tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/cladding-66136/articlesCladding – The Conversation2022-06-14T16:35:35Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1850402022-06-14T16:35:35Z2022-06-14T16:35:35ZGrenfell Tower: finally, the worst type of cladding is to be banned, five years on<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468728/original/file-20220614-24-ynvg0f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Residents have long bemoaned measures taken to make buildings look better, but not safer.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/london-uk-june-14-2018-view-1117120043">Ajit Wick | Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Five years after <a href="https://theconversation.com/grenfell-tower-the-difficult-task-of-creating-a-fitting-memorial-to-the-tragedy-184847">72 people lost their lives</a> in the Grenfell Tower fire, which broke out on June 14, 2017, the UK government <a href="https://www.architectsjournal.co.uk/news/grenfell-tower-cladding-to-be-banned-from-all-projects?tkn=1">has announced</a> plans to ban the type of cladding used to cover the external walls of the North Kensington high-rise. These <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1080214/ADB_amendment_booklet_June_2022.pdf">revised building regulations</a> are to be put into effect in December 2022. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/grenfell-four-years-after-the-disaster-are-our-buildings-safer-162202">inquiry</a> into the disaster concluded, in its <a href="https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report">first report</a> in 2019, that this cladding – polyethylene-filled aluminium composite panels, to be specific – was responsible for the fire spreading so quickly.</p>
<p>Polyethylene-filled aluminium composite panels are lightweight, stiff and cheap. They’re coated with durable paint and can easily be formed into architecturally interesting shapes. </p>
<p>Of all the common plastics, polyethylene is one of the most easily ignited and gives off the most heat <a href="https://www.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhazmat.2020.123894">when burning</a>. Because it has the same chemical composition as petrol, when it is molten, it burns ferociously with a high heat release. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A detailed shot of a burnt high-rise building with some cladding still intact." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468722/original/file-20220614-16-40vasd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468722/original/file-20220614-16-40vasd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468722/original/file-20220614-16-40vasd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468722/original/file-20220614-16-40vasd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468722/original/file-20220614-16-40vasd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468722/original/file-20220614-16-40vasd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468722/original/file-20220614-16-40vasd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The central component of the cladding panels – polyethylene – is highly combustible.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/london-uk-28th-june-2017-editorial-670939831">John Gomez | Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A multilayered fire hazard</h2>
<p>Polyethylene-filled aluminium composite panels are typically a 4mm thick composite of two sheets of 0.5mm aluminium sheets sandwiching a 3mm layer of polyethylene. If heated by a fire, the polyethylene melts and pours out, where it can easily catch alight, thereby spreading the fire downwards through flaming, molten droplets. </p>
<p>The panels themselves aren’t the only problem, however. “Rainscreen” cladding systems, which are attached to the outside walls of large modern buildings to improve appearance and thermal insulation, are comprised of these outer cladding panels combined with an inner ventilation cavity (50mm wide) and a layer of insulation (100mm to 200mm thick). </p>
<p>This means that from the outside going in, after the cladding panel, there is a ventilated cavity and insulation, which is often combustible (usually phenolic foam or polyisocyanurate foam in the UK). This provides the fire with additional fuel, which burns more slowly. As a result, the contents of individual flats can catch fire. Catastrophic loss of life can follow, as occurred in the Grenfell Tower fire.</p>
<p>Critically, the air-gap, which is used to prevent moisture build-up, acts as a chimney. It allows flames to grow upwards inside it, inaccessible to firefighters’ hoses. </p>
<p>Conversely, in incidents where polyethylene-filled aluminium panels have ignited on buildings without insulation, such as the 2016 fire at the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-middle-east-35208484">Address Downtown Hotel in Dubai</a>, or <a href="https://theconversation.com/lacrosse-fire-ruling-sends-shudders-through-building-industry-consultants-and-governments-112777">the 2014 fire at the Lacrosse Building</a> in Melbourne, flames have ripped up the outside of the building in minutes, but lives have not been lost. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Fire hoses rolled up on a fire truck" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468725/original/file-20220614-19-4h9n2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468725/original/file-20220614-19-4h9n2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468725/original/file-20220614-19-4h9n2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468725/original/file-20220614-19-4h9n2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468725/original/file-20220614-19-4h9n2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468725/original/file-20220614-19-4h9n2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468725/original/file-20220614-19-4h9n2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Firefighters have difficulty accessing the inner air gaps in these cladding systems.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/compartment-rolled-fire-hoses-on-engine-693614314">Azami Adiputera | Shuttertstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Inadequate regulation</h2>
<p>Other cladding panel types include high-pressure laminate (similar to the material used to make kitchen worktops), which also burns with disastrous consequences. This is what happened in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-from-lakanal-house-were-not-heeded-then-grenfell-happened-80051">2009 Lakanal House fire</a> in London and the fire at <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-53597167">The Cube in Bolton in 2019</a>. </p>
<p>There are estimated to be three times as many buildings clad with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/nov/17/bolton-blaze-housing-and-fire-chiefs-hit-out-over-cladding-lottery">this laminate</a>. The combination of both types of cladding panel (polyethylene-filled aluminium composite and high-pressure laminate) has led to thousands of occupants being unable to sell their homes.</p>
<p>Since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-what-it-would-have-been-like-to-be-caught-in-the-great-fire-of-london-64469">Great Fire of London</a> in 1666, the use of combustible walls and roofs have been banned in England. The 2010 building regulations stated that “the external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls and from one building to another, having regard to the height, use and position of the building”. </p>
<p>But guidance as to how this regulation may be met was given in the 2006 edition of the UK government’s 180-page <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/441669/BR_PDF_AD_B2_2013.pdf">Fire Safety: Approved Document B</a>. It explains that this can be achieved by the use of non-combustible products on the outside walls of the building, but it also allowed combustible products to be used, provided they met certain criteria (published separately in a <a href="https://www.brebookshop.com/details.jsp?id=327140">document known as BR135</a>) when exposed to fire in a large-scale test (following the <a href="https://shop.bsigroup.com/products/fire-performance-of-external-cladding-systems-test-method-for-non-loadbearing-external-cladding-systems-fixed-to-and-supported-by-a-masonry-substrate/tracked-changes">BS 8414 test standard</a>).</p>
<p><a href="https://www.doi.org/10.1007/s10694-020-00993-z">Our research has shown</a> the inadequacy of this approach, because the ideal test environment differs significantly from the actual building. This guidance essentially made the use of combustible products on the outside walls of tall buildings possible. It required that these products either meet the BR135 criteria, or, in the absence of a test result, that a fire consultant undertake what is known as a “desktop study” to determine whether they would be likely to meet the criteria. </p>
<p>Climate change was used by the insulation industry to persuade regulators to increase the insulation requirements of modern buildings to conserve heat. This was done without considering the fire safety consequences. </p>
<p>The climate emergency is undeniably the biggest threat to humans and our planet. Domestic space and water heating accounts for <a href="https://royalsociety.org/-/media/policy/projects/climate-change-science-solutions/climate-science-solutions-heating-cooling.pdf">around 20% of carbon emissions</a>, and insulation reduces those emissions. But there are many ways to reduce carbon emissions, starting with leaving fossil fuels in the ground. </p>
<p>Some insulation products, such as glass wool and stone wool are non-combustible, and can safely be put on the external face of a building. Other insulation products (such as those phenolic or PIR foams, themselves derived from fossil fuels) have been shown to be safe in a fire only when enclosed in solid masonry. This however is more expensive, and may not be feasible when refurbishing an existing building. </p>
<p>The Grenfell inquiry has revealed gaping holes in the procedures for ensuring building fire safety, from product manufacturers, test laboratories, third-party certifiers, builders, architects and even regulators. </p>
<p>From a regulatory point of view, allowing combustible products to be used on external walls in the first place has been shown to be counterproductive. In many cases, they have actually been removed but not replaced. This has improved fire safety, but deprived the occupants of the insulation they had previously benefited from. </p>
<p>Further, the carbon emissions associated with remediation of buildings following the Grenfell Tower fire, to ensure fire safety, are likely to be greater than the potential savings from the improved insulation. Consequently, if non-combustible insulation and non-combustible cladding panels had been specified by the building regulations, not only could the Grenfell tragedy have been avoided, but the adverse climate effects of all the other unsafely clad buildings could have ultimately been lessened.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185040/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Hull does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Inadequate building regulations led to combustible products being used on external walls.Richard Hull, Professor of Chemistry and Fire Science, University of Central LancashireLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1673532021-09-08T20:12:45Z2021-09-08T20:12:45Z9/11 conspiracy theories debunked: 20 years later, engineering experts explain how the twin towers collapsed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419912/original/file-20210908-7120-1nfd6c7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=19%2C26%2C4346%2C2900&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Roberto Robanne/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The collapse of the World Trade Center has been subject to intense public scrutiny over the 20 years, since the centre’s twin towers were struck by aircraft hijacked by terrorists. Both collapsed within two hours of impact, prompting several investigations and spawning a variety of conspiracy theories. </p>
<p>Construction on the World Trade Center 1 (the North Tower) and World Trade Center 2 (the South Tower) began in the 1960s. They were constructed from steel and concrete, using a design that was groundbreaking at the time. Most high-rise buildings since have used a similar structure.</p>
<p>The investigatory reports into the events of September 11, 2001 were undertaken by the <a href="https://www.fema.gov/pdf/library/fema403_ch2.pdf">US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)</a> and the <a href="https://www.nist.gov/el/final-reports-nist-world-trade-center-disaster-investigation">National Institute of Standards and Technology</a>. </p>
<p>FEMA’s report was published in 2002. This was followed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s three-year investigation, funded by the US Federal Government and published in 2005.</p>
<p>Some conspiracy theorists seized on the fact the NIST investigation was funded by the federal government — believing the government itself had caused the twin towers’ collapse, or was aware it would happen and deliberately didn’t act.</p>
<p>While there have been critics of both reports (and the investigations behind them weren’t flawless) — their explanation for the buildings’ collapse is widely accepted. They conclude it was not caused by direct impact by the aircraft, or the use of explosives, but by fires that burned inside the buildings after impact.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419934/original/file-20210908-18-1d6m7vf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Fire and rescue workers search through the rubble of the World Trade Centrr" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419934/original/file-20210908-18-1d6m7vf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419934/original/file-20210908-18-1d6m7vf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419934/original/file-20210908-18-1d6m7vf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419934/original/file-20210908-18-1d6m7vf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419934/original/file-20210908-18-1d6m7vf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419934/original/file-20210908-18-1d6m7vf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419934/original/file-20210908-18-1d6m7vf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fire and rescue workers search through the rubble of the World Trade Center in New York on 13 September 2001. On 11 September 2001, two aircrafts were flown into the centre’s twin towers, causing both to collapse.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">BETH A. KEISER/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why did the towers collapse as they did?</h2>
<p>Some have questioned why the buildings did not “topple over” after being struck side-on by aircraft. But the answer becomes clear once you consider the details. </p>
<p>Aircraft are made from lightweight materials, such as aluminium. If you compare the mass of an aircraft with that of a skyscraper more than 400 metres tall and built from steel and concrete, it makes sense the building would not topple over.</p>
<p>The towers would have been more than 1,000 times the mass of the aircraft, and <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11837-001-0003-1">designed to resist</a> steady wind loads more than 30 times the aircrafts’ weight.</p>
<p>That said, the aircraft did dislodge fireproofing material within the towers, which was coated on the steel columns and on the steel floor trusses (underneath concrete slabs). The lack of fireproofing left the steel unprotected.</p>
<p>As such, the impact also structurally <a href="https://www.nist.gov/el/final-reports-nist-world-trade-center-disaster-investigation">damaged</a> the supporting steel columns. When a few columns become damaged, the load they carry is transferred to other columns. This is why both towers withstood the initial impacts and didn’t collapse immediately.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/9-11-the-controversial-story-of-the-remains-of-the-world-trade-center-167481">9/11: the controversial story of the remains of the World Trade Center</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Progressive collapse</h2>
<p>The fact that the towers withstood initial impacts also spawned one of the most common conspiracy theories surrounding 9/11: that a bomb or explosives must have been detonated somewhere within the buildings. </p>
<p>These theories have developed from video footage showing the towers rapidly collapsing downwards some time after impact, similar to a controlled demolition. But it is possible for them to have collapsed this way without explosives. </p>
<p>It was fire that caused this. And the fire is believed to have come from the burning of remaining aircraft fuel. </p>
<p>According to the FEMA report, fire within the buildings caused thermal expansion of the floors in a horizontal and outwards direction, pushing against the rigid steel columns — which deflected to an extent but resisted further movement.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419729/original/file-20210907-17-ceifdd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419729/original/file-20210907-17-ceifdd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419729/original/file-20210907-17-ceifdd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419729/original/file-20210907-17-ceifdd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419729/original/file-20210907-17-ceifdd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419729/original/file-20210907-17-ceifdd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419729/original/file-20210907-17-ceifdd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This figure shows the expansion of floor slabs and framing which likely happened as a result of the fires.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">FEMA / https://www.fema.gov/pdf/library/fema403_ch2.pdf</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>With the columns resisting movement, there was nowhere else for the concrete floors to expand to. This led to an increased buildup of stress in the sagging floors, until the floor framing and connections gave in. </p>
<p>The floors’ failure pulled the columns back inwards, eventually leading to them buckling, and the floors collapsing. The collapsing floors then fell on more floors below, leading to a progressive collapse.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419730/original/file-20210907-15-n8yw7s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419730/original/file-20210907-15-n8yw7s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419730/original/file-20210907-15-n8yw7s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419730/original/file-20210907-15-n8yw7s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419730/original/file-20210907-15-n8yw7s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419730/original/file-20210907-15-n8yw7s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419730/original/file-20210907-15-n8yw7s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The buckling of columns initiated by floor failure.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">FEMA / https://www.fema.gov/pdf/library/fema403_ch2.pdf</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This explanation, documented in the official reports, is widely accepted by experts as the cause of the twin towers’ collapse. It is <a href="https://www.nist.gov/el/final-reports-nist-world-trade-center-disaster-investigation">understood</a> the South Tower collapsed sooner because it suffered more damage from the initial aircraft impact, which also dislodged more fireproofing material. </p>
<p>The debris from the collapse of the North Tower set at least ten floors alight in the nearby World Trade Center 7 building, or “Building 7”, which also <a href="https://www.nist.gov/publications/final-report-collapse-world-trade-center-building-7-federal-building-and-fire-safety-0">collapsed</a> about seven hours later. </p>
<p>While there are different theories regarding how the progressive collapse of Building 7 was initiated, there is <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/data/UQ_9f81895/P003_UQ9f81895_Paper21.pdf?dsi_version=87e49663794e5734a13be9924e57b0a7&Expires=1631067602&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJKNBJ4MJBJNC6NLQ&Signature=BFjdytaaDOoZ4UkNnYkXUS5J5CZrVXDG0C%7E39s6s3ljwVyI8yeiKjFSWIbVMrPxD2J%7EYfBgk8AMGWZ2NfJCyn4EOn2KpKGZ8wY-eJXXLmwU3hRbIBGl9sFTIOwNIAuAgPjMPQtIJS6K9vRxvasOJpXnSWZYNc67UOKSZJ84HPu7es-4DcQPn18AmHVq6oBDaCjeIlWZmx9v05H8CaOi9VaT%7EHPxJR0J46QXyL4w72BoU287X58Z3n6wB5cyeeULUL7zIwQo0HLLofLKfyam5zaKDXghQNVTtwEfaX5l7pj2zVedjbpZiaNQ6KZcR7pO%7EXuCwmaRM0QgrU-GK2q4pCg">consensus among investigators</a> fire was the primary cause of failure.</p>
<p>Both official reports made a range of fire safety recommendations for other high-rise buildings, including to improve evacuation and emergency response. In 2007, the National Institute of Standards and Technology also published a <a href="https://www.nist.gov/publications/best-practices-reducing-potential-progressive-collapse-buildings">best practice guide</a> recommending solutions to reduce risk of progressive collapse.</p>
<h2>What does this mean for high-rise buildings?</h2>
<p>Before 9/11, progressive collapse wasn’t well understood by engineers. The disaster highlighted the importance of having a “global view” of fire safety for a building, as opposed to focusing on individual elements. </p>
<p>There have since been changes to building codes and standards on improving the structural performance of buildings on fire, as well as opportunities to escape (such as added stairwell requirements).</p>
<p>At the same time, the collapse of the twin towers demonstrated the very real dangers of fire in high-rise buildings. In the decades since the World Trade Center was designed, buildings have become taller and more complex, as societies demand sustainable and cost-effective housing in large cities.</p>
<p>Some 86 of the current <a href="https://www.skyscrapercenter.com/buildings">100 tallest</a> buildings in the world were built after 9/11. This has coincided with a significant increase in building façade fires globally, which have <a href="https://www.koreascience.or.kr/article/JAKO201809355933912.page">gone up sevenfold</a> in the past three decades.</p>
<p>This can be partly attributed to the wide use of flammable cladding. It is marketed as an innovative, cost-effective and sustainable material, yet it has shown significant shortcomings in terms of fire safety — as witnessed in the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-40301289">2017 Grenfell Disaster</a>. </p>
<p>The Grenfell fire (and similar cladding fires) are proof that fire safety in tall buildings is still a problem. And as structures get taller and more complex, with new and innovative designs and materials, questions around fire safety will only become more difficult to answer.</p>
<p>The events of 9/11 may have been challenging to foresee, but the fires that led to the towers’ collapse could have been better prepared for.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fire-risks-have-been-known-for-years-lives-depend-on-acting-now-with-no-more-delays-111186">Cladding fire risks have been known for years. Lives depend on acting now, with no more delays</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167353/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Oswald has received funding from various organisations including the Association of Researchers in Construction Management and the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute. He is affiliated with The Institute of Civil Engineers acting as a journal Associate Editor.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Erica Kuligowski currently receives funding from the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Measurement Science and Engineering Grants Program (as a subcontractor). She is affiliated with the Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) as a Section Editor for their Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering (Human Behaviour Section) and as a member of the Board of Governors for the SFPE Foundation. Also, from 2002 to 2020, Erica worked as a research engineer and social scientist in the Engineering Laboratory of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. While at NIST, Erica worked on NIST's Technical Investigation of the 2001 WTC Disaster as a team member of Project 7: Occupant Behavior, Egress, and Emergency Communications.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kate Nguyen receives funding from the Australian Research Council and other government/industry-funded programs. She is a member of the Society of Fire Safety, Engineers Australia. The view and opinion that she has in this article is her personal view and does not represent her employer's opinion. </span></em></p>The World Trade Center buildings were built to withstand wind loads more than 30 times the aircrafts’ weight.David Oswald, Senior Lecturer in Construction, RMIT UniversityErica Kuligowski, Vice-Chancellor's Senior Research Fellow, RMIT UniversityKate Nguyen, Senior Lecturer, ARC DECRA Fellow and Victoria Fellow, RMIT UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1573072021-03-21T18:51:56Z2021-03-21T18:51:56ZOnly a small fraction of buildings with flammable cladding have been fixed, and owners are feeling the strain<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390521/original/file-20210319-15-1o3nsj4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C2%2C1417%2C890&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">MFB</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19491247.2021.1893119">more than 3,400</a> buildings with flammable cladding. In Victoria alone, at least 71 of these buildings <a href="https://theurbandeveloper.com/articles/cladding-safety-victoria-ceo-appointed">have been classified</a> as “extreme risk” and another 368 as “high risk”. Despite the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/oct/26/director-at-grenfell-tower-tmo-describes-how-fatal-cladding-saved-800000">tragic evidence</a> of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/lacrosse-fire-ruling-sends-shudders-through-building-industry-consultants-and-governments-112777">risks</a> of <a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fire-risks-have-been-known-for-years-lives-depend-on-acting-now-with-no-more-delays-111186">cladding</a> fires, rectification work had been completed on only <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/secrecy-around-cladding-hit-list-attacked-as-spin-after-signs-reveal-dozens-of-sites-20210219-p573yr.html">11 of these buildings</a> by February 2021. </p>
