195/original/file-20211207-137612-1aqaps0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Clinton speaks during the Dec. 14, 1995, ceremony for the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords at the Elysee Palace in Paris. Joining him are, at left, Presidents Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, and Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia. At right is President Jacques Chirac of France.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-clinton-speaks-during-the-ceremony-for-the-news-photo/635957449?adppopup=true">Photo by Peter Turnley/Corbis/VCG via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>With good reason. Since Dayton, there’s been peace, but little else: <a href="https://www.economy.com/bosnia-and-herzegovina/indicators">a moribund economy</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/bosnias-25-year-struggle-with-transitional-justice-75517">failed reconciliation</a>, a country thrice-cleaved. Dayton is often blamed for Bosnia’s dysfunction, but that’s a half-truth: “Dayton Bosnia” is dysfunctional – but which part is failing? </p>
<p>Not Dayton: It’s designed to prevent effective governance and to ensure that no one of Bosnia’s three groups might dominate the others. Dayton’s compromises were the logical culmination of Bosnia’s war – the tribute reason paid to power.</p>
<p>No, the dysfunction is Bosnia – the idea that this territory, whose <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/mladic-verdict-reveals-bosnias-divisions-lack-reconciliation-2021-06-08/">three peoples lack shared identity</a>, is a sensible unit. A quarter-century on life support suggests it isn’t. </p>
<h2>The path never taken</h2>
<p>Policymakers interpret the current crisis as a <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/bosnia-test-western-resolve">test of Western resolve</a>: Increase the pressure again, add new sanctions or deploy more troops. But to what end? America keeps trying to fix Dayton but treats Bosnia as a given, and then wonders why the treatment doesn’t take. There’s no exit strategy: Just stabilize the patient, again. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjkybabkdL0AhWwjYkEHYdpAN4QFnoECAYQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.undp.org%2Fcontent%2Fdam%2Funct%2Fbih%2FPDFs%2FPrism%2520Research%2520for%2520UN%2520RCO_Statistical%2520report.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0G39DCAIdqJzP2uEGQSYsd">half of Bosnia’s population would support secession</a> and <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2021/11/17/nearly-half-of-bosnias-youngsters-pondering-emigration/">half its youth want to emigrate</a>. Why not view Bosnia’s dilemma as data? America’s policy isn’t working because Bosnia doesn’t. The U.S. intervened to end a war, but the challenge is different now. Then-Sen. Joe Biden supported that intervention. President Biden needs an alternative.</p>
<p>There is one. Secession isn’t just a symptom. It could be a cure. </p>
<p>There are plausible outcomes: a smaller Bosnia that could efficiently govern itself, mergers of Croat and Serb areas with Croatia and Serbia, transit arrangements for enclaves. The U.S. could trade recognition of independence for Serb concessions on these issues – reparations, formal apologies, guarantees for minorities. Hard questions that diplomacy would have to resolve – and could. But America wouldn’t need to impose division – not opposing it is enough.</p>
<h2>Risks and opportunity</h2>
<p>Secession has been off the table because <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/bosnia-serb-blinken-/31565317.html">America has excluded</a> secession as an option based on three unexamined strategic and moral assumptions. First, policymakers assume secession means war – yet so might continued paralysis. And U.S. policy ignores the likely source of violence. Bosnia is so divided that separation could be achieved peacefully, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/17/opinion/bosnia-dodik-dayton-accords.html">unless Bosniaks start fighting</a>. </p>
<p>Second, an impoverished geopolitics assumes that because Russia backs the Serbs, America should oppose them. But Bosnia’s fragility generates instability. The U.S. is conceding Russia a Balkan foothold – for what? Why not outflank Russia and draw new stable states closer to NATO, as we’ve done with Montenegro, Croatia and Slovenia? Regional security and integration would actually be easier with units that aren’t so internally brittle. </p>
<p>Third, there’s an assumption that seems to answer every doubt about continuing to pursue a failed policy: Secession would validate genocide. I <a href="https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facbooks/62/">edited a book on Slobodan Milosevic’s trial</a> and helped indict five Serbs for war crimes, so I’m under no illusions. But atrocities have a context. An independent Republika Srpska would have little reason to pursue violence, but forcing unwilling communities into political union is destabilizing – as we’re seeing now. It’s unwise and it doesn’t vindicate the dead. Memorials, reparations and trials are meaningful responses – but a state? Only if the living want it.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman in a head scarf cries surrounded by gravestones." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436445/original/file-20211208-25-4eesee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436445/original/file-20211208-25-4eesee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436445/original/file-20211208-25-4eesee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436445/original/file-20211208-25-4eesee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436445/original/file-20211208-25-4eesee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436445/original/file-20211208-25-4eesee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436445/original/file-20211208-25-4eesee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Bosnian Muslim woman cries during the 25th anniversary of the Srebrenica Massacre at a cemetery near the graves of close relatives who were among the 8,000 Muslims killed in July 1995 by the Bosnian Serb Army.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/bosnian-muslim-woman-cries-between-graves-of-her-father-two-news-photo/1226034416?adppopup=true">Damir Sagolj/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Bosnia isn’t a moral imperative. It’s a country, and a failed one – not because it’s poor, corrupt and dysfunctional, but because many Bosnians don’t believe in Bosnia. America’s policy is to insist they change their minds.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facbooks/215/">I study secession</a>: Sometimes it’s a sensible response to an intractable political problem – better than just doubling down on what’s not working. Supporting secession in another country might feel like interfering – but so is forcibly holding that country together. The U.S. has been engineering Bosnia since 1995. Reengaging now, <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/bosnias-power-sharing-deal-is-coming-undone-heres-how-to-fix-it/">including proposals to dissolve Republika Srpska</a> – as if that wouldn’t risk war – means more engineering. The question is, for what purpose?</p>
<p>If the reason is to avoid secession, ask why. If the answer is “to avoid war,” ask where our present policy is headed, and how many troops are needed. And when the present crisis passes, let’s have the courage to ask whether insisting on Bosnia makes sense. How long will America keep Bosnia in crisis? Until it works? Until its people stop wanting something else? Right now, those sound like euphemisms. Right now, the answer to our unasked question is “forever.”</p>
<p>[<em>Get the best of The Conversation, every weekend.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklybest">Sign up for our weekly newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173051/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy William Waters does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Dayton accords in 1995 ended years of ethnic warfare in Bosnia, but more than 25 years later, the peace is holding but little else is. Serbian President Milorad Dodik wants out.Timothy William Waters, Professor of Law, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1710682021-11-04T16:02:26Z2021-11-04T16:02:26ZBosnia and Herzegovina: world leaders risk renewed violence if the country breaks apart<p>A quarter of a century since the end of the Bosnian war, Bosnia and Herzegovina is in a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/threats-to-re-establish-republika-srpska-army-risk-undoing-dayton-agreement">perilous position</a>. People who live there are worried. After all, in the conflict that engulfed the country between 1992 and 1995, more than 100,000 people were killed or went missing. Among them were around 8,000 men and boys murdered in the genocide after <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol12/iss2/5/">the fall of Srebrenica</a> in July 1995.</p>
<p>Since the signing of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-war-in-iraq-unintentionally-helped-stabilise-bosnia-91856">Dayton Peace Agreement</a> and the end of the war, much has been done to resolve the legacy of widespread violence. Many of the missing have been found. Some of those responsible for killing, raping and beating thousands of people have been prosecuted and jailed. </p>
<p>It seems, however, that what has been achieved is not enough. Fears are now mounting that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/02/bosnia-is-in-danger-of-breaking-up-warns-eus-top-official-in-the-state">violence could break out again</a>. </p>
<h2>A state of dysfunction</h2>
<p>Since the end of 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been stuck in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/radicalisation-in-bosnia-old-wounds-reopened-by-an-emerging-problem-63534">dysfunctional constitutional setup</a>. The peace agreement created two entities: Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Together with the small but strategically located Brčko district, these constitute the nation state. </p>
<p>The Federation is run jointly by representatives of the Bosniaks (formerly referred to as Bosnian Muslims) and the Bosnian Croats. Establishing an independent Republika Srpska, meanwhile, was the political project envisioned and championed by former leaders <a href="https://theconversation.com/radovan-karadzic-sentenced-to-40-years-but-peace-is-still-a-work-in-progress-56778">Radovan Karadžić</a> and General <a href="https://theconversation.com/ratko-mladic-convicted-but-justice-hasnt-entirely-been-served-in-the-hague-88094">Ratko Mladić</a> along with their sponsors in Serbia. The latter include Slobodan Milošević, who provided the funding and arms necessary to wage war.</p>
<p>Karadžić and Mladić were convicted in The Hague to lifelong prison sentences for crimes committed in the pursuit of their territorial and demographic ambitions. It was during the armed campaign to create this independent Republika Srpska, which would be free of non-Serbs, that many of the horrific crimes were perpetrated.</p>
<p>The system established under the Dayton Agreement brought the war to an end but divided the country. It created incentives for politicians to stoke the flames of ethnic tensions and made it possible for them to indulge in widespread corruption without losing office.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the international community – mainly the US and the European Union – has gradually lost interest in funding state-building efforts in the region. Many commitments were made in the immediate aftermath of the conflict but since that time, crises in Syria, Ukraine and, most recently, Afghanistan have required both responsiveness and resources.</p>
<p>This has seen promises to integrate Bosnia and Herzegovina into the EU lose momentum. For the past 15 years, there has been no vision, no enthusiasm and little hope for a better future. Most recently, the country’s COVID-19 response made painfully apparent that the state has become dysfunctional, with deadly consequences. </p>
<h2>The threat of a new army</h2>
<p>In this complicated context, Bosnian Serb leaders, primarily the long-dominant politician Milorad Dodik, have raised tensions by threatening to establish a Bosnian Serb Army, pull out of joint state institutions – effectively dismantling the state – and declare independence. Dodik’s plans threaten to destroy the very system that keeps Bosnia together and at peace. </p>
<p>The last time nationalists tried to have an independent Republika Srpska, there was bloodshed and the widespread, systematic persecution of non-Serb communities. The Bosnian Serb Army was the force that shelled and sniped the civilians of Sarajevo for four years. Its security and intelligence officers were largely behind the <a href="https://theconversation.com/srebrenica-25-years-later-lessons-from-the-massacre-that-ended-the-bosnian-conflict-and-unmasked-a-genocide-141177">Srebrenica genocide</a>. </p>
<p>Criminal accountability at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in the Hague, as well as in the courtrooms around the country, was supposed to provide justice and deterrence. Bosnians facing this current crisis are not feeling confident. The pace of trials to convict war criminals has slowed in recent years, leaving killers and rapists at large. </p>
<p>In early 2022, it will have been 30 years since the original version of the Republika Srpska emerged as a consequence of a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing and genocide. The approach of that anniversary, alongside the wider geopolitical context – with the US, the UK and the EU distracted and an emboldened Russia – makes for an anxious winter. Russia comes encouraged with experiences from <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-and-russia-why-troop-build-up-unlikely-to-lead-to-all-out-war-157634">eastern Ukraine</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/crimea-is-lost-now-ukraines-future-depends-on-a-delicate-power-game-in-the-east-24556">Crimea</a>, where it has expanded influence and control through cooperation with local actors. It could, analysts agree, do the same by <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/06/russia-s-game-in-balkans-pub-78235">supporting Bosnian Serb plans</a>. </p>
<p>This context is compounded by recent tensions in the region in the border areas with Kosovo. And in Montenegro, there are concerns about a radicalised community wishing closer ties with <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/montenegro-violent-clashes-church-independence/">Serbia</a>.</p>
<p>People in Bosnia and Herzegovina remember the early 1990s. Many of them felt abandoned, not without reason, by the international community, who watched on the evening news as Bosnians were rounded up, put in camps with their property looted or burned, and shot at by snipers from the hills around Sarajevo.</p>
<p>This crisis, as a culmination of years of decay, is a call to action to ensure a reasonable way forward, without violence and with safety and prosperity for all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of background. For that, local political will and commitment are crucial. But even before that, what Bosnia and Herzegovina now desperately needs is attention from politicians abroad and a sense that someone – anyone – in a position to help cares.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171068/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Iva Vukušić has previously received funding from The Dutch Research Council (NWO). </span></em></p>Recent threats by the Bosnian Serb leadership of dismantling the shared state institutions endanger the stability and security of Bosnia and Herzegovina.Iva Vukušić, Lecturer, Department of History and Art History, Utrecht UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1372262020-04-30T13:33:44Z2020-04-30T13:33:44ZWhat coronavirus looks like at the Bosnian-Croatian frontier for Europe’s unwanted migrants<p>Although different countries around the world have taken largely similar approaches to facing the coronavirus pandemic by aiming to reduce human contact, it has become clear that their decisions have different consequences for different groups of people. </p>
<p>For many of us, it simply means adapting to working from home, reducing travel and reorienting our social lives to digital platforms. But for others, the COVID-19 global crisis has overlapped with pre-existing conditions of displacement to make what was already an uncomfortable life even less bearable. This is the case for thousands of asylum seekers who have been deported and held back on EU borders.</p>
<p>In the past three years, the border between Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia has become a gathering point for asylum seekers aiming to reach western EU countries. It’s also where they are stopped and pushed back by Croatian police. Those who are able to reach this border after months travelling across the Balkans, remain blocked on the Bosnian side of the frontier, where the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has set up temporary reception camps in the towns of <a href="https://medium.com/are-you-syrious/ays-special-outsiders-perspective-the-bosnian-frontier-58a21c38c799">Bihać, Cazin and Velika Kladuša</a></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330495/original/file-20200425-163136-oy5dca.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330495/original/file-20200425-163136-oy5dca.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330495/original/file-20200425-163136-oy5dca.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330495/original/file-20200425-163136-oy5dca.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330495/original/file-20200425-163136-oy5dca.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330495/original/file-20200425-163136-oy5dca.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330495/original/file-20200425-163136-oy5dca.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A young migrant rests in a camp.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Benedetta Zocchi</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many of those caught in the attempt to cross the frontier report being <a href="https://bit.ly/3d5G9tj">beaten up and threatened</a> by Croatian police officers. Humanitarian organisations struggle to keep track of the numbers of people passing through but the camps tend to be full most of the time. Consequently, most newcomers are no longer allowed within IOM facilities and are forced to sleep on the street of find shelter in abandoned buildings.</p>