<p>The estimated cost of making these buildings safe is <a href="https://theconversation.com/flammable-cladding-costs-could-approach-billions-for-building-owners-if-authorities-dither-118121">in the billions</a>. State governments have provided limited funding to rectify the highest-risk buildings. Occupants of lower-risk buildings have largely been left to fund the work themselves.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/flammable-cladding-costs-could-approach-billions-for-building-owners-if-authorities-dither-118121">Flammable cladding costs could approach billions for building owners if authorities dither</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>We know from previous building industry failures like the leaky homes crisis in <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/116236850/the-rottenomics-of-the-47-billion-leaky-homes-market-failure">New Zealand</a> and <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/bc-leaky-condo-crisis-1.4609418">Canada</a> that the impacts go beyond the repair costs.</p>
<p>In two recently published research papers, we explore the impacts on occupants’ finances and well-being of owning and living in apartments with flammable cladding in Australia. We interviewed 16 owners and investors from Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia and ACT.</p>
<h2>What costs are owners facing?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/19491247.2021.1893119">paper</a> published last week looked at the accumulating financial costs beyond the rectification work. Participants revealed these costs include:</p>
<ul>
<li>special levies, to cover rectification costs </li>
<li>higher owners’ corporation fees</li>
<li>rising insurance premiums</li>
<li>legal fees</li>
<li>fixing other fire safety defects, such as sprinklers </li>
<li>possible loss of property value.</li>
</ul>
<p>As one occupant said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><em>“We’ve (owners’ corporation) had to put the levies up and then we’d have
rates of special levies for the legal fees and the fire engineer’s report
as well […] And we still got the cladding on the building.”</em></p>
</blockquote>
<p>The financial burdens on households have influenced major and minor life decisions. One participant said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><em>“I really want to retire in two years […] how will I be able to pay for all of this (cladding rectification)? I don’t know […] It might be the case that I then have to actually sell a defective unit.”</em></p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lacrosse-fire-ruling-sends-shudders-through-building-industry-consultants-and-governments-112777">Lacrosse fire ruling sends shudders through building industry consultants and governments</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>How are owners coping?</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02673037.2021.1887458">second paper</a> explores the effects on owners’ well-being. They reported frustration, concern and anger. Some in higher-risk buildings feared for their safety. Some said this range of long-term negative emotions was harming their mental health and well-being. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/NStPd-v42mY?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Some owners fear their building will have the cladding catch fire (such as the fire at the Neo 200 apartments in Melbourne in 2019).</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/grenfell-tower-inquiry-expert-explains-four-main-findings-and-how-emergency-services-must-improve-126163">Grenfell Tower inquiry: expert explains four main findings – and how emergency services must improve</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>All owners were very disappointed that building industry-related professions and the government could allow this to happen. This was compounded by the realisation that their building warranty was mostly useless in this situation:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><em>“And then you find out that the warranty is worth very little, and you have to then deal with the builder who’s engaged in dishonest practices essentially […] The kind of builder we had, it’s the kind of builder that would very much just disappear his company, and recreate to avoid any liability.”</em></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Some expressed serious concerns for people’s lives because of the financial stresses the crisis had caused:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><em>“There’s one lady who’s even worse off than me. She’s absolutely beside herself. She doesn’t know what’s she’s going to do […S] he’ll probably go insane or kill herself or something. Seriously […] she is so distraught about this all.”</em></p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fire-risks-have-been-known-for-years-lives-depend-on-acting-now-with-no-more-delays-111186">Cladding fire risks have been known for years. Lives depend on acting now, with no more delays</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Policy change needed to improve support</h2>
<p>Our research clearly shows apartment owners are feeling the impacts of much more than just the direct rectification costs. Support to help people cope with these broader impacts is lacking. A similar lack of wider support was identified in the building defect crises in New Zealand and Canada.</p>
<p>Recent developments include a Victorian <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-02-01/victorian-ban-on-combustible-cladding-comes-into-effect/13107218">ban on flammable cladding</a> on all new multi-storey buildings and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/society/2021/feb/09/ministers-to-increase-financial-support-for-cladding-removal">extra government funding for rectification work</a> in the UK. The Victorian government is <a href="https://www.vic.gov.au/find-out-about-cladding-safety-victorias-program">contributing A$600 million</a> towards the cost of rectifying some higher-risk apartments. In New South Wales, the government is <a href="https://www.nsw.gov.au/customer-service/projects-and-initiatives/project-remediate">providing interest-free loans</a> to help owners in an estimated 225 buildings. </p>
<p>NSW has also begun work on building industry <a href="https://www.nsw.gov.au/building-commissioner/news/a-better-future-a-better-industry">reforms</a> to:</p>
<ul>
<li>improve regulations, with new powers, processes and audit practices for the regulator</li>
<li>use a system to rate building risk that links past practice, finance and insurance records so consumers are protected from risky projects and practitioners</li>
<li>improve procurement methods with major changes to contracting, declared design requirements, and sign-off processes/stages</li>
<li>improve building skills and capabilities through professional education, development, responsibilities and certification</li>
<li>develop digital systems to modernise and harmonise the industry. </li>
</ul>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-nsw-building-law-could-be-a-game-changer-for-apartment-safety-140432">New NSW building law could be a game changer for apartment safety</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>These are clearly good steps forward. But governments and the building industry need to do more to provide broader support and protection for the affected households. As our research shows, they are suffering financially on a number of fronts and all the while the crisis eats away at their well-being.</p>
<p>Government policy on housing defects has focused on the cost of fixing these defects. The other indirect financial costs, such as increased insurance, and effects on well-being, have been neglected. Future policy must reduce the risks of more crises such as combustible cladding and, if there is a crisis, consider all the financial costs owners bear as well as the need to support their well-being.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157307/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Trivess Moore has received funding from various organisations including the Australian Research Council, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Victorian Government and various industry partners. He is a trustee of the Fuel Poverty Research Network.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Oswald has received funding from various organisations including the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute and the Association of Researchers in Construction Management. He is the lead guest editor for a special issue in the journal Construction, Management and Economics, titled: ‘Construction defects, danger, disruption and disputes: A systemic view of the construction industry post-Grenfell.'
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Simon Lockrey has received funding from various organisations including the Australian Government, Victorian Government and various industry partners. He is the Vice President of Automotive Historians Australia, and on the boards of Glowpear and the International Sustainable Development Research Society. Dr Lockrey also owns property affected by combustible cladding.</span></em></p>Since the Grenfell Tower fire claimed 72 lives in 2017, Australia has identified flammable cladding on more than 3,400 buildings. Despite apartment owners’ fears and rising costs, few have been fixed.Trivess Moore, Senior Lecturer, School of Property, Construction and Project Management, RMIT UniversityDavid Oswald, Senior Lecturer in Construction, RMIT UniversitySimon Lockrey, Senior Lecturer in Industrial Design and Research Fellow, RMIT UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1502922020-12-06T18:54:16Z2020-12-06T18:54:16ZDealing with apartment defects: a how-to guide for strata owners and buyers<p>If you own an apartment – or are thinking of buying one – the recent news about building quality <a href="https://theconversation.com/would-you-buy-a-new-apartment-building-confidence-depends-on-ending-the-blame-game-122180">has been worrying</a>. There have been evacuations at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/there-are-lessons-to-be-drawn-from-the-cracks-that-appeared-in-sydneys-opal-tower-but-they-extend-beyond-building-certification-109428">Opal</a> and <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-11-24/mascot-towers-apartment-owners-still-living-in-limbo/12911968">Mascot</a> apartment towers in Sydney, cladding fires at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/lacrosse-fire-ruling-sends-shudders-through-building-industry-consultants-and-governments-112777">Lacrosse</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fire-risks-have-been-known-for-years-lives-depend-on-acting-now-with-no-more-delays-111186">Neo200</a> towers in Melbourne and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/grenfell-tower-inquiry-expert-explains-four-main-findings-and-how-emergency-services-must-improve-126163">Grenfell Tower tragedy</a> in London. While most buildings won’t have such serious defects, many do have significant problems, and owners must get these fixed so they aren’t a health and safety risk. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-big-lesson-from-opal-tower-is-that-badly-built-apartments-arent-only-an-issue-for-residents-109722">The big lesson from Opal Tower is that badly built apartments aren't only an issue for residents</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Even if the defect doesn’t affect their apartment, this is often the shared responsibility of all owners in the building. It’s essential they have access to good guidance on dealing with defects in strata properties – but this isn’t always easy to find. To help owners, we’ve worked with the <a href="https://nsw.strata.community/">Strata Community Association (NSW)</a> to produce a <a href="https://cityfutures.be.unsw.edu.au/research/projects/defect-rectification/">free guide to rectifying defects</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372949/original/file-20201203-23-1770psg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="screenshot of strata defects rectification guide home page" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372949/original/file-20201203-23-1770psg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372949/original/file-20201203-23-1770psg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=261&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372949/original/file-20201203-23-1770psg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=261&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372949/original/file-20201203-23-1770psg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=261&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372949/original/file-20201203-23-1770psg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372949/original/file-20201203-23-1770psg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372949/original/file-20201203-23-1770psg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The online guide to rectifying defects takes apartment owners step by step through what they should do.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://cityfutures.be.unsw.edu.au/research/projects/defect-rectification/">City Futures Research Centre, UNSW/SCA (NSW)</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This how-to guide takes current and potential owners through the steps of identifying and rectifying defects, with links to helpful resources. It includes advice on getting a defect report, whether the developer or builder might be responsible for fixing the issue, how to choose and manage building experts, and how to manage communication with owners and workers. </p>
<p>The guide has been developed for New South Wales, but may also be helpful if you have a strata property elsewhere in Australia.</p>
<h2>So what key things should owners know?</h2>
<p>Each building’s experience with defects will differ. But there are some key principles owners should always keep in mind – these underpin all the advice in our guide.</p>
<p><strong>Ignorance isn’t bliss</strong>: as an owner, you are automatically a member of the <a href="https://www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au/housing-and-property/strata-and-community-living/strata-schemes">owners corporation/body corporate</a>. This means you have a legal <a href="https://www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au/housing-and-property/strata-and-community-living/strata-schemes/responsibilities-of-the-owners-corporation">responsibility to maintain and repair the common property</a>, including dealing with defects. </p>
<p><strong>Information is power</strong>: gather all the information you can when investigating defects. For buyers, a good strata report is essential. For owners of new buildings, getting a professional defects report is particularly important. It’s worth the cost. </p>
<p>Focus on potential fire, waterproofing or structural issues. These defects can be hard to see but expensive to fix. They also have major impacts on health and safety. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/housing-with-buyer-protection-and-no-serious-faults-is-that-too-much-to-ask-of-builders-and-regulators-113115">Housing with buyer protection and no serious faults – is that too much to ask of builders and regulators?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>The early bird catches the worm</strong>: you can never start looking for and dealing with defects too early. Be aware of time limits on building warranties. </p>
<p>In NSW, for minor defects, you have two years to start the process of getting the builder or developer to fix the defect. For major defects, you have six years. If your building is outside the warranty period, you may have to fund rectification yourself.</p>
<p><strong>Sharing is caring</strong>: make sure you report defects to people who need to know. This will include your owners corporation, but also your insurer(s) and <a href="https://www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au/help-centre/online-tools/make-a-complaint">Fair Trading</a> (especially if the defect is major). </p>
<p>Keeping good records is also important. Records are needed in case there are disputes and to show future buyers the building is well-maintained. </p>
<p><strong>Look after yourself</strong>: dealing with defects can be financially and emotionally draining. Conflict can occur, and collective decision-making can feel very slow. </p>
<p>To help navigate the process, you want the best experts by your side. They include lawyers, building specialists, strata managers and project managers. And always get a second opinion if in doubt.</p>
<h2>What else can be done to improve the situation?</h2>
<p>While our guide will help apartment owners and buyers to work through defect issues, state and territory governments could also do more to help out owners. </p>
<p>Since the Opal Tower evacuation, the NSW government has <a href="https://www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au/about-fair-trading/legislation-and-publications/changes-to-legislation/building-industry-reforms">moved to tighten building laws</a> to reduce future defects. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-nsw-building-law-could-be-a-game-changer-for-apartment-safety-140432">New NSW building law could be a game changer for apartment safety</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>These legal changes are important, but they are unlikely to completely get rid of building defects. And buildings built before the new laws might still have problems down the track. </p>
<p>One way governments can help owners who face such issues in the future is to make it easier for them to get the information they need to deal with defects effectively and efficiently.</p>
<p>Currently, strata buyers and owners suffer from what economists call “<a href="https://theconversation.com/lack-of-information-on-apartment-defects-leaves-whole-market-on-shaky-footings-127007">information asymmetry</a>” – they don’t have access to all the information they need to make informed decisions about building quality. For example, developers might not give new owners all the details about how their building was built, what materials were used, or which builders and tradespeople worked on it. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lack-of-information-on-apartment-defects-leaves-whole-market-on-shaky-footings-127007">Lack of information on apartment defects leaves whole market on shaky footings</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Developers should be required to give owners better information, as well as taking more responsibility for fixing defects. </p>
<p>Owners corporations should be encouraged to keep building records on defects up-to-date and make this information available to prospective buyers and relevant authorities. </p>
<p>And governments should support further professionalisation of the strata and building management industries, to make sure owners have the best possible support to navigate defects issues and care for their buildings.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150292/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sian Thompson receives funding from Strata Community Association (NSW) and the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bill Randolph receives funding from the Australian Research Council, Landcom, Shelter WA and various strata industry organisations, including Strata Community Association (NSW), which funded the work discussed in this article. He is a Board Member of Shelter NSW.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hazel Easthope receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, the City of Sydney and Strata Community Association. She is an academic member of the Australian College of Strata Lawyers. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laura Crommelin receives funding from Strata Community Association (NSW), the Australian Research Council, and the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Loosemore receives funding from the Strata Community Association (NSW) and the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>Identifying and fixing apartment defects can be challenging, especially as they’re often the shared responsibility of all owners in the building. A new guide aims to help navigate the pitfalls.Sian Thompson, Research Associate, City Futures Research Centre, UNSW SydneyBill Randolph, Director, City Futures Research Centre, Faculty of the Built Environment, UNSW SydneyHazel Easthope, Scientia Associate Professor, City Futures Research Centre, UNSW SydneyLaura Crommelin, Research Lecturer, City Futures Research Centre, UNSW SydneyMartin Loosemore, Professor of Construction Management, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1404322020-06-11T19:55:58Z2020-06-11T19:55:58ZNew NSW building law could be a game changer for apartment safety<p>Three years have passed since a <a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fire-risks-have-been-known-for-years-lives-depend-on-acting-now-with-no-more-delays-111186">cladding-fuelled fire</a> claimed 72 lives in <a href="https://theconversation.com/grenfell-tower-inquiry-expert-explains-four-main-findings-and-how-emergency-services-must-improve-126163">Grenfell Tower</a>, London, on June 14 2017. The construction industry and its regulators around the world are still grappling with how to create effective regulations to ensure dwellings are built to keep their occupants safe.</p>
<p>The New South Wales Parliament passed two important bills last week: the <a href="https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/bills/Pages/bill-details.aspx?pk=3716">Design and Building Practitioners Bill 2020</a> and the <a href="https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/bills/Pages/bill-details.aspx?pk=3738">Residential Apartment Buildings (Compliance and Enforcement Powers) Bill 2020</a>. This put in place two important pieces of the “jigsaw puzzle”, as NSW Better Regulation Minister Kevin Anderson <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/building-watchdog-warns-he-will-clamp-down-on-shameful-developers-20200603-p54yzs.html">put it</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nsw-building-certification-bill-still-lets-developers-off-the-hook-132502">NSW building certification bill still lets developers off the hook</a>
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<p>The Residential Apartment Buildings Bill in particular could be a game changer and is the focus of this article. The law is expected to take effect on September 1 2020.</p>
<h2>New powers to order serious defects be fixed</h2>
<p>The centrepiece of the legislation is an ability for the Secretary of the Department of Customer Service to order the correction of “serious defects” in residential apartment buildings. In practice, the NSW building commissioner and his staff will apply these orders, according to the bill’s <a href="https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Hansard/Pages/HansardResult.aspx#/docid/'HANSARD-1323879322-110436'">second reading speech</a>. Developers can be ordered to rectify building work “if the secretary has a reasonable belief that building work was or is being carried out in a manner that could result in a serious defect”.</p>
<p>The “was” is significant here. These powers of intervention can be used up to ten years after an occupation certificate is issued. </p>
<p>And, to make sure defects are fixed before residents take possession of their apartment, the secretary can issue a “prohibition order” to delay an occupation certificate.</p>
<p>The definition of “serious defect” includes:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>failure to comply with performance requirements of the <a href="https://hia.com.au/business-information/standards-regulations/building-standards">Building Code of Australia</a></p></li>
<li><p>defects likely to deny habitability or use of the building for its intended purpose</p></li>
<li><p>use of banned building products.</p></li>
</ul>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fires-expose-gaps-in-building-material-safety-checks-heres-a-solution-111073">Cladding fires expose gaps in building material safety checks. Here's a solution</a>
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<p>Other states and territories have in place various provisions to order rectification. However, none of these are as extensive as the new regime in NSW.</p>
<p>In particular, the express power to order rectification after apartments are completed addresses the issue that frustrated the Victorian Building Authority’s 2017 attempt to <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/vic/VSC/2017/805.html">have the builder rectify non-compliant cladding</a> at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/lacrosse-fire-ruling-sends-shudders-through-building-industry-consultants-and-governments-112777">Lacrosse Building</a> in Melbourne. So, the rectification powers are likely, along with the statutory duty of care in the Design and Building Practitioners Bill – also a NSW innovation – to attract interest across the country. </p>
<h2>How much will the industry push back?</h2>
<p>These measures to rectify defects go to the heart of the commercial drivers that underpin our largely privately delivered apartment stock in Australia. Without an occupation certificate, developers can’t settle the sale of the apartments (usually off-plan). Likewise, their building contractors will typically remain “on the hook” for a raft of obligations under their contracts.</p>
<p>By making defects correction a precondition for issuing the occupation certificate, the new law embraces the “prevention is better than cure” mantra that underpins reforms in Australia and beyond. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/housing-with-buyer-protection-and-no-serious-faults-is-that-too-much-to-ask-of-builders-and-regulators-113115">Housing with buyer protection and no serious faults – is that too much to ask of builders and regulators?</a>
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<p>To what extent will the industry support this shift? Time will tell. </p>
<p>What can be said is that the reforms add a high level of intervention in the commercial drivers of apartment construction when the industry is already operating under the shadow of COVID-19 and its gathering recession. So it is something of a “wildcard” in an already fraught commercial landscape.</p>
<p>This means developers who do not have adequate measures in place to pass the costs of rectification and delayed occupation down the contractual chain are likely to resort to the extensive appeal measures in the legislation. Likewise, when contractors, subcontractors, consultants and suppliers do “carry the can” for such liability, they will look hard at the relief provisions in their contracts. </p>
<p>The disputes and delays that inevitably result can leave apartment owners and renters in limbo, despite the intent of the legislation to protect them.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-not-just-the-building-cracks-or-cladding-sometimes-uncertainty-does-even-more-harm-120662">It's not just the building cracks or cladding – sometimes uncertainty does even more harm</a>
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<h2>Regulators need adequate resources</h2>
<p>Another crucial “time will tell” aspect is whether the regulator will have enough resources to inspect buildings – and issue prohibition and rectification orders when needed – in a timely manner across the industry.</p>
<p>The legislation largely leaves it to the Department of Customer Service to appoint “authorised officers”. The minister has indicated these officers will be the building commissioner and his staff. </p>
<p>The commissioner was <a href="https://www.thefifthestate.com.au/innovation/rating-tools/brush-off-your-old-cv-the-nsw-building-commission-is-now-hiring/">reported in February</a> to be recruiting up to 60 construction professionals as “auditors” for a scheme that looks similar to what is now enshrined in legislation. They will need to move rapidly to have it ready for the extensive interventions that the legislation anticipates.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lack-of-information-on-apartment-defects-leaves-whole-market-on-shaky-footings-127007">Lack of information on apartment defects leaves whole market on shaky footings</a>
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<h2>A game changer?</h2>
<p>Ever since the Grenfell tragedy, politicians around the world have at least paid lip service to the aspiration that “occupants of buildings deserve to feel safe and secure within their walls”. In saying this to the NSW parliament last week, Anderson was able credibly to put forward the Residential Apartment Buildings Bill as a vital piece in the regulatory “puzzle” to achieve that goal.</p>
<p>The issues discussed here are likely to be just the tip of the iceberg as the industry absorbs the implications of the new law (and its forthcoming detail by way of regulations). But recent activity by NSW lawmakers suggests there is at last strong impetus to achieve meaningful and comprehensive reform.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140432/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Bell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Orders to fix serious defects, even up to ten years after completion, and to delay the occupation certificate developers need to sell apartments until they’re fixed, gives regulators real teeth.Matthew Bell, Senior Lecturer and Co-Director of Studies for Construction Law, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1270072019-11-20T19:16:32Z2019-11-20T19:16:32ZLack of information on apartment defects leaves whole market on shaky footings<p>The litany of <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-has-a-new-national-construction-code-but-its-still-not-good-enough-113729">defects, poor building standards</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ministers-fiddle-while-buildings-crack-and-burn-120592">regulatory failures</a> has serious implications for apartment owners, occupiers and buyers alike. Fears of a <a href="https://www.afr.com/news/politics/national/the-apartment-building-crisis-explained-20190716-p527k0">loss of confidence in the sector</a> have unfortunately come true. Our research suggests a lack of reliable information about building defects is a critical factor in the crisis.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/would-you-buy-a-new-apartment-building-confidence-depends-on-ending-the-blame-game-122180">Would you buy a new apartment? Building confidence depends on ending the blame game</a>
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<p>About a year ago, we started a research project with <a href="https://cityfutures.be.unsw.edu.au/documents/536/defects_project_overview.pdf">six industry partners</a> in New South Wales entitled <a href="https://cityfutures.be.unsw.edu.au/research/projects/defects-strata/">Cracks in the Compact City: Tackling Defects in Multi-Unit Strata Housing</a>. The context is compact city planning policies and a rapid shift towards apartment living in Australian cities. </p>
<p>The urban development strategies of NSW and other states rely on higher-density cities with many more multi-unit strata title dwellings. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-not-just-the-building-cracks-or-cladding-sometimes-uncertainty-does-even-more-harm-120662">human</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/flammable-cladding-costs-could-approach-billions-for-building-owners-if-authorities-dither-118121">economic</a> impacts of the building defects crisis could undermine these strategies. </p>
<p>Even with our resources, obtaining data on the extent and nature of defects in NSW apartment buildings has been a challenge. Individual buyers and owners must face even greater obstacles. </p>
<p>This lack of access to information poses a clear challenge to the principle of “buyer beware” that underpins property sales. The imbalance it creates between buyers and sellers is a prime example of what economists call “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_asymmetry">information asymmetry</a>”. </p>
<h2>Why does this matter for the whole apartment market?</h2>
<p>Nobel laureate George Akerlof <a href="https://www2.bc.edu/thomas-chemmanur/phdfincorp/MF891%20papers/Ackerlof%201970.pdf">explained</a> how the price and quality of goods traded in a market affected by information asymmetries tend to gradually reduce to the point where only lowest-cost “lemons” remain. When buyers can’t tell the difference between products of good and bad quality, they typically prefer the cheapest available. This forces higher-quality products out of the market. </p>
<p>Sellers can also exploit this situation to hide poor-quality products from consumers. They might even charge the same as competitors selling higher-quality products. </p>
<p>While some unscrupulous sellers might profit in the short term, overall profits fall for everyone as confidence and links between price and quality are undermined. Ultimately, the entire market can collapse.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-not-just-the-building-cracks-or-cladding-sometimes-uncertainty-does-even-more-harm-120662">It's not just the building cracks or cladding – sometimes uncertainty does even more harm</a>
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<p>The risks are highest in markets with these two features:</p>
<ul>
<li>sellers are not rewarded for delivering information to buyers or cannot disclose it effectively</li>
<li>buyers cannot discriminate between the quality of different products, as is often the case in apartment developments. </li>
</ul>
<p>These problems are more likely when buyers cannot easily inspect products at the time of sale – as with apartment units bought off the plan.</p>
<p>When a vendor sells a product to multiple buyers, again typical in apartment developments, that can multiply the impact of information asymmetries. </p>
<p>The buyer of a standalone house might be able to make the sale conditional on an independent inspection of the entire building. But such clauses are very difficult to negotiate in off-the-plan sales for apartments in multi-unit buildings. </p>
<p>It would also be too costly for each buyer to commission such an inspection. Buyers are unable to organise a joint inspection of the building until after they have settled, which greatly increases their risk. While NSW’s new <a href="https://www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au/housing-and-property/strata-building-bond-and-inspections-scheme">defects bond scheme</a> does require an inspection, it happens after ownership is transferred.</p>
<p>The negative impacts for buyers have spill-over effects as information asymmetries mean risks are perceived to increase across the entire apartment housing sector. <a href="https://www.afr.com/property/residential/the-opal-tower-effect-sydney-high-rise-site-sales-crash-50-per-cent-20191024-p533t4">Negative publicity</a>, such as the <a href="https://www.news.com.au/national/stalemate-leaving-fireprone-ticking-time-bombs-around-australia/news-story/7b26701bd6a690238a98e590c7d9a76a">flammable cladding</a> and <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/we-ve-had-ceilings-collapse-sydney-s-30-million-in-defect-payouts-revealed-20190705-p524kq.html">defects</a> scandals, can cause values to fall market-wide, regardless of the quality of individual developments. At the same time, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/berejiklian-calls-for-national-solution-amid-building-crisis-20190715-p527gj.html">finance and insurance costs increase</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-big-lesson-from-opal-tower-is-that-badly-built-apartments-arent-only-an-issue-for-residents-109722">The big lesson from Opal Tower is that badly built apartments aren't only an issue for residents</a>
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<p>The issue persists for subsequent buyers too. Information about defects is often unavailable due to <a href="https://www.afr.com/property/residential/a-bigger-problem-than-building-defects-20190724-p52a6g">poor record-keeping</a> or <a href="https://cityfutures.be.unsw.edu.au/documents/424/Case_Study_Poster_-_Defects_3.pdf">confidentiality agreements</a>. Ironically, this adds to the information asymmetries that contributed to the problem in the first place.</p>
<h2>What can we do about the problem?</h2>
<p>To reduce information asymmetries, sellers and buyers tend to engage in two main types of behaviour: <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Job-Market-Signaling-Spence/c63c6222735629d0e232d5b2532152bf3b0880a8">signalling and screening</a>.</p>
<p>Signalling involves sellers flagging the higher quality of their products to buyers indirectly. For example, a reputable developer may use warranties and brands or quality marks, certificates and awards as a sign of their high-quality work. Buyers may well be prepared to pay more for higher-quality products that won’t cost more in the longer term.</p>
<p>Crucially, signalling only works if the signal is credible. At present, there are no construction-specific quality certifications and warranties, only <a href="https://www.iso.org/standard/62085.html">generic standards such as the international ISO 9001: 2015</a>. And the administrative burden and costs of independent third-party certification make it unviable for many small companies. So instruments like ISO 9001 are likely of very limited value for effective signalling in the apartment sector.</p>
<p>The NSW Building Commissioner is supporting an industry rating system that will enable better signalling. Data mining will be used to identify risky players and <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/politics/victoria/phoenixing-in-crosshairs-amid-crackdown-on-dodgy-building-operators-20191028-p5351a.html">phoenix operators</a>. It should take effect in the apartment sector by 2021.</p>
<p>Screening involves buyers investing time and resources to uncover the likelihood of defects. This includes examining available records and the behaviours of sellers and their representatives. But this adds to buyers’ costs, which disadvantages them in the marketplace. </p>
<p>Stakeholders in the building development process should be compelled to release this information. NSW’s <a href="https://www.registrargeneral.nsw.gov.au/news/new-requirements-for-off-the-plan-contracts-from-1-december-2019">new law</a> on off-the-plan contract sales will increase sellers’ disclosure obligations and provide stronger protections for buyers. Importantly, sellers will have to identify material changes made during the development process at least 21 days before settlement. </p>
<p>A similar requirement involving an independent expert building inspection would help buyers better understand the risk of defects before they finalise their purchase.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/housing-with-buyer-protection-and-no-serious-faults-is-that-too-much-to-ask-of-builders-and-regulators-113115">Housing with buyer protection and no serious faults – is that too much to ask of builders and regulators?</a>
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<p>Another positive move is the requirement in the new <a href="https://www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au/consultation-tool/design-and-building-practitioners-bill-2019">Design and Building Practitioners Bill</a> for declared designs and as-built drawings to be lodged with the government. The Building Commissioner has said these will be made available on an easy-to-access platform. </p>
<p>This would enable buyers to check information as the development progresses, before the crucial building handover. It’s a step towards creating a “<a href="https://www.thefifthestate.com.au/columns/spinifex/new-nsw-building-legislation/">digital twin</a>” for everyone licensed to perform construction work, making it easier for the public to check their record. </p>
<p>While the devil is likely to be in the detail, the NSW government is on the right track in tackling the information asymmetry problem. However, the various information gatekeepers will still have to be persuaded – or required – to release information they have long withheld in their own interests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127007/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Loosemore receives funding from The Australian Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bill Randolph receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, South Sydney Regional Organisation of Councils, the Community Housing Industry Association and various strata industry organisations.
He is a Director of Shelter NSW, a Fellow of the Planning Institute of Australia and a member of the Australasian Housing Institute. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Caitlin Buckle receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hazel Easthope receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Strata Community Association and the City of Sydney.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laura Crommelin receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute. </span></em></p>The difficulty of finding out about building defects creates an information deficit that threatens public confidence and stability in the apartment market. NSW has begun work on a solution.Martin Loosemore, Professor of Construction Management, University of Technology SydneyBill Randolph, Director, City Futures Research Centre, Faculty of the Built Environment, UNSW SydneyCaitlin Buckle, PhD Candidate in Human Geography, UNSW SydneyHazel Easthope, Associate Professor, City Futures Research Centre, UNSW SydneyLaura Crommelin, Research Lecturer, City Futures Research Centre, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1259332019-10-30T05:11:48Z2019-10-30T05:11:48ZWe made a flammable cladding database to help boost fire safety in our buildings<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299390/original/file-20191030-154694-vj28xg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=64%2C56%2C5327%2C3540&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The materials used for cladding buildings can greatly affect a building's overall vulnerability to fire. In Australia, buildings with flammable cladding continue to pose safety concerns. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">SHUTTERSTOCK</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Modern buildings have seen rapid development in recent decades, with a push towards sustainable practices and improved energy efficiency. But the advancement of fire safety has been less prioritised, and we need to rethink our approach.</p>
<p>Combustible cladding materials, which are often found in buildings, pose safety concerns. The systems originally in place to help solve this problem weren’t good enough. That’s why my colleagues and I created the <a href="https://claddingmaterialslibrary.com.au">Cladding Materials Library</a>, an online database which provides insight into the flammability of various cladding materials.</p>
<p>Cladding materials used in modern <a href="https://www.designingbuildings.co.uk/wiki/Rainscreen">rainscreen systems</a> on the outside of buildings offer insulation and protect buildings against rain, wind and sun. They also let architects create interesting building designs, such as by adding bright colours or curves to the exterior.</p>
<p>But flammability in modern cladding materials, <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/data-and-publications/building-confidence-building-ministers-forum-expert-assessment">among other failings</a>, has led to increasingly frequent fires breaking out across the world. Examples include the 2014 <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-28/lacrosse-apartment-owners-win-5.7-million-cladding-fire-damages/10857060">Lacrosse fire</a> in Melbourne and the 2017 <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/london-fire-brigade-criticised-for-grenfell-tower-apartment-fire-20191030-p535jy.html">Grenfell Tower fire</a> in London.</p>
<h2>The extent of the problem</h2>
<p>Many cladding materials currently used are flammable to varying degrees, including very common Aluminium Composite Panels (ACPs). These have a plastic-based core material (such as polyethylene), with a sheet of aluminium glued to either side. While ACPs can sometimes be nearly non-combustible, they’re generally considered flammable.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/flammable-cladding-costs-could-approach-billions-for-building-owners-if-authorities-dither-118121">Flammable cladding costs could approach billions for building owners if authorities dither</a>
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<p>In Queensland, about <a href="https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/national/queensland/18-000-queensland-buildings-registered-to-check-for-flammable-cladding-20190328-p518om.html">18,000 buildings</a> have been looked at to determine cladding flammability and overall building response to fire. Of these, 75% required no further action. For the remaining 25%, engineers were hired to further investigate whether they were problematic or not.</p>
<p>The Queensland government estimated 100-200 of the buildings needed to be made safer, with the price of work on a single building costing up to <a href="https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/politics/queensland/flammable-cladding-confirmed-on-five-queensland-government-buildings-20180926-p5060z.html">tens of millions of dollars</a>.</p>
<p>It’s important to note some buildings with combustible cladding otherwise had rigorous fire safety designs, such as networks of well-maintained fire doors, short escape distances, good firefighter access, and layouts that minimise risk. Thus, having flammable cladding does not necessarily mean a building is dangerous. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, such materials <a href="https://theconversation.com/lacrosse-fire-ruling-sends-shudders-through-building-industry-consultants-and-governments-112777">shouldn’t have been included</a> without architects, engineers and builders properly understanding the associated risks.</p>
<h2>To help, we developed a database</h2>
<p>The database my colleagues and I created, the first of its kind, offers a detailed collection of flammability information and material properties for different types of common cladding materials.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fires-expose-gaps-in-building-material-safety-checks-heres-a-solution-111073">Cladding fires expose gaps in building material safety checks. Here's a solution</a>
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<p>Generally, the same materials are used repeatedly across buildings, as there are only so many products available on the market. We used small-scale testing (10cm samples) to identify exactly which materials were the most important. </p>
<p>But identifying a material is not enough to understand how it performs in a fire. That’s why we completed flammability testing (of samples up to 1m in length) on 20 materials commonly found on the outside of buildings.</p>
<p>Over the course of a year, we took 1,100 small material samples from buildings and performed 9,250 tests. We then identified 75 unique cladding materials, and narrowed these down to 20 materials, on which we performed detailed testing (with about 30 tests per material). We chose a wide range of materials to ensure the most common ones were represented in our selection. </p>
<p>The experiments we did involved exposing the materials to heat in controlled ways, and then changing the amount of heat to see how the samples responded. Our process included measuring the time taken for a material to ignite, the amount of heat released from the material, how the heat was released, and how the flames spread. </p>
<p>Our results are now publicly available in the Cladding Materials Library, which can be updated as new materials are invented. The database will help fire engineers effectively assess the potential fire risk of buildings.</p>
<h2>Writing accurate reports is crucial</h2>
<p>Fire engineers can use our database to determine how a building as a whole might perform during a fire. They may then ask questions such as: </p>
<ul>
<li>how quickly will the fire spread up the building? </li>
<li>can people reach a place of safety in time? </li>
<li>is there flammable material near important escape routes? </li>