<h2>Lockdown without isolation</h2>
<p>The first case of COVID-19 in Bosnia & Herzegovina was recorded in the city of Banja Luka on March 5 and the government declared a state of emergency 12 days later. People under 18 and over 65 were told to stay home for a month and a nationwide 8pm curfew was imposed.</p>
<p>The IOM camps immediately closed their gates so that no one was allowed to come in or to go out. In Bihać and Velika Kladuša, the situation has added another layer to what was already an emergency.</p>
<p>The two camps of Bira and Miral amount to little more than tents and containers hosted inside former factories. They have very poor hygiene conditions, no light and limited access to humanitarian support. Some of the people hosted in Bira have declared they are not receiving enough food or medical help. There is only one doctor in the camp and social distancing is not an option. Some of those who showed COVID-19 symptoms have not been able to self-isolate.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330494/original/file-20200425-163098-86b2mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330494/original/file-20200425-163098-86b2mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330494/original/file-20200425-163098-86b2mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330494/original/file-20200425-163098-86b2mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330494/original/file-20200425-163098-86b2mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330494/original/file-20200425-163098-86b2mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330494/original/file-20200425-163098-86b2mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330494/original/file-20200425-163098-86b2mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Migrants squatting an abandoned factory in Bihać.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Benedetta Zocchi</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Outside the camps, some of the central supermarkets in the towns of Bihać and Velika Kladuša have stopped selling food to migrants. They were already kept out of most cafes and restaurants so their options are now extremely limited.</p>
<p>Most recently, drastic new measures were taken as a new camp was set up 30km from the city of Bihać, in an area called Lipa. local police have started deporting migrants, catching them around town or forcefully removing them from the squats they are occupying, to bring them to the new camp, in which they will be confined at least as long as the lockdown is in place. </p>
<p>Just a year ago, the European Commissioner for Human Rights criticised Bihać’s mayor Suhret Fazlic for setting up an open-air camp in the <a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/bosnia-and-herzegovina-must-immediately-close-the-vucjak-camp-and-take-concrete-measures-to-improve-the-treatment-of-migrants-in-the-country">mountain area of Vucjak</a>. Migrants who were sent to Vucjak called it “jungle camp” as is was situated in a completely isolated area, on the site of a former dump, with no access to electricity or drinkable water.</p>
<p>Fearing being sent to the new jungle camp, migrants are pushing forward more rapidly with their attempts to cross the frontier. That, in turn, means local Bosnian and Croatian police forces are using up valuable resources to chase and remove them from the border area. All this is happening against a background noise of <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2020/04/21/bosnia-shifts-vulnerable-migrants-and-refugees-to-new-temporary-camp/">Serbian interest groups</a> suggesting these vulnerable Muslim migrants pose a threat to already precarious equilibrium between Serbians and Bosnian Muslims. </p>
<p>Many of us like to think we are all facing the same threat in this virus. It is a great leveller that doesn’t distinguish on the basis of class, race or gender. Yet the policies we put in place to manage it clearly do. Migrants who were already struggling to access basic resources are being pushed further onto the margins of locked down societies. </p>
<p>For asylum seekers displaced across Europe, the new global imperative of distancing was implicitly in place even before the pandemic crisis. These people are forever being asked to be somewhere else. In Europe, even in the face of a pandemic, different human lives have different value.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/137226/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benedetta Zocchi receives funding from the Leverhulme Trust Doctoral Scholarship</span></em></p>The pandemic has added to an already desperate situation.Benedetta Zocchi, Leverhulme Trust Doctoral Scholar, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/991222018-07-11T12:31:34Z2018-07-11T12:31:34ZRemembering Srebrenica, more than 20 years on<p>One of the darkest hours in recent human history, the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, has plenty of unpleasant parallels in today’s world, from <a href="https://theconversation.com/syrias-latest-chemical-massacre-demands-a-global-response-94668">Syria</a> to <a href="https://theconversation.com/rohingya-crisis-this-is-what-genocide-looks-like-83924">Myanmar</a>. 23 years after the massacre in and around the Bosnian enclave of Srebrenica, remembrance of what has been <a href="http://www.icty.org/en/press/radovan-karadzic-and-ratko-mladic-accused-genocide-following-take-over-srebrenica">described</a> as “scenes from hell, written on the darkest pages of human history” is as important as ever.</p>
<p>The events in and around Srebrenica between July 10-19 1995 are well known. In those few days, an estimated 8,000 Muslim Bosniaks were murdered by Bosnian Serb forces. Efforts to find, recover, identify and repatriate the victims’ remains are ongoing – and the task is a hugely complex one.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.euronews.com/2017/07/11/srebrenica-massacre-commemorated-with-burial-of-recently-identified-bodies">Every year</a> at the <a href="https://www.srebrenica.org.uk/lessons-from-srebrenica/srebrenica-potocari-memorial/">Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Centre and Cemetery</a>, more victims are laid to rest. This year, <a href="http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/sarajevo-honours-convoy-carrying-srebrenica-dead-07-09-2018">35 people</a> have been identified and will be buried. Of the 430 Srebrenica-related sites where human remains have been recovered, 94 are graves and 336 are surface sites with human remains scattered on the ground. Pathologists and anthropologists examined more than 17,000 sets of human remains related to Srebrenica, resulting in around 7,000 identifications, most of them via DNA. To gather enough DNA to make those identifications, more than 20,000 DNA samples had to be collected. </p>
<h2>Slow justice</h2>
<p>It was only in autumn 2017 that Ratko Mladić, a former general of the Bosnian Serb forces, was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/22/ratko-mladic-convicted-of-genocide-and-war-crimes-at-un-tribunal">convicted</a> of the crimes that took place in Srebrenica – genocide and persecution, extermination, murder, and the inhumane act of forcible transfer. Mladić is one of relatively few defendants to have appeared before the <a href="http://www.icty.org/">International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</a> (ICTY) charged with genocide. </p>
<p>This is because for a conviction on the grounds of genocide, the prosecution has to prove a catalogue of things. To be convicted of the crime of genocide, the accused must have <a href="http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf">deliberately intended</a> “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such”. Punishable under Article 4(3) of the ICTY Statute are also conspiracy to commit genocide, incitement to commit genocide, attempts to commit genocide and complicity in genocide. Two things have to be proven: the <em>actus reus</em> (the actual killings, serious bodily or mental harm and deliberate infliction of conditions designed to bring about the destruction of the group) and the <em>mens rea</em> (the specific intent to destroy the group).</p>
<p>Mladić’s 2017 conviction did not bring an end to all aspects of his case. In March 2018, both the defence and prosecution <a href="http://jrad.unmict.org/webdrawer/webdrawer.dll/webdrawer/search/rec&sm_recnbr&sm_ncontents=mict-13-56&sm_created&sm_fulltext&sort1=rs_datecreated&count&rows=100">filed their notices of appeal</a>. Though not in relation to Srebrenica, the prosecution submits that the trial chamber erred in two of its findings: first, that Bosnian Muslims in the areas of Foča, Kotor Varoš, Prijedor, Sanski Most and Vlasenica did not constitute a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and second, that Mladić (and others) did not intend to destroy those Bosnian Muslims. As a result, the <a href="http://www.unmict.org/en/cases/mict-13-56">proceedings</a> are ongoing.</p>
<p>During the 530 days of Mladić’s original trial, 377 witnesses appeared in court, some of them victims of war crimes. Victims often have <a href="http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/24977/">many needs</a>: to tell their stories, to contribute to public knowledge and accountability, to publicly denounce the wrongs that were committed against them and others, to bear witness on behalf of those who did not survive, and to receive reparations, public acknowledgement or apologies. They may wish to confront the accused, to find out the truth about what happened to their loved ones, to contribute to peace goals or to help prevent the perpetration of further abuse. Many risk their own personal safety to tell their stories, or those of victims who did not survive.</p>
<p>And yet, a recent <a href="https://www.impunitywatch.org/docs/Keeping_the_Promise_%5BFINAL%5D.pdf">report by international NGO Impunity Watch</a> paints a bleak picture stating that “Western Balkan states have done very poorly when it comes to victim participation in [transitional justice] processes. Victims’ voices are marginalised and their rightful claims have been politicised by the different sides.”</p>
<h2>Remembrance and responsibility</h2>
<p>Impunity Watch describes a continuing “battleground of conflicting narratives, in which each side claims victimhood and blames the other for past abuses”. This does not bode well for the future.</p>
<p>The divisions in Bosnia are hard to ignore; Srebrenica’s Serb mayor, Mladen Grujičić, <a href="http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/srebrenica-s-serb-mayor-repeats-denial-of-genocide-04-13-2017">denies that the genocide occurred</a>, as does <a href="http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/thousands-mourn-at-srebrenica-anniversary-commemoration-07-11-2016">Milorad Dodik</a> the leader of Bosnia’s Serb-led entity Republika Srpska. Many Serbian nationalists regard Mladić as a war hero. To many people, his conviction would therefore be <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/22/bosnians-divided-over-ratko-mladic-guilty-verdict-for-war-crimes">effectively meaningless</a>.</p>
<p>And yet, plenty of civil society activities, interventions and educational programmes have been devised. In Bosnia, <a href="https://balkandiskurs.com/en/2018/02/11/youth-united-in-peace-25-years-of-seaside-peacebuilding/">Youth United in Peace</a> and <a href="http://www.yihr.org/">Youth Initiative for Human Rights</a>, to name but two, offer young people the chance to hear different perspectives about the past through workshops and visits to commemorative places of all sides. Such projects try to counter ethnic <a href="https://www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/education">segregation</a> to offer shared space for dialogue.</p>
<p>In a speech to the United Nations in 1958, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/universal-declaration-human-rights-UDHR">Eleanor Roosevelt</a> famously said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home – so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of the world. Yet they are the world of the individual person; the neighbourhood he lives in; the school or college he attends; the factory, farm, or office where he works.</p>
<p>Such are the places where every man, woman, and child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without discrimination. Unless these rights have meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere. Without concerted citizen action to uphold them close to home, we shall look in vain for progress in the larger world.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>All too often this is forgotten. But with stark societal divisions palpable in many parts of the world, we have to keep reminding ourselves that all others are above all else human beings. Only if we do that will the idea of human rights be meaningful.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99122/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The massacre of 8,000 Muslim Bosniaks in a few days in 1995 must never be forgotten.Melanie Klinkner, Principal Academic in International Law, Bournemouth UniversityGiulia Levi, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Health and Social Sciences, Bournemouth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/934082018-03-19T12:58:42Z2018-03-19T12:58:42ZBritain’s role in the Balkans – why Boris Johnson is about to turn pro-EU<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210514/original/file-20180315-104676-drf5g0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Neil Hall</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Here’s a paradox from Brexit Britain. This summer, at a summit meeting in London organised by the UK’s Foreign Office, a hard Brexiteer – the foreign secretary Boris Johnson – will be the designated advocate of EU membership for the Western Balkan states. A country preparing to leave the EU will preach the accession of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/bosnia-10925">Bosnia-Herzegovina</a>, Albania, FYR Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro to the European Union. A country seeking to “take back control” from the heavy-handedness of Brussels will advise others to relinquish their sovereignty to that same superstate. What’s going on here?</p>
<p>The London summit in July will host the leaders of the six Western Balkan states and those of Britain, Germany, Italy, France and Austria. It’s part of the so-called <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=berlin+process+balkans&oq=berlin+process+balkans&aqs=chrome..69i57.4952j1j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8">Berlin Process</a>, an intergovernmental initiative introduced by Angela Merkel in 2014 whose goal was to help the development of the Western Balkans by focusing on investment, connectivity, infrastructure and regional cooperation, with the ultimate aim of their <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-balkans/eu-opens-door-to-balkans-with-2025-target-for-membership-idUKKBN1FQ1X4">joining the EU</a>.</p>
<p>So far, as part of the process, a <a href="http://www.rycowb.org/">Regional Youth Cooperation Office</a> has been established to “promote the spirit of reconciliation and cooperation between the youth in the region through youth exchange programmes”. An <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/policy-highlights/regional-cooperation/20150828_chairmans_conclusions_western_balkans_summit.pdf">agreement</a> has also been signed for the settlement of bilateral disputes. There is also talk of a Western Balkans Economic Area, where goods, services, investments and skilled workers would be able to move without obstacles. </p>
<p>The Berlin Process includes, from the EU side, the five strongest and most prominent member states. Every summer, the leaders of these countries meet with the leaders from the six Western Balkan countries to reaffirm their commitment to the region’s European integration. They also aim to attract pledges for investment and take a family photo during a highly publicised summit.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Delegates arrive at the 2017 summit in Trieste.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Now, following a commitment made in 2014, it’s Britain’s turn to be the host of that summit. The 2018 meeting is an opportunity for the UK to show that it has something substantial to offer to European affairs despite Brexit. After all, every host so far has shaped the agenda by including their own expertise. In Vienna, three years ago it was civil society engagement, in Paris, two years ago, it was climate change. Last year’s summit in <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/international/news/2017-07-12-western-balkans-summit-2017-delivering-region_en">Trieste</a> dealt with the rule of law and the fight against corruption.</p>
<h2>Delicate balance</h2>
<p>Despite its imminent departure from the EU, Britain does still have a useful role to play in the Berlin Process. That might include its security expertise as a strong military nation that remains an enthusiastic member of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/nato-786">NATO</a>. With geopolitics becoming increasingly significant for Europe’s foreign policy, the Western Balkans is one of the most vulnerable regions of the continent. From a security perspective, the region is highly exposed to risks on the periphery of Europe. </p>
<p>The security risks in the region include a generic fear of return to the wars of the 1990s among some post-Yugoslav states, the threat of <a href="https://theconversation.com/radicalisation-in-bosnia-old-wounds-reopened-by-an-emerging-problem-63534">Islamic fundamentalism</a>, the rise of organised crime, geopolitical and geo-economic competition from China, Russia, or Turkey.</p>
<p>Then there are the existing bilateral disputes among post-Yugoslav states. All have unresolved border issues – some of them subject to international arbitration. And all these disputes affect stability. None of the states have threatened to use military force against each other to resolve these issues, but any security assistance from abroad to one country may be seen to antagonise the interests of the neighbouring country.</p>
<p>Focusing so heavily on the issue of security can also actually harm political progress. People in the region increasingly experience a backsliding of democracy. </p>
<p>As a recent House of Lords <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldintrel/53/53.pdf">report</a> noted, there is “serious concern that gains made towards good governance and the rule of law are in danger of being lost as countries in the region turn to authoritarian leadership, nationalistic politics and state capture”. And a recent <a href="http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/balkan-countries-still-facing-old-human-rights-issues-01-18-2018">report</a> by Human Rights Watch found that most countries in the region still face serious challenges in upholding human rights standards.</p>
<p>Because the primary concern has, for so long, been security in the Western Balkans, such anxieties have, for the most part, fallen on deaf ears in Western capitals. Geopolitical concerns have allowed local leaders and governments to enjoy lax political conditionality for the sake of security and stability – what has been labelled “stabilitocracy”. As a result, liberal politics have deteriorated and advances made during the 2000s have eroded.</p>
<p>It’s important that any security agenda embraces democracy, human rights, and rule of law – the “holy trinity” of political transformation, which itself is a necessary condition for security and stability in the region. That should be the common goal of both the Berlin Process and the European Commission, the latter having recently adopted a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf">new enlargement strategy</a> for the Western Balkan candidate states. The biggest challenge for Johnson and the Foreign Office, on this particular occasion, is to find ways to cooperate effectively with the European Union, aiming at the inclusion of the Western Balkan countries in the European family, at a time when the UK is excluding itself from it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93408/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adis Merdzanovic receives funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Othon Anastasakis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The foreign secretary will host a summit in London this summer on helping Balkan states join the EU.Othon Anastasakis, Program Director and Senior Research Fellow in South East European Studies, St Antony's College, University of OxfordAdis Merdzanovic, Postdoctoral Researcher, Junior Research Fellow, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/897252018-01-08T12:45:18Z2018-01-08T12:45:18ZWoodrow Wilson’s famous US speech makes a mockery of Donald Trump<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201129/original/file-20180108-83563-ej88x6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Thomas Woodrow Wilson (1856-1934)</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Woodrow_Wilson#/media/File:President_Wilson_1919.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>We have reached the centenary of US President Woodrow Wilson’s speech to Congress on January 8, 1918, outlining his <a href="http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp">Fourteen Points</a> for brokering a lasting peace in Europe after World War I. It was the famous roar of idealism from across the Atlantic that would be <a href="https://www.historyonthenet.com/world-war-one-the-treaty-of-versailles/">whittled back</a> in the name of self-interest by the victorious allies at Versailles the following year. </p>
<p>The speech would go on to shape many features of American foreign policy, however, particularly the broader points like open diplomacy, removal of economic and trade barriers, freedom of the seas and a general association of nations working together. Wilson <a href="http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/woodrow-wilson-suffers-a-stroke">would suffer</a> a stroke that would partially paralyse him in the fallout from Versailles, but his Congress speech would ensure his legacy as one of America’s most influential presidents. </p>
<p>The centenary takes place just days before the anniversary of the inauguration of Donald Trump. With the media currently full of the astonishing claims about the administration contained in <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/05/michael-wolff-claims-spent-three-hours-talking-donald-trump/">Michael Wolff’s new book</a>, one wonders what the 45th president’s legacy will be. Certainly foreign policy looks more uncertain than for many years. What, then, do the Fourteen Points tell us about Donald Trump?</p>
<h2>America front and centre</h2>
<p>Wilson’s speech that day in 1918 reflected his conviction that the United States should take a central place on the world stage – securing global peace and stability while furthering American interests at the same time. His approach would be largely rejected by his countrymen during the isolationist 1920s and 1930s, before ultimately coming to define many Americans’ view of their country’s role in the world. </p>
<p>Since Trump came to power last January, it looks as if America has entered a new era. Many conservatives and rural middle Americans – the bedrock of President Trump’s support – have long been suspicious of America’s global role and complained about the ways in which the country’s foreign policy has been viewed by the rest of the world. </p>
<p>They feel that when America intervenes – as in the first Gulf War or in Afghanistan – it is accused of putting self-interest before the good of the international community. But when it doesn’t intervene – as in Bosnia or Syria – the accusations are little different. Why, they argue, should the United States be the world’s policeman? </p>
<p>This is clearly reflected in Trump’s <a href="http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2017/">National Security Strategy</a>. Released in mid-December, it rejects many of the principles of previous American foreign policy, stating quite clearly that it must be “guided by outcomes, not ideology”. It is pure realpolitik. </p>
<p>The document promises explicitly to “put the safety, interests and well-being of our citizens first”. This includes building <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-mexico-has-nothing-to-fear-from-donald-trump-55362">the infamous wall</a> along America’s border with Mexico, withdrawing from many trade agreements which it sees as unfair, and beginning a substantial conventional and nuclear arms build up. It is America first from top to bottom – almost point by point a rejection of the ideas contained in Wilson’s Fourteen Points. </p>
<h2>The great game</h2>
<p>If this Trump strategy rejects the 20th-century concept of internationalism, it has surprising echoes of much earlier mid-19th century diplomacy. It says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>After being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition has returned.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Trump developed this point while outlining his policy to journalists, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/donald-trump-new-era-global-competition-america-going-to-win/4169607.html">explaining</a>: “America is in the game, and America is going to win.” The idea that foreign policy is a great game that can be won has echoes of Victorian men’s clubs, and is one of the most worrying changes initiated by Trump’s administration. It suggests a binary explanation of the world where there are only winners and losers, where those not participating in the game can be ignored. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201136/original/file-20180108-83556-wy6yex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201136/original/file-20180108-83556-wy6yex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201136/original/file-20180108-83556-wy6yex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201136/original/file-20180108-83556-wy6yex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201136/original/file-20180108-83556-wy6yex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201136/original/file-20180108-83556-wy6yex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1009&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201136/original/file-20180108-83556-wy6yex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1009&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201136/original/file-20180108-83556-wy6yex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1009&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bird brain.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/america-first-presidential-inauguration-pledge-isolated-560804350?src=EV8H1eezXw3XBcsYfMYJ6A-1-58">Barry Barnes</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But perhaps the most concerning shift of all, which probably echoes Trump’s personality more than his policy advisers, is the determination to conduct foreign policy “without apology”. Not only will the US put its own interests first, in other words, it will not deeply consider the interests of its allies. </p>
<p>Two recent policy changes reflect this. Following America’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-climate-usa-paris-idUSKBN1AK2FM">withdrawal</a> from the Paris Climate Agreement, the security strategy makes no mention of climate change as one of the issues facing the world, although it repeatedly discusses “the business climate”. </p>
<p>An even clearer rejection of internationalism was the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-will-trumps-declaration-on-jerusalem-mean-to-palestinians-88841">December 6 decision</a> to move the American Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This was apparently against the specific advice of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, both of whom feared the impact on American diplomatic influence in the Middle East. </p>
<h2>Big button diplomacy</h2>
<p>This brings us to Twitter. Rather like 19th-century diplomats, where telegrams could spark wars, Trump seems often to have resorted to “Twitter diplomacy” to shape, or more often seemingly frustrate, American foreign policy. </p>
<p>President Teddy Roosevelt famously counselled that American foreign policy should “speak softly, and carry a big stick”. Perhaps nothing sums up Trump’s contrast to his predecessors than his tweeting – most recently the <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/02/politics/donald-trump-north-korea-nuclear/index.html">New Year’s Day reminder</a> to North Korea’s Kim Jong-Un, in language more reminiscent of a primary school playground than international diplomats, that “I too have a nuclear button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his”. </p>
<p>None of this is to lionise Wilson, it should be said. America’s 28th president was no progressive <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/wilson-legacy-racism/417549/">on race</a>, for example, and he <a href="https://millercenter.org/president/wilson/foreign-affairs">invaded</a> Haiti and the Dominican Republic. </p>
<p>But his Fourteen Points speech remains one of the great pieces of statesmanship of the modern era. Where it fought hard for stability, President Trump’s foreign policy seems more likely to produce instability. Where it fought for openness, the Trump administration turns inwards. It is a moment to reflect on what American leadership offered the world 100 years ago, and what it might learn to offer again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89725/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Ward does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>America finds itself in uncharted territory under Donald Trump – not least when it comes to climate change and Israel policy.Matthew Ward, Senior Lecturer in History, University of DundeeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/879272017-11-23T00:40:44Z2017-11-23T00:40:44ZRatko Mladic, the ‘Butcher of Bosnia’, to spend life in prison for genocide and war crimes<p>The former commander of the Bosnian Serb army, Ratko Mladić, has been found guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, and sentenced to life in prison. </p>
<p>Mladić was convicted by the <a href="http://www.icty.org">International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</a> of crimes committed against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. <a href="http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-summary-en.pdf">The tribunal declared</a> that the crimes he committed were “among the most heinous known to humankind”.</p>
<p>Trials of former high-ranking war criminals are often peppered with drama, and this week’s verdict announcement was no exception. Disruption of trials is a way for previously powerful people – usually men – to reclaim some of their lost power. </p>
<p>Halfway through the verdict summary announcement, Mladić requested a break. After a lengthy break, the court was informed that Mladić had high blood pressure, but on medical advice, deemed it appropriate to continue. At this point, Mladić refused to sit and began shouting at the judges: “this is a lie” and “shame on you”. </p>
<p>He was thrown out of court, and watched the rest of the proceedings from another room. This unfortunately meant that victims were unable to see his reaction to the long-awaited verdict and sentencing.</p>
<h2>Long road to justice</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.icty.org/en/node/10764">First indicted</a> by the tribunal in 1995, Mladić stayed in military resorts, protected even though a fugitive. He later went into hiding until his arrest in Serbia in 2011. Mladić’s trial began in 2012, concluded in 2016, with the verdict delivered on November 22.</p>
<p>Mladić, who came to be known as the “Butcher of Bosnia”, rose through the ranks to become the commander of the Bosnian Serb army in 1992, participating in atrocities committed under Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević’s regime. Milošević was also tried by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, but died before he could be convicted.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/bosnias-25-year-struggle-with-transitional-justice-75517">Bosnia's 25-year struggle with transitional justice</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Mladić played a leadership role in these atrocities, commanding the army as it committed crimes across the regime. He has been convicted of “Joint Criminal Enterprise” – the international equivalent of conspiracy – alongside other leaders such as Milošević and Bosnian Serb politician Radovan Karadžić. The tribunal found that Mladić was instrumental in the crimes and they would not have taken place without his involvement.</p>
<p>The atrocities included the siege of Sarajevo, which lasted for 44 months from 1992-95. Some 10,000 people died during the siege, including many children. Some of Mladić’s other crimes were committed at internment camps such as Omarska and Foča, where thousands were tortured and raped. He has also been held responsible for the kidnapping of UN peacekeepers in order to leverage NATO to stop air strikes.</p>
<p>Convicting the high-ranking Mladić is symbolic and momentous, as he was the commander of the soldiers who carried out these actions.</p>
<p>Perhaps most significant is the conviction for genocide over mass killings at Srebrenica in July 1995. Some 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were killed and buried in mass graves.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PQ0iT4mSK0I">Identification of remains</a> is ongoing, with thousands of bones and personal belongings still being analysed in hope of a match for families that continue to seek the whereabouts of loved ones. Identification is hampered by the fact that two months after the killings, bodies were moved to alternative mass grave locations.</p>
<h2>A welcome day for survivors</h2>
<p>The many survivors have waited a long time justice, both for themselves and for their lost loved ones. Some victims <a href="http://www.euronews.com/2017/11/20/families-of-bosnia-victims-head-to-the-hague-for-mladic-verdict">travelled to The Hague</a> to hear the verdict first hand.</p>
<p>It is particularly poignant, given that some of the war criminals convicted by the tribunal have already served their sentences and returned to Serbia and Bosnia, now living in communities with their victims. A life sentence for Mladić is a source of satisfaction to the victims; a minimum justice for their suffering and loss.</p>
<p>Legal consequences of this ruling are also substantial. Proving genocide in court is challenging for prosecutors, with the requirement of a “special intent” to eliminate part or whole of a specific population. </p>
<p>Convictions for genocide are rare; only a handful of convicted perpetrators at the ICTY were found guilty of genocide, including Karadžić and Radislav Krstić, a deputy commander in the Bosnian Serb army. </p>
<p>The confirmation that the Srebrenica massacre was indeed a genocide is important, because many Bosnian Serbs continue to deny the fact. Victims hope the ruling will contribute to a broader acknowledgement, which in turn could help the reconciliation process. </p>
<p>Yet <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/11/bosnia-war-victims-speak-ratko-mladic-verdic-171120142218960.html">others have little hope</a> that the ruling will change things. Srebrenica’s Serb mayor Mladen Grujičić still denies the genocide, and many Serbian nationalists still laud Mladić and his fellow war criminals as heroes.</p>
<p>Mladić was found not guilty of one count of genocide, in reference to a broader spate of killings throughout Bosnia. This is in keeping with previous decisions where Srebrenica has been deemed genocide, but the overall objective of the leadership for the whole of the Yugoslav territory has not.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ratko-mladics-conviction-and-why-the-evidence-of-mass-graves-still-matters-87976">Ratko Mladić's conviction and why the evidence of mass graves still matters</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This verdict is the final judgement to be delivered by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, slated to close at the end of this year. Since it was established in 1993, the tribunal has indicted 161 individuals and convicted 84 perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.</p>