<li>if the fire spreads upwards, how will the rest of the building perform?</li>
</ul>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lacrosse-fire-ruling-sends-shudders-through-building-industry-consultants-and-governments-112777">Lacrosse fire ruling sends shudders through building industry consultants and governments</a>
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<p>But fire engineers involved in such investigations also need ongoing training to update their knowledge. For many, this came in the form of a continued professional development course designed by the University of Queensland, and a similar course for building professionals (such as builders and architects) developed by the Queensland government. </p>
<p>The latter has been important to the success of our project, as it allows building professionals to understand the problems at hand, and the reports written by engineers.</p>
<h2>Safety in the future</h2>
<p>For now, fire engineers hired by either the government or by building owners are making immediate changes to the relevant buildings to boost their short-term safety. Eventually, they will make suggestions for how to improve long-term building safety, which may cost more time and money. </p>
<p>The only way to solve the issue of fire risk is to understand how each building performs, and to have a suitably qualified engineer take responsibility for its design. </p>
<p>Our research will represent a change in how we approach solving this problem, and will hopefully help prevent fires in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125933/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martyn S. McLaggan and The University of Queensland has received funding from the Queensland Government - Department of Housing & Public Works. The work has also received support from the Non-Conforming Building Products Audit Taskforce, which includes the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services and Queensland Building and Construction Commission. Some of the materials contributed to the database were donated by manufacturers who had no influence or say in the results. The continuing professional development course for engineers was designed by The University of Queensland, and UQ receives money when participants attend the course.</span></em></p>Ensuring a building will be safe against fire requires careful consideration from not only fire engineers, but also from builders, architects and building owners.Martyn S. McLaggan, Research Fellow, School of Civil Engineering, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1221802019-08-27T20:10:39Z2019-08-27T20:10:39ZWould you buy a new apartment? Building confidence depends on ending the blame game<p>“What we need to do is rebuild confidence in Australia’s building and construction sector,” <a href="https://www.minister.industry.gov.au/ministers/karenandrews/transcripts/doorstop-building-ministers-forum-sydney">said</a> federal minister Karen Andrews after the July 2019 meeting of the <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/regulations-and-standards/building-and-construction/building-ministers-forum">Building Ministers’ Forum</a>. </p>
<p>This has been a recurring theme since the federal, state and territory ministers commissioned Peter Shergold and Bronwyn Weir in mid-2017 to assess the effectiveness of building and construction industry regulation across Australia. They presented their <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/July%202018/document/pdf/building_ministers_forum_expert_assessment_-_building_confidence.pdf">Building Confidence report</a> to the ministers in February 2018. </p>
<p>In the 18 months since then, the combined might of nine governments has made scant progress towards implementing the report’s 24 simple recommendations. Confidence in building regulation and quality has clearly continued to deteriorate among the public and construction industry.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-big-lesson-from-opal-tower-is-that-badly-built-apartments-arent-only-an-issue-for-residents-109722">The big lesson from Opal Tower is that badly built apartments aren't only an issue for residents</a>
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<p>In last week’s Four Corners program, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/4corners/cracking-up/11431474">Cracking Up</a>, Weir was asked whether she would buy an apartment. She responded: “I wouldn’t buy a newly built apartment, no […] I’d buy an older one.” She went on to say: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have hundreds of thousands of apartments that have been built across the country over the last two, three decades. Probably the prevalence of noncompliance has been particularly bad, I would say in the last say 15 to 20 years […] And that means there’s a lot of existing building stock that has defects in it […] There’ll be legacy issues for some time and I suspect there’ll be legacy issues that we’re not even fully aware of yet. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>These comments may not have delighted those developers trying to sell new apartments, or owners selling existing apartments, but they are fair and correct. Confidence will not be restored until all the governments act together to improve regulatory oversight and deal with existing defective buildings. </p>
<p>Residents of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/lacrosse-fire-ruling-sends-shudders-through-building-industry-consultants-and-governments-112777">Lacrosse</a>, <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/same-as-grenfell-tower-cladding-fears-as-fire-rips-through-melbourne-cbd-apartment-building-20190204-p50vgl.html">Neo200</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-big-lesson-from-opal-tower-is-that-badly-built-apartments-arent-only-an-issue-for-residents-109722">Opal</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/buck-passing-on-apartment-building-safety-leaves-residents-at-risk-119000">Mascot</a> towers and other buildings with serious defects are already living with the impact of “legacy” problems. Over the weekend, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-08-23/cladding-and-mould-forces-residents-out-of-apartment-block/11443976">another apartment building was evacuated</a> – this time in Mordialloc in southeast Melbourne. The building was deemed unsafe because it was clad with combustible material and had defects in its fire detection and warning system.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/_qpPAoWy1CU?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Residents had to evacuate an apartment building in Mordialloc, Melbourne, after it was found to pose an extreme fire safety risk.</span></figcaption>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fire-risks-have-been-known-for-years-lives-depend-on-acting-now-with-no-more-delays-111186">Cladding fire risks have been known for years. Lives depend on acting now, with no more delays</a>
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<h2>A costly but essential fix</h2>
<p>Fixing such defects is a costly business. A Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal <a href="https://www.vcat.vic.gov.au/resources/owners-corporation-no1-of-ps613436t-owners-corporation-no-2-of-ps613436t-owners">decision</a> established that the costs due to fire damage and replacing combustible cladding on the Lacrosse building in Melbourne are around A$36,000 per unit on average. At Mascot Towers, consultant engineers <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-08-23/mascot-towers-repair-bill-soars-to-20-million/11439856">estimated the cost</a> of structural repairs at up to A$150,000 per unit on average.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://cityfutures.be.unsw.edu.au/research/projects/governing-the-compact-city-the-role-and-effectiveness-of-strata-management-in-higher-density-residential-developments/">UNSW</a> and <a href="https://www.afr.com/property/residential/cladding-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg-20190612-p51wrw#logout">Deakin</a> research, between 70% and 97% of units in strata apartments have significant defects. Let’s assume 85% have such defects and the average cost of fixing these is only $25,000 per unit. That would mean total repair costs for the 500,000 or so tall apartments (four-storey and above) across Australia could exceed A$10 billion. </p>
<p>The Victorian government has taken the lead on combustible cladding, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-16/flammable-cladding-removal-fund-victorian-government/11311518">setting up and funding a A$600 million scheme</a> to replace it. It’s also replacing combustible cladding on low-rise school buildings even though these may comply with the letter of the National Construction Code. </p>
<p>No other state has yet followed this lead. This is concerning given the risk to life. No one viewing images of the <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/how-hundreds-of-lives-were-thrown-into-chaos-when-neo-200-caught-fire-20190429-p51i62.html">Neo200 fire</a> in the Melbourne CBD could doubt how dangerous combustible cladding can be. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Combustible cladding allowed fire to spread rapidly up the Neo200 building.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The other states and territories should immediately copy the Victorian scheme. While not perfect, and probably underfunded, it is a positive step to improve public safety. The Andrews government should be congratulated for doing something practical while its counterparts in New South Wales and Queensland, which have many buildings with combustible cladding, fiddle about. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/flammable-cladding-costs-could-approach-billions-for-building-owners-if-authorities-dither-118121">Flammable cladding costs could approach billions for building owners if authorities dither</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>All governments share responsibility</h2>
<p>The federal government’s response has been inadequate. When asked about contributing to the Victorian scheme, Karen Andrews said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Commonwealth is not an ATM for the states […] this problem is of the states’ making and they need to step up and fix the problem and dig into their own pockets.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This flies in the face of reality. All nine governments are responsible for building regulation and enforcement. All signed the <a href="https://www.abcb.gov.au/Resources/Publications/Corporate/2017-Inter-Governmental-Agreement">intergovernmental agreement</a> on building regulation. </p>
<p>The federal government, which chairs the Building Ministers’ Forum, leads building regulation in Australia. The <a href="https://www.abcb.gov.au/ABCB/The-Board">Australian Building Codes Board</a>, which produces the <a href="https://ncc.abcb.gov.au/ncc-online/About">National Construction Code</a>, is effectively a federal government agency. The precursor to the national code, the Building Code of Australia, was a federal initiative.</p>
<p>It is clear Australian governments have worked effectively together in the past to combat threats to life and safety, or to provide consumer protection nationwide. Examples include initiatives as diverse as the <a href="https://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n5314/html/ch09.xhtml?referer=&page=16">national gun buyback</a>, the <a href="https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/what-we-do/how-we-operate/history/">creation of the Australian Securities and Investment Commission</a> (<a href="https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/what-we-do/our-role/">ASIC</a>) and the <a href="https://www.choice.com.au/transport/cars/general/articles/takata-airbags-what-you-need-to-know-in-australia-230717">program to replace defective Takata airbags</a> in cars.</p>
<p>The crop of building defects we see today are a direct result of negligent regulation by all nine governments over the past two decades. Clearly, they all have a legal and moral duty to coordinate and contribute to a program to manage the risks and economic damage this has created. </p>
<p>All the evidence points to a <a href="https://www.afr.com/property/governments-failed-to-act-on-warnings-of-combustible-cladding-dangers-20190226-h1br6n">long-term failure to heed repeated warnings about the dangers</a>. Governments and regulators were captive to the interests of the development lobby, building industry and building materials supply industry.</p>
<p>The governments must stop playing a blame game. Effective programs are urgently needed to fix defects, including combustible cladding, incorrectly installed fire protection measures, structural noncompliance, structural failure and leaks. </p>
<p>The Australian Building Codes Board, which is directly responsible for the mess, should be reformed to ensure it becomes an effective regulator. The National Construction Code <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-has-a-new-national-construction-code-but-its-still-not-good-enough-113729">should be changed</a> to make consumer protection an objective in the delivery of housing for sale. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/housing-with-buyer-protection-and-no-serious-faults-is-that-too-much-to-ask-of-builders-and-regulators-113115">Housing with buyer protection and no serious faults – is that too much to ask of builders and regulators?</a>
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</p>
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<p>All parties involved will have to take some pain: regulators, developers, builders, subcontractors, consultants, certifiers, insurers, aluminium panel manufacturers, suppliers and owners. Only governments can broker a solution as it will require legislation and an allocation of responsibility for fault. </p>
<p>The alternative will probably be a huge number of individual legal cases and a rash of owner bankruptcies, which may well leave the guilty parties untouched.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article has been updated to clarify the nature of around A$12 million in costs incurred by apartment owners in the Lacrosse building, of which <a href="https://www.afr.com/property/four-years-after-lacrosse-fire-lu-simon-to-replace-cladding-for-56-million-20181205-h18qoo">A$5.6 million was the agreed cost of replacing combustible cladding</a> after the 2014 cladding fire. These costs do not include legal costs or financial impacts on owners, such as reduced property values, that are unable to be assessed under the rules of the tribunal.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122180/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Geoff Hanmer has received funding from the Building and Construction Council of NSW to research building defects. The BACC is no longer in existence. </span></em></p>Unsafe apartments are being evacuated as confidence plummets – even the author of a report commissioned by building ministers wouldn’t buy a new apartment. What will it take for governments to act?Geoff Hanmer, Adjunct Lecturer in Architecture, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1206622019-07-22T19:59:00Z2019-07-22T19:59:00ZIt’s not just the building cracks or cladding – sometimes uncertainty does even more harm<p><a href="https://www.afr.com/news/politics/national/the-apartment-building-crisis-explained-20190716-p527k0">News</a> of evacuations from cracked apartment buildings in Sydney and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fire-risks-have-been-known-for-years-lives-depend-on-acting-now-with-no-more-delays-111186">need to replace combustible cladding across Australia</a> illustrate how uncertainty compounds problems for those affected. Who is responsible for the remedy? Residents have had to leave their homes indefinitely, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/looking-for-answers-mascot-towers-owners-want-to-return-home-20190627-p521wl.html">not knowing when their buildings can be repaired and made safe</a>. Others remain in at-risk buildings with the constant <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-17/apartment-owner-welcomes-victorian-combustible-cladding-fix/11315278">worry about what might happen if fire breaks out</a>. </p>
<p>Some may also wonder whether the remedies really are “safe”. And how much they will be out of pocket? Some <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-au/news/australia/i-couldnt-believe-it-was-happening-how-a-single-mother-with-a-baby-boy-is-left-owing-dollar13000-and-living-in-temporary-housing-after-being-kicked-out-of-her-mascot-towers-apartment/ar-AAEtQZ3">express concern about whether they will ever be able to sell their unit</a> and what their financial fate will be given that their home is their largest investment.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-18/building-industry-meeting-agrees-to-create-national-body/11320444">outcome of last Thursday’s Building Ministers’ Forum</a> did little to end the uncertainty plaguing residents. More broadly, the uncertainty is hitting the construction industry, with <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/berejiklian-calls-for-national-solution-amid-building-crisis-20190715-p527gj.html">insurance costs rising and some insurance being withdrawn altogether</a>.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/flammable-cladding-costs-could-approach-billions-for-building-owners-if-authorities-dither-118121">Flammable cladding costs could approach billions for building owners if authorities dither</a>
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<hr>
<h2>Uncertainty gnaws away at us</h2>
<p>How uncertainty plays a central role here can be seen in a little known but classic piece written 50 years ago by a cultural anthropologist. Professor Elizabeth Colson drafted “Tranquility for the Decision-maker” for a volume, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/cultural-illness-and-health-essays-in-human-adaptation/oclc/741222">Cultural Illness and Health</a>. </p>
<p>Colson had studied the Gwemba Tonga of east-central Africa, in what is now Zambia. Villages of the Gwembe Tonga were faced with displacement due to the building of a dam on the Zambezi River. They were given a choice of where to settle. </p>
<p>However, the construction zone barred the villagers’ access to the ritual grounds where they traditionally made such decisions. An inability to arrive at a decision resulted in prolonged uncertainty. Colson witnessed behaviour that suggested the harm that uncertainty had on individual and community mental health.</p>
<p>Colson also told of how the group dealt with drought. Farmers had seed they could plant and then tend, but if they planted it too soon before the rains, the seed would be lost. If they planted it too late or failed to tend it, then the plants would not reach maturity, and they would have no crops for food and no seed for the next year. </p>
<p>Villagers figured that they could find a way to cope with having no crops; they had a “plan B”. However, each day they dithered about whether to plant, going out to the fields but then returning again. The uncertainty had harmful effects on the villagers, Colson explained. They lacked a way to determine whether to adopt “plan B” or stick with “plan A”. </p>
<p>Such an analysis suggests that we can deal with good fortune and bad fortune. What really drives us up the wall is uncertainty.</p>
<p>This uncertainty can be generated by the unpredictability of nature or the volatility of international markets. It’s made worse in situations where clear and unambiguous information is missing. </p>
<p>More problematic are complex and costly situations where delay results from blaming and <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/systemic-crisis-states-responsible-for-fixing-cladding-problems-20190718-p528c5.html">manoeuvring to avoid paying the financial or political cost</a> of a decision. These two elements can occur in unison: a lack of knowledge and potentially responsible parties evacuating the “blame avenue”.</p>
<p>Situations where uncertainty is playing a role include farmers facing drought, as in Colson’s case, and potential climate change impacts – such as severe weather events for coastal communities. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/coastal-law-shift-from-property-rights-to-climate-adaptation-is-a-landmark-reform-59083">Coastal law shift from property rights to climate adaptation is a landmark reform</a>
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<p>There are also effects on rural communities of changes in international prices for mining and agricultural exports. Similar dynamics around uncertainty and blame apply to interned <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-resignation-syndrome-and-why-is-it-affecting-refugee-children-101670">asylum seekers awaiting a government decision</a>, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/getting-to-the-heart-of-coal-seam-gas-protests-its-not-just-the-technical-risks-107086">debate about coal seam gas development in Narrabri</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/getting-clean-drinking-water-into-remote-indigenous-communities-means-overcoming-city-thinking-106701">communities with groundwater contaminated by chemicals like PFAS</a>. </p>
<p>In these examples, costs to individuals and families are potentially great relative to their resources. Resolution often requires a central role for large institutions, whether government agencies or multinational corporations.</p>
<p>Uncertainty due to a lack of information is being addressed in certain arenas. For instance, mathematical <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-predicting-the-weather-and-climate-is-even-harder-for-australias-rainy-northern-neighbours-106939">models to predict the weather are improving</a>. The same can be said for models to predict shifts in international commodity prices. </p>
<h2>Institutional responses make uncertainty worse</h2>
<p>Also needing attention are institutional decision-making processes. Decision-making is often fragmented, as it involves disparate organisations or silos in organisations. Add to that a propensity to avoid taking the blame and shouldering the financial or political cost or the potential impact to one’s career. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/buck-passing-on-apartment-building-safety-leaves-residents-at-risk-119000">Buck-passing on apartment building safety leaves residents at risk</a>
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<p>This domain falls under the banner of “allocation of responsibility”, an area addressed historically by social and cultural anthropologists looking at law and moral codes. Attempting to avoid blame can contribute to delay in decision-making, which prolongs and potentially deepens uncertainty. </p>
<p>Collaborative efforts can reduce such delays and uncertainty. Collaboration requires the building of trusting working relationships among agencies and organisations – a form of what is called “collective impact”. One also needs openness with affected individuals, families and communities – an element in <a href="https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/procedural-fairness-duty-and-its-content">procedural fairness</a>. </p>
<p>These aspects are relatively easy to identify but challenging to implement and even more challenging to sustain for a prolonged period.</p>
<p>The point here is that the true impact on residents of cracks in their apartment block, flammable cladding, an uncertain migration status, or PFAS in the groundwater is not merely the inconvenience or out-of-pocket expense. The impact includes prolonged uncertainty about very significant elements of their well-being. That has an impact on individual and community mental health, with potential flow-on effects to physical health. </p>
<p>The remedy involves a greater willingness by organisations and agencies to take on responsibility without delay and improved institutional relationships to arrive at suitable resolutions for the long term. So, our concern should not only be about the cracks in the buildings but about the fissures separating those who together could implement remedies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120662/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Will Rifkin is director of the Hunter Research Foundation Centre, which receives funding from local, state and federal government agencies, as well as private companies, through contract research and research grants related to urban and regional development, infrastructure, innovation and well-being. The HRF Centre is part of the University of Newcastle, and it collaborates on projects with private companies, non-profit enterprises, industry groups, and government agencies. </span></em></p>The delay in adopting a national approach to building industry reform, based on a report received more than a year ago, typifies official neglect of the impacts of uncertainty on the affected people.Will Rifkin, Chair in Applied Regional Economics and Director, Hunter Research Foundation Centre, University of NewcastleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1205922019-07-19T05:38:49Z2019-07-19T05:38:49ZMinisters fiddle while buildings crack and burn<p>The <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/regulations-and-standards/building-and-construction/building-ministers-forum">Building Ministers’ Forum</a> (BMF) <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-18/building-industry-meeting-agrees-to-create-national-body/11320444">met yesterday</a> yet again to discuss implementing the February 2018 <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/July%202018/document/pdf/building_ministers_forum_expert_assessment_-_building_confidence.pdf">Shergold-Weir Report</a> they commissioned in mid-2017. The BMF is responsible for overseeing the Australian Building Codes Board (ABCB) and building regulation across Australia. The BMF <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-07/bmf-communique-18-july-2019.pdf">announced</a> yesterday it’s going to “strengthen” the ABCB, which will be “expanded to include greater representation and engagement from industry”.</p>