<p>Some <a href="http://www.icty.org/en/content/infographic-icty-facts-figures">4,650 witnesses have appeared</a>, more than 1,000 of whom testified about the Srebrenica genocide. There are only seven proceedings remaining, with the UN Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals finalising cases. The tribunal has undoubtedly contributed to justice and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia.</p>
<p>However, success has not been absolute, with criticism that sentences have been too short. There is also inevitable post-atrocity denial of crimes committed by perpetrators and their communities, with continued rejection by Serbian communities and politicians of the validity and decisions of the Tribunal.</p>
<p>These 84 convictions are clearly only a small proportion of the thousands of perpetrators. With the wind-up of the tribunal, remaining perpetrators will continue to be tried at local war crimes courts in Bosnia.</p>
<p>Throughout Europe, 14 countries have housed convicted tribunal war criminals in their prisons. Mladić will serve his sentence in a country yet to be determined. </p>
<p>While it may not bring their loved ones back, survivors can have some comfort in knowing the man who ordered and oversaw the atrocities will spend the rest of his life in prison.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87927/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Melanie O'Brien is a member of the Australian Red Cross Queensland International Humanitarian Law Committee, and the Second Vice-President of the International Association of Genocide Scholars. </span></em></p>Former commander of the Bosnian Serb army Ratko Mladic has been found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Survivors of the atrocities have today welcomed the long-awaited news.Melanie O'Brien, Research Fellow, TC Beirne Law School, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/879692017-11-22T21:41:10Z2017-11-22T21:41:10ZRatko Mladić: orchestrator of the brutal siege of Sarajevo<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195861/original/file-20171122-6031-94dh5o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">General Ratko Mladić – convicted of war crimes and genocide.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/ssoosay/5763104078/in/photolist-9Mgq4q-oMbmvS-bv3iqL-9MHbyF-GQnVnF-GQnVvB-Dpbets-21rZs4G-QmyYtM-ZqwwKn-GQnV18-21rZtkE-GQnVEp-ZqwwVT-GQnWgz-GQnVdT-GQnVNR-GQnWpF-Dpbex5-ZqNupP-Dpbefm-57FJbJ-7uTBvq-9SqZ6C-9Qf31o">Surian Soosay</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ratko Mladić’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/22/ratko-mladic-convicted-of-genocide-and-war-crimes-at-un-tribunal">sentencing for genocide</a> in Srebrenica will doubtless be the headline in the plethora of press coverage that has accompanied judgement of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). But Mladić was also sentenced for his role in executing <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/it/book/9781137577177">the siege of Sarajevo</a>, the longest siege in modern European history during which citizens were targeted by mortar, shell and sniper fire and the city’s water and electricity was cut off. It was a brutal campaign to break the city’s resistance, and there was no distinction made between military and civilian targets. </p>
<p>Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most multi-ethnic of former Yugoslavia’s six republics. The population of its capital, Sarajevo, mirrored this ethnic complexity and the city itself. But the first multi-party elections in Bosnia in 1990 had brought a tenuous coalition of nationalist parties to power. This coalition, comprising the (Bosniak) Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) were elected with a Bosniak, Alija Izetbegović, as president. </p>
<p>As the Yugoslav state continued to disintegrate, with Slovenia and Croatia both pursuing independence, Bosnia’s situation became increasingly dangerous. In short, <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/radovan-karadzic-26073">Radovan Karadžić</a>’s SDS wished to remain in a Yugoslav state, whatever form that would take, while both the SDA and the HDZ pursued independence. During heated exchanges in October 1991, the SDS walked out of parliament and set up a parallel Bosnian Serb assembly and <em>de facto</em> headquarters in the nearby Holiday Inn hotel. </p>
<h2>Sliding into war</h2>
<p>On February 29 and March 1, a referendum on independence was held. The SDS, arguing that the decision to hold a referendum was unconstitutional because it was not reached by consensus, called on Serbs to boycott the vote. Those who did vote, largely Bosniaks and Croats, opted for independence. The result initiated the “war of the barricades”, during which the SDS (and later the SDA) erected barricades in areas of Sarajevo they claimed as theirs. War was avoided then, but on April 6, 1992 shots were fired from <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24730400">the Holiday Inn</a> by snipers into a crowd of peaceful demonstrators who were assembled outside the Bosnian parliament. In the chaos that followed, Karadžić fled. The Bosnian Serb leadership established their wartime base in nearby Pale and heavy weapons were placed on the hills surrounding Sarajevo. Intermittent shelling and sniping began.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/-boLmzBnzO8?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Whether interested in politics or not, the siege imposed itself on ordinary people’s lives in increments. Many continued going to work, despite the sporadic sniper and mortar fire and fierce battles in Ilidža, just west of Sarajevo. They refused to believe it could happen in their city, which was civilised, cultured, part of the European mainstream. But any existing illusions were shattered by the summer of 1992. Mladić assumed command of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) in May 1992, promising to “blow the minds” of the citizens of Sarajevo. Throughout the subsequent months the city was heavily shelled, causing significant civilian casualties and the destruction of many important buildings, such as the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-cityhall/sarajevo-reopens-landmark-city-hall-and-library-destroyed-in-war-idUSKBN0DP0XO20140509">Vijećnica</a>, which housed thousands of rare books and manuscripts. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195858/original/file-20171122-6051-yyzqe8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195858/original/file-20171122-6051-yyzqe8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195858/original/file-20171122-6051-yyzqe8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195858/original/file-20171122-6051-yyzqe8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195858/original/file-20171122-6051-yyzqe8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195858/original/file-20171122-6051-yyzqe8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195858/original/file-20171122-6051-yyzqe8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">General Mladić (centre) arrives for UN-mediated talks at Sarajevo airport, June 1993.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ratko_Mladi%C4%87#/media/File:Evstafiev-mladic-sarajevo1993w.jpg">I, Evstafiev</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It was, however, the first winter of the siege that brought real privation to Sarajevo. No running water, no electricity and limited amounts of food (UN aid and anything that could be purchased for inflated prices on the black market) meant the challenges of surviving were manifold. And the extremities of life under siege had a significant impact upon people’s ability to stay sane. Daily shelling and sniping – sometimes in a slow and methodical manner – and constant danger of death placed citizens of Sarajevo in an unimaginable psychological position. Some withdrew into themselves, while others found survival mechanisms and a way of facing the realities of their lives. Otherwise normal activities became vital mechanisms for survival – dressing well, attending theatre performances or going to <em>ad hoc</em> gigs. Humour, albeit of the rather dark variant, was equally important. Preservation of one’s dignity was a serious matter. </p>
<p>The construction of a tunnel (built by the Bosnian Army) underneath Sarajevo airport in 1993 eased the situation somewhat, with arms and food being brought into the city – breaking somewhat the over-inflation of basic goods. But life under siege became a reality with no end in sight. The international community’s efforts to bring the siege to an end had failed, though <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Deliberate_Force">NATO airstrikes on VRS</a> positions, following the two mortar attacks (in February 1994 and August 1995) would eventually help to do so. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195934/original/file-20171122-6013-14qe5iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195934/original/file-20171122-6013-14qe5iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195934/original/file-20171122-6013-14qe5iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195934/original/file-20171122-6013-14qe5iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195934/original/file-20171122-6013-14qe5iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195934/original/file-20171122-6013-14qe5iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195934/original/file-20171122-6013-14qe5iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Sarajevo Tunnel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/26781577@N07/15840660490/in/photolist-9fD5ai-9fD5cM-9fGevw-8trhr7-q8Mwu3-qqgH75-C8kFuT-HjxHfD-qqgGwh-wDpDRX-oZtdwu-buTb32-buTNtz-buTNNr-buTMbP-buTN26-bsCwiv-9kav2S-9fJnfS">Clay Gilliland</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The war in Bosnia ended with the signing of the <a href="http://www.osce.org/bih/126173">Dayton Peace Agreement</a> in November 1995, though the siege of Sarajevo was not lifted until February 1996. As part of the peace agreement, the vast majority of the city – with the exception of Istočno Sarajevo (eastern Sarajevo) – became part of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of the country’s two entities (the other being Republika Srpska). This initiated the departure of the majority of the city’s Serb population. </p>
<p>By the lifting of the siege over 11,000 people, 5,000 of whom were civilians (2,000 were children), were killed during the siege of Sarajevo. In the context of the charges relating to Sarajevo, Mladić’s sentencing is no surprise – his colleagues, <a href="http://www.icty.org/case/galic/4">Stanislav Galić</a> and <a href="http://www.icty.org/case/dragomir_milosevic/4">Dragomir Milošević</a> both commanders of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of the VRS had previously received lengthy sentences. Mladić’s sentencing for the siege of Sarajevo (not to mention his other crimes) will never compensate for the destruction of a city and the targeting of civilians, but it may go some way to bringing a close to a dark chapter in Bosnia, and Sarajevo’s, history.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87969/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kenneth Morrison is author of four monographs on the Balkans, including Sarajevo’s Holiday Inn: On the Frontline of Politics and War (Palgrave MacMillan, 2016).</span></em></p>Bosnian Serb general found guilty of genocide.Kenneth Morrison, Professor of Modern South-East European History, De Montfort UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/879762017-11-22T17:21:41Z2017-11-22T17:21:41ZRatko Mladić’s conviction and why the evidence of mass graves still matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195903/original/file-20171122-6061-czl9t1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former general Mladić during proceedings in January.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/icty/31737888363/in/photolist-9Mgq4q-oMbmvS-57FJbJ-bv3iqL-GQnVnF-9MHbyF-7uTBvq-9SqZ6C-GQnVvB-QmyYtM-9Qf31o-Dpbets-21rZs4G-ZqwwKn-21rZtkE-GQnV18-Dpbex5-Dpbefm-GQnVEp-GQnWgz-ZqwwVT-GQnVdT-GQnWpF-GQnVNR">UN ICTY</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ratko Mladić <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/22/ratko-mladic-convicted-of-genocide-and-war-crimes-at-un-tribunal">has been convicted</a> of genocide and persecution, extermination, murder and the inhumane act of forcible transfer in the area of Srebrenica in 1995. He was also found guilty of persecution, extermination, murder, deportation and inhumane act of forcible transfer in municipalities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and of murder, terror and unlawful attacks on civilians in Sarajevo. </p>
<p>In addition, the former Bosnian Serb army general was convicted for the hostage-taking of UN personnel. But he was acquitted of the charge of genocide in several municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992.</p>
<p>The events that occurred in and around the Srebrenica enclave between July 10-19 1995, where an estimated 8,000 Bosnian Muslims, mostly men and boys, lost their lives, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/05/11/reviews/970511.11grimont.html">are well documented</a>. These atrocities, <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Yugoslavia-Death-Nation-Laura-Silber/dp/0140262636">culminating in</a> the “biggest single mass murder in Europe” since World War II, not only resulted in a tremendous loss of life and emotionally scarred survivors, it also left behind a landscape filled with human remains and mass graves.</p>
<p>Forensic investigations into the Srebrenica massacre <a href="http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/24750/1/Karadzic%E2%80%99s%20guilty%20verdict%20and%20forensic%20evidence%20from%20Bosnia%E2%80%99s%20mass%20graves%20Sci-Justice%202016.pdf">assisted</a> in convicting Mladić, who stood accused for his involvement in implementing and orchestrating the forcible transfer and eventual elimination of the Bosnian Muslim population from Srebrenica. For the Srebrenica investigations, between 1996 and 2001, the <a href="http://www.icty.org/">International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</a> (ICTY) conducted exhumations at 23 sites, while a further 20 mass graves were probed to confirm that they <a href="http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/documents/P642-1a.pdf">contained human remains</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195909/original/file-20171122-6016-4ntuqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195909/original/file-20171122-6016-4ntuqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195909/original/file-20171122-6016-4ntuqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195909/original/file-20171122-6016-4ntuqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195909/original/file-20171122-6016-4ntuqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195909/original/file-20171122-6016-4ntuqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195909/original/file-20171122-6016-4ntuqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Srebrenica.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/martijnmunneke/2653413838/in/photolist-53trus-53tuFf-53pecX-53trZG-53tuRh-53tuzf-53tuLW-53pcec-53pcsF-53tvwJ-53pgY6-53tvtd-53pezt-53pdXF-53tsNy-53trCJ-53pftF-53tsru-53tu8y-53tvpG-53trfJ-53phoB-53pe4X-53pffz-53tr4w-53ttaW-53pfn4-53peXP-53tsUY-53tqTq-53pdB4-53pfai-53pgLr-8A4MLN-53pgkx-53tviA-53ph1r-53tvd3-53tuPq-o9UYVS-obNR8L-a5ypHx-53tvaL-53tv93-53pgNn-53pfGX-vSB5KV-a3tvtf-Xefv6v-a3tuw3">Martijn.Munneke/ Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The investigative objectives for these investigations were to:
* Corroborate victim and witness accounts of the massacres;
* Determine an accurate count of victims;
* Determine cause and time of death;
* Determine the sex of victims;
* Determine the identity of victims (a process that is ongoing with the help of DNA analysis); and
* Identify links <a href="http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/documents/P642-1a.pdf">to the perpetrators</a>.</p>
<p>The task of locating and exhuming mass graves in Bosnia continues, as does the general quest of locating the missing in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. And this evidence still matters for the ICTY. Evidence on hundreds of bodies exhumed from the Tomašica mass grave near Prijedor in the north-west of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was <a href="http://www.sense-agency.com/icty/what-post-mortems-of-tomasica-victims-showed.29.html?cat_id=1&news_id=16662">presented in the Mladić trial</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-summary-en.pdf">summary judgment</a> read out in the court room in The Hague made this very clear:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>During several weeks in September and early October 1995, senior members of the VRS [Army of the Bosnian-Serb Republic] and the MUP [Ministry of the Interior] attempted to conceal their crimes by exhuming their victims’ remains from several mass graves, and then reburying those remains in more remote areas in Zvornik and Bratunac municipalities. Their attempt to cover up the Srebrenica massacres ultimately failed. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Such attempts at hiding crimes by digging up mass graves only to dispose of the bodies in so called “secondary mass graves” results in commingled and mutilated body parts rendering identification and repatriation of human remains all the more difficult. This causes further and prolonged distress to the survivor population and can be seen as intent to cause suffering.</p>
<p>Properly investigated forensic evidence from mass graves, the presentation of such physical evidence, the testing of expertise, independence and impartiality of the accounts in court, is likely to result in more reliable findings. In the case of Bosnian Serb leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/radovan-karadzic-sentenced-to-40-years-but-peace-is-still-a-work-in-progress-56778">Radovan Karadžić</a> forensic evidence helped confirm the crimes committed – it can be assumed that the same is the case for Mladić; at the time of writing the judgment in its entirety is not available yet. </p>
<p>It is well worth remembering that the information from forensic mass grave investigations has another purpose and does not only speak to a court of law. The work on the ground through organisations such as the <a href="https://www.icmp.int/">International Commission on Missing Persons</a> will continue <a href="https://www.ictj.org/news/karadzic-bosnia-herzegovina-criminal-justice#.VwvL_wtXbgc.twitter">as there are</a> “too many people who are still searching for their children’s bones to bury”. Those forensic findings will have a value and meaning for family members and survivors that judgments such as the Mladić one cannot have. It offers them information on their lost loved ones and, hopefully, the return of their human remains.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87976/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Melanie Klinkner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Forensic science of the dead helps to convict the living responsible.Melanie Klinkner, Senior Lecturer In Law, Bournemouth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/793932017-06-16T13:50:22Z2017-06-16T13:50:22ZHow the spectre of Yugoslavia looms over EU’s handling of the refugee crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174172/original/file-20170616-505-v1g0t2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Memorial to early 1990s war in Sarajevo, Bosnia. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/26781577@N07/16027223292/in/photolist-egsG6G-6abNp5-7JM6DS-qqgH75-9y4d8t-rU8BDr">Clay Gilliland</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>With peak season approaching for refugees making treacherous journeys to and through Europe, don’t be surprised if we are told again that this is unprecedented. That would certainly be in keeping with what <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34173972">news organisations</a>, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-idUSKCN0QZ0TK20150831">politicians</a> and <a href="https://www.oecd.org/migration/Is-this-refugee-crisis-different.pdf">research bodies</a> have asserted in the past several years. </p>
<p>In fact, Europe has coped with comparable situations – not least the Balkan crisis of the early 1990s. It tends to be overlooked that the Yugoslav experience has informed EU refugee policy this time around. Arguably this has made the situation better than it might otherwise have been. </p>
<p>Contrary to popular belief, similar numbers of people <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/3c3eb40f4.pdf">from the</a> former Yugoslavia <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/latest/2002/6/3d0f6dcb5/2001-global-refugee-statistics.html">sought</a> asylum in northern Europe as Syrians have <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_quarterly_report">more recently</a> – as demonstrated below. Indeed, more sought asylum from the former Yugoslavia in Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and the UK than from Syria so far. </p>
<p><strong>Asylum applications from Yugoslavs and Syrians</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173636/original/file-20170613-30061-fihe29.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173636/original/file-20170613-30061-fihe29.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173636/original/file-20170613-30061-fihe29.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173636/original/file-20170613-30061-fihe29.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173636/original/file-20170613-30061-fihe29.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173636/original/file-20170613-30061-fihe29.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173636/original/file-20170613-30061-fihe29.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173636/original/file-20170613-30061-fihe29.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sources: UNHCR, Eurostat.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Looking at asylum seekers <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en">in general</a>, more did come to most northern European countries during the 2010s than the early 1990s. Yet the difference is not enormous: approximately 2.5m in 1991-96 versus 3.2m in 2011-16. </p>
<p>While Germany, Sweden, France and Austria have recorded more applications in the more recent period, the opposite is true for the Netherlands and the UK. And since most northern European countries’ populations rose between the early 1990s and the early 2010s, the overall difference will also be less as a proportion of populations as a whole. </p>
<p><strong>Asylum applications as a whole</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173642/original/file-20170613-30093-13g8863.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173642/original/file-20170613-30093-13g8863.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173642/original/file-20170613-30093-13g8863.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173642/original/file-20170613-30093-13g8863.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173642/original/file-20170613-30093-13g8863.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173642/original/file-20170613-30093-13g8863.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173642/original/file-20170613-30093-13g8863.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173642/original/file-20170613-30093-13g8863.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sources: UNHCR, Eurostat.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The Mediterranean spectacle</h2>
<p>The northern European media have nevertheless given much more prominence to the latest crisis. Partly this is because those seeking protection in the early 1990s mainly came by car, bus or train. In more recent years, many asylum seekers have taken to the seas to get around Europe’s strict visa laws. Images of distressed boat migrants played out in the media before millions of viewers. It became a <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01419870.2013.783710">border spectacle</a>, which encouraged perceptions of migrants’ illegality in the process.</p>
<p>The fear of Islamic terrorists posing as refugees also differs substantially nowadays. Although many Muslims from Bosnia and outside Europe applied for asylum in the early 1990s, their religious background was not such an issue. </p>
<p>Following 9/11 – and numerous other Islamic terrorist attacks in the West – debates about immigration and asylum have become far more security and culturally oriented. This has frequently been driven by anti-immigration parties such as <a href="http://www.ukip.org">UKIP</a> in the UK, France’s <a href="http://www.frontnational.com">Front National</a> and the <a href="https://www.parlement.com/id/vhnnmt7m4rqi/partij_voor_de_vrijheid_pvv">Partij voor de Vrijheid</a> in the Netherlands. </p>
<p>These parties did sometimes break through in northern Europe in the early 1990s. The Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs in Austria attained 22% of the <a href="http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2017_94.htm">national vote in 1994</a>, for example. Nevertheless these parties have become much more media savvy and presentable, as demonstrated by Marine le Pen in France and the <a href="http://eureferendum.com">Brexit success</a> in the UK. This has been heavily assisted by the economic crisis and a sense of disillusion with mainstream politics. </p>
<h2>EU in the dock</h2>
<p>The anti-immigration parties attach much blame to the EU for allowing too many people to come in and failing to control what happens at borders. The truth is rather more complicated. </p>
<p>During both crises, many European states have adopted a beggar-thy-neighbour attitude to asylum. States, including Germany, that encouraged joint European responses have borne most of the burden. In 1994 Germany <a href="http://www.lse-students.ac.uk/THIELEMA/Papers-PDF/JRS-16-3-BS-Interests-Norms.pdf">proposed</a> a pan-EU distribution system for asylum seekers. Other EU members, especially the UK and France, opposed this – despite receiving relatively few applicants. In the end, the EU shelved the idea.</p>
<p>The likes of the Germans and Swedes perceived that the EU’s lack of power over immigration asylum policy was part of the problem, so they sought reform. As a result, the EU’s influence on the immigration and asylum affairs of member states has since developed significantly. The <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A41997A0819%2801%29">1997 Dublin Convention</a> requires asylum seekers to apply for protection in the first EU country they enter, while the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en">1999 Common European Asylum System</a> attempted to harmonise the whole asylum process. </p>
<p>Another lesson post-Yugoslavia was that instead of relying on the likes of the British, you seek alternatives. So instead of any move towards proper collective responsibility for EU asylum seekers, the southern and central European states <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/de/book/9783319398280">have taken</a> more responsibility while the north’s commitment has stayed the same. </p>
<p>Southern EU countries, notably Greece and Italy, agreed to this in the 2000s because they had few refugees and wanted to implement a comparable system to the northern states over time. Newer EU states joined too late to influence negotiations. You can see the consequences in this graph:</p>
<p><strong>Applications in Hungary, Greece and Italy</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173768/original/file-20170614-21350-1lffgzm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173768/original/file-20170614-21350-1lffgzm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173768/original/file-20170614-21350-1lffgzm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173768/original/file-20170614-21350-1lffgzm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173768/original/file-20170614-21350-1lffgzm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173768/original/file-20170614-21350-1lffgzm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173768/original/file-20170614-21350-1lffgzm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173768/original/file-20170614-21350-1lffgzm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sources: UNHCR, Eurostat.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Not only has the EU therefore reduced northern member states’ asylum burden, with Angela Merkel to the fore it successfully negotiated an <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/">agreement</a> with Turkey last March. This helped greatly reduce the numbers making the sea voyage to Greece, cutting all <a href="https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-top-363348-2016-deaths-sea-5079">boat voyages</a> to Europe by roughly two-thirds in 2016. </p>
<p>This has not solved the problem. The numbers dying at sea actually <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/23/record-migrant-death-toll-two-boats-capsize-italy-un-refugee">increased</a> in the same period despite this agreement because the journey from Libya to Italy is much more dangerous. It remains difficult for the EU to strike a deal with Libya – the country’s civil war is ongoing and it has never signed the <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/uk/1951-refugee-convention.html">UN Refugee Convention</a>. Migrants also <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/DetainedAndDehumanised_en.pdf">tend to be</a> treated appallingly in Libyan detention centres. </p>
<p>Many EU states are nevertheless seeking a way around this problem –a <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-leaders-approve-plan-to-curb-migration-from-libya-africa/">plan was agreed</a> earlier this year to curb refugee numbers from Libya. Expect further debate about such initiatives once peak season begins. </p>
<p>In short, what separates the current refugee crisis is not its scale. It is that it has occurred during a <a href="https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2016/02/europe%E2%80%99s-refugee">perfect storm</a> of other factors: the economic crisis, the rise of anti-immigration parties, and a media <a href="http://serious-science.org/newspapers-in-crisis-5974">increasingly desperate</a> for readers and arguably resorting to ever uglier coverage to keep them. </p>
<p>Look beyond this and the northern European countries have clearly tried to learn from the past. The real question is whether the fix is workable – in particular, the shifting of some of the burden to southern and central European states. It is not at all clear <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/refugee-hotspots-in-italy-and-greece-not-yet-adequate-say-eu-auditors/">whether they have</a> the capacity to cope with it. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article is part of a series on sustainability and transformation in today’s Europe, published in collaboration with <a href="http://www.europenowjournal.org">EuropeNow Journal</a> and the <a href="https://councilforeuropeanstudies.org">Council for European Studies (CES)</a> at Columbia University. Each article is based on a paper presented at the <a href="https://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/conferences/upcoming-conferences/2017-ces-conference">24th International Conference of Europeanists</a> in Glasgow.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79393/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Irial Glynn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Everyone has forgotten there were almost as many asylum seekers in Europe in the early 1990s as today.Irial Glynn, Marie Curie Intra-European Fellow at the Institute of History, Leiden UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/755172017-04-05T01:10:08Z2017-04-05T01:10:08ZBosnia’s 25-year struggle with transitional justice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164098/original/image-20170405-14629-16m39ti.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Graves at the memorial center Potocari, near Srebrenica</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Amel Emric</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Bosnian war started 25 years ago this week.</p>
<p>Although bombs ceased falling in 1995, in many ways the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) are as divided as ever. The past two decades have repeatedly shown that divisions exacerbated by the war continue to permeate politics. </p>
<p>In fact, according to a 2013 public opinion poll, just one in six residents of BiH feels that the three ethnic groups that live there – the Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats – have reached <a href="http://www.media.ba/sites/default/files/prism_research_for_un_rco_statistical_report_1.pdf">reconciliation</a>.</p>
<p>It would be easy to pass this sentiment off as what one former U.S. secretary of state called “<a href="http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1992/html/Dispatchv3no52.html">ancient tribal, ethnic and religious rivalries</a>.” But I believe it raises profound doubts about the ability of international justice to bring about a more peaceful world.</p>
<p>As I demonstrate in my book, <a href="http://undpress.nd.edu/books/P01398">“The Costs of Justice</a>,” transitional justice – the process of dealing with human rights abuses committed by a previous regime – is an inherently political process made even more contentious by taking it out of the country. The fallout is not just a lack of reconciliation, but also the constant threat of violence. </p>
<p>In BiH, <a href="http://www.media.ba/sites/default/files/prism_research_for_un_rco_statistical_report_1.pdf">more than 30 percent</a> believe a renewal of armed conflict could be right around the corner.</p>
<h2>The G word</h2>
<p>Ongoing resentment in BiH was highlighted by two recent events. </p>
<p>First was the fall election of a Serbian genocide denier, Mladen Grujicic, as mayor of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/07/10/legacy-srebrenica">Srebrenica</a> – a town where more than 8,000 Bosniaks, or Bosnian Muslims, were systematically killed in 1995.</p>
<p>Next came the Bosniak response: a February <a href="http://www.rferl.org/a/icj-bosnia-serbia-genocide/28360242.html">request</a> for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to review its 2007 ruling that cleared the neighboring state of Serbia of complicity in genocide during the war. </p>
<p>The war may be long over, but wounds are still oozing. </p>
<iframe src="https://www.google.com/maps/embed?pb=!1m18!1m12!1m3!1d2905758.676488683!2d14.726032644738389!3d44.66540078404253!2m3!1f0!2f0!3f0!3m2!1i1024!2i768!4f13.1!3m3!1m2!1s0x134ba215c737a9d7%3A0x6df7e20343b7e90c!2sBosnia+and+Herzegovina!5e0!3m2!1sen!2sus!4v1491325241954" width="100%" height="300" frameborder="0" style="border:0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<p>Lack of reconciliation in BiH comes despite – or perhaps because of – a major international effort to ensure justice in the region. BiH, like other states of the former Yugoslavia, was under the jurisdiction of the <a href="http://www.icty.org/en/about">International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</a> (ICTY) at The Hague for more than two decades. </p>
<p>The ICTY’s establishment in 1993 was greeted by human rights advocates as the harbinger of a new era of justice. At the time, transitional justice scholars preached its <a href="https://bookstore.usip.org/books/BookDetail.aspx?productID=51329">numerous benefits</a>. These included deterring future rights violations, strengthening rule of law, increasing the legitimacy of a new regime and, perhaps most importantly, encouraging reconciliation within broader society.</p>
<p>There are many <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343309340108">ways to address</a> past rights abuses – from issuing apologies and providing victim compensation to holding truth commissions and launching criminal trials. The international community has historically focused on the latter – whether at <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/accountability-for-human-rights-atrocities-in-international-law-9780199546671?cc=us&lang=en&">Nuremberg</a>, <a href="http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/tokyo/tokyolinks.html">Tokyo</a> or <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100357920">The Hague</a>.</p>