<p>This is the same regulator and the same industry that have been responsible for producing the dud buildings that have been making news across the country: <a href="https://theconversation.com/lacrosse-fire-ruling-sends-shudders-through-building-industry-consultants-and-governments-112777">Lacrosse</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-big-lesson-from-opal-tower-is-that-badly-built-apartments-arent-only-an-issue-for-residents-109722">Opal</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fire-risks-have-been-known-for-years-lives-depend-on-acting-now-with-no-more-delays-111186">Neo200</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/buck-passing-on-apartment-building-safety-leaves-residents-at-risk-119000">Mascot Towers</a>, the <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/zetland-apartments-abandoned-in-secret-evacuation-over-severe-defects-20190709-p525lk.html">Gadigal Avenue apartments</a> and countless others that have burned, leaked, cracked and failed, but in less newsworthy ways. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/buck-passing-on-apartment-building-safety-leaves-residents-at-risk-119000">Buck-passing on apartment building safety leaves residents at risk</a>
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<p>On being appointed by the federal Coalition government in November 2017, the current chair of the ABCB, ex-NSW premier John Fahey, had this <a href="https://www.abcb.gov.au/Connect/Articles/2017/11/Introducing-the-new-Chair-of-the-ABCB">to say</a> about his priorities:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The reform must reduce significantly red tape and have an over-riding focus of industry affordability.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In other words, the ABCB was to improve compliance by reducing red tape and focusing on “affordability”, which is about making buildings cheaper at completion. As the White Queen said to Alice in Wonderland: “Why sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.” </p>
<h2>Self-regulation has failed</h2>
<p>Needless to say, virtually no progress has been made to re-regulate the industry, provide protection for consumers, or improve the durability and safety of buildings in the 19 months Fahey has held the reins. </p>
<p>Both major political parties have played a role in creating the policy and self-regulation regime that has produced so many faulty buildings over the last 30 years. It is about time the ALP, the Coalition, the BMF and the ABCB admitted that self-regulation has failed. NSW Liberal Premier Gladys Berejiklian <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/it-hasn-t-worked-premier-admits-sydney-s-building-industry-is-failing-20190710-p52601.html">has already done so</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We allowed the industry to self-regulate and it hasn’t worked. There are too many challenges, too many problems, and that’s why the government’s willing to legislate.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The building ministers should instruct the ABCB to dump its focus on self-regulation and also require the regulator to start taking into account whole-of-life building costs, not just cost at completion. Senior ABCB staff, including the chair, appear to be part of the problem. Asking for their resignation or sacking them would not be unreasonable in the circumstances. </p>
<h2>Regulations are far from watertight</h2>
<p>Section F of the National Construction Code (<a href="https://ncc.abcb.gov.au/ncc-online/NCC/2019/NCC-2019-Volume-One/Section-F-Health-and-Amenity/Part-F1-Damp-And-Weatherproofing">NCC</a>), which controls waterproofing, should be immediately rewritten to make it clear buildings should be waterproof. Section FP1.4 now reads:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A roof and external wall (including openings around windows and doors) must prevent the penetration of water that could cause —
(a) unhealthy or dangerous conditions, or loss of amenity for occupants; and
(b) undue dampness or deterioration of building elements.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>What are “unhealthy or dangerous conditions”? What constitutes a “loss of amenity”? What is “undue dampness”? </p>
<p>No one can answer these questions, which is why builders and developers regularly try to dodge responsibility for leaks, by claiming moisture ingress is due to occupants “taking too many showers” or that “a bit of moisture is normal”. </p>
<p>The ABCB should change this clause to read:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A roof and external wall including all penetrations and inclusions must prevent the ingress of water and water vapour to the habitable part of a building for a minimum period of 40 years, without any maintenance. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Specifying durability standards is important. At present, most of the test methods in the NCC are satisfied if a sample component performs once in a lab. This does not deal with issues that occur in practice. </p>
<p>We know that any joint depending entirely on a sealant or paint is likely to last for <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=ZfNKeNuQukwC&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=deterioration+of+silicone+sealants+in+australian+conditions&source=bl&ots=iq_fiFg_t8&sig=ACfU3U2wajoIt5ZAsus2z2E4IUthJOszsQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjAwuz5nMDjAhVl73MBHZmUA1A4ChDoATACegQICBAB#v=onepage&q=deterioration%20of%20silicone%20sealants%20in%20australian%20conditions&f=false">only between seven and ten years</a> if it is exposed to typical Australian sunlight and atmospheric conditions. That is nowhere near good enough on a tall building, where the entire facade will have to be scaffolded to rectify defects. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-has-a-new-national-construction-code-but-its-still-not-good-enough-113729">Australia has a new National Construction Code, but it's still not good enough</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Unfortunately, we can’t sack the past state and federal ministers who have presided over this fiasco. But the least the current politicians can do is not appoint them to the authorities that are supposed to be cleaning up the mess. </p>
<p>For example, former Victorian deputy premier John Thwaites was <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-03/taskforce-to-investigate-flammable-cladding-on-vic-buildings/8672892">appointed to lead the Victorian Cladding Taskforce</a>. Thwaites <a href="https://www.architectureanddesign.com.au/news/bpn/john-thwaites-appointed-to-chair-australian-buildi">chaired the Australian Building Control Board</a> (ABCB) from 2011 to 2017, appointed by the Rudd government. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/6STWyPod9wI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The Lacrosse apartments cladding fire rang alarm bells back in 2014.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lacrosse-fire-ruling-sends-shudders-through-building-industry-consultants-and-governments-112777">Lacrosse fire ruling sends shudders through building industry consultants and governments</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The problems are widespread</h2>
<p>In 1996, <a href="https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/2071.0%7E2016%7EMain%20Features%7EApartment%20Living%7E20">according to ABS data</a>, nearly one in five (18%) of all Australia’s occupied apartments were four storeys or over. By 2016 this had more than doubled to 38% of all occupied apartments (or 463,557 in total in 2016).</p>
<p>All of these buildings have been completed during a period where there has been “an over-riding focus on affordability” to use Fahey’s words. If the <a href="https://www.australianpropertyjournal.com.au/2019/06/19/apartment-owners-face-potential-financial-ruin/">research</a> we have is any guide, between 80% and 97% of these buildings may have serious defects. </p>
<p>If these buildings are defective, the owners and tenants <a href="https://theconversation.com/housing-with-buyer-protection-and-no-serious-faults-is-that-too-much-to-ask-of-builders-and-regulators-113115">have virtually no recourse</a>. Development companies and building companies are routinely wound up after a building is completed, state governments have withdrawn from the insurance market and private insurers have been proven to provide limited protection – some have now <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-18/building-industry-meeting-agrees-to-create-national-body/11320444">withdrawn indemnity insurance</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/flammable-cladding-costs-could-approach-billions-for-building-owners-if-authorities-dither-118121">Flammable cladding costs could approach billions for building owners if authorities dither</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This situation is so bad, and trust in the industry so damaged, that we were treated last week to the unique spectacle of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meriton">Meriton</a> boss Harry Triguboff, among others, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/immediate-reforms-triguboff-s-meriton-wants-building-industry-change-20190712-p526re.html">asking the government to do a better job of regulating builders</a>. </p>
<p>What we need now is concerted and urgent action to stop defective buildings being built and a plan to help residential apartment owners rectify their buildings. (The commercial and government sector by and large can look after itself.) </p>
<p>The highest priority is to replace combustible cladding on tall residential buildings. The Victorian government should be congratulated for <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-16/flammable-cladding-removal-fund-victorian-government/11311518">going forward with a scheme to achieve this</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the BMF and the ABCB are still fiddling while Rome burns. They need to get on with it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120592/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Geoff Hanmer received funding to research building defects from the Building and Construction Council (NSW). </span></em></p>The construction industry crisis didn’t happen overnight. Authorities have been on notice for years to fix the problems that now have the industry itself calling for better regulation.Geoff Hanmer, Adjunct Lecturer in Architecture, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1190002019-06-19T20:01:19Z2019-06-19T20:01:19ZBuck-passing on apartment building safety leaves residents at risk<p>Hundreds of residents in a Sydney apartment complex, the 122-unit Mascot Towers, were evacuated last Sunday when cracks began to appear due to a serious structural failure. And it isn’t clear when the residents can return. </p>
<p>This crisis echoes the structural <a href="https://www.domain.com.au/news/five-months-on-more-than-170-opal-tower-apartments-still-uninhabitable-843214/">failure at Opal Tower</a> and its evacuation on Christmas Eve last year. We have seen a series of serious building failures and <a href="https://theconversation.com/flammable-cladding-costs-could-approach-billions-for-building-owners-if-authorities-dither-118121">fires</a> in recent years. And state and federal governments have <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/July%202018/document/pdf/building_ministers_forum_expert_assessment_-_building_confidence.pdf">had more than year to act on recommendations</a> for better construction regulations, but instead they’re <a href="https://www.afr.com/real-estate/commercial/inconsistency-on-cladding-blame-the-states-industry-minister-says-20190528-p51ru6">shifting blame</a>. </p>
<p>Although each building failure was different, the end result is the same: misery for the residents and a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-19/buying-a-new-high-rise-apartment-a-risk-best-avoided/11220972">looming financial disaster for the owners</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/flammable-cladding-costs-could-approach-billions-for-building-owners-if-authorities-dither-118121">Flammable cladding costs could approach billions for building owners if authorities dither</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>New South Wales Premier Gladys Berejiklian <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/berejiklian-says-everyone-will-be-held-to-account-over-mascot-towers-20190616-p51y64.html">said</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We’re getting to the bottom of what happened. The NSW government will hold everybody to account, that’s our role.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But the government’s role is to regulate sufficiently to prevent building failures in the first place, not to hold people to account after the event. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/housing-with-buyer-protection-and-no-serious-faults-is-that-too-much-to-ask-of-builders-and-regulators-113115">Housing with buyer protection and no serious faults – is that too much to ask of builders and regulators?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Building regulations since the Great Fire of London</h2>
<p>Prevention of construction failures has been the bedrock of building regulations ever since the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-36774166">Great Fire of London</a> in 1666. In the aftermath, the English government realised there was not much use in raking through the ashes and trying to hold people to account, and that an ounce of prevention was worth a pound of cure. This led to the parliament <a href="https://www.museumoflondon.org.uk/application/files/6514/5511/5493/what-happened-great-fire-london.pdf">passing regulations</a> to prevent the spread of fire between buildings. </p>
<p>Governments all around the developed world took the lesson of the Great Fire to heart. Their common goal has been to proactively ensure buildings are constructed properly and are safe as a result. </p>
<p>This has been a pretty successful effort and most significant building failures since 1666 have contributed to a more comprehensive and effective regulatory regime.</p>
<h2>Serious building failures appear to be more frequent</h2>
<p>Prior to the Opal Tower emergency, there had been only one significant evacuation of a multi-unit residential building in NSW due to structural failure. That was a result of the <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/bondi-junction-gas-explosion-two-men-seriously-burnt-20141112-9gbp.html">2009 gas explosion</a> at Eastgate Towers in Bondi Junction. </p>
<p>However, depending on which research you read, either <a href="https://cityfutures.be.unsw.edu.au/research/projects/governing-the-compact-city-the-role-and-effectiveness-of-strata-management-in-higher-density-residential-developments/">72%</a> or <a href="https://www.afr.com/real-estate/residential/cladding-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg-20190612-p51wrw">97%</a> of strata apartments suffer from serious defects when they’re finished. </p>
<p>There have also been a series of other problems with recent buildings. These include <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-27/perth-childrens-hospital-cleared-for-opening-after-lead-problem/9591812">lead in water</a> caused by imported brass plumbing components, non-complying imported <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/recall-for-faulty-power-cables-that-could-cause-house-fires-20140827-108y25.html">electrical cables</a> and failures in the <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/towers-of-trouble-20181228-p50ol6.html">installation</a> of fire doors, fire walls and fire door frames. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-has-a-new-national-construction-code-but-its-still-not-good-enough-113729">Australia has a new National Construction Code, but it's still not good enough</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Why has this happened?</h2>
<p>The states progressively introduced the Building Code of Australia (now the <a href="https://ncc.abcb.gov.au/">National Construction Code</a>) during the 1990s as part of an agreed plan between the states and the federal government to make building regulations less prescriptive. </p>
<p>The aim was to <a href="https://www.thefifthestate.com.au/innovation/building-construction/ncc-2019-section-j-gets-a-complete-overhaul/">reduce the cost</a> of construction by favouring “innovation” over conservative “deemed to satisfy” regulations. Innovation, in these terms, meant finding ways to make buildings <a href="https://www.afr.com/real-estate/national-construction-code-change-opens-way-for-timber-buildings-up-to-8-storeys-20160128-gmg87e">cheaper</a> to build. </p>
<p>This move coincided with the globalisation of the building materials supply industry and a boom in the construction of tall apartment buildings in Australia. </p>
<p>Some of the innovation has been innocuous, or even beneficial, such as the introduction of a variety of lightweight interior wall systems, but some have resulted in substantial remediation bills – combustible cladding being the prime example. Inspection and responsibility for the plethora of imported components is virtually non-existent. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/dont-overlook-residents-role-in-apartment-building-safety-111255">Don't overlook residents' role in apartment building safety</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The downstream cost of failure has landed squarely in the laps of the building owners, many of them owners of tall apartments. </p>
<p>It’s difficult to estimate the total bill for remedial works to tall apartment buildings built over the last 25 years, but it may well exceed the Productivity Commission <a href="https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/building/report">estimates of savings</a> resulting from the introduction of the National Construction Code. </p>
<h2>Blame shifting and ineffective regulations</h2>
<p>The federal minister responsible for building regulations, Karen Andrews, <a href="https://www.afr.com/real-estate/commercial/inconsistency-on-cladding-blame-the-states-industry-minister-says-20190528-p51ru6">says the states</a> are to blame. </p>
<p>And some states, including NSW, have resorted to <a href="https://mattkean.com.au/news/media/nsw-fair-trading-get-extra-powers-crack-down-dodgy-builders-and-tradies-be-paid-quicker">tough talk</a> about crackdowns on “dodgy” certifiers and “dodgy” builders. In reality, the problem is dodgy government regulation, by both federal and state governments.</p>
<p>The federal and state governments already have an initial plan for fixing these problems. <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/July%202018/document/pdf/building_ministers_forum_expert_assessment_-_building_confidence.pdf">The Shergold-Weir report</a> was delivered to the Building Ministers’ Forum in February 2018. </p>
<p>As the report said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>After having examined the matters put to us, we have concluded that the nature and extent [of building defects] are significant and concerning. The problems have led to diminishing public confidence that the building and construction industry can deliver compliant, safe buildings which will perform to the expected standards over the long term.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Since then, state and federal governments have done almost nothing to implement the recommendations of the report, despite the 2018 Christmas Eve failure at Opal and the <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/how-hundreds-of-lives-were-thrown-into-chaos-when-neo-200-caught-fire-20190429-p51i62.html">fire at Neo200</a> in Melbourne the following February. </p>
<p>The report itself states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The recommendations have been designed to form a holistic and structured framework to improve the compliance and enforcement systems of the [National Construction Code] across the country. They form a coherent package. They would best be implemented in their entirety.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In NSW, the <a href="https://www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/451375/Response-to-Shergold-Weir-Building-Confidence-Report.pdf">published response</a> to Shergold-Weir is a patchwork focusing on holding people to account after a building construction event. This is the reverse of the proactive approach developed following the Great Fire of London. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/beyond-opal-a-10-point-plan-to-fix-the-residential-building-industry-110975">Beyond Opal: a 10-point plan to fix the residential building industry</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The NSW government is set to <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/biggest-shake-up-in-building-laws-in-our-state-s-history-follows-opal-tower-debacle-20190210-p50wtd.html">appoint</a> a building commissioner to oversee qualifications and to review building documentation. </p>
<p>But this will likely not achieve much, unless the government commits to upskilling workers throughout the industry and backs up desktop audits by increasing direct inspections on site. Neither of these things appears to be part of its plan. </p>
<p>All governments must take an active role in fixing the defective regulatory regime they have created. If they can’t get on with this process in a timely way, we will need <a href="https://theconversation.com/royal-commission-take-three-construction-sector-still-lawless-23074">yet another</a> royal commission to sort it out. </p>
<p>The least Premier Berejiklian can do is to treat the Mascot Towers and Opal events in the same way the government treats natural disasters and provide housing assistance to residents who have been displaced through no fault of their own.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119000/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Geoff Hanmer had received funding from the Building and Construction Council to research defects in multi-unit housing. He is member of the Australian Institute of Architects and the Managing Director of ARINA, a consultancy engaged in strategic planning and architecture for the Higher Education sector. </span></em></p>Regulations that are meant to protect residents from building failures and fires have been found wanting. All governments must take responsibility for fixing the defective regime they created.Geoff Hanmer, Adjunct Lecturer in Architecture, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1181212019-06-05T20:09:35Z2019-06-05T20:09:35ZFlammable cladding costs could approach billions for building owners if authorities dither<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278001/original/file-20190605-69083-hb4ybh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Lacrosse building fire in Melbourne's Docklands district rang alarm bells about the risks of combustible cladding back in 2014.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.mfb.vic.gov.au/media/docs/post_incident_analysis_for_lacrosse_docklands_-_25_11_2014%20-%20final-dd61c4b2-61f6-42ed-9411-803cc23e6acc-0.pdf">MFB</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australian building owners face a bill that could run into billions of dollars to replace <a href="http://theconversation.com/cladding-fire-risks-have-been-known-for-years-lives-depend-on-acting-now-with-no-more-delays-111186">combustible cladding</a> of the sort that fuelled the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-40301289">Greenfell tower fire in the UK</a>, which killed 72 people, as well as fires in Australia and <a href="http://www.mfb.vic.gov.au/media/docs/post_incident_analysis_for_lacrosse_docklands_-_25_11_2014%20-%20final-dd61c4b2-61f6-42ed-9411-803cc23e6acc-0.pdf">overseas</a>. The cost estimate is based on our calculations for Victoria, which has had apartment building cladding fires in <a href="https://theconversation.com/lacrosse-fire-ruling-sends-shudders-through-building-industry-consultants-and-governments-112777">2014</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fire-risks-have-been-known-for-years-lives-depend-on-acting-now-with-no-more-delays-111186">2019</a>. </p>