<p>Criminal prosecutions are largely symbolic, but they are nonetheless important. They signal the end of impunity, or the ability to escape punishment, and the start of a more just order. The fact that post-conflict countries frequently lack institutions strong or independent enough to pursue criminal prosecutions on their own makes international mechanisms indispensable. Indeed, BiH’s inability to carry out its <a href="https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-FormerYugoslavia-Domestic-Court-2008-English.pdf">own criminal trials</a> for a decade and a half points to a real need for international courts. </p>
<p>But the very process of taking criminal prosecutions out of the domestic purview can ultimately be a <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/accountability-for-human-rights-atrocities-in-international-law-9780199546671?cc=us&lang=en&">blow to justice</a>. Most locals, for instance, lose interest in trials that play out in faraway courtrooms, meaning trials fail to bring about the sorts of dialogue that might lead to mutual understanding. </p>
<p>Formidable challenges of international prosecutions, from learning the intricacies of a foreign culture and political regime to collecting evidence essential for a successful prosecution, mean that international trials also take a long time to complete. And, of course, they are expensive. The <a href="https://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/15/3skilbeck.pdf">ICTY cost</a> more than US$1 billion, or between $10 million and $15 million for each person accused. Various countries, including the United States, footed the bill.</p>
<p>And yet, rather than improve relations in the region, the ICTY may have <a href="http://undpress.nd.edu/books/P01398">incited tensions</a>. Each of the parties claimed they were unfairly targeted. Serbs were infuriated by their overrepresentation on the court’s docket. Croats couldn’t believe that any of their heroes were facing judgment. </p>
<p>Little surprise then that <a href="http://www.media.ba/sites/default/files/prism_research_for_un_rco_statistical_report_1.pdf">only 8 percent</a> of those polled in BiH in 2013 felt the ICTY had done a good job facilitating reconciliation. </p>
<p>While international courts did little for reconciliation, they fundamentally sabotaged more <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2009.00891.x/abstract">organic forms of justice</a> than could otherwise have happened at the local level. In the former Yugoslavia, political leaders who were struggling to balance international pressure for – and domestic opposition to – ICTY cooperation opted for half-baked local initiatives designed to satisfy both. The result was a watered-down <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2002/02/truth-commission-serbia-and-montenegro">truth commission</a> here, an <a href="http://www.rferl.org/a/1105227.html">apology</a> of questionable sincerity there. </p>
<p>These half-measures ultimately replaced what might have been <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ijtj/article-abstract/10/2/292/2356904/History-of-a-Failure-Attempts-to-Create-a-National?redirectedFrom=fulltext">more earnest mechanisms</a> had they not been established in the context of ongoing international trials. The recent Bosniak appeal to the ICJ, just like the key political victory of a Serb genocide denier, highlights the degree to which justice and historical memory remain politicized in BiH a quarter-century after the war began. </p>
<h2>The ICTY’s long shadow</h2>
<p>The ICTY and subsequent tribunals demonstrated that international prosecutions can play an important role in ending impunity. But they must carefully balance the need of the international community to ensure accountability with the needs of a local populace to deal with past rights abuses on their own terms. </p>
<p>Limiting international prosecutions to the most serious perpetrators is one way to reach this balance. Few in Serbia shed tears for the arrest of Slobodan Milosevic, a corrupt dictator. </p>
<p>Even then, the recent experience of the International Criminal Court (ICC), established in 2002 as a permanent and global version of the ICTY, demonstrates this can be a tough sell. Numerous African states have accused the ICC of the same bias Yugoslavs attributed to the ICTY. They are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/jan/31/african-leaders-plan-mass-withdrawal-from-international-criminal-court">threatening to withdraw</a> as a result.</p>
<p>Back in Bosnia, the <a href="http://www.rferl.org/a/icj-bosnia-serbia-genocide/28360242.html">ICJ last month rejected</a> the Bosniak request on the grounds it did not come from all three members of the country’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/oct/08/bosnia-herzegovina-elections-the-worlds-most-complicated-system-of-government">tripartite presidency</a>. In other words, the very lack of reconciliation between Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats that prompted the initial appeal now makes that appeal impossible. It is ironic that Bosniaks still feel the need to turn to international justice mechanisms for redress. After all, international justice may bear some blame for the predicament they’re in today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75517/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Grodsky received funding from a number of organizations while carrying out research in the former Yugoslavia, including grants from Fulbright-Hayes and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. </span></em></p>How long does it take to make peace? Decades after the end of the Bosnian war, just one in six residents felt that country had reached reconciliation.Brian Grodsky, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/635342016-08-09T11:09:42Z2016-08-09T11:09:42ZRadicalisation in Bosnia: old wounds reopened by an emerging problem<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133153/original/image-20160804-513-1qmy01.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/ronan_shenhav/18794577200/in/photolist-uCP81u-s4Jmr6-JPi78Q-Kcj9s1-JiMjNY-45xEz-o2qwn3-d2GQV5-boPtWM-ctahAq-35X1wv-362Fjs-5edAR9-zWHmzJ-5e9fDX-GKHTT-dVVLhF-5e9fAp-daaLQe-o2q7hE-74mEMh-o2q7Kd-fX9ov-ogSWUu-79VxkM-5edB1m-GKHKH-4UUaDn-GKFLS-AQTzPh-5e9fiz-oiVzbC-Hz9qwN-GKFBY-oTUNiw-GPttxG-GPttPy-GxB4Rb-GxB4UC-GUJ9F7-G3cKHw-GRKRRp-GRKR8F-GXJx8x-GxB44E-GXJAdF-GXJA2i-tYKJN8-GUJ9Xj-G3cM6m">Ronan Shenhav</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Bosnia experienced a difficult reconstruction process after its 1992–1995 war. Now its ongoing political and economic crisis is making it harder to respond to a growing global problem – radicalisation.</p>
<p>According to <a href="http://atlanticinitiative.org/images/THE_LURE_OF_THE_SYRIAN_WAR_THE_FOREIGN_FIGHTERS_BOSNIAN_CONTINGENT/The_Lure_of_the_Syrian_War_-_The_Foreign_Fighters_Bosnian_Contingent.pdf">recent reports</a>, Bosnians have been travelling to Syria to fight for radical Islamist groups in increasing numbers since 2012. They now constitute one of the largest European foreign fighter contingents as a proportion of national population. Figures from 2015 suggest there are more than <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33345618">300 Bosnians</a> in Syria.</p>
<p>There have also been a number of low-level incidents of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/25/isis-targets-vulnerable-bosnia-for-recruitment-and-attack">terrorist violence</a> in Bosnia. In April 2015, for example, a 24-year-old man from an area near the town of Zvornik drove into a police station and opened fire. He killed one officer and injured two others before being shot dead. </p>
<p>This has prompted heated debates about how to handle the problem without feeding into the tensions that pervade in Bosnian politics. Of particular concern is the possibility that decisions about security will be coloured by ethno-politics.</p>
<h2>Ethnic divides</h2>
<p>Bosnia’s post-war reconstruction, which began in 1995, resulted in a complex multi-ethnic state structure. There are two separate entities and an independently supervised district: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Republika Srpska and the Brĉko District (placed under the jurisdiction of Bosnia-Herzegovina).</p>
<p>The Bosniak-Croat Federation covers 51% of the territory and the mainly Bosnian-Serb Republica Srpska covers 49%. Each has its own president, government, law enforcement and other political bodies.</p>
<p>After the war, the aim was to give equal representation to Bosnia’s three constituent groups (Bosniaks, Bosnian-Serbs and Bosnian-Croats) at all levels of government. To make sure that happens, there is also a central government with a rotating presidency.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133398/original/image-20160808-18030-uig42r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133398/original/image-20160808-18030-uig42r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133398/original/image-20160808-18030-uig42r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133398/original/image-20160808-18030-uig42r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133398/original/image-20160808-18030-uig42r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133398/original/image-20160808-18030-uig42r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133398/original/image-20160808-18030-uig42r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Clear division.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina#/media/File:Map_Bih_entities.png">Wikipedia/Panonian</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This arrangement has embedded ethnic division into the country’s political system. It has created obstacles to sustainable peace, state efficiency and positive political dialogue between the ethnically-oriented political parties.</p>
<p>Bosnians can’t help but wonder if the weak economic situation that seems to have ensued from the political stagnation is driving many people out of the country and into Syria. The official average unemployment rate for 2008 was 24% and for those aged 15 to 24 it was 47.5%. It has been <a href="http://www.ba.undp.org/content/bosnia_and_herzegovina/en/home/countryinfo.html">estimated</a> that current youth unemployment is around 45% to 50%. Those departing for Syria and Iraq are offered housing and support to relocate with their families.</p>
<p>According to local NGOs, the first departures were motivated by humanitarian concerns, as Bosniaks wanted to help fellow Muslims fight state oppression. But more recently, they have been joining the ranks of Islamic State.</p>
<p>Some are war veterans who fought with the Mujahideen in the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17212376">Bosnian war</a> while others are men with military skills and war experience. Then there are young, unemployed Bosnians driven by the need of group belonging and attracted by the financial support on offer.</p>
<p>An IS propaganda video released in June 2015 called on Bosnians to carry out terrorist attacks at home. But even prior to this video, attacks were being reported in Bosnia. In 2010 a bomb exploded at a police station in the town of Bugojno, leaving one officer dead and several injured. The attack was apparently part of a drive to establish sharia law in the region and to hurt Bosnian Muslims who took a different view of Islam.</p>
<p>In 2011 a man fired shots at the US embassy in Sarajevo. His accomplice, although acquitted, was later confirmed to have died as consequence of a <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/bosnia-becomes-front-in-balkan-fight-against-terror/a-18868031">suicide mission</a> in Iraq. In November 2015, an attacker by the name of <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/sarajevo-gunman-kills-two-soldiers-commits-suicide-396117">Enes Omeragić</a> shot dead two Bosnian soldiers in Sarajevo before dying himself in an explosion at his home. </p>
<p>Some of these attacks have been connected to the town of Gornja Maoča in north-eastern Bosnia, known to be a base for foreign and domestic <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-wahhabism-in-saudi-arabia-36693">Wahhabis</a> – followers of a particularly conservative sect of Islam. This village is said to be an operational ground for IS training camps and a centre for planning terrorist attacks. It is constantly being raided by the authorities. Weapons have been confiscated and arrests made. In 2015 several <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-islamicstate-idUSKBN0L920720150205">news outlets</a> reported seeing IS flags and iconography around the village.</p>
<h2>Divided over a shared problem</h2>
<p>The response to the growing problem of radical terrorism at home has shown just how divided Bosnian politics remains.</p>
<p>Milorad Dodik, president of Republika Srpska, blamed Bosnia’s state institutions for the Zvornik incident. He accused Bosniak political leaders of protecting those connected with <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/islamic-radicalization-stirs-concern-bosnia/2743574.html">crime and terrorism</a>.</p>
<p>On the same day, Zeljka Cvijanovic, prime minister of Republika Srpska, held a meeting on increasing security and preventing retaliatory attacks from the Bosnian-Serb population against Bosniak property. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Serb authorities were using the attack as evidence of the need to investigate Bosniaks in their territory. A new Serb police squad was established and raids carried out at 32 locations. In response, Bosnian political leaders accused the Bosnian Serb government of using counter-terrorist measures as a form of intimidation against non-Serbs living in Republika Srpska. </p>
<p>Concern has grown ever since that the Bosnian-Serb anti-terrorist operations are not communicating or co-operating with Bosnia’s state institutions. Some believe Dodik is tightening security in Republika Srpska as a way to introduce a separate intelligence agency. That could, in turn, be seen as a push towards the <a href="http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-serbs-may-withdraw-from-state-security-system-over-terrorist-attack">dissolution of Bosnia</a>.</p>
<p>In late 2015, Bosnian security minister Dragan Mektić announced a new operational group to guarantee cooperation and information sharing between security, intelligence and police agencies in Bosnia. This group was presented as part of a national anti-terrorism strategy that would improve investigations stalled by the fragmented judicial and security systems in the country.</p>
<p>But there has been opposition from authorities in Republika Srpska, which see the group as a threat to the balance of powers between political institutions in the country. They argue that the group would enable the Bosnian Ministry of Security to bypass other agencies in counter-terrorism investigations.</p>
<p>And in Bosnia that matters. This is a country divided and with many challenges still emerging as it rebuilds. Dealing with the problem of radicalisation is proving difficult even for countries without such a history. Enduring tensions just make the job that bit harder.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63534/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Louis Monroy Santander receives funding from Economic and Social Research Council. . </span></em></p>A spate of low-level terrorist incidents has the authorities arguing, instead of tackling the problem.Louis Monroy-Santander, PhD student, International Development Department, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/627522016-07-20T18:32:46Z2016-07-20T18:32:46ZMaking sense of the local soldiers of the global jihad<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/131241/original/image-20160720-31156-1257502.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The heavy truck that was driven into a crowd at high speed killing scores on Bastille Day in Nice.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Eric Gaillard</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>With every terrorist attack it has become increasingly difficult to determine a “standard” profile of the perpetrators to understand where and how radicalisation takes place.</p>
<p>The young men who carried out the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/oct/31/spain">2004 Madrid</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jul/07/london-bombings-anti-terrorism">2005 London attacks</a> met in Internet cafés and neighbourhood mosques, in libraries and sport clubs. They watched videotapes of the wars in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/chechnya-anniversary-missing-people-remain">Chechnya</a> or <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/04/bosnian-war-20-years-on">Bosnia</a>, and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/17/israel">Israeli-Palestinian conflict</a>. </p>
<p>Many came from the postcolonial immigration. They were first-generation, like those of Madrid, or second-generation, like London. The 9/11 attackers – most of them from Saudi Arabia – followed international networks to training camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen.</p>
<h2>Individualisation of terrorism</h2>
<p>Since London, attacks have been called “homegrown”. That’s in reference to individuals becoming radicalised and striking the countries in which they live, and of which they can be citizens or even native-born. While sometimes referred to as “lone wolves”, they often work in groups formed spontaneously in neighbourhoods, mosques and associations. They also can be part of networks that allow them to travel to the land of jihad and prepare their actions in home countries. They are, in most cases, young people from immigrant backgrounds.</p>
<p>Lone wolves or homegrown, many see themselves as local soldiers of the global jihad. Recent examples include the <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/09/us/san-bernardino-shooting/">San Bernardino couple</a> in November 2015 and the <a href="http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-mateen-steroid-hiv-20160715-snap-story.html">Orlando shooter</a> in June 2016 in the US. The case of Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel, who killed 84 people on July 14 in Nice, France, is <a href="https://theconversation.com/was-the-nice-attacker-really-an-is-lone-wolf-62585">less clear-cut</a>. But the pattern of a group of friends (as in Madrid and London), siblings (the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/03/23/world/brothers-terrorism.html">Kouachi, Abdeslem, and Tsarnaev brothers</a>), or members of a tribe (in the case of 9/11) has given way to individuals isolated in front of their screens at home.</p>
<p><figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130808/original/image-20160717-2127-jt4j07.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130808/original/image-20160717-2127-jt4j07.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130808/original/image-20160717-2127-jt4j07.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130808/original/image-20160717-2127-jt4j07.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130808/original/image-20160717-2127-jt4j07.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130808/original/image-20160717-2127-jt4j07.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130808/original/image-20160717-2127-jt4j07.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A rally on June 12, after the carnage in a nightclub in Orlando, Florida.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/fibonacciblue/27027482763/in/photolist-J87hd6-J7d6MF-HbhccU-HFB2aU-HLfYeJ-J7Said-Hgiqp2-HbjV18-HZFGX4-HbecS7-HZEinG-JcEHA2-J9DsnM-HZuS4y-HdVuBC-HHJQJA-HHWuZm-J42zjF-HdA4s6-J4Ym7i-J7hTCG-J7oEgu-J8jpjr-J65bt2-HL5Gnd-Hdx17L-JbG7Ua-HdcgHf-HdiLCg-J2ER9K-HfLbA3-HfL3Tu-J8MGzf-Hbi8cX-HbpTFe-Hbhs5E-HFEXis-HbdVQY-J9Ckmq-HXpjj3-HdN1Np-HJ65Eb-J9Qryv-J9gKbv-J6wJUh-J34rmD-HdbjKQ-HgW6JJ-JjGeTJ-J9Q9et/">Fibonacci Blue / Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure></p>
<p>Suicide bombers use their body as a weapon of war and as a testament to their perceived self-sacrifice. It’s a way to ensure their belonging to a “community”, real or imagined. </p>
<p>From the mobility of the physical body – highlighting the image of the martyr – comes the move to the truck as a weapon, <a href="https://theconversation.com/nice-attack-how-vulnerable-are-we-to-low-tech-terror-62542">as in Nice</a>. The truck is mobile too, but incomparably larger and more deadly, and its “success” magnified by speed. The variety of weapons used highlights the dark imagination of suicidal acts fed by social networks and websites fuelled by radical Islam.</p>
<h2>The call to diaspora</h2>
<p>While the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/13/history.alqaida">roots of al-Qaeda</a> stretch back to the late 1980s, it is on today’s online networks that young people become familiar with the tenants of radical Islam. That is where they hear the speeches that attract them to a single narrative of belonging to the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1061854"><em>Ummah</em></a> – the global Muslim community where nation, religion and land are blurred. The online discourse on <em>Ummah</em> refers to a new “imagined geography” as a representation of deterritorialised and denationalised world.</p>
<p>The non-territorial borders of <em>Ummah</em> follow the networks – formal or informal – that transcend the boundaries of states and nations. They thus create a kind of territory – invisible and unfenced – and political community that seeks to consolidate itself through speeches, symbols, images and objects that circulate through websites that have become the main space of power and influence. Leaders speak to Muslim youth of the diaspora as part of <em>Ummah</em>, citing the traditional <a href="https://www.al-islam.org/forty-hadith-noble-quran-majid-adili"><em>hadith</em></a> (or narrative): “The <em>Ummah</em> is like our body. If one part hurts, the <a href="http://www.inter-islam.org/Lifestyle/brotherUnity.htm">whole body aches</a>.”</p>
<p>The concept of jihad as it’s understood today hinges on perceived membership in the <em>Ummah</em>, a global nation conceived as a foundation for a new identity. This allows those who have chosen the path of jihad to step outside traditional nation states and identify with a borderless community, as with a non-territorial nation.</p>
<h2>Extraterritorial wars</h2>
<p>This new dynamic transforms territorial wars into extraterritorial wars. But in a <a href="http://www.articlemyriad.com/relevance-westphalian-system-modern-world-sasha-safonova/">Westphalian</a> world, territory remains the space where power is concentrated. When a faction of al-Qaeda took control of an area the size of the UK on the border between Syria and Iraq, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/30/isis-announces-islamic-caliphate-iraq-syria">proclaimed itself to be the “Islamic State”</a> (IS) and named a caliph, it had no legitimacy in the eyes of international law and the nations concerned. Yet it confirmed the essential role of territory within the tactics of war and an expansionist strategy. The areas seized serve to attract not only the young Muslim diaspora, but also others from Europe, the Caucasus and Asia, coming together with local tribes to form an “army”.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/foreign-fighters-syria-iraq-is-isis-isil-infographic/26584940.html">February 2016 testimony</a> before the US Senate Armed Services Committee, James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, stated that since 2012 more than 38,200 foreign fighters – including at least 6,900 from Western countries – have travelled to Syria from more than 100 countries. In Europe, France and Belgium are the largest sources of recruitment. In the Middle East, it is Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia. From Asia, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh provide most of the recruits. </p>
<p>These young people, regardless of their national origin, see themselves as mobilising for the caliphate. They’ve made it their “homeland”, the homeland of an imagined diaspora of <em>Ummah</em>. No matter if they are organised in groups, or networks, local or global, no matter if they act individually or in a collective organised way their identification – individual and/or collective – with the <em>Ummah</em> seems to find a ground in this “diasporic” aspect of a dispersion.</p>
<p></p>
<p>Hence the paradox. Out of diasporas often rise the vision of a re-territorialisation, “restoration” or “recovery” of a real or mythical territory, yet still sovereign. The discourse that underlies the idea of transforming the <em>Ummah</em> into a global nation relies on its members finding unity based on overlapping identities (national, regional, religious, linguistic). It also relies on shared experiences (colonisation, exile or emigration). Furthermore, it relies on constant references to a denationalised and de-territorialised “we” that establishes itself within the conceptions of the diaspora and the nation.</p>
<p>If diasporas encourage a sort of “nationalism” that is abstract yet anchored in a physical territory, the <em>Ummah</em> generates new impulses based on the transnational communities and networks that seek to consolidate themselves through the strength of a single story fed by symbols, images and objects.</p>
<p>In the first half of 2016, coalition strikes have inflicted <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/11/islamic-state-has-lost-grip-on-12-of-territory-in-six-months-study">significant losses</a> on the “Islamic state”. Yet the soldiers of the caliphate continue their work in a “de-territorialised” way. They attack where they are, and thus recall the objectives of both territorial “state building” as well as a global expansion through the “imagined diaspora” that motivates foreign fighters. </p>
<p>Every attack – even the most isolated and individual – is claimed by IS. It uses these claims to further its global ambitions and appropriate a war wherever the self-identified solders and/or combatants act.</p>
<p>This back and forth between the local – territorial – and the globalised forms of radical Islam, the shifting profiles and widespread locations of its fighters, and the limitless imagination of weapons of war are a new challenge to nations in their fight against radicalisation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62752/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Riva Kastoryano ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The Bastille Day attack in Nice – committed by an individual unknown to French security services – marks the evolution of radicalisation in many ways.Riva Kastoryano, Directrice de recherche, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/567782016-03-24T15:19:06Z2016-03-24T15:19:06ZRadovan Karadžić sentenced to 40 years, but peace is still a work in progress<p>Former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić has been sentenced to 40 years in prison by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).</p>
<p>The court found the former president of the Bosnian Serb republic guilty of one count of genocide and <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-things-you-need-to-know-about-the-radovan-karadzic-case-56767">nine war crimes</a>, all relating to the war in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. He is criminally responsible for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/international-court-upholds-srebrenica-massacre-verdicts-37003">Srebrenica</a> massacre in 1995.</p>
<p>This marks the final chapter in three interlinked stories of hubris, war and retribution in Europe at the turn of the millennium.</p>
<p>The first of these stories is a personal journey of an ambitious intellectual – a psychiatrist and a poet who rose from poverty and obscurity to eventually join the political elite. It’s the story of a man who went on to lead a nationalist movement responsible for some of the most heinous crimes seen on the continent since 1945.</p>
<p>Karadžić held political authority over the Bosnian Serb forces that perpetrated the crimes for which he was charged by the ICTY. Ousted from power after the conclusion of the <a href="http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA_951121_DaytonAgreement.pdf">Dayton Peace Agreement</a>, he remained a fugitive until 2008. He was found living on the outskirts of Belgrade disguised as a new-age healer. It’s a tale that could have been taken from a Yugoslav surrealist film.</p>
<p>He will undoubtedly spend the remainder of his life in prison – an apt ending to this extraordinary trajectory.</p>
<p>The intriguing question that remains is how an apparently tolerant and convivial man, who worked and associated with Bosnians of different religious backgrounds and exhibited no particular nationalist leanings prior to 1990, became a ruthless political ideologue who oversaw a policy of mass murder, torture, rape and the forced removal of non-Serb populations for the sake of creating an “ethnically cleansed” Serbian state in Bosnia.</p>
<h2>A new kind of justice</h2>
<p>The second story is that of the international tribunal itself. Set up by the UN in 1993 to investigate the war crimes that took place in the Balkans in the 1990s, the ICTY has undergone several metamorphoses over its 20-year existence.</p>
<p>The tribunal began as an ineffectual and underfunded institution. It was unable to press Western governments into capturing the more important war criminals. But from 2001 it went on to score some remarkable successes. All its indictees were eventually arrested, including the big fish, such as Serbia’s former president <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/serbia/8538575/Serbian-war-criminals-Slobodan-Milosevic-profile.html">Slobodan Milošević</a> and the Bosnian Serb political and military leaders Karadžić and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/21/14-years-fugitive-hunt-for-ratko-mladic-butcher-of-bosnia">Ratko Mladić</a> (who is currently on trial).</p>
<p>This success was due largely to new governments coming to power in the post-Yugoslav states and the West’s policy of making financial aid and accession to the EU conditional on co-operation with the tribunal. </p>
<p>The ICTY has provided impressive evidence of the worst crimes committed in the Yugoslav wars. It identified those involved and charted the chains of command. It set some important milestones in international law, paving the way to the creation of a permanent <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/international-criminal-court">International Criminal Court</a>. Without the ICTY, it is unlikely that some of the worst perpetrators in the Yugoslav wars would have been brought to justice or that we would have such detailed knowledge about the conduct of those wars. </p>
<p>However, the tribunal has been very controversial in the region. It has ultimately made little headway in its mission of contributing to reconciliation. </p>
<p>Nationalist politicians have sought to portray the ICTY as <a href="http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/un-debate-turns-as-criticism-of-the-icty">victimising</a> their individual national groups. They present the indictments of their own former political or military leaders as disproportionate and unjust.</p>
<p>The tribunal has remained insular and remote from the region, making little attempt to explain its indictments, procedures and judgements to the war-ravaged and traumatised populations for which it was meant to provide justice.</p>
<p>Often relatively short sentences issued for capital crimes have rankled with victims and some of those tried by the tribunal have now returned home and were welcomed as war heroes. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.icty.org/en/press/jovica-stani%C5%A1i%C4%87-and-franko-simatovi%C4%87-acquitted-all-charges">acquittals</a> of high ranking military and security figures from Croatia and Serbia in 2012 and 2013 produced consternation even among the greatest champions of the tribunal. Even some <a href="http://hrbrief.org/2013/03/acquittals-for-croatian-generals-raise-questions-about-the-icty-and-its-legacy/">ICTY judges</a> publicly protested. </p>
<h2>An international journey</h2>
<p>The Karadžić judgment (along with those pending for Mladić and a few others) also marks the end of a third story – that of external involvement in the region’s reckoning with its legacy of war.</p>
<p>Without <a href="http://research.gold.ac.uk/1899/">international intervention</a>, there would probably have been little justice. However, the actions of external actors sometimes had counterproductive effects, undermining the reformist political forces seeking genuine change in their countries. And, ultimately, real reckoning with a difficult past cannot be orchestrated from outside. </p>
<p>If the Karadžić judgment is to have any longer-term resonance in the region, it will need to be part of a sustained internal and introspective process in those states where the crimes were perpetrated.</p>
<p>That usually implies the presence of both genuine political commitment and a propitious socio-economic context. Unfortunately, neither of these conditions are on the horizon yet anywhere in the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/56778/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jasna Dragovic Soso does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Former Bosnian Serb leader guilty of one count of genocide and numerous war crimes after 18 months of deliberation.Jasna Dragovic Soso, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Goldsmiths, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/567672016-03-24T10:59:06Z2016-03-24T10:59:06ZFive things you need to know about the Radovan Karadžić case<p>The <a href="http://www.icty.org">International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</a> is issuing its judgment in the case of Radovan Karadžić, arguably its most high-profile accused since the trial of Slobodan Milošević, which ended in 2005. Here’s all you need to know about this landmark decision.</p>
<p><strong>1. Who is Radovan Karadžić?</strong></p>
<p>He’s the former president of Republika Srpska, an autonomous region established in <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/bosnia-and-herzegovina">Bosnia and Herzegovina</a> in 1992 at <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17212376">the outbreak of war</a> in the region. It ended in December 1995 and Karadžić lost power. He then went into hiding and wasn’t captured until 2008, when he was found in Belgrade. He had apparently been working as an <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/magazine/26karadzic-t.html">alternative medicine practitioner</a> for several years. His neighbours were unaware of his true identity.</p>
<p><strong>2. What is he charged with?</strong></p>
<p>Karadžić is charged with 11 counts of genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws of war. The tribunal has already convicted a number of defendants for their role in the genocide in the enclave of <a href="https://theconversation.com/international-court-upholds-srebrenica-massacre-verdicts-37003">Srebrenica</a> where more than 7,000 men and boys were separated from their families and killed, while women, young children and some elderly men were forcibly removed from the enclave. Karadžić is charged with this genocide. He denies the charges. </p>
<p>He is also charged with genocide committed in seven other municipalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Earlier in the case, the Trials Chamber was found that there was not sufficient evidence about what happened in these seven municipalities for it to be considered genocide against Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat groups, and the charge was dropped. However, the Appeals Chamber found that the evidence did reach the threshold, and it reinstated the charge. </p>
<p>Another interesting charge is the war crime of taking hostages. This is the first time that the tribunal has charged anyone with this crime. In 1995, Bosnian Serb forces detained UN peacekeepers, purportedly in an attempt to stop the NATO bombing that was going on at the time. <a href="http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/karadzic-s-appeal-on-hostage-taking-rejected">Karadžić argued</a> that, because of NATO’s involvement and the peacekeepers’ link thereto, the peacekeepers were lawfully detained prisoners of war. This argument has been unsuccessful to date, and is unlikely to hold sway in the Trial Chamber’s judgment. </p>
<p><strong>3. How long did the trial last?</strong></p>
<p>Karadžić’s trial ran from 2010 to 2014. The Trial Chamber has been deliberating on its much anticipated judgment since October 2014. Over the course of the trial, the chamber heard evidence from almost 600 witnesses, received thousands of pages of evidence and received filings from both the prosecution and defence totalling 90,000 pages. Karadžić has received almost 3m pages of disclosed evidence from the prosecution. Right up <a href="http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tdec/en/160314.pdf">until last week</a>, the chamber was deciding on motions where the prosecution had failed in its obligation to disclose exculpatory (in other words favourable) evidence to the accused. </p>