<p>Nearly <a href="https://theconversation.com/grenfell-tower-criminal-charges-delayed-but-that-doesnt-mean-there-wont-be-justice-113215">two years on from the Grenfell disaster</a>, there is <a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fire-risks-have-been-known-for-years-lives-depend-on-acting-now-with-no-more-delays-111186">ongoing tension</a> between policymakers, the building industry and owners about how to resolve the problem of combustible cladding. And little information is available about the scale of the issue for owners across Australia, particularly those living in apartments. </p>
<p>So what could the costs be? We looked at Victoria as a case study. Our modelling produced cost estimates of between A$250 million and A$1.6 billion. The ultimate figure will depend on the cost-efficiency of any rectification program and the risk level and size of the 629 buildings known to be affected – and many more could yet be identified.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/NStPd-v42mY?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Combustible cladding allowed fire to spread rapidly up the Neo200 building in central Melbourne in February 2019.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p></p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fire-risks-have-been-known-for-years-lives-depend-on-acting-now-with-no-more-delays-111186">Cladding fire risks have been known for years. Lives depend on acting now, with no more delays</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>How were costs estimated?</h2>
<p>The 2018 <a href="https://www.planning.vic.gov.au/building-policy/victorian-cladding-taskforce">Victorian Cladding Taskforce</a> identified 354 low/moderate-risk buildings and 275 high/extreme-risk buildings in a statewide <a href="https://www.planning.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0029/394733/VCT-Taskforce-Update-October-2018.pdf">cladding audit update</a> last October.</p>
<p>There is little data available on dwelling density for Victorian apartment building stock. <a href="https://data.melbourne.vic.gov.au/clue">Melbourne City Council (MCC) records</a> show residential buildings with ten dwellings or more (medium-to-high-density buildings) have an average of 75 dwellings per building in the built-up municipality. Buildings of this density are known to be <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/politics/victoria/government-to-act-on-cladding-crisis-but-only-for-buildings-it-owns-20190527-p51rpr.html">receiving notices from the Victorian government to act on cladding</a>.</p>
<p>To model costs we have also used real quotes owners have received to rectify their properties, as well as quotes revealed in media reports. These quotes reveal a range of lower costs for low/moderate-risk buildings and higher costs for high/extreme-risk buildings, usually based on the work for varying levels of rectification.</p>
<p>Firstly, we conservatively applied lower rectification cost data, being A$2,500 per dwelling for low/moderate-risk buildings and A$20,000 per dwelling for high/extreme-risk buildings.</p>
<p>Secondly, we applied higher costs found in quotes and media reports. These are $15,000 per dwelling for low/moderate-risk buildings and A$60,000 per dwelling for high/extreme-risk buildings. These figures are still conservative, based on multiple sighted estimates approaching $100,000 per dwelling.</p>
<p>We have calculated costs for two scenarios for all 629 buildings identified by last October:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>an average of 75 dwellings per building as per MCC data</p></li>
<li><p>an average of 37 dwellings per building, 50% less than MCC data to account for a higher proportion of lower-density developments affected (<a href="https://www.planning.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/121724/Housing-outcomes-in-established-Melbourne.pdf">based on averages in municipalities</a> significantly affected by the crisis such as <a href="https://www.vba.vic.gov.au/cladding">Port Phillip, Stonington and Moreland</a>).</p></li>
</ol>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lacrosse-fire-ruling-sends-shudders-through-building-industry-consultants-and-governments-112777">Lacrosse fire ruling sends shudders through building industry consultants and governments</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>So how high could the bill be?</h2>
<p>Our estimates show Victorian owners who are known to be affected may conservatively face a rectification bill of A$250-$500 million, if industry and government work with them to cap costs in economies-of-scale solutions. The bill may be as high as A$1.6 billion, if an inefficient approach is used and we have a higher proportion of larger buildings affected.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277823/original/file-20190604-69095-1vb6vrk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277823/original/file-20190604-69095-1vb6vrk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277823/original/file-20190604-69095-1vb6vrk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=61&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277823/original/file-20190604-69095-1vb6vrk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=61&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277823/original/file-20190604-69095-1vb6vrk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=61&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277823/original/file-20190604-69095-1vb6vrk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=76&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277823/original/file-20190604-69095-1vb6vrk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=76&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277823/original/file-20190604-69095-1vb6vrk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=76&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>Cladding audits are ongoing. The number of identified affected properties is likely to rise. At the 2019 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLAWpz7v8cdutmOf_GDwtU3Gcs3CLQ5clb">Building Surveyors’ Conference</a>, the Victorian Building Authority appeared to categorise over 1,200 private Victorian buildings as moderately through to extreme risk for combustible cladding.</p>
<p>If this figure is correct, our cost estimates are conservative and will double. </p>
<p>Our estimates do not factor in the apartments yet to be identified or, more broadly, the issues in <a href="https://www.finance.nsw.gov.au/fire-safety-and-external-wall-cladding">other states</a> that have also been identified.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fires-expose-gaps-in-building-material-safety-checks-heres-a-solution-111073">Cladding fires expose gaps in building material safety checks. Here's a solution</a>
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<h2>Government and industry shun responsibility</h2>
<p>To date, the response of the Victorian government and industry has been to push financial responsibility back onto home owners. A Victorian low-interest loan scheme was launched in October allowing owners to repay amounts over ten years. It has been <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-16/combustible-cladding-risk-affects-thousands-but-few-fix-options/10804014">reported</a>, however, that no loans had been granted as recently as February.</p>
<p>The Victorian government’s <a href="https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/budgetfiles201920.budget.vic.gov.au/2019-20+State+Budget+-+Service+Delivery.pdf">May 27 budget papers</a> stated that A$160 million would be spent on the crisis “on public safety grounds”. This including ongoing assessments of private buildings affected by combustible cladding and 15 evaluation projects to manage and improve rectification outcomes.</p>
<p>As yet no funding has been provided to help owners of private dwellings who bought supposedly compliant properties. While <a href="https://www.sro.vic.gov.au/node/6514">billions in revenue is recouped from stamp duty</a>, owners are being told to rectify a problem for which they were not responsible – all at their own cost. </p>
<p>Many owners simply will not be able to pay. Some individual bills sighted are as much as a quarter of the owner’s property value. On top of this, some insurance premiums have quadrupled.</p>
<p>At the vast costs we have estimated, and based on <a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fire-risks-have-been-known-for-years-lives-depend-on-acting-now-with-no-more-delays-111186">the chain of events leading to the cladding crisis</a> and the <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/business/consumer-affairs/victims-suffer-as-combustible-cladding-crisis-rages-on-20190402-p519yy.html">lack of support following</a>, is it reasonable that sole responsibility falls on owners to pay? And will such a move not lead to thousands of <a href="http://theconversation.com/lacrosse-fire-ruling-sends-shudders-through-building-industry-consultants-and-governments-112777">costly actions through the courts</a> as owners try to recoup costs?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/housing-with-buyer-protection-and-no-serious-faults-is-that-too-much-to-ask-of-builders-and-regulators-113115">Housing with buyer protection and no serious faults – is that too much to ask of builders and regulators?</a>
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<p>Government and industry should provide substantial financial support to owners to help them recover from mass <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/business/fear-over-highrise-tower-fire-risk-in-melbourne-20141203-11zgp7.html">failures of policy, regulatory policing and industry practice</a>. The UK government has <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/britain-to-spend-200-million-fixing-combustible-cladding-20190510-p51m2c.html">to the tune of £200 million</a> (A$364 million). It is time to support Australian owners in a billion-dollar crisis they were not responsible for creating.</p>
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<p><em>Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Phil Dwyer from <a href="http://www.builderscollective.org.au/">Builders Collective of Australia</a> for working with us on the modelling for this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118121/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Simon Lockrey owns property which was built with non-compliant cladding, even though it was signed off and sold as compliant.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Trivess Moore has received funding from various organisations including the Australian Research Council, Victorian Government and various industry partners.</span></em></p>Estimated costs for Victoria alone range from hundreds of millions to as much as $1.6 billion If work to rectify buildings fitted with combustible cladding isn’t well handled.Simon Lockrey, Senior Lecturer/ Research Fellow, RMIT UniversityTrivess Moore, Lecturer, RMIT UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1131152019-04-09T20:03:20Z2019-04-09T20:03:20ZHousing with buyer protection and no serious faults – is that too much to ask of builders and regulators?<p>Regulation of the Australian building industry is broken, according to the <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/data-and-publications/building-confidence-building-ministers-forum-expert-assessment">Shergold-Weir report</a> to the <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/regulation-and-standards/building-and-construction/building-ministers-forum">Building Ministers’ Forum</a> (BMF). </p>
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<p>[…] we have concluded that [the] nature and extent [of problems] are significant and concerning. The problems have led to diminishing public confidence that the building and construction industry can deliver compliant, safe buildings which will perform to the expected standards over the long term. </p>
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<p>You can say that again. </p>
<p>Just one of the issues identified in the report, combustible cladding, <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/hit-list-identifies-10000-potential-grenfellstyle-buildings/news-story/65aaf99088ead16bd3e0947a6e242770">could affect over 1,000 buildings across Australia</a>. An unknown proportion of these are tall (four storey and above) residential strata buildings. Fears of rectification costs are starting to have <a href="https://www.afr.com/real-estate/melbourne-apartment-buildings-face-extra-scrutiny-over-combustible-cladding-20190205-h1avoi">severe impacts on the apartment market</a>. </p>
<p>The cost of replacing combustible panels at the Lacrosse Apartments in Melbourne, which caught fire in 2014, will be <a href="https://theconversation.com/lacrosse-fire-ruling-sends-shudders-through-building-industry-consultants-and-governments-112777">at least A$5.7 million, plus A$6 million or so in consequential damages</a>. The total cost of replacing combustible panels across Australia is unknown at this point, but is likely to run to billions of dollars. </p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lacrosse-fire-ruling-sends-shudders-through-building-industry-consultants-and-governments-112777">Lacrosse fire ruling sends shudders through building industry consultants and governments</a>
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<p>The <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/data-and-publications/building-confidence-building-ministers-forum-expert-assessment">Shergold-Weir report</a> identifies a catalogue of other problems, including water leaks, structurally unsound roof construction and poorly constructed fire-resisting elements. Faults appear to be widespread. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://cityfutures.be.unsw.edu.au/documents/44/Governing_the_Compact_City_EXECUTIVE_SUMMARY.pdf">2012 study by UNSW City Futures</a> surveyed 1,020 strata owners across New South Wales and found 72% of respondents (85% in buildings built since 2000) knew of at least one significant defect in their complex. Fixing these problems will cost billions more. </p>
<p>Regulatory failures are not only “diminishing public confidence”, they have a direct impact on the hip pockets of many Australians who own a residential apartment. In short, building defects resulting from lax regulation are a multi-billion dollar disaster. </p>
<h2>How could authorities let this happen?</h2>
<p>A web of regulations and standards enacted by governments cover construction in Australia, but this regulation is centred on the <a href="https://ncc.abcb.gov.au/ncc-online/About">National Construction Code</a> (NCC). The <a href="https://www.abcb.gov.au/ABCB/The-Board">Australian Building Codes Board</a> (ABCB), a body controlled by the Building Ministers’ Forum, manages the NCC. The ABCB board comprises appointed representatives from the Commonwealth plus all the states and territories and a few industry groups. </p>
<p>It is such a complicated system that it is hard to identify any government, organisation or person that is directly responsible for its performance. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-has-a-new-national-construction-code-but-its-still-not-good-enough-113729">Australia has a new National Construction Code, but it's still not good enough</a>
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<p>The NCC is supposed to create “benefits to society that outweigh costs” but it appears the ABCB may have been more focused on the need to “consider the competitive effects of regulation” and “not be unnecessarily restrictive” (Introduction to NCC Volume 1).</p>
<p>The BMF’s <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/bmf-communique-8-february-2019.pdf">February 8 communique</a>, issued <em>after</em> the <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/bmf-communique-8-february-2019.pdf">fire in the Neo200 building</a> in Melbourne, is straight out of the Yes Minister playbook:</p>
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<p>Ministers agreed in principle to a national ban on the unsafe use of combustible ACPs (aluminium composite panels) in new construction, subject to a cost/benefit analysis being undertaken on the proposed ban, including impacts on the supply chain, potential impacts on the building industry, any unintended consequences, and a proposed timeline for implementation. Ministers will further consider this at their next meeting [in May this year].</p>
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<p>This suggests the ministers are more concerned about possible impacts on the panel suppliers and the building industry than the consumer. The earliest a ban can take effect is in May. In the meantime, anecdotal evidence suggests buildings are still being clad in combustible ACP.</p>
<p>Thanks to the journalist Michael Bleby, we know <a href="https://www.afr.com/real-estate/governments-failed-to-act-on-warnings-of-combustible-cladding-dangers-20190226-h1br6n">governments and the ABCB failed to act in 2010</a> when presented with evidence that combustible ACP was not only a danger, but was also being widely used on tall residential buildings. </p>
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<p>Bleby quoted ABCB general manager Neil Savery as saying neither his organisation, nor any of the states, was aware that builders were using the product incorrectly.</p>
<p>We also know that panel manufacturers, including the Australian supplier of Alucobond, actively lobbied building ministers. At the July 2011 BMF meeting, the ACT representative effectively vetoed an ABCB proposal to issue an advisory note on the use of combustible ACP. </p>
<p>We are entitled to ask why the ABCB and its staff, or the downstream regulators and their staff, did not know about serious fire problems with ACP that the technical press <a href="http://www.cookeonfire.com/pdfs/eurisolgreenreport.pdf">identified as long ago as 2000</a>.
The answer will be of particular interest to residents of tall apartment buildings clad in these panels, all of whom are now living with an active threat to their safety. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fire-risks-have-been-known-for-years-lives-depend-on-acting-now-with-no-more-delays-111186">Cladding fire risks have been known for years. Lives depend on acting now, with no more delays</a>
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<h2>Consumers are owed better protection</h2>
<p>While both Labor and Coalition governments have worked to improve consumer protection for people buying consumer goods, their record on housing, particularly apartments, is awful. While a consumer can be reasonably sure of getting restitution if they buy a faulty fridge, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/business/consumer-affairs/victims-suffer-as-combustible-cladding-crisis-rages-on-20190402-p519yy.html">no such certainty exists if they buy a faulty house or apartment</a>. </p>
<p>At the moment, the NCC does not have any focus on providing protection for buyers of houses or apartments. There are few requirements for the durability of components and astonishingly weak requirements for waterproofing. Under the NCC and its attached Australian Standards, particularly AS 4654.1 and 2-2012, a waterproof membrane could last, in practice, five minutes or 50 years. </p>
<p>Given the magnitude of the economic loss, it would be appropriate for the BMF and ABCB board to publicly admit they have failed. Since their appointments in November 2017 and January 2013 respectively, neither ABCB chair John Fahey nor Savery as general manager has remedied the situation. The Shergold-Weir report has not been implemented and the combustible cladding issues remain unresolved. It would be reasonable for Fahey to step down and for Savery to consider his future. </p>
<p>The next federal government should consider what further action should be taken, particularly in relation to individuals on the BMF and within the ABCB involved in the 2010-2011 decision not to issue the proposed advisory note on the use of ACP. Since the ABCB does not publish minutes and none of its deliberations are in the public domain no one knows what actually happened or who did what. </p>
<p>The new board should consider moving residential apartment buildings (Class 2 buildings in the NCC classification) from Volume 1 of the NCC to Volume 2, which controls detached and semi-detached housing. Volume 2 should then have as its overriding objective the protection of consumers. </p>
<p>The downstream regulators should focus on requiring builders to deliver residential buildings with no serious faults and providing simple mechanisms for redress if they don’t. </p>
<p>Surely this is not too much to ask. </p>
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<p><em>This article has been updated to correct a reference to NCC volumes 1 and 2 – the latter controls detached and semi-detached housing.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113115/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Geoff Hanmer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Years of regulatory failure are having direct impacts on the hip pockets of the many Australians who bought defective houses or apartments. It’s turning into a multibillion-dollar disaster.Geoff Hanmer, Adjunct Lecturer in Architecture, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1137292019-04-08T20:07:10Z2019-04-08T20:07:10ZAustralia has a new National Construction Code, but it’s still not good enough<p>After a three-year cycle of industry comment, review and revision, May 1 marks the adoption of a new <a href="https://ncc.abcb.gov.au/ncc-online/About">National Construction Code</a> (NCC). Overseen by the <a href="https://www.abcb.gov.au/ABCB/The-Board">Australian Building Codes Board</a> (ABCB), the code is the nation’s defining operational document of building regulatory provisions, standards and performance levels. Its <a href="https://ncc.abcb.gov.au/ncc-online/About">mission statement</a> is to provide the minimum necessary requirements for safety and health, amenity, accessibility and sustainability in the design, construction, performance and liveability of new buildings.</p>
<p>Some say the building industry is in <a href="https://www.thefifthestate.com.au/columns/spinifex/construction-crisis-no-minister-its-broken-try-an-iron-clad-mandated-warranty-instead/">deep crisis and broken</a>, that even our entire building regulatory system is not fit for purpose. Consider what has happened, <a href="https://www.afr.com/real-estate/what-are-australias-other-defective-towers-aside-from-sydneys-opal-tower-20190102-h19n02">particularly in residential construction</a>. We have had buildings <a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fire-risks-have-been-known-for-years-lives-depend-on-acting-now-with-no-more-delays-111186">burning</a>, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/biggest-shake-up-in-building-laws-in-our-state-s-history-follows-opal-tower-debacle-20190210-p50wtd.html">cracking</a>, windows exploding, <a href="https://www.propertyobserver.com.au/forward-planning/investment-strategy/property-news-and-insights/83308-vue-on-king-william-adelaide-cbd-owners-hot-under-the-collar.html">rooms with intolerable heat stress</a>, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-23/opal-tower-residents-face-long-wait-for-repair-work/10842504">rendered unfit for occupation</a> without <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/feb/12/it-could-take-two-years-to-replace-flammable-cladding-in-melbourne-says-building-authority">costly remedial action</a>, class <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-09-08/residents-furious-builder-sued-combustible-cladding/10214570">actions against developers</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/lacrosse-fire-ruling-sends-shudders-through-building-industry-consultants-and-governments-112777">multi-million-dollar court judgments</a> against consultants and builders. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/beyond-opal-a-10-point-plan-to-fix-the-residential-building-industry-110975">Beyond Opal: a 10-point plan to fix the residential building industry</a>
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<p>What have reforms to the old Building Code of Australia (BCA), now the NCC, delivered? Is the new code good enough? </p>
<p>Well, how do you measure performance? We should think in terms of lives saved, <a href="https://theconversation.com/health-check-how-can-extreme-heat-lead-to-death-91480">heat stroke</a> minimised, costly remedial works avoided, <a href="https://theconversation.com/too-hot-to-sleep-heres-why-11492">less sleep deprivation</a> and climate-induced respiratory issues, <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-cant-just-leave-it-to-the-ndis-to-create-cities-that-work-to-include-people-with-disability-93419">disability access</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/sustainable-housings-expensive-right-not-when-you-look-at-the-whole-equation-60056">less bill shock for the vulnerable</a>, and housing that is built to allow <a href="https://theconversation.com/for-australians-to-have-the-choice-of-growing-old-at-home-here-is-what-needs-to-change-91488">ageing in place</a>. </p>