<p><strong>4. Did he get a fair trial?</strong></p>
<p>Karadžić chose to represent himself at trial and as a result, received less legal aid than he would have if he were represented by a lawyer. There have been issues with the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8325096.stm">adequacy of time</a> and <a href="http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/presdec/en/120131.pdf">financial resources</a> for the preparation of the defence case throughout the trial, only some of which were resolved by the Trial Chamber.</p>
<p>Karadžić has been critical of the use of written witness statements in the place of full oral testimony, and of the doctrine of <a href="http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.co.uk/2016/03/did-karadzic-get-fair-trial.html">judicial notice</a> which admits previously adjudicated facts from other cases into the record in this case. Furthermore, one of Karadžić’s key witnesses, his wartime ally and former military leader <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27464998">Ratko Mladić</a> (who is currently also standing trial in The Hague) refused to answer any questions when called to testify. Although the tribunal issued a subpoena for Mladić to appear, it failed to take any further action to compel him to testify, such as charging him with contempt of court, so Karadžić missed out on this testimony. </p>
<p><strong>5. What sort of sentence will he get, if convicted?</strong></p>
<p>Unlike many legal systems, international criminal courts do not have sentencing guidelines, so it is hard to predict. However, if convicted of even some of the charges, it’s likely that Karadžić will spend the rest of his life in prison. </p>
<p>His good behaviour and co-operation with the tribunal throughout the trial will be acknowledged as a mitigating factor in sentencing, but his refusal to surrender to the tribunal will likely act against him. Furthermore, if he is found guilty, his leadership position is likely to be an aggravating factor when it comes to sentencing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/56767/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yvonne McDermott does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A four year trial and several years of deliberation later, and an international tribunal is to decide on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity.Yvonne McDermott, Senior Lecturer in Law, Bangor UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/461812015-10-22T13:15:25Z2015-10-22T13:15:25ZScientists at work: tracing the path to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94029/original/image-20150907-1996-868row.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/johovac/7073289807/in/photolist-bM3sCx-5KeBuC-cMUFjs-67WPiK-5VzUtQ-5Bmpg1-5VvyhT-cMRuAd-cMRvm3-66YUv5-66UEXi-9Rm48K-cMTuRd-5nRsxL-cMUm7L-681Y5j-5KajMB-9HBj8n-6XfRbp-5V4pXL-5nx938-6XjN6m-bM3iAx-by8AWE-by8AfG-9HBk5Z-5KrByo-5KrBcG-9HEchY-6XjPbw-5nBkyJ-5KrAPf-5VzTZ7-5nwYi4-66UEp4-cMUGL3-cMU1oA-5WcCG6-6fu8oU-cMUpSN-cMSafb-cMTVmS-cMUsQy-cMSQ9b-cMV8HQ-cMSzMu-cMTLMd-cMUoYY-cMSHij-cMRKEC">Ed S. Johovac</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of the walls in my office in the town of Sanski Most, northwest Bosnia-Herzegovina, is covered with posters. Each depicts a different answer to the question “What is peace?” They range from the intellectual and practical, to the personal and provisional. </p>
<p>One proposes “harmony and unity in public and private relations”, while a second describes peace as “living free from injustice, inequality and pain”. Another suggests that “peace can be found within”, while another still describes a rather more mundane solution that doubtless many can relate to, identifying peace as “when my brother is far away from me”. These posters are a daily reminder that defining peace is hard enough, without then having to make it happen. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99326/original/image-20151022-8027-1m6kshz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99326/original/image-20151022-8027-1m6kshz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99326/original/image-20151022-8027-1m6kshz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99326/original/image-20151022-8027-1m6kshz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99326/original/image-20151022-8027-1m6kshz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99326/original/image-20151022-8027-1m6kshz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99326/original/image-20151022-8027-1m6kshz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Writing on the wall.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Here in Sanski Most, I’m seeking to understand how reconciliation emerges from conflict. My workplace is an organisation called Centar za Izgradnju Mira (<a href="http://unvocim.net/eng/">CIM</a>) – the Center for Peace Building. The organisation’s slogan is Našput je mir: “Our way is peace”.</p>
<p>My role is to investigate the issues that have made post-conflict reconstruction in Bosnia so difficult, looking at the political system, the state of the economy, the role played by international organisations and the processes of justice and reconciliation.</p>
<p>Bosnia’s 1992-1995 war erupted out of the political struggle that followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia. It was one of the first violent conflicts of the post-Cold War era.</p>
<p>The war was fought along ethnic lines, dividing the country into its three main groups: Bosniaks (Bosnian-Muslims), Bosnian-Serbs and Bosnian-Croats. There was ethnic cleansing and genocide, mainly against the Bosniak population, and concentration camps were established around the country.</p>
<p>The violence was ended by the <a href="http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA_951121_DaytonAgreement.pdf">1995 Dayton Accords</a>. It was decreed that the Bosnian State would be rebuilt as two entities – the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska) and the Bosniak/Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.</p>
<h2>Sticking points</h2>
<p>As I investigate Bosnia’s contemporary problems two decades after the war, however, many disturbing problems remain. There is talk, for example, of young people being vulnerable to radicalisation. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99325/original/image-20151022-8024-1o4qhx1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99325/original/image-20151022-8024-1o4qhx1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99325/original/image-20151022-8024-1o4qhx1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99325/original/image-20151022-8024-1o4qhx1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99325/original/image-20151022-8024-1o4qhx1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99325/original/image-20151022-8024-1o4qhx1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99325/original/image-20151022-8024-1o4qhx1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A memorial in Sanski Most.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mistrust and ethnic hatred are often passed from generation to generation. That seems to be true here in Bosnia, a country that has yet to come to terms with its violent past. Young people have only known a Bosnia defined by ethnic divisions and often develop hardened views about other groups, adopting attitudes that may risk a renewal of ethnic-based violence.</p>
<p>Particularly disturbing is talk of Bosnian foreign fighters joining Islamic State in Syria. Islamic State has <a href="http://atlanticinitiative.org/project-activities-nato-debates/491-new-atlantic-initiative-research-the-lure-of-the-syrian-war-the-foreign-fighters%E2%80%99-bosnian-contingent.html">targeted Bosniaks</a>, focusing particularly on those from deprived and marginalised backgrounds. For these youths, who often face unemployment and poverty in Bosnia, offers of housing and better economic prospects overseas are a great incentive to leave.</p>
<p>Many of the people that I have met also say that they are disillusioned with politics and the ethnic rhetoric spouted during electoral campaigns. Some believe that politicians seek to frustrate ethnic divisions and the partition, promoting fear and mistrust to bolster their own positions. </p>
<p>State activity grinds to a halt in the process as ethnic politics hinder national decision-making. One side vetoes the other and the result is stalemate. This situation also fosters corruption and instability as parties and public officials often rely on nepotism and clientelism, establishing self-serving ethnic networks at various levels of government. </p>
<h2>Starting with the young</h2>
<p>The education system and media don’t always help. Instead of being tools for reconciliation, both have become channels for spreading political rhetoric and fostering ethnic divisions.</p>
<p>Bosnia’s media is seen as biased, often giving an unhelpful ethnic angle to all kinds of issues. Schools generally remain segregated along ethnic lines, too. Some are mono-ethnic, others split up students in subjects deemed “sensitive”, such as language, religion, history and geography. Programmes such as the “two schools under one roof” system, whereby students attend school in different shifts in order to avoid contact with different ethnic groups, continue.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/bosnia-and-herzegovina/unemployment-rate">High levels of unemployment</a> – and particularly youth unemployment – pose another threat to the Bosnian economy and generate a pessimistic view among citizens about their country’s future. </p>
<h2>Fresh hope</h2>
<p>But it’s not all gloom. All sides feel a need to find a way for their country to open a new, more prosperous chapter, even if they don’t agree on how to get there. </p>
<p>I’ve also been learning about peace-building initiatives that focus on youth and gender issues, transitional justice and creative ways of dealing with the past. There are also forums for inter-ethnic dialogue between Bosniaks, Bosnian-Serbs and Bosnian-Croats.</p>
<p>An example of this is CIM’s Peace Camp: a week-long retreat that brings together young people from various ethnic backgrounds to meet and debate Bosnia’s more sensitive topics.</p>
<p>Although this research has highlighted the many problems faced by modern Bosnia, it is an inspiring place. People have a zest for life which is often reflected in Sanski Most’s embracing environment, the friendly disposition of its inhabitants and during the many refreshing and sunny evenings I have spent by the river Sana. Many people are incredibly friendly and open to receiving researchers like me. I even get a free, one-minute lesson in Bosnian every time I visit my local bakery. It’s the little things that give us hope.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46181/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Louis Monroy Santander receives funding from The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)</span></em></p>Louis Monroy Santander has been looking at how locals in the town of Sanski Most are moving on after a brutal conflict.Louis Monroy-Santander, PhD student, International Development Department, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/443962015-07-10T16:28:59Z2015-07-10T16:28:59ZProtecting the memory of Balkans tragedy from political opportunism<p>Bosnia and Herzegovina is preparing to mark the 20th anniversary of the coldblooded extermination of more than <a href="http://www.rferl.org/fullinfographics/infographics/27114531.html#">7,000 Muslim men and boys</a> in the small mining village of Srebrenica in the east of the country.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/world/europe/srebrenica-genocide-massacre.html?_r=0">massacre</a> was one of the worst atrocities to be committed on European soil since World War II and the only internationally recognised <a href="http://www.icty.org/sid/8434">case of genocide</a> in the Bosnian conflict.</p>
<p>There will be an influx of visitors to Srebrenica over the anniversary. Survivors, relatives and returning nationals will memorialise the men and boys killed in 1995 with the burial of 136 victims at the <a href="http://www.sitesofconscience.org/members/srebrenica-potocari-memorial-center-cemetery/">Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Center</a>.</p>
<p>Others, though, have been using the opportunity to fuel divisions in the fragile country. The complexities and mess of war and post-war recovery are not limited to Srebrenica. A multitude of experiences of conflict as well as sites marking scenes of violence exist across Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/1992/aug/07/warcrimes.edvulliamy">Omarska</a> and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/27/radovankaradzic.warcrimes2">Trnopolje</a> – which were concentration camps established near Prijedor to imprison non-Serbs.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://iwpr.net/global-voices/prlic-trial-shown-images-war">Helidrom</a>, people remember the internment of Muslims near Mostar and in <a href="https://iwpr.net/global-voices/former-firefighter-recalls-sarajevo-siege">Sarajevo</a>, they remember the longest siege in modern history.</p>
<h2>Admitting guilt</h2>
<p>In the run up to the 20th anniversary, the international and political nature of Srebrenica has come to the fore. National governments have <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-pledges-12-million-to-remember-victims-of-srebrenica">reflected on their involvement</a> and appear to be <a href="http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Regions-and-countries/Bosnia-Herzegovina/The-Netherlands-and-Srebrenica-the-burden-of-guilt-162201">making small acknowledgements of their blame</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/un-shares-blame-for-srebrenica-genocide">UN</a> has admitted to failing to protect Srebrenica and recently sought to pass a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/08/russia-vetoes-srebrenica-genocide-resolution-un">resolution</a> condemning the events there as genocide. The resolution was vetoed by Russia, but it shows willingness by other UN members to acknowledge the severity of what happened.</p>
<p>This came against the backdrop of revelations that the fall of the town was not the unexpected tragedy so often portrayed. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/04/west-true-role-in-srebrenica-massacre-bosnia">Recently released documents</a> suggest the UK, US and France in fact sought to cede Srebrenica to the Bosnian Serbs in a bid to end the conflict in the Balkans. </p>
<p>Within the region, admitting blame is still difficult. Serbia’s prime minister, Aleksandar Vučić, a nationalist and supporter of the idea of <a href="http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/sites/default/files/publications/ofre2www_csee_3.pdf">Greater Serbia</a>, will <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/07/07/uk-bosnia-serbia-srebrenica-idUKKCN0PH2FM20150707">attend the commemoration</a> – but it will be under a cloud of political dispute. Serbia recently issued an arrest warrant for war crimes allegedly committed by the former Srebrenica commander, Naser Orić. This even though Orić had already been aquitted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in 2008 of crimes against Serbs in the Srebrenica area.</p>
<p>Orić’s recent <a href="http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-army-wartime-commander-naser-oric-arrested">arrest</a>, and subsequent release, have created tension between both Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has also caused division domestically within Bosnia and Herzegovina, further heightening ethnopolitical tensions between the Muslim Croat Federation and the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska. Nationalist politicians have been calling for a referendum to decide if Republika Srpska should break away from Bosnia and Herzegovina – and the arrest has only fuelled their campaign.</p>
<p>This has led other nationalist political parties to appropriate the 20th anniversary of Srebrenica. The massacre and the politics surrounding it are being used to foment divisions in the country in an effort to further political and often divisionist agendas.</p>
<h2>Reclaiming remembrance</h2>
<p>This political appropriation of Srebrenica does not help the process of healing and the building of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But there is resistance and a movement to reclaim the memorialisation of Srebrenica and other sites of violence. These movements do not take away from the pain and suffering of Srebrenica but rather encompass and recognise the complexities of the war experience. The aim is to take a human rights-based view rather than use the massacre as part of a political battle.</p>
<p>This was seen at a recent event in <a href="http://instituteforgenocide.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/THE-PRIJEDOR-GENOCIDE-1.pdf">Prijedor</a> – where 5,200 non-Serbs from the town and 14,000 non-Serbs from the surrounding area were either killed or are missing. The event called for <a href="http://instituteforgenocide.org/?p=9990">an end to genocide denial</a> and aimed not only to raise awareness of what took place in Prijedor in 1992, but also protested the lack of the right to pay tribute to the children killed in Prijedor during the Bosnian conflict.</p>
<p>As <a href="http://balkanist.net/twenty-years-since-srebrenica-no-reconciliation-were-still-at-war/">Refik Hodzić</a> reminds us, the legacy of violence and war are still present in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Srebrenica is the main battlefield.</p>
<p>Maybe it is only through the act of challenging the appropriation of remembrance at the international, regional, and local levels that Bosnia and Herzegovina can begin to deal with the past.</p>
<p><em>Martin Avila, Marija Sarić, Nicola Ovenden and Mike Lipari also contributed to this article</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/44396/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michaelina Jakala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the run up to the 20th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre, nationalists are fuelling divisions.Michaelina Jakala, Research Associate, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.