<h2>Safety and amenity</h2>
<p>Widespread use of non-compliant building materials, and specifically combustible cladding, has been foremost in the minds of regulators. Three years ago, after the <a href="https://www.melbourne.vic.gov.au/sitecollectiondocuments/mbs-report-lacrosse-fire.pdf">Lacrosse fire in Melbourne Docklands</a>, the ABCB amended the existing code. This crucial revision has been <a href="https://www.abcb.gov.au/Resources/Publications/Education-Training/Fire-performance-of-external-walls-and-cladding">carried forward into the new code</a>.</p>
<p>Individually, states have acted on the findings of a <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Non-conforming45th/Report">Senate inquiry</a> into this area. Last October, for example, Queensland enacted the <a href="http://www.hpw.qld.gov.au/construction/BuildingPlumbing/Building/Pages/NonConformingBuildingProducts.aspx">Building and other Legislation (Cladding) Amendment Regulation 2018</a>.</p>
<p>Investigations into the highly publicised, structurally unsound Opal tower in Sydney found the design – namely the connections between the beams and the columns on level 10 and level 4, the two floors with significant damage — indicated “<a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-01-16/opal-tower-investigation-what-the-report-actually-says/10717830">factors of safety lower than required by standards</a>”.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Opal Tower report finds “construction issues”.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Just two months ago when the new code was released in preview form, we learnt that a significant number of approved CodeMarks used to certify compliance for a range of building materials are under recall. The Australian Institute of Building Surveyors <a href="https://aibs.com.au/Public/News/2019/20190220_CodeMark_Certificates_Withdrawn.aspx">posted urgent advice</a>: “We are in the process of making enquiries with the ABCB and Building Ministers to find out when they were made aware that these certificates were withdrawn and what the implications for members will be […] and owners of properties that have been constructed using these products.”</p>
<p>Fire safety concerns are driving changes in the code. The new NCC has extended the provision of fire sprinklers to lower-rise residential buildings, generally 4-8 storeys. However, non-sprinkler protection is still permitted where other fire safety measures meet the deemed minimum acceptable standard. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lacrosse-fire-ruling-sends-shudders-through-building-industry-consultants-and-governments-112777">Lacrosse fire ruling sends shudders through building industry consultants and governments</a>
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<h2>Comfort and health</h2>
<p>The code includes new heating and cooling load limits. However, requirements for overall residential energy efficiency have not been increased. The 6-star minimum introduced in the 2010 NCC remains. </p>
<p>The code has just begun to respond to the problem of dwellings that are being constructed to comply but which <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27432732">perform very poorly in the peaks of summer</a> and winter and <a href="http://www.thrive-research.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Living-Well-Report-Final-for-issue-080317.pdf">against international minimum standards</a>. The change in the code deals with only the very worst houses – no more than 5% of designs with the highest heating loads and 5% with the highest cooling loads.</p>
<p>It’s a concern that the climate files used to assess housing thermal performance use 40-year-old BOM data. Off the back of record hot and dry summers, readers in such places as Adelaide and Perth might be surprised to learn the ABCB designates their climate as “<a href="https://www.abcb.gov.au/Resources/Publications/Education-Training/Energy-Efficiency-NCC-Volume-Two">the mildest region</a>”.</p>
<p>For well over a decade my colleagues and I have researched thermal performance, comfort and health and improvements by regulation. Our <a href="http://anzasca.net/paper/investigating-equivalence-in-compliance-pathways-to-australian-housing-energy-efficiency/">recent paper</a>, based on a small <a href="http://www.nathers.gov.au/newsletters/issue-2-june-2016/nathers-news">sample of South Australian houses built between 2013 and 2016</a>, demonstrated what has been discussed anecdotally in hushed voices across the industry, that a building can <a href="http://anzasca.net/paper/investigating-equivalence-in-compliance-pathways-to-australian-housing-energy-efficiency/">fail minimum standards using one particular compliance option yet pass as compliant using a different pathway</a>. </p>
<p>A building that is not six stars can be built under the new code. In fact, it may have no stars! </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/construction-industry-loophole-leaves-home-buyers-facing-higher-energy-bills-82378">Construction industry loophole leaves home buyers facing higher energy bills</a>
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<p>Lamentably, there has been no national evidenced-based evaluation (let alone international comparison) of the measured effectiveness of the 6-star standard. CSIRO did carry out a <a href="https://publications.csiro.au/rpr/pub?pid=csiro:EP1312595">limited evaluation</a> of the older 5-star standard (dating back to 2005). An <a href="https://www.abcb.gov.au/Resources/Publications/Consultation/Energy-Action-Modelling-and-Sensitivity-Analysis">evaluation for commercial buildings</a> is available from the ABCB website. </p>
<h2>Accessibility and liveability</h2>
<p>Volume 2 of the NCC covers housing and here it is business as usual, although the ABCB has released an <a href="https://www.abcb.gov.au/Resources/Publications/Consultation/Accessible-Housing-Options-Paper">options paper</a> on proposals that might be part of future codes. Accessible housing <a href="https://www.abcb.gov.au/Initiatives/All/Accessible-Housing">is treated as a discrete project</a>. Advocates for code changes in this area, such as the <a href="https://anuhd.org/">Australian Network for Universal Housing Design</a> (ANUHD), have written to the ABCB expressing disappointment.</p>
<p>A Regulation Impact Assessment on the costs and benefits of applying a minimum accessibility standard to all new housing has yet to see the light of day. </p>
<p>These proposals or “options” talk of silver and gold levels of design (there is no third-prize bronze option for liveable housing). Codes of good practice in accessible design have for decades recommended such measures.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australias-housing-standards-are-failing-its-ageing-population-51460">Australia's housing standards are failing its ageing population</a>
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<h2>It’s all about performance</h2>
<p>Some argue that deep-seated problems have developed from a code that favours innovation and cost reduction over consumer protection. There is a cloud over the industry and over some provisions – or should we say safeguards and compliance? </p>
<p>Safety should not be a matter of good luck or depend on an accidental selection of a particular building material or system. New buildings born of this new code are hardly likely to differ measurably from their troublesome older siblings. The anxiety for insurers, regulators and building owners continues.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fires-expose-gaps-in-building-material-safety-checks-heres-a-solution-111073">Cladding fires expose gaps in building material safety checks. Here's a solution</a>
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<p>The National Construction Code adopts a performance-based approach to building regulation, but don’t expect the sales consultant to know the <a href="http://www.yourhome.gov.au/passive-design/glazing">U-value</a> of the windows, whether the doors are hung to allow for disabled access, or if the cleat on your tie beam is to Australian standards. </p>
<p>Anyone can propose changes to the NCC. The form is on the website. Consultants will be hired to model costs and benefits. </p>
<p>Regulatory reforms introduced through the ABCB over the past 20 years have produced an <a href="http://www.thecie.com.au/?page_id=379">estimated annual national economic benefit of A$1.1 billion</a>. That’s a lot of money! The owners of failing residential buildings could do with some of that cash to cover losses and legal fees.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113729/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Timothy O'Leary has received past funding from the Australian Research Council and the State Government of South Australia for research in housing energy performance, energy disclosure and housing lifetime affordability.
Dr O' Leary holds an unpaid position as a Program Advisory Group member of the Victorian Government, Residential Efficiency Scorecard and contributes in a non paid advisory role to the National Energy Efficient Buildings Project (NEPP), stakeholder reference group convened by the Australian Department of Environment and Energy.</span></em></p>Under the new code, buildings are hardly likely to differ measurably from their fault-ridden older siblings and can still fall short of a six-star rating. It’s possible they may have no stars!Timothy O'Leary, Lecturer in Construction and Property, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1127772019-03-04T19:03:13Z2019-03-04T19:03:13ZLacrosse fire ruling sends shudders through building industry consultants and governments<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261789/original/file-20190303-110140-1tsk03c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Flames spread rapidly up the external wall cladding at the Lacrosse building in Melbourne in November 2014. More than four years on, the combustible panels are still in use.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.mfb.vic.gov.au/media/docs/post_incident_analysis_for_lacrosse_docklands_-_25_11_2014%20-%20final-dd61c4b2-61f6-42ed-9411-803cc23e6acc-0.pdf">MFB</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the last day of summer for 2019, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) delivered a burst of sunshine to apartment owners at the high-rise Lacrosse building in the Melbourne Docklands precinct. Lacrosse suffered a serious cladding fire on November 24 2014, started by a single cigarette on a balcony. Last Thursday, Judge Ted Woodward <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-28/lacrosse-apartment-owners-win-5.7-million-cladding-fire-damages/10857060">ordered the owners be immediately paid A$5.7 million in damages</a>.</p>
<p>The judge also indicated that the owners would receive most of the balance of their A$12.7 million claim – including nearly A$6 million in calculated costs of compliance with building codes.</p>
<p>However, in our adversarial legal system, there are losers as well as winners. The losers in this case are the fire engineer, the certifier and the architects. </p>
<p>The builder, LU Simon, was ordered to pay more than A$5.7 million to apartment owners. However, the architect, fire engineer and building certifier who worked on the project would pay most of that to LU Simon after Judge Woodward found they had breached contractual obligations.</p>
<p>Fire engineer Thomas Nicholas was ordered to pay 39% of the damages, certifier Gardner Group 35% and architects Elenberg Fraser 25%. Incredibly, the builder, LU Simon, is a winner, assessed to pay only 3% of the damages. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fire-risks-have-been-known-for-years-lives-depend-on-acting-now-with-no-more-delays-111186">Cladding fire risks have been known for years. Lives depend on acting now, with no more delays</a>
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<p>So shocking is the <a href="https://www.vcat.vic.gov.au/resources/owners-corporation-no1-of-ps613436t-owners-corporation-no-2-of-ps613436t-owners">VCAT decision</a> to architects that the national president of the Australian Institute of Architects suggested in an email to members last Friday that they might need to seek counselling. </p>
<p>The decision reminds architects and other consultants that abiding by common practice is no defence if that practice is inadequate. Even though an architect may work for the builder and be employed on a limited commission during construction, they still bear primary responsibility for the safety of the building as the “lead consultant”. According to the decision, architects and consultants are required to exercise high standards of professional judgement and skill even if their commissioning arrangements and fees militate this. </p>
<h2>So is this a win for all owners?</h2>
<p>It looks like a cause for celebration by the owners. But is it?</p>
<p>Well, for a start, this decision has taken over four years to emerge. It may yet be the subject of an appeal. In the meantime, owners and residents have had to live in a building that is not safe, although work to replace the cladding should be complete by May. </p>
<p>Judge Woodward said the decision applies to the specific circumstances of Lacrosse only, so the owners of other buildings, including <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-04/spencer-street-apartment-fire-melbourne/10776018">Neo200, which was evacuated on February 4</a> after a similar fire, might not also be in the winner’s circle. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/dont-overlook-residents-role-in-apartment-building-safety-111255">Don't overlook residents' role in apartment building safety</a>
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<p>Fourteen of the Neo200 apartments are so badly damaged that <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/some-neo-200-residents-told-to-expect-year-long-wait-before-they-return-20190215-p50y26.html">rectification works could take up to a year to complete</a>. If Lacrosse is any indication, the Neo200 legal case might take until 2022 to conclude. </p>
<p>The Lacrosse case ran for 22 days, involved five QCs, five juniors and an army of instructing solicitors, paralegals and expert witnesses. There were 91 volumes of documents tendered as evidence. Legal costs almost certainly exceeded A$2 million, or more than 15% of the damages sought. </p>
<p>Around the country, based on state audits, I estimate around 1,000 buildings have combustible aluminium composite panels on their facades. If they all generate a court case half as complex as Lacrosse, the legal bills alone could total over A$1 billion. </p>
<h2>Government must also answer for deregulation</h2>
<p>Those who eased the regulatory framework in place in Australia since the late 1980s share culpability with the consultants for the fires at Lacrosse and Neo200. Until the early 1990s, Australian building codes prohibited the use of combustible elements on the facades of tall buildings. Throughout the 1990s, the then Building Code of Australia (now the <a href="https://ncc.abcb.gov.au/ncc-online/NCC">National Construction Code</a> or NCC) was relaxed to a “performance standard”, which allowed builders and consultants to believe aluminium composite panels and timber were permissible. </p>
<p>By 2000, despite plenty of evidence that these panels were combustible and therefore not suitable as facade material on tall buildings, the market for them continued to grow. The Australian Building Codes Board did nothing about this, encouraging a potentially fatal error. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fires-expose-gaps-in-building-material-safety-checks-heres-a-solution-111073">Cladding fires expose gaps in building material safety checks. Here's a solution</a>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The ABC reports on the hidden potential killer in Australian buildings following the Lacrosse fire.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So far, on the regulatory side, no one has actually owned up to a mistake. However, the Building Ministers’ Forum is considering the 24 recommendations of a <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/data-and-publications/building-ministers-forum-expert-assessment-building-confidence">report it commissioned</a> from Peter Shergold and Bronwyn Weir. New South Wales’ minister for innovation and better regulation, Matt Kean, has <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-12-30/opal-tower-damage-sparks-nsw-government-crackdown/10673968">promised to crack down on dodgy certifiers</a>. In the light of the cladding panel fiasco, he probably should be reviewing his own remit, which is based on the premise that less regulation is better. </p>
<p>The NCC has a goal to encourage innovation in building by allowing alternative solutions to “deemed to satisfy” provisions. Unfortunately, in the case of the cladding panels and other “innovations”, the cost savings may be only a tiny proportion of the costs of rectifying the problems. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/beyond-opal-a-10-point-plan-to-fix-the-residential-building-industry-110975">Beyond Opal: a 10-point plan to fix the residential building industry</a>
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<p>Penitent governments should ensure flammable cladding is replaced now, not next year and certainly not in five or six years’ time when another round of court cases are finally decided after appeal. Unless governments act to fix this mistake, one that they are substantially responsible for, someone is going to be killed in a cladding fire in Australia. </p>
<p>As Judith Hackitt, who headed the inquiry into the <a href="http://theconversation.com/grenfell-a-year-on-heres-what-we-know-went-wrong-98112">Grenfell Tower disaster</a>, said last week, a Grenfell-like event in Australia is “<a href="https://www.afr.com/real-estate/entirely-foreseeable-judith-hackitt-warns-of-grenfell-tragedy-in-australia-20190226-h1bqkw">entirely foreseeable</a>”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112777/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Geoff Hanmer is a member of the RAIA. ARINA had an association with Hayball, the Architects for Neo200 from 2013 to 2016. ARINA and Geoff Hanmer had no involvement in Hayball multi-unit residential projects during that time. </span></em></p>Architects, certifiers and engineers who work as consultants to builders are on notice about potential liability for the use of flammable cladding, but governments are also culpable for their actions.Geoff Hanmer, Adjunct Lecturer in Architecture, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1111862019-02-08T03:46:41Z2019-02-08T03:46:41ZCladding fire risks have been known for years. Lives depend on acting now, with no more delays<p>The <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/same-as-grenfell-tower-cladding-fears-as-fire-rips-through-melbourne-cbd-apartment-building-20190204-p50vgl.html">fire at the Neo200 building</a> on Spencer Street in the Melbourne CBD this week has eerie similarities to the <a href="http://theconversation.com/grenfell-a-year-on-heres-what-we-know-went-wrong-98112">Grenfell Tower disaster</a>. Fortunately, instead of 72 people dead as at Grenfell, only one person was hospitalised for smoke inhalation. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fires-expose-gaps-in-building-material-safety-checks-heres-a-solution-111073">Cladding fires expose gaps in building material safety checks. Here's a solution</a>
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<p>Nevertheless, the building industry has responded straight from the Grenfell song sheet. Rydon, the main contractor for the Grenfell Tower cladding, <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/meridian/update/2017-06-15/statement-from-rydon-after-public-inquiry-announcement/">said</a> the work:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… met all required building regulations – as well as fire regulation and Health & Safety standards – and handover took place when the completion notice was issued by Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea building control.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Rydon chief executive Robert Bond <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/15/experts-warned-government-against-cladding-material-used-on-grenfell">said</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I will do all I can to assist in this investigation in order to establish what caused this tragedy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Neo 200 architect, Hayball, <a href="https://architectureau.com/articles/cladding-back-in-the-spotlight-after-melbourne-apartment-tower-blaze/">stated</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Neo 200 achieved certification and approval from the building certifier and relevant authorities at the time. We welcome the opportunity to support any investigation into the incident by authorities.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This appears to be the property sector’s version of “thoughts and prayers”. We’re very sorry, but there’s nothing we can do. </p>
<p>Sadly, this is far from the truth. We have known of the risk for years and the problem can be rectified. </p>
<p>Governments must act to ensure the cladding identified as a fire risk on hundreds of buildings is replaced. Further delay in fixing an identified threat to life is unacceptable. </p>
<p>Before the Grenfell and Neo200 fires, Melbourne had a cladding fire at the <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/politics/victoria/docklands-owners-sue-for-24m-over-fire-as-date-to-fix-cladding-looms-20180909-p502pc.html">Lacrosse building</a> in 2014. This led to an <a href="https://www.vba.vic.gov.au/media/latest-news/article/2016/vba-releases-external-wall-cladding-audit-report">audit of external wall cladding</a> on buildings by the Victorian Building Authority. </p>
<p>Following the Grenfell fire, states conducted further audits. In October 2018, an <a href="https://www.planning.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0029/394733/VCT-Taskforce-Update-October-2018.pdf">update</a> by the <a href="https://www.vba.vic.gov.au/cladding/victorian-cladding-taskforce">Victorian Cladding Taskforce</a> stated: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Our investigations found dangerous materials are widely used on buildings throughout Victoria, a finding that is consistent with inquiries carried out interstate and internationally.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>We now know that hundreds of residential buildings are rated as either a moderate or high risk by the New South Wales and Victorian governments. Over 350 buildings in Melbourne alone are rated “high risk”. Neo200 was regarded as only a “moderate risk”. </p>
<p>Residential buildings are particularly vulnerable to the effects of a cladding fire because people can be asleep and windows are often left open. The amount of smoke generated by the recent Neo200 fire is frightening.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Combustible cladding allowed the fire to spread rapidly up the Neo200 building.</span></figcaption>
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<p>In the UK, the central government has given local authorities the power to replace risky cladding. We should do the same here. </p>
<p>Governments should take rectification out of the hands of dithering strata committees and, if necessary, carry out the necessary work directly and recover the costs from the responsible parties.</p>
<h2>How did we get to this point?</h2>
<p>Polyethylene-cored aluminium sandwich panels – often referred to as aluminium composite panels (ACP), PE or PU panels – were <a href="https://alucobond.com/company#history">developed 50 years ago</a>, patented in 1971 and marketed as Alucobond. When the patent expired in 1991 other manufacturers entered the market, including products marketed as Reynobond (originally Reynolds Aluminium) and Alpolic (Mitsubishi Chemicals). Now, it is estimated over 200 manufacturers around the world produce ACP panels. </p>
<p>By the 1990s, ACP was gaining a level of acceptance in the Australasian construction market. This was aided by the introduction of performance requirements to replace a previous blanket ban on combustible materials being used on tall building facades. The timing of the relaxation of the Building Code of Australia and the introduction of ACP panels to the Australian market by multinational companies could be a coincidence. </p>
<p>By the end of the 1990s, there was growing evidence that the performance-based approach to facade fire protection was not working. Combustible cored sandwich panels were implicated as contributors to serious injuries and death. A notable example was a <a href="https://www.ife.org.uk/Firefighter-Safety-Incidents/sun-valley-1993/34014">1993 fire in the Sun Valley food-processing factory in Hereford</a> in which two firefighters died. In 1997, the <a href="https://www.architectsjournal.co.uk/home/burning-issues/181812.article">Museum of New Zealand (Te Papa) experienced a cladding fire</a> during construction. </p>
<p>The general and technical press, including architectural magazines with wide circulation, reported cladding fires in various types of materials, including ACP. </p>
<h2>What can be done to reduce the risk?</h2>
<p>Clearly, a facade fire has serious consequences. The bedrock of all modern fire regulations is that a fire in a tall building must be confined to a single storey. A fire spreading from one floor to the next completely undermines all the elements of protection and control that make egress routes and firefighting viable. </p>
<p>As we saw at Grenfell, a fire that spreads up the facade and involves nearly every storey in the building can’t be brought under control. </p>
<p>By 2000, there was widespread concern among fire professionals and some regulators that ACP was a bomb waiting to go off. A <a href="http://www.cookeonfire.com/pdfs/eurisolgreenreport.pdf">paper by Dr Gordon Cooke</a> clearly outlined the risks. It makes chilling reading in the light of the Grenfell disaster. </p>
<p>Luckily, most tall residential buildings in Australia with combustible ACP cladding have internal sprinkler systems – unlike Grenfell. We might also be able to buy some time by banning barbecues and smoking on balconies, but it is doubtful this will be 100% effective. Another possibility is to physically secure balcony doors shut, but many owners and tenants might strongly resist this draconian measure. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/dont-overlook-residents-role-in-apartment-building-safety-111255">Don't overlook residents' role in apartment building safety</a>
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<p>These measures still will not eliminate the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/breakfast/victorian-government-refuses-to-publicly-identify/10780228">risk of arson highlighted by the Victorian government</a>. </p>
<p>As the Neo200 fire demonstrates, even a moderate risk is still quite risky. It is extraordinary that a fire allegedly lit by a single smouldering cigarette could spread so quickly across seven floors and generate so much potentially deadly smoke. </p>
<p>An urgent cladding replacement program certainly has its challenges. A campaign that involves working on several hundred buildings at once in Melbourne and Sydney might overload the industry. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the situation has been created by a lack of action by governments. Only decisive government action can rectify it. No more “thoughts and prayers”, enquiries or investigations; just replace the cladding now.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111186/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>ARINA had an association with Hayball Architects for four years to 2016. ARINA had no involvement with the residential component of the practice. </span></em></p>The risks of combustible cladding on high-rise buildings have long been known. And audits have identified hundreds of Australian buildings with this cladding. Delay in replacing it is inexcusable.Geoff Hanmer, Adjunct Lecturer in Architecture, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1112552019-02-07T19:10:04Z2019-02-07T19:10:04ZDon’t overlook residents’ role in apartment building safety<p>For many of us, the reality of Australian homes now sits many storeys up in the sky. <a href="https://theconversation.com/higher-density-and-diversity-apartments-are-australia-at-its-most-multicultural-97176">High-rise apartment buildings have sprouted across the nation’s cities</a>. In recent weeks – <a href="https://theconversation.com/there-are-lessons-to-be-drawn-from-the-cracks-that-appeared-in-sydneys-opal-tower-but-they-extend-beyond-building-certification-109428">on Christmas Eve at the Opal Tower building in Sydney</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/feb/04/apartment-fire-in-melbournes-spencer-street-prompts-new-fears-over-cladding">on February 4 at the Neo200 Building in Melbourne</a> – that reality has turned into the nightmare for hundreds of residents of being turned out of their homes with little more than the clothes they were wearing.</p>
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<p><em><strong>Read more:</strong> <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-big-lesson-from-opal-tower-is-that-badly-built-apartments-arent-only-an-issue-for-residents-109722">The big lesson from Opal Tower is that badly built apartments aren’t only an issue for residents</a></em></p>
<p><em><strong>Read more:</strong> <a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fires-expose-gaps-in-building-material-safety-checks-heres-a-solution-111073">Cladding fires expose gaps in building material safety checks. Here’s a solution</a></em></p>
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<p>The Opal Tower evacuation was <a href="https://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/-/media/Files/DPE/Reports/Opal-Tower-Investigation-Draft-Interim-Report-2019-01-15.pdf">due to structural cracking</a>. At Neo200, a fire raced up the building, <a href="https://www.afr.com/real-estate/combustible-cladding-main-contributor-to-melbournes-spencer-st-tower-fire-20190204-h1atix">fuelled by flammable cladding</a> on part of its facade. </p>
<p>The rapid spread of the fire, and <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/cbd-tower-residents-forced-out-of-apartments-after-blaze-20190204-p50vlt.html">its apparent origin in a smouldering cigarette on the balcony</a>, was eerily reminiscent of the <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/politics/victoria/docklands-owners-sue-for-24m-over-fire-as-date-to-fix-cladding-looms-20180909-p502pc.html">Lacrosse building fire</a> in Melbourne in 2014. It also brings to mind the Grenfell Tower inferno in London (probably <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-40301289">originating in a small electrical fire</a>). This catastrophe took the lives of 72 people and devastated the lives of many more.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/grenfell-a-year-on-heres-what-we-know-went-wrong-98112">Grenfell: a year on, here's what we know went wrong</a>
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<p>Media reports of the Neo200 fire included two concerning aspects:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/extra-fire-alarms-put-in-a-fortnight-before-blaze-ripped-through-tower-20190204-p50vjt.html">tenants had been unaware</a> the building was partially covered in combustible cladding</p></li>
<li><p><a href="http://www.mfb.vic.gov.au/Media/docs/Post_Incident_Analysis_for_Lacrosse_Docklands_-_25_11_2014%20-%20FINAL-dd61c4b2-61f6-42ed-9411-803cc23e6acc-0.PDF">as the Metropolitan Fire Brigade found at Lacrosse</a>, <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/same-as-grenfell-tower-cladding-fears-as-fire-rips-through-melbourne-cbd-apartment-building-20190204-p50vgl.html">smoke detectors had been covered</a>, rendering them inoperable.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Such behaviours and lack of knowledge compromise critical safety-related equipment. This represents both a challenge to, and reinforcement of, the critical role of residents in ensuring high-rise buildings are safe. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/707785/Building_a_Safer_Future_-_web.pdf">final report</a> of the post-Grenfell “Building a Safer Future” review for the UK government, Dame Judith Hackitt observed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Residents need to be safe, and feel safe, in their homes … they also have a responsibility towards their fellow residents to ensure that their actions do not compromise the safety of the building. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Six elements of residential building safety</h2>
<p>The Hackitt Review joins a raft of reports that have influenced ongoing reform of residential construction regulations. In Victoria, notable recent contributions include the Auditor-General’s <a href="https://www.audit.vic.gov.au/report/victorias-consumer-protection-framework-building-construction">2015 report</a> on the consumer protection framework, and <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/July%202018/document/pdf/building_ministers_forum_expert_assessment_-_building_confidence.pdf">Shergold and Weir’s 2018 report</a> for the Building Ministers’ Forum.</p>
<p>There is significant agreement between these reviews. Their vision for an effective regulatory scheme can be distilled into six elements, which need to interact holistically:</p>
<ol>
<li><p><strong>Information:</strong> all parties who have an influence on occupant safety need sufficient information about the risks in the building to make decisions consistent with protecting occupant safety.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Responsibility:</strong> while the “buck stops” with an adequately resourced regulator, all parties in the residential construction supply chain need to discharge clearly expressed, risk-based and complementary responsibilities.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Standards:</strong> people with appropriate expertise (for example, about how building materials interact) should set standards to be enforced throughout the supply chain.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Competence:</strong> where work requires particular skills and experience, only people who have these should do it.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Quality assurance:</strong> inspection regimes need to provide a robust “last line of defence” to catch defects before they threaten occupants’ safety.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Rectification:</strong> recognising that litigation is slow and expensive, dispute avoidance processes and insurance should expedite rectification.</p></li>
</ol>
<p>The Victorian regulatory regime for residential construction mainly comprises the <a href="http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/domino/Web_Notes/LDMS/LTObject_Store/ltobjst10.nsf/DDE300B846EED9C7CA257616000A3571/FF534BFE5E1FF524CA2583150019BDAF/%24FILE/93-126a117.docx">Building Act 1993</a>, its recently updated <a href="http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/Domino/Web_Notes/LDMS/PubLawToday.nsf/b12e276826f7c27fca256de50022686b/d6ce1ed4cf4cae14ca25833000014a82!OpenDocument">regulations</a>, the <a href="https://ncc.abcb.gov.au/ncc-online/NCC">National Construction Code</a> which underpins those regulations, and the <a href="http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/Domino/Web_Notes/LDMS/LTObject_Store/LTObjSt10.nsf/DDE300B846EED9C7CA257616000A3571/513B8F096A77B1A7CA2583300080DA1F/%24FILE/95-91a084.docx">Domestic Building Contracts Act 1995</a>. Justifiably, much of the recent reform focus has been on the role of the regulator under element 2 – the Victorian Ombudsman’s <a href="https://www.ombudsman.vic.gov.au/Publications/Parliamentary-Reports/Own-motion-investigation-into-the-governance-and-a">2012 report</a> led to the Victorian Building Authority replacing the Victorian Building Commission – and elements 3-6. Contributors to The Conversation have, for example, noted:</p>
<ul>
<li>the difficulties of <a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fires-expose-gaps-in-building-material-safety-checks-heres-a-solution-111073">tracking compliant products throughout globalised supply chains</a> (element 3), and how technology can help overcome these challenges</li>
<li>the importance of enforcing competence (element 4) in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/beyond-opal-a-10-point-plan-to-fix-the-residential-building-industry-110975">ten-point plan to fix the residential building industry</a></li>
<li>scapegoating <a href="https://theconversation.com/there-are-lessons-to-be-drawn-from-the-cracks-that-appeared-in-sydneys-opal-tower-but-they-extend-beyond-building-certification-109428">private building inspectors</a> (element 5), as happened after the Opal evacuation, attacks a symptom of the disease, rather than the inherent tension between cost and quality in residential construction.</li>
</ul>
<p>The regulatory response on each of these four elements remains a matter for ongoing debate. This is justified given that the performance-based nature of most standards-setting results in increased competence requirements.</p>
<h2>What about the role of residents?</h2>
<p>The Neo200 experience highlights, however, that the role of residents can be underestimated. In particular, where regulatory elements 1 and 2 refer to “parties”, this very much includes dwelling occupants and others who enter these buildings. It also includes the designers, builders and other construction professionals who are the primary concern of elements 3-6.</p>
<p>Given the diverse ways in which people visit, live or work in high-rise buildings, it will always be a challenge to devise ways to make sure occupants:</p>
<ul>
<li>have enough information to understand the risks of being in such buildings (whether or not there is combustible cladding)</li>
<li>act in ways that reflect their responsibility to keep themselves and their fellow residents safe. </li>
</ul>
<p>As recent moves in Victoria to <a href="https://www.vba.vic.gov.au/consumers/swimming-pools/information-for-consumers-who-have-an-existing-pool-or-spa">register and inspect backyard pools and spas</a> arguably demonstrate, there seems to be robust community support for intruding into people’s homes where the safety risk is seen as high. Is it time, therefore, to mandate airline-style safety briefings in apartments, regular inspections of apartments to make sure smoke detectors are working, and other similar interventions? Certainly, a recognition of occupants as active stakeholders would suggest such measures are appropriate in pursuit of a deeply held community goal of dwelling safety.</p>
<p>As a society, though, are we ready for such state-based assaults on our homes – upon what the Kerrigans regarded as their “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0118826/">castle</a>”? Time will tell. In the meantime, the residents of the Neo200 building – like those at the Opal building before them – are left searching for alternative accommodation, and for answers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111255/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Bell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As more and more Australians live and work in high-rise buildings, their responsibilities and roles in ensuring all occupants’ safety must not be neglected.Matthew Bell, Senior Lecturer and Co-Director of Studies for Construction Law, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1110732019-02-05T01:28:17Z2019-02-05T01:28:17ZCladding fires expose gaps in building material safety checks. Here’s a solution<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257129/original/file-20190204-86236-b3h0zk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The fire in the Melbourne CBD on Monday was a reminder of the urgency of developing a system that guarantees only materials that meet building safety standards are used. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://twitter.com/bekahjaynex">Bekah Jane/Twitter</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/same-as-grenfell-tower-cladding-fears-as-fire-rips-through-melbourne-cbd-apartment-building-20190204-p50vgl.html">fire at the Neo 200 apartment building</a> in Spencer Street, Melbourne, on Monday highlighted the risk to human safety from flammable cladding and other non-conforming building products. Building quality and safety are compromised when there is no transparency about the products used. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://vimeo.com/314639721">experimental research project</a> suggests a solution that uses sensor technology and artificial intelligence. Finding such a solution to ensure unsafe and substandard products are detected and prevented from being used in buildings is critical, given the scale of the problem in Australia. </p>
<p>In 2014, a <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/politics/victoria/docklands-owners-sue-for-24m-over-fire-as-date-to-fix-cladding-looms-20180909-p502pc.html">similar cladding fire</a> spread across multiple levels of the Lacrosse Tower in Melbourne’s Docklands. This led to an initial audit by the Victorian Building Authority. </p>
<p>In 2017, after 72 people died in the Grenfell cladding fire in London, the <a href="https://www.vba.vic.gov.au/cladding/victorian-cladding-taskforce">Victorian Cladding Taskforce</a> conducted another audit. It found at least 1,400 buildings contained cladding that was non-conforming to Australian standards and/or non-compliant with government safety regulations. Its <a href="https://www.planning.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/90412/Victorian-Cladding-Taskforce-Interim-Report-November-2017.pdf">interim report</a> concluded:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Victorian Cladding Taskforce has found systems failures have led to major safety risks and widespread non-compliant use of combustible cladding in the building industry across the state.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/grenfell-a-year-on-heres-what-we-know-went-wrong-98112">Grenfell: a year on, here's what we know went wrong</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>How could this happen?</h2>
<p>The taskforce noted 12 reasons for non-compliant use of cladding. From a systems perspective, these can be categorised as:</p>
<ol>
<li> incentive to substitute products driven by cost</li>
<li> no reliable means of independently verifying product certification </li>
<li> product labelling cannot be verified to detect fraudulent or misleading information</li>
<li> products cannot reliably be verified as being the same as those approved (and used)</li>
<li> on-site inspections are unreliable or do not take place.</li>
</ol>
<p>Essentially, the taskforce identified a problem with the system of verifying products’ conformance to standards and compliance with government regulation.</p>
<p>Substandard products can be found across a range of materials used in the building sector. These include steel, copper, electrical products, glass, aluminium and engineered wood. For example, the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Non-conforming45th">Senate inquiry into non-conforming products</a> found:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The ACCC [Australian Competition and Consumer Commission] advised that electrical retailers and wholesalers have recalled Infinity and Olsent-branded electrical cables, warning that ‘physical contact with the recalled cables could dislodge the insulation and lead to electric shock or fires’. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The taskforce estimated over 22,000 homes were affected. It estimated the cost of the recall and replacement at A$80 million.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/reach-for-the-sky-why-safety-must-rule-as-tall-buildings-aim-higher-83223">Reach for the sky: why safety must rule as tall buildings aim higher</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>So how can technology help?</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257125/original/file-20190204-86198-vmjrnp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257125/original/file-20190204-86198-vmjrnp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257125/original/file-20190204-86198-vmjrnp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=654&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257125/original/file-20190204-86198-vmjrnp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=654&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257125/original/file-20190204-86198-vmjrnp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=654&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257125/original/file-20190204-86198-vmjrnp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=822&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257125/original/file-20190204-86198-vmjrnp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=822&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257125/original/file-20190204-86198-vmjrnp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=822&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A QR code can tell you about this bottle of Chianti and, by matching against supply chain data, can be used to verify that the wine is genuine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:%2213_QR_CODE_ITA_LANG_-_Chianti_DOGC_wine_bottle_code_scan_smartphone_-_qr_code_steps.png">Andrea Pavanello, Milano/WIkimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Similar problems have existed in other industries. In the wine export industry, sensor technology has been used to detect fraudulent products in our biggest market, China. This involves scanning <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QR_code">QR codes</a> on bottle labels to identify the manufacturer, the batch and other product details that authenticate wine products. </p>
<p>Scanning technology, involving complex data-matching across different data platforms, is used daily – when we use credit cards, for example. The building industry has embraced some excellent systems to collect data of importance such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Building_information_modeling">building information modelling</a> (BIM). However, BIM does not verify authenticity of products. </p>
<p>In the the case of flammable cladding, data verification to solve the use of non-conforming products is housed across a number of authorities, manufacturers and industry associations. Collaboration is needed to design a system to solve the problem. The data should be collected and stored in a manner that enables secure access by a digital verification system.</p>
<h2>What features does the system need to have?</h2>
<p>Our research focus has been on designing a system based on criteria informed by industry innovators and stakeholders. The system must be able to:</p>
<ol>
<li> collect and match product data in real time</li>
<li> verify non-conforming and non-compliant products in real time</li>
<li> maintain integrity of labelling </li>
<li> store data securely so all stakeholders can verify the status of the building, including architects, builders, site managers, inspectors, owners, investors, insurers and financiers</li>
<li> trace data (and composition) throughout the product life-cycle, to predict maintenance, recovery and repurposing.</li>
</ol>
<p>The system we suggest uses two elements, sensor technology and artificial intelligence, to do all this. </p>
<figure>
<iframe src="https://player.vimeo.com/video/314639721" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" webkitallowfullscreen="" mozallowfullscreen="" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Technology to solve the problem of tracking and validating building product safety is being developed.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How does the system work?</h2>
<p>A mobile app that can scan QR codes or “building material passports” is being developed in Europe. The label will hold relevant compliance data of the assembled product and its component parts. This includes building code compliance, and relevant assessments and certifications. </p>
<p>The product’s QR code can be scanned at any time along the supply chain and throughout the life of the building. This then enables its status to be verified via data matching. </p>
<p>Linking to a platform that uses artificial intelligence (AI) solves the problem of ensuring compliance with government regulation. CSIRO Data 61 has developed an AI software tool that enables regulation to be coded using AI algorithms to accurately determine compliance. We are working with Data 61 to test Australian regulation and ensure transparency for all. </p>
<p>The solution is designed to plug into existing technology solutions, such as BIM and <a href="https://matrackinc.com/">Matrack</a>, to trace the movement of products along the supply chain and throughout the building’s life-cycle.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111073/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Usha Iyer-Raniga is Vice President, Education (ACTS). She is on advisory boards/committees such as the Property Council's Sustainability and Wellness Committee.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevin Argus does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Fortunately, no lives were lost in the latest cladding fire in Melbourne, but it’s a stark reminder of the urgent need to track and verify that building materials comply with safety standards.Kevin Argus, Lecturer, Marketing & Design Thinking, RMIT UniversityUsha Iyer-Raniga, Professor, School of Property, Construction and Project Management, RMIT UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.